Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)
Thursday 27th February 2025
(1 day, 18 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBorder Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 View all Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 February 2025 - (27 Feb 2025)
The Chair
Before we hear from our witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interests in connection with the Bill? No. In that case, we will now hear oral evidence from the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the National Crime Agency and the Crown Prosecution Service.
Examination of Witnesses
Assistant Chief Constable Jim Pearce, Sarah Dineley and Rob Jones gave evidence.
The Chair
We have until 2.40 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves briefly for the record?
Rob Jones: I am Rob Jones, the director general of operations for the National Crime Agency.
Sarah Dineley: My name is Sarah Dineley, and I am head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead on organised immigration crime.
Jim Pearce: Good afternoon. I am Assistant Chief Constable Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on organised immigration crime.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
Q
Rob Jones: There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems; you need a range of measures that concurrently bear down on them. The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants; and those who are closer, in near-Europe, who are involved in it. From an organised crime perspective, it is about concurrent pressure in a number of areas to make the incentives for being involved in organised immigration crime no longer viable.
Jim Pearce: From my perspective, you need to look at this at both ends of the scale. What we are probably thinking about at the moment is prosecution and putting people through the courts. Actually, we know that, in other thematic serious and organised crime, prevention and early intervention work just as effectively. We would call that disruption. Disrupting the patterns, and the ways of working that Rob just described, earlier would obviously prevent victims from becoming victims in the end. It is the 4P approach, which I am sure most of you have heard of. It is about working from neighbourhood policing, with a local factor, in order to gather intelligence, and putting that into the system all the way up through our regional crime units and into the National Crime Agency and high-end prosecution, international and online.
Sarah Dineley: I concur with my two colleagues. I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero. It is about having a suite of measures—whether they are prosecutorial or disruptive in nature—that taken together will allow the prosecution and law enforcement teams to work together to tackle the gangs. It is always important to remember that a criminal justice outcome is not necessarily the right outcome; there are other outcomes that can tackle organised immigration crime and gangs effectively.
Matt Vickers
Q
Sarah Dineley: From a prosecution point of view, I would say it is a matter for the legislators to decide what legislation they feel is appropriate. The Bill as drafted does add to the toolkit of measures we have available.
Rob Jones: From my perspective, the measures that make the most difference and are the most significant in tackling the organised crime element are on preparatory acts, in clauses 13 to 16. They give us the ability to be pre-emptive, proactive and very disruptive, giving us something we have not had before—the ability to act before people actually commit an offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, which is the facilitation offence. That is an important opportunity, because we are driven by trying to reduce the highest-risk crossings and trying to prevent crossings. We would not choose to react to crossings and then investigate; we want to act as quickly as we can. These measures create the ability to do that—to go much sooner, have more impact, and build momentum, so that the people who are behind these attempts really start to feel the pressure.
Jim Pearce: In addition, the Bill provides the opportunity to increase clarity and focus, with the ability to gain information and intelligence through the seizure of electronic devices, for example. I know this is controversial. Being able to do that with a very clear power to search, seize and then download, as opposed to potentially—I am not saying this has happened—misusing existing powers, will give clarity because you can say to an operational police officer, immigration officer, or a member of the National Crime Agency, “This is what you use in order to get that defined intelligence at the end.”
Matt Vickers
Q
Jim Pearce: From a policing point of view, there would be insurance around safeguarding. For the electronic devices, for example, I understand the benefits that would come from the counter-terrorism-style powers to be able to seize electronic devices. I am confident that that is managed through the measures in place around reasonable suspicion and having to get the advice from a senior officer. It is about operationalising that, putting it into practice, and making sure that our staff understand through education and training. Any change in legislation requires training, finance and input. Those are the types of things that I would be thinking about.
Rob Jones: I agree. It is about the professional development and the guidance for officers who are using new tactics and new tools against this threat, and making sure that we are ready to go with very clear guidance on how officers should look to engage the new offences in the Bill.
Sarah Dineley: Clause 17 and one of the subsections of clause 18 create extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offences, and it would be remiss of me not to highlight some of the challenges that that will bring. We have a system of judicial co-operation, something called mutual legal assistance, whereby we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level. We work very hard on building those relationships to collaborate.
To that end, the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world. Specifically, we have liaison prosecutors based in the major organised immigration crime countries—Spain, Italy, Turkey, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium—and two in France, one of whom is actually a dedicated organised immigration crime liaison prosecutor. We use them to foster and build those relationships so that we have that reciprocal exchange of information where required. That is not to say that is without its challenges. I flag that as something that we will continue to work on, but it has challenges.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)
Q
Rob Jones: It gives us the opportunity to make the most of the intelligence dividend that we have invested in tackling the threat. We have a good understanding of the people behind small boats crossings in particular, the supply of materials, the facilitation from near-Europe and further afield, but we want momentum and greater agility so that when we are aware that a crossing is being prepared—when materials are moving—we can act pre-emptively and proactively.
As I said earlier, we do not want to be investigating after thousands of people have arrived, and trying to put together very complex investigations that may involve months of covert surveillance and eavesdropping—a whole range of covert tactics—to get us over the line for a charging decision for a section 25 offence. The new offences give us the opportunity to act when we see that jigsaw puzzle coming together, to go to the CPS when we reach a tipping point and to go earlier than we can now. That means that we can pull more people through that system, deliver justice more quickly and be more disruptive in tackling the threat. That is a big step forward. That is lacking in the current toolbox to operationalise the intelligence we have.
Sarah Dineley: The endangerment offence potentially fills a gap between the current section 24 and 25 provisions. Each boat has a pilot—someone steering it across the channel—who, by the very nature and condition of those boats, the overcrowding, the lack of lifesaving equipment, and so on, puts everyone in that boat in danger of losing their life. We welcome that clause and will draft guidance on how it can be interpreted in terms of practical application.
Jim Pearce: Police officers mainly deal with the inland clandestine events as opposed to the small boats. From my point of view, it would be, correctly, common practice to use schedule 2(17) of the Immigration Act 1971 to detain migrants and then pass them into the immigration system. On searches after that, yes, there are powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 after that provision under section 32, but that is mainly to safeguard; it is not to seize evidence.
On Rob’s point about early intervention and intelligence gathering, the only way you gather intelligence is through what people tell you and what electronic devices give up. The Bill gives police officers the ability to gather intelligence through defined and clear powers in legislation, so that they are not misusing a PACE power, an operational procedure or anything else. That would be the biggest change for policing.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
Rob Jones: You could say that about all serious organised crime. Where do you go from there? I do not agree with that view. It is definitely transnational and complicated, but it is a relatively new serious organised crime threat, and it is not too late to stop it. In 2018, there were a few hundred people coming on small boats. There were 36,000 last year. We need to unravel the conditions that have allowed that to happen, and this legislation will help with that. I do not take the view that you cannot stop it.
There will always be people attempting organised immigration crime, but this element of it—small boats—is relatively new. There are very specific things that organised crime groups involved in it need to do. They need access to very specific materials—otherwise they cannot move the numbers that they attempt to move—and they need to be able to operate using materials that are lawfully obtained, albeit for criminal purposes. This attacks that business model because we can pursue the dual-use materials with more vigour and have more impact. It is challenging, and it is a different challenge from drugs and other threats, but it is there to be dealt with. It is a very public manifestation of the OIC threat that has always been there. This part of it relies on a very specific business model that we can attack.
Sarah Dineley: The follow-on point from that, and one that you raised, is that people are making a lot of money out of this, so the illicit finance piece is really important. These new clauses actually give us more on which to hang illicit finance investigations. There is a lot of work going on in the illicit finance sphere; in particular, and most recent, the illicit finance taskforce between the UK and Italy, was set up specifically to look at the profits being made by the people who are preying on other people’s misery.
Jim Pearce: It has been said already but I want to reinforce the point about organised crime gangs being involved in polycriminality. Organised immigration crime is one part, but so are modern slavery, serious acquisitive crime and drug running. That is felt in local communities across the whole country. In my own force area of Devon and Cornwall, you would think that modern slavery and organised immigration crime do not exist, but we have a number of investigations and intelligence leads being developed; they are being looked at by both our regional crime units and members of Rob’s team. This exists everywhere across the country. As I say, if you are prepared to effectively smuggle people into the country, or at least to facilitate that, you are prepared to get involved in very serious things indeed.
Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)
Q
Sarah Dineley: I will deal with the second point first, as it is probably the easiest and it flows into the first. In relation to clauses 13 to 16, with any new legislation, the Crown Prosecution Service always publishes guidance on how it is to be interpreted. Certainly, the example that you gave about asking what the weather is like in Dover when you are stood in Calais would not fall within the guidance as meeting the evidential test. Of course, it is not just about an evidential test being met, but a public interest test as well. Our guidance always deals with that specific question of whether it is in the public interest, so that prosecutors can do that balancing exercise and ask, “Are there factors that weigh in favour of prosecution? Are there factors that tend away from prosecution?” They want to come to a decision that is compliant with our code for Crown prosecutors, so it is a mixture of guidance and application of the code that hopefully gets us to the right conclusion.
Going back to your first point, I mentioned that we have mutual legal assistance and that we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for. One of the problems is that there has to be something called dual criminality—there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books. However, we are confident that there are reciprocal laws in the major OIC countries in Europe to allow us to make those requests for information under mutual legal assistance. We are aided by the network of prosecutors based abroad, which I mentioned. We also have Eurojust and the joint investigation teams run out of Eurojust. We are well versed in working internationally and with the measures that we can deploy to make sure that we build a strong evidential case.
Mike Tapp (Dover and Deal) (Lab)
Q
We have talked a lot about the upstream side, which publicly people are well aware of. Is there a significant domestic angle here? Are we confident that we have a sound intelligence picture—as much as we can? Are there crossovers with other crime? Does the Bill help us to disrupt and arrest people in this country?
Rob Jones: I will come back on that first. There is a footprint in the UK for organised immigration crime. The footprint for the small boats crossings has typically been driven by Belgium, Germany, Turkey and further afield, with Iraqi Kurdish and Afghan groups. As more and more people have successfully exploited that route, however, they put down ties, they get involved in criminality and they know it has worked for them, so that drives the problem. There are organised crime groups in the UK that we are targeting. Some of our most significant cases to date have involved a footprint in the UK.
When we look at those groups and what it took to bring them to justice, we have either had to extradite them to another country following a judicial investigation, or we have done very complex covert investigations for many months. This helps with that issue, because when we have got good evidence from covert tactics—this was my earlier point—we are able to go earlier with it. The majority of the criminality that drives the small boats element, however, is based overseas. We have a good intelligence picture through OIC, which has improved dramatically since 2015 when we started targeting this, when the crisis first started.
Jim Pearce: I have a follow-on from policing. I probably have two points to make. First, tomorrow you will start hearing national media on interventions across the country, which are termed Operation or Op Mille—police interventions to do with cannabis farms. A lot of the intelligence linked to that particular operation involves workers who have been brought in illegally from abroad, and all those disruptions will be from across the whole country. That might just bring this to life.
The second point I want to make is on legislation changes, which you just asked about. The two changes—well, there are more than two, but the ones I particularly want to focus on—relate to serious crime prevention orders and the ability of law enforcement, which is the police, the NCA and of course the CPS, to apply for interim orders, especially those on acquittal. Serious crime prevention orders are probably a tool that is underused at the moment. We are keen to push into that space moving forward.
Sarah Dineley: To put that into context, at the moment there are effectively two types of serious crime prevention order: one is imposed on conviction, and between 2011 and 2022, we had 1,057; the other is what we call the stand-alone serious crime prevention orders. Those are made before any charges are brought and they are heard in the High Court. To date, there have only been two applications, one of which was successful. The introduction of this new serious crime prevention order does fill a massive gap in that restrictive order.
Rob Jones: I agree with that, and I welcome those measures. There is a similar regime for sexual offences, which allows control measures for people who are suspected of offences. That has been very successful. We welcome that.
Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)
Q
Mr Jones, I am struck by your confidence that you are going to end this. I think you made a comparison with illegal drugs. You are probably right to make that comparison—they are both demand-led and operated by illegal gangs—but we have not been particularly successful with illegal drugs over the course of the past decade.
Lastly, Ms Dineley, you said something about pilots of the boats. I hope your intelligence is telling you exactly the people who are piloting the boats. It is not the gang members or people associated with this crime. It is ordinary asylum seekers who cannot afford the fare or are forced into piloting these boats. I hope that when approaching the new powers in the clauses you will be proportionate, you will know what is going on and will not endlessly prosecute innocent people who are just asylum seekers fleeing oppression and warfare.
Rob Jones: We are not looking to pursue asylum seekers who are not involved in serious and organised crime. That is not what we do. This is about tackling serious and organised crime and being as effective as we can be in doing that. There are examples of people involved in piloting boats who are connected to the organised crime groups.
Pete Wishart
Q
Rob Jones: People have been convicted of those offences, so that has passed an evidential test. Our role is undermining a specific element of the business model. It is not like drugs trafficking. Drugs trafficking has been established since the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. It is a lot older, a lot more established and involves billions of pounds and tens of thousands of people internationally, if not more. The small boats threat is different from that. It is the highest harm manifestation of organised immigration crime. I have not said that I will stop organised immigration crime. I said that we will tackle the small boats business model and then continue to tackle the OIC threat, as we have been doing since 2015.
Sarah Dineley: In relation to asylum seekers piloting boats, under the Immigration Act 1971 we have two offences: sections 24 and 25—section 25 being the facilitating offence. Our guidance is very clear on when we charge the section 25 facilitation offence. It is very clear from our guidance that it is not just about having a hand on the tiller; it is about being part of a management chain and being part of the organisation of that crossing.
You mentioned people who are coerced into taking the tiller. We would look under section 24—arriving illegally—on whether an offence of duress would be sustained. That would form part of our considerations on whether evidentially it is made out and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute that person. We do look at the whole set of circumstances, and our guidance sets out in very clear terms what is required, both in terms of the evidential test and the public interest test—that balancing exercise. We also have specific guidance in relation to how we treat refugees and asylum seekers. Again, that plays into the charging decision equation, as I will put it, and the balancing exercise.
Jim Pearce: I am not sure what I could add to my colleagues’ comments.
Pete Wishart
Q
Jim Pearce: I am not sure I am going to be able to answer that question, but I can tell you that for 12 months since November 2023 the police were involved with just under 2,000 inland clandestine incidents. What I mean by that are, for example, relevant persons who have been found in the back of an HGV who walk into police stations declaring asylum or those who have been left at petrol stations and are then picked up by police patrols and brought in. There were 2,000 incidents and nearly 3,000 persons. Obviously, they are not all being arrested for organised immigration crime offences, because they have not necessarily committed them, and my colleague here has spoken about the aggravating factors that sit within section 24, which are the key points to prove. As I say, that is probably all I could offer you at this time.
Sarah Dineley: Perhaps I could put things into some sort of numerical context. Last year, we had 37,000 arrivals in the UK through small boats crossings alone, and, in the period from April to September last year, there were only 250 prosecutions.
Pete Wishart
And were they gang members?
Sarah Dineley: I cannot break that down, but that would include gang members. That is the total number of prosecutions.
Kenneth Stevenson (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)
Q
Rob Jones: In relation to the powers in clauses 13 to 16?
Kenneth Stevenson
Yes. I apologise—I think I have cut across the Minister, because she asked a very similar question, but, if you could give us an idea of how those three things that you spoke about before could be helped by the Bill, that would be really helpful.
Rob Jones: When we identify somebody from the UK who is involved in organising small boats crossings, for instance, we have to get very good, sophisticated surveillance control over that individual to get enough evidence to be able to produce a full file submission to the CPS for a section 25 facilitation offence. That could mean months of surveillance, or covert activity, in terms of eavesdropping and audio recordings.
In the meantime, we are seeing that individual with a public profile on social media, researching crossings, communicating with people overtly and meeting people. When you are looking at the commissioning of the offence, and you are living with somebody who is involved in serious organised crime, you are seeing that play out in front of you.
These clauses allow us to take elements of their business model—as they are meeting people, as they are researching, and as they are taking the preparatory steps to the section 25 offence—then go to the CPS and say, “We think we’ve got enough; we think we could go now.” That gives you more momentum, more speed and more agility.
It is the same mindset as trying to prevent attacks in the CT world. You would not choose to reactively investigate a terrorist attack; we would not choose to reactively investigate highly dangerous crossings in the English channel during which people get killed. We would choose to pre-emptively stop them, and that is what the new offences would introduce.
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
Q
Then, just picking up on your point, Mr Jones, about criminal gangs starting to feel the pressure because of this new suite of tools, would you say that the tools provided for in this Bill, which will have a disruptive effect, could in consequence also have a deterrent effect on the criminal smuggler gangs?
