(2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe reasoned amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch), has been selected.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The purpose of the Bill is to strengthen UK border security, which has been weakened and undermined in recent years; to restore order to the immigration and asylum systems, which were left in chaos; and to bring in new counter-terror-style powers for our law enforcement to go after the dangerous criminal gangs that undermine our border security, that profit from putting lives at risk and that have been getting away with it for far too long.
It is a Bill to strengthen leadership and accountability around our borders, putting the Border Security Command on the statute book, and to bring in tougher powers to tackle organised immigration crime, including pursuing those involved in supply chains, preparatory acts and seizing mobile phones. It is a Bill that allows us to take stronger action on those who put the lives of others at risk at sea, that will improve intelligence gathering and sharing, and that will restore order and control to the asylum system so that we can clear the backlog.
It is a Bill to deliver on our Labour manifesto commitment to bring in counter-terrorism-style powers to increase enforcement and returns. It is part of the programme to deliver what we set out before Christmas in the Government’s plan for change—rebuilding secure borders; restoring order, control and confidence to the immigration and asylum systems; and bringing legal and illegal migration down.
The Home Secretary may recall that, when she was on the Opposition Benches, I cautioned the then Conservative Government that the actions they were going to take to have a uniform immigration policy throughout the United Kingdom were unsustainable. More particularly, I warned during proceedings on the Illegal Migration Bill that it would conflict with the Windsor framework. They said I was wrong, but the High Court in Belfast has said that we were correct. She is taking steps today to repeal sections of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, so will she confirm, as Home Secretary of this United Kingdom, that our immigration policy will run throughout the entirety of this United Kingdom?
The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. I can assure him that our approach is for both immigration and asylum to apply right across the UK, recognising the importance of border security as part of that UK-wide approach.
Most people across the UK want strong border security and a properly controlled and managed asylum and immigration system, so that the UK does its bit, alongside other countries, to help those fleeing persecution, but also so that those with no right to be here are swiftly returned and the rules are respected and enforced. None of that has been happening in recent years. When this Government took office, basic rules had stopped being enforced, the asylum system had been crashed, and smuggling gangs saw the UK as an easy target. The last Conservative Government completely lost control of our borders.
I will give way to the hon. Member, but I inform Members that although I will take many interventions, I must make progress first.
That is fair enough, and I am grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way. She talks about how much the whole of the UK wants this Bill, but my little part of the UK has experienced population stagnation, with decline coming in the 2030s. What we want and need are the tools to address that. A Scottish visa, supported by every sector and business organisation, would help our nation. When will we get that to help with our issues?
Let me repeat the answer that I have just given: our immigration and asylum system applies right across the UK. I say to the hon. Member that when net migration soared under the previous Government, it did not address the labour market issues in Scotland. That is why we need a proper strategy that addresses the labour market issues, rather than always seeing migration as the answer.
The last Conservative Government completely lost control of our borders. Net migration quadrupled in the space of three years to a record high of nearly 1 million people, as overseas recruitment soared while training was cut in the UK. Immigration is important for the UK, but that is why it needs to be controlled and managed. The party that told people that it was taking back control of our borders instead just ripped up all the controls.
Six years ago, barely a handful of boats crossed the channel: 300 people arrived by small boat in 2018. Within four years that number had risen to more than 30,000—a 100-fold increase—which not only undermines our border security but puts huge numbers of lives at risks. The Conservative Government failed to act fast with France and other countries to increase enforcement and prevent the gangs from taking hold. Instead, criminals were let off and an entire criminal industry was established along our borders in just a few short years, with tragic consequences.
I am most grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way. Nobody in this House supports criminal gangs or people smugglers. We recognise that they are grotesque people who exploit those in very vulnerable situations. However, the people who get on those boats are desperate. Many of them are victims of war and the most grotesque human rights abuses, and they deserve to be treated with respect. Does she agree that, by way of balance, we should work out more sustainable safe routes for asylum seekers to gain a place of safety, in recognition of the massive contribution that many of them will make to our community, our country and our society?
The UK must always do its bit to help those who have fled persecution. That is what we have done with Ukraine and Afghanistan, and it will continue to be important, but no one should be making this dangerous journey on a boat across the channel and being exploited by the criminal gangs that are profiting from it. They are making huge amounts of money—hundreds of millions of pounds—from putting lives at risk and undermining our border security. It should be Governments, not gangs, who decide who enters our country.
Under the last Government, asylum decision making collapsed, with a 70% drop in monthly decision making in the run-up to the election and an 80% drop in asylum interviews. The entire asylum system was crashed by their chaotic legislation, driving the backlog up at huge cost to the taxpayer, and enforcement was undermined, with a 34% drop in returns compared with the last Labour Government. Just four employers were charged with illegally employing migrant workers in the space of two and a half years, and of course, £700 million was spent on sending four volunteers to Rwanda—that programme ran for more than two years and sent just four volunteers. At the time, we said that it would have been cheaper to send those same people on a round trip to Australia on the former Prime Minister’s private helicopter. It turns out that it would have been cheaper to buy each of them a fleet of private helicopters themselves, never mind spending that money on paying for thousands more doctors, nurses or police officers, or paying to boost our border security instead.
We said in our manifesto that we would stop the chaos and return order to the system. That is what this Bill does, and it is exactly what we are doing. Since the election, we have started by ensuring that rules are respected and enforced, because immigration is important, but the system should not be misused or abused. We have transferred staff and resources from the failed Rwanda scheme and boosted returns and enforcement. The result is a 24% increase in enforced returns in our first seven months for those who have no right to be in the UK. Some 19,000 people were returned by the end of last month, including the four largest return charter flights in our country’s history, and there has been a 38% increase in illegal working raids and arrests compared with the same time period under the previous Government. New biometric kits have been rolled out, so that immigration enforcement can check fingerprints and biometric residence permits on the spot, and we are already strengthening our approach to prosecuting employers for exploitation and employment of illegal workers.
Can the Home Secretary tell the House how many of those who have been deported since she came into office had crossed into the UK on a small boat?
I should perhaps point the hon. Lady to her own Government’s record, which left us with a shocking and disgraceful backlog in the asylum system. We are now clearing that backlog so that small boat cases can now be returned, something that was not possible under her Government’s approach. They never decided any asylum cases, and as a result could not return anyone who arrived on a small boat because their system was so broken. Not only are this Government introducing stronger powers to prevent small boats arriving in the first place—something that, shockingly, Conservative Members seem to want to vote against this evening—we are clearing the backlog so that we can substantially increase returns, compared with the total failure under the previous Government.
We have established our new Border Security Command to draw together the work of the Border Force, the National Crime Agency, the police, Immigration Enforcement, the Foreign Office and the intelligence and security agencies in order to strengthen our borders. That is backed by £150 million of funding for new technology and hundreds of specialist investigators, and it has already led to major joint operations with Belgium, France, Germany, Bulgaria and Iraq, taking out smuggler gang leaders and supply chains—the criminals operate across borders, and so must we.
Since the election, we have signed new agreements with Germany, Iraq, Italy, the Calais group and the G7, and we are drawing up new, closer arrangements with France. In parallel with our new UK Border Security Command, the French Interior Minister has announced increased enforcement along the coast and a new criminal intelligence and investigations unit to drive new action against organised immigration crime.
But we need to go much further. It is worth understanding how extensive and vile this criminal industry really is. It operates from the money markets of Kabul to the hills of Kurdistan and right across Europe—through the western Balkans and across the Mediterranean. It uses false advertising on social media and hawala networks to channel the cash. There are huge supply chains of flimsy boats, weak engines and fake lifejackets that would not keep anyone afloat. There are shipping routes through Bulgaria, Italy and Spain; warehouses of boats in Germany; and organised logistics networks through Belgium and northern France.
Gangs have become increasingly violent in their determination to make as much money as possible. They are crowding more and more people into flimsy boats with women and children in the middle, so that if the boats fold or sink, they are the first to drown or be crushed. They provide the fuel in flimsy containers that leak, so that when it mixes with saltwater, it inflicts the most horrific burns.
The gangs’ latest tactic is to make people wait in freezing cold water—even in January—until a boat arrives from further along the shore to pick them up. The International Organisation for Migration estimates that at least 78 people died when attempting to cross the channel in 2024. Families have been left devastated by the loss of loved ones, the victims of a diabolical trade —the most disgraceful and immoral trade in people.
The Home Secretary will accept that this is a difficult time to speak up for a fair and ethical immigration policy, with the tide of far-right politics sweeping Europe, and maybe even lapping the shores of this country. Does she accept, however, that she is in danger of sounding like she is trying to stigmatise desperate migrants, rather than build a fair system?
The Mother of the House has long had an interest in these issues and has often spoken on them. I would say that it is important for the UK to have a fair and effective asylum and immigration system. Immigration has always been an important part of the UK, but for it to be so, the rules need to be respected and enforced. We cannot allow the criminal gangs to put life at risk in that way or to undermine our border security. It is as a result of the operations of those criminal gangs that 78 people died while attempting to cross the channel in 2024 and that we have seen those quite horrific tactics.
The Home Secretary is clearly describing the grotesque way in which evil people traffickers encourage people to cross the channel, but my constituents find it difficult to understand why people want to come across the channel from France, which is a lovely country where many people enjoy holidaying and it is so safe. What is her understanding of why people make that journey and how will the Bill specifically help to reduce the number who do?
As the hon. Lady will know, this challenge has been escalating for six years. We have seen a huge increase in the number of boat crossings, and underpinning that increase is the development of a criminal industry. In 2018 there were barely a handful of boat crossings, and now an entire criminal industry has developed based on false advertising and marketing, and on being able to promise people that they will be able to work illegally. That is why the previous Government’s complete failure to take enforcement action on illegal working or to make sure that there was a proper system in place for returns has been deeply damaging.
The Bill provides statutory underpinning for the new Border Security Command. For too long, different agencies with responsibility for border security have been operating in silos, without clear strategy or direction. Criminals can exploit that fragmentation, and the new Border Security Command that we established last summer is drawing together the work of different agencies including Border Force, the National Crime Agency, local police forces, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, immigration enforcement, the intelligence and security agencies and, because strengthening our borders means working internationally, the work of the Foreign Office on border security. Led by former police chief Martin Hewitt, Border Security Command is already having an impact, driving law enforcement co-operation across Europe and beyond. By placing it on a statutory footing and securing its authority and direction, for the first time border security is being treated as the national security issue that it needs to be, engaging with the multiple challenges and threats that we face around our borders.
The Bill strengthens the powers that law enforcement can use against ruthless and devious criminals. For too long, the ringleaders and facilitators of this wretched trade have been able to evade justice by ensuring that they are not present when the money changes hands or the boats set off. That has to change. Learning from early intervention counter-terrorism powers, the Bill will make possible much stronger early action against smuggler and trafficking gangs. New powers will better target supply chains, making it an offence to organise the buying, selling and transporting of small boat parts, motors and engines to be used for illegal entry—not waiting until we can prove that the boats in question were used to arrive at Western Jet Foil.
We are making it an offence to organise the logistics or gather information for the purposes of organised immigration crime, making clear that that is targeting criminal gangs who are profiting from trading in people, not those who help rescue others from serious danger or harm. We are giving law enforcement powers to seize and search the mobile phones of those arriving on small boats, to trace the gangs who organised their journey. As Rob Jones from the National Crime Agency said,
“if you get effective legislation, and you get concerted effort across the system internationally, you can make a real difference.”
That is why a Bill such as this is so important.
I have asked the Home Secretary this before and she has not given an answer yet: which metric should we use, and by which date, if we are to ascertain whether she has succeeded in smashing the gangs?
We have been clear as part of the plan for change that the purpose is to reduce illegal migration and the number of boats crossing the channel, because no one should be making those dangerous journeys. We must take these powers to be able to go after the gangs —powers that, astonishingly, the hon. Gentleman and his party seem to want to vote against tonight. They will be voting against the action that we need, and voting in favour of the criminal gangs, letting them off the hook once again.
I am also deeply concerned about the growing violence and risk to life. In the past 12 months we have seen a disturbing number of cases where the French authorities have tried to rescue people, including children, from dangerously overcrowded boats on which they were being crushed to death. One such case was last April when a seven-year-old girl died. Even though people had died and many were complicit in the crushing and putting lives at risk, some refused rescue and remained on the boat to travel to the UK. We must be able to take stronger action here in the UK. We must be able to extradite people to France to face trial, but we need powers in the UK too. A new offence of endangering life at sea is being introduced to send a clear message that we will take action against those who are complicit in loss of life or risk to life at sea. Those involved in behaviour that puts others at risk of serious injury or death, such as physical aggression, intimidation or rejecting rescue attempts, will face prosecution.
I support the intent of this Bill to reform the asylum system and prevent further deaths in the channel. The Prime Minister has promised to defend migrants and to develop a system based on “compassion and dignity”, and that can be resolved by looking at safe routes. People would not put their lives on the line and put themselves in danger if there were safe routes. Can the Home Secretary tell us what will be in this Bill to support safe routes?
The purpose of this Bill is to pursue the criminal gangs who are undermining border security and putting lives at risk. That is the way the criminal gangs work, and that is why the Bill is so important. Unless we do that, any other measure we take in any direction will be undermined and will fail. The UK must always do its bit—it has always done its bit—alongside other countries to help those fleeing persecution. That is what we have done and continue to do for Afghanistan, for example. We also have to ensure that Governments, not gangs, choose who enters our country and that we prevent this criminal trade in people that is putting lives at risk.
The Bill will upgrade serious crime prevention orders, which are a potentially vital tool, but are currently underused. Under new interim serious crime prevention orders, the process will be streamlined, so that strict curbs can be placed on individuals suspected of involvement in organised immigration crime before they are prosecuted and convicted. That could mean, for example, restrictions placed on travel, social media access or the subject’s finances, so that early intervention can prevent dangerous action.
The Home Secretary has outlined many of the measures she is taking to try to deal with the gangs, but the fact is that people come here because there are advantages in coming here. What is she doing to ensure that those advantages are removed, so that there is no incentive for people to come to the United Kingdom? Secondly, what role will Border Force have between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, since the Irish Republic is also a route for illegal immigrants to come to the United Kingdom?
The right hon. Member will be aware that the common travel area has long been in place, and that means that arrangements have to be addressed differently. Part of the problem with the whole asylum and immigration system has been that issues around enforcement have just not been taken seriously enough for far too long. We have been clear that the rules need to be respected and enforced. That is why we have substantially increased the resources and staffing available for enforcement and returns. It is why we have had 19,000 people returned. It is why we have increased returns. For example, we have increased enforced returns by 24%. It is why we have also increased the illegal working raids by 38% just since the election. That is a substantial increase in the illegal working raids and arrests, because not enough action was being taken on illegal working and employers exploiting people. If we do not have that system of proper enforcement, people think it is just too easy to ignore the rules, to break the rules and to ignore the system, and that is what we have to turn around. There has to be some credibility underpinning the asylum and immigration system and some enforcement of the rules; frankly, there just has not been that for far too long.
We will introduce two new offences to criminalise the making, adapting, importing, supplying and offering to supply and the possession of a specified list of articles for use in serious crime. That includes templates for 3D-printed firearms, pill presses and vehicle concealment. We will introduce stronger powers to go after dangerous criminals—criminals who are planning to provide small boats, supplying small boats, putting lives at risk, undermining border security and organising serious crime.
I know that the Home Secretary is doing her best to cover the waterfront—almost literally—but is not part of the problem that so many of the criminal gang organisers are outside our jurisdiction? How will these new laws apply to people we cannot reach?
The right hon. Member makes an important point, because we have to do this work in co-ordination with other countries. Alongside the UK’s setting up the Border Security Command, France is setting up its new organised immigration crime unit and a new intelligence centre and is strengthening enforcement. Alongside the UK’s strengthening our law to be able to go after the preparatory supply chains used by the people smugglers, Germany is also committed, as part of our new agreement, to strengthen its laws so that it can take action against the warehouses that we know hold huge numbers of the flimsy boats that are then used to transport people across the channel, putting lives at risk. He is absolutely right that this has to be done in co-operation and co-ordination with other countries, because the best way to strengthen border security is to work in co-operation.
The National Crime Agency is also clear that some of the organisers are here in the UK, such as those who do the facilitation, organise the supply chains and organise and help plan some of the routes, the dropping-off points and the advertising. Some of them are based in the UK, so we need the powers to be able to go after them here. If we are asking France, Germany and other countries to do their bit to help go after the criminal gangs, we need to make sure we are doing our bit, too.
That is why, to be honest, I find it absolutely astonishing that the Conservatives are planning to vote against Second Reading and against the provisions we are putting forward. [Interruption.] There is no point doing, “Yeah, but no, but yeah, but no, but”; the impact of the reasoned amendment from the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) is to refuse to give a Second Reading to this Bill, which puts forward counter-terrorism-style powers to go after the criminal people smugglers and traffickers who have undermined border security and put lives at risk. We have seen reasoned amendments from Reform and the Scottish National party, too, all wanting to oppose this Bill and the powers we need to go after the criminal gangs. Frankly, they should all explain why they want to let down the people of this country and stand up instead for the people smugglers and the traffickers who are putting lives at risk and undermining our border security. On the Government Benches, we believe we should go after those gangs, because theirs is a vile and illegal trade.
The Bill also strengthens intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing to tackle organised immigration crime. It will make it easier for customs data to be shared with the Home Office and police and provides for data held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency on UK-registered trailers to be shared with law enforcement in real time. The House will remember the terrible case where 39 people died in the back of a trailer in Essex. The Bill will help detect attempts to smuggle people or goods into the country illegally via lorry. It will also provide for biometric checks to be taken more easily in different locations, including from Scottish ports and evacuation routes.
Importantly, the Bill also restores order to the asylum system by putting an end to some of the failed gimmicks and unworkable mess that the previous Government left us. That includes sorting out the chaos created by the unworkable and contradictory provisions in the Illegal Migration Act 2023, most of which are so unworkable that Conservative Ministers never commenced or implemented them. Some 34 major clauses were passed by this House but never commenced, because Ministers knew they would not work. Sixteen more were commenced, but never operationalised, because they were simply unworkable. The chaotic combination of section 9 and section 2 meant that anyone who arrived could claim asylum, get asylum support and get put up in an asylum hotel, but the Home Office could never take a decision on their case, so they would have to stay forever—an asylum Hotel California which people never leave, while the backlog soars and the taxpayer foots the bill.
We are repealing many of those chaotic, gimmicky and broken laws, including the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, which will allow us to withdraw from the UK-Rwanda treaty that would otherwise have cost us hundreds of millions of pounds more for an unworkable scheme.
The Home Secretary mentions asylum hotels. The Government have actually opened more asylum hotels since they have been in office. Can she give us a date when she will have met her manifesto commitment to close the last asylum hotel?
I would just point out to the hon. Member that his party’s previous Government opened 400 hotels. This Government have already cut the cost of asylum accommodation substantially, and we continue to do so. We have also had to start clearing the backlog that was created by the previous Government collapsing asylum decisions in the run-up to the election, creating total chaos.
The Bill is about restoring order to the immigration and asylum system and rebuilding our border security. Immigration has always been important to the UK, but that is why it should be controlled and managed so that the system is fair. Our country will always do our bit to help those who have fled persecution and conflict, but the system needs grip and control, not gimmicks and false promises. Unlike our predecessors, we will not claim that there is a single fantasy gimmick that will solve the serious challenges. The gangs have been allowed to take hold for six years, so it will take time to loosen that grip and smash the networks that lie behind them, but there is no alternative to the hard graft of going after those gang networks, which have been getting away with this for far too long. Nor is there an alternative to working with international partners on this international crime, building new alliances against organised criminals—not just standing on the shoreline shouting at the sea.
If all the other parties are serious about tackling the criminal gangs that undermine our border security and put lives at risk, if they are serious about tackling crime, if they are serious about tackling criminals, and if they are serious about protecting our borders, they will support the Bill. The gangs do not care about borders, or whether the people they exploit live or die, but we have a responsibility to the British people, who rightly expect our borders to be secure, to go after the criminal gangs that are undermining them. We have a moral duty to prevent further tragedies, and stop the gangs that undermine border security and put lives at risk. I commend the Bill to the House.
I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “That” to the end of the Question and add:
“this House, while welcoming measures to create new immigration criminal offences, declines to give a Second Reading to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill, because an effective removals and deterrence arrangement is fundamental to stopping illegal immigration, but the Bill abolishes laws passed under the previous Government to ensure removals, and abolishes laws passed under the previous Government to ensure a deterrent by restoring illegal migrants’ ability to claim indefinite leave to remain and British citizenship; and because the Bill contains no proposals to limit legal migration, nor limit the eligibility criteria for settlement and citizenship, which means that the Bill will lead to increased illegal and legal immigration.”
It has been seven months since the Government came to office, so we have had a chance to look at their record. I am afraid it does not make for happy reading. Since the general election on 4 July, 24,793 people have illegally, dangerously and unnecessarily crossed the English channel. That is a 28% increase on the same period 12 months previously. The Home Secretary tells us how good her Government’s record is, yet illegal crossings have gone up by 28% on her watch. She promised that she would end the use of asylum hotels. My hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Lewis Cocking) asked her when she would deliver on that manifesto commitment, and she did not answer the question. The truth is that, after the election, there were 6,000 more people in asylum hotels: a failure on her watch.
The Home Secretary crows about removal numbers, not mentioning of course that three quarters of those removals were voluntary, and only a tiny fraction relate to people who arrived by small boat. In the first three months of this Government, the number of people who were removed having arrived by small boat actually went down. In fact, the removals of small boat arrivals in those first three months—the most recent period for which figures are available—amount to only 4% of small boat arrivals, so how can she tell us that letting 96% of illegal immigrants stay here is some kind of deterrent? It is not.
The shadow Home Secretary seems keen to reflect on the records of Governments. In 2010, the number of people in the asylum system reached an over-20-year low. By the time the Conservative Government had left office, the number had ballooned by 13 times to 225,000. Will he reflect on who was responsible for that?
I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman knows which Government gave an effective asylum amnesty; it was the previous Labour Government. If he is so interested in the asylum backlog, does he know whether it has gone up or down under the new Government? It has gone up, as has the number of illegal migrants crossing the channel, leaving a safe country—France—from which there is no necessity to depart in order to find safety. France has a fully functioning asylum system, does it not?
In 2018, 400 people crossed. On the Conservative Government’s watch, 130,000 people crossed the border. Will the shadow Home Secretary apologise?
The hon. Gentleman is obviously not aware that in 2023 the numbers were going down. Since his Government came to office on 4 July last year, the number has gone up by 28%.
The shadow Home Secretary notes that the number of asylum claims has gone up since the Government came to power, yet thousands have been wiped off because those people have been automatically given permission to stay in the United Kingdom. Does he not think that one reason we will continue to see people flooding in is that they know we are an easy touch? They can just come here and get granted asylum.
The right hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. The asylum grant rate in this country has gone up in recent months, and is high in comparison with some other European countries. That is obviously a potential pull factor for people considering a dangerous and unnecessary crossing of the English channel.
Let me say a word about the Bill in general before discussing its specifics. The Bill cancels the obligation on the Government to remove people who have arrived illegally. That is a shocking move. It creates a pathway to citizenship for people who have entered the country illegally, which will only increase the pull factor, and completely cancels any prospect of establishing a removals deterrent, which the National Crime Agency says is necessary.
How many people were removed under the previous Government’s so-called deterrent?
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the deterrent never even started. The first flight—[Interruption.] The first flight was due to take off on 24 July, but his Government cancelled the deterrent before it had even started. That was their mistake, and as a result illegal crossings have gone up by 28%. This is not a border security Bill, given the measures that I have mentioned; it is a border surrender Bill. It is a weak bill from a weak Government.
I was in opposition when we had ferocious debates about Brexit, and Conservative Members used words like “surrender”, “traitors” and “weak”. The shadow Home Secretary is now doing the same in opposition. Does he honestly believe that such language is conducive to getting to a solution? Does he think that it makes any person in this House feel better about themselves? Does he think that it gives him the moral high ground? I think it exposes his inability to conduct an argument in a way that is vaguely civil.
I think a Bill that creates a path to citizenship for illegal migrants and cancels the obligation on the Government to remove people who arrive illegally is a shocking piece of legislation. That is why we tabled a reasoned amendment.
I have given way a lot. Let me make some progress.
The Home Secretary asked about the Opposition’s position on various topics. Our reasoned amendment makes it clear that we support measures to increase criminal penalties and to legislate against articles for use in serious and organised crime—measures that we introduced as part of the Criminal Justice Bill last year—but we do not support a path to citizenship for people who arrive illegally, and we do not support cancelling the Government’s obligation to remove them. That is why I moved the reasoned amendment.
Perhaps the shadow Home Secretary can confirm that the measure in the Illegal Migration Act on citizenship was never commenced because it was unworkable. The Government have strengthened the powers to ensure that small boat arrivals cannot get citizenship by strengthening the rules. We have done more in seven months than the Conservative party did in 14 years. If he really wants to support counter-terrorism-style powers, why is he going to vote against the Bill on Second Reading?
The reasoned amendment makes it very clear that we support those powers, but we do not support the totality of the Bill. In terms of tough action, the Home Secretary has yet to explain to the House why illegal crossings have gone up by 28% on her watch.
Will the shadow Home Secretary give way?
I will make some progress.
Let me turn to the detail of the Bill. The only problem with the Border Security Commander is that he cannot actually command anything. There are no powers at all in the Bill, merely functions. They include, in clause 3, publishing a strategic priority document and, in clause 4, a duty to prepare an annual report. Preparing a strategic priority document and publishing an annual report are unlikely to smash the gangs. The Border Security Commander has no clear powers, merely an ability to publish documents and reports.
The hon. Gentleman has been extremely persistent, and that deserves its reward.
I thank the shadow Home Secretary for the reward, and I hope to return one. The director general of the NCA has said:
“The Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill should help UK law enforcement act earlier and faster to disrupt people smuggling networks and give us additional tools to target them and their business models.”
The Conservative party is about to vote against the Bill. Why does the shadow Home Secretary think that he knows better than the director general of the National Crime Agency?
The point of a debate is to engage rather than read out a pre-prepared question. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the National Crime Agency has said that we need a deterrent. The Bill removes any legislative prospect of a deterrent, which is why we oppose it.
The Home Secretary talked about various new offences, including endangering life at sea and activities preparatory to supporting illegal migration. Of course, no one from any party in this House wants those things to happen, but the measures that she proposes duplicate the existing provisions in section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, as amended by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Facilitating illegal immigration—quite a broad term—is already a criminal offence. Unlike her offence of endangering life at sea, which carries a five-year maximum sentence, section 25 of the Immigration Act states that facilitating illegal migration carries a maximum sentence of life, recently increased from 14 years. Guess who voted against that increase in the sentence? The Home Secretary.
Although we support the thrust of the clauses in the Bill, they are already covered by the tougher existing offence of facilitating illegal immigration. Clauses 19 to 26 contain plans to seize phones, which in principle we support, but that power exists already in section 15 and schedule 2 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. There is an element of duplication.
Let me move on to the more objectionable parts of the Bill. Clause 37 repeals the entirety of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] That appears to command some rather unwise enthusiasm from the Government Benches. As I said, the first flight under the Rwanda scheme was due to leave on 24 July, following extensive legal challenge and legislation in this House. Very unwisely, the Government chose never to start that scheme, which would have had a deterrent effect, because it stands to reason that if people know that if they try to cross illegally into a country such as the UK they will be removed to Rwanda, they will not bother in the first place.
We have seen that kind of scheme work elsewhere, with Operation Sovereign Borders in Australia around 10 years ago. We have seen it work here as well, with the 2023 removals agreement with Albania. Crossings by Albanians, who were the most numerous cohort crossing the channel, went down by 93%. Again, it stands to reason that if people know that if they arrive here they will be removed, they will not bother crossing in the first place. But hon. Members should not take my word for it. The National Crime Agency says that we need a deterrent, and even the Government’s own Border Security Commander, Martin Hewitt—who cannot command very much—says that we need a deterrent.
That is the second time the shadow Home Secretary has said that the National Crime Agency has suggested that Rwanda would be a deterrent. The head of the National Crime Agency has said specifically, “Others are implying that we support Rwanda, and that isn’t true.” Will the right hon. Gentleman withdraw that?
No, what the National Crime Agency said was that we need a deterrent. That is what it said, that is what I quoted, and the Government’s own Border Security Commander made the same point.
Last year, as part of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I visited Rwanda to see the accommodation at Hope hostel that was to be provided to people who were moved under the Rwanda scheme. I learned from that visit that, yes, people would have been deterred from going across the channel, but that migrants who were sent to Rwanda would have been well looked after, well cared for and able to set up a new life, free from the war and famine that they were fleeing.
I thank my hon. Friend for taking the time and trouble to visit Rwanda, which almost no supporter of the Bill has ever bothered doing. It is clear that the Rwanda scheme would have had a deterrent effect, had the Government allowed it to start. The National Crime Agency has said that, and we have seen it work in Australia. The fact that this Government are removing only 4% of people who cross by small boat—meaning that 96% are able to stay—explains why so many more people have crossed the channel under this Government than under the previous regime.
Can the right hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members look themselves in the mirror, with a hand on their heart, and say in good conscience that for a great nation like ours—a country that believes in the international rule of law—to outsource its asylum policy to a country like Rwanda is the correct way to behave? Can he really say that that is the right policy for this country?
The right policy for this country is for the Government, not people smugglers, to decide who comes into this country. Unlike this Government, we have a plan to deliver that. I point out to the hon. Gentleman that France is a safe country. There is no need to cross the English channel to flee war or seek asylum. France has a perfectly well-functioning asylum system.
When it comes to people who are genuinely in need, this country has a proud record. The Home Secretary referred—rather generously, I might say—to initiatives undertaken by the last Government. They include the Ukraine scheme, which allowed in 200,000 or 300,000 people; the resettlement scheme that welcomed around 25,000 Syrians from about 2015 to 2020; the provisions made for British nationals overseas who came here from Hong Kong, and the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme and Afghan relocations and assistance policy. That is the record of this country, and of the previous Government, on people who are in genuine need. But people—overwhelmingly single young men—leaving France, conveyed here by people smugglers, are not the people whose entry we should be facilitating.
Let me move on to the Bill’s provisions to repeal much of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. One such provision to be repealed, therefore depriving the Government of the ability ever to use it, is section 2, which created an obligation on the Government to remove people who come here illegally. Let me point out to those people who are concerned about genuine asylum seekers that section 2(4) of the 2023 Act makes it clear that the provision does not apply if someone comes directly from a place of danger. That is consistent with article 33 of the 1951 refugee convention, which Members will be familiar with. But people who come here directly from France—a safe country where no one is being persecuted, which has a perfectly well-functioning asylum system—should not illegally enter the United Kingdom.
The Bill will also repeal section 32 of the 2023 Act, which prevents people who enter the country illegally from gaining citizenship. By repealing that section, the Bill will create a pathway to citizenship for people who entered the country illegally, and I think that is unconscionable.
The Bill will also repeal sections 57 and 58 of the 2023 Act —a topic on which the Minister for Border Security and Asylum and I have had some correspondence—which concern scientific age assessment methods. Every European country apart from this one uses scientific age assessment techniques, such as an X-ray of the wrist, although there are other methods. That is important because quite a few people entering the country illegally who might be in their early or even mid-20s falsely claim to be under the age of 18, and without a scientific age assessment method it is very hard to determine their age. That creates serious safeguarding issues. There have been cases of men in their mid-20s ending up in schools with teenage girls, which carries obvious safeguarding risks.
A statutory instrument passed in early 2024—quite soon before the election—commenced the power to use those age assessment techniques. I really hope the new Government will use those powers and start using wrist X-rays, or other techniques, to ensure that people cannot falsely claim to be under 18. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide an update on that in her winding-up speech, because we would certainly support her work in that area. As I say, there is an important safeguarding element to this matter, as well as a migration element. I note that in repealing section 57 of the 2023 Act, the Government will no longer be able to treat as over 18 somebody who refuses one of those tests. There are some predating provisions in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, but the provision being repealed is stronger, and in the circumstances that may be rather unwise.
There are various things missing from the Bill. We will table various amendments during its passage that will seek to introduce much stronger measures, but I want to point to two in particular now. The first addresses the fact that there is no mechanism in the Bill for a binding annual cap on legal migration.
No—I have taken lots of interventions.
I think we can all agree that numbers in recent years have been far too high, and what is needed is a binding cap that Parliament can vote on, so that it can decide how many visas are issued each year. I believe the Prime Minister was asked about that and said he did not agree with it, but I think the Bill is an ideal opportunity to create that power for Parliament—for us, the directly elected representatives of the people—to vote each year on how many visas get handed out. Perhaps the Minister for Border Security and Asylum will execute a considered U-turn and embrace the suggestion I have just made.
On the topic of legal migration, the previous Government —in fact, I think it was my right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr Cleverly), the former Home Secretary, who is in his place—announced an increase to the threshold for dependant visas. It went up somewhat in April last year, and it was due to go up again this April to about £38,000. I would be grateful if the Government could clarify whether they will go ahead with that plan, which would, of course, control some of the numbers.
The second area that requires further legislation is indefinite leave to remain, which the Leader of the Opposition and I spoke about last week. Indefinite leave to remain, as the name implies, confers an indefinite right to reside in the UK and provides a number of privileges, including access to full benefits, social housing and pension rights. It is the Opposition’s view that it should be granted only if a person, having come here for work purposes, has made a genuine contribution—if they have earned more than they have paid in taxes, which we could measure by reference to a salary threshold. If, after someone comes to the UK to work, it turns out they have not worked and have become a burden on the taxpayer, or have worked for a very low level of wages, implying they are not making a net contribution, it strikes us as fair that they should not be granted indefinite leave to remain and that their visa should not be renewed.
Last September, the Office for Budget Responsibility published an analysis showing that migrants on low wages carry a lifetime fiscal cost to the rest of the taxpayers of £500,000. The Centre for Policy Studies recently published an analysis showing that the fiscal cost of those who might be granted ILR in the next four or five years will amount to £234 billion over their lifetime. We do not think it is reasonable for taxpayers to bear so high a cost for people who have arrived only relatively recently and have not made a significant contribution, so we will be tabling amendments to ensure that only those coming here on work visas who have actually made a contribution will be eligible for indefinite leave to remain. I would be grateful to know whether the Minister for Border Security and Asylum will support that measure.
The Government have presided over 25,000 illegal crossings since they came into office—a 28% increase on the same period 12 months ago—and have failed to remove 96% of the people who have crossed the channel. They scrapped the Rwanda deterrent before it even started, even though the National Crime Agency and their own Border Security Commander said that a deterrent is needed and we have seen it work in Australia. The Bill will cancel the Government’s obligation to remove people who have come here illegally, and we see the Government creating a path to citizenship for illegal migrants. This is a weak Bill from a weak Government, and that is why we will oppose it.
We will start with an immediate five-minute time limit, with the exception of Front-Bench speeches.
I welcome this important Bill, which will introduce new counter-terror-style powers to identify, disrupt and smash the people smuggling gangs. I take this opportunity to commend the Home Secretary on the work the Government have already done to remove foreign criminals and immigration offenders at the highest rate since 2018. By restarting asylum processing to clear the backlog and redeploying 1,000 staff to work on immigration enforcement, the Government have been able to deport more than 16,000 people, while the previous Government deported just four volunteers.
I want to focus on an extremely important aspect of the Bill that has gone largely overlooked, and on which I have been campaigning for change. Clauses 43 and 44 will introduce new offences to clamp down on the rise of 3D-printed firearms, which is a serious threat. Such firearms present a new challenge to law enforcement because they can easily be made at home and are untraceable and undetectable by magnetometers in places such as airports and courthouses. While the UK has been successful in policing gun crime, law enforcement agencies have warned that they are underpowered to tackle this rising threat, so I am glad that the Bill addresses it.
Birmingham, the city I represent, has regrettably become the gun capital of the United Kingdom, with nearly 600 firearm offences recorded in the West Midlands police area last year. In 2023, a local man was convicted of possession of a range of home-made assault rifles manufactured using a 3D printer in his home. That is why last year I introduced my Firearms (3D Printing) Bill, which would make it an offence to possess and share the blueprints to build these deadly weapons and to possess part of a 3D-printed firearm.
I worked with Channel 4 and Middlechild TV on a documentary about this issue, and I was shocked to learn that files containing IKEA-like step-by-step guides to 3D print firearms at home can be downloaded from the web in as little as three clicks. That is putting the public at risk. I am therefore delighted that Ministers have wasted no time in closing this loophole, introducing much-needed legislation and backing my Bill.
The horrors of the Dunblane massacre in the 1990s mean that the UK has got much right on gun control. Our constituents see mass shootings in other countries and are thankful for the strong gun controls we have here. However, that has never been a reason to be complacent, and the rise of 3D printer technology in recent years has presented a novel threat. Someone can buy a 3D printer for £150. As we saw in the Luigi Mangione case in the United States, 3D-printed firearms are not toys, but deadly weapons. Some might look like Nerf guns, but 3D-printed weapons can kill.
In the United Kingdom, 3D-printed firearms are growing in popularity, with several cases in recent years. In 2023, a man from Bradford was held in possession of a FGC-9 home-made automatic sub-machine-gun, magazine and bullets. In May 2023, two men from Bradford and Hull were convicted of plotting to build and supply home-made weapons to criminal gangs. In the same month, National Crime Agency officers uncovered a factory in south London that was converting blank-firing guns into lethal weapons using 3D-printed parts. Earlier this year, an Islamist extremist was jailed for seven years after being found with instructions on how to build 3D-printed weapons. I mentioned the case in Birmingham, where a man was convicted of making assault rifles in his own home similar in size and scope to the AK47. The point of this legislation is to limit the accessibility of blueprints and prevent dangerous people using them to undermine gun control in the United Kingdom, and to send a strong message that the law will come down on those who want to do harm to our country. In conclusion, the Labour Government came to power promising safer streets. I am proud that we are taking stronger action to deliver on that pledge. In a weaponising world, legislation must keep pace with new technology and the rise of new novel threats. My call for a change in legislation has meant that those seeking to undermine our gun controls to commit criminal acts under the radar by downloading and sharing blueprints to make 3D-printed guns will now face criminal charges. I thank the Government for that.
Finally, turning to other measures in the Bill, I commend the Government for taking a practical approach to Britain’s border security. The previous Government’s efforts were a disaster. They stopped processing asylum cases while failing to deport people with no right to be here, with the result that thousands upon thousands of asylum seekers have been left to languish in hotels and B&Bs across the country, costing the taxpayer billions. Even more self-defeating was the previous Government’s decision to write a blank cheque out of Britain’s aid budget to pay for that mess, taking away funding to tackle the crisis that many people are fleeing in the first place. There is no solution to the global displacement crisis without international development. The Bill is right to focus on the smuggling gangs. We need to break the business model of the vile criminals who are still shipping families across the channel, even in the freezing cold, with no concern as to whether they live or die. The Bill will equip our law enforcement agencies with the powers they need to stop them, disrupt their supply chains and bring most of those who profit from this human misery to justice. The new counter-terrorist powers—
Order. I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
We all want to stop the dangerous channel crossings, wherever we sit on the political spectrum. There are some measures proposed in the Bill that we on the Liberal Democrat Benches support, some that we do not think will be effective enough, and some that we will seek to amend in Committee.
When in government, the Conservatives systematically dismantled safe and legal routes to sanctuary, forcing desperate people into the arms of criminal smugglers. At the same time, they mismanaged our asylum system so badly that they allowed a massive backlog to build up, with thousands of people stuck in limbo, banned from working and contributing to society, and costing taxpayers millions.
The current asylum system is not working for anyone. It is not working for communities like mine, whose hotels are being used to house asylum seekers. It is not working for those housed in those hotels for months and years waiting for their applications to be processed, unable to get on with their lives and integrate, banned from paying their fair share by working and thereby paying tax, and too often called by their room number, rather than their name. And it certainly is not working for the taxpayer who is forking out millions to pay for this broken system.
The Liberal Democrats want a fair, effective immigration and asylum system that treats people with dignity and respect. That means scrapping the unworkable and inhumane Rwanda scheme and investing the savings in clearing the asylum backlog. That means real action against the criminal gangs profiting from human misery, but it also means tackling the root causes of the crisis, rather than just chasing headlines. Applications should be processed quickly, so that those with a right to be here can integrate and contribute, and those without the right to be here can be returned swiftly. The Bill, however, fails to provide a humane, legally sound and effective framework to achieve those goals.
One of the biggest gaps is in the area of modern slavery. The previous Government brought in the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which shamefully stripped protections from those who arrive irregularly in the UK, leaving victims at risk of further exploitation. This Bill does not reverse those measures, which exclude asylum seekers from the protections under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Further, without access to the national referral mechanism, survivors of modern slavery are left without the support they need to rebuild their lives. Surely the Government can see that that plays right into the hands of the very criminals they claim to be fighting, by keeping victims trapped in exploitation rather than helping them to escape.
I just want to point out that, contrary to some of the reporting when the Bill was published, the vast majority of the clauses in the Illegal Migration Act that prevented children and others from having access to the national referral mechanism have, in fact, been repealed.
I thank the Minister for her intervention. It is good that the vast majority have been dealt with, and we will get into the detail of all of them in Committee.
During the passage of the Illegal Migration Act, the Liberal Democrats tabled amendments to remove those restrictions, which, had they been accepted, would have protected survivors and made it easier to bring traffickers to justice. If the Government are serious about smashing the gangs, they should commit to establishing a new single enforcement body to crack down on modern slavery in the UK, as the previous Government once promised and failed to deliver. Whether it is domestic workers, seasonal agricultural workers, or, in the case of a raid on a Stockport abattoir only last week, meat processing workers, modern slavery is happening across our country today. We look forward to scrutinising the Bill in detail, line by line, in Committee.
The Bill also continues the indefensible policy of detaining children for extended periods, a policy that undermines the UK’s commitment to child welfare and international protections for unaccompanied minors. The Liberal Democrats would end the detention of children for immigration purposes entirely and reduce detention for adults to an absolute last resort, with a strict 28-day limit.
Another shortcoming is the lack of any serious attempt to improve safe and legal routes for asylum seekers. The Government continue to restrict those routes, forcing vulnerable people to risk their lives at sea. They are cracking down on the gangs while simultaneously forcing asylum seekers into their hands. Do Government Members not see the conflict? By shutting down legal routes, the previous Government made the channel crossings crisis worse. Under this Government, the cap on safe and legal arrivals remains, limiting those who wish to travel safely to the UK to claim asylum, rather than turning to smugglers. The Liberal Democrats would take a different approach. We would expand and properly fund the UK resettlement scheme, introduce humanitarian travel permits, and widen family reunion rules to better protect children. If we truly want to tackle smuggling gangs, we must cut off their business model and that means the existence of safe and legal routes.
The Bill could and should go further to improve cross-border co-operation. Stopping the gangs that profit from human trafficking requires more collaboration with our European partners. The UK should work more closely with Europol and the French authorities to track and dismantle smuggling operations before people even reach the channel. As the Home Secretary said, this is an international crisis and it needs an international solution. The UK should be leading in Europe on this issue.
The Conservatives have long failed on immigration. They failed to stop the boats, failed to clear the asylum backlog and failed to crack down on trafficking gangs. The Bill, for all its rhetoric, has too many missed opportunities. We look forward to scrutinising it in detail. The Liberal Democrats will continue to fight for an immigration system that is fair, humane and effective.
The Bill paves the way to end 14 years of gimmicks and sticking-plaster politics. The previous Government threw £700 million of taxpayers’ money at the Rwanda scheme, which, from the time it was introduced to the day it was scrapped, saw 84,000 people arrive on our shores in small boats. Given the focus of the Bill, it is important that clear distinctions are drawn on its purpose, and on immigration itself.
Workers arriving here legally to fill the gaps in industry and institutions such as our national health service are vital contributors to our society and economy. Migrant labour and immigration from Ireland and the commonwealth nations built my constituency in the 1920s and 1930s. Not only is that a part of Dagenham and Rainham’s heritage, but my heritage as the daughter of an Irish immigrant. My dad came here for work in the ’50s and contributed to our society throughout his life. Equally, those fleeing war and devastation, human rights abuses and more, have an international right to seek asylum.
It is also important to acknowledge that our borders cannot be an open door, especially not to criminality or exploitation. That brings us to the focus of the Bill. It is why I welcome the Bill and will be supporting it on Second Reading. The Bill seeks to close the gaps, ensuring that law enforcement agencies are granted counter-terror-style powers to tackle organised immigration crime. There is a public perception, and a perception of some who are new to the House, that those arriving here are somehow stealing from the British people—taking something away, whether it be jobs, homes or services. The truth is, however, that many thousands of those who arrive on our shores find themselves exploited and trapped, used in criminality, and thrown into the life of modern slavery. With no recourse to public funds, they are not accessing our services, and without citizenship or national insurance, they are not taking our homes or our jobs.
Lives are being lost, but the organised crime groups who are fuelling this—they are despicable people—do not care whether those who are exploited live or die, as long as they make a profit. Back in October 2019, close to my constituency, we saw how that leads to the terrible tragedy of which the Home Secretary spoke earlier, when 39 men and women were found dead in a lorry in Grays. This cannot continue. The Bill is, first and foremost, a way to disrupt organised immigration crime by scaling up law enforcement and the response to border security checks. It is about our Government getting things done: being tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime, and protecting our borders while still ensuring that the vulnerable, and victims of organised crime, are offered the protection that they deserve.
This is a vital issue, and Labour voters feel as strongly about it as Conservative voters. Our inability as a country to control the people smugglers is utterly debilitating to the political process, and is causing tremendous unhappiness and angst in our nation. We can throw brickbats across the Chamber and blame each other, arguing about which Minister is or is not responsible, but until we solve this problem together we are simply feeding a vast populist movement that could be intensely damaging to both the Conservative and Labour parties, so we have to work together to solve it.
I know that I will not persuade Labour to support the Rwanda scheme, but experience shows that the only effective deterrent is to detain and deport. We know that from other countries, such as Australia. I will not become involved in an argument about whether Rwanda is right or not, or how many people were or were not exported, and I agree that the Government should be commended for wanting to be seen to do something, but what they are doing is ineffective because it scraps the Rwanda scheme.
The devil is in the detail, so let me deal with one detail to prove this point. Article 33 of the 1951 refugee convention forbids the return of refugees to countries where they may be at risk, but it creates a specific exception for those claiming refugee status who either pose a danger to the security of the country or have been convicted of a particularly serious crime. That exception exists regardless of the threat of being persecuted, so, under the convention, someone who is a criminal can be exported to Afghanistan. Article 3 of the European convention on human rights is a very sensible and restrained one-sentence article prohibiting torture, but the European Court has expanded its meaning to interpret it as prohibiting Governments from returning individuals to countries where they could be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment. That is a massive extension of article 3’s sensible and reasonable intention. I am sorry to go into so much detail, but it is essential to understand what is going on.
This is typical of the way in which judges have worked to undermine legitimate Government action undertaken by elected representatives. Two weeks ago, I sat in the hemicycle of the Council of Europe listening to Lord Hermer saying that he would always accept every interpretation of the convention. That, in my view, is unhealthy, and undermines our democracy as well as the public legitimacy of the system. The refugee convention was drafted in 1949, in tandem with the European convention on human rights—it is very old, even older than I am, and that is something—and it was drafted by the same people. It was never intended that the ECHR should apply to immigration at that time; it was only in the 1980s that judges in the European Court extended it. In 1996, in Chahal v. United Kingdom, it was held that there was an absolute rule to prevent the exporting of criminals. I am a delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Government should work with other members there to seek to revise the convention. All European Governments are struggling: we are all in the same mess.
Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that the European convention on human rights and the European Court of Human Rights are not a pick and mix? If we are signed up to the convention, we have to abide by the decisions taken by the Court. The right hon. Gentleman seems to be taking an approach that does not accept the jurisdiction of that Court over UK law, which is implicit within the Human Rights Act 1998 in this country.
I know that the right hon. Gentleman has a particular point of view, but what I am trying to explain to the House is that the convention was never intended to apply to immigration. The refugee convention applied to it, and under the refugee convention we can export criminals. It is judges who have extended the European convention on human rights. Unless we persuade the Court to change, I am afraid that if we want to solve this problem—if we want to stop people coming across the channel, and if we want to detain and deport—in the end we will have to grasp the nettle and get out of the European convention on human rights.
There is precedent for issuing a temporary derogation, given that we are facing a crisis, but if that is not heeded, we always have the option to leave the convention altogether and opt out of the Strasbourg Court’s expansive rulings. That covers the criminals claiming asylum or entering illegally. For non-criminals, we need a programme like Rwanda, although it may not be Rwanda; I know that I will not convince the Government on that. As for legal migration, the Government—any Government—must stop subsidising legal arrivals undercutting existing workers in Britain. I am very critical of my own Government for allowing this mass immigration, and I was constantly raising these points from the Back Benches, but at least, albeit too late, the Conservative Government committed themselves to raising the earnings minimum to meet the average earnings in the UK. That must be kept up to date and enforced.
Let me end by saying that it we are to solve this crisis, we need, ultimately, to get out of the convention, stop the boats, and stop importing low-paid workers legally.
It is an honour to follow the Father of the House.
Alongside a deterrent—perhaps—the first, foundational point of any system must be control at the border, and over the past 14 years we have certainly not had that. My constituents tell me that they want change, and want fairness to be at the heart of the border and asylum system. There has been chaos—chaos that saw last year alone at least 77 souls lose their lives by drowning while crossing the channel, about a third of them children; chaos that saw £700 million wasted on a scheme that did nothing to stop those crossings, but paid for a grand total of four migrants to move voluntarily to Rwanda; chaos that saw tens of thousands of people come to the UK and then spend years in hotels, including a manor house in my town, in military bases while our serving personnel waited for homes, and on barges, because the Government of the day refused to process their claims.
The Bill marks a sea change, away from chaos and towards a security that will allow us to tackle the human trafficking gangs with counter-terrorism-style laws and tactics—to go after them, lock them up, and take possession of the proceeds of their crime. That security will allow us to welcome the most talented, the best and brightest, to make this country a better place, contributing to our public services, our cultural sector and our world-leading technology, research and innovation sectors, together with the people who help our country around the world, including Afghan interpreters.
When things go wrong, however—when laws are broken, or time is up—my constituents expect the state to have the ability, the right and the mechanisms to remove people who have no right to remain here. The Bill takes the welcome first steps that will enable the state to remove such people, particularly those who come to the UK to commit crime. I urge the Government to go further, and allow British judges to impose stand-alone deportation orders in cases where the public interest is served.
During the general election campaign, many voters asked me about illegal migration. Many of them had concerns about small boat crossings. They felt that Britain should have control over our borders, and that we should decide who can and cannot enter our country. Illegal small boat crossings undermine that principle, and make it impossible to have an asylum and immigration system that is both fair and functional.
This Bill gives Britain a better deal. It protects vulnerable people against human trafficking and dangerous small boat crossings, and it restores law and order at our borders. It will give us greater powers to identify and detain the people behind the industry. It creates a criminal offence of supplying or handling items that are used for organised immigration crime. At long last, it allows us to tackle the problem upstream in order to stop a backlog the size of Colchester building up, as it did under the last Conservative Government’s watch.
Today’s Bill is about illegal migration and our approach to it. The merits of legal migration, and how to ensure a fair and balanced system, start with the Government’s ability to decide who comes in and who does not, and who stays and who does not. The Bill is a first step towards ensuring that this Parliament, on behalf of the British people, makes that decision—not criminal gangs who make money from exploiting and trafficking children, women and men.
After 14 years, the shadow Home Secretary should have stood up and apologised. I have a warning for the public: those who come up with simple solutions to complex problems are not telling the truth. This Bill is a first step in the hard work to take back control of our borders.
I call the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.
It is an honour to follow my fellow member of the Home Affairs Committee, the hon. Member for Telford (Shaun Davies). He made exactly the right point in saying there are no easy answers to this problem.
I stand here in another immigration Bill debate—I do not know how many I have attended in the 15 years that I have been in Parliament. Madam Deputy Speaker, you held the brief of Immigration Minister for some time. We have all tried to combat this problem, and we all want to see the same solution. I sincerely wish the Home Secretary and her team of Ministers the best of luck in getting the Bill right, which may mean that there need to be some amendments to make sure that it actually delivers what she wants it to deliver, because there are no easy solutions. There is no silver bullet that will solve this problem, and any politician who dares to stand up and say, “Only one thing is going to make this better,” is misleading the public and making it harder for all of us to do the job that we were elected to do.
It is important to say that the Bill builds on previous work, including on data sharing and returns. These are all matters that Governments of every colour have worked on for many years. I congratulate the Secretary of State on focusing on those, but it is right to say that this is a process rather than an event, that these are things that all parties and all Governments have worked on, and that legislation can only go so far. This is about how enforcement happens, about training and about understanding at the frontline. I praise the NCA, which has done incredible work on this issue globally for many years and continues to do so. We need to remember when people get to the beaches in northern France that an awful lot of others do not make it there because of the work of the NCA and other parts of our law enforcement system.
Illegal migration is a global problem, and we cannot escape that. We have talked about the increase in numbers, which is down to global events. This is happening across the world; we are not the only country suffering from this problem. We might see it acutely on the boats crossing the channel, but this is happening everywhere. May I ask the Home Secretary to use her good offices, and those of the Prime Minister, to raise this issue at all multilateral levels? We need it to be on the agenda for the UN General Assembly, and we need an annual Heads of Government meeting at a UN level to look at this matter. The Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), talked about when the refugee convention was written and what it was written for. Things are different now. We are living in a different world, which means that we need to work together globally to deal with this issue.
In the short time I have, I will make just a couple of points. I welcome the measures on endangering life at sea, but the devil will be in the detail. We will need to make sure that the measures are properly understood by those enforcing the laws, and that they can actually be implemented. The Home Affairs Committee has heard that if a boat gets on to a beach near Calais, it is very difficult for anyone to intervene at that point because of the legal position in international maritime law and other matters.
I also welcome the protection measures and the biometric testing. I met representatives of the British Red Cross last week, and they have some very interesting ideas about potentially expanding where that testing could take place. I hope that the Home Secretary and the Minister can take that point forward.
My final point is about modern slavery. I welcome what the Home Secretary said about the protections for victims of modern slavery, but I want to reiterate that modern slavery is not a migration crime; it is a financial crime. It is the exploitation of one human being by another for financial profit, and we must not confuse the two. If somebody chooses to pay a people smuggler to put them in an unsafe vessel, that is a crime, but it is a consensual crime. If somebody has been forced to get into an unsafe vessel, that is a coercive crime and needs to be treated differently. In much the same way as our policy response to a person who gets ill from having their drink spiked is different from our policy response to somebody who gets ill from taking an illegal substance that they chose to buy, there has to be a different policy response to victims of modern slavery.
May I ask the Home Secretary and the Minister to make sure that, throughout the passage of this Bill and elsewhere, the victims of modern slavery are put at the forefront and can get the protections they need? They should enter the national referral mechanism so that they can be looked after. We owe it to the world to be a leader in this matter, and I fear that if we do not take those steps, we will fail to be so.
I rise in support of this important Bill, which is a crucial step as this Government regain control of our borders after the Conservative party lost control.
My constituency is a diverse and welcoming place. We have a long and proud history of migrants from around the world coming to work and contribute to our community, and we have a proud history of welcoming refugees fleeing persecution and abuse. That compassion is part of who we are as a country, but our compassion must always come alongside control and a system that is fair. That is why my constituents are right to be angry about illegal crossings. When the last Government lost control of our borders, it risked lives and undermined our national security, and meant that people could cheat the system. It also meant that millions of pounds were being spent unnecessarily while our public services were on their knees. Enough is enough. This Government are determined to secure our borders.
Whereas the Conservative party chose the path of sounding tough but failing to deliver, since the election this Government have rolled up their sleeves. Whereas the Conservative party picked fights with France, we have made landmark deals with international partners. Whereas the Conservative party spent nearly £9 million a day on hotels for asylum seekers, we have restarted processing to save the taxpayer £4 billion a year over the next two years, and to end the use of hotels. Whereas the Conservative party spent years pursuing the fiction of the Rwanda scheme to send a sum total of four volunteers, on our watch 32 charter flights have returned migrants across the world, enforced returns are up by 24% on the year before the election, and our streets have been made safer through the removal of 2,500 foreign criminals.
The Bill before us does two really important things. First, it removes from the statute book the fallacy of the Rwanda scheme—the so-called deterrent that saw 84,000 people cross the channel between the day it was announced and the day it was scrapped. Secondly, the Bill removes a hodgepodge of unenacted and unworkable clauses, whose sole purpose in law is to act as a monument to Conservative failure.
Most importantly, this Bill delivers a range of counter-terror-style powers that I believe will enable us systematically to dismantle the vile criminal gangs who facilitate small boat crossings and risk lives. It introduces new offences, so that we can use every tool possible to put gang leaders away; new powers to seize devices, check biometrics and share data; and a new role for our new Border Security Command, so that we can ensure that all agencies work together. No more empty rhetoric; instead, a common-sense, intelligence-led approach to border security. We are taking down the gangs and building the international relationships that we need to regain control. We have turbocharged our asylum system so that we can return people with no right to be here and allow those granted asylum the chance to work and contribute. A real plan. No more empty rhetoric from the Conservatives or Reform; these are concrete steps to secure our borders, and I will be proud to vote for Second Reading today.
I cannot help but think that the Home Secretary thought that border control, reducing illegal migration and stopping the boats was going to be considerably easier than it has turned out to be. She spoke with great authority and confidence ahead of the election, and yet, as the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), has highlighted, since taking office the Labour Government have seen almost every key metric go in the wrong direction. I therefore think it is right for us to look at what is actually in the Bill—not just the tone and the rhetoric, but the detail.
What the Home Secretary says in general terms is quite welcome, but let us look at the example of the new Border Security Command. At the Dispatch Box and in the media studios, she has spoken about this new, powerful organisation that will bring a step change in the co-ordination of our national response to illegal migration, so when the Bill was published, I looked with great interest at the specific provisions for this new, powerful organisation headed by a senior former police officer and a senior former Royal Artillery officer—a wise choice of regiment—and I found myself saying, “Is that it?” Looking at the detail, we see, as my right hon. Friend set out, that this powerful new organisation will be able to write a plan, to present an annual set of accounts and then to ask nicely, but not compel, any other organisation to do its bidding. The headlines might sound great, but the detail is frankly underpowered.
This Bill removes more power from the Government than it puts on the table—as my right hon. Friend said, the ability to seize and search mobile phones already exists—so when we come to the Division later this evening, we will be making our decisions on what is actually in the Bill, not on the rhetorical cloud that surrounds it. The simple truth is that the Government had an opportunity to make something different and to be courageous, but they missed the target. This Bill is massively underpowered. It does not have the kind of game-changing clauses that the current situation demands. People on both sides of the House may disagree with the detail of the Rwanda scheme, which this Bill repeals, but it was at least an attempt to do something significant in response to a significant situation.
Ultimately, the Home Secretary will have to explain, or perhaps the Minister for Border Security and Asylum will do so in her summing up, where she envisages people being returned to if they fail in their asylum application here in the UK but their home nation is deemed unsafe to return them to—the Afghans, the Syrians and people from other parts of the world. If the Home Secretary is saying that they cannot go to their home country or to a third country, she is by definition saying that they can stay here, and that is a blank cheque for hundreds of millions of people around the world. She can be as critical of me and the Conservatives as she likes, but until she comes up with a credible alternative, her criticism is massively undermined, and this is not a credible alternative.
This is a missed opportunity. This is words but not action. This is headlines but no substance. When this Bill is passed, as it inevitably will be because the Home Secretary has a majority, but then fails to achieve what she has promised, she will find that her party is punished at the ballot box.
I shall begin by committing my support to the Government’s efforts today. After years of the Conservatives failing to secure our borders with failed projects such as the Rwanda scheme, it is refreshing to see legislation come forward in this place that will smash criminal smuggling gangs and disrupt their ability to carry out small boat crossings. When debating such issues, we must not forget the lives lost in small boat crossings. They include women and children, often fleeing violence and persecution, and they are treated in the most abhorrent manner by criminal gangs who put them on those small boats with no care whatsoever for their safety, or indeed for whether they make it across the channel. We must be in no doubt that the sole focus of these criminal people smugglers is profit. They care not for the lives of the vulnerable and frightened, but only for lining their own pockets and the continuation of their despicable criminal enterprise.
Although not a surprise, it remains absolutely absurd that Reform UK and increasingly the Tories, under the Leader of the Opposition, point the finger at a Government that are actually working to address this issue, rather than work co-operatively to save lives, punish criminals and secure our borders. It would be fair to say that Reform UK is engaging in a form of politics that absolutely scrapes the barrel. It is focused on pitting working people against one another. Its language and manner have seen people who have been settled in this country for decades become increasingly frightened about walking their own streets, and it has no care whatsoever if its actions erode the great British values of tolerance, inclusivity and respect.
I certainly agree with my hon. Friend.
As the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have said, the acts of criminal gangs must be treated as a global security threat, and as such must be addressed using counter-terrorism tactics. I am pleased that this legislation will allow immigration enforcement, the police and the National Crime Agency to seize electronic devices from people who come here illegally, if intelligence suggests that this would help to gather information on organised immigration crime. Indeed, I am reassured that these measures have been established in co-operation with law enforcement and by learning best practice from other examples of tackling and defeating sophisticated and organised crime.
In taking these steps, we will limit and disrupt the operations of the criminal gangs, which is critical to securing our borders. This stands in stark contrast to the previous Government, who spent £700 million of taxpayers’ money on their failed Rwanda scheme. Their costly gimmick sent just four volunteers to Rwanda and caused a complete collapse in asylum decision making. What a difference serious government makes. Is it any wonder that the people of this country voted for change?
We have debated in great detail the technicalities of this legislation, but I would like to briefly look at my own constituency of Airdrie and Shotts. Lanarkshire is a place where many communities from across the globe have settled, where their culture has been respected and enjoyed, and where people have been welcomed after fleeing situations that could only be described as horrifying. However, just last week when I held my surgery on Friday, I took a walk around Airdrie and found graffiti in our town centre that can only be described as racist, abhorrent and hostile. It was the sort of language that is not welcome in Airdrie and Shotts, and I reiterate my support and solidarity for those communities who have made our towns and villages their home over many generations and contributed positively to our local area.
Immigration must be controlled, but it can and does work. I conclude by reminding those on the Opposition Benches that people are watching. People are listening to their rhetoric, and if they continue to embark on a campaign of rhetoric and divisive messaging, they risk destroying the historic ties, tolerance and unity that make Britain great.
Well, here we go again—another Government with the same old, tired, failed approach to asylum and immigration. Other than getting rid of the truly bizarre Rwanda Bill, this Bill just picks up where the Tories left off, with the added extra of further criminalising asylum seekers.
I cannot help feeling that a lot of the activities and debates around this Bill have quite a lot to do with Reform’s rise in the opinion polls. Its Members usually sit behind me but, bizarrely, they have not turned up to debate this immigration Bill. The bizarre videos of the Home Secretary going to deportation centres and the posters celebrating the Government’s success in deporting and kicking people out play right into Reform’s territory. I say to Labour Members that they will never out-Reform Reform—they are masters of the art of anti-immigrant rhetoric. Regardless of how hard Labour Members try, they are mere amateurs by comparison. All Labour is doing by going on to Reform’s territory is legitimising it. You do not pander to the populists and the likes of Reform; you take them on.
The Bill does nothing to address the real issues we will confront in the middle-to-late part of this century. The Bill is totally fixated on the small numbers of people who come across the channel in small boats, but it does nothing to tackle the massive structural problems that are about to come our way because of population stagnation and population decline.
If anything, this Bill is designed for the early part of the century, not for the part of the century we are about to enter. Nations across the industrialised world, including Italy, Spain and France, are taking action to increase their population. South Korea has pumped $200 billion into what it calls the demography crisis. Japan has historically been resistant to immigration, and with a birth rate of one child for every three women, its population is predicted to fall by 25% by 2050. Japan will fall from third in the GDP league to eighth—that is what is coming our way.
Even the Bill’s purpose of defeating the gangs is doomed to failure. This Bill does nothing to address the root causes of irregular immigration, and it does not even start to get curious about why there is a problem with immigration in the first place. All it will do is make immigrants take even greater risks. It will have very little impact on the gangs the Government are targeting, as the gangs will adapt their business models accordingly.
The Government might inadvertently make the gangs’ obnoxious trade even more lucrative. The smuggling gangs are successful because they have exclusive rights and a monopoly on the irregular immigration market. There is nowhere else for people to go other than to the illegal gangs, as there are no safe routes to get into the UK.
We have particular problems in Scotland. Our population is currently around 5.43 million, and it has grown modestly over the past few years because of the Conservative Government’s immigration debacle, but Scotland will be one of the first parts of the UK to experience population decline, and it could come as early as 2030. That is why we have been so resolute and persistent in calling for a Scottish visa, and all sectors in Scotland now support that call.
I think Scottish Labour also supports it, as the hon. Gentleman will probably clarify.
Of course, the issue is that Scotland is not the same everywhere. My community in Edinburgh and East Lothian is seeing its population grow, while other parts are seeing their population decline. The reason is Scotland’s labour market and economy. Even when we had access to 300 million people as an EU member, with net migration of 900,000, there were still parts of Scotland that were unable to attract migrants. The problem was not the immigration system; the problem was our labour market.
I do not think the hon. Gentleman understands the scale of the problem in our nation of Scotland. Twenty-two per cent of our population is over 65, compared with 19% in England. We have one of the lowest birth rate ratios, with one child for every three women. If we do not do something quickly, this will have a huge impact on every sector of our society and every part of our economy.
I thought Scottish Labour supported a Scottish visa. I have heard Jackie Baillie speak very interestingly about it, but all of a sudden Scottish Labour has abandoned it. Every time I raise it with the Home Secretary, I am totally rebuffed. Every time my colleagues ask the Government to give us the tools to help address our predicament, we are told where to go.
We need the tools so that Scotland can grow its population, and so that we can equip ourselves for the problems that are already coming our way. We need a new mindset on immigration, which we have to start seeing as a benefit to communities. We have to recognise how it enriches our society. For the Government, immigration is a bad that has to be dealt with, and that is such an early-century approach. We will soon be facing population stagnation and decline. Unless we get ready and prepare for what is coming, we will be in serious trouble.
I look across at Labour Members who are singularly uninterested in any of this. They want to be as hard on immigration as the Tories and the Reform party. It does not work, it cannot work, and it is the wrong solution for where we are heading. I encourage them to think once again about what we all need across the United Kingdom.
I commend the Home Secretary and her team for the reforms in the Bill that are genuinely positive, including the scrapping of the unworkable and costly plan to expel asylum seekers to Rwanda—a repressive regime that is making war on its neighbours. The Bill rescues us from the “Alice in Wonderland” situation in which Rwanda is safe if the Government say it is safe. The Government have also scrapped and towed away the Bibby Stockholm, the miserable and dangerous prison ship, and committed to deciding asylum claims that had previously been placed in indefinite limbo. Those are all positive developments.
However, it is difficult to be positive about the remainder of the Bill. It clearly aims to prioritise border security, but the malign Greek chorus that chants “Stop the boats!” in response to every problem in our society is wrong. With these measures, as with others, the boats will not be stopped unless we look at the issue holistically. Have we stopped organised crime, drugs, people trafficking, fraud, firearms and so on? Of course not, because some of those crimes are high-tech operations, but all these overseas-based people smugglers need is a dinghy.
We cannot have a credible plan to smash the gangs unless we deal first with the demand for what they supply. Many of us have long argued that the way to undercut and ultimately eliminate the gangs is to re-establish safe and legal routes for asylum seekers, to establish processing centres in northern France, to turn away failed applicants, and to allow safe travel for those who are entitled to be here.
Does my hon. Friend agree that more people should listen to those of us who say that, if we do not want people drowning in the channel, the answer is to enable the processing of asylum claims in northern France, as the French have offered?
I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention, and obviously she is always right. It is not impossible; in fact, it has been done before.
Instead, this Bill could end up criminalising people because of how they travelled here, which is wrong. It is widely understood that many of these people, precisely because they are victims of persecution, cannot apply for visas in the normal fashion, and many more cannot afford the cost of long-haul flights either. Genuine and valid asylum seekers could be criminalised. We should remember that these people are fleeing war and devastation. Some have been trafficked, and many of those are brought here as slaves—either for domestic service and menial unpaid work, or for sex slavery. The Bill could abolish their rights and protections under the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Then there is the question of immigration detention, which will increase as a result of the Bill. The immigration detention estate is already costly and cruel. It is a ridiculous irony that we are releasing criminals because our jails are full, yet we are increasing the use of immigration detention despite 75% of those detained eventually being found to be entitled to be here.
The main concern has been foreign national offenders, and 4,674 were returned in the year ending September 2024. That is an increase of more than a quarter compared with the previous year, which means that this Government are doing what they want to do on foreign national offenders. Why are we holding on to the idea of increasing the immigration detention estate when we know that in 2019 the Conservative Government awarded asylum accommodation contracts worth billions of pounds to just three companies, and almost every single one of the removal centres operated by those companies has reported overcrowding, hostile and unsanitary conditions, and, at worst, death and suicide? Those centres are costly and cruel. A limit on immigration detention would be both humane and efficient. The average daily cost of holding an individual in immigration detention is £122. What a huge cost when there are options for detention in the community. Most people are detained when they go to their bi-weekly reporting session at the Home Office.
We are detaining far too many people unlawfully. In 2023-24, the Home Office issued 832 compensation payments for unlawful detention, totalling £12 million. As we have heard, we detain children—in 2023, the Home Office detained 47 children for immigration-related reasons. We disagree on many things across the House, but the rights of children is not usually one of them. People say there are complex reasons why such detentions happen. To that I say: “Make it simple and make it stop.” We should not be detaining children for immigration-related reasons.
I am also concerned that the Bill might undermine the application of international law to refugees. Section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 will be untouched, even though it was a truly rotten measure introduced by the Conservatives, who had a problematic relationship with international law. We on the Government Benches must be better than them. At the moment, a trafficked woman who arrived here having been abducted halfway across the world would have no rights as refugee, precisely because her traffickers brought her here on a small boat. That cannot be right.
The Bill focuses on small boat crossings, but it is an immigration Bill, and that means it does not all have to be negative. There are things we could do that we largely agree on, such as scrapping child citizenship fees and introducing further protections for European Union nationals and the Windrush generation. When we were in opposition, we supported scrapping child citizenship fees. The shadow Home Secretary, when he was the immigration Minister, implemented a fee waiver, but last year only 36% of those waivers were accepted—40% were rejected and 22% are awaiting decision. That is just not good enough. This is about children who have lived here for their whole lives—children who were born here, including the children of EU nationals.
We know that EU nationals continue struggle with their rights, which is something that we could resolve. We can all agree that the Windrush generation have the right to be here, but they are still having major issues; we should not wait for the appointment of the Windrush commissioner to be told that they are still subject to the hostile environment. We could do so much more on things we agree on, but unfortunately there are too many instances where victims can be blamed for the crime, and I worry that the Bill could codify that injustice in law.
We have heard that there are no easy answers to the topic of tackling illegal immigration, but as Members of this House, we have to find within ourselves the collective will to succeed. Since July, 24,586 people have crossed the channel, compared with 19,300 in the same period the year before, which represents a 28% increase since the election. That shows clearly that the Government need to go further with legislation to strengthen the nation’s response to illegal immigration.
I cannot understand why the Government are seeking, through the Bill, to abandon X-ray assessment of asylum seekers to validate their age and prevent a surge in false applicants. All other major countries on the continent, including France and Germany, make use of medical tests to determine the age of applicants. The lack of such testing significantly increases the pull factors, and the Bill also creates a path to citizenship for illegal migrants, which provides a direct new incentive for people to come here illegally.
The truth is that, in many cases, those who travel via illegal routes and seek to claim asylum in the UK travel through numerous safe countries throughout Europe before they arrive here. We have heard from other Members that this issue is global, and I implore the Home Secretary and Ministers across Government to raise it at every single meeting with foreign Governments.
The stark reality is that 87% of those arriving via illegal small boats are young men in their 20s. That begs the question: where are their wives, partners and children? Surely they did not flee a devastating situation of persecution and desperation, and leave their loved ones behind to suffer.
On that point, will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Not at the moment.
Furthermore, many of them pay thousands of pounds to smuggling gangs before they make the journey. These false cases do huge damage to public trust in the asylum system, as well as to the cases of genuine asylum seekers.
Over the past two decades, our economy has become addicted to mass migration, and we have been sold the idea that our economic prosperity hinges on the notion that mass migration will deliver prosperity. We were wrong on mass migration. It has instead placed undue pressure on public services, and housing in particular. Many migrants perform valuable roles, particularly in public services such as the NHS and the care sector, but it is critical that the Government focus for the long term on rebalancing our economy in order to once again make all manner of roles attractive to UK citizens, and reduce our dependency on long-term migrant labour.
Mass migration, especially by those who skipped the queue and arrived illegally, does not just impact us economically, but affects the social identity of our communities. The identity of many cities, towns and villages across the UK is changing. Part of that is down to us, as shopping habits go online, but, as reported in The Times today, there has been an increase in illegal workers in retail roles across the country, as cash-only vape shops, tanning salons, convenience stores, barbers and car washes start to litter our communities, with no social benefit to enrich our towns and villages. Not only are such businesses widely considered to be a front for money laundering, but they are linked to illegal immigration and people smuggling. They are a dangerous lure for young people who risk being drawn into county lines-style linked criminality.
We owe it to the future of our country to ensure that we have a controlled, measured approach to mass migration, and to respond with every legal, social and economic lever that we have to protect against the unmitigated erosion of our identity. We must ensure that those who are granted the privilege of leave to remain in the UK are net contributors—that is, they pay more in taxes than they cost the UK taxpayer—and that the customs, traditions and culture of our country are respected.
We must make the distinction between those travelling illegally and asylum seekers travelling to the UK via recognised routes of asylum, such as those who travelled to the UK from Ukraine when Putin’s illegal invasion commenced three years ago. It is a falsehood that the UK can become home to millions of people without any qualifying criteria. My constituents are not anti-immigration, but they want to see a system based on control and fairness to the UK taxpayer. I implore the Government to rethink the Bill, focus on reducing the pull factors to deter illegal migration, and invest the savings into our communities.
I draw the attention of the House to my declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests on the help I receive from the Refugee, Asylum and Migration Policy project and as co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on migration.
After the mountain of Acts passed by the last Government, I can finally breathe a sigh of relief that today we are debating an immigration Bill that, on its first page, states that it complies with the convention rights. That is a nice change, and one that was much needed.
The Bill builds on some of the vital reforms to our asylum system that our Government have already made. It removes so much of the draconian legislation introduced by the previous Government that stripped those fleeing war, persecution and human rights abuses of their right to seek safety in this country. Repealing the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 and a significant amount of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is a step in the right direction, but beyond a functional asylum system is one that is fair and welcoming. With that in mind, there are a few areas of the Bill in which I feel opportunities have been missed, and I hope those can be addressed as it moves to Committee.
I am concerned that the Bill does not repeal section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act, which makes any asylum or human rights claim by a national of a safe state inadmissible. Blanket bans on asylum claims from entire countries are fundamentally flawed, and with Rwanda we have seen the dangers of legislating that a country is safe when in reality it may not be so for everyone. Although I know that section 59 has not been enacted, it will set a dangerous precedent if it remains on the statute books.
For example, Georgia, one of the countries that the previous Government added to the safe states list, is becoming an increasingly hostile and dangerous place for LGBTQI+ people. While I have had assurances that the section 59 powers have not been commenced—and I know the Minister shares my concerns about the situation in Georgia—they will be left on the statute book. The Bill provides a golden opportunity to repeal them altogether. If they are not going to be used, what is the use of having them? I ask the Minister to consider that in Committee.
A fair system would also mean people seeking asylum being able to access the UK safely. The four Ps approach to tackling organised criminal gangs, as outlined in the Bill’s explanatory notes—to prevent, pursue, protect and prepare—are all important parts of disrupting the business model of criminal gangs, but I fear that we have lost sight of who needs protecting. No one wants to see more deaths in the channel, but prosecuting people smugglers needs to go hand in hand with other measures to prevent channel crossings. The Bill could provide a vital opportunity to set out clear plans for reviewing and expanding safe and legal routes to the UK.
I hope that those important points can be addressed as the Bill progresses. If not, I hope that we can have a good, grown-up conversation about safe and legal routes, which was absolutely missing from the last Parliament.
I think that everybody across the House wants to see small boat crossings diminish and hopefully conclude entirely. Likewise, I think that most people across the House feel that we need to have a fair, robust and effective way to deal with illegal immigration.
This, as I have said previously in the House, is a moral issue. We do not want to see any more women, children or men dying in the channel. When I raised that with the Home Secretary on 22 July, she seemed to agree with me, but thus far agreement does not seem to have matured into action. Indeed, when the Minister of State responded to me on a similar point on 6 November, she was much more equivocal about how the Government were going to deal with this really serious issue.
That is no surprise when we come to the Bill, which has ripped the heart out of the previous Government’s Illegal Migration Act. All the deterrence put into that Act has been pulled out. That is important for two reasons. First, this Bill will clearly not stop the small boat crossings. Secondly, it sends a message to those traffickers who want to exploit people and bring them across the channel that the Government are not serious about stopping the problem. We can see that from the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Bradley Thomas) mentioned, the X-raying and medical checks of migrants have been ripped out. That is something that EU countries do on a routine basis.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. These points are obviously going to come from Conservative Members. Have they read the comments of the noble Lord Winston in the other place on 27 November 2023, when he outlined that while scientific equipment may be used, the analysis that comes from bone density checks or X-rays is entirely flawed? The results depend on the calcium deposits and the food that was eaten by the person being X-rayed, as well as other health reasons. Has the hon. Gentleman read those comments? If not, could he read them? If he has read them, does he disagree with what Lord Winston said and think he knows better?
Far be it from me to criticise a Member of the other place, especially one with such a distinguished medical career. All I would say gently to the hon. Member is that this is not novel or unique to this country; it is being used in countries across the EU. Likewise, on the Rwanda scheme, which the Government scrapped, we can have a debate about whether it was right or wrong, but EU countries are looking at similar schemes. If the Government do not like Rwanda, why are they not looking at other sites?
It is not just me who is saying this. The National Crime Agency has said clearly that no country has ever stopped people trafficking upstream in foreign countries. While the Australians have done it, that was with a deportation scheme, but that is not being introduced by the Government. Likewise, the former chief immigration officer Kevin Saunders said that the United Kingdom needs a “big deterrent” and that everyone has told the Prime Minister that. We need a big deterrent to stop migrants. Forget about the gangs: if we stop the migrants from wanting to come to the UK, the gangs will not exist.
I come at this from a moral point of caring about ensuring that people do not die in the channel. We need a deterrent, which is sorely missing from the Bill. It should not surprise us that the Government are not robust on this, because Labour voted against every tough measure that the previous Government introduced in the Illegal Migration Act. Labour Members voted against measures to tackle illegal immigration 134 times. They voted to block, delay or weaken our plans to stop the boats 126 times in the last Parliament. It is therefore absolutely no surprise that their Bill does nothing to stop that and will lead to more dying in the channel.
We need a fair migration system. We need to support those who genuinely need our help or whom we genuinely need to fill gaps in our labour market, but we must not be taken for fools by the trafficking gangs, nor must we be taken for fools by this Labour Government.
I accept some of the analysis of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire (Pete Wishart), who said that we have a problem with our birth rates. However, the way to solve that is not through unlimited mass migration. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove said, we cannot build an economy reliant on mass migration. We must build home-grown resilience. Again, this is a moral issue. If we denude developing countries of their most highly talented people, those countries will never be able to rebuild themselves and become successful, and the problem that we are dealing with will just carry on.
I have no confidence in the Government to sort this problem out. That is because, as we have already seen this evening, the Government have no answer on how many of the people who came over on small boats they have deported. Perhaps more tellingly, they have no ambitious target about when any of the measures they are proposing will start to solve the problem.
As I said, we need a fair, robust and effective immigration system, and not this insipid Bill, which will not secure our borders or deter the people traffickers, and, I am afraid, will lead to further deaths in the channel.
The British people are firm, but they are fair. They believe in order. They believe in justice. They know that security and decency are not rivals; they are partners. Those are the values that built our country, and they must be the values that shape our future, but for too long we have seen those values undermined. The promise of secure borders became a false hope. The system buckled under failure. Where there is failure, there are some who seek to divide us: to turn neighbour against neighbour and to fuel fear instead of fixing problems. They wrap themselves in our great flag, yet they offer nothing but empty slogans and false patriotism.
Border security is not a game. It is not a slogan. It is a fundamental duty of any serious Government. For years, the British people were promised control; instead, they got failure. We inherited open borders. Small boat crossings skyrocketed from just a few hundred in 2018 to 150,000 since. The last Government talked tough but were paralysed by their own failure. Under Labour, that ends.
In just six months, the Government have already taken decisive action. We have set up the Border Security Command and we have fixed and strengthened important international alliances. Nearly 4,000 illegal workers have been arrested since we came into government. Vitally, we have deported 16,400 people who have no right to be here—that is more in six months than the last Government managed in an entire year. The British people were told that this could not be done, but we are proving otherwise.
Today, we take another crucial step with this important Bill. The smuggling gangs are not petty criminals or opportunists; they are predators, and they make a mockery of our borders. We promised the British people that we would treat them like the national security threat they are, and that is exactly what the Bill does.
We do not wait for terrorists to carry out their plans before we act. We disrupt them, we intercept them and we take them down before they can do harm. We hit their networks, seize their assets and cut off their ability to operate. The Bill gives us the power to do the same against the smuggling gangs, to stop those vile criminals before they reach our shores. It allows us to use intelligence to take action, just as we do with terrorists. When our security services, police and the Border Security Command know what those criminals are doing, under the Bill they can act immediately, not sit back and wait for another overloaded boat to capsize in our channel.
I kindly say to the hon. Gentleman—he will know that that is my form when I ask questions—that there is a serious problem with the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, with people coming in through the Republic, into Northern Ireland and across to the mainland. What are the Minister and the Government doing to address that issue for us in Northern Ireland and the whole of the United Kingdom?
My understanding from the Minister earlier was that the Bill would work across all borders coming into the United Kingdom—I am sure that will be clarified later.
The Bill removes the loopholes that have allowed criminals to exploit our system. Smuggling is an industry, and we are dismantling it boat by boat, gang by gang. The British people know that an asylum and immigration system only works if it is properly enforced. They know that border security is not about hostility; it is about order and rules. They know that we must not allow criminals to decide who comes into this country. There is no silver bullet, but this Government are taking that control back. We will be firm, because the British people demand it; we will be fair, because that is who we are; and we will be decent, because strength without decency is weakness. Division is easy. It takes moral courage to lead with decency and strength. We are delivering security, and we play the ball, not the player. The Bill will help turn the page on failure, restore order to our borders and protect the country we serve.
Many people in my constituency are angry and frustrated at Britain’s approach to illegal migration. They see hundreds of people every week getting into small boats to cross the channel. Those people pay for a place in a small boat because they know that once they set foot on British soil, there is almost no prospect of their being deported. That is morally wrong. It brings the whole immigration system into disrepute.
Earlier in the debate, the Home Secretary was invited to say how many of those she has deported in the past seven months had arrived in a small boat, and there was no answer. I suspect the reason is that the answer is zero, but no doubt the Minister can provide an answer when she responds.
It is self-evident that most of the migrants standing on beaches in France are not refugees; they are economic migrants. They have not only reached a safe country, but have had to travel through a succession of safe countries to arrive at that beach in France. The National Crime Agency has made it clear that to stop the boats, we need an effective removals and deterrence strategy. The Bill does not deliver that. In fact, it does the opposite: it removes the key deterrents that we had put in place.
The last Government were correct in passing the Illegal Migration Act, which would have stopped those who enter the UK illegally from claiming asylum or being eligible for British citizenship. Twenty days after the election, Labour put it on hold, and it is now repealing those provisions through the Bill. It is a privilege to live in this country and to apply for British citizenship. The Government are removing the barriers to accessing that privilege and are therefore inviting thousands more people to join the queue. That is why the asylum backlog has grown under this Government. That is why the number of people in asylum hotels has risen by 6,000 since the election. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr Cleverly) stated, this is a seriously under-powered Bill. It actually does very little, and it reveals the Home Secretary’s policy of “smash the gangs” to be just a slogan.
Former chief immigration officer Kevin Saunders said,
“You need a big deterrent to stop the migrants. Forget about the gangs—if you stop the migrants wanting to come to the UK, the gangs won’t exist.”
Unfortunately, the Bill provides no deterrent. In fact, it removes the deterrents that were working. It has no vision for controlling illegal or legal immigration, no plan to protect our borders and no strategy to ensure that those who break the law by coming here illegally are removed quickly and effectively. The Home Secretary claimed this evening that the Government are repealing our legislation because it did not work. Did it not work when we struck landmark deals like the one with Albania, which drastically reduced the number of Albanian migrants arriving via small boats? By making it clear that they would repeal the Rwanda scheme before it started working without coming up with any alternative deterrent, the message that the Labour party has been sending to would-be illegal migrants is, “Come and have a go”. Is it any wonder that illegal crossings are up 30% since the election?
The Government are not in control of the borders, so we Conservative Members will reject the Bill. Our reasoned amendment will give Members a chance to say that we want strong action on illegal immigration.
Like many colleagues across the House, I am in no doubt that immigration and border security are a top concern for many of the people I represent in Weston-super-Mare. They tell me on the doorstep, by email and on social media that this is not a conversation that we can shy away from, although any conversation on immigration and border security is easily inflamed and sensitive for many.
As the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley) said, there is no silver bullet and there are no simple answers, and those who peddle them are peddling falsehoods, but we must talk about and do better at showing how we are addressing people’s concerns. Concern about immigration and the pressures it places on any society or community is understandable, but so are concerns for all human life and the need to support people in need. How we lead on improving border security is a moral duty of this Government, and as a Christian I wrestle with that and with how we best achieve a balance between compassion for those who need help, and clarity and strength when it comes to defending our security and values.
In my constituency, like many others, there are strong views on the extremes of both sides of the immigration question. They are often very loud and absolutely at odds with the views of the vast majority of my constituents, who believe in British values of fairness, tolerance, human rights and the rule of law. They want our systems to work, are proud of Britain’s role as a force for good in the world and want us to sort our immigration system. We need the Government to deliver on a fairer immigration and border system precisely so that people can trust us again to keep them safe and do not turn to extremes because they feel there is no alternative. People are worried and want action, and it is this Government’s responsibility to address those issues in a way that is firm but compassionate, just and in line with our values.
The growing number of crossings, particularly in small boats, is not just a statistic; it is a crisis that demands urgent action. The tragic loss of life—at least 78 people died last year alone—should horrify us all, and we cannot allow that to continue. It is clear that our action to secure our borders and smash the gangs who are profiting from this evil trade in human desperation is necessary and urgently needed. Immigration, both legal and illegal, is of huge national and local concern, which has been fed in many ways by decades of under-investment in our communities, skills and infrastructure, leaving us reliant on importing the skills that we should have been developing here for our communities in places such as Weston-super-Mare.
I lay no blame at the door of immigrants who came here for a better life and who contribute so much to our country. I blame successive Governments for taking the easy route—or the impossible route in the case of the Rwanda scheme—and leaving us in a situation where public trust is through the floor. People can no longer be left behind because it is easier and cheaper to import talent and labour. I see the impact of poverty and systemic under-investment daily, and the people of my constituency and I will not stand for it. That is why I am pleased that the Government are taking concrete action through the introduction of the Bill, rather than following the example of previous Governments and continuing to use border security as a political football. We must find sustainable, meaningful and impactful solutions now. We have run out of road and public patience.
The Bill alone will not fix the deep distrust in our society—that will take years of demonstrable change and investment across housing, healthcare, community safety and jobs—but it will start that process by strengthening our response to border security threats, granting stronger law enforcement powers that allow us to go after organised immigration crime directly, and disrupting the criminal networks that profit from human misery. It will properly equip the teams on the ground to deal with this issue by enabling them to act faster and go further in protecting our borders and national security. Such action is long overdue, and I hope that it will be warmly welcomed by people in my constituency and across the country.
The Government deserve credit for swiftly scrapping the disgusting, immoral and illegal Rwanda plan, but we need to scrap the attitudes that underpinned it too. The demonising of vulnerable people and of anyone who is different—pandering to the nasty, dog-whistling of Reform and the Tories—is divisive and dangerous. It is shocking, then, to witness the Government trying to mimic the Tories and Reform with migrant raid videos and adverts boasting about deportations. Do they not understand that that just serves to reinforce Reform’s scapegoating rhetoric? Let us not forget that last summer we saw mobs, driven by hate, trying to burn refugees alive in hotels. The Government should be challenging those narratives head-on and helping communities to heal from divisions, not publishing videos that risk encouraging further animosity towards migrants and anyone perceived as being one.
Let me turn to the Bill. I share the Refugee Council’s concerns about the potential for clauses 13 to 16 and 18 to lead to the unintentional criminalisation of refugees who are forced to make decisions under coercion when their survival is at stake—by being forced to steer a small boat under threat of death, for example. Although I am pleased to see the repeal of child detention powers, 1,300 children were wrongly assessed to be adults over an 18-month period, so how do the Government plan to address that? I welcome the repeal of much of the Illegal Migration Act 2024, but I am concerned that some aspects that should have been scrapped will remain, including, for example, the automatic inadmissibility of asylum and human rights claims from certain countries, which is particularly dangerous for LGBTQ+ asylum seekers.
Let me come to my central point. Focusing solely on enforcement simply is not saving lives. The number of deaths in the channel remains horrifying. Enforcement against criminal gangs is of course needed, but that is not going to work on its own when refugees have no other choice. Instead, if people have a choice not to go with gangs, not to put their children in a deathly dinghy and not to risk their lives, the gangs lose their power.
I hope that Ministers have seen the report on safe routes published by the APPG on refugees, of which I am a member. It contains three recommendations, all of which are already tried and tested in other countries and should, in my view, be totally uncontroversial. First, we must urgently fix family reunion. Refugee children are being intentionally kept apart from their parents by the UK’s asylum laws. That is unconscionably cruel. We must move in line with the majority of European nations by bringing parents and children together, which would likely reduce the number of parents making dangerous journeys across the channel to be reunited with their children.
Secondly, Ministers must improve the UK resettlement scheme, which has a lot of potential but has consistently failed to help enough people—only 435 people were resettled last year. My inbox—like those of many Members, I am sure—is full of heartbreaking pleas from people caught up in delays and huge backlogs, and that step could help to fix the system. Thirdly, I would like the Government to pilot a humanitarian visa, to provide a safe option for refugees with strong asylum claims to travel here and make their claim. It is based on successful schemes in the US and Switzerland that have helped to reduce people smuggling.
In conclusion, bits of the Bill are important and hugely welcome, but let us be clear: scrapping something illegal, immoral and unworkable is the bare minimum, and now we need Ministers to build something better that helps this country to rise above the far-right narrative that demonises all migrants. Before I end my remarks, I invite everyone in the Chamber to join me in a very short thought experiment. “The political environment in your home country has become extremely dangerous for anyone with your political views. People in your movement have been murdered. Last month, your children got followed home by an unmarked car, and you have received threatening calls. You have a family member in the UK who successfully claimed asylum a few years ago and is very worried about you. He implores you to join him. Your options are to stay in your home country, risk being murdered and leaving your children orphaned, or to flee to the UK.” Who among us could say with 100% certainty that we would stay?
I will abstain on Second Reading, because although I support the scrapping of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act and the Illegal Migration Act, if the Government truly want to modernise the asylum system, they must be honest about the need for safe routes and respect for human rights.
The Bill, which has been welcomed by the National Crime Agency and the new Border Security Commander, delivers the measures required to tackle smuggling gangs, prevent people from getting into unsafe boats, and improve our border security. It is about giving our law enforcement agencies the tools they need to tackle what have been described as “industrialised” smuggling networks.
