Counter Terrorism Policing: Arrests

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 7th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the police, security services and other agencies across the country who have worked and continue to work around the clock to keep our country safe. Ken McCallum, the director-general of MI5, revealed last year that the British security services had foiled 43 late- stage terror plots since March 2017. Every one of these attacks threatened lives and sought to attack our very way of life. The work that our police and security services do every day should not be taken for granted, and I know the whole House will join me in recognising this work and paying thanks to those men and women who protect us.

On the events of 3 May, the scale of this operation is simply quite staggering. Eight men in total have been arrested by the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command, five on suspicion of preparation of a terrorist act in several locations across the country. I appreciate that this is a sensitive and ongoing matter and that the Minister is limited in what he can say. However, it is clear from what the Minister in the other place said yesterday that there are grounds to believe that this was a threat made at a state level by Iran.

The threat posed to British lives by Iran is considerable. Last year, Ken McCallum confirmed that the intelligence services and the police had identified 20 credible Iranian plots to kill or kidnap people in the UK since 2022. What we have seen in the last few weeks is not an isolated incident but another attempt to undermine our values, our way of life and the safety of our people. Given the scale of the risk posed by Iran and Iranian-backed organisations, I ask the Minister what advice the Government have received from the police and the intelligence agencies about proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. What is the Government’s assessment of the impact of proscription in terms of how it will improve their capacity to combat the threat posed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? Furthermore, can the Minister update the House on the discussions that the UK Government are having with their counterparts in Iran to hold them to account for the threats that that organisation poses to our democratic society and security? We have an ambassador and diplomats in Tehran. Can he confirm that urgent discussions are being undertaken with Iranian authorities on this matter? It is important that the Government take appropriate steps to strengthen their resolve against those who wish to harm us and our communities, and we on these Benches would welcome any steps made in that direction.

The news of these arrests will naturally make people worried. There will be communities around the country that feel particularly at risk, given the nature of the arrests made. Without speculating on any specific target, which I know the Minister is unable to do, can he none the less provide assurances to communities around the country that safeguards are in place to make sure that they are kept safe?

I am aware that the Minister making the Statement in the other place said the Government would not be providing a running commentary on the progress of the investigation, but can the Minister perhaps commit to keeping the House updated on any further developments?

This is a serious issue of national security, and people are feeling under threat in a very tangible sense. An assurance from the Government that they will keep us informed about how they are working to mitigate the threat we face and to implement safeguards for the future would be most welcome and would, I know, be much appreciated by the communities most likely to be targeted by the Iranian actors.

I reiterate my thanks for the work of our security services and the police, who have likely saved several lives through their work on this case alone. While I appreciate that this is an ongoing, sensitive matter, I hope the Minister will address the few questions that I have asked. I know that any assurances he can give to communities at risk will be most welcome.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I too take this opportunity to thank the security services and police for what they do. The weekend’s arrests are an important reminder of how hard they work behind the scenes to keep us all safe. The scale of the threat posed by the Iranian regime is great, and there is clear evidence of Tehran’s willingness to disregard the rule of law to silence critics and fuel extremism.

UK-based Iranians have been the main targets, with mounting proof of Iran seeking to control its citizens abroad through intimidation, harassment and violence. That culminated in last year’s stabbing of a journalist working for the TV station Iran International, attacked outside his London home; and Iranian journalists, including those working for the BBC Persian service, facing daily threats of violence. Meanwhile, Iranian intelligence continues to target Jewish and Israeli individuals abroad, spreading fear and disinformation. I too would like to know if the Minister can confirm that extra security measures are in place to provide vulnerable communities and individuals with protection and reassurance amid these direct and unacceptable attacks on both media and religious freedoms.

In opposition, the Government were clear that they supported the proscribing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation. Canada took that step in June and the United States did so in 2019, but in Britain we have yet to make that call, preferring to keep communication channels open. Does the Minister agree that this weekend’s events indicate that the policy is not working, and that now is the time for the Government to act and to proscribe the IRGC as a terrorist organisation? Not only would that allow tighter control of the UK’s borders; it would enable the police proactively to charge those who materially or financially support the IRGC and enable assets linked to the organisation to be frozen.