Rob Jones: I will take the second question first. Obviously time will tell but, adding to what we are doing already, these tools will rack up the pressure, and that starts to change behaviour. It increases costs and increases friction in the business model. Those things contribute to deterring people from getting involved, and we see that with other areas of criminality. I will allow others to answer the asylum question.
Sarah Dineley: I am going to dip out, rather, and say that it is not really a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service, but I can tell you that the Home Office is undertaking a piece of work looking at what the pull factors are for migrants wanting to reach the UK, and at what point they reach the firm decision that the UK is their final destination.
Tom Hayes
Q
Sarah Dineley: There is nothing that I have read in any interview provided by a migrant to suggest that that is a pull factor.
Jim Pearce: I have a personal view, but I am speaking on behalf of the national police chiefs, and I am not sure that I am in a position to do that. That is probably a question for either Immigration Enforcement or the Home Office.
Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)
Q
My second question is for Sarah. I should probably declare an interest because I was previously the home affairs attaché at the embassy in Paris. You talked about international co-operation and mentioned things like JITs and Eurojust and the challenges we face there. We heard from a previous witness about how the UK no longer being in Dublin is being cited by migrants as one of the reasons that they are going in. Can you say more about the challenges that the UK is facing post Brexit? How do we build relations with key allies to overcome them?
Sarah Dineley: I will start with how we rebuild relations with key allies. I have talked about our network of liaison prosecutors. We regularly engage and hold engagement events with our overseas prosecutors: this year alone, we have had engagement events in Ireland, Spain and, two weeks ago, Italy. That is about building those relationships and finding out what their challenges are, as well as finding out about their legal systems and what barriers there are to the co-operation that we are seeking. I think we do have to recognise that different countries have a different legal framework, and we cannot simply impose our framework on another country; we have to be able to work around their framework to try to get what we need from them.
The Chair
I want to get Mike Tapp’s question in quickly so that you can summarise. We have got just two minutes left.
Mike Tapp
Q
Rob Jones: For me, I have worked really closely with Martin Hewitt already, and it works well. It allows me to focus on the operational leadership of tackling the organised crime threat and Martin to have the convening power and to work across Whitehall on a range of issues. It provides clarity, and we have more than enough to get on with in the NCA in tackling the organised crime element.
Jim Pearce: I sit on Martin’s board, so strategically I am heavily involved, and members of my team sit within the operational delivery groups. Speaking from a personal point of view, his strategic plans over the next few years make absolute sense in terms of what he is seeking to achieve for the Border Security Command. Exactly as Rob just said, it feels as though the co-ordination is there and it is driving a system response across law enforcement and more widely.
Sarah Dineley: Although we contribute to the Border Security Command, as an independent prosecuting authority we cannot be tasked or directed. However, we do value the collaborative work that we can do within that sphere.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the witnesses for your evidence and for your service.
Examination of Witnesses
Tony Smith, Alp Mehmet and Karl Williams gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the former director general of UK Border Force, from Migration Watch UK and from the Centre for Policy Studies. We have until 3.20 pm for this panel. Could witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Karl Williams: I am Karl Williams, the research director at the Centre for Policy Studies. I have written several reports on legal and illegal migration.
Tony Smith: Hello, my name is Tony Smith. I spent 40 years in the Home Office, between 1972 and 2013, from immigration officer right the way up to director general of UK Border Force.
Alp Mehmet: I am Alp Mehmet, chairman of Migration Watch. I am also a former diplomat and a former immigration officer.
Matt Vickers
Q
Alp Mehmet: May I just make a few remarks? Would that be acceptable?
The Chair
We have a limited amount of time, so if you could answer the question, that would be great.
Alp Mehmet: I welcome the Bill in many respects. It is the sort of thing that needed to be done, and it is now happening. I welcome the co-ordination taking place across Government, and the potential co-operation with the EU and EU member states is also to be welcomed. The setting up of Border Security Command and the Border Security Commander will be helpful. My only gripe is that I strongly disagree with the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024—I think that is a mistake. I also think that repealing certain parts of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is a mistake. That is my personal view, and I am happy to explain why in a moment.
I wonder whether primary legislation was necessary to do a lot of what is happening, but we are where we are. If anything, I think repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration, or whatever we may call it, to some degree, which is unfortunate. A lot of people entering the EU—240,000 were declared to have entered illegally last year—will end up coming to us. There is no deterrence because, once they arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. I believe the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message. I do not think anything in the Bill suggests that is going to happen. That is broadly my view.
Tony Smith: Looking at the relevant clauses, the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.
I would like to see the Border Security Commander and his team have law enforcement powers so that they can arrest and detain, the same as officers in Border Force, the National Crime Agency and Immigration Enforcement. I think that whole governance structure needs attention. It needs someone to pull it all together. I am not sure we have pitched the post right in immigration law enforcement teams.
On the Border Security Commander’s reporting requirements under the Bill, I think he regularly needs to publish details of irregular arrivals by way of nationality and age, and provide regular updates on where they are in the process, so we can all see whether there are logjams in the process from arrival to either removal or grant. We can check the timelines. I think they already have a dashboard in the Home Office that does that, so I presume he will be able to take responsibility for that.
I would also like to follow up on the point that Alp Mehmet made about data on removals and the numbers of people who can currently be excluded under NABA because they have come from a safe third country. That is still there, but we do not know the data on how many of them are actually being removed on a case-by-case, so I would like to see a list of all the countries to which we can remove people: safe first countries, source countries and third countries.
We know the EU will not take third-country returns. In fact, other than Rwanda, I do not think there are any countries that will take third-country returns. There are countries that will take back their own nationals, but under this new system where we are doing away with SORA and most of the IMA, there does not seem to be a third-country outlet. Therefore, people who come here from Iran, Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan know that, from the other side of the channel, they need only get into British territorial waters and they will probably be allowed to stay in the UK. They might well get asylum, but even if they do not, it is impossible to return them for one reason or another.
I am really interested in that returns piece. I am keen on capturing data from mobile devices. Some of them keep their mobile phones. That data is being used for prosecution purposes only. I think it should be made available to officials who are considering their asylum claim. Passport data, identity data, age data and travel history data are often held on those phones—all data that would be useful when considering an asylum application. We need legislation to do that.
I would also use mobile devices to track people who are given bail so that we can use the tracker to know where they are in the event of an adverse decision from the Home Office, so that we are able to find them. At the moment, we do not have powers to do that because of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. I would like to see an amendment that enables that to happen. We know the tagging systems have not really worked. In the unlikely event that we keep SORA or the Rwanda plan—I do not expect the Government will—we really need to look at options for offshoring asylum claims from people who have arrived from a safe third country. If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.
Matt Vickers
Q
Karl Williams: I have two brief points to reinforce what Tony was saying. It feels to me like the Bill focuses on disruption and the interdiction of routes for entering the country illegally. It does not do much on deterrence. As the impact assessment says, on pillar 3, the changes to measures for going after the gangs, it is very uncertain what the outcome will be. That is because there is no evidence base here. The only country that has succeeded in stopping small boats is Australia. There was some interdiction work with Indonesia, but it was primarily about the offshoring agreement, which was a major plank of its deterrence. I would like to see deterrence measures added, not just disruption.
Secondly, on the Border Security Command, to reinforce what Tony said, data information is really important. Migration policy, legal and illegal, has generally been bedevilled by very poor quality Government data. It seems the new Border Security Commander will have limited ability to take operational control. One thing I would like to see them have is power to access and pull together data, so that we can have a much better picture.
Matt Vickers
Q
Tony Smith: One thing I have raised is the possibility of a biometric entry/exit system, which we do not have in this country. I chair a lot of conferences around the world, on border developments, border security and border technologies. Your face will become your passport sooner or later—sooner in some countries than here. If we had the powers and authority, we could capture a digital biometric image of everybody entering and exiting the country, and we could require the carriers to do likewise—we do not have physical embarkation controls.
This is happening in America. It is happening in Dubai. It is happening in Singapore. We are going to Curaçao, which now has a walk-through border. All it does is capture your face. It matches you to the API data that you already have, uploads it into the cloud and recognises you straightaway, so you have a more seamless border. It will give proper figures on who is in this country and who is not. Your net migration figures will be a lot more accurate than they are currently, provided that we have the powers to capture and retain everybody’s facial image. That means UK passports, Irish passports, electronic travel authorisations and visas, and permanent residents. I think that is achievable, and I would love to see it happening in this country.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
“significant fall in the percentage of the indigenous (white British) population.”
