Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I do not want to repeat all that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, but I agree with every word. If we wish people to become full citizens of, or to integrate into, our country, looking back at the way in which they came into the country actually damages that process. People who could have been working here for years, and brought families up together, are being denied that opportunity.

It is quite clear that this is a case of one step forward, one step back. The repeal of some of the provisions of the Illegal Migration Act, in Clauses 38 and 39 of the Bill, was absolutely the right thing to do. But then the Secretary of State overturned that by stating simply that, from 10 February 2025, individuals applying for citizenship who arrived by “a dangerous journey”, or who entered the UK irregularly, “will normally be refused” British citizenship, with no carve-out for refugees, stateless persons, victims of trafficking or children—and it is retrospective to people already in the United Kingdom.

Because it is such an important issue, I managed to ask whether Britain was standing alone on this matter. I have arranged, through a system in this Parliament that I did not know about, to ask all 46 Parliaments of the Council of Europe a question. When considering a citizenship application from an individual who is legally recognised as a refugee, to what extent does the method by which they entered the country impact their eligibility for citizenship? For example, does entering national territory without permission normally make an applicant ineligible for citizenship, including if they are later recognised as a refugee?

That was dealt with by the Parliaments of the Council of Europe, and we received responses from 31 member countries. Not one of them has the rule that the Secretary of State has just applied to this system. I will read out the names of those countries, because they ought to be on record: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada—which is an associate of the Council of Europe—Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. None of them carries out this policy.

Why are we standing alone? Why are we the ones who are marching out of step with everybody else? Why is it that we do not want these people, who are coming here and spending their lifespan here, to be integrated fully and granted citizenship? They have worked their way through our society. It is absolutely shameful and the Government ought to rescind the Secretary of State’s statement and fall back on what is done in this Bill. In the Bill, we have done the right thing. By contrast, the Secretary of State’s statement needs to be re-dealt with, so that we can fall in line with every other country in Europe that decided to respond to this. Incidentally, it was only the small countries that did not respond, such as San Marino and Andorra; all the big countries of Europe are in there.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly about the first amendment in this group, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford and moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, before moving on to those in my name and those of my noble friends.

The “good character” assessment may, in the view of some noble Lords, have a slightly antiquated name, but let me take a moment to go into some more detail. A person will not normally be considered to be of good character if there is information to suggest that any of the following apply: if they are a criminal, if they are a terrorist, if they have failed to pay tax, if they are dishonest or if they have breached immigration laws. That is not an exhaustive list, but those are the main points set out by the Government.

I know that the amendment is well intentioned, but we on these Benches believe that the requirements currently set out to be considered a person of “good character” are not only valid but important for maintaining national security and the safety and well-being of our citizens. For us to say that a person should not be a threat to national security, that they should be honest and that they should seek to nurture our community rather than harm it, as a prerequisite, is, I am sure all noble Lords will agree, an entirely valid principle. I therefore cannot support any measures that threaten the watering down of this principle and cannot back the amendment.

I turn to the amendments in this group in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Cameron and Lord Jackson of Peterborough. We need to acknowledge in this debate that, despite our various disagreements on the Bill and, to some extent, on how we approach the issue of migration more widely, we share the same fundamental ambition to see our country succeed. We all want a country in which everyone contributes, in which communities thrive and work together, and in which our economy and public services are properly supported. But, if we are to get closer to achieving this ambition, we must face up to the reality that our social security and welfare systems are not limitless. They exist to protect the vulnerable here at home and to support those who fall on hard times. That is why these amendments are so vital.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