The Liberal Democrats have previously welcomed sanctions against those with links to the Iranian regime, and we will support proposals to sanction the Iranian-backed Foxtrot criminal network when they come before the House next week. However, we hope the Government can go further to establish whether those with links to the Iranian regime have assets here in the UK. As such, we would like to see an audit carried out so we can find out where those assets are, including those put in the name of family members, so we can freeze them accordingly.

Thanks to the work of the police and security services, we appear to have been lucky this time, but we must now heed the warning and do more to ensure that the Iranian regime’s reach cannot continue to spread. Given the threat, does the Minister agree that now is not the time to cut the overseas budget, which had previously been used to support vital resilience programmes countering Iran’s malign influence?

It is already clear that the foundations of the previous world order are shifting fast, with America increasingly taking a step back, so can the Minister reassure the House that the Government are taking steps to fill the void by working with their international partners to combat Iran and address the wider situation in the Middle East?

Police: Stop and Search

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right that intelligence-led policing is critical to making the best use of stop and search. That includes methods where individuals who have information can pass it in confidence to the police. The suggestions the noble Lord has made are important ones. It will also be helpful that we will have over this Parliament an extra 13,000 neighbourhood police officers, with neighbourhood police officers allocated to each community area. It will build confidence and trust to report those matters.

The noble Lord mentioned technology. It is no secret that the Government have been looking at the question of facial recognition and other technologies along those lines, which can spot and analyse the use and carrying of knives. That is something we are working on, although I cannot give him definitive answers today.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as has been said many times, stop and search is a vital part of the police toolbox to tackle crime. The 2023 review by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, highlighted several areas of concern in how these powers were used. In my years of policing, I always maintained that it is vital that all officers are properly trained in how to use these powers and that they know their limitations within the law. Could the Minister update the House on how the Government are working with the College of Policing to deliver the updated national policing curriculum to ensure that guidance for stop and search is properly understood and implemented on the ground?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right; it is important there is training in the use of stop and search by police officers and that it is updated. It is important that the outcomes of stop and searches are monitored for both the impacts, which the noble Lord mentioned earlier, and to see whether racial disparities are taking place. Those should be fed back to both the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council. This is why the National Police Chiefs’ Council is issuing and regularly updating information on the race action plan, both monitoring it and examining its impact.

Knife Crime

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Education and contact in schools is probably one of the key issues that need to be challenged to give young people the skills and confidence to play a role with their friends in a way that is not in a gang—where they are not drawn into criminal activity and have the confidence to resist those temptations when they are put in front of them. The right reverend Prelate’s point is vital, and it lies with the Department for Education in England and with the devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is key to driving up individuals’ confidence to tackle knife crime at source.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Last year, there were around 50,500 recorded offences involving a sharp instrument. Knife crime, of course, terrifies communities and can have lethal consequences, and it is very worrying that the numbers are heading in the wrong direction. The Government reported in February that 17% of knife crime offences related to children, and over 99% of these were for possession alone. One of the great issues around this is the glorification of carrying knives among some young people, so what might the Minister have to say about tackling this glorification?

Tackling Child Sexual Abuse

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the issue we are debating is incredibly serious and we should always remember that, at the centre of this debate, are hundreds, if not thousands, of victims, and children at risk of becoming victims, of the horrific crime of child sexual abuse. It is vital to remember that the discussions we have on this issue should focus on justice for victims of sexual abuse, urgent action to prevent further abuse, and the steps we can take as a country to safeguard members of our community and communicate in no uncertain terms that we will never tolerate these crimes.

The Statement delivered in the other place before the Easter Recess by the Safeguarding Minister has raised several questions. One point of concern held by many across both Houses is the decision to reject calls for a national statutory inquiry into rape gangs in favour of five local ones. The detail on these inquiries is vague. It is deeply concerning that, months after they were announced, we still know almost nothing about them, with only one having been announced.

The Government’s decision to undertake numerous localised inquiries means there is a risk that the local authorities that presided over these crimes are not held to account, as they should be. In their Statement, the Government said that they would

“adopt a flexible approach to support both full independent local inquiries and more bespoke work”.

