Immigration (Biometric Information etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2025 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, this legislation represents part of the Government’s ambition to use new technologies to significantly improve public services. There are four principal functions that will enable us to fulfil our commitments to transition from physical to digital documentation and to make full use of the biometric information that we collect during visa applications and at the border. If noble Lords will allow me, I shall outline what those changes are.

These regulations will allow: first, a new power at the border to enrol and retain biometric information from people arriving in the UK; secondly, for visa applications, measures to support the transition from physical biometric immigration documents to digital immigration status in the form of an eVisa for everyone who applies for a visa to come to the UK, including visitors; and, thirdly, the extension of the standard fingerprint retention period beyond 15 years for people who abscond from immigration bail and become uncontactable. Lastly, the instrument prevents abuse of the statelessness route.

I will take each of those changes in turn, starting with the changes at the border. The legislation will introduce crucial new border powers to expand the circumstances in which we can enrol biometric information from everyone at the UK border and retain it for non-British citizens. Biometric information plays a crucial role in our immigration system. It is an effective and efficient way of checking and confirming the identities of all arrivals to the UK, as well as the immigration status of foreign nationals who come into or live in the UK. This instrument will enhance current Border Force powers to refuse or cancel permission to enter the UK, and will empower officers to take robust action against non-British or non-Irish citizens who deliberately evade the requirement to provide their biometric information on arrival.

We are continually striving to improve how people cross the UK border, ensuring that we maximise passenger flow while maintaining security. We want to utilise biometric information further to trial new identity-verification and facial comparison technologies, known as contactless travel, in order both to build a border that can efficiently withstand future pressures and to ensure that our border remains secure. I know that noble Lords will share in that objective.

Contactless travel could enable a person to enter the UK without the need to routinely produce their passport at the border. Instead, we would compare the facial image of a person arriving in the UK with the biometric information that we hold from either their UK passport or their immigration application. Coupled with this, our universal permission to travel will prevent those without authorisation boarding a flight, ship or train to the UK; of course, everyone arriving in the UK will still need to travel with their passport and be prepared to present it at the border.

We are not alone in trialling new facial comparison capabilities. Other countries, such as the USA and Australia, are looking at introducing biometrically enabled automated border systems to improve passenger flow and maintain security. This instrument will ensure that we do not fall behind.

Our plan for contactless travel’s future use at the UK border is ambitious. However, as noble Lords would expect, we will take a cautious approach to the introduction of new border technology. These regulations do not commit the Government to introducing any new technology, so we can take the time to ensure that we get this system right. Our first step will be initially to test contactless travel on British citizens only, and we will move to further implementation only if this is a success. Our ambition is to start this trial by the end of this year, and we plan to announce further details shortly.

Looking now to the rollout of eVisas, the Government are pursuing an ambitious digital programme to modernise public services, including our visa system. These changes enable the UK to deliver a fair and firm immigration system that not only works in the national interest but is in line with the modern digital age. Businesses and customers alike expect a prompt and user-friendly experience in their transactions. I hope this instrument will enhance their experience by further supporting the transition from physical to online evidence of immigration status in the form of eVisas. Over time, physical and paper-based products and services will be replaced with accessible, straightforward digital products and services. Our overall aim is to ensure that people will have a secure and seamless digital journey when they interact with the UK’s immigration system. To support this, we stopped issuing biometric residence permits and cards on 1 November 2024.

Noble Lords will know that an eVisa is an online record of a person’s immigration permission in the UK and any conditions that might apply. It can be viewed by logging into the “view and prove” service using a UK Visas and Immigration account. As of 27 February 2025, more than 4 million people had created a UKVI account to access their eVisa, with a daily increase in this number as many more create accounts. Our aim is to ensure that the rollout of eVisas will improve foreign nationals’ experience of our border system, because eVisas are secure and cannot be stolen, lost, or tampered with, unlike physical documents. The fact that they can be accessed at almost any time and anywhere will give people with a valid immigration status in the UK an easy way to evidence their status and identity.

With the transition from physical cards to eVisas, the requirement for holders of physical immigration documents with settled status to apply for a replacement at least every 10 years has been eliminated. This is because an eVisa does not expire in the same way that a physical document would. This digital approach to our border and immigration system will streamline processes for people making applications or updating their details.

However, we acknowledge that a person’s personal information may change over time. In particular, facial images change as people age, so this instrument allows us to require eVisa holders to update their facial photographs at least once every 10 years. This mirrors the requirement we have for UK passports. I noticed from discussions of this that my passport is nine and a half years old now and coming to the end of its useful life, and I will have to update my passport shortly, as I would with an eVisa. It also mirrors what happens with driving licences. Having up-to-date images on eVisas will enable third parties, such as employers, to conduct their checks easily. Where an eVisa holder fails to update their photo within the required time, this instrument enables us to restrict their ability to share their status for verification. I emphasise that these sanctions will apply only to those who refuse to comply with the requirements, not those who are unable to.

We are particularly committed to preventing undue burdens on older people. We have drawn from the Windrush generation’s experiences. As older people are less likely to need to prove their immigration status in the UK, we will not require people aged over 70 to update their facial image or create a UKVI account. We will, however, encourage them to do so for their own convenience should they so wish.

Finally, we are now focusing on the change to our biometric retention approach for immigration absconders. The regulations clarify government powers to use and retain biometric information obtained from persons who abscond from immigration bail and avoid contact with the Home Office or the police beyond the standard 15-year retention period. This change will ensure that the person can be identified if they are encountered on a later occasion.

I will also briefly mention the statelessness route. This legislation closes a previous gap that enabled some people to avoid providing their biometrics. We now set out provisions that will ensure that we can capture biometric information from people who apply to stay in the UK as a stateless person. People who fail to enrol their biometrics as required without a reasonable excuse may have their application rejected or refused.

These changes are a fair and efficient way to maintain robust border control. I thank noble Lords for their attention and support in advancing these measures. This measure passed the House of Commons recently. Together, we are building a digitally driven immigration and border system that is fair and fit for the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the significance of these regulations in the context of the Government’s broader efforts to modernise the immigration and border control systems. The introduction of biometric data collection, along with the transition towards a contactless border system, represents a significant step forward in ensuring the security and efficiency of our borders. Although His Majesty’s Official Opposition do not object to the instrument in principle, we believe that it is essential to scrutinise its provisions carefully to ensure that they deliver the intended outcomes.

Let us consider the impact of these measures. The regulations, as outlined, facilitate the collection of biometric data from all entry clearance applicants, with a specific requirement for facial images to be updated every 10 years. Additionally, the retention period for certain biometric data has been extended, and new sanctions have been introduced for non-compliance. The aim, of course, is to ensure that the system remains accurate, secure and consistent, and I believe it is imperative that we continue to assess how effectively these measures meet their stated objectives.

The Government’s shift towards contactless border control is a key aspect of these regulations. Through allowing biometric checks upon arrival at the UK border, the legislation seeks to streamline the border process, reduce queuing times and improve identity verification. The use of biometric data at eGates and primary control points is intended to facilitate smoother passenger flows. Although the intentions behind these measures are clear, we must consider their practical implications.

His Majesty’s Official Opposition acknowledge the necessity of biometric data retention as a key aspect of modernising border control. However, it is important to note that there are several concerns, particularly regarding the adequacy of the measures in fully realising the vision of a contactless border system, so there is particular interest in the practical challenges of implementing such a system.

Questions have been raised about whether the current data retention period and infrastructure are sufficient to handle the demands of a fully digitalised border. The increased reliance on biometric data also raises important questions about the system’s progression and effectiveness as it evolves. As we continue to expand the use of biometric information, it is crucial that the infrastructure that is in place can support the necessary technological advancements without introducing new vulnerabilities.

Additionally, there is a call for greater clarity on enforcement mechanisms. The growing importance of biometric data in identity verification processes necessitates robust compliance measures. Concerns have been raised about whether the current sanctions for non-compliance are adequate to address potential risks, such as fraudulent activity or failure to adhere to biometric requirements. These are important considerations, and it is vital that any enforcement measures are proportionate, fair and effective in securing compliance.

I have several key questions for the Minister. First, how do these measures address concerns regarding the progression of infrastructure and enforcement as biometric data becomes a central element of the border control process? Furthermore, given the move towards a fully contactless border system, how will these advancements integrate into our existing security frameworks to ensure that security, privacy and compliance are maintained? On biometric data retention, does the Minister believe that the 15-year retention period is adequate to support a robust and sustainable database that aligns with the Government’s vision for a contactless border system? Can he clarify the timeline for testing contactless travel for British citizens, including the duration and expected sample size of the trial? Additionally, what steps are being taken to integrate biometric data with other data sources to enhance security and improve efficiency at the border? How feasible is this integration within the current system?

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, this Bill has its genesis in the evening of 22 May 2017 in the Manchester Arena, where more than 1,000 people were injured and 22 were killed in a terror attack—the sole responsibility of the terrorist involved. This Bill is a tribute to those victims and to the victims of other terrorist attacks. They will never ever be forgotten.

Noble Lords will be aware, of course, of the campaigning work of Figen Murray and her team. We would not be here today without her and her team, and I give them my thanks. This Bill will now be known as Martyn’s law in memory of Figen’s son, Martyn, who died in that Manchester terror attack. I also pay tribute to the security and intelligence services, law enforcement and others, who work day in and day out to protect this country from the ongoing threat of terrorism, and to the first responders who are on the front line, if and when the worst happens.

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debates on the Bill. They have been astute and considered, and I am deeply grateful for their scrutiny. I hope that we have had a collaborative, constructive approach to this Bill, and it is important that such legislation on terrorism has cross-party support across this House and the House of Commons. I am proud to be one of the Ministers who have brought this to fruition on behalf of the Government.

I thank Minister Dan Jarvis, who led the Bill in the House of Commons, and my noble friends Lady Anderson and Lord Moraes, the Whips on the Government Benches who have worked to tight timetables. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower—and his colleagues, the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Cameron of Lochiel—as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for their leadership on the Benches opposite.