Let us make no mistake, under the previous Government the gangs were allowed to get away with it. Instead of sitting down with law enforcement agencies and doing the hard but necessary work to strengthen our borders and disrupt that activity, the Tory Government focused on their shambolic Rwanda gimmick. Shamefully, as those gangs developed and strengthened their processes, Tory Ministers were signing £700 million cheques as part of their Rwanda plan—an unforgiveable amount of money to move just four volunteers. Not only was that a colossal waste of public funds, but all the while, the lack of focus on disrupting the criminal activity perpetrated by the gangs was leading to more dangerous crossings, with a real human cost for often very vulnerable people.
The Bill puts the Border Security Commander on a statutory footing. Having one person leading a unit with responsibility for co-ordinating the UK’s response to our border security challenges is vital. The Bill sets out the framework for how that leadership role will operate within our current policing and security landscape, and the NCA, police and immigration enforcement must all have due regard to its priorities.
We know that the gangs are constantly looking for new ways to stay in business, and law enforcement in our country needs to keep pace. The Bill contains new immigration offences for the supply or receipt of items that the person knows or suspects will be used to facilitate illegal travel. Those tough new powers draw much from existing powers under counter-terrorism legislation, and are accompanied by powers to seize mobile phones, allow for the better sharing of data, and take biometric information. That represents a step change. It means that those engaged in people smuggling will be viewed as a global security threat, in the same way as terrorists.
I believe that that is worth highlighting. The criminal gangs are putting often very vulnerable people in boats that are wholly unsuitable for such a perilous crossing. It is therefore right that our law enforcement bodies be allowed to go after those criminals with the counter-terrorism powers proposed in the Bill. That will transform our response. We will target the criminals, stop people embarking on those dangerous journeys, and keep our borders more secure as a result. The strengthening of serious crime prevention orders will ultimately make all our constituents safer. The new interim SCPOs will put severe restrictions on people involved in organised immigration crime before they are arrested, allowing us to take decisive action when we know that time is of the essence.
The previous Government threw all their efforts behind the unworkable Rwanda plan, but we finally have a Bill that considers the detail and provides practical measures that will make a tangible difference. That will not happen overnight—we know just how sophisticated the gangs are, and how long they have been allowed to thrive—but with strengthened powers we will be in a far better place to tackle them head on. We are now investing in a workable system, with no gimmicks and no grandstanding. Instead, we are doing the detail. The Bill builds on what the Government have achieved so far, including a £150 million package for a Border Security Command, unlocking new surveillance technology and funding more NCA investigators; anti-smuggling action plans with our key allies in Italy and Germany; increasing enforced returns by nearly 25% compared with the year up to the election; and, of course, utilising the hundreds of staff who were working on the Rwanda scheme. Now they are working on immigration enforcement and helping to deliver bespoke charter flights, removing immigration offenders to countries around the world. This Bill delivers on our commitment to give our enforcement agencies the power they need to protect our borders and our citizens, and it has my support today.
I will be voting against the Bill and in favour of the reasoned amendment, for the simple reason that I do not believe this Bill will do anything to smash the gangs, which is what the Labour party sold to the British public.
Over the past 12 months and beyond, my constituents have regularly brought up immigration on the doorstep, talking about both legal and illegal immigration. They want a fair legal system that ensures that the best and the brightest come to this country, as we have always wanted, but for them, this is really an issue of fairness. They believe that uncontrolled borders are not fair, and I agree. Uncontrolled borders make people angry and undermine the case for taking those who are most in need.
Over the past 14 years and beyond, we have had a great track record of taking in refugees from areas of conflict and other places, but by cheating the system, thousands of illegal migrants are entering the country, with the inevitable consequence that our public services are overburdened. That makes my constituents feel that the system is broken—that it does not work for them. Our schools, NHS and welfare system fail to work properly because of the strains caused by illegal migration, and my constituents are right to feel a deep sense of unfairness. Until they see the fundamental issue being tangibly addressed, which this Bill does not do, they will continue to feel that sense of unfairness.
We have seen this with the reopening of the asylum hotels. That is a manifesto pledge that has been broken—the number of asylum hotels and the number of people in them has gone up. Those hotels are funded by the taxpayer, and divert money that my constituents feel could be spent on improving our public services. Earlier, we heard the Home Secretary give no guarantee on when those asylum hotels will be cleared. That will be a consistent and continuous source of consternation for many people across the country, who feel totally helpless when they see pictures and videos of often young men entering this country illegally and being given access to things that my constituents work hard for and pay taxes to sustain.
I firmly believe that all of us across this House want to control illegal immigration, but I fundamentally disagree that this Bill will do so. I have talked about our track record of taking in refugees. We have had a consistent record for many years—we have taken in refugees from Afghanistan, from Syria, and of course from Ukraine—but that track record is being constantly undermined by the dramatic increases in illegal migration, making people feel that we cannot do more.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley) made an eloquent case for this being a global issue. That is often forgotten in the debate, whether it is due to climate change or conflict. However, the public want to see the case being made for the nation state—to know that we can control our borders, and can then allow in the people who we want in the country. Since the Labour party has been in government, we have seen a 28% increase in illegal migration, which will inevitably put strain on our resources. The consequence is that society becomes fragmented, and there are those on the far echelons of the political spectrum who take advantage of that for their own ends and crowd out legitimate and reasonable debate.
The Bill takes away the deterrent and does not deal in any way with the need for a deterrent. As we have heard consistently from the NCA and other experts, without a deterrent, there is nothing disincentivising the gangs from bringing people over. We all want people who are in need to be taken care of, but this Bill does not do that—there is no guarantee that it will. We have heard the Home Secretary continuously fail to provide an answer on that point.
The Bill’s weak tinkering around the edges of the illegal migration system will actually strengthen the gangs, because they now know that they can take advantage of that system. This House is engaged in debate, but the Labour party will win this evening’s vote—of course it will. It has got the numbers; the British people placed a huge amount of trust in Labour, which is now being betrayed, and those gangs will take advantage of it. The one example I will use is that when the Rwanda scheme received Royal Assent, we continuously heard people—and people smugglers—saying that they were not going to come to the UK, and we saw the numbers drop. They will be celebrating the fact that this Bill is going through the House.
I will not give way, because I only have five seconds. This Bill will weaken our borders and strengthen the gangs, and the Labour party really needs to come up with answers to that.
First, I welcome the Government’s commitment to scrapping the costly and inhumane Rwanda plan, repealing much of the previous Government’s draconian legislation, and overturning the pause on processing asylum applications. They have averted a meltdown by cutting the delays built in by the previous Government. The Government are also right to seek to tackle the vicious smuggling gangs that prey on the most vulnerable, but how we do so is key to the success of those efforts.
I despair of the toxic, dehumanising political narrative around immigration over recent years, which has solved nothing and has driven division and hostility towards migrants in our communities, as we saw during last summer’s racist violence. From immigration mugs to Rwanda, from Reform to blue Labour, the spiral of doom on this issue continues apace. The shameless posturing of politicians who wish to make their name on the back of this issue, driving division, is one of the most unedifying parts of this job and this place. Just last week, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) was praising Trump’s horrific statement about ethnically cleansing Gaza of the people it belongs to—a plan that will create over 1.6 million refugees if, God forbid, it comes to fruition. I cannot help but wonder how many of those freshly created refugees would be invited to build a new life in Clacton.
I also worry that by focusing too extensively on deterrence and enforcement, the Government will miss a vital opportunity to tackle the deep-rooted, systemic issues that are truly at the heart of inequality in our country. If we solve the economic issues, we will begin to heal as a nation, and the toxicity around this debate will lose its power. I have discussed migration many times with concerned constituents, and I really value those conversations, but I was told during one such conversation that we have a shortage of housing due to immigrants and that constituents cannot see a GP because of immigrants. I will repeat in this Chamber what I told my constituent: between 1946 and 1981, as a nation, we built 5 million council homes. Since 1981, we have built 250,000, and Liverpool has not built a council house for 36 years. Thatcher’s legacy, not migration, is where the finger should point for our present-day housing crisis.
Speaking of myths, despite the best attempts of some sections of the media to portray asylum seekers as living a life of luxury at the expense of UK taxpayers, the reality is quite different. It is often the private companies, contracted to run the Government’s immigration services and house asylum seekers in awful conditions, that reap the benefits. Serco’s 2023 half-year results stated that revenues had increased by 13%, with financial statements citing that rise in profits as being partly due to
“strong demand for immigration services”.
The destruction of the NHS by 14 years of austerity and decades of privatisation is why people cannot get a GP appointment or receive treatment in A&E. It is immigrants who helped build the NHS.
A man recently told me that he was a true patriot, and that immigration is responsible for everything he was suffering economically. I reflected on those words—“true patriot”—and the narrative being spun around who is and is not worthy to live on these isles. My brother recently had our DNA tested, and we discovered that we are 65% Irish, 25% Scottish, 9% Welsh and, surprisingly, 1% Danish, but 0% English—Scouse not English, you might say. However, I am fiercely proud to come from these isles and from my great city of Liverpool, with its melting pot of cultures built on immigration. That is how I define patriotism, rather than by race or religion, which is a road I fear many are taking right now in a race to the bottom with Trump’s America.
To conclude, let us stop demonising those who come to the UK in search of safety, security and a better life. Let us nurture humanity, not hatred, and revisit the methods used to house, support and integrate migrants upon their arrival in the UK. As I have said, immigration forms the very foundation of my great city, and we are all richer for it. We know that when it is managed badly, immigration can breed fear, anger and hatred, but that is not inevitable. Managed well, and with the right support in place for local communities and migrants, immigration can reap benefits for us all. I will watch this Bill with great interest as it progresses, to see whether it delivers the fair, humane and effective immigration system this country so desperately needs.
This Government, with this plan, will sadly not get on top of illegal immigration. The Secretary of State made much of the fact that the Bill will introduce powers that mirror counter-terror legislation
“to allow law enforcement partners to disrupt, investigate and prosecute those facilitating organised immigration crime”,
but law enforcement already has the ability to disrupt, investigate and prosecute. The Border Security Command and the recruitment of its commander were announced with great fanfare by the Government, but what is there to show for them? Having already removed any deterrent, the number of small boats has risen to its highest level. By the end of the year, the number had risen to more than 30,000 arrivals—now crossing with impunity.
The Border Security Command is due to provide and oversee a long-term vision for the border security system, but what is that vision? Within that system, the commander is responsible for setting the system’s strategic priorities, but what are they? The commander was appointed in September, and it is now February, so when will he set the Government’s strategic priorities for border security?
The default answer of the Minister for Border Security and Asylum to nearly every question is that the Border Security Command is providing “cross-system strategic leadership” to tackle organised immigration crime—because cross-system strategic leadership is the No. 1 thing that people smuggling gangs fear more than anything. I asked what the Border Security Command’s target is for reducing the number of people entering the country via small boat: “cross-system strategic leadership”. I asked what the Border Security Command’s timeline is for reducing the number of people entering the country via small boat: “cross-system strategic leadership”. I asked what Border Security Command provides in the way of cross-system strategic leadership to Border Force, to the National Crime Agency, to immigration enforcement and to the police. The response was:
“The Border Security Command is, for the first time, providing system leadership across those partners.”
Most importantly, several months after the Border Security Command was established, I asked how many organised immigration crime groups had been dismantled —or, to put that in terms that regular viewers may find more familiar, how many gangs have been smashed? The answer was that it is
“collecting key data across the system… This will support the BSC’s ability to drive cohesive delivery across the system”.
So none—not a single gang has been smashed.
The Government have stated that their new approach to border security will focus on prevent, pursue, protect and prepare. Prevent will “disincentivise migrants”, but how will this legislation do that? Currently, if anybody is wondering whether the journey to the UK will be worth the risk, the gov.uk asylum support webpage states:
“You can ask for somewhere to live, a cash allowance or both as an asylum seeker… You’ll be given somewhere to live if you need it. This could be in a flat, house, hostel or bed and breakfast… You’ll usually get £49.18 for each person in your household. This will help you pay for things you need like food, clothing and toiletries.
It continues:
“If you’ve been refused asylum but you’re still eligible for support you’ll be given: somewhere to live”
and
“£49.18 per person on a payment card for food, clothing and toiletries”.
Whether someone is eligible for asylum or not, they will likely still get a home and £50 a week. What deterrent is there in this legislation to mitigate those pull factors? None.
No, I will not.
The Bill repeals most of the Illegal Migration Act, removes the duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements to remove persons who entered the UK illegally to their home country or a safe third country, and allows illegal migrants to obtain British citizenship—more incentives. The Illegal Migration Act blocked asylum seekers from claiming asylum based on their method of entry, so those who entered the country illegally via small boat were unable to claim asylum, not eligible for support and, crucially, not eligible to claim British citizenship.
The Government talk tough on deportations, proudly boasting that they have deported record numbers of migrants, but more than 80% of those individuals are voluntary returns. When I asked the Home Office how much they were each awarded in financial incentives of up to £3,000 per person, the Minister for Border Security and Asylum could not provide that information. Why does she not know? Even those who lose the game still walk away with a cash prize.
With no credible deterrent since the election, we have seen numbers rocket and migrant hotels reopen. In just three months since the election, the number of migrants in asylum hotels rose by 6,000, which is roughly equivalent to the population of the third biggest town in my constituency. Indeed, in Cambridgeshire, the hon. Members for Peterborough (Andrew Pakes) and for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling) have asked the Home Office to rethink its decision to move 146 male asylum seekers into the Dragonfly hotel in Peterborough. I imagine that was not on their bingo card for the first six months of a Labour Government.
The only deterrent in the Bill appears to be five years in prison if migrants refuse to be rescued in the channel by French authorities. I will be staggered if a single person is prosecuted for refusing to be rescued by the French. For reference, threatening someone with a weapon carries a maximum sentence of four years’ custody in the UK, so to suggest that migrants will receive a harsher sentence for not being rescued by French authorities is a nonsense.
This is a terrible Bill that pays lip service to controlling illegal immigration by talking tough while crossing its fingers behind its back. We know that Government Members are more comfortable signing letters to stop deportation flights than they are actually deporting people, but this Bill pours fuel on the fire of illegal migration. It encourages it and facilitates it, and I would not be surprised if Lord Hermer had advised on it. The Bill makes for a snappy headline, but it will not be the solution needed to curtail illegal immigration.
Hon. Members might not realise it from some of the speeches that we have heard, but this Bill is actually about people—people fleeing war, persecution and unimaginable hardship. The repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act and parts of the Illegal Migration Act is welcome, because those cruel, unworkable policies undermined our international obligations and put lives at risk.
This Bill still falls short, however, because it retains harmful provisions, such as section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act, which deems asylum claims from countries such as Albania, Georgia and India inadmissible. Those are not universally safe countries—just ask the LGBT community in Georgia, journalists in Albania, or Kashmiris and religious minorities in India. Survivors of trafficking and torture from those nations seek refuge here, so denying them asylum based on nationality alone is unjust and risks returning them to danger.
Section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act is equally appalling. It denies protections to victims of modern slavery if they have a criminal record, ignoring that many are coerced into crime by traffickers. Punishing victims for their own exploitation is not just cruel; it is a failure of justice. Section 12 further weakens judicial scrutiny of immigration detention, letting the Secretary of State determine what constitutes a reasonable period. That strips away legal safeguards and allows indefinite detention by ministerial order. Sections 12, 29 and 59 also risk breaching the European convention on human rights and should be repealed.
The Bill also introduces new offences that could see refugees prosecuted simply for seeking safety—a deeply troubling approach. In reality, these measures will punish desperate individuals rather than the smugglers who exploit them. Let us be clear: no one risks their life crossing the channel in a flimsy boat unless they have no other choice. Enver Solomon, chief executive of the Refugee Council, put it plainly:
“Criminalising men, women and children who have fled conflicts in countries such as Sudan does not disrupt the smuggling gangs’ business model. When a refugee is clambering into a boat with an armed criminal threatening them, they are not thinking about UK laws but are simply trying to stay alive. The most effective way to break the smuggling gangs’ grip is to stop refugees from getting into the boats in the first place, which means giving them a legal way to apply for asylum in the UK without crossing the Channel.”
Yet this Bill fails to do that.
The Bill continues to treat desperate people as criminals rather than addressing the reasons that they are forced into dangerous crossings in the first place, and it fuels toxic rhetoric that breeds hate and division. We have all seen the consequences of that: asylum hotels named by MPs in this Chamber have been targeted by far-right rioters who set them alight. I have said it before and I will say it again: the enemy of the working class travels by private jet, not migrant dinghy. When politicians and the right-wing press deliberately stoke anti-migrant sentiment, they distract us from the real issues: a system that prioritises profit over people, that slashes our public services, that gives tax breaks to the wealthy and that allows inequality to flourish.
This Bill could have ended the hostile environment, but it doubles down on the same failed policies by criminalising refugees, denying protection to survivors and failing to provide safe routes. As an MP representing Coventry, a proud city of sanctuary enriched by generations of immigration, I demand better. We need a system that upholds human rights and international law and is built on fairness, compassion and humanity, not more failed, punitive policies. We need safe, legal routes for asylum seekers, family reunification and protections for trafficking survivors. This Bill, however, entrenches injustice instead of ending it.
The Home Secretary asked earlier why we oppose this Bill. The answer is that it weakens the law and it allows illegal immigrants to claim asylum, live off benefits and become British citizens. It hinders enforcement by stopping scientific age checks for illegal immigrants and it allows the courts to further restrict immigration detention. No wonder the Home Secretary was yet again unable to say which metric we should use, and when, to judge whether she has succeeded in “smashing the gangs”. Once more she revealed her party’s true self by arguing that the problem with the crossings is not the crime of illegal immigration, but the risk to the illegal immigrants.
Much of this Bill is fanciful. New offences for facilitating the channel crossings apply in other jurisdictions. The idea that the state, even working with other countries, might identify, arrest and extradite the criminals involved, when it fails to prosecute elementary immigration crimes committed on British soil, seems far-fetched.
Some measures are pathetically weak. For example, the Bill requires the Border Security Commander to produce a “strategic priority document”, to which partners agencies must have “regard”. Even measures that supposedly toughen policy have glaring loopholes. The new offence of
“endangering another during sea crossing”
excludes the parents of children on the boats from prosecution, obviously encouraging migrants to put more children on to the boats. But it is all a sham, because we know that the Government’s real policy is to rush asylum claims through, accepting the vast majority before hiding immigrants in the welfare and local authority housing budgets. A Government impact assessment last July admitted that in black and white, stating that 44,000 illegal immigrants who Ministers were choosing not to deport would be granted asylum instead. That cohort alone will cost the taxpayer up to £18 billion over their lifetimes. So opaque was the Home Office about the true costs of its policy choices that the UK Statistics Authority rebuked it, in a letter to me, for being insufficiently transparent.
That should prompt an urgent question about what we are going to do with the huge numbers of low-skilled and high-cost immigrants who have come to Britain in recent years. According to the Centre for Policy Studies, more than 2 million visas have recently been issued to immigrants who could soon get indefinite leave to remain. That gives them the right to live in Britain indefinitely, and grants them access to the NHS, social housing and benefits. Even cautious estimates suggest that the net lifetime fiscal cost to the taxpayer could reach £234 billion.
That brings me to my final point: those immigrants who entered the country illegally should never be allowed to stay here, and those who came here legally on time-limited visas and have not contributed enough should be expected to leave. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition is right to say that ILR should be conditional on someone’s respect for the law and their contribution to our economy. That would go some way to making up for the failures of immigration policy in the recent past, and it would mean a different system, in which we think of immigration as a temporary stay, not a permanent right. It would increase the outflow of migrants as we also control the inflow, and ensure that both the law and the state are in a condition to deliver that policy.
Civilisations that are unable to control their borders die, and ours is no exception. The future of immigration policy must be not just about who comes here, but about who we decide must leave.
I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and the support provided to my office by the Refugee, Asylum and Migration Policy project.
I commend those on the Government Front Bench for their work on the Bill, which will give law enforcement agencies the powers that my constituents in Folkestone and Hythe expect them to have to tackle the smuggling networks. It is a lamentable failure of government that the Conservative party prefers gimmicks to practical, workable solutions to take down those gangs. The only winners in this multimillion-pound industry, which burgeoned under the previous Government, are organised criminals who exploit the desperation of others and force many to work in criminal enterprises in the UK.
In my 18 years as a lawyer, I worked with many victims of modern slavery and saw how organised criminals use brutal, dehumanising tactics to destroy the will and dignity of their victims. Instead of addressing that complex issue, the Conservative party wasted £700 million on an expensive Rwanda gimmick and created a massive asylum backlog, all while stoking division and disregarding the rule of law. I am pleased to see this Government draw a line under that by taking a different approach and repealing the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 and most of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. I am pleased that their answer to these problems takes the common-sense approach of tackling organised crime with stronger law enforcement tools.
I wish to use my remaining time to make two points about something that the Bill leaves in and something that it leaves out. First, I thank the Minister for repealing the worst aspects of the Tories’ Illegal Migration Act when it comes to modern slavery, but do we really need to keep the uncommenced provision in section 29, which would block modern slavery protections on public order grounds, and could well undermine our efforts to combat trafficking?
Section 29 would deprive police of the vital intelligence needed to imprison traffickers, who intimidate victims into silence by convincing them that they will be harmed if they speak out. Victims need to trust that their coming forward will lead to protection, not punishment, but under section 29, anyone arriving in a small boat could be prosecuted for entering without a visa, and excluded from trafficking protections as a result. Victims are likely to think, “What’s the point in going to the police and making myself a target, when the police won’t protect me anyway?” That would support the traffickers’ business model and violate our international obligations. When the Bill reaches Committee, will the Government reconsider the need for section 29, together with section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022?
Secondly, the Bill tackles the criminal groups that drive small boat crossings, but it does not address the other dimension of the problem: the lack of avenues through which to seek asylum without making those dangerous crossings. The Home Secretary rightly said that the Bill is focused on the gangs, but pre-arrival processing is an important outstanding issue. We have schemes for Ukraine, Afghanistan and Hong Kong, and we should be thinking about increasing the resettlement of refugees who have already been recognised abroad, for example through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Will the Minister commit to looking seriously at a pilot system for those from specific conflict zones who have strong claims to be allowed to travel here so that their claim can be fully examined on UK soil? That would build an evidence base on the issue to inform future policy and lawmaking. I echo the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Hallam (Olivia Blake) on section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the safe country list.
The Bill is a long overdue step towards fixing the foundations of our asylum system so that it is a fair, managed and compassionate system that the public can once more have confidence in. It pursues practical, workable solutions, rather than the gimmicks and divisiveness of the other parties, which I am proud that this Government reject.
My constituents do not object to immigration per se, and it is a myth that people who voted for Brexit did so purely on the basis of racism—far from it. People across my constituency want a fair immigration system, in which people stand in turn and come to this country fairly. Where the system has fallen down, and we now see ever increasing numbers of people choosing to come here illegally across the channel, we must have a deterrent to deal with the issue. Without that, we will continue to see and feel the effects of too many people coming into our country illegally.
My constituents are clear that the way to smash the people smugglers is to have a strong deterrent. Look at Australia: when illegal migration first emerged as a major problem in 2001, the Howard Government took swift action to break the smugglers by having a deportation strategy. That policy was of course dismantled by the incoming Labour Government in 2007, yet the same Government were forced to reintroduce the Howard Government policy after five years of ever increasing numbers making their way to Australia through people smugglers who saw the elephant in the room—an immigration policy that had no deterrent. That is exactly what we have here in this country: an inadequate measure to deal with a major issue. Illegal crossings are up 30% since the general election. We need to see action, and now, not just tinkering around the edges of legislation. We need to see deterrents in place and working. Currently, there is no deterrent to stop the boats.
Turning specifically to the Bill, it repeals the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 and the Illegal Migration Act 2023. Much has been said about these two pieces of legislation, but what I see in front of me in this Bill amounts to sheer madness. It means that asylum seekers can refuse to take a scientific age assessment and consequently no longer be treated as over 18. How on earth do the Government plan to identify adults pretending to be children if they legislate to allow them not to have to take a scientific age assessment? That surely acts as a further tool in the armoury of the people smugglers, who I am sure are already poring over this legislation and identifying the loopholes. What does it mean for the safeguarding of those in our country who are tasked with dealing with these individuals?
As it stands, the Bill would enable an unintended consequence around refusing a rescue, whereby someone on a small boat can claim they are a parent with a child and can therefore refuse rescue by French authorities, refuse return to France and continue to the UK. We need an understanding and a plan for what to do with someone who cannot be returned. We need third-party agreements, which are vital. That is why we put the Rwanda scheme and the Albania scheme in place. Guess what? It works. It is a route of return and a deterrent. Those coming illegally to the UK from Albania know that they will be returned.
Disappointingly, the minute that this Labour Government came to power and signalled their intentions to scrap the deterrent within our immigration policy, the number of channel crossings once again started to rise—30% in seven months. I accept that as a Government we had far more to do, and our loss of trust with the British people was not least on this issue, but this Bill and this Government’s repealing of the Rwanda legislation will do nothing to improve the trust of this House and the British people and do nothing to make them believe their borders are safe. All it does is tinker at the edges. Our constituents want to see action, not just words.
In all honesty, I cannot see anything in this Bill that gets to the heart of the problem, which has to be to smash the gangs. What is worse, I am left fearing that this proposed legislation simply gives a green light to the people smugglers that this country has open borders without any form of deterrent. For that reason alone, I cannot support this legislation.
As others have spoken about the specific measures in this Bill, I will take a step back and talk about the ideas that underpin it. There have been grumblings tonight that we are aping Conservative Members and that we are being asked to pretend, to delude ourselves and to dupe the public somehow into thinking that we support strong and controlled borders as a precondition for managed migration. I support this Bill, but I am doing no such thing.
For one thing, we have no need to ape Conservative Members. Their continued smug self-satisfaction smacks of their refusal to reckon with the magnitude of their failure, including to secure our borders. We also have no need to emulate the tub-thumping, NHS-destroying five musketeers who seem to be enjoying flying around the world, raking in cash and occasionally representing their constituents. Only one of them has bothered to show up tonight.
We should worry less about those people and more about the force of our own arguments—the arguments of those who believe in progress and fairness, and who seek to represent the interests of working people in this country. So often I have been told by people who live in wealthier, educated, cosmopolitan cities that support for strong borders and for the right of a public to choose who joins its ranks is an unenviable moral compromise. They say that open borders are the natural state of things, and the use of force to control them is a regrettable, if sometimes necessary, feature of the modern world. Those who think that do not understand the history of our democracy.
I hope the House will forgive a short detour. In the first great democracy in history—ancient Athens—about half the residents were migrants, or metics. Metics were subject to different rules; who joined the city was controlled and the bar was set high for who could become a citizen and vote. If metics broke Athenian laws, they were expelled from the city, and sometimes thrust into the blazing Greek sun. It is a fundamental principle of democracy that people who govern themselves control who they are and who becomes a member of the demos, but in recent decades, some in this country seem to have forgotten that principle. For instance, I was enormously frustrated by the remain campaign’s failure to acknowledge that the EU alters that fundamental principle. We might argue that control is worth giving up for some other reason, such as economic growth or reducing red tape, but without acknowledging that it is given up, we lack the credibility to make the argument.
This is something that my constituents understood perfectly well: control over who joins our self-governing nation is not a moral compromise; it is the heart of what makes us a free people and a strong democracy. The upshot is simple: control over the borders of this country is a precondition for a serious moral debate about who we should allow to join, on what terms and for what reasons. Unless elected Governments can demonstrate to their people that they have control over admission, we cannot seriously debate the trade-offs in who we admit and why.
The public rightly judged my party to have lost credibility on this issue in recent decades. In 2004, we chose not to put the brakes on and opened our labour markets to new EU members. At times, we openly mocked those concerned about migration, but we are not that party any more. I was not elected to this Chamber to espouse those views; in fact, I promised hundreds of my constituents that I would not rest until we gripped our borders, restored control, and yes, as the Home Secretary said, brought down the number of legal migrants entering this country each year—and I meant it. For me, this is not a regrettable moral compromise—a pact with the devil in which we hold our noses and ape Conservative Members to win votes—it is about a deep belief in what it means for our country to be strong, and our democracy respected.
Elected politicians do not just follow the polls; they explain and defend their convictions, and ours are these: the Labour party exists to represent working people. We seek to win power and use it to represent people outside the establishment who do not usually sit in the rooms where decisions are made. At the heart of that is the simple idea that elected people like me should take responsibility for deciding who gets to join our country. Parliament controls our borders, not Brussels or, after this Bill, smuggler gangs. We in the Labour party believe in control and order. The Opposition do not.
I welcome the Bill unequivocally. Those who abuse vulnerable people to threaten the order of our borders should be treated like terrorists, and I am glad that under this Government they will be. In doing so, we are not aping anyone; we are doing what Labour exists to do: take back control to represent the working people of this great country.
We will go down to a four-minute time limit after the next speaker.
In the summer of 2001, on a University of Southampton history field trip to the east end of London—part of the course “The Making of Englishness” on changing notions of British and English national identity in relation to issues of race, ethnicity and immigration from 1840 to the present day—Professor Tony Kushner, who still teaches the course now, took us to a building on the corner of Brick Lane. That building was once a Huguenot chapel, then a Jewish synagogue, and is today a Muslim mosque. That visit changed my understanding and perception of how immigration has impacted our country, and of the place of refuge that we have been over the centuries.
Immigration to the UK is not a new thing, and issues with asylum and illegal immigration are also not new. Two years later, I did a stint in the European Parliament working for an MEP, and I spent some time researching the different asylum systems across the member states in response to the issues that we were facing under the previous Labour Government. Why was that? Because the number of immigrants had shot up, casework had rolled in, and it became obvious that then, as now, we were the final destination for a huge number of illegal immigrants.
Fast forward 20 years and I found myself the Cabinet member responsible for refugees in Plymouth. I saw at first hand the exceptional record of the previous Conservative Government in providing for those arriving legitimately as part of resettlement schemes in response to crises in Hong Kong, Ukraine and Afghanistan, and the integration and engagement that took place as more than half a million migrants and refugees settled here, facilitated by many, including my South West Devon constituents. I also saw the impact on local services, housing, health and schools: the cost of even legitimate immigration.
We all agree that we must tackle the numbers arriving in this country illegally so that we can better serve those who arrive legitimately—those claiming asylum through legitimate channels and not arriving here in small boats having passed through safe country after safe country. We must tackle those who ignore international asylum rules, designed so that the burden of those fleeing conflict, famine and persecution is shared equally among those nations that have a moral duty to offer refuge.
The number of those arriving illegally will, however, keep increasing unless we have a deterrent. That is why the Bill is so counterproductive. By removing not only the deterrence put in place by the last Conservative Government but repealing most of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, the new Labour Government are, in effect, removing any deterrent while also increasing the incentives for getting here illegally: the promise of claiming asylum regardless of whether someone arrives legally or illegally, and the promise of British citizenship. Talk about an open door policy.
Since the new Labour Government took office, so many debates involve highlighting the unintended consequences of their legislation. In this case, the unintended consequence is bound to be increased numbers of those likely to try to get to our shores—the complete opposite of what they want to achieve—and with that, a huge knock-on impact on housing, schools, healthcare and public services in general, all because the Government are naive enough to believe that a so-called Border Security Commander will solve the problem. Tackling illegal gangs is a noble aim, but the last time I checked, illegal gangs do not tend to identify themselves easily. All the while, the numbers arriving in this country will only keep increasing.
Without being defeatist, we struggle to tackle knife crime and drug gangs here on our own streets. I remain unconvinced, therefore, that we can tackle the tsunami of illegal boat crossings, which are already up a quarter on previous figures since this new Labour Government arrived, by simply tackling the black market that is driving illegal immigration. By all means tackle the gangs, but to rely on that with no deterrent and, instead, effectively reward those who make it here illegally, is doomed to fail. It reduces the value of doing the right thing and arriving here legally, and is a roll of the dice that is certain to fail before it has even started.
Before I get to my main speech, I will say a few words on my position on migration. When I was growing up, my dad, who was a bricklayer, had to go and work in Germany because it was so hard to get good-paying work in Burnley, where I am from. A bit like “Auf Wiedersehen, Pet”, he and loads of mates went over to Germany to help with reunification when the Berlin wall was taken down. He was able to earn the wages that helped my parents put a roof over my head and food in my belly.
Migration is not a threat. It is part of our national story and of the very fabric of who we are as a country, and it contributes to our economy, public services, businesses and communities. What we cannot allow, and should never tolerate, is unchecked illegal immigration, led by bad faith actors who seek to undermine our border security and, in doing so, put lives at risk. For too long, ruthless gangs have exploited vulnerable people by charging them thousands of pounds to make dangerous journeys in overcrowded, flimsy boats. These journeys are not only illegal but often deadly, leading to tragic and unnecessary loss of life. We cannot in good conscience stand by while human lives are treated as commodities and our borders are compromised by those who profit from human misery.
Right now, the system is completely overwhelmed, with unworkable policies creating backlogs and putting impossible pressure on housing and public services. I, too, was a councillor, and I remember the pressures on local services. This is not about turning our backs on those in need. It is about creating an orderly, compassionate and secure system that works for everyone. It is about restoring public confidence and ensuring that our borders are protected without compromising our values. The Bill fixes what is not working, ensuring that we have a fair but firm asylum process that prioritises genuine refugees while stopping the current abuses of the system. I strongly support the Bill, and I encourage colleagues across the House to vote for it. Let us send a clear message: we are a nation of compassion and of fairness, but also one of law, order and border security.
We must bring migration numbers down. They have simply been far too high for far too long. My constituents say that to me loud and clear, and I completely agree with them. Unfortunately, despite the Home Secretary’s words, I am not convinced that the Bill will go far enough. The Government have ignored the National Crime Agency, which has stated that a deterrent is essential to prevent small boat crossings. They are now repealing the legal basis of the deterrent that the last Government introduced, ignoring the fact that there has been a 30% rise in small boat crossings since they took office.
The Government are ignoring their own Back Benchers, who just last week were calling for a stronger stance on immigration, by repealing the laws introduced by the previous Government to toughen up the system. The Illegal Migration Act 2023 placed a duty on the Secretary of State to remove illegal migrants to their home country or a safe third country and ensured that those entering this country illegally would never be eligible for British citizenships. No ifs, no buts: someone entering the UK illegally should never be able to claim citizenship. British citizenship is a privilege, not a right. What message does repealing those measures send to our constituents or those considering the dangerous crossing? Frankly, it shows that if someone manages to get to the UK illegally, this Labour Government will let them stay for good.
I fully support what the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) has set out this afternoon and support the Conservative amendment. Citizenship and permanent residency should not be handed out freely. The ability to access that status should be heavily restricted. It must not be available to those who have a criminal record, have claimed benefits or have accessed social housing. We must be clear that individuals who enter the country illegally should never be granted indefinite leave to remain or citizenship, and I am disappointed that the Bill does the exact opposite.
Clauses 1 to 12 provide a framework to enable Border Security Command to fulfil its role as an effective border security system and set out that the commander must minimise threats to our border security. The commander has been in place since September—what has this new organisation been doing in that time? It certainly has not tackled the threats to our border security; as I have said, small boat crossings are up by 30% since July.
My constituents want to see immigration, both legal and illegal, under control. As their MP, I will vote for measures that reduce net migration numbers to avoid the situation recently forecast by the Office for National Statistics. This Bill fails to do that.
I am pleased we are having this debate today, as the measures proposed in the Bill are long, long overdue. Anyone can see that confidence in the immigration and border security system broke down under the previous Government, when hundreds of millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money was wasted on hare-brained schemes, tens of thousands were crossing the channel every year, and 69 people died in the waters off our shores while trying to cross the channel last year. We do not need more gimmicks and headline grabbing; instead, we need serious measures and hard graft.
There are three key components to the Bill that I think will have the most impact. The first is the counter-terror-style powers on immigration enforcement. These important measures will make immigration enforcement properly intelligence-led. There is no point in arresting someone when they step off the boat if we do not disrupt the network that funnelled them to the shore in the first place. The new powers on seizing electronic devices, biometric testing and intelligence gathering and the serious crime prevention orders are exactly what is needed. For four years before I was elected I served as the justice and home affairs attaché at the British embassy in Paris, where I saw at first hand the kind of interventions that make a difference in securing the channel border. These measures are exactly what we need. We are talking about large, well-funded organised crime networks, and we need to treat them as such.
Secondly, I strongly welcome the new offence of endangering a life at sea. We have to change the risk calculation of the people getting on those boats, which the Rwanda plan clearly failed to do. It should shame us all that we have somehow contrived a situation where innocent people drown off our shores, and it is right that we treat the people who endanger their lives like terrorists.
Finally, I cannot welcome enough the emphasis on working with other countries. Immigration is, by its very definition, a cross-border phenomenon, so immigration crime is a cross-border crime. Countries such as France, Germany and the rest of the Calais group will be central to helping Britain tackle our challenges, and intelligence sharing, access to databases and joint operations are the bread and butter of fixing immigration challenges.
Immigration is obviously a challenging topic politically, but as with the economy and public services, public trust is conditional on the Government having a firm grip on the immigration system. Folk understand that we live in a complex world and that people cross borders. They want to be compassionate to save those fleeing for their lives. They do not want to see people drown. Most of all, they want to see the system managed. It has to be firm and fair—it has to be both.
The measures in the Bill should have been on the statute book long ago. Rather than just standing on our shores and shouting, we are seeing the Government get down to doing the hard graft of what it takes to secure our borders.
There but for the grace of God go I. Like everyone in this House, I appreciate the need for security at our borders and the need for a sensible discourse around immigration, but we must be very careful and mindful of our approach, rhetoric and implementation. Our approach must always be guided by compassion, legality and an unwavering commitment to human rights. I appreciate that the Bill seeks to confront the increasingly sophisticated methods used by organised crime groups to facilitate irregular migration. However, global instabilities, be they conflict or the devastating impact of climate change, force desperate people to risk everything in search of security. Since August 2019, 138 people, including many children, have tragically lost their lives. They are not migrants who drown; they are not asylum seekers who drown. They are human beings. These losses are a stark reminder that people do not take such risks unless they are fleeing unimaginable atrocities. In our pursuit of security, we must take care not to conflate genuine asylum seekers with criminals or opportunists. Our language and policies must not inflame hatred or prejudice against those seeking sanctuary.
In addressing irregular immigration, the Government have proposed the following four pillars: preventing, by disincentivising migrants; pursuing, by disrupting the operations of organised crime gangs; protecting; and preparing. I would like the Government to add one more: participating, to meaningfully resolve global conflict and address the root causes of migration, such as climate change, famine, conflict and human rights violations. We must increase our spending on overseas aid back up to 0.7% of GDP. By taking a proactive international role, we can help to create conditions that reduce the pressures driving desperate migration.
We must not view this entire process through the prism of criminality. Particularly alarming is clause 18, which creates the criminal offence of
“Endangering another during sea crossing”.
This clause is aimed clearly at those inside the boats—the very individuals fleeing peril—and represents a dangerous escalation in the criminalisation powers under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Such measures risk penalising vulnerable people who are already caught in the midst of conflict, deprivation and despair. Worryingly, according to the European convention on human rights memorandum,
“Although it is very unlikely, there is no absolute bar to prosecuting parents who have taken their children on journeys which come within the ambit of the Endangerment Offence, which could result in the break-up of families.”
Furthermore, we must ask why the Bill excludes countries such as India, Albania and Georgia from its protections. Genuine survivors of torture, trafficking and persecution from those nations deserve our help, not our suspicion. The retention of sections 59 and 29 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 would restrict or even criminalise asylum and human rights claims from those very countries.
I call on the Government to address these pressing questions. How will we ensure that our measures do not criminalise those seeking asylum? Why are we excluding countries like those mentioned above? What steps will be taken to increase international aid? The Bill is a missed opportunity to demonstrate the Government’s stated commitment to human rights and the rule of law, and to
“modernise the asylum and immigration system”—[Official Report, 17 July 2024; Vol. 752, c. 40.]
We all welcome the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, but I look forward to seeing some meaningful amendments in Committee.
Let me start by correcting some misinformation that has been shared throughout the debate by Opposition Members— unintentionally, I am sure. Those who speak about illegal immigrants, or people seeking asylum illegally, should bear in mind that everyone, under international law, has a right to seek asylum from persecution. That is enshrined in international law. There is also the right not to be penalised for entering the country without permission when it is necessary to seek asylum. Those who use the word “illegal” should remember that it is only illegal because the last Government made it so, just as Rwanda was only considered safe because the last Government legislated to make it safe. The vast majority of people need to cross the channel by irregular means because there are very few safe routes. The UK requires them to do that, and then criminalises people who do it.
The Government’s scrapping of the Rwanda plan, and the repealing of some of the most extreme elements of the Conservative Government’s legislation, are very welcome. It is essential for this performative cruelty to be wiped from the statute book, and I congratulate my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Home Office team on doing so. However, I must admit that I am disappointed that many inhumane policies have been left to stand. For example, the Home Office will still be allowed to operate a two-tier asylum system: some refugees will be penalised for the route by which they arrived; some victims of modern slavery will continue to be denied protections; and some people’s claims will still be automatically inadmissible on the basis that they have come from so-called safe countries, a number of which are anything but safe for minority groups.
I am particularly worried about certain new elements of the Bill. It expands offences, and gives the state additional powers to investigate and prosecute people. I know that the Government’s target is the organised criminals running these operations, but I am deeply concerned about the possibility that many more people seeking asylum will also be criminalised as an unintended consequence. We must ensure that people who just want to start a new life in safety after being forced from their homes are not punished. We need to combat the dehumanising, false narrative that desperate people fleeing war and persecution are criminals, and we must not treat them as such. Instead, we should be properly reforming our broken asylum system. An improved system should include safe and legal routes, a fair and efficient decision-making process, the lifting of work restrictions, the closure of all large sites, and increased asylum support rates.
It is appalling that 138 people—138 human beings—have died attempting to cross the channel since the summer of 2019. I have no doubt that my party is united in wanting to save lives, but I fear that the Bill, no matter how well-intentioned its aims might be, will not succeed, and that more people will die attempting to reach our shores because it does not tackle the lack of alternative options for claiming asylum, which is driving people on to those dinghies. I worry that our approach, which does not differ drastically enough from that of the last Government, will continue to add to the suffering that so many people seeking asylum have already experienced. When sector organisations such as Asylum Matters, Asylum Aid, Médecins Sans Frontières, the Refugee Council and Migrants’ Rights Network have expressed serious concerns about the Bill, alarm bells should be ringing.
It is a truth universally acknowledged that we need to have a robust migration policy that fulfils the economic needs of the UK while also protecting and preserving our British way of life. Although it is important that the British public hear loud and clear our acknowledgement that the last Government did not get everything right on migration numbers, it is equally important that recognition be given to the actions that they took to start turning the tide on migration numbers. The changes in visa rules at the end of 2023 curbed some of the student visa abuses, with the result that applications fell by 30%, delivering a cut in legal migration. As for illegal migration, the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 created the foundations for a deterrent—which the National Crime Agency says is essential—that would have allowed the UK to process asylum applications overseas. The Illegal Migration Act 2023 would have prevented those who entered the UK illegally from claiming asylum or gaining citizenship. The Bill before us seeks to undo so much of that good work, as the shadow Secretary of State and my right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr Cleverly) explained. Labour will allow illegal migrants to claim asylum and have access to British citizenship, remove our third-country deterrent and make our borders weaker.
We are already starting to see the effects of Labour’s light-touch approach to border security. Since the election, we have seen illegal boat crossings up and the number of migrants housed in hotels, at taxpayers’ expense, up. At least the Labour party is consistent on this issue. However, it is essential that we safeguard our borders, and this is not just linked to migration numbers. Under this Bill, the Government are seeking to set up a Border Security Commander who, in exercising their functions—which, I note, are undefined—must have regard to the objective of
“maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities relating to threats to border security”.
One such partner authority would be Border Force, which is a law enforcement organisation whose priority in relation to channel crossings is
“search and rescue and the safety of life”.
However, as was flagged in the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee’s session last week, Border Force is also responsible for control of personal imports and for checks on illegal meats coming in across the border. Biosecurity threats do not respect boundaries or borders, but Border Force is so stretched that we are able to check only about 20% of the meats imported into the UK. I cannot state clearly enough that our biosecurity is at risk, particularly given the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Germany, and the spread of African swine fever.
My concern is that the Government have created a new position without clear functions in the Border Security Commander, which is a distraction from the action that is needed now. Overwhelmed by the numbers coming across the channel, and without an effective deterrent, our Border Force cannot manage the catastrophes in front of it. It needs urgent funding, yet this Government are not addressing that.
For all the reasons that I have stated, I will vote in favour of the reasoned amendment, as this Bill fundamentally undoes the good work of the previous Conservative Government, flies in the face of common sense, and is an insult to my constituents in South Northamptonshire, who want to see stronger borders and a tough migration policy.
I thank the Home Office team for bringing forward this Bill. We all recognise in this place that, over the years, immigration has enriched our country and helped us all to prosper. One only has to look at the local health and care system in and around my constituency of High Peak, where nurses and care workers from around the world are keeping our NHS running. I want to put on record my thanks to all those in High Peak who have made it their home and contribute so much to our communities.
The concerns that I hear from local residents in High Peak are not about those who come here legally, play by the rules and fill vital roles; they are about those who enter the UK irregularly, mostly on small boats, who my constituents see as skipping the queue. This is about fairness, the rule of law and standing up for British values.
Not that long ago, the last Government, Boris Johnson and the now hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) promised us that leaving the European Union meant that we would take back control of our borders. The last Government left us with open borders and failed to create a plan to tackle illegal migration. Small boat crossings reached record numbers and, in their last three years, the previous Government poured all their energy and resources into the shambolic, unworkable Rwanda scheme—a gimmick that saw just four volunteers go to Rwanda, at a cost of £700 million of taxpayers’ money. That was an utterly scandalous waste of my constituents’ money, and it was anything but a deterrent. It is shocking that so much time and effort was put into a scheme that could never work and would never work.
In High Peak, we saw the consequences of the lack of a deterrent when the previous Government tried to convert High Peak Halls in Buxton into an asylum dispersal centre, which was ultimately only stopped by opposition from local police, local councils and local people.
By contrast, this Government are getting on with the job of delivering stronger border security and a fairer immigration system. We are determined to decisively bring down the number of small boat crossings and end the use of asylum hotels for good. Our deterrent is clear: we will process applications and we will deport those that do not have the right to be here. Some 19,000 people have been returned under this Government—a 24% increase in enforced returns. That is a genuine deterrent, and this Bill will go further in helping to defeat the criminal gangs that are making millions of pounds from preying on vulnerable people. All of us in this House have seen the tragic losses of life in the channel, and stopping the crossings is a humanitarian necessity. The Bill will help to do that by creating the offence of endangering life at sea.
I fully support the measures in this Bill that give the law enforcement agencies the toughest tools possible to break down the smuggling gangs’ ability to carry out those small boat crossings. The Prime Minister was right to say that we need to view the smuggling gangs as a global security threat and treat them as the terrorists that they are. The Bill will replicate the counter-terror powers on issues such as electronic devices at our borders, and introduce new offences against gangs conspiring to plan crossings. As a result of this and the statutory powers of the new Border Security Command, the people of High Peak can finally have faith that our law enforcement agencies will have the power to stop these vile criminals.
Only by taking these concrete steps can we smash the gangs and bring down the numbers of people who are travelling to this country illegally. The Government’s plan for change relies on stronger border security, and it is critical that these steps are taken to ensure that those who threaten our security can be pursued relentlessly and by every means. This Bill will start to restore fairness and balance to our immigration system and, dare I say it, take back control of our borders. That is what the people of High Peak expect, and that is what this Labour Government will deliver.
Our country has a proud history and record of offering sanctuary to and helping those in need. From the Kindertransport when we offered a home to Jewish children escaping Nazi persecution to hosting Ukrainians fleeing President Putin’s Russia, our country has proudly welcomed people from around the world. In fact, in our very own hour of need, when our cities lay in ruins after world war two, immigrants from the West Indies played a significant role in rebuilding Britain, filling labour shortages in critical sectors such as construction, transport and healthcare. We should never forget either the contribution that immigrants have made to our country or our responsibility as a place of refuge in the world, but today immigration is higher than it is ever been, and this causes legitimate problems and concerns that my constituents in Mansfield are very concerned about.
Let me be absolutely clear that my constituents, many of whom voted for me last year, are not racist, right wing or far right for having concerns about immigration and the security of our borders. They are neither racist nor far right for being worried about our NHS, about housing or about why their children cannot get a place in the local school of their choice. We must never label those constituents who raise legitimate and factually sound concerns as racist. What we must do as a Government is address those concerns. I believe that the previous Government failed to do that, instead allowing migration, both legal and illegal, to skyrocket. I am glad, therefore, that the Government are scrapping the completely ineffective Rwanda scheme, which cost an eye-watering £700 million, and that we are instead introducing measures that will deal with the problem at hand.
I am particularly pleased that the Bill will target the people smuggling gangs that have facilitated boat crossings of the channel. It will create a new offence of selling or handling small boat parts for use in the channel, it will enable the confiscation of electronic devices and the disruption of communications, and it will support the newly created Border Security Command. These responsible, realistic actions show that this Government are focused on delivering results, unlike the solutions offered by the Opposition.
My constituents in Mansfield want to get on with things. This Bill, along with the other legislation that the Government have introduced in their first six months to support house building and invest in our national health service and schools, will go a long way towards doing that.
I simply wish to make one request and propose one amendment to the Bill. I have listened to the whole debate. There are more asylum seekers in hotels in my constituency than in any other constituency in the country. I have two detention centres, one of which was the last to imprison children, so I understand. I tour the hotels, and every time there is a debate like this in this place and it is reported outside, I worry because it creates insecurity, worry and fear among the asylum seekers in my constituency.
To answer a point made earlier, most of the asylum seekers in hotels at the moment did come in the boats, but they came in the boats because there is no other route. It is as simple as that. I chair the Public and Commercial Services Union parliamentary group, and the PCS and the frontline Border Force staff it represents say that the way to stop the boats is to introduce a safe-passage visa system, accessible through our European centres or online. That would undercut the criminal gangs’ money earning potential.
When I meet asylum seekers and listen to their individual stories of the suffering both in their home country and during their passage here, I rarely come away without tears in my eyes. It is also rare that I do not come away impressed by the scale of their talent, and by just how much they can contribute to our economy and our society. I want the message to go out that I welcome asylum seekers—it is as simple as that.
There has been a failure to address the age assessment of individual applicants. The previous Government introduced the national age assessment board, which uses supposedly scientific measures to assess an applicant’s age. As Members involved in that debate will know, experts both in this place and elsewhere—Lord Winston has been mentioned—have contested the idea that it is a scientific approach and said it is inaccurate. It has been proven to be a failure, and where it has been used in other countries, it has never been solely relied upon. What has been successful is a comprehensive evidence-taking process, through a social work-type assessment of individuals.
Since the new system was introduced, as the hon. Member for Bristol Central (Carla Denyer) mentioned, there have been 1,300 incorrect assessments. What does that mean? I will give one example. Under the new law, 450 people have been convicted of arriving on the boats. Of those 450 convictions, 14 people who were imprisoned were later determined to be children. If a child is incorrectly assessed, they are classified as an adult and are put into an adult institution, and some of those classified as adults have therefore been imprisoned alongside adult offenders. That is not fulfilling our duty to safeguard children, is it?
That is why this system needs to be changed. We need to reinvest the £1.7 million that has been wasted on these “scientific” assessments and go back to the social assessments made by professional social work experts. At least we will then be able to live up to the expectation of safeguarding young people.
I draw the attention of the House to my entry in Register of Members’ Financial Interests and the support I receive from the Refugee, Asylum and Migration Policy project.
Members across the House want an immigration system that is well managed. When I speak to my constituents, they tell me that is what they want, too—grip, control and a Government back in control of our borders. I am so pleased that the Bill seeks to provide exactly that, and not just with slogans, but with solutions.
I welcome the establishment of the Border Security Command and the enhanced powers to tackle the criminal gangs that make it possible for people to cross the channel in small boats. Those gangs are exploiting some of the world’s most vulnerable people, and that is unacceptable. I welcome the Bill’s focus on unaccompanied children who enter the country in that way. It is right that we will no longer detain them without time limits, and it is right that local authorities will be supported to make decisions on their accommodation needs. We must not leave those vulnerable children in hotels or in any inappropriate adult accommodation. I cannot tell the House how much I welcome the repeal, in full, of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. Some £700 million of taxpayer money was wasted on a scheme that was inhumane and never going to work.
There are two areas of the Bill that we will need to scrutinise carefully as it moves forward. First, I would like reassurance that we are able to continually review which countries are safe and which are not, based on evidence. That is really important when international events can be so unpredictable and fast-paced, as we have seen with the fall of Assad in Syria, for example. Secondly, we have to be careful to minimise the risk of unintentionally criminalising asylum seekers—people like Ibrahima Bah, a young person from Senegal who was sentenced after steering a dinghy that broke apart next to a fishing vessel, under threat, he claimed, of death. It is the smuggling gangs we need to target, not young people who are coerced while trying to survive. I know that Ministers will be looking carefully at that.
I turn to the international context in which we are discussing the Bill. While I welcome the Bill and I hope it reduces the number of people crossing the channel in grave danger, the reality is that for as long as persecution, war and conflict exist in the world, there will always be people fleeing for their safety, including to the UK. With that in mind, I see a vital continuing role for safe and legal ways for refugees and asylum seekers to seek protection in the UK. We know that safe routes can work; I am proud of our country for the Homes for Ukraine scheme and the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme, for example. When such schemes operate effectively, we do not see people of those nationalities getting on small boats.
The APPG on refugees, of which I am co-chair, last week published an inquiry into safe routes, proposing further solutions, such as reviewing the financial restrictions for UK-based sponsors to reunite with their children who remain in danger overseas. I hope those proposals will be considered. The benefit of options such as family reunion and humanitarian visas is that they are also controlled and orderly, in the same spirit as the Bill.
I also see a vital role for international co-operation. I know the Home Secretary has been working with European neighbours to tackle the criminal smuggling gangs, which is vital. I was pleased to see the joint action with Germany in December. I would like to see international co-operation extend to better anticipating and engaging constructively in resolving the crises that cause people to flee their homes in the first place, and to providing support for people closer to their homes. For example, the 3.3 million people who have fled across a border to escape the conflict in Sudan need support in Sudan and when they flee to neighbouring countries. That work has just got harder with the dramatic cuts to the US international aid budget, which I fear will be deeply destabilising. Ultimately, that is where the work must start to stop vulnerable people attempting to reach our own shores.
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak and I look forward to supporting the Bill tonight.
My hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Josh Simons) took us back to ancient Athens. I am a recovering classicist, so let me note that Britain has, from the time of the Romans, been a nation of immigrants. Scientific analysis has proven the rich cultural diversity of Roman Britain, and immigration has enriched our country ever since, with people from the Windrush generation to, in more recent times, the Ukrainians and Hongkongers proudly making their homes here in the UK.
As the MP for Bracknell, a new town, I know that my constituents understand what it is to set up home in a new corner of Earth. That said, they also know that it is the first duty of any Government to protect the country, and a functioning and fair immigration system is the prerequisite to that. The Government—any Government—must have control of their borders, but the sad reality is that, under the previous Government, control of our borders was lost.
Nearly 37,000 people crossed the channel in small boats last year. Many of them were vulnerable individuals, but nevertheless the sheer number of people crossing demonstrates a lack of control. For the Conservative party, which fashions itself as taking a tough stance on immigration—we have heard some of that in the debate—that is an embarrassing record. One need only look at the Rwanda scheme, which cost £700 million of taxpayers’ money and saw 84,000 people crossing the channel from the day it was announced to the day it was scrapped —some deterrent.
The challenge with the open-border policy of the previous Government was that it undermined the possibility of having a safe, just and effective asylum system. Many people who risk their lives crossing the channel do so because they are seeking asylum. It is proper that our country protects the rights of asylum seekers, but it is also true that some of those crossing the channel have no right to be here. That is why there has been a 10% increase in returns under this Government, and almost 3,000 foreign criminals have already been removed from Britain’s streets—a 24% increase on last year. Flights to Rwanda stayed on the ground; this Government are ensuring that flights to deport foreign criminals are taking off.
We can already see the effect on small boat arrivals under this Government. When we won the election in July, arrivals for 2024 were almost 6% ahead of the record year of 2022. In the second half of last year, we saw almost 10,000 fewer arrivals than in 2022, despite having more days when the weather was favourable for crossings.
The Bill will introduce landmark new measures so that we have the tools to fix the immigration system that the Tories have broken—and, yes, it will act to smash the gangs. There are measures to strengthen border security, strengthen the asylum and immigration system, prevent crime, and protect vulnerable asylum seekers whom the vile people smugglers would seek to exploit. That is the action that the Government are taking, and that is why I support the Bill.
Some of us have run a real business. I had to drive trucks across the channel, and I still remember the Calais-to-Dover border crossings, with dogs sent in to sniff out human trafficking and groups of men at every service station on the road to Calais. My fear that my lorry might be hijacked by someone attempting to enter our country illegally very much reflected the confusion and anger expressed by my constituents in Bassetlaw. That is why they sent me to Parliament to be their loud voice, to monitor and to push for tough action to boost border security and to sort this problem out.
We now have a Border Security Commander in Martin Hewitt, who was appointed in the first days following the general election. His job is to bring back control of our borders, smash the gangs and stop the flow of illegal migrants. Under the previous Government, £700 million of taxpayers’ money was wasted on the failed Rwanda scheme, 84,000 crossed the channel in rubber dinghies, asylum decision making collapsed, and the cost of asylum hotels stacked up to £6 million a week.
With this Government, we are getting results: the highest number of returns since 2018, with close to 19,000 individuals having been flown out of our country; nearly 3,000 foreign criminals removed; deals around the world, including with Iraq, to break up those at the centre of the organised smuggling gangs; proper dialogue with our G7 partners as we start to work in step on this issue; agreement with the German authorities to arrest and imprison anyone caught facilitating the trafficking of illegal migrants; and, just last month, 828 raids on businesses, including the nail bars and car washes where people are brought to work in slave labour conditions. But we need power to take more action, and the Bill will enshrine the Border Security Command in law, enabling the co-ordination of law enforcement agencies with the sole focus of taking back control of our borders.
We must make the English channel a no-go area for the criminal gangs by effectively targeting them; disrupting their activities through the seizure of electronic devices, including mobile phones; restricting their activities by maximising the impact of serious crime prevention orders and giving law enforcement the power to monitor and intervene; and arresting and jailing them, with new offences that will mean that those selling or handling small boat parts for use in the channel face up to 14 years in prison. The Bill will make it a criminal offence to endanger life. My thoughts today are with those children too young to make a choice who were lost by drowning.
There can be no hiding places. Where lorry drivers are bringing people in, there will be a new 14-year jail term for vehicle concealment. My message to the Government is: crack on with the job, give us a running commentary of every success, publicise the return flights and the jailing of criminals, clear up the Conservatives’ mess, secure our borders, close down the use of hotels and stop the small boats.
I thank the Home Secretary and the Minister for Border Security and Asylum for introducing the Bill, which undoes some of the harmful elements of the asylum system, including the measures introduced in the Illegal Migration Act and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act. In particular, I welcome the measures to repeal child detention powers and Home Office accommodation powers over unaccompanied children.
From the Kindertransport to the many children we have welcomed into our homes from Ukraine, the Great British public really care about the welfare of children coming from war zones and fleeing persecution. We must be diligent to ensure that the Bill does not criminalise the wellbeing of children or lead to cruel measures against children fleeing persecution in their own countries. It is the people smugglers who are putting lives in danger, yet they are not the people who are trying to migrate here. Those migrating here are escaping persecution, and we must be mindful of that when we seek international and EU powers to criminalise those who are actually trafficking people.
Children are too often caught up in politics that leaves them cruelly treated, such as in 2023 when the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), as Immigration Minister, ordered that murals of Mickey Mouse and other cartoon characters designed to welcome child asylum seekers to a reception centre in Dover be painted over because they sent “too welcoming” a message. These are children fleeing war and persecution.
I want to draw the Minister’s attention to my concern about the new law enforcement elements of the Bill. The changes include new criminal offences of supplying or handling almost any item to be used in connection with illegal immigration, and of collecting information to be used for arranging an unauthorised journey to the UK. I will give an example. Some non-governmental organisations in border zones provide a play service to create space for refugee and asylum-seeking children to process trauma, develop key skills and make positive memories in hostile environments. That can be a lifeline for children at risk across continents. It helps mitigate some of the traumatic effects they experience and hopes to lessen the impacts of post-traumatic stress disorder.
If the new law enforcement powers criminalising the supply or handling of almost any item to be used in connection with illegal immigration do not include exemptions for toys or other items used for play, are we penalising children’s ability to play or enjoy a toy that brings them solace in the chaos of their fleeing journey? We must ensure that children and aid workers are not penalised under the Bill for supplying toys or items that bring solace to children.
To reassure my hon. Friend, these items certainly will not include children’s toys, and nor will we be doing anything to introduce widespread powers that just apply to everybody. These are intelligence-led powers that will focus on those in the gangs doing the organising.
I thank the Minister for that reassurance. As the Bill progresses to Committee, it would be helpful if those items were listed among the relevant articles to give some solace to the NGOs, which have pointed out their concern to me. That would be an easy thing to add to the list already in the Bill.
To conclude, I welcome this significant step forward for children’s rights. I look forward to further strides during the Bill’s passage to find ways of bringing unaccompanied children and family reunion into the migration system once again.
Britain has a long and proud tradition of providing asylum to those fleeing war and persecution, and that patriotic principle must always remain. However, we must be honest: too many people are arriving in our country with no legal right to be here, and they must be returned. Further still, they must be prevented from entering our country altogether. The numbers are too high; they must come down.
The alternative is unacceptable. Towns such as Hartlepool are targeted by private providers of asylum accommodation because of our lower housing costs. Those providers are profiting from this crisis and putting a burden on Hartlepool’s public services. Local schools, hospitals and social services are forced to absorb the consequences of a broken system—that is the reality that we face, and it must change. The Bill signals the Government’s intention to do just that. Instead of open borders, we will have a Border Security Command. Instead of a soft touch, we will have record deportations. Instead of expensive gimmicks, we will have far-reaching new powers that will put the boot of the state on the throat of the criminal gangs whose trade, let us not forget, is the trafficking of human beings. The Bill is about restoring control and taking decisive action to fix the system.
Hartlepool people are open, generous and welcoming. I have personally seen their fundamental decency on display in communities across our town, including at the Salaam Community Centre on Murray Street, where Nancy Pout and her amazing team took to the streets after last summer’s rights and, alongside volunteers and council workers, cleaned up the devastation left by mindless thugs. They symbolise fundamental Hartlepool values.
Those values include fairness, which is why I believe that transparency in these matters is essential. Home Office figures provided to me by the House of Commons Library show that, as of September 2024, Hartlepool is supporting 50 asylum seekers per 10,000 people. The neighbouring, larger local authority is hosting just seven per 10,000. There are local authorities up and down this county for which the figure is zero. That cannot be right. After 14 years of austerity for our public services, it must not be the most deprived areas of our country that carry the biggest burden.
When the break clauses in the asylum accommodation contracts come up in 2026, I urge Ministers to use them and spread the burden fairly as we fix the system and bring the numbers down. This is about taking back control of our asylum and immigration system, not through slogans and broken promises, but through real enforceable action. The people of Hartlepool, and communities across the UK, deserve nothing less.
The Conservative party has a record of failure, and now it is failing to back our measures to put things right. On Rwanda, so much money was wasted to deport so few people, and with so little remorse. Imagine the howls that we would have heard if a civil servant or trade union had wasted just 1% of that sum. On the asylum backlog, the graph is like the NHS waiting list under the Conservatives: up and up it went to 166,261 by 2022—an elevenfold increase on the number that they inherited. That is what happens when those who do not believe in government are the Government.
While this Bill focuses more on asylum, the net migration figures also illustrate that the previous Government let things get out of control, with a 220% increase in net migration from 244,000 in 2010—then a record—to 782,000 in 2023. As with policing and defence, so it is with asylum and immigration: the previous Government failed, yet Conservative Members rail against us as we tackle the crisis that they bequeathed us. I do not want to rehearse the excellent policies set out by Ministers and by my Labour colleagues, so I will just gently ask right hon. and hon. Members on the Conservative Benches to put their hand on their heart and tell us that they are proud of their record. Do they think it is dignified for a great country such as ours to offshore our responsibilities to Rwanda, a country that they needed—with an Orwellian flourish—to define as safe? Hand on heart, do right hon. and hon. Conservative Members think that it is in the national interest to vote against the robust, practical and principled approach in this Bill?
It is a shame that the Conservative party continues to resort to false promises and populist language. We have heard that tonight, such as “surrender”, or the words of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), who spoke about the £49.18 per week that asylum seekers receive to pay for clothes and toiletries. These are human beings. I am sure that the hon. Member was not suggesting that a country such as ours should not be offering people the ability to clothe themselves.
I was not suggesting that people should not have the ability to clothe themselves; my point was that this is advertised on the Government website, and is a pull factor. What does this Bill do to address that pull factor?
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. This Bill proposes numerous measures that will get tough on the evil criminal gangs that are bringing people here on those boats, and my hon. Friends on the Labour Benches have made that point very clearly.
With their hand on their heart, are right hon. and hon. Members on the Conservative Benches perhaps feeling ashamed of flirting with the idea of derogating from our international rights obligations? In time, I believe that the public will see that—led by a Prime Minister who has actually tackled criminal gangs—the Home Secretary and her team will leave behind the failure, gimmicks and populism of the past and replace them with effective action.
That brings us to the Front Benchers. I call Matt Vickers.
Today’s remarks from Conservative Members have been clear—we understand the public’s frustration that more has not been done to reduce these numbers. They are too high, and they must be lowered. During the election campaign, Labour said that it wanted to smash the gangs, but since it took power, small boat crossings have risen by 28%. Before the election, we were closing hotels, yet now 6,000 more people are in hotels, and the number of people arriving in small boats and being removed is down. Conservative Members remain deeply concerned that this Bill and the Government’s approach would represent a backwards step. Rather than utilising every power available, they are focused on tweaking existing laws and stripping away powers that were previously put in place. That is not the approach that the UK needs; rather, we need legislation and a strategy that establishes powers to stop illegal migration for good.
I can already hear Labour Members criticising the last Government. We do not deny that numbers were far too high—quite the opposite—but it was the last Government who introduced a deterrent, one that was scrapped by the Labour party immediately upon taking office before it could even begin. The Leader of the Opposition has been abundantly clear that despite efforts made by the last Government, far more needed to be done to solve the problem.
The problem for the Government is that, despite their complaints about their predecessors, this legislation is unlikely to provide anything like a real solution. The immigration crisis is undoubtedly one of the biggest challenges we face as a country, and it requires bold action. If people believe that they can arrive here illegally and stay, they will continue to come in ever-increasing numbers. The cancelling of the deterrent was an act of national self-harm. The increase in small boat arrivals since the Labour party took office makes that clear for the whole House to see.
I will give way to people who have been here throughout and have contributed to the debate.
Some of the changes in the Bill weaken rather than strengthen our ability to deal with the issue. Creating a route to British citizenship for those arriving here illegally—enticing more people to come—cannot be part of the solution. Weakening our ability to scientifically verify the age of those arriving, creating huge safeguarding risks in our education and care system, is also not part of the solution.
The National Crime Agency, and examples from Governments around the world, show that a deterrent must be in place, but this Bill does the opposite by removing the deterrent that is currently in law. It seems to stem from the misguided belief that arresting a small number of these heinous criminals will be enough to stop the crossings. Even though we would all like that to be the case, it is a vast oversimplification.
On deterrence to stop criminals, we all agree on the need to arrest the people behind these crimes, which is why, in 2023, there were 246 arrests of people smugglers and 86 arrests of small boat pilots—and I am still stunned that the Labour party opposed life sentences for people smugglers. We need measures that stop people boarding those boats in the first place, however, because failing to do so not only harms our country but fails those who endanger their lives by making that perilous journey.
Where legislation increases enforcement powers, enables further interventions and enhances data availability, we will welcome it. The experience of the enforcement authorities must be heard to ensure that they have the necessary powers. These sensible measures should not, however, be bundled into a Bill that simultaneously weakens the Secretary of State’s authority. The Home Secretary’s remarks failed to acknowledge the impact of the repeals. [Interruption.] She could have commenced them with the stroke of a pen. We must ask why this Bill repeals sensible provisions. It is stunning that the Government would prefer to weaken their powers rather than strengthen them.
Turning specifically to the repeals of previously passed legislation, I ask the Government what is wrong with the principle that if someone enters the UK illegally, they should never have a path to British citizenship. Why remove that provision? British citizenship is a special privilege, not something to be granted lightly. Those who enter our country illegally—breaking our laws—should not be offered a pathway to citizenship. Regularly granting citizenship to such individuals undermines the deterrent and sends the damaging message that breaking the law can lead to benefits. That harms the UK and endangers those who risk their lives to come here.
Additionally, the legislation repeals the Secretary of State’s ability to regulate consent for scientific age assessments where there are no reasonable grounds to withhold consent. That was a sensible step to prevent the abuse of the system. Some may argue that the provision is unnecessary, but between 2016 and September 2022, around 8,000 asylum cases involved age disputes. In about half, the individuals were assessed to be adults. Removing that power again weakens our legal infrastructure. We have also suggested significant but appropriate changes to indefinite leave to remain and citizenship. Why should the right to stay not be dependent on someone’s willingness to contribute and obey the law?
Last week, the Brussels correspondent for The Times reported that the European Union is drafting plans to overhaul the post-war refugee convention in what may be one of the most significant shifts in migration policy for decades. That is a clear signal of a growing consensus across the western world that the legal structures and institutions that restrict the Government from doing what is best for our country, and that have been obstructive, are no longer fit for purpose in tackling this significant issue.
While EU countries look to put together a deterrent scheme similar to the one cancelled by the Government, we must ask what the Government are trying to achieve with this legislation. Rather than implementing the significant changes being seriously discussed in Europe, or those that have been effective in Australia, they are opting for limited interventions. They are focused on tweaks to the system while simultaneously reducing their own powers in other aspects of the legal framework. That is not the decisive leadership that we need from the Government of the United Kingdom; it is a weak approach stemming from weak leadership, and for that reason I urge the House to vote for the reasoned amendment. It would be far better for the Government to go away, return swiftly with the necessary legal changes, and adopt an approach that genuinely deters people from coming to this country illegally.
I remind Members that despite pledges to smash the gangs, as of yesterday crossings were up by nearly 28%. That demonstrates that, as we warned the Government, their plan is not working, and the reality is that there are no easy fixes to this problem. There are significant challenges in addressing the issues arising from channel crossings, but we do not believe that the appropriate response is to dismantle legislation that provides the Government with powers they could use for the benefit of the country. That would be capitulation, and a charter for illegal immigration. I say to the Government: bring forward a Bill that enhances the ability of enforcement agencies, rather than one that strips them of their powers. We need a solution that takes the transformative steps to reduce illegal migration significantly, and action that secures our country’s borders and stops these life-threatening crossings. It is wrong to tell the world that if someone comes here illegally they can become a British citizen. I urge Members to back the reasoned amendment.
There was one iota of reality and truth in the middle of that farrago of rubbish that we have just heard from the Conservative party, and I will quote it because I pricked up my ears. The hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) said that there are “no easy solutions” to this problem. You could have fooled me, Madam Deputy Speaker! Conservative Members spent most of their last few years in office telling us that there were easy solutions and passing legislation that was so unusable and useless that they never commenced it, yet they now complain about our taking it off the statue book.
Conservative Members need to explain to the people of this country why they do not want counter-terrorism-style powers to deal with organised immigration, and why they are voting against sensible extensions of powers, which have been asked for by the National Crime Agency, our Border Security Commander and the police, to help deal with this challenge on our borders. Why are they against the Bill? Almost all of them are still trying to claim that somehow their fantasy of the Rwanda scheme actually was a deterrent, when we know that it did not work—[Interruption.] The shadow Home Secretary can chunter all he likes, but 84,000 people crossed the channel in small boats when the Rwanda scheme was in operation and on the statute book. Conservative Members started off by saying that all they had to do was talk about the Rwanda scheme and it would be a deterrent. Then it was, “Once we’ve put it on the statue book it will be a deterrent”, and now all of a sudden it is, “Oh well, it never worked because not a plane took off.”
No. If they were so convinced that the Rwanda scheme was going to work, why did they hold a general election a week before the first plane was due to take off?
This crucial Bill will give law enforcement new powers to combat threats to border security and evolve our response as those threats change. Before I respond, in a slightly quieter way I hope, to some of the many excellent speeches we have heard today, I remind the House of the dire legacy left to us by the Conservatives. They left a system in chaos, where asylum claims were hardly being processed. It takes some brass neck for the shadow Home Secretary to complain that the number has gone up. It has gone up because we started to process decisions, which they had stopped. [Interruption.] Yes, it has gone up because we are processing decisions. We have a system where they did not do any processing for a year, then they wonder why there are a load of people in a backlog. We had to come into government and clean up the mess. Asylum claims were hardly being processed, and we are now processing 11,000 a month. The Conservatives were down to below 2,000 a month.
Tens of thousands of people were left in limbo. Tens of thousands more were crossing the channel in small boats because they were not deterred by the Rwanda scheme. Some 84,000 people crossed while the Rwanda scheme was being pursued. The Conservatives pursued expensive and unworkable gimmicks, spending £700 million to send four volunteers to Rwanda. They allowed ruthless gangsters to operate with impunity and make a fortune exploiting desperate people. They put legislation on the statute book that was so unworkable, even they did not commence it, and now they are complaining about our having to repeal it. I like a tidy statute book; we are not going to leave the rubbish that the Conservatives put on the statute book to clutter it up.
It is time to shift the dial. That is why this Bill puts the Border Security Command on a legal footing, offering system leadership and co-ordination across borders. The Bill introduces counter-terror-style powers to disrupt and prevent organised immigration crime and the gangs from profiting from the exploitation and misery that they cause. It takes the fight to the gangs on multiple fronts, using every possible tool at our disposal.
To give the Minister a breather and for the education of the House, can she refer to the particular clauses in the Bill that give the Border Security Command any ability whatever to dictate the activity of other bits of Government to that end?
The Border Security Command co-ordinates and leads across Government; the right hon. Gentleman will want to serve on the Committee so that we can discuss this in detail. [Interruption.] I can tell the right hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] I can tell him that the Border Security Commander is already leading across Government and making a real difference in operational co-ordination, which this Bill will put on the statute book. [Interruption.]
Order. Mr Cleverly, we have heard you shout enough times. The Minister will respond.
We are not doing line-by-line; those on the Opposition Front Bench need to know that that happens in Committee. I have just invited the right hon. Gentleman to sit on the Committee. If he looks, he will see that the first part of the Bill deals entirely with the Border Security Commander and putting his powers on the statute book, and it makes clear that he is a systems leader who can co-ordinate properly across Government. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating.
Is it clause 3(6) in part 1 of the Bill that lists the agencies that the Border Security Commander does not have authority over? If I know the Minister’s Bill better than she does, she should consider her position.
I am too busy cleaning up the right hon. Gentleman’s mess to consider my position.
While we have been drafting the Bill, we have been busy in other places. As we know, there are no quick and easy answers to this complex problem; we finally heard that from the shadow Minister. We have therefore struck groundbreaking new agreements with key international partners, ranging from the Calais group to Italy and Germany. The Home Secretary has been to Iraq to do some important work on dealing with the gangs. [Hon. Members: “Private jets!”] Well, at least she has not taken a private jet to Rwanda. We all know that only four volunteers ever went there at huge cost, but two Home Secretaries went too. Certainly more Conservative Home Secretaries managed to go to Rwanda than asylum seekers ever did.
We are dealing with international co-operation because it is right both for returns and for co-ordination to smash international smuggling gangs and organised immigration crime that we work co-operatively with our colleagues, not only in Europe but further afield. We have also concentrated on actually enforcing the law, and illegal working visits and arrests are up 38% since we came into government. We have ramped up returns. The latest figures show that 18,987 people with no right to be here have been deported since we came into government. There is no point in having an asylum system if we do not return those people who are found to have no right to be here.
I am sure that the Minister is about to get to this, so I apologise for intervening, but as I raised in my speech, we want to be very clear about how she will measure success based on the Bill. By what metric, and by when, will we be able to judge whether the Government’s policy has worked?
There will be more than four.
Yes, it is certainly true that we promise to get more than four volunteers out of the country.
The Bill is not about posturing or pretending that there are easy answers to complex questions. The Bill is not about expensive gimmicks and an abject failure to deliver. The Bill is about restoring order to the chaos that we inherited from the Conservative party. It is about giving our law enforcement authorities the counter-terror-style powers that they need to dismantle the organised criminal gangs who are exploiting desperate people. It is about enforcing the law and securing our borders, and I commend it to the House.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWe are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to please switch electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Date Time Witness Thursday 27 February Until no later than 12.10 pm Refugee Council, Scottish Refugee Council, British Red Cross Thursday 27 February Until no later than 12.40 pm Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, Migration Observatory Thursday 27 February Until no later than 1.00 pm The Children’s Commissioner for England Thursday 27 February Until no later than 2.40 pm National Police Chiefs’ Council, National Crime Agency, Crown Prosecution Service Thursday 27 February Until no later than 3.20 pm Migration Watch, Tony Smith, former Director, UK Border Force, Centre for Policy Studies Thursday 27 February Until no later than 3.40 pm David Coleman, Emeritus Professor of Demography, University of Oxford Thursday 27 February Until no later than 4.00 pm Professor Brian Bell, Professor of Economics, King’s College London Thursday 27 February Until no later than 4.20 pm Home Office
We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication, and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence session. In view of the time available, I hope we can take these matters formally, without debate. The programme motion was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee for the Bill.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 27 February) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 27 February;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 4 March;
(c) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 6 March;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 11 March;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 13 March;
(f) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 18 March;
(g) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 20 March;
2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
3. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 40; Schedule 1; Clauses 41 to 47; Schedule 2; Clauses 48 to 57; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 20 March.—(Dame Angela Eagle.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Dame Angela Eagle.)
Copies of the written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Dame Angela Eagle.)
We are now sitting in public again, and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start hearing from witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill?
I want to let the Committee know that I know Daniel O’Malley from Scotland through the Liberal Democrats.
I have previously met Daniel O’Malley as well.
Very popular. If any interests are particularly relevant to a Member’s questioning or speech, they should declare them again at the appropriate time. We will now hear oral evidence from the Refugee Council, the Scottish Refugee Council and the British Red Cross. We must stick to the timings that the Committee has agreed in the programme motion. For this panel, we have until 12.10 pm. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Enver Solomon: Thank you very much, Chair. My name is Enver Solomon, and I am the chief executive of the Refugee Council.
Mubeen Bhutta: Good morning; I am Mubeen Bhutta, the director of policy research and advocacy at the British Red Cross. I think you have all been told that I am a hearing aid user; I am just having an issue with one of my hearing aids, so I need to step out and step back in, if that is okay.
Yes, that is okay.
Daniel O’Malley: I am Daniel O’Malley, policy and public affairs specialist with the Scottish Refugee Council.
Q
Enver Solomon: I am happy to take that one. Our view is that this legislation is rightly seeking to disrupt the criminal gangs—the smuggling gangs. The trade is heinous; it is very damaging to people and it needs to be stopped. In that context, the Border Security Command is an understandable response. I think the issue that we have with it is that it is very difficult to simply rely on enforcement to tackle what is a complex and challenging situation.
The Bill is putting multiple eggs in the basket of enforcement, not just through the Border Security Command but by introducing a number of new offences. Our view, based on our frontline practice and work over many decades with people who have come to this country from war zones, having fled persecution or having been victims of modern slavery, is that that strategy will fundamentally fall short, because it is very difficult to change behaviour by adopting a primarily enforcement approach, which is primarily driven by further prosecution and creating new laws.
Essentially, new laws, such as the offences created in the Bill, are pretty much a blunt instrument to deal with behaviour that drives people to seek protection in other countries and to come here seeking asylum. I think that the evidence, from the offences created in previous legislation, demonstrates that they have not acted as a deterrent.
To sum up, enforcement is an understandable and legitimate approach, but it is only one approach, and it needs to be combined with other approaches that focus on international diplomacy and co-operation, and, critically, on additional legal routes. If you look at the evidence, particularly from the US under the previous Administration, the combination of those three can have a demonstrable impact on reducing irregular arrivals.
Despite the intention that this Bill has set out, our concern is that it will not deliver the outcome—the understandable and credible outcome—that the Government are trying to achieve, which is to stop the people smugglers and to stop people making dangerous crossings. It is focusing too much on an enforcement-driven agenda.
Q
Enver Solomon: We would have liked to see more provisions that look at opening up targeted, additional humanitarian pathways, additional legal routes, and additional mechanisms for people to seek humanitarian protection and make applications for asylum without necessarily having to take dangerous journeys. We have advocated for a targeted humanitarian visa to be piloted for specific nationalities where there is a high grant rate.
We would also have preferred to see the full repeal of the Illegal Migration Act 2023—not all provisions have been repealed. It is very positive that a significant number have been repealed, and that the Government have started to clear the backlog and essentially end the meltdown of the asylum system under the previous Administration, with the failed implementation of the Act. That is positive, but we think that retaining other provisions in the Act, particularly the provisions on inadmissibility, and not repealing the differential treatment provisions in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, contribute to greater dysfunction in the system.
The Government’s laudable and correct intention to bring greater efficiency and competence to the system is absolutely right, but having multiple pieces of legislation that just create greater dysfunction will not ensure that you get an effective end-to-end system. You do that by ensuring that you have reliable, speedy decision making on asylum; that decisions are right first time; that if people are granted protection, they can move through the system effectively with appropriate support; and that if people are not granted protection, the right steps are in place to support them. The focus needs to be much more on getting the asylum system to function, with a clear vision of its purpose, than on layering more and more legislation on to an already incredibly complex legislative system, which actually just creates further dysfunction.
Before I go to the Minister, can I just check with Mubeen that you can hear us okay?
Mubeen Bhutta: Sorry?
If we speak louder, is that better?
Mubeen Bhutta: Yes, that is helpful. I do apologise; it is a technical thing.
Q
Enver, thank you for your evidence. You welcomed the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 and the majority of the Illegal Migration Act, which this Bill accomplishes. Could you talk about your experience of trying to live with those Acts on the statute book? Some argue that those bits of legislation were the only deterrent that we could have had. Can I have your thoughts on whether they worked?
Enver Solomon: Absolutely. In short, they were a disaster. They were a disaster in terms of the lived experience of people who had come from places such as Sudan; we know about the civil war there. They created huge uncertainty and anxiety. Through our work, we saw a rise in levels of great mental distress, and even in suicide ideation, as a consequence of those pieces of legislation, which led to what we described as a system meltdown. That was a fundamental meltdown that resulted in the system pretty much coming to a standstill. The system slowed down, with productivity in asylum decision making at its lowest level since the height of the covid pandemic. It is absolutely right that steps were taken to address that and to ensure that the asylum system is functioning effectively.
The asylum system has to deliver integrity. It has to ensure that the public have trust in a system that functions. It functions by ensuring that decisions are fair—the great British value of fair play—by ensuring that decisions are taken in a timely fashion and by ensuring that taxpayers’ money is well spent. That means you do not have billions being wasted every year on housing people in hotels that become flashpoints for community tensions. The system also works effectively when it ensures that people are supported to integrate and to go on and contribute to communities across the country in the way that generations of refugees have done. Critically, you must also ensure that if people are not granted protection, there are appropriate pathways to support them to return to the countries they have come from.
Q
Enver Solomon: I will let my colleagues come in.
Daniel O’Malley: In relation to the European convention on human rights, frankly, coming out will not help anyone—it will not make the system any more efficient. For example, when it comes to the human trafficking provisions in the Illegal Migration Act, we want to see more of those repealed because they undermine human trafficking protections in Scotland.
The broader repeal that has happened of the Illegal Migration Act and the statutory instrument laid down to alter that Act has aided, for example, the guardianship programme in Scotland, which gives a guardian to unaccompanied minors in Scotland and was put on to a statutory footing in Scotland under the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. It helps that programme because asylum claims were previously just not being made under the IMA, so that programme had thousands more people in it. The programme was operating, but it was getting overloaded with more and more people.
The wider point is that there are protections that we are signed up to—for example, the UN convention for refugees. Continuing with those is absolutely right; the repeal of them will not make the system any more efficient and it will not be a deterrent to anyone.
Q
Mubeen Bhutta: I do not have anything more to add to the important points that Daniel made.
Q
Mubeen Bhutta: I did not quite catch the first bit of your question, but I think you are asking about safe and legal routes. I endorse some of the comments that my colleague Enver has already made. We welcome the Bill. We welcome the intention of the Bill around reducing the loss of life in the channel, but that is only half of the story.
It is really important that we look at the reasons why people are putting their lives in the hands of people smugglers in the first place. It is often because there is no other choice—there is no route that they can take. We would like to see more safe and legal routes, whether that is new routes, such as enabling people to apply for a humanitarian visa in the country that they are in to come directly to the UK and then be able to claim asylum, or expanding existing routes such as family reunion, so that there is more eligibility for people to use those routes.
It is really important to look at both sides of the coin. In a way, you could consider this Bill to be looking at the supply of this sort of activity, but it does not do anything about the demand. People will still need to make those journeys if no other routes are available.
Daniel O’Malley: For us, this is another migration Bill on top of many migration Bills. The system that people seeking asylum currently face is convoluted and arbitrary, and it is founded on hostility. As Mubeen rightly said, it is about the enforcement and stopping people crossing, rather than creating a more efficient asylum system. For us at the Scottish Refugee Council, that is what we are concerned about in the Bill. You talked about the Bill being quite narrow, but there are aspects of it that are far too broad and that can be applied in too broad a manner.
For the Scottish Refugee Council, the asylum aspects of the Bill do not address an updating of the asylum system. There are points on integration that should be considered as well. Nothing in the Bill talks about the integration of people seeking asylum while they are in the system. We commend the Government for speeding up the clearing of the backlog, which is great, but work needs to be done to help people who are in the system to integrate into the country. About 75% of people in the system will typically be granted refugee status, so work needs to be done to help them to integrate into communities, rather than having them in asylum accommodation or hostile environments.
The Government are rightly looking at asylum accommodation and the Home Affairs Committee is also doing an inquiry into it, so we know the work is being done. We would have liked to see the Bill contain a point about integration. The work in Scotland on this is the “New Scots Refugee Integration Strategy”, with an approach to integration from day one of arrival. We would like to see that extended to the UK level as well, mirroring what has also been done in Wales.
Q
Enver Solomon: I think those measures are legitimate. As I said, it is important to take steps to disrupt the activity of gangs that are causing huge harms to the lives of individual men, women and children, who are often extremely vulnerable. Attempts such as the powers you referred to are important and have a role to play—I am not disputing that. What I am saying is that they need to be used proportionately and to be clearly targeted at the individuals behind the criminal gangs and the trade of the criminal gangs.
Our concern is that, by broadening criminal powers in the Bill and specifically by introducing new offences, individuals will be caught up in that process. People who are coming across in very flimsy and dangerous vessels will end up being criminalised through no fault of their own. We are also concerned that using further laws—as has been seen across a whole range of different areas of public policy—is a blunt instrument to try to change the behaviour of people.
People will not stop getting into flimsy dinghies and coming across the channel or the Mediterranean because of new offences that they might face. They will probably know very little about the nature of those offences. They will know very little about the new rules that mean, if you get refugee protection, you will no longer be able to go on and gain British citizenship. We know that from our experience: they will know nothing about that, so it will not change behaviour or provide the deterrence that I think it is hoped it will provide.
That is why you need to use these powers in a very targeted, proportionate way that deals with the prosecution of the criminal behaviour but does not result in, in effect, punching down on those vulnerable people who are getting into the boats because they want to seek safety. It will not change their behaviour. That is our experience from having worked with refugees and people seeking asylum over many decades.
Q
Enver Solomon: I would say not. I will come to clause 18 in a second, but I encourage the Committee to look at clauses 13 and 14. In our submission, we proposed that they should be amended to ensure the focus of the new offence is on people smugglers and not on those seeking protection in the UK. We also said that clause 15 should be amended to include other items that are important for reducing the risk that people face when attempting to cross the channel, and that the Government should consult widely to ensure the list is as extensive as is necessary.
On endangering others, given that, as Committee members will know, many of the boats now used are barely seaworthy and overcrowded, and that the numbers crammed into them are increasing, clause 18 could cover many more people than those whom the offence is apparently targeted at—that is, the people smugglers. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary gave some useful examples of the types of behaviour that could result in people being prosecuted, including physical aggression, intimidation, the rejection of rescue attempts and so on. We think the wording should be amended to reflect specific actions to ensure that the offence is very clearly focused.
We argue overall that these new offences are an extremely blunt instrument to change behaviours, and they will not have the desired effect of changing behaviours and stopping people getting into very dangerous, flimsy vessels.
Daniel O'Malley: To add to what Enver says, yes, it is a blunt instrument. We operate a refugee support service across the whole of Scotland, and when people come to our services they do not talk about the deterrence or anything like that; they talk about what they see once they get here. The environment that is created around people seeking asylum and refugees does not deter them from coming here, but once they are here, they feel that there is a threat to their protection and that their status here is under threat.
The language in these deterrents does not deter anybody from coming here; it just causes a hostile environment. That was the situation created by the previous Bills under the previous Government. We hope that will not be continued with the new Bill and other changes the Home Office is making. At the end of the day, when people come to our services and talk about stuff like this, they talk about how it makes them feel when they are in the country, not about how it deters them from coming here.
Q
Enver Solomon: In short, what happened with the system meltdown that I referred to is that processing did pretty much come to a standstill. You had a huge and ever-growing backlog, and people were stuck in limbo indefinitely in the system. The number of people in hotels—asylum contingency accommodation, as it is called—reached record numbers. Hotels were being stood up in communities without proper prior assessments with relevant agencies of the potential needs—health, the NHS, and tensions vis-à-vis the police.
We work in Rotherham, where a hotel was brutally attacked and refugees were almost burned alive in the summer. My staff were in contact with people in the hotel who were live streaming what was happening. They thought that they were going to get burned alive. That hotel in Rotherham should never have been opened. It was always going to be a flashpoint. It was located in an incredibly isolated area, there were not appropriate support services, the local services were not properly engaged with in advance and there was no appropriate planning and preparation. That story, I am afraid, was repeated across the country because of the dysfunction and the system meltdown that the previous pieces of legislation resulted in. It is absolutely critical that we learn the lessons from that and do not repeat those mistakes.
There is no need to use asylum hotels. As I understand it, there are roughly 70,000 individual places within the asylum dispersal system today. If we had timely decisions being made in a matter of months, people moving through the system, a growing backlog in the appeal system dealt with by ensuring the decisions are right first time, and people having good access to appropriate legal information and advice from representation, which is a huge problem, you would begin gradually to fix the system.
It will take time to fix the system and create efficiencies, but it is absolutely vital that plans to move away from the use of hotels are taken forward rapidly, and that the current contracts in place with the three private providers to provide dispersal accommodation are radically reformed, because they just create community tensions. They are pivoted towards placing people in parts of the country where accommodation is usually cheap and where there are going to be growing tensions, often without support in place for people in those communities.
Mubeen Bhutta: I did not fully catch your question, Chris—I apologise.
It was about the impact on local communities of the dysfunction created by the Illegal Migration Act and the Rwanda Act, and how much you attribute that dysfunction—especially the growing use of hotels for asylum seekers—to those Acts, which we are proposing to repeal.
Mubeen Bhutta: I probably do not have a huge amount more to add to what Enver just said, but it goes back to what was said earlier about the speed of decision making, the time that people are left in accommodation, the suitability of that accommodation, the impact on their wellbeing—certainly in terms of what we three see through our services—and the need for a comprehensive strategy. It comes back to what we said at the beginning about what is in the Bill, and what needs to go alongside it that is not in the Bill, around integration.