Certain local councils, such as Bradford, where the abuse was at its worst, are refusing to participate in local inquiries. How will the Government ensure that all local authorities, including those in Bradford, participate fully in these inquiries?

We welcome that the Government have decided to continue our policy of a mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse. Children who are abused need to know that if they come forward, they will be heard. Adults that children trust, such as teachers and healthcare workers, have the capacity to act on behalf of victims to make sure that their abuse can be stopped and those responsible brought to justice. However, it is important to recognise that we need to support those adults who will hold these new responsibilities. By nature, the situations they will be helping to resolve will be highly emotional, stressful and dangerous. I therefore ask the Minister how the Government will make sure that those adults are supported in their important work of reporting child sexual abuse and how those adults, like the children they are supporting, can be sure that their reports will be taken seriously and their well-being supported.

The national audit on group-based child sexual exploitation and abuse, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was announced on 16 January. The Government gave assurances that the report would be concluded within three months. People across this country have had their faith in the system shaken by stories of this abuse. It has now been more than three months since the report was announced. I must therefore ask the Minister as a matter of urgency: when will the report be published? Can he please name a date on which the final report will be released in writing? Can the Government show that they are acting in good faith by producing this report as soon as possible? It is now overdue.

Finally, I want to touch on the point of aggravating factors in some instances of abuse. It was disappointing that the Government did not engage properly with this issue in the debate that followed the Statement in the House of Commons. It is clear from the patterns of abuse we have observed, often connected with co-ordinated abuse undertaken by grooming gangs, that ethnic and religious factors play a key role in characterising the nature of these crimes and who the victims are. I therefore close by asking the Minister whether he accepts that, in many cases, these crimes were racially and religiously aggravated, and how, without a national inquiry, we can understand what part those factors played. Understanding why these crimes were committed, which groups are particularly at risk of abuse and the various factors that motivated abusers to perpetrate these abhorrent offences, is fundamental to making sure that our next steps to prevent further abuse are as effective as possible.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Brinton should be speaking on this Statement on our behalf, but, unfortunately, she has been unwell and so cannot be with us.

From these Benches, I begin by paying tribute to the victims and survivors of child sexual exploitation—individuals who, for far too long, were not only ignored but actively failed by the very institutions meant to protect them. Many were treated as offenders rather than as victims and retraumatised by police, social services and others in power. Their courage in continuing to demand justice, even after being silenced for years, is nothing short of remarkable.

We welcome the Government’s Statement before Easter updating the House on their actions to tackle child sexual abuse and exploitation. It is right that we now see momentum after years of delay. The grooming gangs task force is making arrests and a national audit by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, is under way. These are important steps. But this update also highlights how much time has been lost. It has now been over two years since the final report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was published, drawing on over 2 million pages of evidence and testimonies of more than 7,000 victims. Yet the previous Government failed to implement a single recommendation. That was a catastrophic failure, for which survivors have paid the price.

We welcome the progress now being made on the independent inquiry’s key proposals, particularly the creation of a new child protection authority and the commitment to mandatory reporting. We also support the proposed criminal offence of obstructing someone from making a report, but how will that be implemented? Who will be held to account? Crucially, will this reporting duty extend to all relevant institutions —faith settings, private schools and voluntary groups—where abuse has so often been hidden?

On mandatory reporting, while the Government now promise legislation through the Crime and Policing Bill, questions remain. The duty must be clear, enforceable and properly resourced. Professionals and volunteers need legal protection when they report, and we must see firm consequences when people deliberately obstruct such reports.

Support for survivors also remains a concern. We welcome the commitment to double funding for national support services in this financial year, but this must be part of a longer-term plan. Survivors live with this trauma for life, and they deserve continuity of care, access to therapeutic support and a clear, properly funded path to justice and recompense. Therefore, we on these Benches were disappointed by the delay in progressing the national redress scheme recommended by the independent inquiry. The scale of this proposal is indeed significant, but so too is the suffering it seeks to address. I ask the Minister, why must survivors wait yet again until the spending review later this year? Surely, they have waited long enough.

While we welcome steps to remove the limitation period for civil claims, we must be vigilant that the shift in burden of proof does not get lost in procedural detail. Victims must not have to endure fresh ordeals simply to secure the justice they were denied as children. So I ask the Minister, will all of the independent inquiry’s 20 recommendations be implemented in full? Will the newly proposed child protection authority serve not just as a symbolic body but as an authority empowered to enforce, investigate and hold failing institutions to account?