Can you explain what your worry is, and could you define “indigenous white population”?
Alp Mehmet: First, I am a first-generation migrant. I came here as an eight-year-old. I have been here since the mid-’50s. The immigrant ethnic minority element of the population in those days was something like 4%. In the 1951 census, it was 3.9%, and it is now 25%. That has substantially happened over the last 30 years.
What worries me, if that is the right word, is the fact that people are being added to the population, and migration is the only driver of population increase at the moment. I know you have David Coleman coming up next. He will tell you a great deal more about the likely evolution of the population’s demographic mix. That is my concern. Having arrived here as a migrant, and accepted and joined this country and made it my own, I see it now changing very rapidly into something that the majority of people in this country do not want to happen.
Dame Angela Eagle
You still have not told us what indigenous means, but thank you very much.
Mr Forster
Q
Tony, you talked about your perfect solution to borders. You did not mention the costs. Do you have an idea of the set-up and running costs?
Karl Williams: The short answer is that we do have safe and legal routes. The new Home Office immigration data, which was published this morning, pointed out that last year 79,000 people arrived through safe and legal routes. Since 2020, about 550,000, maybe slightly more, have arrived by safe and legal routes: Ukraine, Hong Kong, the Afghan resettlement schemes, and people arriving through UN programmes and from Syria, yet that does not stop the crossings.
The fundamental problem is that there will always be more demand to come to this country than we would probably be willing to allow for through safe and legal routes. One stat is that, a couple of years ago, Gallup did a very wide-ranging poll of attitudes on migration and found that, globally, about 900 million adults would migrate, given the opportunity—30 million of those people put Britain as their first choice. There is always going to be a longer queue to get in than we have capacity for at any given time. That is my view.
Tony Smith: I do not have a detailed financial breakdown for you, but I can say that the direction of travel in the UK and around the world is to take away officers from the border and to automate a lot of the processes. We are doing that here already: we move, I think, more people through e-gates than any other country does. This is an automated border that will reduce the number of officers required to do frontline, routine tasks, which they really do not want to do, and enable them to target the people they want to focus on. If you were to do that detailed analysis, you would probably find that it will be cost-neutral in the end.
Mr Forster
Q
Karl Williams: I do not think it combats it, and I do not think it is a disincentive. The ideal solution is that, once we have control over the small boats, and therefore who is coming to this country, we can have a serious conversation about, if we want, expanding safe and legal routes, what that might look like and what other parts of the world we might want to help. But so much resource is now sucked up by dealing with the downstream consequences of the channel crossings, such as the hotel bills and so on—this is a sequence of things. I do not think having a safe and legal route is in itself a disincentive to small boat crossings.
Jade Botterill (Ossett and Denby Dale) (Lab)
Q
Tony Smith: I do not think any of it was good value for money for the taxpayer, was it? The history and record speak for themselves. But we need to think about why it did not work and look at the reasoning behind why it took three years to try to get the process going. An awful lot of work was done in Rwanda and the Home Office to try to make it happen, but it was subject to continual legal challenge. Legal challenges were made in Europe, in the domestic courts and by judicial review. On a number of occasions, flights were lined up that did not happen, and a lot of money was therefore wasted in the process.
I am not a big fan of the Illegal Migration Act. Some of it was cumbersome, because it put all the eggs in the Rwanda basket. Rwanda was a limited programme—obviously, we could not send everybody to Rwanda—but under NABA, you had the option to triage and put some people into the Rwanda basket: those hard country removals, where you could not remove them anywhere else. You had that option, but you could still do what you are doing now and process people from places like Turkey and Albania, put them through the asylum system and return them to source.
Losing that triage option is going to be a big drawback, and it is going to cost a lot more money in the long run. The intake will continue to come, and you will then have to rack up the associated asylum, accommodation and settlement costs that run along with that.
Karl Williams: I would ask: “Value compared with what?” There is one argument around the counterfactual of if you had a deterrent, but I would also refer to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s analysis last summer on the fiscal impact of migration. It estimates that a low-skilled migrant, or low-wage migrant as the OBR puts it, will represent a lifetime net fiscal cost to the taxpayer of around £600,000. We know from analysis from Denmark, the Netherlands and other European countries that asylum seekers’ lifetime fiscal costs tend to be steeper than that, but even on the basis of the OBR analysis, even if everyone ends up in work, if 35,000 people cross a year, which is roughly where we were last year, at that sort of cost range, it will probably be £50 billion or £60 billion of lifetime costs. Compare that with £700 million—it depends on what timescale you are looking at.
Pete Wishart
Q
If I am unfairly characterising your view, you can correct me, but your view is that they should not get into the UK, that they should be stopped either in the sea or the minute they arrive in the UK, and that at that point they should be booted out somewhere—if not Rwanda, some other country—or just put back to country of source. Is that roughly your view? You can just shake your head or nod.
Tony Smith indicated assent.
Pete Wishart
Q
Tony Smith: I do have sympathy with them. I do sympathise. Many of us, I suspect, would do the same. My issue is that they have travelled through a great many countries to make it to the UK. We used to have the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees resettlement programme, when we had control of our borders. I was a big fan of that; I went to Canada and studied it for three years. We were actually searching the world and working with the UNHCR to identify the most vulnerable people and set a cap on the numbers that we could take. That was going on in Canada, Australia and the UK.
If you look at the UNHCR website and see the numbers of people who are going through that programme now, they are not getting resettled. The reason why not is that the business model has been taken over by the smugglers. That is why we are getting large numbers of young men who can afford to cross multiple borders and pay smugglers to get here. I would like to see a return to the system where we have control of those irregular routes. Then we could start looking, as Karl said, at reintroducing UNHCR resettlement programmes, going to the UNHCR and taking a certain quota into the UK in a managed way.
Alp Mehmet: Out of Gaza, there are going to be potentially 2 million people who would like some comfort, so they would like to move to somewhere a bit more convivial than Gaza is at the moment. But, if I may ask the question, why is it assumed that—because people like us advocate control and discouraging people, a lot of the time, from risking their lives, not just in crossing the channel but in living rough as they do—discouraging them from coming is in some way inhuman, insensitive and unkind?
Pete Wishart
Q
Alp Mehmet: We do, and even in my day as an immigration officer 50 years ago, that was exactly what we did. Tony rose to run the show, but I would argue that we had far more leeway in the ’70s as very junior, humble individual immigration officers. We were properly trained, we were monitored, we did things entirely within the law and we dealt with people humanely. It does not mean that that will not happen because we are saying, “No, you shouldn’t jump into a dinghy and make your way over here.”
Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
Q
Alp Mehmet: Tony, you start, and then I will catch up with the question, because I did not quite hear.
Tony Smith: We may well say the same thing. The question was about the fact that the Rwanda plan did not deter anybody because we still had 84,000 people arrive. I think the reason for that was that it was never, in fact, implemented. The intelligence coming across from Calais was that the smugglers and migrants never believed that it was going to happen. Once it became clearer that the Safety of Rwanda Act had passed, and that it might well become a reality, there was intelligence to suggest that some people were thinking twice about getting into dinghies, and there was some displacement into Ireland as a result. Of course, we will never know now, because we never actually implemented it.
We had a change of Government, and the new Government made it very clear that they were going to abolish the Rwanda plan, so we are where we are, but I would have liked an opportunity to see what would happen if we had started at least some removals. We had flights ready to go. I would have liked to see the impact that starting some removals would have had on the incoming population. We will never know now, I am afraid. Clearly, we hardly removed anybody to Rwanda in the end—I accept that—but I would have liked us to at least try, to see if it had an impact.
Alp Mehmet: It was never going to be the solution. It was not going to be the way to stop those people jumping into boats and coming across, but it was going to help. There needed to be other changes. I appreciate that we are not going to resile from the European convention on human rights any time soon, but while it is there, it is very difficult to be certain that people will be dissuaded. Some will be, some would have been, and we know that some were already being deterred. It was a pity, I am afraid, that the Rwanda deal went.
Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)
Q
Karl Williams: If we are talking about what deterrence we might need or what pull factors there are, having charities that in some circumstances are facilitating people crossing the channel is clearly an extra pull factor—probably a small one in the grand scheme of things, but it is there. I am thinking about organisations such as Care4Calais, which provide, for example, phone-charging services to migrants who are waiting in the sand dunes and the camps around the beaches where the crossings are made. They can recharge their phones; they are therefore in contact with the smuggling gangs. I think that there is a hole in the system that needs to be closed, and I do not think that this Bill does it.
