Life Sciences: Beagles
Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts(5 days, 14 hours ago)
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Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is a long way from animal testing but I will give the noble Baroness a straight answer on it anyway. I personally voted to ban fox hunting on every occasion in the House of Commons when I was a Member of Parliament. I personally support the Government’s intention to stop trail hunting. Those are matters of management and political decision. That is what the Government will do, and I hope the noble Baroness will continue to raise those issues. We will look at the consequences, but ultimately it is the right thing to do.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, having recently debated the life sciences sector and being aware of how crucial it is, not only for our economy but for our national security, we know that much of the research conducted in Britain is increasingly at risk from espionage, cyber attack and theft, most notably from China. What steps, in addition to the legislation, have the Government taken to robustly disrupt such efforts by our adversaries and protect the British life sciences sector?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is an important point. We have to ensure that the sector operates properly and effectively and is not damaged by foreign state actors or any other criminal elements. That is why we put in place the measures in relation to protests, which we debated in this House last week. The Government will continue to ensure that robust measures, about which it would not be appropriate to talk in this Chamber, are put in place to protect all sectors of our industrial society.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsThursday 5th February 2026
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XV Fifteenth marshalled list for Committee - (3 Feb 2026)
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 464 I will speak to Amendments 467, 468 and 503, in my name. These amendments collectively address the governance of Clauses 192 to 194, which grant the Secretary of State broad powers to make regulations giving effect to international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Following the recent passage of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, we are now operating in a new legal landscape, where the statutory threshold for protecting data transferred overseas has been lowered. These amendments are not just desirable; they are essential safety mechanisms to fill that gap.
Amendment 464 would be a safeguard of, so to speak, look before you leap. It stipulates that, before regulations are made under Clause 192 to implement a new international agreement, the authority must publish a comprehensive privacy impact assessment. The necessity of this assessment has intensified following the enactment of the Data (Use and Access) Act. The UK’s new test for onward transfers of data has lowered the bar. It no longer requires foreign protections to be essentially equivalent to ours, but merely not materially lower. This creates a dangerous new risk profile. The European Data Protection Board has explicitly noted that this new test omits key safeguards against foreign government access and removes redress mechanisms for individuals. If the general statutory floor has been lowered, Amendment 464 becomes the essential safety net. We must assess these specific risks via a privacy impact assessment before we open the digital borders, to ensure that we are not exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no legal remedy.
This brings me to Amendment 467, which addresses the nature of the data being shared. Where regulations authorise the transfer of highly sensitive personal data, such as biometrics, genetics or political opinions, this amendment would require enhanced protective measures. All this highlights the illusion of data protection when transferring data to high-risk jurisdictions that lack the rule of law. We know that in authoritarian states domestic intelligence laws will always override the standard contractual clauses usually relied on for data transfers. Because the Data (Use and Access) Act has removed the requirement for foreign safeguards to be essentially equivalent, we cannot rely on the general law to protect highly sensitive biometric or health data. My amendment would restore the requirement that transfers of such sensitive data must be demonstrated to be strictly necessary and proportionate. We cannot allow efficiency of data sharing to deny the reality that, in some jurisdictions, once data arrives, the state will have unrestricted access. Transparency must follow these powers.
Amendment 468 would mandate the production of an annual report on international law enforcement information sharing. This is vital because we are entering a period of divergence. The European Commission, at the urging of the European Data Protection Board, will be monitoring the practical implementation of the UK’s revised data transfer regime. If the EU will be monitoring how our data laws operate, surely Parliament should be doing the same. We need an annual report to track whether these law enforcement transfers are inadvertently exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no effective legal redress. Without this feedback loop, Parliament is legislating in the dark.
Finally, Amendment 503 would ensure that regulations made under Clause 192 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Given that the primary legislation governing data transfers has been loosened, it is constitutionally inappropriate for these specific law enforcement agreements to slip through via the negative procedure. Amendment 503 would ensure that these regulations, which may involve the transfer of our citizens’ most sensitive biometric data to foreign powers, must be actively debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament.
We support international co-operation in fighting crime, but it must not come at the cost of lowering our standards. These amendments would restore the safeguards that recent legislation have eroded. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and the importance that he has obviously placed on the right to privacy of the general public.
I support the principle behind Amendment 464. Sharing information often carries a risk with it, particularly when it is for the purposes of law enforcement, and especially when this is done internationally. Law enforcement data contains information that is far more personal to the individual or case in question than the norm. Any data of this sort must be handled with the highest discretion. Ensuring that the sharing of this data respects the right to privacy carries no unintended consequences and, most importantly, is necessary and should be the benchmark from which regulations are made.
If this amendment is accepted, I do not see the additional need for Amendment 468. At the very least, the privacy impact assessment under Amendment 464 should form the basis of any annual report that Amendment 468 would mandate. Less is more when it comes to admin and reports, so I am hesitant to support a new report that is not necessarily needed.
I think Amendment 467 is sensible. In general, internationally shared data should not include information prejudicial to any individual, let alone domestic citizens. This particularly extends to the sharing of biometric data for the purpose of unique identification or genetic identification.
These categories of data are obviously vital for the purposes of law enforcement, but law enforcement extra territorially risks placing this data in the wrong hands. This and similar data should therefore be particularly protected, which is the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment. I hope that the Minister can outline what the Government intend to do to ensure that the international sharing of personal data is undertaken in the most discreet and protected manner.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling this clause stand part notice. I would like to add my reservations about this clause.
First, I am concerned that this clause has not received sufficient scrutiny and consideration by Parliament. It was added on Report in the other place on 17 June last year. The Minister moving the new clause dedicated only 255 words to explain its effect and it was not mentioned by a single other Member. It has not received adequate attention. For that reason, I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has tabled this amendment to allow us to press the Government on the measures they are proposing.
The second point is the potential impact this clause could have on the right to a fair trial for British citizens. Under Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, where a person has been convicted in another country, the judge at the extradition hearing must first decide whether the person has been convicted in their absence and then decide whether the person deliberately absented themselves from the trial. If the judge is satisfied that the person was convicted in absentia and did not deliberately absent themselves from the trial, the judge must determine whether the person would be entitled to a retrial or to a review that amounts to a retrial in the territory to which the person would be extradited. If the judge does not believe that the person would be entitled to a retrial if extradited, the judge must discharge the prospect of extradition.
The Supreme Court in the recent cases of Bertino and Merticariu distinguished between the right to a retrial and the right to apply for a retrial. The court has held that a person’s entitlement to a retrial does not simply mean the person “might” be entitled to a retrial but that they “must” be entitled. This means that a conditional entitlement to a retrial that is dependent upon the finding of the court in the requesting country is insufficient for extradition to proceed. This places a decision on whether a fair trial can be had firmly in the hands of British judges. That is surely right. It is plainly preferable for the determination of the ability for a retrial to take place to be undertaken by a British judge, as opposed to merely relying on the decision of a foreign court.
However, in Clause 195, the Government are seeking to overturn this ruling, thereby removing a key safeguard against unfair extradition. If this clause is brought into force, the judge in Britain would have to order a person’s extradition on the simple assertion by the requesting country that the person could be permitted to stand trial in person, regardless of whether that is actually true or not.
Let us imagine a person who was tried in absentia and was not aware of their conviction in another country. If they were extradited and not permitted a retrial, they would not have been able to stand up in court and defend themselves against the charges they had been accused of. That is surely a recipe for serious injustice. In short, I am concerned that this clause will lead to more British citizens being extradited on the whim of a foreign judge and not afforded the right to a fair trial. For this reason, I very much support the proposition from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that the clause should not stand part.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I begin by saying how sorry I am that it is the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, moving her proposition and not Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who we will greatly miss. As we all know, he was a staunch advocate for the people of Orkney and Shetland. I served nine years with him in Parliament, as we crossed over during that time, and found him to be an exemplary public servant as Deputy First Minister for Scotland and as a Member of Parliament. I had less contact with him in your Lordships’ House and I am genuinely sorry that I cannot have contact with him today. I pass my condolences to his family. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness Lady Brinton for taking up the cudgels on this specialist subject and doing it in a way that is professional. I promise that I will try to answer the questions and follow up on the points she has raised.
I am also grateful to the noble Baroness for reminding me of the constituency case of Paul Wright in Mold, which I dealt with in a former life as Paul Wright’s Member of Parliament, following the extradition case with Greece. I will have to google it to refresh all the details in my memory, but it was an important constituency case for me to take up as a Member of Parliament at that time. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, feels that this did not receive sufficient scrutiny, but I take his point, and I hope I can answer his points today.
Clause 195 standing part of the Bill means that, under the Extradition Act 2003, the UK may extradite individuals either to face trial or serve a sentence. Where a conviction occurred in absentia and the UK court finds the person did not deliberately absent themselves, the judge must determine whether they will be entitled to a retrial in the requesting state. This clause will amend Sections 20 and 85 of the 2003 Act to restore the original policy intention that the individual must have a right to apply for a retrial, not a guaranteed retrial, for extradition to proceed. The amendment is required, as the noble Baroness mentioned, following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Merticariu v Romania, which interpreted the current drafting of the 2003 Act as requiring a guaranteed retrial—something some states cannot offer. Without this fix, certain legitimate extradition requests could be blocked, undermining justice for victims.
I know the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned this, but the amendment itself does not change any existing safeguards or processes governing extradition. The full suite of safeguards in the 2003 Act, including judicial oversight and human rights protections, remains unchanged. This includes the UK court’s powers to consider and determine whether someone deliberately absented themselves. I hope that gives her some reassurance.
The small government Amendment 537 makes minor drafting changes. It simply provides that Clause 195 will be commenced by regulations, as opposed to automatically coming into force on Royal Assent, as was originally planned.
I have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has said and I have heard the complex case that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has mentioned. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked whether she could have a meeting with appropriate supporters to discuss this and I would be happy to do so. For the purposes of confirming that, I would be grateful if she could email me the details of who she wishes to attend that meeting. It is entirely up to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, but I would be happy if the noble Lord, Lord Davies, wishes to attend—or I could offer him a separate meeting if he wants to have further discussions or representations. If that can be discussed outside Committee, I would be happy to do that.
In the meantime, I hope the reassurances I have given are sufficient for the moment. I would be happy if the noble Baroness would withdraw her opposition to the clause standing part, pending any discussion, which I will ensure takes place if possible—subject to our diaries—before Report, as appropriate. If not, we can still have the discussion, so that we can at least reflect on the points that have been made today.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, as a former trustee of UNICEF, I rise to support Amendment 469, so clearly presented by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and signed and spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Internationally, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is recognised as 12, and UNICEF has always been clear that it should be 14. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, said, and understand his concerns about the very large number of young people and children being groomed and pulled into criminal gangs. He is right to say that we need more concerted support in terms of police, education and youth work intervention, but it is not the children’s—younger children’s—fault that they have ended up there. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, recognised that heinous crimes needed to be marked in a certain way, but both also commented on the fact that we needed to understand that these were children. I am really grateful for the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.
Your Lordships’ House has been discussing this for many, many years and as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, she was campaigning on this long before she came into Your Lordships’ House. Now is the time; we need change. We need to do that because there is so much evidence now.
In 2011, Nicholas Mackintosh, who chaired the Royal Society study on brain development, told the BBC then that there was
“incontrovertible evidence that the brain continues to develop throughout adolescence”,
and that some regions of the brain, responsible for decision-making and impulse control, do not mature fully
“until at least the age of 20”.
That Royal Society report cited the
“concern of some neuroscientists that the … age of criminal responsibility in the UK is set too low”.
We are still discussing it today.
UNICEF’s view is that 14 should be the minimum age, using scientific research as a base, but it is very specific that no country should have the age below 12. This places England, Wales and Northern Ireland in breach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is bad enough, but the real problem is a court system that assumes that children have capacity to make decisions when all the research shows that that is not reliable. It is wrong for a Government to assert that any interference with a child’s human rights can be justified.
UNICEF says in its excellent guidance note on youth offending published in 2022, that children under the minimum age of criminal responsibility,
“should not be considered (alleged) child offenders but, first and foremost, children in need of special protection”.
It says that offending behaviour by such children
“is often the result of poverty, family violence and/or homelessness … their involvement in offending behaviour is an indicator of potential vulnerability that has to be addressed by the social welfare system. Special protection measures for children … should address the root causes of their behaviour and support their parents/caregivers. The measures should be tailored to the child’s needs and circumstances and based on a comprehensive and interdisciplinary assessment of the child’s familial, educational and social circumstances”.
That matches the advice of the medical specialists too. Frankly, it is time that the Government stepped up and took the brave decision that we need to recognise that we are out of kilter with the rest of Europe and, frankly, most of the world.
Prosecuting children and holding them in young offender institutions does not give them the time and space to learn how to live their lives differently. We have heard from both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about how the arrangements work for children in specialist secure accommodation. We can still use those systems but without giving children the label of being a criminal when, clearly, they are not capable of making the right decisions.
I am really grateful to my noble friend Lord Dholakia, who has been campaigning on this particular issue for decades before he came into your Lordships’ House in 1997. His Private Member’s Bill in 2017 resulted in a wide public discussion. It is a shame that, nine years on, we have not progressed further. Let us do so now.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a genuinely interesting debate. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales from 10 to 14. For the reasons I will set out below, I am unable to support it.
First, the purpose of the age of criminal responsibility has not been designed to criminalise children unnecessarily. Rather, it is to ensure that the state can intervene early and proportionately when a child’s behaviour causes serious harm. As the noble Baroness, Baroness Levitt, the Minister, stated in this House, setting the age at 10 allows the justice system to step in at a point where intervention can prevent further offending and protect both the child and the wider public, and, crucially, children are not treated as adults. They are dealt with through youth courts under a distinct sentencing framework with rehabilitation as the central aim.
The evidence shows that the system already uses this power sparingly. We are told that, in 2024, only 13% of all children sentenced were aged between 10 and 14, and that proportion has been falling year on year. Of the 1,687 sentences imposed on children in that age group, just 23 resulted in custody. Those figures matter. They demonstrate that the age of criminal responsibility being set at 10 does not mean routine criminalisation of children. It means retaining a backstop for the most serious and persistent cases while diversion remains the norm.
Raising the age to 14 would create a dangerous gap. It would mean that children aged 10 to 13 who commit grave offences—including serious violence, sexual offences or sustained harassment—could not be held criminally responsible. This would limit the state’s ability to manage risk, protect victims and, in some cases, protect the child. There are rare but tragic cases—
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Section 44 of the Children Act deals with children who are a danger to themselves and to others. The only difference in the criminal court is that it comes through the family proceedings court, but in fact the local authority would have to deal with it and the child would be put into secure accommodation. I wonder whether the noble Lord could take that on board.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for that. I do not dispute that fact; I quite accept it.
There are rare but tragic cases, such as the murder of James Bulger, where a criminal justice response is unavoidable and undoubtedly in the public interest.
I respectfully suggest that international comparisons cited in this debate are far from straightforward and can sometimes serve to confuse matters. In fact, certain countries are now moving in the opposite direction. Sweden, for example, is proposing to lower its age in response to gang exploitation of children who know that they cannot be prosecuted. That underlines a key point. If the threshold is set too high, it can incentivise adults to use children as instruments of crime.
It is also worth noting that, although Scotland recently raised the age of criminal responsibility, Scotland’s experience should not justify this amendment. Even after deciding the age of criminal responsibility should be raised from eight years old, Scotland raised the threshold to 12 and not to 14. The Scottish Government also retained extensive non-criminal powers to respond to serious harmful behaviour. This amendment would go significantly further without clear evidence that such a leap would improve outcomes for children or public safety.
It is worth noting that a number of Commonwealth countries retain the doctrine that a child is considered incapable of wrongdoing, which was abolished in England and Wales by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In many of those jurisdictions, the standard age of responsibility is similar to ours. Australia, for example, has a standard age of criminal responsibility of 10 years old, but a rebuttable presumption exists up to the age of 14. However, I should also stress that, simply because other countries may have higher ages than England and Wales, that is not, in and of itself, a justification to alter ours. We must ensure that the age of responsibility here is suitable for our needs—
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Before the noble Lord leaves the question of international comparisons, can he confirm that in Sweden the proposal is to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 15 to 13, rather than leaving that unsaid?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I cannot confirm that, but I will certainly have a look at it.
The question is not whether children should be protected but whether removing the ability to intervene criminally until 14 years old would make children, victims or communities safer. I do not believe that it would. The current system already prioritises proportionality and rehabilitation, while retaining the capacity to act when it is absolutely necessary. For those reasons, I cannot support this amendment.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has a long and honourable record of raising issues on behalf of some of the most vulnerable in society. She and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, make a formidable team when moving this amendment. I am very grateful to them for ensuring that this important issue remains at the forefront of every Government’s mind, including this one.
It was about a fortnight ago that your Lordships’ House debated this issue in response to my noble friend’s Oral Question. I said at the time, and repeat today, that the age of criminal responsibility is a complex and sensitive issue. I want to take this opportunity to set out in a bit more detail than the Oral Questions format allows why the Government believe that we should keep the age of criminal responsibility at 10 years old.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it might not surprise the Committee to hear that I do not support this amendment and I am sure I will find myself making the same arguments as the Minister when he responds.
In 2021, Parliament passed the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act, which was introduced to this House by my noble and learned friend, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. Its effect was to create a legislative framework through which covert intelligence officers can be authorised to participate in conduct which would normally be criminal. The criminal conduct authorisation might be granted under Section 29B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as inserted by the 2021 Act, only if it is proportionate and necessary, in the interests of national security, prevention of crime and disorder, or in the interests of our economic well-being. Subsection (6) of that section also requires the person authorising the criminal conduct to ensure—and this is important—that all alternative avenues that do not make use of criminality have been exhausted. Subsection (7) states that the decision to grant an authorisation is required to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998. Finally, there is an explicit goal for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
Therefore, there already exists a number of safeguards to prevent covert intelligence officers overstepping the bounds of their authorisation and to ensure that the authorisation itself is tightly drawn and strictly necessary. When a criminal conduct authorisation is granted, the officer to whom it relates is permitted to engage in the specified criminal conduct and cannot be prosecuted for that conduct. It is perfectly well understood and accepted that covert agents do, on occasion, have to engage in such criminal conduct in the course of their operations. It is absolutely right that the law protects them when this is the case.
It is also worth noting that the 2021 Act did not create new powers for the police and intelligence services; it simply placed on a statutory footing the mechanism by which they can be authorised to engage in criminal behaviour. This is surely preferable to having the whole system working on the side and in the dark.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, proposes in her Amendment 470 to remove the criminal and civil immunity provided to officers when they commit a criminal offence in pursuance of an authorisation to do so. She proposes replacing it with a defence to criminal or civil charges. However, she has also included an exception to that possible defence—when an officer encourages, assists or attempts to discredit the person who is under surveillance. I find this a startling exception. If a covert officer is given a criminal conduct authorisation and that authorisation, taking into account all the available safeguards, includes permission to commit an inchoate offence, I cannot see why that officer should not be able to do so. Certainly, the officer should not be held criminally or civilly liable.
I am sure the Minister will have further points to add, but we on these Benches cannot support this amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Is the noble Lord saying that he supports officers or their assets acting as agents provocateurs, inciting crime rather than investigating it?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am not saying that at all. We all recognise that things have gone wrong, but what I say generally is that this type of policing—indeed, quite a number of aspects of policing—is about testing the law. Certainly, this is the case with the involvement of CHISs.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
The noble Lord mentioned all the safeguards, but why does he think the safeguards failed not once, but multiple times, and over quite a number of years?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I cannot answer for all the cases that have gone wrong; indeed, I cannot answer for any cases that have gone wrong—it is not my place to do that. I can say, however, that it very much depends on good leadership and good supervision, and all of that comes down to good training. It has always been my view that training is at the core of all of this.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
Does the noble Lord accept that statutory blanket immunity from civil or criminal action acts as a barrier for people who are affected by such unlawful activities? It is a significant concern because of the impact that barrier has on those who might need to bring such action, and who might have difficulty getting funding or access to the necessary support. Then, there is an ongoing huge impact on trust in the police.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Trust in the police in this area is essential. I am not sure I quite get the gist of what the noble Baroness is asking, but I am very happy to discuss it outside the Chamber later, if that would help.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
It was about statutory blanket immunity—the extent of the immunity.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Again, I would have to have a look at that before I give an answer. I am very happy to discuss it with the noble Baroness.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Can the noble Lord comment on the case of R v Barkshire, and does he endorse the behaviour of the counter-intelligence officer in that case?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am not entirely sure that I know all the facts of that case, so I am probably not qualified to answer that question. I spent my job putting people behind bars, not defending them. I am not a lawyer; I would not like to take that any further, frankly.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for her amendment. The discussion today has taken me back to my time in Northern Ireland, when I had to see the product of covert intelligence. As Counter-Terrorism Minister in 2009, I had to see the product of that intelligence, so I understand the value of that. I also understand that the amendment seeks to amend the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by removing the legal protections for covert human intelligence sources who have been tasked by the police and a limited number of other public authority agencies, such as the intelligence services, with engaging in specific, tightly defined, pre-approved criminal conduct. Furthermore, the amendment seeks to remove protections for CHISs engaged in such authorised criminal conduct where it engages the offences of encouraging or assisting an offender under the Serious Crime Act, or seeks to discredit those who are subject to a particular investigation. I understand the motive behind what my noble friend has brought forward.