Survivors have done their part. They spoke their truth, often at great personal cost. Now it is time for us to show that we are finally listening, and that their suffering was not in vain. We must ensure that this renewed energy leads not only to new laws and frameworks but to a culture that puts children’s safety before institutional reputation.

Foreign Influence Registration Scheme

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, maintaining our national security is one of the first duties of government. When we were in office, we took robust steps to strengthen our national security in the face of an increasingly unstable world. That international trend has continued since this Government took office, and it is essential that the Government build on our work to protect our country from foreign threats.

I was very pleased to hear the honourable Member for Barnsley North in the other place praise our Conservative record in passing the National Security Act 2023, a landmark piece of legislation, which, to quote the Security Minister, has been “transformative”. I welcome that constructive tone from Ministers on this policy area, and I can only hope that the Government will take the same approach in other policy areas.

In the Statement, Ministers had plenty to say about Iran and Russia. In the same constructive tone that they have taken, we welcome these steps. Both Iran and Russia pose a threat to our national security, and we must be robust in response to those threats. But Ministers are silent on China. Can the Minister please take this opportunity to explain why the Government have not added China to the enhanced tier of FIRS? We have already set out the shocking evidence of Chinese engagement in foreign espionage in the UK, and this House recently voted to prevent Great British Energy’s supply chain including products linked with oppressive practices. We did this with China’s oppression of the Uyghur people in mind, and I pay particular tribute to the tireless campaigning of the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, on that issue.

China engages in industrial-scale espionage, stealing technology from Governments, universities and industry. I have already spoken about the repression of the Uyghur people, but it also seeks to repress Chinese citizens here in Britain, and the Chinese state’s approach to Hong Kong and the Hong Kongese is deeply concerning. China has set up undeclared and illegal police stations in the UK and, last year, placed a bounty on the heads of three Hong Kong dissidents living in the UK. Why has the Chinese ambassador not been summoned to explain that? We on these Benches believe that China should be in the enhanced tier of FIRS. The Government refuse to comment on this but, regardless of whether the Minister is willing to comment, I hope that he will listen.

Ministers have said:

“We will co-operate where we can; compete where we need to; and challenge where we must, including on issues of national security”.


This approach is not strong enough, and we will and must continue to press the Government to place China on the enhanced tier of FIRS.

Knife Crime: Stop and Search

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 1st April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very happy to take up my noble friend’s suggestion, when time allows. As he knows, that mixture of education, youth hubs, wider support for parents and an understanding of the reasons why people are involved in knife culture is really important. Equally, this Government are focused on online sales and how we can take action to give the police better support, including the use of the new technology I mentioned earlier. A whole raft of measures is contributing to the Government’s commitment to halve knife crime over a distinct period. That is a really important point, and I will certainly look at lessons elsewhere to help inform the Government.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Stop and search is a vital tool for stopping those intent on causing death, injury and fear in our communities, and I can personally vouch for that. Policing response, and the successful detection of crime, is of course based on responding to local intelligence and victim statements. However, as we know, evidence suggests that the use of stop and search can negatively affect the relationship between police and ethnic minority communities, which is of course damaging. Can the Minister outline how the Government are working with the police—I am particularly thinking of training issues—and communities to strengthen trust and make sure that stop and search does not come at the cost of community confidence?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to His Majesty’s Opposition’s spokesperson. It is important that stop and search, as with policing generally, has the confidence of the communities being policed. The Government have made a commitment to increase the number of neighbourhood police officers and to make them front line, and to have that front-facing community engagement through neighbourhood policing over the next few years. There will be an additional 11,000 to 12,000—possibly even 13,000—neighbourhood police officers by the end of this Parliament, which is a key commitment to ensure that we have community engagement at a local level.

