Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on your first outing, Mr Stuart. Clause 5(3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have a view about what those agreements will look like and what sort of obligations will fall on both parties?

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It will be the first occasion of many, I am sure. I hope you enjoy chairing Bill Committees as much as I enjoyed doing so in the previous Parliament.

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats. That requires a whole-of-Government response, which will be enabled by this clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as it is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partner authorities across the system work in lockstep to enhance border security while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners in other contexts, beyond border security matters.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

The Board

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 6 places a duty on the Border Security Commander to establish and maintain a board to assist with the exercise of their functions. That unique forum enables senior representatives from across the border security system to convene to shape our collective response to organised immigration crime and other border security threats. The commander will consult the board when developing strategic priorities for border security, which makes the board a crucial forum in shaping the whole-of-Government response to these threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 6 states:

“The Commander must establish and maintain a board to assist the Commander in the exercise of the Commander’s functions.”

It is all quite open-ended: the chair will be the commander, and the board will be made up of one or more representatives from each relevant partner authority. Will the Minister explain on what basis the commander might decide to have representatives from partner authorities? Why do all partner authorities not need to be represented?

Subsection (6) states:

“The Commander must hold meetings of the Board at such intervals as the Commander thinks appropriate.”

Does the Minister have any views about how regular the meetings should be? What sort of matters does she envisage the board will deal with?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Bill is a framework within which the Border Security Commander operates, but it is not prescriptive because the people who drafted the Bill could not see what the priorities will be in the future. It is a framework that enables the Border Security Commander to respond to what is going on at the time, without limiting him.

There has been a common theme throughout the speeches from the Opposition. They seem to feel that somehow the commander does not have sufficient empowerment to command the border security system, that he is not independent enough, and that he somehow cannot get things done, but the functions outlined in these clauses are not the sole capabilities of the commander’s role as empowered by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.

The Border Security Command is not an operational entity, but a strategic leader for border security. Representatives on the board would be Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Cabinet Office, as well as operational partners such as the National Crime Agency, the UK intelligence community and security services, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and policing. Those kinds of people will be convened for a strategic purpose. It makes sense, if we think about it, that the commander can bring these people together as and when he or she sees a need for them to meet, depending on what is on the agenda and what is going on.

The commander is already using the role and its associated capabilities to deploy key functions to lead on border security across Government, including deploying additional resources across partners, such as the additional £150 million for border security that has been announced by the Government, and developing border security legislation to be used by operational partners, such as the powers in this Bill. In last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from operational partners such as the police, the NCA and the Crown Prosecution Service on how useful they felt the powers in the Bill would be in their everyday operational capacity. The operational commander can also lead on international engagement diplomatically, and has accompanied both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary on journeys to Italy, Germany and Iraq to ensure that we have meetings at the highest levels with people in other jurisdictions, to try to get more co-operation going to deal with the cross-border issues of border security.

The Bill provides a new significant wide-ranging power to lead the border security system strategically, which is being done for the first time. All partner authorities, defined as those public bodies with functions in relation to border security, must, as a legal duty, have regard to the strategic direction set by the commander. However, this works best if there is not a battle between different bits of the Government—if there is co-operation and co-ordination—and that is what these structures are designed to try to achieve. The Bill will, for the first time, provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership to all parts of the system that work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems both domestically and internationally.

I hope that that has provided a little more explanation for the Opposition on the thinking and approach behind some of the powers set out in the clauses we are considering, and most specifically in clause 6.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Delegation by the Commander

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 7 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can be delegated to an authorised civil servant when required. Flexibility in the exercise of these functions will support the most efficient and effective delivery of the Government’s actions to tackle border security threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 7 makes provision about the delegation of the commander’s functions. Subsection (1) provides that

“The functions conferred on the Commander by this Chapter may be exercised by any civil servant authorised by the Commander for that purpose.”

This is further evidence, were any needed, that the post of commander might not be a serious one. We have already seen that the Bill does not specify any minimum qualifications or experience for the commander, and we have seen why: they are not really in charge of anything.