189: After Clause 48, insert the following new Clause—
“Disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998 for immigration legislation(1) For the purposes of any provision made by virtue of this Act or the relevant immigration legislation, and for any decision, action or policy made under this Act or the relevant immigration legislation, the Human Rights Act 1998 does not apply.(2) Where a court or tribunal is considering any decision under the relevant immigration legislation, the court or tribunal must disregard the Human Rights Act 1998.(3) For the purposes of this section “the relevant immigration legislation” means—(a) the Immigration Acts as defined by section 61(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007, and(b) the Immigration Rules made under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971.(4) In the Human Rights Act 1998—(a) in section 3, after subsection (2), insert—“(3) This section does not apply to any provision made by or by virtue of the relevant immigration legislation as defined by section (Disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998 for immigration legislation) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.”;(b) in section 6— (i) in subsection (2)(a) omit the last “or”(ii) after subsection (2)(b) insert—“(c) the authority was exercising powers or fulfilling functions conferred on the authority by the relevant immigration legislation as defined by section (Disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998 for Immigration Legislation) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.”(5) In the Immigration Act 1971—(a) in section 8AA—(i) in subsection (2), omit “Subject to subsections (3) to (5)”,(ii) in subsection (2)(a)(i) omit “, or”;(iii) omit subsection (2)(a)(ii), and(iv) omit subsections (3) to (6), and(b) in section 8B, omit subsection (5A).(6) In the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, omit section 2.(7) In section 84 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002—(a) in subsection (1) after “must” insert “not”,(b) in subsection (2) after “must” insert “not”,(c) in subsection (2) for “section 6” substitute “any section”, and(d) in subsection (3) after “must” insert “not”.(8) In the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 in section 2 (offences relating to entering the United Kingdom without a passport), in subsection (12) for the definition of “leave or asylum interview” substitute—“leave interview” means an interview with an immigration officer or an official of the Secretary of State at which a person seeks leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.(9) Where the European Court of Human Rights indicates an interim measure relating to the exercise of any function under the legislation identified in subsection (1)—(a) it is only for a Minister of the Crown to decide whether the United Kingdom will comply with the interim measure under this section, and(b) an immigration officer or court or tribunal must not have regard to the interim measure.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we now turn, in my submission, to probably one of the most important groups of amendments on the Bill, which I am sure will promote some discussion and likely much disagreement. That is perhaps something to be welcomed.

The stated aim of the Human Rights Act, when it was introduced, was to bring rights home. It incorporates 16 rights derived from the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law and was itself enacted to satisfy the obligations placed on the British Government by Article 1 of the ECHR. This was all to satisfy a noble purpose: to make sure that human rights in the United Kingdom were protected and upheld. But we have seen the corruption of this noble purpose no more keenly than when we see how it has been applied to matters of immigration and deportation.

To give an example, noble Lords will no doubt be familiar with the horrific abuses inflicted on girls by the Rochdale grooming gangs. Two of the Rochdale grooming gang ringleaders, Adil Khan and Qari Abdul Rauf, fought deportation by claiming their right to a family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is also Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. Rauf even gave up his Pakistani citizenship just to make sure that we could not deport him. He lost his appeals, yet he is still here: still in Rochdale, still living among the people whose lives he destroyed.

It is clear that, under the straitjacket imposed on us by the Human Rights Act, our country has lost control of the asylum system. Hundreds of thousands of people have come here claiming to be refugees—far more than politicians before us ever imagined—almost all passing through neighbouring countries which are perfectly safe. Tens of thousands of them will receive taxpayer-funded legal aid, which is spent on lawyers competing to devise ever more ingenious legal arguments to keep them in the country.

Let me give your Lordships some more examples. One woman, who was refused leave to remain, deliberately joined a terrorist organisation to manufacture a claim that she risked imprisonment back home. A convicted paedophile evaded deportation by claiming he was gay and that his life would be at risk in his home country. And let us not forget the Albanian criminal who claimed in February that he could not be deported because of his son’s sensitivity around food, the sole example given in court being his aversion to foreign chicken nuggets. The immigration tribunal ruled that his deportation would breach his Article 8 rights, as it would apparently have an “unduly harsh” impact on his son.