Apple: Advanced Data Protection Service

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 31st March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I acknowledge that the Home Office has already said, as has been endorsed today by the Minister, that it does not comment on operational matters, but it has been widely reported that this decision by Apple was taken in response to a government demand to view users’ encrypted data both in the UK and abroad. Of course it is right that the Government act to keep people safe, but they must do so while respecting people’s privacy. Can the Minister comment on how the Government intend to engage with Apple and other tech companies going forward to make sure that future discussions on security do not result in another unproductive breakdown of relations?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government take privacy extremely seriously. We have a strong international reputation for privacy, and we continue to work with companies to ensure that privacy is respected, but I cannot comment on the issue the noble Lord has mentioned concerning any ongoing issues or operational matters. I cannot confirm or deny any notices, and I will, I am afraid, have to repeat that again for the House today.

UK Resettlement Scheme 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 27th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes his point again. We have set out our position on overseas aid through, and prior to, the Statement yesterday. We are setting out our position in relation to the UNHCR and the potential help and support that we can give now. We will address many of the points that the noble Lord has alluded to in a future immigration White Paper, which will be presented to this House and to the House of Commons in due course. We will debate this issue in due course. I think that we are meeting our obligations, and we will still, through our colleagues in the Foreign Office, support overseas aid and do so in an effective way, but that debate will undoubtedly continue.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

The United Kingdom has a proud history of providing protection for those who genuinely need it through our safe and legal routes. I am sure that the Minister will agree with me that we need to make sure that, when we commit to helping refugees, we have the capacity to support them, not only in housing but in schooling and healthcare too. It is right, however, that this support is given only if it does not disadvantage the taxpayers in this country who fund these services. I therefore ask the Minister: what other specific limited resources, besides suitable accommodation, does his department consider before allowing people using the UK resettlement scheme to move to the UK? How do this Government ensure that their commitment to support those using the scheme does not disadvantage the UK taxpayer?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes an important point that is absolutely vital. Individuals who come here as a part of our international obligations put pressure on public services, and that needs to be taken into account in relation to the issues on which we are in discussion with the UNHCR. The noble Lord mentioned housing, transport, medical services and education; they are all considerations. That is why, to go back to the point by the noble Lord, Lord German, and indeed the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, the Government are assessing on an annual basis with the UNHCR what assistance and support we can provide for refugees coming to this country. We want to meet our obligations, but we need to do so in a way that allows us to provide the required services in support. That is why I cannot give a figure to the noble Lord, Lord German, and why I welcome the flexibility mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope. It is an issue that noble Lords will continue to press me on, rightly, but this is important for the sustainability of the UK taxpayer as well as our international obligations.

Asylum Hotels and Illegal Channel Crossings

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 26th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister claims that this is an entirely inherited issue, the Government have, since taking office nine months ago, put up an additional 8,500 illegal immigrants in hotels, and the number of small boat crossings since 1 January 2025 is up 37.5% on the same period last year. These are shocking numbers that are careering in the wrong direction, and the taxpayer is picking up the tab while the Government fail in their election promise. Can the Minister say what new, concrete steps the Government are taking to deter those who are currently on the cusp of crossing the channel? How do they intend to terminate the use of hotels in housing illegal immigrants without reducing the number of homes that should be prioritised for British citizens and those who have travelled to the UK legally?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I just remind him that, in 2016, there were no hotels in use; in 2023, there were 400. We have a manifesto commitment to end the use of hotels. That is because his Government failed in their process, did not manage asylum claims properly, allowed small boat crossings to increase and wasted £700 million on a Rwanda scheme which deterred nobody. We will have some discussions and lessons from that, but let us look at what we are doing. Between the general election on 4 July and 31 January this year, we have removed 19,000 failed asylum seekers, increased enforced returns by 24%, increased illegal working arrests by 38%, removed 2,591 foreign national offenders and had the four biggest return charter flights in the history of return charter flights. I hope I can look forward to his co-operation to pick up the mess that he left behind.

Immigration (Biometric Information etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2025 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, this legislation represents part of the Government’s ambition to use new technologies to significantly improve public services. There are four principal functions that will enable us to fulfil our commitments to transition from physical to digital documentation and to make full use of the biometric information that we collect during visa applications and at the border. If noble Lords will allow me, I shall outline what those changes are.