There are serious questions to answer on the delegation of functions. What sort of functions does the Minister envisage the commander potentially delegating under this clause? Can any specific functions be named? The Bill does not specify any level of seniority for those the commander might delegate functions to. Is there any grade within the Home Office that the Minister thinks it would not be appropriate for the commander to delegate to? What oversight will there be of any delegation process?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I set out in some detail in my reply on the previous clause some of the things that the commander is involved with, including some of the meetings he is involved in convening and the purpose of those strategic meetings. During the evidence we heard last week from operational partners, both the NCA and the police chiefs set out some of the benefits they felt there would be.

[Margaret Mullane (Dagenham and Rainham) (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that we seem to be having repetition in our discussions about the commander and his abilities within his role? The role is respected, and that came up in the evidence we heard. Does she feel that there is repetition of this point, with the Opposition picking up on it at every moment?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Opposition have asked which bits of the commander’s functions may be delegated and to what level. In theory, it can be any of them. We are trying to ensure that there are no issues in primary legislation that would mean something is prevented from being delegated that would have been effective.

I do not think that the hon. Member for Stockton West would expect me to go into great detail about what might happen with delegation in the future, but I can give an example. If there was to be a high-level visit to Iraq to conclude a memorandum of understanding on returns and activity against organised immigration crime, and the commander was detained elsewhere, it would be possible to delegate that function to somebody who would then go in his place.

We are trying to get to the stage in legislation where we create the commander and give flexibility as to how the job can be put into effect in scenarios that may crop up, without being too prescriptive. I hope that the hon. Member for Stockton West will accept that example of the sort of thing that may crop up.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

It is quite interesting to hear the points that the Minister is making, considering the conversation we had this morning about the commander being functionally a civil servant. Although I was never officially a civil servant in the proper sense, from my experience it is really important that senior leaders within the civil service are able to avail themselves of delegation capacities as needed.

It can be done for many reasons. It could be a bandwidth issue, where someone has multiple priorities and needs to delegate to someone else because they are not able to be in two places at once—and looking at the responsibilities of the commander as set out in the legislation, there are a lot. It could also be a resourcing issue or because of a conflict of interest. That brings me to the point I was making about this being a civil service role; there need to be proper conflict of interest considerations. That is what we are taking account of here.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

My hon. Friend is right that circumstances often crop up that require this kind of provision. All clause 7 does is allow it, so I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Designation of an Interim Border Security Commander

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 8 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can continue to be exercised in the event that the post of commander is vacant for a period, or if the commander is incapacitated or temporarily unavailable. This ensures that the work to enhance our border security and undermine the people smuggling gangs threatening our borders continues in the event that the post either falls vacant or is effectively vacant for a period.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 8 is clearly there in the event of the commander being incapacitated or ill and unable to do the job for a while. It is not unusual that people have life experiences that mean they have to take time off work. In that kind of instance, an interim commander could be appointed, pending the return of the role holder, who may be receiving medical treatment or may be incapacitated in some way. There may also be a gap between the resignation or retirement of a commander and reappointment, although one would hope that planning ahead would mean that that would be minimised. The clause addresses the practical issue of having an interim in case there were an issue with appointment.

The interim commander would, obviously, be expected to have the skills to do the job to the full extent. No time limit has been put into primary legislation because if there were a hard timeline it would make it harder in practical terms to get a replacement. It is very much a horses for courses thing, allowing there to be an interim in the case of incapacity, retirement or replacement while the replacement is advertised for and appointed in the usual manner.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Exclusion of application to the armed forces

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clauses 11 and 12 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 10 states that the duties in this chapter of the Bill do not apply to the armed forces, clause 11 makes amendments to the Data Protection Act 2018, and clause 12 provides definitions of the terms used. The work of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence makes a significant contribution to the security of the United Kingdom. The Border Security Commander will work across Government, including with the Ministry of Defence, to enhance our border security. Clause 10 recognises the unique work of the armed forces. While the Border Security Commander will work closely with the armed forces, including through the military aid to the civil authorities process, it is correct that the important duty of our armed forces remains independent from the functions outlined in this chapter. That is achieved by clause 10.