Tony Smith: There are charities and charities. Some charities are not in any way involved in facilitation; it is a pure “care in the community” exercise or function in Calais. But I think other charities are a little bit more mischievous: they might be helping people with what to say when you are near the border, how to present your asylum claim, and how to get to a beach that might not be patrolled. I would like to see more work done on that.
Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)
Q
Given that the Bill clearly provides a deterrent to smugglers, to the people-smuggling business and to the criminal gangs in the channel by disrupting their activity, and by making it a greater expense, why do you still think it is a mistake—I think two or three of you said it outright, but you all seem broadly supportive of the Rwanda scheme—to be repealing those Acts with the Bill?
Tony Smith: There is the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, and there is the Illegal Migration Act 2023. I said earlier that I was not a great fan of the IMA, for the very reasons that you have stated: it brought in the ban too early, and people were being banned from re-entering this country before we had even removed them. That was impacting on port cases. It was a hugely difficult time, because that law put all of the eggs in the Rwanda basket. As you say, that left increasing numbers of boat people being served with a notice that they were going to Rwanda, when they were never going to go to Rwanda; they were going into the system that you described. I do not think that that was a very good idea. If we had put the IMA to one side, with the duty to remove, we could have stuck with NABA.
Then we had SORA, the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act, which would have turbocharged NABA. It would have given you a triage option: either to accept people into the asylum system quickly and process them, as you are doing now, or—for others, where you wanted to make a point that it is not okay to come across in a small boat and get to stay in the UK—to send some of them to Rwanda. That is what we could have done under NABA and SORA, and my view is that the IMA disrupted that.
Karl Williams: I suppose the asylum backlog of inadmissible people is a function of the disjunction whereby different parts of the legislation are being implemented at different speeds. Obviously the intention at the beginning was that we would have the flights going off in January or February 2023. When the ECHR injunction stopped the first flight, that derailed it. You could conceivably have had a situation in which a combination of some offshoring and the deterrent effect of that meant that the backlog of inadmissible cases did not grow. The fact that Rwanda was stalled in the courts for a couple of years, and then just did not happen at all, meant that that amount was inevitably going to increase. That was then locked in.
Mike Tapp
Q
Tony Smith: No, I have not spoken to the DG of the National Crime Agency. I am retired, so there are probably different constraints on what I can say versus what you can say when you are still working for the Government. But I am very close to Border Force immigration enforcement and a lot of my former colleagues who are still working. I went out on the boats with them last year and am very much in touch with what is going on there.
I worked under the UK Border Agency. We had agency status, and we were at arm’s length from Government. I had specific removal targets that I had to deliver. I had end-to-end teams: I had front-end teams, asylum teams and immigration enforcement teams in a region, working a case from start to finish, with rigorous case conclusion targets. I liked that system, because I thought it worked, but it got broken up into silos—we now have directors general for Border Force, immigration enforcement, migration and borders, and homeland security, and now we are putting another one in for Border Security Command. That is quite a jumbled mirage of civil servants. If you then have crime agencies—NCA, the police, and the security services—it gets really complicated, so I can see why you want a co-ordinator. But that is what it is: a co-ordinator, not a commander.
I was Gold commander for the UKBA at the London 2012 Olympics. I was in charge, basically; obviously I was answering to the Home Secretary on decision making, but it came to me because I had command over all those units. Now, you do not have that, because the Home Office is very gradeist. You have all these directors general for a whole bunch of silos, so it is going to be a heck of a job for the new security commander to actually direct activities to those agencies that have other priorities and other responsibilities. That is why I would like to see them have agency powers—arrest powers, enforcement powers—and to have a look at that whole structure of Border Force enforcement and migration enforcement, and ask, “Is this too unwieldy? Can we have a more streamlined process whereby we have somebody calling the shots?”
Mike Tapp
Q
Tony Smith: I know you have an order coming in next week that will allow biometrics to be captured, but I do not think it goes far enough.
Mike Tapp
Yes, we are. It is coming in this year.
Tony Smith: We do not have a biometric entry/exit system. The EU is bringing in EES, which means Brits will have to give their biometrics on entry and exit. We are bringing in the electronic travel authorisation—the ETA—but that is different from an entry/exit system.
Tom Hayes
Q
I also want to ask you about that report. In a previous answer, you raised the importance of counterfactuals. In reaching the overall recommendations and assessments in your report, did you consider counterfactuals such as the fact that migrants might move up the wage and skills distribution and might not always remain on low pay? In the absence of migrant workers, for instance in health and care settings, there would need to be other people who could do their work. Did you consider the economic impact of having nobody in those roles to do that health and care work, and whether that would affect the worklessness in our country? Did you consider whether there could be a reallocation of British workers into higher-skilled and higher-wage jobs as a consequence of those migrant workers? Did you think about the economic impact of potentially more people doing unpaid care because of a lack of paid carers?
I ask those questions not because I feel we should rely on migrant workers—I do not—but because your report has been lauded by the shadow Home Secretary and other Conservative Members of Parliament. I want to make sure that if it is being used as a point of reference, the data and the assessments have integrity. If you were to consider those counterfactuals, I wonder whether that would affect your report.
Karl Williams: To clarify, we are talking about the report on indefinite leave to remain that came out recently, not the report from last year.
Tom Hayes
I forgot the name of it. The “Here To Stay?” report?
Karl Williams: Yes, that is the one. That is purely about the fiscal impact. There is some analysis, which I can go into in a minute, on the broader economic picture in the previous report, but this report was more tightly focused.
Tom Hayes
But inevitably the counterfactuals would have an impact on the fiscal burden carried by the state.
Karl Williams: Indeed, yes. The counterfactuals we did think about were different levels of stay rates and different rates among different wage profiles. Migrants earning more as they go through the system clearly does happen to some extent, whether through out-migration or through career progression. In conducting that analysis, we stuck to the fiscal profiles used by the OBR, because, as you say, the data quality is fairly poor. That was the best there was, without trying to construct our own estimates for ingoings and outgoings as migrants progress over their life course in the UK. The OBR models it by age, so it captures the different wage contributions that you make at different points in your life, which will be higher in some points and lower in others. It also captures the different burdens of, for example, healthcare in old age.
I am glad that you have raised the quality of the data. We have repeatedly pointed out, as have the Governor of the Bank of England and the Office for National Statistics, that the labour force survey is very broken. In that report and in previous reports, we have always pushed the point that we need better data. Everyone needs better data. This is one area where there is broad consensus, whether you are restrictionist or want more migration or whatever else. I understand that the reference here is to Denmark and the Netherlands.
Tom Hayes
Q
Karl Williams: The report is very clear about the assumptions we have made at various points and the unknowns. With any modelling exercise, whether you are conducting a fiscal model of an effect of a tax change or whatever else, you have to make reasonable assumptions.
The Chair
Thank you. That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses very much for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
David Coleman gave evidence.
The Chair
Good afternoon. We will now hear evidence from David Coleman, emeritus professor of demography at the University of Oxford. We have until 3.40 pm for this witness. Could you please introduce yourself briefly for the record?
David Coleman: Yes, of course. My name is David Coleman. I am emeritus professor of demography at the University of Oxford. I have been retired for over 10 years, and I interest myself in all sorts of aspects of demography—not just migration, but mortality, fertility and all the other things that we play with.
Matt Vickers
Q
David Coleman: The sad fact is that I do have reservations about the Bill, but I do not have any magical solutions to put that right, I am sorry to say. It is, after all, an intractable problem, this question of asylum and migration.
My concerns are that we have to, we are forced to, restart or intensify a war that we may not easily win. Rather like, as I suggested in my note, the war against drugs, it will be difficult—probably perpetual and probably indecisive. It will have some effect. It will consume a great deal of effort. It may involve unkindness to asylum seekers and possibly risk to those doing the investigations. It is, I think, very much second best to the idea of trying to deter migration for asylum claiming in the first place. That, of course, was dismissed by the present Government as being unfeasible, unworkable and unkind, so the Rwanda scheme was scrapped. However, although it sounds rather brutal, it seems to me that the only obvious way of deterring movement to Britain is by making the movement to Britain unattractive. The obvious way of doing that is to divert at least some of the claimants somewhere they will be safe but will not enjoy the benefits of being in a rich country.