These regulations will allow: first, a new power at the border to enrol and retain biometric information from people arriving in the UK; secondly, for visa applications, measures to support the transition from physical biometric immigration documents to digital immigration status in the form of an eVisa for everyone who applies for a visa to come to the UK, including visitors; and, thirdly, the extension of the standard fingerprint retention period beyond 15 years for people who abscond from immigration bail and become uncontactable. Lastly, the instrument prevents abuse of the statelessness route.

I will take each of those changes in turn, starting with the changes at the border. The legislation will introduce crucial new border powers to expand the circumstances in which we can enrol biometric information from everyone at the UK border and retain it for non-British citizens. Biometric information plays a crucial role in our immigration system. It is an effective and efficient way of checking and confirming the identities of all arrivals to the UK, as well as the immigration status of foreign nationals who come into or live in the UK. This instrument will enhance current Border Force powers to refuse or cancel permission to enter the UK, and will empower officers to take robust action against non-British or non-Irish citizens who deliberately evade the requirement to provide their biometric information on arrival.

We are continually striving to improve how people cross the UK border, ensuring that we maximise passenger flow while maintaining security. We want to utilise biometric information further to trial new identity-verification and facial comparison technologies, known as contactless travel, in order both to build a border that can efficiently withstand future pressures and to ensure that our border remains secure. I know that noble Lords will share in that objective.

Contactless travel could enable a person to enter the UK without the need to routinely produce their passport at the border. Instead, we would compare the facial image of a person arriving in the UK with the biometric information that we hold from either their UK passport or their immigration application. Coupled with this, our universal permission to travel will prevent those without authorisation boarding a flight, ship or train to the UK; of course, everyone arriving in the UK will still need to travel with their passport and be prepared to present it at the border.

We are not alone in trialling new facial comparison capabilities. Other countries, such as the USA and Australia, are looking at introducing biometrically enabled automated border systems to improve passenger flow and maintain security. This instrument will ensure that we do not fall behind.

Our plan for contactless travel’s future use at the UK border is ambitious. However, as noble Lords would expect, we will take a cautious approach to the introduction of new border technology. These regulations do not commit the Government to introducing any new technology, so we can take the time to ensure that we get this system right. Our first step will be initially to test contactless travel on British citizens only, and we will move to further implementation only if this is a success. Our ambition is to start this trial by the end of this year, and we plan to announce further details shortly.

Looking now to the rollout of eVisas, the Government are pursuing an ambitious digital programme to modernise public services, including our visa system. These changes enable the UK to deliver a fair and firm immigration system that not only works in the national interest but is in line with the modern digital age. Businesses and customers alike expect a prompt and user-friendly experience in their transactions. I hope this instrument will enhance their experience by further supporting the transition from physical to online evidence of immigration status in the form of eVisas. Over time, physical and paper-based products and services will be replaced with accessible, straightforward digital products and services. Our overall aim is to ensure that people will have a secure and seamless digital journey when they interact with the UK’s immigration system. To support this, we stopped issuing biometric residence permits and cards on 1 November 2024.

Noble Lords will know that an eVisa is an online record of a person’s immigration permission in the UK and any conditions that might apply. It can be viewed by logging into the “view and prove” service using a UK Visas and Immigration account. As of 27 February 2025, more than 4 million people had created a UKVI account to access their eVisa, with a daily increase in this number as many more create accounts. Our aim is to ensure that the rollout of eVisas will improve foreign nationals’ experience of our border system, because eVisas are secure and cannot be stolen, lost, or tampered with, unlike physical documents. The fact that they can be accessed at almost any time and anywhere will give people with a valid immigration status in the UK an easy way to evidence their status and identity.

With the transition from physical cards to eVisas, the requirement for holders of physical immigration documents with settled status to apply for a replacement at least every 10 years has been eliminated. This is because an eVisa does not expire in the same way that a physical document would. This digital approach to our border and immigration system will streamline processes for people making applications or updating their details.

However, we acknowledge that a person’s personal information may change over time. In particular, facial images change as people age, so this instrument allows us to require eVisa holders to update their facial photographs at least once every 10 years. This mirrors the requirement we have for UK passports. I noticed from discussions of this that my passport is nine and a half years old now and coming to the end of its useful life, and I will have to update my passport shortly, as I would with an eVisa. It also mirrors what happens with driving licences. Having up-to-date images on eVisas will enable third parties, such as employers, to conduct their checks easily. Where an eVisa holder fails to update their photo within the required time, this instrument enables us to restrict their ability to share their status for verification. I emphasise that these sanctions will apply only to those who refuse to comply with the requirements, not those who are unable to.