Clause 11 amends the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that the Border Security Commander may process data for law enforcement purposes. That information is vital to build a shared understanding of the nature of border security threats and inform the priority setting process. Clause 12 provides definitions for the terms used in chapter 1 of the Bill for the reader’s understanding and to ensure clarity on definitions during the implementation and operation of the legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 10 makes it clear that this chapter does not apply to the naval, military or air forces of the Crown. Clause 11 is an amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 to allow the Border Security Commander to be added to the list of competent authorities in relation to the processing of personal data carried out for a law enforcement purpose. Given how toothless the Border Security Commander appears to be, will the Minister explain why this measure needs to be added to schedule 7 of the Data Protection Act, as well as what law enforcement purposes the commander will have and for what purpose they will be processing personal data?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Member asked why the Border Security Commander should be processing data collected from electronic devices. He will know that later in the Bill, there are some new powers that involve collecting, in an intelligence-led way, data from suspected organised immigration criminals. The point is to ensure that data is collected in a lawful manner, and that is why clause 11 allows the Border Security Commander to process data for law enforcement purposes. Some of that is about the counter terrorism-style powers, which we will discuss in relation to later clauses—I do not want to have that debate here—but it is really an enabling power to put beyond doubt the legality of the collection of such material.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Supplying articles for use in immigration crime

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 13, page 7, line 12, at end insert—

‘(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), P cannot commit an offence if P is an asylum seeker.’

This amendment would specify that the offence created by clause 13 (“Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”) cannot apply to asylum seekers.

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[Pete Wishart]

That is a helpful and useful intervention, and the hon. Lady is right that the CPS did say that. I listened again very carefully to what was said, because concerns about these provisions have been raised repeatedly. I am sure that the CPS is serious about that, but I challenge the hon. Lady to look at the provisions and tell me how such a scenario could not be caught. The Bill is badly drafted because it provides the conditions to allow such a perception to develop. I know the Government do not want to arrest people who are looking at weather maps. I am certain that is not their intention at all, but when we examine the Bill we can see that it will allow that very thing to happen.

The Minister refers to the provision in section 25 of the Illegal Immigration Act 1972 or 1973—

[Dame Angela Eagle]

1971.

[Pete Wishart]

1971—there we go. Section 25 of that Act offers the protection of allowing for a reasonable explanation of why people are caught up in such activity. That is useful when it comes to this Bill, but why do we have to rely on something like that? We are creating a new Bill, which does something specific and unhelpful for some of the poorest and most wretched people who exist on our globe. We have a responsibility for those people under our international obligations and conventions, and this new legislation does nothing to assist them.

The collection of data from people’s phones is facilitated by the Bill, which creates new broad powers to enable the search and seizure of electronic devices. I will come back to the main point I made on Second Reading. We did not get much time to elaborate on this, but I think it is pertinent to the clauses that we are debating, and the Committee must consider it properly.

The gangs have a monopoly and an exclusive right to the irregular migration market. There is no other way for asylum seekers to get to the UK. It just is not possible. There are safe routes available for a small number of countries, but for the vast majority of potential asylum seekers in war-torn regions, areas and countries around the world, the only way to claim asylum in the United Kingdom is to put themselves at the mercy of the gangs, and to go on a small boat to get across the channel.

Business is booming. I do not know if anyone saw the shots today from the camps in France—I think it was on Sky News. What a hell on earth they are! What a disgrace that is for us, who are part of the problem. We cannot get the situation resolved, and we are keeping some of the poorest people in such circumstances. Shame on us, and shame on everyone in the international community who allows such conditions to develop and thrive. Business is booming for the illegal gangs.

I will tell you something else, Mr Stuart. It will only get better for the gangs when the Government cut the international aid budget. What do they think will happen? Do they think that conditions in those areas will get better? Of course they will not. That will lead to so many more people making the journey to the UK, and it will be down to the Government.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

We have had an interesting debate, and Members have come at this complex problem from different angles. The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would give everyone who gets on the boats the benefit of the doubt, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent was somewhere towards the opposite end of that spectrum, and we had everything in between.