There are four ways of dealing with the issue, are there not? One is to have open borders, so that everybody who wants to come can come. Then there are two ways of being nasty: one is being nasty to the smugglers themselves, which is, I suppose, what the Bill is primarily about, and the other is being rather nasty to people who wish to claim asylum, which the previous policy did. Alternatively, you could have special routes for selected people who can be investigated, possibly by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and then admitted. That has, as far as I can make out, been ruled out by the Government for the time being.
Matt Vickers
Q
David Coleman: The lesson that everyone cites is the example of Australia, which, depending on which Government are in power, has a policy of diverting people right across the other side of the Pacific to an island where they were notionally safe, but where they were not able to enjoy being in Australia. That is supported or not supported depending on which Government is in power, which is one of the problems with migration policy. Generally speaking, whether the doors are tight shut, half open or fully open depends very much on the swings and balances of electoral change and is rather unpredictable. That is inevitable.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
David Coleman: Yes and no. The Galton Institute does not exist any more; it has changed its name to the Adelphi Genetics Forum.
Dame Angela Eagle
But it is a eugenics organisation?
David Coleman: No, it is not. It is devoted to genetics research and has conferences every year on genetics research. It promotes research into that and has a small grant fund that people can apply for. It is a very pukka organisation.
If you have any doubts about it, I suggest that you look at its publications and its website. You will find something by me on that that is only slightly connected to genetics: “New Light on Old Britons”—it is about palaeontology and human evolution. That is one of the things that the organisation was interested in. You are quite right that it started off as the Eugenics Society, and before that it was the Eugenics Education Society. That was in the days when progressives of every kind clustered around to support eugenic ideas because they were thought to be improving and beneficial to society. Society has changed its mind—
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
David Coleman: It got a terribly bad name for that reason—exactly so. That is why, over the last century, opinion has moved against using that word and using those notions. But I respectfully point out that it has nothing to do with asylum seeking.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
David Coleman: I suppose, as a rather bad Christian, I am bound to believe that, but the problem with human rights definitions is that they tend to be infinitely extendible. All kinds of entitlements that started off being universally accepted by almost everyone of good will tend to get expanded beyond reason.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
David Coleman: I mean making the prospect of life in the country of intended asylum less attractive than otherwise might be the case. That is what the Rwanda policy was. I suppose I was speaking slightly tongue in cheek in calling it “nasty”, but it certainly is not the same thing as being welcoming, is it? The idea of the Rwanda Bill was to secure the safety from persecution and risk of death for asylum seekers, which is the aim of asylum, without admitting them to Britain and all the benefits of being in a rich country.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
David Coleman: I am not here to defend the Rwanda policy, although I think that, in principle, it had some merit. That is a problem that would arise whether there was a Rwanda policy or an Illegal Migration Act or not, because of the sheer pressure of asylum seeking from all corners of the world. That has been the case in the past for a long time and will continue to be the case. We now have asylum claims up to 99,000 in the last year, so it is not just to do with the Illegal Migration Act; it is a worldwide process.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
David Coleman: I do not know how important the Illegal Migration Act was in increasing the number of the backlog, to be perfectly honest. In the past, it has been the same height without the Illegal Migration Act. About 15 or 20 years ago, it was also 90,000 per year, and that was way before any of the past legislation was enacted.
Pete Wishart
Q
David Coleman: This is a formidable tutorial group to try to give such an answer to. If I could say with any kind of confidence what was going to happen by the middle of the century, I would deserve a Nobel prize.
Pete Wishart
Q
David Coleman: I can do my best. The present situation, as you are obviously suggesting, is rather dire from the point of view of domestic demography, such as the fact that the so-called total fertility is down to 1.44 and may fall further. Therefore, it presages considerable population ageing and decline should it continue.
At the risk of being technical and boring, I would point out that total fertility is a snapshot. It is only a calculation of, on average, how many babies the average woman—if you can imagine an average woman—will produce over a lifetime, if the same levels of age-specific fertility were to continue, which refers to the same levels of birth rate at the ages 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and so on. If that continues at the present level, in the long run you will get 1.44 babies. This is a very volatile measure; it goes up and it goes down. Back in 2010, it was 1.94, which is really very healthy and probably as high as you could possibly get.
Pete Wishart
Q
David Coleman: Yes, or 2.1. That is true, although there is a risk of starting another hare. I suggest that some degree of population ageing and population decline is tolerable, particularly when we are faced with a world whose habitable area is shrinking and productivity is declining, thanks to the inevitable level of global climate change. The last thing we want, it seems to me, anywhere, is population growth. Population stabilisation and population decline, as long as it is modest and eventually comes to an end, is to be welcomed. I have said that with colleagues on a number of occasions.
I do agree that the present level of fertility is very unsatisfactory; it would be much healthier if it were higher. One gets into perilous waters trying to persuade people to have more children. The important thing is to identify those obstacles that stand in the way of the family size that people keep on saying they want to have. Despite all the problems at the present time, opinion polls suggest that people still want to have, on average, almost two babies or even more than two babies, but they cannot, for all sorts of reasons. In this country, some of those reasons are very obvious. One is the atrocious cost of housing. House prices are now at nine times the level of the average income, compared with three or four times, which was normal in the past.
The Chair
Sorry, we have four minutes left and I have three people to get in.
David Coleman: Forgive me; I ran away with myself. I am so sorry.
Margaret Mullane (Dagenham and Rainham) (Lab)
Following on from what the Minister asked you about how we have to be mean or have open borders, I looked at your written evidence, in which you have put as your ninth point, “Make Britain unattractive again”, and then you refer to the Rwanda policy. You say that you do not really know, but we had the National Crime Agency in before you and they were quite optimistic about the deterrent aspects of the Bill. Are you saying that you are not at all?
David Coleman: I am not, but at the moment it is to some extent a matter of opinion. The sorts of measures being proposed in the Bill are a development and accentuation of what has been done already. After all, the Government are not doing nothing to try to moderate asylum seeking; they have already, like the previous Government, been involved in discussions with our neighbours to try to come to an agreement on all sorts of aspects of migrant trafficking. The Bill is trying to ratchet that up, perfectly reasonably.
So far those measures, although admittedly not as intense as this Bill wants to impose, have not been notably successful. I drew a parallel with the war against drugs, which has an effect. It reduces the volume of drugs in circulation and puts drug pushers in prison, but it also puts up the price of drugs. There is a rather depressing parallel there.
Chris Murray
Q
David Coleman: That, I suppose, is the reason why the previous Government wanted to try to do something very different indeed in the Rwanda policy.
Chris Murray
But they passed the Act.
David Coleman: It was never tried. It might well have failed, but it was certainly a different avenue. It was not the one you had in mind, I am sure, but it was none the less a different way of doing it. It was attacking the problem from a different angle—from the question of demand rather than control.
The Chair
Order. That brings us, unfortunately, to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for his evidence.
Examination of Witness
Professor Brian Bell gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Professor Brian Bell from King’s College London. We have until 4 pm for this panel. Could the witness please briefly introduce himself for the record?
Professor Brian Bell: I am Professor Brian Bell, the chair of the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee.
Matt Vickers
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I think it is fair to say that it is an open question whether it will be effective. The evidence from lots of previous experiences is that it is actually very hard to deter this kind of activity, but I suppose you have to try everything you can and see what works. If something does not work, you try something else.
In some sense, it is an unanswerable question at this point, and it may be unanswerable in the long run. Suppose that the Bill is passed and small boat numbers go up. That does not prove that the Bill failed, because we do not know what the counterfactual is of what would have happened without the Bill, and vice versa: if the numbers go down, it could just be that the number of people who wanted to come to France and then on to England had fallen. It is going to be very difficult to directly observe the effect. Whenever you think about these issues, you always have to think about both the deterrence and sanction effect, which is what the Bill is focused on, and then how you change the underlying incentives.
Matt Vickers
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I do not think so, in the sense that I do not think any country has experienced these issues and dealt with them particularly successfully. There are different approaches—obviously, Australia has taken a different approach—but I do not think that any country would claim that it has really succeeded in significantly addressing this kind of problem.