I begin by addressing the undercover police inquiry, raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. I took office in July 2024, and the undercover policing inquiry had operated for nine years at that stage. It is clear that the historical allegations under consideration by the inquiry are absolutely appalling. Such behaviour should rightly be condemned. The inquiry is ongoing, and we await the findings and any recommendations, but let me assure all those who have spoken that I am now responsible in the Home Office for managing inquiries, and I wish to see recommendations as soon as possible, for the very reasons noble Lords and Baronesses have mentioned today.
The current landscape around undercover operatives is much changed, and since 2013 enhanced safeguards have been put in place, but the Government want to see the lessons of that inquiry and consider them as soon as possible.
Noble Lords may recall the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which has been referred to today, and the revised CHIS code of practice of 2022, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, which were subject to debate and approval both here and in the House of Commons. This scrutiny includes consideration of similar amendments proposed by my noble friend at the time.
I say to noble Lords generally, including my noble friend Lord Hacking, that CHIS play a crucial part in preventing, detecting and safeguarding the public from many serious crimes, including terrorism, drugs and firearms offences, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. Those who do it do so at such personal risk to themselves. I noted and welcome the support from the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson—I will take the support where I can get it. It needs to be properly authorised and specifically defined criminality by the state, and they do so knowing that they will not be penalised for carrying out that activity, particularly by those engaged in criminal or terrorist activity, who may otherwise pursue legal action against them.
It is important that we place on record that CHIS authorisations and criminal conduct authorisations under Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 can be validly given only where the proposed conduct is necessary, proportionate and compliant with the Human Rights Act. Valid authorisations make activity carried out in relation to them “lawful for all purposes”, providing protection from criminal and civil liability. However—I know my noble friend knows this—should a court find that the authorisation does not satisfy these necessary requirements, or should the conduct go beyond what is permitted by the authorisation, it will not be rendered lawful.
Given the significance of these powers, it is important to note that there are independent and effective avenues of oversight and redress, and that these exist—I know that colleagues who have spoken know this, but it is worth putting on the record again—via the Investigatory Powers Tribunal for anyone who believes they have been subject to improper activity by a public authority using covert investigatory powers.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I fully understand the noble intentions behind Amendments 472 and 473, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. The crimes he speaks of are among the most abhorrent and the work he has done is admirable. He is to be warmly congratulated. However, for reasons I will set out, the Opposition cannot support the amendments.
We must first recognise that the British justice system has, first and foremost, a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and punish criminality in Britain. Similarly, the British Government have, first and foremost, a responsibility to protect the security of Britain, and this must be our principal concern. The British Government are not a global Government; we cannot police the world, and we must be very open and honest about that.
It is also a more than unfortunate fact that there are a number of Daesh fighters and other terrorists who have been returned to Britain but have not successfully been prosecuted for the crimes the noble Lord, Lord Alton, refers to. Daesh committed widespread war crimes, genocide against Yazidis and numerous crimes against humanity. To pick up on the noble Lord’s point, if we have people in Britain who committed these heinous crimes but have not yet been prosecuted, I am not sure we should be adding even more by bringing prosecutions against people with no connection to the United Kingdom. Let us prosecute those who have been involved in genocide and war crimes who are in the UK first, before we start trying to prosecute others.
It is also very important that we do not simply welcome people with terrorist connections back into our country. We on these Benches are firmly supportive of the Home Secretary robustly using her powers to exclude people from the United Kingdom who pose a threat to the British people and, where necessary, to strip particularly dangerous people of their British citizenship.
Finally, there is also a question of where prosecutions should best take place. There is a compelling argument for prosecutions and investigations to take place closer to where the crimes were committed, which should allow for a better evidence-gathering process. Ultimately, we must be careful not to subordinate the safety and security of the British public for the purposes of advancing international law. For these reasons, we cannot support the amendments.
Lord Garnier (Con)
Can my noble friend comment on the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven? Did he find nothing in what they had to say the least bit attractive?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, my old home city, for the way in which he has approached these amendments. I thank him for the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which he chairs, and through him I pass on my thanks to my old colleague Sarah Champion, the MP for Rotherham, for the work she has done on this issue. As he knows, we had an opportunity to debate the committee’s report in Grand Committee. I was fortunate that my noble friend Lord Katz took the debate on that occasion and was able to set out the Government’s response, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will realise has not really changed in the intervening months since that debate. However, I am grateful to him, my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their supportive comments, and I will come on to comments from other noble Lords in due course. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is not in her place at the moment, and missed the start of the debate so was therefore not able to speak in this debate—although she tried—but if she reads Hansard tomorrow, she can make any points she was going to raise in a letter to me and we will consider those prior to Report, which I hope is a fair compromise.
Before I go on to the main bulk of the arguments, I refer to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and his comments on the death of Mr Ryan Evans, of Wrexham, which is close to both him and me. It is obviously a deeply sad incident and his death in Ukraine in 2024 followed a Russian strike, as the noble Lord outlined. The UK Government continue to support efforts to ensure accountability for the crimes that are committed in Ukraine. This includes supporting the independent investigation of the International Criminal Court into the situation in Ukraine, as well as providing assistance to Ukrainian domestic investigations and prosecutions of international crimes. Although I cannot give him much succour today in relation to that particular issue, I hope he will pass on the Government’s condolences to Ryan’s parents. We are obviously happy to have further representations on that matter should he wish to make them in due course.
The points made by my noble friend Lord Katz in the previous debate—and those with which I shall respond to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool—relate to the fact that the UK applies its universal jurisdiction only to a very few specific international crimes. Our approach to universal jurisdiction is designed to ensure that those suspected of, or accused of, crimes are investigated, charged and tried fairly and impartially at every stage, with access to all available evidence. This is in accordance with local constitutional and legal frameworks. It remains the case—and I know this will disappoint those noble Lords who have spoken in support today—that we do not believe that it is necessary at this time to extend the scope of the UK’s policy on universal jurisdiction to include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is the long-standing view of successive Governments in general that where there is no apparent link between the UK and an international crime—and this goes to the point the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, made—we support the principle that such crimes are best investigated and prosecuted where they are perpetrated. That also goes to some of the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, because the advantages of securing evidence and the witnesses required for a fair investigation and a successful prosecution are part of a credible judicial process.
It should be noted that the UK already has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity where they are alleged to have been committed by UK nationals or residents. In some cases where the UK does not have jurisdiction, such as in Ukraine—I have just mentioned the situation in relation to Mr Ryan Evans, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley—we are trying to ensure that we build domestic capabilities, and we support the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General to ensure that allegations of war crimes are fully investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.
To go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, the most serious international crimes not covered by the UK’s universal jurisdiction policy are generally already subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which, again, I would argue today, is better placed to prosecute such offences where they are not being dealt with by the relevant domestic authorities. The UK is a strong supporter of the ICC and its mission to end impunity. I know that we will do what we can to ensure that the crimes that have been mentioned today are dealt with by that international court, but I have to say that the debate that we had in the Moses Room, led by my noble friend Lord Katz, and the response I have given to the amendments today are the Government’s position. I accept and respect the points that have been put to the Committee today, but given the considerations that I have mentioned, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, to withdraw his amendment. In saying that, I suspect we will return to these matters on Report. The Government will always reflect on what has been said in Committee, but I hope in due course the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, economic crime is not a marginal issue. It is a national crisis affecting millions of people every year but, generally speaking, it goes under the radar most of the time. These are not victimless offences: they destroy life savings, devastate small businesses and undermine trust in our economy and democracy. When economic crime goes unchecked, it is not the powerful who suffer but ordinary people.
The amendment is modest and pragmatic. It would not establish a new fund; it simply asks for a viability study. I know the Minister is never keen even on turning a semicolon into a comma but, in this instance, it is not asking an awful lot of the Government—the Minister must stop stabbing his heart—just to agree to look at a viability study. It is really not a big deal. There are already clear precedents for this approach, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, just said; the FCA, the Ministry of Justice and parts of the police are already able to retain fines in different ways. If the Government are really serious about the UK’s reputation as a global financial centre, they must match rhetoric with resources. Can I persuade the Minister, for once, to move and just say yes?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for moving this amendment. Economic crime is one of the most pervasive threats to public trust and business confidence in the UK. In the year ending March 2024, fraud accounted for around a third of all crime recorded by police. Industry estimates suggest that economic crime costs the UK economy tens of billions of pounds per year, according to police statistics. These staggering statistics underscore the need for effective enforcement and resourcing.
In this context, the need to seek more sustainable and predictable resourcing for economic crime enforcement is understandable. The proposal to assess the viability of an economic crime fighting fund based on reinvesting a proportion of receipts from enforcement reflects a desire to tackle this persistent and widespread issue. I recognise that there may be merits to an approach that allows specialist technology and expertise to be built and retained over multiple years.
The amendment also calls for an examination of the impact of budget exchange rules on the functioning of the asset recovery incentivisation scheme. There have been reports that recovered assets sometimes cannot easily be redeployed by front-line investigators and that incentives can be blunted by accounting constraints. If funds that are recovered through enforcement cannot, in practice, be retained or redeployed effectively by those doing the work, it is sensible to ask whether the current framework is optimally aligned with the policy objective of strengthening economic crime capability. However, I recognise that any move towards hypothecation of enforcement receipts raises potential governance issues, and there is also the question of how such a fund would sit alongside existing funding streams and the Government’s wider strategy in this area.
I therefore look forward to the Minister’s response to this amendment. I would be grateful if he could outline what steps the Government are currently taking to fight economic crime and whether they believe that any further action is required.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, not just for his amendment today but for his patience in sitting through the Committee debates prior to introducing his amendment this evening. I am also grateful for the meeting we had with him and Phil Brickell, MP for Bolton West, in October and the meeting we had on 18 November.
It is important that Amendment 482 is considered. It would require the Government to consult on the viability of a ring-fenced economic crime fighting fund, and the intention of the amendment is to examine whether such a fund could provide multi-year resourcing for tackling economic crime. I am grateful for the comments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in support of the amendment. The amendment recognises the significant harm that economic crime causes—reflected in the contributions made—to individuals, businesses, the economy and wider society.
The Government remain committed to tackling economic crime. That is evidenced not just by words in this Chamber but by our continued investment through the asset recovery incentivisation scheme and the economic crime levy, which has allocated £125 million to tackling economic crime in recent months. These schemes are delivering state-of-the-art technology to provide law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to stay ahead of criminals. It also includes an important factor, which is the recruitment of 475 new officers across the threat leadership, intelligence, investigative and prosecution capacity. We are putting people on the ground to deal with this issue as part of the, we hope, tangible benefits that we can get in the fight against economic crime. As a Government, we want to continue to work with our partners to ensure that we are most effectively investing the funding available.
I understand and accept—and did so in the face-to-face discussions we had with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, and the Member of Parliament Phil Brickell—that the call for sustaining funding is an important one that needs to be investigated. I want to confirm to the noble Lord what I hope is of help to him: the Government are committed to exploring the funding landscape with the aim of strengthening economic crime enforcement. This is witnessed by the statements we have made in the recently published economic anti-corruption strategy, which was published last December —particularly paragraph 42, on page 23, which I quote for the noble Lord:
“In the context of Spending Review 2025”,
we will
“explore the funding landscape with the aim of strengthening economic crime enforcement”
as a joint Treasury and Home Office priority commitment in that anti-corruption strategy.
This strategy is fixed and there was a timescale for it when published. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, will accept our intentions in identifying the issues that he has raised and not just doing what we have done to date, which is to ensure that we have put resources in already. I hope that that review commitment in the strategy from December is of help to the noble Lord regarding the objectives of his amendments here today.
With that commitment, I would be grateful if he would at least welcome it and hold us to account on it and, in doing so, withdraw his amendment today.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for tabling their amendment. As a rural-dweller myself, I agree and recognise many, if not all, of the offences that have been identified. Our rural communities are incredibly important. On this side of the Committee, the Opposition have made it an absolute priority to support them in this difficult time. That support extends past simply fiscal policy following recent tax policies to all issues that affect them, including crime. It is promising that, last year, rural crime fell by over 16%, but there is still work to be done. Those offences still cost rural communities over £44 million a year—a fact that underlined our pledge to set up local taskforces to tackle rural crime.
Our objectives are not different from those of the noble Baroness; we simply differ on delivery. A top-down, centralised approach is never normally the most effective way to tackle local disconnected issues, and rural crime is a prime example of this. It is far less the operation of the highly organised criminal gangs we see in our cities, and more often the actions of an isolated few who sense an opportunity to steal or exploit the countryside and act on it.
Localised problems require localised solutions. Police forces are budgeted based on local needs, and are therefore the most alert to the specific issues facing their communities. It should be them organising taskforces to tackle rural crime, as they have the knowledge and ability to act and adjust to the changing crime picture in their area. While we agree with the noble Baroness’s intentions and entirely support them, we would much rather see funding directed to local forces and delegate responsibility to them and their taskforces to tackle the rural crime that we all want to see curbed. I hope the Minister agrees.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for raising these issues, and to the noble Lords who have spoken in support of her. As someone who represented a rural constituency in the House of Commons for 28 years, I can say that things such as sheep worrying, isolation and local policing were meat-and-drink on a daily basis. In fact, the north Wales rural crime unit was the model for a lot of the work that has been done on rural crime at a national level. I therefore appreciate and understand the problems that are faced by rural communities. I say to the noble Baroness and others that the Government remain committed to tackling those crimes that particularly impact our rural communities.
Noble Lords have spoken today about some of the government measures being brought forward, but I want to address them as a whole. As part of our safer streets mission, we are introducing important measures to protect rural communities that look at clamping down on anti-social behaviour, strengthening neighbourhood policing and preventing the very farm theft that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, spoke of, as well as the issue of fly-tipping, which has been mentioned by noble Lords today. I would also add shop theft to that. That is an important issue because, particularly in rural areas where there is perhaps only one shop, an organised crime gang, or regular shop theft, can impact small independent businesses very strongly. We are trying to deal strongly with those issues. Rural communities across England and Wales are already better protected from the rising threat of organised gangs, and we have new strategies to tackle crimes plaguing countryside areas.
I was struck by my noble friend Lord Forbes of Newcastle, who focused not just on the rural crime issues that I know he is aware of but raised important issues around fraud and the isolation that fraud can bring. I advise him that, in a three-year fraud strategy that we intend to publish in relatively short order, the Government intend to look very strongly at those issues and at what we can do in that space.
Developing a robust response to a rural crime is extremely important. I know that noble Lords have mentioned it, but the objective of the amendment is, as the explanatory statement says,
“to establish a task force to produce a strategy for tackling rural crime”.
I say to the mover of the amendment that, in November 2025, the Home Office, Defra and the National Police Chiefs’ Council published the Rural and Wildlife Crime Strategy, which, in essence, does what the amendment asks for, and which will bring together the points that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, asked for, with ministerial oversight. The strategy is a vital step in the mission to provide safer streets everywhere.
There is also a Defra-led rural task force that was set up last year—that sounds like a long way away, but it was just over a month ago—with the aim of gathering evidence through a series of meetings and workshops to look at the specific challenges faced in rural areas. The evidence gleaned from the workshops is being examined, and it will be used to outline the Government’s strategic ambition for rural communities.
Some of the points that noble Lords have mentioned today, such as tackling equipment theft, are a huge concern. I understand that. We intend to implement the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023, which will introduce forensic marking and registration on a database of all new terrain vehicles and quad bikes. I am also pleased to say that we recently announced removable GPS systems. Those are demands that I had just over a year ago when I went to the rural crime conference chaired by the police and crime commissioners for Norfolk and Cheshire. We have acted on that.
Clause 128, which has already been considered, contains a valuable tool for the police that will help them tackle stolen equipment. It will ensure that, where it has not been reasonably practical to obtain a warrant from the court, the police can enter and search premises that have been electronically tagged by GPS or other means and where items are present that are reasonably believed to have been stolen. That is a very strong signal for organised criminals that we are going to track and monitor them and have a non-warranted entrance to their property if they have stolen equipment—and we will hold them to account for it.
I was pleased to be able to announce last year at the police and crime commissioners’ conference a long-term commitment of £800,000 for the National Rural Crime Unit and the National Wildlife Crime Unit. We have committed to replicating this year’s funding next year, in 2026-27; in what are tight and difficult financial times, we have still managed to commit that funding to help to support the National Police Chiefs’ Council in achieving the aims of that strategy.
To go to some of the specific issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, mentioned, such as hare coursing, the establishment of that unit and work that it has done, and through that unit Operation Galileo, has seen a 40% reduction in hare coursing—again, that was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, as a specific problem that has existed and causes great difficulties in rural areas.
We have also looked not just at the excellent work of the National Rural Crime Unit but, overall, at how we can tackle rural crime in an organised way. Again, I recognise that there are challenges. The Government separately, through the Statement that we made only a couple of days ago in this House, are looking at reorganising and shrinking the number of police forces, and we are going to have a commission to look at that, with a review, in the next few months to come to some conclusions. We are trying to centralise some national activity on serious organised crime, which is very much behind a lot of that rural crime. That landscape will need to be looked at.
The noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, referred to what I said on Tuesday night. We are looking at how we review the funding formula—that is important. Again, I cannot give specific answers on that today, but I would say to the noble Baroness who moved the amendment and noble Lords who have spoken to it, including the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that significant work is being done on this. We have a strategy and a task force; we have co-operation with Defra and specific measures being brought in that have been called for for a long time on equipment theft and wildlife crime, as well as on the funding of the unit. We have looked at a range of other measures that we will bring forward to tackle organised crimes in rural areas. With the neighbourhood policing guarantee, we are looking at every neighbourhood police force having named, contactable officers dealing with local issues. We are putting 13,000 of those neighbourhood police officers in place over the next three to four-year period, which will mean that we have 3,000 extra neighbourhood police officers by March this year and 13,000 by the end of this Parliament. That is focusing people from the back room to local police forces.
Again, there is a big mix in this, and I know that noble Lords will appreciate that it is a significant challenge at the moment, but I hope that that work is helpful and that the direction of travel suggested by the amendments is one that noble Lords can understand we are trying to achieve. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
I will follow the strictures just put on us to stay with the amendment. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as he still came back for another bite, that as someone who sat on the Industry and Regulators Committee that looked into the water industry in detail, I know that the Victorian system reached its capacity in 1960, and public and private ownership both failed in different ways for the simple reason that he gave: short-termism. That is the problem we face: the multiple billions that have to be spent over a long period, and no Government looking to get re-elected for the next five years will ever spend it.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for tabling this amendment and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for putting their names to it and contributing today.
Although we understand the noble Baroness’s intention, we do not believe that this amendment is the right approach to ensuring that our water companies act ethically and serve the customer. Neither do we believe that increasing offences for companies or for individuals is the right approach to decreasing water pollution. They are already subject to the powers of Ofwat and the Environment Agency; additional measures will just drive up legal costs and encourage hostile behaviour.
The Water (Special Measures) Act of last year placed a new duty on companies to publish an annual pollution incident reduction plan, and we should wait and see what the outcome of that policy is before we attempt to legislate further. It is undoubtedly an important issue, but we simply do not believe that this is the best way to go about it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for tabling the amendment, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving it, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for putting her name to it and speaking to it. I enjoy—well, “enjoy”—sparring on issues of water ownership and water companies. Usually it is in Oral Questions rather than in the middle of the Crime and Policing Bill but, hey ho, you take your chances wherever you can. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for bringing his sense of history and active participation over a number of decades, if I may say so, on the issue of water ownership and stewardship. I found myself agreeing—which may not be too strange—in no small part with many of his comments.