Q
Mubeen Bhutta: We do not fully know what the impact of that new offence will be, because it is not enforced yet. It is helpful to see that there is provision in the drafting around charities and their role, but it is not certain how that will play out. Our concern is also that new offences could impact the overall aims around the focus on seeking protection. It could influence behaviour or the ways that people offer support if there is concern that they might be caught.
Daniel O'Malley: On the point about the new offences and the deterrent aspect on human traffickers and smuggling gangs, there are aspects of the Illegal Migration Act that have not been repealed that apply to human trafficking. For example, a provision about disqualification from human trafficking protection in section 29 of the IMA has been kept. We would like to see that removed because an individual who has been in a nail bar and might have been human trafficked, as tends to be the case, might not come to any services due to fear of being disqualified from human trafficking protection because they may have engaged in criminal activity. If you have been human trafficked, you are likely to have engaged in criminal activity by virtue of that. That is the problem with the aspects of the Illegal Migration and Nationality and Borders Acts that have been left in.
The Nationality and Borders Act still contains section 60, which raised the threshold for referral to the national referral mechanism. Someone from a legal organisation in Scotland said that before the Nationality and Borders Act—he had been a lawyer for a couple of years by then—he had done one judicial review on the national referral mechanism. Since the Nationality and Borders and Illegal Migration Acts, he has done more than 50 judicial reviews. That keeps in the Act a freezing factor. Gangs and human traffickers can scare people who have been human trafficked by saying, “You might not get this protection because these offences could be applied or your protection could be taken away.” That is the aspect we would like to see removed to make sure that any offences are not disproportionately affecting victims of human trafficking.
The next question will be the last. Witnesses, if there is anything that you have not yet said but would like to say, please do so.
Q
Enver Solomon: The system meltdown that came about because of the fantastical Rwanda policy and the full provisions of the Illegal Migration Act left people in a state of permanent limbo, in inappropriate accommodation, in very vulnerable situations, in communities where there were high tensions. As a consequence of that, people’s wellbeing was potentially compromised. There is no question about that. We saw that through our work. We saw the rise in stress and in suicidal ideation. There was very clear evidence from our practice about the impact of what was, as we described, a system meltdown.
On your point about enforcement, enforcement has a role to play but it has to be one strategy combined with others—one side of a multi-pronged approach. Similarly to the evidence from dismantling drug trafficking, often when you dismantle one set of smugglers or gangmasters, others will reappear and take over that part of the trade. It is very difficult to enforce and prosecute your way out of this challenge. Multiple strategies have to be adopted—
Order. Sorry to interrupt, but we are in our last minute. Mubeen and Daniel, would you like to come in quickly?
Mubeen Bhutta: Thank you—my hearing aid has magically started working.
On disrupting the business model, going back to what we said at the beginning about this being the other half of the safe routes story, clause 34 is about taking biometrics and introduces flexibility so that biometrics can be taken outside visa centres. We would like to see that extended to people required to submit their biometrics for family reunion visas, because we know that people are making dangerous journeys to visa centres. Often there are multiple journeys, often in conflicts, and people often have to use smugglers to get across the border if the visa centre in their country is closed. There is a real opportunity to strengthen that existing safe route by extending the flexibility in clause 34.
That brings us to the end of the time allocated. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Zoe Bantleman and Dr Peter Walsh gave evidence.
We will now hear oral evidence from the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and from Migration Observatory. Again, we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 12.40 pm. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Zoe Bantleman: Good afternoon. I am Zoe Bantleman and I am the legal director of the Immigration Law Practitioners Association.
Dr Peter Walsh: Good afternoon. I am a senior researcher at the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford.
Q
Dr Peter Walsh: Evidence from academic research shows that the impacts of deterrence policies are fairly small. The main reason for that is that migrants often do not have accurate or detailed knowledge of policies in destination countries. Their understanding of those policies is often lacking in detail and wrong, and it is often influenced by what they are told by their smugglers or handlers, who have a vested interest, of course, in downplaying risks.
There is also some statistical evidence that looks more broadly at what drives unauthorised migration and asylum applications around the world. That has found that domestic policy is not statistically one of the more important factors. Instead, geopolitical developments, conflict—civil, ethnic or international conflict—ecological disaster and regime change are all statistically much stronger drivers of unauthorised migration and asylum applications in particular countries.
Finally, rounding out the picture, when an asylum seeker decides which destination country to move to, that calculus is influenced not just by policy—policy is one of the things that they take least account of—but by things like the presence of family members, members of the community, friends, language and in some cases, in the context of small boat arrivals, escaping the Dublin system. Individuals may have claimed asylum in other EU countries—maybe those claims are outstanding or have been refused—and they understand that if they move to the UK they cannot be returned to the EU, because we are no longer a part of the EU and of the Dublin system that facilitated that.
Q
Dr Peter Walsh: Because under the IMA the Government proposed not to process people’s claims, they would not have known whether returning those individuals to countries of origin would be safe or not. That is where Rwanda came in.
There were always questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy. For my part, whatever deterrent effect it would have had would have depended fundamentally on how many people were actually sent to Rwanda. You can imagine that if it was a large share of people arriving by small boat, that might make people think twice, but if it were a small share—only thousands a year when we have tens of thousands of small boat arrivals—that would imply that the chance of being sent to Rwanda was fairly small. You can imagine that the people then making the trip would view that risk as just one risk among many much greater risks—risking their lives, for example—so there were always real questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy and how many people would in fact have been sent there.
The last Government said that the scheme was uncapped, and the Rwandan Government said, “We can take as many people as you can send.” But there were logistical challenges there, not least among them where people would be detained. At that time we had about 1,800 people in immigration detention in the UK, with a capacity of 2,200. You would have to detain people if you were threatening to remove them to Rwanda, so that was a very big initial stumbling block, putting aside whatever the capacity of those Rwandan facilities would have been, and more broadly the capacity of the Rwandan asylum system to process large numbers of claims. Typically it processed only a few hundred a year, not 10,000 or 20,000, so there were real questions there.
The big risk was what to do with people who are neither deterred from arriving nor able to be removed to Rwanda. That would be a sub-population in the UK without legal status who would be here indefinitely, so they would for ever have no legal right to remain in the UK, but we would be required to provide them with asylum accommodation and support at great cost. That was the risk when it came to Rwanda and the IMA.
Q
Dr Peter Walsh: I was not surprised, because I think that was consistent with the attitude at the time on the part of the Government. I did note that they did decide not to pursue a similar kind of agreement, which hampered them in a certain sense because there was no longer a mechanism to return asylum seekers arriving by small boat to the EU. It is true that in the last five years or so that we were a part of Dublin, we were actually a net receiver of asylum seekers under the system: we received more than we sent out. That is for various reasons, including administrative ones. But yes, it was striking that a similar kind of agreement or remaining a part of the Dublin system was not pursued because that appeared to hamper the Government in that aim—namely, to remove people arriving without authorisation to the EU.
Q
Zoe Bantleman: As the witnesses in the previous session have already said, those are not the only international legal agreements by which we are bound. The UK has voluntarily agreed to be bound by a great many international legal agreements, including in relation to the rights of children, the convention on action against trafficking and the conventions on the rights of stateless persons. There are a whole host in addition to the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights.
One of the hallmarks of the new Government has been this new-found commitment towards our international legal obligations, and also restoring the UK’s position as a leader in the international rules-based order, which all three of the previous Acts—the Safety of Rwanda Act, the Illegal Migration Act and the Nationality and Borders Act before it—eroded. I think it is fundamental to retain our commitment towards our international legal obligations. But there was also a case in the High Court in Belfast, brought by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in relation to the Illegal Migration Act, that found that it was not only the convention on human rights that was breached by the Illegal Migration Act, but also the Windsor framework itself.
At a time when His Majesty’s Government are trying to reset the relationship with Europe, it seems a very strange thing to do—to try to back out of our human rights obligations. Again, the Good Friday agreement and the trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union are both based on our compliance with the European convention on human rights.
Q
Zoe Bantleman: The offences are drafted in quite broad terms and the defences are quite narrow. There is a real concern, particularly on behalf of the legal professions, as to what would constitute a defence. For example, one of the defences is where a person was
“acting on behalf of an organisation which—
(i) aims to assist asylum-seekers, and
(ii) does not charge for its services.”
Would a legal aid firm charging the legal aid fund for services come within the scope of this defence? That is a real question.
We could also imagine the much more practical question of someone who is, for example, in Calais with their family member, and their family member wants to get on to a small boat and they are saying, “No, don’t get on to the small boat. Look here—this is what the weather is going to be today” and they show them on their phone what the weather is going to be. That could be useful to that person in helping them to prepare for their journey to the UK, and it would be the collection, recording and viewing of that information. It is not clear that such a person would have a defence if they were to reach the UK by a safe route, if a safe route was available to them. Even though that was done in France rather than the UK, they could potentially be prosecuted once here because of the extraterritorial scope of the offences, subject of course to prosecutorial discretion.
There is a very large scope to the offences and the defences are potentially not sufficient and holistic enough to account for all situations in which persons should not be prosecuted and should not be criminalised for their behaviour.
Q
Dr Peter Walsh: The Dublin system provided a mechanism for asylum seekers to be transferred between EU member states and prioritised the idea that people should have their claim processed in the first state in which they arrived. There are other things that the decision can be based on—one might be having family members in the country; that could also be the basis for a transfer.
There is emerging evidence from when researchers have spoken with migrants in and around Calais. They ask them, “Why have you taken this dangerous journey to the UK?” They talk about family, the English language and perceptions of the UK as being safer. Often they have experienced harsh treatment at the hands of the French police. Increasingly, they specifically mention Dublin.
What we can infer from that is that these people have an outstanding or rejected claim—or claims, potentially in a number of EU member states, even though there are rules and processes to prevent that. They have exhausted what they view as the opportunity to receive a successful asylum claim in the EU. That leaves the UK. They understand that because the UK is no longer a part of Dublin, we are effectively not able to return them to the continent. That is fairly recent evidence we have found.
On the smuggling networks and how they work, one of the big challenges is that they operate transnationally, so they are beyond the jurisdiction of any single authority. That, by its very nature, makes enforcement more difficult because it requires quite close international co-operation, so the UK would be co-operating with agencies that operate under different legal frameworks, professional standards and norms and maybe even speak a different language. That challenge applies with particular force to the senior figures, who are often operating not only beyond the UK’s and EU’s jurisdictions but in countries where there is very limited international law enforcement co-operation with both the UK and the EU. I am thinking of countries such as Afghanistan, Syria and Iran.
More generally, the smuggling gangs have become more professionalised. They are very well resourced and are highly adaptable. There is a sense that law enforcement is constantly having to play catch-up. The gangs are decentralised, and there are quite small groups of, say, eight to 12 individuals, spread out across the continent, who are responsible for logistics—for example, storing equipment like motors and engines in Germany that are imported to Turkey from China and then transported in trucks to France. Those networks stretch out across the continent. That is why it is so hard for law enforcement to fight them.
Q
Unless we tackle the demand, surely there will not be anything we can effectively do to tackle the illegal gangs, particularly if we are going to be cutting international aid budgets, which will exacerbate the problem and drive more people into the hands of the gangs. Ms Bantleman, you have written to the Government urging them to amend the good character guidance to ensure compliance with the UK’s international obligations. Could you expand on that and elaborate on what you are intending from the Government? You are right to remind the Government of the range of their commitments and international obligations. I will come to you first, Dr Walsh.
Dr Peter Walsh: It is true that there is a real lack of evidence on what the likely impact of specific policies to disrupt smuggling networks will be, but the policies could assist in disrupting smuggling activities. If you invest more resources in enforcement and agencies have greater power of seizure, search, arrest and investigation, then you would expect that more smugglers would be brought to justice. The bigger question for me is: will that reduce people travelling in small boats? There is the separate question of whether this will eliminate the market for smuggling.
What we do know is that a lot of people are willing to pay a lot of money for the services that smugglers provide. If the effect of the policies is to disrupt smuggling operations, that could conceivably raise the cost of smuggling—a cost that would be passed on to migrants. It may be the case that some are priced out at the margins, but I suspect that demand is fairly inelastic. Even with an increase in price, people will still be willing to pay.
Another challenge is the people most directly involved in smuggling operations on the ground—the people who are tasked with getting the migrants to shore, the boats into the water and the migrants into the boats. It does not require substantial skill, training or investment to do that job. You can apprehend those individuals, and that requires substantial resource, but they can quickly be replaced. That is why it has been described as being like whack-a-mole. I think that is one of the real challenges.
Zoe Bantleman: I would like to add to that point, before I address the second question. I completely agree with what Peter says about how the most fundamental challenge in breaking the business model of smugglers is that, simply, smuggling will exist for as long as there is demand. There will be demand for it as long as there are people seeking safety. For as long as we fail to have accessible, safe, complementary routes for people to arrive here, and for as long as carriers are too fearful to allow people on to safe trains, ferries and planes to the UK, people will feel that they have no choice but to risk their lives, their savings and their families’ savings on dangerous journeys.
The focus of the Bill is not on tackling trafficking or the traffickers, or on protecting the victims of trafficking; it casts its net much wider. It is really about tackling those who assist others in arriving here, as well as those who arrive here themselves.
That leads me on to the second point, which is in relation to the good character guidance. There was a recent change, on the day of Second Reading, that also resulted in a change to the good character guidance, which is a statutory requirement that individuals must meet in order to become British citizens. The guidance says that anyone who enters irregularly—it actually uses the word “illegal”, which I have substituted with “irregularly”—shall “normally” not have their application for British citizenship accepted, no matter how much time has passed.
Fundamentally, article 31 of the refugee convention says that individuals should be immune from penalties. It is a protective clause. It is aimed at ensuring that exactly the kind of person who does not have the time or is not able to acquire the appropriate documentation, who has a very short-term stopover in another country on the way to the UK, and who is allowed to choose their country of safety can come here and is immune from penalties. There is also an obligation under the refugee convention to facilitate the naturalisation of refugees.
We also mentioned many other conventions, including the convention on the elimination of discrimination against women, and the convention on the rights of the child. Children have a right to obtain citizenship, so stateless children should not be barred from obtaining British citizenship. In addition, they should not be held accountable for things that were outside their control. Children placed on small boats may have had no control or understanding of their journey to the UK, so arriving here in a way outside their control, in a way that the Government consider to be illegal but is not illegal under international law, is not a reason for them to be barred from citizenship. That is the substance of what we have said.
This may be the last question, unless anybody else has indicated that they wish to ask one.
In his evidence, Enver Solomon spoke about the “meltdown” of the immigration system—that it is chaotic. I think we all heard that. I am on the Home Affairs Committee, and we are also looking into that. Quite a few people from different groups have given evidence, and their evidence was slightly more optimistic than what has been said today.
We are all in mass communication, so I think word will get around when this starts rolling out. If the system had been chaotic and everything had ground to a halt, the gangmasters running the boats would have got to grips with it as time went on, and that would have seeped through. It therefore would not necessarily be the case that people would want to risk the boats and the gangs.
Dr Peter Walsh: On communication, many of these individuals who are travelling receive information from their handlers, agents and smugglers. Sometimes it comes from people who have already made the trip and are in the UK, but that has the effect of emboldening them. I am not sure what the prospects would be for them learning about the reality of the UK’s asylum system more broadly. We see that knowledge of the system—whether it is chaotic or functioning well—is always filtered through their agents, smugglers, handlers and those they know in the community who are making the trip or have already successfully made it.
Q
“The deterrent impact of the policy would likely have depended on the number of people sent to Rwanda.”
You estimated the probability of people crossing the channel in a small boat being sent to Rwanda to be about 1% to 2%.
You also said:
“There is no evidence that political discussions surrounding the Rwanda policy deterred small boat arrivals.”
In fact, from the day the policy was announced to the day it was scrapped, we saw 84,000 people cross the channel. Do you want to say anything about the efficacy of the so-called deterrent? Relatedly, do you agree that it is hard to make emphatic assessments of the fiscal burden of immigration owing to the quality of the available data?
Dr Peter Walsh: Yes, I would agree with that last point.
The Rwanda policy was never implemented, so it would be unfair to say that it did not have a deterrent effect. Policies of that kind typically have the bulk of their effect once they have been implemented. I cannot remember the source for the 1% to 2% figure. This is a somewhat old research paper, but at the time it was the best estimate we could point to. It was not an estimate that I or colleagues made. Can you see what the source is?
I can. It says:
“If only a few hundred asylum seekers were sent to Rwanda each year (as suggested by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Home Office’s modelling) and unauthorised arrivals had continued at rates similar to those seen in 2022 and 2023”—
the paper was published in 2024—
“then the probability of a person crossing the Channel in a small boat being sent to Rwanda would have been small—around 1-2%.”
Dr Peter Walsh: I now recall the Home Office’s modelling, and it was subject to a whole range of caveats. The Home Office was actually quite cautious about the estimates. That was the best available figure it had at the time. It was in part based on Rwanda’s capacity to process claims. The number could have gone up, but we never found out.
Q
It has been very interesting to hear about what does not deter people from coming across, but it would also be very interesting to hear about anything that does deter them. Could you outline that too?
There is less than a minute left, and I wonder whether Zoe wants to quickly come in too.
Dr Peter Walsh: Strong deterrents do not necessarily operate on a psychological level. They include the physical interception of boats in the water, and the case of Australia demonstrates that quite clearly. It had an offshore processing plan, but the huge decrease in numbers arriving by unauthorised boats happened once Australia was physically intercepting those boats in the water and returning them to the countries of departure.
Can you answer my original question about the engagement you have had with the Government? You are saying that small gangs are very flexible, but obviously the Government are saying that they are going after those gangs—
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions. I thank our witnesses on behalf of the Committee for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
Dame Rachel de Souza gave evidence.
We will now hear oral evidence from the Children’s Commissioner for England. Once again, we must stick to the timings in the programme order. We have until 1 pm for this panel. Could the witness please introduce herself for the record?
Dame Rachel de Souza: Good afternoon. I am Rachel de Souza. I am the independent Children’s Commissioner for England. It is my job to protect and promote the rights of children. Since I took up the role, I have made working with illegal immigrant children who arrive in Kent one of my top priorities. I go down to the Kent intake unit. I talk to all the children who are in hotels. My independent advocacy body has supported hundreds of these young people. I have used my entry powers to go in and look at their situation, and I have used my data powers to track safeguarding issues. It has been really thoroughgoing work for the past four years.
Q
Dame Rachel de Souza: I do not want to see any child crossing the channel in a small boat. I have sat in those small boats myself. I have talked to children who have come across on them. I have seen eight-year-olds, blind children and children with Down’s syndrome come across on them. The crossings are dangerous. One case that sticks in my mind is that of a young Iranian lad who saw his parents killed in front of him. He was taken by smugglers and did not know where he was going, but he came across on a small boat. Anything to stop these wicked traffickers is good in my book, as long as we are protecting and safeguarding children.
You will know that I was very vocal about the Illegal Migration Act, particularly the bits that conflicted with the Children Act 1989. When a child is on this soil, up to the age of 18, the Children Act has authority over them. I was very worried about the Home Office accommodating children, and I am pleased to see that has now been changed. Every Home Office official was working hard to do their best by those children, but the Home Office accommodation and the hotel accommodation were not suitable. Children were languishing without proper safeguarding in inappropriate places. Children’s social care must look after unaccompanied children, so I am pleased to see that change.
From a children’s perspective, I am pleased to see the Rwanda Act repealed. Children told me that it would not have stopped them coming; they were just going to disappear at 18. It would have ended up putting them at more risk. I had concerns about that. I also had concerns about children who had been settled here for a number of years then, at 18, being liable to be moved to Rwanda, so I am pleased to see that changed.
In general, I am really supportive of this Bill. There are some things that I would like to see it go further on, and I do have some concerns, but in general I am very supportive.
Q
Dame Rachel de Souza: Because I see so many of these children and work with them directly, I am often thinking practically about what their lives are like and how to ensure that they are okay, so I tend to come at your questions from that approach. One of the things that I am worried about is the potential for getting the scientific age assessment wrong.
There was a fantastic debate in the other House, where Lord Winston and others talked about the British Dental Association and the lack of clarity and slight vagueness around age assessment procedures. What I will say is that the social work team down at the Kent intake unit are fantastic and they have developed a strong approach to and knowledge about how to get those age assessment decisions right, with an understanding of school systems and other things about young people. I think we need to be really careful on the age assessment side.
You know that I am also going to be worried about safe and legal routes. Let me give you two examples two young ambassadors out of my large group. One is from Ukraine. She came under the Ukraine scheme, managed to complete her Ukrainian education and her UK education at the same time, and is going to King’s College. She has had nothing but support. The other is from South Sudan and, with no safe and legal route, came as an illegal immigrant. Female genital mutilation was an issue; there were some really serious issues. She found it hard to find somewhere to live and hard to get a job. She is now at Oxford University, because we have supported her and she is brilliant. Those are just two completely contrasting cases.
I stood and welcomed off the boat the first child who came from Afghanistan, who spent his nights weeping because he did not know whether his parents were alive. There is that safe and legal routes issue, particularly for children we know are coming from war-torn areas—we know that they are coming. We really need to think about that and think about support for them. That perhaps answers your tone question as well.
Q
Dame Rachel de Souza: Down in Kent, because needs must, hotels were set up, so I visited the hotels that children were in. The situation was wholly inappropriate. Many children were languishing there for months, without English teaching. Kent county council was doing its best. Some of the best provision that I saw for children who were just arriving was put on by Kent, which had managed to get school going and get interpreters in, but it was overwhelmed.
What I will say, to pay tribute to local authorities around the country, is that whenever there was a very young child or a disabled child, they would step up and help. But it was hard to get the national transfer scheme going and the children were confused by it as well. The Hghland council offered a range of places to some of the children, and they were like, “Where is the highlands and what are we going to do there?” It felt discombobulated at best. It was really tricky.
Of course, let us not forget that a lot of those children were older teenagers, and a lot of the provision that they were going to was not care, but a room in a house with all sorts of other people—teenagers and older people. They were left to fend for themselves, which was incredibly disorientating. We have a problem with 16 and 17-year-olds in the care system. There was a massive stretch on social care. Every director of children’s social care who I spoke to said that it is a massive stretch on their budgets, and that they do not know what to do with those children.
I think we could be more innovative. Again, there is massive good will out there in the country. We should be looking at specialist foster care, and not sticking 17-year-olds in rooms in houses on their own. There are so many things we could be doing to try to make this better, such as settling children in communities with proper language teaching.
The No.1 thing that children tell me that they want, given that they are here, is to learn—to be educated—so that they can function well. For me, particularly with some of the children who I have seen, they do not in any way mirror the stuff that we read in the media about freeloading—coming here for whatever. Most of them are really serious cases, and given that they are here, they want to try to learn and be good productive members of our communities. There is much that we can do.
Q
We are keeping parts of NABA, so that will be a feature of the Bill. There are concerns about modern slavery and the impact on children with that. Are there any amendments that we could bring to the Bill that would help to deal with that and meet some of those concerns, so that we can get to a much better place with how we deal with children in our asylum system?
Dame Rachel de Souza: Obviously, both of those issues are concerns of mine—age assessment and the modern slavery provisions not being allowed to be applied. On age assessment, it is important that we know how old children are. I have seen 14-year-olds in hostels with 25-year-olds, which is totally inappropriate. I have seen girls who say that they are not 18 be age assessed as 18 and put in adult institutions with adult men. We do not want people masquerading as children to be put in with younger children. We need to do everything we can to determine age.
The technology around scientific age assessment is going to be difficult, not least because when you are dealing with an international population—as Lord Winston talked about—it is really difficult to be precise. Being precise matters. When children arrive in Kent, they get their new clothes, then if they are sick, they are put into a shipping container until they are not sick any more. They maybe then have to sleep a bit on a bench, and then they are age assessed. That age assessment is the most important thing about the rest of their journey here. If that goes wrong, that is it; if you get that wrong, they are an adult. It is a really important and tricky thing, and it is often not supported.
There are things we can do—I always look for solutions. Maybe we ought to be saying, “This is obviously a child. This is obviously an adult.” But there is a group where there are questions and perhaps we should be thinking about housing people in that group and spending a bit more time to work out how old they are and try to get the evidence, rather than making these cut-and-dry decisions that will change people’s lives. As I said, I found a 14-year-old boy in Luton who was there for years with 25-year-olds and was really upset.
On the modern slavery provisions, all I would say—I hope this is helpful—is that I have seen with my own eyes a 16-year-old Eritrean girl arriving at Kent with an older man who was her boyfriend. She obviously said, “It’s fine—I’m 16. We can come in.” She had lost her parents. It was obviously going to be trafficking. We need parts of the Bill to pick that up. That is real, so we need to be really careful about these things.
Q
Dame Rachel de Souza: That is the first question I asked the National Crime Agency when I came into the role. I asked, “Could you find every child in this country?” I was told that, “With enough resource, we could pretty much do it, apart from some of the Vietnamese children who are trafficked into cannabis factories and things like that.” With resource, and with this new Border Security Command, we will get a lot nearer, and we need to do that.
Q
Dame Rachel de Souza: The Home Office was the only Department that failed to answer my data request in time and that gave me imperfect data, but I did not stop and I kept going. I have to say: it is much better now. I was able to speak to and did have access to Ministers, and I was always able to make my case. I did not get that information in a timely manner, but I did get that information in the end. I am worried about what has happened to those children.
The data we were after was safeguarding data that showed all the concerns, and the reason I asked for it was because I knew that the safeguarding in the hotels was not as it should be. We got the data on children who had been victims of attempted organ harvesting, rape and various other things, as well as the number of children who were missing. We still do not know where many of those children are, and that is not good enough. The whole tone has changed, and I hope that the Government will still want to stop the small boats, while also being much more pro-children.
Q
Dame Rachel de Souza: Absolutely. The number of tales and stories from children about how virtually the entire rest of the hotel had been picked up and driven off by gangs was really not good. They would just walk outside and be picked up, and they would go. Some of those children made their way back to Kent because they were being exploited so badly. It was really terrible. There were not proper safeguards.
One of the reasons I do not want the Home Office to accommodate children is that, while it is great at many things, it should have nothing to do with children. Children’s social care should be looking after children. The Home Office was never able to put in appropriate safeguarding. Despite its best efforts, it did not manage to structure children’s days. It did not have the personnel to deal with this.
Children were going missing regularly; some are still missing. Kids were there for months who were not learning English. What were they doing? Whereas, when they went straight into Kent’s care, they were put in school, learning English, learning what it is like to be in England, learning to understand their rights and getting used to the country they were in, but I fear that many of those children came to terrible ends—
Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allocated and allotted for the Committee to ask questions. I thank the witness for her evidence.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore we hear from our witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interests in connection with the Bill? No. In that case, we will now hear oral evidence from the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the National Crime Agency and the Crown Prosecution Service.
Examination of Witnesses
Assistant Chief Constable Jim Pearce, Sarah Dineley and Rob Jones gave evidence.
We have until 2.40 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves briefly for the record?
Rob Jones: I am Rob Jones, the director general of operations for the National Crime Agency.
Sarah Dineley: My name is Sarah Dineley, and I am head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead on organised immigration crime.
Jim Pearce: Good afternoon. I am Assistant Chief Constable Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on organised immigration crime.
Q
Rob Jones: There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems; you need a range of measures that concurrently bear down on them. The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants; and those who are closer, in near-Europe, who are involved in it. From an organised crime perspective, it is about concurrent pressure in a number of areas to make the incentives for being involved in organised immigration crime no longer viable.
Jim Pearce: From my perspective, you need to look at this at both ends of the scale. What we are probably thinking about at the moment is prosecution and putting people through the courts. Actually, we know that, in other thematic serious and organised crime, prevention and early intervention work just as effectively. We would call that disruption. Disrupting the patterns, and the ways of working that Rob just described, earlier would obviously prevent victims from becoming victims in the end. It is the 4P approach, which I am sure most of you have heard of. It is about working from neighbourhood policing, with a local factor, in order to gather intelligence, and putting that into the system all the way up through our regional crime units and into the National Crime Agency and high-end prosecution, international and online.
Sarah Dineley: I concur with my two colleagues. I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero. It is about having a suite of measures—whether they are prosecutorial or disruptive in nature—that taken together will allow the prosecution and law enforcement teams to work together to tackle the gangs. It is always important to remember that a criminal justice outcome is not necessarily the right outcome; there are other outcomes that can tackle organised immigration crime and gangs effectively.
Q
Sarah Dineley: From a prosecution point of view, I would say it is a matter for the legislators to decide what legislation they feel is appropriate. The Bill as drafted does add to the toolkit of measures we have available.
Rob Jones: From my perspective, the measures that make the most difference and are the most significant in tackling the organised crime element are on preparatory acts, in clauses 13 to 16. They give us the ability to be pre-emptive, proactive and very disruptive, giving us something we have not had before—the ability to act before people actually commit an offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, which is the facilitation offence. That is an important opportunity, because we are driven by trying to reduce the highest-risk crossings and trying to prevent crossings. We would not choose to react to crossings and then investigate; we want to act as quickly as we can. These measures create the ability to do that—to go much sooner, have more impact, and build momentum, so that the people who are behind these attempts really start to feel the pressure.
Jim Pearce: In addition, the Bill provides the opportunity to increase clarity and focus, with the ability to gain information and intelligence through the seizure of electronic devices, for example. I know this is controversial. Being able to do that with a very clear power to search, seize and then download, as opposed to potentially—I am not saying this has happened—misusing existing powers, will give clarity because you can say to an operational police officer, immigration officer, or a member of the National Crime Agency, “This is what you use in order to get that defined intelligence at the end.”
Q
Jim Pearce: From a policing point of view, there would be insurance around safeguarding. For the electronic devices, for example, I understand the benefits that would come from the counter-terrorism-style powers to be able to seize electronic devices. I am confident that that is managed through the measures in place around reasonable suspicion and having to get the advice from a senior officer. It is about operationalising that, putting it into practice, and making sure that our staff understand through education and training. Any change in legislation requires training, finance and input. Those are the types of things that I would be thinking about.
Rob Jones: I agree. It is about the professional development and the guidance for officers who are using new tactics and new tools against this threat, and making sure that we are ready to go with very clear guidance on how officers should look to engage the new offences in the Bill.
Sarah Dineley: Clause 17 and one of the subsections of clause 18 create extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offences, and it would be remiss of me not to highlight some of the challenges that that will bring. We have a system of judicial co-operation, something called mutual legal assistance, whereby we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level. We work very hard on building those relationships to collaborate.
To that end, the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world. Specifically, we have liaison prosecutors based in the major organised immigration crime countries—Spain, Italy, Turkey, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium—and two in France, one of whom is actually a dedicated organised immigration crime liaison prosecutor. We use them to foster and build those relationships so that we have that reciprocal exchange of information where required. That is not to say that is without its challenges. I flag that as something that we will continue to work on, but it has challenges.
Q
Rob Jones: It gives us the opportunity to make the most of the intelligence dividend that we have invested in tackling the threat. We have a good understanding of the people behind small boats crossings in particular, the supply of materials, the facilitation from near-Europe and further afield, but we want momentum and greater agility so that when we are aware that a crossing is being prepared—when materials are moving—we can act pre-emptively and proactively.
As I said earlier, we do not want to be investigating after thousands of people have arrived, and trying to put together very complex investigations that may involve months of covert surveillance and eavesdropping—a whole range of covert tactics—to get us over the line for a charging decision for a section 25 offence. The new offences give us the opportunity to act when we see that jigsaw puzzle coming together, to go to the CPS when we reach a tipping point and to go earlier than we can now. That means that we can pull more people through that system, deliver justice more quickly and be more disruptive in tackling the threat. That is a big step forward. That is lacking in the current toolbox to operationalise the intelligence we have.
Sarah Dineley: The endangerment offence potentially fills a gap between the current section 24 and 25 provisions. Each boat has a pilot—someone steering it across the channel—who, by the very nature and condition of those boats, the overcrowding, the lack of lifesaving equipment, and so on, puts everyone in that boat in danger of losing their life. We welcome that clause and will draft guidance on how it can be interpreted in terms of practical application.
Jim Pearce: Police officers mainly deal with the inland clandestine events as opposed to the small boats. From my point of view, it would be, correctly, common practice to use schedule 2(17) of the Immigration Act 1971 to detain migrants and then pass them into the immigration system. On searches after that, yes, there are powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 after that provision under section 32, but that is mainly to safeguard; it is not to seize evidence.
On Rob’s point about early intervention and intelligence gathering, the only way you gather intelligence is through what people tell you and what electronic devices give up. The Bill gives police officers the ability to gather intelligence through defined and clear powers in legislation, so that they are not misusing a PACE power, an operational procedure or anything else. That would be the biggest change for policing.
Q
Rob Jones: You could say that about all serious organised crime. Where do you go from there? I do not agree with that view. It is definitely transnational and complicated, but it is a relatively new serious organised crime threat, and it is not too late to stop it. In 2018, there were a few hundred people coming on small boats. There were 36,000 last year. We need to unravel the conditions that have allowed that to happen, and this legislation will help with that. I do not take the view that you cannot stop it.
There will always be people attempting organised immigration crime, but this element of it—small boats—is relatively new. There are very specific things that organised crime groups involved in it need to do. They need access to very specific materials—otherwise they cannot move the numbers that they attempt to move—and they need to be able to operate using materials that are lawfully obtained, albeit for criminal purposes. This attacks that business model because we can pursue the dual-use materials with more vigour and have more impact. It is challenging, and it is a different challenge from drugs and other threats, but it is there to be dealt with. It is a very public manifestation of the OIC threat that has always been there. This part of it relies on a very specific business model that we can attack.
Sarah Dineley: The follow-on point from that, and one that you raised, is that people are making a lot of money out of this, so the illicit finance piece is really important. These new clauses actually give us more on which to hang illicit finance investigations. There is a lot of work going on in the illicit finance sphere; in particular, and most recent, the illicit finance taskforce between the UK and Italy, was set up specifically to look at the profits being made by the people who are preying on other people’s misery.
Jim Pearce: It has been said already but I want to reinforce the point about organised crime gangs being involved in polycriminality. Organised immigration crime is one part, but so are modern slavery, serious acquisitive crime and drug running. That is felt in local communities across the whole country. In my own force area of Devon and Cornwall, you would think that modern slavery and organised immigration crime do not exist, but we have a number of investigations and intelligence leads being developed; they are being looked at by both our regional crime units and members of Rob’s team. This exists everywhere across the country. As I say, if you are prepared to effectively smuggle people into the country, or at least to facilitate that, you are prepared to get involved in very serious things indeed.
Q
Sarah Dineley: I will deal with the second point first, as it is probably the easiest and it flows into the first. In relation to clauses 13 to 16, with any new legislation, the Crown Prosecution Service always publishes guidance on how it is to be interpreted. Certainly, the example that you gave about asking what the weather is like in Dover when you are stood in Calais would not fall within the guidance as meeting the evidential test. Of course, it is not just about an evidential test being met, but a public interest test as well. Our guidance always deals with that specific question of whether it is in the public interest, so that prosecutors can do that balancing exercise and ask, “Are there factors that weigh in favour of prosecution? Are there factors that tend away from prosecution?” They want to come to a decision that is compliant with our code for Crown prosecutors, so it is a mixture of guidance and application of the code that hopefully gets us to the right conclusion.
Going back to your first point, I mentioned that we have mutual legal assistance and that we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for. One of the problems is that there has to be something called dual criminality—there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books. However, we are confident that there are reciprocal laws in the major OIC countries in Europe to allow us to make those requests for information under mutual legal assistance. We are aided by the network of prosecutors based abroad, which I mentioned. We also have Eurojust and the joint investigation teams run out of Eurojust. We are well versed in working internationally and with the measures that we can deploy to make sure that we build a strong evidential case.
Q
We have talked a lot about the upstream side, which publicly people are well aware of. Is there a significant domestic angle here? Are we confident that we have a sound intelligence picture—as much as we can? Are there crossovers with other crime? Does the Bill help us to disrupt and arrest people in this country?
Rob Jones: I will come back on that first. There is a footprint in the UK for organised immigration crime. The footprint for the small boats crossings has typically been driven by Belgium, Germany, Turkey and further afield, with Iraqi Kurdish and Afghan groups. As more and more people have successfully exploited that route, however, they put down ties, they get involved in criminality and they know it has worked for them, so that drives the problem. There are organised crime groups in the UK that we are targeting. Some of our most significant cases to date have involved a footprint in the UK.
When we look at those groups and what it took to bring them to justice, we have either had to extradite them to another country following a judicial investigation, or we have done very complex covert investigations for many months. This helps with that issue, because when we have got good evidence from covert tactics—this was my earlier point—we are able to go earlier with it. The majority of the criminality that drives the small boats element, however, is based overseas. We have a good intelligence picture through OIC, which has improved dramatically since 2015 when we started targeting this, when the crisis first started.
Jim Pearce: I have a follow-on from policing. I probably have two points to make. First, tomorrow you will start hearing national media on interventions across the country, which are termed Operation or Op Mille—police interventions to do with cannabis farms. A lot of the intelligence linked to that particular operation involves workers who have been brought in illegally from abroad, and all those disruptions will be from across the whole country. That might just bring this to life.
The second point I want to make is on legislation changes, which you just asked about. The two changes—well, there are more than two, but the ones I particularly want to focus on—relate to serious crime prevention orders and the ability of law enforcement, which is the police, the NCA and of course the CPS, to apply for interim orders, especially those on acquittal. Serious crime prevention orders are probably a tool that is underused at the moment. We are keen to push into that space moving forward.
Sarah Dineley: To put that into context, at the moment there are effectively two types of serious crime prevention order: one is imposed on conviction, and between 2011 and 2022, we had 1,057; the other is what we call the stand-alone serious crime prevention orders. Those are made before any charges are brought and they are heard in the High Court. To date, there have only been two applications, one of which was successful. The introduction of this new serious crime prevention order does fill a massive gap in that restrictive order.
Rob Jones: I agree with that, and I welcome those measures. There is a similar regime for sexual offences, which allows control measures for people who are suspected of offences. That has been very successful. We welcome that.
Q
Mr Jones, I am struck by your confidence that you are going to end this. I think you made a comparison with illegal drugs. You are probably right to make that comparison—they are both demand-led and operated by illegal gangs—but we have not been particularly successful with illegal drugs over the course of the past decade.
Lastly, Ms Dineley, you said something about pilots of the boats. I hope your intelligence is telling you exactly the people who are piloting the boats. It is not the gang members or people associated with this crime. It is ordinary asylum seekers who cannot afford the fare or are forced into piloting these boats. I hope that when approaching the new powers in the clauses you will be proportionate, you will know what is going on and will not endlessly prosecute innocent people who are just asylum seekers fleeing oppression and warfare.
Rob Jones: We are not looking to pursue asylum seekers who are not involved in serious and organised crime. That is not what we do. This is about tackling serious and organised crime and being as effective as we can be in doing that. There are examples of people involved in piloting boats who are connected to the organised crime groups.
Q
Rob Jones: People have been convicted of those offences, so that has passed an evidential test. Our role is undermining a specific element of the business model. It is not like drugs trafficking. Drugs trafficking has been established since the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. It is a lot older, a lot more established and involves billions of pounds and tens of thousands of people internationally, if not more. The small boats threat is different from that. It is the highest harm manifestation of organised immigration crime. I have not said that I will stop organised immigration crime. I said that we will tackle the small boats business model and then continue to tackle the OIC threat, as we have been doing since 2015.
Sarah Dineley: In relation to asylum seekers piloting boats, under the Immigration Act 1971 we have two offences: sections 24 and 25—section 25 being the facilitating offence. Our guidance is very clear on when we charge the section 25 facilitation offence. It is very clear from our guidance that it is not just about having a hand on the tiller; it is about being part of a management chain and being part of the organisation of that crossing.
You mentioned people who are coerced into taking the tiller. We would look under section 24—arriving illegally—on whether an offence of duress would be sustained. That would form part of our considerations on whether evidentially it is made out and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute that person. We do look at the whole set of circumstances, and our guidance sets out in very clear terms what is required, both in terms of the evidential test and the public interest test—that balancing exercise. We also have specific guidance in relation to how we treat refugees and asylum seekers. Again, that plays into the charging decision equation, as I will put it, and the balancing exercise.
Jim Pearce: I am not sure what I could add to my colleagues’ comments.
Q
Jim Pearce: I am not sure I am going to be able to answer that question, but I can tell you that for 12 months since November 2023 the police were involved with just under 2,000 inland clandestine incidents. What I mean by that are, for example, relevant persons who have been found in the back of an HGV who walk into police stations declaring asylum or those who have been left at petrol stations and are then picked up by police patrols and brought in. There were 2,000 incidents and nearly 3,000 persons. Obviously, they are not all being arrested for organised immigration crime offences, because they have not necessarily committed them, and my colleague here has spoken about the aggravating factors that sit within section 24, which are the key points to prove. As I say, that is probably all I could offer you at this time.
Sarah Dineley: Perhaps I could put things into some sort of numerical context. Last year, we had 37,000 arrivals in the UK through small boats crossings alone, and, in the period from April to September last year, there were only 250 prosecutions.
And were they gang members?
Sarah Dineley: I cannot break that down, but that would include gang members. That is the total number of prosecutions.
Q
Rob Jones: In relation to the powers in clauses 13 to 16?
Yes. I apologise—I think I have cut across the Minister, because she asked a very similar question, but, if you could give us an idea of how those three things that you spoke about before could be helped by the Bill, that would be really helpful.
Rob Jones: When we identify somebody from the UK who is involved in organising small boats crossings, for instance, we have to get very good, sophisticated surveillance control over that individual to get enough evidence to be able to produce a full file submission to the CPS for a section 25 facilitation offence. That could mean months of surveillance, or covert activity, in terms of eavesdropping and audio recordings.
In the meantime, we are seeing that individual with a public profile on social media, researching crossings, communicating with people overtly and meeting people. When you are looking at the commissioning of the offence, and you are living with somebody who is involved in serious organised crime, you are seeing that play out in front of you.
These clauses allow us to take elements of their business model—as they are meeting people, as they are researching, and as they are taking the preparatory steps to the section 25 offence—then go to the CPS and say, “We think we’ve got enough; we think we could go now.” That gives you more momentum, more speed and more agility.
It is the same mindset as trying to prevent attacks in the CT world. You would not choose to reactively investigate a terrorist attack; we would not choose to reactively investigate highly dangerous crossings in the English channel during which people get killed. We would choose to pre-emptively stop them, and that is what the new offences would introduce.
Q
Then, just picking up on your point, Mr Jones, about criminal gangs starting to feel the pressure because of this new suite of tools, would you say that the tools provided for in this Bill, which will have a disruptive effect, could in consequence also have a deterrent effect on the criminal smuggler gangs?
Rob Jones: I will take the second question first. Obviously time will tell but, adding to what we are doing already, these tools will rack up the pressure, and that starts to change behaviour. It increases costs and increases friction in the business model. Those things contribute to deterring people from getting involved, and we see that with other areas of criminality. I will allow others to answer the asylum question.
Sarah Dineley: I am going to dip out, rather, and say that it is not really a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service, but I can tell you that the Home Office is undertaking a piece of work looking at what the pull factors are for migrants wanting to reach the UK, and at what point they reach the firm decision that the UK is their final destination.
Q
Sarah Dineley: There is nothing that I have read in any interview provided by a migrant to suggest that that is a pull factor.
Jim Pearce: I have a personal view, but I am speaking on behalf of the national police chiefs, and I am not sure that I am in a position to do that. That is probably a question for either Immigration Enforcement or the Home Office.
Q
My second question is for Sarah. I should probably declare an interest because I was previously the home affairs attaché at the embassy in Paris. You talked about international co-operation and mentioned things like JITs and Eurojust and the challenges we face there. We heard from a previous witness about how the UK no longer being in Dublin is being cited by migrants as one of the reasons that they are going in. Can you say more about the challenges that the UK is facing post Brexit? How do we build relations with key allies to overcome them?
Sarah Dineley: I will start with how we rebuild relations with key allies. I have talked about our network of liaison prosecutors. We regularly engage and hold engagement events with our overseas prosecutors: this year alone, we have had engagement events in Ireland, Spain and, two weeks ago, Italy. That is about building those relationships and finding out what their challenges are, as well as finding out about their legal systems and what barriers there are to the co-operation that we are seeking. I think we do have to recognise that different countries have a different legal framework, and we cannot simply impose our framework on another country; we have to be able to work around their framework to try to get what we need from them.
I want to get Mike Tapp’s question in quickly so that you can summarise. We have got just two minutes left.
Q
Rob Jones: For me, I have worked really closely with Martin Hewitt already, and it works well. It allows me to focus on the operational leadership of tackling the organised crime threat and Martin to have the convening power and to work across Whitehall on a range of issues. It provides clarity, and we have more than enough to get on with in the NCA in tackling the organised crime element.
Jim Pearce: I sit on Martin’s board, so strategically I am heavily involved, and members of my team sit within the operational delivery groups. Speaking from a personal point of view, his strategic plans over the next few years make absolute sense in terms of what he is seeking to achieve for the Border Security Command. Exactly as Rob just said, it feels as though the co-ordination is there and it is driving a system response across law enforcement and more widely.
Sarah Dineley: Although we contribute to the Border Security Command, as an independent prosecuting authority we cannot be tasked or directed. However, we do value the collaborative work that we can do within that sphere.
That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the witnesses for your evidence and for your service.
Examination of Witnesses
Tony Smith, Alp Mehmet and Karl Williams gave evidence.
We will now hear oral evidence from the former director general of UK Border Force, from Migration Watch UK and from the Centre for Policy Studies. We have until 3.20 pm for this panel. Could witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Karl Williams: I am Karl Williams, the research director at the Centre for Policy Studies. I have written several reports on legal and illegal migration.
Tony Smith: Hello, my name is Tony Smith. I spent 40 years in the Home Office, between 1972 and 2013, from immigration officer right the way up to director general of UK Border Force.
Alp Mehmet: I am Alp Mehmet, chairman of Migration Watch. I am also a former diplomat and a former immigration officer.
Q
Alp Mehmet: May I just make a few remarks? Would that be acceptable?
We have a limited amount of time, so if you could answer the question, that would be great.
Alp Mehmet: I welcome the Bill in many respects. It is the sort of thing that needed to be done, and it is now happening. I welcome the co-ordination taking place across Government, and the potential co-operation with the EU and EU member states is also to be welcomed. The setting up of Border Security Command and the Border Security Commander will be helpful. My only gripe is that I strongly disagree with the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024—I think that is a mistake. I also think that repealing certain parts of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is a mistake. That is my personal view, and I am happy to explain why in a moment.
I wonder whether primary legislation was necessary to do a lot of what is happening, but we are where we are. If anything, I think repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration, or whatever we may call it, to some degree, which is unfortunate. A lot of people entering the EU—240,000 were declared to have entered illegally last year—will end up coming to us. There is no deterrence because, once they arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. I believe the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message. I do not think anything in the Bill suggests that is going to happen. That is broadly my view.
Tony Smith: Looking at the relevant clauses, the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.
I would like to see the Border Security Commander and his team have law enforcement powers so that they can arrest and detain, the same as officers in Border Force, the National Crime Agency and Immigration Enforcement. I think that whole governance structure needs attention. It needs someone to pull it all together. I am not sure we have pitched the post right in immigration law enforcement teams.
On the Border Security Commander’s reporting requirements under the Bill, I think he regularly needs to publish details of irregular arrivals by way of nationality and age, and provide regular updates on where they are in the process, so we can all see whether there are logjams in the process from arrival to either removal or grant. We can check the timelines. I think they already have a dashboard in the Home Office that does that, so I presume he will be able to take responsibility for that.
I would also like to follow up on the point that Alp Mehmet made about data on removals and the numbers of people who can currently be excluded under NABA because they have come from a safe third country. That is still there, but we do not know the data on how many of them are actually being removed on a case-by-case, so I would like to see a list of all the countries to which we can remove people: safe first countries, source countries and third countries.
We know the EU will not take third-country returns. In fact, other than Rwanda, I do not think there are any countries that will take third-country returns. There are countries that will take back their own nationals, but under this new system where we are doing away with SORA and most of the IMA, there does not seem to be a third-country outlet. Therefore, people who come here from Iran, Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan know that, from the other side of the channel, they need only get into British territorial waters and they will probably be allowed to stay in the UK. They might well get asylum, but even if they do not, it is impossible to return them for one reason or another.
I am really interested in that returns piece. I am keen on capturing data from mobile devices. Some of them keep their mobile phones. That data is being used for prosecution purposes only. I think it should be made available to officials who are considering their asylum claim. Passport data, identity data, age data and travel history data are often held on those phones—all data that would be useful when considering an asylum application. We need legislation to do that.
I would also use mobile devices to track people who are given bail so that we can use the tracker to know where they are in the event of an adverse decision from the Home Office, so that we are able to find them. At the moment, we do not have powers to do that because of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. I would like to see an amendment that enables that to happen. We know the tagging systems have not really worked. In the unlikely event that we keep SORA or the Rwanda plan—I do not expect the Government will—we really need to look at options for offshoring asylum claims from people who have arrived from a safe third country. If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.
Q
Karl Williams: I have two brief points to reinforce what Tony was saying. It feels to me like the Bill focuses on disruption and the interdiction of routes for entering the country illegally. It does not do much on deterrence. As the impact assessment says, on pillar 3, the changes to measures for going after the gangs, it is very uncertain what the outcome will be. That is because there is no evidence base here. The only country that has succeeded in stopping small boats is Australia. There was some interdiction work with Indonesia, but it was primarily about the offshoring agreement, which was a major plank of its deterrence. I would like to see deterrence measures added, not just disruption.
Secondly, on the Border Security Command, to reinforce what Tony said, data information is really important. Migration policy, legal and illegal, has generally been bedevilled by very poor quality Government data. It seems the new Border Security Commander will have limited ability to take operational control. One thing I would like to see them have is power to access and pull together data, so that we can have a much better picture.
Q
Tony Smith: One thing I have raised is the possibility of a biometric entry/exit system, which we do not have in this country. I chair a lot of conferences around the world, on border developments, border security and border technologies. Your face will become your passport sooner or later—sooner in some countries than here. If we had the powers and authority, we could capture a digital biometric image of everybody entering and exiting the country, and we could require the carriers to do likewise—we do not have physical embarkation controls.
This is happening in America. It is happening in Dubai. It is happening in Singapore. We are going to Curaçao, which now has a walk-through border. All it does is capture your face. It matches you to the API data that you already have, uploads it into the cloud and recognises you straightaway, so you have a more seamless border. It will give proper figures on who is in this country and who is not. Your net migration figures will be a lot more accurate than they are currently, provided that we have the powers to capture and retain everybody’s facial image. That means UK passports, Irish passports, electronic travel authorisations and visas, and permanent residents. I think that is achievable, and I would love to see it happening in this country.
Q
“significant fall in the percentage of the indigenous (white British) population.”
Can you explain what your worry is, and could you define “indigenous white population”?
Alp Mehmet: First, I am a first-generation migrant. I came here as an eight-year-old. I have been here since the mid-’50s. The immigrant ethnic minority element of the population in those days was something like 4%. In the 1951 census, it was 3.9%, and it is now 25%. That has substantially happened over the last 30 years.
What worries me, if that is the right word, is the fact that people are being added to the population, and migration is the only driver of population increase at the moment. I know you have David Coleman coming up next. He will tell you a great deal more about the likely evolution of the population’s demographic mix. That is my concern. Having arrived here as a migrant, and accepted and joined this country and made it my own, I see it now changing very rapidly into something that the majority of people in this country do not want to happen.
You still have not told us what indigenous means, but thank you very much.
Q
Tony, you talked about your perfect solution to borders. You did not mention the costs. Do you have an idea of the set-up and running costs?
Karl Williams: The short answer is that we do have safe and legal routes. The new Home Office immigration data, which was published this morning, pointed out that last year 79,000 people arrived through safe and legal routes. Since 2020, about 550,000, maybe slightly more, have arrived by safe and legal routes: Ukraine, Hong Kong, the Afghan resettlement schemes, and people arriving through UN programmes and from Syria, yet that does not stop the crossings.
The fundamental problem is that there will always be more demand to come to this country than we would probably be willing to allow for through safe and legal routes. One stat is that, a couple of years ago, Gallup did a very wide-ranging poll of attitudes on migration and found that, globally, about 900 million adults would migrate, given the opportunity—30 million of those people put Britain as their first choice. There is always going to be a longer queue to get in than we have capacity for at any given time. That is my view.
Tony Smith: I do not have a detailed financial breakdown for you, but I can say that the direction of travel in the UK and around the world is to take away officers from the border and to automate a lot of the processes. We are doing that here already: we move, I think, more people through e-gates than any other country does. This is an automated border that will reduce the number of officers required to do frontline, routine tasks, which they really do not want to do, and enable them to target the people they want to focus on. If you were to do that detailed analysis, you would probably find that it will be cost-neutral in the end.
Q
Karl Williams: I do not think it combats it, and I do not think it is a disincentive. The ideal solution is that, once we have control over the small boats, and therefore who is coming to this country, we can have a serious conversation about, if we want, expanding safe and legal routes, what that might look like and what other parts of the world we might want to help. But so much resource is now sucked up by dealing with the downstream consequences of the channel crossings, such as the hotel bills and so on—this is a sequence of things. I do not think having a safe and legal route is in itself a disincentive to small boat crossings.
Q
Tony Smith: I do not think any of it was good value for money for the taxpayer, was it? The history and record speak for themselves. But we need to think about why it did not work and look at the reasoning behind why it took three years to try to get the process going. An awful lot of work was done in Rwanda and the Home Office to try to make it happen, but it was subject to continual legal challenge. Legal challenges were made in Europe, in the domestic courts and by judicial review. On a number of occasions, flights were lined up that did not happen, and a lot of money was therefore wasted in the process.
I am not a big fan of the Illegal Migration Act. Some of it was cumbersome, because it put all the eggs in the Rwanda basket. Rwanda was a limited programme—obviously, we could not send everybody to Rwanda—but under NABA, you had the option to triage and put some people into the Rwanda basket: those hard country removals, where you could not remove them anywhere else. You had that option, but you could still do what you are doing now and process people from places like Turkey and Albania, put them through the asylum system and return them to source.
Losing that triage option is going to be a big drawback, and it is going to cost a lot more money in the long run. The intake will continue to come, and you will then have to rack up the associated asylum, accommodation and settlement costs that run along with that.
Karl Williams: I would ask: “Value compared with what?” There is one argument around the counterfactual of if you had a deterrent, but I would also refer to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s analysis last summer on the fiscal impact of migration. It estimates that a low-skilled migrant, or low-wage migrant as the OBR puts it, will represent a lifetime net fiscal cost to the taxpayer of around £600,000. We know from analysis from Denmark, the Netherlands and other European countries that asylum seekers’ lifetime fiscal costs tend to be steeper than that, but even on the basis of the OBR analysis, even if everyone ends up in work, if 35,000 people cross a year, which is roughly where we were last year, at that sort of cost range, it will probably be £50 billion or £60 billion of lifetime costs. Compare that with £700 million—it depends on what timescale you are looking at.
Q
If I am unfairly characterising your view, you can correct me, but your view is that they should not get into the UK, that they should be stopped either in the sea or the minute they arrive in the UK, and that at that point they should be booted out somewhere—if not Rwanda, some other country—or just put back to country of source. Is that roughly your view? You can just shake your head or nod.
Tony Smith indicated assent.
Q
Tony Smith: I do have sympathy with them. I do sympathise. Many of us, I suspect, would do the same. My issue is that they have travelled through a great many countries to make it to the UK. We used to have the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees resettlement programme, when we had control of our borders. I was a big fan of that; I went to Canada and studied it for three years. We were actually searching the world and working with the UNHCR to identify the most vulnerable people and set a cap on the numbers that we could take. That was going on in Canada, Australia and the UK.
If you look at the UNHCR website and see the numbers of people who are going through that programme now, they are not getting resettled. The reason why not is that the business model has been taken over by the smugglers. That is why we are getting large numbers of young men who can afford to cross multiple borders and pay smugglers to get here. I would like to see a return to the system where we have control of those irregular routes. Then we could start looking, as Karl said, at reintroducing UNHCR resettlement programmes, going to the UNHCR and taking a certain quota into the UK in a managed way.
Alp Mehmet: Out of Gaza, there are going to be potentially 2 million people who would like some comfort, so they would like to move to somewhere a bit more convivial than Gaza is at the moment. But, if I may ask the question, why is it assumed that—because people like us advocate control and discouraging people, a lot of the time, from risking their lives, not just in crossing the channel but in living rough as they do—discouraging them from coming is in some way inhuman, insensitive and unkind?
Q
Alp Mehmet: We do, and even in my day as an immigration officer 50 years ago, that was exactly what we did. Tony rose to run the show, but I would argue that we had far more leeway in the ’70s as very junior, humble individual immigration officers. We were properly trained, we were monitored, we did things entirely within the law and we dealt with people humanely. It does not mean that that will not happen because we are saying, “No, you shouldn’t jump into a dinghy and make your way over here.”
Q
Alp Mehmet: Tony, you start, and then I will catch up with the question, because I did not quite hear.
Tony Smith: We may well say the same thing. The question was about the fact that the Rwanda plan did not deter anybody because we still had 84,000 people arrive. I think the reason for that was that it was never, in fact, implemented. The intelligence coming across from Calais was that the smugglers and migrants never believed that it was going to happen. Once it became clearer that the Safety of Rwanda Act had passed, and that it might well become a reality, there was intelligence to suggest that some people were thinking twice about getting into dinghies, and there was some displacement into Ireland as a result. Of course, we will never know now, because we never actually implemented it.
We had a change of Government, and the new Government made it very clear that they were going to abolish the Rwanda plan, so we are where we are, but I would have liked an opportunity to see what would happen if we had started at least some removals. We had flights ready to go. I would have liked to see the impact that starting some removals would have had on the incoming population. We will never know now, I am afraid. Clearly, we hardly removed anybody to Rwanda in the end—I accept that—but I would have liked us to at least try, to see if it had an impact.
Alp Mehmet: It was never going to be the solution. It was not going to be the way to stop those people jumping into boats and coming across, but it was going to help. There needed to be other changes. I appreciate that we are not going to resile from the European convention on human rights any time soon, but while it is there, it is very difficult to be certain that people will be dissuaded. Some will be, some would have been, and we know that some were already being deterred. It was a pity, I am afraid, that the Rwanda deal went.
Q
Karl Williams: If we are talking about what deterrence we might need or what pull factors there are, having charities that in some circumstances are facilitating people crossing the channel is clearly an extra pull factor—probably a small one in the grand scheme of things, but it is there. I am thinking about organisations such as Care4Calais, which provide, for example, phone-charging services to migrants who are waiting in the sand dunes and the camps around the beaches where the crossings are made. They can recharge their phones; they are therefore in contact with the smuggling gangs. I think that there is a hole in the system that needs to be closed, and I do not think that this Bill does it.
Tony Smith: There are charities and charities. Some charities are not in any way involved in facilitation; it is a pure “care in the community” exercise or function in Calais. But I think other charities are a little bit more mischievous: they might be helping people with what to say when you are near the border, how to present your asylum claim, and how to get to a beach that might not be patrolled. I would like to see more work done on that.
Q
Given that the Bill clearly provides a deterrent to smugglers, to the people-smuggling business and to the criminal gangs in the channel by disrupting their activity, and by making it a greater expense, why do you still think it is a mistake—I think two or three of you said it outright, but you all seem broadly supportive of the Rwanda scheme—to be repealing those Acts with the Bill?
Tony Smith: There is the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, and there is the Illegal Migration Act 2023. I said earlier that I was not a great fan of the IMA, for the very reasons that you have stated: it brought in the ban too early, and people were being banned from re-entering this country before we had even removed them. That was impacting on port cases. It was a hugely difficult time, because that law put all of the eggs in the Rwanda basket. As you say, that left increasing numbers of boat people being served with a notice that they were going to Rwanda, when they were never going to go to Rwanda; they were going into the system that you described. I do not think that that was a very good idea. If we had put the IMA to one side, with the duty to remove, we could have stuck with NABA.
Then we had SORA, the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act, which would have turbocharged NABA. It would have given you a triage option: either to accept people into the asylum system quickly and process them, as you are doing now, or—for others, where you wanted to make a point that it is not okay to come across in a small boat and get to stay in the UK—to send some of them to Rwanda. That is what we could have done under NABA and SORA, and my view is that the IMA disrupted that.
Karl Williams: I suppose the asylum backlog of inadmissible people is a function of the disjunction whereby different parts of the legislation are being implemented at different speeds. Obviously the intention at the beginning was that we would have the flights going off in January or February 2023. When the ECHR injunction stopped the first flight, that derailed it. You could conceivably have had a situation in which a combination of some offshoring and the deterrent effect of that meant that the backlog of inadmissible cases did not grow. The fact that Rwanda was stalled in the courts for a couple of years, and then just did not happen at all, meant that that amount was inevitably going to increase. That was then locked in.
Q
Tony Smith: No, I have not spoken to the DG of the National Crime Agency. I am retired, so there are probably different constraints on what I can say versus what you can say when you are still working for the Government. But I am very close to Border Force immigration enforcement and a lot of my former colleagues who are still working. I went out on the boats with them last year and am very much in touch with what is going on there.
I worked under the UK Border Agency. We had agency status, and we were at arm’s length from Government. I had specific removal targets that I had to deliver. I had end-to-end teams: I had front-end teams, asylum teams and immigration enforcement teams in a region, working a case from start to finish, with rigorous case conclusion targets. I liked that system, because I thought it worked, but it got broken up into silos—we now have directors general for Border Force, immigration enforcement, migration and borders, and homeland security, and now we are putting another one in for Border Security Command. That is quite a jumbled mirage of civil servants. If you then have crime agencies—NCA, the police, and the security services—it gets really complicated, so I can see why you want a co-ordinator. But that is what it is: a co-ordinator, not a commander.
I was Gold commander for the UKBA at the London 2012 Olympics. I was in charge, basically; obviously I was answering to the Home Secretary on decision making, but it came to me because I had command over all those units. Now, you do not have that, because the Home Office is very gradeist. You have all these directors general for a whole bunch of silos, so it is going to be a heck of a job for the new security commander to actually direct activities to those agencies that have other priorities and other responsibilities. That is why I would like to see them have agency powers—arrest powers, enforcement powers—and to have a look at that whole structure of Border Force enforcement and migration enforcement, and ask, “Is this too unwieldy? Can we have a more streamlined process whereby we have somebody calling the shots?”
Q
Tony Smith: I know you have an order coming in next week that will allow biometrics to be captured, but I do not think it goes far enough.
Yes, we are. It is coming in this year.
Tony Smith: We do not have a biometric entry/exit system. The EU is bringing in EES, which means Brits will have to give their biometrics on entry and exit. We are bringing in the electronic travel authorisation—the ETA—but that is different from an entry/exit system.
Q
I also want to ask you about that report. In a previous answer, you raised the importance of counterfactuals. In reaching the overall recommendations and assessments in your report, did you consider counterfactuals such as the fact that migrants might move up the wage and skills distribution and might not always remain on low pay? In the absence of migrant workers, for instance in health and care settings, there would need to be other people who could do their work. Did you consider the economic impact of having nobody in those roles to do that health and care work, and whether that would affect the worklessness in our country? Did you consider whether there could be a reallocation of British workers into higher-skilled and higher-wage jobs as a consequence of those migrant workers? Did you think about the economic impact of potentially more people doing unpaid care because of a lack of paid carers?
I ask those questions not because I feel we should rely on migrant workers—I do not—but because your report has been lauded by the shadow Home Secretary and other Conservative Members of Parliament. I want to make sure that if it is being used as a point of reference, the data and the assessments have integrity. If you were to consider those counterfactuals, I wonder whether that would affect your report.
Karl Williams: To clarify, we are talking about the report on indefinite leave to remain that came out recently, not the report from last year.
I forgot the name of it. The “Here To Stay?” report?
Karl Williams: Yes, that is the one. That is purely about the fiscal impact. There is some analysis, which I can go into in a minute, on the broader economic picture in the previous report, but this report was more tightly focused.
But inevitably the counterfactuals would have an impact on the fiscal burden carried by the state.
Karl Williams: Indeed, yes. The counterfactuals we did think about were different levels of stay rates and different rates among different wage profiles. Migrants earning more as they go through the system clearly does happen to some extent, whether through out-migration or through career progression. In conducting that analysis, we stuck to the fiscal profiles used by the OBR, because, as you say, the data quality is fairly poor. That was the best there was, without trying to construct our own estimates for ingoings and outgoings as migrants progress over their life course in the UK. The OBR models it by age, so it captures the different wage contributions that you make at different points in your life, which will be higher in some points and lower in others. It also captures the different burdens of, for example, healthcare in old age.
I am glad that you have raised the quality of the data. We have repeatedly pointed out, as have the Governor of the Bank of England and the Office for National Statistics, that the labour force survey is very broken. In that report and in previous reports, we have always pushed the point that we need better data. Everyone needs better data. This is one area where there is broad consensus, whether you are restrictionist or want more migration or whatever else. I understand that the reference here is to Denmark and the Netherlands.
Q
Karl Williams: The report is very clear about the assumptions we have made at various points and the unknowns. With any modelling exercise, whether you are conducting a fiscal model of an effect of a tax change or whatever else, you have to make reasonable assumptions.
Thank you. That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses very much for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
David Coleman gave evidence.
Good afternoon. We will now hear evidence from David Coleman, emeritus professor of demography at the University of Oxford. We have until 3.40 pm for this witness. Could you please introduce yourself briefly for the record?
David Coleman: Yes, of course. My name is David Coleman. I am emeritus professor of demography at the University of Oxford. I have been retired for over 10 years, and I interest myself in all sorts of aspects of demography—not just migration, but mortality, fertility and all the other things that we play with.
Q
David Coleman: The sad fact is that I do have reservations about the Bill, but I do not have any magical solutions to put that right, I am sorry to say. It is, after all, an intractable problem, this question of asylum and migration.
My concerns are that we have to, we are forced to, restart or intensify a war that we may not easily win. Rather like, as I suggested in my note, the war against drugs, it will be difficult—probably perpetual and probably indecisive. It will have some effect. It will consume a great deal of effort. It may involve unkindness to asylum seekers and possibly risk to those doing the investigations. It is, I think, very much second best to the idea of trying to deter migration for asylum claiming in the first place. That, of course, was dismissed by the present Government as being unfeasible, unworkable and unkind, so the Rwanda scheme was scrapped. However, although it sounds rather brutal, it seems to me that the only obvious way of deterring movement to Britain is by making the movement to Britain unattractive. The obvious way of doing that is to divert at least some of the claimants somewhere they will be safe but will not enjoy the benefits of being in a rich country.
There are four ways of dealing with the issue, are there not? One is to have open borders, so that everybody who wants to come can come. Then there are two ways of being nasty: one is being nasty to the smugglers themselves, which is, I suppose, what the Bill is primarily about, and the other is being rather nasty to people who wish to claim asylum, which the previous policy did. Alternatively, you could have special routes for selected people who can be investigated, possibly by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and then admitted. That has, as far as I can make out, been ruled out by the Government for the time being.
Q
David Coleman: The lesson that everyone cites is the example of Australia, which, depending on which Government are in power, has a policy of diverting people right across the other side of the Pacific to an island where they were notionally safe, but where they were not able to enjoy being in Australia. That is supported or not supported depending on which Government is in power, which is one of the problems with migration policy. Generally speaking, whether the doors are tight shut, half open or fully open depends very much on the swings and balances of electoral change and is rather unpredictable. That is inevitable.
Q
David Coleman: Yes and no. The Galton Institute does not exist any more; it has changed its name to the Adelphi Genetics Forum.
But it is a eugenics organisation?
David Coleman: No, it is not. It is devoted to genetics research and has conferences every year on genetics research. It promotes research into that and has a small grant fund that people can apply for. It is a very pukka organisation.
If you have any doubts about it, I suggest that you look at its publications and its website. You will find something by me on that that is only slightly connected to genetics: “New Light on Old Britons”—it is about palaeontology and human evolution. That is one of the things that the organisation was interested in. You are quite right that it started off as the Eugenics Society, and before that it was the Eugenics Education Society. That was in the days when progressives of every kind clustered around to support eugenic ideas because they were thought to be improving and beneficial to society. Society has changed its mind—
Q
David Coleman: It got a terribly bad name for that reason—exactly so. That is why, over the last century, opinion has moved against using that word and using those notions. But I respectfully point out that it has nothing to do with asylum seeking.
Q
David Coleman: I suppose, as a rather bad Christian, I am bound to believe that, but the problem with human rights definitions is that they tend to be infinitely extendible. All kinds of entitlements that started off being universally accepted by almost everyone of good will tend to get expanded beyond reason.
Q
David Coleman: I mean making the prospect of life in the country of intended asylum less attractive than otherwise might be the case. That is what the Rwanda policy was. I suppose I was speaking slightly tongue in cheek in calling it “nasty”, but it certainly is not the same thing as being welcoming, is it? The idea of the Rwanda Bill was to secure the safety from persecution and risk of death for asylum seekers, which is the aim of asylum, without admitting them to Britain and all the benefits of being in a rich country.
Q
David Coleman: I am not here to defend the Rwanda policy, although I think that, in principle, it had some merit. That is a problem that would arise whether there was a Rwanda policy or an Illegal Migration Act or not, because of the sheer pressure of asylum seeking from all corners of the world. That has been the case in the past for a long time and will continue to be the case. We now have asylum claims up to 99,000 in the last year, so it is not just to do with the Illegal Migration Act; it is a worldwide process.
Q
David Coleman: I do not know how important the Illegal Migration Act was in increasing the number of the backlog, to be perfectly honest. In the past, it has been the same height without the Illegal Migration Act. About 15 or 20 years ago, it was also 90,000 per year, and that was way before any of the past legislation was enacted.
Q
David Coleman: This is a formidable tutorial group to try to give such an answer to. If I could say with any kind of confidence what was going to happen by the middle of the century, I would deserve a Nobel prize.
Q
David Coleman: I can do my best. The present situation, as you are obviously suggesting, is rather dire from the point of view of domestic demography, such as the fact that the so-called total fertility is down to 1.44 and may fall further. Therefore, it presages considerable population ageing and decline should it continue.
At the risk of being technical and boring, I would point out that total fertility is a snapshot. It is only a calculation of, on average, how many babies the average woman—if you can imagine an average woman—will produce over a lifetime, if the same levels of age-specific fertility were to continue, which refers to the same levels of birth rate at the ages 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and so on. If that continues at the present level, in the long run you will get 1.44 babies. This is a very volatile measure; it goes up and it goes down. Back in 2010, it was 1.94, which is really very healthy and probably as high as you could possibly get.
Q
David Coleman: Yes, or 2.1. That is true, although there is a risk of starting another hare. I suggest that some degree of population ageing and population decline is tolerable, particularly when we are faced with a world whose habitable area is shrinking and productivity is declining, thanks to the inevitable level of global climate change. The last thing we want, it seems to me, anywhere, is population growth. Population stabilisation and population decline, as long as it is modest and eventually comes to an end, is to be welcomed. I have said that with colleagues on a number of occasions.
I do agree that the present level of fertility is very unsatisfactory; it would be much healthier if it were higher. One gets into perilous waters trying to persuade people to have more children. The important thing is to identify those obstacles that stand in the way of the family size that people keep on saying they want to have. Despite all the problems at the present time, opinion polls suggest that people still want to have, on average, almost two babies or even more than two babies, but they cannot, for all sorts of reasons. In this country, some of those reasons are very obvious. One is the atrocious cost of housing. House prices are now at nine times the level of the average income, compared with three or four times, which was normal in the past.
Sorry, we have four minutes left and I have three people to get in.
David Coleman: Forgive me; I ran away with myself. I am so sorry.
Following on from what the Minister asked you about how we have to be mean or have open borders, I looked at your written evidence, in which you have put as your ninth point, “Make Britain unattractive again”, and then you refer to the Rwanda policy. You say that you do not really know, but we had the National Crime Agency in before you and they were quite optimistic about the deterrent aspects of the Bill. Are you saying that you are not at all?
David Coleman: I am not, but at the moment it is to some extent a matter of opinion. The sorts of measures being proposed in the Bill are a development and accentuation of what has been done already. After all, the Government are not doing nothing to try to moderate asylum seeking; they have already, like the previous Government, been involved in discussions with our neighbours to try to come to an agreement on all sorts of aspects of migrant trafficking. The Bill is trying to ratchet that up, perfectly reasonably.
So far those measures, although admittedly not as intense as this Bill wants to impose, have not been notably successful. I drew a parallel with the war against drugs, which has an effect. It reduces the volume of drugs in circulation and puts drug pushers in prison, but it also puts up the price of drugs. There is a rather depressing parallel there.
Q
David Coleman: That, I suppose, is the reason why the previous Government wanted to try to do something very different indeed in the Rwanda policy.
But they passed the Act.
David Coleman: It was never tried. It might well have failed, but it was certainly a different avenue. It was not the one you had in mind, I am sure, but it was none the less a different way of doing it. It was attacking the problem from a different angle—from the question of demand rather than control.
Order. That brings us, unfortunately, to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for his evidence.
Examination of Witness
Professor Brian Bell gave evidence.
We will now hear oral evidence from Professor Brian Bell from King’s College London. We have until 4 pm for this panel. Could the witness please briefly introduce himself for the record?
Professor Brian Bell: I am Professor Brian Bell, the chair of the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I think it is fair to say that it is an open question whether it will be effective. The evidence from lots of previous experiences is that it is actually very hard to deter this kind of activity, but I suppose you have to try everything you can and see what works. If something does not work, you try something else.
In some sense, it is an unanswerable question at this point, and it may be unanswerable in the long run. Suppose that the Bill is passed and small boat numbers go up. That does not prove that the Bill failed, because we do not know what the counterfactual is of what would have happened without the Bill, and vice versa: if the numbers go down, it could just be that the number of people who wanted to come to France and then on to England had fallen. It is going to be very difficult to directly observe the effect. Whenever you think about these issues, you always have to think about both the deterrence and sanction effect, which is what the Bill is focused on, and then how you change the underlying incentives.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I do not think so, in the sense that I do not think any country has experienced these issues and dealt with them particularly successfully. There are different approaches—obviously, Australia has taken a different approach—but I do not think that any country would claim that it has really succeeded in significantly addressing this kind of problem.
To me, it is very much the same kind of problem as any sort of criminal activity. You can change the sanctions and the effectiveness of the police, and that has some effect. The evidence tends to suggest on this sort of thing that it has a fairly small effect. The deterrence effect tends often to be quite small with these policies, so in the end the right response will almost certainly be about changing the incentives as well, in terms of both what is the attraction to come to the UK and whether there are ways we can encourage people to stay in France, in this case, instead of wanting to make those journeys.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Yes.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Absolutely, but that is sort of true of all crimes: if someone is committing a crime, you want to stop them doing it. I think the difficulty is in the question: if you stop one criminal doing it, what happens? Is there a substitution effect where you just get the next organised crime organisation taking action? The risk is that you may well succeed, but the overall macro effect of that may be not as positive as you might hope.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Absolutely not.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: It is likely to have some positive effect. In some sense, it cannot have a negative effect, so it must have some positive effect. The difficulty is that, as almost everyone would accept, it is impossible to judge ex ante what the size of that effect will be, but that sort of tells you that you should try it and see how it works.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: It is an effort worth making, but I would caution that in other areas of police and crime activity, the impact of being tougher with sanctions and new offences does not necessarily lead to very substantial changes in crime rates. The overall crime rate in the UK is almost certainly driven more by incentives and economic outcomes in the long run than it is by particular offences and statutes that are passed.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Completely.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I do not have expertise in that area. I am confused as to how significant it will be. As I understand the Bill, it will allow HMRC to share customs data with other parties. It is not clear to me what that achieves. It would be wrong of me to imply that I have any particular operational understanding of how that will help operations.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Data sharing overall can be phenomenally valuable in thinking about immigration more broadly. The Migration Advisory Committee has been very clear that we need to improve the data. We have access to data from HMRC that we find very useful on the legal migration side. Fundamentally, the question is: what data does HMRC hold that will provide useful information to border security in terms of stopping organised immigration gangs? Presumably, the Government think that there are some useful points. My view is, “Why wouldn’t you try it and see if it helps?” If it does not, you are no worse off.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I will take those questions in reverse order. I do not think they were very effective. Again, I would caution that there is always this problem that you see a piece of legislation passing and then look at the numbers and try to guess whether it was the legislation that caused the change that you see. Other things are going on, so it is always difficult to do that.
More broadly, the evidence that we have from people seeking asylum is that the exact nature of the rules that exist in the country they are going to are not big drivers of their decision to go there. People have asked asylum seekers to list the reasons they want to come to the UK, and very rarely are they things like the legal system in operation for dealing with asylum claims. It is all about the fact that English is the most common language in the world and often the second language of these people. There is often a diaspora in the country, or labour market opportunities are potentially better than in some of the other countries. Those things are generally much more important than whether your asylum claim will be dealt with in Rwanda. I do not think that many people concern themselves with that.
The numbers are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act. Of course, asylum seekers might have been really clever and spotted that it was probably going to be declared illegal by the Supreme Court—perhaps they were prejudging the legality of the measures. The cost was staggering for a policy that was very unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect. The previous Government’s difficulty was that they could never actually tell you how many people they thought would be sent to Rwanda. It is not a deterrent if you are sending a few thousand people every year.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Well, four went voluntarily, but if the policy had been implemented in full, there were never any guarantees. We certainly would not have been able to send 100,000 a year to Rwanda; Rwanda was never going to accept that. The cost was astounding, given the likely deterrence effect. It illustrates a problem in the Home Office at the time: there was little rational thinking about what the costs and benefits of different policies were. My personal view is that getting asylum claims dealt with more quickly would have been a much more effective use of public resources. That is in the interests of not only the British public but asylum seekers, as most of their claims are accepted. If we could have got them through the system faster, got them approved if they were approved, got them into work and integrating within their communities and, if they were rejected, actually deported them, that would have been a much better use of public resources.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I think the numbers will be quite small. In some senses, a good piece of legislation makes a criminal offence so serious, and a penalty so severe, that no one commits the crime. There is a risk that you think you have failed because no one is convicted, but actually if you deterred the behaviour then it succeeded. The reality is that if there are any convictions, it will be almost entirely asylum seekers who are convicted. I do not see how the gangs will be convicted because, as I understand it, they are not on the boats.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: That is the implication of the legislation. I am not a lawyer, so I should be careful here, but I understand that there is a defence in the legislation that would allow you to claim that you were essentially forced into doing it, under sort of human slavery conditions.
Not according to the current numbers: 205 is a lot of people being convicted for being compelled to drive a boat—
Q
Professor Brian Bell: It is probably not a very strong deterrent. To repeat myself, all the evidence is that when asylum claimants think of where to claim asylum they do not have detailed knowledge of the ins and outs of the procedures of different countries. They almost certainly do not know what might happen in five to 10 years, which is the length of residence that they would need to apply for citizenship, so I am not sure it will be a significant deterrent. However, it is important to recognise that citizenship is not a right; it should be viewed as a privilege that people earn. It is reasonable for the Government to take the view that citizenship should not be given to certain people. I do not think there is anything wrong with that—it seems a legitimate observation.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: You would not want to disrupt some of the incentives. For example, the unemployment rate is 7.8% in France and 4.4% in the UK. The gap is slightly larger for young people than for the population as a whole. I am sure the Government would not want to change that incentive, although the French probably would. If you have a buoyant economy relative to your neighbour, at least in the labour market, that is an incentive. There is an incentive in terms of things that you would not necessarily want to change. The English language is really important as a pull factor, and the fact that there are diasporas already in the country.
There tends to be some evidence that the UK has been somewhat more successful than France at integrating immigrants into society, particularly second-generation immigrants: there is some evidence that whereas employment rates are always very poor for first-generation immigrants relative to natives, that gap narrows quite a bit in the UK when you look at second-generation immigrants. That is less true in France, so people may think the opportunities are better here.
The area where the Government could take action—and they are with the Employment Rights Bill—is that we have lots of employment rights in this country, but do not bother enforcing any of them, because we do not spend money on HMRC minimum wage enforcement teams and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority does not have enough money to employ people to do all the work it needs to do. If the Fair Work Agency can take over and actually be beefed up, then we can enforce labour standards a bit more and that may discourage people, because one of the attractions of coming to the UK is that our looser enforcement of rules in labour market makes it easier to employ people who are here irregularly.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: That is a speculative number. It is actually extremely difficult to work out the fiscal impact of migration. We are doing it at the MAC at the moment. We can only do it because we have access to data that the CPS could not possibly have. I do not know how you do that kind of analysis without making really very brave—and some may say foolhardy—estimates of what these people are going to do when they are in the UK. To give a very simple example, we currently do not know what dependants do when they come into the country. Let us say we issue a skilled worker visa and a dependent comes in. We will know nothing about what they do because the Home Office, quite fairly, does not pursue finding out about that dependent because they are here legally, but you need to know how much they earn and if they are in a job to work out what their contribution will be over the next 50 to 60 years of their life.
I think it is very dangerous to just make broad assumptions about, “Oh, they are going to be like this and they are going to earn this”, and then you can come up with a very big number. I could choose a big group of British people who will also have very big negative effects, because if you just choose people who are low earners and perhaps people who are disabled, you automatically get those numbers because they are entitled to more benefits in the long run, and they do not pay as much tax. I am not particularly sure what that tells us.
Q
Professor Brian Bell: As I understand it, the big difference is that in the Australian system, if your asylum application was granted, you were brought to Australia; the system was just offshore processing of the application. That is very different from the Rwanda scheme, where we were essentially washing our hands of any responsibility going forward for those asylum applicants. The Australian model is worth thinking about if you could find countries that would be willing to process the applications, because we are spending—let us be honest—an absolute fortune on housing asylum seekers here while we consider their claims. If you could find a cheaper and more effective way of doing that, while still recognising that we have the responsibility to take those asylum seekers who have claimed asylum in this country, that would be worth considering.
That brings us to the end of the time allocated for Members to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the witness for his evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Dame Angela Eagle and Seema Malhotra gave evidence.
We will now hear evidence from Dame Angela Eagle MP, Minister for Border Security and Asylum, and Seema Malhotra MP, Minister for Migration and Citizenship at the Home Office. We will have until 4.20 pm for this panel.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: The Illegal Migration Act was flawed legislation, which did not actually work. It was so flawed that the previous Government, even though they put it on to the statute book, did not actually commence much of it at all.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: The issue was that we did not think it was possible to make the suite of legislation, which involved the Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act, work together coherently. Its effect was essentially to allow people into the country but make it illegal to process them and leave them stuck in an ever-lengthening backlog and in limbo. The whole approach established by the interplay of those two Acts of Parliament, one of which was barely commenced even though it was on the statute book, had to be taken away so that we could bring some order to the chaos that we inherited from the previous Government, as a result of the practical outcomes of those two pieces of legislation.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: No, we certainly have not said that. As soon as people’s asylum claims have been properly processed, and the appeals that they are allowed to make are finished, if they have failed, we will seek to remove those people—but not to a third country.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: The Home Secretary has made it perfectly clear in the changes to the advice that if you come to this country illegally, we do not expect that you will be granted citizenship.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: We have taken that out of primary legislation because it was connected with the duty to remove, which was about the interplay of the Illegal Migration Act and the Rwanda Act. As I have just said, it was flawed legislation that did not work in practice.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: There are real issues about the accuracy of scientific age assessment. At the Home Office, we are in the middle of doing work to see whether we can get a system of scientific age assessment that is robust enough to use. We are certainly not ruling it out, but the effects in that legislation were all about the duty to remove—it was about trying to define children. You will remember that in the IMA, the duty to remove excluded children, which perhaps created a bigger incentive for people to claim that they were children when they were not. The scientific age assessment clauses in that Act were related to the duty to remove. Given that we are repealing the vast majority of the Illegal Migration Act in this Bill, we removed those clauses.
I would not, however, want to give the hon. Gentleman the false impression that we have completely abandoned the idea of doing scientific age assessment. Currently, we are trying to assess whether there are ways of doing it that not only are cost-effective, but can be relied on. It is not an easy thing to do; there are no very easy solutions to whether it is accurate. We are exploring those areas ahead of making any subsequent announcements about if—and how, if we do—we use scientific age assessment.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: First, we will always seek to return people if they fail the asylum system, and have had all their claims and appeals, as soon as it is safe to do so. That is the first thing to say, and we must never lose sight of that. Situations in particular countries change—sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse, as the hon. Gentleman knows. We never give up on that. Clearly, if people are here and have failed, we want them to leave, and we will facilitate them to leave.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: With all due respect, I do not think they were ever going to go to Rwanda.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: One of the important things for the integrity of any asylum system is that if people fail it, there are consequences that are different from those if they do not. It is the hard and nastier end of any asylum system: if you have no right to be here, we will want you to leave—voluntarily, if at all possible. Sometimes we will even facilitate that, but we will return you by force if we have to. The 19,000 returns that we have achieved since 4 July are an indication that we want to ensure that enforcement of the rules is being put into effect more than it was. There had been very big falls in returns, and very big falls in enforcement, and we want to put that right.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: Clearly, it is important that we try to deal with the development of organised immigration crime on our borders. Colleagues will have heard the comments from the NCA and the National Police Chiefs’ Council about how important it is to assert the rule of law in such areas. It is very important. That is the main aim of the Bill.
If the hon. Gentleman is talking about safe routes, we heard some evidence today about safe routes. I am personally sceptical that those would stop people wanting to come across in boats. If one takes the example of our Afghan scheme—a safe route for particular people from Afghanistan who have been put in danger by supporting UK forces—that is a legal route that is safe. At the same time, last year the largest nationality represented among small boat arrivals was Afghans.
We have people arriving on small boats who come from countries where we have visa regimes, so I am not convinced that we could provide enough places on safe routes to prevent people smugglers benefiting from that kind of demand. That is my opinion from having looked at what goes on and I accept the hon. Gentleman might have a different one.
Seema Malhotra: If I may add to that, we also heard in the evidence about the scale of the challenge that we face and how small boat crossings are a relatively new phenomenon, in that we had around 300 in 2018, but the number is now 36,000. In a very targeted way, this Bill is looking at what more tools we can bring in along with the Border Security Command to tackle the criminal gangs that are literally making millions—if not more—out of people who are very vulnerable.
The fact that there were more deaths in the channel in 2024 than in previous years shows that the situation is becoming even more dangerous, so we absolutely have to do everything we can to disrupt those criminal gangs. Therefore, I want to focus on that for this Bill, because we cannot do everything in one piece of legislation.
It is important, however, to correct, from my understanding, a bit of evidence that was given earlier by Tony Smith that the UK resettlement scheme was closed—it is actually still open. We have had over 3,000 refugees resettled via that scheme since its launch four years ago. The number of refugees arriving on that depends on a range of factors, and that includes recommendations from the UNHCR as well as how many offers of accommodation we have from local authorities; that is an ongoing system. This is legislation around tackling the small boats and the criminal gangs that are enabling that as a new trade.
Q
To be more specific, I have a follow-up on clause 18. We are creating a new criminal offence of endangering someone on a sea crossing—why is it an unauthorised sea crossing? Why is it not a blanket endangering of someone when crossing the sea? Should that offence not be wider or is it more like an aggravating factor?
Dame Angela Eagle: I will talk about the very detailed aspect of that during our line-by-line scrutiny.
There has been a certain behaviour that has begun to happen, which has been perceived on the crossings in the small boats and which this offence is designed to deal with. That is the various kinds of violent intimidation that goes on, such as putting women and children in the middle of boats that then collapse, so they are crushed and die in that way, or holding children over the edge of boats to prevent rescue.
Sometimes if there has been a fatality on a boat—and we have seen what has happened—we go to pick people up and return them to France. The French authorities also do that. There is then a battle not to be returned and violence is sometimes used to prevent people from accepting the rescue that is offered to them. So there are some very particular things that this endangerment clause and this new offence are seeking to deal with.
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: Well, the Border Security Commander is very happy with the powers that he has—he has been appointed. Again, we will talk about this in some detail, but it is important that we get co-ordination across different areas of activity. I think you will have heard what the NCA witness said about how he wants somebody else to do the co-ordination while he does the basic work. Everybody is working together very well across the people who have to have regard. The Border Security Commander is bringing together a range of very important players in this area to strategise and co-ordinate, and he has not told me—I meet him regularly—that he needs any more powers.
Q
The other thing is that it will have very little impact on people making the decision to come to the United Kingdom. They are fleeing oppression, poverty and war, and they do not care about the laws of the United Kingdom—what Angela Eagle is doing in a migration Bill is not going to deter them from coming here. So what are we going to do to get on top of this issue? Should we not be thinking, as we go through this Bill process, about fresh, new ideas to tackle it?
Dame Angela Eagle: Well, we have just come out of a period of fresh new ideas and gimmicks—
Yes, but that is gone.
Dame Angela Eagle: And very expensive they turned out to be. We have inherited such a mess, with huge backlogs and very long waits for appeals, that we have to try to clear up. We have an asylum system that essentially broke down—I think one of our witnesses was talking about it being “in meltdown” earlier today.
We are going to do the day job and start to get that system working. I think that having fast, fair and effective immigration decisions is a very important part of all of this, as is removing those whose claims fail so that we can actually get to the stage where people know that, if they come to this country and they do not have a reasonable chance of being accepted as an asylum seeker, they will be returned. I think that is what the deterrent is.
Seema Malhotra: If I may add one point, it is absolutely valid and right to say that this Bill is one part of trying to tackle both the criminal gangs and the demand. Certainly, the other side of the work that the Home Secretary has been leading on—in terms of agreements with other countries for returns, as well as the reasons why people are coming and what more could be put in place as a deterrent—is work that was also talked about in evidence today; international diplomacy is also an important part of the overall framework. That is going on in parallel, and it is important to be working upstream through diplomacy and agreements with other countries too.
Q
I then heard that there were no magical solutions and that war was not easy to win—so we are in a “war” with migrants. We then spoke about unkindness to asylum seekers. I think that the most important words that I heard today were proactive, pre-emptive and disruptive— that is what the Government are trying to be. Do you agree that that has to start with the gangs who are starting this and are pulling—or pushing—people across?
Dame Angela Eagle: Yes. There are many genuine asylum seekers, many of whom are granted asylum when they are finally processed, who have come in that way. There are also people who are trafficked, who are in debt bondage, who go into sex work in nail bars, say from Vietnam, or who end up—as the police chief told us—growing cannabis in hidden farms in all our communities or being involved in serious crime. Some of them are victims of modern slavery, and some of them are the perpetrators of all that kind of evil.
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the Ministers for their evidence.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWill everyone please ensure that they have switched off any electronic devices or turned them to silent mode?
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection grouping for today’s sitting is available in the room or on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. The purpose of the grouping is to limit, in so far as possible, the repetition of the same points in debate. The amendments appear on the amendment paper in the order in which they relate to the Bill.
A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. In the case of a stand part debate, the Minister will be called to speak first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments, new clauses or schedules, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause to speak again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or the new clause or seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendment in a group, including grouped clauses and new schedules, they need to let me know.
I hope that that brief explanation is helpful. I remind Members about the rules on declaring interests, as set out in the code of conduct.
Clause 1
The Border Security Commander
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out
“designate a civil servant as the”
and insert “appoint a”.
This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The subject of this Bill is incredibly important to this country and its future. I hope that, during the next two weeks, the Committee will give us a constructive opportunity for the consideration and strengthening of the Bill.
Let me briefly outline our first amendment. Clause 1 creates the Border Security Commander as a statutory office holder, and requires that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the Border Security Commander. As Tony Smith, former director general of the UK Border Force, said in evidence to the Committee:
“I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]
That is why we tabled amendment 10, which would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.