The important thing that we need to get right in this Bill is that we must give those who are trying to prevent dangerous boat crossings all the tools they tell us they need to help them deal with the criminal gangs that have been allowed to take hold across the channel and who are currently perpetrating this evil trade. We all agree that we want to stop that.

I am starting by talking about what we agree on, and I will then explain how the clauses will assist. We all agree that the right way to go about this is to ensure that the decisions about who is allowed to come into our country are taken by the authorities in the country, rather than by sophisticated, internationally organised criminal gangs with supply chains that go across many jurisdictions, and which make millions out of their illegal trade.

I want to give the Committee a couple of examples to put some flesh on the bones of what we are trying to do with the clauses in this group. Although people may think they are wide-ranging, their purpose is not to criminalise every asylum seeker, or even the vast majority of asylum seekers. Our approach will be intelligence-led. The National Crime Agency and others who police our borders have told us that these powers will assist them in doing the things they most want to do. The NCA gave evidence last week in which it said that its strategy is to prevent, which is to deter participation in organised immigration crime; to pursue, which is to disrupt the way that organised criminals work; to protect, which is to detect and act before the damage has been done—not wait until there are deaths in the channel, but stop small boats being launched in the first place—and to prepare, which is to manage and deal with the issues.

I am going to read into the record a couple of examples, to give Members an insight into what we are trying to achieve. These powers are short of those in section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, because they relate to preparatory acts, which is what these clauses deal with. These are two case studies from the National Crime Agency. The first relates to the offence of handling articles. In November 2024, a man called Amanj Hasan Zada, who organised cross-channel small boat crossings from his home in Lancashire, was jailed for 17 years after being found guilty of people smuggling charges following an investigation by the National Crime Agency. Investigators were able to link him to three separate crossings made from France to the UK in November and December 2023, and he was convicted under section 25. Each crossing involved Kurdish migrants who had travelled through eastern Europe into Germany, Belgium and then France.

It is possible that the reasonable suspicion element meant that investigators would have met the requirements to arrest and charge him earlier, ahead of the section 25 powers becoming an option, if the new offences had been on the statute book when this was going on. This man was also moving between the UK and Iraq regularly, meaning that these powers would have assisted investigators. He was overseas, but he had access to some of these articles when he was in the UK, so he would have been in the scope of the offence, and we would have been able to interdict and arrest him earlier and prevent those crossings from happening. Part of the idea of the new offences is that they are intelligence-led, but they relate to preparatory acts. They are attempting to disrupt before the more serious section 25 offence happens, and therefore they will prevent some of the damage done if that is allowed to happen because the authorities do not have enough evidence to arrest on the more serious offence.

Let me tell the Committee about another case study. An investigation into an Albanian organised crime gang using small boats to facilitate illegal immigration to the UK led to the arrest of an individual who was identifying rigid-hulled inflatable boats for sale on behalf of that gang. The gang subsequently bought and used the identified boats for organised immigration crime purposes. The individual was never directly involved in the movement of migrants or the purchase of those boats; he simply sourced them. The NCA provided evidence that they were on the periphery of the organised criminal gang and were researching for the gang to support their criminality. Despite that evidence, he was never directly involved in the actual facilitation, so the case could not go through to charging.

The preparatory acts offence would have enabled prosecution in that case, as the individual took part in the research and planning of acts to facilitate organised immigration crime, despite not being directly involved in the facilitation and illegal entry of migrants. Both the type of information and the circumstances the information was collected under would be captured by the new offence, and the evidence that the NCA had would have been sufficient for a sentence of up to five years.

We are talking about doing prevention work, to disrupt, to interdict and to stop some of this stuff happening before it has reached its full maturity and people’s lives have been put at risk in the channel. It is a different approach. To sit, watch and wait until something has happened and people have perhaps died is one way of doing it, but the entire approach of the counter-terrorism style powers, of which the powers in this clause are an example, is what the NCA and other people have asked us to assist them with. They see the pattern in their information gathering: how these things are organised, what the patterns are, who is involved and how they do their business. They have demonstrated to me and others that these kinds of powers would be really useful in a preventive way and may very well save lives. I hope that giving those two examples will mean that we have more of a handle on the kind of things that the clauses are trying to do.