We are particularly committed to preventing undue burdens on older people. We have drawn from the Windrush generation’s experiences. As older people are less likely to need to prove their immigration status in the UK, we will not require people aged over 70 to update their facial image or create a UKVI account. We will, however, encourage them to do so for their own convenience should they so wish.

Finally, we are now focusing on the change to our biometric retention approach for immigration absconders. The regulations clarify government powers to use and retain biometric information obtained from persons who abscond from immigration bail and avoid contact with the Home Office or the police beyond the standard 15-year retention period. This change will ensure that the person can be identified if they are encountered on a later occasion.

I will also briefly mention the statelessness route. This legislation closes a previous gap that enabled some people to avoid providing their biometrics. We now set out provisions that will ensure that we can capture biometric information from people who apply to stay in the UK as a stateless person. People who fail to enrol their biometrics as required without a reasonable excuse may have their application rejected or refused.

These changes are a fair and efficient way to maintain robust border control. I thank noble Lords for their attention and support in advancing these measures. This measure passed the House of Commons recently. Together, we are building a digitally driven immigration and border system that is fair and fit for the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the significance of these regulations in the context of the Government’s broader efforts to modernise the immigration and border control systems. The introduction of biometric data collection, along with the transition towards a contactless border system, represents a significant step forward in ensuring the security and efficiency of our borders. Although His Majesty’s Official Opposition do not object to the instrument in principle, we believe that it is essential to scrutinise its provisions carefully to ensure that they deliver the intended outcomes.

Let us consider the impact of these measures. The regulations, as outlined, facilitate the collection of biometric data from all entry clearance applicants, with a specific requirement for facial images to be updated every 10 years. Additionally, the retention period for certain biometric data has been extended, and new sanctions have been introduced for non-compliance. The aim, of course, is to ensure that the system remains accurate, secure and consistent, and I believe it is imperative that we continue to assess how effectively these measures meet their stated objectives.

The Government’s shift towards contactless border control is a key aspect of these regulations. Through allowing biometric checks upon arrival at the UK border, the legislation seeks to streamline the border process, reduce queuing times and improve identity verification. The use of biometric data at eGates and primary control points is intended to facilitate smoother passenger flows. Although the intentions behind these measures are clear, we must consider their practical implications.

His Majesty’s Official Opposition acknowledge the necessity of biometric data retention as a key aspect of modernising border control. However, it is important to note that there are several concerns, particularly regarding the adequacy of the measures in fully realising the vision of a contactless border system, so there is particular interest in the practical challenges of implementing such a system.

Questions have been raised about whether the current data retention period and infrastructure are sufficient to handle the demands of a fully digitalised border. The increased reliance on biometric data also raises important questions about the system’s progression and effectiveness as it evolves. As we continue to expand the use of biometric information, it is crucial that the infrastructure that is in place can support the necessary technological advancements without introducing new vulnerabilities.

Additionally, there is a call for greater clarity on enforcement mechanisms. The growing importance of biometric data in identity verification processes necessitates robust compliance measures. Concerns have been raised about whether the current sanctions for non-compliance are adequate to address potential risks, such as fraudulent activity or failure to adhere to biometric requirements. These are important considerations, and it is vital that any enforcement measures are proportionate, fair and effective in securing compliance.

I have several key questions for the Minister. First, how do these measures address concerns regarding the progression of infrastructure and enforcement as biometric data becomes a central element of the border control process? Furthermore, given the move towards a fully contactless border system, how will these advancements integrate into our existing security frameworks to ensure that security, privacy and compliance are maintained? On biometric data retention, does the Minister believe that the 15-year retention period is adequate to support a robust and sustainable database that aligns with the Government’s vision for a contactless border system? Can he clarify the timeline for testing contactless travel for British citizens, including the duration and expected sample size of the trial? Additionally, what steps are being taken to integrate biometric data with other data sources to enhance security and improve efficiency at the border? How feasible is this integration within the current system?