The status of the Border Security Commander—as well as the commander’s functions and priorities, which I will come to in discussions on later amendments—is crucial if the role is to be in any way meaningful. As the Minister is aware, there are organisations that do not require civil servants to run them. Such a structure ensures their independence and reduces the internal day-to-day political struggles that can easily be imposed on them. Allowing recruitment from outside the civil service may also provide a wider talent pool and prevent the role from being relegated to that of yet another senior civil servant in the Department. We heard evidence about the wide array of roles in the Home Office already. The amendment would highlight the clear distinction between existing positions and the importance of securing our borders.
I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the following questions. Why have the Government decided that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant? What is the operational benefit of that decision? Why would the Border Security Commander not benefit from greater independence? What level of seniority will the Border Security Commander have? In evidence to the Committee, Tony Smith assumed that the post would likely be a director general. Is he correct? If so, why have the Government made that decision? Fundamentally, if Mr Smith is correct and the Border Security Commander cannot actually command anything—we will discuss that in detail when we come to later amendments—what is the point of the position?
Clause 2 sets out that the Border Security Commander must
“hold and vacate office in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Commander’s designation,”
and that the
“terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”
That is all the information we get. Will the Minister explain what the terms and conditions of a designation as commander will be? Let us compare the situation of the Border Security Commander, who is allegedly responsible for the security of our border, with that of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out that the commissioner has to be suitably qualified; will the Minister explain why no such requirement appears to exist in the legislation for the Border Security Commander? What would count as suitable qualifications for someone to take up the post of commander?
If the Secretary of State determines that a person’s designation as commander should be terminated, the Secretary of State must give the commander a written explanation of the reasons, give them an opportunity to make written representations and consider those before making a final decision. That seems sensible and in line with other positions, such as the Met Commissioner, that ought to be vaguely comparable in terms of responsibility.
It is a pleasure to serve with you chairing our proceedings, Dr Murrison, and I look forward to many hours of that—as I am sure you do.
I will set out what clauses 1 and 2 do and hopefully persuade the Committee that amendment 10 is not required. The clauses set out the role of the Border Security Commander and detail the terms and conditions under which they hold the office. The purpose of the Opposition’s amendment 10 is to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander be a civil servant. The hon. Member for Stockton West—I will learn all Members’ constituencies by the time we get to the end—seemed to say that he thought there was operational benefit in complete independence. I suppose that is one way of looking at it, but there is also benefit in co-ordination and in being attached to a central strategic point. The Government believe that that attachment, rather than total independence for the sake of it, is more likely to be effective.
Amendment 10 implies that the Border Security Commander should not be a civil servant. The role of the commander is a civil service role and the Border Security Command is a directorate within the Home Office. In a future recruitment exercise, existing civil servants could be appointed or the role could be advertised externally. Under the arrangements in clause 1 there is no limit one way or the other on where the Border Security Commander might come from—they could be internal or external. I hope that is some reassurance.
The mechanism of appointment is a civil service recruitment campaign to ensure that the best candidate is selected on merit. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and leads the functions of a directorate in the Department, it is logical that the role would be a civil service role. The idea is to cohere, not to fragment the work that is done. I see it very much as ensuring that all the cogs across Government connect with one another, so that when we turn the wheel we get something out at the end, rather than having a load of cogs that do not connect, which would not lead to a more effective outcome.
Clause 1 sets out that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the commander and will make the necessary arrangements to ensure that resources are available to support them in exercising their functions. The Bill will place the Border Security Commander on a statutory footing, which will future-proof and solidify the role and ensure a clear direction and leadership for the UK’s border security system. Placing the Border Security Commander under this new legal framework is a clear signal of our determination to tackle organised immigration crime by going after the criminals who put lives at risk and undermine our border security.
Clause 2 details the commander’s terms and conditions and how they will hold, maintain and vacate the office. This clarity is necessary to ensure continuity in the role, and it underlines the Government’s commitment to making the Border Security Commander an enduring office.
We on the Opposition Benches struggle to understand why the law must set out that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant. The Minister said that amendment 10 implies the commander should not be a civil servant, but all it seeks to do is remove the requirement that they should be. If the Home Secretary and, presumably, the Home Office permanent secretary believe that the role is best filled by a civil servant, perhaps for the reasons of co-ordination that the Minister set out, so be it—they can still be appointed as a civil servant—but the legislation will mandate that they have to be, and we struggle to understand why that requirement is necessary.
I made it clear in my response to the hon. Member for Stockton West that the recruitment could be done externally. Were somebody to be appointed who was not a civil servant when they applied, they would then come into the Home Office on civil service terms, bringing with them whatever experience they had and that the recruitment process had determined would be suitable for the role. I am not sure there is much between us, unless the hon. Lady is implying that, by the act of becoming a civil servant, the commander would somehow be less effective. I do not believe that is the case, especially as the idea is to ensure that the Border Security Commander can convene the entire system across Government Departments. Having a base in the Home Office, albeit designated as a civil servant, will make that more effective rather than less effective. To be clear, if the legislation gets on the statute book, any future office holder would not have to come from the civil service. I hope that reassures the hon. Lady.
I thank the Minister for that response, which is reassuring, but it does not quite address the concern. These issues are very difficult, and I presume the Minister accepts that it is possible that it might be better, either in due course or in relatively short order, for the commander to be operationally independent. If that is the Home Secretary’s judgment as time goes on, the Government will have to come back to Parliament to change the law. Would it not be better for them to give themselves the flexibility?
The hon. Lady implies that total independence from the machinery of government would somehow assist in the job that we wish the Border Security Commander to do. I do not agree with her in that analysis. The job of the Border Security Commander is to convene and cohere and to strategically focus, across Government Departments, with a focus on checking that our border security is as effective as it can be. I do not think that total independence is going to add to effectiveness in that context. In fact, we believe that having the commander operating out of the Home Office at a director general level, but appointed by the Prime Minister with a special place in primary legislation, is a more effective way to ensure that the commander’s basic role has the biggest-percentage likelihood of being effective.
The Minister has been clear that we can of course recruit from outside the civil service, and that being within the civil service equips the person with the powers, the tools and, of course, the access to be effective in the role.
I am slightly concerned that the hon. Member for Stockton West tabled the amendment off the back of oral evidence from Tony Smith, who—with full respect—retired from his role 13 years ago. The director general of the National Crime Agency gave evidence on the same day as Tony Smith, and he said:
“For me, I have worked really closely with Martin Hewitt already, and it works well. It allows me to focus on the operational leadership of tackling the organised crime threat and Martin to have the convening power and to work across Whitehall on a range of issues. It provides clarity, and we have more than enough to get on with in the NCA in tackling…organised crime”.
Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on organised immigration crime, then said:
“I sit on Martin’s board, so strategically I am heavily involved, and members of my team sit within the operational delivery groups. Speaking from a personal point of view, his strategic plans over the next few years make absolute sense in terms of what he is seeking to achieve for the Border Security Command.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q42.]
I was just checking that I had my hon. Friend’s entire constituency name. They have all changed, Dr Murrison, which can be a bit disorientating because I am used to the old names.
My hon. Friend is exactly right. He demonstrates, through the evidence we heard—particularly from the NCA, the Crown Prosecution Service and the police chiefs last Thursday—that there is and was a strategic gap. Everybody is doing fantastic work in the NCA, the police, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the security services, but nobody had taken a focused look at how border security could be delivered most effectively. From the meetings I have had since Martin Hewitt took up his post, it seems there is almost relief that somebody is convening a board that can look at analytics on where the threats are, how they are developing and how we can best deal with them, and do the legwork to come up with a strategy focused on border security. That is the whole point of creating the command.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I would like to make a couple of points about the amendment.
As the Minister set out, clause 1 does not mean that someone who is not a civil servant cannot apply for the role. We have to be careful not to have an old-fashioned view of how the civil service operates. External candidates are increasingly common nowadays as outside specialisms are required by the Government, even for roles that are not particularly senior.
Even if an external candidate applies, they will get the support of the civil service. The role compares to Home Office roles such as the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration and the commissioner on modern slavery, who are separate from the Home Office apparatus and often report—especially at the Home Affairs Committee—that they do not get the support and structural backing they need. Clause 1 would obviate that. The commander will also be subject to the civil service code, which is important given the high levels of public expectation for the role.
The one difference between this and other directors general, and other senior figures in the Home Office, is that the role is set out in primary legislation. We will thereby create a distinction for the role by passing the Bill. The shadow Minister suggested that we should discuss the suitable qualifications for the role, but the role is very operational so we should be wary of setting out in legislation or in this debate the exact specifications of every task.
Finally, we must be careful of the pendulum swinging in one direction with one Government and then, with a change of Government, straight back in the other direction, meaning we repeat the mistakes of the past. When the coalition Government came into office in 2010, Home Secretary Theresa May—now Baroness May—restructured the UK Border Agency, as it was under the Labour Administration. She commented at the time that the UKBA had been structured in such a way as to be so independent that it would
“keep its work at an arm’s length from Ministers—that was wrong. It created a closed, secretive and defensive culture. So I can tell the House that the new entities will not have agency status and will sit in the Home Office, reporting to Ministers.”—[Official Report, 26 March 2013; Vol. 560, c. 1500.]
Although we are trying to correct what has clearly gone wrong over the previous 14 years of Conservative government of Border Force, it is important that we do not overcorrect and go back to the situation we were in before, which Baroness May pointed out did not work then.
My hon. Friend makes some very good points, particularly about over-correction between Governments but also about the fact that independence is an obvious thing to have for particular posts—in inspection, for example, but not necessarily operational ones—and the need to cohere a system, to ensure that all the good work being done across different Departments can be focused strategically on one aim. That is what the clauses seek to do.
It is a pleasure to speak under your chairpersonship, Dr Murrison. I want to take on a principled point that I have heard levelled by the hon. Member for Stockton West and other Conservative Members today and on Second Reading, which is that the Border Security Commander cannot command. It is really important to address that point.
From 2018 to 2023, we saw the number of small boat arrivals increase from 299 to 29,500. That is a hundredfold increase. As I understand it, some of the explanation given by the Conservatives is that the matter became very complicated, and we were seeing an increase in organised crime activity. To their credit, that was reinforced by the director general of the National Crime Agency, Rob Jones, who said
“The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants”.––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.]
Those were just some of the things he highlighted.
If we acknowledge that the present Government face a more complicated situation, we should agree that it will involve a suite of tools. As Rob Jones said,
“There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems”. ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.]
Sarah Dineley, the deputy chief Crown prosecutor, concurred with her colleagues and said:
“I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 30, Q28.]
Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for organised immigration crime, highlighted the same point.
If the situation is so complex and there is a need for the suite of tools that are being strengthened by this Bill, surely there is a need for greater co-ordination. Greater co-ordination will surely help to fix some of the strategic challenges that our immigration system and asylum system have faced in recent years. To co-ordinate is to command, and it is crucial we accept that point. If we do not, we will not be able to tackle the backlog we face, we will not be able to implement the measures in the Bill and we will not be able to secure our borders.
Amendments have been tabled in relation to aspects of the Border Security Commander role, but I am not entirely certain whether the Conservative party supports the role of Border Security Commander at all. On Second Reading, we heard colleagues asking what Martin Hewitt is doing with his time. I would welcome the hon. Member for Stockton West explaining whether the Conservative party does in fact support the role of Border Security Commander and Border Security Command. We heard clearly from those who gave oral testimony, who are operationally focused, experienced and expert in their field, about the necessity of such a command. Indeed, Enver Solomon, the chief executive of the Refugee Council, summed it up well when he said that
“the Border Security Command is an understandable response.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 5, Q1.]
We will discuss when we come to the next group of amendments the aims and objectives of this role, and the fact that if we are going to have a Border Security Commander, they should have a very meaningful role that can make a real difference. I would like to press on clause 2 of the Bill, which talks about
“The terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”
I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee what those terms and conditions of designation might be? As I mentioned, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out how the Met commissioner must be suitably qualified. What sort of qualifications could we expect to see in a commander and what will those terms and conditions be?
I do not want to read out the job description, which was put out there ahead of Martin Hewitt being appointed last year. It is there for all to see, it is a public document. The role is very much about being able to operationally cohere the system and to make certain by the operation of the Border Security Commander’s board, upon which sit many of the other parts of Government that need to have regard to the strategy, that we decide how to take forward and deal with threats to our border security. It is not really rocket science, and I do not think that there would be much to be gained from putting the details of all of that into primary legislation.
It is important that as the threats to our border security evolve, which they certainly will do over time, that we do not find ourselves with a very rigid set of requirements in primary legislation, which is hard to change. The idea is to have convening powers to give flexibility to the commander to ensure that he can bring together all of the forces across Government that are charged with security in this area and ensure that the focus on organised immigration, crime and border security is always at the forefront of the work that they do.
I am a little confused by some of the contributions from Labour Members. They seem to be advocating for the commander to be a civil servant, and that is fine, but that is not actually what we are discussing. The question here is whether there could be any benefit in having some flexibility for the Home Secretary to do something different, and we do not feel that that point has been answered.
Could the hon. Lady go into more detail about what she means with respect to that? I have given her an assurance that the Border Security Commander could come from outside of the civil service and be appointed from outside of the civil service, but would then take up a civil service role of convening within Government and with the support of Government. That means that we do not have to set up an entirely new independent structure and fund it separately, which would be more likely to disintegrate rather than integrate the strategic approach to this multifaceted problem. I am beginning to wonder what the hon Lady has got against civil servants?
Nothing whatever. There are lots of parts of the Home Office where the principle is accepted, that sometimes, particularly for difficult things and things that the Department has struggled to achieve, independence can be valuable. It sounds like the Minister is saying that she does not feel that that is the case. We must accept that, but we do not have to agree with it.
It is true that independence has a very valuable part to play, particularly in holding Government structures to account. For example, the independent inspectors of our detention or prison estates who are allowed to go in and publish without fear or favour regarding what they find there. That is obviously a very important role where independence matters. But in this context, the Border Security Commander is cohering the effect and the work across Government that is trying to keep our borders properly protected. That is operational. It ties into the diplomatic and political as well, although obviously Ministers have an important part to play in that too.
The hon. Lady has nothing to worry about when it comes to the Border Security Commander sitting in a civil service context given that nothing in this Bill means that anyone who was not a civil servant when they applied to the post of Border Security Commander would be excluded from consideration. Being in the civil service to begin with is not a requirement.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Functions of the Commander
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 29, at end insert—
“(1A) In exercising the Commander’s functions, the Commander must have full regard to the provisions of—
(a) the Human Rights Act 1998; and
(b) the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.”
This amendment would confirm that the Commander must have full regard to the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Action against Trafficking.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 12, in clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end insert—
“(2A) The strategic priority document issued under subsection (2) must support the Home Office’s UK Border Strategy.”
This amendment would require that the Border Security Commander’s strategic priority document supports the UK Border Strategy.
Amendment 13, in clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end insert—
“(2A) The Home Secretary may give direction to Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and the National Crime Agency to support the Border Security Commander in the delivery of the Border Security Commander’s objectives and strategic priorities.
(2B) The Home Secretary’s powers under subsection (2A) must not be used to interfere with the democratic mandate of the PCC within a force area, nor seek to interfere with the office of constable or operational independence of the chief constable or the operational independence of the National Crime Agency, unless the Home Secretary is satisfied on the advice of HMICFRS that not to do so would result in a police force of the National Crime Agency failing or national security being compromised.”
This amendment would enable the Home Secretary to direct other agencies to support the Border Security Commander’s objectives and strategic priorities.
Amendment 11, in clause 3, page 2, line 41, leave out subsection (b).
This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing the strategic priority document.
New clause 7—Duty to meet the director of Europol—
“The Border Commander must meet the director of Europol, or their delegate, no less than once every three months.”
This new clause would require the Border Commander to meet with the Executive Director of Europol every three months.
New clause 21—Functions of the Commander in relation to sea crossings to United Kingdom—
“(1) In exercising the Commander’s functions in relation to sea crossings to the United Kingdom, the Commander must have regard to the objectives of—
(a) preventing the boarding of vessels, with the aim of entering the United Kingdom, by persons who require leave to enter the United Kingdom but are seeking to enter the United Kingdom—
(i) without leave to enter, or
(ii) with leave to enter that was obtained by means which included deception by any person;
(b) ensuring that a decision is taken on a claim by a person under subsection (1)(a) within six months of the person’s arrival in the United Kingdom; and
(c) making arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of a person who enters the United Kingdom without leave, or with leave that was obtained by deception.
(2) The Commander must include, in the strategic priority document issued under section 3(2), an assessment of—
(a) the most effective methods for deterring illegal entry into the United Kingdom;
(b) the most effective methods for reducing the number of sea crossings made by individuals without leave to enter the United Kingdom; and
(c) the most effective methods for arranging the removal, to the person’s own country or a safe third country, of a person who enters the United Kingdom illegally.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) ‘sea crossings’ are journeys from dry land in France, Belgium or the Netherlands for the purpose of reaching dry land in the United Kingdom; and
(b) illegal entry to the United Kingdom is defined in accordance with section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 (illegal entry and similar offences).”
This new clause sets out objectives and strategic priorities for the Border Security Commander in relation to sea crossings and arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of people who enter the UK illegally.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison. It is a good 10 years since I have had the pleasure and privilege of being on a Public Bill Committee—or Standing Committee, as we used to call them back in the day—and I hope that it will be as much fun as I remember. Ten years ago, I was the home affairs spokesperson, and I saw a number of Bills quite like this one: good old-fashioned “stop them coming and boot them out” Bills. There has been a succession of them over the years from various Governments. The Minister knows that I hold her in great respect and affection, and I wish her particularly well with the Bill.
I hold the hon. Gentleman in similar affection. We are pretty long in the tooth—we are the two people who are the most long in the tooth on this Bill Committee—and I look forward to listening to his arguments.
I am grateful to the Minister for that. I would hate to think of our combined number of years in this House, but certainly we have almost spanned half a century.
The first 12 clauses are totally dedicated to putting the Border Security Commander into statute, and the first three list his functions, and outline and define some of his responsibilities. The Bill states that the Border Security Commander must be appointed by the Home Secretary and will be obliged to prepare annual reports. A board will be appointed
“to assist the Commander in the exercise of the Commander’s functions.”
I do not know about other hon. Members, but the last time I looked there already was a Border Security Commander, who is doing the job as outlined in the Bill effectively, pretty much as the Home Secretary has been directing him, without needing to have been put into statute. If my mind does not deceive me, I remember Martin Hewitt being appointed as the commander and doing all these things, but here he is, 12 clauses of a Bill better off, and secure in the knowledge that he is now in statute.
All that makes me think of the BBC Scotland series “The Chief”, which as Scottish members of the Committee will know is the fantastic new spin-off of “Scot Squad”. It features the mythical and fantastic character Chief Commissioner Miekelson. He is a complex character. A bit self-aggrandising, he is always getting himself on the wrong side of various issues around the culture wars, which he is pretty uncomfortable with; he always manages to upset or offend somebody. I am sure that he is the exact opposite of Commander Hewitt, who I believe is modest, nice and easy to get on with—I have not had the pleasure of meeting him so far. However, they have a couple of things in common, which I want to explore as we look at the functions of the commander.
It strikes me that Commander Miekelson would love to be in statute; 12 clauses of a Bill—he would look at this as some great calling card. They face similar threats: for Commander Miekelson, it is the bams who make his life a misery and whom he needs a whole load of new powers to deter; for Commander Hewitt, it is the illegals. As we go through the Bill, let us wish Commander Hewitt and Chief Commissioner Miekelson all the best as they tackle these threats.
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that although Commissioner Miekelson is a fictional character, the role was created by statute—by the SNP Scottish Government when they created Police Scotland?
Police Scotland has a chief constable who is in charge, but in “Scot Squad”, Commissioner Miekelson is a chief commissioner. It is only right that we point out these distinctions; there is a significant difference between that mythical, fictional character and the reality of the role of chief constable, which is very efficiently and effectively looked after by the current inhabitant of that post.
I know you want me to get on to the particular amendment, Dr Murrison, so thank you for your forbearance and patience. My amendment confirms that the,
“Commander must have full regard to…the Human Rights Act 1998; and…the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking”.
The Minister is likely to tell me that none of that is necessary as human rights compliance is already implicit with Government operations. However, without these explicit legal mandates and safeguards, all of that can be overlooked. If the Minister is asking us to agree to 12 clauses at the outset of a Committee for an important Bill, relating to a job that is already being done, surely we can agree that one of these functions should be about the observance of our very important international obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.
I do not think anybody is opposed to the border commander; I know there are a few jokes about his comparison to Chief Miekelson, but all of us agree that the Minister is establishing a necessary and useful role. I do not think, even though she was trying to chide her Conservative colleagues, that there was much disagreement from anybody on whether this is a useful role that could help bring together quite a lot of the structure and infrastructure that is responsible for operating our border security. There is a discussion about a lot of his tasks being administrative. There is nothing wrong with that, but for something as important as this, everybody would like to think that where there is administration, it will be effective and put in place in a way that we could look at it.
However, we need further clarity on the roles, functions and responsibilities of the border commander. Clause 3 is supposed to be the place where we find all of those things, but the one thing that the clause does not do is outline fully, perfectly, roundly and coherently what the actual functions of the border commander will be. Even if we look very carefully in all the different subsections, it does not say much about what he is expected to do. It lists a number of administrative responsibilities he will have, which is fair and fine, but all of us discussing the role of the border commander in the Committee would like to understand what he will be doing—what are his jobs, what are his functions, what responsibilities will he have, how will these things be discharged, and how will he be open to the type of scrutiny that we, as Members of this House, require?
There are provisions that seem to speak about the functions without actually identifying any of them. The only place where we can find objectives in clause 3 is subsection (1), but they are only objectives to which the commander must have regard. That is important. It just says he must “have regard” to the particular responsibilities that are outlined in the subsections. Subsections (7) to (9) are particularly interesting because they seem to suggest that people smuggling and human trafficking to the UK are to be regard as threats to border security. That seems fair enough; most of the Bill is about the perceived threat—disrupting networks and tackling the gangs that operate their vile trade across the channel.
Here is the thing: the people who board these boats are subject to the constraints imposed by these gangs and are at their mercy. They are controlled and reliant. Those people are totally and utterly ignored in the subsections in clause 3. Their realities—their need and right to seek safety, reunite with family and escape situations of extreme deprivation—are ignored, even though they have everything to do with the responsibilities and functions of the commander. As a matter of principle, then, it is vital that the Bill should be amended so that the Border Security Commander has regard to objectives concerned with respecting human life and dignity, and that must include specific shared obligations to provide asylum to people fleeing persecution and to enable victims of human trafficking to have security and safety from their enslavement.
There are concerns that, if border enforcement strategies do not include these protections for vulnerable individuals and victims of modern slavery, trafficking victims will enter further cycles of exploitation. In prioritising enforcement over protection, as the Bill does almost exclusively, we risk wrongfully criminalising victims of trafficking and failing to identify those in need of urgent intervention—or, worst of all, sending them back to their exploiters. If we stand by our commitments under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, the Bill should ensure that the commander respects those obligations too.
As we have discussed, the commander is a civil servant. I have taken no great view on that, and I listened carefully to the exchanges about the civil service role, but I have a couple of concerns in relation to my amendment 1 that I would like the Minister to address. The civil service code does not give a clear, enforceable duty to respect the UK’s obligations under international law. I am pretty certain that the Minister will tell me that there is a general obligation to comply with the law and our international obligations, as that is expected and anticipated in everything that the Government do through all their responsibilities and actions.
However, I refer the Minister to the recent case in the High Court. That was, of course, R (on the application of FDA) v. Minister for the Cabinet Office and others. I think the Government actually won that court case, which meant that any of the civil servants who were involved in compiling regulations had to abide by the legislative context but did not have to oblige and comply with the international obligations. At best, it is unclear, so I ask the Minister to clarify: will the Border Security Commander, who will be a civil servant, always be obliged—totally and utterly—to fully respect all our international obligations, particularly those around the HRA and the ECAT?
Without those specific obligations in the Bill, the Border Security Commander will be presumed always to prioritise enforcement over vital legal protection, potentially leading to human rights violations. Although the commander is required to comply with instructions set by the Home Secretary, which again I think everybody would accept is right and appropriate, they are not explicitly required to comply with the UK’s human rights obligations. For me, that is totally wrong, and it completely skews the whole modus operandi of our Border Security Commander and features of the Bill. I will come back to that as the Bill progresses.
We need to see this change to the Bill. We have 12 clauses and various subsections dedicated to the role and the functions of the commander. Let us have one—just one—that says that he must be prepared and obliged always to act in line with all of our obligations on international responsibility, being a good international actor, being a place that is recognised for exemplary human rights requirements and being signed up to the HRA and to ECAT. Let us put that in the Bill.
I have not come across Chief Commissioner Miekelson before, but I will endeavour to catch up on Netflix or iPlayer.
Clause 3 sets out the functions of the Border Security Commander. The shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), correctly pointed out on Second Reading that the new Border Security Commander
“cannot actually command anything. There are no powers at all in the Bill, merely functions. They include, in clause 3, publishing a strategic priority document and, in clause 4, a duty to prepare an annual report…the Border Security Commander has no clear powers, merely an ability to publish documents and reports.”—[Official Report, 10 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 69.]
According to the legislation, the functions of the commander
“must have regard to the objectives of…maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities relating to threats to border security, for the purpose of minimising such threats, and…maximising the coordination of those activities for that purpose.”
That sounds suspiciously like a co-ordinator, rather than a commander. That is exactly what the legislation states: the commander does not appear to be empowered by the Bill to command anyone.
Subsection (5) defines a partner authority as a
“public authority with functions in relation to threats to border security (whether exercisable in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”,
but—in subsection (6)—
“not…the Security Service…the Secret Intelligence Service”
or “GCHQ”.
Will the Minister confirm what is meant by partner authorities? Does she have a list of likely organisations that the Border Security Commander should be able to direct co-operation with? How far does she think that the Border Security Commander will be able to have an impact on public authorities abroad? For example, what role might French law enforcement be expected to play in having regard to the commander’s strategic priority document?
The Opposition have tabled amendment 13, which would enable the Home Secretary to direct other agencies to support the Border Security Commander’s objectives and strategic priorities, specifically Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, police and crime commissioners and the National Crime Agency. Ideally, we would like the Border Security Commander to have a meaningful role and the ability to direct other agencies. As the Government seem unwilling to do that, however, we thought it might be possible for the Home Secretary to give the Border Security Commander a little support.
If the Minister does not want to accept amendment 13, I would like to understand why not. Why do the Government seem willing to allow the commander only to co-ordinate, rather than to command? Why could the Home Secretary not add some additional impetus?
The clause requires the Border Security Commander to issue a strategic priority document that sets out the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions in relation to any of the threats to the border identified by the commander. We have tabled amendment 12 to ensure that the strategic priority document supports the Home Office’s UK border strategy. We are attempting to ensure that the Border Security Commander is aligned with the rest of the Home Office’s work to secure the border. I am interested to understand why the Minister is not willing to accept that amendment.
It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison. Given the representations made by the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Weald of Kent, something seems strange and I would appreciate an explanation. The hon. Member for Stockton West is speaking to amendment 12 and the necessity of supporting the Home Office’s UK border strategy. Given the hon. Member’s comments about the Border Security Commander having a role within the civil service, why does he want the commander to adhere to the Home Office’s UK border strategy, which is headed up by a director general who is a civil servant?
If we are to have such a position, we want it to be effective and have the relevant powers, but we also want it to be aligned with the other priorities of the Home Office and the work going on there. I think that is clear.
Amendment 11 would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing the strategic priority document. We would like to understand the operational benefits of the Secretary of State having to sign off the strategic priority document, which again highlights the lack of a meaningful role for the Border Security Commander. Although the strategic policy document should set out what are, in the commander’s view, the principal threats to border security and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard, in reality the document is a diktat from the Secretary of State about the Secretary of State’s views, and that arguably exposes a lack of influence and gravitas in the Border Security Commander’s role.
Allowing the commander to issue a strategic priority document without seeking prior permission from the Secretary of State would provide a welcome level of independence for the role. The oversight and consultation of the board would ensure confidence in the Border Security Commander’s ability to take all necessary steps to stop the crossings. There may be occasions when the commander believes it is necessary to act swiftly and to implement changes without delay. Removing the requirement to have ministerial consent would allow them to act decisively. That approach, I am sure, could subsequently be supported by the Secretary of State.
What, then, is the hon. Gentleman’s view of how UKBA functioned? In her testimony, Theresa May said that, where it had that kind of independence, it became “closed, secretive and defensive”, and she had to completely restructure UK border defence because the independence that the hon. Gentleman is talking about actually made it difficult for Ministers to have proper oversight.
When we talk about the Border Security Commander role, if we think it is going to “smash the gangs”, sort out all these problems and play a huge part in creating a secure border for this country, it is important that we allow it some element of independence and gravitas. We have talked about the commander being tied into the strategic priorities of the Home Office, but this amendment is about empowering them to make the difference that we want them to make. We want them to succeed.
As I was saying, removing that requirement would allow the Border Security Commander to act decisively. We must avoid unnecessary bureaucratic wrangling and ensure that, in this critical matter, they have the freedom they need to deliver results.
I have two quick points. First, the hon. Member talked about whether the Border Security Commander could somehow command or direct the activities of our international partners. I would highlight that this Government have strengthened and created the new international arrangements that have made it possible for us to start to secure and securitise our borders. It is important not to pretend that the history of what has happened did not happen; we should realise that we need to have close international ties.
Secondly, I am listening closely to the hon. Member’s suggestions for how the role could be improved. Is he proposing these amendments because the current office holder, Martin Hewitt, is not discharging the office in the way that he would like? Could he comment on whether he thinks that Martin Hewitt is doing a good job or a less-than-good job, and whether he thinks that the Border Security Commander role, as it is currently being discharged, is satisfactory?
At some point, Martin Hewitt will be superseded. We want to make sure that whoever is in this role is in the best possible position to do the best possible job. I do not think that these measures are necessarily about Martin Hewitt’s effectiveness or otherwise; they are about this post and its fundamental role—well, its apparent fundamental role—in delivering border security for this country.
It is not about Martin Hewitt’s professional competence or his ability as a person to do the role; it is about the role itself. Based on how the role has been configured, does the hon. Member believe that the present office holder is discharging the role well, with the responsibilities given, or is he proposing these measures because he believes that somehow the role is lacking?
I think there is an opportunity to strengthen this role so that it can provide that real fundamental change that we are apparently looking for in this Bill. I would not necessarily want to comment on the individual.
We have tabled new clause 21 to set out some clear and measurable objectives for the Border Security Commander, to attempt to give this co-ordinator some clear direction. New clause 21 would set out that, in exercising their functions, the commander
“must have regard to the objectives of…preventing the boarding of vessels, with the aim of entering the United Kingdom, by persons who require leave to enter the United Kingdom but are seeking to enter the United Kingdom…without leave to enter, or…with leave to enter that was obtained by means which included deception”.
In effect, we want it in black and white in the Bill that the commander will be given the objective of reducing illegal entry to the country, and that is what new clause 21 would achieve.
Since 2018, when the figures were first recorded, more than 150,000 people have arrived in small boats. As of 29 January, 1,098 people had crossed the channel since the start of 2025. In 2024 as a whole, 36,816 people were detected making the crossing. I would like to understand why the Government do not think it is worthwhile to give the Border Security Commander the direct objective of reducing or even ending those arrivals.
We also wish to ensure that those who arrive in this country illegally will not be able to stay. We know that effective returns agreements work as a deterrent. When in government, we cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by more than 90%, thanks to our returns agreement. In 2022, 12,658 Albanian illegal migrants arrived in the UK by small boat, but that fell to just 924 in 2023, following our landmark returns agreement with Albania.
We have therefore included in new clause 21 the objective for the Border Security Commander to ensure that a decision on a claim by a person who has arrived in the UK illegally is taken within six months of the person’s arrival, and for the commander to make arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of people who enter the UK illegally. It is up to the Government to put in place an effective deterrent to people crossing the channel in small boats.
I find it quite astounding that there are any claims of success from the Opposition, given that we saw 299 people cross in 2018 and then an exponential rise of over 130,000 on the Conservatives’ watch. The hon. Gentleman is talking about a deterrent, but four people went to Rwanda and over 80,000 people crossed when that scheme had been introduced.
Importantly, the whole system in the Home Office had completely ground to a halt. There is another deterrent that was overlooked by the Conservatives during their tenure, and that is having a process that actually functions. We now have record high deportations, and as that message cuts through to people who are looking to cross, it will start to serve as a deterrent.
I thought that we would get a bit further through the Bill before we got into records. In real terms, there has been a marked increase in the number of people coming here since this Government took office—small boat crossings are up by 28%. We now have 8,500 more people staying in hotels across the country—up by nearly 29%. We were closing hotels. The hon. Member talks about the number of people being deported, but they are voluntarily going back. In real terms, the number of people who have arrived on small boats being returned went down, and in the most recent figures, it has gone down again. We have not been sending back those people who have arrived in small boats since this Government took office—that is just not the case.
I thank the hon. Member for giving way again; I will not make a habit of it. It is important to realise that the processing of those who come into Western Jet Foil and then Manston takes time, but of course they will be deported, if they are not genuine refugees, once the system gets there.
It is also important to note something else. Being the Member of Parliament for Dover and Deal, I often look out across the sea, and I can tell when it is a good day to cross and when it is not. On those days when it is viable to cross, crossings have reduced. The Conservatives were relying only on the weather to bring down boat crossings.
I think, in the last week, we have found that the only thing that this Government are relying on is the weather, but I will carry on. I am sure we will come back to all these things in due course; it is good to be discussing them here instead of on a news channel somewhere.
As the Government are repealing the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 with this Bill, we want to make sure that the Border Security Commander is empowered to ensure that all relevant agencies are working towards taking timely decisions on any claims by illegal immigrants, and removing those who enter the UK illegally.
I applaud the hon. Gentleman’s comments about a timely turnaround in the processing of asylum claims—something that really concerns Government Members with regard to the IMA and the Rwanda Act. Could he tell me what proportion of asylum claims under the previous Government were processed within the six-month period stipulated in this new clause?
I could not, but I could tell the hon. Lady that the backlog is even bigger now than it was when this Government took office.
If the Government were serious about tackling illegal crossings and creating an effective deterrent, they would support new clause 21. We also want to make sure that the Border Security Commander is transparent with the public about how best to stop illegal and dangerous channel crossings, which is why this new clause includes a requirement for the commander to make an assessment of the most effective methods for deterring illegal entry into the UK, the most effective methods for reducing the number of sea crossings made by individuals without leave to enter the UK, and the most effective methods for arranging the removal, to the person’s own country or a safe third country, of a person who enters the UK illegally. Again, if the Government were serious about protecting borders, they would support the new clause.
Clause 9 specifies that the Border Security Commander must
“comply with directions given by the Secretary of State about the exercise of the Commander’s functions under this Chapter.”
Can the Minister explain what sort of guidance the Secretary of State is likely to want to give the commander? Can she explain how the Secretary of State wishes to exercise the powers in the clause?
The SNP’s amendment 1 would confirm that the commander must have full regard to the Human Rights Act and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Given that the commander’s role, as drafted by the Government, includes no real power or responsibility, I am not sure what that amendment would actually achieve.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The Liberal Democrats would like to introduce new clause 7, because we want to strengthen cross-border co-operation and Britain’s role in that process. We also believe that we need to reverse some of the last Government’s roll-back of provisions to tackle gangs involved in modern slavery. The new clause would require the border commander to meet the executive director of Europol every three months, which would help to achieve those goals.
Before I was elected and before Brexit, I was the justice and home affairs attaché at the British embassy in Paris. I helped to co-ordinate engagement between the Home Office, the French Government and Europol. I do not know how much the hon. Lady knows about how Europol functions, but it has a lot of operations and is a very busy organisation. It would frequently take us more than three months to arrange a meeting. Would the new clause not put civil servants at risk of breaching the law just because they could not set up a meeting fast enough?
That is a really important point. If the new clause were accepted, civil servants would perhaps have to look at ways to schedule meetings in advance so that they were not done on an ad hoc basis.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. If the role of the Border Security Commander is ultimately to be successful, there needs to be confidence in its efficacy. The title of clause 3 is “Functions of the Commander”, but headings in law are often not necessarily reflected in the interpretation, and the clause does not fully do what it sets out to achieve. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire highlighted, it does not actually set out exactly what the functions are. It sets out that the commander has functions, and that they
“must have regard to the objectives of…maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities”—
which I assume would include Border Force—and
“maximising the coordination of those activities”.
As Migrant Voice and Amnesty International said during evidence, it seems that the role of the border commander involves little more than administration, and I am concerned about what they will actually do. Even with the objective of issuing a “strategic priority document”, all they have to do is set out the principle threats to border security and the strategic priorities.
I have a genuine question about the efficacy of the border commander. First, border security goes beyond just migration; it also relates to our biosecurity, as mentioned in the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee the other day. Border Force highlighted that it deals with numerous issues, including breaches of rules on personal imports. That means that illegal meats are coming into the country, which is a real concern for our border security.
I am concerned about what the border commander will be able to do. Border Force actually needs help with monitoring imports and safely disposing of illegal meats, but it seems that the border commander will be able only to pull together Border Force groups and get them to talk about the problem or list potential threats. We know what the threats are; we just need action, as Border Force itself has called for. It needs more powers.
My concern is that the establishment of the border commander, although an interesting approach, will not actually solve the problems that need solving right now. Perhaps the Minister could address what the border commander will be able to do in that regard.
I think Chief Miekelson will be on all our lists now. I spend the small amount of time I have in life to twiddle my thumbs looking for new detective dramas, and it seems I have overlooked one. I have been too into Scandi noir, when I should have been into Scottish noir. I will talk to the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire after the sitting to see whether he can give me a little more detail, so that I can follow up for my own enjoyment.
This group contains various provisions relating to the Border Security Commander, including amendments 11 to 13 and new clause 21 from the official Opposition, and new clause 7, which the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire spoke to. It also contains amendment 1, with which the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire opened our proceedings on this group. In our earlier exchange, he and I reflected on how long in the tooth we both are. So experienced is he that he anticipated what my answer to his amendment would be, and his comments show that he has a coherent and experienced view of the way in which human rights law works. If we had to list in every single bit of primary legislation the treaties we had solemnly entered into, and the international agreements that we had, in many cases, helped to formulate and that we had then put into effect in our own law, we would have an even messier statute book than we have at the moment.
Amendment 1 seeks to ensure that the commander has full regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings while carrying out all his functions. Both pieces of international agreement and law were freely entered into by predecessor Governments, and we take them extremely seriously as a law-abiding Government who believe in the rule of law. The Border Security Commander will be a public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act, and must act compatibly with the Act. That is absolutely the case. It is not explicitly written into the Bill, as the hon. Gentleman’s amendment would require, but that does not mean that all the requirements in the two agreements that amendment 1 mentions will not be adhered to.
Before I put my question to the Minister, I will just say to the Committee that “The Chief” is available on iPlayer, if they want to enjoy the eight episodes that will come their way.
Perhaps not—I am sure you would have a few words to say about that, Dr Murrison.
I did anticipate the Minister’s response, but I do not think there is anything wrong with ensuring that our commitments to international operations and to the whole force of human rights across the world—things we agree on—are in the Bill. We saw with the previous Government how easily international obligations and the international rule of law can be set aside and torn up. We are asking for these things to be in the Bill to give us security and a guarantee that the border commander will pay attention to them. If the commander is not compelled to do that by statute, there will be no obligation whatsoever.
The hon. Gentleman can be assured that everything the commander does must be compatible with our obligations under the Human Rights Act and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Those things are implicit with every public office holder in the UK, in all the contexts in which they work. The fact that those things are implicit, and not explicitly in the Bill, does not undermine the commitment of any Government who want to act within the rule of law. One of the first things our current Prime Minister said when he walked through the door at Downing Street was that we would be a Government who respected the rule of law and the Human Rights Act.
The most comparable piece of legislation on this topic in a devolved context is the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. That Act does not require a clause that specifies the obligation to respect international law. Those things are implicit in legislation passed by the Scottish Government, even on this topic.
My hon. Friend is exactly right. Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act, all office holders implicitly have to follow the rules of the European convention on human rights. One issue, if we decide to move away from the current approach and start to include an explicit provision in particular Bills—as the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would—is that it might look like the implicit duty to adhere to these agreements does not apply if it is not stated explicitly. That would actually lead to a lessening of protections, if judges looking at what Parliament was legislating for decided that we must take account of section 6 of the Human Rights Act only if we put that in a Bill. We would end up in a worse situation.
I ask the hon. Member to accept that the structure in the Bill is the one we have used so far. I understand why he is sceptical, after the behaviour of the last Government, but I hope he accepts, given the Prime Minister’s pronouncements right from the beginning of this Government taking office, that we are not planning on undermining the Human Rights Act or its provisions.
I do not like having to correct the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh, who is usually very diligent on these matters, but the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 is fully compliant with human rights legislation. That fact is included in the Act, as it is in practically every Act passed by the Scottish Parliament.
I am not massively familiar with the Scottish statute book.
On that point, the 2015 Act does refer to the Council of Europe protections and its definitions are taken from there. But there is not a clause that says that due regard has to be given—
But in an implicit way, just as this Bill is. There is nothing on the face of the Act, in the way the hon. Member is proposing for this Bill.
I feel I ought to intervene and separate the combatants. I reassure the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire—especially given the pronouncements from some in the previous Government—that this Government are absolutely committed to the provisions of the Human Rights Act and the convention on action against trafficking in human beings. I hope he accepts that and will withdraw his amendment.
Amendment 12 seeks to ensure that the strategic priority document produced by the Border Security Commander is supportive of the Home Office’s UK border strategy. Border security is a fundamental part of the strategic approach to the wider border, and the strategic priorities for border security will help to drive the wider UK approach. They are part of the approach—they are not a threat or a counter to it. The strategic priority document will be consulted on at the board—which the Committee will discuss when we reach clause 6—which has representatives from across the border security system, to ensure alignment with wider strategic approaches to the border. The whole point of the Bill is to cohere and convene and to ensure that there is co-operation across complex systems; it is not to disintegrate systems. Therefore, it would be fairly astonishing if the border security strategy was somehow completely at odds with what the Border Security Commander and the wider system were planning.
Amendment 13 seeks to give the Border Security Commander the power to direct the specified law enforcement bodies and personnel in the delivery of his objectives and strategic priorities. The power to direct—what the hon. Member for Stockton West called “empowerment”—is not required. During last week’s oral evidence, we heard from representatives of the National Crime Agency and the National Police Chiefs’ Council that they welcome and value the collaboration to date with the Border Security Commander. The arrangements as provided for in the Bill will reflect and respect the operational requirements of the various board members. They are a balancing act between convening, collaborating and co-operating, and a way of ensuring that those who have some independence written into what they have to do in other areas feel not that they are being made “subject to” but that they are “collaborating with”. The most effective commanding is exactly that: it is done with co-operation; it is not done with dictatorial powers or attempts to undermine the independence of other organisations.
Under clause 5, partner authorities already have a duty to co-operate with the commander, in so far as it is reasonably practicable for them to do so. Under clause 3, partner authorities must have regard to the strategic priorities on which the board will be consulted and which will be endorsed by the Secretary of State, as set out in clause 4(b). Amendment 11 would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State to issue a strategic priority document.
My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh has already pointed out that an obsession with complete independence can actually fragment a system and make it harder for us to achieve outcomes by working together. He rightly mentioned that, where there is operational independence and we are trying to make a system work in co-operation, that can sometimes lead to cultures of secrecy and non-co-operation, rather than co-operation that focuses on objectives.
In the Bill, we wish to foster co-operation that focuses on very defined objectives and strategies. The Government believe that that is the best balance. Allowing the Border Security Commander to publish documents behind the back of the Home Secretary, for whatever reason he or she may think fit, is not exactly fostering a co-operative working environment or an environment that is likely to be successful. We believe that the way in which these things are expressed in the existing clauses is more likely to foster agreement.
As already discussed, the strategic priority document provided for in clause 3(2) will set out the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, as well as the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions in relation to any of the identified threats. The role of the Border Security Commander is to support the Government of the day, and it is therefore only right that Ministers and the Secretary of State endorse the strategic direction and collective response of this public authority in relation to border security.
The hon. Member for Stockton West seemed to want to give the Border Security Commander powers to do things and to remove the requirement for ministerial consent for whatever they wanted to do. That seems to set up the Border Security Commander in a more powerful position than Ministers, which seems an odd thing for a Member of Parliament and a shadow Minister to wish to do. We think that the right way of ensuring accountability for the way these things are done is to have ministerial involvement, rather than set up operational structures that are so independent of Ministers that people want to do things behind Ministers’ backs.
The Minister makes good points about the practicalities. It is good to hear that she recognises that the Liberal Democrats are simply trying to ensure that we have international influence and cross-border activities.
I can certainly assure the hon. Lady that I recognise the import of what she is trying to do with the new clause. Often, such proposals are hooks to hang a debate on, so that there can be a little more information about the Government’s intent. I can assure her that having close operational and diplomatic liaison across all the different structures we have to work with to deal with cross-border immigration crime is absolutely at the centre of what the Border Security Commander will want to do. When we come to it, I hope she will not press her new clause to a vote.
The contrast is interesting. The Opposition want to see a Border Security Commander independently empowered to make meaningful changes to secure the border, rather than another civil servant muted by political oversight. There is a big contrast in perspective in terms of whether a Home Secretary should be signing off on anything anyone in this huge role—which will make a difference to our borders—will be able to say. Secondly, I would like to understand why the Government do not think it worth the Border Security Commander having the objective of reducing or even ending small boat crossings.
It is quite revealing that the hon. Gentleman seems to think that the natural order of things is for Ministers to be at loggerheads with civil servants and the people who are operationally charged with delivering on objectives. That may say more about Opposition Members than about the way we are seeking to achieve operational effectiveness and objectives in what we are doing.
Finally, new clause 21 focuses on the Border Security Commander’s functions in relation to tackling small boat crossings to the UK. This is an all-encompassing new clause, which goes far beyond the commander’s functions as set out in the Bill. The new clause seems to want the commander to be all things to all people.
The immediate priority is organised immigration crime-enabled small boat crossings. The Border Security Commander will, and necessarily must, evolve over time to provide the systems leadership across all threats as they emerge. Such crossings did not really emerge until 2018, but they have become embedded and more of a threat over time. Had we been discussing something like this in 2017, small boat crossings would not have featured at all. It is therefore important that our legislation allows the Border Security Commander to change approach or focus as new threats emerge. Threats evolve and change over time. Our approach accounts for that by stipulating in legislation that the Border Security Commander has particular objectives that might be important now but less important in the future. The new clause seems to me to present an overly difficult and inflexible way of moving forward.
Yes.
I was going to talk about what new clause 21 suggests we should do. For example, the subsection on asylum processing seems to say that the Border Security Commander should somehow take over the duty to ensure that those who arrive illegally are processed within six months—something that the Conservatives did not achieve at all during their time in Government. I am not certain why the Border Security Commander should be empowered to take over the entirety of the asylum system.
Next, the new clause states that the commander should also be in charge of immigration enforcement, and that they should do removals as well as asylum processing and defending the border. The authors of the new clause seem to think that the Border Security Commander should be not only independent, but virtually all-seeing, all-singing and all-dancing, and that they should do absolutely everything with which the entire immigration and asylum system is currently charged. That is overreach, to say the least.
The new clause also suggests that the commander should remove people to a safe third place within six months for processing. In all their years in office, the Conservatives never managed to achieve any of those things. To put them into a new clause for a Government that has been in office for seven months—a Government who were left with the most appalling mess, with an asylum system that had crashed and had massive backlogs, and with a structure in the Illegal Migration Act that made it illegal for us to process any new arrivals who claimed asylum after March 2023—and to complain that we have not sent small boat arrivals home fast enough takes the biscuit.
I think the intention behind the new clauses, as has been identified, is to give the Border Security Commander more teeth to help him to do what he is supposed to do. Although I appreciate that behind the drafting of the Bill is a recognition that the commander might need to be reactive in future, the new clauses aim to reduce the number of illegal migrants; that is what we are all trying to tackle. When the Border Security Commander can only do things such as
“ maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities”,
“maximising the coordination” and issuing reports, it does not give us confidence that the commander has the necessary power or that we will see the results that the Government are trying to achieve.
It is fairly astonishing to have a new clause that puts the Border Security Commander in charge of the entire asylum and deportation systems and asks him, in legislation, to achieve processing times that the Conservative party never achieved when they were in Government. It falls into the trap of empowering the Border Security Commander to such an extent that he seems to have to take over most of the Home Office. That is not really what we intend to do with this Bill. New clause 21 would result in a fairly astonishing increase in not only the power, but the reach of the Border Security Commander. That would be massively disruptive and would probably lead to an outcome similar to the collapse of the asylum system, of which we have had to clean up the mess.
I think the new clause is more of a political point than a constructive addition to the Bill. I am new to Parliament, but I think Bill Committees can be really useful. This new clause is far from useful, however, and there is nothing constructive in it. It is unrealistic and feels like political point-scoring.
Not for the first time today, I agree with my hon. Friend. When the time comes, we will be voting against this new clause.
The Minister perhaps slightly mischaracterises new clause 21. It states that the Border Security Commander should “have regard to”, not manage, the wider aims of the Home Office in securing the border. Why would the Minister not want the Border Security Commander to have regard to that?
New clause 21(1)(c) talks about:
“making arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of a person who enters the United Kingdom without leave, or with leave that was obtained by deception”
and new clause 21(1)(b) mentions:
“ensuring that a decision is taken on a claim by a person under subsection (1)(a) within six months of the person’s arrival in the United Kingdom”.
If that is not asking the Border Security Commander to take over the workings of the asylum system, I am not sure I understand what the new clause is trying to do.
The new clause clearly does not do that. The two points that the Minister just mentioned are part of a broader sentence that states that the Border Security Commander
“must have regard to the objectives”
in subsection (1). The new clause does not state that the Border Security Commander should do those things themselves.
But how on earth could asking the Border Security Commander to have regard to those things lead him or her to deal with border security? The new clause would take away the focus in the current Home Office arrangements on immigration enforcement and the asylum system. The new clause says that the Border Security Commander must have regard to all the processes in areas of the Department they have nothing to do with. It would upend working relationships. It would make it impossible and incoherent to deliver any kind of—
This is my third Bill Committee, and so far I am really enjoying it. In all three Bill Committees, I have sensed something interesting; my understanding of what the Conservative party has been does not quite coincide with what it is today. It feels peculiar to hear Conservative Members asking for this role to have so many teeth and being so prescriptive about writing that into primary legislation. As I understand it, Conservatives typically used to try to minimise the amount of detail in primary legislation, in order to give the arms of the state the freedom to do their duties and enact their responsibilities properly.
That is particularly important when we are living through a time of significant volatility. The complications surrounding our immigration and asylum system are manifold, so we need to give this role significant flexibility in order that the Border Security Commander can co-ordinate command. I am struck by what seems to be almost an existential challenge at the heart of modern Conservative thinking.
I think, Dr Murrison, you would probably not be very pleased with me if I started to talk about existential challenges at the heart of Conservative thinking, much as I would like to do so. I hope that I have given some reasons why new clause 21 should not stand part of the Bill.
I thank the Minister for her full response to some of my concerns about compliance with international obligations. Something that she did not respond to, and that I am really keen to secure her views on, is the FDA v. the Cabinet Office High Court case during the Rwanda litigation, which the Government obviously won. It seemed to suggest that any civil servant would not be bound by international obligations. Where does that leave the Border Security Commander?
The Prime Minister made it clear right at the beginning of his time in office that the Government will be bound by the international obligations that we have signed up to. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] Well, he is a sceptical man, as I would expect, but I have said what I have said about that. Is he suggesting that we should change the law as a result of the High Court?
My concern is that the judgment in that court case significantly changed our approach to international obligations and the rule of law. All I am interested in knowing is whether the Minister has any concerns, given such a significant and dramatic shift in the way successive Governments have approached these issues. Will that have any bearing on the operation of the Border Security Command?
As I said earlier, the Border Security Commander and the Border Security Command will work within the confines of international obligations and human rights law.
I apologise for my lack of timely bobbing earlier, Dr Murrison. I draw attention to the Home Secretary’s statement at the very top of the Bill:
“In my view the provisions of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.”
That adds to what the Minister has said: that those in public office have an obligation to abide by the law. If they were not to do so, there would of course be legal challenge.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
If we are to have a Border Security Commander, we want an effective one who can publish a strategy without being subject to a political veto, who has priorities aligned to the UK border strategy, and whom Home Secretaries can direct agencies to follow. We wish to press the amendments to a Division.
Amendment proposed: 12, in clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end insert—
“(2A) The strategic priority document issued under subsection (2) must support the Home Office’s UK Border Strategy.”—(Matt Vickers.)
This amendment would require that the Border Security Commander’s strategic priority document supports the UK Border Strategy.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clauses 3 and 9, taken together, outline the functions of the Border Security Commander and the directions given to the commander by the Secretary of State. Clause 3 ensures that the commander has the ability to bring partners together to provide an authoritative source of information on priority and emerging threats to border security. Through the strategic priority-setting process, the commander, working collaboratively with partners and with consent from the Secretary of State, will have the authority to issue strategic priorities on border security, to which partners must have regard. That creates a new mechanism to ensure that there is a whole of Government understanding and a collective response to border security threats.
The provisions of clause 3 recognise the varied responsibilities of partners, and deliberately ensure that the duty does not prevent partner authorities from exercising their existing constituted mandates or from setting their own wider priorities. The UK intelligence community are exempted from definition as partner authorities, in order to ensure that they can carry out their functions without constitutional conflict. However, UKIC will continue to work closely with the Border Security Command on border security matters, and arrangements are being developed, and will be agreed by the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary, to ensure that that takes place. Such arrangements are required by clause 5.
Clause 9 builds on that by ensuring that the Secretary of State can hold the Border Security Commander to account for the delivery of improved border security outcomes. As an elected official, the Secretary of State is accountable to the Cabinet and to Parliament, and can assure that the actions of the commander are being carried out in the interests of the British public.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Duty to prepare annual reports
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 4, page 3, line 37, at end insert—
“(c) set out how the Commander has fulfilled the Commander’s duties under section 3(1A) of this Act to have full regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.”
This amendment is linked to and consequential upon Amendment 1, and would require the Commander to include in the annual report information about how they have paid due regard to the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Action against Trafficking.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 14, in clause 4, page 3, line 37, at end insert—
“(c) state the number of persons who have, since the later of the passing of this Act or the last annual report, been—
(i) charged with offences under sections 13, 14, 18, and 43 of this Act; or
(ii) convicted of offences under sections 13, 14, 18, and 43 of this Act;
(iii) identified as entering the United Kingdom via sea crossing without leave to remain;
(iv) detained pending deportation or a decision on deportation;
(v) deported to a country of which the person is a national or citizen; or
(vi) deported to a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that the person will be admitted.”
This amendment would place a duty on the Border Security Commander to include, in their annual report, figures on immigration crime, sea crossings, detentions and deportations.
Clause stand part.
I will not detain the Committee for long. Amendment 2 covers the same sort of terrain as my amendment 1, which sought to ensure that the Border Security Commander takes cognisance of international obligations, most notably in relation to human rights and the provisions of the European convention on action against trafficking. Amendment 2 would require the commander, when making the annual report, to make reference to his compliance, in the work that he has done, with the Human Rights Act and with ECAT. That is all I am asking. There is no good reason why that cannot be included as part of the commander’s annual accounting to the House of Commons. That would give us an opportunity to understand how part of his work has been in ensuring that those obligations have been met, and I think it would be a worthy inclusion in his annual report. I commend the amendment to the Committee.
Clause 4 would give the Border Security Commander a duty to prepare annual reports, which must state how the commander has carried out their functions in that financial year and set out the commander’s view on the performance of the border security system that year, with particular reference to the commander’s strategic priorities. That all seems very vague, and a case of the Border Security Commander being allowed to mark their own homework.
Can the Minister explain what success would look like for the Border Security Commander? What are the measurable key performance indicators that the Home Secretary will consider? That is important because the Secretary of State, as set out in clause 2, can dismiss the commander. What would constitute poor enough performance for that to happen, and what would be a success?
To try to inject some objectivity and accountability into the process of annual reports, we have tabled amendment 14. We would like the Border Security Commander to report on the number of persons who have, since the later of the passing of the Bill or the last annual report, been charged or convicted of offences under clause 13, “Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”; clause 14, “Handling articles for use in immigration crime”; clause 18, “Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom”; or clause 43, “Articles for use in serious crime”. We want to know how effective the new offences will be in practice for achieving the Government’s aim of stopping illegal immigration.
The Government’s own impact assessment admits that very few people will go to prison as a result of the measures in the Bill. On the proposals to strengthen and improve the function of serious crime prevention orders, it says:
“It is estimated that between zero and three prison places, with a central estimate of one prison place will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”
On introducing an interim serious crime prevention order, it says:
“It is estimated that between 0 and 1.54 prison places, with a central estimate of 0.2 prison place will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”
On serious and organised crime articles, it says:
“It is estimated that between four and six prison places, with a central estimate of five prison places will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”
On new offences to criminalise the making, adapting, importing, supplying, offering to supply and possession of articles for use in serious crime, it says:
“It is estimated that between four and six prison places, with a central estimate of five prison places will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”
It is important to report on the new offences relating to immigration crime, which the Government think will not send a meaningful number of people to prison, and also on the new offence of endangering lives at sea, for which the impact assessment includes no estimate. Can the Minister confirm how many people the Government expect each year to be arrested, convicted and imprisoned under the new offence of endangering lives at sea?
We want to see how effective the offences will be. The Government have set that out in part, but not for the new offence of endangering lives at sea, which has great consequence.
Amendment 14 would also require the Border Security Commander to report on the number of people identified as entering the United Kingdom via sea crossing without leave to remain; how many of them are detained pending deportation or a decision on deportation; and how many are deported to a country of which the person is a national or citizen, or to a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that the person will be admitted. We believe it is important to have transparency about the role of the Border Security Commander in facilitating removals. If they are charged with minimising threats to the border, removing those who enter this country illegally with no reason to remain is a big part of successfully achieving that objective.
It is important to note that measures of success can change. Legislating for that might mean that, in a decade, we are wasting the time of the Border Security Command and its commander. My understanding of statistics and their collection is that that is for the Home Office and the Office for National Statistics. Of course, as those who are prosecuted go through the courts, we will all be able to see that.
There may also be a slight misunderstanding about what a prevention order is and what it aims to do. It is a disruptive measure that can be used before charge to stop the vile smuggling criminals from operating. If and when they go to prison, that means that they have breached that order. The fact that the estimate is low means that there is confidence in the prevention orders succeeding.
To follow up on the points of the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, the duty to prepare annual reports feels like a self-appraisal. Essentially, all the commander has to do in those annual reports is state how they have carried out their role and set out their view on the performance. We need some more evidence. In appraisals in any work context, it is always necessary to have the opposite feedback, but I feel that is missing here. It is not clear that there will be an opportunity to challenge the information that comes in front of the House. We really need the detail.
I worry that the fact that the Government are not prepared to require the Border Security Commander to include these details of their work in their annual report is a sign that they do not have confidence in what the commander can do, so our amendment is very important. The hon. Member for Dover and Deal said that he is worried that it will be burdensome, but I think that the information it would require is the minimum that should be provided to us. That information should be happily supplied to the House in the interest of transparency, and I am sure the Minister is keen to do that. That needs to be considered, and perhaps she will address that.
Amendment 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, would require the Border Security Commander to clearly outline how they have paid due regard to the Human Rights Act and the European convention on action against trafficking by including that information in the annual report that is laid before Parliament. As discussed when we debated amendment 1, the Border Security Commander will be a public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act, and must act in compatibility with the human rights legislation. The commander will be aware of the risks in relation to trafficking and modern slavery through their work, and will continue to comply with the obligations, as part of the Government, under the European convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Therefore, it is unnecessary to detail explicitly that that should be in the report. That does not mean that it will not be, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire recognised when he withdrew amendment 1. He has made his point powerfully.
Amendment 14 would create a requirement for the Border Security Commander to include in the annual report a range of statistics relating to the new offences created by the Bill, and wider relevant statistics in relation to irregular entrants who have arrived via a sea crossing, and to deportations. The amendment proposes that the annual report must state how the commander has carried out the functions of their office in the financial year, and set out the commander’s views on the performance of the border security system, with particular reference to the strategic priorities that have been set.
The clause envisages that the report will be laid before Parliament and published. That will provide public and parliamentary accountability for the work of the Border Security Commander across all threats, although the strategic priorities may change over time as the threats against which the commander will need to report evolve.
Amendment 14 in the name of the hon. Member for Stockton West is quite prescriptive about what should be in the report, and includes a range of statistics. In the UK, we have quarterly publication of immigration statistics, which are organised by the Home Office and under the code of practice of the independent UK Statistics Authority. Statistics are regularly made available about what is going on in this area. The hon. Gentleman wants such statistics to be published, under statute, in the annual report that the commander puts before Parliament but, with all due respect, I think it is important that the commander is able to write his report himself without primary legislation directing him what to put in it, especially given that those statistics are regularly made available and are well looked at and reported upon. What the hon. Gentleman is suggesting is cumbersome and would not assist in ensuring that we have parliamentary and public accountability for the commander’s performance.
The hon. Gentleman also quoted from the assessments of the number of prison places that would be created by the new crimes that we will talk about when we debate subsequent clauses. I am not sure what he does not understand about serious crime prevention orders or interim serious crime prevention orders. The idea of some of the new powers—the counter terror-style powers, which we will talk about in due course—is that they will prevent crossings and crimes from happening in the first place. They will allow the police and the National Crime Agency to intervene much earlier and to stop crime happening. In those circumstances, there may be a lesser sentence rather than a prison sentence, but lives would be saved and exploitation would be prevented. That is the nature of counter terror-style powers.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that the annual report will allow public and parliamentary accountability for the work of Border Security Command and that he will not press his amendment, as it would create too inflexible an annual report for the commander, with too much outside interference through primary legislation.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 14, in page 3, line 37, at end insert—
“(c) state the number of persons who have, since the later of the passing of this Act or the last annual report, been—
(i) charged with offences under sections 13, 14, 18, and 43 of this Act; or
(ii) convicted of offences under sections 13, 14, 18, and 43 of this Act;
(iii) identified as entering the United Kingdom via sea crossing without leave to remain;
(iv) detained pending deportation or a decision on deportation;
(v) deported to a country of which the person is a national or citizen; or
(vi) deported to a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that the person will be admitted.”.—(Matt Vickers.)
This amendment would place a duty on the Border Security Commander to include, in their annual report, figures on immigration crime, sea crossings, detentions and deportations.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats, which requires a whole of Government response and will be enabled by the clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partners across the system are working in lockstep to enhance border security, while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners beyond border security matters.
Clause 5 provides that a partner authority has duties, so far as is “appropriate and reasonably practicable,” to co-operate with the commander in carrying out the commander’s functions. It would be helpful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by
“so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable”
and under what circumstances it might be justified for a partner authority not to co-operate. Does it mean, as per subsection (2), that the partner authority would co-operate only so far as the co-operation was compatible with the exercise of its other functions, or are there other circumstances where partner authorities might not have to co-operate?
Again, the clause exposes how powerless the Border Security Commander is. The commander cannot actually command any of these partner authorities to do anything at all. Subsection (3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have—
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWould everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on declarations of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on your first outing, Mr Stuart. Clause 5(3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have a view about what those agreements will look like and what sort of obligations will fall on both parties?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It will be the first occasion of many, I am sure. I hope you enjoy chairing Bill Committees as much as I enjoyed doing so in the previous Parliament.
Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats. That requires a whole-of-Government response, which will be enabled by this clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as it is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partner authorities across the system work in lockstep to enhance border security while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners in other contexts, beyond border security matters.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
The Board
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6 places a duty on the Border Security Commander to establish and maintain a board to assist with the exercise of their functions. That unique forum enables senior representatives from across the border security system to convene to shape our collective response to organised immigration crime and other border security threats. The commander will consult the board when developing strategic priorities for border security, which makes the board a crucial forum in shaping the whole-of-Government response to these threats.
Clause 6 states:
“The Commander must establish and maintain a board to assist the Commander in the exercise of the Commander’s functions.”
It is all quite open-ended: the chair will be the commander, and the board will be made up of one or more representatives from each relevant partner authority. Will the Minister explain on what basis the commander might decide to have representatives from partner authorities? Why do all partner authorities not need to be represented?
Subsection (6) states:
“The Commander must hold meetings of the Board at such intervals as the Commander thinks appropriate.”
Does the Minister have any views about how regular the meetings should be? What sort of matters does she envisage the board will deal with?
The Bill is a framework within which the Border Security Commander operates, but it is not prescriptive because the people who drafted the Bill could not see what the priorities will be in the future. It is a framework that enables the Border Security Commander to respond to what is going on at the time, without limiting him.
There has been a common theme throughout the speeches from the Opposition. They seem to feel that somehow the commander does not have sufficient empowerment to command the border security system, that he is not independent enough, and that he somehow cannot get things done, but the functions outlined in these clauses are not the sole capabilities of the commander’s role as empowered by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.
The Border Security Command is not an operational entity, but a strategic leader for border security. Representatives on the board would be Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Cabinet Office, as well as operational partners such as the National Crime Agency, the UK intelligence community and security services, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and policing. Those kinds of people will be convened for a strategic purpose. It makes sense, if we think about it, that the commander can bring these people together as and when he or she sees a need for them to meet, depending on what is on the agenda and what is going on.
The commander is already using the role and its associated capabilities to deploy key functions to lead on border security across Government, including deploying additional resources across partners, such as the additional £150 million for border security that has been announced by the Government, and developing border security legislation to be used by operational partners, such as the powers in this Bill. In last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from operational partners such as the police, the NCA and the Crown Prosecution Service on how useful they felt the powers in the Bill would be in their everyday operational capacity. The operational commander can also lead on international engagement diplomatically, and has accompanied both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary on journeys to Italy, Germany and Iraq to ensure that we have meetings at the highest levels with people in other jurisdictions, to try to get more co-operation going to deal with the cross-border issues of border security.
The Bill provides a new significant wide-ranging power to lead the border security system strategically, which is being done for the first time. All partner authorities, defined as those public bodies with functions in relation to border security, must, as a legal duty, have regard to the strategic direction set by the commander. However, this works best if there is not a battle between different bits of the Government—if there is co-operation and co-ordination—and that is what these structures are designed to try to achieve. The Bill will, for the first time, provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership to all parts of the system that work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems both domestically and internationally.
I hope that that has provided a little more explanation for the Opposition on the thinking and approach behind some of the powers set out in the clauses we are considering, and most specifically in clause 6.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Delegation by the Commander
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can be delegated to an authorised civil servant when required. Flexibility in the exercise of these functions will support the most efficient and effective delivery of the Government’s actions to tackle border security threats.
Clause 7 makes provision about the delegation of the commander’s functions. Subsection (1) provides that
“The functions conferred on the Commander by this Chapter may be exercised by any civil servant authorised by the Commander for that purpose.”
This is further evidence, were any needed, that the post of commander might not be a serious one. We have already seen that the Bill does not specify any minimum qualifications or experience for the commander, and we have seen why: they are not really in charge of anything.
There are serious questions to answer on the delegation of functions. What sort of functions does the Minister envisage the commander potentially delegating under this clause? Can any specific functions be named? The Bill does not specify any level of seniority for those the commander might delegate functions to. Is there any grade within the Home Office that the Minister thinks it would not be appropriate for the commander to delegate to? What oversight will there be of any delegation process?
I set out in some detail in my reply on the previous clause some of the things that the commander is involved with, including some of the meetings he is involved in convening and the purpose of those strategic meetings. During the evidence we heard last week from operational partners, both the NCA and the police chiefs set out some of the benefits they felt there would be.
Does the Minister agree that we seem to be having repetition in our discussions about the commander and his abilities within his role? The role is respected, and that came up in the evidence we heard. Does she feel that there is repetition of this point, with the Opposition picking up on it at every moment?
The Opposition have asked which bits of the commander’s functions may be delegated and to what level. In theory, it can be any of them. We are trying to ensure that there are no issues in primary legislation that would mean something is prevented from being delegated that would have been effective.
I do not think that the hon. Member for Stockton West would expect me to go into great detail about what might happen with delegation in the future, but I can give an example. If there was to be a high-level visit to Iraq to conclude a memorandum of understanding on returns and activity against organised immigration crime, and the commander was detained elsewhere, it would be possible to delegate that function to somebody who would then go in his place.
We are trying to get to the stage in legislation where we create the commander and give flexibility as to how the job can be put into effect in scenarios that may crop up, without being too prescriptive. I hope that the hon. Member for Stockton West will accept that example of the sort of thing that may crop up.
It is quite interesting to hear the points that the Minister is making, considering the conversation we had this morning about the commander being functionally a civil servant. Although I was never officially a civil servant in the proper sense, from my experience it is really important that senior leaders within the civil service are able to avail themselves of delegation capacities as needed.
It can be done for many reasons. It could be a bandwidth issue, where someone has multiple priorities and needs to delegate to someone else because they are not able to be in two places at once—and looking at the responsibilities of the commander as set out in the legislation, there are a lot. It could also be a resourcing issue or because of a conflict of interest. That brings me to the point I was making about this being a civil service role; there need to be proper conflict of interest considerations. That is what we are taking account of here.
My hon. Friend is right that circumstances often crop up that require this kind of provision. All clause 7 does is allow it, so I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Designation of an Interim Border Security Commander
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can continue to be exercised in the event that the post of commander is vacant for a period, or if the commander is incapacitated or temporarily unavailable. This ensures that the work to enhance our border security and undermine the people smuggling gangs threatening our borders continues in the event that the post either falls vacant or is effectively vacant for a period.
Clause 8 allows for an interim Border Security Commander to be designated. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that this is essentially a stopgap either because a Border Security Commander is going to step down without a replacement yet secured, or for reasons of temporary incapacity to carry out their functions.
Subsection (2) specifies that the interim Border Security Commander can be designated
for such period as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”
I would like the Minister to explain whether there is a limit to what could be regarded as appropriate. This is, on the face of it, a temporary measure, so what counts as temporary for these purposes? What are the safeguards against an interim appointment carrying on indefinitely?
Subsection (3) says that the temporary designation can last no
“longer than the period for which no Commander is designated or (as the case may be) the Commander is incapacitated or unavailable”,
but no time limit is set out in the Bill. Are there any minimum qualifications the Minister would expect an interim commander to have?
Clause 8 is clearly there in the event of the commander being incapacitated or ill and unable to do the job for a while. It is not unusual that people have life experiences that mean they have to take time off work. In that kind of instance, an interim commander could be appointed, pending the return of the role holder, who may be receiving medical treatment or may be incapacitated in some way. There may also be a gap between the resignation or retirement of a commander and reappointment, although one would hope that planning ahead would mean that that would be minimised. The clause addresses the practical issue of having an interim in case there were an issue with appointment.
The interim commander would, obviously, be expected to have the skills to do the job to the full extent. No time limit has been put into primary legislation because if there were a hard timeline it would make it harder in practical terms to get a replacement. It is very much a horses for courses thing, allowing there to be an interim in the case of incapacity, retirement or replacement while the replacement is advertised for and appointed in the usual manner.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Exclusion of application to the armed forces
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10 states that the duties in this chapter of the Bill do not apply to the armed forces, clause 11 makes amendments to the Data Protection Act 2018, and clause 12 provides definitions of the terms used. The work of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence makes a significant contribution to the security of the United Kingdom. The Border Security Commander will work across Government, including with the Ministry of Defence, to enhance our border security. Clause 10 recognises the unique work of the armed forces. While the Border Security Commander will work closely with the armed forces, including through the military aid to the civil authorities process, it is correct that the important duty of our armed forces remains independent from the functions outlined in this chapter. That is achieved by clause 10.
Clause 11 amends the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that the Border Security Commander may process data for law enforcement purposes. That information is vital to build a shared understanding of the nature of border security threats and inform the priority setting process. Clause 12 provides definitions for the terms used in chapter 1 of the Bill for the reader’s understanding and to ensure clarity on definitions during the implementation and operation of the legislation.
Clause 10 makes it clear that this chapter does not apply to the naval, military or air forces of the Crown. Clause 11 is an amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 to allow the Border Security Commander to be added to the list of competent authorities in relation to the processing of personal data carried out for a law enforcement purpose. Given how toothless the Border Security Commander appears to be, will the Minister explain why this measure needs to be added to schedule 7 of the Data Protection Act, as well as what law enforcement purposes the commander will have and for what purpose they will be processing personal data?
The hon. Member asked why the Border Security Commander should be processing data collected from electronic devices. He will know that later in the Bill, there are some new powers that involve collecting, in an intelligence-led way, data from suspected organised immigration criminals. The point is to ensure that data is collected in a lawful manner, and that is why clause 11 allows the Border Security Commander to process data for law enforcement purposes. Some of that is about the counter terrorism-style powers, which we will discuss in relation to later clauses—I do not want to have that debate here—but it is really an enabling power to put beyond doubt the legality of the collection of such material.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Supplying articles for use in immigration crime
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 13, page 7, line 12, at end insert—
‘(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), P cannot commit an offence if P is an asylum seeker.’
This amendment would specify that the offence created by clause 13 (“Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”) cannot apply to asylum seekers.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Amendment 4, in clause 14, page 8, line 11, at end insert—
‘(2A) For the purposes of subsection (1), P cannot commit an offence if P is an asylum seeker.’
This amendment would specify that the offence created by clause 14 (“Handling articles for use in immigration crime”) cannot apply to asylum seekers.
Clauses 14 and 15 stand part.
It is an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairing this afternoon, Mr Stuart. I welcome you to the Committee.
Clauses 13 to 18 are where we start to get into the serious business of the Bill, and where some of its most concerning and controversial aspects are revealed. Nowhere is that more certain than in clauses 13 and 14.
The Government tell us that their whole intention and focus is exclusively on smashing the gangs, disrupting their business and bringing to justice as many of the people associated with and involved in this vile trade as possible. In everything we do in the Committee and in the House, the community must ensure that the Government are supported in that ambition and intention. That is one thing that unites the whole House, and we wish the Government every success in disrupting the gangs, smashing their business operations and bringing them to justice.
As we look at clauses 13 and 14, the first thing we have to do is assess and judge whether they assist in that process. I think we have to come to the conclusion that they do not, and they could make the situation a lot worse. They will certainly make the conditions of those who seek to come to our shores—some of the most wretched people in the world—much harder and more intolerable.
Does the hon. Member hold the view that an asylum seeker cannot be above the law when it comes to participating in smuggling gangs?
I do not think anyone would assert, contend or propose that. Everybody is subject to the laws. Clauses 13 and 14 are designed to create new ways to criminalise people. I have listened carefully to the Government’s rhetoric, and I believe the focus and ambit of these new laws is to smash the gangs and disrupt their business, but they will not do that. The only people who will be ensnared, entrapped and put on the wrong side of these laws are asylum seekers. I say candidly to the hon. Lady that we are creating new ways to further criminalise the most wretched people in the world, and that is a grotesque ambition for this Government.
I tried to find out from the senior law officers who gave evidence how many members of gangs would be apprehended and brought to justice as a result of these new clauses. The law officers could not tell me. I do not blame them for that; they probably did not know. I suspect it would be really difficult even to make some sort of guess about how many criminals would be brought to justice as a result.
I also asked what would be the ratio of ordinary asylum seekers to gang members—the ones who secure this vile trade—but the law officers could not tell me. However, I know and suspect, as I am sure they do, that nearly everybody who falls foul of the clauses will be an asylum seeker. I suspect they know—I do, and probably everybody else does—that very few gang members will be brought in front of any of our judiciary as a result of the provisions.
There is an issue around taxonomy and categorisation here. Anyone is entitled to claim asylum. It is a universal human right. Anyone from any nationality and background, whatever their criminal history, is entitled to make a claim to be an asylum seeker. It is possible to be a member of a criminal gang and plan on claiming asylum. From my 15 years of working in the asylum and immigration service, I know it is an undeniable point of fact that some people exploit that to delay or get around the system, and we must act on such abuse.
Does the hon. Member agree that we have to be careful in our classifications? There is a distinction between an asylum seeker who has a genuine claim to refugee status but who might not be eligible, and someone exploiting the system.
Before the hon. Member responds, that was far too long, Mr Murray. Please try to keep interventions short. Of course everyone is welcome to speak in the debate.
Thank you, Mr Stuart. That is a reasonable point; I think the hon. Gentleman is on to something. Of course some gang members will pretend to be asylum seekers, but it is up to the fine people who came in front of our Committee to determine and ascertain the truth. We should not create further ways to criminalise people that focus almost exclusively on asylum seekers. We must find ways to differentiate; we cannot have blanket, broadly defined clauses that include everybody.
The hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh has a fine history and record of working with asylum seekers and refugees. He has seen the briefings, as I and all Committee Members have. He will therefore know that practically every charity and organisation that works with, and tries to improve the lives of, asylum seekers and refugees tells us that ordinary asylum seekers—those fleeing conflict, oppression and extreme poverty—will be the ones caught up in these new measures.
My amendments are very straightforward. Let us exclude asylum seekers from the provisions of clauses 13 and 14. I want to do that for a number of reasons, but the one the Minister might be most attracted to is that doing so will actually help the Border Security Commander. It will allow him exclusively to focus, laser-like, on the Bill’s main target: the gangs that ply this evil trade. Let us forget about the riff-raff and the chaff. Let us focus our attention on those who arrange and organise this vile trade across the channel, and go for them.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree with what Rob Jones, the director general of operations at the National Crime Agency, said in his oral testimony last Thursday? He said:
“We are not looking to pursue asylum seekers who are not involved in serious and organised crime. That is not what we do. This is about tackling serious and organised crime and being as effective as we can be in doing that.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 35, Q35.]
If we read the tea leaves, it is almost as if the hon. Gentleman is saying that there is an intent to pursue asylum seekers. Moreover, the NCA’s remit is already to be laser-focused and go after those gangs, as he recommends.
Rather lengthy interventions are a feature of this Committee, but I am happy to go with that if everyone else is. The hon. Gentleman is right to refer to the National Crime Agency. I listened carefully to what Mr Jones had to say to the Committee, and I have no doubt about his intention. I do not think he really wants to ensnare asylum seekers; I do not think that is his focus. But he has these two badly drafted and broadly defined clauses as the net that will scoop everything up. As the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said, everybody will be in that net, and it will be a matter of trying to sieve them.
Why not start with the presumption that we will go for the gangs exclusively and leave aside those who come our shores to apply legitimately for asylum in the United Kingdom? Let us not waste time criminalising such people. The main problem, as I have said, is that the clauses are so broad in scope. They are not just a fishing net; they are a trawling net, trying to lift out everybody who comes across the channel.
The clauses cover not only direct acts of people smuggling, but incidental activities that may not involve any criminal intent. In combination with other clauses, they would make it a crime to supply or receive almost any item that one suspects could be used to facilitate illegal travel to the UK. The proposed legislation criminalises collecting or even viewing information that could be useful in making irregular journeys, if there is reasonable suspicion that it could assist others in migration. Although the Government couch a lot of this in humanitarian language, the provisions will not prevent deaths and harm at sea. Instead, they will criminalise people on the move who have no alternative route to the UK.
Let us look at the provisions in a little bit more detail. Supplying, offering to supply and handling articles for use in immigration crime will now get someone a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. Although there are some limited humanitarian exemptions—for example, offering food and drink—the provisions considerably broaden the potential prosecution of migrant assistance and support. Importantly, with all the proposed new offences, there appears to be no explicit defence for those who are on the move.
Then there are the provisions about collecting information for use in immigration crime. Such information includes arranging departure points, dates and times; in other words, information that it would be necessary to gather if someone attempted to make such a journey themselves. The Bill makes it clear that evidence could include someone’s internet history and downloads. The Government contest this, but even looking up a weather map could put someone on the foul side of these clauses. I expect the Government will tell me, “No, of course that won’t happen,” but nothing in the clauses that we are debating states that that activity is exempt.
It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. Did the hon. Member feel that the Crown Prosecution Service gave that assurance at our evidence session last week? The witness categorically stated that such circumstances would not pass the criminal test or the public interest test. Does the hon. Member think it is important that we do not make such inferences when we discuss the Bill, so that we can see clearly how our criminal justice system applies these things?
That is a helpful and useful intervention, and the hon. Lady is right that the CPS did say that. I listened again very carefully to what was said, because concerns about these provisions have been raised repeatedly. I am sure that the CPS is serious about that, but I challenge the hon. Lady to look at the provisions and tell me how such a scenario could not be caught. The Bill is badly drafted because it provides the conditions to allow such a perception to develop. I know the Government do not want to arrest people who are looking at weather maps. I am certain that is not their intention at all, but when we examine the Bill we can see that it will allow that very thing to happen.
The Minister refers to the provision in section 25 of the Illegal Immigration Act 1972 or 1973—
1971—there we go. Section 25 of that Act offers the protection of allowing for a reasonable explanation of why people are caught up in such activity. That is useful when it comes to this Bill, but why do we have to rely on something like that? We are creating a new Bill, which does something specific and unhelpful for some of the poorest and most wretched people who exist on our globe. We have a responsibility for those people under our international obligations and conventions, and this new legislation does nothing to assist them.
The collection of data from people’s phones is facilitated by the Bill, which creates new broad powers to enable the search and seizure of electronic devices. I will come back to the main point I made on Second Reading. We did not get much time to elaborate on this, but I think it is pertinent to the clauses that we are debating, and the Committee must consider it properly.
The gangs have a monopoly and an exclusive right to the irregular migration market. There is no other way for asylum seekers to get to the UK. It just is not possible. There are safe routes available for a small number of countries, but for the vast majority of potential asylum seekers in war-torn regions, areas and countries around the world, the only way to claim asylum in the United Kingdom is to put themselves at the mercy of the gangs, and to go on a small boat to get across the channel.
Business is booming. I do not know if anyone saw the shots today from the camps in France—I think it was on Sky News. What a hell on earth they are! What a disgrace that is for us, who are part of the problem. We cannot get the situation resolved, and we are keeping some of the poorest people in such circumstances. Shame on us, and shame on everyone in the international community who allows such conditions to develop and thrive. Business is booming for the illegal gangs.
I will tell you something else, Mr Stuart. It will only get better for the gangs when the Government cut the international aid budget. What do they think will happen? Do they think that conditions in those areas will get better? Of course they will not. That will lead to so many more people making the journey to the UK, and it will be down to the Government.
I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has noticed, but for the last three years we have had a refugee crisis from Ukraine—and there is such a distinction between how we have responded to Ukraine and how we have responded to everybody else. We put forward legal routes to allow Ukrainians to come to our country. My local authority, Perth and Kinross council, has the largest number of refugees from Ukraine in the whole of Scotland except the city of Edinburgh. I am immensely proud of the generosity of spirit of the people I represent who are taking part in that scheme.
Is it not so different when we allow schemes like that? That is what we are asking the Minister for. We will have a depopulation crisis towards the middle of the century, and immigrants might be at a premium by 2060 or 2070. Why have we not been inventive and creative? Why are we not looking to do things other than leave that mess—that disgrace—on the shores of France, as we have done to date?
I am sure the Minister will tell us that there is the defence of “reasonable excuse”. I accept that, and I know that it applies to each of these new offences—in other words, if a person has a reasonable excuse for engaging in the relevant conduct, they will not be guilty of the offence. I know that that is exactly what she will tell me, and she is already indicating that that is the case. But the burden lies on the defence to adduce sufficient evidence of a reasonable excuse, and if they have done so, it is for the prosecution to prove the contrary beyond reasonable doubt.
To be fair, the Bill sets out a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which the defence of reasonable excuse would apply. Under clause 13, for example, a person will have a reasonable excuse if
“their action was for the purposes of carrying out a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm”.
They will also have a reasonable excuse if they were acting on behalf of an organisation that aims to assist asylum seekers and does not charge for its services. All that is purely a matter of judgment, and there does not seem to be a specific threshold for conviction. The maximum sentences for each of the new offences is pretty stiff and those for offences in clauses 13 and 14 in particular are disproportionately high. To put it in context, the offence of possession of articles used in terrorism has a maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment, but someone could get 14 years for falling foul of the provisions in clauses 13 and 14.
The Bill is likely to have an impact on the prison population—I think I heard the hon. Member for Stockton West address some issues about the prison population with the Minister.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart, as I should have said earlier. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the proposed sentence for the facilitation of small boat smuggling and criminal activity is too high? Did I hear that correctly? Please do correct me if I am wrong.
The hon. Gentleman is wrong, and he did not hear me correctly. I am talking about the new offences in clauses 13 and 14, falling foul of which could result in a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment. He might contend that that might get some gang member, but I am suggesting otherwise. I suspect that practically nobody from gangs involved in this vile trade will be caught up in these offences, but ordinary asylum seekers will be.
Lastly on the prison population, there is a notable lack of robust evidence that lengthier custodial sentences achieve a deterrent effect or a reduction in reoffending. That is explicitly not acknowledged in the impact assessment for the Bill, which states:
“There is limited understanding of the behavioural impact of this intervention, so the deterrence effect on dangerous behaviour may not be realised as intended.”
I do not know whether the Minister believes that the new laws she is creating will make the slightest bit of difference to those who are in areas of conflict or fleeing oppression. I am not entirely sure that asylum seekers sitting down on the beach, or in the deserts of Sudan, in Afghanistan or in Iran, are the least bit cognisant of the developing, hardening and draconian laws of this country, put in place in Committees like this one. I suspect that they do not know about them—and, if they did know about them, they would not care less. Their sole and exclusive priority is saving their family’s and their children’s lives, and getting the hell out of that place.
That is the irritation; those asylum seekers could not care less about the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill that is being debated here today. They want out, and they will do anything possible to rescue their family. Imagine that, after all that journey, after sitting in these boats, after being in the hands of the people smugglers and those gang members, they arrive in the good old United Kingdom, only to be apprehended on the basis of clauses 13 and 14 of the Bill.
His speech—my apologies; I will not make that mistake again. It is really important that we look at what is covered in the Bill, and how it enables our Border Security Command, the National Crime Agency, the police, the border forces and the security services to act. We said before the election, in our manifesto, that we were going to take this on in a counter-terror style, so that we can get to those who are looking to launch the boats before they launch them. These clauses go some way to achieving that; I will not quote the NCA director general again, but he was very enthusiastic about that. The further clauses include acts taking place abroad and not just in the United Kingdom.
On the specific amendments, we must be clear. We do not know who is a genuine asylum seeker at the point that they seek to cross; we will not know for some time. The elephant in the room is that, even if they are genuine asylum seekers, they are in France. They are not in danger, as they would be in Sudan, and putting others at risk by preparing these crossings, facilitating them or being involved is not acceptable. Asylum seekers are not above the law, and these clauses ensure that they will be held to account.
As hon. Members will have read, clause 13 creates a new offence of
“Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”.
The offence has two limbs. First, that the person supplies or offers to supply those articles to another person, and secondly that, when they do so, they know or suspect that the item will be used in connection with any offence under sections 24 or 25 of the Immigration Act 1971—illegal entry and assisting unlawful immigration, respectively. I have a question for the Minister on the reasonable excuse elements of the clause. It is a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they had a reasonable excuse. Subsection (3) defines a reasonable excuse as explicitly including that,
“(a) their action was for the purposes of carrying out a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm”,
which seems reasonable, or,
“(b) they were acting on behalf of an organisation which—
(i) aims to assist asylum-seekers, and
(ii) does not charge for its services.”
That second defence seems to the Opposition to create a large loophole in the law. Does the Minister accept that these defences will have the effect of exempting non-governmental organisations from criminal charges for helping asylum seekers to cross the channel? Why would the Government seek to do that?
The defence categorises organisations that aim to assist asylum seekers into those that do not charge for their services and those that do. Surely this criminal offence is a criminal offence regardless of who is responsible; why would it be any less criminal if someone does it voluntarily? Why is making money from something the determinant of whether it is a crime? As we heard in evidence, charities can be “mischievous”—I think that was the word used—in their activities and in how close they come to facilitating illegal crossings to the UK. Does the Minister accept that the activities of some charities can veer close to the line of facilitating illegal entry? If so, what do the Government intend to do about it?
The threshold for the defence is low. The accused simply needs to provide sufficient evidence to raise an issue, and the contrary must not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Might that be why the Home Office impact assessment considers that between four and six prison places—I believe the central estimate is five—will be required per year once this steady state is reached? The Home Office has lauded the new powers and offences in the Bill as being key to smashing the criminal smuggling gangs, but it does not appear to consider that many people will be convicted under the new offences. How can both those things be the case?
Clause 14 creates the new criminal offence of handling articles for use in immigration crime. The person has to receive or arrange to receive a relevant article, remove or dispose of an article for the benefit of another person, or assist another person to remove or dispose of a relevant article. Again, the clause provides the same defence to the offence as clause 13 does—namely, that the action of the accused was
“for the purposes of carrying out a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm”,
or that they were acting
“on behalf of an organisation which—
(i) aims to assist asylum-seekers, and
(ii) does not charge for its services.”
I therefore have the same questions for the Minister about this defence as I did for the defence in clause 13.
Clause 15 provides a definition of “relevant article” for the purposes of the new offences in clauses 13 and 14. There are exemptions for food and drink, medicines, clothing, bedding, tents or other temporary shelters, and anything to preserve the life of a person in distress at sea or to enable such a person to signal for help. Will the Minister set out the kinds of articles that she therefore expects to be captured by the offences in clauses 13 and 14? It would be useful to know what items the Home Office, Border Force and the police specifically wish to disrupt. There is also a power in clause 15 for the Secretary of State to amend the list of relevant articles. Will the Minister explain what purpose that power serves? The list of what counts as a relevant article is almost limitless, so does she envisage that the power will be used primarily to create exemptions?
The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire has tabled amendment 3 to specify that if a person is an asylum seeker, they cannot commit the offence in clause 13: supplying articles for use in immigration crime. It would be good to understand why the Scottish National party does not think it is possible for asylum seekers to commit that offence. How are law enforcement officers supposed to know that a person is genuinely an asylum seeker—and even if they are, what happens if their application is subsequently rejected?
The hon. Gentleman also tabled an amendment to require the commander to include in their annual report information about how they have paid due regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on action against trafficking. My views are the same as those set out by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West on amendment 1.
I apologise for my longer interventions, Mr Stuart; I will try to bundle them all into this speech.
One of the most important things that we heard during evidence was from Dr Walsh from the Migration Observatory. He said that demand for cross-channel crossings is essentially inelastic. Even if the price of a crossing doubles, there will still be demand for it; people rise to meet that price. That tells us that deterrence and disruption of the demand alone will never be enough to tackle the horrors that we are seeing in the channel at the moment. We must also disrupt the supply of ability to cross the channel. That is an important part of the Bill, and these clauses go right to the heart of it.
On the point about criminalising all asylum seekers, ahead of oral evidence, I read carefully the submissions we have had from organisations I have worked with in the past. I found the testimony of the Crown Prosecution Service very convincing. It stated clearly that in addition to the primary legislation, the CPS will produce guidance that will set out both the public interest threshold and evidential test that it would seek in order for a case to go to prosecution. It was very clear that the kind of hypothetical examples set out by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would not meet that threshold.
On the point about decriminalising all asylum seekers, to clarify the point I was trying to make in my interventions, during a crossing anyone can declare themselves an asylum seeker. That then breaks down into different categories: someone who is genuinely eligible for asylum in the UK and will, when they go through the process, get refugee status; someone who is genuinely seeking asylum, but will not meet the threshold when they go through the process and will not get such status; and someone who knows that they are ineligible, or might be eligible on some counts, but is engaged in the criminal act of facilitating illegal entry into the UK and putting those other people’s lives in danger. At that moment, it is not possible to distinguish between those people; the asylum process is there to do that.
Were we to accept the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, it would be a wrecking amendment. I know it is not intended that way, but it would in reality be a wrecking amendment to any kind of intervention on a crossing at sea.