Every day we see these kinds of cases reported, and tens of thousands of illegal immigrants, mainly adult men, take the risk of crossing the channel in small boats because they know that we cannot remove even criminals and terrorists. Indeed, we pay their legal fees to help them stay. We have seen this unjust situation unfold further with the Government’s returns deal with France. The week before Parliament broke for recess saw the first two flights leave with no migrants on board. Those who were due to be deported on those flights had their deportation orders halted by the High Court due to concerns about human trafficking and torture. The new Home Secretary herself admonished those trying to use the Human Rights Act and the ECHR to prevent their deportation as

“making a mockery of our laws”.

How can this situation be a reflection of the laudable aims that heralded the incorporation of the ECHR into our statute book in 1998? The simple answer is that it is not. The dream has become a nightmare, and the time has come for us to do something about it. That is why I and my noble friends on these Benches have tabled this amendment.

There is a point I wish to clarify here. After the excellent, thorough report of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, the Conservative Party has committed itself to repealing the Human Rights Act and leaving the ECHR. While it is no longer the policy of the Official Opposition simply to disapply the Human Rights Act for immigration cases, this Bill does not present us with the opportunity to repeal the HRA. To do so would require a Bill of its own. This amendment is therefore the avenue through which we are able at this stage to facilitate discussion on the impact of our continued membership of the ECHR.

I know that some noble Lords in your Lordships’ House today will disagree with me. As I have already said, the debate is welcome, but I ask those who disagree whether our situation now, this minute, is one that the Human Rights Act is working to improve. Has the Human Rights Act protected the victims, their families and communities in Rochdale? Has it protected our people from the paedophiles who continue to languish in the United Kingdom because we cannot deport them? Does it help or hinder people smugglers who use it to reassure the people they are transporting that they will not be removed? The answer is clear: the Human Rights Act in this context does not uphold human rights. It aids and abets abusers in their abuse. Trauma is continued and renewed because of the Act. The rights of our people come second to the rights of child abusers and terrorists, who hide behind the Act to remain on our shores, to remain a threat to our people and to remain a source of terror and pain for the people they have already harmed. We are prevented from deporting those who show flagrant disrespect for the laws passed by our sovereign Parliament, but even more fundamentally it prevents us enacting the wishes of the British people. This is an untenable situation that we must swiftly seek to remedy.

I further welcome the amendments to Amendment 189 tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth; they perform an important function in strengthening its purpose. While that amendment would disapply the Human Rights Act from immigration legislation, my noble friend’s additions would ensure that the mechanisms contained in Sections 4 and 10 of the Human Rights Act are also expressly excluded. In practice, this means that the courts would not be able to issue declarations of incompatibility in relation to immigration law; nor would Ministers be able to use remedial orders to alter such legislation on human rights grounds. That would close off any backdoor reintroduction of Human Rights Act challenges into this field, and it would provide the clarity and certainty that are essential if this policy is to be delivered effectively. I therefore strongly support these amendments as a logical and necessary reinforcement of the central principle of Amendment 189.

As has been said in the other place, now is the time for radical decisions. This is an amendment the Government should welcome if we are to stand up for the rights and well-being of the British people. I beg to move.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as foreshadowed by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, I have two amendments in this group that seek to amend the Front Bench disapplication provision for the Human Rights Act. Of course, disapplication feels rather “yesterday”; the Overton window on the question of human rights law is now clearly swinging in favour of repeal of the Human Rights Act, following the excellent report produced by my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and the announcement of the party’s new policy. Be that as it may, for the purposes of this Bill, the correct approach, which I suggest the Minister should grasp with both hands, is to disapply the effect of the convention and the operation of the Act in the sphere of immigration decisions.

Disapplying the Human Rights Act from this area is not unprecedented. As the Minister will recall, this provision was incorporated, in a slightly different form, in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act, and it was clearly a matter that passed both Houses of Parliament. It is both a precedented and a necessary step.