I thank the policy, legal and Bill teams in the Home Office, which have worked under the previous Government and this Government; their tireless work has made this Bill possible. I also thank the team at the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel for drafting the Bill. I extend my deep and perpetual gratitude to the parliamentary staff, doorkeepers, clerks and others for their professionalism and their continued support for the Bill and your Lordships’ House.

This Bill will help save lives. As it leaves this House now, I look forward to its final passage in the House of Commons soon and its continuance to Royal Assent in due course. I commend it to the House.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing the Bill forward for Third Reading. I express my gratitude to all noble Lords for their diligent scrutiny and contributions throughout the Bill’s progression.

I also extend my sincere thanks, once again, to Figen Murray—together with her team, as the Minister mentioned—whose tireless campaigning has been instrumental in ensuring that we make progress on stronger protection for premises. Without her dedication, the Bill would not have progressed as it has.

I am pleased that we had the opportunity for a thorough debate around the important issues contained in the Bill both in Committee and on Report. On Report, several crucial issues were raised; foremost among them was the concern that the Bill should not place an undue burden on smaller businesses and voluntary organisations. Indeed, I still have some concerns about that, and its eventual effect remains to be seen. We heard compelling arguments from my noble friends Lord Udny- Lister, Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord De Mauley about the challenges faced by small enterprises, charities, events and community groups, particularly in implementing the necessary security measures without excessive financial or administrative strain.

Similarly, concerns were voiced regarding the potential impact on volunteers and organisations in the cultural, sporting and heritage sectors. We heard from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester on the potential issues for hundreds of church communities and how they will be affected. These discussions underscored the necessity of ensuring that the provisions of the Bill are not only effective but proportionate and pragmatic in their application. While I am disappointed that the Government felt unable to support amendments that sought to protect smaller businesses and volunteers, we acknowledge the importance of moving forward with a Bill that still represents a significant step forward in our collective security.

We also welcome the Government’s clarification on the Henry VIII powers contained in the Bill, an issue of legitimate concern that was rightly debated in detail. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for bringing amendments to refine these provisions. I commend the Minister on engaging seriously with these concerns and ensuring that the necessary clarifications were made. This is precisely the kind of constructive scrutiny in your Lordships’ House that strengthens legislation, and I am grateful to all who participated in this process.

I thank my noble friends Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Sandhurst for their support on the Bill. I must also mention our support team on this side, Henry Mitson and Max McGiffen.

As we move towards the implementation of the Bill, it is vital that those affected by its provisions—businesses, charities, local authorities and venue operators —receive clear guidance and support. The effectiveness of this legislation will be determined not by the words on the page alone but by how well it is put into practice. Adequate resources, training and advice must be provided to ensure that compliance is achievable and that security measures are implemented effectively without unnecessary complexity or confusion. To that end, a watchful eye will be kept on the performance of the Security Industry Authority.

Furthermore, we must continue to evaluate the impact of these measures once they are in force. Security threats evolve, and our responses must remain adaptable. I hope that the Government will remain open to reviewing and, if necessary, refining the legislation in the future to ensure that it continues to meet the needs of those it seeks to protect.

In conclusion, the Bill represents a significant and necessary step in our ongoing efforts to protect the public from the scourge of terrorism. While no legislation can eliminate it entirely, we have a duty to take every reasonable measure to mitigate threats and to ensure that venues and public spaces are as prepared as possible. The Bill is a tribute to those who have tragically lost their lives to terrorism, and a testament to our resolve that we will do all we can to prevent future tragedies.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, as has been said, thanks must primarily go to Figen Murray, Stuart Murray and their team. Not for a minute have they allowed us to forget the significance of the Bill, which Figen instigated. Their staying power is remarkable, but not really a surprise in view of their history.

In the absence of my noble friend Lady Suttie from these Benches, we thank the Minister and his team for their helpfulness, openness and, as he said, collaboration, which we have really appreciated. I thank my noble friend Lady Suttie for being so easy to work with and so clear about what we wanted to achieve. As ever, I thank Elizabeth Plummer in our Whips’ Office. I have often said to her that she works so hard on legislation that she should do the last bit and be here to speak to it.

The Bill will not stop terrorism but has a very important part to play in the response to it, and we are pleased that challenges to the Bill have been resisted. We look forward to following its implementation.

Iranian State Threats

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing the Statement to the House today and I welcome the Government’s recognition of the growing threat posed by Iran to our national security. The escalation of Iranian state-backed plots against UK residents and the targeting of dissidents, Jewish communities and journalists is deeply concerning. I join Ministers in paying tribute to our intelligence services and law enforcement officers who work tirelessly to thwart these threats.

While we welcome the measures outlined today, I must ask whether they go far enough. The danger posed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, is clear and escalating, as Iran has supported Putin’s barbaric and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Are this Government acting decisively enough on proscription? The Foreign Secretary has ruled it out, despite overwhelming evidence of the IRGC’s involvement in malign activities. Does the Minister now acknowledge that proscribing the IRGC is a necessary and overdue step? If not, can he explain how the measures announced today will be as effective in tackling this threat?

I welcome the decision to place the entire Iranian state on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. However, given Iran’s well-documented use of proxies, how do the Government intend to enforce these requirements effectively? Can the Minister provide assurances that those who fail to register will be swiftly identified and prosecuted?

The role of Iranian-linked organised crime networks is another crucial issue. The Government have pledged further sanctions and action against these networks, but we need clarity. Will the Minister commit to a specific timeline for additional sanctions and further crackdowns on the IRGC’s financial networks in the United Kingdom?

Finally, while it is right that we strengthen our domestic resilience, we must work closely with our allies to counter Iran’s destabilising activities internationally. Can the Minister outline what further steps the Government will take to enhance security co-operation with our Five Eyes partners and European allies in tackling Iranian aggression?

The threats we face from hostile states require more than just words—they require action. The Government must match their rhetoric with decisive steps to protect Britain from Iranian intimidation and ensure that those responsible for such threats face the full force of the law.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, just last week in the Chamber we debated the unacceptable practice of the Iranian regime holding joint nationals in detention. My noble friend Lady Brinton spoke powerfully in that debate. Therefore, these Benches support what the Government are doing and how they are doing it. We join others in giving thanks for the work of our intelligence services and our law and order community, the men and women who work every single day to keep us safe.

However, we need constant vigilance. We have seen the unacceptable practice of the intimidation of BBC journalists, and individuals within this country who have been targeted by the Iranian regime, as it continues to do. Placing Iran on the enhanced tier scheme is welcome.

We are all aware that, given the economic crisis and tense political situation in Iran, it is likely that the regime will seek to export further attempts to destabilise and disrupt neighbouring countries, and countries such as the United Kingdom. The persecution of individuals in Iran is heightening, especially that of women and girls. As the Minister taking the Statement is from the Home Office, I ask him not to have a closed mind with regard to potential safe and legal routes for those who are persecuted within Iran, for whom we can provide refuge in the United Kingdom. There is currently no safe and legal route, but it would be a very strong signal of support for the human rights of people within Iran.

Of course, however, the first duty of government is to protect those within the United Kingdom. We have seen the use of proxies: we have seen the use of agencies and we have seen the use of other countries’ nationals. So I also wish to ask: when it comes to the implementation of the enhanced scheme, as well as the policing, how vigilant are we about those from other countries who are paid by the Iranian regime to carry out actions on its behalf? It is, of course, not the case that it will always be Iranian nationals who will be carrying out this work.

We have a country-wide Iranian sanctions regime, which is welcome, but the question I asked when we scrutinised that regime was about other bodies whom the Iranians are paying and who are nationals of other countries. That is a grey area when it comes to our legislation, so I would be grateful if the Minister could reassure us that nationals of other countries acting on behalf of the Iranian regime will also be covered by the enhanced tier element.

Hong Kong Democracy Activists

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a gross infringement of British sovereignty. The Chinese Communist Party and its repressive regime have arrested over 100 people in Hong Kong on politically motivated charges. In the other place, the Security Minister claimed that

“concerns have been raised at every opportunity”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/3/25; col. 184.]

Can the Minister confirm whether this specifically has been raised with Chinese officials? Will he confirm whether the Government have made formal diplomatic representations to China regarding this blatant extraterritorial threat? Will he commit to placing China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The answer to the noble Lord’s first two questions is yes. Representations have been made by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary at the highest level, and Ministers who have visited China have also made representations. We will continue to make representations on this matter because it is a serious issue, and the Government need to ensure that the Chinese know that there is widespread concern among the populace and the Government. On FIRS, the noble Lord will know that we announced yesterday that the state of Iran is being included in FIRS. The scheme will become live during the summer. We will keep all nations under review but at the moment our announcement has only been in relation to Iran.

Migrants: Indefinite Leave to Remain

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government have recently issued a statement revising and extending the Ukrainian scheme, and anybody who is here currently under that Ukrainian scheme will have been notified of the requirements under that. Their status will be regularised as long as the illegal occupation and invasion of Ukraine by the Russian state pertains.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

What progress has been made in closing asylum hotels, in line with the Government’s manifesto commitment? How will the Government ensure that those granted indefinite leave to remain contribute to the economy, rather than becoming dependent on state support?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government have closed a certain number of asylum hotels—it is in the low teens at the moment. The Government have a commitment to closing such hotels because they are a waste of taxpayers’ resource, and there are better ways to manage what we inherited from the previous Government. Since July, we have removed 19,000 people with no legal right to remain in the United Kingdom. Of those, 5,100 were enforced returns and, since July, we have also tackled 5,400-plus visits on illegal working, and we are improving the situation with removal of foreign national offenders. There is a record that the noble Lord has to defend, and we are trying to unpick that record—and those hotels are his legacy. We will meet our manifesto commitment during this Parliament.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

1: Clause 2, page 2, line 11, leave out “from time to time” and insert “not less than once a month”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and the other in the name of Lord Sandhurst to Clause 2 seek to remove the reference to “from time to time” and provide a benchmark by which the attendance at a premises may be measured.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to open this first group of amendments to the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill on behalf of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, who, unfortunately, is not in a position to be here today.