The hon. Gentleman neglects to mention one thing. He is correctly summarising what is happening with the amendments, but it is already illegal to arrive into the UK illegally—that is what is happening. That is why so many people have been arrested and are now being processed and sent back. It is illegal to come to the UK just now if you have no means to support yourself when you are here. All the Bill is doing is finding new ways to criminalise people. I do not know what the point of the new clauses is, when all that is already happening.
The hon. Gentleman is making an important point, but I do not accept that the proposal is creating new criminal offences for all asylum seekers or for all people; it is creating new criminal offences for those engaged in the exploitation of people and the trafficking or smuggling of them across the channel in great danger. We cannot allow that to continue if we care about those people’s lives at all.
In the constituency of every single MP in this room, there will be a cannabis factory where a probably under-age Vietnamese child is working at cultivating cannabis. If they arrived in the past two years, they came across in one of those boats. Significant, serious organised crime networks are exploiting the vulnerability of those people in order to facilitate such crossings. This proposal is how we stop them doing it, and that affects every one of our communities.
I am aware that I am testing people’s patience, but I want to make two final points. The first is about the criminalisation of organisations that help asylum seekers. That is an important point, and the distinction has to be clear. I did have concerns about this measure being in the Bill, but the evidence sessions completely reassured me. The testimony of the CPS was that asking about the weather in Dover when in Calais, and those kinds of things, would not be facilitating immigration crime. The testimony that the National Crime Agency is using these measures to tackle serious and organised crime makes it clear what the purpose of the clauses is.
The hon. Member for Kent—
Weald of Kent, sorry—that is quite far south for me. The hon. Lady made a point about the sector and charging for services. Some organisations out there are charitable and provide services for free, and some organisations charge enormous fees and are extremely exploitative. That is where that distinction comes from. That would be my interpretation of the legislation.
That is absolutely right—but, in my experience of the channel coast and of working in the refugee sector, those do not exist. Anyone who was to do that would probably be giving immigration advice, which is a regulated component under UK legislation. That would be structured differently from someone on the coast or on a boat or vessel, in the way that this legislation sets out. I am happy to be corrected, but that would be my interpretation.
Finally, I come to the point about mobile phones and the different things listed that can be seized when a vessel is disrupted. Last week, we heard so much evidence—there is so much evidence out there—that the crossing of the channel is the final stage in a very long process involving criminal gang networks, organised crime networks and just immigration networks that stretch through Europe, including allied countries and countries very difficult for us to have relationships with. We know that those smuggling networks are all orchestrated by mobile phone, so it is important that the Bill incorporates that.
On the concerns that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire about criminalising the most wretched people in the world, the exemptions in the Bill are clearly humanitarian. They are clearly the kinds of things that people need to survive on a dangerous sea crossing or on their arrival. The only exception is their phone. It is because we know that the data taken from those phones is critical in the fight that phones are excluded. That is why it is important that that component remains in the Bill.
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart.
These provisions relate to the supplying or handling of articles, the majority of which will, I assume, be held outside the UK. Clause 17, which we will come to, tries to ensure that the offences have effect outside the UK, but how does the Minister see that working in practice? The majority of people will be out of the realms of this law, so how will we enforce it?
On clause 14, on the handling of articles, the Law Society has great concerns that asylum seekers may be victims if they are forced to handle goods. How does the Minister propose to address that point?
We have had an interesting debate, and Members have come at this complex problem from different angles. The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would give everyone who gets on the boats the benefit of the doubt, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent was somewhere towards the opposite end of that spectrum, and we had everything in between.
The important thing that we need to get right in this Bill is that we must give those who are trying to prevent dangerous boat crossings all the tools they tell us they need to help them deal with the criminal gangs that have been allowed to take hold across the channel and who are currently perpetrating this evil trade. We all agree that we want to stop that.
I am starting by talking about what we agree on, and I will then explain how the clauses will assist. We all agree that the right way to go about this is to ensure that the decisions about who is allowed to come into our country are taken by the authorities in the country, rather than by sophisticated, internationally organised criminal gangs with supply chains that go across many jurisdictions, and which make millions out of their illegal trade.
I want to give the Committee a couple of examples to put some flesh on the bones of what we are trying to do with the clauses in this group. Although people may think they are wide-ranging, their purpose is not to criminalise every asylum seeker, or even the vast majority of asylum seekers. Our approach will be intelligence-led. The National Crime Agency and others who police our borders have told us that these powers will assist them in doing the things they most want to do. The NCA gave evidence last week in which it said that its strategy is to prevent, which is to deter participation in organised immigration crime; to pursue, which is to disrupt the way that organised criminals work; to protect, which is to detect and act before the damage has been done—not wait until there are deaths in the channel, but stop small boats being launched in the first place—and to prepare, which is to manage and deal with the issues.
I am going to read into the record a couple of examples, to give Members an insight into what we are trying to achieve. These powers are short of those in section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, because they relate to preparatory acts, which is what these clauses deal with. These are two case studies from the National Crime Agency. The first relates to the offence of handling articles. In November 2024, a man called Amanj Hasan Zada, who organised cross-channel small boat crossings from his home in Lancashire, was jailed for 17 years after being found guilty of people smuggling charges following an investigation by the National Crime Agency. Investigators were able to link him to three separate crossings made from France to the UK in November and December 2023, and he was convicted under section 25. Each crossing involved Kurdish migrants who had travelled through eastern Europe into Germany, Belgium and then France.
It is possible that the reasonable suspicion element meant that investigators would have met the requirements to arrest and charge him earlier, ahead of the section 25 powers becoming an option, if the new offences had been on the statute book when this was going on. This man was also moving between the UK and Iraq regularly, meaning that these powers would have assisted investigators. He was overseas, but he had access to some of these articles when he was in the UK, so he would have been in the scope of the offence, and we would have been able to interdict and arrest him earlier and prevent those crossings from happening. Part of the idea of the new offences is that they are intelligence-led, but they relate to preparatory acts. They are attempting to disrupt before the more serious section 25 offence happens, and therefore they will prevent some of the damage done if that is allowed to happen because the authorities do not have enough evidence to arrest on the more serious offence.
Let me tell the Committee about another case study. An investigation into an Albanian organised crime gang using small boats to facilitate illegal immigration to the UK led to the arrest of an individual who was identifying rigid-hulled inflatable boats for sale on behalf of that gang. The gang subsequently bought and used the identified boats for organised immigration crime purposes. The individual was never directly involved in the movement of migrants or the purchase of those boats; he simply sourced them. The NCA provided evidence that they were on the periphery of the organised criminal gang and were researching for the gang to support their criminality. Despite that evidence, he was never directly involved in the actual facilitation, so the case could not go through to charging.
The preparatory acts offence would have enabled prosecution in that case, as the individual took part in the research and planning of acts to facilitate organised immigration crime, despite not being directly involved in the facilitation and illegal entry of migrants. Both the type of information and the circumstances the information was collected under would be captured by the new offence, and the evidence that the NCA had would have been sufficient for a sentence of up to five years.
We are talking about doing prevention work, to disrupt, to interdict and to stop some of this stuff happening before it has reached its full maturity and people’s lives have been put at risk in the channel. It is a different approach. To sit, watch and wait until something has happened and people have perhaps died is one way of doing it, but the entire approach of the counter-terrorism style powers, of which the powers in this clause are an example, is what the NCA and other people have asked us to assist them with. They see the pattern in their information gathering: how these things are organised, what the patterns are, who is involved and how they do their business. They have demonstrated to me and others that these kinds of powers would be really useful in a preventive way and may very well save lives. I hope that giving those two examples will mean that we have more of a handle on the kind of things that the clauses are trying to do.
The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire was worried that the powers will criminalise all asylum seekers. That is not the intention. The intention of these powers is to be completely intelligence-led and focused on perpetrators, whether they are on the periphery or directly involved. More than 95% of people whom we know of who arrive illegally on small boats claim asylum. The hon. Member’s amendments, which would take all people who claim asylum out of consideration of these offences, would be an obvious way of avoiding the offences being brought to bear and could be used by any of the people who are involved in organised immigration crime to avoid the powers being used against them. Therefore, while I am sure it was not his intention at all, the effect of the amendments is to wreck the approach to prevention and disruption that these powers represent in the Bill.
I want to be clear—it is important that I put this on the record, so I will say it again—that it is not the intention to target asylum seekers with these new offences. The offences do not penalise individuals for entering illegally any more than they are penalised already, but they criminalise the conduct of activities connected to facilitation and illegal entry offences through the supply or handling of articles. In practice, the focus will be intelligence-led and targeted at those who law enforcement believe to be working in connection with organised criminal networks. Believe you me, Mr Stuart, those networks exist in the UK and they come across on small boats themselves. They also travel between the UK and some of the countries of origin they are working with. We know that that is exactly what happens because we can track and follow some of them. It is therefore important that we can bring these powers to bear. We know there are individuals who have claimed asylum in the UK and operated criminal activity from within the UK as part of a wider criminal gang with networks overseas in order to facilitate smuggling into the UK—I have just given the Committee an example. That is a phenomenon we are aware of today and we cannot exclude anyone with an asylum claim from the scope of these new offences, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would want us to, regardless of the circumstances.
Excluding asylum seekers fuels abuse and exploitation of the asylum system, as well as the intentional frustration of our criminal justice system, with those involved in the supply and handling of articles able to claim asylum on arrival or arrest and therefore evade prosecution. I am sure that that was not the hon. Member’s intention, but I hope he will also take at least some comfort from what I have said about this power not being applied to everybody, but instead being very focused and intelligence-led. We cannot provide blanket exemptions. I hope given the explanation, he will therefore withdraw the amendments.
Turning more broadly to what the clauses will achieve in practice, clause 13 creates a new offence of supplying or offering to supply an article where the individual knows or suspects that the article is to be used in relation to an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, which covers illegal entry, or section 25, which covers the facilitation of unlawful immigration.
Criminal smuggling gangs are using wide international and transnational networks to supply items for their criminal ventures. The new offence is intended to allow law enforcement to target those who act in a way that removes themselves from the direct act of people smuggling, so as to allow them to be caught under existing legislation. It will allow for earlier intervention, as in the example I have just used, potentially before boats have even been launched and lives risked. That is the prevention side.
I wish I could say that I was reassured by the Minister’s response. There were things she said that encouraged me and that I think she was genuine and sincere about. She, and everybody who has contributed today and who we have heard from over the past couple of weeks, is right that we do not want to arrest asylum seekers. That is the last thing we want to do, and I accept that that is the case in practically everything that anybody has said. However, more asylum seekers will be arrested because of these clauses. More will be facing justice, whatever way it applies, right across the United Kingdom because of these new offences.
What we have forgotten is that it is already illegal to enter the UK irregularly. In 2020, 6,477 people were arrested because they arrived in the UK irregularly. With clauses 13 and 14 we are not addressing the illegality of issues such as people coming to the United Kingdom; we are finding new ways of ensuring that those people will be subject to court proceedings—to being on the wrong side of UK law—and that is the thing that concerns us most.
Many people have referred to agencies that gave us support today. I listened to the NCA’s evidence, and some of it was very interesting and compelling. I accept that it wants to target the gang members and those involved in this violent trade, and that is what we should be helping it to do. Obviously, asylum seekers will get caught up in all that, but let us enable the NCA to focus exclusively on trying to apprehend the gang members and secure justice rather than trying to find new ways to criminalise people coming to the UK,.
Will the hon. Gentleman not take my word that the offences will be intelligence-led? They are not targeting all asylum seekers, but they certainly would target someone coming over on a boat who may claim asylum, who has been involved in an organised immigration gang, and who has been organising the supplies for it.
I obviously accept the Minister’s word when it comes to all this, but we need to look at what is in the Bill. There are measures that we do not like and that we do not think will help to achieve the major objective, which is to disrupt the gangs’ business model and ensure that they are brought to justice. That just does not happen with these new clauses. The measure to which amendment 3 refers does not offend me in the same way that the subject of amendment 4 does. I will withdraw the amendment, but I reserve the right to push the next amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Amendment 4 negatived.
Clauses 14 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Collecting information for use in immigration crime
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The provisions in clause 16 create an additional tool to act earlier to disrupt criminal gangs smuggling people into the UK. The new offence targets specified preparatory activities associated with people smuggling. These activities relate to the collection, recording and possession, viewing or accessing of information that is likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a journey of more than one person into the UK, where their entry or arrival constitutes an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. These specified activities must also be conducted in circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the information being collected, recorded, possessed, viewed or accessed will be used in organising or preparing for such a journey.
This clause is levelled strongly against people-smuggling gangs and their associates. It includes a defence for someone of undertaking these specified activities for their own journey only. Also included as a defence is a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses, where one express excuse is conducting these activities to carry out or to prepare to carry out the rescue of a person from danger or serious harm. The maximum sentence for this offence is five years’ imprisonment.
Clause 16, as the Minister has just set out, creates a new offence of collecting information for use in immigration crime. A person commits such an offence if a person:
“collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey or part of such a journey…possesses a document or record containing information of that kind, or…views, or otherwise accesses, by means of the internet a document or record containing information of that kind.”
This is an extremely wide set of information that is being criminalised. We understand the desire to keep these offences broad in order to capture as many offenders as possible, and we support that aim. However, if the definition is too wide, there is a risk that it becomes meaningless and therefore self-defeating. So, it is important to understand how the Minister believes law enforcement will assess whether the information is of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey. Could she please explain how this test will be met in practice? It would also be helpful, for similar reasons, to know when the CPS will publish its guidance on what might meet the threshold for an offence to be committed under this clause. Finally, it is again a defence for an organisation that aims to assist asylum seekers if it does not charge for its services. So, we have the same questions and concerns about this defence as we did in relation to the preceding clauses.
I will quickly talk about this clause, because it is one of my favourite clauses in the Bill. Having worked in a counter-terror role in the past, I know that one of the most effective ways of preventing terror attacks on the streets of the United Kingdom is by identifying hostile reconnaissance, whether it is physical or online. That is why I am so happy to see this clause in the Bill, because it gives our authorities the opportunity to get to these vile criminals before they take to the seas.
I take my hon. Friend’s point. This clause is very much about being able to capture preparatory work for any effort to evade our immigration laws and bring people over in small boats, illegally putting their lives at risk and potentially costing lives in return for money.
This clause is about a wide range of potential research, but there are also explicit safeguards within it that are sufficient to protect individual migrants and refugees, or families of refugees, trying to help family members to flee danger or serious harm. The defence that a person is conducting these activities exclusively in preparation for their own journey protects individuals from falling foul of this law. The clause is explicitly focused on and aimed at the work done by gang-affiliated facilitators of immigration offences.
The express reasonable excuse of
“carrying out, or preparing for the carrying out of, a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm”
may—depending on the circumstances—protect the families of refugees wanting to help their loved ones flee. There is also an express reasonable excuse for a person
“acting on behalf of an organisation which…aims to assist asylum-seekers, and…does not charge for its services.”
The list of reasonable excuses in the Bill is not exhaustive, so it is very much a question of looking at the information that has been gathered and making a judgment, knowing that the idea of this offence is to focus specifically on organised immigration criminality, not the individuals who may be asylum seekers or may be being trafficked.
Clause 17 provides for the offences set out in clauses 13 and 14—the supply and handling of articles for immigration crime—and clause 16—the collecting of information for immigration crime—to apply to activities committed both inside and outside the UK, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. The activities criminalised by these offences are often carried out overseas, as well as in the UK, by perpetrators of various nationalities to facilitate people smuggling to the UK. This clause will strengthen the offences, enhancing the ability to disrupt those involved in this trade, indiscriminate of their nationality and the location of their crime.
Clause 17 also makes provisions for, where an offence under clauses 13, 14 or 16 is committed outside the UK, proceedings to be taken in the UK. For application in Scotland, this clause provides that those proceedings are to be made in accordance with the relevant processes and bodies of the devolved Administration. Finally, this clause provides that section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, which requires consent from the Secretary of State for certain prosecutions of non-UK nationals on territorial waters, does not apply. In doing so, the impacts of these offences are not narrowed and law enforcement is able to pursue perpetrators of these offences when committed on territorial waters.
Clause 17 sets out that the offences of supplying articles for use in immigration crime, handling articles for use in immigration crime and collecting information for use in immigration—so the clauses that we have just discussed—apply to things done both inside and outside the United Kingdom, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. In essence, clause 17 makes these three new offences extraterritorial. Subsection (2) provides that where the offence is taken outside the United Kingdom, proceedings may be taken in the United Kingdom.
When we heard evidence from Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead, she said that this provision and subsection (7) of clause 18, which extends the offence of endangering lives at sea to acts committed outside the UK, create challenges. She said,
“we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level…the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world…we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 31-33, Q30.]
However, she also said that, for these new offences to work, there has to be “dual criminality”; that is to say,
“there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 33, Q33.]
Can the Minister reassure the Committee that offences equivalent to those in clauses 13, 14 and 16 exist internationally in relevant partner countries so that we can be assured that the extraterritorial scope of the offences will be effective in tackling organised immigration crime? Can she name those offences or share a list? We fully support the aims of the Government but are keen to establish the efficacy of these measures in disrupting the vile work of people-smuggling gangs.
I thank the hon. Lady for her observations. In practice, the clause allows for prosecution where an offence was committed overseas. It may well rely on evidence sharing from an international partner. She is right to talk about the network of CPS prosecutors across other jurisdictions.
In the time that I have been in the Home Office, we have been strengthening those ties and growing them further. We have done a lot of work via arrangements such as the agreement we came to with the Italians; the German agreement; the work we have done with the Calais group; the information we are sharing in and around the Balkan countries about the routes that go through those countries; the work that the Home Secretary and the Border Security Commander have done in not only Italy, but Iraq, the Kurdish region and Tunisia and some of the other countries that tend to be countries of transit. We are focusing more and more on how we can co-operate operationally.
Some of that work involves cross-country and cross-jurisdiction work to hit particular organised immigration crime across the piece on a set day. There have been some very good examples of cross-jurisdictional days of action. The muscles in this area are strengthening and being worked more. This clause is an added power that will make it easier for us to continue that work.
I draw attention to what Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service, said in her testimony:
“I will start with how we rebuild relations with key allies.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q41.]
That implies that relations with key allies have been strained and need rebuilding. She then said:
“I have talked about our network of liaison prosecutors.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q41.]
She then talked about how there is regular engagement and said that engagement events with overseas prosecutors have increased in recent months. Does the Minister agree that one of the reasons we have had an asylum backlog in recent years, and our asylum system has been described as a disaster, a meltdown and worse in oral testimony, is that we strained our relations with key allies?
Yes. When things are cross-jurisdictional and cross-country, one has to be able to co-operate with other jurisdictions with some respect for their particular prosecutorial approach in order to be able to share information and work together operationally and diplomatically to deal with the significant challenges that organised immigration crime presents. The Government certainly want to renew and strengthen their approach in that area, and have made a good start.
People should not underestimate how often people who break this law and would fall foul of this increase in jurisdiction come to visit the UK. It is possible that we could pick them up and charge them here and, in some instances, follow them and wait for them when they arrive. The extension of jurisdiction, which is the essence of clause 17, will provide us once more with what we hope will be an extremely effective new tool that will help us to disrupt and begin to dismantle some of the organised immigration criminal gangs.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Martin McCluskey.)
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWould all Members ensure that electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on the declaration of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.
Clause 18
Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom
I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 18, page 11, leave out lines 24 to 26 and insert—
“(c) the vessel in which the person travelled could not reasonably have been thought to be safe for the purposes of reaching the United Kingdom.”
This amendment would apply the new offence of endangering another during a sea crossing to the UK to any individual who tries to enter the UK illegally and makes their journey in an un-seaworthy vessel, removing the requirement for the individual to have done an act to cause or create a risk of death or serious injury.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 5, in clause 18, page 11, line 36, at end insert—
“(E1C) (a) For the purposes of subsections (E1A) and (E1B), a person cannot commit an offence if the person is an asylum seeker.
(b) For the purposes of this subsection, ‘asylum seeker’ means a person who intends to claim that to remove them from or require them to leave the United Kingdom would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under—
(i) the Refugee Convention (within the meaning given by section 167(1) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999), or
(ii) the Human Rights Convention (within the meaning given by that 35 section).”
This amendment would specify that the offence created by clause 18 (“Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom”) cannot apply to asylum seekers.
Amendment 15, in clause 18, page 12, line 5, leave out “six” and insert “fourteen”.
This amendment would increase the maximum penalty for the offence of endangering lives at sea to fourteen years.
Amendment 16, in clause 18, page 12, line 9, leave out “five” and insert “fourteen”.
This amendment would increase the maximum penalty for the offence of endangering lives at sea to fourteen years.
Clause stand part.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. Clause 18 creates a new offence of endangering others’ lives during a sea crossing from France, Belgium or the Netherlands to the United Kingdom, which results in the commission of an existing offence under section 24 subsection (A1), (B1), (D1) or (E1) of the Immigration Act 1971. Proposed new subsection (6) to section 24 of the 1971 Act states that this offence
“applies to acts carried out inside or outside the United Kingdom.”
The provision is necessary for this offence. Can the Minister explain whether partner countries have comparable offences to this one that can be used to apprehend people in France, Belgium and the Netherlands?
The former director general of Border Force, in his evidence to the Committee, was clear that clause 18 would be more effective if operated by French enforcement agencies, rather than in the UK, as most of the offences occur in French territory. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that, in order to successfully prosecute these offences in the UK, UK Border Force will be able to gather evidence collected outside the UK? Can the Minister guarantee that French support in providing that evidence will be forthcoming? What guarantees has the Home Office been given?
In order to be prosecuted under clause 18 for offences committed in French territorial waters, people would need to be transported to this country if they are not already here, which would have the rather perverse outcome of more people coming and being able to claim asylum. As I have not been able to find any reference to that in the impact assessment, I would like the Minister to share with the Committee what the justice impact tests showed for this new offence. How many new prison places are going to be required at steady state? In other words, how effective does the Minister think the new offence will be?
The Opposition tabled amendment 17 as we suspect that the new offence is not going to be greatly used. Amendment 17 would apply the new offence of endangering another during a sea crossing to the UK to any individual who tries to enter the UK illegally and makes their journey in an unseaworthy vessel, removing the requirement for the individual to have done an act to cause or create a risk of death or serious injury. If a person has crossed to the UK in a small boat, they have by definition endangered both their lives and the lives of others at sea. Those boats are unseaworthy, overcrowded and everyone who gets on board is responsible for that position. It is not just the lives of people on those dangerous vessels that are placed in danger, but potentially the lives of those who rescue them.
We have tabled amendments 15 and 16 to increase the sentence for the offence to 14 years. Before the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 was passed, section 25 offences attracted a prison sentence of up to 14 years. The 2022 Act increased the penalty to life imprisonment in order to discourage unlawful facilitation of migrants to the UK, so why are the offences in this Bill for endangering lives at sea so much lower?
Since the Government have scrapped the Rwanda deterrent, we would like to help them to make this damp squib of a Bill a bit more of an effective deterrent to those considering making such a dangerous crossing from a safe third country. That is why we have tabled amendments 17, 15 and 16: to demonstrate that if an individual gets on an unsafe boat to cross the channel, thereby committing an immigration offence, they will be found guilty of endangering lives at sea. Then, as a foreign criminal, their deportation should be easier for the Home Office.
If the Minister is not going to accept our amendment, which would ensure that everyone arriving on a small boat should be found guilty of endangering lives at sea, I would like her to explain how people who cram themselves into overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels have not endangered themselves, others on that vessel and those who have to come to their rescue.
It is an honour to serve under your chairpersonship today, Mr Stuart.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that on average we are seeing the number of people per boat increasing each year? He alluded to that earlier, and it means that more and more people are crowding into each small boat—he is nodding, so he seems to agree. Does he also agree that, because we are seeing more and more people crowded into these small boats, it is accounting for a rise in the number of people who are crossing the channel in small boats?
Yes—it is the case that more people are coming on fewer boats. Equally, however, there is also a rise in the number of boats that are coming across. I think that both those things are problematic. One thing that we know about these boats being filled with yet more people is that they become ever more dangerous, and we have seen some of the horrible consequences and fatalities as a result of that.
Amendment 5, tabled by the Scottish National party, specifies that the offence created by clause 18—endangering another during sea crossing to the United Kingdom—cannot apply to asylum seekers. Surely, that would render the new offence even more ineffective, as it will not be possible to charge people until their asylum claim has been determined. Someone is perfectly capable of endangering lives at sea, whether they are an asylum seeker or not.
I will respond to some of the points that the hon. Member for Stockton West has just made, starting with the point about the French. Under the last Government, we saw what amounted to Twitter diplomacy, continuous bashing of the French online and in the papers, and a breakdown of that relationship. Since we came into Government, we have seen that Keir and Yvette, who was out there in France recently, have looked to reset that relationship and rebuild it. I believe that recent visits that Yvette has made to France, including one that involved a meeting with the French Minister of the Interior, have been very productive. The French are looking at their laws and considering how they can improve things on their side—[Interruption.] I apologise, Mr Stuart. I mean the Home Secretary, not Yvette. The smaller Committee Rooms sometimes result in some informality.
As I was saying, the French are looking to readdress their laws, including things such as intercepting boats in shallow water, which to date has been neglected. That adult approach to politics and working with the French will help us to reduce the number of these boat crossings.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart.
My hon. Friend is making a really important point: these cross-channel operations and strategies are more diplomatic than they are legislative. Does he agree that, because the UK is unusual in that our Border Force is not a police force, whereas the French police aux frontières, the Belgian police and all other European border agencies are police forces, we have very different kinds of operations and structures, and this work needs to be done gently, through diplomacy and not through amendments to legislation?
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. He makes the powerful point that the French need to be engaged with diplomatically rather than being bashed on social media, which damages our relationship with them. The way forward here is to continue with that gentle diplomacy to bring about the changes in their laws that may well benefit the United Kingdom. We have already seen results on that front in Germany. The Germans have changed laws around the facilitation of the kit to be used for these crossings, so diplomacy is already yielding positive results, and I expect we will see more of that.
My second point is that this amendment is fantasy land from the Opposition. We inherited a justice system that was completely broken and on its knees, with just 2% of prison places still available. Do the Opposition propose sticking all these people in prison? If so, where are those prison places going to come from, given what we have inherited?
It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for a second day, Mr Stuart. I rise to speak to amendment 5 in my name.
Of all the new criminalising clauses in the Bill, this is the one that concerns me most. It is the most invidious and cruel. As we have heard, the clause proposes a new criminal offence of endangering another during a sea crossing, with a proposed maximum sentence of six years’ imprisonment. The offence is defined as committing an act that creates a risk of death or serious physical or psychological injury to another person during a sea journey from France, Belgium or the Netherlands to the UK—in effect, all the sea journeys across the channel by, mainly, asylum seekers who are seeking refuge in the UK.
How that is supposed to be assessed is anyone’s guess. Any potential transgression of the clause could happen only in the most chaotic of circumstances—on a small boat where people will probably be struggling for their lives to try to get here. The only witnesses to any transgressions of this clause will be other traumatised souls who had the great misfortunate to be there at that time. The new offence is concerningly broad, and explicitly aimed at people on the move; it exclusively and directly targets those on the boats.
Which people may get caught up in this offence? The first category that comes to mind is those people who may have been offered rescue by the French but refused the opportunity of rescue. But why would they take that opportunity? These are people who have travelled thousands of miles to try to seek asylum in the United Kingdom. I am supposing that they make up the first category that the Minister has in mind with this offence.
However, it is also possible to prosecute individuals who, in moments of panic or self-preservation, inadvertently put others at risk. That means that someone who makes a sea crossing out of desperation could face a prison sentence simply because of the circumstances of their arrival, rather than any deliberate intent to cause harm. This law makes no attempt to take account of the high risk and chaotic nature of these journeys, where panic, misjudgment or even attempts to help others could inadvertently lead to criminal liability.
What makes the clause particularly invidious, and why we should think about it very carefully, is that it does not do even one thing to tackle what the Government say they are tackling: the gangs—the people who organise this foul trade and are responsible for putting people on the boats. It does nothing to target them. The only people who will be in the sights of this invidious, cruel clause will be ordinary asylum seekers.
The refugee convention is clear that refugees should not be penalised for how they enter a country to claim asylum. The clause runs a coach and horses through that obligation. It also breaches the Palermo protocol, which enables asylum seekers to claim asylum freely and honestly. The European convention on human rights memorandum states that
“parents who bring their children on the type of journeys that the Endangerment Offence captures will be excluded from prosecution in almost all circumstances”.
The key words are “almost all”: there could still be prosecutions, and the memorandum notes that that could lead to families breaking up.
There is another main target of the offence. It is designed to entrap and ensnare those who pilot the boats. Let us look at how far we have come with this new distinction and new category of people that the Government are now going after. It was in 2019 that the Government started bringing criminal charges against people identified as steering dinghies across the channel. Prior to this clause, those identified as piloting boats have usually been arrested and charged with the offence of facilitating a breach of immigration law under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971.
The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 increased the maximum sentence for that offence to life imprisonment. In most cases, the second charge is dropped due to a lack of evidence—as I explained, the deeply chaotic circumstances where evidence could be acquired lead to a lack of evidence being presented in court proceedings. However, there have been some successful section 25 prosecutions. For example, they can happen when a person pleads guilty to an offence at the first opportunity before it is dropped.
It is an honour to serve on your Committee, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Members for Perth and Kinross-shire and for Stockton West for their contributions. There are a few points I want to make. Clause 18 already outlines provision within the lines that amendment 17 seeks to remove. Naming the act of supplying an unseaworthy vessel, while removing the broader terminology of an act from the Bill, sets a precedent where we would have to outline all possible acts within the Bill. That is wholly unnecessary and not in keeping with the structure of the Bill. Although providing an unseaworthy vessel is the initial act that causes risk to life, amendment 17 would serve to de-prioritise further acts of criminality that could endanger life in a sea crossing. The wording already in the Bill provides sufficient scope to address what the amendment seeks.
Following on from this, I think everybody in this room agrees with the sentiment of amendment 5—that genuine asylum seekers are vulnerable—but it is also important to recognise that someone with the right to asylum could be involved in criminality. The Bill already establishes, through clauses 16 to 18, the provision of a reasonable excuse as a defence, creating a clearer distinction between humanitarian activity and genuine asylum seekers, journalistic or academic works, and those involved in immigration crime as well. I believe that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire has already conceded that point, having withdrawn amendments of a similar nature.
It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham and Rainham, who made a very persuasive case. She has stolen much of what I was going to say, which is actually quite helpful. I want to start by reflecting on the international situation, following up on the equally persuasive points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal about the relationship between the UK and France. It is worth reflecting on where we are. The current Home Secretary was the first to visit northern France in almost five years. Using a parallel Conservative political time continuum, that was six Home Secretaries ago.
In December, we had the meeting of the Calais Group in London, which was able to agree a plan to tackle people smuggling gangs. We have seen the Home Secretary and Interior Ministers from G7 countries, Germany included, meeting in Italy to agree a new joint action plan. We have seen the French Government appoint a new special representative on migration, Patrick Stefanini. He will work closely with our new role of Border Security Commander so that we have the closest, strongest, deepest engagement and interaction.
It is worth reflecting on that, because we are not going to solve the problem of small boat crossings on our own. We have to repair the damage done by the previous Conservative Government to our relationships with our major EU allies and partners. One of the consequences of the botched Conservative Brexit deal is that the UK no longer participates in the EU’s Dublin system, which determines which countries should take responsibility for processing an asylum claim where a person has links with more than one country, and provides a mechanism to return the person to the responsible country. That is underpinned by a shared database of asylum seekers’ fingerprints. It is chaotic that we had a deal that robbed us of the opportunity to take part in that system.
Mr Hayes, I am sure that, from now on, you will want to focus closely on the subject of endangering people while at sea.
I thank the hon. Lady for her question, but I have another compelling statistic for her. Implicit in much of what the Conservatives say is the idea that the UK alone is carrying the burden of asylum seeker hosting, but the UK is actually fifth, behind Germany, France, Italy and Spain, in our receipt of the number of asylum seekers in the year ending September. The point I am making is that actually, contrary to much of the rhetoric that we hear in the Chamber and may be hearing in this debate that the United Kingdom is somehow on its own, shouldering all the responsibility for providing a safe place to asylum seekers, we are not. That is worth mentioning, because as a country we are trying to repair our relationships—
Order. That has been mentioned, so clause 18 would now sensibly be the focus of your words.
Thank you for your patience, Mr Stuart. I will progress to my more substantive points.
I welcome the introduction of the new offence of endangering another life during perilous sea crossings to the UK, because we know that life is being endangered. At least 78 people died in the channel last year, and a total of 327 have died on the channel route since 2014. With your patience, Mr Stuart, I will talk about a particular case study.
We know that some of the lives that were cut short were incredibly young. A year and three days ago, a seven-year-old girl boarded a small boat in northern France with her three siblings, father and pregnant mother. The family joined six other children on that small boat, all of them seeking to cross the channel to reach the UK. Four other adults completed the complement on the boat. To describe that boat as small is a joke. It was later described as very small, no bigger than the kind a fisherman might use. It was too small for the number on board, which reinforces the point that I made to the hon. Member for Stockton West: that we are seeing the average number of people per boat rising, which accounts in part for the larger number of people trying to cross the channel to the UK.
The little girl I just talked about was pulled out of the water by rescuers. There were efforts to save her, but they failed. She could not be resuscitated. Aged seven, that child suffered a heart attack and she stopped breathing. Her family died. The six other children on the boat died. The four other adults on the boat died.
Later that day—3 March 2024—another boat crossing got into trouble. Thankfully, the 47 lives on that boat were saved. The night before, on 2 March 2024, another boat got into trouble when it deflated because it was not seaworthy. Again, thankfully, 20 lives were saved. But 327 lives have been lost on the channel route.
We know the facts of life in these flimsy boats. We know that every small boat is crowded with more and more people. We know that gangs are set on making as much money as possible, no matter the risk to life. We know that women and children are forced into the middle of ever smaller boats, so that when those boats fold and sink, as they do, it is they who are the first to be drowned or crushed. We know that the fuel is in containers that are so flimsy that they leak, and we know that when it mixes with seawater, saltwater, it inflicts the most horrific burns on the most vulnerable people.
We know another fact of life on these boats: the engines are among the weakest and the lifejackets are fake, do nothing and keep nobody afloat. And so I have to ask: why would we oppose the introduction of this new offence? It will ensure that anyone involved in physical aggression, intimidation or coercive behaviour will face prosecution and a sentence of up to five years.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has been clear that this offence sends
“a clear message that we will take action against those who are complicit in loss of life or risk to life at sea.”—[Official Report, 10 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 63.]
To hear that from a Home Secretary is really important for those criminal gangs that are contemplating criminality. This is about going after those who further jeopardise the safety and lives of others during crossings and who are actively preventing offers of rescue. It is not about, as some have said, criminalising vulnerable people and dangerous crossings. Indeed, the Home Office has already said publicly that the Crown Prosecution Service always considers whether it is in the public interest to prosecute individuals. This is about protecting children like the seven-year-old whose life was ended a year and three days ago.
I want to dwell on the point about child protection, because it is so relevant to the question of sea crossings and whether we have this offence to try to limit the loss of life. We heard in oral testimony from the Children’s Commissioner for England about the horrifying crossings that are taking place, but we also heard that the Conservatives had forced vulnerable children into horrifying situations when they arrived here in Britain. The commissioner stated:
“Children were languishing without proper safeguarding in inappropriate places.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 21, Q21.]
The Children’s Commissioner had to persistently pursue, from a Home Office that hindered her from doing her job, data on
“children who had been victims of attempted organ harvesting, rape and various other things”.––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 25, Q26.]
As she says on children who are missing:
“We still do not know where many of those children are…that is not good enough.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 25, Q26.]
I say that because we have a massive child protection issue on our sea. We have a massive child protection issue in the United Kingdom. We need the Bill to make sure that children are safe.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. These steps have been taken following discussions with law enforcement to be as thorough as possible in our attempts to smash the criminal gangs and disrupt an organised activity at the very source, particularly in relation to endangering another during a sea crossing, but also when it comes to supplying and handling articles for immigration crime. We must allow enforcement every opportunity to identify the causes of such crime and use the findings of any investigation to deter further crossings. If he allows me a little bit of leeway, I will refer to the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, who spoke about piloting boats.
I thank my hon. Friend for his point; I agree with him.
I want to continue to dwell on the question of children’s social care. It is this Government who have been backing children’s social care to look after unaccompanied children—something so important in the eyes of the Children’s Commissioner. It is we who are seeking to protect children when they make their desperate crossings and when they are here in the UK. It is no surprise that this Government is doing the same in other areas, such as the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill in this parliamentary Session, which establishes child registers to track children not at school, strengthens multi-agency safeguarding arrangements and assigns a unique identifier for each child. I say that because children’s protection is absolutely critical.
If the Conservative party, in tabling its amendment, were serious about protecting endangered life and tackling the criminal gangs that threaten children’s safety and undermine our border security, why did it do so little during its time in office and why did it not vote for the Bill? It proposed an amendment with the express intention of killing the Bill—as we saw in the Chamber, its Whips were begging Reform MPs to back the amendment that would have killed it off. I saw that with my own eyes.
This Government have increased deportations, returns and removals, which are at the highest rate for six years. We are cutting the cost of the asylum system. I beg the Conservative party and its allies in Reform to get serious about protecting our borders and protecting children and to stop blocking progress.
I have some comments on the amendments. I will start with amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. I have watched the first episode of “The Chief”, which I enjoyed and gave me some insights into the outlook—perhaps even the ambitions—of the hon. Gentleman, which were very much to my liking. Although I have enjoyed lots of the contributions you have made with such huge passion, and indeed compassion for the people you refer to, my concern is about the unintended consequences of your amendment.
Sorry, Mr Stuart. I am concerned that the hon. Gentleman’s proposal to exclude asylum seekers from prosecution opens up a situation in which someone who has come here as an asylum seeker, and then seeks to engage in illegal activity to assist more illegal channel crossings, would be exempt from prosecution. That would undermine a lot of what many of us are trying to do. My concern is not with the intention of the amendment, which is incredibly clear, but its application, which would go against a lot of the things we are aiming to achieve.
When he moved his amendment 17, the hon. Member for Stockton West did not give a definition of an unseaworthy vessel. This is potentially another area where, despite the rhetoric—which I understand to be about appearing tougher on gangs and people who attempt to make and to assist illegal crossings—the Opposition may actually have introduced an amendment to dilute the Bill.
The amendment ties criminality to the seaworthiness of a vessel. Members on both sides of the Committee have talked about the ability of these gangs: they are fast-paced and cunning, and they move with the times. The Committee heard from witnesses that the gangs regularly change tack to keep up with and get around legislation. That is why the measures we are taking are needed. There is no legal definition of a seaworthy vessel, only that, “A seaworthy vessel is a type of boat or ship that is strong enough to handle the normal stresses of being on the water, such as waves and wind. It is also capable of carrying cargo or passengers safely.” It is about not only the use of the ship, but the conditions.
Amendment 17 proposes a reasonableness test for a vessel to be deemed unseaworthy. That could include things such as having safety equipment onboard, or having qualified crew—although we have perceptions about who the people smugglers are, it is reasonable to think that some of them could have a background on the sea, as fishermen or as people who have transported cargo, so their boats could potentially have safety equipment and a qualified crew onboard. Some of the things that could be used to deem a ship seaworthy include how many crew members there are on board, which—as we have discussed in this sitting—varies, as do the provisions on the boat, such as food, water and safety equipment, and the weather and sea conditions on the day of travel.
I would welcome clarification from the hon. Member on his particular definition of seaworthiness. I understand the narrative of trying to appear tough on this issue, my grave concern and opposition to the amendment comes from the fact that it would dilute the opportunity to be tough on those criminal gangs.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I will make a couple of points about the amendments to the clause, and the clause overall.
I have always been frustrated that people from both left and right make the same mistake on immigration policy—we forget that immigrants and asylum seekers are people. That means that, just like any group of people, they vary: some are entirely innocent and exploited, and some seek to exploit others and are criminals. We need to make the distinction between those groups.
Amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, makes some important points, and my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd East is right about the passion and compassion that drive the amendment. I absolutely recognise, support and understand that passion and compassion, but we must be clear-eyed about the reality of what is happening in the channel.
Yes, people are in great danger, and they are the most exploited, most vulnerable people, but they are not there by accident. They are not panicking because they have stumbled by accident into the boat. There is a large, extremely organised, extremely well-financed criminal enterprise putting them in that position and it does not care one bit whether they live or die. We need to be able to draw a distinction between the vulnerable people who are in that situation and the people who are putting them there.
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that we have to make that distinction between those who have organised, orchestrated and profited from such activities and those at the sharp end of it: the asylum seekers and immigrants themselves. We need to be laser-focused on the gangs, the people who put together and design this vile trade, not on the ordinary asylum seekers, whom these criminalisation clauses exclusively focus on.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but I am afraid I completely disagree with him on what this Bill is doing. Being an asylum seeker is a self-declaration. It is anticipatory. Someone just declares themselves as one; the system later ascertains whether that is correct and whether they are a refugee. He mentioned earlier that the refugee convention does not penalise people for the mechanism by which they enter; he is quite correct, but that is not a blanket immunity from any criminal act committed in the process.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. If, as I imagine, the wording of clause 18 will not be changed further, I just wanted to draw attention to the concerns that we will be criminalising those making the crossings and not those who organise the passage. I point to written evidence from the Law Society, which raised particular concerns that are important to consider:
“The Law Society is concerned that parents or guardians could be prosecuted for taking their children on these journeys. The human rights assessment produced by the Government for this Bill states that parents who bring their children on these types of journeys will be excluded from prosecution under this offence in almost all circumstances, but the phrasing”—
this is the most important point—
“does not rule out prosecution in all circumstances. There is a concern that this could result in families being split up.”
The Law Society asks that the Government should either
“clarify if this provision is intended to apply to asylum seekers in some circumstances, or amend it to ensure it does not in practice.”
I ask the Minister to address that point.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I want to reinforce the points made by my hon. Friends the Members for Dagenham and Rainham and for Clwyd East regarding amendment 17, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West. I firmly believe that the amendment actually serves to dilute the legislation.
The hon. Member does not consider the fact that many people are coerced into boats in the belief that they will be safe, because there will be lifejackets provided. However, many times those lifejackets do not meet EU or British standards, or children’s lifejackets are provided for every person on the boat—or, when people get on the boat, there are not enough lifejackets. The gangs who are using that to coerce people on to the boats should be prosecuted for that simple act.
It has been a while since the sitting began, and it is easy to overlook that I have not been up on my feet so far. We have had an interesting debate. The amendments before us range from, at one end, the Opposition, whose amendments seek to criminalise everyone who gets in a small boat and presumably cart them directly to prison, through to the other end of the argument, represented with his usual passion by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, who feels that, if someone is an asylum seeker, they should be exempt from being judged at all on the behaviour that happens on the boat.
I will deal with some of those points in turn, but I also want to compliment my colleagues who have made their own comments and some very important points in this debate. It is important, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said, that we are clear-eyed about what is happening in the channel. We can be romantic about it in many ways, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire often appear to be, or we can regard all those who come over as criminals and a threat, but the truth is somewhere in between.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East made a moving speech about the realities of what can happen in these circumstances; it is easy to forget, when we are sat in a nice warm Committee Room—although it is not always warm, facing as it does on to the river. Imagine ending up in the water in the channel, Mr Stuart; you can last only so long. You could easily have a heart attack in that cold water and not be resuscitated. Clearly, if you are a child, or vulnerable in any other way, then that is likely to happen—and it will happen to you first.
My hon. Friends the Members for Bassetlaw, for Clwyd East and for Dover and Deal made important points about the realities too. I will come on to what the Government are trying to do with this offence and why it is in the Bill, but I will deal with the amendments first. I hope I will be able to answer some of the questions that have been asked during this important debate—[Interruption.] I also hope that my voice is going to last out.
Amendment 15 focuses on the length of the sentence attached to clause 18 and seeks to increase the sentence from six to 14 years where an irregular entrant arrival has caused or created a risk of serious personal injury or death to others during a sea crossing to the UK. Clause 18 introduces a new criminal offence that is to be inserted into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. The current sentence for the offence of arriving in breach of a deportation order under section 24(A1) of the Immigration Act is five years.
Because clause 18 will be inserted into section 24 of the Act, the intention of the clause is to ensure that, given the egregious and serious natures of the acts committed under the new offence, the maximum sentencing is increased, albeit remaining in line with the existing sentencing framework in section 24 of the Act. The issues about the length of sentence are all about keeping sentencing in that section of the Immigration Act coherent. Grabbing extra, lengthier sentences out of the air to insert them into the Act can create inconsistency and mess up the structures of sentencing involved in the Act, making it less coherent than it should be. The sentence of five years was reached after discussions with partners about all the sentences and offences in this particular area, and it rightly reflects that coherence.
An increased sentence of six years is considered to be appropriate for the endangerment offence. It furthers the deterrence aim of the policy, but is not so severe as to deter prosecutors from bringing a prosecution in the first instance. That is another area in which the rhetoric of even longer sentences deters prosecutors from bringing charges at all. We have seen that with the facilitation offences, where the introduction of a life sentence has led to fewer prosecutions being pursued; prosecutors think that for a sentence of that length, more obvious evidence has to be accrued, so they charge fewer people. An increased sentence can sometimes have a perverse effect on the system. We think that the sentence in the Bill is in keeping with the Immigration Act and is about right.
I am pleased that the Minister talked about the length of the sentence, which we have not talked about very much in the debate so far. Fourteen years is the maximum sentence for placing explosives with intent to cause bodily injury, and for such other offences as causing death by dangerous driving. To me, 14 years is more applicable in those cases. Does she agree? I do not understand the rationale for 14 years.
Yes, and it is not for me to get into the head of the hon. Member for Stockton West. Perhaps he will talk to us about why he picked that particular number. I agree with the hon. Member for—is it Worthing? [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Woking—I knew it began with a W, and my own constituency begins with a W, so we are there or thereabouts in the dictionary.
Similarly, amendment 16 seeks to increase the sentence from five years to 14 years where an irregular migrant or arrival has caused or created a risk of serious personal injury or death to others during a sea crossing to the UK and is entering without the requisite leave to enter, entry clearance or electronic travel authorisation. As with the approach taken to those who arrive in breach of a deportation order, and as discussed in relation to amendment 15, clause 18 will provide an increased sentence compared with the offences under section 24(B1), (D1) and (E1) of the Immigration Act.
I am sorry to see that the Minister is still bravely struggling with a cold—the Committee has noticed. A variety of offences are available to the courts to make sure that anybody who endangers people at sea can be prosecuted. There is illegal arrival, there is facilitating the illegal entry of others, and there is what Ibrahima Bah was convicted of—gross negligence manslaughter. These offences are all currently available to the prosecutorial authorities. I do not know why the Minister feels she needs this new offence. It can only be because she has a particular target in mind against whom she wants to apply these rules. Can she confirm that?
I will try to give the hon. Gentleman some insight. I was going to come on to this when addressing the clause itself, but it is in the Bill because we have perceived a change in behaviour in some areas.
There has been an increase in physical aggression towards other people, including migrants and third parties. There is a lot more violence on the beaches against French police. There is intimidating and controlling behaviour on the boats. People are preventing others from disembarking or calling for help when the boat gets into difficulty. There are physical acts that result in harm being caused to another person either while boarding a boat or while on a boat. People are being pushed off boats, including in shallow French territorial waters. The pilots sometimes decide to continue on to the UK even when there have been fatalities or serious harm on the boat. We are now seeing a range of behaviours that clause 18 will allow us to address.
I will address amendment 5, but the view of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire is that no asylum seeker should be charged with this new criminal offence, which would render clause 18 unworkable and pointless, as 95% of people who come across on small boats claim asylum. How one behaved on the boat across will be in the purview of clause 18, whether it is dangling children over the side or forcing women and children to sit in the middle—often the middle of the boats come free and collapse, so the women and children are the first to die. Where women and children are forced to sit in the middle, they sometimes arrive in the UK with horrific burns because of the combination of fuel and seawater, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East said.
I simply do not agree with the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire that, just because someone will claim asylum when they get to the UK, none of their behaviour on the way over should have any bearing on what happens when they get here. Clause 18, which creates a new criminal offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act, will not criminalise everyone who makes these crossings. It would be pointless and completely unworkable if we sought to do that, as the Opposition amendments do. It is about addressing, discouraging and deterring the acts that cause or create a risk of serious injury or death to others, which we are now seeing from individuals travelling to the UK by small boats.
There have to be consequences for anyone who further jeopardises the safety and lives of others during these dangerous crossings. There are those who insist on continuing their journey when assistance is at hand, who refuse assistance, and often, when there have been fatalities, try to prevent others from being rescued. Clause 18 addresses specific acts that create or cause a risk of serious injury or death to others during a journey. We heard in oral evidence how these journeys are being made more dangerous by such acts, and clause 18 is a response to the increasing propensity of this kind of behaviour.
There have been shocking and tragic cases of women and children being forced and intimidated into life-threatening positions during journeys that are already dangerous enough, which is exactly the type of offending that clause 18 aims to target. The approach cannot simply be to say that whatever happens on the boat, stays on the boat. The new offence is another tool designed to curb the endangerment of life. It sits alongside other activity against gangs that intentionally place people in danger by selling these crossings as a viable route to the UK. This Government take fatalities and injuries at sea extremely seriously, and we are going further than ever to try to bring an end to them.
I thank the Minister for her full response to the amendments before the Committee. I totally agree with her on amendment 17, and I hope the Committee rejects it. It is a ridiculous and unworkable proposition that everybody who comes to our shores should be criminalised almost immediately upon arrival.
A couple of things have been said in this debate that I want to challenge and take head on, including the idea that everything is black and white, that people are either the exploited or the exploiters. Everybody accepts that there is a grey area. I think every member of this Committee believes that those who behave in a reprehensible, appalling and awful way, whether on the small boats or in getting people on to the small boats, should rightly face the full force of the law.
The Minister is right to highlight all those examples of the dangerous behaviour that happens during some of these journeys. None of us would want people to get away with that behaviour, but the Bill does not refer to such activity, and there is nothing in the guidance or the explanatory notes. Nothing in the Bill specifies this type of behaviour. As the Bill progresses, the Minister will have to make sure it mentions such behaviour.
The other challenge with the type of activity the Minister describes is how to get the evidence. This activity is happening in the most chaotic circumstances, on small boats coming across the channel. We know these things are reported, and we know that people are arrested and face the full force of the law, but the Minister still has to convince the Committee that a new offence is needed, and that certain categories of migrant will not be caught up.
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that, if his amendment 5 were accepted, someone could orchestrate a boat crossing the channel, throw a child off—which this measure is trying to prevent—and then, when they arrive on the shores of the UK, just say, “I am an asylum seeker”? That would be an obstacle to any prosecution.
The only way we could get over that obstacle—even if the person were French—would be for them to go through the entire asylum process. They would be placed in a hotel in one of our constituencies and, given the huge backlog we have, it would be almost two years before we are able to prosecute them.
It must be how I am presenting this but, again, I am not being understood. I am sorry that I have not explained the intention clearly enough, but I have no intention of that scenario happening. [Interruption.] Can I say to the hon. Gentleman—and to the Whip, the hon. Member for Inverclyde and Renfrewshire West, who is trying to intervene from a sedentary position—that existing offences are in place to deal with the activity being described. I have cited the example of Ibrahima Bah, who was done for gross negligence manslaughter. Where that happens, of course people should face the full force of the law. And that happens, because we have existing laws in place.
I listened very carefully to the Minister’s description of the new types of activity that she feels clause 18 is necessary to address, but those activities have to be specified and defined. If she moved new clauses to address such activity, I am sure she would get a fair hearing—she would get a fair hearing from me—but, because clause 18 is so broad, other behaviour and activity will inadvertently be drawn into these offences. People who are possibly acting in self-protection, or who are trying to save people but inadvertently put others at risk, will be caught by this clause.
We need to apply common sense to what the Minister is trying to do, and we need to make sure common sense is reflected in the Bill because, at this stage, it is not.
I just want to tease out what the hon. Gentleman has said. Does he accept that, if this amendment passed, gang members facilitating crossings on small boats would escape prosecution?
Absolutely not. Again, I must be having great difficulty getting through, and I accept that that is my responsibility, but that is not what is intended in the least. A variety of laws deal with the activity that the Minister mentioned. We know that because 244 people were charged in the course of 2023, and since the Labour Government came to power, something like 86 people have been charged with offences. People are being charged and prosecuted for serious offences.
The Minister has identified new dangerous activity, and she is right to do so, but if we want legislation to deal with it, bring that legislation before the House. Do not bring in this broad-sweep legislation, under which natural, normal activity that may be designed to help and protect people could be caught up. The difficulty with this legislation is that it inadvertently draws in people who do not deserve to be. I know it is about targeting the pilots in the boats, but there has to be some recognition of what forces and coerces people into piloting the boats. There needs to be an understanding of their situation and why they are doing that, but the clause fails to take account of any of that.
I take on board the hon. Gentleman’s point, and I can assure him that no one has higher respect than I do for the organisations that have supplied such evidence. I have been in conversations with them myself. The issue at hand here, however—I know this from having worked in the sector—is that they are not set up to stop the gangs or take through criminal prosecutions. That is not their objective. Their job is purely, and properly, to protect migrants. They will lean towards a broad definition, and that is why I think he has inadvertently fallen into a trap. In excluding everyone from the provisions, we avoid the traffickers, but it is not the job of those organisations to target them.
The hon. Gentleman is spot on. The job of those organisations is to be concerned for the welfare and conditions of people who come to our shores, and to ensure that they are supported on their journey through the asylum process. The organisations have identified that the Bill does little to target the gangs that the hon. Gentleman is referring to; in fact, they do little at all. They are all about ordinary asylum seekers. The new criminalisation clauses that we have debated over the past couple of days are all exclusively devoted to the activity of asylum seekers coming here, and none more so than this clause.
I hope that, as the Bill proceeds through its remaining stages—particularly when it goes through the other place, although that greatly concerns me for a number of reasons—we will be able to improve it, and get to a place where it reflects what the Minister said in her fine contribution.
I did not hear from the Minister a response on the Law Society’s concern about parents and guardians being criminalised, and I wonder whether I could hear some thoughts on that.
In general, it is not expected that parents will be criminalised, but there is not a total ban on that. It will depend on what has happened and what the circumstances were. That will be looked at on a case-by-case basis. It is difficult to be more explicit about that, given that the nature of the offence represents a stricter law that is meant to deter people from making small boat crossings. It is a signal to smugglers and passengers that fatalities and injuries at sea are taken extremely seriously, so there may well be consequences for particular unacceptable behaviour of the sort that I have talked about. I would not want there to be an absolute exclusion, but I would not expect a large cohort of people to fall within the purview of the new offences.
I thank Members for their considered contributions. Effective international partnerships can be useful, but I would not want to deny anyone the right to scrutinise a partner on Twitter, particularly one to whom we pay so much money. The previous Government were right to toughen up on sentences for the worst offences. They were right to restrict prisoner release during the pandemic. That put pressure on the prison system, and that that is why the previous Government were also right to undertake the biggest prison building programme since the Victorian era. I realise that the Labour party did not agree, but it was right that the previous Government used the Nationality and Borders Act to increase the penalty for people smugglers to a life sentence.
I was going to allow that statement to go by, because lunch is near and I am quite hungry, but I am hungrier still for the truth. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept the validity of independent assessments of our prison system—the system that this Labour Government inherited—as near to collapse? For him to claim otherwise is farcical, and I hope he will withdraw that.
I repeat exactly what I said: the previous Government were right to toughen up those sentences and make those who are guilty of some of the worst offences stay longer in prison. They were right not to release people during the pandemic, and therefore they were right to have the biggest prison-building programme since the Victorian era; that is a fact. It was also right that the previous Government used the Nationality and Borders Act to create life sentences for people smugglers. The vile criminals who profit from the peril of others deserve nothing less. That is why it is right to increase the sentence for this offence, as set out in amendments 15 and 16, to deter people from engaging in this awful, vile and inhumane trade. I will press amendments 17, 15 and 16 to a vote—
As I said in my opening remarks, that has to be a deterrent. This is a damp squib Bill. If people come to this country illegally—if they break in—there should be real consequences. If they put other people’s lives at risk, there should be real consequences. I think we have proposed the right sentence, and Committee Members can now have their say on it.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWill everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on declarations of interests as set out in the code of conduct.
Clause 19
Meaning of key expressions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the Chair, Mr Stuart, for what will be a marathon session. Clause 19 provides definitions for the key expressions used in relation to the electronic devices measure. These definitions mean that the measure will focus the powers only on irregular entrants who are in possession of an electronic device that authorised officers have reasonable groups to suspect contains information relating to facilitation offences under the Immigration Act 1971.
Furthermore, clause 19 defines “authorised officer” as:
“an immigration officer, or…a constable of a police force maintained by a local policing body”.
The aim of the powers is to gain access to information held on such devices on the organised crime groups who help facilitate or plan migrants’ dangerous journey and, as a result, to save lives from being lost. The clause is integral in defining the key expressions relating to how the powers can be used.
Clause 20 enables immigration officers within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and police constables in England and Wales only to search an irregular entrant if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are in possession of an electronic device that contains information linked to a facilitation offence. That power enables the search of a person, property, premises, vehicle or container. That is to ensure that, in any circumstances in which it is necessary to obtain a device, the authorised officer can use the powers to conduct a search. The clause contains safeguards to ensure the powers are used appropriately. Clause 20 provides clarity over how searches must be conducted in accordance with these powers.
Finally, clause 26 defines any additional expressions referenced throughout clauses 19 to 23. That will ensure that it is clear to users of the powers what key expressions mean. It is important to be transparent about what is meant and to ensure that the public and authorised officers fully understand these expressions.
We support clauses 19 to 26, but only in so far as they endorse powers that we think already exist to seize, extract and retain data from mobile devices. Clause 19 provides definitions of key terms in sections 20 and 21 relating to the provisions of those clauses to allow authorised officers to search for, seize and retain relevant articles. The definition of a “relevant article” is
“any thing which appears to an authorised officer to be a thing on which information that relates, or may relate, to the commission of an offence under section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971 is, or may be, stored in electronic form.”
Will the Minister provide some concrete examples of what the Government think such information might consist of?
Clause 20 gives relevant officers—either an immigration officer or a police constable—powers to search a relevant person, which is someone who has entered the UK without leave or in breach of a deportation order. Will the Minister explain why subsection (2) does not allow for any more than one search after the person in question has arrived in the UK? The clause gives officers the power to search for “relevant articles”, which are described in clause 19 as
“any thing which appears to an authorised officer to be a thing on which information that relates, or may relate, to the commission (whether in the past or future) of an offence under section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971”.
That is quite a narrow definition, as it covers just electronic devices. Will the Minister reassure the Committee that the necessary powers to search for non-electronic items exist elsewhere? In practice, we suspect the power will be used to gather information and evidence to identify smugglers for prosecution. We fully support that, but most mobile devices are destroyed during or prior to travelling across the channel. Will the Minister therefore explain whether she expects any of the evidence gathered using the powers in these clauses to be used to support decision making on immigration enforcement?
If the devices are seized, as the former director general of Border Force pointed out in his evidence, they may contain useful information about nationality, identity, age and travel history, and may provide valuable evidence when assessing asylum claims. Will the Minister explain how effective the new powers will be in supporting evidence gathering to remove those with no right to be here? Will information gathered using these powers be available to asylum screening teams? Will that evidence be used in decision making for immigration appeals? These clauses do not have extraterritorial reach, so can the Minister explain to what extent the Government envisage these additional powers will make a meaningful difference to smashing the gangs, when many of the perpetrators are located outside the UK?
These clauses create invasive new search, seizure and retention powers, along with the powers to access, copy and use information contained within an electronic device. The new powers can be applied to any person who arrives irregularly and has not yet been granted permission to enter or remain in the UK. They allow an immigration or police officer to fully search a person, including a search of that person’s mouth. I expect that the Minister will tell us exactly whether that particular qualification is required for these new powers.
This is not the plot and setting of some future dystopian film: it will be the UK sea border in the course of the next few months. These things will not be done to hardened criminals wandering the streets of the United Kingdom or those associated with violent crime. They are to be done to some of the most abandoned and traumatised people in the world. With these clauses we are starting, measuredly, to go into police state territory. They are essentially a hybrid form of stop-and-search powers, without the due qualifications and reassurances. I do not know if profiling will be a part of this—I will be interested in the Minister’s response—but it seems like only one profile will be included in all that, which is that of every asylum seeker. They may all be subject to these new powers.
For these powers to be exercised, there need only be reasonable grounds and suspicion that a relevant article appears to store some electronic information that relates or may relate to the future or past commission of a facilitation offence. That seems excessively broad. Practically any person who arrives irregularly to the UK may be subject to these powers. Any information received from these searches would be used for preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting facilitation offences. The property can be retained for as long as considered necessary to assess, examine or copy information for use in proceedings for an offence, before being returned or disposed of.
I trying to think why the Government want these clauses. I know they are going to tell us it is all about helping to disrupt organised crime and making sure they can find particular and specific information on electronic devices, but I think a lot of it has to do with the 2022 High Court ruling decreeing that the Home Office’s secret policy of blanket searching, seizing and returning mobile phones from individuals arriving by small boats was unlawful.
Just like the Tories before them, if any particular law that defends and protects people is seen or deemed to be a little bit unnecessary, the Government will just bring in a new one to override it completely, forgetting anything to do with the consequences and implications for people. These new offences clearly compromise a person’s right to a private and family life. Given the confidential, legally privileged, sensitive, private and personal nature of the messages, photographs, information, correspondence and data that may be on such mobile devices, we hold that that could only ever be the case. To be fair, the Government respect that and acknowledge it as fact, and the European convention on human rights memorandum suggests that the new powers could be distinguished and that phones will not be seized on a blanket basis when these powers come into force—well, thank goodness for that.
The memorandum says:
“The Home Office will issue non-statutory guidance about the use of the powers and training which will be required for authorised officers exercising those powers.”
We will have to see that happen pretty quickly, because we have no idea how any of these powers will be exercised. Again, I am entirely happy to take the Minister at her word on how the new law will be exercised as we go forward. However, there is no such guidance for parliamentary scrutiny during the passage of the Bill, so it remains entirely unclear how the Home Office proposes to use these wide and invasive new powers.
I am distinctly uncomfortable with the new powers, and I am disconcerted about how they may be applied and used. A number of agencies have serious misgivings about the type of individuals who will be subject to these new powers. The Minister has to explain just a little more how these powers will be used and what protections will be put in place, particularly for some of the most traumatised people whom we will be ever deal with in this country.
I very much welcome this element of the Bill on electronic devices. While clause 22 will give officers powers to seize digital devices that are believed to be used for the purpose of people smuggling, clause 23 gives suitably trained and accredited criminal investigators the powers to access the information on mobile devices, phones and laptops that will build the evidence base, history, connections and understanding of the routes of the criminal gangs.
Seizing and extracting data from mobile devices is a powerful tool already used by our security services. There are already established Home Office guidelines on this, and these clauses extend those powers and will help enable intelligence-led profiling of irregular arrivals. That key change will lead to greater opportunities to disrupt the trade of these awful gangs.
I want to make just a couple of points on the seizure of phones. We have to be incredibly realistic about the threat that the country faces and how these things are organised. We have seen people-smuggling networks and trafficking networks developing in complexity and scale. It does not start in France; it goes all the way through European countries—our allies—and then through countries that are very difficult for us to engage with, including some countries that are at war and some that are hostile states.
The evidence from the National Crime Agency is very clear that the networks are organised by phone, and that that is the primary means by which these criminals orchestrate them. We know that they are evolving, so it is really important that we give officials the power to seize those phones not only to understand where these smuggling networks are coming from, which is the only way to intercede and save people in unsafe vessels, but to disrupt those networks later.
We heard a whole set of arguments earlier about the insufficiency of deterrents in stopping sea crossings. Professor Walsh from the Migration Observatory was really clear that the demand is inelastic. No matter how many deterrents we introduce, there will still be some demand rising to meet them. That is why disruption is so important, which we can only happen if we have the ability to seize those phones. There is a really important distinction between targeting the demand and targeting the supply of the ability to cross the channel.
On the point about whether the powers are applied on a blanket basis, they are not. The Home Office is clear that there will be statutory guidance. The people who seize these phones will be subject to the same rules that are already in place on the handling of material seized from any individual, and they need those powers. The point about family life and private life is absolutely fair, and it applies whenever someone’s phone is stolen, which is a wider debate that we have in society. The truth is, there is no capacity to only seize part of someone’s phone. We cannot seize only some data and not detect, for example, private text messages or family photographs. It is proper that the Home Office officials who seize such data are subject to the rules that we have in this country about protecting the data and returning it when it is decided that it is not required, but we cannot separate out different types of data, and we would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater if we did not allow the powers to seize it.
The proposed powers will enable immigration officers and the police to search for, seize, retain and extract information from electronic devices, but only based on two criteria. The first is reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has a relevant electronic device and that it contains information that relates, or may relate, to the commission, whether in the past or future, of an offence under sections 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971—the facilitation offence.
The second criterion is that the person must be an irregular arrival or entrant. Currently, the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which is on the statute book until we get this Bill made into an Act, allows for blanket seizure, and searching for all purposes, of all phones. We are repealing that very wide power and replacing it with this one, which is much more targeted than the IMA one.
The hon. Member for Stockton West hinted that we should use this clause to widen the powers, or allow all the information on the phone to be used for all purposes. That is not what we are suggesting. In fact, part of the reason why the Illegal Migration Act powers of seizure was never operationalised is that building the sheer capacity to take everyone’s phones off them and download the contents and analyse what was on all of them defeated the powers that be, and the technical ability to do so has not yet been developed.
It seems to us, from talking to organisations in the police, and the National Crime Agency, who follow these things very closely, that the best and most targeted way to get at some of this information is to have these criteria. There must be reasonable grounds to suspect, and that is not a blanket thing. These are intelligence-led powers, which will lead us potentially to certain individuals, so that we can take a device off them and analyse what is on it.
Experience suggests that what is on such devices can be very revealing. I will not list things here, because I do not want to produce a list of things that people should not leave on their phones that is essentially public, but we all use our telephones and other devices in ways that we all know about, and we probably would be very sobered if we realised how much Apple knows about us, for example, just by looking at its own records. A lot can be gleaned, but there must be reasonable suspicion that the individuals whose devices are taken are involved in facilitation—not just coming over, under section 24, but under section 25, which is facilitation, the more serious offence.
The hon. Member for Stockton West said he thought those powers already existed. In the Illegal Migration Act, yes, but they are completely uncommenced and not put into effect, and are far too blanket to be useful. There is a current power to seize, but that power does not enable immigration officials or police constables to search and seize devices in many circumstances at all. First, a person must be under arrest before that can be done, and we think that, as part of our intelligence-led, counter-terrorism-style powers to defeat organised immigration crime, being able to search a bit ahead, and certainly ahead of an arrest, is a useful power, so that is what these clauses provide for.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked whether information found on phones could be used for asylum casework. No, we do not think that is appropriate. This focused power allows us to search for information and evidence about organised immigration criminality, not about any other aspect of the person’s existence. There are clauses that we will come to later, however, that would enable us to operationalise the information we have, particularly if other crimes come to light as a result of a search.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Powers to seize and retain relevant articles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21 provides immigration officers in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and police constables in England and Wales, with the power to seize and retain electronic devices. Clause 21 provides a clear and detailed approach for authorised officers to ensure that the powers are correctly, efficiently and effectively used.
Clause 21 gives authorised officers the power to seize any electronic device that has been found in a search under clause 20, or is not found on a search but appears to the officer to be, or to have been, in the possession of a relevant person. How would officers determine whether an article appears to be or to have been in the possession of a relevant person? What is the evidence threshold for that?
My question for the Minister about clause 21 is similar to my one about clause 20. Will the powers be used to gather evidence that can be used in immigration decision making and appeals? The Opposition support the powers in this clause, in so far as they go.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman supports the powers, but I emphasise to him again that clause 21 is very much in the context of the clauses that we have just agreed. It is a more limited—not a blanket—power. It exists within the parameters that I set out in the previous debate.
I emphasise again that none of the information seized in this context could be used in an asylum case; it is for the purposes of dealing with organised immigration crime. It is not for wider purposes, unless other criminality is found, in which case it becomes available and can be passed on. That will be dealt with in some clauses that are coming up. But these provisions are limited to collecting evidence and intelligence on organised immigration crime from people who have just entered the country illegally.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Duty to pass on items seized under section 21
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22 will provide immigration officers using the powers with the duty to pass on electronic devices to other agencies, such as the police. The clause will be used if an electronic device seized contains information about a non-immigration offence—this is the case that I was hinting at earlier. Clause 22 provides the process to be used in these types of cases. We cannot seize an electronic device without that process in place, because we may discover information relating to a criminal offence, such as a counter-terrorism offence or an offence related to indecent and/or obscene material of a child—those kinds of offence. If we discover evidence of such activities on a phone, we must act, and to act we have to have the processes in place to enable items to be forwarded to police or any other agency that needs to take possession of the device for its investigation into the other criminality.
The clause provides for a robust step-by-step process to ensure that immigration officers know what actions to take to forward the device or if the agency to which we wish to forward the device refuses to accept it for an investigation.
Clause 22 gives authorised officers the duty to pass on seized items that have been found in a search under clause 21 where there is a reasonable belief that the article or information stored on it has been obtained in consequence of, or is evidence in relation to, an offence other than the relevant immigration offence. The immigration officer is under a duty to notify someone who has the functions to investigate the relevant offence. What might be the reasons why a person notified under the clause might not accept the article, and what would be an acceptable reason? If a relevant person refuses to accept the article, what are the next steps? We support the powers in the clause so far as they go.
It is a bit difficult to talk about specific circumstances in a generalised way. As the hon. Gentleman will perceive, there may be some material on a phone that police or immigration officers are worried breaks the criminal law—I talked about counter-terrorism and child sexual exploitation as potential examples. That information may be passed on and the relevant authorities might decide that it was not at a criminal level—that would be the kind of occasion that the hon. Gentleman was asking me about.
However, one would assume that, with the appropriate training, it would be fairly obvious whether something would be a worry for the purposes of counter-terrorism or child sexual abuse, and police forces could understand whether they have an obligation to try to prevent criminal activity of a category other than that for which the phone was originally seized. Once we begin to seize phones for narrow purposes, we have to make certain that passing on that information is lawful, and that is the purpose of the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Powers to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 22—Access to mobile phone location data—
“(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 86 (Part 3: interpretation), after subsection (2A)(b), insert—
‘(c) illegal immigration.’
(3) The Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows.
(4) In paragraph 4 of Schedule 10, (electronic monitoring condition), after subsection (2)(d) insert—
‘(e) involve the tracking of P using P’s mobile phone location data.’”
This new clause would allow law enforcement to access mobile phone location data of people who enter the UK illegally.
I will wait until the hon. Member for Stockton West has spoken to his new clause before I respond to anything he says about it; I will briefly outline what clause 23 does and if the hon. Gentleman wants a reply, I will come back at the end.
Clause 23 will ensure that authorised officers can assess, examine, copy and use information stored on a relevant article. It will enable authorised officers to copy the information from electronic devices so that the device can be returned to the owner as soon as possible. The clause is vital to enable authorised officers to obtain the information needed in relation to facilitation offences under sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971, to use for purposes relating to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of such an offence. It is very much targeted at organised immigration crime and the facilitation of illegal entry to this country.
Clause 23 will help the Government to tackle organised crime groups, protect migrants from exploitation and prevent lives from being lost on dangerous journeys across the channel. Obtaining that information will further focus our approach to tackling organised crime groups, identifying as early as possible the trends in the activities of gangs, including their modus operandi, and providing the Government with improved information to prevent future fatalities.
Clause 23 gives authorised officers the power to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles that have been retained under powers detailed in clause 21, and authorises the use of any information retained under this clause relating to the prevention, detection and investigation, or prosecution of such an offence. We support the powers in the clause. However, it is important to bolster the utility of the powers in clauses 20, 21 and 23. It is for that reason that we have tabled new clause 22, picking up on the suggestion made by the former director general of Border Force in his written evidence to the Committee.
We have tabled the new clause because currently Border Force and immigration enforcement officers are not able to use mobile devices to track illegal migrants on bail. Although powers exist for electronic tagging, there are difficulties with using these powers and so they are not frequently used. At present, mobile devices can be used only for tracking people for serious offences. Under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, an illegal entry into the UK does not count as a serious offence for these purposes.
Mobile devices are often used by migrants on bail to report by phone rather than in person, which minimises their risk of arrest and detention on reporting. Without access to location data about illegal migrants, they are able to stay at addresses not listed on their bail forms. If immigration officers were able to make use of location data from mobile devices, they would be better able to secure compliance with bail conditions and thus reduce the risk of absconding.
New clause 22 would allow law enforcement to access the mobile phone location data of people who enter the UK illegally. It would do so by adding illegal immigration to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 as a serious offence that allows location data to be used. We would also amend the Immigration Act 2016 to allow a person’s mobile phone location data to be used as part of electronic monitoring for immigration enforcement.
Of course, migrants can change phones, but they are more likely to make use of them than electronic tags. In our view, the new clause would add a useful new power to immigration enforcement teams. I am very keen to hear the Minister’s view.
New clause 22 proposes an amendment to section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. However, I do not think that this proposal is either necessary or appropriate.
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides law enforcement and other relevant public authorities with the ability to acquire communications data covertly, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. Members of the Committee should particularly focus on the seriousness of the powers conferred in the 2016 Act, including the ability to covertly acquire communications data where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.
With new clause 22, the question arises as to whether it is appropriate to add immigration issues to that area of the law, and whether, with an immigration issue, it would be necessary and proportionate to start acquiring covertly communications in an immigration setting. It is important to consider whether that would unbalance the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and cause some issues that would probably weaken it.
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is intentionally neutral on the specific types of crime for which the powers within it can be deployed. Instead, it sets a threshold for serious crime, to enable access to more intrusive powers. The threshold for the acquisition of communications data—the who, when, how and where of communication, but not the content—is set out in section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act. Events data, which includes details of where and when a specific communication took place, is available only for crimes that meet the serious crime threshold. The threshold at section 86(2A)(a) of that Act is a crime for which a sentence of at least 12 months’ imprisonment can be handed down.
The proposed new clause does not define illegal immigration, but many of the immigration offences in section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, as recently amended by the Nationality and Borders Act, will already meet the serious crime threshold. There is no real reason to put immigration crime in there; it is already implicitly included. If we start to add particular instances, that will unbalance the way that the Investigatory Powers Act works. That is a technical point, but it is about keeping our statute book coherent, rather than adding things in for effect. Essentially, since offences under section 24 of the 1971 Act are indictable, the serious crime threshold would already be met, so events data can already be acquired as part of the investigation. We do not need to go through the rigmarole in the new clause to emphasise what is already possible.
Where offences do not meet the serious crime threshold, it would not be proportionate to extend the use of events data to those crimes. The right to private and family life is set out in article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and it is important to uphold our obligations to the European convention on human rights. I know that is not always the most popular thing among Opposition Members, but as someone who voted for it in 1998, I am still quite proud of it. Defending our human rights and ensuring that such things are proper, proportionate and lawful is an important part of trying to pursue and deal with difficult cases with certain standards of behaviour.
Although article 8 is a qualified right, we must ensure that interference remains necessary and proportionate to the level of criminality. By introducing specific crime types that do not meet the sentencing threshold, we risk eroding the safeguards in the regime. By taking away the rights of people who may seem marginalised at the moment, I submit that we are putting at risk our own rights, and human rights in general. That is not something that I would want the Government to do.
New clause 22 would also unnecessarily amend schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016. Where a person is subject to electronic monitoring as a condition of their immigration bail, the Home Office can access their location details via the GPS tag or non-fitted device. There is no need to access mobile phone location data, because there are already powers to monitor the whereabouts of individuals at risk of absconding. I hope that, having had that debate, the hon. Member for Stockton West will realise that those things are already covered in the way that we currently do things. I hope that he will not press the new clause to a vote, but obviously we will not know until we get on to voting on it—some time in the future.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Amendment of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 24 and 25 deal with amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, extending those powers to other authorised officers and to key definitions in the clauses. Clause 24 includes amendments to the 2001 Act to extend powers of seizure where a device may contain legally privileged material, excluded material and special material. The 2001 Act also contains essential safeguards for the handling of such material. Extending its powers will ensure that the seizure of any device will not be prevented by claiming that it holds legally privileged, excluded or special material, which is often an excuse that is raised when such matters come up.
Furthermore, clause 24 will ensure that this data is protected, but that operationally, the information needed can still be taken for the purpose of these powers, and that seized electronic devices are returned as soon as reasonably possible.
Clause 25 provides the Secretary of State with the ability to extend the powers to other authorised officers, via secondary legislation, if they are required to support the disruption of organised immigration crime. The Government will ensure that any decisions on extending the powers to other authorised officers will be fully considered before action is taken.
Clause 24 amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 so that provisions relating to the protection of legally privileged material and excluded and special material apply when mobile devices are seized under clauses 20 to 23. Can the Minister explain how often the Government envisage that those provisions would need to be invoked?
Clause 25 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to extend the powers given to authorised officers in clauses 20 to 23, to be available to other people, including people designated by the Secretary of State. Why might these powers need to be extended to different categories of people? Who does the Minister have in mind? Why are those not included on the face of the Bill? Why was it judged appropriate that these powers are subject to the negative procedure?
Clause 26 defines key terms used in the preceding clauses, and we have no problem with those definitions.
Clauses 19 to 23 contain very wide powers. Often, police constables have those powers only when they are authorised and monitored by their superiors, but the powers in the Bill almost allow civil servants and immigration officers to use them without oversight. Clause 25, first, allows Ministers to extend those powers to privately employed staff, and secondly, does so without requiring Ministers to give directions for the exercise of those powers. That sits very poorly with me. I am quite concerned about that. I can understand why we need some broad powers, and I was happy to let the others go through on the nod, but clause 25 seems to go further still. Could the Minister try to reassure me—or us? Particularly, would the Government agree to issue directions for the use of those powers, either today or before MPs vote fully, on Report? I think some colleagues out there will say that the private sector should not have these powers, but if they are clearly identified and statutory guidance is issued, I would feel a lot more reassured.
The first thing to say is that the powers under the Criminal Justice and Police Act are already used by law enforcement and apply in many statutes. Therefore, all of these powers will be used to ensure compatibility with ECHR protections, GDPR protections and data protection generally. We have a very high level of expectation when it comes to data protection in these instances.
Both hon. Gentlemen—the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Woking—have asked about the extension to further authorised people, which is potentially available as part of the clause. It is not unusual—the hon. Member for Woking has made this point—for the Government to hire and use contractors, on either a short-term or a long-term basis, depending on demand or business needs. One example that comes to mind in this context would be for a forensic data specialist to do analytics of the information that had been downloaded. [Interruption.] I am very sorry if that is me. Hopefully it is not.
Some of this is about ensuring flexibility in the statute, within the protections that I have just talked about—the GDPR, data protection legislation and ECHR requirements —to be able to deal with the information in all circumstances without having to come back to primary legislation. Clearly, those people would be working under the same data protection expectations and requirements as any directly employed person working for the Home Office.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 28 and 29 stand part.
New clause 23—Exemptions from the UK GDPR: illegal migration and foreign criminals—
(1) The Data Protection Act 2018 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2)(b) of section 15 (Exemptions etc), at end insert “, and makes provision about the exemption from all GDPR provisions of persons who entered the United Kingdom illegally and foreign criminals;”
(3) In paragraph (2) of Schedule 2, after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
“(1A) GDPR provisions do not apply if the data subject entered the United Kingdom illegally or is a foreign criminal.
(1B) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1A)—
(a) a person “entered the United Kingdom illegally” if they entered the United Kingdom—
(i) without leave to enter, or
(ii) with leave to enter that was obtained by means which included deception by any person; and
(b) “foreign criminal” is defined in accordance with section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007.”
This new clause would disapply data protection laws from data on people who have entered the UK illegally or are Foreign National Offenders.
Again, I will reserve my comments on the new clause until after I have heard what Members on the Opposition Front Bench have to say about it.
The group entails clauses 27 to 29, which cover the arrangements for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions. The group also covers new clause 23, which I will try and separate out so that I can try to answer the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, once he has put them.
Government Departments like the Home Office and law enforcement partners rely on information sharing for a range of purposes, including law enforcement and border security-related purposes. Key datasets are held by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, many of which are held in connection with HMRC’s customs functions. Existing statutory provisions to share this information are complex, fragmented and restrictive in ways that prevent the Government from taking full advantage of technology such as modern big data analytic tools.
Clause 27 will create a new power for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions to a range of recipients, including UK Ministers, Government Departments, police, and certain international partners. HMRC will be able to supply information for use for the purposes of any of the functions of the recipient.
The sharing of entire datasets and the use of customs information for more than just customs purposes will enable the Home Office and other partners to analyse the information to identify suspicious activity that would not be apparent if each dataset were considered in isolation. This will support key Government objectives, such as disrupting and dismantling organised crime groups, preventing the unlawful movement of people and goods into the country, prosecuting offenders and protecting vulnerable people, as well as the Government’s safer streets mission.
Clause 28 regulates how the information supplied under clause 27 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded while also enabling Government Departments to use information received for any of their functions. That will ensure that maximum benefit can be derived from the information received.
Information shared under clause 27 is subject to a general rule: the person who receives it must only use it for the purposes for which it was supplied. They may not further disclose it to anyone without HMRC’s consent. However, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule that will enable certain recipients to use and disclose information more flexibly. UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police will be able to reuse customs information for any of their functions and further share it between themselves for specified border security and law enforcement-related purposes. Additionally, there will be extra onward disclosure permissions for the Home Secretary so that she may disclose the information to any person for use for certain immigration and customs-related purposes.
Clause 29 regulates how the information supplied onwards in accordance with clause 28 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded. The clause focuses on making clear the restrictions surrounding the reuse and onward disclosure of information supplied under clause 28. Any person supplying information in reliance on clause 28 or 29 must notify the recipients of these restrictions, as they apply to the reuse and onward disclosure of the information. In recognition of the particular importance of protecting HMRC information, which can include a great deal of personal information, clause 29 extends the existing criminal offence of wrongful disclosure under section 19 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 to apply to any person who discloses information in contravention of these restrictions.
The intent of clause 29 is a continuation of the safeguards laid out in clause 28, while ensuring that none of the restrictions go against the spirit of the overall information-sharing provision. Clause 29 protects information from being shared beyond the provision’s intent. I will not deal with new clause 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West until he has spoken to it.
We welcome the powers in these clauses to share HMRC data. Border Force is responsible for clearing both people and goods at the UK border. There is international precedent for moving towards joint targeting centres for people and goods. From a law enforcement perspective and from ours, the more customs information that can be shared with UK and other Government agencies, the better. HMRC has a range of customs functions, including the collection and management of customs duty, monitoring and controlling the movement of goods, and control of cash entering or leaving the UK. HMRC is bound by a statutory framework of confidentiality and needs a lawful basis to disclose information.
Clause 27 will allow HMRC to share customs information in support of defending the security of the UK borders. The clause allows UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police to reuse customs information for any of their functions, as the Minister laid out. The clause also allows data to be shared with international organisations that have functions relating to the movement of goods or cash across international borders, or if an international arrangement makes provision for co-operation between that organisation and HRMC. We welcome the powers in clause 27. I would like to ask the Minister how often she expects these data-sharing powers to be used for law enforcement and her assessment of what practical effects the powers will have on making it easier to disrupt organised crime networks.
Clause 28, which we support, specifies the circumstances in which UK Government Departments, Ministers and the police can further share customs data. We also support clause 29 on the safeguards included in this clause. We have tabled new clause 23 to disapply data protection laws from data on those who have entered the UK illegally or are foreign national offenders. The purpose of the new clause is exactly the same as the purpose of clauses 27 to 29, which is to minimise barriers to data sharing between agencies for immigration and law enforcement purposes. We table it in the spirit of the support I have already mentioned for the Government’s aims regarding data access.
If someone has entered the UK illegally or is a foreign national offender, law enforcement for their removal is vital and GDPR legislation should not stand in the way of being able to gather and establish any necessary evidence for use in immigration appeals or law enforcement. We wish to remove the barriers to data sharing in these cases, and we know the Government want that too. We hope that they will find the suggested new clause useful.
I thank the hon. Lady for speaking to new clause 23. As she said, it seeks to disapply the protections afforded by the UK GDPR regulations to people who have entered illegally or who are foreign criminals. I think that would massively complicate data protection legislation, given that we would always have to keep an eye on who is a foreign national criminal or an immigration offender, over time as well as in the moment. That could make it harder to apply some of the data-sharing rules.
We believe that with the protections in clauses 27 to 29, we can get and share the information that we need to share, to its greatest effect, while protecting people from unlawful disclosure, without complicating things further by trying to check whether somebody is a foreign national offender or has entered the country illegally.
We have a strong history of maintaining high data protection standards. The legislation permits the use of personal data for legitimate purposes, such as immigration control, while giving the public the reassurance that such use will be subject to proportionate safeguards. Our approach will be to rely on the proportionate safeguards, rather than to disapply the entirety of data protection laws to certain groups of people who happen to be in our society at the moment. The proportionality test, with the focus on organised immigration crime, is important.
Does the Minister agree that the lesson learned from the previous Government, with the blanket application of some seizure powers under the Illegal Migration Act being so complicated that they were not actually enforced properly—as we learned from one of our witnesses—is a cautionary tale illustrating why new clause 23 should be rejected?
It is certainly a good idea to create legislation that can actually be commenced. Otherwise, we are just all having a fun time in Committee— I can see everyone agreeing with me—and not affecting the statute book, making it easier to do what must be done or enabling the law to help with that rather than having a gigantic problem. As a Minister, I am certainly in favour of enacting laws that we can commence, and I hope that we will be able to commence large parts of the Bill as soon as it has made its proper progress through both Houses.
The UK has a long history of maintaining high data protection standards. Complicating them by trying to disapply them for certain individuals who are in our society whether we want them to be or not implies that we would have to keep very up-to-date, regular records of every single person in the country to check their status. That sounds like ongoing identity checks across the whole population, and that is easier said than done. It is not Government policy, and I did not think it was Opposition policy either. Although the new clause is well meaning, it is a complication rather than an assistance.
Where the exercise of data subject rights, such as the right to seek access to personal data, could undermine the tasks, appropriate exemptions can be applied on a case-by-case basis. Disapplying data protection rules in a blanket fashion for certain groups is unnecessary and could disadvantage some of the most vulnerable people in society, such as victims of trafficking. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Weald of Kent will not press new clause 23, with the reassurance that we think that these clauses give us the power to use big data and big data analytics in a way that is in keeping with data protection laws, the GDPR and the ECHR.
I take the Minister’s points about practicality, but in situations where new clause 23 created additional complexity, the Home Office would retain the option to adhere to the GDPR if it wished to; it would just not be forced to do so. We really think that the provision would be a useful addition and we hope the Government will consider it further. However, we do not intend to press it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 28 and 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Supply of trailer registration information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 30 and 31 concern the sharing of trailer registration information. Clause 30 creates a clear discretionary power for the Transport Secretary and, in practice, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency to share some or all of the trailer registration information they hold with the Home Office, for specified purposes related to border security and law enforcement; the National Crime Agency and HMRC, for use in connection with their statutory functions; policing bodies, for purposes of policing law enforcement and safeguarding national security; and specified persons in the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar for purposes equivalent to their UK counterparts.
The measure is designed in recognition of the limited timeframes that law enforcement bodies have to review information and take decisions when risk-assessing thousands of lorry movements into the UK each day to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute crime, and to conduct checks at the roadside. Border Force intends to use this information, alongside customs information and other information it holds, to develop a richer picture of vehicle movements and enable timely interventions. For the police, the National Crime Agency, HMRC and recipients in the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar, the value of the information will be realised via the law enforcement data service, which will provide it on demand at the point of need.
I am sure that if we cast our minds back to 2019, we will all remember the awful case where 39 Vietnamese migrants died in the back of a trailer in Essex. Reading reports of what people found when they opened the lorry, and hearing about people dying in excruciatingly painful ways, makes us all realise that everything we are doing is about trying to stop harm to vulnerable people and save lives. Does my hon. Friend agree that this group of clauses will make it easier for data held by DVLA on UK-registered trailers to be shared with our law enforcement and police, and that as a consequence we might be able to avoid more misery and loss of life in such excruciating circumstances?
I certainly agree with my hon. Friend. That is at the higher end of the harms that one would hope could be prevented by more timely access to this kind of information. These clauses will ensure that those charged with securing the border and beyond can use the information in line with the range of threat types enabled by cross-border lorry movements such as the one my hon. Friend just mentioned, to ensure that the law enforcement community engaged in tackling organised immigration crime, and wider serious and organised crime, are able to tackle it at pace.
Clause 31 complements clause 30 by setting out how information received by the Home Office and the police may be disclosed onwards, with whom and for what purposes. Robust inter-agency and international co-operation is crucial to smashing the criminal gangs. Border Force routinely works with the National Crime Agency and the police for the purposes of criminal investigations connected with the smuggling of people and illicit goods, and with HMRC for customs purposes.
The police, in turn, need to be able to alert law enforcement partners to identify specific trailers of interest. Border Force and the police also need to be able to alert European law enforcement partners to intercept trailers where there might be a threat to life and in support of cross-border co-operation against illicit goods. This clause, subject to safeguards contained in clause 32, enables just such an outcome to be achieved.
Clause 30 provides a power for the Secretary of State for Transport to supply trailer registration information to the Secretary of State for the Home Department for immigration purposes, law enforcement purposes, human welfare purposes, purposes connected with functions under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, protecting national security, and responding to an emergency. The information can also be shared with the National Crime Agency and HMRC.
We support the powers in the clause. As with the previous group of clauses, this is about being able to bring together the information held by different arms of the state to defend the border, and we wholeheartedly agree with that. I must confess that this is going to be a fairly friendly section of the afternoon, for which I can only apologise to all involved.
Clause 31 provides powers for the onward sharing of information in clause 30. It is important that that information can be shared with those exercising public functions, including those outside the United Kingdom. We also support the new powers in the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Sections 27 to 31: general provision about disclosure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This group includes clauses 32 and 33, which provide for safeguards with respect to the customers and trailer registration information-sharing provisions, which we have just agreed will stand part of the Bill, as well as providing clarity about the meanings of terms within those clauses.
Clause 32 makes general provision about the disclosure of information with respect to clauses 27 to 31. That is information held by HMRC in connection with its customs functions, as set out in clauses 27 to 29, and the DVLA’s trailer registration information in clauses 30 to 31. The clause does two things. First, it clarifies that clauses 27 to 31 do not limit how information may be disclosed outside of the scope of this legislation. It does not tie the hands of a named party to disclosing information subject only to the regime established here if another information gateway exists. Secondly, it clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would contravene UK data protection or investigatory powers legislation. In deciding on that, the clauses are to be taken into account. Clause 32 neither treads upon other legal regimes to disclose information outside of the scope of this legislation nor permits anything that would fall foul of existing statutory safeguards—a perfect, balanced approach.
Clause 33 makes provision for the interpretation of clauses 27 to 31—the terms used, their scope and limits. First, it defines the meanings of certain terms through direct definition and in reference to other legislation. Secondly, it seeks to capture all UK police forces and bodies that might be the end users of the information, referring to a “UK authorised person” and a “UK authorising officer” for the purposes of clause 30, and defining what it means in this clause.
The use of the terms “UK authorising officer” and
“the person under whose direction and control the constable…is”
avoids reliance on references to chief constable, commissioner and chief officer, because those terms have prescribed legal meanings that exclude the commanders of the very important ports police and the even more important Mersey Tunnels police, which rely on other ranks to command. That ensures that the definitions apply to everybody, whatever the force. The ports forces and the Mersey Tunnels police are an extremely important part of defending the border, for obvious reasons.
For “UK authorised person”, the term constable, which includes special constable, is used. The clause also refers to
“other person who is under the direction and control of a person who has the direction and control of a body of constables”.