I turn briefly to the context for my amendment. The amendment itself would add two further provisions to the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Davies: that is, to include in the operation Section 4 of the Human Rights Act, which is the court power to make a declaration of incompatibility, and Section 10, which is a power to remedy any incompatibility by means of a statutory instrument. As Policy Exchange observed in its paper on the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act in December 2023, that disapplication provision did not mention Sections 4 and 10 and was the worse for it, because the experience has been that, where a court can make a declaration of incompatibility, those matters are taken almost automatically by the Government as warranting some sort of remedial step.

No Government so far have ignored a declaration of incompatibility, to my knowledge. For example, in the recent case where the Northern Irish High Court found an incompatibility in the legacy Act, the decision of the Government was to bring forward a remedial order to have the effect of suspending the operation of the provisions of that Act without waiting for primary legislation, itself a controversial move. To avoid that situation recurring, I have tabled these amendments to exclude from any potential challenge to immigration-related decisions a decision by a court to make a declaration of incompatibility, or a decision by a Government to attempt to remedy it by making a remedial order under Section 10 of the Human Rights Act.

It is clearly time that we took back control of the United Kingdom’s borders. This Government, and particularly this Home Office, know the difficulties that trying to operate within the constraints of the Human Rights Act has generated as it has evolved. I encourage the Minister to accept a provision similar to this so that he can implement the policies of his Government.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I suggest that the noble Lord tests me on these matters when we have, as I have said, undertaken the work, reviewed potential legislation, brought forward proposals and put them before both this House and the House of Commons. Either I or a Minister in the House of Commons will have signed the Bill at that stage, in terms of those issues, but we are a number of steps away from that.

At the moment, we have assessed—this goes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, mentioned—that Articles 3 and 8 have some challenges, but the principle is not to do what the Opposition seek, which is to withdraw from this in its entirety and, in doing so, withdraw from a range of international obligations that we share with many countries and which underpin the work of this United Kingdom in so many areas. That is not my natural approach to this challenge. With due respect to noble Lords, let us have that debate and, if need be, let us have that vote at some point. We will be on different sides of that argument.

To the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I say this: bear with us. We will bring forward the points that I have tried to make in tonight’s debate on Articles 3 and 8. They will be examined when the Government have had an opportunity both to examine them in detail—now that we are in government, as opposed to being outside the tent in opposition—and to bring forward proposals that will help in a way that builds consensus with our partners on what ECHR reform could look like. At the recent European Political Community Summit, 17 nations, including the UK, agreed to work together to ensure that the ECHR and other international frameworks are implemented in a way that safeguards against abuse so that Governments can tackle modern challenges.

The UK is committed to complying with international law. If we accepted the amendments from those opposite, we would not be, in my view, complying with international law. That includes implementing judgments of the European court and complying when it indicates binding interim measures in pending cases; when the court has reformed and improved its approach to interim measures, which I currently welcome, we will abide by those also.

In summary, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, can be patient. To the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Murray, I say this: I am sorry that we are not going to agree, but I hope that I have explained the reasons why.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as expected, that created a good discussion on the amendments in this group; I am thankful to the noble Lords who took part in it. I am disappointed that, after all the legitimate deportations that have been blocked, the Government are still resisting these sensible proposals—if not, perhaps, a little confused by the Government’s variety of views as to where they are going with this.

I shall not detain the Committee for much longer, but I must stress that the Human Rights Act is not supporting or upholding the rights and freedoms that it was meant to enshrine. The Human Rights Act has become a shield behind which criminals, terrorists and abusers hide. We are clear that this is not at all right.