To me, it is very much the same kind of problem as any sort of criminal activity. You can change the sanctions and the effectiveness of the police, and that has some effect. The evidence tends to suggest on this sort of thing that it has a fairly small effect. The deterrence effect tends often to be quite small with these policies, so in the end the right response will almost certainly be about changing the incentives as well, in terms of both what is the attraction to come to the UK and whether there are ways we can encourage people to stay in France, in this case, instead of wanting to make those journeys.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Yes.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Absolutely, but that is sort of true of all crimes: if someone is committing a crime, you want to stop them doing it. I think the difficulty is in the question: if you stop one criminal doing it, what happens? Is there a substitution effect where you just get the next organised crime organisation taking action? The risk is that you may well succeed, but the overall macro effect of that may be not as positive as you might hope.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Absolutely not.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
Professor Brian Bell: It is likely to have some positive effect. In some sense, it cannot have a negative effect, so it must have some positive effect. The difficulty is that, as almost everyone would accept, it is impossible to judge ex ante what the size of that effect will be, but that sort of tells you that you should try it and see how it works.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
Professor Brian Bell: It is an effort worth making, but I would caution that in other areas of police and crime activity, the impact of being tougher with sanctions and new offences does not necessarily lead to very substantial changes in crime rates. The overall crime rate in the UK is almost certainly driven more by incentives and economic outcomes in the long run than it is by particular offences and statutes that are passed.
Dame Angela Eagle
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Completely.
Mr Forster
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I do not have expertise in that area. I am confused as to how significant it will be. As I understand the Bill, it will allow HMRC to share customs data with other parties. It is not clear to me what that achieves. It would be wrong of me to imply that I have any particular operational understanding of how that will help operations.
Mr Forster
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Data sharing overall can be phenomenally valuable in thinking about immigration more broadly. The Migration Advisory Committee has been very clear that we need to improve the data. We have access to data from HMRC that we find very useful on the legal migration side. Fundamentally, the question is: what data does HMRC hold that will provide useful information to border security in terms of stopping organised immigration gangs? Presumably, the Government think that there are some useful points. My view is, “Why wouldn’t you try it and see if it helps?” If it does not, you are no worse off.
Chris Murray
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I will take those questions in reverse order. I do not think they were very effective. Again, I would caution that there is always this problem that you see a piece of legislation passing and then look at the numbers and try to guess whether it was the legislation that caused the change that you see. Other things are going on, so it is always difficult to do that.
More broadly, the evidence that we have from people seeking asylum is that the exact nature of the rules that exist in the country they are going to are not big drivers of their decision to go there. People have asked asylum seekers to list the reasons they want to come to the UK, and very rarely are they things like the legal system in operation for dealing with asylum claims. It is all about the fact that English is the most common language in the world and often the second language of these people. There is often a diaspora in the country, or labour market opportunities are potentially better than in some of the other countries. Those things are generally much more important than whether your asylum claim will be dealt with in Rwanda. I do not think that many people concern themselves with that.
The numbers are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act. Of course, asylum seekers might have been really clever and spotted that it was probably going to be declared illegal by the Supreme Court—perhaps they were prejudging the legality of the measures. The cost was staggering for a policy that was very unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect. The previous Government’s difficulty was that they could never actually tell you how many people they thought would be sent to Rwanda. It is not a deterrent if you are sending a few thousand people every year.
Chris Murray
Q
Professor Brian Bell: Well, four went voluntarily, but if the policy had been implemented in full, there were never any guarantees. We certainly would not have been able to send 100,000 a year to Rwanda; Rwanda was never going to accept that. The cost was astounding, given the likely deterrence effect. It illustrates a problem in the Home Office at the time: there was little rational thinking about what the costs and benefits of different policies were. My personal view is that getting asylum claims dealt with more quickly would have been a much more effective use of public resources. That is in the interests of not only the British public but asylum seekers, as most of their claims are accepted. If we could have got them through the system faster, got them approved if they were approved, got them into work and integrating within their communities and, if they were rejected, actually deported them, that would have been a much better use of public resources.
Pete Wishart
Q
Professor Brian Bell: I think the numbers will be quite small. In some senses, a good piece of legislation makes a criminal offence so serious, and a penalty so severe, that no one commits the crime. There is a risk that you think you have failed because no one is convicted, but actually if you deterred the behaviour then it succeeded. The reality is that if there are any convictions, it will be almost entirely asylum seekers who are convicted. I do not see how the gangs will be convicted because, as I understand it, they are not on the boats.
Pete Wishart
Q
Professor Brian Bell: That is the implication of the legislation. I am not a lawyer, so I should be careful here, but I understand that there is a defence in the legislation that would allow you to claim that you were essentially forced into doing it, under sort of human slavery conditions.
Pete Wishart
Not according to the current numbers: 205 is a lot of people being convicted for being compelled to drive a boat—
Jo White
Q
Professor Brian Bell: It is probably not a very strong deterrent. To repeat myself, all the evidence is that when asylum claimants think of where to claim asylum they do not have detailed knowledge of the ins and outs of the procedures of different countries. They almost certainly do not know what might happen in five to 10 years, which is the length of residence that they would need to apply for citizenship, so I am not sure it will be a significant deterrent. However, it is important to recognise that citizenship is not a right; it should be viewed as a privilege that people earn. It is reasonable for the Government to take the view that citizenship should not be given to certain people. I do not think there is anything wrong with that—it seems a legitimate observation.
Katie Lam
Q
Professor Brian Bell: You would not want to disrupt some of the incentives. For example, the unemployment rate is 7.8% in France and 4.4% in the UK. The gap is slightly larger for young people than for the population as a whole. I am sure the Government would not want to change that incentive, although the French probably would. If you have a buoyant economy relative to your neighbour, at least in the labour market, that is an incentive. There is an incentive in terms of things that you would not necessarily want to change. The English language is really important as a pull factor, and the fact that there are diasporas already in the country.
There tends to be some evidence that the UK has been somewhat more successful than France at integrating immigrants into society, particularly second-generation immigrants: there is some evidence that whereas employment rates are always very poor for first-generation immigrants relative to natives, that gap narrows quite a bit in the UK when you look at second-generation immigrants. That is less true in France, so people may think the opportunities are better here.
The area where the Government could take action—and they are with the Employment Rights Bill—is that we have lots of employment rights in this country, but do not bother enforcing any of them, because we do not spend money on HMRC minimum wage enforcement teams and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority does not have enough money to employ people to do all the work it needs to do. If the Fair Work Agency can take over and actually be beefed up, then we can enforce labour standards a bit more and that may discourage people, because one of the attractions of coming to the UK is that our looser enforcement of rules in labour market makes it easier to employ people who are here irregularly.
Tom Hayes
Q
Professor Brian Bell: That is a speculative number. It is actually extremely difficult to work out the fiscal impact of migration. We are doing it at the MAC at the moment. We can only do it because we have access to data that the CPS could not possibly have. I do not know how you do that kind of analysis without making really very brave—and some may say foolhardy—estimates of what these people are going to do when they are in the UK. To give a very simple example, we currently do not know what dependants do when they come into the country. Let us say we issue a skilled worker visa and a dependent comes in. We will know nothing about what they do because the Home Office, quite fairly, does not pursue finding out about that dependent because they are here legally, but you need to know how much they earn and if they are in a job to work out what their contribution will be over the next 50 to 60 years of their life.
I think it is very dangerous to just make broad assumptions about, “Oh, they are going to be like this and they are going to earn this”, and then you can come up with a very big number. I could choose a big group of British people who will also have very big negative effects, because if you just choose people who are low earners and perhaps people who are disabled, you automatically get those numbers because they are entitled to more benefits in the long run, and they do not pay as much tax. I am not particularly sure what that tells us.