Such is the poetry of legislative diction, but lawyers know exactly what that means. Instead of police civilian staff, or similar terms with prescribed meanings, we have that rather long and convoluted explanation, which includes everybody. That is because not all forces employ police staff subject to employment contracts. Some also use police volunteers. The MOD police uses civil servants in such roles, while the Police Service of Northern Ireland has powers to use civil servants separately from employed police staff. Use of “other person” accommodates all these cases, so it is all-encompassing, and I hope we have not missed anybody out.
Thirdly—this applies only to the trailer data—we have worked with the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar to identify persons undertaking statutory functions equivalent to their UK border security and law enforcement counterparts. We have defined them as a non-UK authorised person and specified them in a table along with the authorising officers.
Finally, the clause establishes a regulation-making power for the Secretary of State to define the meaning of specified purposes related to policing to ensure that the data requirements are met today and can be updated from time to time as operational requirements evolve. Such an extension would be subject to consultation with policing bodies across the UK, Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and it would require the affirmative resolution of both Houses. With those reassurances, I hope members of the Committee will be happy to support clauses 32 and 33.
Clause 32 makes general provision about the powers of disclosure in clauses 30 and 31. Subsection (2), as the Minister laid out, clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would otherwise contravene data protection or investigatory powers legislation. How much difficulty does the Minister envisage these provisions causing for the sharing of information? I seek reassurance—she has offered some already—that the safeguard will not frustrate legitimate data-sharing activities. Clause 33 defines key terms included in clauses 27 to 31, and we have no problems with it.
I reassure the hon. Lady that we do not envisage the definitions causing any practical problems with data sharing and the powers defined in clauses 27 to 31.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Provision of biometric information by evacuees etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34 is critical to the Government’s ability to manage crises and support evacuations effectively. Where the UK Government are considering or have facilitated an individual’s departure from a country in crisis, it is essential to lock in identity and conduct necessary biometric checks at the earliest opportunity, for obvious reasons. Clause 34 ensures that there is a clear legal framework for collecting biometric information outside the UK in these exceptional circumstances. The clause includes important safeguards, particularly for children, to ensure that biometric data is collected responsibly. The provision reflects the UK’s commitment to maintaining both security and efficiency in high-risk international evacuation situations.
Clause 34 provides a power for an authorised person to take biometric information when the Government are in the process of facilitating their exit from a state or territory. The purpose of the power is to ensure that only those who qualify under particular evacuation schemes are able to come to the UK. The power to take biometric information should help to verify identity and conduct screening checks, as individuals in these circumstances are often undocumented. We fully support the provision.
We would be interested to hear more about whether the Government intend to take further action on biometrics, which could be brought about through the Bill. Countries such as Dubai and Singapore are investing in biometric entry and exit systems, as is the EU. The UK does not routinely capture biometrics at the border, although with the new UK electronic travel authorisation, we will collect digital photographs of all non-visa nationals, with the option of retaining fingerprint scans.
We are aware that there are logistical and financial challenges to enabling Border Force to collect biometrics routinely from all passengers on arrival and departure, but there are also substantial benefits, including helping to match illegal migrants and asylum seekers leaving the country, thereby giving a clearer picture of those who are overstaying through more accurate migration figures. We would be interested in hearing how the Government are thinking about biometrics more broadly in the context of their not extending the power to capture biometrics more widely in the Bill.
Working out the potential for electronic borders and a more sophisticated approach to the hundreds of millions of journeys that cross our borders every year is an important part of the day job of my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston. This is a more limited clause, but we are certainly investigating the potential, costs and benefits of a much more digitalised border. We are not about to introduce that through this Bill, but there will be more to be said when that work has been done in due course.
We understand the potential for making border crossings much more convenient for everybody while having more robust information about who has crossed borders, and when and where they were crossed. Some of this is about goods, trailers and a range of other things crossing borders, and ensuring that we have information on when people smugglers and clandestines cross borders, too.
I note that clause 34(3) sets out the requirement for an authorised person only to take biometric information from a child under the age of 16
“in the presence of a person aged 18 or over who is—
(a) the child’s parent or guardian, or
(b) a person who for the time being takes responsibility for the child.”
Does the Minister agree that we ought not to disapply the requirement for consent on such tests for children who are under the age of 16?
It is important that we uphold standards and have those requirements, which is why the clauses we are debating do that. These clauses deal with the need, in an emergency situation, to evacuate people who are British citizens and/or people who live in families that include British citizens. It is about being able to get them to safety but, at the same time, to collect biometric information so that we can check who they are. It is much more effective for us to do that at the earliest opportunity rather than getting them to the UK or on UK territory and having to do it then. That is why the clauses will put us in a much better situation from the point of view of identity and security checks, if there is an emergency evacuation of British nationals from a particular place in the future, which we hope will not happen.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Provision of biometric information at ports in Scotland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36 will enable the biometrics of persons detained in Scotland under schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 to be taken at ports, thereby bringing the position in Scotland into line with that in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Those schedules allow an examining officer—a constable, or a designated immigration or customs officer—to stop, question, search and detain a person at a port, or at the border area in Northern Ireland, for the purposes of determining whether the person appears to be a person who is, or has been, engaged in terrorism or hostile activity. An examining officer may stop and question a person whether or not there are grounds for suspecting that the person is, or has been, engaged in terrorism or hostile activity. Those are important powers that allow counter-terrorism police officers to detect, disrupt and deter terrorism and hostile activity at the border.
The powers for taking biometrics in Scotland are contained in paragraph 20 of schedule 8 to the 2000 Act and paragraph 42 to schedule 3 of the 2019 Act. Clause 36 amends those paragraphs, removing the unnecessary restriction unique to Scotland that requires that those detained under those powers are taken to a police station to have their biometrics taken. The clause will allow biometrics to be taken much more easily and quickly in situ, rather than the person having to be transported to a police station.
Clause 36, as the Minister has laid out, extends biometrics powers to ports in Scotland. As we understand it, immigration enforcement already has the power to take biometrics from people arrested in the UK, including at ports, if they are suspected of having entered or remained in the UK illegally. How does the Minister think that the clause will add to existing operational powers?
It is a lacuna in Scotland rather than a problem elsewhere. It is simply that, in Scotland, biometrics cannot be taken except in a police station. In his 2020 report on the operation of the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation recommended that we address the issue. We saw the Bill as an opportunity to deal with what is obviously an unintended kink, so we are ironing it out.
At the moment, under Scottish law, biometrics—in this instance—must be taken in a police station. Everywhere else, they can be taken in situ. We are just bringing the situation in Scotland into line. It is a minor change, but it will have an important practical effect.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further considered be now adjourned.—(Martin McCluskey.)
(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWould everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on the declaration of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.
Clause 37
Repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure once more to be in this delightful room doing line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill.
The clause repeals in full the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The Act, which requires that decision makers treat Rwanda as a safe third country for the purposes of removing individuals there, and disapplies sections of the Human Rights Act 1998, was passed by the previous Government in an attempt to facilitate removals to Rwanda under the migration and economic development partnership. Despite that, the Act has served no practical purpose since it became law: no decisions were made that were affected by its provisions, and, as we have stated repeatedly, only four individuals were ever relocated voluntarily. No enforced removals to Rwanda ever took place under the partnership.
The Government have been clear from the outset that we will not proceed with the partnership. There is no evidence that it was successful in deterring small boat arrivals, nor has it delivered value for money for the British taxpayer. On the contrary, nearly 84,000 people arrived on small boats between 14 April 2022, which was the date the partnership was announced by the former Government, and 5 July 2024, which was the day after this Government were elected.
The Government have been clear that we will not make further payments to Rwanda, saving £100 million in upcoming annual economic transformation and integration fund payments, and a further £120 million that the UK would otherwise have been liable to pay once 300 individuals had been relocated to Rwanda. That is without even considering the additional staffing and operational costs, which would have been substantial. We will also exit the UK-Rwanda treaty as part of ending the partnership. It is therefore appropriate for the Government to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act so that the legislation, which relies on the provisions of the treaty, will no longer be on the statute book. That is what clause 37 achieves.
Clause 37 repeals the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. In doing so, the Government are removing the only deterrent, and indeed the only place where we can send people who have arrived from a safe third country. It is well established that it is extremely difficult to return people to some countries. In addition, the lack of documentation can frustrate the process of removal to someone’s home country. That is why a third country deterrent is needed: if people cannot be removed to their home country, they can and will be removed to a third country.
The logical consequence of repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act is that a greater number of migrants will arrive from countries that are harder to return them to. Without some form of agreement to send the migrants to a safe country, they will continue to come and to stay. Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a list of safe countries, but the list is limited to countries that contribute very few illegal migrants, save for Albania. The last Conservative Government cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by over 90%, showing that our returns agreement with Albania worked. As the former director general of Border Force said:
“If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 41, Q43.]
Channel boat crossings are up 28% since the election, with more than 1,300 people crossing in the week commencing 1 March 2025. This Labour Government have smashed farmers, small business owners and pensioners, but it seems that the people-smuggling gangs are the only ones who are safe. The only thing that will stop the gangs is a strong deterrent that means that people do not board small boats because they know that they will be deported if they reach the UK, and they will not be allowed to stay.
The additional offences and powers in this Bill are welcome as far as they go, but, with the scrapping of the Conservatives’ deterrent—that if someone has no right to be in this country, they will not be able to stay—this Bill is just window dressing. It will not, and cannot, stop people crossing the channel in small boats. The Government know that, because their own impact assessment shows that only a handful of people each year would be imprisoned because of the new offences created by this Bill.
Since the announcement that our deterrent would be scrapped, there are almost 8,500 more people in asylum hotels. That is the Government’s failure.
I was trying to count the number of times the hon. Member used the word “deterrent”, and I ran out of fingers. Could he please define what a deterrent is?
Does the hon. Gentleman want me to use my fingers to help him to count? The deterrent is preventing people from getting in those boats. If people know that they will be detained and removed when they arrive in this country, they will stop coming.
Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the crossings have risen from 299 in 2018 to more than 150,000 since then, the majority of them on the Conservatives’ watch? Does he also acknowledge that deportations have increased by 24% under this Government?
Does the hon. Gentleman know what has happened with global migration? If we compare the movements that have been made in the last week, those into Europe and those into this country seem to be slightly misaligned. The number of people arriving in this country is up 28%. The number of people put into hotels in communities across this country is up 29%; that is 8,500 more people. The number of people who have arrived in this country illegally and been removed is down significantly since this Government came to office.
It is clear that a new approach is needed. The National Crime Agency said that stopping channel migrants is not possible without a Rwanda-style scheme. It was a terrible mistake for Labour to cancel our deterrent before it had even started. The Labour Government like to point out the cost of the Rwanda plan, but a deterrent that stops illegal migrants from making the crossing and settling in the country will save the state billions in lifetime costs.
As Karl Williams from the Centre for Policy Studies pointed out,
“the Office for Budget Responsibility’s analysis last summer…estimates that a low-skilled migrant, or low-wage migrant as the OBR puts it, will represent a lifetime net fiscal cost to the taxpayer of around £600,000.”
Williams then pointed to
“analysis from Denmark, the Netherlands and other European countries that asylum seekers’ lifetime fiscal costs tend to be steeper than that” ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 43, Q49.]
The evidence therefore suggests that if 35,000 people cross the channel a year—that is roughly where we were last year—at that sort of cost range, the lifetime costs will probably be £50 billion or £60 billion.
I ask the hon. Member to desist from referring to that report. In oral evidence, I asked two experts whether they thought it was possible to make such assessments on the basis of the available evidence, and they declined. In fact, the author of that report said that the available evidence was fairly lacking in robustness and integrity. When I asked him whether he had considered certain key counterfactuals, he admitted that he had not. Later, in response to my question about whether it was appropriate for MPs to brandish such research, Professor Brian Bell said that it would be “foolhardy” to do so because the report itself made “very brave” assumptions.
Will the hon. Member now desist from using that report, given that we are in a democracy, we are striving for accountability and truth, and we should not be using fake information?
I will not desist from using those figures, but I would be happy to hear the hon. Member’s alternative figures when the time comes. I am sure this is not cost-neutral; I am sure it is very expensive.
As I was saying, that is why an effective removals and deterrent agreement is needed. I ask the Minister whether the Government are looking at a removals and deterrent agreement. If not, why are they repealing the UK’s only deterrent? How does she think we can control our borders without one, when it is clear that this Bill will not be effective in doing so? Does she agree with the National Crime Agency that a removals agreement is the only way to stop channel migrants, as happened with Operation Sovereign Borders in Australia?
The Government say that they are clearing the backlog and returning people who arrived on small boats. That is just not the case. The most recent immigration figures show that the asylum backlog is higher than when Labour came into office, and returns of small boat arrivals were down again in the most recent quarter, with only 4% of arrivals being removed. In fact, of the total returns between October and December 2024, only 16% were enforced; in the three months before, only 13% were. Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal immigrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart, and I promise that I will be briefer. Does the hon. Member agree that the overwhelming trend under the last Conservative Government in the balance between enforced and voluntary returns was in favour of voluntary returns? In fact, in 2023, only 24% of returns were enforced, in 2022, 25% were and in 2021, 27% were. Does he not agree that the trend over the last years has been one of voluntary returns?
I would say that the big issue around deterrence is how many of those who arrive in small boats are removed. Despite the fact that the number of those arriving illegally is up 28%, the number who are being returned is down significantly. That is the big question at play here.
I thank the hon. Member for his patience. Does he agree that he is moving the goalposts slightly to manufacture a political argument that, as he knows, would not be supported by the evidence available? Furthermore, will he look back into history at the record of the last Labour Government? I invite him to comment on their success—I know that he will want to jump at that. In 2004, 85% of people reaching our country were removed through enforced returns; in 2005, 73% were. Where there was a trend of enforced returns, it was actually under the last Labour Government.
In terms of the political arguments, what people out there want to see is the number of people arriving illegally in this country going down. They are not seeing that; it is up 28%. They want to see the number of hotels in communities across the country going down. It is not, although it was. The number of people arriving was also going down, but it is now up 28%, and there are 8,500 more people in hotels. That is the reality of the situation.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous. Of course, that is what Committee debates are meant to be about; it is easier to have a bit more to and fro in Committee than it often is on the Floor of the House, when we have two and a half minutes and we have had to rewrite our speech and discard most of what we were going to say.
Will the hon. Gentleman admit that the way in which the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act meant that nobody could be processed at all; they were just stuck, and there was a build-up in hotels of small boat arrivals and other asylum claimants who could not be processed? That meant that there was a big backlog, and we have had to restart decision making. That inevitably means that there will be a slowdown in sending back people who have arrived by small boat until we can get on top of the backlog that the Conservative Government created.
The principle at stake is that if someone arrives in this country illegally, they will be removed. We were not processing people who had arrived illegally and were meant to be removed, but we were returning more of them before the election than we are now. However, I will get through my comments, and there will be plenty of time then for debate—we have a full morning ahead of us.
Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal migrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent? At the moment, people know that if they come here on a small boat, they are 96% likely to be allowed to stay. That is a strong pull factor. The only way to remove that pull factor is to reinstate a strong deterrent. People need to know that if they arrive here on a small boat, they will not be able to stay. Can the Minister explain how she will increase the number of removals without a third country to which migrants can be sent? If it is not Rwanda, where will they go? Will it be Redcar? Will it be Romford? Will it be Richmond? Where will these people who cannot be removed to a safe country go?
As Alp Mehmet said,
“repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration… 240,000 people were declared to have entered”
the EU “illegally last year” and will likely end up coming to the UK. The Government have confirmed with this Bill and the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda Act that there is no deterrence, because once people arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. Mehmet also echoed the comments from the National Crime Agency, saying,
“the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 39-40, Q43.]
As he pointed out, there is not “anything in the Bill” that would suggest that people will be removed quickly. Why has a removals agreement not been included in the Bill? The EU is now looking at offshore processing and deportation centres. There is also a growing consensus in the EU that the 1951 refugee convention is not fit for purpose. What assessment has the Minister made of the impact of these changes on the UK? Why have the Government scrapped the Rwanda plan, leaving the UK as an outlier? We wish to oppose the repeal of the Act by way of a Division.
I welcome the opportunity to examine the failed Rwanda scheme. The Israeli scheme, which was set up more than a decade ago, provides stark evidence that the previous Government should have considered before recycling an idea that has cost taxpayers £700 million. In Israel, asylum seekers were given a stark choice: be sent home, go to a migrant detention facility or take $3,500 on a one-way flight to Rwanda. One such asylum seeker quickly found that he was not welcome on arrival. No sooner had he landed in Kigali than he was told he had to leave again for Uganda, and for a fee. He said that he quickly left for Greece on a small boat and then travelled over land to Switzerland, where he is now settled. Another used a $5,000 payment that he received to catch a flight to Amsterdam, where he then claimed asylum status.
The previous Conservative Government entered into the agreement with Rwanda with full knowledge of the previous failings there and offered individuals a personal payment of £3,000 to resettle their lives. Figures have been bandied about on how many asylum seekers Rwanda was willing to take, with the previous Government saying 1,000, and Rwanda saying between 100 and 200. It is not clear who was right, but a question that has often been repeated to me is: how can that be regarded as a deterrent? Indeed, our witnesses from the refugee support organisations made the point that people will continue to come and try their luck, and 84,000 took that risk. I welcome the fact that we have our common sense back and we are repealing the Act, but I despair at the waste of taxpayers’ money on pursuing a fantasy that had already failed elsewhere.
Good morning to you, Mr Stuart, for week two of our fascinating journey into the depths of the Bill. There will be absolutely no argument from me about this one, and I wholeheartedly agree that the Bill must go through. When we look back at the whole sorry Rwanda debacle, we will wonder how on earth such a crackpot scheme was not only conceived, but actually constructed and delivered. A few words will be forever on the gravestone of the last Conservative Government: “stop the boats” and “Rwanda”. It was the first time, in my experience, that an Act decreed a new reality. Through sheer willpower alone, the Conservatives declared that Rwanda was a safe place, and in true Orwellian style, they even called the legislation the Safety of Rwanda Act. It was the most blatant political attempt ever to try to convince us that black was white.
Rwanda is so safe that it is currently accused of supporting the M23 militia, which is claimed to be recruiting child soldiers and carrying out killings and rapes of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Saying all that, Rwanda played an utter blinder. It milked this for all it was worth. It saw these mugs coming. So far, Rwanda has made £240 million—money that will not have to be paid back. The Bill was described by the Law Society as “defective” and “constitutionally improper”, and it was declared unlawful in the Supreme Court. All those rebukes did nothing for the Conservatives other than to encourage them to ensure that the idea became a reality.
We just have to look at the sheer waste and the sheer stupidity that was the very essence of the Rwanda policy. The headline was that it cost taxpayers £750 million and failed to deport a single asylum seeker against their will. There was £270 million to support economic development in Rwanda, £95 million for detention and reception centres and £280 million for other fixed costs. Fifty million pounds was spent preparing for flights that never took off.
Then there is the farce of the Kigali four—the four volunteers sent to Rwanda, who were the only people who actually made it through the whole scheme. Tortoise did us a favour by unearthing the script that was used when the Home Office tried to persuade people to take up a “generous one-time offer” of a relocation package to Rwanda. One source said that demonstrated an
“insane level of resource that went into just proving the concept”.
I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for his creative statement. The chaos in our asylum system and the dangerous rise in illegal small boat crossings is, of course, one of the greatest challenges facing our country, and for years the British public have been promised solutions. They were told that the previous Government’s Rwanda policy would fix the problem, but instead it proved a costly failure. It got stuck in legal battles, was riddled with operational flaws and was utterly ineffective. I will go into detail about that soon.
In 2018, 299 people crossed the channel on small boats. By 2022, the number had surged to 30,000—a hundredfold increase on the Conservatives’ watch. Despite their grand claims that the Rwanda scheme would act as a deterrent, more than 80,000 people crossed the channel after the scheme was announced, and not a single asylum seeker has been successfully removed under it—not one. It is clear that this policy failed.
Let us start with the legal reality. The Rwanda asylum scheme was not just controversial but unlawful. In November 2023, the UK Supreme Court struck it down, ruling that Rwanda was not a safe country to send asylum seekers. The reason for that was systematic defects in Rwanda’s asylum system: almost no claims from Afghans, Syrians or Yemenis were ever approved. The Court found a serious risk that genuine refugees could be sent back to danger, in direct breach of international law. Let us not forget that Rwanda has a track record here: a previous deal with Israel, mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, led to refugees being secretly deported back to their home countries, in clear violation of human rights protections. This policy depends on breaking the law, and that is no policy at all. It is a legal and moral dead end.
That is why the Bill repeals the Rwanda scheme and replaces it with a system that upholds the rule of law. It will focus toughness where it belongs: not on desperate people, but on the criminal gangs who exploit them. Instead of wasting years in court, we will implement a legally sound system that actually works.
Further, the Rwanda scheme was not just unlawful; it was an economic disaster. As of mid-2024, at least £318 million had already been spent on this failing policy. What did taxpayers get in return? Nothing—no removals or deterrent effect, just an ever-growing backlog of cases and ever-rising hotel bills, which we have inherited. Even if the scheme had gone ahead, it would have been staggeringly expensive. The National Audit Office estimated that removing just a few hundred people could cost up to £2 million per person, yet we are expected to believe that this was a serious solution to the problem of tens of thousands arriving each year on the Conservatives’ watch.
This Government are putting an end to that waste. Instead of throwing money at a scheme that does not work, we are investing in practical measures. This approach is already delivering results: since taking office, the new Government have increased enforced removals by 24%. That shows that when we have a working system, we do not need gimmicks like the Rwanda plan; we just need competence.
This is not just about law or economics. It is also about how we treat people. A core British value is strength, but another is decency. Strength without decency is weakness, as the previous Government demonstrated. The Rwanda scheme was not just ineffective; it was cruel. It was based on the idea that people fleeing war and persecution should be someone else’s problem, no matter the risk to their safety.
Let us be clear that many of those crossing the channel are genuine refugees—they include people fleeing the Taliban in Afghanistan, dictatorship in Iran and war in Syria—but the Rwanda policy, and, it would seem, the Conservatives, did not care. The policy made no distinction, lumped everyone together and treated them as a problem to be shipped off 4,000 miles away, out of sight and out of mind—although of course it did not work.
That is not the British way. This country has a proud history of offering sanctuary to those in need, and we do not abandon our humanitarian duties for the sake of a headline and a gimmick. Of course, those who should not be here will be deported, as we are already seeing, and those who genuinely need help will receive it under this Government. A true deterrent is taking out the smuggling gangs and deporting those who should not be here. The truth is that we do not stop the boats by shouting slogans; we stop the boats by giving people an alternative.
Finally—I thank hon. Members for their patience—the Rwanda plan was never operationally viable. Even if it had survived the legal challenges, the logistics were impossible. To make it work, the Government would have had to detain nearly every small boat arrival indefinitely—a task for which we simply do not have the detention space, the staff or the legal authority. Rwanda itself had agreed to take only a few hundred people a year, which is a drop in the ocean—excuse the pun—compared with the scale of the problem. Meanwhile the real criminals—the smuggling gangs—continued to operate freely. The Rwanda plan did nothing to target them. It was an illusion of control, rather than a real solution.
This Government take a serious, workable approach. That is how we secure the border: not through wishful thinking, but through real enforcement. The Conservatives have tried gimmicks. They tried grandstanding; they tried expensive, legally dubious, headline-chasing policies, and they failed. It is time to move forward. We will uphold the rule of law, protect those in genuine need and take real action against the criminals exploiting them.
These are difficult problems and challenging questions. Practically every country in the western world is struggling with this and, with the notable exception of Australia, effectively none has solved it. The basic logic of the situation is that, if someone comes here illegally from a place to which it would be dangerous to return them, there are only four options.
First, they could be sent back to the country they came from. That is not legal in our current framework—even before getting to the morality of doing such a thing. Secondly, they could be put in immigration detention indefinitely. That is also not legal; a person can be held in immigration detention only if there is a realistic prospect of removal, which there would not be in this case. Thirdly, they could stay here indefinitely. That is not fair, and it is not what the public want. Finally, they could go somewhere else—a safe third country. Such an agreement was very difficult to broker; indeed, until the Rwandans agreed, many considered it to be impossible.
Clearly, the Government have little time for the Rwanda scheme and destroying it was one of the first things they did in office, but the basic logic problem remains. The last Conservative Government did not get everything right—that is for sure—but the Rwanda scheme was a genuine attempt to solve this truly hard problem, and it remains the only solution that we can see.
Does the hon. Lady accept that there is a fifth option? Just because someone does not have the right to be in the UK, it does not mean that they do not have the right to go to any other country in the world. The programme of voluntary returns, which massively went down under the Conservatives but has gone up massively under this Government, is part of the solution to that.
But they do not. There will always be people who come to this country illegally from dangerous places. They are human beings responding to obvious incentives. Could the Minister please tell us which of the four options she thinks is the right one? Is it sending someone back to a dangerous country, which will entail a change in the law and probably leaving the European convention on human rights? Is it holding someone in immigration detention indefinitely, which has the same conditions? Is it allowing people to stay here, or is it sending them to a third country?
It is a pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart. I was disappointed but not surprised to hear that the official Opposition want to keep the Safety of Rwanda Act on the statue books. I was disappointed for a number of reasons, which I will set out shortly, but I was not surprised. I have seen the way in which the Tories continue to position and conduct themselves on immigration policy. It is clear to me that they simply refuse to learn the lessons of the last 12 months. The public saw right through their Rwanda plan. They could see it for exactly what it was: a gimmick that was both unworkable and unaffordable.
Before today, I thought I would familiarise myself with the Report stage and the Third Reading of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. At the time, a good number of Committee members, including me, had yet to be elected, but reading the debates really brings home the sense of chaos that had engulfed the Conservative party at the time. The then shadow Home Secretary, now Home Secretary, summed it up:
“What a farce…We have a Prime Minister with no grip, while the British taxpayer is continually forced to pay the price. Former Tory Cabinet Ministers and deputy chairs from all sides have been queueing up to tell us it is a bad Bill. They say it will not work, it will not protect our borders, it will not comply with international law and it is fatally flawed.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 966.]
A previous Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), stated that
“to arrogate to oneself the right to declare one’s own compliance with international law runs the risk of, first, other states finding comfort in our example and, secondly, undermining our own messages in other situations. That makes this not just bad law, but bad foreign policy.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 855.]
This is an example of utter chaos. The Law Society, in welcoming the repeal of the Rwanda Act, said in its evidence to this Committee that the Act
“set a dangerous legal and constitutional precedent by legislating to overturn an evidence-based finding of fact by UK courts that Rwanda is an unsafe country to send asylum seekers to.”
However, the measure made it on to the statute book. The Rwanda plan ran for two years and, as we know and have heard several times this morning, a grand total of four volunteers were sent to Rwanda at the not insubstantial cost of £700 million to the UK taxpayer—quite a remarkable feat.
While hundreds of millions of taxpayer pounds were sent to Rwanda, the legislation’s effect was felt in the UK. As a result of the fantastical Rwanda plan, huge backlogs of asylum claims were building, with tens of thousands of people in hotels unable to leave because of the design of the Illegal Migration Act. We know that the use of hotels does not represent value for money and we are moving away from it. When it comes to the idea of the Rwanda policy being a deterrent, from its inception to the announcement it was to be scrapped, 84,000 people crossed the channel in small boats. It is always difficult to measure a deterrent’s effectiveness, but that is a pretty clear indicator that a deterrent it was not.
Good morning, Mr Stuart. It was interesting to hear from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire that he considered the Rwanda scheme a crackpot scheme. Another opinion is that it was “un-Conservative and un-British”—the opinion of John Major, the former Conservative Prime Minister. We have to acknowledge that the basic principle of this Bill is to address the failures of past legislation. Indeed, the Minister explained during an earlier debate that it is not possible to make the suite of legislation involved in the Safety of Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act work together coherently. Not to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act would undermine confidence in the credibility of the Bill. We are moving away from reliance on expensive gimmicks, hotel use, the flaw that is the Rwanda Act, with its price tag of £700 million of taxpayers’ money, and failure to effectively process the people arriving on our shores. Do we really believe that clinging to a piece of dead legislation is the way to protect our borders and put the safety of our country in focus and at the front?
May I start by saying that it is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart? I am particularly enjoying the opportunity to have these debates in a free-flowing way—while sticking to parliamentary etiquette, obviously.
I commend the hon. Member for Stockton West, with whom I have some sympathy. He has been sent here to defend the impossible. I half wondered, when he came in wearing that fetching yellow tie, which I slightly covet, whether he had come to hold his hands in the air, make an apology and perhaps stand on the side of classical liberalism, but no: he stood true to the 2024 manifesto on which he was elected. I hope that in addressing how he would define a deterrent, I will add something new. When I asked him for a definition, he said that a deterrent would prevent people from coming and that it would do so by detaining and removing them. I shall make a case that challenges his assumptions on that basis.
A deterrent is a strategy aimed at preventing external actors, targets and adversaries in the military sense from taking unwanted actions. For the Rwanda asylum policy to be a deterrent, the Conservative Government would have needed to achieve certain things: to maintain the capabilities required to deter and be highly resolved to deploy them—as the hon. Member said, to be able to detain and remove—and to effectively communicate their resolve to act. In any communication, one needs to be understood to be highly resolved and capable of following through.
For the Rwanda asylum policy to be a deterrent, the Government would have needed to persuade potential migrants of their capabilities and resolve to send them to Rwanda to process their claims after they had illegally entered the country, and to have stopped migrants from paying significant sums of money to smuggler gangs facilitating illegal migration. In short, from what the hon. Member said, it feels as though the principal target of deterrents was migrants. The Rwanda asylum policy was always doomed to fail on those key conditions, because it was not able to achieve detention or removal.
On detention, Professor Brian Bell, the chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, told us that the numbers given by the Government
“are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 56, Q84.]
Dr Peter Walsh of the Migration Observatory cited concerns about
“where people would be detained”,––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 14, Q13.]
as the UK immigration detention system had capacity for only 2,200 people, with roughly 400 spaces free. Moreover, he said that Rwanda would struggle to process more than “a few hundred” asylum claims a year.
That takes me to the question of removal.
Does my hon. Friend realise that the detention estate was used by the Conservative party to empty some prison places and try to relieve pressure there? I think it highly unlikely that there would be even 400 spaces.
I thank my hon. Friend for that important reminder that when the Labour Government took office after our historic win, we inherited an awful mess in our prison system, which was described by independent experts and organisations as near to collapse—so near that there were just a few hundred spaces left at a time when the country was rioting.
Is my hon. Friend also aware that under the previous Government, the Home Office tried to secure additional detention estate for asylum seekers but catastrophically failed to do so? For example, at Northeye, they spent hundreds of millions of pounds to secure the site—far more than the previous owners had paid—yet found that it had contaminated ground and could not be used, and the Bibby Stockholm in Dover closed very swiftly after opening.
I thank my hon. Friend for those important points. In fact, the Bibby Stockholm was moored just off a place near my constituency in Dorset. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton) for campaigning so quickly and efficiently to have the Bibby Stockholm closed, and I thank the Government for responding so constructively to that request. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh about how we have seen significant challenges to the state’s ability to detain. As a consequence, in one of the two conditions set out by the hon. Member for Stockton West for an effective deterrent, it is clear that the Conservative Government failed.
For the next component of an effective deterrent—removal—we need only look at the ultimate proof: who went to Rwanda? What deportations actually happened? I can anticipate some of the ways that the Conservatives may challenge that, so I would like to take them on. First, they may blame this Labour Government for cancelling the policy, without also saying that the Conservative party controlled the timing of a general election that they seemed certain to lose. That they believed they were certain to lose is perhaps why they called the election before they could begin deporting asylum seekers to Rwanda. In fact, the first flight was set to take off on 24 July. If the Conservatives had delayed the Dissolution of Parliament by just 20 days, to 19 June rather than 30 May, the first planes could have taken off.
The last Prime Minister could have waited out those 20 days, if he did not have anything else to do. With a zombie Government that were not showing any ambition, if he had wanted to show ambition, he could have spent a nice 20 days watching all 90 hours of the TV show “Lost”. If he wanted to go at a more leisurely pace—and the Conservatives were excelling at going at a leisurely pace—rather than binge watching something, he could have watched all 30 hours of the TV show “Stranger Things”. Instead—and this is where the “ba-dum” comes in—the Government manifested signs of being lost, and the last Conservative Cabinet just comprised stranger things.
I thought I would to and find a moment of humour in the dispiriting debate on this topic.
The Conservatives may progress to blaming successful legal and judicial challenges to the policy. The Rwanda policy was, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal said, unlawful and deemed to be so by the courts. If they do, His Majesty’s Opposition should confirm whether they respect the independence of our judiciary in adjudicating such challenges on the one hand, and respect the international human rights laws, under which challenges were made and were successful, on the other. That is important, because one of the hallmarks of the new Government is to be lawful and to respect our judiciary. We need to embrace that change. The Opposition could also reflect on the probability of further legal challenges being undertaken because of the human rights concerns about Rwanda, which my hon. Friend highlighted so effectively.
Last, the Conservatives may want to blame political challenges for undermining the credibility of their Rwanda asylum policy. In a democracy, it is of course right that Members of Parliament raise concerns on behalf of their constituents—indeed, that is what we have been doing—but the Conservatives overcame those political constraints by passing the Safety of Rwanda Act to address judicial concerns, and they signed a legally binding agreement with Rwanda. So the idea that the deterrent was not able to function because of legal or political challenges is actually farcical, because the previous Government held the cards in their hands.
I have heard it said that the Conservatives could have followed the Australian asylum policy, which has been described as a successful model—perhaps it even inspired the Rwanda asylum policy—but there is good reason to believe that UK could not have achieved the deterrent effects of the Australian offshore asylum processing model. Indeed, Professor Brian Bill, chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, said in oral evidence that it was inappropriate to draw comparisons between the Rwanda scheme and the Australian policies.
Were we to be generous and accept the view of the hon. Member for Weald of Kent that the Australian policy stood out in the world as being successful, there would be challenges to assessing the efficacy of that policy. As the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, an expert and independent institution, has said, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the Australian offshoring policy was the reason for a drop in numbers of people going to Australia. Put bluntly, if migrants were paying attention to the last Government’s policy, they had no reason to believe that they would be barred from staying in the UK.
That takes me to my third and final definition of what would make an effective deterrent. Yes, the state must be understood to be highly resolved to deter, detain and remove, and capable of doing so, but it takes two to tango. Britain can only be understood if asylum seekers are able to understand, which in turn depends on several key factors. It means migrants being able to do at least three things: to pay close attention to the last Government’s actions—I struggled to do that, so I cannot see how asylum seekers would—to stay fully informed about the many twists and turns in the Safety of Rwanda Act asylum policy, which again I struggled to stay abreast of, and to behave as rational actors who weigh up the costs and benefits of action.
We have heard in testimony and oral evidence that migrants are typically unaware of Government policy and actions, because they are too busy being asylum seekers and migrants. Moreover, it can be said that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the chaotic and difficult circumstances that they are forced to inhabit prevent them from being the rational actors that they would otherwise be, calmly and objectively assessing the trade-offs between the perceived costs of illegal entry, the probability of those being incurred, and whether those are outweighed by the potential benefits of migration.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. I rise to put on the record my support for the Government’s decision to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act. It is important to remember that this Act was passed by a Conservative Government who knew that they were on their way out—a Government who had run out of road and run out of ideas. The Safety of Rwanda Act was nothing more than a gimmick, as has been pointed out many times this morning. It was a waste of taxpayers’ money and only reaffirmed the widely held view that the Conservative Government had lost control of our borders.
The Bill brought forward by the Labour Government aims to tackle an extremely challenging issue—one made far more challenging by the incompetence shown by the previous incumbents. It marks a welcome shift from wasting taxpayers’ money on projects such as the Rwanda scheme to a plan that genuinely aims to smash criminal gangs and stop small boat crossings at the source, with a consistent approach of respecting the vulnerability of the human lives involved. That is why we must reject Conservative attempts to continue their failed schemes.
For those now in Opposition, one would have thought the lessons of July last year were to look outwards, consider what went wrong and reassess their positions on key matters such as immigration, but clearly, they are carrying on as they have done for years, insistent on making the same mistakes that cost the public purse millions that could have been spent on supporting the working people of the United Kingdom. I reiterate my support for the repeal of the Rwanda scheme and look forward to supporting this Government’s plans for restoring control to our borders and delivering on the priorities of the British people.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart, especially after we have had such an interesting debate with some very thoughtful contributions. I will respond to some of the issues that have been raised.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East mentioned that I keep quoting Peter Walsh, and I am going to again, because the point he made in the evidence sessions was one of the most critical points on immigration policy in Britain overall. He said that demand for Channel crossings is “fairly inelastic”. The demand will not wax and wane hugely in response to Government policy, which tells us that deterrence will have only limited use. That is the conceptual flaw at the heart of the Rwanda plan. It put all the country’s cards and money on a deterrence-only approach. Deterrence has to be real and believable, which the scheme clearly was not.
I listen closely to what the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire says about the role of deterrence in migration policy. The exchanges we are having are helping to clarify the thinking. It is clear from the Bill that deterrence can only ever be a component. We must focus on the supply—the ability for people to cross the Channel—and not just the demand. That requires the measures in the Bill, but also diplomatic work and upstream work.
The repeal of the Rwanda legislation was inevitable and written in the stars from the very beginning of that hare-brained scheme. Before it passed, the European Council on Foreign Relations said that the scheme was doomed to failure and a “floundering disaster”, because it was unlikely to deter illicit migration, it would damage the UK’s standing in international law, it would endanger refugee lives and it would come at huge financial cost. Every single one of those predictions came to pass, so it is no surprise that we are having to deal with this today. I would also say that it presaged the Conservatives going down in an historic election defeat, so it was clearly a failure politically for them as well.
On the point about removal to third countries, before we left the European Union, the UK had the capacity to remove people to safe countries in the EU that they had travelled through. The Conservatives manifestly failed to avail the country of that power we had, and then failed with the Rwanda system. Clearly, the Conservative track record on third countries is very poor. There is a component in the immigration system for people going to third countries when they have no right to stay here, which is something we need to look at further ahead.
The hon. Member for Stockton West made reference to the Albania relationship and returns increasing to Albania, as if that somehow proves that the Rwanda scheme would have worked if we had just let it take its course, but it is a completely spurious parallel. The returns to Albania happened before the communiqué was signed with Albania, so the two are not related—perhaps he was arguing that the prior readmission agreement was the variable that led to the increase, but it came after the spike, so it cannot be held responsible. The Albania agreement was not just about illegal immigrants; it also included a huge number of foreign national offenders—a different group of people entirely. It was also about people from Albania returning to Albania, not third-country nationals. The idea that the Albania scheme is somehow an alibi for Rwanda can be completely rejected.
That is not actually the point, however, because the Rwanda scheme would never have worked at the scale required, even if it had been able to work at all. The Minister was correct when she talked in her initial remarks about the interaction between the Illegal Migration Act and the Safety of Rwanda Act. That meant that nobody was getting processed, so the country ended up with a perma-backlog of asylum seekers with nowhere to go; they could not return to the country they came from through a voluntary returns agreement or be recognised as refugees. The Rwanda scheme would never have worked at a meaningful scale, and it would never have been able to deal with the backlog. We were on track to having to take over half the hotels in the country to accommodate asylum seekers.
We can have a debate about how best to manage an asylum system—voluntary returns, swift processing, meaningful decisions and removals are clearly components of that—but we can surely say in debating this clause that the Rwanda Act was not the solution. Some £240 million of our constituents’ money was wasted on the scheme, which the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire was quite correct to call “crackpot”. Passing legislation to assert that reality is not what it is will never be an effective way to govern anything, never mind the asylum system, so I am pleased that the Act will finally be off the statute book.
We have had an interesting debate about taking the Safety of Rwanda Act off the statute book, as clause 37 does. I am distressed that the Conservative party continues to assert without evidence—in fact, contrary to most evidence—that that Act and the Illegal Migration Act were about to work. Apparently, those Acts were on the cusp of being a great success when the evil new Government came along and cancelled them.
I speculate that many Conservative Members are secretly pleased that they can assert that, because it gets them out of an embarrassing, expensive farrago; the Safety of Rwanda Act will go down in this country’s history as one of the most catastrophic pieces of legislation that Parliament has ever dealt with. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham and Rainham rightly pointed out, it was not ordinary or normal for Conservative ex-Prime Minister John Major to pronounce the Act to be “un-Conservative”. The Act is many things, unconservative being one of them.
Government Members, and the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, assert that the Act was not a deterrent. This is the current discourse: we are saying that it was not a deterrent and that we can prove it, and the Conservative party, which was responsible for the Act, is left asserting that it was a deterrent, despite there being absolutely no evidence for that despite all the years since the policy was announced and all the years the Act was on the statute book.
That reminds me of discussions I used to have as a student—a very long time ago—about whether communism in its pure sense had actually ever existed. It was obviously a failure, but when one came across the ideologues, they simply asserted that the communism that had been tried to date just was not pure enough, and it was therefore still likely to succeed if ever it was tried properly. Does that sound similar to the discussions we are having about this iteration of fantasy asylum policy as gimmick? I think it does.
I have asked this question a few times and never quite got to the bottom of it. We were sending people to Rwanda who could not be returned to their home country because it was not safe. Where will those people go now, if not Rwanda? Does the Minister fear that, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said, the Government might end up coming back to this issue in a few years when they realise that things are continuing to go the wrong way?
First things first: the hon. Gentleman was not going to send to Rwanda only those whom we could not return to their own country; in theory, he was going to deport to Rwanda absolutely everybody who arrived to claim asylum after March 2023—that was what we were told. In reality, those people all ended up in hotels, unable to be processed and growing in number, while the Conservative party indulged in its expensive gimmicks and fantasies of how the world should be.
As many Committee members have pointed out, the day job was not being done while that parallel universe policy was being developed. It took all the attention away from running what is a complex enough system as it is. Many resources were diverted to try to create that new reality, resulting in the neglect of the system, and huge backlogs were built into the system because of how the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act. That made it impossible to run the current system or to move to a new system that was remotely workable, thereby landing this country with a huge, dysfunctional series of backlogs, and a system that we have had to literally start up again from scratch to try to get working coherently.
The Minister may have been coming on to the second part of the question asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West, but will she be brave enough to tell the Committee that this Labour Government will never consider sending asylum seekers and refugees to a third country?
The Home Secretary has said that she does not rule out third country processing; that is not the same as the Rwanda scheme, which was deportation to a third country permanently. I think the hon. Gentleman is talking about third country returns, such as reviving the Dublin system. When the previous Government negotiated the EU withdrawal agreement, they perhaps should have included something about returns to Europe. Had they done so, perhaps we would be in a different situation, but those would also have been third country returns. He asked a wide-ranging question, and I have been as honest as I can in answering it at this point.
We could spend all day, and probably many more days, talking about the failure encompassed in the interaction of the Safety of Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act. Our job today, though, is to tidy it up. Clause 37 will take the Safety of Rwanda Act off the statute book and put it in the dustbin of history, where it belongs.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Liberal Democrat spokesperson is not here to move amendment 9, so we move to clause 38 stand part.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 2—Repeal of the Illegal Migration Act 2023—
“The Illegal Migration Act 2023 is repealed.”
This new clause would repeal the Illegal Migration Act in full. In combination with Amendment 8 to leave out clause 38, it would replace the selective repeal in the Bill with a full repeal.
As always, the Lib Dems are keeping us on our toes. I hope there is a benign reason why they are not in attendance today—perhaps my horrible cold made its way over to them and they are not well.
Clause 38 repeals the vast majority—not all—of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. We decided not to take a blanket approach to repealing it all, and we will have that debate when the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire speaks to new clause 2. He has given us the choice whether to repeal the Illegal Migration Act as a whole. Our view, which I will explain in response to his speech, is that there are a few useful clauses in the Act that we have decided to keep on the statute book.
In general, we all know that the Illegal Migration Act was a flawed piece of legislation that made it impossible for us to process and run asylum claims. It was on the statute book in the context of the Safety of Rwanda Act, which assumed that anyone who arrived after March 2023 would not be allowed to become part of an asylum claim in this country. It contained the so-called duty to remove, which placed a statutory duty on the Home Secretary to remove everyone who came to this country after that time. It was flawed in many ways, but it made it impossible for us to run asylum claims in this country lawfully. Therefore, it is important that the vast majority of this flawed legislation should be removed from the statute book, and that is what clause 38 does.
I will set out in detail why we have decided to keep six clauses of the Act. I will try to explain to the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and the rest of the Committee our thinking behind each case, but I will do so when the new clause has been spoken to.
Clause 38 repeals sections 1 to 6 and schedule 1, sections 7 to 11, sections 13 to 15 and schedule 2, sections 16 to 28, sections 30 to 5, sections 53 to 58, section 61 and section 66 of the Illegal Migration Act.
Section 2 of the Illegal Migration Act placed a duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements to remove persons to their home country or a safe third country who have entered or arrived in the UK illegally. Let me point out to those people who are concerned about genuine asylum seekers that section 2(4) of the IMA makes it clear that the provision does not apply if someone comes directly from a place of danger, which is consistent with article 33 of the 1951 refugee convention. However, people who come here directly from France, a safe country where no one is being persecuted and which has a perfectly well-functioning asylum system, should not illegally enter the United Kingdom.
I ask the Minister why the Government are repealing this duty. Is it because they do not think they are able to remove those who have arrived illegally? Is it because the Government think people who arrive in this country illegally should be allowed to remain?
Section 5 of the Illegal Migration Act provides that asylum claims are automatically deemed inadmissible for those who have arrived illegally. One of Labour’s first actions in government was to allow illegal migrants to claim asylum. Can the Minister explain how allowing illegal migrants to claim asylum is providing any deterrent? Surely it will help the smuggling gangs, by providing a stronger incentive for people to make those dangerous crossings of the Channel in small boats.
There is a lot to do in the way of commencement; the Bill is there and could be commenced at any time, if the Government felt it was of help. In fact, in a few years’ time, when they come back to the drawing board to try to find a deterrent, they might well want to do that.
Sections 31 and 32 of the Illegal Migration Act prevented people who have entered the country illegally from obtaining British citizenship. The Labour Government are repealing this provision. Their position is hardly surprising when the Prime Minister does not think that British citizenship is a pull factor, but that does not mean it is the right thing to do. Why are the Government repealing this clause, allowing illegal migrants to get British citizenship?
Do the Government not believe that British citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, especially for those who have entered the country illegally? If so, why have the Government not included measures to stop illegal migrants obtaining British citizenship, and instead only issued guidance stating that
“applications made after 10 February 2025 that include illegal entry will ‘normally’ be refused citizenship, regardless of when the illegal entry occurred.”?
Section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act states:
“The Secretary of State may make regulations about the effect of a decision by a relevant person (“P”) not to consent to the use of a specified scientific method for the purposes of an age assessment…where there are no reasonable grounds for P’s decision.”
This means that, if a migrant refused to undergo an age assessment, they would be considered an adult. Labour have removed age assessments for illegal migrants who claim to be under 18, resulting in the risk that grown men may end up in schools with teenage girls. In fact, the most recent data on age disputes shows that more than 50% of migrants claiming to be under 18 were actually adults. How do the Government therefore intend to ensure that migrants claiming to be under 18 actually undergo age assessments, and why is that not included in the Bill?
The SNP’s new clause 2 would repeal the Illegal Migration Act entirely, so the SNP must be agreeing with the Labour Government that illegal migrants should be able to get British citizenship and should not have to undergo age assessments. Therefore, I ask the same questions: does the SNP not believe that British citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, especially for those who have entered the country illegally? How would the SNP ensure that migrants claiming to be under 18 actually undergo age assessments, and why is that not included in new clause 2?
By repealing the Illegal Migration Act in its entirety, the SNP want to stop the seizure of mobile phones from illegal migrants, something that helps to establish identities and obtain evidence of immigration offences. As Tony Smith said:
“Passport data, identity data, age data and travel history data are often held on those phones—all data that would be useful when considering an asylum application.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]
The Liberal Democrats’ amendment 9 would have repealed section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act, which requires the Secretary of State to remove people who have sought to use modern slavery protections in bad faith. Do the Liberal Democrats think that people using modern slavery protections fraudulently should be allowed to stay in the UK? If so, do they believe that people who make fraudulent immigration claims should be allowed to stay in the UK? We believe that the effect of repealing the majority of the IMA and the entirety of the Safety of Rwanda Act will be an increase in the number of people arriving in this country illegally and remaining.
I have therefore asked the Government whether they would be prepared to be transparent about the numbers. If they are convinced that the approach set out in the Bill will be successful, let us measure it. Will the Minister commit to publishing all the numbers, and the nationalities, of all those who might have been excluded from the UK asylum system on grounds of connection with a safe third country or a late claim, but have not been—with reasons why not—and to setting out the obstacles to returning them to their country of origin and what steps are being taken through international agreements to overcome that, as recommended by Tony Smith in evidence to this Committee? We will oppose the inclusion of this clause in the Bill by way of a Division.
I must say to the hon. Member for Stockton West that he really does not want to know my views on British citizenship, because they are likely to blow his head—but we will leave that one at that.
It is disappointing to note the absence of our Liberal colleagues. Back in the day—the good old days, Mr Stuart —when we had an effective, efficient, diligent and conscientious third party, there would always be someone present to ensure that the views of the third party were represented. I am sure that the Liberal Democrats have good excuses, but I hope they start to take a bit of interest in this important Bill, because it has been disappointing thus far.
I say to the Minister, “‘Useful clauses?’ Come on!” We are talking about sections 29, 12, 59, 60 and 62, some of the nastiest and most pernicious parts and aspects of the Illegal Migration Act. I cannot believe that this Government want to continue that horrible and heinous Tory set of proposals and clauses in this Bill. This was their great opportunity to wipe the slate clean of the previous Government’s hopeless and useless crackpot Rwanda scheme and their heinous and horrible Illegal Migration Act.
I will give the Minister a few quotes from some of her colleagues, some of which I wish I had come up with myself. The now Prime Minister said at the time that the Illegal Migration Bill would drive “a coach and horses” through protections for women trafficked to the UK as victims of modern slavery. The now Home Secretary said that that IMA does the “total opposite” of providing support for those who have been trafficked, and that it was nothing other than “a traffickers’ charter”. There are other prize quotes from the Home Secretary and various Ministers within the Home Office—absolutely and totally correct, right and true—about the horrible Illegal Migration Act. Now we have a Labour Government inconceivably standing by large swathes of an Act that they so rightly and widely rubbished and wanted rid of only a short while ago.
It would be different if the Government were maintaining some benign, useful or helpful parts of that Tory Act, but they are maintaining some real, pernicious nasties. Provisions that were damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under the Tories are just as damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under this new Labour Government. I remind the Minister what the then Home Secretary said on that Bill when introducing it:
“I am unable to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Illegal Migration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights, but the Government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.”
The previous Government could not care less about our obligations under international law or about human rights, and they were quite happy to set them aside. Now we have a Home Secretary who stands by certain provisions of that Act, with all its difficulties concerning its relationship with convention rights.
The hon. Gentleman will have noted on the front of the Bill that we are debating the statement from the Home Secretary on the European convention on human rights:
“In my view the provisions of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.”
I am glad that the Home Secretary stated that, as she always does when it comes to our relationship with, and compatibility with, human rights. I want to raise a couple of issues and ask a couple of questions about just how very loosely this Bill is connected with the Government’s obligations and about some of our real concerns on human rights. I will come to that in the course of what I hope will be a short contribution.
It is completely incomprehensible that the Government have chosen to repeal only some aspects of the IMA rather than the whole Act, particularly since so many members of this Government have been so vocally opposed to the IMA in the past. Can we please just have a look at some of the stuff that they want to retain? The one that concerns me most, and the one that concerns the range of organisations, groups and charities associated with refugees and asylum seekers, is the retention of section 29.
Let us remind the Committee what section 29 does. It extends the public order disqualification originally introduced by section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and mandates that victims of trafficking and modern slavery who have criminal convictions or are considered a threat to public order be disqualified from support and protection. To me, that provision is deeply concerning, as it means that victims of trafficking, many of whom have been coerced into committing crimes as part of their exploitation, could face detention, deportation or removal rather than the support and recovery that they need.
I do not know where the hon. Member gets his figures, but let me give him some in return. Home Office statistics from 2024 revealed that 70% of the individuals disqualified under the provision had elements of criminal exploitation in their case. What is so wrong about this particular measure is that it stops us giving the necessary and relevant support that we should give—that we owe—to people who have been victims of human trafficking.
This is where we start to get back into very uncomfortable and dangerous territory, where it is going to be up to the individual to prove that they are not guilty of such crimes. This is a blanket clause that will entrap them and leave it to them to make their way through the courts to prove their innocence when they have been innocent all the time, or particularly when they have been victims of trafficking and forced into criminal activity. The system could punish vulnerable individuals who were coerced into committing crimes, often by their traffickers, thus reinforcing the power dynamic that allows traffickers to exploit their victims further.
The retention of section 29 increases the likelihood of re-trafficking and re-exploitation as victims might fear coming forward to the authorities due to the threat of detention, removal or criminalisation. That has issues for us in Scotland. Quite rightly, I suppose, immigration is totally and utterly reserved, but we have responsibility under our devolved powers to ensure that victims of modern slavery who come to Scotland are looked after and tended to by Scottish legislation. There are powers that we have within Scotland.
In retaining section 29 of the IMA, the Bill also restricts the ability of the Scottish Government to support the victims under the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. The Scottish Act places a duty on Scottish Ministers to secure immediate support and recovery services for victims of human trafficking and exploitation. In Scotland we have tried to design a system that, unlike this Bill, places an emphasis on victim care and rehabilitation.
That is the approach that we take in Scotland, and that is what we want to try to deliver within our range of devolved power, but it relies on the national referral mechanism identifying and supporting victims of trafficking. The disqualification provisions in section 29 could result in vulnerable individuals in Scotland being detained or deported without being properly identified and supported as trafficking victims, thus weakening the Scottish Government’s ability to implement their own modern slavery protections.
Like the Safety of Rwanda Act clause, this clause is an inevitability, because it was clear from the outset that these sections of the Illegal Migration Act were never going to work. I know that the Conservatives tend to think that everybody who works in the migration sector set out to thwart their plans at every turn, but that is not the case. I was working for the strategic migration partnership in Scotland when the Illegal Migration Bill was introduced two years ago. I remember sitting down with local authorities, the police and other key stakeholders to look at the legislation, and all of us collectively said, “How is this going to work? This is never going to be feasible in reality.”
I draw people’s attention to one component of the Act that is being repealed, which brings its failure to the fore. The IMA placed on the Home Secretary a duty to remove that applied to all asylum seekers regardless of their case. For anyone under 18, the duty to remove kicked in at the age of 18, but when we were working with local authorities, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children came across and sought asylum in this country. These children are among the most vulnerable people in the world. They have lost their loved ones, they are on their own and they are in a strange country. In the UK, we have a national transfer scheme to disperse them around different local authorities. I worked with the officers who were trying to help those children to get themselves together after a really traumatic experience.
The Illegal Migration Act meant that, at the age of 18, in theory those people would be eligible for immediate removal. What does the Committee think that did to those children in terms of their attempts to secure any services, learn English or get any education? It made it impossible for them and it had a direct impact: they did not leave the country, but they disappeared. Some of them are probably out there being exploited right now, as a direct consequence of clauses in the Illegal Migration Act. The Act did not just put those children at risk; it put incredible pressure on overstretched local services around the country. For the previous Government to set out to use immigration legislation to put further pressure on overstretched local services was only going to have negative consequences in communities, and it should never have happened.
More broadly, the duty to remove, which this clause repeals, essentially shut down the asylum system and created what IPPR has called a “perma-backlog”. We have talked about deterrents and incentives, but I do not see any greater incentive for someone seeking to exploit the asylum system in this country than shutting it down overall, which is what that duty to remove did. It created a vicious circle, which frankly was bad for asylum seekers themselves, because genuine refugees had to spend years in hotel accommodation, which is not a particularly nice thing to do, and for the taxpayer in the UK, because costs soared from £18,000 per asylum seeker per year in 2019 to £47,000 in 2024. It was also bad for communities, because people could not be moved through that process, which clearly put pressure on an already febrile immigration situation. It is good that we are repealing this duty; as I said, it was inevitable, because it was never going to work.
Finally, I understand the points that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire made about human trafficking. It is really important that we offer the victims of modern slavery proper protections, especially when they are forced to commit crimes in the course of being trafficked. This legislation does not completely take that power away, but again, I have to draw on my experience of the last couple of years. There was an increase in the number of exploiters—those who were perpetrators of trafficking—using the trafficking system to evade prosecution. I worked closely with Police Scotland and the Crown Office, including in the Perth and Kinross council area. We saw, particularly in the Vietnamese community, the growth of that development.
We must not see the world in black and white. I am by no means saying that every victim of trafficking is somehow an imposter and we must stop them getting any protection, but it is happening, so it is proper that we keep the clauses in place so that we can tackle that. If we do not have that component, the system will break down. Just as we saw with the asylum system, if we do not have clauses to make the system functional, it will break down and everybody loses.
It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh, who, in an outstanding speech, set out the major challenges with the Illegal Migration Act, part of which will be repealed.
I want to knock on the head four things that were said by the hon. Member for Stockton West. The first was in reference to section 23 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. That provision, which the Opposition have talked about, was never implemented by the last Government, so in effect he is opposing a repeal of something that his last Government never started. That feels to me like the worst kind of politics. Between the Royal Assent given to that legislation and the Dissolution of Parliament, 315 days passed, yet no effort was made to implement that provision.
Secondly, sections 9 and 10 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 were, as we have heard, unworkable. They allow people to arrive, claim asylum in the UK, get support, and be put up in a hotel, which as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh described, will often be in the some of the most dire conditions that somebody can go through after fleeing some of the worst experiences that people can have, be it trauma, famine, disease or poverty—the list goes on. Applications were not processed, so people were not able to leave their hotel. The consequence of that is not just an expensive asylum backlog, but people living with serious psychological scarring for a significant amount of time.
That brings me to my third point. I will talk more about this when we reach new clause 26, which relates to scientific age assessments, but I really do not know how the Conservative party can talk about the welfare and protection of children when we heard oral testimony from the Children’s Commissioner about children who were subject to, and vulnerable to, organ harvesting, rape, sexual assault and disappearance from hotels and into wider society, where, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said, they are likely to continue to be abused, exploited and victimised. I will make those points when we reach that debate.
Lastly, on the point about France, I wish the Conservative party would stop throwing stones at one of nearest neighbours and most important strategic allies, particularly when we are in such a volatile international climate. It is really important that we properly scrutinise legislation, but do not indulge in the petty politics that defined the last Conservative Government, disrupted so many of our international relations, and actually made us less secure.
This has been a small but perfectly formed debate on clause 38, which repeals all but six sections of the Illegal Migration Act. As Government Members have pointed out, despite the amount of time that has lapsed since the Act got on the statute book, the vast majority of its provisions have never been commenced. In fact, we had to commence one tiny bit of it so that we could restart asylum processing; that is probably the most it ever had any effect.
Let us be clear: the Illegal Migration Act meant that thousands of asylum claims were put on hold, because of the duty to remove, increasing the backlog, putting incredible pressure on the asylum accommodation system and creating what has been called the “perma-backlog”. We all know what that was, and how big it was when we came into Government. The Act has largely not been commenced, nor will it be under this Government. We need to sort out the chaos created by the unworkable and contradictory provisions in the Act. Despite the bravado of the hon. Member for Stockton West in his earlier contribution, I suspect that most Conservative Ministers knew that the Act was unworkable, because it was not commenced when they had the ministerial capacity and power to do so for all the time between when it was put on the statute book and when we formed a new Government a year later.
The system had been left in chaos but, were the Government to accept new clause 2 and simply repeal the entire Act, it would lead to a missed opportunity to improve our immigration system. I will go through some of that with the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. Clause 38 will repeal section 2 of the 2023 Act, which provides for the duty to remove. The Government are committed to ending the migration and economic partnership with Rwanda, so section 2 will be repealed to deliver that by repealing the duty to remove and associated provisions.
On sections 22 to 28 of the Illegal Migration Act, we are not retaining the vast majority of modern slavery provisions in the Act because they are connected to the duty to remove irregular migrants. These sections were never commenced and provided that where a duty to remove was applied for an individual, that individual should be disqualified from the national referral mechanism unless certain limited exemptions applied. We are removing sections 30 to 37 relating to permanent bans on entry, settlement and citizenship, which, while held up as a success by others, were unenforced and unworkable. Sections 57 and 58 of the Act are also repealed. They relate to age assessments, but both sections are unworkable and irrelevant without the duty to remove.
Is there any reason we cannot introduce provisions in this area as part of the Bill, and when can we expect to see them?
Work is going on in the Department to assess the accuracy of the various methods of age assessment, which ministerial predecessors from the hon. Gentleman’s party commenced, but which has not yet been finished. As soon as we have more idea about how reliable scientific age assessment can be, how expensive it is and all those things, I will either come to Parliament or make a statement about how we intend to proceed. The hon. Gentleman must not assume that because these sections have been repealed we are not interested in scientific age assessments and their potential per se. They were simply unworkable because they were attached to the duty to remove, which was such a feature of the Illegal Migration Act.
The six measures that the Government intend to retain, including where provisions are in force, have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. These powers are all ones that the Government see as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve wider priorities alongside the powerful measures set out in the Bill.
The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire talked about section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act. The public order disqualification under the Nationality and Borders Act is currently in operation. It enables decisions to disqualify certain individuals from support and protections afforded by the national referral mechanisms on grounds of public order and bad faith. Public order grounds include serious criminality and threats to national security. Such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, considering the individual’s vulnerabilities. That is the sole modern slavery measure in the Illegal Migration Act that is being retained. It would, if commenced, amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. Disqualification will continue to be assessed on an individual basis.
I am glad that the Minister got to that last sentence, because it is quite clear from section 29 that victims of modern slavery only have to be considered a threat to public order. It is quite likely that many victims of modern slavery will get caught up in this; in fact, they already have. Is the Minister happy that those who were probably coerced into criminal activity will now almost be blanket-banned from any opportunity to go through the asylum process in the United Kingdom?
There will not be a blanket ban. Individuals who have been subject to public order disqualification will have been disqualified for things such as multiple drug offences, possessing a firearm and ammunition, multiple counts of sexual assault and assault by beating, grooming and engaging in sexual communication with a child. Those are the kind of things that currently lead to public order disqualifications. Nothing in the retention of section 29 will mean that individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis cannot be taken into account. It is important to understand that that will still happen. If it were commenced—it has not yet been—section 29 would introduce a duty to apply the public order disqualification, unless there are compelling circumstances that the disqualification should not apply. That still ensures case-by-case consideration.
The citizenship ban is removed from the Bill because it was unworkable and unenforced; that is, again, attached to the duties to remove. We have updated the good character guidance to prevent people from gaining citizenship if they arrived illegally by dangerous journeys. The idea is to emphasise that citizenship is not a right, but a privilege. We will continue to make those decisions on a case-by-case basis.
The other sections that we have retained are thought to be useful. The six measures in section 12 emphasise the right of the Secretary of State to determine what constitutes a reasonable time period to detain a person for the specific statutory purpose of effecting removal from the UK. Section 52 allows flexibility in our judiciary by making first-tier tribunal judges eligible to sit in the upper-tier tribunal. I cannot imagine anyone in the Committee would worry about that.
Section 59, if commenced, would extend the inadmissibility provisions to asylum and human rights claims from nationals in a list of generally safe states. Section 60 requires an annual cap to be set on the number of individuals admitted to the UK by safe and legal routes. Section 62 adds failing to provide information, such as a passcode to an electronic device, to the behaviours that could be considered damaging to the credibility of an asylum and human rights claim. All those issues are thought to provide utility, but outside the context of the duty to remove.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI congratulate everyone on their very prompt arrival.
Clause 39
Sections 37 and 38: consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
It is a great pleasure to see you, the fourth Chair of our Committee, Dame Siobhain. I welcome you to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve with you directing us.
The clause is a simple consequential one: it removes references to and amendments made by the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 when they no longer serve a purpose. During the passage of those two pieces of legislation it was necessary to amend existing Acts of Parliament, to cross-reference them and to enable enactment of the provisions within them. Few, if any, of those provisions were ever properly commenced or enacted but, since this Government intend to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act and large parts of the Illegal Migration Act, which we spent most of this morning discussing, those references no longer serve any practical purpose. They should therefore be removed from the four existing Acts of Parliament.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Dame Siobhain, as it was yesterday afternoon. It is good to see you two days in a row.
The clause, as the Minister said, makes consequential amendments necessary as a result of the two clauses that we discussed this morning: clause 37, which repeals the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024, and clause 38, which repeals provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. As we do not support either of those repeals, we do not support these revisions or agree that the clause should stand part of the Bill.
We have had our debates about the contents of those Acts. The clause concerns truly miscellaneous aspects, although I understand the logic of the hon. Lady’s argument. I certainly hope that we will press on and agree clause 39.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause introduces schedule 1, which will allow the governance arrangements for the Immigration Services Commissioner and deputy commissioner to be made more flexible. That will bring them in line with other public appointments by allowing for interim or shorter appointment lengths.
Schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner and deputy commissioner are to hold office for a term not exceeding five years. That allows the appointments to be for less than five years; currently, there is a fixed five-year term. Schedule 1 will make it discretionary to appoint a deputy commissioner, allowing for the governance arrangements to remain flexible to meet the demands of the organisation. It will enable the Home Secretary to appoint a senior, experienced member of staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances. It is to be used, for example, to ensure that cover is in place during a public appointment process where there is a vacancy in the commissioner and deputy commissioner posts. It does not replace the provision to appoint a deputy commissioner and will ensure continued regulatory oversight of immigration advisers, which is the point of this organisation.
The schedule will mean that the work of the Immigration Services Commissioner will continue and will operate more flexibly to ensure that good immigration advice is readily available. That is critical to the effective running of a coherent, efficient and fair immigration system.
As the Minister has outlined, clause 40 inserts schedule 1 into the Bill. That provides that the Immigration Services Commissioner is not to hold office for a term exceeding five years. The current regime is based on there being a commissioner and deputy, so schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner may appoint a deputy. There is also a provision to enable a member of the commissioner’s staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances, such as the roles of commissioner and deputy both being vacant. That effectively allows for the appointment of an interim commissioner.
As was said in evidence to the Committee, these amendments do not seem to us to have operational consequence. We will not oppose them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 41
Detention and exercise of functions pending deportation
I beg to move amendment 7, clause 41, page 35, line 32, leave out subsection (17).
This amendment would leave out the subsection of this clause that applies subsections (1) to (13) (relating to detention and exercise of functions pending deportation) retrospectively, i.e. as if they have always had effect.
It is great to see you in the Chair, Dame Siobhain; it makes a pleasant change from what we have had in the past couple of weeks. I say that in the nicest way to Mr Stuart.
Clause 41 introduces a significant expansion of detention powers, allowing individuals to be detained from the moment a deportation is considered rather than waiting for a formal order. However, my main concern with the clause is that it is to apply retrospectively, meaning it would legally validate past detentions that were previously unlawful. As would be expected, the provision has sparked serious concerns among legal experts, human rights organisations and advocacy groups, raising critical questions about the rule of law, human rights and judicial oversight.
We had the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association with us as part of an evidence session. They have expressed great concern with this provision, saying:
“We are concerned with the dangerous precedent which would be set if unlawful deprivation of liberty were to be treated as lawful—such retrospectivity undermines the rule of law and remains wholly unjustified in the materials accompanying the Bill.”
I have looked at this issue and there does not seem to be any sufficient justification for this exceptional measure. The ILPA warns us that it could rewrite history, denying justice to individuals who could have sought remedies for unlawful detention.
Amnesty International, which again gave very good evidence to the Committee, has also voiced strong objections. It has highlighted how detention powers have expanded significantly while judicial oversight has weakened, leading to risks of serious injustice.
Bail for Immigration Detainees has stressed that clause 41 risks
“further criminalising migrants and refugees”.
It urges instead for a system that upholds human rights and dignity.
Combined with the Illegal Migration Act, the clause could lead to longer, more expensive and potentially unlawful detentions in breach of article 5 of the European convention on human rights. The Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges that clause 41 effectively makes lawful past detentions that were not compliant with due process at the time, yet the European convention on human rights memorandum does not properly address whether that retrospective validation aligns with the fundamental legal safeguards of article 5. I would particularly like the Minister to address those concerns.
Clause 41 therefore undermines accountability, weakens judicial scrutiny and risks setting a dangerous precedent through which the Government can retroactively legitimise actions that would otherwise have been unlawful. Given the weight of these concerns, there is a strong case for leaving out the retrospective provisions from clause 41, and that is what my amendment 7 seeks to do. Upholding the rule of law means ensuring that detention powers are subject to proper legal safeguards and that individuals are not denied their fundamental rights through legislative backtracking.
The purpose of clause 41 is to clarify the existing powers of detention pending deportation set out in schedule 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. The clause ensures that the Secretary of State can detain individuals once they have been notified that deportation is being considered. It also aligns the power to detain with the power to take biometrics and to search for nationality documents. That is because the taking of biometric information and any other searches will ordinarily take place at the point that somebody is detained. The effect of clause 41 is to make clear that a person subject to deportation may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It strengthens an existing power; it does not create a new power. It clarifies a power that has always existed and been used for this purpose.
Another effect of the clause is to confirm that the Secretary of State may take biometrics and search for those documents. Since clause 41 clarifies existing powers, the detention provisions it contains are regarded as always having had effect. It is extremely important for Members to understand what the clarification of the powers of detention means. If a person is subject to deportation on the basis that the deportation is conducive to the public good, they may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It is extremely important that the Home Office should be able to detain those it is seeking to deport on that basis. Some of these foreign national offenders pose a high risk of harm to the public. Therefore, inability to detain them could have a direct impact on public safety.
The clause makes it clear that it is lawful to detain a person once they are notified that the Home Office is considering whether to make a deportation order against them, but that is not a new detention power; it has been misunderstood in some of the commentary from outside of this place. The clause clarifies an existing power to ensure there is no ambiguity about when someone subject to a conducive deportation can be detained. The accurate identification of such people is very important.
The clause also makes consequential amendments to existing powers to search detained persons—potential deportees—for documents that prove their identity or nationality, and to take their biometrics upon their being detained. Clause 41 sets out the power to detain pending deportation, as the Home Office has always understood it to operate. It is therefore right that the provision applies retrospectively. That deals with amendment 7, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and seeks to remove the retrospective element of the clause.
Clause 41 clarifies the existing statutory powers of detention. There are important public safety reasons why these powers need to be put beyond doubt. Clause 41 clarifies the powers as the Home Office has always understood them to operate. There will be no operational impact that we can assess, or increased use of the power, and no effect on people in relation to whom this power has been exercised. It is entirely right that these provisions should apply retrospectively in these circumstances.
I hear the Minister’s justification for the powers and why she feels they are necessary, but I do not hear any compelling reason for why they have to be introduced retrospectively. What on earth is that supposed to help with? She knows the range of concerns raised by a number of legal organisations. I wish she would address their concerns about the consequences of the clause.
The clause seeks to put beyond any doubt that the Home Office has the power to detain, in conducive deportation cases, at the earliest point. It has been doing that for many years. The clarification in the clause applies retrospectively to ensure that those who have been detained in the past have not been detained unlawfully. We do not believe they have, but this puts it beyond doubt. To clarify, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is putting beyond doubt in the Bill the understanding of how and when these powers can be used—at the earliest opportunity, if it is a conducive deportation. The powers, including to detain at the earliest opportunity, have always existed.
If the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire were agreed to, it would cast doubt on many of the arrests and detentions ahead of deportations that have happened in the past, which I do not think the hon. Gentleman would want to do. To reassure the hon. Gentleman one final time, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is a clarification of the way that they have always been understood to work. The clause puts beyond legal doubt that if somebody is being detained pending deportation, they can be detained lawfully at the earliest opportunity. That understanding has always been the case, but the clause puts it beyond any legal doubt.
Clause 41 confirms that the Home Office may detain someone subject to deportation from the point at which the Home Office serves the notification that deportation is being considered, when that deportation is conducive to the public good. We support this provision to allow for detention before a deportation order is signed, but that only applies if the Secretary of State has notified the person in writing. Can I seek reassurance from the Minister that the requirement for a written notice will not build any delay into the process? We also support the provision in clause 42 to allow the Home Office to capture biometrics at the new, earlier point of detention.
I will not detain the Committee for long. I do not like clause 41 anyway—I think the extension of deportation powers is overwhelming and I do not believe they are required—but I do not like this retrospection one bit. I have not secured an adequate explanation from the Minister about why that is necessary. I would therefore like to put my amendment to a vote, Dame Siobhain.
Thank you for clarifying, as that was going to be my next question. Does anybody else wish to contribute?
I am happy to give the hon. Lady the assurance that she sought. If somebody is going to be detained, it will always be done with written notice, and that should not delay anything—it has not in the past.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
You are getting a lot of practice with locking and unlocking the doors and having Divisions, Dame Siobhain—it is quite exciting this afternoon.
Clause 42 modernises our powers to capture biometric information, so that we have greater flexibility over who can take that information. It will enable a wider range of appropriately trained people to take biometric information, strengthening processing resilience following instances of small boat crossings or unexpected arrivals. In a situation where it is essential to capture biometrics at the earliest opportunity and through streamlined processes, we will be able to utilise our resources more effectively. For example, the measure will enable contractors working at a short-term holding facility to capture biometrics in the same way as other contractors based in detention centres currently do. The clause also includes a power to make secondary legislation where there is a need for others to be able to capture biometric information. That is a future proofing of the legislation.
These are sensible and necessary measures to ensure that we can identify people quickly and establish whether they pose a threat to public safety if they have arrived in an irregular or illegal way.
We are essentially supportive of clause 42, which among other things allows a person employed by a contractor in a short-term holding facility to be an authorised person to take fingerprints. The clause also includes a regulation-making power to allow other types of people to be authorised for this purpose.
May I ask the Minister how the regulation-making power is intended to be used? Are there currently other categories of people whom the Secretary of State or others in the Department would like to authorise to take fingerprints, or is this essentially a future-proofing measure, as the Minister mentioned?
This is essentially future proofing. If another category or range of people became available, we may future proof this power and use the regulation-making power to ensure that they are taking biometrics lawfully.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Articles for use in serious crime
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 43 and 44 cover the creation of two new offences concerning articles for use in serious crime. Law enforcement agencies are increasingly encountering individuals in possession of, or supplying, articles suspected to be intended for serious crime. However, proving intent or knowledge for a prosecution is often difficult, as the connection to a specific crime may not be immediately clear and facilitators frequently go undetected.
To address that challenge, clause 43 introduces two new criminal offences. The first criminalises the possession of specified articles; the second targets the importation, manufacture, adaptation, supply or offer to supply of those articles where there is a reasonable suspicion that they will be used in a serious offence. The specified articles include templates for 3D-printed firearms components, pill presses and vehicle concealments. Those concealments are particularly concerning in relation to smuggling operations, as they are often used to hide individuals for irregular immigration purposes.
The accused will need to prove that they did not intend for the article to be used in a serious offence, or that they could not have reasonably suspected it—given the few, if any, legitimate uses for the articles I have just mentioned. Those offences will be triable either way, with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, a fine or both.
Clause 43 defines “serious offences” broadly, to include drug trafficking, firearms offences and assisting unlawful migration, as outlined in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. The clause strengthens the ability of law enforcement agencies to target those facilitating serious crime. It does that by closing legal gaps and addressing emerging criminal tools.
Clause 44 defines the specific articles to be included in the new criminal offences in clause 43. As I said, the articles are templates of 3D-printed firearms or their components, pill presses and encapsulators, and vehicle concealments. Law enforcement agencies have been clear that those articles are being increasingly used by organised crime gangs, and they will continue to be used unless we take action now. 3D-printed firearms templates are increasingly being used by organised criminals, and they are at present not illegal to possess. Pill presses are being used to manufacture illicit drugs, particularly benzodiazepines. Similarly, vehicle concealments have become a significant concern for law enforcement agencies, and they are used as aids in people smuggling and irregular migration.
Clause 44 also provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the list of specified articles, allowing the law to adapt to emerging threats. Any changes will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Home Office will continue to work closely with law enforcement agencies and other partners to monitor and update that list, ensuring that it remains relevant as criminal tactics evolve. By capturing those articles, the aim is to disrupt the enablers and facilitators who profit from supplying tools for organised crime.
The clauses seem broadly reasonable, but we have a few questions on which I would appreciate some clarification from the Minister. Clause 43 creates two new offences: the possession of articles for use in serious immigration crime, and the importation, manufacture, and supply or offer to supply of articles for use in serious immigration crime. Could the Minister explain whether she feels that UK Border Force currently has the right capabilities to identify and intercept the harmful materials captured by the clause?
Clause 43 reverses the evidential burden of proof, in that a person charged with offences under it can successfully prove their defence if they provide enough evidence in court to raise a question about the issue, and the prosecution cannot prove the opposite beyond reasonable doubt. Could the Minister please explain why the decision has been taken to do that? The maximum penalty for the offences created under the clause is imprisonment for five years, a fine or both. Could the Minister please explain how and why those penalties were decided on?
Clause 44 defines “relevant article” for the purposes of the offences created in clause 43. Could the Minister please explain whether clauses 43 and 44 provide any operational benefit in terms of tackling smugglers operating abroad, and if so, how?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Dame Siobhain. I want to dwell briefly on clause 43 because it embodies a significant theme in the Bill: preparing our country for the challenges we face today and those we will face to a greater extent in the future. In that context, it is so important to talk about the risk posed to our country’s security by 3D-printed firearms.
I commend the campaigning of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill), who has done an enormous amount of work on this issue. 3D-printed firearms are a serious threat to our security, and present a new challenge to law enforcement because they can easily be made at home and are untraceable and undetectable. Indeed, files containing IKEA-like step-by-step guides to 3D print firearms at home can be downloaded from the web in as little as three clicks. That is terrifying. If we can tackle that through the Bill, that feels like a significant contribution.
The hon. Member for Weald of Kent may be familiar with the provisions in clauses 43 and 44, because they were in a Bill introduced by her predecessor, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who is now the shadow Home Secretary. That Bill was interrupted by the general election. Oddly, I chaired that Bill Committee in the last Parliament and listened to him make a speech about this issue. I therefore hope that there will be no real objection to the powers we need to take in clauses 43 and 44 to make it easier to disrupt and prevent harm from serious organised crime, some of the tools used in it and the facilitators who enable it. Such people might not have been at the scene of the crime, but they have enabled a lot of harm by supplying or importing the goods that I mentioned.
There are two sets of offences, which are designed to target different types of activity. The hon. Member for Weald of Kent asked about the evidential burden. These articles do not have ordinary, normal uses that I would consider legitimate. Printing 3D guns, or having pill presses in order to produce drugs for street sale, does not seem to be as legitimate as, say, purchasing a boat engine or indeed a boat. Given that there are no real, legitimate uses for such items, we think that placing the evidential burden on the defence to explain why on earth the person charged with possessing them has them is wholly reasonable.
Clauses 43 and 44 are intended to disrupt serious organised crime efforts to penetrate our border with paraphernalia for producing drugs or guns, or any of the things that go along with serious organised crime activity in this country, and thereby to keep people safe. I hope that the Committee will support them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Confiscation of assets
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45 amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to include offences related to the possession and supply of articles intended for serious crime, as outlined in clause 43. It will enable law enforcement agencies to seize the assets of individuals convicted under clause 43.
Specifically, the clause adds:
“Offences relating to things for use in serious crime”
to the criminal lifestyle schedules for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. A defendant convicted of an offence listed in those schedules will automatically be deemed to have led a criminal lifestyle and to have benefited from criminal conduct over a period of time. That means that assets obtained or spent in the six years prior to conviction are presumed to be derived from criminal conduct and are subject to confiscation unless the defendant can prove otherwise. However, the court is not required to make that assumption if it would result in injustice or is shown to be incorrect.
Confiscation orders are calculated based on the defendant’s monetary gains from crime—known as the benefit—and the assets they have available to them when the order is made. Orders are made to reflect the amount gained from crime and can be increased if the defendant’s finances improve. Non-payment of orders can lead to the defendant returning to prison.
By including these offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act, we can target financially criminals who profit from facilitating crime, disrupting both the crime and the financial gains that support it.
Clause 45 allows the relevant articles listed under clause 44 to be confiscated under the Proceeds of Crime Act. We support this measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Electronic monitoring requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The purpose of clause 46 is to remove any ambiguity about the court’s power to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of a serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order.
As currently drafted, the clause applies in England and Wales for any serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order, and in Scotland and Northern Ireland in terrorism-related cases only. However, since the Bill’s introduction, further legal complexities have come to light regarding the devolved Governments’ powers to impose an electronic monitoring condition. Pending agreement from the Scottish Cabinet Secretary, an amendment will be tabled to remove that express provision for Scotland. Northern Ireland’s position is still to be determined. I point that devolution complication out to Committee members and will keep them informed as those discussions develop.
Electronic monitoring serves as a deterrent, but it also improves the detection of any breaches. If the subject violates the conditions, it enables quicker intervention by law enforcement agencies. The clause outlines specific requirements for both the courts and the individual, including the obligation for the subject to consent to the installation and maintenance of monitoring equipment and to avoid tampering with it.
Additional safeguards are included. For instance, electronic monitoring can be imposed only for up to 12 months at a time, with the possibility of extension. A further safeguard requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on handling monitoring data, ensuring consistency and clarity for law enforcement.
This clause on electronic monitoring for those subject to serious crime prevention orders will enhance the effectiveness of such orders and interim SCPOs, supporting efforts to disrupt serious and organised crime, reduce harm and protect the public. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Clause 46 allows the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a serious crime prevention order. The clause is helpful for investigating suspects who are already in the UK, and we broadly support it. Will the Minister confirm that the requirement for electronic monitoring will apply to those who are on immigration bail? What value does the Minister feel serious crime prevention orders might have as a deterrent for those operating abroad?
Clause 46 specifies that there will be a code of practice to outline the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the data gathered, retention and sharing of information on these orders. When will that code of practice be issued, and can the Minister please outline what the Government expect to be included?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I would like the Minister to define electronic monitoring for us, if she can. I do not believe that there is such a definition in the Bill or in other Acts of Parliament. As a result, I worry that there is confusion, so I would welcome her thoughts.
We are talking about electronic monitoring in the context of serious crime prevention orders; we are not talking about monitoring simply in connection to being an asylum seeker or migrant. I would not want Opposition Members to worry or mix up those two things.
This part of the Bill is about dealing with serious and organised criminality, some of which will involve people smuggling, and some of which will involve drugs, firearms or other serious organised crime. This is electronic tagging in the context of the granting of serious and organised crime orders, or interim serious and organised crime orders, which are designed to disrupt and prevent the activities of serious organised crime groups, not just general asylum seekers or migrants. Obviously, there may be some connection between the two, but it is not direct in this area.
Those orders and their conditions, such as electronic monitoring, therefore will not apply to migrants generally. Law enforcement agencies use serious crime prevention orders to manage individuals who have been convicted of, or are suspected of, serious criminality, where the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting the person’s involvement in serious crime.
Serious crime prevention orders can be imposed on offenders for a range of offences relating to people smuggling. The specific conditions of the order will be a matter for the judge in the High Court who makes it, and for the law enforcement body that makes the application. This is very focused, and it is all about the context of the individual who has been served with such an order. For that to happen, there has to be evidence of their involvement in serious and organised crime.
Clearly, tagging is about being able to check where people are, while electronic monitoring can also apply to other activity. It will apply in a particular context to a particular person for disruption reasons, so there is not one definition of electronic tagging. I hope that helps the hon. Member for Woking to understand the monitoring that we are talking about. On that basis, I hope members of the Committee will agree to clause 46.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Interim serious crime prevention orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47 introduces interim serious crime prevention orders as part of the wider regime of serious crime prevention orders established under the Serious Crime Act 2007. Interim serious crime prevention orders are designed to protect the public while a full serious crime prevention order application is considered. The Court can impose an interim serious crime prevention order within hours, imposing a range of conditions and restrictions to disrupt further criminal behaviour. For example, anyone suspected of being involved in people trafficking or other serious crime could face bans on travel, using the internet and mobile phone use.
Clause 47 introduces a new provision for interim serious crime prevention orders. These allow the High Court to impose immediate restrictions, pending the determination of a full serious crime prevention order application. The Court can do that if it considers that it is just to do so. Can the Minister explain a little more by what process the Court will decide whether it is just? Is the criterion that it is necessary for public protection?
Proposed new section 5F of the Serious Crime Act makes provision for without notice applications. That is where the application for an interim serious crime prevention order, or the variation of an interim serious crime prevention order, is made without notice being given to the person against whom the order is made, in circumstances where notice of that application is likely to prejudice the outcome. Subsection (2) of proposed new section 5F makes provision for the Court to allow the relevant person to make representations about the order as soon as is reasonably practicable. Can the Minister explain whether that will always happen after the order is granted?
The High Court will be empowered to impose an interim serious crime prevention order if it considers it just to do so. In other words, it is not an evidential test, because the Court does not apply a standard of proof. Rather, it invites the Court to impose an order before it has heard and tested all the evidence in instances that require fast-paced action to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime. It is therefore an exercise of judgment or evaluation. There is a precedent for this approach in interim sexual risk orders and interim slavery and trafficking risk orders, which are currently a feature of the system and work reasonably well.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 48
Applicants for making of orders and interim orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Currently, the High Court can make a serious crime prevention order only upon application from the Crown Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office and the police in terrorism-related cases. However, High Court serious crime prevention orders have not been fully utilised; between 2011 and 2021, only two applications were made, and only one resulted in a successful order. Clause 48 extends the list of agencies that can apply directly to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order, or an interim serious crime order, to the National Crime Agency, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the police in all cases, including the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police. The clause also specifies who within each agency is authorised to apply for these orders.
This extension will simplify and expedite the application processes for serious crime prevention orders, making it easier for agencies that are directly involved in tackling serious crime to make an application where appropriate. It gets rid of a gateway process that has proven to be so tight that it has not allowed very many of these orders to go forward at all. Those agencies are often best placed to apply for a serious crime prevention order as they already have an in-depth knowledge of the case.
The clause also requires the CPS to be consulted by the applicant authority, as it will continue to have responsibility for ensuring that the order is not used as a substitute for prosecution. That is a very important part of ensuring that these orders work appropriately. In practice, this clause will make serious crime prevention orders more readily available to the agencies that are most likely to use them, to ensure that this powerful tool is used to best effect to protect the public by preventing and disrupting serious and organised crime.
Clause 48 details who can apply to make orders and interim orders, and it replaces and extends the previous list in section 8 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Can the Minister please explain how long an application for an interim serious crime prevention order might take when made to either the High Court or the Crown court?
I want to reflect on where we have got up to. We have moved through the clauses at quite a pace, and that is very pleasing to see. The Bill responds to the requests of operationally and frontline-focused people in law enforcement and border security, and it is an attempt to give them the tools and powers that they need. I particularly wanted to mention that in the context of interim serious crime prevention orders, which we have spoken about in clauses 47 and 48.
That cuts such a sharp contrast with what has happened over recent years. In 2022, one Home Secretary introduced the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. At the time, the Government said that that would deter people from crossing in small boats, but it did not. In 2023, another Home Secretary brought in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. At the time, the Government said that that would turn people away from crossing the channel in small boats, but it did not. In 2024, another Home Secretary brought in the Safety of Rwanda Act, which happily we have just repealed today. At the time, the Government talked about the prospect of sending people to Rwanda, and they said that alone would be sufficient to deter people from crossing the channel in small boats. It is no wonder that that failed, too.
I wanted to set out how in 2022, 2023 and 2024 we had three separate Acts, which all aimed to do something and failed to do so. They have not delivered what operationally focused people have requested. We really need to look at how, just eight months into this new Government, we are turning the page on our asylum system and giving enforcement powers to the people who need them. We are also tidying up the statute book and ensuring greater co-ordination across the key agencies that can secure our border. I commend clause 48 to the Committee, as I do the series of clauses before it and the Bill overall.
The idea behind the creation of interim serious crime prevention orders is to ensure that they can be brought into use ahead of a longer lasting serious crime prevention order. The widening of the range of organisations that can apply for them is designed to empower organisations such as the National Crime Agency, HMRC and the MOD police to apply, because they are much closer to the evidence that could enable the disruption of a particular serious organised crime group.
The hon. Member for Weald of Kent asked how long it would take to get such an order, and that would vary from case to case. It depends on the evidence. As I pointed out in relation to the previous clause, this is about the High Court reviewing the papers. It is not about a trial or a pre-trial; it is just about issuing an order that will prevent something that might cause damage from happening. We think that the changes made by the clauses that we have just debated, up to and including clause 48, make it more likely that serious and organised crime orders will be used and will be effective.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Notification requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to introduce a standardised list of notification requirements for individuals and bodies corporate that are subject to serious crime prevention orders. This is a process of standardisation. Currently, notification requirements are added at the court’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. The clause will standardise those requirements for all serious crime prevention orders, improving the consistency and monitoring of the orders across police forces.
We have worked closely with law enforcement partners to identify appropriate requirements. The standard list will include monitoring legitimate income, checking addresses or communication methods for signs that criminal activities are being re-established, and monitoring foreign travel to assess potential indications of a return to crime. The courts can then impose additional requirements and conditions as part of the serious crime prevention order.
For bodies corporate, a designated individual must be named to liaise with the police and provide the notifiable information—including personal details, employment, financial data and contact information—which is essential for law enforcement to ensure compliance and assess risk to public safety.
The clause includes a delegated power to add to the list of notification requirements, ensuring flexibility to meet operational needs as technology evolves. The statutory instrument will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order must provide the notifiable information within three days of the order coming into force. Failure to provide information, or providing false information, will be a criminal offence punishable by a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment. The standardisation of notifications will improve consistency in managing serious criminals and improve law enforcement agencies’ ability to assess risk and therefore more effectively protect the public.
Clause 49 sets out a prescribed set of notification requirements, so that a person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order is required to provide the police or the applicant authorities with certain information. We support the clause, although can the Minister explain why three days has been given as the deadline to respond with the notifiable information requested?
Three days seems a reasonable amount of time to allow the individual or body corporate concerned to gather the information, but also to ensure that the authorities get it in a timely way, so as to prevent any potential harm that might come from delay.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Orders by Crown Court on acquittal or when allowing an appeal
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Currently, the High Court has the authority to impose a serious crime prevention order without a conviction, provided that the Court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting their involvement in serious crime.
Clause 50 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to grant the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on individuals who have been acquitted of an offence, or in circumstances where the appeal has been allowed, if the same two-limb test is met. There may be cases where a person is acquitted but a serious crime prevention order is still needed. This can happen if the threshold for a criminal conviction is not met but there is still enough evidence to show that the person is involved in serious crime, and that the order would protect the public.
The Crown court would have just heard the evidence of the case and would be in the best position to assess whether an order is necessary to protect the public. Again, this approach is not new; similar provisions are found in other laws, such as domestic abuse protection orders under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, where orders can still be issued even after an individual has been acquitted. The effect of this clause is to streamline the process, enabling serious crime prevention orders to be applied more regularly and effectively in appropriate cases.
Clause 50 allows the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on acquittal or when allowing an appeal. Subsection (2) provides that in order to impose a serious crime prevention order in these circumstances, the court has to be satisfied both that the person has been involved in serious crime and that the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by that person in serious crime in England or Wales. Why do both tests need to be satisfied for a serious crime prevention order to be imposed? Where these cases involve acquittal, as the Minister outlined, it might be hard to satisfy the first test. It seems to us that the second test of protecting the public is sufficient grounds to impose a serious crime prevention order.