Although we do not wish to divide on Amendments 1 and 4, we have tabled them to seek further clarity and precision from the Government on this crucial area of the legislation. These amendments, proposed by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, replace the vague phrase “from time to time” with the more precise

“not less than once a month”.

This change is more specific and tightens up some of the language in the Bill. If, say, a venue has 200 people once a year for a Christmas party but has fewer than 200 at every other point in the year, under this amendment that venue would not be covered.

The logic of this amendment is to ensure that the SIA is given a clear benchmark by which it can measure venue capacity. This avoids ambiguity, and I hope the Minister will agree that it improves the quality of the legislation. I eagerly await his response and hope to see some movement from the Government on this issue. I look forward to hearing from my noble friends Lord De Mauley and Lord Udny-Lister. I am sure that this will be a constructive and positive debate.

[Lord Udny-Lister (Con)]

My Lords, my amendment seeks to raise the qualifying premises threshold in this Bill from 200 to 500. This is a necessary and proportionate adjustment to ensure that the legislation is both effective and enforceable. At its core, this Bill is about ensuring that public venues take reasonable steps to protect the public from the ever-present threat of terrorism. This is a goal that we all share, but it is also our duty as legislators to ensure that any obligations that we impose are realistic, achievable and properly targeted. The current threshold of 200 is, in my view, too low. It captures far too many small businesses, community venues and organisations that simply do not have the resources to comply effectively with the security measures required under this legislation.

We must therefore ask ourselves what we are truly trying to achieve. If the Bill is about protecting high footfall venues that are most likely to be targeted, a threshold of 500 is much more appropriate. A venue that regularly accommodates 500 people is a significantly different proposition from one with just over 200. The former will have the infrastructure, resources and operational capacity to manage the enhanced security obligations that the Bill requires, whereas the latter will often struggle under the weight of compliance, detracting from the effectiveness of the legislation as a whole.

Moreover, this is a question of enforcement. By setting the threshold too low, we risk overburdening the enforcement agencies tasked with ensuring compliance. We should be concentrating our efforts where they will make the most difference: on larger, more high-risk venues, where the potential impact of an attack would be greatest. A threshold of 500 strikes that balance.

I also want to address the issue of fairness. Many small and medium-sized businesses are still recovering from the financial strain of recent years. The hospitality, entertainment and cultural sectors in particular have been hit hard. If we impose overly stringent requirements on smaller venues, we risk pushing them into further difficulties, leading to unintended consequences such as venue closures or reduced community engagement. This is not, therefore, about opposing security measures—far from it. It is about ensuring that these measures are appropriate for the size and nature of the premises they apply to.

I do not bring this amendment forward lightly. I support the principles of the Bill and I recognise the importance of making public spaces safer. However, legislation must be both proportionate and practical. The Government have not, in my view, provided sufficient justification for the 200-person threshold, and nor have they demonstrated that raising it to 500 would compromise security in any way.

On the contrary, I believe this amendment enhances the Bill by making it much more targeted and therefore effective. For these reasons, unless I hear a clear commitment from the Government today that they will reconsider their position, I will be dividing the House on this amendment. I urge noble Lords to join me in supporting a measured, proportionate and practical approach to this issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, I say to the noble Lord that the Government have made a judgment on the 800 figure, which we have estimated is just over £5,000 in cost, but this figure of 800, which the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, would change to 1,000, is a figure that probably impacts the Wembley Stadiums, the big theatres, the big venues. A £5,000 cost for that, which is what we have estimated in the impact assessment, would be a reasonable cost and would probably be consumed in normal training for staff, because most of those arenas hold full-time staffed events. For the 200 to 800 threshold, again, we have been looking at the whole question of what is reasonable. I think that 200 is a reasonable figure to assess on that.

However, we are going to disagree and, if we disagree and if the noble Lord wants to move his amendment, we will test the will of the House. That is what this place is about. I will see him in the Lobbies—reluctantly —if need be but I hope that he will understand why we have settled on the 200 figure to date.

Before I sit down, I must speak to government amendments 6 to 11, which make small technical amendments to the Bill and which follow reflection we have had at official level and ministerial level. The amendments further clarify how the Bill is intended to apply to premises and events. They do not change anything in the scope of the Bill but simply increase certainty about the premises in scope of the Bill. For example, private events such as weddings attended by relations and friends, or office parties attended by employees or customers, are deemed private events that are not attended by the public. The amendments make it clear, even more so than they did previously, that they should be out of scope.

I hope the noble Lord will not test the will of the House. But if he does, I urge my noble friends and anybody else who wishes to join us to vote him down.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a relatively short but very good debate, and I thank my noble friends for their amendments in this group. Amendments 2 and 3 address the threshold for qualifying premises. My noble friend Lord Udny-Lister’s amendment proposes raising the threshold from 200 to 500, while my noble friend Lord Murray’s amendment strikes a balance by setting it at 300, with flexibility for the Secretary of State to make determinations in exceptional cases.

These amendments recognise the practical implications of compliance while ensuring that the duty to protect the public is both proportionate and effective. It is essential that this legislation targets venues most at risk while avoiding undue burdens on smaller establishments, and if my noble friend Lord Udny-Lister is minded to test the opinion of the House, we will support him.

Amendment 5, tabled by my noble friend Lord De Mauley, would adjust the threshold for enhanced duty premises from 800 to 1,000. This refinement aligns with the broader effort to ensure that security obligations are applied appropriately. Larger venues naturally pose greater security challenges. Amendment 5A, which similarly adjusts the threshold for qualifying events from 800 to 1,000, also makes sense to me.

The cost of compliance for events will be large and thus slightly raising the threshold will allow for greater focus and precision in what the Bill intends to remedy. If my noble friend Lord De Mauley intends to test the opinion of the House, we will support him.

On Amendments 6 to 11, tabled by the Minister, I acknowledge the suggested improvements, replacing “invitations” with “tickets”, and substituting “other” with “similar”. These amendments means that the public protection procedures will apply only when members of the public are in attendance and not at private events such as weddings. I am supportive of these amendments and thank the Minister for tabling them.

In conclusion, the amendments I have spoken in favour of today enhance the clarity, proportionality and practical application of the Bill. In the face of ever- present security threats, our legislation must be both robust and precise.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I support what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester have said about Amendment 25. This needs consistency. The danger, as well as the fact that these things can change quite quickly, is that the SIA would struggle to respond to a potential wave of applications, when the certainty that people require is probably on whether they are safe in a venue and whether there is an invacuation plan or an evacuation plan. These things can be predictable and consistent, so it would not be helpful to tie them to the thresholds. These thresholds move predictably in the sense that we can see the threat rising and events happening, but sometimes they are based on intelligence that is not always open to the public, and therefore a rapid change could lead to quite a lot of uncertainty in the operation of premises. That is not wise, either, so I cannot support Amendment 25.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 13 and 25, both tabled by my noble friend Lord De Mauley, which introduce much-needed flexibility and proportionality into the Bill. They recognise that a one-size-fits-all approach is neither practical nor desirable when it comes to public protection measures.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Suttie (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 16, I will also speak to Amendments 17 and 24A, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

Amendments 16 and 17 are, as we debated in Committee, about the importance of training and guidance and ensuring the quality of that training. It is worth repeating that all the organisations we have spoken to about this Bill have stressed the importance of ensuring good-quality training; it was the one issue they all raised with us. This is perhaps particularly true for smaller events and premises, which have not necessarily previously had experience of drawing up plans for what to do in the event of a terrorist attack. As we discussed previously during the passage of the Bill, many larger venues have already put such training in place.

In Committee, the Minister gave some reassurances about training, but we have retabled the amendments to push him a little further on these matters. The previous draft Bill from the previous Conservative Government had a much more prescriptive approach to training. This has been removed, but it is vital that guidance on training is produced as soon as is practically possible, following consultation with the sector.

In Committee there was much discussion about the risks of expensive consultants—“snake oil salesmen”, as noble Lords referred to them. The sooner guidance is published, the less able such consultants will be to promote unnecessary or “gold-plated” training. Consultation with the industry affected by the provisions of the Bill will be key.

This brings me on to Amendment 24A. Consultation with those to be impacted will be the very best way to ensure that training is user-friendly, of a high standard and comprehensive, but not unnecessarily complex, and that guidance is written in plain, easy-to-understand English. I would be grateful if the Minister gave us further reassurances—he has already given some this evening—on full consultation with the sector to be impacted, including with small rural village halls, and the voluntary sector, as well as with big venues and the night-time and creative industries. Will he also commit, following that consultation exercise, to publishing guidance on training as soon as possible, and certainly well before the end of the rollout period of the Bill, which I believe is going to be two years? I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to address this group of amendments, which touches on critical aspects of training, funding, economic impact and consultation within the framework of the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill. Although I cannot support Amendments 16 and 17, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Hamwee, I express my strong support for Amendments 30 and 34 and will speak to Amendment 31.

Amendments 16 and 17 propose requirements for training in public protection procedures and would ensure that training providers meet high and competent standards. The importance of proper training in counterterrorism preparedness is self-evident. However, there are practical considerations regarding how such training is implemented, who bears the cost and how providers are accredited. Although these amendments highlight an important issue, further clarity may be needed to ensure that they are applied in a way that is both effective and feasible for those affected.

I fully support Amendments 30, 31 and 34 as they introduce essential provisions to ensure that implementation of the Bill is both fair and practical. Amendment 30, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, calls for additional funding for local authorities. This is absolutely necessary. Local authorities will play a crucial role in ensuring compliance with the new security measures, yet they are already under considerable financial pressure. Without adequate funding, we risk imposing responsibilities on local government without the means to fulfil them effectively. Security cannot be done on a shoestring budget. If we are serious about protecting the public, we must ensure that local authorities have the resources to do so.

Amendment 31, in my name, seeks to review the impact of the Bill on the night-time economy. This is a crucial safeguard: bars, clubs and entertainment venues are vital to the economic and cultural life of our towns and cities. Although security is of course paramount, we must ensure that the measures imposed by this legislation do not have unintended negative consequences, leading to excessive costs, closures and job losses. A structured review would allow us to monitor these effects and make adjustments if necessary.

Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, proposes that businesses be properly consulted. This is a matter of both practicality and fairness. Businesses, particularly those in hospitality and events, will be directly affected by the Bill, and it is only right that they have a voice in shaping how its provisions are implemented. Engaging with businesses will not only improve compliance but will ensure that security measures are designed in a way that works for all stake- holders.

In conclusion, I urge the House to support Amendments 30, 31 and 34, which would provide essential financial support, ensure careful economic consideration and guarantee meaningful engagement for those most affected. A well-crafted security framework must not only protect the public but be practical, proportionate and sustainable.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the amendments before us today. I hope I can give some comfort on at least one of the amendments during the course of our discussion.

Training is extremely important. I have been supportive of the need to make sure that those who have to have a role in the legislation—and the premises and events within scope of the legislation—are given sufficient training and guidance, so they understand how to follow the procedures and measures in the event of an attack. Such training will be imperative to ensure that procedures and measures are adequately implemented and that the Bill’s public protection objectives are met. However, the Government assesses that a one-size-fits-all approach to training would be inappropriate, due to the different types and wide variety of premises and events that fall within scope. The most important factor is that the public protection procedures are effective and that they will be able to be carried out at any particular event.

We have tried to ensure that the public protection procedures are suitably in place and that the responsible person ensures that relevant workers, or volunteers, are adequately instructed as to how to carry out a procedure. The procedures in Clauses 5 and 6 are relatively straightforward. We have been through them in a number of stages, in Committee and on Report. I do not wish to repeat them today. They are designed to be simple and low cost. It is about putting in place appropriate procedures that could help protect people from harm and ensuring that staff or volunteers are properly trained in those procedures and how to follow them.

For the overwhelming majority of venues, this should not require specialist training. As I mentioned previously, free guidance will be available. Given that the procedures and measures will need to be tailored to the relevant premises, the content of any staff training will also be very much venue-specific. A generalised scheme for certifying training providers, as proposed in Amendment 17, is unlikely to be helpful in the circumstances. Premises and events should not have to pay for any specific training and the relevant legislation should be easily understood and put in place without detailed training. The Government will ensure that free, digestible guidance, advice and training will be provided. I hope that helps with the first set of amendments.

On Amendment 24A, in the name of the Liberal Democrat Front-Bencher, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, much of the debate throughout the Bill has rightly focused on ensuring that those responsible for qualifying premises and events have both the time and information needed to ensure that they can plan and prepare for, and ultimately implement, what is reasonably appropriate for them under the Bill. I put on the record today that the Government will publish guidance well in advance of commencement the new regime. The Government will determine the exact timescale for this in due course, ensuring that we strike the right balance between publication and making the guidance as robust as it can be through a period of proper consideration and engagement. I would expect that to last for a few months prior to implementation.

The Government are therefore happy—I hope this helps the noble Baroness—to support Amendment 24A, from the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, which will place a statutory duty to consult as appropriate before publication of the guidance under Clause 27. I hope that demonstrates the Government’s commitment to ensuring that we get the guidance right, by having a consultation, which will be well in advance of the implementation date and give an opportunity for colleagues across the sector to comment on the guidance that, potentially, is being published. I hope that is of further reassurance to the House.

Further amendments have been tabled. Amendment 30, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, was spoken to by the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench. I know that we are mindful of cost. We have discussed the cost issue on several occasions. Because of the Bill, there will be pressures on local authorities. It is not the Government’s intention for the Bill to frustrate the vital work they undertake. Our intention is to keep the public safe. I would like to reassure the House that the requirements for appropriate procedures and measures to be in place, as far as is reasonably practical, are designed to ensure that the relevant factors, including costs, are considered. Throughout our debates, “reasonable”, “practical”, “relevant” and “considered” are words I have used from this Dispatch Box and wish to re-emphasise today.

As we have discussed on a number of amendments today, it is envisaged that the requirements will be simple and low cost. Those in the enhanced tier will tailor the procedures and measures they implement to their particular circumstances. This includes consideration of the resources available to them. As a result, I do not believe that the Government should be looking at financial assistance.

UK Airports: British Passport Holders

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 3rd March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I know that my noble friend will reflect on his comments and understand that the politics that may divide us do not go down to what individuals wear in the Chamber. I hope that he can accept that. The noble Baroness took a principled stand on Brexit. It is a stand that I disagreed with. I voted and campaigned for remain, but she took that stand and won. There are consequences to that Brexit agreement that the Government are currently looking at. There are issues to do with how we can reset the relationship nine years after the referendum on things such as security and on the issues mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, around growth, but there are still fundamentals of that Brexit settlement that we have to maintain and that is what the Government will try to do to ensure that we get the best for Britain, as we have always done. The differences between the noble Baroness and me are stark, but I hope we can deal with them in a civilised manner.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, leading on from the Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, can the Government confirm that they will seek to renegotiate arrangements with EU airports to ensure reciprocal fast-track access for UK citizens similar to that provided for EU travellers? Can the Minister outline what investment is being made in staffing and technology at UK Border Force to reduce waiting times for British citizens at peak travel periods?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The answer to the noble Lord is yes. We will continue to look at how we can get reciprocal arrangements with our European partner nations. We do that on an individual basis, and it is a matter for each nation as to whether it wishes to have that reciprocal arrangement. We will continue to work to achieve that in the interests of co-operation.

This Government are investing significant amounts of resource in border security, and that includes access gates and other things at airports such as Heathrow and Gatwick and around the country. That resource being invested in extra border security is money that we have saved from the wasteful Rwanda scheme that the noble Lord supported. We are going to put that resource into protecting our borders. I will certainly come back to him in due course with specific numbers and amounts of investment in respect of the particular issues that he has raised.

E-scooters

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for educating me in the use of mobile fridges; I saw on my local regional television service that the Co-op is trialling them in the north-west of England. I am not aware how widespread that is, and to be honest from the Dispatch Box, I am not aware of what current legislation will cover that issue. But, as ever, I will take it away, examine it and make sure that I respond to the noble Baroness, and I will certainly look with interest at the impact of those mobile vehicles on pavements. My view is—this is a long-standing view—that pavements are for people, not for cars, bikes or e-scooters. But I will examine for the noble Baroness how that aspiration goes into legislation.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, further to the point on criminality made by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, quite apart from the nuisance value and the danger that is attached to the use of these e-scooters, there is strong evidence to show that they are being used in connection with crime and anti-social behaviour, such as the increasing level of mobile phone thefts. Can the Minister perhaps outline what action is being taken to tackle this problem in conjunction with the Home Office?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord may be aware—if he is not, I will certainly send him information on it—that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary convened a meeting last week with police chiefs and the Metropolitan Police to look at ongoing concern about mobile phone theft, and as a result of that discussion, several areas of work are being commissioned to look at how we can reduce it. It is completely unacceptable for any criminals to use bikes, e-scooters or other potential means of movement to steal mobile phones. It is a growing crime that we want to crack down on, and it is distressing to people. It is not about the loss of the phone; if the phone is unlocked, it can lead to wider fraud issues, such as bank fraud and the use of Apple Pay, et cetera. The noble Lord raises a really important issue, and I will update the House when we have had further discussions with the police about what actions can be taken.

Prevent: Learning Review

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am responding to this Statement on behalf of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition with deep sadness. Sir David Amess was not just a colleague and friend of mine in the other place; he was a true servant of the people. His warmth, kindness, keen sense of humour and unwavering commitment to his constituents set an example to all parliamentarians. His murder was an attack on democracy itself and it is incumbent on us all to do everything in our power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again.

The Government are right to publish the Prevent Learning Review into this case. Transparency is crucial in restoring trust in our counterextremism strategies. It is only by learning from past failures that we can strengthen our national security. The findings of the review are concerning. It is clear that the vulnerabilities of the perpetrator were not adequately assessed, that record-keeping was inadequate and that a miscommunication led to an incomplete intervention. Most concerningly, the case was closed too soon, allowing a dangerous individual to slip through the cracks. These are not minor administrative errors but systematic failings that demand urgent attention.

I welcome the fact that all four recommendations of the review have been implemented, but we must go further. The introduction of a new independent Prevent commissioner is an important step, but this role must have real teeth to scrutinise the system and hold authorities to account. The Prevent programme must be laser-focused on countering Islamist extremism—the ideology that led to the murder of Sir David. The independent review of Prevent by William Shawcross made it clear that, too often, the programme has been distracted by vague and politically correct priorities, rather than focusing on the clear and present threat posed by radical Islamism. This must change.

The Government must also address the broader weaknesses in our counterterrorism approach. The British people expect that those who pose a clear danger to our country are properly monitored and, where necessary, detained. We must ask whether current powers are sufficient. Whole-life sentences for terrorists are welcome, but we should also consider greater use of terrorism prevention investigation measures and enhanced surveillance for those who leave Prevent but remain a risk.

Additionally, this review has highlighted the crucial issue of MPs’ security. Public service should not come with a threat of violence. The Government must continue working with the parliamentary security department to ensure that MPs can serve their constituents without fear.

More must be done to clamp down on online radicalisation, which played a role in this case. Social media companies must take greater responsibility for tackling extremist content.

Finally, let us never lose sight of what this debate is truly about. Sir David’s light remains. His service, optimism and belief in his community live on. It is in his memory that we must commit to doing everything possible to prevent another tragedy of this kind. I support the Government’s effort to strengthen Prevent, but I urge Ministers to ensure that this programme never again fails, as it did in this case. We must be ruthless in our commitment to national security and unwavering in our resolve to protect the values that Sir David embodied.

What specific measures will the new independent Prevent commissioner have at their disposal to ensure greater accountability and effectiveness in countering radicalisation?

Secondly, given the concerns raised in the Shawcross review, how will the Government ensure that Prevent remains focused on the most pressing threats, particularly from Islamist extremism, rather than being diluted by other priorities?

What steps are the Government taking to enhance the monitoring of individuals who leave the Prevent programme but may still pose a risk? Should stronger legal powers, such as TPIMs, be considered?

How will the Government work with social media companies to crack down on online radicalisation? What consequences will there be for platforms that fail to remove extremist content?