The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire was worried that the powers will criminalise all asylum seekers. That is not the intention. The intention of these powers is to be completely intelligence-led and focused on perpetrators, whether they are on the periphery or directly involved. More than 95% of people whom we know of who arrive illegally on small boats claim asylum. The hon. Member’s amendments, which would take all people who claim asylum out of consideration of these offences, would be an obvious way of avoiding the offences being brought to bear and could be used by any of the people who are involved in organised immigration crime to avoid the powers being used against them. Therefore, while I am sure it was not his intention at all, the effect of the amendments is to wreck the approach to prevention and disruption that these powers represent in the Bill.

I want to be clear—it is important that I put this on the record, so I will say it again—that it is not the intention to target asylum seekers with these new offences. The offences do not penalise individuals for entering illegally any more than they are penalised already, but they criminalise the conduct of activities connected to facilitation and illegal entry offences through the supply or handling of articles. In practice, the focus will be intelligence-led and targeted at those who law enforcement believe to be working in connection with organised criminal networks. Believe you me, Mr Stuart, those networks exist in the UK and they come across on small boats themselves. They also travel between the UK and some of the countries of origin they are working with. We know that that is exactly what happens because we can track and follow some of them. It is therefore important that we can bring these powers to bear. We know there are individuals who have claimed asylum in the UK and operated criminal activity from within the UK as part of a wider criminal gang with networks overseas in order to facilitate smuggling into the UK—I have just given the Committee an example. That is a phenomenon we are aware of today and we cannot exclude anyone with an asylum claim from the scope of these new offences, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would want us to, regardless of the circumstances.

Excluding asylum seekers fuels abuse and exploitation of the asylum system, as well as the intentional frustration of our criminal justice system, with those involved in the supply and handling of articles able to claim asylum on arrival or arrest and therefore evade prosecution. I am sure that that was not the hon. Member’s intention, but I hope he will also take at least some comfort from what I have said about this power not being applied to everybody, but instead being very focused and intelligence-led. We cannot provide blanket exemptions. I hope given the explanation, he will therefore withdraw the amendments.

Turning more broadly to what the clauses will achieve in practice, clause 13 creates a new offence of supplying or offering to supply an article where the individual knows or suspects that the article is to be used in relation to an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, which covers illegal entry, or section 25, which covers the facilitation of unlawful immigration.

Criminal smuggling gangs are using wide international and transnational networks to supply items for their criminal ventures. The new offence is intended to allow law enforcement to target those who act in a way that removes themselves from the direct act of people smuggling, so as to allow them to be caught under existing legislation. It will allow for earlier intervention, as in the example I have just used, potentially before boats have even been launched and lives risked. That is the prevention side.

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[Pete Wishart]

I wish I could say that I was reassured by the Minister’s response. There were things she said that encouraged me and that I think she was genuine and sincere about. She, and everybody who has contributed today and who we have heard from over the past couple of weeks, is right that we do not want to arrest asylum seekers. That is the last thing we want to do, and I accept that that is the case in practically everything that anybody has said. However, more asylum seekers will be arrested because of these clauses. More will be facing justice, whatever way it applies, right across the United Kingdom because of these new offences.

What we have forgotten is that it is already illegal to enter the UK irregularly. In 2020, 6,477 people were arrested because they arrived in the UK irregularly. With clauses 13 and 14 we are not addressing the illegality of issues such as people coming to the United Kingdom; we are finding new ways of ensuring that those people will be subject to court proceedings—to being on the wrong side of UK law—and that is the thing that concerns us most.

Many people have referred to agencies that gave us support today. I listened to the NCA’s evidence, and some of it was very interesting and compelling. I accept that it wants to target the gang members and those involved in this violent trade, and that is what we should be helping it to do. Obviously, asylum seekers will get caught up in all that, but let us enable the NCA to focus exclusively on trying to apprehend the gang members and secure justice rather than trying to find new ways to criminalise people coming to the UK,.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Will the hon. Gentleman not take my word that the offences will be intelligence-led? They are not targeting all asylum seekers, but they certainly would target someone coming over on a boat who may claim asylum, who has been involved in an organised immigration gang, and who has been organising the supplies for it.