It is a two-limb test. Obviously, the evidential test for criminal proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. There is a lower evidential test in other court instances, and it may very well be that someone who did not pass the “beyond reasonable doubt” test in a criminal trial would still be considered by the court to be involved in criminal activity, and therefore they would pass the first limb of the test. They would pass the second limb as they would still be likely to be involved in criminal activity in the future. We think that the two-limb test is an appropriate response to protect civil liberties, while protecting the public from the behaviour of those who are involved in serious and organised crime. We think that that balance is about right.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Martin McCluskey.)
(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWould everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off, or switched to silent mode? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the Committee Room and on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on the declaration of interests, as set out in the code of conduct. I also remind Opposition Members that, if one of your new clauses has already been debated and you wish to press it to a Division when it is reached on the amendment paper, you should please let me know in advance.
Clause 51
Validation of fees charged in relation to qualifications
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship today, Dame Siobhain, and to contribute to Bill Committee proceedings on this important piece of legislation.
I will briefly state the purpose and effect of the clause before I make some more detailed remarks. The purpose of the clause is to ensure retrospective power for the charging of fees currently provided on behalf of the Home Office and the Department for Education in relation to the comparability, recognition or assessment of qualifications obtained in and outside of the UK from any time to the point at which the Bill comes into force. The effect of the clause is that fees charged by, or under, arrangements with the Secretary of State in relation to the comparability, recognition or assessment of qualifications obtained in and outside of the UK will have been charged lawfully.
I will now lay out how this situation came about. In spring 2024, under the previous Administration, an issue was identified with the legal arrangements to charge fees for three services provided by a third-party supplier on behalf of the Home Office and the DFE. Those are the Home Office’s visas and nationality service, the Department for Education’s UK European network of information centres services, and the Department for Education’s non-UK early years qualifications recognition service. A statutory basis for those fees has not been in place for a part, or the whole, of the period of their being charged. Although we do not have an exact date from which that may have run, the estimate is from around 2008 to the present day.
Regulations have been made for the charging of services recently for the Home Office’s visas and nationality service, and are being made for the Department for Education’s UK ENIC services. The fee for the non-UK early years qualifications recognition service was removed. We are bringing forward the clause to ensure that fees charged before the Bill comes into force are lawful.
We recognise that retrospective legislation should be used with caution, however, we consider that there are important reasons for it in this case, and indeed, that it was assumed that there was a legal basis for those fees in the past. In considering whether retrospective legislation is the right approach, it is important to be clear that customers who paid a fee received a service that they were able to use as part of, for example, a visa or nationality application, or to understand the comparability of qualifications to support access to education or work.
Other options, such as repaying fees, would require placing a considerable and unfair financial burden on UK taxpayers, who have not, on the whole, directly benefited financially from income generated by these services. That is why we believe that this measure is the right course of action to ensure that there is no doubt about the charges being lawful while protecting taxpayer money and Government resource. I repeat the fundamental point that a service was received for the fee that was paid.
It is important to make sure that we learn lessons and ensure that that situation does not happen again. Both Departments now have robust guidance and processes in place to support policy leads where legislative powers are needed to support the charging of fees in relation to the provision of public services.
Clause 51 details the validation of fees charged in relation to qualifications. We support this measure.
Great—we are off to a flying start.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Financial provisions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 20, in clause 53, page 55, line 23, at end insert—
“(3) The Secretary of State may only make regulations under subsection (1) which amend, repeal or revoke an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament following consultation with Scottish Ministers.”.
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult Scottish Ministers when making regulations under Clause 53 (1) which amend, repeal or revoke an enactment in or under an Act of the Scottish Parliament.
Clauses 53 and 54 stand part.
Clause 52 enables money to be provided by Parliament for expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Bill and for any increase in expenditure attributable to the Bill. Clause 53 allows the Secretary of State to make consequential or minor amendments to the Bill by regulation. Clause 54 confirms that regulations under the Bill must be made by statutory instrument.
Regulations under the provisions of the Bill listed in clause 54(3) will be subject to the affirmative process and will therefore require a draft statutory instrument to be laid and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament before they can be made. I commend the clauses to the Committee, but I will answer any questions or queries the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire has in his speech on amendment 20.
Dame Siobhain, we have to stop meeting like this. Amendment 20 is a rather simple amendment, and one that I hope the Minister takes seriously. Clause 53 has a massive and dramatic impact on Scottish legislation that has been passed under devolved powers by the Scottish Parliament. It says that the Secretary of State has the power to make regulations that are consequential on the Bill. Those regulations could,
“in particular, amend, repeal or revoke any enactment passed or made before, or in the same Session as”
the Bill.
The power granted to the Secretary of State is overly broad, affecting all legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament and Scottish statutory instruments over the past 25 years. Importantly, that includes enactments in or made under an Act of the Scottish Parliament as well as similar legislation passed by the Senedd Cymru and the Northern Ireland Assembly. It is unreasonable that the Home Secretary could amend, repeal or revoke that body of law through regulations that bypass proper parliamentary scrutiny.
Requiring consultations with Scottish Ministers before making those regulations is the bare minimum and could help to identify potential issues and prevent unintended consequences. The use of Henry VIII powers —or James VI powers, as we would prefer to call them in Scotland—is unconstrained and could have significant implications for the law in Scotland. For that reason, it is crucial that the Secretary of State consults with Scottish Ministers and with other devolved Administrations before moving forward with those regulations.
Amendment 20 seeks to add a requirement to the Bill that Scottish Ministers are consulted before any regulations are made under clause 53(1). I recognise the sentiment behind the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and fully expect it. I support his general point about the importance of collaboration between the UK Government and the devolved Governments. The Prime Minister was clear when this Government were elected that it is our intention to ensure close collaboration between the UK Government and the devolved Governments. I hope that my counterparts in those Governments have felt that that rings true in the case of this Bill; I was pleased to discuss it with them in February.
I can assure the hon. Member that—he will be surprised to hear—this amendment is unnecessary. The standard power in clause 53(1) simply enables regulations to make any further necessary consequential amendments. Where such regulations amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, clause 54(3) provides that the regulations would follow the draft affirmative procedure, requiring the approval of each House.
In line with normal practice, the Home Office and other UK Government Departments work with officials in the devolved Governments when legislation is being developed that would have an impact on the devolved nations, including where there is an interaction with legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament, the Senedd or the Northern Ireland Assembly. For this Bill, I and officials in the Home Office have had regular engagement with the devolved Governments. I put on record my thanks to the officials and my ministerial counterparts in the devolved Governments their constructive engagement and contributions to the development of this legislation. They are considering the Bill, and I have asked them to seek legislative consent in their respective legislatures where appropriate for certain measures.
I also note that since the relevant regulations cover only those provisions consequential on the content of the Bill, and since that content has involved continued engagement with devolved Governments over many months, what the amendment seeks is already accounted for. That said, I reiterate that normal practice would be for the devolved Governments to be engaged where legislation, including secondary legislation, is expected to have an impact on their nation. This legislation largely concerns matters that are reserved to this Parliament. For the areas where it does not, legislative consent motions are in the process of being considered in the devolved Administrations.
Given those reassurances and the general good will that has come out of the meetings we have had with all the devolved Administrations, I hope that the hon. Member will consider his concerns to be unjustified in this instance and will not push the amendment to a vote.
Clause 52 details the financial provisions. Clauses 53 and 54 set out the regulations. Clause 55 extends the Act to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Clause 56 details when the sections of the Act come into force. We welcome the clarity provided by the Minister on collaboration. We will not oppose these measures.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 53 and 54 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 21, in clause 55, page 56, line 28, after “12,” insert “24, ”.
This amendment removes clause 24 (which amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001) from the power to extend provisions of the Bill to the Isle of Man by Order in Council.
Government amendments 23 and 24 add to the existing provision at clause 55(4):
“His Majesty may by Order in Council provide for any of the provisions…to extend…to the Isle of Man.”
Certain provisions are, as appropriate, excluded from extension. The amendments make the same provision to extend provisions by Order in Council to the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey. That follows the Government receiving confirmation from the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey that they wish for a permissive extent clause to be included in the Bill. I am grateful for the engagement of officials and the consideration by respective legislative assemblies on these matters. Confirmation from the Isle of Man has been received before the introduction of the Bill, hence provision already being made at introduction.
Government amendment 21 amends the list of provisions excluded from extension by Order in Council with the effect that clause 24, which amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, may not be extended. That is on the basis that that Act does not have an equivalent permissive extent clause, and any extension would therefore not be required or appropriate. That is a little tweak to the Bill.
I am surprised to be raising this issue and that I do not immediately know the answer. The Minister has raised issues with Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, but that poses the question: what about our other overseas territories and areas such as the Falklands? The Government clearly considered the impact of our complicated relations with some places when drafting the Bill, but what about the others? Have the Government considered all those issues?
I assure the hon. Gentleman that we certainly have considered those issues. The tweak with the Isle of Man relates to a technicality that was discovered after the Bill was drafted. The two other amendments, which extend certain provisions to the Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey respectively, were added after work was done between our Parliament and those legislatures to ensure that they were happy for that extension and wanted a permissive extension clause to be added. That is what the amendments do.
Amendment 21 agreed to.
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 55, page 56, line 28, after “39” insert “ and (EU Settlement Scheme: rights of entry and residence etc)”.
This amendment to the extent clause is consequential on NC31.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 25.
New clause 31—EU Settlement Scheme: rights of entry and residence etc—
“(1) For the purposes of this section ‘relevant citizens’ rights’ means the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures which—
(a) are recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 7A or 7B of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and
(b) are derived from—
(i) Title 2 of Part 2 of the withdrawal agreement or Title 1 or 4 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Title 2 of that Part,
(ii) Title 2 of Part 2 of the EEA EFTA separation agreement or Title 1 or 4 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Title 2 of that Part, or
(iii) Article 4(2), 7 or 8 or Chapter 1 of Title 2 of Part 2 of the Swiss citizens’ rights agreement or Title 1 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Chapter 1 of Title 2 of that Part.
(2) Subsection (5) applies to a person (‘P’) where—
(a) P has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom granted by virtue of residence scheme immigration rules,
(b) the leave was granted to P on the basis of requirements which included that P is a relevant national or is (or was) a family member of a person who is (or was) a relevant national,
(c) each of the requirements on the basis of which P’s leave was granted was in fact met,
(d) either—
(i) in a case where P’s leave was not granted on the basis that P is (or was) a joining family member of a relevant sponsor, P was resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period, or
(ii) in a case where P’s leave was granted on the basis that P is (or was) a joining family member of a relevant sponsor, the relevant sponsor was resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period, and
(e) the residency mentioned in paragraph (d) was not relevant residency.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)—
(a) a person is to be treated as a family member of another person if they are treated as the family member of that person by residence scheme immigration rules;
(b) ‘joining family member’ and ‘relevant sponsor’ have the same meaning as in residence scheme immigration rules;
(c) a person is to be treated as resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period even if they were temporarily absent from the United Kingdom or the Islands at that time if their absence was permitted for the purposes of establishing or maintaining eligibility for leave under residence scheme immigration rules;
(d) ‘relevant national’ means a national of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden or Switzerland.
(4) In this section ‘relevant residency’ means—
(a) residency in accordance with Union law (within the meaning of the withdrawal agreement),
(b) residency in accordance with the EEA Agreement (within the meaning of the EEA EFTA separation agreement), or
(c) residency in accordance with the FMOPA (within the meaning of the Swiss citizens’ rights agreement).
(5) Relevant citizens’ rights—
(a) are capable of accruing and applying to a person to whom this subsection applies notwithstanding that the residency mentioned in subsection (2)(d) was not relevant residency, and
(b) are to be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.
(6) Every enactment (including an enactment contained in this Act) is to be read and has effect subject to subsection (5).
(7) In this section—
‘EEA EFTA separation agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) of that Act);
‘enactment’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (see section 20(1) of that Act);
‘the implementation period’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (see section 1A(6) of that Act);
‘the Islands’ means the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey or the Isle of Man;
‘residence scheme immigration rules’ has the same meaning as in Part 3 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 17 of that Act);
‘Swiss citizens’ rights agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) of that Act);
‘withdrawal agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) and (6) of that Act).”
This new clause ensures that an EEA or Swiss national or their family member who has immigration leave granted under the EU Settlement Scheme can enforce residency and other rights directly under the withdrawal (or other separation) agreement even if the person, or their family member, was not resident in the UK or the Islands in accordance with Union (or other equivalent) law at the end of the implementation period.
Clause stand part.
Clauses 56 and 57 stand part.
I turn first to new clause 31, which is on EU citizens’ rights. It will confirm in law what the UK has in practice sought to do since the EU settlement scheme was established: to ensure that all EU citizens and their family members with status under the scheme have equal rights in the UK.
Part of this is quite complicated, so it may be useful to try to simplify it. In order to meet free movement rules, those who were here as residents from the European Union before the end of the transition period, which was the end of December 2020, needed to have been financially self-sufficient, studying or working for the previous five years. That meant that they had the rights of permanent residence in the UK. If their family members, who may have been partners or children under the age of 21, were also here before the end of December 2020, then at that point it was a bit like census day—it did not matter whether they were outside the UK; under permitted absence rules, they could have been abroad for whatever reason but coming back. The point is about the definition of meeting free movement rules. They were resident here and effectively living under EU law, so they would be eligible for rights under the EU withdrawal agreement.
The issue is a technical one. There is a cohort described as the extra cohort, rather than the true cohort. The true cohort is those who were self-sufficient, studying or working, and therefore ticked all the boxes of meeting free movement rules. But those who, for example, were not in work on 31 December—they might have lost their job, or there was some other reason why they were not technically meeting the rules—are described as the extra cohort. While they were not technically meeting those free movement rules at that moment, we moved forward with citizens’ rights after we left the European Union at the end of the transition period by treating those two cohorts as the same, as if it had been census day.
Those technicalities have meant that the withdrawal agreement rights apply completely to the true cohort, but arguably, given case law, have sometimes become a bit more complicated when applied to the extra cohort—who, as far as the UK is concerned, should be treated the same. It is important that we clarify in law that we treat the cohorts the same. At the end of December 2020 they might technically not have met all the definitions under the free movement rules, and therefore technically not have been complying with EU law, but for all intents and purposes they should still have their citizens’ rights. The source of those rights is the withdrawal agreement. New clause 31 clarifies that so that we do not have case law challenging it or defining it differently.
It was always the UK’s intention to treat those cohorts the same, but as case law has evolved it has become more difficult in practice. I thank other parliamentarians, including those in the other place, and stakeholders who have raised this issue. We want to ensure that there is clarity in law and that what we intend is actually the case. It is better all round to make the position clear. New clause 31 will mean that all EU citizens and their family members with status under the EUSS who were resident in the UK before the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020—I remind the Committee that we left the EU at the end of January 2020, but had the transition period until December 2020—will be considered beneficiaries of the withdrawal agreement and accordingly have rights in UK law. That is regardless of whether they belong to what I have described as the true cohort—the vast majority, who were compliant with all aspects of the free movement rules—or whether they technically did not and fell within what we have called the extra cohort. The new clause means that they all be able to rely directly on the rights in the withdrawal agreement for as long as they hold EUSS status. I am sure that, like all of us, Dame Siobhain, you consider it important for your constituents to have clarity about their rights in law.
The Government take citizens’ rights very seriously, and we continue to work constructively with the EU to ensure that citizens’ rights provisions in the withdrawal agreement are properly implemented in the UK and the EU. The EUSS opened on 30 March 2019, when the withdrawal agreement was still in draft; some of us still remember those slightly heady days and late nights. From the start, the UK’s approach has been that, as the withdrawal agreement requires, all EU citizens resident in the UK before the cut-off date, which proved in the end to be the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020, are eligible for the EUSS, irrespective of whether they resided in the UK in accordance with EU law at the end of 2020. The EUSS, our scheme in the UK, does not therefore assess whether, at the end of the transition period, the EU citizen was exercising treaty rights in the UK by being a worker, self-employed, a student or self-sufficient, or whether they had an EU law right of permanent residence here, possibly on the basis of having spent five years working here.
The approach we took was fair and ensured a smooth transition. It was a priority for the whole of Parliament during that time that EU citizens with a right to be in the UK and British citizens in the EU did not have their lives disrupted by the consequences of Brexit. That approach has greatly simplified the operation of the EUSS, under which 5.7 million people now have status. It also simplified it for applicants and caseworkers. That is important, because we want consistency and accuracy in the processing of cases.
Just by virtue of these technicalities, two cohorts of EU citizens and their family members have status under the EUSS: the true cohort, who derived their rights from the withdrawal agreement, and the extra cohort, who were not within scope of the withdrawal agreement for technical reasons and derived their rights from domestic legislation. The UK has sought as a matter of practice to treat those cohorts the same in how we have interpreted and treated those cases in relation to their status in the UK, but as case law has evolved, very small technical points have had consequences where rights have been derived technically from the withdrawal agreement or domestic legislation.
The new clause will make the position clear in law. It removes the distinction in UK law between true and extra cohorts, making it clear that both are to be treated as if they were in scope of the withdrawal agreement at the end of the transition period in December 2020, meaning that they benefit from the rights contained in part 2 of the agreement.
I do not think I missed it in the Minister’s speech, although I apologise if I did. Can she advise on how many people have applied for and been granted settled status under the EU settlement scheme?
I have another question for the Minister. I believe that she said that the true cohort had about 5.7 million applicants, but I wanted to understand more about the numbers of those who would fall under the extra cohort, given that they will be benefiting from rights. Can she give a little more of an explanation as to why the issue has come to light at this point, and was not in the original drafting?
I want to ask one simple question: does the Minister remember the good old days, when we had freedom of movement across the continent?
I thank hon. Members for those comments. I can clarify the numbers that I have; if there is anything that we have not covered, I can make sure that Members are written to. I mentioned that 5.7 million people now have status, but 4.1 million have settled status. We have met the requirements for that. On why the change has happened now, the main point is that the issue has been ongoing and we had to work out the best time to bring it forward. We have now been able to bring it forward as a new clause in the Bill.
On the timing of this measure, does our experience not show us that it is better to do these things in advance rather than later, when migrants come out of the woodwork having been let down? That happened with the Windrush experience.
I thank my hon. Friend for his question. I would probably put it slightly differently. This is an example of where we are being fair and generous—going beyond what was technically within the withdrawal agreement—because that is right for EU citizens who were here. In line with the approach that we took across the whole of Government, we should make sure that there is a smooth transition and security for EU residents here in the UK and also for British citizens in the EU.
I spent four years on the Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union—I was a veteran, from the first meeting to the last. Early on, citizens’ rights were important and central. Policy has sometimes become a bit more difficult because of case law—we cannot always predict where that ends up—so it is right that we look at where we can make the position clear in law, which is what we are doing today.
Just to follow up on the numbers and check that I have understood this correctly, the Minister said that 5.7 million people have a grant of status, of whom 4.1 million people have settled status; presumably the remainder have pre-settled status. Are those numbers entirely the true cohort? Are the numbers of people that we are talking about today extra to that?
The hon. Lady asks a good question. The extra cohort is a minority in that. There are estimates. I am not sure whether I have here the estimate of the specific number of the extra cohort, which it is quite difficult to have an exact number on. But I will make sure that she is written to about the best estimate or the best way in which we can consider it. The extra cohort is a minority, but it is important that we clarify that their rights, too, are derived from the withdrawal agreement.
I thank the Minister; that is very helpful. As I understand it, settled status under the EU settlement scheme entitles individuals to welfare payments, social housing, surcharge-free NHS care and more. Of those people who have been granted settled status, is the Minister or anyone in the Home Office—or indeed anyone anywhere in Government—making an assessment of how many of those individuals are net contributors to the public purse, and how many are a net cost to Britain’s taxpayers?
I will just make this point first. In a sense, the new clause will have a very limited impact on access to benefits for those with pre-settled status, or limited leave, under the EUSS. To access income-related benefits such as universal credit, they would be required to evidence relevant qualifying activity, such as current or recent employment or self-employment. Those with settled status, or indefinite leave, under the EUSS already have full access to benefits where eligible.
On the question asked by the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, I know there is broader research, and there is some data but not other data, and there are different estimates, but I am sure that she will know and appreciate that the vast majority will be working. Her question is also relevant to a more general question about those who are here and have settled status: how many are working? We know that there is different research, but the vast majority are self-sufficient.
I refer the Committee back to the oral evidence that we heard at the very start of our work. Experts were asked whether they felt that the available immigration data, which could have been improved over 14 years, was robust enough for making strong assertions. Time and again, we heard from experts that it is very hard to make assessments about the net benefit or net cost of immigration flows into our country. Do the Government intend to work alongside the Migration Advisory Committee to improve the quality of immigration data so that we can make such assessments on a more robust footing?
Indeed, it is important to have data that can inform policymaking and public debate. This is a separate matter to the one of those who come to work, settle and contribute to our economy and society, which I know we all want to see—that is indeed what we see in our constituencies—but it is also important that those who come through humanitarian routes are supported to access employability skills and employment, so that they can support themselves and their families. It is important that we look at how joined-up we are and to what extent that support is in place.
Amendment 22 agreed to.
Amendments made: 23, in clause 55, page 56, line 29, after “to” insert
“any of the Channel Islands or”.
This amendment enables certain provisions of the Bill to be extended by Order in Council to any of the Channel Islands.
Amendment 24, in clause 55, page 56, line 31, after second “to” insert
“any of the Channel Islands or”.—(Dame Angela Eagle.)
This amendment enables certain amendments and repeals by the Bill to be extended by Order in Council to any of the Channel Islands.
Clause 55, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 56
Commencement
Amendment made: 25, in clause 56, page 57, line 15, after “35” insert
“, (EU Settlement Scheme: rights of entry and residence etc)”.—(Dame Angela Eagle.)
This amendment to the commencement clause has the effect of bringing NC31 into force 2 months after Royal Assent.
Clause 56, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 30
Conditions on limited leave to enter or remain and immigration bail
“(1) The Immigration Act 1971 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) In section 3(1)(c) (conditions which may be applied to limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom)—
(a) omit the ‘and’ at the end of sub-paragraph (iv), and
(b) at the end of sub-paragraph (v) insert—
‘(vi) an electronic monitoring condition (see Schedule 1A);
(vii) a condition requiring the person to be at a particular place between particular times, either on particular days or on any day;
(viii) a condition requiring the person to remain within a particular area;
(ix) a condition prohibiting the person from being in a particular area;
(x) such other conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit.’
(3) Before Schedule 2 insert—
‘Schedule 1A
Electronic monitoring conditions
1 For the purposes of section 3(1)(c)(vi), an “electronic monitoring condition” means a condition requiring the person on whom it is imposed (“P”) to co-operate with such arrangements as the Secretary of State may specify for detecting and recording by electronic means one or more of the following—
(a) P’s location at specified times, during specified periods of time or while the arrangements are in place;
(b) P’s presence in a location at specified times, during specified periods of time or while the arrangements are in place;
(c) P’s absence from a location at specified times, during specified periods of time or while the arrangements are in place.
2 The arrangements may in particular—
(a) require P to wear a device;
(b) require P to make specified use of a device;
(c) require P to communicate in a specified manner and at specified times or during specified periods;
(d) involve the exercise of functions by persons other than the Secretary of State.
3 If the arrangements require P to wear, or make specified use of, a device they must—
(a) prohibit P from causing or permitting damage to, or interference with, the device, and
(b) prohibit P from taking or permitting action that would or might prevent the effective operation of the device.
4 An electronic monitoring condition may not be imposed on a person unless the person is at least 18 years old.
5 In this Schedule “specified” means specified in the arrangements.’
(4) In Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 (immigration bail), in paragraph 2(1) (conditions of bail), after paragraph (e) insert—
‘(ea) a condition requiring the person to be at a particular place between particular times, either on particular days or on any day;
(eb) a condition requiring the person to remain within a particular area;
(ec) a condition prohibiting the person from being in a particular area;’”.—(Dame Angela Eagle.)
This new clause makes provision about the conditions which can be imposed on a grant of leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom or a grant of immigration bail.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause encompasses the conditions that can be attached to permission to enter or stay and immigration bail. Where a person is liable to be detained, for example because they are in the UK without the required permission or are subject to deportation proceedings, they may be placed on immigration bail. Where appropriate and in accordance with our European convention on human rights obligations, those on immigration bail can be subject to measures such as electronic monitoring and curfews.
Where a person does not qualify for asylum or protection under the refugee convention but cannot be removed from the UK because of our obligations under domestic and international law, they are granted permission to stay. Irrespective of the threat posed by the person, our legislation prevents us from imposing the same conditions that they may have been subjected to while on immigration bail.
The new clause will end that disparity in the powers available to protect the public from the particular migrant who poses a threat. It also makes crystal clear the conditions that may be imposed when a person is subject to immigration bail.
The new clause makes provision about the conditions that can be imposed on a grant of leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom or a grant of immigration bail. The new conditions focus primarily on electronic monitoring, and we are supportive of those. However, given that the Government are repealing the provision passed by the last Conservative Government to mandate scientific age assessment, I am interested to know how they intend to ensure that the requirement that an electronic monitoring condition
“may not be imposed on a person unless the person is at least 18 years old”
can be delivered. As the Minister may have noticed, I am deeply concerned about the repealing of mandatory scientific age assessment provisions, and this is another reason why. Can she give us any timetable for when the Government might return to the issue?
I am a little disconcerted by this new clause. It is disappointing that it was introduced so late in proceedings; it should have been included in the Bill as presented on First Reading. Regardless of that, the new clause seems to fit a trend that I have detected with this Bill: there seems to be a cavalier attitude, approach and relationship with international obligations and some of our human rights commitments. Whereas I think everybody would accept that we want to target high-risk criminals and offenders, and the Government require the necessary powers to do that, they do admit that there are issues to do with the ECHR. I want to hear the Minister explain clearly what she means by high harm and risk. I think she has to give the Committee examples of the type of person who would fall foul of the new clause.
Human rights protections are in place for really good reasons. They have been designed and concocted to ensure that people get the protections regardless of what they may have committed in the past. We muck about with them at our peril. All that this cavalier approach to human rights will do is encourage those who want to get rid of our international obligations and our human rights entirely. I am looking at my Conservative friends; this does nothing other than encourage them and push this Government to go further.
We need to hear from the Government what they actually mean by the new clause. Given this watering-down of our commitments, we need to hear a real commitment from the Government that they stand by our international obligations and everything that is included in human rights for everybody we have a responsibility and obligation for.
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain.
I disagree with the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. Given what we have seen play out in the last few weeks, I welcome the measures outlined in the new clause, which answers some of the issues highlighted by new clause 44, which was tabled by the Opposition.
I draw attention to the amendment of section 3(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971, which would put in a place a robust suite of measures to monitor and manage those coming into our country. Let us not forget that the new clause focuses on those who are coming here illegally and who are known to have been involved in criminality. The use of curfews, as well as inclusion and exclusion zones, with the possibility of extending conditions where the Secretary of State sees fit, will be a marked improvement on the incoherent approach currently in use. As we have debated in previous sittings, the provisions in the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 are not fit for purpose.
I believe that new clause 30, with greater intelligence and the duties of co-operation outlined in clause 5 relating to the role of the Border Security Commander, will create a foundation for better communication and data sharing between our intelligence agencies and their international counterparts. I feel that it will greatly improve on the current situation, in which, in the past few weeks, criminals and those with links to terrorist organisations have entered the country with limited restriction under the flawed legislation of the previous Government.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham and Rainham and I welcome the new clause. British citizens must be safe, and they need a Government who act to protect them. I believe that the new clause will give them reassurance that we have the ability to impose tight controls and monitoring of an individual if it is deemed necessary by the authorities. We must have legislation that puts the security of our country at the top of the agenda, and the new clause gives the police the powers to impose electronic monitoring, curfews and movement bans on people who are perceived to be a threat when ECHR obligations are protecting them.
I want to comment briefly on the speech by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. I understand the importance of being sensitive to possible infringements and abuses of international law; indeed, in recent years, we have seen states around the world traducing it. However, I gently say to him—I hope it has not missed his attention—that the Prime Minister is a lawyer and, as a consequence of that background, he is deeply wedded to the law. In most of his speeches and statements, he refers consistently to the importance of the UK being a leader on the world stage by respecting international law.
I say that because the Committee has just repealed the Safety of Rwanda Act, which was deemed unlawful by the courts. We have a Prime Minister who deeply respects international law; around the world, we have states and actors who traduce it. Having a Prime Minister and a country that are so committed to it at this point in history is really important. I gently say to the hon. Member that it is important that we are sensitive to possible infringements of international law, but we ought not to overplay the possibility of it happening here in our country, when all the evidence from the last eight months should give us confidence and hope.
I would be interested in the Minister’s assessment of the operational utility of the new clause. What impact do the Government expect it to have on lowering the rate of abscondence from immigration bail?
We have had a small but perfectly formed debate on the new clause. I seek to reassure the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and explain to those who have made contributions the effect of the provisions.
I say gently to the hon. Member that the Bill is in compliance with international human rights laws. The powers in the new clause are necessary to protect the public from a very small cohort of migrants who pose a threat to them, but who cannot be removed because of our obligations under domestic and international law. In other words, they exist only because we are observing our obligations under international law. If we were simply to ignore international law and seek to deport people against the standards of international law to which we have signed up, we would not need to have these extra powers. We are debating new clause 30 only because we are adhering to international law. The hon. Member says that we are being cavalier about our commitment to adhering to international law. I gently say that he has got it pretty wrong.
In these cases, we will continue to frequently assess each person’s circumstances to ensure that they are removed at the earliest opportunity from measures such as a requirement to report, a curfew or electronic tagging, if it is safe to do so from the point of view of protecting the public. The powers will be used only in cases involving conduct such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, extremism or serious crime, or where the person poses a threat to national security or public safety. That is a pretty high bar.
The idea is that if somebody is on immigration bail and we are trying to detain them to deport them, but it transpires that we cannot deport them because of the threat to their safety and they have to be looked after here, it is wholly proportionate, if they present a real threat to the public, that the powers to electronically tag them or subject them to exclusion or inclusion zones can be attached to them. We are talking about people who come off immigration bail because we cannot deport them and, without the new clause, would suddenly find themselves much freer to cause the damage that we fear they may cause if they are left unwatched. That is the very narrow purpose of the new clause in the circumstances that I have talked about. To impose these tough restrictions there has to be a proportionality test, and of course all that is testable in law.
We are seeking to make certain that we can satisfy ourselves, more than we can at present, that that small category of people who, on a case-by-case basis, will be assessed to present this kind of risk can be properly managed and watched. In those circumstances, I hope that the Committee will agree to add the new clause to the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 30 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 31
EU Settlement Scheme: rights of entry and residence etc
“(1) For the purposes of this section ‘relevant citizens’ rights’ means the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures which—
(a) are recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of
section 7A or 7B of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and
(b) are derived from—
(i) Title 2 of Part 2 of the withdrawal agreement or Title 1 or 4 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Title 2 of that Part,
(ii) Title 2 of Part 2 of the EEA EFTA separation agreement or Title 1 or 4 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Title 2 of that Part, or
(iii) Article 4(2), 7 or 8 or Chapter 1 of Title 2 of Part 2 of the Swiss citizens’ rights agreement or Title 1 of Part 2 of that agreement so far as relating to Chapter 1 of Title 2 of that Part.
(2) Subsection (5) applies to a person (‘P’) where—
(a) P has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom granted by virtue of residence scheme immigration rules,
(b) the leave was granted to P on the basis of requirements which included that P is a relevant national or is (or was) a family member of a person who is (or was) a relevant national,
(c) each of the requirements on the basis of which P’s leave was granted was in fact met,
(d) either—
(i) in a case where P’s leave was not granted on the basis that P is (or was) a joining family member of a relevant sponsor, P was resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period, or
(ii) in a case where P’s leave was granted on the basis that P is (or was) a joining family member of a relevant sponsor, the relevant sponsor was resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period, and
(e) the residency mentioned in paragraph (d) was not relevant residency.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)—
(a) a person is to be treated as a family member of another person if they are treated as the family member of that person by residence scheme immigration rules;
(b) ‘joining family member’ and ‘relevant sponsor’ have the same meaning as in residence scheme immigration rules;
(c) a person is to be treated as resident in the United Kingdom or the Islands immediately before the end of the implementation period even if they were temporarily absent from the United Kingdom or the Islands at that time if their absence was permitted for the purposes of establishing or maintaining eligibility for leave under residence scheme immigration rules;
(d) ‘relevant national’ means a national of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden or Switzerland.
(4) In this section ‘relevant residency’ means—
(a) residency in accordance with Union law (within the meaning of the withdrawal agreement),
(b) residency in accordance with the EEA Agreement (within the meaning of the EEA EFTA separation agreement), or
(c) residency in accordance with the FMOPA (within the meaning of the Swiss citizens’ rights agreement).
(5) Relevant citizens’ rights—
(a) are capable of accruing and applying to a person to whom this subsection applies notwithstanding that the residency mentioned in subsection (2)(d) was not relevant residency, and
(b) are to be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.
(6) Every enactment (including an enactment contained in this Act) is to be read and has effect subject to subsection (5).
(7) In this section—
‘EEA EFTA separation agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) of that Act);
‘enactment’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (see section 20(1) of that Act);
‘the implementation period’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (see section 1A(6) of that Act);
‘the Islands’ means the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey or the Isle of Man;
‘residence scheme immigration rules’ has the same meaning as in Part 3 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 17 of that Act);
‘Swiss citizens’ rights agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) of that Act);
‘withdrawal agreement’ has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (see section 39(1) and (6) of that Act).”—(Seema Malhotra.)
This new clause ensures that an EEA or Swiss national or their family member who has immigration leave granted under the EU Settlement Scheme can enforce residency and other rights directly under the withdrawal (or other separation) agreement even if the person, or their family member, was not resident in the UK or the Islands in accordance with Union (or other equivalent) law at the end of the implementation period.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 1
Duty to publish a strategy on safe and managed routes
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish a strategy on the Government’s efforts to establish additional safe and legal routes for persons to seek asylum in the United Kingdom.
(2) A report under subsection (1) must be laid before Parliament.”—(Pete Wishart.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament a strategy on the development of safe and managed routes for people to seek asylum in the UK.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 6—Additional safe and legal routes—
“The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passage of this Act, make regulations specifying safe and legal routes through which refugees and other individuals requiring international protection can enter the UK lawfully.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying additional safe and legal routes, under which refugees and others in need of international protection can come to the UK lawfully from abroad.
The Government’s intention with the Bill is, as we have heard on numerous occasions—practically ad nauseam—to smash the gangs and disrupt their business model. In their attempt to do that, they have focused the Bill exclusively on what Ministers and various other Labour Members have called “deterrence measures”. That seems to include the further criminalisation of a number of new offences, and the extreme and exclusive focus on asylum seekers. Throughout the Committee’s proceedings, we have been encouraged to believe that all this is necessary for the Government to secure their objectives. We will see in time whether they are successful, but I have my doubts; the Bill is pretty much the same as others I have seen over the past 20 years.
The reason it is likely to fail is that what is entirely missing is the stark reality of those making the journey themselves. There is not even the remotest bit of curiosity as to why people are making such dangerous crossings or why they are prepared to put themselves and their families at such huge risk. Asylum seekers do not want to be at the mercy of these gangs and this vile trade—of course they don’t—but other than a few distinct and narrowly defined legal routes, asylum seekers are completely and utterly dependent on, and at the mercy of, the gangs.
That may well be the case, but I suggest to the hon. Member that Ukrainians are not getting on small boats across the channel because they have an effective and efficient safe route to get to this country that is not available to most other nations. There is no safe route, for example, for Eritreans or Sudanese people. There is just nothing available. The only means they have to get to the UK are small boats.
There is also the Hong Kong scheme. We do not see very many people from Hong Kong getting on board small boats to come across because, again, they have an efficient, effective scheme that is inclusive and deals with most of the problems. The Ministers also say that safe routes will do nothing to stop people getting on small boats and nothing to stop these journeys. No one is claiming that the establishment of safe routes would end all unsafe journeys. I do not believe that that is the appropriate test. It would not end small boat crossings, just as Ministers do not make ending all people smuggling and human trafficking the test of this new Bill, and their policy of smashing gangs and stopping the boats.
Safe routes cannot be expected to end all dangerous journeys or exploitation by smuggling gangs, and their capacity to reduce them depends on their accessibility. We also support safe routes because they are morally right—it is the right thing to do—and because safe routes save lives. The more available and accessible safe routes are, the more lives will be saved. Safe routes undercut smuggling gangs. The more available and accessible they are, the more they will do for the effort to smash the gangs and the people involved in this vile trade.
We have discussed the whole Bill in the last two weeks and it focuses primarily on increasing offences. Although tackling organised crime is necessary, it addresses only one side of the problem. Without safe routes, desperate people will continue to attempt dangerous crossings. We have a choice in front of us. We can continue with a range of policies that ignore the root causes of these journeys, or we can take meaningful action: expand safe routes, uphold our humanitarian commitments and make migration safer and more manageable. A truly modern and compassionate asylum system must include safe routes as a central pillar as well as all the other things this Government want and intend to do. Surely we should be looking to save as many lives as we can, and we know that safe routes save lives.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I have listened with interest to the points made by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. We need to go back to the evidence we heard from the researcher from the Migration Observatory who I keep quoting. He said that demand for channel crossings is essentially “inelastic”. The hon. Gentleman is predicating his argument on tackling the demand side of the equation. We have been told by the experts that policy will have only a limited impact on the demand, and that is particularly salient when we think about safe routes.
The hon. Gentleman is quite correct; we already have safe routes in this country. We have the Afghan scheme, but because that is not available to everyone from Afghanistan, some of those who are not eligible come across on unsafe routes. Although the Ukrainian and Hong Kong schemes are not specifically refugee schemes —they are analogous, I accept that point—they are open to a much broader cohort of people. There are some 254,000 Ukrainians and 120,000 Hong Kongers in the UK right now. Those figures are off the top of my head; I am ready to be corrected. It is because of the comprehensiveness of that safe route that we see such high numbers in the declines in the channel.
If we followed the hon. Gentleman’s advice, we would fall into the same logical trap as the Conservatives did with the Rwanda scheme. With Rwanda, the so-called message to the migrants was, “Don’t get on a boat—there’s a 1% chance that you’ll be sent to Rwanda.” First, it was not credible. Secondly, it clearly had no impact on people’s decision making. The hon. Gentleman is proposing that we say, “Don’t get on a boat—there’s a 1% chance that you can come in on a safe route.” I would argue that that would have the same impact on people crossing the channel.
The only way we could have a safe routes phenomenon would be to open them to a select group of people from a select few countries. That would basically be deciding who we thought was the most deserving and who was not, which is not how the refugee system should work. People’s cases should be judged on their merits and on individual circumstances. People can come from ostensibly safe countries but face things such as LGBT discrimination. People could be from a country at war but ineligible because they are one of the perpetrators of that war. We need to judge people on their cases.
Finally, the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said that safe routes are the only way to stop people getting on boats and freezing in the channel. Let us be really clear: that is the whole purpose of the Bill. However, the channel crossings are a new phenomenon. They were not happening five or 10 years ago, when we did not have safe routes either. The way to tackle people getting on those boats is by tackling the supply of boats and ways to cross the channel by tackling the gangs. Safe routes may have other values, but not for the purposes of stopping channel crossings.
I am happy to support new clause 1—in fact, I enthusiastically support it. The challenge of speaking after the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire is that most of the things worth saying have already been said. In the evidence session I highlighted that safe and legal routes are a key part of us tackling the problem. The Ukrainian scheme is a clear example of success, as is the Hong Kong scheme, yet this Government, like the last one, seem reluctant to go down that route.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh was just saying, that we listen to the refugee voice and think more broadly about what asylum seekers and refugees actually want?
In a previous life, I worked for an international development charity where I led UK campaigning on safe and legal routes. In so doing I took away a major learning, which is that the UK cannot be overwhelmingly the country that receives refugees and asylum seekers via safe and legal routes. That is in part because the UK alone cannot be asked to shoulder such a large responsibility, but also because many asylum seekers and refugees wish to return home and therefore want to be located in a safe country that is nearer to their home country. Is it not right that we think about this in a broader and international sense, rather than assuming that the UK has to always be the country that shoulders the responsibility, when there are other ways that we can support?
I have some sympathy for what the hon. Member says. We talked about listening to the refugee charities. One of the notes that I made of our evidence session is that they criticised the Bill as only being half the story—saying that it tackles the supply but not the demand. They said that we needed an integrated approach, and to them this Bill was not that; it was a blunt instrument. They were sympathetic to some of the Bill, but they said that it will not fully solve the things that we want to solve.
I have sympathy with the hon. Gentleman’s point that it might not be a full solution if the UK is the only country to agree safe and legal routes; but we made an agreement with Europe agreed about the Ukrainians. The hon. Member could have tried to amend the new clauses to say that the Government should be working with international partners to introduce safe and legal routes, but it seems that the Government want to dismiss any discussion of safe and legal routes whatsoever, even if working with partners.
Is it not the case that the Government do not think that primary legislation is the way to secure international negotiation about safe and legal routes? Actually, those conversations will be happening with the Government and partners. In fact, one of the highlights of having a new Government is a reset of our relationship with the European Union, which—in time, once it matures and restores—can help in negotiations for better routes for humanitarian assistance and support. Primary legislation is not needed for everything.
I would really like to hear the Minister confirm that the Government are going to work with international partners to encourage a co-ordinated programme on safe and legal routes. One option, I would hope, is to agree to the new clause, but if the Government will not agree with this version, will they agree to consult on how to introduce safe and legal routes with partners? I am trying to be as moderate and practical as possible. A lot of requests from MPs do not require immediate action, but they do require the Government to consult. Is that something that the Minister would consider?
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East for making a compelling argument around the balance between our decency and humanity and not creating a pull factor that will cause more risk. I draw the Committee’s attention to our work as a Government with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which has resettled individuals from Ethiopia, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. Combined with the other resettlement routes that we have in place, such as family reunion, the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, and the Hong Kong and Ukraine schemes, we have resettled over half a million individuals since 2015—I do not know the exact stats. There are ways to come here safely for people who need it.
When it comes to illegal migration, it is important that we take out the smuggling gangs. The Bill will help us do that with disruptive measures so we can get there first. This counter-terror approach is the right way.
SNP new clause 1 and Liberal Democrat new clause 6 seek to establish, within six months of the passage of this legislation, safe and legal routes through which refugees and other individuals can enter the UK. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said, it was very good that the previous Conservative Government set up the Afghan resettlement programme, which was a route that Afghans could use to come to the UK. However, in that same year, 2022, over 8,000 Afghans arrived on small boats—the second-highest number of people by nationality. The trend has continued, as Afghans were the top nationality arriving by small boats in 2023 and 2024. This shows that safe and legal routes do not necessarily lead to an end to crossings in small boats. The point is especially important now, as the EU has begun to take action to tackle illegal migration, such as looking again at the 1951 refugee convention.
The fundamental question of safe and legal routes seems to be that of how many people the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire thinks Britain might need to let in to achieve the aims he sets out. There are over 120 million people in the world who have been displaced from their homes, of whom nearly 50 million are refugees. That is nearly three quarters of the population of this country. On top of that, the 1951 refugee convention now confers the notional right to move to another country upon at least 780 million people, for—as well as internationally displaced refugees and modern slaves—there are all those who could potentially face a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, who may flee their home country. Some of those people—many of them, perhaps—are living lives that might seem to us in the UK unspeakably and unthinkably hard and sad. It is also true, though, that there is a limit to what this country is able to do to help through migration. The answer to global suffering cannot be that all those people come here.
New clause 1 calls for a strategy on safe and managed routes, but that does not reflect the challenge of these routes and the way that they are created. By their very nature, specific asylum routes are often opened up in response to specific circumstances: usually, emergencies that could not be foreseen and anticipated in a neat strategy. The hon. Member for Dover and Deal is right to highlight the work this country does with the UN to identify those in the world in the greatest need of our help and where that help, in the form of resettlement, would be most appropriate. It seems to me that it would be impossible to publish in advance a strategy for something that is mostly centred around emergencies that cannot be foreseen.
This has been a very good debate and we have got to the heart of some of the issues. I will push the new clause to a vote because, of all the things that those involved with the welfare of and looking after refugees and asylum seekers tell us, their main ask of this Government is to look at a strategy for safe routes. I think we are getting to the equation at the heart of all the issues that we are considering today: the demand side and the supply side.
We are supporting Government measures to ensure that they tackle the demand side—they might have useful armoury, like this Bill, to achieve that—but surely we should give even scant attention to the supply side: the reasons that so many people are coming here. The fact is that they have no other option but to get on an unseaworthy boat to sail across the channel to get to the UK, as they can only make a claim for asylum when they are based in the UK.
I am not asking the Government to open the country up to 247 million refugees. That would be absurd and ridiculous. I do not think anybody is suggesting that at all. All we are asking is for the Government to see if they could do something more to ensure that there are routes available for some of the most wretched people in the world who are looking to come to the United Kingdom, and that we do not leave them exclusively at the mercy of the people that I know the Government are sincere in wanting to tackle.
That is a very difficult thing to say. We have some rough ideas when it comes to the Ukraine and Afghan schemes. These schemes are really worth while. We have seen them work, because there are no Ukrainians crossing the channel—we have had five individuals. It is absurd and ridiculous to suggest that every single refugee in the world is going to come, but the Government—we passed this in a clause earlier—are putting a cap and a quota on people using these safe routes. They are not interested in opening up and developing these safe routes; they want to stop and put a quota on people using them.
Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that there is not a binary choice between, on the one hand, safe and legal routes to the UK, and on the other, getting into a death machine boat to reach the UK? Actually, we could have refugees and asylum seekers who travelled through safe and legal routes to other countries.
Absolutely. I think we are starting to get into territory where there is general agreement. With these amendments, we are asking the Government to look at what more they could do to achieve their clear objective of smashing the gangs. The gangs are successful and will adapt to whatever is put in their way by the Bill. These people know how to work this business. People have said it has only been going five years, but this business is developing at pace. They will amend their business model and practice to adapt to whatever the Government throw at them in the new criminalisation clauses. Their trade will probably get more lucrative as a response, so let us beat them. Let us take them on. Let us really spike their business model by offering an alternative way and means to secure entry to the UK so asylum can be claimed. All we are looking for is an opportunity to develop this and have a conversation.
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that it is the same dynamic as the Rwanda programme? If we are offering only 1% of people safe routes, it is the same as saying to 1% of people that they will be sent back. The impact on those people’s decision making is exactly the same.
I have been listening very carefully to the hon. Gentleman, and I have been impressed by his contributions thus far in public, but it is utterly absurd and ridiculous to suggest that offering safe routes is somehow on a par with the Rwanda scheme. It disrespects the hon. Gentleman’s case to suggest there is any similarity about this. We are trying to ensure that the business model of the gangs will be smashed and tackled.
Who and where does the hon. Gentleman see the scheme applying to? It is very easy to go along with the case for compassion, but who and where? The hon. Gentleman says that he cannot give an indication of numbers or costs, but who are the priorities, and who exactly will benefit from such a scheme?
If we look at the international situation, we know the hotspots and the areas and issues that have difficulty, because there are people queuing up in France to come to the United Kingdom. Safe routes should not be the only solution; they are part of a solution. We also have to look at what we are doing on the ground in these countries about particular difficulties and issues. We seem to be making the situation 10 times worse by withdrawing international aid from a number of these countries, which will only put more pressure on these areas. The scheme is part of a package. It looks at the criminalisation clauses and uses safe routes as a means to assist that process, getting involved in countries where there are difficulties and issues and trying to help resolve the tensions and difficulties there. For every single organisation that works with refugees and asylum seekers and is concerned about their care, this is their main ask. We should listen to them.
The hon. Gentleman speaks passionately and with a great deal of compassion, which I respect, and I understand his point. However, I return to the point from this side of the Committee, which is that there is a limit to how many people we can look after and help. We also owe a duty to those who have already come into the country, and a duty to our own population, to offer them services. There is currently a real stretch, and I think that, without knowing the details about how many, and where they will come from, we will really struggle.
Before I take an intervention from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, does the Minister want to contribute?
Thank you, Dame Siobhain. It is a pleasure to speak to these new clauses, and to acknowledge the genuine questions and important aspects that have been raised in the debate so far. In particular, I thank the hon. Members for Perth and Kinross-shire and for Woking for tabling the amendments. Contributions also came from my hon. Friends the Members for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh and for Dover and Deal and from the Opposition.
The point I want to make on this subject is in response to both new clauses, although I recognise the slight differences. New clause 1 seeks to require a strategy, laid before Parliament, for the development of safe and managed routes for people to seek asylum in the UK, and new clause 6 seeks to require the Secretary of State to
“make regulations specifying additional safe and legal routes”.
The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said that he was pretty good at predicting the responses from colleagues. I gently suggest that I might say some things that he may not expect about certain aspects of the subject. That is because some parts of what we currently do have not been raised at all in the debate. They are in relation to safe and legal routes, and how they are working, outside the Afghan, Ukrainian and Hong Kong schemes. I want to go through those points because they are important.
I also make a broad point in relation to, in particular, the comments and the question from the hon. Member for Woking about consideration and having a conversation. The Government will, as he knows, shortly set out our approach to immigration as part of considering how we bring down net migration, tackle abuse and put more controls in the system. The system has lost public confidence. I think we all know—the Conservatives themselves have acknowledged it—that we lost control of immigration. The system was and is chaotic. It is not just a problem in relation to how people feel about an immigration system that is not fair, controlled or managed; it is about the consequences for individuals, such as asylum seekers caught up in backlogs. Their lives are on hold until their claim is considered.
It is important to return to the subject of the utter chaos that the whole system has been in, and why the Bill is important to what we are looking to do to strengthen our borders and go after the smuggling gangs, which hon. Members have mentioned. Those gangs do so much damage to the lives of migrants. They also undermine our border security and make money—millions—from putting lives at risk. It is important that we look at how we are tackling the demand. Several hon. Members made that important point. I was surprised that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire did not talk about going even further with what he is suggesting.
I realise and understand that it is me standing between everybody else around here and lunch, so I will be brief. I am grateful to the Minister, and there is very little I disagree with her on: we have to tackle the upstream situations and do all we can to ensure that we alleviate some of them. I agree with all that. All I am seeking to do with the new clause is to add to the armoury for taking on the gangs. That is the intention of this Government, but without this new clause, the whole system is not complete; we are just leaving all those asylum seekers at the mercy of these illegal gangs and their vile trade. All I am asking is whether we can devise a strategy that would help the Government in their mission. I will press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 4—Scottish visa scheme: immigration rules—
“(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must by immigration rules provide for the establishment of a Scottish visa scheme.
(2) A scheme established under subsection (1) must be administered under the executive competence of Scottish Ministers.
(3) No scheme may be established under subsection (1) until consent has been given by Scottish Ministers with respect of the criteria, extent and duration of the scheme.”
In conjunction with NC3, this new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide for a Scottish visa scheme administered under the executive competence of Scottish Ministers.
I thought we were ready for lunch! I am ill prepared. This Committee has a strong work ethic—I am desperately trying to find my notes.
The new clauses are practically the exact opposite of everything about this Bill. I am delighted, if quite surprised, that they have been selected for debate. As you would expect, Dame Siobhain, I am going to use the opportunity to promote this cause. Unlike everything about the Bill, the new clauses have at their heart the recognition of the value of immigration, how it is a benefit and why it is necessary to keep our communities and workforce healthy and sustainable.
Scotland has an emerging demography and population crisis, and that is only going to get worse unless we do something about it. With our falling birth rate, we are reaching the stage where we have too few working-age people available to look after an ever-increasing older population. We are already experiencing issues and difficulties in the health service; the care service in Scotland is heading for a workforce crisis; and hospitality outlets and businesses are closing in rural constituencies like mine because they have not got the staff. The simple fact is that Scotland needs more working-age people to refresh our population. If we fail to secure the people we require, we will be in serious trouble.
Scotland is not alone in this—we are just a little bit further along than some other nations. All over the world, advanced democracies are facing the same range of problems and are now positively addressing their own issues with a range of interventions that they hope might spare them the worst of the consequences. Ironically, the global population is still growing and it is uncertain when population growth will peak, but most predict it will come as early as the 2060s.
When I heard that we had a demography professor as a witness in our evidence session, I was quite excited, given my interest in population and demography, but he seemed to be more interested in eugenics than global trends. I think we almost got him to confirm that almost all predictions show that we will soon be heading to population decline. Given his particular and weird worldview, I do not think he accepted even that.
All reputable sources agree that the world population will soon peak and then fall rapidly. As population growth slows down, we are starting to see the difficulties occur. They will start to be felt in nations that experienced rapid growth in the 20th century, like the United Kingdom and most other European democracies. Already we see countries in Europe, such as Italy and Spain, starting to see the real difficulties of population stagnation. Even China is beginning to experience the wider impacts of population slowdown. Japan stands out as a stark example: it is not just at population stagnation, but population decline, which might see it fall from third in the GDP ranks to eighth, because of the impact on the economy.
Far from being a burden, by the end of the century we might be in a situation where immigrants could be at a premium—a highly sought commodity. I am sure that is a prospect that would make our Reform colleagues’ heads explode, as well as those of some Conservatives.
The conventional Westminster consensus view from both Labour and the Conservatives is that immigration is a burden—it is out of control and something that must be tackled and controlled. They might look at the general UK population trends and believe they validate the point. The UK population is currently 68.3 million. It is apparently going to grow by another 5 million to 72.5 million by the mid-2030s, then it is going to fall. But it is going to grow by that scale only because the Tories made such a hash of their mission to cut immigration that they inadvertently quadrupled it.
I admire the hon. Gentleman’s forthrightness in putting forward his argument. I have thought about this issue for a long time. Two cantankerous Scotsmen talking about their hobby-horse while everyone else waits for lunch is an exquisite torture to subject the rest of the Committee to.
I was surprised even to see the new clause on the amendment paper—
Because the Bill is about border policy and asylum policy, which have very little to do with visas, migration and the running of the immigration system. I do not think this Committee is the place for it, but I am learning that people sneak amendments in wherever they can in this place.
The new clause refers to the granting of visas
“to enable certain workers to work in Scotland only.”
First, let us be clear: that is absolutely a part of our immigration system. An international student who wants to study at the University of Edinburgh, or Queen Margaret University in my constituency, gets a visa to that university. I suppose they could commute from Worthing or Dagenham, but in reality they live locally. Equally, when people get a job, they get it on the basis of a specific role, so it is tied to that location. The immigrants we currently have in Scotland are obviously allowed to move around the country, as we have free movement within the UK, but we already have the component of their job location, so the new clause is completely irrelevant.
Secondly, we have had some international examples of a federated country or state introducing a specific visa system, such as Canada and Australia, and 20-odd years ago we had the Fresh Talent scheme in Scotland. The evidence is that specific systems are not very effective at either achieving the aims they set out or tackling any of the deep-rooted challenges that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire alluded to. All the evidence shows that such schemes are not the right tool to address those challenges.
To come to some of the points the hon. Gentleman made, we have to be honest about the challenges we face in Scotland. Even in this era of record-high net migration to the UK, the figure for which is 900,000—way higher than the goal the Conservatives set—parts of Scotland still struggle to attract migrants. When we had access to European free movement, or 300 million potential people to come and fill vacancies in our labour market, we did not attract them. We have been talking about demand and supply and migration, but the problem is not the supply of immigrants coming to Scotland. It is that we are not generating the demand for them to come to our part of the UK. That is what we need to work on.
The reason for that is the Scottish labour market: it is not dynamic or attractive enough to solve the challenges we have. I would argue that after 20 years of the SNP Scottish Government running our economy and leaking our taxes, that is the cause of our challenges.
I cannot let the hon. Gentleman get away with this, because it is utter and total bunkum. I ever so gently encourage him to look at the migration figures within the United Kingdom and at how many people are leaving Scotland and how many are coming from the rest of the UK to settle in Scotland. It is at a record high, and it is growing. We have never seen figures quite like this before. They are attracted to Scotland because we have a better health service, we have a better taxation system and there are more opportunities.
I have given the hon. Gentleman a great deal of latitude in the Committee, and I suggest that what he is doing is not an intervention.
I do not think it is the state of the Scottish health service that is attracting people to Scotland. Other Members are seeing what it is like dealing with the Scottish nationalist party. To a man with a hammer, every problem is a nail. To the SNP, the solution to every question is Scottish independence, or some specific Scottish legislation. Where there are specificities in Scotland, such as our health service and some of our labour market, there absolutely should be action from the Scottish Government to deal with it. However, this problem is not that. The issue is not that Scotland needs to become independent to attract people. We need to reform our labour market so that we can deal with the demographic issues.
The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire makes the point that people are coming to Scotland now, but once again the SNP is making the mistake of seeing all of Scotland as some monolithic whole, rather than trying to think about what is happening in Scotland. My constituency of Edinburgh East and Musselburgh is seeing record population growth, at 15%, and it is 20% in the East Lothian part of the constituency. We are struggling to put in houses because we are so attractive and wonderful.
But other parts of Scotland are not finding that. The hon. Member for Inverclyde and Renfrewshire West is present, and there are serious challenges in Inverclyde as population is declining. We are seeing a move in Scotland from the west coast to the east coast, as Scottish people move about, and we are also seeing international migrants focusing on certain parts. Some areas have vacancies, especially the highlands and the north of Scotland, because moving there is not attractive to people within Scotland. A Scottish visa could end up with everyone moving to Edinburgh, which would not at all solve the problems that other Members in the room face.
I made the point at the beginning that if we want to use migration to solve our demographic challenges, we are falling into the same mistake as the far right: we are forgetting that migrants are people. They are not just cogs that we put in a machine to be placed in and taken out at will. They are people who grow old, get sick, fall in love, move around and do stuff. We do not suddenly put people in and find that we have solved our demographic challenge. There are whole sets of things that we have to do. Most of all, the main point is that this is a debate that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and I need to have at length over the course of this Parliament, not as part of the Bill.
SNP new clauses 3 and 4 seek to set up a separate visa scheme and immigration rules for Scotland. Can the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire explain a little more about how this would work in practice? Who does he expect or anticipate those “certain workers” to be? How does he expect that to work in isolation from the wider UK economy? What would prevent someone from applying for a visa to Scotland and moving to other parts of the UK? Is the SNP advocating that there should be checks on people moving between Scotland and the rest of the UK? Why is the SNP not spending more time getting those who are economically inactive into work, rather than reaching for the immigration lever?
I think that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire implied Professor David Coleman was talking about eugenics in the session. I want to put on record that he was not talking about eugenics and that he is an emeritus professor of demography; I know that was a line of questioning raised by the Minister. I want to put on record that that was not what he was there for. He was there to talk about his work with Migration Watch.
The Minister says that the professor is a eugenicist, but he actually explained a different relationship. It is important that that is put on record, because it is taking away from his role as emeritus professor for demography.
I am a little surprised to see the suggestion from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire because my sense, from the rest of what he said in the debates we have had over preceding sessions, is that he would like to see less of a distinction between British people and those who come to this country as migrants. Indeed, his new clause 5, which we will debate after this, will explicitly set this out, particularly on the question of British citizenship. A scheme like the one he proposes in new clauses 3 and 4 would have the opposite effect, since any citizen of the United Kingdom can freely move between England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, living and working wherever they choose, and can change the location of their home or employment without permission or notice from any authority. We can pass from one area to another without being stopped or questioned, without having to evidence who we are, where we are from and going, and if and when we might return.
A specifically Scottish visa programme would presumably only work if none of those things were the case. Whatever the details, it would surely involve people coming to Britain but promising only to live and/or work in Scotland, over and above the situations where such things are already implied by the specific conditions of their visa—like the university at which they are studying or the company employing them, as the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh already laid out.
How would this be evidenced, tracked or enforced? Would individuals moving from a few metres into Scotland to a few metres into England be deported? Why would this be a specialist visa programme? If our friends north of the English-Scottish border are especially keen to attract people of working age, be they migrants or not, why would this be the right solution? What steps are already being taken to attract such people, or to make it easier for them to move to or work in Scotland?
Finally, I am interested in the view of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire on why Scotland currently has within its borders so few asylum seekers within the system. Given what he has previously said, it would be interesting to understand why he thinks that the number of asylum seekers—either in hotels or in dispersed accommodation in Scotland—is less than half of what it should be, proportionate to population of the rest of the United Kingdom.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship for this important debate, Dame Siobhain. It is probably the fourth time we have discussed this matter. I want to acknowledge the persistence of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. He will be aware—perhaps this is one point I can acknowledge that he would have predicted my response—that we will not be introducing a Scottish visa scheme or devolving control of immigration policy. This has also been a discussion that we have had, and a point that we have made to the Scottish Government. In my remarks, I will perhaps make a few points that will be useful for his ongoing deliberations on this issue, and suggest how he may direct them towards working with the Scottish Government on some matters that it may be useful for him to be aware of.
The key point is that we must work together to address the underlying causes of skills shortages and overseas recruitment in different parts of the UK, and that is what we are seeking to do. The hon. Gentleman also knows that we believe net migration must come down—under the last Government, it more than trebled and reached a record high of over 900,000 in the year to June 2023. Immigration is a reserved matter, on which we work in the interest of the whole of the UK. The previous schemes that we have talked about have succeeded only in restricting movement and rights, and creating internal UK borders. Adding different rules for different locations will also increase complexity and create friction when workers move locations.
I will be brief, but a lot of the questions that were asked were relevant and deserve a response. First, it is not me that the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh needs to debate and speak to about this; it is Scottish businesses, business organisations and the political consensus in Scotland. The hon. Member should sit down with Jackie Baillie, who raised visas as a live issue during the general election campaign. I do not know what happened to that ambition from Scottish Labour. It seems to me that it was totally slapped down by the bosses down here in the Home Office, who wanted absolutely nothing to do with it. We do not hear about it as much anymore, but it was a real ambition from Jackie Baillie and the Labour party to secure this provision for Scotland. We only need to look back at the last Labour Government to see what imagination can do and what effective Government can deliver. We had the Fresh Talent scheme—a fantastic scheme that gave us a competitive advantage when it came to university students.
The hon. Gentleman mentions the Fresh Talent scheme, which allowed graduates of Scottish universities to remain and work for two years after graduation without needing a sponsoring employer. In practice, many Fresh Talent participants did not remain in Scotland and took up employment elsewhere in the UK. That is precisely the challenge we are talking about.
I remind the Minister that we have a hard return at 2 o’clock, so the longer we go on, the less likely it is that anybody is going to get an opportunity for lunch.
I will try to be as brief as possible, because I understand that we have got a time constraint.
Fresh Talent possibly did do that, but it would be different this time round because we have a distinct tax code in Scotland. We have Revenue Scotland as a result of further devolved powers from a few years ago. To address the questions from Conservative Members as to how a scheme would work, because of that tax code anybody who came in through a distinct Scottish visa scheme would be bound by that, and the obligations and qualifications would be to work in a list of occupations that is designed in Scotland.
Members are talking about this as if it has never been done anywhere else in the world. When I chaired the Scottish Affairs Committee, I took it to Quebec, and we sat down and examined exactly what happened there. We saw a fantastic scheme that has given Quebec, and particularly the Montreal metropolitan area, huge advantages over the rest of Canada. It works there and it works in Australia. Through imagination and making sure they are done in the right way, these schemes work and bring real benefits. International examples show that distinct tax codes that would allow people to stay within a distinct area in Scotland could be easily delivered.
We are going to continue to debate this issue as this Bill goes forward. The whole Scottish business community and the care sector are saying to us, “This is a priority.” It is not going to go away, but again it is rebuffed. Is a place on the Migration Advisory Committee really the best that the Government can with this range of difficult circumstances? I will be back to the issue and we will make sure that we take things forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Martin McCluskey.)
(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI congratulate everybody on arriving so promptly; I hope there is not too much indigestion about.
New Clause 5
British citizenship
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act—
(a) ensure that illegal entry to the UK is disregarded as a factor for the purposes of assessing whether a person applying for British citizenship meets the good character requirement; and
(b) ensure that all asylum seekers with—
(i) indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom;
(ii) settled status; or
(iii) indefinite leave to enter the United Kingdom;
have a right to naturalisation after five years of residency in the United Kingdom, regardless of their country of origin or method of arrival.”—(Pete Wishart.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to change current Home Office guidance stating that people who enter the UK illegally, regardless of how long ago, will "normally be refused" citizenship (if they applied after 10 February 2025).
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss
New clause 13—Good character requirement: illegal entry—
“The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, ensure that illegal entry to the UK is disregarded as a factor for the purposes of assessing whether a person applying for British citizenship meets the good character requirement.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to change current Home Office guidance stating that individuals who enter the UK illegally, regardless of how long ago, will “normally be refused” citizenship (if they applied after 10 February 2025).
I trust everybody enjoyed the five-course banquet we had in the 20 minutes available to us. I apologise if I seemed to be unnecessarily detaining the Committee and depriving them of a good and solid lunch; we will make sure that that does not happen again, Dame Siobhain.
It was with a gasp of astonishment that we learned of this Government’s intention to change the nationality good character requirement guidance—it came totally out of the blue. I think we are all still reeling a little bit, thinking about what this involves and what is at stake. It establishes a new standard that individuals who previously entered the UK illegally or without valid entry clearance, particularly in what is described as a “dangerous journey”, will now be refused citizenship. That is a huge departure from previous practice, where illegal entry was typically considered a barrier to citizenship only if it had occurred in the past 10 years. Regardless of how long a person has lived in the UK, their mode of entry could now be used to deny them the right to naturalise.
This policy has been implemented without prior consultation or parliamentary scrutiny—it is going to get a little bit this afternoon, but that is only because we have brought the issue to this Committee—and that raises serious concerns about its fairness and legality. The majority of refugees arrive in the UK through irregular routes; safe and legal pathways remain extremely limited, as we learned in the previous debate. By effectively banning these individuals from citizenship, this policy risks permanently disenfranchising those who have sought protection in the UK and who have built their lives here.
We already heard from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which wrote to the Committee to say that the decision to deny citizenship based on mode of entry contradicts the UK’s commitment under international law, particularly article 31 of the 1951 refugee convention. This article’s non-penalisation clause states:
“The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”
The denial of citizenship based on how someone arrived in the UK is a clear penalty, which goes contrary to the convention. The UNHCR notes that it previously highlighted in its legal observation on the Illegal Migration Bill 2023 that restricting access to citizenship under section 31 to 35 of that Act would constitute a
“penalty under Article 31 of the Refugee Convention and be in breach of that provision. It further stated that the provisions ran counter to Article 34 of the Refugee Convention and Article 32 of the 1954 Convention on Statelessness which requires States to ‘as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of’ refugees and stateless people”.
Despite the proposed repeal of these provisions, updates to the nationality good character requirement guidance issued in February 2025 appear to reintroduce similar barriers, further restricting pathways to citizenship for those affected. In addition, the policy change is likely to deter many from applying for citizenship altogether, given the high costs involved and the lack of an appeal process in case of refusal. Even if the guidance states that an exception may be made, which I am pretty certain is what the Minister will tell me, those who would be likely to obtain citizenship due to their personal circumstances will be deterred from applying.
Currently, a naturalisation application costs £1,605, with an expected increase of £1,685. That financial burden, combined with the uncertainty surrounding the application process, creates significant barriers for refugees and stateless persons who would otherwise seek to integrate fully into British society.
The application of the policy will go beyond individual applicants. Citizenship is a key factor in social integration, providing security, stability and full participation in civic life, including the right to vote in general elections. Without access to naturalisation, many individuals who have lived and worked in, and contributed to, the UK for years—if not decades—will remain in a precarious status. Although the Home Office guidance allows for some discretion in decision making, it provides no real criteria on how that discretion will be applied. The lack of transparency makes the process unpredictable and risks creating a system where citizenship decisions are inconsistent or arbitrary.
The changes also highlight the broader issue of immigration law being shaped through administrative guidance rather than through democratic scrutiny, which is our role as parliamentarians in this House. By changing the interpretation of the statutory good character requirement without parliamentary oversight, the Home Office has effectively reinstated elements of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 that were meant to be scrapped through this Bill. The lack of accountability is deeply concerning.
Granting citizenship is a key step in ending an individual’s status as a refugee or stateless person. It also benefits the host country by fostering economic, social and cultural integration while promoting social cohesion. Restricting access to citizenship undermines those objectives, and that is why I tabled this new clause.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to change current Home Office guidance stating that people who entered the UK illegally, regardless of how long ago, will normally be refused citizenship. The new clause states that illegal entry—in other words, breaking into this country—should be disregarded as a factor for the purposes of assessing whether a person applying for British citizenship meets the good character requirement. Effectively, both the Liberal Democrats and the SNP want to ensure that entering this country illegally is not a bar to gaining citizenship.
British citizenship is a huge honour and privilege, and the benefits that come with it have attached costs. Can hon. Members see what a pull factor this measure would create for making dangerous channel crossings in small boats? There is nothing compassionate about allowing small boat crossings to continue, and this new clause would do nothing but encourage more. The Labour Government are already repealing provisions in our Illegal Migration Act that prevented illegal migrants from getting citizenship. It seems that the SNP, the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Government are all in agreement that illegal migrants should get British citizenship. Do the SNP and the Liberal Democrats agree with the Prime Minister that British citizenship is not a pull factor for illegal immigrants?
If people believe that crossing in a small boat will ensure that they can not only stay, but stay for evermore with all the attached benefits of British citizenship, they will continue to come in ever-increasing numbers. Even the Government’s own Border Security Commander has said that we cannot smash the gangs without a deterrent. British citizenship and all its associated benefits would provide an incentive for making that small boat crossing, inducing people to feed the model of the evil people-smuggling gangs. The Conservative party believes that British citizenship is a privilege, not a right, and certainly not a reward for illegally crossing the channel. We do not support the measure.
I want to put on record again the importance of the rule of law. This new clause would essentially allow someone rights when they have entered the country illegally. The rule of law and compliance with the law are fundamental within our system, so I cannot accept the premise that acting illegally should be waived or permitted. We are a country of fairness and there has to be fairness and equality under the law. This provision flies in the face of that. If we make an exception here, no matter how desperate the situation, we set a dangerous precedent.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West said, it is a privilege to have British citizenship, and so many people abide by the law. The system proposed by the new clause for those trying to enter the country via illegal routes fundamentally undermines that. We have to be incredibly careful in how we proceed with these things; if something is illegal, the clue is really in the name.
I am happy to support the new clause tabled by my friend the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. I will also speak to new clause 13, which does essentially the same thing. This issue is about fairness and reasonableness. Ensuring that effectively no refugee or asylum seeker can get citizenship is not reasonable. Refugees will forever become second-class citizens if we allow that to go ahead. I am concerned that that would deepen divisions within society by disenfranchising our newest constituents and residents. The refugees I have spoken to in my constituency of Woking are so proud when they get citizenship, and it encourages integration. Banning them from citizenship, which is what current guidance amounts to, is wrong. I am happy to support both new clauses.
To quote my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch), British citizenship is—or at least should be—
“a privilege to be earned not an automatic right.”
Citizenship should be available only to those who have made both a commitment and a contribution to the United Kingdom. For example, it should be a fundamental principle of our system that people who come to this country do not cost the public purse more than they contribute to it. It should also be a fundamental principle of our system that those who seek to harm this country, to break its laws and to undermine what we hold to be fair and right should never be able to become British citizens. To state something so obvious that it sounds almost silly, those who have come to this country illegally have broken the law. The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National party are proposing that we ignore that fact.
As my hon. Friend the Member for South Northampton- shire just said, how can we possibly say that lawbreaking should not be considered when assessing whether someone is of good character? It seems to me outrageous, unfair and completely against what we understand to be the wishes of the public to turn a blind eye to the fact that someone has broken the law when it comes to determining their character and thus whether they should become a fellow citizen of this great country.
Separately, the Conservatives feel that the timeframe the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire suggests in new clause 5 is far too short. In line with our party’s wider policy, we feel that five years is not enough time to qualify a person for indefinite leave to remain. Immigration, as we are all well aware, was at well over 1 million people a year in 2022, 2023 and 2024, and net migration was at, or is expected to be, at least 850,000 people for each of those years. If we accept that the immigration policy of the past few years was a mistake, we should make every effort to reverse the long-term consequences. That is why the Conservative party is advocating that the qualifying period for ILR should be extended to 10 years, rather than the five years in the new clause.
Finally, I return to my earlier point about Scotland, the Scottish National party and the proof of its compassion as compared with its words. The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire shook his head when I was speaking about the number of asylum seekers and where they are located. The latest data released on that is for December 2024. As I read it, in Scotland, there are 1,421 asylum seekers in hotels, compared with 36,658 in the rest of the country, and 4,262 asylum seekers in dispersed accommodation, compared with 61,445 across the rest of Britain.
I appreciate that that is challenging mental maths, so I will tell hon. Members that that means that Scotland houses only 5% of the asylum seekers currently accommodated by the state in this country. Scotland is underweight relative to population and dramatically underweight relative to size. Given everything that the hon. Gentleman has said that he and his party stand for, would we not expect the opposite to be true—that Scotland would be pulling its weight more, rather than less?
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in response to the debate on new clauses 5 and 13. I want to clarify a few points. There are already rules that can prevent those arriving illegally from gaining citizenship. In February, the Home Secretary further strengthened measures to make it clear that anyone who enters the UK illegally, including small boat arrivals, faces having a British citizenship application refused. This change applies to anyone who entered the UK illegally, or those who arrived without a required, valid entry clearance or valid electronic authorisation, having made a dangerous journey, regardless of the time that has passed since they entered the UK.
I remember saying on Second Reading that this Government were carrying on in the vein of the Conservatives. Doing something so all-encompassing and denying as this is probably worse than what the Conservatives would ever produce. They did not conceive anything like this. They are capable of having the warped imagination that produced the Rwanda Bill, but they did not even come close to something like this.
As well as being a privilege, surely British citizenship should be available. What the Government are doing with the change to the good character reference is denying all asylum seekers and refugees the slightest opportunity to become a British citizen, except in narrowly defined circumstances, as the Minister pointed out. What about all the things about cohesion, and giving people opportunities? I thought that was the British spirit.
I am a British citizen. It is not a particular definition that I want to hold on to for much longer, but I am a British citizen. To me, it strikes me as just not British to deny a whole swathe of people in this country the right to achieve that status.
Does the hon. Member realise how ironic it is for him to be lecturing us on British citizenship when he does not particularly want his?
I am sure the hon. Gentleman and I will have the opportunity to discuss these issues in the future of this Parliament and I very much look forward to that.
I did not hear anything at all from the Minister about anything to do with the quite stern rebuke to this Government from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in its written evidence. It is concerned that this measure drives a coach and horses through the UK Government’s commitments to certain sections of the various conventions. Is the Minister even slightly embarrassed about what has been presented to them?
This is a nasty, pernicious move by this Government, and it is not particularly in the spirit of what they are trying to achieve with the Bill. It is a continuation of the ethos of the previous Conservative Government. It even introduces through the back door certain aspects of the Illegal Migration Act that we are very keen to move on from. I hope that the Government reconsider this measure, and I will certainly be testing the Committee with a vote on the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 9—Participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations—
“(1) The Secretary of State must provide adequate resources to law enforcement agencies for the purpose of enhancing their participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations.
(2) The resources provided under subsection (1) must include technology for conducting improved surveillance on, and detection of, smuggling networks.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), ‘law enforcement agencies’ include—
(a) the National Crime Agency
(b) police forces in England and Wales; and
(c) the British Transport Police.”
This new clause would require the Government to allocate adequate resources to law enforcement agencies to enhance their participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations, including through technological tools for better surveillance and detection of smuggling networks.
New clause 10—Requirement to produce an annual report on cooperation with Europol—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passage of this Act, lay before Parliament an annual report on cooperation between UK law enforcement agencies and Europol.
(2) A further report must be published and laid before Parliament at least once per year.
(3) An annual report under this section must include—
(a) actions taken during the previous year to cooperate with Europol;
(b) progress in reducing people smuggling and human trafficking; and
(c) planned activities for improving future cooperation with Europol.”
This new clause would require the Government to provide an annual report to Parliament detailing the UK’s efforts to cooperate with Europol, its progress in reducing levels of people smuggling and human trafficking, and its plans to improve future cooperation.
I will be relatively brief. The three new clauses concern Europol, and the Liberal Democrats and I think that they are vital to ensuring that the Bill goes further and is more effective. Cross-border co-operation is key to reducing small boat crossings—something that the former Government made it harder for our country to do. However, the Bill misses the opportunity to better tackle them. We believe that this Government should strive for greater cross-border co-operation, including by working with Europol. Including that as part of the Bill seems a sensible step.
Liberal Democrat new clauses 8, 9 and 10 attempt to establish a joint taskforce with Europol and provide annual reports to Parliament to reduce levels of people smuggling and human trafficking.
Most Governments accept that international partnerships and cross-border co-operation have a role to play in solving the problem, but the new clauses could restrict the Government’s ability to negotiate in this regard while creating a cost by way of the need to provide further adequate resources to enhance that partnership and participation. They would also impose a responsibility to create yet another report. The National Crime Agency has said that no country has ever stopped people trafficking upstream in foreign countries. The Australians have done it, but that was with a deportation scheme. Why do hon. Members not think that a strong deterrent—that people who arrive in this country illegally will not be able to stay—would not be more effective in stopping people smuggling?
I realise that the Lib Dems seem to think that Europe has the answer to all the world’s problems, but surely even they must appreciate the need for a deterrent, rather than an incentive. In fact, as Europe reconsiders its approach to immigration by looking at what it can do to deter illegal entries, it is even more important that we do the same, rather than becoming the soft touch of Europe.
In the light of the comments that Government Members have made on other provisions in the Bill, these new clauses seem to us completely unnecessary. Exactly as my hon. Friend just said, they do not seem to us appropriate for primary legislation and seem more likely to constrain rather than empower the Home Secretary and Ministers in their difficult job of securing the border.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I will keep my comments brief.
I read the new clauses from the hon. Member for Woking with interest. I understand the important point that has been raised—I think by hon. Members on both sides—about the importance of working internationally on this issue. I suppose my question to him would be: does he not think that an international outlook in tackling the issues that we have here, which is the sole purpose of the Bill, has already been exercised? In December last year, we agreed the Calais Group priority plan with our near neighbours and the joint action plan on migration with Germany. In November last year, we had the landmark security agreement with Iraq, and we also have a well-established relationship with our counterparts in France to work closely to prevent the dangerous crossings and reduce the risk to life at sea.
We have talked a lot about cause and effect, and I can really see the intention behind the new clauses. However, I question their necessity, as well as some of the suggestions made about the intention of the Government, who have really shown a pragmatic outlook about how we deter those crossings.
I wonder whether the SNP and the Liberal Democrats are experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder, and I mean that in two senses. First, they query whether this Government are committed to international human rights, when they have shown time and again that they are, although I understand that concern, given what has gone before. With this situation—where they are trying to prescribe, in primary legislation, the foreign affairs of this Government and the regularity with which they meet international organisations—I wonder too whether they are experiencing some post-traumatic stress disorder, because they know that the previous Conservative Government resorted to sticking two fingers up at our international partners and international agencies. I hope they will withdraw the new clause because they should feel reassured that this Government have a respect for human rights, international law and working with our international partners and agencies.
I hope you, too, enjoyed a long and languid lunch, Dame Siobhain, after the way in which we overshot this morning’s sitting. This group of new clauses introduces requirements, in primary legislation, for the Secretary of State to put in place arrangements for closer co-operation with Europol, which includes seeking the establishment of a joint task force, providing adequate resources for participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations and the publication of an annual report.
Very few of us would quibble with what I suspect is the intended output of such clauses, but I would quibble with the means by which the hon. Member for Woking has decided to try to bring it about. He is putting things into a piece of primary legislation, which cannot be easily changed, moved or shifted about, and that creates more issues and less flexibility than what I am sure he is seeking to achieve.
I suspect that, with these clauses, the hon. Gentleman is using the Bill as a hook on which to hang requirements on the Secretary of State, so as to have a debate about how the Government will co-operate with international law enforcement agencies. I do not think he is really saying that we should be doing that in the quite rigid way that his new clauses suggest. I reassure him that we are doing what I think he wants us to do according to the new clauses, but in a much more flexible way that can be changed very quickly because it is not stuck in a piece of primary legislation. I think we also discussed it on day one in Committee.
The UK has a strong relationship with Europol, including significant permanent presence in the agency’s headquarters in The Hague. UK law enforcement agencies already collaborate with international partners through Europol-supported operations. The allocation of resources to that participation is an operational decision for law enforcement agencies, and certainly not one that should be included in primary legislation. There is regular interaction on both operational and strategic matters between Europol, this Government and the Home Office, including at the most senior levels.
As well as working with Europol, the Home Office will continue to work with a range of international bodies—including Frontex and operational work with many of the law enforcement agencies in European countries and beyond, for example—to deliver the Government’s border security objectives. That is because we recognise that border security is not just about one’s own border: quite often weaknesses in others’ borders along the traveller and migratory routes cause weaknesses for us. Indeed, sometimes visa regimes in other countries can cause problems in the UK. For example, the sudden appearance on small boats last year of large numbers of Vietnamese, who clearly had not walked from Vietnam, was caused by changes that had happened to visa requirements in other countries. Those things are interrelated. Fighting organised immigration crime is an interrelated operational, diplomatic and political matter, on which this Government are doing a great deal of work to try to strengthen it and make it more effective.
The UK regularly participates in operational taskforces with EU partners, and it is inappropriate to place on the face of a piece of legislation a statutory requirement to seek to establish a joint taskforce. That would force us to have a joint taskforce, whether or not we wanted one and whether or not it would do any good, thereby, in that case, diverting precious resources where they are not operationally needed.
I hope the hon. Member for Woking understands the points that I am making. The Border Security Commander will provide an annual report to Parliament, setting out their views on the performance of the border security system as it develops. Europol is an individual agency, among many with which UK law enforcement collaborates to achieve the Border Security Commander’s objective. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept my comments on his three new clauses in the spirit in which they are intended: we know what he means, but we think that we have a better way of bringing it about in a far more flexible way than through his new clauses. If he accepts that argument, I certainly hope he will withdraw the amendment.
I do not quite get the reasoning that says that we do not need the amendment in order to work with Europol because we already work with Europol. The amendment is about empowering Parliament and making the Executive act, which is what we are keen to do. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 11
Removal of restrictions on asylum seekers engaging in employment
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the date on which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament a statement of changes in the rules (the ‘immigration rules’) under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (general provisions for regulation and control) to make provision for asylum applicants to take up employment whilst their application is being determined, if it has been over three months since the application was made, with no decision made.
(2) Employment undertaken pursuant to subsection (1) is subject to the following restrictions—
(a) employment may only be taken up in a post which is, at the time an offer of employment is accepted, included in Appendix Immigration Salary List;
(b) there must be no work in a self-employed capacity; and
(c) there must be no engagement in setting up a business.”—(Mr Forster.)
This new clause would remove the restriction on working for asylum seekers, if it has been over three months since they applied.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is about allowing asylum seekers to work. It is commonly raised, by a lot of people, that this country discourages asylum seekers from working. It seems that it is viewed as being tough on them, but what it does is encourage an unacceptable welfare bill. We have a lot of research on it from the Lift the Ban coalition. Several years ago, it said that, actually, the fiscal gains from such a change would be significant. Originally it said that the gains would be £97.8 million a year, but that figure was later revised up to £108.8 million. I think the new clause would encourage work, lower the benefits bill for the taxpayer and ensure better integration.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that what is causing that huge bill is not the fact that people cannot work, but that they are waiting for a decision? They are stuck in backlog, but if they got a decision that would obviate this discussion completely.
I do agree with that. The system was broken by the previous Government; that is one of the very few things that the hon. Member and I completely agree on. We know that the system is broken, but we leave people stuck in limbo. Until the system has been fixed, let us enable them to work and use their skills to benefit our constituencies. If there were a quick decision in a matter of weeks, there would be no need for the new clause. But we know that is not going to happen. That has consistently failed to be implemented. In the meantime, we should let and encourage asylum seekers to work, for their benefit, the benefit of their families and the benefit of our constituents.
Liberal Democrat new clause 11 attempts to remove the restrictions on asylum seekers engaging in employment. It is yet another inducement for making that perilous journey, and another selling point for the people smuggling gangs as they make their pitch with the aim of profiting from the peril of others. New clause 11, coupled with new clause 10, seems to mark out a marketing plan for those evil and immoral people smuggling gangs.
Successive Governments have maintained that easing work restrictions could draw asylum seekers to the UK because they would believe that the reception conditions were more favourable. It creates a huge potential for an increase in applications from economic migrants whose primary motivation for coming to the UK is to benefit from work opportunities rather than to seek safety.
Do the Liberal Democrats not agree that lifting the ban will act as pull factor for migrants all over the world to come to the UK? Do the Liberal Democrats understand the impact that such a policy would have on other Departments, such as the Department for Work and Pensions and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs? If the Liberal Democrats are worried about skills shortages, what plans do they have to get the 9 million economically inactive people already in the UK into those roles? What thoughts have the Liberal Democrats put into the measure, the legal issues it may introduce with employee rights, and the further challenges it will give the Home Office in swiftly removing those here illegally to their country of origin?
In evidence for the Bill, Professor Brian Bell, who chairs the Migration Advisory Committee, spoke about what he sees as the incentives for people to come over here from France, which is of course a safe country. He spoke of the strong economic incentives to come to the UK and the challenge that poses for any Government because it would not necessarily benefit us to remove those incentives. He said:
“the unemployment rate is 7.8% in France and 4.4% in the UK. The gap is slightly larger for young people than for the population as a whole. I am sure the Government would not want to change that incentive, although the French probably would. If you have a buoyant economy relative to your neighbour, at least in the labour market, that is an incentive.” ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 58, Q89.]
He went on to say that there are some things that we could do that might help, such as better enforcement of our labour laws, making it more difficult for people to work illegally.
What the hon. Member for Woking and the Liberal Democrat party are proposing is exactly the opposite of what Professor Bell was saying that we should do. Allowing asylum seekers to work before their claims are approved would make it easier for people to come here illegally and make money, and so it would increase the economic incentive for people to come, which we have heard is a pull—perhaps the primary pull—for people making those life-threatening journeys across the channel in the hands of organised criminal gangs. We consider it to be deeply wrong and counter to the aim of everything we are trying to achieve in securing the border against illegal migration. It is unfair and immoral.
This is another rare moment of general agreement with the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Weald of Kent. We will savour this moment. I will make some quick points on the new clause. It does create an additional pull factor for those seeking to travel. We do not know who is a genuine asylum seeker until their claims have been processed. The new clause would put a lot of people who are not genuine asylum seekers into our workforce to then be pulled away when the deportation takes place. Having asylum seekers in work may also create funding for others looking to travel over on small boats, as they may send money back to others in order to come over.
The answer to this question is in what we are doing already. The Home Secretary and immigration Ministers are working hard day to day at getting the Home Office back doing their day jobs again and speeding up the processing so that those who should be in work can be and those who should not be here are deported.
I have a few points about some of the legal issues around what it would mean if we allowed asylum seekers to work at this point. The Opposition already have concerns about the Employment Rights Bill and the day-one rights that will be accrued, so I wonder in this context how this would actually work. On another level, I wonder about how we would deal with tax that they pay and their national insurance numbers before they have had their asylum claims examined.
I see that subsection (2)(a) of the new clause talks about asylum seekers being able to take up a post that is included in the appendix immigration salary list. I wondered whether the hon. Member for Woking had more detail about what that means or entails—forgive me, I am not an expert in that area. I also note that they cannot do any self-employed work or set up a business. Although I can see the principle of what hon. Members were trying to achieve with the new clause, in reality I am not sure that, given how it is drafted, it would get them anywhere near that. I have quite a few concerns about it.
I wholeheartedly back the hon. Member for Woking’s new clause; I thought about tabling it myself, but he beat me to it. It is sensible and should be supported by the Committee—mainly because it is an utter waste that people with huge skills are languishing in hotels doing practically nothing all day. We host a number of asylum seekers and refugees in hotels in Perth, and I go and visit them. Can I just say to the hon. Member for Weald of Kent that Scotland more than has its share of the general number of asylum seekers across the United Kingdom? I do not know where she has got her figure from.
No, I will correct her and then she can come back on that. Scotland hosted 5,086 refugees receiving support from local authorities. That represents 8.3% of total asylum seekers. The population of Scotland accounts for something like 8.8% of the total population of the United Kingdom, so we are hosting almost the same number as our population share—that is quite remarkable given the distance Scotland is from where most of the asylum seekers come in. We have a proud record of supporting asylum seekers. Not only do we have our fair share when it comes to hotels, but we give free travel to asylum seekers in Scotland—something we are very proud of. I am happy to give way to the hon. Lady if she wants to come back on that, but I do not know where she is getting her figures from.
My figures are from the Government release of the data for December 2024. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has those figures or can break them down, but they state very clearly: 1,421 asylum seekers in hotels in Scotland; 4,262 asylum seekers in dispersed accommodation in Scotland; and then 36,658 and 61,445 in the rest of the country.
I think the hon. Lady and I will have to trade these statistics privately, because the figure I have is 5,086 receiving support, and that is from the Office for National Statistics. That is where I got my figures.
No, I am not going into this. I know that we are testing Dame Siobhain’s patience, so we will discuss this privately and might come back to it at another date.
As well as it being the right thing to do, this new clause would also let us use the skills available to us by giving people the opportunity for employment. The people I have met in some of the hotels in Perth have brought a whole range of skills that would be easily utilised by the community in which they are placed. It makes sense to take this change forward.
In the new clause, the Liberal Democrats suggest that work should be available three months after an application is made. That might be a little bit generous. If I was drafting the amendment, I would go for the six months that has been generally agreed with the all-party groups. I think that what we have done is introduce this issue as a debate item, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Woking for that. It is something that should be seriously considered.
There have been a number of questions at the Home Office about this and from a number of Members—not just from the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National party but from Labour. I know that we have quite a compliant set of Labour MPs on this Committee, but a number of them have raised this in debates and in questions.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. Can he tell me how many people in Scotland actually work, and how many are employed by the state? Where are these jobs that he is talking about, in which people are going to be employed? His Government cannot really get people employed just now. They have not been able to do that. They have not provided it. I do not see where the jobs are, but I am happy to listen to where they are coming from.
Of course, the hon. Gentleman would not expect me to have those statistics at my fingertips, so, as Ministers say, I will write to him to let him know how many people are in work in Scotland. But I say to him that we have the fastest-growing employment rates in the whole United Kingdom—something that he and I should be very proud about, given what has been created in our nation. He only needs to go and speak to some of the people in the care sectors in his constituency; they will tell him that they are crying out for available staff to come and fill the holes within their own sectors, as is the case in the health sector and in a number of others.
The hon. Gentleman is talking about the care sectors, and I take it that that includes palliative care as well. St Andrew’s Hospice is in my area; it costs £10 million to run it, and £3 million comes from his Government. That is an incredible shortfall. The hospice is talking about cutting numbers and not having as many staff as it would normally have, so where does the hon. Gentleman see all of these wonderful vacancy figures in care?
I am not entirely sure what point the hon. Gentleman is trying to make. I think jobs being available for ordinary Scots is the general thrust of his argument and debate, but I would just challenge him to go and speak to people who are actually working and serving in the care sector—people in the NHS. If he is really interested, he could come to my constituency and speak to those in rural sectors, and in hospitality and catering, who cannot get the people to staff their businesses, which is forcing them to close, or to open part time.
That is the reality of the situation, and here we have, sitting in these hotels, people who could do these tasks and functions. Not only that, but some of them are accountants, doctors and economists. The range of skills available in each of these hotels is quite outstanding. They speak perfectly good English. All of them could do these tasks. I think it is just such a waste that they are doing absolutely nothing other than waiting the months and months—possibly even years—for their applications to be processed by this Government.
I know this Government have improved on what was happening under the Conservatives, but there is still a long way to go before we are anywhere close to an efficient system in which people are having their applications processed readily and quickly. Therefore, I support the new clause; I think it is a good one to bring forward, and I really hope that the Government listen.