Before I get into the meat of my remarks, I want to be clear: as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, the Government are not going to nationalise the water industry. It would cost around £100 billion.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I fully support this amendment. I agree effectively with every word that has fallen from the lips of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and my noble friend Lady Brinton, and almost every word uttered by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I hope that the Government will listen and give careful consideration to this amendment.
The law of joint enterprise has long been unsatisfactory. It was substantially improved by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Jogee case, as explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. The present state of the law in the light of Jogee is that an offence is committed by an accessory only if the defendant charged as an accessory intended to assist the principal in the commission of the offence. Even so, the law is still unsatisfactory and unclear, as extensively supported by the academic evidence cited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and it sorely needs reform.
The phrase “significant contribution” to the commission of the offence used in the amendment is apt. It would overcome the difficulties mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, with the Court of Appeal’s position on the related accessory offences of procurement. The phrase has been proposed by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies and widely by academics. It was the phrase used in Kim Johnson’s Private Member’s Bill, which was supported by, among others, Sir Bob Neill, who was then chair of the Justice Select Committee, and therefore one presumes by the committee itself.
While the expression may in some ways seem vague, it sets exactly the type of test that juries can and do recognise and regularly apply, rather similarly to the test for dishonesty used in relation to Theft Act offences. The amendment would make an offence of being an accessory much more comprehensible and justifiable than the present test. The present test, I suggest, focuses disproportionately on the mental element of accessory liability, whereas the amendment would focus on the actual contribution of the accessory to the commission of the offence.
There is considerable cause for concern that joint enterprise law in its operation is discriminatory. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, mentioned the research showing that Black people are 16 times more likely to be prosecuted on the basis of joint enterprise than white people. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mentioned the same research. What neither mentioned is that that staggering figure—I suggest that it is staggering—was based on the CPS’s own figures for 2023.
I accept that there may be cultural issues, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, but they have to be judged against the caution that was mentioned by my noble friend Lady Brinton. There is also serious evidence of unjustified, unwarranted group prosecution. There is significant concern about evidence of racial bias and the risk of guilt by association in consequence. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—that it sometimes may seem easier to prosecute for joint enterprise than by establishing individual guilt—is, or may be, justified. Concerns about guilt by association and gang involvement are entirely legitimate. I think they are shared by the public, and they are evidenced by the clear examples we have heard today. They evidence a lack of principle in prosecution and in the application of the law.
In evidence to the Leveson review, Keir Monteith KC and Professor Eithne Quinn from the University of Manchester argued that joint enterprise was overused. They went so far as to say that it contributed, as inevitably statistically it does, to the growth of the backlogs. They cited the trial of seven Black teenagers in 2022 who were accused of murder, where the prosecution accepted that they could not be sure who stabbed the victim, but asserted that all of those who went to the park where the killing occurred
“shared responsibility, at the very least contributing to the force of numbers”.
That was an inaccurate or, at the very least, incomplete statement of the law in the light of Jogee. Six of the seven defendants were acquitted, but the fact that they were tried and went through the period that they did prior to trial highlights the confused state of the law, which makes the essential ingredients of the offence difficult for jurors and sometimes even prosecutors to understand.
We should also take into account, particularly given the delays in bringing trials to court, the serious risk of charges based on joint enterprise leading to defendants who are ultimately acquitted being held on remand, as one of the seven defendants in the case I mentioned was for no less than 14 months.
Finally, I have a technical point that was mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, to whom I had mentioned it. While I support the amendment completely, it needs to be reworded or supplemented to cover summary offences. That is because, as a result of the amendment of Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 by the Criminal Law Act 1977, the accessory offence under the 1861 Act applies only to indictable offences—offences that are either indictable only or triable either way. A parallel amendment to Section 44(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 is required to cover summary offences. There is no justification for distinguishing between them. With that rather academic point, I hope that the Government will act on this.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for bringing forward this amendment and for the care and intellectual rigour with which he has set out the case for revisiting the law on joint enterprise. He has laid out a clear case for why this area of criminal law generates much concern, not least because of the length of sentences involved and the understandable anxiety about culpability and clarity in attributing criminal responsibility.
My noble and learned friend has, rightly, reminded the Committee of the complex and often unsettled journey that this area of law has taken, from the missteps identified by the Supreme Court in Jogee through to more recent Court of Appeal decisions, which some commentators argue have again widened liability in ways that risk injustice. His concerns about overcriminalisation and the potential for convictions where an individual’s role is marginal are serious points that deserve careful reflection. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on them.
That said, while I welcome this debate and acknowledge the force of many of the arguments advanced, I am not persuaded that this amendment provides the right statutory solution at this stage. The introduction of a requirement that an accessory must have made a “significant contribution” to the commission of an offence raises difficult questions of definition and application. What amounts to “significant” is not self-evident. If left undefined, it would inevitably fall to the courts to develop meaning over time through case law, creating precisely the uncertainty and inconsistency that this amendment seeks to address. Alternatively, attempting to define “significant contribution” exhaustively in statute risks rigidity and unintended consequences across a wide range of factual scenarios. Tied to this, there is currently a wealth of case law that can be applied by the courts when considering joint enterprise. This case law would be made redundant in many scenarios if the law were to be changed by this amendment, which would surely not be desirable.
I believe that my noble and learned friend acknowledges that this amendment may not be the only way, or even the best way, but rather uses it as a probing amendment to draw attention to the problem. There is clearly an ongoing need to ensure that the law of secondary liability remains anchored to principles of intention, causation and moral culpability and that juries are properly directed to distinguish between meaningful participation and mere presence.
However, given the Law Commission’s ongoing review of homicide and sentencing, which includes consideration of joint enterprise in light of Jogee, I am cautious about pre-empting that work with a statutory change that may generate further ambiguity. Reform in this area must be evidence based and coherent. While I welcome the discussion sparked by this amendment and commend my noble and learned friend for his persistence in pursuing clarity and justice, I cannot lend the amendment my support today. However, I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the concerns raised and indicate how they intend to ensure that the law on joint enterprise is both fair and clearly understood.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, as the Home Secretary observed in the recent White Paper, policing has not always kept pace with a rapidly changing world. Airspace has indeed become a new frontier for both opportunistic and organised crime. Drones are now being used by burglars and organised gangs as near-silent scouts, identifying empty homes, weak locks or high-value items through windows. The law can, of course, address the burglary that follows, but it struggles to capture the preceding act of reconnaissance. This is particularly relevant to rural crime, where drones are acting as the advance guard for the theft and export of GPS equipment.
In our prisons, drones are described by residents as “almost routine”, delivering drugs, phones and weapons straight into exercise yards. Ministry of Justice data shows more than 1,700 drone incidents in a single year. That fuels violence and instability across the estate. However, as the Justice Committee pointed out last October, the problem is not only the drones but the conditions that allow them in: broken windows, unmaintained netting and faulty CCTV. Creating a new offence may have value, but it cannot by itself remedy years of underinvestment in the prison system.
I want to raise two further concerns. The first is an operational one. With core capital grants under severe strain, how can we realistically expect overstretched forces to invest in drone detection and countersurveillance technology? Secondly, until national integration plans are fully delivered, data on drone incursions will remain largely trapped in 43 police silos, leaving us blind to the wider intelligence picture.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for tabling his amendment. We entirely understand the intention behind it and support its aim.
In government, we gave police forces the power to intercept or seize drones suspected of being used to break the law, and those that attempt to smuggle drugs or weapons into prisons. Before the 2024 election, we announced our intention to implement no-fly zones around prisons, extending the current provisions over airports. We therefore entirely support the aim of prohibiting drone use for criminal ends. Using drone technology as a reconnaissance tool for a crime is self-evidently wrong and that should be reflected in the law.
Similarly, using drones to carry drugs, stolen goods, weapons, harmful substances or anything similar must be tackled by the police. For the police to do so, they must be given the means. Nowhere is this more evident than in prisons, where drugs and weapons are being transported in by drones in order to run lucrative illegal businesses. Reports suggest that some offenders are deliberately breaking probation terms in order to sell drugs in jail, where they can make more money. Anything that enables this must be stamped out. If drones are indeed a means of transport for many of these drugs, we should target those who operate the drones and play a part in criminal enterprises. I hope that the Minister recognises this problem and will agree with me that the amendment is entirely correct in its aims.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for setting out the case for his amendment. In tabling the amendment, he wrote to my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint and to my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill at the Department for Transport on the issue.
I think across the Committee we share the same concerns. I stress that the Government take the issue of the use of drones to facilitate illegal activity extremely seriously. However, my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint set out in his letter to the noble Lord that the challenges of responding to these are not gaps in our criminal law so much as limitations on the practical enforcement tools available and in regulation to improve the visibility and compliance of drones. We are working to address these issues by supporting the development of counter-drone technologies and operational approaches, and ensuring regulations are in place that enable the legitimate use of drones while assisting operational responders in identifying illegitimate users.
Amendment 486A seeks to criminalise the use of drones for criminal reconnaissance and the carrying of illicit substances. The act of criminal reconnaissance is not in itself currently an offence, as proving intent, prior to an act being committed or without substantive additional evidence, would be extremely difficult for prosecutors. Criminal reconnaissance using a drone encounters the same issue. It would be impractical and disproportionate to arrest anyone for taking photos of a property or site, or for piloting a drone. In both instances, the act of reconnaissance would not be practically distinguishable from legitimate everyday actions, making the proposed offence effectively unenforceable. Where intent could be proven, it is likely that such acts could be prosecuted under existing legislation—for example, the offence of going equipped for stealing in Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968.
The carrying of illicit materials, whether it is in and out of prisons or elsewhere at large, is already an offence, regardless of a drone’s involvement. There is already a comprehensive regime of offences relating to the possession and supply of drugs, weapons and other illicit materials. I do not think that the amendment would address any gaps in the criminal law.
The Government have already made changes to the unmanned aircraft regulations to require drones to be equipped, as the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, set out, with direct remote identification, which will improve visibility and accountability of compliant drones. This system will allow drones to broadcast identification and location information in-flight and will help identify drone operators who may be acting suspiciously or breaking the law.
I share the sentiment of the noble Lord and the Committee in seeking to curtail the use of drones for criminal purposes. However, for the reasons I have outlined, I ask that he withdraw his amendment and let me sit down—as I have a cough.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is a short and uncontroversial amendment. The 15 days in Committee we have had on the Bill have been a very long but important process, and I thank all the noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite for the many hours dedicated to the Bill so far. The amendment makes an amendment to the regulation-making powers of Welsh Ministers in consequence of the Legislation (Procedure, Publication and Repeals) (Wales) Act 2025, and for that reason I have no objection.
Public Order Act 2023 (Interference With Use or Operation of Key National Infrastructure) Regulations 2025
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Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a passionate debate, which we on these Benches welcome. Dealing with the statutory instrument before us gives us the opportunity to recognise the importance of our life sciences sector to public health, national resilience and the wider economy. It is therefore right that they should work and operate without sustained disruption, intimidation or obstruction.
The regulations, as outlined in the debate, extend the definition of “key national infrastructure” to include the life sciences sector. In doing so, they ensure that the police have access to a clear and consistent set of powers where protest activity moves beyond lawful expression and into serious interference with the use or operation of critical facilities.
It is important to be clear about what this instrument does and does not do. It does not prohibit peaceful protest, nor does it seek to suppress legitimate debate, including on matters that attract strong and sincerely held views. The right to protest remains a fundamental one. What these regulations address is conduct that is deliberately disruptive, sustained or targeted in a way that prevents lawful activity from taking place and places staff, researchers and patients at risk. Life sciences facilities have in the past been subject to precisely that kind of activity. Existing public order powers can be complex, reactive and fragmented. By bringing the life sciences sector within the framework established by the 2023 Act, the regulations provide greater legal clarity, earlier intervention where appropriate and a more proportionate and effective response to serious disruption.
We also note that the instrument is tightly focused. It does not create new categories of protest offence but applies an existing regime to a sector whose importance to the national interest is clear. The offences remain subject to established thresholds, safeguards and oversight, and their application must continue to respect the principles of necessity and proportionality.
For those reasons, we on these Benches are satisfied that the case for this instrument has been made. It strikes an appropriate balance between protecting critical national infrastructure and safeguarding the right to peaceful protest. We therefore support the regulations and believe that the House should approve them.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, before the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, responds on her amendment, it is important that I respond on behalf of the Government to some of the points that have been raised. I do not intend to repeat the discussion points in my opening speech, but some of them may be referred to because they have generated debate. This debate has generated a lot of interesting and important points of principle, and I am grateful for the contributions. I shall respond to four broad points: the right to protest, the SI provision use, the use of animals in science and—the big question—why now? I will address those in turn.
The right to protest was raised by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Grender and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Sikka and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, speaking just now from the Front Bench. I want to be clear right now in front of this House: as I said in my opening statement, this is not about the rightful, peaceful protest which is a fundamental part of our democratic society. This measure does not prohibit or restrict peaceful protest. However, peaceful expression does not extend to causing serious disruption to the hard-working majority in the businesses in question.
Shamima Begum
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Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The original decision was made by the previous Administration, and it happens to be one that this Government upheld and support. I say again to the House that there are ongoing proceedings about her status, and the decisions were very clear. Under legislation which the previous Government took, we have examined this matter and are now in discussions in the European Court of Human Rights. I think it is best left to be determined in the way in which it will ultimately be determined.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I have said it before and I will say it again: we on these Benches are unequivocal in our view that Shamima Begum should never be allowed to return to Britain. However, the noble Lord is right to note the increase in fighting in northern Syria. One of the issues this raises is that British-born Islamic State fighters and sympathisers may be freed and then attempt to make the journey back to Britain, potentially by small boat crossings. In the interests of the security of the British people, what are the Government doing to ensure that no one who has fought for or assisted a terrorist group in that region is able to return to Britain?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord makes a very valid point, and it is one that I support. The Foreign Secretary has already spoken to the Syrian Foreign Minister about the situation of those who have been and are being detained. We want to ensure that we continue to monitor the security situation in northern Syria, but the noble Lord makes a very valid point that the Government will bear in mind.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsTuesday 27th January 2026
(2 weeks, 4 days ago)
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Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Cash for tabling this important amendment, allowing for a debate on this matter. The link between ethnicity and crime has, for far too long, been a taboo subject, but the fact is that it always has been and remains to be a significant factor in explaining certain trends.
When ethnicity is ignored and underreported, observers are reduced to relying on conjecture based upon unverified connections. It does an injustice to the victims of crimes that go either unresolved or underreported because their causal factors are refused to be acknowledged. When the facts are obscured, it opens the door for accusations from both sides in bad faith. People are derided as racist, and uninvolved communities are implicated. The result, again, is that the focus is directed away from the victims.
Grooming gangs have been the case study most often referenced when discussing this topic, and I apologise for repeating the same argument, but we do so because they offer the best example of the consequences of ignoring this link. For decades, tens of thousands of white working-class girls were systematically groomed, trafficked and raped by gangs of predominantly Pakistani men. This is a fact that has only recently been accepted by mainstream politicians and media, despite years of campaigning and research conducted outside of Westminster.
We should not have arrived at this point where, after more than 30 years, Westminster is only just waking up to the scale of the tragedy. We should not have had to wait for the review from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, which was commissioned only after the Government faced significant pressure, both in Parliament and online, for politicians to act on an overtly racialised crime. I understand that the failings surrounding the inability to bring these gangs to justice have been many, but a consistent factor is authorities overlooking the crimes for fear of being racist. In turn, the police have done nothing to allay their fears by providing accurate ethnicity figures.
The words of Denis MacShane, the former MP for Rochdale, a grooming hotspot, aptly demonstrate this. By his own words in 2014, he avoided the industrial-scale rape of working-class girls in his constituency out of fear of “rocking the multicultural boat” and offending his own sensibilities as a
“true Guardian reader and liberal Leftie”.
Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends than that good men should look on and do nothing. Good men, in the narrow sense that they were not the ones committing evil crimes, were permitted to adopt Denis MacShane’s acquiescent attitude for decades, because there was no official empirical pushback for campaigners to draw from. If ethnicity data had been collected and released, the fact that these crimes were disproportionately committed by the Pakistani community —as we know from the fragmented picture that we now possess—would have been transformed from a racist trope derided as an inconvenience into a proven fact to be used by police forces for action.
We must learn from our failings. It is not enough simply to commission a review into grooming gangs and hope that acknowledging past crimes will put a stop to future crimes being committed. Crimes are still happening, and they are still happening along ethnic lines. Mandating the recording of ethnicity is a necessity for any Government claiming to want to reduce violence against women and girls.
Past the recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and past grooming gangs, there is a great practical reason to introduce a requirement to record ethnicity. Crime trends differ from community to community, and identifying exactly what these are will help the police direct resources more effectively. This data—and I hope that many noble Lords opposite will support me here—would even reduce officers’ unconscious biases, as decisions would be based upon empirical evidence and not assumptions drawn from shaky data.
The administrative burden that would come with this change would be negligible. It is an extra tick in the box in an arrest report. The benefits, as explained, are numerous. If we are serious about organising a victim-orientated system that is empirically based, this amendment is absolutely necessary. I hope that the Minister will agree, and I very much look forward to hearing from him.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her amendment, which seeks to mandate the collection of ethnicity data in respect of the perpetrators of crime. I also thank all those who contributed to this debate: my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and, for the Opposition, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.
I will not repeat the point that I made in the last group—admittedly, this is a bit further away than I thought we were going to be—but I stress that the content of the annual data requirement on police is reviewed annually. We have also announced plans in the police White Paper, which we have already discussed in a previous group, to bring forward legislation, when parliamentary time allows, on mandating the collection of suspect ethnicity data.
There has been a lot of discussion and debate on this amendment around the recent National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. For the avoidance of any doubt, I want to be absolutely clear that these abhorrent crimes must be pursued wherever they are found, without cultural or political sensitivities getting in the way.
I will just pause to correct the record. While I am not at all defending his comments, I believe that I am right in saying that Denis MacShane used to be MP for Rotherham rather than Rochdale—I am referring to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said—which is obviously where one of the gangs that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, looked into operated. I just want to put that out there. However, as I said, that does not undermine the abhorrence of these crimes; they must be pursued, irrespective of any cultural or political sensitivities getting in the way.
The previous Home Secretary wrote to all chief constables to make it clear that we expect that ethnicity data will be collected from all suspects in child sexual abuse and criminal exploitation cases. As previously set out by the Home Secretary, we will be legislating to mandate the collection of ethnicity data in such cases. To be very clear, I quote directly from the police White Paper, which was published yesterday:
“we will work with policing to create a framework for mandating clear national data standards in a timely way, to improve how data is collected, recorded and used across England and Wales, and make sure these standards are applied across all forces and the systems they use. This will further support existing legal and ethical frameworks, ensuring data is managed responsibly and proportionately, and maintaining public confidence”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, referred to the importance of self-defined ethnicity, and this is how the ONS recommends that ethnicity be recorded in line with the census, which does ultimately provide the benchmark versus which all public service data should be collected. In light of this and our commitment to bring forward legislation in the context of our wider reforms to policing, I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, withdraw her amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Exception of the police from the public sector equality dutyIn Schedule 18 (public sector equality duty: exceptions) of the Equality Act 2010, after paragraph 3 insert—“The police
3A (1) Section 149 does not apply to any police force when exercising policing or law enforcement functions.(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, “police force” includes—(a) a police force maintained by a local policing body,(b) the British Transport Police,(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, and(d) the Ministry of Defence Police.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, so as to ensure they are solely committed to effectively carrying out their policing functions.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 438D, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, seeks to exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when they are exercising core policing and law enforcement functions. The public sector equality duty requires public authorities, in the exercise of their functions, to
“have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation … advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it … foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.
The purpose of the amendment is simple, and it comes from what should be a fundamental truism: the police should focus unambiguously on preventing crime, protecting the public and upholding the law.
Police forces already operate within one of the most extensive frameworks of legal accountability in public life. Their powers are constrained by statutes such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, regulations, ethics codes, common law and detailed operational safeguards. Despite this, operational decisions of police officers are being second-guessed not through the lens of legality or effectiveness but through compliance with equality impact assessments, diversity metrics and institutional diversity, equality, and inclusion priorities that were never designed for split-second operational judgments.