[Pete Wishart]

I obviously accept the Minister’s word when it comes to all this, but we need to look at what is in the Bill. There are measures that we do not like and that we do not think will help to achieve the major objective, which is to disrupt the gangs’ business model and ensure that they are brought to justice. That just does not happen with these new clauses. The measure to which amendment 3 refers does not offend me in the same way that the subject of amendment 4 does. I will withdraw the amendment, but I reserve the right to push the next amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 4 negatived.

Clauses 14 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Collecting information for use in immigration crime

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

The provisions in clause 16 create an additional tool to act earlier to disrupt criminal gangs smuggling people into the UK. The new offence targets specified preparatory activities associated with people smuggling. These activities relate to the collection, recording and possession, viewing or accessing of information that is likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a journey of more than one person into the UK, where their entry or arrival constitutes an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. These specified activities must also be conducted in circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the information being collected, recorded, possessed, viewed or accessed will be used in organising or preparing for such a journey.

This clause is levelled strongly against people-smuggling gangs and their associates. It includes a defence for someone of undertaking these specified activities for their own journey only. Also included as a defence is a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses, where one express excuse is conducting these activities to carry out or to prepare to carry out the rescue of a person from danger or serious harm. The maximum sentence for this offence is five years’ imprisonment.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 16, as the Minister has just set out, creates a new offence of collecting information for use in immigration crime. A person commits such an offence if a person:

“collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey or part of such a journey…possesses a document or record containing information of that kind, or…views, or otherwise accesses, by means of the internet a document or record containing information of that kind.”

This is an extremely wide set of information that is being criminalised. We understand the desire to keep these offences broad in order to capture as many offenders as possible, and we support that aim. However, if the definition is too wide, there is a risk that it becomes meaningless and therefore self-defeating. So, it is important to understand how the Minister believes law enforcement will assess whether the information is of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey. Could she please explain how this test will be met in practice? It would also be helpful, for similar reasons, to know when the CPS will publish its guidance on what might meet the threshold for an offence to be committed under this clause. Finally, it is again a defence for an organisation that aims to assist asylum seekers if it does not charge for its services. So, we have the same questions and concerns about this defence as we did in relation to the preceding clauses.

[Mike Tapp]

I will quickly talk about this clause, because it is one of my favourite clauses in the Bill. Having worked in a counter-terror role in the past, I know that one of the most effective ways of preventing terror attacks on the streets of the United Kingdom is by identifying hostile reconnaissance, whether it is physical or online. That is why I am so happy to see this clause in the Bill, because it gives our authorities the opportunity to get to these vile criminals before they take to the seas.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I take my hon. Friend’s point. This clause is very much about being able to capture preparatory work for any effort to evade our immigration laws and bring people over in small boats, illegally putting their lives at risk and potentially costing lives in return for money.

This clause is about a wide range of potential research, but there are also explicit safeguards within it that are sufficient to protect individual migrants and refugees, or families of refugees, trying to help family members to flee danger or serious harm. The defence that a person is conducting these activities exclusively in preparation for their own journey protects individuals from falling foul of this law. The clause is explicitly focused on and aimed at the work done by gang-affiliated facilitators of immigration offences.

The express reasonable excuse of

“carrying out, or preparing for the carrying out of, a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm”

may—depending on the circumstances—protect the families of refugees wanting to help their loved ones flee. There is also an express reasonable excuse for a person

“acting on behalf of an organisation which…aims to assist asylum-seekers, and…does not charge for its services.”

The list of reasonable excuses in the Bill is not exhaustive, so it is very much a question of looking at the information that has been gathered and making a judgment, knowing that the idea of this offence is to focus specifically on organised immigration criminality, not the individuals who may be asylum seekers or may be being trafficked.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 17 provides for the offences set out in clauses 13 and 14—the supply and handling of articles for immigration crime—and clause 16—the collecting of information for immigration crime—to apply to activities committed both inside and outside the UK, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. The activities criminalised by these offences are often carried out overseas, as well as in the UK, by perpetrators of various nationalities to facilitate people smuggling to the UK. This clause will strengthen the offences, enhancing the ability to disrupt those involved in this trade, indiscriminate of their nationality and the location of their crime.