Lastly, what further reforms are being considered to improve MPs’ security? How will the Speaker’s Conference ensure that lessons from Sir David Amess’s murder are fully implemented?

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the murder of Sir David Amess highlights the urgent need to strengthen our counterterrorism strategy if we are to prevent similar tragedies in future. The terrorist threat is continually evolving. More extremists now follow multiple ideologies, or none at all, with the internet and social media fuelling self-radicalisation. Conspiracy theories, personal grievances, misogyny and anti-Government sentiment further blur the picture, making credible threats harder and harder to predict. To stay effective, our approach must adapt to this increasingly fragmented and unpredictable landscape.

The review that was made public yesterday highlights that Sir David Amess’s killer had his Prevent file closed too soon in 2016—a failure the Home Office and counterterrorism police have known about since at least February 2022. Yet, as we heard last week, less than three years on, a similar pattern of failure has been identified in the review following the Southport stabbings. This suggests that, while much may have been done to improve the workings of Prevent in the last decade, some critical lessons have still not been learned. We therefore echo the sentiments of Sir David’s family in welcoming the fact that light has finally been shone on those failings, following yesterday’s retrospective publication of the 2022 report.

The Liberal Democrats have consistently raised concerns about whether the Prevent strategy is the most effective mechanism for addressing radicalisation. Unfortunately, recent events confirm that its shortcomings are not isolated incidents, and I therefore welcome the Government’s decision to task the new Prevent commissioner with reviewing the handling of Sir David’s case. Can the Minister confirm that the commissioner will have a broad and independent mandate to conduct a thorough assessment of Prevent? Will the Government commit to placing this role on a statutory footing to ensure accountability and effectiveness?

Any comprehensive review must also examine how Prevent collaborates with stakeholders, including police and crime commissioners and elected mayors. Community engagement is central to an effective counterterrorism strategy. Can the Minister outline how local communities will be consulted in the development of future counterextremism policies?

The current system is simply not equipped to manage emerging risks effectively. We live in a world where counterterrorism casework involving young people is increasing, and more referrals are now for individuals with a vulnerability rather than an apparent ideology. To tackle both emerging and traditional forms of radicalisation, we urgently need a system that is built for the reality of modern extremism.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

There have always been instances in which some Acts have given rise to immediate civil liability. In others, you had to plead that the breaches of regulations and so on were evidence of negligence. That was so under the old Factories Act and, I think, under the health and safety Act—I cannot remember, but it was a common pleading which I used to do 30 years ago.

It is for the Government to make it absolutely plain whether they want this to be a strict liability—in the sense that the moment that a breach occurs, however blameless, but nonetheless in breach, the party is, damages should follow. My understanding is that the Bill as drafted had that in mind, although it may be difficult. Think of a terrorist act: there may have been a relatively minor breach of regulations. Is that to give rise to millions of pounds-worth of damages, where it has no or very little causal connection, but just enough?

I understand where those moving the amendment are coming from, but this is a matter of policy for those behind it as to the parties likely to be affected and whether the change is necessary. It would be interesting to hear from the Minister what the philosophy is behind the drafting.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I will speak to Amendment 37A to Clause 31, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. This amendment proposes to remove Clause 31 and replace it with a new provision, stating that:

“Nothing in this Act or regulations made under it affects any right of action in civil proceedings”.


The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill represents a critical step in strengthening the security framework for public venues and premises across the country. The increasing sophistication and unpredictability of terrorist threats demand that we establish robust and effective measures to protect the public. By setting out clear responsibilities for operators of certain premises, the Bill aims to ensure that the tragic events that we have seen in the past are less likely to be repeated in the future.

As we consider Amendment 37A, it is essential to examine whether the proposed changes will support or potentially undermine the Bill’s objectives. At its core, this amendment seeks to clarify that the Bill will not interfere with the right to pursue civil claims. Such a provision could be seen as a safeguard, ensuring that individuals and organisations maintain access to legal redress if they believe that negligence or a breach of duty has contributed to harm caused by a terrorist incident.

This is a significant consideration. Civil liability serves as an important mechanism for accountability and justice in our legal system. It encourages responsible behaviour, provides a pathway for compensation and often plays a complementary role in reinforcing public safety. Ensuring that individuals retain this right can provide reassurance that public security measures do not come at the expense of fundamental legal principles. However, there are important questions that we must address.

First, is this amendment necessary? It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that civil liability is not displaced unless explicitly stated in the legislation. Therefore, some may argue that this amendment is redundant and risks introducing ambiguity into the Bill’s interpretation. If the existing legal framework already protects the right to bring civil claims, we must carefully consider whether including an explicit provision could inadvertently complicate matters rather than clarify them.

Another practical consideration is the potential impact on compliance with the Bill’s requirements. Premises operators, many of whom are already facing financial and operational pressures, may view the introduction of this provision as increasing their exposure to litigation. This could have the unintended consequence of discouraging proactive security measures if operators become overly concerned about the risk of legal action. It is essential that the Bill strikes a balance between imposing reasonable obligations and supporting those who are making good-faith efforts to comply.

Furthermore, we must assess whether this amendment could lead to increased litigation that detracts from the primary purpose of the Bill. Legal disputes can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, diverting attention from the urgent task of implementing effective security measures. We should be mindful of the potential for unintended consequences that may hinder the Bill’s objectives. It is also worth considering the impact on the insurance market. If the inclusion of this provision is perceived as creating greater uncertainty or exposure to liability, it could lead to increased insurance premiums for premises operators. This may place an additional financial burden on businesses and organisations that are already navigating a challenging economic environment.

That said, the Government must also be mindful of the importance of maintaining public trust and confidence in counterterrorism measures. Ensuring that individuals have access to justice when they have been wronged is fundamental to our legal system and to public confidence in the rule of law. If stakeholders, legal experts or civil society organisations believe that this amendment is necessary to provide clarity and reassurance, their concerns should be carefully considered. Ultimately, the key question is whether the amendment strengthens the Bill by providing clarity or whether it introduces unnecessary complexity that could hinder its implementation. I look forward to hearing the Government’s view on this matter and the perspectives of other noble Lords.

As we deliberate on this amendment, let us remember the importance of striking the right balance: ensuring robust security measures that protect the public, while safeguarding access to justice and upholding the legal rights that are fundamental to our democracy. We must strive to create a framework that achieves both security and fairness in the face of evolving security threats.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment, with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. We have had discussions outside this Committee to examine these issues. I am genuinely sorry that I was not able to allay the concerns expressed in our discussions, but I hope to be able to do so today, formally and on the record. I am grateful for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, which I think were supportive, and those from the Opposition Front Bench made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.

The purpose of the Bill, as we have discussed, is to mitigate the effects of physical harm arising from acts of terrorism. My starting point, which I know will be shared by everybody in this Committee today, is that the people responsible for such heinous acts that might be inflicted as a result of terrorist activity are the terrorists themselves. The purpose of this potential Act, if it is approved downstream, is to ensure that there are requirements on the duty holders under it which make a real difference to the physical harm caused by potential acts of terrorism. For this reason, there is both a set of conditions to put in place, under Clauses 5 and 6, and robust regulatory and enforcement provision in the Bill.

However, the duties should not impose an actionable right for someone who has suffered loss or injury to bring a claim for a breach of statutory duty. I will try to explain why I think that is the case in due course. I may or may not convince the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, but I will attempt to do so.

Clause 31(1) puts this principle beyond doubt and provides valuable reassurance for responsible persons who, fearing they may face civil proceedings, could otherwise feel pressured to overcomply with the Bill’s requirements. These points were made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. They might, as the Liberal Democrats have previously spoken about, drive people who have those statutory responsibilities to start to engage expensive consultants to overworry about the provisions or to make alterations to their premises that are disproportionate to the risks they face.

Throughout the Bill, the Government have tried to make the provisions as simple and clear as possible and to not put concerns that would lead to potential costly litigation on the face of the Bill. Clause 31(2) makes it clear that it does not affect any right of action which exists, apart from the provisions of Part 1 of the Bill. I know the noble Lord is aware of this because we have discussed it but, for example, a claim for negligence could still be made under the provisions of Clause 31(2). That provision is precisely in line with existing legislation, such as the health and safety legislation in 2013, which ensured that no civil right of action was available for breach of statutory duty unless provided for specifically under the Bill.

It is right that the Bill makes it clear that existing rights of action, such as negligence claims, are not affected, while providing what I hope—again, this is for noble Lords to assess—is clear reassurance to all that a civil claim for breach of statutory duty may not be brought. Therefore, I hope it helps the true purpose of the Bill: to require reasonable, simple and effective steps to mitigate the harm that could be caused by an act of terrorism, for which the terrorist is solely responsible. It should be achieved appropriately, proportionately and without overcompliance flowing from a fear of costly litigation.

I may not have succeeded, but I hope I am finding the balance point between the concerns expressed by Members of the Opposition, and the genuine concerns put down by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I hope that balance point is achieved by what the Government say. I will listen again if the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, wishes to make any further points based on what I have said. That is —not with my legal training but the legal mind of the Home Office lawyers behind me—the position I put before the Committee in response to the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, in an earlier day of Committee, the Committee heard an exchange between my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower and the Minister. It was pointed out that political gatherings of more than 200 people quite frequently happen in Members of Parliament’s constituencies. Quite often there is a local issue, or indeed a national issue, that encourages public engagement. One of the features of this Bill is that it is striking that there has been no discussion about the impact of the measures in the Bill on the right to protest. That is an ancient right under common law but it is now found also, in part, in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention, as scheduled to the Human Rights Act.

One of the Bill documents produced by the Home Office—quite rightly—when this Bill was produced was the human rights memorandum prepared for the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. That document does not appear to engage with the question of whether this Bill will infringe or curtail any person’s Article 10 or 11 rights to protest. It is noticeable, given that omission from the human rights memorandum, that the Minister and his equivalent in the Commons certified on the front of the Bill that, in their view, it was compliant with the convention. I am afraid that I beg to differ with that analysis—at least to the extent of the amendment proposed on the Marshalled List today.