Let us not forget that varying degrees of this policy are supported by many of those on the Government’s own Benches. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, has publicly called for the Government to suspend parts of the ECHR to allow for more illegal migrants and foreign criminals to be deported. Another former Labour Home Secretary, Jack Straw, has proposed decoupling human rights laws from the ECHR to permit more deportations. I note that the Government have committed to reforming how Article 8 is interpreted under UK law and we have heard that commitment again from the Minister. But the simple fact is that this is not sufficient. If we reinterpret Article 8, crafty defence lawyers will find a workaround for the new interpretation or will start using other provisions of the Human Rights Act to block deportation. We say that only a wholesale repeal will resolve the issue of vexatious legal challenges and allow us to regain control of our asylum system.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

204: Clause 49, page 47, line 14, leave out “5” and insert “14”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to standardise the punishment for offences relating to articles used in serious crime in this clause with the punishment for offences relating to articles used in immigration crime in clauses 13 and 14.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a simple group with some simple amendments. As we are close to reaching the end of six rather long days of Committee on this Bill, I will be brief. Amendment 204 seeks to standardise the punishment for offences relating to articles used in serious crime in Clause 49 with the punishment for offences relating to articles used in immigration crime in Clauses 13 and 14.

It is slightly strange that Part 3 has found its way into this Bill. The provisions around serious crime prevention orders and articles for use in serious crime were part of the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, which unfortunately fell due to the election. Although it is welcome that this Government are taking these provisions forward, it would have made more sense to include them in the upcoming Crime and Policing Bill, which we will consider later this week, rather than in an immigration and border security Bill. But, since these clauses have found their way into this Bill, there is good reason to consider them holistically as part of the general measures aimed at deterring immigration offences. That is what the amendments in this group aim to achieve.

Amendment 204 therefore changes the maximum period of imprisonment for possession of an article for use in a serious crime from five years to 14 years. This would be the same as the maximum imprisonment for the new offences of supplying or handling an article for use in immigration crime. Similarly, Amendments 204A and 204B would expand the class of applicants for a serious crime prevention order to include the directors-general of Border Force and Immigration Enforcement, as well as the Border Security Commander. This would permit those senior officials to apply for these prevention orders as part of their duties in protecting our border security and enforcing immigration laws.

Amendment 208B would expand the definition of a “serious crime” for the purposes of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Currently, the only crime under any of the immigration Acts considered to be a serious crime is the offence of assisting unlawful immigration and helping an asylum seeker enter the United Kingdom. If a serious crime prevention order can be given for these offences, why can one not be given for all offences under Sections 24 and 24A of the Immigration Act 1971? Certainly, why can one not be given under the new immigration offences in Clauses 13 and 14 of this Bill?

These amendments, taken together, are intended to strengthen the ability of the authorities to tackle immigration crimes by giving them the necessary legal tools. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 207 in this group. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that it is rather odd that the serious crime prevention provisions are in this Bill. I wondered whether it is because the Crime and Policing Bill was “overloaded”—would that be the term to use? But that is the extent to which I agree with the noble Lord.

I am not alone on these Benches: the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I have raised a number of times over the years our concern about civil orders morphing into crime without any finding of guilt. The Bill extends serious crime prevention orders with the inclusion of electronic monitoring and the creation of interim orders, extends the list of parties who can apply for an order—the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would extend it further—and gives the Crown Court jurisdiction in this area. So it will be no surprise to anyone who has heard us before to see this amendment.

It is not only the extensions that make the need for a review all the more important. There is very little evidence or data, if any, to show that the orders work. They overlap with other orders, so there is some confusion. There is inconsistency in their use, which I have become very aware of in the context of modern slavery and human trafficking, where it became clear that some police forces were not even aware that they could pursue equivalent orders. There is a lack of resourcing and infrastructure to monitor and enforce orders. Breaches are common, which is not surprising, because individuals do not have adequate support to comply with the restrictions and requirements that orders can contain and so, as has been put to us, they are set up to fail.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights made recommendations with regard to these provisions:

“Given the severe infringement on the right to privacy posed by the imposition of electronic monitoring, the test should be one of ‘necessity and proportionality’, not whether it is ‘appropriate’”,


and,

“To ensure respect for Convention rights, the prosecuting authorities and the courts must be careful to only seek and impose these interim orders where risks are imminent”.