Clause 17 also makes provisions for, where an offence under clauses 13, 14 or 16 is committed outside the UK, proceedings to be taken in the UK. For application in Scotland, this clause provides that those proceedings are to be made in accordance with the relevant processes and bodies of the devolved Administration. Finally, this clause provides that section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, which requires consent from the Secretary of State for certain prosecutions of non-UK nationals on territorial waters, does not apply. In doing so, the impacts of these offences are not narrowed and law enforcement is able to pursue perpetrators of these offences when committed on territorial waters.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 17 sets out that the offences of supplying articles for use in immigration crime, handling articles for use in immigration crime and collecting information for use in immigration—so the clauses that we have just discussed—apply to things done both inside and outside the United Kingdom, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. In essence, clause 17 makes these three new offences extraterritorial. Subsection (2) provides that where the offence is taken outside the United Kingdom, proceedings may be taken in the United Kingdom.

When we heard evidence from Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead, she said that this provision and subsection (7) of clause 18, which extends the offence of endangering lives at sea to acts committed outside the UK, create challenges. She said,

“we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level…the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world…we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 31-33, Q30.]

However, she also said that, for these new offences to work, there has to be “dual criminality”; that is to say,

“there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 33, Q33.]

Can the Minister reassure the Committee that offences equivalent to those in clauses 13, 14 and 16 exist internationally in relevant partner countries so that we can be assured that the extraterritorial scope of the offences will be effective in tackling organised immigration crime? Can she name those offences or share a list? We fully support the aims of the Government but are keen to establish the efficacy of these measures in disrupting the vile work of people-smuggling gangs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Lady for her observations. In practice, the clause allows for prosecution where an offence was committed overseas. It may well rely on evidence sharing from an international partner. She is right to talk about the network of CPS prosecutors across other jurisdictions.

In the time that I have been in the Home Office, we have been strengthening those ties and growing them further. We have done a lot of work via arrangements such as the agreement we came to with the Italians; the German agreement; the work we have done with the Calais group; the information we are sharing in and around the Balkan countries about the routes that go through those countries; the work that the Home Secretary and the Border Security Commander have done in not only Italy, but Iraq, the Kurdish region and Tunisia and some of the other countries that tend to be countries of transit. We are focusing more and more on how we can co-operate operationally.

Some of that work involves cross-country and cross-jurisdiction work to hit particular organised immigration crime across the piece on a set day. There have been some very good examples of cross-jurisdictional days of action. The muscles in this area are strengthening and being worked more. This clause is an added power that will make it easier for us to continue that work.

[Tom Hayes]

I draw attention to what Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service, said in her testimony:

“I will start with how we rebuild relations with key allies.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q41.]

That implies that relations with key allies have been strained and need rebuilding. She then said:

“I have talked about our network of liaison prosecutors.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q41.]

She then talked about how there is regular engagement and said that engagement events with overseas prosecutors have increased in recent months. Does the Minister agree that one of the reasons we have had an asylum backlog in recent years, and our asylum system has been described as a disaster, a meltdown and worse in oral testimony, is that we strained our relations with key allies?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes. When things are cross-jurisdictional and cross-country, one has to be able to co-operate with other jurisdictions with some respect for their particular prosecutorial approach in order to be able to share information and work together operationally and diplomatically to deal with the significant challenges that organised immigration crime presents. The Government certainly want to renew and strengthen their approach in that area, and have made a good start.

People should not underestimate how often people who break this law and would fall foul of this increase in jurisdiction come to visit the UK. It is possible that we could pick them up and charge them here and, in some instances, follow them and wait for them when they arrive. The extension of jurisdiction, which is the essence of clause 17, will provide us once more with what we hope will be an extremely effective new tool that will help us to disrupt and begin to dismantle some of the organised immigration criminal gangs.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Martin McCluskey.)