We will look at what the amendment does in a second. By way of background, it is important to point out that on 6 February this year, the Court of Appeal, presided over by the Lady Chief Justice, produced a judgment in the case of Sarti, Hall and Plummer against the Crown: 2025 EWCA Crim 61. The Court of Appeal considered, as part of the Just Stop Oil protests, appeals brought by individuals who had been protesting by closing Earl’s Court Road. The Court of Appeal, reversing or revising earlier decisions of the courts, determined that it was not necessary for a criminal court hearing a charge of this type to go through the elaborate proportionality tests required in the earlier Shvidler case, and therefore it was for the court to implement Section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023.

Noble Lords will be asking, “Why is all this relevant?” It is relevant for this reason: Section 11 in Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 imposes an obligation to notify the police in advance of the date, time and proposed route of any public procession or protest which is intended

“to demonstrate support for or opposition to the views or actions of any person or body of persons”,

or to

“publicise a cause or campaign”.

That obligation to notify the police is not addressed in any way in the provisions of Clause 3 of our Bill, which defines “qualifying events”, and it is not inconceivable to see that there may well be a situation where a public protest falls within the definition of Clause 3.

The Bill is silent about who may be considered the responsible person and who may be liable to regulation by the SIA. In fact, the whole thing is simply inapposite. But it is not inconceivable that, unless an amendment of the type that I propose in the Marshalled List is inserted, there is a risk—albeit, as I am sure the Minister will tell me, it is a small risk—that these measures might be used to curtail protest, or have the unintentional consequence of curtailing the democratic right to protest.

For those reasons, I draw the attention of the Committee to the provisions of my amendment. Clearly, the first proposed new subsection simply ensures, as a matter of construction, that nothing in the Bill should be viewed as curtailing those Article 10 and 11 rights. Similarly, it makes clear, in proposed new subsections (2) and (3):

“The provisions of this Act shall not apply to protests or demonstrations, provided that such protests or demonstrations do not directly incite violence, threaten public safety”,


et cetera. The third provision is:

“This Act shall not be used to impede, restrict, or unlawfully interfere with the right of individuals to express dissent”


or to protest. So, in that way, this measure will simply ensure that the Bill could not be misread by any future Government, or indeed by anyone. I can see no reason why His Majesty’s Government would not accept this amendment or something similar. I look forward to hearing some good news from the Minister. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 37B, tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. The amendment seeks to insert a new clause after Clause 31 to safeguard the right to protest, as protected under Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998. The amendment makes it clear that nothing in the Bill should be construed as infringing on the right to protest, provided that such protests are conducted peacefully and lawfully, do not incite violence and do not threaten public safety or disrupt essential services. Furthermore, it proposes that any action taken under the Bill that impacts the ability to protest or assemble should be subject to review to ensure that fundamental freedoms are not unduly restricted.

The right to protest is a cornerstone of any democratic society and one of the primary means through which individuals and groups can express their views, voice grievances and influence public discourse. Throughout history, peaceful protests have played a transformative role in shaping our society, strengthening democratic governance and securing fundamental rights and freedoms. From the suffragette movement, which fought for women’s right to vote, to more recent demonstrations calling for climate action and social justice, the ability to gather, express dissent and campaign for change has been essential to our democratic values. Indeed, the richness and resilience of British democracy have often been reinforced by the willingness of citizens to stand up and speak out when they see injustice or seek reform.

However, the context in which we now consider this amendment is one of heightened security concerns. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill rightly seeks to enhance public safety by imposing new security obligations on certain premises to protect against the ever-evolving threat of terrorism. As noble Lords will agree, this is a pressing and legitimate concern, and our duty to protect citizens from harm is paramount.

Yet, as we pursue this noble objective, we must be vigilant in ensuring that necessary security measures do not inadvertently erode the civil liberties that define us as a free and democratic society. The fight against terrorism must never become an excuse to undermine the very freedoms we seek to protect. Ensuring compatibility with human rights principles is not merely a legal obligation—it is a moral imperative.

This amendment provides much-needed clarity. It recognises that, although security is of the utmost importance, it must be balanced with the protection of democratic rights. The conditions it outlines are both reasonable and proportionate. They would ensure that protests remain peaceful, lawful and respectful of public order while preventing unnecessary or heavy-handed restrictions that could stifle legitimate dissent. The provision for review is particularly important. It would ensure accountability and create a safeguard against potential overreach by authorities. This is essential in preserving public trust, especially in the sensitive area of counterterrorism measures. If people perceive that security measures are being used to suppress dissent rather than to protect them, we risk undermining the very co-operation and solidarity needed to combat threats effectively.

Critics may argue that the amendment is unnecessary because existing legal frameworks already protect the right to protest. However, clarity within the legislation is crucial to avoid legal ambiguities or unintended consequences. By explicitly affirming the compatibility of this Bill with the right to protest, we would send a strong message that we value security and civil liberties equally and make it clear that security and freedom are not mutually exclusive but must coexist in a healthy democracy.

In practical terms, this amendment would also support public co-operation with counterterrorism efforts. When people see that their rights are respected and protected, they are more likely to trust and engage with security measures. Public trust is a critical component of effective counterterrorism strategies. A society that respects the right to peaceful assembly is one where people are more inclined to work with, rather than against, the authorities.

To be clear, this amendment would not weaken the Bill’s security provisions, or shield unlawful, violent or disruptive activities. Rather, it reinforces the principle that peaceful and lawful protest should not be treated as a threat to public safety or security. It provides assurance that this important legislation will not inadvertently target the exercise of democratic freedoms.

Moreover, we must consider the international dimension. The United Kingdom has long been regarded as a bastion of democracy and human rights. By enshrining protections for the right to protest in this Bill, we would reaffirm our commitment to those values on the global stage and demonstrate that it is possible to confront terrorism without compromising the fundamental freedoms that are the hallmark of a democratic society.

This amendment would strengthen the Bill by ensuring that it aligns with the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights. It would send a clear and important message that we can protect our citizens from terrorism without sacrificing the freedoms that define our society. Security measures that respect civil liberties are not only more just but more effective in fostering a cohesive and resilient society. I therefore urge the Government and noble Lords to support it. Let us demonstrate that we are committed to both safeguarding our citizens and upholding the principles that make this nation great. By doing so, we can ensure that our response to terrorism remains not only strong but principled, just and democratic.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, sometimes the world goes a bit topsy-turvy and mad. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has given an inspiring rendition of the importance of the right to protest. I kept thinking that I was sure that I made many a speech like that—not as well or with such wonderful rhetoric—saying that the right to protest should never be compromised when that side was in government. There are times when you wonder what is going on. However, I concede that I have thought that there could be problems in this Bill around the right to protest, so I am glad that it has been raised.

The noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, made a very lawyerly speech. I did not understand all of it, but it is worth probing this. The other day, I talked about farmer protestors meeting in a barn and wondered whether this would apply, who would be the responsible person and so on. There is something in this. It is also what I had in mind when I supported the amendments about the Henry VIII powers, because there is no doubt that those powers give the Secretary of State the right to interpret public safety and security in such a way that our civil liberties could well be compromised in the name of public safety. In that sense, at least some reassurance from Minister would be very welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

If the Government believe that additional security measures are needed, then they should step in and provide financial support to business to implement them. In this amendment, I am therefore seeking measures that will ensure that venue holders are not placed under financial strain. I further believe that it is worth pointing out that some 116 theatres are owned and operated by local councils in England. Many of these are run on a shoestring as non-profit businesses or are managed by community trusts, and almost all of them would fall within the threshold of this Bill. With many councils in England facing huge financial challenges in their budget, cultural provision such as budgets for municipal theatres are being cut significantly up and down the country. With this in mind, I urge the Secretary of State to establish a financial support scheme to assist such venues, be it through grants, low-interest loans or tax relief, as many of these theatres and premises, much loved by their communities, could face closure. They are the cultural foundation of our country and Government should step in to prevent such a travesty from happening and this amendment seeks to achieve just that. I therefore commend both amendments to the Committee.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 40, tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. This amendment proposes the insertion of a new clause after Clause 34 to establish tax relief incentives for security investments by businesses covered under this Act. The purpose of this amendment is to encourage businesses to strengthen their security infrastructure voluntarily by offering tax deductions of up to 25% for qualifying security expenditures. These investments would include, but are not limited to,

“surveillance and monitoring equipment, … physical barriers and access control systems, … staff training on counter-terrorism measures, and … cyber-security infrastructure for venue security”.

The security landscape we face today is increasingly complex. The threat of terrorism has evolved, targeting not only traditional public spaces but also a wide variety of venues where people gather for work, entertainment, and everyday life. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill rightly places obligations on certain premises to implement security measures to protect the public. However, it is essential that we consider the financial burden this may place on businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises, which form the backbone of our economy.

This amendment offers a constructive and forward-thinking solution by incentivising security investments through tax relief. Such an approach would have several key benefits. First, by offering financial incentives, we encourage businesses to take proactive steps to enhance their security infrastructure. Many businesses want to do the right thing but are constrained by budgetary limitations. Tax relief would help alleviate these financial pressures and empower them to invest in modern, effective security measures that reduce the vulnerability of their premises to acts of terrorism.

Secondly, the amendment recognises the importance of innovation in counterterrorism technologies. By incentivising investments in advanced surveillance systems, access control solutions and cybersecurity infrastructure, we create a market environment that encourages the development and adoption of cutting-edge security technologies. This not only benefits individual businesses but strengthens the broader security landscape of our nation.

Thirdly, security is a shared responsibility. While the Government have a duty to protect its citizens, the private sector also plays a critical role in safeguarding public spaces. By incentivising private investment, this amendment helps reduce reliance on public funding for security infrastructure, ensuring that taxpayer resources can be allocated more efficiently. Fourthly, providing a financial incentive makes it more likely that businesses will not only comply with the requirements of this Bill but go above and beyond to implement comprehensive security measures. This contributes to a safer environment for the public and demonstrates a collaborative approach to counterterrorism efforts.