Rather than proposing those provisions specifically, we on these Benches feel that it would be helpful and important for there to be a review of prevention orders in the round before we make piecemeal additions to them, and a review would certainly extend to the issues of necessity and proportionality.

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[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I am very happy to write on that point but, speaking as a practitioner of the dark arts of evaluation, I am generally in favour of its publication.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his response and will be very brief in closing this group. The amendments considered here all focus on provisions drafted by the previous Government and continued by this one, so it is not surprising that I support them. My amendments in this group do not signify my opposition to these clauses of the Bill. Rather, they serve as suggestions to further improve and expand the ability of immigration authorities to combat immigration crime—although I perhaps take issue with what the noble Lord said in respect of Amendment 204B. Perhaps that is a debate for another time. I understand his view on this and I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 204 withdrawn.

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I am not expecting the Minister when he responds to say, “Yes, it is a wonderful idea and we will do it tomorrow”, but I hope he will at least consider it and see if it is a way of saving lives. I do not care whose lives they are; that is something completely separate, but you still have a duty to save lives. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will deal with Amendments 208 and 208A tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Dubs. I begin by saying that we on these Benches agree very much with the underlying principle: the importance of taking action against those who endanger lives at sea.

We appreciate the passion behind this amendment. Indeed, I fully appreciate it, having been a maritime Minister. That is a principle that we have strongly supported. Indeed, it is one already reflected in the amendments we have tabled to this Bill. There can be no doubt that the small boat crossings in the channel are dangerous, reckless and exploitative. Time and again we have seen the devastating consequences of criminal gangs putting men, women and children into overcrowded and unseaworthy boats, knowing full well the risks to life that this involves.

However, this amendment as drafted, we believe, is flawed. It appears to rest on an assumption that some of the vessels are safe and some are not, and that it is the task of enforcement authorities to distinguish between the two. That is not a distinction that exists in reality. The simple truth is that one endangers lives at sea purely in the act of getting into one of these boats in the first place. Every single vessel making an illegal crossing of the channel is, by definition, dangerously unsafe. Everyone involved in launching or boating those vessels, from the organisers to the passengers, is participating in an inherently perilous act which should be treated as such under the law.

We cannot afford a situation in which authorities must first determine whether a vessel is dangerously unsafe before intervening. We cannot wait for tragedy to occur before action can be taken. The legal position must be absolutely clear: all such crossings are unsafe, unlawful and unacceptable. That is the principle that underpins the approach that we have advocated throughout this Bill and the one that we believe that the Government must continue to uphold.

On Amendment 208A, I appreciate the noble Lord’s intention to ensure effective co-operation between the Border Force’s maritime command and His Majesty’s Coastguard. However, it is not clear that the creation of an additional co-ordinating body, as this amendment proposes, would make any practical difference on the ground. The Border Force and the coastguard already operate under well-established protocols for joint working through the Joint Maritime Security Centre. We must trust the professionals on the front line, the experts in the Border Force and the coastguard, to exercise the powers granted to them safely, responsibly and in the national interest.

The answer to the challenges in the channel lies not in expanding bureaucracy or creating new administrative structures but in ensuring that the powers and resources that we have already legislated for are used effectively. Both these amendments proceed from understandable and serious concerns, but in our view the right way forward is not to introduce new uncertainty into the law nor to create additional layers of oversight but to maintain clear, firm principles—that all small boat crossings are inherently unsafe and that those charged with policing them must be trusted to act decisively and professionally to prevent loss of life and secure our borders.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I was intrigued to know what points the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, was going to raise. After listening to him, it occurs to me to ask the Minister whether HM Coastguard is a partner authority under Clause 3 of the Bill:

“a public authority with functions in relation to threats to border security (whether exercisable in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”.

Of course, partner authorities have a duty to co-operate with the Border Force commander—so I am asking about context.