There is a practical application here. The police are often hampered in their ability to stop and search people because of their duties under the Equality Act. For example, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act Code A, which governs the operation of police powers to stop and search, states that
“when police officers are carrying out their functions, they also have a duty to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation, to advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and people who do not share it, and to take steps to foster good relations between those persons”.
I think it would be quite widely accepted by the public that it is not the police’s role to advance equality of opportunity. They are not activists.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
If the noble Baroness looks at aspects of the Bill before us today and earlier in Committee, and at what we said in the policing White Paper yesterday, she will know that the Government do not accept that standards do not need to be raised. We want raised standards, better vetting of police officers, better performance and speedy dismissal if police officers have done wrong. We want to improve those standards. However, the Equality Act is about basic principles underpinning how public services interact with people in our community. In the policing sense, I argue, as I did a moment ago, that those Equality Act provisions underpin what the police want to do, which is to police with the consent of the community. I cannot agree with her; that is an honest disagreement between us. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate; it has been short but stimulating. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for their support.
When considering this matter, there is a question that I would like all noble Lords to keep in mind: what do we want the police to prioritise? Surely the answer is public safety, crime prevention, and the fair and firm enforcement of the law. As I have said, and as the legal framework makes clear, policing is already tightly regulated. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, codes of practice, judicial review, the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the courts all ensure that police powers are exercised lawfully and proportionately. None of those protections would be removed by this amendment. The entire purpose of the amendment is to remove a layer of bureaucratic obligation that is ill suited to operational policing and increasingly counterproductive. It would allow officers to make decisions based on intelligence, behaviour and risk, rather than the fear of breaching abstract equality issues—but perhaps I am guilty of looking at this from an operational perspective.
If we want the police to be active on our streets rather than passive observers and to intervene early rather than apologise later, and if we want public confidence rebuilt through effectiveness rather than process then we must give them the clarity and confidence to do their job. We must recognise that effective policing is itself a public good and that the most equal outcome of all is a society in which the law is enforced without fear or favour. With that, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Goodman of Wycombe for his recent group of amendments. Extremism in its worst form of course becomes terrorism. This is often, if not always, the product of idle inaction or, at worst, encouragement from surrounding communities and influencers. The propounding of extremist views, even if not necessarily violent, has slowly seated itself in public discourse and is gaining influence in local communities throughout the country. It is clearly something that needs to be addressed, so I welcome the chance to hear from the Government.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 438EB is inspired by the 999 Injured and Forgotten campaign, led by Tom Curry, a detective forced to retire after suffering a life-changing injury on duty, weeks before reaching 22 years of service. In 2023, Tom launched a petition calling for a new medal for police injured on duty and discharged from the service, and it has since expanded to include all public servants.
Every day, emergency responders put their lives on the line to protect the public. Tragically, within policing alone, more than 16,000 officers have suffered catastrophic injuries in the course of their service and have had to give up their careers as a result. Yet there is currently no formal means of recognising their sacrifice. Like Tom, many injured officers miss out on long service and good conduct medals, which now require 20 years of sustained service. Gallantry awards elude most assault victims, who are typically ambushed from behind, depriving them of the opportunity to show valour.
The Elizabeth Emblem was created in 2024 to rightly honour public servants killed in the line of duty. On these Benches, we believe it is wrong that those whose lives have been changed irrevocably through injury are overlooked. This is a modest amendment. It simply asks the Government to consider the merits of such an award and to lay a report on it before Parliament. Although the Bill’s scope does not allow me to include all those we believe should be eligible, this would be an important step towards formal recognition of injured survivors and to honour the brave work of our emergency services. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for this amendment and the case she put forward. It is absolutely axiomatic that we must honour and recognise those brave police officers who put their safety at risk to protect the public. During my police service, I saw many acts whereby officers placed themselves in the most dangerous of situations with little recognition. If I had time, I would be keen to relate some of those instances to noble Lords; some of them, of course, had consequences. There is certainly some merit in the proposal. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what the Home Office might suggest on this.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we owe our emergency service workers a massive debt of thanks for the work they do to keep us safe and for always answering the call when we need help. When dedicated public servants suffer serious injuries in the course of their duties, it is incumbent on us, as a state and as a society, to wrap our arms around them, so to speak, and ensure that they are given all the support they need.
I am sure we all agree that the list of public servants who risk and suffer injuries during the course of their duties is not limited to police officers; this was reflected in the noble Baroness’s comments. Other emergency services, such as our brave firefighters, ambulance workers and other emergency service workers, also face great risk of injury on duty. Any consideration will have to include them alongside police staff—I think the whole Chamber would agree on that—though I note that the text of the amendment refers to police officers alone. I hope the noble Baroness takes that in the spirit in which it is intended.
Noble Lords will be aware that the police are already eligible for a number of medals, including for long or exemplary service, for specific celebrations such as a Coronation or jubilee, and for gallantry. Individuals who suffer injury as a result of their efforts to prevent loss of life can and have been successfully put forward for formal gallantry awards. This includes Sergeant Timothy Ansell of Greater Manchester Police, who was injured coming to the aid of a colleague and received a King’s Commendation for Bravery in October.
Although I recognise that the threshold for these awards is high, and rightly so, there are many incidents which can and should be put forward but which currently fall below the radar. The Home Office has been driving work to increase the number of gallantry nominations for the police, and I encourage any noble Lords who have cases to put forward to do so via the Cabinet Office website.
Work to identify whether a medal is the best method of recognising emergency service workers who are injured as a result of their duties and whether it is viable is ongoing. However, I point out that in this country, all medals are a gift from the Government on behalf of the monarch. They are instituted by royal warrant and sit firmly under royal prerogative powers. It would therefore be inappropriate to legislate for such a medal, potentially cutting across the powers that rightly rest with His Majesty the King. On the understanding that this is a matter that is actively under consideration, I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsTuesday 27th January 2026
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Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches there is strong support for Amendments 435 and 438A, which would finally shine a light on one of the most sensitive and least discussed aspects of police welfare: suicide and attempted suicide among officers and staff. This is not about apportioning blame; it is about creating conditions in which people can seek help early and leaders cannot look away. Nearly two years ago I sought this very information and was assured that work was happening to collate it. Yet no figures have emerged, leaving families, colleagues and policymakers in the dark, still awaiting clarity and transparency. These amendments would ensure that bereaved families do not feel that their loss has been silently absorbed and they would confront the lingering stigma around mental ill health in policing.
Policing demands a particular duty of care that transcends the ordinary employer-employee relationship, as the state requires officers to face repeated trauma that is unparalleled in any other walk of life. We are now operating in what many describe as a crisis policing model, where officers spend most of their time dealing with the darkest parts of human experience with far fewer opportunities to balance that with visible neighbourhood-based work. In the past, time spent on community policing would lift them out of the dark place. Today, that release valve is much weaker. Much of the informal support that once existed has disappeared. Officers used to have shared spaces where they could decompress together at the end of a shift, but those communal areas have largely gone. From staff sifting through distressing online material every day to front-line officers facing the increasing likelihood of physical assault, the psychological strain is relentless. This feeds a siege mentality in a service that still struggles to recognise emotion and is not naturally open.
Policing remains an environment where taking paternity leave can invite mockery and where the burden can fall especially heavily on women and minority officers amid unreported discrimination. In too many forces, officers still fear that admitting vulnerability will derail their career progression. If Parliament seeks people to shoulder that burden on our behalf, it must insist on collecting basic information. Tracking suicides and attempted suicides would pinpoint hotspots and high-risk groups, enabling proactive measures such as resilience training, peer support and routine psychological screening. I urge the Minister to take these amendments back to the Home Office and consider bringing forward concrete proposals on Report.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing this matter to the attention of the Committee. The noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, and I know all too well the stresses and strains of policing. It is vital that more is done to support our officers. I approach these amendments from the fact that it is impossible to address what we do not measure and, at this moment, policing has almost no reliable national mechanism for measuring accurately the total number of police suicides.
Data from the Police Federation of England and Wales shows that more than 100 police officers and staff have died by suicide between 2022 and 2025, with at least 70 officer deaths and over 200 attempted suicides in that period. Those figures are likely undercounts because there is no statutory requirement for forces to record such events. The federation has also revealed troubling trends in how these incidents are linked with organisational stresses—notably, that 47 of 70 suicides and 173 of 236 attempted suicides that it has identified between 2022 and 2025 involved officers under investigation for misconduct or criminal allegations. That is not simply a statistic; it is a human tragedy that echoes through families, colleagues and communities.
As has been said, police forces are not required to record suicide or attempted suicide, meaning that the true scale of the problem is hidden from view and national suicide statistics do not treat policing as a risk occupation, as they should. Without a statutory duty to record and report, we are asking police leaders to act in good faith alone, with widely inconsistent results. Two of the largest police forces in England and Wales reportedly could not provide their own figures when the federation asked. The amendments would end that inconsistency by placing responsibility for data collection and publication on a statutory footing.
The amendments are not a step taken in isolation from policing leadership. The National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing are already committed to suicide prevention across the service. They have jointly endorsed a national consensus statement on working together to prevent suicide in the police service in England and Wales, acknowledging the importance of reducing stigma and improving well-being. The College of Policing also leads on national suicide prevention guidance and professional practice, emphasising the duty of forces to recognise inherent risk factors associated with police work and to promote supportive interventions. However, guidance and consensus alone cannot ensure consistent national reporting or create the accountability that comes from an annual report, laid before Parliament, which analyses trends, contributory factors and the effectiveness of support mechanisms under the police covenant.
Requiring chief constables to certify compliance and linking non-compliance to inspection through HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services will ensure that this is not simply a bureaucratic exercise but a real driver for change. However, without consistent mandatory data, these efforts lack the firm foundation needed to evaluate progress and target interventions where they are most needed. We on these Benches fully support the amendments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for highlighting the amendments that he has put before the Committee today and to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, although he is not in his place, who tabled two of the amendments.
The importance of collecting accurate and consistent data for police officer and staff suicide is certainly relevant. I note particularly that the noble Lords, Lord Stevens and Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Bach have a significant senior level of experience in these areas. I am grateful also for the comments of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and I recognise and note the strong support from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Opposition Benches for the proposals in the amendments.
Every life lost to suicide is a tremendous tragedy and, when that person is part of our police workforce, that loss is even deeper because those officers, as has been said, walk towards danger and see things that everyday citizens do not see. It is only fair that we support them with the same care and commitment that they show to us.
It may help the Committee to know that last year I met the Police Federation chair, Tiff Lynch, when she raised these matters with me. I have to say that this is an issue. We must do our utmost to protect and support police officers and this Government agree that understanding the scale and nature of the problem is essential. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it is important that we understand whether any levels of suicide are linked specifically to a policing role or linked to factors outside of policing that policing may or may not exacerbate, as well as what measures can be taken, as in any walk of life, to help to support and encourage individuals who have mental health challenges or experiences that drive them to suicide. That is why we as a Government are actively considering the best options for achieving that, both in legislation and via non-legislative routes, so that we can deliver meaningful and sustainable improvements without creating unnecessary burdens.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I thank the Minister for such a constructive response and of course I thank everyone for their support. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, made a point that I had not made in my speech but that I want to amplify: in collecting the data, we should consider people for at least 12 months after retirement. He mentioned one particular case, but we can all perhaps imagine others and, if there is a link, that would be interesting to look at.
I hope we do not have to end up with legislation, because, in a way, that would be an admission of failure. There are far better ways of achieving it without that, or the bureaucracy that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, mentioned. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, for his usual powerful support for this and for saying it is common sense that this needs sorting out—there was no challenge on that from the Minister. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for their wholehearted support.
A couple of important things have through in the debate. First, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned the potential link to misconduct processes. If that is an issue, we need to understand why. We had an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, on a previous Committee day about potential deadlines or timelines for how long these things take; that cannot be unconnected. Whatever it is, we need to understand what it is about.
There is a second very important HR issue: are we recruiting people who understand the nature of the job they are about to embark on? Are we sharing the nature of the challenges? Are we supporting them at the beginning if they have things that they are not sure about? It is important, for the reasons we have all talked about, to make sure that this happens. I am really reassured about the round table. It would be really helpful if, by Report, we had a definite route forward, because I can see there are various routes.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
Can I raise one point with the noble Lord? It seems to me—certainly from reflecting on my own police service—that one of the issues regarding suicide simply was the fact that police managers were unable to identify the issues when they arose. I wonder whether he, as a former commissioner and part of the inspectorate, has a view on that.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, makes a really good point: are we training our managers and supervisors to recognise the signs? For good reasons, occupational health units keep all this data together privately. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, mentioned a referral to the medical officer to see whether there was a problem; I wonder how many referrals are coming back the other way to let the manager know that this person might have an issue, not necessary to talk about suicide but to say there is a stress issue and they may need some support. Has it become a one-way valve that protects their privacy but reduces their safety? There are many facets to it that I hope the round table might address. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and thank the Government for their response.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling her two amendments. I begin with Amendment 436, co-signed by my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough. I strongly support my noble friend’s efforts to ensure that release statistics are as rigorous and useful as possible. These releases are pivotal to both the police and the public—the police so that they are aware of the types of crimes they are likely to encounter, and the public so that they can judge the performance of police forces for themselves.
As it stands, there is not a standard, reliable measurement of crime rates and statistics. The current accredited metric used by the Office for National Statistics is the Crime Survey for England and Wales, which is helpful in giving an indication of certain crime rates but cannot be described as a foolproof operational tool. It uses an interviewer-administered face-to-face survey, which immediately makes the recounting of crime a choice on behalf of the victim, who may, for whatever reason, decide not to disclose it. It reports only crimes committed against over-16s and excludes crimes against the general public, the state, tourists and residents of institutions.
I understand that this is done so that the survey is unaffected by police reporting or recording changes, but it also creates a crime reporting system deeply affected by human discretion that can similarly not serve as a trustworthy basis. The least we can do is ask that the police are required to record data on the enforcement of offences simultaneously to the Crime Survey for England and Wales releases. It would provide a metric to judge police performance, as it would demonstrate the estimated number of crimes committed compared with those investigated by police forces.
This leads me to my noble friend’s second amendment, also signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. Investigations into committed crimes must lead to prosecutions, or else there is little point in maintaining a justice system. Between 2020 and 2024, more than 30,000 prosecutions collapsed. A large proportion of these came from the mishandling or loss of evidence by police. The storage and retention of evidence is an area in desperate need of modernising. It has been described as overwhelming by serving officers and has too often resulted in injustice for victims. The first step in solving this issue is a thorough review of the system as it currently exists before setting out a blueprint of reform. The amendment in question would provide for this, so I wholly support it and I hope the Minister does too. I look forward to his reply.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for her continued interest in improving transparency and accountability in policing. She will know that I am outcome-focused myself, and that I try to ensure that we get outcomes. I note the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lord Davies of Gower, for Amendment 436.
The Government have taken significant steps to improve the visibility of police performance. I draw noble Baroness’s attention to the newly established police performance framework. That framework, supported by the Home Office’s police performance unit, provides a robust mechanism for monitoring enforcement activities across all 43 current police forces in England and Wales. This includes the priority offences that the noble Baroness mentioned, such as shoplifting, knife crime and theft.
The noble Baroness mentioned the White Paper; I will respond by trailing some of the announcements that were made in the White Paper yesterday. A key one was that the Home Office will this year introduce an initial sector-facing police performance dashboard that will enable chief constables and local policing bodies to analyse the transparent, high quality and operationally significant data that all three Back-Bench speakers sought. This will empower forces to deliver improvements through strengthening their understanding of where they are performing well and where they can learn from practice in other forces to improve. The framework has been designed to be flexible, and there will be a midpoint review in middle of 2027-28 to allow for the inclusion of any new priorities that might be brought forward. The Government believe that this is an appropriate mechanism for considering additional offence categories, rather than—with due respect to the noble Baroness— mandating them in primary legislation.
I took to heart the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that requiring police forces to publish enforcement data on a fixed list of offences might add burdens and administrative duplication, particularly when many of these offences are already captured through a range of other mechanisms, and contradict the later amendments to reduce police bureaucracy. That is an important factor to bear in mind when we consider this proposal.
Furthermore, the police and the CPS are required to comply with the Director of Public Prosecutions guidance on charging, which applies to all offences where a criminal charge may be instituted. This guidance ensures that investigations meet evidential and public interest tests before prosecution. Compliance for that is monitored through an internal assessment framework between the police and the CPS that is crime agnostic and used only for management purposes. A statutory duty to publish enforcement data for selected offences might duplicate those arrangements and divert resources from front-line policing.
In summary on Amendment 436, yes, we need to improve, but we have put in place some mechanisms. We will monitor those mechanisms and, I hope, return to them in due course, without the legislative requirement proposed by the noble Baroness.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 437 goes to the heart of the core issue of productive use of police time. I again note the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for this amendment. The 2023 Police Activity Survey, provided by the Home Office, gave us significant insights into how police time is used. We are planning to repeat that survey this year, and I hope it will again help us to understand a bit more about the policing landscape.
The 2023 productivity review, sponsored by the College of Policing’s Centre for Police Productivity, prioritised the rollout of productivity-enhancing capabilities, such as the use of AI and robotic process automation, to reduce the time spent on administration. I know that there are concerns about AI, and I have heard them raised today in Committee. However, when properly used, AI can reduce bureaucracy. In Autumn 2024, we launched the Police Efficiency and Collaboration Programme to explore how we can improve productivity and efficiency savings.
Yesterday, the Government published the policing White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing—I have a copy to hand for ease of reference. In that White Paper is a comprehensive package of reforms that address the issues in the noble Baroness’s amendment. I refer her to paragraph 91, which says:
“Another area of extensive paperwork in policing comes from the requirements of the criminal justice system. In the months ahead we will work with the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Prosecution Service (alongside the Attorney General’s Office) to examine changes that could reduce the burden on policing. As part of this work, we will look at a number of areas including the disclosure regime and redaction, the use of out of court resolutions, charging and joint police-prosecution performance metrics. We will do this alongside consideration of any new or emerging evidence, such as the implications of the Independent Review of Disclosure and Sir Brian Leveson’s recommendations for criminal court reform”.
We therefore recognise that that is an important issue.
I also refer the noble Baroness to paragraph 293, which says:
“It is expected that in its first year Police.AI will focus on some of the biggest administrative burdens facing policing – including disclosure, analysis of CCTV footage, production of case files, crime recording and classification and translating and transcribing documents. This will free up 6 million policing hours each year”.
The Government are therefore focused on those issues, so I am not convinced that we need a legislative solution to deal with them. With this having been put in the White Paper—it is a brand-new document, and Members will want to have a chance to reflect upon it—the direction of travel is self-evidently there. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand that the core issues on which she is calling for a review are addressed in the document that I have just referred to the Committee.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Cash both for bringing forward this amendment and for the clarity with which she set out the problem that it seeks to address. I speak in support of the amendment. It is fundamental to our safety and justice system that police data is accurate and fit for purpose.
I am grateful for the warm words that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, spoke about me. I hope that I will not disappoint her too much when I say that sex is not an incidental characteristic in policing or criminal justice: it is a foundational variable. Patterns of offending, particularly in relation to serious violence, sexual offences, domestic abuse and repeat high-harm crime are profoundly sex-disaggregated.
I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, that police forces depend on this data to analyse trends, assess risk, deploy safeguarding interventions and evaluate whether strategies, including those endorsed by your Lordships’ House, are actually working. If police records cannot reliably distinguish males from females, risk assessment collapses, trend analysis becomes unreliable and the very legislation that we pass to make the public safer is frustrated.
We have already seen what happens when biological sex is replaced with self-declared gender identity. As has already been mentioned, in Scotland, Police Scotland permitted suspects’ sex to be recorded on the basis of self-identification, including in serious sexual offences. The consequences were predictable and serious: incoherent statistics, loss of public confidence and an inability to analyse male violence accurately. After sustained scrutiny, Police Scotland reversed that policy in October 2025 and confirmed that biological sex would be recorded, with transgender status noted separately where relevant. That reversal was driven by operational reality, not ideology, and it offers a clear lesson for England and Wales.
Independent expert evidence reinforces this point. The Government-commissioned review led by Professor Alice Sullivan was unequivocal: sex should mean biological sex and, where gender identity is relevant, it should be recorded separately, not substituted. Similar conclusions have been reached by independent analysis examining the consequences of degraded data across public bodies. Once sex data is compromised, statistics become contested, safeguarding weakens and public trust is eroded.