Critics may argue that offering tax relief for security investments could reduce government revenue. However, this must be weighed against the potential costs of a terrorist attack, including the loss of lives, economic disruption and the subsequent expenditure on emergency response and recovery. Investments in security are not merely costs; they are investments in resilience and stability. Additionally, by incentivising security investments, we send a strong signal that the Government recognise the challenges businesses face and are willing to support them in meeting their obligations under this Bill. This builds good will and fosters a sense of partnership between the public and private sectors in the collective effort to protect our society from terrorism. Furthermore, the scope of this amendment is deliberately broad, allowing the scheme to cover various types of security investments. This flexibility ensures that businesses can tailor their security measures to their specific needs and circumstances, rather than being forced into a one-size-fits-all approach.

The amendment strikes the right balance between enhancing security and supporting economic growth. It encourages businesses to invest in vital security measures while reducing the financial burden they face. By incentivising innovation and collaboration, we create a more secure and resilient society, so I urge the Government and noble Lords to support this amendment. It is a pragmatic, forward-thinking proposal that strengthens the Bill, promotes public safety and supports businesses in playing their part in counterterrorism efforts. Security and prosperity are not mutually exclusive; they can and must go hand in hand. This amendment embodies that principle and deserves the full support of this Committee.

I now speak in support of Amendment 41, tabled by my noble friend Lord Udny-Lister. This amendment proposes the insertion of a new clause after Clause 34 to ensure that local authorities are adequately supported and properly co-ordinated in their role under the Bill. The amendment has two key components. First, it calls on the Secretary of State to provide funding and resources to local authorities to support their expanded role in overseeing compliance with the security requirements outlined in this legislation. Secondly, it requires the Government to issue clear guidelines for local authority co-ordination with the Security Industry Authority. The importance of this amendment cannot be overstated. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill rightly seeks to enhance security measures at public venues and premises across the country. However, it is clear that local authorities will play a critical role in ensuring the effective implementation and enforcement of these measures. If we are to succeed in making public spaces safer, local authorities must be properly equipped to carry out their responsibilities.

Local councils are already under significant financial and operational strain. Many are grappling with stretched budgets, increased service demands and a shortage of skilled personnel. Adding the responsibility of overseeing complex security compliance requirements without additional support would place an unsustainable burden on them. This amendment recognises that reality and ensures that councils are provided with the funding and resources necessary to carry out their new duties effectively. By investing in local authorities, we not only empower them to fulfil their role under the Bill but enhance the overall security infrastructure of our communities.

The Security Industry Authority has a vital role in regulating private security services and ensuring high standards across the sector. However, effective security co-ordination requires seamless co-operation between local authorities and the SIA. This amendment addresses the need for clear and consistent guidelines on how such co-ordination should be conducted.

Providing clarity on roles and responsibilities will prevent a duplication of effort and reduce the risk of confusion or gaps in enforcement. It will foster stronger partnerships between local authorities, the SIA and other stakeholders, creating a more cohesive and effective security framework.

Terrorist threats are complex and multifaceted, requiring a co-ordinated and collaborative response at all levels of government. Local authorities are often best placed to understand the specific security challenges within their communities and to engage with businesses, venue operators and the public in implementing tailored security measures. However, this localised approach can be effective only if councils have the necessary resources and clear guidance from central government; without this, we risk creating a fragmented and inconsistent security landscape that leaves communities vulnerable.

Some may argue that councils already have extensive responsibilities, and that security should remain the domain of specialised agencies. However, the evolving nature of security threats requires a whole-of-society approach. Local authorities are on the front lines of public service delivery and community engagement; they are uniquely positioned to play a key role in implementing the security measures under this Bill, provided they are given the tools and support to do so. It is worth noting that investment in local authority capacity will have broader benefits beyond security: strengthening council capabilities can enhance their ability to deliver other services more effectively, creating more resilient and well-managed communities.

This amendment represents a practical and necessary step to ensure the successful implementation of the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill. It acknowledges the vital role of local authorities and provides the support they need to fulfil that role effectively. By ensuring proper funding, resources and clear co-ordination with the SIA, we can create a security framework that is both robust and locally responsive. I urge the Government and noble Lords to support this amendment; it strengthens the Bill, supports our councils and, ultimately, contributes to a safer and more secure United Kingdom.

Amendment 42 calls on the Secretary of State to establish a financial support scheme to assist businesses with the cost of implementing the security measures required under this legislation. The proposed scheme would include low-interest loans, grants or tax relief for businesses facing costs ranging between £3,000 and £52,000. While we all recognise the necessity of strengthening security measures to protect the public from the ever-present threat of terrorism, we must acknowledge the financial burden these requirements may place on businesses—particularly small and medium-sized enterprises—many of which are already grappling with rising costs, from energy bills to supply chain disruptions.

For a small business, an unexpected £3,000 security expenditure can be a significant financial strain, let alone costs in the tens of thousands. Without support, some may face difficult decisions, including delaying essential security upgrades or, in extreme cases, closing their operations altogether. This would not only harm local economies but could inadvertently weaken the overall security framework that the Bill seeks to strengthen. A financial support scheme, as outlined in this amendment, offers a practical solution. By providing low-interest loans, grants and tax relief, we can alleviate the financial pressures on businesses, while encouraging compliance with those security requirements. This is a prudent investment in the safety and resilience of our commercial sector and the communities it serves.

Finally, Amendment 45 addresses the equally important issue of financial support for voluntary and community organisations, including village halls, which are often at the heart of rural and suburban communities. It calls on the Secretary of State to provide grants or funding schemes to cover the costs associated with compliance under the future Act. Voluntary and community organisations face unique challenges; they often operate on shoestring budgets, relying heavily on donations, grants and volunteer support. These organisations provide essential services and spaces for social engagement, education and cultural activities. Village halls, in particular, are vital hubs for community life, hosting everything from children’s playgroups to senior citizen gatherings.

The imposition of costly security measures, while understandable from a public safety perspective, could deter community engagement and even lead to the closure of some of these cherished institutions. That is a price that we cannot afford to pay. By providing targeted financial support, we ensure that voluntary and community organisations can continue to thrive while meeting their security obligations. This amendment is not just about compliance; it is about preserving the social fabric of our communities and recognising the invaluable role that these organisations play in society.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the amendments, and I hope that I will be able to respond to them fully.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, for her plug for the service she mentioned; I take it in good heart. She will know that the purpose of the Bill is to give the Security Industry Authority the power to give advice and for the Home Office to enable that. I will take away her suggestion and feed it to officials. If it can be done, we will look at how it can be examined by the Security Industry Authority to be a helpful contribution to resilience for local groups and organisations. I thank her for that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, my two colleagues mentioned the situation in Northern Ireland. The Minister will be very familiar, from his service there, with a lot of this. A lot of the protections that were put in place were against blast. Terrorist tactics have changed and will continue to change. You cannot simply look at what the threat might have been 30 or 40 years ago: look at the threat that we face today, but in 10 years or 20 years, it may be very different.

The trick will be to have flexible thinking going into the actual design, so although the nature of the threat will change over time there will at least be a bit of future-proofing—that is the language we would need to use. All those lessons should be learned. I served on the Northern Ireland Police Authority, which had to deal with the threats to buildings in those circumstances and to other Civil Service facilities. The Minister will be very familiar with all that. The key is for those who design or adapt buildings—because more buildings are going to be adapted than built from scratch—to show a bit of flexibility in those processes and put a little thought into what might be coming down the road. Our buildings were largely protected against blast, which would not necessarily be the only thing that is at risk.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 43, tabled by my noble friend Lord Udny-Lister. This has been a very interesting debate. The amendment seeks to introduce a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to

“consult with local authorities on integrating counter-terrorism measures into the planning and design of new buildings which are likely to be designated ‘qualifying premises’ for the purposes of this Act”.

It further calls for the introduction of measures to ensure that anti-terrorism design principles are incorporated into building projects, particularly those in high-risk areas.

The importance of designing safer urban environments from the outset cannot be overstated. In an era where the threat of terrorism continues to evolve, our approach to public safety must also adapt. The integration of counterterrorism measures into the planning and design of buildings offers a forward-thinking solution that enhances security while reducing the need for costly and disruptive retrofits. By embedding security principles into architectural design, we can create spaces that are both functional and secure. Measures such as blast-resistant materials, secure perimeters, control access points and natural surveillance through open and well-lit layouts can significantly reduce the vulnerability of public spaces.

Many countries have already embraced the concept of designing out terrorism. For example, in the United States and parts of Europe, urban planners and architects routinely incorporate security features into the design of transport hubs, commercial centres and public venues. The United Kingdom should not lag behind in adopting similar best practices. This amendment encourages a collaborative approach between the Government, local authorities and the construction industry to ensure that new developments are designed with security in mind. Local authorities are uniquely positioned to provide insights into the specific risks and needs of their areas, making their involvement in this process essential.

Incorporating counterterrorism measures at the planning stage is not only more effective but more cost-efficient. Retrofitting existing buildings to meet new security requirements can be expensive and disruptive, often requiring extensive modifications that compromise the original design and functionality. By contrast, proactive design reduces long-term costs and creates environments that seamlessly balance aesthetics, functionality and security.

I must stress that this amendment does not seek to turn our urban landscapes into fortresses. Good design can enhance both security and public experience without compromising the openness and accessibility that define vibrant communities. By working closely with architects, planners and local authorities, we can ensure that security features are thoughtfully integrated and do not detract from the usability and beauty of public spaces. I fully associate myself with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, on this issue.

The amendment rightly prioritises high-risk areas where the likelihood of terrorism incidents is higher due to factors such as foot traffic, symbolic importance or previous threats. By taking a proactive approach in these areas, we would not only protect lives but bolster public confidence in the safety of shared spaces. In conclusion, the amendment would strengthen the Bill by embedding security into the very fabric of our built environment. It demonstrates a pragmatic and forward-looking approach to counterterrorism that balances safety, efficiency and community needs. I urge the Government and noble Lords to support this amendment as it represents a vital step forward, creating a safer, more resilient United Kingdom.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, for raising the important issue of how new buildings—his amendment mentions “new buildings”—and development should consider security in their design where it is appropriate to do so.

