Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Tom Hayes Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

The next question will be the last. Witnesses, if there is anything that you have not yet said but would like to say, please do so.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

Q Part of the aim of the Bill is to minimise opportunities for crossings, which involves targeting the criminal smuggler gangs that are enabling small boat crossings to take place. Do you agree that enforcement activities against those smuggler gangs will have a deterrent effect—that enforcement activity has value in its own right, but minimising the number of crossings by disrupting the business model will have a deterrent effect? On Enver’s point about the asylum hotel that was at risk of burning down, would you agree that those Government policies directly and gravely put the lives of vulnerable asylum seekers at risk?

Enver Solomon: The system meltdown that came about because of the fantastical Rwanda policy and the full provisions of the Illegal Migration Act left people in a state of permanent limbo, in inappropriate accommodation, in very vulnerable situations, in communities where there were high tensions. As a consequence of that, people’s wellbeing was potentially compromised. There is no question about that. We saw that through our work. We saw the rise in stress and in suicidal ideation. There was very clear evidence from our practice about the impact of what was, as we described, a system meltdown.

On your point about enforcement, enforcement has a role to play but it has to be one strategy combined with others—one side of a multi-pronged approach. Similarly to the evidence from dismantling drug trafficking, often when you dismantle one set of smugglers or gangmasters, others will reappear and take over that part of the trade. It is very difficult to enforce and prosecute your way out of this challenge. Multiple strategies have to be adopted—

[The Chair]

Order. Sorry to interrupt, but we are in our last minute. Mubeen and Daniel, would you like to come in quickly?

Mubeen Bhutta: Thank you—my hearing aid has magically started working.

On disrupting the business model, going back to what we said at the beginning about this being the other half of the safe routes story, clause 34 is about taking biometrics and introduces flexibility so that biometrics can be taken outside visa centres. We would like to see that extended to people required to submit their biometrics for family reunion visas, because we know that people are making dangerous journeys to visa centres. Often there are multiple journeys, often in conflicts, and people often have to use smugglers to get across the border if the visa centre in their country is closed. There is a real opportunity to strengthen that existing safe route by extending the flexibility in clause 34.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We have two quick questions to squeeze in.

[Tom Hayes]

Q We hear that, because the so-called Rwanda deterrent never actually happened, it is hard to assess whether or not it was a deterrent, but in a Q&A you published on 25 July, Dr Walsh, you said:

“The deterrent impact of the policy would likely have depended on the number of people sent to Rwanda.”

You estimated the probability of people crossing the channel in a small boat being sent to Rwanda to be about 1% to 2%.

You also said:

“There is no evidence that political discussions surrounding the Rwanda policy deterred small boat arrivals.”

In fact, from the day the policy was announced to the day it was scrapped, we saw 84,000 people cross the channel. Do you want to say anything about the efficacy of the so-called deterrent? Relatedly, do you agree that it is hard to make emphatic assessments of the fiscal burden of immigration owing to the quality of the available data?

Dr Peter Walsh: Yes, I would agree with that last point.

The Rwanda policy was never implemented, so it would be unfair to say that it did not have a deterrent effect. Policies of that kind typically have the bulk of their effect once they have been implemented. I cannot remember the source for the 1% to 2% figure. This is a somewhat old research paper, but at the time it was the best estimate we could point to. It was not an estimate that I or colleagues made. Can you see what the source is?

[Tom Hayes]

I can. It says:

“If only a few hundred asylum seekers were sent to Rwanda each year (as suggested by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Home Office’s modelling) and unauthorised arrivals had continued at rates similar to those seen in 2022 and 2023”—

the paper was published in 2024—

“then the probability of a person crossing the Channel in a small boat being sent to Rwanda would have been small—around 1-2%.”

Dr Peter Walsh: I now recall the Home Office’s modelling, and it was subject to a whole range of caveats. The Home Office was actually quite cautious about the estimates. That was the best available figure it had at the time. It was in part based on Rwanda’s capacity to process claims. The number could have gone up, but we never found out.

[The Chair]

Can I quickly get Kenneth’s question in?

--- Later in debate ---

[Jo White]

Q I will be quick. Thank you for the work that you do. My biggest concern is those children who come into the UK who we do not even know are coming in, because it is hidden. They are clearly victims of modern slavery or child sexual exploitation. It is important, as you said just now, that we stop the gangs that are bringing them across. How confident are you that the new Border Security Commander with his anti-terrorism powers will be able to track those gangs down and smash them?

Dame Rachel de Souza: That is the first question I asked the National Crime Agency when I came into the role. I asked, “Could you find every child in this country?” I was told that, “With enough resource, we could pretty much do it, apart from some of the Vietnamese children who are trafficked into cannabis factories and things like that.” With resource, and with this new Border Security Command, we will get a lot nearer, and we need to do that.

[Tom Hayes]

Q Thank you for all of your work. In April 2023, you wrote to the then Home Secretary requesting information about children accommodated in hotels. Seven months later, when you received the information, you then said that it was seven months past your deadline and that the quality of the information itself was deeply troubling. Can you comment on how difficult or easy it was for you to discharge your statutory duties as Children’s Commissioner when working with the last Government to safeguard children?

Dame Rachel de Souza: The Home Office was the only Department that failed to answer my data request in time and that gave me imperfect data, but I did not stop and I kept going. I have to say: it is much better now. I was able to speak to and did have access to Ministers, and I was always able to make my case. I did not get that information in a timely manner, but I did get that information in the end. I am worried about what has happened to those children.

The data we were after was safeguarding data that showed all the concerns, and the reason I asked for it was because I knew that the safeguarding in the hotels was not as it should be. We got the data on children who had been victims of attempted organ harvesting, rape and various other things, as well as the number of children who were missing. We still do not know where many of those children are, and that is not good enough. The whole tone has changed, and I hope that the Government will still want to stop the small boats, while also being much more pro-children.

[The Chair]

We will squeeze in one last question.