There are also real-world safeguarding implications. Ministry of Justice analysis shows that trans-identified male offenders exhibit offending patterns aligned with the male population, including for violent and sexual crimes. Recording such individuals as female underestimates male violence, artificially inflates female offending and distorts risk analysis.
We have already seen the downstream consequences in the prison estate, where serious safeguarding failures led the Government to tighten allocation rules. Biological sex is a material risk factor; police data is upstream of all this and, if it is wrong at the point of arrest or charge, the entire system is compromised.
There is a theme running through many of our debates today: good policing is inextricably linked to good data. The Government have acknowledged this. Biological sex is just one of the data variables that must be recorded for accurate policing, so I wholeheartedly support my noble friend’s amendment and I hope the Minister will, too.
Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (Application to Immigration Officers and Designated Customs Officials in Northern Ireland) and Consequential Amendments Regulations 2026
Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
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Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for his explanation of this draft statutory instrument. I declare an interest as an outgoing member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee; our clerk is presiding over our proceedings here today.
I was intrigued when I read the submission from the committee again; my noble friend the Minister referred to that. Why the delay in implementation? We had to wait until some 17 years later. The Conservatives were in government during many of those years, so perhaps this question might be better addressed to the shadow Minister on the Opposition Front Bench, who might be able to offer an explanation for the delay; it seems quite incredible that that is the situation and that we did not have a service in Northern Ireland.
I also point out that these are issues of particular relevance to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, because they are dealing with and have direct responsibility for issues to do with Article 2 of the Windsor Framework, which deals specifically with issues in the wider purview of the Good Friday agreement in relation to immigration and migrants to ensure that people are properly protected. Maybe some of those issues will impact on other legal judgments that have taken place, so perhaps my noble friend the Minister could outline what discussions may have taken place with those commissions. Could he also outline—because work is required with the Police Service of Northern Ireland—what work will take place with it and what work took place with it during that intervening period? Were reports made from the Home Office directly to the Northern Ireland Policing Board? Could I receive assurances that the PACE SI will adhere to the principles of equality, fairness and human rights? What discussions took place in that intervening period with An Garda Síochána and the Home Office to counter any potential for terrorism or for people to seek to avail of potential opportunities through movement on a north-south basis on the island of Ireland?
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his explanations. I look forward to the explanation for the lack of representation in those 17 years from the shadow Minister—and I support the PACE SI.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak briefly on these regulations. I am grateful to the Minister for introducing this SI today. The purpose of this instrument is straightforward; it extends to immigration officers and designated customs officials in Northern Ireland the powers contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989—powers that their counterparts in England and Wales have exercised for more than a decade under the equivalent provisions of PACE 1984.
Without this instrument, officers in Northern Ireland would continue to rely on a patchwork of powers under the immigration Acts, which the Government argue do not align with the framework used elsewhere in the United Kingdom. The intention here is therefore to ensure consistency, improve co-operation between agencies and provide officers with the tools that they need to tackle organised immigration crime effectively. We support these regulations today.
The equality impact assessment makes it clear that these changes are not expected to lead to a significant increase in arrests or prosecutions. Rather, the effect should be to strengthen cross-authority working between criminal and financial investigations, Border Force and the police, and to support the effective operation of the common travel area. On that basis, and given our long-standing support for ensuring that immigration officials have the powers necessary to implement existing law, we support the instrument and deem it totally necessary.
This is a modest and largely technical instrument, bringing Northern Ireland into alignment with powers established elsewhere in the United Kingdom. We support that objective while recognising the sensitivities that have surrounded the timing of its introduction. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)
Before my noble friend the Minister makes his response, I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, if he can provide any explanation of why, during that period, there was no implementation of this SI in Northern Ireland.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I cannot answer those questions. I was not here at the time, so I cannot. Sorry.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)
I do not wish to delay proceedings. I recall that the noble Lord came into your Lordships’ House at the same time as me around October or November 2019. From my recollection, the Conservatives were in government. So, the noble Lord is bound to have had some recollection and he had Front Bench responsibilities.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I was not the Minister. I cannot answer the question, and it is not my place to answer it now.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, perhaps I can assist my noble friend with some comments. Self-evidently, I was a Minister in the Labour Governments of 1997 to 2010, and the power to make these regulations came into play originally when I was in government. But self-evidently, nothing happened between 2010 and the regulations being brought forward now.
I am not party, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, is not, to what happened in those years because for nine of them I was in opposition and, for five of them, I was not in Parliament. But I can potentially help my noble friend by saying that it was initially planned to extend the PACE powers to Northern Ireland in 2013, alongside the same processes being undertaken in England and Wales. I am advised that limited resources and/or competing priorities meant that that was not implemented. There was also the additional factor of the closure of the Belfast criminal financial investigations office between 2017 and 2022, which made it difficult to pursue those regulations until now. Questions of why those decisions on resources or legislative capacity were made and why the office was closed are beyond my capacity, but those are the facts of the assessment that has been made. That is what I have been advised.
My noble friend also asked what changes these powers make. The regulations give officers a number of powers that they do not already have. Immigration criminal investigations in Northern Ireland will now benefit from a number of provisions of PACE, notably: Section 19 in relation to powers of seizure in relation to evidence of non-immigration offences; Section 8, relating to warrants; Sections 9 and Schedule 1, which give access to excluded or special procedural material; Section 20, giving extension of seizure powers to include information on computers; Section 46A on power of arrest for failure to answer bail; and Sections 18 and 32 on simplified powers of seizure and search.
Border Force officers with customs powers will no longer have to rely on the temporary measures that were set out in Section 22 of BCIA back in the day. Therefore, officers will benefit from the following provisions not currently applied in 2007: guidance and consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions; telephone review of custody; detention after charge, search and examination; and a number of other points.
These powers have successfully been exercised in England and Wales with no controversy over the past 13 years. When the powers come into force, agreed by Parliament, which I hope will be soon, then in late February or early March, pending parliamentary approval, they will be available to customs officers on the ground. That is important because the powers will be available also to officers from the rest of the United Kingdom undertaking in-country investigations when required. Immigration Enforcement officers currently undertake criminal investigations and have powers of arrest and detention. Border Force designated customs officers do not lead on criminal investigations, which is a point that my noble friend asked about. This is done predominantly by the police or the National Crime Agency. Again, she asked about consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive. We have had no response on those issues from the Executive, and I am taking no response in terms of no comment.
I also potentially do not have the detail of the consultation with the Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission at this moment but, if my noble friend will allow me, I will look into that and respond to her in due course—if need be. On reflection, I think a full equality impact assessment probably has been completed and that would have included discussions in which the two bodies that my noble friend mentioned would have had an opportunity to input.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsTuesday 20th January 2026
(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-XI(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Eleventh Marshalled List) - (20 Jan 2026)
Lord Davies of Gower
“Stop and searchIn section 60(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of, or after, violence)— (a) in paragraph (a) omit “serious”, and(b) in paragraph (aa)(i) omit “serious”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would lower the threshold for stop and search to “violence” rather than “serious violence”.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 411 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. The amendment was championed by my honourable friend Matt Vickers in Committee in the other place.
The amendment alters the statutory threshold for the exercise of the powers under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. That section permits a police officer of at least the rank of inspector to authorise stop and search powers within a defined locality for a period of 24 hours. Where such an authorisation has been given, a police officer may stop any member of the public to search them for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments without suspicion of the commission of an offence—so, essentially, it allows for a temporary adjustment to standard stop and search powers.
The current test that must be met is for the officer of sufficient rank to reasonably believe that incidents involving serious violence may take place in any locality in his police area. Our amendment would lower the threshold so that the police would be able to use Section 60 powers where there is a reasonable likelihood of violence, not serious violence. The fundamental principle behind this amendment is that the police should be able to act where there is a threat of violence—any form of violence—without being required to weigh the seriousness of that violence. This would remove the more subjective element of the test.
We know that stop and search powers are highly effective in combating crime and preventing violent offences. In the year ending March 2025, there were a total of 528,582 stops and searches conducted by officers in England and Wales. This represented a slight decrease of 1.4% from the previous year. Of those, 5,572 were conducted under Section 60 powers, which actually represented an increase of 5.4%. This is welcome; I am pleased to see the police making good use of their powers. But, given that there were 1.1 million incidents of violence with or without injury recorded by the police in the year ending June 2025, that the figure that the ONS has given shows no statistically significant change compared with the previous year, and that there were still 51,527 knife offences, there is more work that needs to be done. Lowering the threshold for the use of Section 60 is another tool that the Government could utilise in their efforts to crack down on the use of offensive weapons and the incidence of violence. I beg to move.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend on the Front Bench. At this juncture, I also thank the Committee for its forbearance when I was not able to move my previous amendment on mobile phone theft. I put on record my warmest thanks to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving it so eloquently on that occasion.
This is an issue about the difference between “serious violence” and “violence”, but the wider context is the fact that the UK has a knife crime problem. In London, the number of incidents up to June 2025 was 15,639, which was an increase of nearly 72% from the data recorded in 2015-16. Unfortunately, it has to be said that the number of stop and search encounters peaked at the end of the last Labour Government and dramatically decreased under the two previous Governments. Between 2003 and 2011, stop and search numbers increased, peaking at 1.2 million, but by 2018 this had fallen by 77%. The number of arrests resulting from stop and search encounters had fallen from 120,000 to 48,000.
The fact is that there is significant evidence that stop and search does demonstrably have an impact on the incidence of knife crime, and therefore reduces crime. In a study released in 2025, the two criminologists Alexis Piquero and Lawrence Sherman analysed data between 2008 and 2023, and found that stop and search encounters were successful in reducing deaths and injuries related to weapons. The conclusion of the study was that
“increased stop and search encounters can significantly reduce knife-related injuries and homicides in public places”.
Evidence from a number of bodies and think tanks, including Policy Exchange, suggests that, while there may be a range of causal factors, a link between rates of knife crime and rates of stop and search exists. As the rate of stop and search decreases, the amount of knife crime increases. As stop and search rises, the amount of knife crime falls. The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, Sir Stephen Watson, said last year:
“If you don’t back your officers to do stop and search, they will stop doing stop and search. And if you stop doing stop and search, you’ll see street robberies going up”.
The issue is the difference between “serious violence” and “violence” within that context. My simple point to the Committee is that, if we want to take weapons off the street and prevent incidents of knife crime and other crime, we have to increase stop and search. Therefore, you have to give warranted officers the legal underpinning and the authority to make the appropriate decisions for stop and search. In 2023, there were 5,014 occasions when a police officer found a weapon or firearm when looking for a different prohibited item. In 3,221 of those cases, they were looking for drugs. This is a case of effective policing and not just getting lucky. So, if they could stop for “violence”, they might find weapons that could have led to a more serious situation. If not, there is a potential for people to just walk away.
On that basis, it is wise for the Government to consider this amendment, because it allows flexibility in operational policing. Fundamentally, it will prevent crime and may even in the long run prevent serious injury or death. Therefore, I invite Ministers and the Committee to give this amendment their strong support.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, there is now considerable evidence about how stop and search powers are used in practice, their impact and long-term consequences, not least in building trust, which is so vital for effective community policing. Stop and search powers, especially under Section 60—suspicionless powers —already fall disproportionately on marginalised communities, particularly black and minority ethnic young men. Lowering the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” can only increase the frequency and breadth of those powers and with it the disproportionality. This is not an abstract civil liberties concern but goes directly to trust and confidence.
It is also just 18 months since the Home Office accepted the findings of a police inspectorate report that identified serious shortcomings in the use of Section 60 powers, including low arrest and seizure rates for weapons, inadequate training and failures to adhere to statutory duties, such as PACE Code A or voluntary frameworks such as College of Policing APP guidance.
From a Liberal Democrat perspective, the test for expanding intrusive powers is a simple one. Is there a clear and compelling operational case, supported by evidence, that the existing powers are inadequate and that widening them will improve outcomes without unacceptable collateral damage to rights and community relations? We do not believe that the case has been made here. What is on offer is a lower legal bar for the most intrusive stop and search powers we have, imposed on communities that already experience it acutely, with no serious account taken of the long-term impact on policing by consent. On that basis, we cannot support the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a very interesting short debate, and I thank my noble friends—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I did indicate that minor scuffles would not be seen as serious violence. I am not trying to determine from this Dispatch Box the use of a Section 60 power by a police officer on the ground because of the level of violence the police have witnessed and wish to act upon. If we look at the figure 16 years ago, it was significantly higher than in the 12 months prior to now, at just over 5,000. The law has not changed but, going back to the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, police practice and police assessments have meant that they do not need to use that power. In parallel with that, the Government believe that if we wish to make an impact on knife crime, stop and search is a tool in extremis but better education, youth futures programmes and policing hot spots are more effective ways of reducing the problem overall. With that, I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has become an even more interesting debate, and I thank noble Lords for their contributions, particularly my noble friends Lord Jackson and Lord Blencathra.
I say to the Minister and to noble Lords that this amendment is intended to help the Government. Regardless of our politics, everyone would like to see a reduction in violent offences, and increasing police use of stop and search is an incredibly powerful tool to do just that. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Sentamu, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that there is nothing wrong with stop and search. Stop and search is one of the most useful tools in the box. Having spent 32 years on front-line policing in London, I know that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, it is an issue of training and adherence to the codes of practice. There is no question about that in my mind. That is what police need to be concentrating on when it comes to the issues around stop and search.
Lowering the threshold to the likelihood of violence would enable officers to intervene earlier to prevent harm, protect the public and de-escalate potentially dangerous situations before they result in injury or worse, and before becoming serious violence cases. I know full well that officers often face rapidly evolving situations in which it is difficult to draw a clear line between violence and serious violence. I hope that the Government take this away and reflect, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Prohibition on police use of digital ID(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.(2) After section 6 insert—“6A Police not to require digital identity document(1) If, at any time, His Majesty’s Government introduce a digital identity document scheme, a constable may not—(a) require a person to produce a digital identity card on request,(b) ask a person to produce a digital identity document for inspection, or(c) use any information contained within, or obtained from, a digital identity card for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence.(2) In this section a “digital identity document” means a document which—(a) is issued to an individual by a relevant authority,(b) is available only digitally, and(c) contains or records information which could be used to identify the person.”.”
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it has become a cliché to say that a week is a long time in politics, but it is an idiom that forever rings true. We began a couple of weeks ago with the Government still firmly wed to the idea that digital ID cards were going to save us all, and we ended the week with the policy relegated to a footnote in future history books. As with everything the Government touch these days, the digital ID policy had become completely toxic and incredibly unpopular, forcing them into the U-turn. It is a U-turn I am supportive of, and I am pleased that the Government have finally seen sense and ditched this policy.
I suppose I should be grateful to the Minister for somewhat negating the need for this amendment. It is quite easy being in opposition when the Government do your job for you.
The amendment is intended as a safeguard to prevent the police being able to require a person to show them a digital identity card when—or should I say if—such a scheme is ever introduced. Fundamentally, this whole debate comes down to who we are as a nation. Britain has never been a country where, in peacetime, one must have an identity card simply because the state mandates it.
I heard much Newspeak about the policy from Government Ministers soon after the announcement. Following the immediate backlash, many started claiming that it was not going to be mandatory after all, and that it was simply mandatory if you wanted to work. The Prime Minister said at the announcement of the policy:
“Let me spell that out: you will not be able to work in the United Kingdom if you do not have digital ID. It’s as simple as that”.
But requiring everyone who wants a job to have digital ID does make it mandatory—we all need to go to work to earn a living. We heard the justification change more times than we could count. First, it was needed to stop illegal migration and illegal working. That argument was soon blown out of the water by the fact that employers are already required to undertake right-to-work checks, and those who violate the law already were never going to suddenly start conducting such checks simply because of the existence of digital ID. Then we heard that it was necessary for efficiency and joined-up services. I can only wonder what the next justification would have been.
That is why I tabled this amendment. It was always a probing amendment, but we must make these arguments to stand up for the principle. The Government might have U-turned on this now, but what is to say that we do not see this pernicious policy creep back towards becoming mandatory in the future? In such a scenario, having such a legislative guardrail against potential police use of digital ID would make sense.
Fundamentally, the principle is that Britain is not a country where police officers require the presentation of mandatory ID cards. A person should be able, if they so wish, to go about their lives with as minimal interference by the state as possible. Digital ID cards were a wrong-headed and poorly thought-through policy, costing large sums of money that we do not have and coming at the expense of fundamental British values. I am glad to see the back of the mandatory element, but we must guard against any future expansions of this scheme. I beg to move.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I am, of course, also delighted that this amendment is now unnecessary and irrelevant, but it fits into some broader concerns that have been expressed in Committee, such as the planned nationwide rollout of police-operated live facial recognition cameras and a whole range of technology used to introduce a surveillance state. The use of digital ID would have not only created that very unpleasant checking of one’s papers by the police but introduced an element of technology which, without being anti-technology, could be seen as problematic.
I noted and would like the Minister’s response to an interview that the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, did with Sir Tony Blair last week, in which she talked about AI and technology having a transformative impact on
“the whole of the law and order space”,
which would therefore mean that digital ID was not totally off the table. The Home Secretary said
“my ultimate vision for that part of the criminal justice system was to achieve, by means of AI and technology, what Jeremy Bentham tried to do with his Panopticon. That is that the eyes of the state can be on you at all times”—
a rather chilling declaration, I must say. At this stage, as we are not going to have to discuss digital ID, that broad use of technology and surveillance might be something that the Minister could reassure us on specifically. It is good to see the back of digital ID, but I am not keen on the eyes of the state being on us at all times as a justification for tackling crime and disorder.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am going to try to stay roughly on the topic of the amendment, rather than turn this into a wider debate on the introduction of digital ID, because I am not entirely sure that my briefing will cover all the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, has addressed.
To be absolutely clear, we are not stepping back from the idea of introducing a digital ID. On 15 January, there was an Urgent Question on the issue in the other place that was repeated here. We have been very clear that we are introducing a digital ID programme. There are two core objectives: first, to make accessing public services easier and to make the state work better for ordinary people, and, secondly, to aid with right-to-work checks and catching those who are working illegally. To be clear, that is still happening. As I say, there is a public consultation coming that will set out the scope of the scheme, and those who wish to respond will be able to respond in those terms.
To respond directly to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, around the use of ID by policing and enforcement agencies, there are already safeguards in place to ensure that the use of any such measures is balanced against the need to protect individual privacy rights. That will be the same for digital ID as it is for existing police access to information contained within the passport and immigration databases, for example, which is done in specific circumstances where that is lawful, necessary and proportionate. An example of a legal safeguard already in place is contained in the UK Borders Act 2007, which makes it clear that holders of e-visas cannot be required to carry them at all times.
I think I have already touched on the issue of stop and search, but I cannot quite remember because of the flow of the interventions. To be clear, the digital ID will not be used as part of stop and search, and police officers will never demand to see it as part of stop and search. However, consistent with current powers where immigration enforcement are carrying out an enforcement visit or warrant, they have powers to ensure that all those who are employed have the right to work in the UK. These powers include the ability to demand ID, take biometrics, and detain, search and seize property to assist their investigation. I hope that provides some clarity on that point.
Given the considerations that I have set out, particularly the fact that the introduction of the digital ID scheme will require its own legislation in future, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank all those who have contributed to this short debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.
At the time when this amendment was tabled, the Government were pressing ahead with plans that would have fundamentally altered the relationship between the citizen and the state. The prospect of compulsory digital ID, coupled with the possibility of routine police access to digital identity data, raised serious concerns about privacy and subsequent state overreach. It was precisely because of those concerns and the lack of apparent or clear safeguards that the amendment was necessary. Indeed, I am still not clear from what the Minister said in his response as to whether it will be introduced in future or whether it will be compulsory.
Since then, as we have heard, the Government have performed a U-turn, announcing that digital ID will no longer be mandatory. The amendment before us was therefore not speculative or hypothetical; it was a direct response to a live and deeply unpopular government policy. We can only hope that this sudden enthusiasm for reversing course is not confined to digital ID alone. While the U-turn means that the immediate threat that prompted it has receded, the wider issue remains unresolved. The Government’s approach to digital identity remains unclear and may change again before Report. For the time being, I will withdraw the amendment, but it is something that we will continue to consider. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, as the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, said, this is Groundhog Day, and I fear we are rehearsing many of the points raised on earlier groups. We on these Benches do not support Amendment 416 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. As we have heard, there are many reasons why someone might choose to wear a face covering while cycling or scooting, ranging from the practical to the health related. As we have heard, if it is cold weather, of course you are going to wear a scarf or a face covering to keep yourself warm and prevent wind burn. Quite frankly, in the recent cold weather, that might even prevent you getting frostbite while you are cycling along.
