Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eighth sitting)

Pete Wishart Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Katie Lam]

As the Minister has outlined, clause 40 inserts schedule 1 into the Bill. That provides that the Immigration Services Commissioner is not to hold office for a term exceeding five years. The current regime is based on there being a commissioner and deputy, so schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner may appoint a deputy. There is also a provision to enable a member of the commissioner’s staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances, such as the roles of commissioner and deputy both being vacant. That effectively allows for the appointment of an interim commissioner.

As was said in evidence to the Committee, these amendments do not seem to us to have operational consequence. We will not oppose them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 41

Detention and exercise of functions pending deportation

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 7, clause 41, page 35, line 32, leave out subsection (17).

This amendment would leave out the subsection of this clause that applies subsections (1) to (13) (relating to detention and exercise of functions pending deportation) retrospectively, i.e. as if they have always had effect.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Pete Wishart]

It is great to see you in the Chair, Dame Siobhain; it makes a pleasant change from what we have had in the past couple of weeks. I say that in the nicest way to Mr Stuart.

[The Chair]

I will have to find out more!

[Pete Wishart]

Clause 41 introduces a significant expansion of detention powers, allowing individuals to be detained from the moment a deportation is considered rather than waiting for a formal order. However, my main concern with the clause is that it is to apply retrospectively, meaning it would legally validate past detentions that were previously unlawful. As would be expected, the provision has sparked serious concerns among legal experts, human rights organisations and advocacy groups, raising critical questions about the rule of law, human rights and judicial oversight.

We had the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association with us as part of an evidence session. They have expressed great concern with this provision, saying:

“We are concerned with the dangerous precedent which would be set if unlawful deprivation of liberty were to be treated as lawful—such retrospectivity undermines the rule of law and remains wholly unjustified in the materials accompanying the Bill.”

I have looked at this issue and there does not seem to be any sufficient justification for this exceptional measure. The ILPA warns us that it could rewrite history, denying justice to individuals who could have sought remedies for unlawful detention.

Amnesty International, which again gave very good evidence to the Committee, has also voiced strong objections. It has highlighted how detention powers have expanded significantly while judicial oversight has weakened, leading to risks of serious injustice.

Bail for Immigration Detainees has stressed that clause 41 risks

“further criminalising migrants and refugees”.

It urges instead for a system that upholds human rights and dignity.

Combined with the Illegal Migration Act, the clause could lead to longer, more expensive and potentially unlawful detentions in breach of article 5 of the European convention on human rights. The Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges that clause 41 effectively makes lawful past detentions that were not compliant with due process at the time, yet the European convention on human rights memorandum does not properly address whether that retrospective validation aligns with the fundamental legal safeguards of article 5. I would particularly like the Minister to address those concerns.

Clause 41 therefore undermines accountability, weakens judicial scrutiny and risks setting a dangerous precedent through which the Government can retroactively legitimise actions that would otherwise have been unlawful. Given the weight of these concerns, there is a strong case for leaving out the retrospective provisions from clause 41, and that is what my amendment 7 seeks to do. Upholding the rule of law means ensuring that detention powers are subject to proper legal safeguards and that individuals are not denied their fundamental rights through legislative backtracking.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The purpose of clause 41 is to clarify the existing powers of detention pending deportation set out in schedule 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. The clause ensures that the Secretary of State can detain individuals once they have been notified that deportation is being considered. It also aligns the power to detain with the power to take biometrics and to search for nationality documents. That is because the taking of biometric information and any other searches will ordinarily take place at the point that somebody is detained. The effect of clause 41 is to make clear that a person subject to deportation may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It strengthens an existing power; it does not create a new power. It clarifies a power that has always existed and been used for this purpose.

Another effect of the clause is to confirm that the Secretary of State may take biometrics and search for those documents. Since clause 41 clarifies existing powers, the detention provisions it contains are regarded as always having had effect. It is extremely important for Members to understand what the clarification of the powers of detention means. If a person is subject to deportation on the basis that the deportation is conducive to the public good, they may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It is extremely important that the Home Office should be able to detain those it is seeking to deport on that basis. Some of these foreign national offenders pose a high risk of harm to the public. Therefore, inability to detain them could have a direct impact on public safety.

The clause makes it clear that it is lawful to detain a person once they are notified that the Home Office is considering whether to make a deportation order against them, but that is not a new detention power; it has been misunderstood in some of the commentary from outside of this place. The clause clarifies an existing power to ensure there is no ambiguity about when someone subject to a conducive deportation can be detained. The accurate identification of such people is very important.

The clause also makes consequential amendments to existing powers to search detained persons—potential deportees—for documents that prove their identity or nationality, and to take their biometrics upon their being detained. Clause 41 sets out the power to detain pending deportation, as the Home Office has always understood it to operate. It is therefore right that the provision applies retrospectively. That deals with amendment 7, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and seeks to remove the retrospective element of the clause.

Clause 41 clarifies the existing statutory powers of detention. There are important public safety reasons why these powers need to be put beyond doubt. Clause 41 clarifies the powers as the Home Office has always understood them to operate. There will be no operational impact that we can assess, or increased use of the power, and no effect on people in relation to whom this power has been exercised. It is entirely right that these provisions should apply retrospectively in these circumstances.

[Pete Wishart]

I hear the Minister’s justification for the powers and why she feels they are necessary, but I do not hear any compelling reason for why they have to be introduced retrospectively. What on earth is that supposed to help with? She knows the range of concerns raised by a number of legal organisations. I wish she would address their concerns about the consequences of the clause.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The clause seeks to put beyond any doubt that the Home Office has the power to detain, in conducive deportation cases, at the earliest point. It has been doing that for many years. The clarification in the clause applies retrospectively to ensure that those who have been detained in the past have not been detained unlawfully. We do not believe they have, but this puts it beyond doubt. To clarify, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is putting beyond doubt in the Bill the understanding of how and when these powers can be used—at the earliest opportunity, if it is a conducive deportation. The powers, including to detain at the earliest opportunity, have always existed.

If the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire were agreed to, it would cast doubt on many of the arrests and detentions ahead of deportations that have happened in the past, which I do not think the hon. Gentleman would want to do. To reassure the hon. Gentleman one final time, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is a clarification of the way that they have always been understood to work. The clause puts beyond legal doubt that if somebody is being detained pending deportation, they can be detained lawfully at the earliest opportunity. That understanding has always been the case, but the clause puts it beyond any legal doubt.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 41 confirms that the Home Office may detain someone subject to deportation from the point at which the Home Office serves the notification that deportation is being considered, when that deportation is conducive to the public good. We support this provision to allow for detention before a deportation order is signed, but that only applies if the Secretary of State has notified the person in writing. Can I seek reassurance from the Minister that the requirement for a written notice will not build any delay into the process? We also support the provision in clause 42 to allow the Home Office to capture biometrics at the new, earlier point of detention.

[Pete Wishart]

I will not detain the Committee for long. I do not like clause 41 anyway—I think the extension of deportation powers is overwhelming and I do not believe they are required—but I do not like this retrospection one bit. I have not secured an adequate explanation from the Minister about why that is necessary. I would therefore like to put my amendment to a vote, Dame Siobhain.

[The Chair]

Thank you for clarifying, as that was going to be my next question. Does anybody else wish to contribute?