New clause 11, tabled by the hon. Member for Woking, is about giving asylum seekers permission to work in the UK. The hon. Gentleman said that that would cut welfare bills, but he should be clear that those who are awaiting asylum decisions do not have direct recourse to social security, although we do have to spend money ensuring that they are not destitute while their asylum claims are processed.
Clearly, as hon. Friends on the Committee have pointed out, the answer to some of these issues is to recreate a fast, fair and efficient system of dealing with people’s asylum claims, rather than to have backlogs, particularly regarding appeals, which leave people languishing for months—and sometimes well over a year—awaiting asylum decisions.
To that end, it did not help that the Illegal Migration Act was so dysfunctional that it actually banned us from dealing with people’s asylum claims, and meant that this Government inherited a huge backlog of people—a perma-backlog, as I think we have heard during our debates on this Bill.
Clearing through that backlog and dealing with the resultant appeals for those who fail is the Government’s task at the moment, but, looking past the immediate task, my view is that the way to deal with this issue is to recreate a fast, fair and efficient asylum system. That is the first point that I want to make in answer to the hon. Gentleman’s new clause 11.
As the hon. Gentleman probably knows, our current policy allows asylum seekers to work in the UK if their claim has been outstanding for 12 months and the delay was no fault of their own, so there is already capacity to work for those who have been particularly delayed. Those permitted to work in that context are restricted to jobs on the immigration salary list, which is based on expert advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee—it is usually to do with shortages and the need in the economy at the time.
The policy is designed to protect the resident labour market by prioritising access to employment for British citizens and others who are lawfully resident. Lawful residence is a very important part of the system. That includes, of course, those who have been granted refugee status, who are given full access to the UK labour market. That is in line with those seeking to work in the UK under the points-based system. We consider it crucial to distinguish between those who need protection and those seeking to come here to work, who can apply for a work visa under the immigration rules and come here legally. The UK’s wider immigration policy would be totally undermined if individuals could bypass the work visa rules by lodging asylum claims in the UK. The hon. Gentleman has to understand that context, because it is very important.
Unrestricted access to employment opportunities could act as an incentive for more migrants to come here irregularly on small boats or by whatever means, clandestinely—illegally, without permission to be here—rather than claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Although I would be the first to admit that pull factors are complex, we cannot ignore that the perception of access to the UK labour market is among the reasons why people take dangerous journeys to the UK. Therefore, opening up the UK labour market to anyone who happens to arrive on the shores, no matter how they arrived, would not help us deal with that issue, and would create incentives for more and more people to chance their arm and come here in dangerous ways.
In addition, removing restrictions to work for asylum seekers could increase the number of unfounded claims for asylum, reducing our capacity to take decision quickly and support genuine refugees. I acknowledge the concerns that the hon. Gentleman raised, but the chaos we inherited from the Conservative party has led to the backlogs that we are trying to deal with at the moment.
We have been clear that individuals who wish to come to the UK must go through safe and legal routes by applying for the visas that are available. Where the reasons for coming to the UK include family or economic considerations, applications should be made via the relevant route so they can be checked and agreed in the usual lawful way—either the points-based system, or reuniting under refugee family or reunion rules. Allowing those who have come here in an irregular fashion to work, as if there were no difference between applying for a legal visa and getting proper permission to come before arriving, would undermine the entire basis of the rules and would create many incentives that no one on this Committee would like to see.
Given that explanation and the fact that we do allow asylum seekers to work when there is a delay of 12 months or more, I hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his new clause.
I will start with some examples of best practice from elsewhere. In Australia, most asylum seekers have the right to work straight away, even though it is temporary. In Canada, they can apply for a work permit while their asylum application is being processed. The US allows asylum seekers to work after around six months. From June next year, the EU will require member states to let asylum seekers work after nine months. Some go further—Sweden allow them to work straight away. With a one-year restriction, we are out of kilter with the rest of the western world. That is why the new clause has been tabled. I would appreciate the Minister taking away the question about the last time we reviewed the one-year limit and the restrictions on it. How often is it reviewed? An answer to that would be useful.
I was listening carefully and had a lightbulb moment. Perhaps the Conservatives figured out what a deterrent was—it was crashing the economy and putting our country into such difficulty that it obliterated the pull factor. That might be a cruel thing to say. Does the hon. Member agree that we heard in evidence that there are pull factors in the UK in terms of our language, our diaspora and quality of life, and other countries may not have those same factors? If we agree to the new clause and make it easier for people who cross the channel illegally to work here, people may be even more incentivised to come here compared with other countries.
I am happy to have given the hon. Member the chance to mention Liz Truss and attack the Conservative economic record. I take the point. If Government Members like the spirit of the new clause but do not like the detail, why have they not suggested that it should apply only to existing asylum seekers caught up in the backlog rather than new asylum seekers? I have not made that distinction. You are implying that there should be that distinction; you are not implying that, Dame Siobhain, obviously—the Government are implying that. I have not used “yous” for a while; I am afraid I did that time.
We will talk about this in a debate on a new clause that is still to come. The Government have identified that they need to improve the system. I completely agree. They have inherited a completely broken system. A further new clause tabled by the Liberal Democrats would put a legislative framework around the system, to try to improve it. If the Government are so concerned about allowing asylum seekers to work, I hope they will support that new clause.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 14
Report on impact of carers’ minimum wage on net migration
“The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report on the impact of introducing a minimum wage for carers on levels of net migration.”—(Mr Forster.)
This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on the impact of implementing a carers’ minimum wage on levels of net migration.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is a minor new clause that would require the publication of a report on the impact of implementing the carers minimum wage on the level of net migration. As MPs, we want to understand the data and facts to enable us to scrutinise the Government. Without the data, we cannot do our job properly—it is as simple as that.
The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 14 would require the Government to publish a report on the impact of implementing a carers minimum wage on levels of net migration. It requires such publication within 12 months of the passing of the Act.
What outcome are hon. Members seeking to achieve with the new clause? What is the proposed minimum wage for carers that the Liberal Democrats would impose? Our care workers deserve fair pay. We are seeing the impact of the national insurance rise on the care sector and the organisations operating therein, who are now struggling to sustain themselves and deliver good jobs and good pay to the care workers they employ. What assessment has been done of the costs of such a minimum wage and how would the Liberal Democrats seek to ensure that this was fully funded?
I am pleased to speak on new clause 14. It is unclear whether its intention is to commission a review of the impact of setting a minimum wage for new entrants or for settled workers in the care sector. I interpreted that its effect would be the Government commissioning a review into implementing a national minimum wage for workers in the social care sector. It is unclear whether it would apply to international workers or the whole labour market.
It is also unclear—I think this was the shadow Minister’s point—what the minimum wage for carers being referred to is; there are no sector-based minimum wage standards. The national living wage is currently £11.44 for people aged 21 or over. It is rising to £12.21 in April. International workers on a health and care visa are currently required to be paid £11.90.
I do not believe that it is necessary to lay a report before Parliament given that the Government publish details on migration on a quarterly basis, which will show the impact of changes in inwards migration. It will not be possible for that data to show the effect of this issue on net migration, as the figures will depend on other factors such as the number of people who choose to leave the UK, which might not be a result of care worker minimum wage requirements. It is also not clear whether the report would have to look at settled workers and other workers in the labour market as well as those who are on health and care visas.
We have already seen a significant reduction in the number of international care workers recruited for just over a year, and that is because employers have been unable to demonstrate that they have genuine vacancies that would guarantee sufficient hours to meet salary requirements. The most recently published data and statistics show that in the year ending December 2024, the number of international care workers reduced by 91%. The work that the Home Office is doing with the Department of Health and Social Care is increasing the role of regional hubs, with £16 million going into them. Regional hubs play an important role in supporting workers who may have left an employer or lost a licence to find other employment. That reduces the dependency on recruiting from abroad because we are already using those who are here on those visas and wish to work, alongside continuing to recruit home-grown talent.
Perhaps the Liberal Democrats are not fully aware that we are introducing the first fair pay agreement to the adult social care sector, so that care professionals are recognised and rewarded for the important work that they do. The Government will engage all those who draw upon care, as well as those who provide care. We will also consult local authorities, unions and others from across the sector. Fair pay agreements will empower worker representatives, employers and others to negotiate pay, and terms and conditions, in a responsible manner. Crucially, they will help to address the long-standing issues with sustainability of resource, recruitment and retention that we all know exist in the care sector. That will address the workforce crisis in that extremely important sector and so support the delivery of high-quality care. Fair pay agreements are an important first step towards a national care service.
I hope that clarifies the Government’s position and why it will not be necessary to lay a report before Parliament—and that certainly should not be required under this legislation, which is about stopping criminal gangs in their awful trade. I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his proposed new clause and engage in this debate in other ways.
I am happy to take the Minister up on that suggestion. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 15
A three-month service standard for asylum casework
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, implement a three-month service standard for asylum casework.
(2) The service standard must specify that 98% of initial decisions on all asylum claims should be made before the end of three months after the date of claim.”—(Mr Forster.)
This new clause would require UK Visas and Immigration to reintroduce a three-month service standard for decisions on asylum cases.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the cause be read a Second time.
I highlighted this proposed new clause in a previous speech. The clause would ensure a three-month service standard for asylum casework, so that the Government can tackle the backlogs that they inherited. It would require UK Visas and Immigration to introduce that three-month service standard for decisions on asylum claims, to benefit both asylum seekers and the British taxpayer. The service standard
“must specify that 98% of initial decisions on all asylum claims should be made before the end of three months after the date of claim.”
That would help the Government as they rectify the mess they inherited. If the Government suggest that the period I have chosen—three months—should be six months, I am happy to talk about that. I think that setting a stretch target—the Government are setting several, such as the 1.5 million homes target—is appropriate.
The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 15 would require UK Visas and Immigration to reintroduce a three-month service standard for decisions on asylum cases, meaning that
“98% of initial decisions on all asylum claims should be made before the end of three months after the date of claim.”
We agree with the principle that asylum applications should be determined as swiftly as possible, but the raft of new clauses proposed by the Liberal Democrats, including the unfunded proposals to create additional “safe and legal routes”, would surely only increase the queue, and the time required to make initial decisions on claims. The Liberal Democrats do not appear to have any desire to remove those who have entered this country illegally. We can reduce decision times by deterring people, rather than inducing them to enter the country illegally. Is the proposed new clause an attempt to speed up the granting of citizenship, as per Liberal Democrat proposed new clause 13, rather than speeding up decisions so that we can deport those who have entered this country illegally?
It is worth noting that, prior to February 2019, there was a six-month standard time. That was abandoned by the previous Government around the same time that they decided to open the borders. Home Office Ministers have been looking to speed up processing as much as possible. The new clause would be unhelpful because the Home Office is often waiting on outside checks to be completed. The Home Office is, of course, seeking to speed up decisions, but its control is limited because it is trying to get through such huge backlogs. The second important point is that, if we legislate for this and an international event like the Ukraine situation occurs, we would not be able to speed up processing by putting some of the people already being processed to the back of the queue.
The new clause—the hon. Member for Woking spoke about it, although I am not sure whether he tabled it—would introduce a new service standard to ensure that the majority of initial decisions on asylum claims are made within three months of a claim being lodged. It is good to make initial decisions, but if we are looking at asylum claims overall, and getting people through them in a fast, fair and efficient way, we also have to think about appeals, and think about such claims from the very start to the very end, rather than just the Home Office part. That is an important thing to consider. The new clause deals with only the first part of that. If one is looking at a system-wide approach, one has to look from the beginning to the end, rather than just at the initial decision in the Home Office.
I thank the hon. Member for the new clause and stress that we are in absolute agreement that it is important that our asylum process is fair, efficient, as fast as possible, consistent with fairness, and robust. We are committed to ensuring that asylum claims are considered without unnecessary delay. Delays are not always our fault, but they sometimes have been in the past. We are committed to ensuring that those who need protection are granted asylum as soon as possible so that they can start to integrate, rebuild their lives and contribute to our society in the way we all want to see happen. As such, I assure him that we are already taking important steps to achieve that.
The Government restarted processing thousands of asylum claims that were stuck in the perma-backlog that we inherited when we came into office, and we are clearing those at pace, making initial asylum decisions. We are also delivering a major uplift in removals when people fail and have no right to be in the UK; there were 19,000 removals between when we came into office on 4 July last year and the end of January.
The Government continue to restore order to the immigration system so that every part—border security, case processing, appeals and returns—operates fairly and swiftly. By transforming the asylum system, we will clear the backlog of claims and appeals, and that work is ongoing. We have taken action to speed up asylum processing while maintaining the integrity of the system, including simplifying guidance, streamlining processes, developing existing and new technology to build on improvements such as digital interviewing, and moving away from a paper-based system.
We have also changed the law to remove the retrospective application of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which created the perma-backlog that we had to deal with when we came into Government. That allows decision makers to decide asylum claims from individuals who have arrived in the UK from 7 March 2023, with claims to be considered against the existing legislative regime under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which caused much of the previous delay.
I hope that the hon. Member for Woking agrees that the work that we have put in place is starting to have a real impact. I have considerable sympathy with what he is saying in the new clause, but I hope that we will be able to get to a fast, fair and efficient system with the reforms that we are making now, rather than with the new clause.
An Opposition Member and a Minister are not normally meant to agree this much, but I think we do. We probably will not vote the same way, but we generally agree. Last year, there was an asylum seeker who had waited 16 years for a decision on their claim. At the same time, there were 19 people waiting 10 years or more for a decision. That is how broken the system is, and I do not envy the Minister her job. The new clause would support the Government’s work, and I hope that Members will support it.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am happy to introduce new clause 16, which involves an exemption for NHS workers from the immigration skills charge. This new clause would require the Secretary of State to exempt the NHS as an employer from having to pay the immigration skills charge when sponsoring skilled employees.
Liberal Democrat new clause 16 would require the Secretary of State to apply an exception to the NHS as an employer from having to pay the immigration skills charge when sponsoring skilled employees. Do the Liberal Democrats not believe that we should be recruiting British workers to work in the NHS before we look to recruit overseas workers? Do the Liberal Democrats understand that this new clause could result in the NHS recruiting more people from overseas, rather than from our domestic population, further driving up those numbers? What assessment has been done of the costs of such a scheme, and how would the Liberal Democrats seek to ensure that it was fully funded?
The hon. Member for Woking has tabled the new clause with a view to the role that migrant health and care workers play in UK health services. We are all deeply grateful to our doctors, nurses and care workers. They do rewarding jobs, but their roles can be difficult and gruelling, too. It is true that many people in the workforce are not British but have come to this country to do that work. We must thank them for helping to keep us and our families healthy and cared for, but it is our role in Westminster to look at the whole picture and be informed but not led by individual cases.
When we look at that picture, we see that the volumes for the health and social care visa are eye watering. Since 2021, more people have come to this country under the health and social care route than live in the city of Manchester—well over half a million, of whom many are dependents. Yes, that is because these jobs are tough, but it is fundamentally because they are underpaid. To quote the independent Migration Advisory Committee,
“the underlying cause of these workforce difficulties is due to the underfunding of the social care sector.”
Immigration alone cannot solve these workforce issues. Underpaying health and social care professionals is financially self-defeating, because the money the Government save in the short term is dwarfed in the medium and long term by the costs to the state. As we have discussed this afternoon, and as the Minister has heard me say in several different settings, after five years a person who has come to this country on a health and social care visa can apply for indefinite leave to remain. If they get it, and 95% of ILR applicants are successful, they will qualify for welfare, social housing, surcharge-free NHS care—everything. That must all be paid for, and the cost is far greater than those on such salaries will ever pay in tax and far more than they save the state with their artificially low wages. Those individual workers are also at risk of exploitation as a result of the poor pay and conditions that have been allowed to endure across the sector because we have brought in workers from abroad who are willing to accept them as the price of coming to Britain.
The next, related issue with the visa is the degree to which it is abused. The MAC describes its misuse as
“a significant problem and greater than in other immigration routes”.
That raises massive concerns about the safety of the patients and vulnerable people whom the system is charged with caring for.
The rules around the health and care visa need to be further tightened, not loosened through an exemption from the immigration skills charge, and they need to be enforced. That is for the good of healthcare workers and, as should be the Committee’s primary concern, for the good of their patients and the country. Exempting NHS workers from the immigration skills charge, or indeed doing anything that makes it relatively cheaper still to hire migrant workers, will make the fundamental problem in the health sector’s labour market even worse.
This afternoon seems to be a bit of a Lib Dem fest because of the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Woking. There is nothing wrong with that; in fact, I very much approve of this new clause.
To the hon. Member for Weald of Kent—I do not like to rebuke her, because that is not the sort of Member of Parliament I am, as you will know, Dame Siobhain—I say that so many people come through the health and care route because there is real need in the whole system. We need people to come and make sure that someone has those jobs. I challenge her to visit the NHS establishments in her constituency and find out the real difficulties that many health professional managers have in securing the staff they require. This new clause is a practical suggestion to deal with a real issue in our immigration system. It is unfair that those who come to do some of the most demanding and low-paid jobs in the UK are forced to pay that charge.
We know those jobs are underpaid, and that is why so few people in the general community whom the hon. Lady would class as British-born are prepared to do them. We are dependent on people coming to our shores to do those jobs, and our health service would fall apart if they all decided to leave. We depend on them, and it is unfair that they have to pay that extra and excessive charge. I hope that the Government will look at this new clause, because I think it is reasonably good and one of the few that would make a significant and practical improvement to the situation.
I thank the hon. Member for Woking for tabling new clause 16, which would exempt the NHS from paying the immigration skills charge when recruiting skilled workers. I recognise that the intention is to protect the NHS and reduce the cost of recruiting those vital health and care professionals. As we all know, they do a fantastic and important job for all our constituents and families in looking after the wellbeing of people across the UK. It is worth recognising, however, that the new clause would run contrary to the Government’s position that we should reduce our reliance on international workers in all sectors of the UK economy, including the NHS.
The clue to what the immigration skills charge is for and why we have it is in the word “skills”, so removing it would send the wrong message. We would be removing an important tool to encourage employers to look first at the domestic labour market and at what more could be done to train and improve the skills of people already in the UK, rather than looking outside it and continuing our reliance on overseas trained workers to support our public services. In the light of what the immigration skills charge is for—to help and support the development of skills and, therefore, to support the growth of our skills and talent in the UK—I hope that the hon. Gentleman will reconsider and withdraw the new clause.
I will start with what I describe as the brass neck of the Conservatives for breaking the NHS, the immigration system and the social care system, and then criticising my proposal for tackling those problems. I find that extraordinary. We should reduce our reliance on foreign labour to support the workforce in the UK, including the NHS, but until we have done that, I do not believe we should make the NHS pay the immigration surcharge. That is the purpose of the new clause, and I hope some Members will support me.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 19—Victims of slavery or human trafficking: protection from immigration offences—
“(1) The Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 52 (Duty to notify Secretary of State about suspected victims of slavery or human trafficking), after subsection (2), insert—
‘(2A) The Secretary of State must make such arrangements as the Secretary of State considers reasonable to ensure that notification under this section does not include the supply of information to relevant persons or authorities that might indicate that—
(a) the victim has committed an offence under sections 24 to 26 of the Immigration Act, or
(b) the victim might otherwise meet the requirements for removal from the United Kingdom or for investigation pending removal.
(2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A), “relevant persons or authorities” include—
(a) a Minister of the Crown or a government department;
(b) an immigration officer;
(c) a customs official;
(d) a law enforcement officer;
(e) the Director of Border Revenue;
(f) the Border Security Commander;
(g) a UK authorised person; and
(h) the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.’”
This new clause would prevent a public authority, when determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking, from sharing information with immigration authorities and other public authorities that might result in deportation or prosecution for an immigration offence.
We need to understand the impact of our immigration laws on victims of human trafficking and modern slavery. New clause 18 would require the Secretary of State to introduce legislation that incorporates into UK law the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, and to report compliance with the convention. New clause 19 would prevent a public authority, in determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking, from sharing information with immigration authorities or other public authorities that might result in deportation or prosecution for an immigration offence.
I hope that the new clauses are taken in the spirit they are intended. If they fail—based on my experience in the last hour, I think they might—I hope that Ministers and their officials will work with their teams on our immigration laws to make sure that no vulnerable person who has been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery falls through the cracks.
Liberal Democrat new clause 18 would require the Secretary of State to introduce legislation that incorporates the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings into UK law, and to report on compliance with the convention. New clause 19 would prevent a public authority, when determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking, from sharing information with immigration authorities and other public authorities that might result in deportation or prosecution for an immigration offence.
We have seen the abuse of human rights legislation by criminals who want to remain in the UK, such as an Albanian criminal who was allowed to stay in Britain partly because his son will not eat foreign chicken nuggets. The judge in the case allowed the father’s appeal against deportation as a breach of his right to family life under the European convention on human rights. Foreign criminals pose a danger to British citizens and must be removed, but so often that is frustrated by spurious legal claims. The human right of our own citizens to be protected from the criminals is routinely ignored. How do the Liberal Democrats plan to stop the abuse of the clauses by people who know that their asylum claim is likely to be rejected, for example?
I rise in support of the new clauses, particularly new clause 18. There have been a number of references to ECAT throughout our proceedings. New clause 18 would give clarity and ensure that we are properly engaged in all the provisions of ECAT. It is designed to ensure that those caught up in human trafficking are protected, and that Governments do everything they possibly can to ensure that people are cared for and looked after. I fully support this important new clause.
I think everybody in this Committee—I am being very generous—thinks that it is important to protect the victims of modern slavery, and we have legislation in our country to try to ensure that that happens. We also signed the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, and this country complies with the obligations under it.
The intention behind new clause 18 is to incorporate the convention into UK law, but UK compliance is already achieved by a combination of measures in domestic legislation, such as the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Nationality and Borders Act, the criminal justice system and the processes set out in the modern slavery statutory guidance for identifying and supporting victims of slavery and trafficking. Implementation and compliance with those obligations does not require full incorporation into UK law, and therefore the amendment is not required. It will not really add a lot.
On new clause 19, the Modern Slavery Act provides certain named public bodies in England and Wales with a statutory duty to notify the Secretary of State when that body has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be a victim of slavery or human trafficking. The information provided for that notification enables the UK to fulfil its obligations to identify and support victims of slavery and trafficking. The duty to notify is discharged for adults by making a referral into the national referral mechanism where the adult consents to enter the mechanism, or by completing an anonymous entry to that mechanism on the digital system where the adult does not consent. The information provided via the digital system is used to build a better picture of modern slavery in England and Wales and helps to improve the law enforcement response, so it is important that that information is collected.
The information does not include that which identifies the person, either by itself or in combination with other information, unless the person consents to the inclusion of the information. So that information can be put in there anonymously. Child victims do not need to consent to enter the national referral mechanism. As such, the national referral mechanism discharges the duty to notify.
If a person is identified in the national referral mechanism as a potential victim of modern slavery or trafficking, they are eligible for a recovery period during which they are protected from removal from the UK if they are a foreign national and are eligible for support, unless they are disqualified on the grounds of public order or bad faith. Bad faith refers to lying about one’s circumstances, and public order refers to an individual who could be a danger to society. We have had some discussion about that with respect to section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act, which the Government have decided to retain but have not yet commenced. I think we also discussed section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act.
When we came into government, the national referral mechanism decision-making process was in disarray, with a huge backlog. We ensured that 200 more caseworkers were allocated to deal with the backlog, and there has been a great deal of very good progress in getting that backlog down. The Minister for Safeguarding, my hon. Friend for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), is particularly concentrating on getting the national referral mechanism back on track as part of the battle against modern slavery.
With those responses, I hope that the hon. Member for Woking will withdraw the new clause.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 20
Humanitarian travel permit
“(1) On an application by a person (‘P’) to the appropriate decision-maker for entry clearance, the appropriate decision-maker must grant P entry clearance if satisfied that P is a relevant person.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), P is a relevant person if—
(a) P intends to make a protection claim in the United Kingdom;
(b) P’s protection claim, if made in the United Kingdom, would have a realistic prospect of success; and
(c) there are serious and compelling reasons why P’s protection claim should be considered in the United Kingdom.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c), in deciding whether there are such reasons why P’s protection claim should be considered in the United Kingdom, the appropriate decision-maker must take into account—
(a) the extent of the risk that P will suffer persecution or serious harm if entry clearance is not granted;
(b) the strength of P’s family and other ties to the United Kingdom;
(c) P’s mental and physical health and any particular vulnerabilities that P has; and
(d) any other matter that the decision-maker thinks relevant.
(4) For the purposes of an application under subsection (1), the appropriate decision-maker must waive any of the requirements in subsection (5) if satisfied that P cannot reasonably be expected to comply with them.
(5) The requirements are—
(a) any requirement prescribed (whether by immigration rules or otherwise) under section 50 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; and
(b) any requirement prescribed by regulations made under section 5, 6, 7 or 8 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (biometric registration).
(6) No fee may be charged for the making of an application under subsection (1).
(7) An entry clearance granted pursuant to subsection (1) has effect as leave to enter for such period, being not less than six months, and on such conditions as the Secretary of State may prescribe by order.
(8) Upon a person entering the United Kingdom (within the meaning of section 11 of the Immigration Act 1971) pursuant to leave to enter given under subsection (7), that person is deemed to have made a protection claim in the United Kingdom.
(9) For the purposes of this section—
(a) ‘appropriate decision making’ means a person authorised by the Secretary of State by rules made under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 to grant an entry clearance under paragraph (1);
(b) ‘entry clearance’ has the same meaning as in section 33(1) of the Immigration Act 1971;
(c) ‘protection claim’, in relation to a person, means a claim that to remove them from or require them to leave the United Kingdom would be inconsistent with the United Kingdom’s obligations—
(i) under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28th July 1951 and the Protocol to that Convention (‘the Refugee Convention’);
(ii) in relation to persons entitled to a grant of humanitarian protection; or
(iii) under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms agreed by the Council of Europe at Rome on 4th November 1950 (‘the European Convention on Human Rights’);
(d) ‘persecution’ is defined in accordance the Refugee Convention; and
(e) ‘serious harm’ means treatment that, if it occurred within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under Article 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (irrespective of where it will actually occur).”—(Mr Forster.)
This new clause would create a new “humanitarian travel permit”.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is a comprehensive new clause, and I am tempted to be brief in my introduction to it. My Liberal Democrat colleagues would like to suggest the creation of a humanitarian travel permit to counter the gangs that the Government are seeking to attack and undermine through the Bill. We need to support those who genuinely need to travel here safely, and this new clause is an appropriate way forward. As I say, it is long and comprehensive. Hon. Members might want to ask questions about it, or they might want to take it apart, but it is a genuine suggestion about how we undermine the gangs and encourage people to come here safely.
The Liberal Democrats have tabled new clause 20, which would introduce a so-called humanitarian travel permit. The Conservatives have previously drawn up schemes such as Homes for Ukraine and the Ukraine family scheme for families seeking refuge from the war. We do not need a specific permit for people across the world to use to come to the UK, so we do not support the measure.
I will keep my remarks brief, because there is some overlap between this new clause and the debate we had on safe and legal routes. New clause 20 proposes a new humanitarian travel permit. As we have mentioned, the UK has a strong history of protecting those fleeing war and persecution around the world.
I talked about the UK resettlement scheme that we run in partnership with the UNHCR. When people are assessed independently by the UNHCR and accepted as refugees, they may then be allocated to the UK under that scheme; it is then for the UK to provide visas to them in advance of their travelling to the UK, so that they can come here safely.
We previously discussed why there is no provision in the immigration rules for someone to be allowed to travel to the UK to seek asylum, as I think the new clause seeks to provide. There are risks: we may be sympathetic to the international system that I just mentioned, which supports people fleeing very difficult and dangerous situations, but it would be difficult to consider protection claims from large numbers of individuals overseas who might like to come to the UK. It is the case that, as part of how the system works internationally, those who need international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. That is the fastest route to safety.
The hon. Member for Stockton West highlighted that the scheme proposed by the new clause is not dissimilar to ones that the previous Government introduced for Ukrainians and people from Afghanistan, which I found an interesting comparison. If it is appropriate for some specific countries, why would it not be appropriate to have such a scheme on the legal shelf in case we were to need it, especially as the world is more dangerous than ever before?
I acknowledge that those schemes try to do that, but I do not think they are working—the exhibit for that is the number of small boats that we see and the number of people fleeing conflict. Those rules do not meet the framework that is currently required in the UK and in the world, hence this new clause. I am mindful of time, so I will be brief: I hope that hon. Members will support this new clause, which would be a good legal tool for attacking the gangs and protecting vulnerable people as they flee their homes in conflict.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesGood morning, everyone. Would everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? We will continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on declaration of interests, as set out in the code of conduct. I also remind Opposition Members that if one of your new clauses has already been debated and you wish to press it to a Division when it is reached on the amendment paper, you should let me know in advance, please.
New Clause 24
Immigration Tribunal: hearings in public
“(1) The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 5, after subsection 5, insert—
‘(5A) All hearings of the Tribunal must be heard in public, and all decisions delivered in public,’”.—(Matt Vickers.)
This new clause would require all rulings in the Lower Tier immigration tribunal to be heard in public.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The Conservative party has tabled the new clause to ensure that proceedings of the lower-tier immigration tribunal will be heard in public. We have seen absurd outcomes in some of the cases heard in the upper tribunal in recent months, and we feel it is important to make sure that the system is transparent and that the public have full access to the tribunal records at both levels.
Examples of recent cases reported by the Telegraph include that of an Albanian criminal who avoided deportation after claiming that his son had an aversion to foreign chicken nuggets, and that of a Pakistani paedophile who was jailed for child sex offences but escaped removal from the UK as it would be unduly harsh on his own children. More recently, it was reported that a Pakistani man was convicted of sexually assaulting a woman but was allowed to stay in Britain after he claimed he was gay. An Albanian criminal also avoided deportation after a judge ruled that long-distance Zoom calls would be too harsh on his stepson.
The absurdity is further emphasised by the case heard recently in which a Ghanaian woman won the right to remain in Britain as the wife of an EU national, even though neither she nor her husband was present at the wedding held in Ghana. The lower-tier tribunal stated that the marriage was not legal, but that was overturned in the upper tribunal, which ruled that the proxy marriage was recognised in law and that registration at the same time as the marriage ceremony was not mandatory.
The continued abuse of our legal system, and the use of human rights as a defence, has gone on for too long. In another case, a tribunal ruled that a convicted Ghanaian pastor who was deported from Britain for using fake documents should be free to return to the country. Despite being jailed for using illegal documentation, the individual in question appealed under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, leading a judge to revoke the deportation order, claiming that it was an “unjustifiable interference” in his human rights.
The number of decisions may be used as an argument against the new clause, but these decisions are important. The first-tier tribunal’s asylum appeal backlog increased from 34,234 outstanding cases at the end of September 2024 to 41,987 by the end of December. That contrasts with 58,000 in the first quarter of this year. That is significantly more than the upper tribunal, but it underlines the importance of us knowing what has happened in these cases. Public trust is pivotal, as it—
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison—I suspect that you will be bookending our proceedings, if we make reasonable progress today. Does the shadow Minister acknowledge that increases in appeal backlogs are a result of the legacy process that his Government undertook, because people whose claims were not granted in that process have appealed and added to the backlog?
We know that significantly more people are arriving in the country. In fact, since the election, the number arriving illegally is up 29%, as is the number of people staying in hotels. The Government are actually removing fewer people than arrive by small boat now. The more people arrive, the more the backlogs will become an issue. Transparency in these tribunals is essential.
I am really trying to get my head around the new clause. Why would decision making in public be different from decision making in private?
Public trust in these decisions is completely and utterly broken. The answer to that is not to allow a good chunk of them to go unseen by the public. The public deserve to see and the people making the decisions deserve to be held to account. We need to ensure that the law is fit for purpose. We need to see the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR. That needs to be there for all to see. Public accountability and transparency are a good thing. The taxpayers out there, who fund all this, have a right to know what is going on, at any level, in the tribunals.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Dr Murrison. I agree that there is a lack of trust in our immigration and asylum system, but does the hon. Member agree that the cause of that is not the conduct of courts in public or private, but the backlogs that have been created and the inability of the Conservatives to tackle the problems in our immigration and asylum system? Will he also reflect on the fact that the Conservatives in government had the opportunity to introduce this change but chose not to? Is he perhaps playing a bit of politics?
We have seen what has happened since the election. We will not go into the fact that numbers are up significantly, and whether the number of people arriving by small boat is down significantly, but actually, regardless of when it is changed, here is an opportunity, with a piece of legislation, to change this. The trust that the public have in the system is completely battered by these decisions, so it is right to have that transparency. The answer to the need to build public trust is not to hide a good chunk of what is going on, but to let more people see it. The light of day would be very good at getting rid of some of this toxicity, holding people to account and ensuring that the legislation that we have tomorrow is fit for purpose. As parliamentarians, we should be held to account for the legislation that we are putting forward. We should be held to account for its consequences, including in the tribunals that are making so many decisions on these cases.
Public trust is pivotal when advocating for Opposition new clause 24. It transforms the subject of the debate from a dry procedural tweak into a fundamental issue of democratic accountability. The British public’s faith in the immigration system has been battered by the bizarre tribunal rulings highlighted earlier—decisions hidden behind closed doors that defy common sense and insult victims. By mandating public hearings at the first-tier tribunal, we can signal that justice is not just for claimants but for taxpayers, who fund it.
The hon. Member has a lot to say in Opposition, but the big question is: why did he not do this when the current Opposition were in government?
We were doing lots of things. I am sure we will come on to some of the progress that was being made, including the Albania agreement, which has taken thousands and thousands of people back to Albania and reduced the number of people coming. That deterrent stopped people setting off in the first place. It was real progress.
The Bill—this is the reason why we are sitting here today—is the opportunity to shape what comes next, what impact that will have on the number of people coming across the channel and what impact that will have on public confidence in our courts system. That is what we are here for. It is why we have bothered sitting here for so many hours—to ensure that the legislation that goes forward tomorrow is fit for purpose.
Well, we will see how much longer we get to sit. Time will tell, but I will move on.
The hon. Member is making a very powerful point about the importance of restoring trust and, to be fair to him, he has been making that point for many years. On 20 July 2021, he said in debate on the Nationality and Borders Bill:
“Our asylum and immigration system is not fit for purpose. It lines the pockets of criminal gangs and people smugglers, and it is not fair on genuinely vulnerable people who need protection. It is also not fair on the British public, who pick up the tab.”—[Official Report, 20 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 902.]
I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman about what happened in 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and, in fact, the years before that. Does he agree with the 2021 hon. Member for Stockton South, as he then was, that in fact the cause of the mistrust in our asylum system is the management of it, not what he is trying to address here?
I am glad the hon. Gentleman is a fan; I made an effort today with the tie. I think I was speaking as much common sense then as I am today. I agree that the system does not work. That is why we are here. It is why I hope these proposals will make a difference. It is why we are trying to improve the system. And that is why I think we should have transparency in these tribunal outcomes.
As I said, we are talking about decisions hidden behind closed doors that defy common sense and insult victims. By mandating public hearings at the first-tier tribunal, we can signal that justice is not just for claimants, but for taxpayers who fund it and citizens who live with its consequences. Transparency exposes these absurdities, has the potential to curtail judicial overreach, and could reassure a sceptical public that the system prioritises their safety and fairness over secretive leniency, because trust, once lost, is hard to rebuild.
It is only right that the general public, who foot the bill for these cases time and again, are allowed to fully understand what their money is being used for. It is only right that the public can see these sessions so that there is a place for scrutiny and accountability. It is only right that such a shameful abuse of the UK’s legal system be exposed to the taxpayers of this country.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The hon. Member for Stockton West has made a creative argument, and I will try to bring some sense to it. First, we have to look at what the new clause would actually do for the country and our judicial system. Public hearings could expose vulnerable individuals, including victims of persecution or trafficking, to undue public scrutiny, which could deter genuine applicants from seeking justice. There are also security risks. Sensitive information about applicants’ backgrounds, including details that could endanger their families in their home countries, could be exposed.
There is also the risk of the legal system being overloaded further, given what we have inherited. Increased public interest in the hearings could lead to more appeals and challenges, which would cause more delays and inefficiencies in the system. Finally, the new clause is simply unnecessary as courts already have the discretion to allow public access when appropriate. It would remove vital judicial flexibility.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. After years of broken promises, it should come as no surprise that the public do not trust politicians in Westminster on immigration. The distrust is compounded by regular reports of individual cases in the immigration system, the most shocking and nonsensical of which are often those of foreign criminals allowed to remain in this country due to human rights laws.
The system is broken. It has been broken for many decades, and that is now plain to see. Our basic decency—our desire to do the right thing—is exploited by paedophiles, rapists, terrorists and hardened criminals, who threaten not just individual members of the public, which is terrifying enough, but the broader social fabric of our country. The news reports that we read are possible only because upper tribunal judgments on asylum and immigration are published at regular intervals. The publication of those judgments allows everyone in the country to see what tribunal judges have decided in asylum, immigration and deportation cases. Crucially, it allows us to scrutinise both their decisions and their reasoning. We can see why the judgments were made and what that says about our laws, and decide for ourselves whether we think that is right. Judges are not accountable to the public, but transparency allows everyone to see our laws in action and to form a view about whether they are the right ones.
However, upper tribunal judgments do not tell the full story. All immigration and asylum cases are first heard by a lower-tier tribunal, the judgments of which are not made available to the public. Unless the initial decision of the lower-tier tribunal is appealed, the public do not ever get access to the details of any given case. Given the absurdity of the cases that we do hear about, many members of the public will rightly be wondering what is happening in the cases that we do not see.
If we want to restore public trust in the immigration system, we must restore transparency. Publishing the decisions of lower-tier tribunals is not the biggest or most consequential change in the grand scheme of our broken immigration system, but it is a meaningful one. The public have a right to know about the way our tribunal system works, to know about the rules judges use to make fundamental decisions about immigration and asylum—about who can be in this country and why—and to see how those rules are applied in practice so they can decide for themselves whether that is right or wrong and whether it serves Britain’s interests. That is why we tabled this new clause, and we sincerely hope that the Government will consider making it part of the Bill.
It is an honour to serve on your Committee, Dr Murrison. I do not see how turning border security into public discourse on a case-by-case basis is beneficial to the process, either for those administering or presiding over the hearings, or for those subject to the tribunal process. I accept that there is an argument for greater transparency, but given the circumstances of people’s arrival at our borders—they are fleeing trauma, in a vulnerable state—I feel it is inappropriate to parade the lives of asylum seekers in the public domain.
I have every faith that the Bill will create a robust system that is effective and accountable. The new clause would add nothing to its overall strength. The hon. Member for Stockton West says that trust has been lost in the asylum system. I think it will take this Bill and this Government to bring that trust back.
I have to compliment the hon. Member for Stockton West on his tie, since he raised it, and the hon. Member for Weald of Kent seems to have good taste in the colour of her jackets. I promise that that is the last fashion statement that I will make in our proceedings today.
On new clause 24, we agree that accountability and transparency are absolutely vital for building trust and credibility in the immigration system. Under rule 27 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014—note the date—the presumption already is that hearings at the first-tier tribunal must be public unless the first-tier tribunal gives a direction that it or part of it is to be held in private. Indeed, the majority of hearings at the first-tier tribunal are public. However, there are sometimes appropriate reasons for a hearing not to be public. For example, hearings may be held in private to preserve confidentiality in respect of sensitive medical details or to protect the privacy of a victim of a serious crime—for example, of a sexual nature. It may also be done to protect a party or witness from duress.
That is precisely why the Tribunal Procedure Committee has broad discretion to determine what practice and procedure in the first-tier tribunal will best support the overall interests of justice, and why the judiciary has a range of case management powers under the tribunal procedure rules to decide how individual cases should proceed. Those tribunal powers were published and written when the party of the hon. Member for Stockton West was in government, in 2014. It is expected that judges will have a wide discretion in dealing with these sensitive issues.
On making rulings of the first-tier tribunal available to the public, currently judgments of the immigration and asylum chamber of the first-tier tribunal are not routinely published. The decision about whether to publish a judgment is a judicial one. However, members of the public and the media can apply to the tribunal for a copy of the judgment in a specific case. I know that the Lord Chancellor will continue discussions with the judiciary about how we can bolster accountability and transparency to build public confidence, but I cannot help feeling that perhaps certain people who might work for a certain newspaper are getting to the end of their search engines for absurd cases that they can publish, and want a whole new database to search. If they want to bring these issues out into the open at the first-tier tribunal, perhaps they should send some reporters to listen to the case or apply on an individual basis for the judgment to be published. Perhaps that might assuage their ongoing interest in these issues.
I thank the Minister for her opinion, but we stand by this new clause. We want greater transparency, and we think this is an opportunity to do just that and allow the public to see what is and is not going on, so we will press it to a Division.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Conservative party is clear that the ability of immigrants to remain indefinitely in the United Kingdom and to acquire British citizenship should be not an automatic right, but an earned privilege, reserved for those who have made a real commitment to the UK. New clause 25 would increase from five to 10 years the period before a person can claim indefinite leave to remain, and add conditions to ensure that those applying for indefinite leave to remain have not claimed benefits or relied on social housing while here on work visas. Those claiming indefinite leave to remain must also be able to demonstrate that their household would be a net contributor and that they do not have a criminal record.
It is only right that individuals prove they have made a positive contribution to the United Kingdom and that their place in society is justified. For too long, the United Kingdom has been seen to have an open door policy, and this has been abused. Enough is enough. The 10-year rule would prove commitment—five years lets you settle; 10 years lets you prove you belong. It is enough time for people to learn our language, adopt our values and pay their dues.
This proposal has emerged before the Leader of the Opposition sets in train her new policy commissions, including one on immigration, so it is good to get a teaser today. Under this proposal, will a person who would seek to apply for indefinite leave to remain after 10 years be required to apply for limited leave to remain every 30 months?
The hon. Gentleman has got me. I was hoping he was going to spout some more of the common sense that I have contributed to Hansard.
I might be able to help the hon. Gentleman. The IPPR, which listens to the voices of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees navigating that 10-year process—people who look to settle here legally—and which looks at the data, published a report, “A Punishing Process”, which talks about some of the administrative costs and difficulties of the process. As part of the Leader of the Opposition’s new commission on immigration, will the hon. Gentleman be able to provide an assessment of the true cost to the Home Office of an individual applying for LLR every 30 months? Will he would maintain the requirement that people have to pay £2,608 as an adult and £2,223 for a child in visa fees? One of the concerns of the IPPR report is that poorer people often get pushed into greater poverty by having to apply every 30 months.
We have processes in place that determine this, and they do come with a cost. However, the cost to the British taxpayer of allowing this to go on unabated is that much greater. There are processes in place and there are costs attached to them, but there are huge costs attached to allowing people indefinite leave to remain on shorter terms than we are suggesting.
There is huge cost. I will come to what the cost will be in the next few years of the number of people who are about to gain indefinite leave to remain.
No, I will not give him the name of the report.
Applying the 10-year rule, rather than the five-year rule as now, would prove commitment. As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) said:
“A British passport is a privilege, one that has been debased by benefit tourism for too long. Our plan gets it right, making sure that those who pay their way get to stay.”
The Prime Minister, bizarrely, does appears to think that British citizenship is not a pull factor, so much so that the Government are seeking to repeal swathes of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 passed under the previous Conservative Government. In doing so, this Government will scrap rules that meant that almost all those who entered the United Kingdom illegally would not be entitled to British citizenship, and that asylum seekers who failed to take age tests would be treated as adults. Those were common-sense policies. We are calling on all parties, and especially the Government, to support this new clause. We need to ensure that everyone who comes to this country is willing to contribute and to integrate into our society.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison. Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, was first a refugee in the UK, and she said that, in Britain, people would say to refugees, “You’re welcome here…and when are you going home?” whereas, in America, they said, “You’re welcome here…and when will you become a citizen?” Does the hon. Member not think that the problem the last Government created was that they moved to a high-churn model of migration, with huge numbers of people coming in, working in low-paid jobs, not integrating and then leaving, and more people coming in? We want to incentivise people to learn the language, engage with our institutions and follow our rules, which means that pathways such as this are really important, not the model that we have seen for the past 14 years.
The principle here is that we are saying, “You will get indefinite leave to remain, not after five years but after 10 years.” We have already had the debate about British citizenship and what that means—all the benefits that come with it and all the costs to the taxpayer that are attached to it. I therefore I think that this principle is right: if someone is going to stay here, they have to have been here longer, earned their keep, contributed and integrated properly. I think that 10 years allows that. I think that this is the way forward, and I stand by it.
I thank the hon. Member for his patience in allowing me to intervene again. Is it not fair of the Government to accept only those amendments whose details are actually known and worked up; and is it not, therefore, unfair of the hon. Member to press a new clause when he has not worked out the details of what its implementation would look like?
The details and the need for people to engage with the authorities are already in place. This new clause is literally about saying “10 years” instead of “five years”. No part of it amends existing provisions regarding migrants’ responsibility to account for themselves during that period. There is no suggestion of any change to that; it is beyond what we are amending through the new clause. If we wanted to change that, there would certainly be a debate to be had, and there would probably be opportunities to bring forward amendments, but that is not what we are proposing here. We are proposing to increase the period from five to 10 years.
Our country is our home; it is not a hotel. We can guess what the Government’s response to this will be—more deflection and criticism—but they must remember that they are in government now and have a duty to protect the British taxpayer from unnecessary costs. If they do not act, every UK household is forecast to pay £8,200 as a result of between 742,000 and 1,224,000 migrants getting indefinite leave to remain in the next couple of years. The Government must act to ensure that everyone who stays in the country is a net contributor.
It may interest the Government to know that changes to indefinite leave to remain have happened before—and can and should happen again now. In 2006, under the then Labour Government, the Home Secretary extended the time required to obtain indefinite leave to remain from four years to five years, an extension that applied retroactively to those already actively pursuing indefinite leave to remain. It is hoped that this Government will make a similarly bold move and support new clause 25.
Before the accusations start to be thrown around, let me make it crystal clear that new clause 25 is not some cold-hearted exercise in exclusion; it is a robust, principled stand for expectations—a line in the sand that says that if someone wants to live here, stay here, and call Britain their home, that comes with a reasonable cost. That cost is not measured just in pounds and pence, but in commitment, in responsibility, and in proving that they are here to lift us up, not weigh us down.
A recent study undertaken by the Adam Smith Institute found that, according to figures produced by the Office for Budget Responsibility, the average low-wage migrant worker will cost the British taxpayer £465,000 by the time they reach 81 years of age. It is clear that opening the ILR door to millions of new migrants will impose a considerable and unwanted financial burden on the British taxpayer for decades to come.
The OBR report explores the opportunity to reform indefinite leave to remain rules, which new clause 25 seeks to do, to help mitigate the long-term fiscal burden of low-skilled migrants, who are unlikely to be net contributors to the public purse. A refusal to back new clause 25 is not just inaction, but a choice to prioritise the untested over taxpayers—to keep the welcome mat out while the costs pile up. The Opposition say no, this is our home, and we expect those arriving to treat it as such.
It is a pleasure to once again to serve under you as Chair, Dr Murrison. When I look at the Tory amendments in their totality, they are quite frankly an absolute and utter disgrace. It is as if the Tories have learnt absolutely nothing from the Rwanda debacle and the Illegal Migration Act 2023. Some of the amendments that we will be debating are simply heinous, lacking in any reasonable standard of compassion and empathy. What a country they would create: one devoid of human rights and international protections, where people are simply othered and deprived of any rights whatsoever. Some of the most desperate and wretched people in the world would be denied and booted out.
I used to say that the Tories would never beat Reform in the race to the bottom, but looking at the collection of amendments that we are debating today, they are going to give it their best shot. It is just possible that they will out-Reform Reform colleagues in the House of Commons. The amendments are not only terrifying but ludicrously unworkable—blatant political grandstanding, designed to appeal to the basest of instincts. We have the grim task of having to debate them one by one; I just hope that the Committee will reject them totally out of hand.
New clause 25 was raised in a blaze of publicity at the end of the self-denying ordinance from the Leader of the Opposition when she announced her new immigration policy, which I understand has been changed and finessed over the course of the past few weeks, but is still as grotesque underneath as it started. The Conservatives do not believe that British citizenship should be a privilege; they believe that British citizenship should be virtually unobtainable, and that the strongest possible tests must be applied before anybody is ever going to get the opportunity to call themselves a British citizen. That is totally and utterly self-defeating.
The provision will apply to work-based visa holders, skilled workers and global talent, who can currently apply for ILR after five years. Extending that period to 10 years could deter highly-skilled workers and investors from coming to stay in the UK. It may lead to workforce instability, particularly in sectors reliant on international talent. It would also disadvantage certain migrants and people who have lived legally in the UK for 10 years but do not hold one of the listed visas. This is an unworkable, crazy proposal that can only be self-defeating and have a massive impact on our economy. It would create a massive disincentive to the very people we need to come into the UK to fill some of our skills gaps. I hope the provision is roundly rejected.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison. We should never be surprised by the audacity of the Conservative party, which now exists in a state of amnesia following the previous 14 years of failure, collapse and chaos. Let me take a moment to remind Opposition Members of their failed promises.
A good place to start is the general election campaign of 2010, when David Cameron said that his Government would reduce net migration to the tens of thousands. At that point, net migration stood at 252,000. In 2011, he went further, saying that his target would be achieved by the 2015 general election—“No ifs. No buts.” But when the ballot boxes were opened in that election, numbers had risen to 379,000. Then along came Theresa May. At the snap 2017 general election, net migration stood at 270,000, and she had an election pledge to get net migration down to the tens of thousands, but by 2019 the number had risen to 275,000.
How can I begin my remarks without repaying the Minister’s kind words about my clothing? This is one of my favourite jackets and I am delighted to see that it might also be one of hers.
It is no secret, as the hon. Member for Bassetlaw has just set out, that previous Governments of different parties have failed the British public on immigration. The level of immigration to this country has been too high for decades and remains so. Every election-winning manifesto since 1974 has promised to reduce migration. As my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch) has said, the last Government, like the Governments before them, promised to do exactly that, but again like the Governments before them, they did not deliver. Because of that failure to deliver, the British public may face a bill of more than £200 billion in the years ahead, unless we change the rules on settlement.
Under current rules, after just five years in the UK, migrants on work or family visas will become eligible for indefinite leave to remain. If they are successful, and 95% of ILR applicants are, they are entitled to welfare, social housing, surcharge-free access to the NHS and more. According to the Centre for Policy Studies, some 800,000 migrants could claim ILR over the course of this Parliament. Given the profile of those who are likely to qualify, that could come at a lifetime cost of £234 billion.
Sorry, I coughed and laughed at the same time, partly because I think the hon. Member anticipated the point I was about to make. I will put this on the record again, as I have consistently. She may have more information to come back to me with and I will come back to her. The Centre for Policy Studies report is flawed. It has skewed information; it uses assumptions that are unreasonable and the financial modelling that ensues is therefore unreasonable. As a consequence, it feels like the Centre for Policy Studies and the hon. Member are reaching for a very large number to create the impression that there will be a very significant financial burden.
I make two additional points. First, even if that report relied on reasonable assumptions and therefore the modelling was correct, the Boris wave was caused by her party’s Government. She is nodding her head; she affirms that. I welcome that, in her speech, she has so far acknowledged the failings of that Government. Secondly, the report makes some very big assumptions about the future behaviour of the people currently in the migration system in our country. That is not a wise move, particularly when she is extrapolating £235 billion to £240 billion across a very long timeline. In fact, if we were to break it down on an annualised basis, even using the report’s flawed assumptions and flawed modelling, the figure would be far smaller. We need to have some integrity in the data that we use. Does she agree?
As Professor Brian Bell said in evidence to this Committee—in a session to which the hon. Member for Bournemouth East has referred a couple of times—
“It is actually extremely difficult to work out the fiscal impact of migration.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 59, Q92.]
That is clearly true: forecasting the lives of millions of people over decades will obviously have a substantial margin for error.
The only way to avoid that error would be not to try to forecast in the first place. I have repeatedly asked the Home Office, over several months, whether anyone in that Department or any other—indeed, anyone in Government—is attempting to forecast the cost to the public purse of the ILR grants that will come in this Parliament. I am yet to receive an answer. To me, that clearly says that nobody in Government is thinking about the impact the issue will have and how much it will cost. When they do, I will happily use those numbers. Until and unless that happens, the modelling from the CPS is the best we have—in fact, it is all that we have.
This is my last intervention on this matter. I take the hon. Lady’s point entirely, but will she not acknowledge that the modelling has deep, fundamental flaws? Although it may be the only modelling and therefore the best, on the strength of what is in that report it is still not worth considering or using in parliamentary debate.
I have already acknowledged that the margin for error is massive—that is clearly true. If everything that the hon. Member is saying is correct, I would like to see Government figures to replace the CPS figures. I think that is a reasonable request.
The £234 billion cost is equivalent to £8,200 per household, or around six times our annual defence budget, and this about not just money but capacity. Our public services are clearly already overstretched and this could push them to breaking point. If we accept, as we should, that previous Governments have failed on migration, then we should do everything in our power to limit the long-term impacts of that failure. That is why the Conservatives propose to extend the qualifying period for ILR and reform settlement rules to ensure that only those genuinely likely to contribute will be eligible for long-term settlement. That would give us an opportunity to review visas issued over the last few years. Those who have come to this country legally on time-limited visas and have subsequently not contributed enough, or have damaged our society by committing crime, should be expected to leave.
The Prime Minister has repeatedly said that the levels of immigration under the last Government were wrong and that it was a mistake to allow so many people to come to the UK. This amendment would allow the Government to limit the long-term consequences of that mistake, so why would they oppose it? It is not too late to change our rules around settlement. By refusing to extend the eligibility period for indefinite leave to remain, the Government are actively choosing to saddle the British taxpayer with a likely bill of hundreds of billions of pounds. We must make difficult decisions on this reform and the many others required in our migration system. Those decisions may be painful, especially in the short term, for individual people, families or businesses but they are the only way for any Government’s actions to match their words. The public have had enough and rightly so.
The hon. Member for Bournemouth East talked about LLR, which must be applied for every two and a half years on the existing 10-year route. That is the case only because, as it stands, the 10-year route, by design, is for those not on eligible visas. The five-year route that we here propose to change is exclusively for those on eligible visas. I therefore cannot see why, within the existing rules, there would be any requirement for LLR applications. I hope that reassures the hon. Member.
The new clause is not in keeping with the provisions outlined in the Bill, which primarily focus on border security through new and strengthened law enforcement powers, providing intelligence to address organised immigration crime.
I fundamentally disagree with the context of the new clause. Subsection (2) relates to existing legislation whereby the qualification of indefinite leave to remain applies to people on skilled work visas, scale-up worker visas, entrepreneurial or investor visas, innovation founder visas, or UK ancestry visas, and people with a partner who holds citizenship. Those people are, for the most part, contributing to our society through work. If somebody has been living and working here in a skilled role, or innovating in our country—and possibly even supporting job creation—for five years, that is long enough for them to identify Britain as their home. They will have friends and community networks. In most instances, they are boosting our economic productivity. The increased qualification period set out in the proposed new clause would move the goalposts for skilled workers after years of contribution.
I will bring the conversation back to the purpose of the Bill: the Committee’s focus should be on those entering the UK illegally and those engaged in organised immigration crime, not the construction workers, nurses, doctors, investors and business owners in Britain on work visas.
I will speak briefly. I welcome the hon. Member for Weald of Kent’s clarification of the Conservative party’s position on the amendment, but that clarification also raises further questions; I wonder whether the hon. Lady could respond on the spot. If there is no requirement every 30 months in the 10-year period for an individual to pay fees of £2,608—or, for a child, £2,223—to the Home Office, how will the Home Office fund much of its work? The fees paid by adults and children contribute significantly to the Home Office’s budget. The point is particularly important because the Home Office has had to borrow from the official development assistance budget in order to fund asylum hotels. I worry that there is going to be a significant financial gap here, and I wonder if the hon. Lady could clarify what her costings are?
I think the hon. Gentleman is eliding two different routes. At the moment there is a five-year route, which is for people on eligible visas, and a 10-year route. The 10-year route has LLR requirements that have to be applied for every two and a half years, and is the route that generates the fees that he is talking about. Under the amendment, that would not change; we are proposing changes only to the five-year route. The five-year route at the moment does not have LLR requirements because it is for people on eligible visas. The income for the Home Office from the same people should be no different under the amendment that we are proposing. I hope that that is clear.
I am happy to accept that clarification. If that is correct, I look forward to seeing more information about the particular policy, what financial costs would be involved and what the financial benefits would be.
Finally, I echo the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh about the importance of settling. We talk here about the financial costs: it is going to be more costly to our country and public services if somebody is having to go through many years of unsettled status. It is going to be harder for them to have all the infrastructure and anchors that they need within society. As a consequence, I would love to know whether the Conservatives have done any modelling of the impact of increasing the period of limbo, including—as mentioned in the IPPR report that I referenced earlier—the cost to public services when people find themselves homeless, with difficult mental health conditions or unable to take their child to the school that they want and have to travel significant mileage.
The hon. Lady and I share a desire for the integrity of data and its greater availability. In proposing the amendment, does she have access to any of that information?
He is nodding.
Part of what we are trying to say by extending the time is that we feel that a person’s commitment to the UK before they apply for settlement should be longer than five years. If application numbers go down because people feel that they do not want to commit for 10 years before getting settlement, that is something that we are happy to accept as part of the amendment.
It seems from the numbers that we have at the moment that the number of people who would apply over an extended period would go down because fewer people would qualify under the rules that we are stipulating. The reason why they would not qualify is that they would not be making a sufficiently significant contribution to the public purse over that period. Our calculations are that all of those lost applications would be net fiscally positive.
In which case, I will close by saying that the Home Office data shows there is not that drop-off of people—people do not leave the country because they have to wait longer for their status. In fact, those people try to get that status by serving within our country and economy. The Home Office data, which is publicly available on gov.uk, records what the stay and departure rates are each year. I am not sure that the amendment and the policy within it are going to achieve the goal that the hon. Lady is seeking.
I totally take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but I think he is answering a slightly different point. What we are saying is that the combination of the extension of time and the change in criteria would lead to lower applications. It is not so much about a choice on the part of the individual migrant, but a structural change within the system.
The very last point I will make is that I understand what the hon. Lady is saying, but that is not what my point was about. This would not be a deterrent or an incentive for people to leave the country. People would still remain in the country. The health impacts and the limbo that people would experience through their inability to settle would still create a fiscal drag.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison, and to make a few remarks at the end of this interesting debate. I will make a few general comments first and then make more detailed comments on new clause 25.
It is worth re-stating some of the shadow Minister’s points. He said that, for too long, we have had an open-door policy that is open to abuse. He also said that we should remember that we are in government. He is absolutely right that the Tories lost control over our immigration system. We do not need reminding of that—nor do we need reminding that we are in government clearing up their mess.
The context for a lot of the debate today has been the massive backlogs that have built up in every part of the system, the failure to have controls over our system, the levels of abuse and the fall in returns for those who have no right to be here. It is worth mentioning that the steady increase in settlement grants in 2017 reflects high levels of migration in previous years. It is almost as if the Tories are attempting to close the gates to the field from which the horses have long bolted, and everyone else is now picking up the pieces.
It is worth correcting the impression that the shadow Minister gives about our policy. We agree that settlement in the UK is a privilege; it is not an automatic entitlement. However, we understand that the immigration system needs to account for people in a range of circumstances beyond those specified in new clause 25. We also recognise and value the contribution that legal migration makes to our country and believe that the immigration system needs to be much better controlled and managed.
Provisions for settlement are set out in the immigration rules, so the Bill is not the correct legislation for debate about requirements for settlement. What we are doing with this Bill is strengthening our borders, going after the criminal smuggling gangs that have caused so much damage to the lives of migrants already and put lives at risk daily, and securing our borders against systemic abuse.
New clause 25 would restrict settlement in the UK to a handful of economic routes and partners of British citizens. Other routes to settlement in the current immigration system would therefore be excluded from settlement should the new clause be accepted, including settlement for refugees. The shadow Minister may have a view about, for example, a situation facing an Afghan interpreter for the British armed forces who put their life at risk, was evacuated to the UK after the chaos in Kabul in 2020 and was then put up in taxpayer-funded accommodation after arrival in the UK. Correct me if I am wrong, but under clause 25 they would be banned from ever settling in the UK.
It is important that we understand that settlement in the UK is privilege, the argument for which was rightly made. It is right because settlement conveys significant benefits, including the right to live here permanently and to access work, study and public funds, as well as a pathway to citizenship. We also have rules and processes to recognise the expectation that people should serve a period with temporary permission before being eligible to apply for settlement.
There is a range of periods of time that people need to spend in the UK before they can qualify for settlement. Many are five years, but there are shorter periods for exceptional routes. The hon. Member for Stockton West did not lay out his view on some of those specialised routes that may offer a shorter path to settlement, such as the global talent route or the innovator founder route. They allow settlement within three years to help the UK to attract the best talent from around the world, and they reward those working in business who are making some of the greatest economic contributions.
While I want to quote from the Centre for Policy Studies and the Adam Smith Institute, as they are the most important references in these debates, the new clause does not really think through the immigration system as a whole. We must think about it being fairer, more controlled and managed, and we must ensure that it recovers from the chaos that the last Government left it in. Indeed, as the hon. Member for Stockton West will know, the Government will also set out our approach to immigration, including how we bring net migration down and how we link skills policy with visa policy, so that we reduce our dependence on recruiting from overseas. We will be setting out that coherent approach to a future immigration system in a White Paper that is coming out later this spring.
I am stunned—shocked. In fact, I cannot believe that the SNP is less than enthusiastic about our new clause. The Minister and the hon. Member for Bassetlaw were keen to talk about records, but at the risk of repeating myself, immigration is too high. Previous Governments have failed to solve it. I would love for the Government to succeed in doing so, but I am not convinced that they will, particularly without a robust deterrent. I say it again: since this Government were elected, the number of people arriving here illegally is up 28%, and the number of people in hotels is up 29%. There are 8,500 more people in hotels in communities across the country, and fewer of those people who arrive by small boat are being returned.
Does the shadow Minister also agree that, since we came into government to the end of January, returns were almost 19,000, which is up around a fifth on what they were 12 years before, including an increase of about a quarter on enforced returns? He may want to talk more about that.
I am sure the Minister will agree that a large part of those are voluntary returns. I am sure a large part of them may also benefit from some of the agreements made by the previous Government. Actually, when we talk about the people arriving here illegally on small boats, the number is up significantly in the last two quarters, since this Government came into office. That is a fact.
I am reading from the Home Office website, which says:
“Comparisons of arrivals between the same months in different years may also be affected by differences in conditions. As a result, we do not make comparisons between shorter periods where arrival numbers…may fluctuate considerably.”
The Home Office also comments:
“Financial, social, physical and geographical factors may influence the method of entry individuals use and the types of individuals detected arriving… These factors may also change over time.”
Therefore, is it not the case that looking at just two quarters, and trying to make a comparison, is not really the most robust way of doing this? Is it not better to reflect on the Bill and the changes it is seeking to introduce, and to realise that it will make a significant difference in the medium to long term?
Two quarters is a significant amount of time. This is a record. The hon. Gentleman might not be comfortable with it, but the number of people who have arrived here illegally being returned is going down significantly. It is a fact, and this new clause matters. More than 742,000 people will qualify for indefinite leave to remain in the next couple of years. As we have said, that could cost our constituents £8,200 per household. That is a significant cost to people in my part of the world. Because of that cost to my constituents, I would like to press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss
New clause 43—Age determination by the Home Office—
“(1) A person who claims to be a child must not be treated as an adult by the Home Office for the purpose of immigration control.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where—
(a) the Secretary of State has determined that the circumstances are exceptional, or
(b) a local authority has determined that the person is an adult following a Merton-compliant age assessment.
(3) An age assessment must be undertaken by a social worker who has undertaken training on the conduct of age assessments.
(4) The Home Office must retain a record of the methodology and outcome for each age assessment undertaken for the purpose of immigration control.
(5) The Secretary of State must, through regulations made by statutory instrument, establish a framework for independent oversight of the conduct of age assessments.
(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this Act may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(7) Where a person claiming to be a child is determined by the Home Office to be an adult and is placed in adult accommodation or detention, the Home Office must notify the relevant local authority as soon as possible.”
This new clause would ensure individuals claiming to be children are not treated as adults, except in exceptional circumstances or following a Merton-compliant age assessment. It would provide independent oversight of the age assessment process, and notification to local authorities when a person is placed in adult accommodation or detention.
The Bill repeals sections 57 and 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which concern scientific age assessment methods. The Conservative party completely disagree with that decision. Every European country apart from ours uses scientific age assessment techniques such as an x-ray of the wrist, although there are other methods. More than 50% of those claiming to be children were found to be adults after an age assessment in the quarter before the election. Without a scientific age assessment method, it is very hard to determine their age. There have been cases of men in their mid-20s ending up in schools with teenage girls, and that carries obvious safeguarding risks. We have tabled the new clause to ensure that scientific methods for assessing a person’s age are used, and to disapply the requirement for consent for these methods to be used.
We have said that there are several methods. If we are unhappy with one, we can use alternatives. This is something that British taxpayers want to see. They want to ensure that our classrooms and social care settings are safe.
There are a raft of methods. I am happy to be directed, but every country in the EU uses the method I have mentioned. It is tried and tested. It is easy to criticise, question and find holes in a plethora of methods, but I think this is the right thing to do.
We can debate the methods at length, I am sure, but I think we have a responsibility to have a method. The fact that the rest of Europe is doing it means it is something we should be doing.
The rest of Europe is doing free trade, but the shadow Minister does not want to do that. We should reflect on Europe and what we want to import into our country.
On the bone age assessment, can the hon. Gentleman tell us with confidence grounded in science that it would be able to determine the range of relevant ages? Can he tell me what the margin of error would be for someone aged 18 or 19, and what an assessment of bone density and bone age would tell us if they posed as 15 or 16?
I can tell the hon. Gentleman that these age assessments could go some way to ensuring that a 20 or 30-year-old does not end up in a classroom beside a teenage girl. There is an opportunity to provide a power that can be used, along with all the knowledge that the agencies have, to make an assessment. The science can be determined, and the agencies can look at it in the round. We know that people have turned up without any form of identification. This is an opportunity to draw a line in the sand. Where agencies think this is the right thing to do, they can use the power. Of course, they will use it in moderation and in the context of the question marks around any method that they would use to assess age.
I would trust our agencies to use them in context and apply all the other things that they might apply in any given context. This would be another tool that agencies could use, on top of all the knowledge that they might have of people coming in and what their ages might be. This is an opportunity to give our agencies another tool, and it is the right thing to do.
That is why we tabled new clause 26, which would ensure that scientific methods for assessing a person’s age are used, while disapplying the requirement for consent for these methods to be used. That would ensure that adults could not claim to be children. It also gives the Government an opportunity to undo the mistake of repealing the relevant sections of the Illegal Migration Act and allow age assessments for those claiming to be children.
It is a privilege to serve under your chairpersonship, Dr Murrison. Given that the hon. Gentleman’s concern is about children, we should recall the evidence session in which we heard the Children’s Commissioner’s concern that spending extended periods of time in asylum hotels leaves unaccompanied asylum-seeking children vulnerable to organised crime, notwithstanding the mix of ages in those hotels. Why does he still stand by the Illegal Migration Act and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, when they are part of the reason why those children were in asylum hotels for so long?
I will stick to the new clause and the age assessments. This is a tool. It would not be used unabated. It is another tool that our agencies could use alongside whatever other assessments they might make. We would be giving them the opportunity to require people to undergo an assessment, and that is a good thing. That is why the rest of Europe is doing it. The agencies and experts—the professionals on the frontline dealing with these very troubling, difficult cases—should have all the tools they could possibly require to handle them. I see no reason why we would prevent them from doing so.
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s desire for our frontline staff to have all the tools they need. The Bill will expand the number of tools, but those are the tools that frontline staff are requesting. We could have scientific age assessments, and the Government are certainly not ruling them out entirely; there is work going on in the Home Office to consider their efficacy. Does he agree that we need tools that will help our frontline staff achieve the goals that we set them? The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health says that age determination is an inexact science, and that the margin of error can sometimes be as much as five years either side. I myself am not a scientist or a member of the royal college—I assume that the same is true of the hon. Member—so is it not better that we listen to such expert bodies, and develop policy in line with them, rather than just saying, “Because Europe is doing it, we ought to do it”?
That is a safe assessment of my scientific qualifications.
We are not saying that this is the only thing that agencies and experts on the frontline, who deal with these cases day in and day out, will be able to use; it is something that they can use. If we have ended up with adults in classrooms alongside children, that is wrong. We need to give the agencies every tool in the armoury to make the situation work. This is one thing that they can use—with their knowledge and with every other assessment they would make—and it is the right thing to do.
We have talked about kicking this down the road. I think we have a commitment that the Government will do something on this issue some day, or some time. But here is an opportunity to keep the power in the legislation for agencies to use here and now, rather than in six months or a year. I am sure that the Minister will give me a timeframe on whether the Government will come back with such a power.
The SNP’s new clause 43 is almost the polar opposite of our new clause. It states:
“A person who claims to be a child must not be treated as an adult by the Home Office for the purpose of immigration control.”
We know that there are adults coming to this country who claim to be children. Believing them without question would make it harder to control our borders and create significant safeguarding concerns. Why does the SNP think it should be made harder for the Government to determine the true age of those entering this country illegally? How does this best serve the interests of the British people? Given the SNP’s blind adoration for the European Union, we must question why they are happy for the United Kingdom, of which Scotland is a key part, to be the only European nation that does not use medical tests to determine the age of those coming to the country.
Why does this matter? The issue has not decreased in significance. The number of asylum age disputes remains high, particularly in the latest available figures. Of those about whom a dispute was raised and resolved, more than half were found to be over the age of 18. The fact that a record number of asylum seekers pretend to be children should be the wake-up call that we need to ensure that we have the checks in place to verify age and stop those who seek to deceive from entering the UK. As the available figures show, this tactic is becoming commonplace, and action must be taken to stop this abhorrent abuse.
If the figures were not evidence of the need to support new clause 26, perhaps the facts of the cases will be. A 22-year-old Afghan who had murdered two people in Serbia claimed asylum in the UK by pretending to be a 14-year-old orphan, when in fact he was 18. There is the utterly horrific case of the Parsons Green terrorist, Ahmed Hassan, who posed as a 16-year-old before setting off a bomb on a tube train in west London, injuring 23 people. Although the Iraqi’s real age remains unknown, the judge who jailed him for 34 years in 2018 said he was satisfied that the bomber was between 18 and 21. The clock is ticking. The crisis is not slowing; it is surging.
In quarter 2 of 2024 alone, 2,088 age disputes landed on the desk of the Home Office. That is 2,088 claims where someone said, “Trust me, I’m a child.” By the end, 757 were unmasked as adults, and the deception rate was a staggering 52%. That is not a blip, but a blazing red flag. That is more than 750 grown men, and potentially dozens more uncaught, slipping through a system that Labour has crippled by repealing the scientific age checks in the Illegal Migration Act, leaving us guessing in the dark while the numbers climb.
I will deal with some of the broader points in my response, but we do age assessments. We do not simply accept—just as his Government did not—asylum seekers’ claims about their age as if they were the truth. I would not like the shadow Minister to give the Committee the impression that that is happening—that we are accepting claimed ages without any kind of check. I will go into much more detail in my response to the debate about precisely what we do, but he must not give the impression that we are not checking; we are.
I hope the Minister agrees that we should be doing more, rather than less. We need to give agencies all the opportunities and powers to do so, with or without the consent of people who aim to deceive. That is the right thing to do.
If we rewind to 2022, 490 disputes in quarter 1 ballooned to 1,782 by quarter 4. Now we are at 2,088 and counting. This is not a fading headache; it is an escalating emergency. It is a conveyor belt of fraud clogging our borders and spilling into our schools. Failure to conduct these vital checks would mean that we are not just blind, but complicit in handing traffickers a playbook that says, “Send adults, call them kids and watch us flounder.” The public sees it and parents feel it, and every day we delay, the risk festers. We need science, not sentiment, and we need it now.
I rise to speak to new clause 43 on age determination by the Home Office. The one thing we can agree on with the Conservative Front Benchers is that my new clause could not be more different in objective and tone than what we have heard from the shadow Minister. My new clause aims to uphold a simple yet vital principle that no child should be wrongly treated as an adult, subjected to detention or placed in inappropriate accommodation, as happens right now. The new clause would ensure that the Home Office treats as an adult an individual who claims to be a child only in exceptional circumstances or following a Merton-compliant age assessment conducted by local authority social workers. Furthermore, any decision to treat a young person as an adult would have to be made by an appropriately trained official, with reasons recorded and subject to independent oversight. Where such a decision results in the person being placed in adult accommodation or detention, the relevant local authority would have to be notified immediately.
Labour Members are right to have a go at the shadow Minister, but it is imperative that we get this right. This is life-determining and life-shaping for the individuals at the sharp end of these age assessments. The consequences of flawed age assessments at our borders are severe.
Recent data reveals that between January and June 2024 alone, at least 262 children were wrongly assessed as adults and placed in adult accommodation or detention, exposing them to significant safeguarding risks including exploitation, violence and even criminal prosecution. It is worth noting that in many cases, those children endure months of uncertainty before being correctly identified and moved into appropriate care settings. Such errors not only violate child protection principles but undermine the credibility of our asylum system.
The current process of visual assessment, often conducted at the border by immigration officers, is wholly inadequate. Assessments based solely on appearance and demeanour are inherently flawed and have led to serious misjudgments. International and domestic guidance is clear that age assessments should be undertaken only when necessary and should be conducted using holistic, multidisciplinary approaches, yet that is far from the reality.
Concerns about visual assessments have been raised not just by non-governmental organisations, but by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, the Children’s Commissioner, parliamentary Committees and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. In response to those great concerns, the Government have argued that they are improving the age assessment process through the national age assessment board, and by introducing scientific methods of assessing age—we are back to that debate again. It is important to note that neither of those initiatives has any impact on visual assessments made by officials at the border. Biological methods such as dental X-rays and bone age assessment remain highly unreliable, as medical and scientific bodies repeatedly state. I listened to the hon. Member for Stockton West make great play of saying that that is what all of Europe does, but there are countless cases that the EU and other European nations have got wrong. I can send them to him; he can spend most of the day looking at them. They get cases wrong, just as we do with visual assessments.
It is right that in this Bill the Government seek to repeal clause 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which would have meant that children who refuse to undergo these invasive and questionable procedures are presumed to be adults by default—an approach that runs contrary to any safeguarding principles. The previous Government attempted to justify that policy by highlighting the risk of adults falsely claiming to be children to access benefits and services designed for minors. However, the reality is that the greater danger lies in the wrongful treatment of children as adults, which places them in unsafe environments, denies them their rights and can have devastating long-term consequences. The number of children found to have been misclassified as adults outweighs the number of cases where an adult has falsely claimed to be a child, so we have the balance totally wrong.
Crucially, there are greater risks and consequences to placing a child among adults, where there are no safeguards in place, than to placing a young adult in local authority care. It is essential that we restore local authority-led age assessments as a primary mechanism for resolving age disputes. As child protection professionals, local authority social workers are best placed to conduct those assessments in a manner that is thorough, fair and in the child’s best interests. The new clause would ensure that young people who assert that they are children are treated as such unless and until a proper assessment proves otherwise. It also guarantees transparency, independent oversight and accountability in decision making, thereby restoring trust in the system.
On 23 January 2023, Lawangeen Abdulrahimzai was sentenced to life imprisonment at Salisbury Crown court. Nearly a year earlier, Abdulrahimzai had murdered 21-year-old Thomas Roberts in Bournemouth town centre by stabbing him to death in the street following a dispute over an e-scooter.
Abdulrahimzai was an Afghan asylum seeker who came to this country in December 2019. He entered the UK illegally, claiming to be an unaccompanied 14-year-old. He was placed in school and in foster care, but he was in fact already an adult when he came here. Not only was he an adult, but he was also a murderer, having killed two men in Serbia before coming to the UK. He should never have been allowed to come to this country and he should certainly not have been allowed to masquerade as a child.
Assessing a person’s age is surprisingly difficult, but we have a range of tools to do so—the Home Office is just not using them. If we had acted sooner, using the full suite of tools at our disposal to assess Abdulrahimzai’s age, Thomas Roberts might still be alive today. The case of Lawangeen Abdulrahimzai is particularly shocking, but it is unfortunately far from unique.
I wonder whether there have been any new scientific discoveries in the last seven months for identifying someone’s age that the Home Office would not have been aware of over the last 14 years. Is it not the case that the methodologies used are very imprecise and do not often actually lead us, in the liminal cases, to draw the distinction that the hon. Lady is advocating for?
I will come on to precision and the ways of determining age slightly later in my remarks.
Ahmed Hassan, an Iraqi asylum seeker, claimed to be a 16-year-old when he arrived in the UK. In 2017, he set off a bomb at Parsons Green tube station, injuring 23 people. His real age is still not a matter of public record. In 2018, a Home Office probe found that Siavash Shah, an Iranian asylum seeker, spent six weeks as a year 11 pupil in Ipswich despite being 25—the list goes on. In fact, between 2020 and 2023, the Home Office identified almost 4,000 cases of adult migrants claiming to be children—45% of those who originally claimed to be children when they arrived here—and every other person of that cohort was in fact an adult. Some were at least 30 years old. That puts British children at risk, puts genuine child asylum seekers at risk and takes valuable school and care places away from the young people who genuinely need them.
I feel this particularly keenly as a Member of Parliament for Kent, the county into which all small boats arrive. Our laws mandate that the people who come to this country illegally and claim to be under 18 must be prioritised for care equally with Kentish children. That puts enormous pressure on the system and makes it harder for our children to be cared for. That is madness when we know that half of those arrivals are in fact adults, and we must put a stop to it.
It is completely rational, albeit morally wrong, for adult migrants to claim to be children. Under-18s who come here have a greater entitlement to care and support, do not have to live in accommodation with adults, and are not subject to the same rules as adults—or the rules are applied less strictly. Of course, there are people who cross the channel without their parents who are under 18; most, though not all, are male 17 and 16-year-olds, and some are younger children. No one disputes that, and children should be treated as children, but we must be realistic about the scandalous degree to which our system is exploited by the cynical and the sinister.
We have to protect actual children, and we should use every tool in the box to do so, including scientific testing. Where people refuse such tests, the Government should be able to override that refusal. We are acting in the interests of public safety and to protect the security of our children. Labour Members have asked for exact details of the scientific methods. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West set out, there are many methods and several different ways of doing it. The ones that can be implemented in short order are the dental and skeletal tests.
Other methods are currently at an earlier stage of development, such as facial age estimation and DNA methylation, which is a process by which people much cleverer than me can assess how a person’s genes are read by their body, which changes with age. In 2022, the interim Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee stated that the
“teeth, clavicle, and hand/wrist or knee… have been shown to have a significant research and publication credibility and provide a consistent age range over which changes occur.”
Later, the same report states:
“The committee has relied on areas and methods that have been repeatedly tried and tested and shown to have consistency.”
As the report makes clear, and as Government Members have said, scientific age assessment is not perfectly precise and is not magic, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West also correctly says, our proposal is that scientific age assessments should be used not to replace other methods and judgments, but to supplement them.
The situations that my hon. Friend and I have set out are horrifying. We can see no reason why the Government would not want to have the widest possible set of tools available to them to stop such things happening, including the option in future to bring in scientific methods that are currently at a nascent stage.
I thank the hon. Member for Weald of Kent for raising the absolutely horrific and awful circumstances involving Thomas Roberts, who would have been my constituent and whose mother, Dolores, is my constituent. She is racked by grief and unable to sleep at night. Her health has worsened because, as she said to the Minister and me last night in the Minister’s office, with her son being murdered, she feels that half of her whole life has completely disappeared.
I do not want to name the murderer in this debate; I name Thomas Roberts, the victim. I want to talk briefly, with your permission, Dr Murrison, about Thomas Roberts, because it is important for the Committee to know who he was. It is important for Dolores, so racked with grief, to know that her MP and the Committee are focused on what happened.
Thomas was 21 years of age when he died on 12 March 2022 in Bournemouth town centre, the victim of a stabbing by an asylum seeker. His mum has told me several times, and she told me again with the Minister last night, that Thomas was known by everyone and, when his mother wanted to go into town, to Littledown or to other parts of the constituency, he would say no, because he was so well known and he did not want to be seen by his friends out with his mum.
Thomas was an aspiring Royal Marine and, in order to become one, he was in the Sea Scouts. He was physically fit—so fit, in fact, that he would actually bench press his mum and his brother. Dolores told me that the passing of his driving test on the first go was one of her proudest moments. It is one of the things that she remembers so fondly and so closely now, as she comes to terms with her grief.
Thomas was also an aspiring drum and bass DJ, and by all accounts a very good one, who was up and coming on the south coast. If he had not made it as a Royal Marine—there was every certainty that he would—he could easily have taken up a drum and bass DJ career. He was a member of the Christchurch boxing club. He was active in his community, and deeply loving and caring about his family.
Thomas lost his life—or rather, his life was taken from him—because an asylum seeker was in our country. That begs the question: why was that person in our country? Why were they able to wield the knife that cut short Thomas Roberts’s life, and that took away all the hopes and ambitions that his mother had for him? It is because we did not have access to the necessary database to track criminality and find out more about who the asylum seeker actually was. I am deeply sad that Thomas is not with his mum, in his community, or with his friends who loved him so much, because the last Government broke our asylum and immigration system, and created the conditions for that tragic killing and other tragic killings that have happened in our country.
Scientific age assessment, as the hon. Member for Weald of Kent said, is not a magic wand; it is imprecise, as we heard from the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. We know what works, and that having a functioning asylum and immigration system will make all the difference. I just wish we had had that on 12 March 2022 when Thomas was denied his life opportunities because of the breakages in that system.
I thank the Minister for meeting Dolores yesterday—I know that that provided her with much-needed comfort and clarity. I am absolutely confident that the Bill and its measures will make the difference that is so needed to protect our society. I also note the contribution of Councillor Joe Salmon of Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole council, who has been such a support to Dolores and her wider community, because she will be grieving for a very long time. It is incumbent on all of us in public service to speak the truth, look at the facts and bring forward the measures that will make the biggest difference.
If I may, I will return to the question of scientific age assessments. I referred to the concerns of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and of experts, but I now refer to the House of Lords debate on 27 November 2023, which is worth a read if Opposition Members have not had a chance. It goes into significant detail and depth about the concerns that I had about that as a possible policy at that stage of its development.
The Minister has been clear that scientific age assessments are not off the table; there just needs to be certainty that they are an effective tool. To avoid any further deaths and injustices, we need to have the right tools to protect the people of this country, secure and protect our borders, and make sure that we are truly able to restore confidence and trust in this system and in our ability to manage who comes into our country and who stays here.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East and the hon. Member for Weald of Kent for playing a respectful part in quite a heated discussion, which has done honour to Dolores and her family at an incredibly difficult time. It is really poignant that such case studies are discussed in these debates; they show what can happen on the limited and rare occasions that things go incredibly wrong with such systems. It is worthwhile that we have these discussions.
I must say that I was disappointed by Opposition Members’ contributions in support of the new clause, however, because although they successfully focused on occasions where things have gone wrong, they were limited on detail. I was also disappointed by their inability to answer the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh. We need that detail, and we need to understand how that would be different from the tools in the Home Office’s arsenal during the 14 years of their Government.
It was a privilege to hear about Thomas Roberts’s life. The hon. Member for Bournemouth East did himself great credit in telling us about him so movingly. Thomas’s mother, Dolores, whose pain is impossible for us to imagine, has also done his memory great credit by finding a way in her grief to talk about her son to her Member of Parliament and to the Minister.
Securing the border is a genuinely difficult job, and the Opposition are genuine in our desire to support the Government in doing that. We really believe that the new clause would help the Government to expand their ability to do that job. We deeply hope that they will consider it. I also thank the hon. Member for Clwyd East for her generous words.
I start by endorsing what my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East said about Dolores, Thomas Roberts’s mum, whom I met last night. She has gone through a searingly awful life experience. It is difficult even to think about that, let alone to offer any comfort. Unfortunately, I do not think that her experience would have changed much had scientific age assessment been in place, although the person in question had been assessed by his local authority as a child and was therefore in a separate environment from that which he would have been in had he not been assessed.
I am determined to see whether we can connect up our information about people coming from Europe, following Brexit and the disintegration of our access to Eurodac and various other pieces of information collected in Europe on asylum seekers and those arriving illegally—not all of them are asylum seekers. Reconnecting, if possible, to those databases would give us more comfort than we have at the moment. However, I emphasise that when people come to this country, we do check them against all our biometric records and the terrorism lists and watch lists that we have. It may be possible for us to do more in future.
We have had a debate about new clause 26 from the Opposition and new clause 43 from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire on behalf of the Scottish National party. That has again demonstrated the wide range of opinion that there is at both ends of the argument whenever we consider such issues. I will deal with both arguments in my response, and I hope to find a middle way.
First, repealing section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which the Bill seeks to do, does not stop our capacity to do age assessments. Listening to some of the contributions from members of the official Opposition, one would have thought that repealing section 58 will take off the table—completely and utterly—all age assessment. That is simply not true. The age assessments in section 58 were about the duty to remove somebody to Rwanda; they were not connected to anything else. As I understand it, the issue with that legislation was that the then Government’s intention was not to remove children to Rwanda, so it became more important to have a way of assessing whether somebody was a child. The Safety of Rwanda Act and the IMA—the previous Government’s approach to this issue—would have created even bigger incentives for people to claim that that they were children, because they would have avoided being sent to Rwanda, not that anyone ever actually ended up there. The previous Government’s approach of deportation permanently to Rwanda actually created even more incentives for people to lie about their age.
The fact is that there are people who are genuine asylum seekers who are children, people who are not genuine asylum seekers who are adults who claim to be children, and children who sometimes claim that they are adults. When that happens, one has to look at modern slavery issues and coercive control. There are safeguarding issues on both sides of the age assessment argument. Children pretend to be adults for reasons that we can imagine, but we will not go into those, because they are not very pleasant. There are also incentives created by the way in which the Children Act 1989 deals with unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. As a Kent MP, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent knows exactly what happens with the Kent intake unit and the pressure that her own local authority has been put under. However, she also knows about the Government support that her local authority has been given to disperse unaccompanied asylum-seeking children around the rest of the country so that some of the burden can be shared.
We are dealing with people who arrive without papers. Some of them wish to lie about their age, and some have been told to lie because the people-smuggling gangs perceive it as a way for people to access more resources than they could if they were seen as adults. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire pointed out, the system can get it wrong on both sides. People who are children have been judged to be adults and put in inappropriate places, and people who are adults have been judged to be children and put in appropriate places. There is no guaranteed scientific way of making a judgment. We can make judgments about people who are much older, but we are dealing with that uncertain four to five-year range on either side, which is the difference between 18 and 24 or 17 and 23; you will know about that, Dr Murrison, from your work as a medical doctor.
On new clause 26, I want to reassure Opposition Members that there is already provision in law for the use of age assessment, and our repealing of section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act does not remove that provision. That is because the Immigration (Age Assessments) Regulations 2024, which followed scientific advice from the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee in the Home Office, specify for the purposes of section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 the scientific methods currently recommended for age assessment. We have retained those bits of legislation; neither the 2024 regulations nor section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act have been repealed by the Bill, so the capacity to use scientific age assessments remains on the statute book.
The hon. Member for Stockton West did not seem to know which age assessment methods we were talking about. The 2024 regulations specify the power to use X-rays and MRIs, and that it is possible to take a negative view of the credibility of a person who refuses to consent, where there are no reasonable grounds for refusing that consent.
With those measures on the statute book, the Government continue to explore methods to improve the robustness of age assessment processes by increasing the reliability of the scientific methods being used. At the moment, we do not have enough certainty about the gap that exists in the current assessments, which are still being assessed. The hon. Member for Stockton West and the Conservative party put these things on to the statute book but then did not operationalise them. At the moment, we are doing as much work as we can to see how reliable they are, with a view to operationalising them. But as I wrote in a response to shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South, when he wrote to me about this issue, we are in the middle of that process. I hope that we will soon be in a situation to make announcements one way or the other, and those announcements will be made in the usual way.
New clause 26 does not specify the method to be used; it commits the Government to coming back within six months with a statutory instrument. How long does the Minister think it will be before the Government are in a position to do that? Is it six months’ worth of people coming here without our having the ability to assess them without their consent using these methods? Is it a year? Is it 18 months? How long does she think it will be before we are in a position to make these decisions?
We are making a scientific assessment of how accurate and effective the methods are that could be used to make age assessments, and I hope to have some results from that work soon. What I do not want is to have a clause in primary legislation telling me that I have to do that by a set time.
I am trying to reassure the hon. Gentleman that despite the repeal of section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which this Bill brings about, the capacity to do age assessments and apply them scientifically is still on the statute book. We are looking closely into how we can operationalise these methods if we feel they will give us a more trustworthy result, but we will not do that if we do not. We are in the middle of getting to the stage where we can make that judgment.
I will also address new clause 43, which says that we should not use age assessments at all, other than in exceptional circumstances. Given what the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said when he moved it, I think it accepts that we should continue with Merton assessments, which are the other way of dealing with age assessments currently. Those usually involve two social workers and various other experts interviewing the person concerned to try to get a handle on their real age.
I welcome the fact that the Government will come back with scientific age assessments that also do not require consent. But if six months is too long, at what point would the Minister expect to be concerned? If we have not been applying these assessments and we have ended up with the wrong people in the wrong classrooms for years, at what point should we be concerned? If six months is too soon, is it 18 months?
The hon. Gentleman is being a bit mischievous. We are in the middle of an assessment of whether scientific age assessments work and at what level of capacity and detail we can trust them. I expect reports fairly soon, and once I have them I can make a decision on how we go ahead with them. I will let Parliament know in the usual way when that has happened, but it is not useful or effective to have the hon. Gentleman’s new clause setting a deadline for that in the Bill. I hope he will accept that in the helpful way in which I intend it. We are not in disagreement on principles, but if we are going to use scientific age assessment, we need to ensure that it is as effective and useful as possible, so that it can be taken seriously and play an effective part in the battle that all of us want to be involved in: ensuring that children do not end up in adult settings and adults do not end up in children’s settings.
People who arrive here deceptively claiming to be children cannot be allowed to succeed. We should make use of the best scientific age assessment methods available to us, with or without consent. Those will not be used in isolation, but alongside all the other possible assessment methods available to us. We can debate the science all day. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to define those methods within six months through a statutory instrument, using expert advice to do so. One deceptive adult migrant in a classroom or care setting alongside children or vulnerable youngsters is one too many. Giving our agencies the ability to use the best scientific methods available to them to assess age without consent can further their ability to protect children. I would therefore like to press new clause 26 to a Division.
I am grateful to the Minister for her response to my new clause 43, but a lot of what she claims is in it is not actually there—I hope she accepts that. Those of us who visit asylum seekers in our constituencies will recognise that the determination is probably the most contentious issue that asylum seekers bring to us; it is the thing that perplexes and concerns them the most. They are very sensitive to it being done wrong, and it gets done wrong in both directions, as the Minister said.
The number of children found to have been misclassified as adults outweighs quite significantly the number of cases where an asylum seeker has falsely claimed to be a child. Everybody is right that there is no scientific or other method to determine age that is 100% effective—visual assessments certainly are not. Surely, however, the people who are best qualified to make these assessments are people who work with children—whose main business is to make these sorts of judgments about children. That is why we have asked for Merton-compliant age assessments, so that an holistic view is taken of the individual and they are assessed properly by social workers trained to work with children. Surely that is the most effective means to determine these things.
I am not saying that we should not use other things, but where the issue is in dispute—perhaps I should have included that in my new clause; clearly, the people sitting in this Committee could not be classified as children—we must get it right. That is so important as we go forward. It is life-changing, dangerous and damaging to be misclassified. As I said in my initial contribution, this is not an immigration issue, but a safeguarding issue. We must get it right. That is why I will press my new clause to a vote as well.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.