In urban areas, there are specific masks that people wear to tackle the pollution that we still have in many of our cities, to deal with and filter out pollutants, dust and exhaust fumes. How is that wrong? Why would we want to prevent people doing that? Likewise, if we have extreme heat, people sometimes wear masks because they want to block out pollen and other allergens, and also to protect themselves from UV rays. While in this Chamber we have heard often, in my experience so far, quite negative debate about cyclists, there are many cyclists here, and they will know that covering your face prevents bugs, dirt and small debris hitting their mouth or nose while they are riding. I am an occasional cyclist, and I wear sunglasses and wrap up warm when I am out cycling to protect myself from the glare and debris. It is practical. How would we make that a problem? Why is it a cause for concern? It is practical clothing for people who choose to cycle or scoot. Why are we treating those people as criminals?
There is a separate need for management of micromobility, which has come out in all these discussions. It would be good to hear from the Minister when we might expect some legislation around managing micromobility, the explosion of e-bikes and e-scooters on our streets, and the extension of trial after trial by the previous Government. But this amendment treats all cyclists and those riding scooters as criminals, rather than as individuals dressing for their mode of transport. I hope that the Government will agree with me and these Benches that it is disproportionate and not needed in the Bill.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling Amendment 416, which I entirely support. I also thank noble Lords who have contributed, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution.
The amendment, as my noble friend ably set out, would give constables the power to stop individuals cycling while wearing a face covering. Failing to do so would constitute an offence liable to a month’s imprisonment or a fine of up to £1,000. While I know that opposition to this amendment has claimed that this means police powers encroaching into an entirely innocuous activity, it is unfortunately now a necessary measure. What previously would have been a harmless and inoffensive act has been perverted by criminals into a means by which to commit crime and escape justice. We are facing a theft epidemic in this country, largely concentrated in our cities, where youths, often in gangs, shoplift and snatch phones.
Our capital city is now the phone theft capital of Europe, where a phone is snatched every seven and a half minutes. The United Kingdom accounts for almost 40% of all phone thefts on the continent. I task any Member of the Committee to watch footage of these phone thefts and deny that there is a problem with face coverings and bikes. Face coverings mean that they are not detected by CCTV, while electric bikes, often modified, mean that the victim has no chance of chasing and retrieving the stolen property. The same is true for shoplifting. CCTV footage consistently shows offenders using face coverings to evade detection, then using bikes and scooters to flee the scene. The cost to retailers of this shoplifting inevitably is passed on to consumers, and last year amounted to £2 billion.
The police must have the power to stop these criminals, and this amendment provides the grounds for it. It is often impossible to see where a thief has a stolen item on their possession, so we must look for other pointers as to who is committing these crimes. Allowing the police to intervene when they are in public on a bike or scooter is the next necessary step. It would dramatically increase the chances of victims being returned their stolen property and allow the police to begin to tackle the epidemic that we find ourselves in.
I once again thank my noble friend for her amendment, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling Amendment 416. I recognise the concerns that she set out, and those set out very clearly by the many noble Lords who contributed to the debate, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, about the use of bicycles and scooters in facilitating crime and anti-social behaviour.
The Government have committed to the winter of action initiative, which is running from 1 December 2025 to the end of January. This initiative is intended to focus on making town centres across England and Wales safer by building on the safer streets summer initiative and continuing efforts to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, while addressing retail crime and night-time economy offences, particularly during the darker evenings that we have in winter, when there are higher risks to public safety.
I say directly to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that we are setting a framework. We always say, and I think all sides of the Committee agree, that it is for good reasons of operational independence that the police decide their priorities and how they deploy their resources, which will always be scarce however much we want to give them—there will never be enough. These initiatives give us confidence that the police are treating these sorts of offences as a priority and understand the concerns not only of this Committee but across wider society about the sorts of offences that the noble Viscount and other noble Lords set out.
The police do have powers to act here, and we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about police powers to stop any vehicles, which is a good point. However, the powers to which I am going to refer are different, and this goes to the point raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 requires individuals to remove face coverings in designated areas where they are being used for the purposes of concealing their identity and gives police the power to seize the face covering. Areas can be designated when an officer of the rank of at least inspector reasonably believes that crime is likely to take place there. We encourage police forces to make full use of these powers in areas they know to be crime hotspots. This includes any road users or cyclists, including those working for food delivery companies, as my noble friend Lord Shamash set out, when the police have due course, and irrespective of the type of vehicle being used, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, went to some lengths to describe.
In addition, local authorities have powers to make public spaces protection orders, which can prohibit specified acts in designated areas. I understand that a number of local authorities already have in place PSPOs that ban the wearing of face coverings in the area covered by the order, to deal with exactly this kind of anti-social behaviour by Balaclava-wearing cyclists.
This is probably as good a point as any to mention that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, mentioned live facial recognition. I am not sure that either was in their place for the debate we had in Committee last Thursday, but I reiterate that there is a live consultation on live facial recognition, so I once again encourage noble Lords, if interested, to contribute to that and set out their views on live facial recognition.
There are of course legitimate reasons why cyclists may wear a face covering, as we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, including health reasons or just to keep out the cold. That is often, but not always, seasonal. Notwithstanding the Stakhanovite efforts made, at least in London by the mayor, to tackle air quality through ULEZ and other measures, it is sometimes about protecting cyclists from inhaling particulates and the like. It would be disproportionate to introduce a blanket prohibition of the kind envisaged by Amendment 416 or, for that matter, to extend the Section 60AA powers, to which I have already referred, to situations where there are no grounds to reasonably believe that criminal activity may take place in a particular location. Given these considerations, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
We are saying here that the requirement to remove this would be accompanied by some sort of reasonable suspicion that that person had been committing a crime, so it is not just a person who has a cough or a cold.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, the amendment rightly exposes a serious weakness in our current system. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, points out, HMICFRS can diagnose deep-seated problems within police forces but it does not have the power to make sure these problems are fixed. There are simply too few national levers to deal with police underperformance. Labour’s manifesto included a clear commitment to give HMICFRS new powers to intervene in failing forces, and Ministers have signalled that they want to legislate to do this. We welcome that, but the Bill contains no such clause. I appreciate that a White Paper might be imminent. Even so, I urge the Government not to miss this golden opportunity to legislate now for clear, time-bound duties and proper escalation mechanisms, so that police forces are required to act on inspectorate findings.
Amendment 416A seeks to take the Government further by building this question into a wider statutory review of policing oversight. We support that intention, but we part company with the noble Baroness on the mechanism she proposes. Setting up yet another independent commission, with the terms of reference to be devised by the Secretary of State, approved by the Commons and then followed by nine months of deliberation, risks delaying change for at least another year. The evidence base is already substantial. What is missing is not diagnosis but the authority to enforce it. The noble Baroness is quite right that enforcement is a wider problem, one that extends beyond HMICFRS to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where lessons are not always learned, to put it mildly. I agree with the spirit of co-ordination, but we must remember that the IOPC’s role is distinct—to oversee complaints and investigate the most serious misconduct. It is not, and should not become, a general performance regulator for police forces. That role properly lies with HMICFRS and, ultimately, with Ministers.
From these Benches, our preference is clear: do not commission another review and, instead, move directly and decisively to give the inspectorate the power it so clearly needs. For too long, we have had excellent reports, full of well-reasoned recommendations, almost all accepted by the police and the Government, but nothing happens. That inaction is rarely followed up. Measures that ensure that we no longer see the same failures repeated again and again would be very welcome.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for bringing forward Amendment 416A. While I recognise the intention to ensure that policing is subject to effective scrutiny and that regulatory bodies have the tools they need to drive improvement, I do not believe this amendment is necessary, nor do I think it would represent a proportionate or effective use of time and resources. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services already plays a well-established role in ensuring accountability. It has extensive powers to inspect, report and make recommendations, and these reports are published and robust. They are laid before Parliament and used by the Home Office and policing bodies to drive reform. Where forces fall short, the existing framework already enables escalation, follow-up inspections and external pressure.
I was also worried that this amendment risks duplicating work already being carried out within existing structures. The policing oversight landscape includes His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, police and crime commissioners and parliamentary scrutiny through Select Committees. Co-ordination between these bodies is important, and I suggest it would be more constructive to ensure the better use of these mechanisms rather than create a new independent commission.
It is also worth noting the practical burden imposed by this amendment. It would require the Government to establish a commission, set detailed terms of reference, run a comparative review across multiple regulators, and timetable parliamentary debates in both Houses within a very tight timeframe. That is a significant undertaking that may not be justified, given the absence of clear evidence that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services lacks the necessary authority to fulfil its core function. For those reasons, while I very much respect the motivation behind the amendment, I do not believe it necessary or proportionate and therefore cannot support it.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for Amendment 416A. It gives me an opportunity, if nothing else, to pay tribute to His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services for the work it does; she was right to point out its professionalism. Moreover, I want to pay tribute to the current chief inspector, Sir Andy Cooke, who has announced his intention to retire in March. He has served as chief inspector with distinction, has 40 years of service to policing and was Chief Constable of Merseyside. I hope that your Lordships’ House will join me in thanking Sir Andy for his dedicated service.
The Police Act 1996 requires His Majesty’s inspectorate to publish an inspection programme and an inspection framework which, following consultation, are laid before Parliament. The latest versions of these were put before the House on 4 March 2025. As part of its work, HMICFRS inspects every police force as part of its Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy programme, and gives the force a grading on a series of indicators. All these findings are published and are available to chief constables, local policing bodies, the PCC, the public and, importantly, Ministers. HMICFRS also publishes a number of thematic reports covering every aspect of policing, and these form a useful tool for the policing sector to drive performance.
I agree with the noble Baroness that it is important that recommendations made by HMICFRS do not just sit on the shelf, are taken seriously and are implemented, and that those affected make sure that the public are receiving the best possible service as a whole. It is important that the three points she mentioned are examined: inspection findings, closer co-operation, and lessons learned. She quoted to the Committee the manifesto, in which we did say we would give HMICFRS new powers to intervene with failing forces. She is right to point to the fact that there is a police White Paper, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, also mentioned, which is expected to be published shortly. By shortly—I know this is always a topic of interest to the Committee— I do mean shortly in this case. I encourage your Lordships to study that document carefully when it is published, because it contains a wide-ranging set of proposals for improving policing in England and Wales. I hope it will go some way toward shining a light, at least, on the three questions the noble Baroness has put to the Committee today.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this very important amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Young. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs.
The status quo is untenable. It undermines free speech, diverts police resources from real crime and risks criminalising people for behaviour that is lawful and should remain outside the criminal justice system. We on these Benches firmly support the abolition of non-crime hate incidents. Non-crime hate incidents in essence are reports of conduct perceived by someone to be motivated by hostility or prejudice against a protected characteristic which do not meet the threshold of a criminal offence. Under current law, police forces record and retain personal data about those incidents, even though no crime has occurred and no legal breach has been established. That alone is problematic but, in practice, the effects are far worse. Current figures estimate that around 13,000 non-crime hate incidents are logged annually, consuming an estimated 60,000-plus hours of police time that could be better directed to tackling burglary, serious violence, organised crime and other priority areas.
Recording an incident and retaining personal data about motives that are merely perceived rather than proven also has a detrimental and unwelcome effect on free speech. People who express lawful opinions, engage in robust debate or even make clumsy social media posts can find themselves on a police database, not because they have committed a crime but because someone has taken offence to those remarks.
This is not a hypothetical shortcoming of policy: there have been cases where almost trivial or schoolyard remarks became the subject of police records. In one high-profile instance, the arrest of a public figure over a social media post was initially associated with a non-crime hate incident, sparking national debate about policing speech and proportionality. It is no surprise, then, that police leaders and independent watchdogs are reassessing the value of non-crime hate incidents. The Chief Inspector of Constabulary has publicly stated that non-crime hate incidents should not be recorded by police because they risk conflating the offensive with the criminal, diminishing public trust and harming legitimate free expression.
Similarly, the Metropolitan Police recently announced that it will no longer investigate non-crime hate incidents, recognising the difficulty that officers face when drawn into matters that are not criminal by definition. The Government’s response to date has been to commission yet another review, with the suggestion that policy decisions should wait until later in the year. But on an issue that so directly impacts both civil liberties and police effectiveness, delay is not a defensible option.
Amendment 416E would go further than reviews. It would abolish the concept of non-crime hate incidents entirely, prohibit any police authority from recording or processing related personal data and require the deletion of existing records. In doing so, it draws a clear distinction between criminal behaviour, which it is right that the police investigate, and lawful expression or debate that should not be subject to police recording or sanction.
We cannot allow a system that treats controversial yet lawful speech as if it were a matter for the criminal justice system. This amendment is a sensible and necessary step to realign policing with its once core mission of protecting people from crime and harm, not policing speech or perceptions. Therefore, we on these Benches very much support this amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for tabling this amendment. This has been a useful debate, and I hope that we can at least look at the common direction of travel on this matter: the need for reform.
I have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, through the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I have also heard from the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Kempsell, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Herbert of South Downs, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler- Sloss. They have raised a range of issues that, in essence, point to the need for change in this system.
I think it is fair to say, and I hope that the Committee will accept, that the current Government have held office since July 2024. There has been a lot of discussion on the issues caused by, and effect of, non-crime hate incidents since the guidance was published in 2014. I do not want to lose the principle, which was mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Herbert of South Downs, that the non-crime hate incident regime had its genesis in the Macpherson report, and in trying to anticipate and examine where crimes were being committed, potentially in the future, and monitor a range of abuses that were present.
However, I say to the Committee—and I think this was recognised by Members in their contributions today —that how the police should respond to hate incidents that fall below the criminal threshold is a complex and sensitive issue. That is precisely why the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Normanton, and the current Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Shabana Mahmood, the Member for Ladywood, have asked the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to conduct a thorough review into non-crime hate incidents.
The review is examining whether the current approach is proportionate, consistent and compatible with the fundamental right to free expression—which goes to very point that was made. As the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, said, the review is being led by policing experts and is expected to conclude, in his words, “shortly”. The publication date is one for the College of Policing. We have had the interim report, which has said that there are significant concerns in the way non-crime hate incidents are operating.
Given the points that have been made today, and given that the Government have commissioned a review, seen the interim report and, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, expect to receive the final report shortly, I would again ask the Committee to bear with us—I know that I have asked for this on a number of occasions—to examine what professional police officers and the College of Policing are recommending on non-crime hate incidents.
The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, rightly asked some significant questions. What is happening to database logging of anti-social behaviour incidents? What is happening to people who have previously had non-crime hate incidents put against their name? What is happening with regard to non-disclosure? What is happening in terms of the publication of the report and the Government’s response? Those are all fair and legitimate questions.
However, I say to the noble Lord and the Committee that the current Government have come in, recognised that there is an issue, commissioned the College of Policing to look at that issue and have received an independent report, and we expect a full report on how we can deal with those issues and tweak the regime so that we do not lose the very good things that have sometimes been brought out of non-crime hate incidents and we do not throw everything out immediately. I do not know what the final report is going to say.
At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, said:
“The review has found that the current approach and use of non-crime hate incidents is not fit for purpose, and there is a need for broad reform to ensure that policing can focus on genuine harm and risk within communities. The recording of hurt feelings and differing views should not continue”.—[Official Report, 16/10/25; col. 406.]
That is a very clear statement. However, in moving from that in the interim report to whatever the new regime might be, it is incumbent on the Government to reflect on what the final report says. I am not ducking the amendment that the noble Lord has brought forward, nor his challenge that we need to make some changes. As he says, there is an open door. If we did not want this to be reviewed, we would not have asked the College of Policing and the Police Chiefs’ Council to review the incidence of non-crime hate incidents. Self-evidently, some of the examples given today are not what the original purpose of that legislation and approach was meant to be.
Going back to the Macpherson report, there was a serious element as to how assessments have been made. In Committee today, Members have talked about anti- semitism, racism and a range of incidents where the collection of information might give a bigger intelligence picture that requires a policing response, but which may or may not be a policing response that requires individuals to have their names put against them.
The concerns of everybody, from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, through to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, are legitimate, and the Government want to look at and address them. I hope that this can be examined. However, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment and await the outcome of the police review, so that any reforms are grounded in both robust evidence and a consensus.
Ultimately, the Government must and will take some decisions, and we will be held to account in the House of Commons and in this House as well. In the absence of that detailed response, I am not sure that I can come to this Committee and say, “This is what we will do”, because we need to examine that in detail.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsThursday 15th January 2026
(4 weeks, 2 days ago)
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Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention and her questions. I say, with great courtesy to the Government Whip, that her first question does not relate to the amendment because it is not about an offence. She was talking about the pre-banning of people and asking whether harm is so broad. However, that is a debate we need to have as society.
That leads into the noble Baroness’s second question about whether young people can distinguish. I think young people can distinguish. Part of the issue is that we as an older generation do not understand that a lot of them take a great deal of care about their colleagues because they have been brought up in a society with the rules, as opposed to having to introduce them, and they have seen exactly the concerns that I was raising. We need to continue to debate this but, bringing it back to this amendment, the point is that none of those issues is about offences.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for this interesting debate. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for moving Amendment 382F, which I support. Although it ranges across several statutes, it is in truth a coherent proposal with a clear constitutional purpose: to restore the proper limits of the criminal law so that freedom of speech is protected, while of course ensuring that genuinely threatening conduct remains criminal.
At the outset, I recognise the political sensitivity of this area. Any proposal to amend or repeal so-called hate speech provisions risks being misrepresented as indifference to racism, misogyny, homophobia or other forms of discrimination. Let me be absolutely clear: that is not the motivation behind this amendment. As my noble friend said, we on this side of the House oppose racism and discrimination in all their forms. The case for this amendment is not moral indifference but legal realism. The current framework has proved incoherent, ineffective and, in some respects, actively counterproductive.
As my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea most ably set out, the current legislative framework dealing with offensive language, hate speech and the like is a messy, tangled web of patchwork offences. We have the Malicious Communications Act 1988, Sections 4A and 5 and Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. These provisions criminalise speech not because it threatens direct harm but because it is deemed “abusive” or “insulting” or said to cause a person “needless anxiety”.
I am not ignorant to the fact that we have had laws in this country prohibiting the usage of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour for almost a century. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, now repealed, stated:
“Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence”.
But there are two crucial differences between that legislation and this. The 1936 Act was set against the background of rising fascist paramilitaries, first in Italy and then in Germany and, indeed, in Britain. Secondly, use of the language
“with intent to provoke a breach of the peace”
is very different from outlawing insulting language likely to cause a person “needless anxiety”. I think even a child could understand the difference between inciting a riot and causing a person mild offence.
Yet this is where we are. A person can claim to have been caused “annoyance” or even “inconvenience”, complain to the police and have another individual investigated and potentially arrested. That is not hyperbole; it is the truth. There is a litany of recent examples that we could trawl through, but many have been mentioned by noble Lords today so I will mention only a few, as briefly as I can.
As we have heard, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 was used to arrest Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the two parents who have been referred to. The same Act was used to arrest a 17 year-old boy for comments he posted on Tom Daley’s Twitter account:
“You let your dad down i hope you know that”.
While this is obviously poor behaviour, to claim it should be a matter for the law and constitutes criminality is deeply concerning. Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 was used to prosecute a person who posted a picture online with a phallus drawn on it; Jordan Barrack was ordered to pay £400 in compensation for a post that did not cause any harm to anyone. Again, how this case ended up as a matter for the authorities is beyond me.
Of fundamental importance is the fact that the terms we are dealing with here are not precise legal concepts. They are elastic, subjective and dependent on perception rather than consequence. The result is uncertainty for the public, inconsistency in enforcement and an unhealthy transfer of quasi-judicial discretion to individual police officers who have recently taken to very liberal and, indeed, unequal enforcement of these laws.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The noble Lord said that he did not rely on Lucy Connolly in his earlier argument; he is now trying to rely on that case here. I am trying to make the point that it is more complex than he made out in his earlier contribution. I would like to make some progress, if I may.
The previous Government’s LGBT survey in 2018 showed that fewer than one in 10 LGBT people reported hate crimes or incidents. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, has explained one of the reasons for that. The other reason, I know from friends who have also experienced this sort of hate crime, is they do not believe that the police will do anything. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young, that that is one of the reasons why there is concern about the police: too often, people who are targeted in this way feel that they do not get the help that they need.