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, and the noble Lords, Lord Elliott and Lord Empey, for bringing to the Committee their experience of Northern Ireland—with which I have a small element of familiarity but not as much experience as they do.

I welcome the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and particularly his invitation for CT advisers to be incorporated into an advice mechanism, whatever that might be. I will give him the same answer I gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. I reassure him that we want to have this simple advice, focused via the Security Industry Association, and I hope that I can at least refer his helpful suggestion and see how it can be incorporated into the advice given. I thank my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey for his contribution, and the Liberal Democrat and Opposition Front Benches for their comments.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

46: After Clause 34, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of the impact on the night-time economy(1) Within 18 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report reviewing the impact of the provisions in this Act on the night-time economy, jobs and growth.(2) The report must include an assessment of the impact of this Act on—(a) public houses,(b) nightclubs,(c) bars,(d) restaurants,(e) cinemas, and(f) any other late-opening venues that the Secretary of State considers to be part of the night-time economy.”Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause seeks to require the Secretary of State to produce a report reviewing the impact this Act on the night-time economy, jobs and growth.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 46 and in support of Amendment 47 tabled by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst. These amendments address two crucial concerns regarding the implementation and potential impact of the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill: the effect on the night-time economy and the importance of proper consultation and guidance for businesses.

The first amendment, Amendment 46, would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament within 18 months of the Act’s passage reviewing its impact on the night-time economy, jobs and growth. Specifically, it would assess the effects on public houses, nightclubs, bars, restaurants, cinemas and other late-opening venues. The night-time economy is a vital part of our nation’s cultural and economic life. It provides employment for thousands of people, contributes billions of pounds to the economy and plays a central role in fostering vibrant communities. However, it is also an industry that has faced significant challenges in recent years, first with the disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and now with rising operational costs and economic uncertainty.

While the security measures outlined in this Bill are essential to protect the public from the threat of terrorism, it is vital that we do not inadvertently place an unsustainable burden on businesses in the night-time economy. Venues that already operate on tight profit margins may struggle to absorb the costs associated with implementing new security requirements, such as enhanced surveillance, access control systems and staff training. By requiring a formal review of the Act’s impact on this sector, Amendment 46 would provide an essential mechanism for accountability and evidence-based policy-making. It would ensure that Parliament remains informed about any unintended consequences and allows for adjustments to be made if necessary. Crucially, this review would help strike the right balance between public safety and economic vitality.

The second amendment, Amendment 47, seeks to delay the commencement of Parts 1 and 2 until draft guidance has been issued to businesses and a proper consultation has taken place. This is a sensible and pragmatic approach that prioritises clarity and fairness for businesses. It is one thing to pass legislation, but it is another to implement it effectively and responsibly. For businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, sudden and unclear regulatory changes can be disruptive and costly. Without proper guidance, there is a real risk that businesses may struggle to understand their obligations under the Act, leading to confusion, non-compliance and potentially adverse outcomes for security and commerce.

By ensuring that draft guidance is published and consultations are conducted before the Act’s provisions come into force, Amendment 47 would promote a smoother and more co-operative transition. It would allow businesses to prepare adequately, understand the requirements and implement the necessary measures in a way that is both effective and economically viable. Moreover, consultation with businesses is essential to ensuring that the measures introduced are practical and proportionate. Those who operate public venues have valuable insights into the challenges and realities of implementing security measures, and their input can help shape more effective and workable solutions.

Amendments 48 and 49 are probing amendments on the timescale for implementation of the Act. We discussed implementation timescales briefly on the first day in Committee, and the Minister confirmed that the Government think that the Bill will take a two-year period to implement. I have tabled these amendments to understand better how that period will work. Can the Minister confirm which parts of the Bill are likely to be implemented before that two-year period has elapsed? Can he give us an indication of whether the Government are firmly committed to implementing the Bill in full by the end of the two years? We feel very strongly that it would be helpful for organisations and events that would be affected by the Bill’s measures to have as much information as possible as soon as possible. Can the Government confirm how they will keep those organisations and events updated on progress so that they can plan appropriately?

In conclusion, these amendments do not seek to weaken the Bill or undermine its vital security objectives. On the contrary, they would strengthen it by ensuring that its implementation is thoughtful, measured and responsive to the needs of businesses and communities. Amendment 46 would provide a mechanism for accountability and assessment, ensuring that the impact on the night-time economy is carefully monitored. Amendment 47 would prioritise proper consultation and guidance, fostering co-operation and compliance among businesses. I urge the Government and noble Lords to support these amendments as a means of enhancing the effectiveness and fairness of this important legislation. Together, they represent a balanced and pragmatic approach that upholds public safety and economic resilience. I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly support Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst, and I look forward to hearing the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. I wanted to put my name on this group, but I missed the deadline. I think it is a crucial group and I hope that the Government will be very positive about it, because the night-time economy is very worried that its venues are going to be badly affected by this, and I think it would be very constructive for the Government to adopt this amendment as some kind of reassurance.

I was inspired, indirectly at least, to get involved in supporting Amendment 46 by the Prime Minister. Yesterday, on the front page of the Daily Mirror, Keir Starmer was saying that he backed the fight to save the great British pub:

“there's nothing any of us like better than going to the local for a pint, myself included”.

He said:

“They are the places where friends, family, community come together around something which is very British – the pub. It’s a place of warmth, of opportunity, to have a nice time with friends, family and for people to have the friendship and engagement that is so important to their wellbeing”.


The Prime Minister was supporting a campaign to save pubs precisely because pubs are struggling. Data from the Valuation Office Agency in December showed that the number of pubs in England and Wales fell by 402 last year. That was a net figure that took into account new pubs opening but did not include premises standing empty that are still classified as pubs. As pub numbers have plunged by more than 2,000 since the start of 2020, and with industry experts such as AlixPartners warning that 3,000 more pubs, bars, restaurants and clubs are at risk of closing in 2025, I want the Government to note that this Bill represents another burden and that we should at least keep our eye on, monitor and be accountable about whether unintended consequences will damage the sector.

Publicans and experts blame a cocktail of supply and staffing costs, rising energy bills, and those controversial, crippling national insurance contributions, but stakeholders raise all the time regulatory demands and the costs in terms of licensing. There is a certain dread of what this legislation will mean, especially because pubs are trying to make more of themselves as venues—for example, for quiz nights and community choirs. In Neil Davenport’s “Letter on Liberty”, Pubs: Defending the Free House, there is a discussion about a mini boom post-lockdown of pubs as new live-music venues. That thrill of face-to-face live events and the public square as a place of freedom is lucrative as well, so we need to be careful that this Bill does not unintentionally end up killing that off.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling the amendments today. I hope I can respond to them in a positive and reassuring manner.

First, I will look at Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst. All through this debate, at Second Reading, in Committee, and in discussions that we have had outside of this Chamber, we have been keen to reassure noble Lords that we are trying to strike the right balance between public protection and burdens on premises and events. In fact, I prefer the word “standards” to “burdens”; a burden is something that is difficult. What we are trying to put in place is a number of basic standards which it is important for businesses and organisations to meet.

I have said throughout consideration of the Bill in Committee and at Second Reading that, following Royal Assent, we expect that there will be a period of at least 24 months to give us the time to ensure that those responsible for premises and the events in scope understand the new obligations, that they have time to plan and prepare, and—to go back to previous discussions —any training required of volunteers or staff is undertaken.

The proposed timetable in Amendment 46 of 18 months would, with respect, be before any detailed action has been taken under the provisions of the Act. It would assess the preparations generally, as opposed to the actual impact and implementation downstream. Ministers, including myself and my right honourable friend Dan Jarvis will keep legislation under review, including its effectiveness, impact and implementation. Should unintended consequences be identified, the Bill provides powers, which have been subject to debate, to adjust the regime as appropriate. I hope the noble Lord will reflect on Amendment 46 and, when the time comes, withdraw the amendment.

On Amendment 47 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, there will be a 24-month implementation period before the Act is commenced. The Government intend to issue guidance under Clause 27, published before commencement. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord seeks to put some timeframes on that. I think it is best to leave that to judgment, both in the guidance and in the consultation on that guidance with key partners.

Again, the 24-month period covers Amendments 48 and 49, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst. The implementation period will allow those in scope to prepare for and comply with the new obligations. It is important that the SIA, particularly, is operating as soon as is practical. The Government must be certain that it is ready for its new role. We anticipate that this will take at least 24 months—it might take slightly longer—in the light of previous timeframes for other regulators introduced under previous legislation.

I do not anticipate any delays in commencement, but I want to keep the flexibility and appropriate ability for the Government to pick an appropriate commencement date when the Government assess that the SIA has fulfilled its duties, as we anticipate them under the Act, and that the organisations impacted by the Act at that stage are fully prepared and cognisant and are able to implement. Again, I gently suggest to the noble Lord that it would not be sensible for the Secretary of State to be driven by a tied provision in the Act, as opposed to the judgment that, as I have said to the Committee, will look in due course at whether or not we put those provisions in place.

Generally, in relation to Amendments 48 and 49, the 24-month period is what I would hope to be a realistic time to establish the set-up of the regulator and for those in scope of the Bill to prepare. If the Bill achieves Royal Assent, which I hope it will, the noble Lord, this House, the House of Commons and the court of public opinion—that is, the people in businesses and pubs and others who will be impacted by this legislation—have the opportunity to feed into both the Government for their guidance and the SIA for its guidance, as well as into the debate generally about implementation, about how they think the Act is going and what measures are being put in place. A formal consultation or review, as outlined and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would inhibit that process and set formal timescales that would not be helpful. This House remains the first port of call for any concern or points that noble Lords may want to raise about the implementation downstream. I hope that reassurance means that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken, including the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—who talked about the unintended consequences of the Bill, which are a worry—and my noble friend Lord Sandhurst. I thank the Minister for his response, particularly about striking the right balance. I am pleased to hear that he will keep its effectiveness under review and revisit it. On the issue of 24 months, the Minister assures me that he does not anticipate delays, and I will keep his words in mind. For the time being, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 46 withdrawn.