Tom Hayes
Q
Professor Brian Bell: As I understand it, the big difference is that in the Australian system, if your asylum application was granted, you were brought to Australia; the system was just offshore processing of the application. That is very different from the Rwanda scheme, where we were essentially washing our hands of any responsibility going forward for those asylum applicants. The Australian model is worth thinking about if you could find countries that would be willing to process the applications, because we are spending—let us be honest—an absolute fortune on housing asylum seekers here while we consider their claims. If you could find a cheaper and more effective way of doing that, while still recognising that we have the responsibility to take those asylum seekers who have claimed asylum in this country, that would be worth considering.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allocated for Members to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the witness for his evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Dame Angela Eagle and Seema Malhotra gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Dame Angela Eagle MP, Minister for Border Security and Asylum, and Seema Malhotra MP, Minister for Migration and Citizenship at the Home Office. We will have until 4.20 pm for this panel.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: The Illegal Migration Act was flawed legislation, which did not actually work. It was so flawed that the previous Government, even though they put it on to the statute book, did not actually commence much of it at all.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: The issue was that we did not think it was possible to make the suite of legislation, which involved the Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act, work together coherently. Its effect was essentially to allow people into the country but make it illegal to process them and leave them stuck in an ever-lengthening backlog and in limbo. The whole approach established by the interplay of those two Acts of Parliament, one of which was barely commenced even though it was on the statute book, had to be taken away so that we could bring some order to the chaos that we inherited from the previous Government, as a result of the practical outcomes of those two pieces of legislation.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: No, we certainly have not said that. As soon as people’s asylum claims have been properly processed, and the appeals that they are allowed to make are finished, if they have failed, we will seek to remove those people—but not to a third country.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: The Home Secretary has made it perfectly clear in the changes to the advice that if you come to this country illegally, we do not expect that you will be granted citizenship.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: We have taken that out of primary legislation because it was connected with the duty to remove, which was about the interplay of the Illegal Migration Act and the Rwanda Act. As I have just said, it was flawed legislation that did not work in practice.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: There are real issues about the accuracy of scientific age assessment. At the Home Office, we are in the middle of doing work to see whether we can get a system of scientific age assessment that is robust enough to use. We are certainly not ruling it out, but the effects in that legislation were all about the duty to remove—it was about trying to define children. You will remember that in the IMA, the duty to remove excluded children, which perhaps created a bigger incentive for people to claim that they were children when they were not. The scientific age assessment clauses in that Act were related to the duty to remove. Given that we are repealing the vast majority of the Illegal Migration Act in this Bill, we removed those clauses.
I would not, however, want to give the hon. Gentleman the false impression that we have completely abandoned the idea of doing scientific age assessment. Currently, we are trying to assess whether there are ways of doing it that not only are cost-effective, but can be relied on. It is not an easy thing to do; there are no very easy solutions to whether it is accurate. We are exploring those areas ahead of making any subsequent announcements about if—and how, if we do—we use scientific age assessment.
Matt Vickers
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: First, we will always seek to return people if they fail the asylum system, and have had all their claims and appeals, as soon as it is safe to do so. That is the first thing to say, and we must never lose sight of that. Situations in particular countries change—sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse, as the hon. Gentleman knows. We never give up on that. Clearly, if people are here and have failed, we want them to leave, and we will facilitate them to leave.
Martin Vickers
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: With all due respect, I do not think they were ever going to go to Rwanda.
Mike Tapp
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: One of the important things for the integrity of any asylum system is that if people fail it, there are consequences that are different from those if they do not. It is the hard and nastier end of any asylum system: if you have no right to be here, we will want you to leave—voluntarily, if at all possible. Sometimes we will even facilitate that, but we will return you by force if we have to. The 19,000 returns that we have achieved since 4 July are an indication that we want to ensure that enforcement of the rules is being put into effect more than it was. There had been very big falls in returns, and very big falls in enforcement, and we want to put that right.
Mr Forster
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: Clearly, it is important that we try to deal with the development of organised immigration crime on our borders. Colleagues will have heard the comments from the NCA and the National Police Chiefs’ Council about how important it is to assert the rule of law in such areas. It is very important. That is the main aim of the Bill.
If the hon. Gentleman is talking about safe routes, we heard some evidence today about safe routes. I am personally sceptical that those would stop people wanting to come across in boats. If one takes the example of our Afghan scheme—a safe route for particular people from Afghanistan who have been put in danger by supporting UK forces—that is a legal route that is safe. At the same time, last year the largest nationality represented among small boat arrivals was Afghans.
We have people arriving on small boats who come from countries where we have visa regimes, so I am not convinced that we could provide enough places on safe routes to prevent people smugglers benefiting from that kind of demand. That is my opinion from having looked at what goes on and I accept the hon. Gentleman might have a different one.
Seema Malhotra: If I may add to that, we also heard in the evidence about the scale of the challenge that we face and how small boat crossings are a relatively new phenomenon, in that we had around 300 in 2018, but the number is now 36,000. In a very targeted way, this Bill is looking at what more tools we can bring in along with the Border Security Command to tackle the criminal gangs that are literally making millions—if not more—out of people who are very vulnerable.
The fact that there were more deaths in the channel in 2024 than in previous years shows that the situation is becoming even more dangerous, so we absolutely have to do everything we can to disrupt those criminal gangs. Therefore, I want to focus on that for this Bill, because we cannot do everything in one piece of legislation.
It is important, however, to correct, from my understanding, a bit of evidence that was given earlier by Tony Smith that the UK resettlement scheme was closed—it is actually still open. We have had over 3,000 refugees resettled via that scheme since its launch four years ago. The number of refugees arriving on that depends on a range of factors, and that includes recommendations from the UNHCR as well as how many offers of accommodation we have from local authorities; that is an ongoing system. This is legislation around tackling the small boats and the criminal gangs that are enabling that as a new trade.
Mr Forster
Q
To be more specific, I have a follow-up on clause 18. We are creating a new criminal offence of endangering someone on a sea crossing—why is it an unauthorised sea crossing? Why is it not a blanket endangering of someone when crossing the sea? Should that offence not be wider or is it more like an aggravating factor?
Dame Angela Eagle: I will talk about the very detailed aspect of that during our line-by-line scrutiny.
There has been a certain behaviour that has begun to happen, which has been perceived on the crossings in the small boats and which this offence is designed to deal with. That is the various kinds of violent intimidation that goes on, such as putting women and children in the middle of boats that then collapse, so they are crushed and die in that way, or holding children over the edge of boats to prevent rescue.
Sometimes if there has been a fatality on a boat—and we have seen what has happened—we go to pick people up and return them to France. The French authorities also do that. There is then a battle not to be returned and violence is sometimes used to prevent people from accepting the rescue that is offered to them. So there are some very particular things that this endangerment clause and this new offence are seeking to deal with.
Jo White
Q
Dame Angela Eagle: Well, the Border Security Commander is very happy with the powers that he has—he has been appointed. Again, we will talk about this in some detail, but it is important that we get co-ordination across different areas of activity. I think you will have heard what the NCA witness said about how he wants somebody else to do the co-ordination while he does the basic work. Everybody is working together very well across the people who have to have regard. The Border Security Commander is bringing together a range of very important players in this area to strategise and co-ordinate, and he has not told me—I meet him regularly—that he needs any more powers.
Pete Wishart
Q
The other thing is that it will have very little impact on people making the decision to come to the United Kingdom. They are fleeing oppression, poverty and war, and they do not care about the laws of the United Kingdom—what Angela Eagle is doing in a migration Bill is not going to deter them from coming here. So what are we going to do to get on top of this issue? Should we not be thinking, as we go through this Bill process, about fresh, new ideas to tackle it?
Dame Angela Eagle: Well, we have just come out of a period of fresh new ideas and gimmicks—
Pete Wishart
Yes, but that is gone.
Dame Angela Eagle: And very expensive they turned out to be. We have inherited such a mess, with huge backlogs and very long waits for appeals, that we have to try to clear up. We have an asylum system that essentially broke down—I think one of our witnesses was talking about it being “in meltdown” earlier today.
We are going to do the day job and start to get that system working. I think that having fast, fair and effective immigration decisions is a very important part of all of this, as is removing those whose claims fail so that we can actually get to the stage where people know that, if they come to this country and they do not have a reasonable chance of being accepted as an asylum seeker, they will be returned. I think that is what the deterrent is.
Seema Malhotra: If I may add one point, it is absolutely valid and right to say that this Bill is one part of trying to tackle both the criminal gangs and the demand. Certainly, the other side of the work that the Home Secretary has been leading on—in terms of agreements with other countries for returns, as well as the reasons why people are coming and what more could be put in place as a deterrent—is work that was also talked about in evidence today; international diplomacy is also an important part of the overall framework. That is going on in parallel, and it is important to be working upstream through diplomacy and agreements with other countries too.
Kenneth Stevenson
Q
I then heard that there were no magical solutions and that war was not easy to win—so we are in a “war” with migrants. We then spoke about unkindness to asylum seekers. I think that the most important words that I heard today were proactive, pre-emptive and disruptive— that is what the Government are trying to be. Do you agree that that has to start with the gangs who are starting this and are pulling—or pushing—people across?
Dame Angela Eagle: Yes. There are many genuine asylum seekers, many of whom are granted asylum when they are finally processed, who have come in that way. There are also people who are trafficked, who are in debt bondage, who go into sex work in nail bars, say from Vietnam, or who end up—as the police chief told us—growing cannabis in hidden farms in all our communities or being involved in serious crime. Some of them are victims of modern slavery, and some of them are the perpetrators of all that kind of evil.
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the Ministers for their evidence.