As has been described, there is no single piece of hate crime legislation. It includes aggravated assault, which the noble Lord, Lord Young, was particularly concerned about. The point about hate crime is that it is not just the individual; the protected characteristic means that they and their community are also affected by it. We have spent many hours on previous groups on this Bill discussing the absolute abhorrence of antisemitism. If actions in Israel can cause people in the UK to start attacking members of our Jewish community, either verbally or against a person or their property, then that is absolutely unacceptable. That is one of the reasons why I would never want hate crimes to be removed.
Research by Professor Mark Walters of Sussex University shows that hate crimes do not affect just those individuals targeted; he describes them as having a “ripple effect” through their wider communities. Some people will avoid certain routes and places, and others will not leave home at all, particularly in our Jewish communities at the moment, but the same is true in certain areas for our Muslim communities. If laws about hate crime are weakened or repealed, it would send an appalling message to these communities of faith, as well as to LGBT and disabled people. Do the supporters of the amendment really no longer regard it as important that the state recognises the communities that have protected characteristics—their vulnerability—as warranting distinct legal recognition and criminalisation?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, once again, this has been a very interesting debate and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for tabling Amendment 382G. This amendment contains a line of argument that the Committee began to consider in the previous group: namely, whether the criminal law should concern itself with what people do or whether it should also punish what people are thought to feel or believe.
The provisions targeted by this amendment fall broadly into two categories. First, there are ordinary criminal offences—assault, criminal damage, harassment and public order offences—where existing penalties are increased if the court concludes that the offender was motivated by hostility towards a protected characteristic. Secondly, there are freestanding offences, particularly under the Public Order Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which criminalised the stirring up of hatred, even where no violence or other recognised criminal harm has occurred.
The crux of the debate comes down to this: two identical acts can result in radically different sentences depending not on the harm caused but on an inferred state of mind. That inference might be drawn from sparse or ambiguous evidence, yet it carries profound consequences for liberty. This could make prosecutions more complex, investigations longer and outcomes less predictable—hardly a recipe for clarity or fairness. These laws have grown incrementally and unevenly; they overlap, diverge, and sometimes contradict one another. The result is a body of legislation that is difficult to understand, inconsistently applied and increasingly divorced from public confidence.
This amendment offers the Committee an opportunity to step back and ask whether this approach has genuinely improved justice or whether it has instead distracted our criminal justice system from its core task of tackling real and harmful crime. This is a point that I would particularly like to emphasise. As a former police officer myself, I understand the difficulties in enforcing laws that are passed by a well-meaning Parliament but are incoherent and ill thought through. Part of this problem does indeed lie with us, the lawmakers. Successive Governments and Parliaments have not taken a coherent approach to public order and speech legislation. They have passed statute after statute, simply adding to the already long list of different defences, not thinking to consolidate or repeal existing laws.
When the Public Order Act 1986 passed, it contained seven offences of this nature. The previous Labour Government passed the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sections 28 to 33 of which created racially aggravated offences. They then passed the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which added a new Part 3A to the 1986 Act, and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 added hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation to the list of hate crimes. The Sentencing Act 2020 also permits for any offence to be aggravated by hostility expressed towards any of five characteristics.
This Government are going down the same path, as we have already discussed in Committee. Clauses 107 and 108 of this very Bill contain further provisions criminalising the use of offensive language based on racial hatred aimed towards an emergency worker. If the Government think it is coherent to simply bolt new offences on to the already vast array of legislation, then I respectfully suggest that they are somewhat misguided.
Furthermore, far from promoting cohesion, these provisions have too often deepened division. They have encouraged grievance politics and fostered public mistrust. They have also placed the police in an impossible position, asking them to arbitrate not just behaviour but belief and expression.
There is a further concern about effectiveness. These laws, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea mentioned, are clogging the justice system with cases that pose no real threat to public safety, while doing little to address genuine hatred or violence. At the same time, they have fed a broader culture in which accusations of hate are used to silence debate, discourage inquiry and deter people—artists, teachers, academics and ordinary citizens—from speaking openly.
Freedom of speech is not an abstract luxury; it is a defining feature of our national character and a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy. I thank my noble friend for enabling this fruitful debate and hope that the Government will consider it carefully.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Before my noble friend the Minister stands up, I will briefly intervene to say that at Second Reading, I counted 44 previous statutes that were being amended by the Bill. I just counted five in Amendment 382G. I do not know whether they join the 44 statutes in the Bill itself or whether they stand alone, but the Bill is extremely complex. In the word I used at Second Reading, it is, in this sense, a “monster” of a Bill, not because of the many provisions in it and the other provisions that noble Lords have brought out in it: that is not my point. My point is just on the complexity of the Bill. I beg that there may be a change of mind by Governments and parliamentary draftsmen and that they do not inflict Bills like this on the House.
Lord Davies of Gower
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the requirement for an officer to have electronically tracked information to enter and search a premises.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we now come to a group of amendments that seeks to improve the Government’s legislation as it currently stands. We broadly agree with the need to expand the police’s search powers, given the rise in shoplifting—that is not a term I particularly like, as it is really Section 1 theft, but I will refer to it as shoplifting for the purposes of this debate—and theft of personal property. Our only divergence is the extent to which we should extend these new powers.
The measures in the Bill are extremely necessary. We are facing an epidemic of petty theft, with phone theft and shoplifting reaching highs. One-third of adults were victims of phone theft last year, with the United Kingdom accounting for roughly 40% of all such thefts in Europe. These phones are then dismantled, deactivated and often sent abroad, with little chance of their owners getting them back.
Shoplifting gangs are terrorising high streets. Theft from shops reached over £2.2 billion last year, narrowing the margins of small independent stores and pushing up costs for the law-abiding public. Electronic stores are often targeted, with owners left helpless by the lack of power bestowed on security guards and the high costs of surveillance. The police must have the means to tackle this crime past their current capabilities. The fact that, once a criminal enters a premises, he can store the stolen goods until a search warrant is issued is not justice—it is an affront to the victim. It is not good enough to hope that officers arrive in time to arrest criminals in public for individuals to have a chance of retrieving their stolen goods. Officers must be able to enter premises without a warrant if the situation requires it.
That is why the Government’s measure is a welcome step. However, they have watered down the measures that we proposed in the Criminal Justice Bill in 2023. Where our measures would have allowed specified officers to search for stolen goods without a warrant if it is not practicable to obtain one, the Government have limited this to goods with obtainable electronic tracking data. The amendments in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie attempt to revert this measure back to its original intent so that it does not solely pertain to electronically tracked goods.
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is a point well made and well taken. I add that the powers would, of course, be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the service police, so service police would not suddenly be moving into areas of activity that you would expect the territorial police to be pursuing.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, anticipated that I was winding up. I hope that my comments have reassured the noble Lord that the spirit and intention behind his amendments have been incorporated within the proposals in the Bill. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I give thanks to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I will reiterate my opening speech by saying that I know we all have the same end goal of arresting criminals and preventing thefts. We may have different roads that we believe to be the best way of arriving at that goal, but I am confident that this debate has taken place in a productive and open-minded manner.
At the risk of repeating myself, phone theft and shoplifting, frequently targeted at electronic stores, are not just epidemics but growing ones. Crime is thriving, businesses are closing, and the public are becoming increasingly anxious. A phone is stolen every seven and a half minutes in our capital city. We cannot simply look on at the situation with the hope that it gets better.
The Government must resolve to adopt the framework from our 2023 Bill, and they must now go further. Amendments 383, 384 and 385 in my name would achieve this. They would remove the requirement that a stolen good be electronically traceable and would permit senior officers to use discretion to search premises without a warrant. These amendments answer a problem that requires immediate action. The Government must get a grip on the theft epidemic. Our measures provide them with one of many necessary solutions, and I hope the Minister takes them away for consideration.
Moving on to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I largely agree with his principle that the new clause that introduces new powers should be accompanied by checks and balances. Establishing a code of practice, having an independent mechanism for investigating complaints, providing mandatory training for senior officers and requiring an annual report on the use of the powers in question would act to safeguard the heightened powers officers will gain. This especially holds should the Government incorporate our amendments. We trust the judgment of our officers and believe that they will always make the judgment they think best, but I am conscious that we are entrusting them with more intrusive powers. Mechanisms must exist that counteract any tendencies for this power to be misused, and I believe that the noble Lord’s amendments would achieve that. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.
These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.
I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I thank the Minister for tabling, and setting out the rationale behind, this group of government amendments. Amendments 393 and 394 authorise the interception of certain communications in order to access online accounts. These amendments represent an additional measure to youth diversion orders on top of the existing powers provided to the authorities under the current drafting of the Bill.
Public safety is and should be the first priority of any Government. Youth diversion orders exist in order to curb and prevent young people from engaging in terrorist activity or associating with those affiliated to terrorist groups that seek to radicalise children. We are supportive of the measures in the Bill to increase the scope and applicability of youth diversion orders, such as Clause 167, which enables chief officers of police with the power to apply for a youth diversion order. These are necessary and proportionate measures that should be implemented in order to mitigate terrorist risk.
We on these Benches are equally supportive of the amendments in this group that are aimed at ensuring that, when youth diversion orders are made, they contain the necessary provisions to enable authorities to carry out their operations as effectively as possible. There is no point in making a youth diversion order if the provisions of that order do not sufficiently provide police with the ability to execute its objective. Terrorists and extremist groups are increasingly turning to online forums and communities in order to identify individuals for radicalisation and to spread misinformation. Therefore, where the courts deem it necessary to issue a youth diversion order, it is right that a provision of such an order can contain the inspection of any online account. Not only will that ensure that young people are kept safe from dangerous and hateful rhetoric, but it will enable authorities to understand who is targeting children and their methods of radicalisation.
It is also important that the imperative to keep the public safe is counterbalanced with appropriate regard for individual liberty. Youth diversion orders contain a number of provisions which impact on people’s daily lives, so it is right that they are sanctioned only where it is considered strictly necessary. I therefore seek assurances from the Minister that these amendments, and youth diversion orders more generally, are accompanied by having the appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate state overreach and the unnecessary deprivation of people’s freedoms and, of course, their right to privacy.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I am absolutely astonished. Until 10 minutes ago, I had no idea that these provisions existed—that a constable without suspicion could seize a person’s devices, interrogate their data and hold on to them more or less indefinitely. Could somebody, perhaps a Minister, tell me in what circumstances suspicionless search like this is justified?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing forward the amendments in question. Amendments 390 and 391 have been well reasoned, and I am particularly happy to offer my support to the principle behind them. Objectivity should be the aim of every piece of legislation, and I welcome any measures towards that end. That is particularly the case when we are dealing with laws that provide the police with powers that can be used at the expense of people’s privacy. Clause 135 does this, allowing constables to extract online information from defendants’ devices should they need to determine whether the person has been involved in an act of terrorism.
I understand the Government’s intention behind this clause, and that it may have implications for national security. However, because of the importance, we should leave as little of its interpretation to human discretion as possible. We are all aware that, while we continue to support our forces, there are occasional instances of bad faith actors and, more generally, mistakes are a natural product of human enterprise. Allowing a constable’s belief to determine whether it is necessary to retain held information is an unnecessary risk that the Government do not need to take.
Similarly, we are not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 390. Individuals who are subjected to these new powers should not have the anxiety of an indefinite investigation hanging over their heads if the authorities do not have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. For that reason, introducing a limit on the amount of time that information can be held without reasonable suspicion is sensible. That said, I am unsure whether three months is long enough for police forces to determine whether retention is necessary. This is especially the case given the heightened stress that a decrease in officer numbers will put forces under. Despite this, I hope the Minister can agree that a limit is a sensible suggestion and update the Committee on the Government’s position.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am afraid that noble Lords are going to get the full set today. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 396, which is the meat of this group of amendments. It was proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, and it addresses the profound privacy implications of Clause 138. While the Government describe the clause as a technical clarification of access to DVLA records, we on these Benches and groups such as Big Brother Watch see it as the foundation for a vast national facial recognition database. It is also a massive pre-emption, in our view, of the consultation on live facial recognition which is currently being conducted by the Government.
This amendment provides a specific and essential statutory bar. Authorised persons may not use DVLA information for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. Members of the public applying for driving licences do so to drive cars, not to be placed in a permanent digital lineup without their consent—and we know that facial recognition technology is demonstrably biased, as we discussed earlier today. Expanding its use to a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens would be a grossly disproportionate interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Government claim that this is not their intention, yet they have not put that promise in the Bill.
If the Minister is sincere that this power will not be used for mass biometric surveillance, he should have no objection to this amendment. We cannot allow the end of anonymity in public spaces to be achieved through a legislative back door. We are being asked to buy into a massive extension of police access to biometric information. The technology represents a monumental shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a shift must be governed by Parliament, not by secret police watch lists. As my noble friend Lady Doocey said, this can only lead to further erosion of public trust in the police unless these safeguards are installed.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments raises important questions about the use of data, modern policing techniques and the appropriate safeguards that must accompany them. We are sympathetic to the principle that underpins government Amendment 394A. It respects the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and the constitutional and operational sensitivities around policing. There is a careful balance that must be struck between maintaining consistency across the United Kingdom, respecting the powers of devolved Administrations and ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to keep the public safe.
There is also a parallel balance that must be struck between safeguarding individual liberties and being robust in tackling crime. While we recognise the intent behind the amendment, we also acknowledge that the Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and coherent law enforcement arrangements across all parts of the UK. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response in addressing both these issues.
Amendment 396 would prohibit the use of the DVLA database for searches using live facial recognition technology. It will probably come as no surprise that we are firmly opposed to that restriction, as it would undermine one of the key inputs on which the success of live facial recognition hinges. Live facial recognition is an important and increasingly effective tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It is particularly effective in high-crime environments and transport hubs, where the risk of serious harm is elevated and where rapid identification can make a decisive difference.
Equally, across the DVLA, using driver licensing data for law enforcement purposes is not new: nor is it unregulated. Clause 138 ensures that the use of this is accompanied by safeguards, regulation-making powers to the Secretary of State, consultation requirements, a statutory code of practice and annual reporting to Parliament. These measures are designed to ensure proportionality and accountability. To carve out facial recognition from this framework would unnecessarily impede law enforcement’s ability to use the technology effectively. It would also deny the police the ability to use accurate and targeted technology to identify individuals suspected of serious criminality, even where strong safeguards are in place.
I therefore welcome the opportunity for the Minister to expand on how facial recognition fits within this framework and on the safeguards that will ensure that its use is proportionate and effective. But we should be clear that this technology, which can save lives, disrupt violent crime and protect the public, should not be ruled out by default.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, these amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, covering the safe, proportionate and fair oversight of abnormal loads, raise an important issue. It was one that I was not particularly aware of until looking into this group of amendments. Clearly, I had not appreciated that this area had been such a social media hit since Second Reading.
We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, about the heritage rail industry and its use of abnormal loads. I have received correspondence via Helen Morgan MP outlining the real challenges for those in the heavy transport sector working with specialist contractors who operate abnormal loads across the UK highways infrastructure. As this correspondence rightly points out, no infrastructure or major engineering project is possible without the heavy transport industry. A number of the amendments seek to address the inconsistencies in how police forces handle heavy transport, abnormal loads and mobile crane movements—issues that directly impact these businesses.
As I understand the situation, there is no national framework regulating when or how police forces charge for escorting or authorising these essential movements. This is leading to, as we have heard, arbitrary and excessive fees in some areas while others provide the service at no cost, creating uncertainty, delays and financial burdens that undermine operational efficiency and investment confidence. One example I have seen is a project to transfer a piling rig through the West Midlands, which we have heard a lot about today. It was delayed due to the unexpected police escort charges and the availability of those escort services.
These amendments, among other things, are looking for the Home Secretary to introduce clear regulations on police charging for escorts and the authorisations, ensuring that we have transparency, proportionality and national consistency. I understand that these amendments have strong industry backing from organisations, including the HTA, the Construction Plant-hire Association and the Road Haulage Association, among others.
I completely understand the thinking behind some of the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on the charging for special police services for abnormal loads. I also agree that there is a concern about different charging regimes and practices. I understand that this may have already been partly addressed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council guidance and a legal framework, but I would like assurance from the Minister that this is the case.
I am sure the Government will not want to change the road vehicles order 2003 without a full consultation and impact assessment, given that this is about the safe movement of abnormal loads on our highways infrastructure. However, there is clearly a need for a consistent national approach across all police forces. Given that many of these abnormal loads are supporting infrastructure and the growth agenda, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Attlee for his long-standing commitment to this very important issue. I would venture to say that there is not another noble Lord in the Committee who cares as deeply as my noble friend does about the topic of abnormal loads.
Amendment 403 seeks to allow the police to authorise an abnormal load driver to break normal traffic rules in order to negotiate the chosen route for the load. Amendment 404 seeks to repeal the power of the police to grant certain police powers to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems that the original intention of Schedule 5 to the Police Reform Act 2002 was that the police have the powers to direct traffic and permit regulations to be broken where necessary. However, few accreditations have made it, as it would effectively allow a self-escorter not to comply with the rules of the road.
Amendment 403 and 404, taken together, would repeal this problem and offer a more flexible solution. Instead of accreditation, Amendment 403 enables the chief constable to grant a traffic regulation dispensation order to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems common sense to provide the Secretary of State with the flexibility needed to decide which regulations should be dispensed with. Moreover, the chief constable would have the authority to outline any conditions they consider necessary, such as the number of escort vehicles to be allowed. These amendments are well thought out, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 413 would require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework to manage the fees charged to hauliers by police forces for escorting a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions. This amendment has industry support. A regulatory framework will ensure that the fees charged by police forces are consistent among forces across the country. I know that my noble friend has spent much time engaging with industry stakeholders, so I hope the Minister takes his remarks and amendments seriously. I look forward to the Government’s response.
On Amendment 414, I declare myself as an owner of a shotgun. I associate myself completely with the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. I will leave it there.
I support the principle behind my noble friend’s Amendments 416D and 416M. They are, in essence, clarifying amendments that ensure that the scope of the original measure in question is not used for the abuse of police services for personal gain. The provision of special services is a helpful law that chief officers should be able to draw on with discretion, but the compensation for the use of those services should not come at the expense of the police force’s integrity.
Compensation should ideally be monetary, with, if necessary, the short-term loan of items for specific use, as my noble friend’s amendment lays out, but it should not be equipment for personal use. Similarly, as my noble friend said, it should not be the officers making the decision on the use of special police services who gain financially from overtime payments; it should be those actually working overtime. My noble friend has laid out cases where both these incidents have happened and, once again, we hear of malpractice in the West Midlands Police.
My noble friend is infinitely wiser in his knowledge on this subject than I am, so I will defer to him, but I hope the Minister can address his undoubtedly well-informed points in depth, especially given the questions certain police forces currently face. I once again thank my noble friend for bringing these amendments forward, and I look forward to hearing both his and the Minister’s closing remarks.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and his engagement with me and officials from the Home Office and the Department for Transport on abnormal loads. He brings huge—abnormally large, perhaps I should say—expertise to your Lordships’ House on these matters, and certainly expertise that is unique for this House. I thank him for raising his concerns.
It is good to hear from my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester on this, bringing his experience, particularly as it pertains to the operation of heritage railways. Committee on a Bill is not complete, as far as I am concerned, if I have not talked to my noble friend Lord Faulkner about heritage railways. I have done so a few times—at least on the Employment Rights Act, I remember. Obviously, I note with added respect the new status of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, as a social media influencer, so we should freight his words with even greater import.
On the broader issues raised by these amendments, I am aware that the noble Earl has previously written to the DfT with a report that highlighted specific concerns about the interactions between the West Midlands Police and the heavy haulage industry. He made comments about the chief constable, which are obviously relevant and topical. I think we know what he is talking about, and I will just leave it there; it does not really pertain to the issues in these amendments. That report was appreciated, but it will come as no surprise to the noble Earl—although it may sadden him—that I remind noble Lords that the police are operationally independent from government. Therefore, individual police forces are responsible for making decisions on vehicle escorts based on an assessment of risks to infrastructure and the safety of all road users.
As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, acknowledged, the majority of police forces are making those decisions using their operational independence in a way that he is very satisfied with. The final decision in each case is for the relevant chief officer in discussion with interested local parties. That is set out in public guidance produced by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, National Highways and the College of Policing. However, I fully recognise the importance of constructive dialogue on these operational matters. In that spirit, the policing Minister and I are pleased to have arranged a further meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, which I believe is going to happen next week, as he said, along with the national policing lead for abnormal loads, so that these concerns can be discussed in more detail. This would provide an opportunity to ensure that the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council is being applied consistently and that any unintended consequences for the heavy haulage industry are perfectly understood.
As a further general observation on these amendments, I reassure the noble Earl that the Government keep the special types general order 2003 under regular review to ensure that it remains fit for purpose and reflects operational needs and legal requirements. Where improvements are necessary, these can be made via an amending order, using existing powers under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. This approach ensures that any changes are subject to the established processes for regulatory scrutiny, including impact assessments and public consultation. I hope that that provides the reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, sought in her remarks.
In addition, I acknowledge the representations made by the Heavy Transport Association on this matter in support of the noble Earl’s amendments. The Government recognise the importance of the abnormal load and heavy haulage industry to the UK economy and its critical role in delivering major infrastructure projects across the country, be they in transport, civil engineering or housebuilding. We as a Government are committed to growth, and this is an important part of delivering that commitment. In recognition of this, the Government have supported the efforts made by the NPCC to standardise policing practices for abnormal loads. We strongly encourage police forces across the country to make full use of the new guidance on abnormal loads that was published by the NPCC in May 2025, to ensure that abnormal load hauliers receive a consistent service from the police, no matter where they are operating from. Given this ongoing work to support the industry by the NPCC, I contend that we should allow sufficient time for the new guidance to bed in before considering whether changes to the 2003 order are needed. The guidance is due to be reviewed in May 2027.
As to the specifics of these amendments, as the noble Earl explained, Amendment 403 seeks to confer on the police a power to make traffic regulation dispensation orders. This would allow abnormal load drivers to break normal traffic rules to negotiate their chosen route. While I understand the intention behind this proposal, the Government are not persuaded that it is necessary. Traffic authorities already have the power to make traffic regulation orders under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, and these can provide for precisely the situations described. The Government’s view is that traffic management should remain the responsibility of traffic authorities, which are best placed to consider the wider implications for road safety and network efficiency. Giving this power to the police would blur responsibilities and could lead to inconsistent decision-making.
The Government are also unpersuaded of the case for repealing the provision in the Police Reform Act 2002 that allows the police to accredit certain persons with limited powers to control traffic for the purpose of escorting abnormal loads. Removing this power would mean that only police officers could direct traffic during these movements. The noble Earl has suggested that few accreditations have been made by chief officers utilising these powers. That may be the case, but where such designations have been made, it is inevitably the case that the repeal of these provisions would shift the burden back on to warranted police officers, reduce flexibility in managing abnormal load movements, and lead to delays and higher costs for the haulage industry. These movements often support major infrastructure projects and time-sensitive logistics, so any additional delays could have serious economic consequences. The current system strikes a sensible balance by allowing accredited persons to assist under police oversight, ensuring safety while avoiding unnecessary demands on police time.
I turn to the amendments relating to charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads. Amendments 413 and 502 seek to require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework for fees charged by police forces, while Amendment 416D details how payments should be made and received, and Amendment 416M seeks to prevent individuals who could be financially impacted by a decision concerning escorting an abnormal load from being involved in that decision. While I recognise that the aim of these amendments is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe such a statutory framework is necessary.
Further, a national framework for charging for escorting these loads also already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the costs of policing that has been requested by an individual or organisation. Fee levels are set out in NPCC guidance on special police services and updated annually. Introducing a standardised regulatory framework as envisaged in Amendment 413 would also risk undermining the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country, influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic conditions and the availability of police resources.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsTuesday 13th January 2026
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-IX(a) Amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Ninth Marshalled List) - (13 Jan 2026)
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I too support the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that Clauses 118 to 120 should be removed altogether from the Bill.
My reasons are twofold. First, I regard it as wrong and unjustified to prohibit people from concealing their identities at demonstrations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said, let alone prohibiting anyone in a designated locality concealing their identity if they so wish. That is what the Bill does, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out. My second point is that the purpose of the clause can only be to enable the use of live facial recognition technology to monitor demonstrations, to enable the authorities to determine who is attending them and, frankly, to take action against them subsequently. I regard that as an offensive justification, certainly given the present state of the technology and the present lack of regulation of live facial recognition.
On the first reason, overall, the prohibition of individuals concealing their identity involves introducing a Big Brother role for the state that is unwelcome and foreign to our notions of democratic freedom. The power may not be Orwellian in scale, but it has nasty totalitarian echoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four. We should remember that the catchphrase of the dictatorship in that novel is, “Big Brother is watching you”, the justified implication being that state observation of individuals is a principal instrument in the toolkit of dictatorship.
No doubt that is the reason why the power to prohibit such concealment is hedged around in the Bill by the complicated regime of designated localities, exempted purposes and limited durations. Those limits on the prohibition of concealing identity are intended to act as a brake on the power, but, in fact, all the weaknesses—mentioned by my noble friend Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others—emphasise how far the power is a fetter on individual freedom.
I fully appreciate that the power to designate a locality under Clause 119 would arise only if a senior police officer reasonably believed that a protest was likely to involve, or has involved, the commission of offences, and that it would be expedient to exercise the power to prevent or limit the commission of offences. However, that must be measured against not only the seriousness of the offences to be avoided, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out, but the right of individuals to wear a disguise, which may be, as others have pointed out, a perfectly reasonable thing to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke of protesters against the Iranian regime. What about journalists, of whatever political persuasion, who wish to report on a protest but do not want to be recognised by the protesters or the public? What about employees, who would rather not be recognised attending a protest by their employers? The employers may have a political objection to the cause that the protesters are pursuing. Any figure who may be publicly recognisable who wishes to take part in, or even just attend, a protest, and wishes not to be recognised, may legitimately have that right to conceal their identity. What about parents who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their children, or adult children who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their parents?
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relied on the public protests of Emmeline Pankhurst and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly objected to that comparison. There were countless other suffragettes who did not want friends or family to know of their support for, or activity as, suffragettes in protests because they might disagree with their family, parents, husbands, wives or friends, or simply out of concern for their own safety. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, expressed the position of ordinary citizens who wish to keep their identities private. I go further: in peacetime, it is the right of people to keep their identities private. The state would have to justify any limit on that power, and it has not done that.
We all agree that everyone has a right to protest but we must all acknowledge that protests can, and often do, involve the commission of offences by some. But the fact that protest may involve, or be likely to involve, the commission of offences by some people does not justify the police or the state in denying everybody in the designated locality the right to conceal their identities. This prohibition says to people that if you take part in or attend the protest, or are in the locality covered by the designation, you must be recognisable. I say to the Minister that that is an unjustifiable arrogation of power by the state. It must be justified by the Government if they wish to legislate for it, and they have not gone anywhere near justifying that arrogation of power.
My second reason for opposing this clause is that the prohibition on concealment of a citizen’s identity can have only the one purpose of enabling them to be monitored on camera, with a view to being identified later. Let us examine that. At its most benign, the power may be directed only against those who commit offences. Where it is for that limited purpose, it can be argued that preventing offences by the persons identified on camera may be a legitimate exercise of the power of the state, but I will repeat the points made by my noble friend Lord Strasburger on that. Just as police officers justify surveillance, so this power, if it were sufficiently defined and limited, might be justifiable, but the purposes of surveillance in the Bill go much further and unacceptably so. A dictatorial state may regard it as permissible to identify supporters of a particular view, political party or cause for the purpose of keeping them under further surveillance; worse still, branding them as trouble-makers for the future; or, at the extreme, taking action against them, ranging from pulling them in for questioning to arrest and unlawful imprisonment.
We have seen abuse of powers such as that in countries all over the world; the country that is currently under consideration is Iran, but it has happened in many others. We prevent abuse of power only by being astute to limit police powers and state infringement of individual liberties in the first place. This is not just an argument about live facial recognition technology, which my noble friend considered—we will discuss that more later—but an important argument about the legitimate limits on state power. Clauses 118 to 120 come nowhere near falling within those limits, even had they been tightly drawn—which they are not, as my noble friend and others have pointed out. For that reason, these clauses really ought to go.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these stand part notices. However, we on these Benches are unable to support her as we have general support for Clauses 118 to 120.
The clauses address a very real and increasingly familiar problem in modern protest policing: the deliberate concealment of identity to frustrate lawful policing and avoid accountability for criminal acts. I am sure that all noble Lords have seen videos circulating on the news and online of protests where large groups of people arrive masked or disguising their identity. Often, the only reason for that is to embolden themselves and each other to commit offences, knowing that their identification and subsequent prosecution will be next to impossible. This undermines both public confidence and the rule of law.
Clause 118 creates a relatively tightly drawn offence that would apply only where a locality has been designated by the police because there is a reasonable belief that a protest is likely to involve, or has involved, criminality. It is not a blanket ban on face coverings. Rather, the clause provides clear statutory defences for those wearing items for health reasons, religious observance or work-related purposes. I do not have concerns that these defences may be abused, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide some assurances as to how he intends that this will not be the practical reality.
Clauses 119 and 120 provide for necessary safeguards and structures relating to the powers of Clause 118. They stipulate that designation must be time limited, based on a reasonable belief and authorised at an appropriate level. There are explicit requirements to notify the public of the designation, the nature of the offence and the period for which it applies. These safeguards are consistent with other provisions of the Public Order Act that relate to police powers to impose conditions on assemblies and processions.
Removing these clauses would make policing protests even more difficult, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, outlined. Offenders who attend protests with the primary intent to commit crimes, whether related to the protest topic or not, will be able to evade justice more easily. The vast majority of peaceful protesters are unfairly associated with disorder that they did not cause. Effective policing protects the right to protest by isolating and deterring criminal behaviour within it. For those reasons, we cannot support the stand part notices in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling her intention to remove Clauses 118 to 120. The Committee is aware of the purpose of those clauses. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, for the broad principle of the clauses.
I start by referring the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to the front page of the Bill. She will see that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint—which is me—has made the statement that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, which answers the first point that she put to me.
Lord Davies of Gower
“(3A) For the purposes of the defence in subsection (3), a person does not have a reasonable excuse by way of an honestly or sincerely held political belief, irrespective of the nature of the belief.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that a person cannot claim a reasonable excuse for the possession of a pyrotechnic article at a protest because of a sincerely held political belief.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, ever since the Supreme Court ruled in the DPP v Ziegler in 2021, the state of public order and protest law in this country has been nothing less than a confused mess. As Policy Exchange noted in its report, ‘Might is Right?’, we have entered an era of increasingly disruptive protests. We have seen severe disruption from the likes of Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion and pro-Palestinian groups. My amendments together seek to restore clarity and proportionality to our public order law following the deeply troubling consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziegler.
The starting point must be an uncomfortable truth: the law as it now stands has tilted too far in favour of those who seek to justify criminality and serious disruption on the basis of contentious political beliefs. That tilt did not arise from legislation passed by Parliament but from judicial interpretation. It has been Parliament’s clear intention to prevent such actions occurring in the name of protest—that is evident in the legislation that has been passed in recent years—but the will of Parliament has been, to at least some degree, undermined by the judiciary, most notably in the Ziegler ruling, which has elevated protest-related rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights above the practical ability of the state to prevent intimidation, obstruction and damage. I argue that the proportionality analysis mandated by the Human Rights Act 1998 has migrated from being a safeguard of last resort to being a routine defence for conduct that Parliament has plainly intended to criminalise.
In effect, the courts are being invited to weigh the importance of a cause against the harm done to the public. That is not the rule of law; it is moral relativism dressed up as jurisprudence. These amendments offer a direct and refreshingly simple response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope the noble Lord did not take my comments in that vein. It is completely unacceptable for individuals to have their lives disrupted by that level of protest, but it is for the police on site to determine. I was not there on the night; I did not witness the protest. I read about the concerns prior to today, and during the course of this debate I have examined again the reports that have occurred. But it is for a police officer on site to determine. Under existing legislation, there are offences of harassment, of inciting violence and other offences and, as the noble Lord knows, because we have debated this at Second Reading, there are measures in the Bill to ensure that people can, with the police, determine a protest route and the regularity of a protest as part of the proposals in this legislation. I am not ducking the question; it is important that people have the right to live their lives in freedom, and to enjoy a restaurant meal. But I cannot be the police on the night, determining whether the offences that are potentially covered currently by law are exercised by the police. I hope the noble Lord will accept the comments that I have made. With that, I invite the noble Lord not to press the proposed amendments, and to revisit them should he so wish.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to those who have supported my amendments and even to noble Lords who disagreed with them, because this discussion has laid down the real issue before us: who decides where the limits of protest lie —Parliament or the courts?
Much of the criticism rests on the claim that removing reasonable excuse defences is somehow draconian. I profoundly disagree. I say to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that peaceful protest remains fully protected. These amendments address not expression but coercion, not persuasion but disruption, not dissent but deliberate law-breaking carried out in the expectation that the courts will excuse it after the fact.
That expectation is not hypothetical. It is precisely what flowed from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ziegler. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his interpretation of the law as it stands, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, for his further clarification. The Ziegler decision has encouraged protesters to view arrest as a tactical step, confident that they can later invoke proportionality, sincerity of belief and human rights arguments to defeat prosecution. We saw this with a recent case, whereby Just Stop Oil protesters threw powder paint at the historic Stonehenge. They were acquitted, of course, on all counts. The result is uncertainty for the police, frustration for the public and an erosion of respect for the law.
Noble Lords may agree that the answer lies in better guidance or more nuanced drafting, but we have been down that road. The debates on the Public Order Act 2023, particularly those led by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, were an earnest attempt to clarify the law while retaining reasonable excuse defences, but Labour denied the opportunity to do so. The outcome has been complexity layered upon complexity, and still the courts are left to decide case by case whether obstruction, damage, or intimidation was worth it, given the cause advanced.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructureAfter section 8 of the Public Order Act 2023 (key national infrastructure) insert—“8A Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructure(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) they do an act which causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to—(i) two or more individuals, or(ii) an organisation,in their use or operation of road transport infrastructure, and(b) they intend that act to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (a).(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).(4) In this section—“the maximum term for summary offences” has the meaning given by section 6(4); “road transport infrastructure” has the meaning given by section 8(2);“trade dispute” has the meaning given by section 7(10).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause creates a new offence of creating serious disruption to road transport infrastructure.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 370 would create an offence of intentionally causing disruption to road traffic infrastructure where the action in question affects multiple individuals or organisations. The amendment originates from the growth, in recent years, of protests designed to cause maximum public disruption to further narrow ideological ends. Activist groups comprising self-aggrandizing ideologues began to realise that, by taking part in large-scale obstructions that affected the law-abiding public, they could get their causes into newspaper headlines and Twitter feeds. The consequence was that groups such as Just Stop Oil became household names through their disruptive tactics. They targeted the lives of everyday people, disrupting people’s livelihoods and hampering the functioning of society.
The most damaging of these protests has become the disruption to road traffic. Protesters sit on busy roads and grind traffic to a halt. People are late for jobs, emergency services are delayed and police time is wasted, and it is the public who, ultimately, must pay the price. In 2022, Just Stop Oil shut down the M25 for four successive days, causing more than 50,000 hours of vehicle delay to over 700,000 vehicles. This cost the public over £700,000, and the cost to the Metropolitan Police was over £1.1 million. Despite 45 people engaging in the protest, only five organisers were arrested and held in custody. If we do not punish those who cause such obscene disruption, we leave the public vulnerable to further disorder.
The Government have taken forward several measures from our previous Criminal Justice Bill, including the provisions to ban possession of pyrotechnics at protests, the new offence of concealing one’s identity at a protest and the prohibition on climbing on specified memorials. However, it is a shame they have neglected to carry forward this particular measure to prevent serious disruption on roads. Avoiding prosecuting disruptive individuals ultimately comes at the expense of the public. I hope the Government can recognise this and will reconsider the amendment.
My further two amendments in this group respond to a stark reality. We have seen successive waves of disruptive protests that have strained our communities, stretched the capacity of our police forces, and left the public questioning whether the law was operating as intended. It is abundantly clear that undue weight has too often been placed on the rights of disruptive activists at the expense of the rights, well-being and interests of the wider public.
Take, for example, the recent Palestine-related demonstrations. The Metropolitan Police has stated that the costs of policing these protests in London between October 2023 and June 2024 were £42.9 million. Some 51,799 Metropolitan Police officers’ shifts and 9,639 police officer shifts from officers usually based outside the Metropolitan Police area were required. Further, 6,339 police officers have had rest days cancelled between October 2023 and April 2024, all of which will eventually have to be repaid to those officers. Such demands on police capacity inevitably divert resources away from policing crime and protecting vulnerable communities.
It is against this backdrop that Amendment 382A seeks to empower chief officers to act decisively. By way of background, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 currently permits the chief officer of a police force to apply to the local council for an order to prohibit the holding of all demonstrations in a particular area for a period of up to three months. The threshold, as it currently stands, is that the chief officer of police reasonably believes that the powers in Section 12 of the Act—that is, the power to impose conditions on protests—are insufficient to prevent serious public disorder.
However, this threshold of “serious public disorder” overlooks a number of further factors. It does not consider the potential for property damage, the impact on the rights of others not involved in those protests, or the demands placed on police resources. My amendment would replace Section 13(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 to introduce the ability for the relevant chief officer to consider the risk of
“serious public disorder … serious damage to property … serious disruption to the life of the community”
and
“undue demands on the police”.
There is precedent for this. Section 11 of the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 permits the police to prohibit processions if they believe that the protest would place undue demands on the police or military forces. Although I recognise the unique historical context of public processions and assemblies in Northern Ireland, there is no reason why, with modern protest tactics, police forces in England and Wales should not also be able to consider the cost and burden on the police imposed by the policing of the protest.
On Amendment 382C, the existing six-day notice period for marches under Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 simply is not fit for modern policing needs. When tens of thousands of officers must be mobilised at short notice to manage demonstrations that may span multiple days and locations, six days’ advance notice does not provide sufficient time for intelligence assessment, resourcing and engagement with organisers. Extending this to 28 days would acknowledge the complexity and scale of contemporary protest events. It is a proportionate adjustment that gives police forces the lead-in they need without unduly restricting peaceful protest.
I emphasise that these amendments support peaceful, lawful expression, which is a cornerstone of our democracy. They do not, and are not intended to, curtail genuine dissent. They do, however, ensure that, in protecting the ability to protest, we do not trample the rights of those affected by serious destruction.
We are often reminded that the right to protest must be balanced with the rights of others. I put it to noble Lords that these amendments deliver that balance. I beg to move.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend on the Front Bench. I think we grossly underestimate how much damage to the UK economy is caused by stopping motorways, particularly the M25. I have not seen authoritative figures for how much it costs to block a motorway, which happens with road traffic accidents. Years ago, I saw a figure of £0.75 million per hour. I do not know whether the Minister has a figure for how much it costs when the M25 or another important motorway is closed. It is not just the effect on motorists; it is the effect on industry, transport and supply chains, and the need to build in extra float in the transport system to allow for that. So, I strongly support my noble friend in everything he said.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for that contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Harper. I add that into the mix of the debate today, but I still come to the conclusion that existing legislation, however it is interpreted, covers this. Therefore—for the last time, I hope—I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a short debate, but I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed and to my noble friend Lord Attlee for supporting my amendments.
The police are charged not only with facilitating lawful protest but with protecting the safety and liberties of all citizens, yet the current legal framework, I suggest, often leaves officers with insufficient tools to intervene meaningfully before disruption becomes entrenched. Amendment 382A strikes at the core of this problem by allowing chief officers to seek prohibition in defined circumstances, including where marches are likely to cause serious disorder, damage or disruption or to place undue demand on limited policing resources. We align the law with operational reality and public expectations.
What do the public expect? Polling shows that large majorities support police intervention in protest scenarios that go beyond peaceful lawful conduct. They reveal a public who very much distinguish between legitimate expression and conduct that crosses into intimidation and disorder. Similarly, extending the notice period to 28 days is a common-sense enhancement that gives police and local authorities the time needed to prepare for large and potentially complex processions. This is about ensuring the responsible ordering of protest in a way that protects public safety, minimises disruption and allows ordinary citizens to go about their lives.
These amendments are a measured, evidence-based response to the challenge of protest policing in the 21st century. I hear what the Minister says, but I hope the Government can give them some serious consideration. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.