Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention and her questions. I say, with great courtesy to the Government Whip, that her first question does not relate to the amendment because it is not about an offence. She was talking about the pre-banning of people and asking whether harm is so broad. However, that is a debate we need to have as society.

That leads into the noble Baroness’s second question about whether young people can distinguish. I think young people can distinguish. Part of the issue is that we as an older generation do not understand that a lot of them take a great deal of care about their colleagues because they have been brought up in a society with the rules, as opposed to having to introduce them, and they have seen exactly the concerns that I was raising. We need to continue to debate this but, bringing it back to this amendment, the point is that none of those issues is about offences.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for this interesting debate. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for moving Amendment 382F, which I support. Although it ranges across several statutes, it is in truth a coherent proposal with a clear constitutional purpose: to restore the proper limits of the criminal law so that freedom of speech is protected, while of course ensuring that genuinely threatening conduct remains criminal.

At the outset, I recognise the political sensitivity of this area. Any proposal to amend or repeal so-called hate speech provisions risks being misrepresented as indifference to racism, misogyny, homophobia or other forms of discrimination. Let me be absolutely clear: that is not the motivation behind this amendment. As my noble friend said, we on this side of the House oppose racism and discrimination in all their forms. The case for this amendment is not moral indifference but legal realism. The current framework has proved incoherent, ineffective and, in some respects, actively counterproductive.

As my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea most ably set out, the current legislative framework dealing with offensive language, hate speech and the like is a messy, tangled web of patchwork offences. We have the Malicious Communications Act 1988, Sections 4A and 5 and Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. These provisions criminalise speech not because it threatens direct harm but because it is deemed “abusive” or “insulting” or said to cause a person “needless anxiety”.

I am not ignorant to the fact that we have had laws in this country prohibiting the usage of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour for almost a century. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, now repealed, stated:

“Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence”.


But there are two crucial differences between that legislation and this. The 1936 Act was set against the background of rising fascist paramilitaries, first in Italy and then in Germany and, indeed, in Britain. Secondly, use of the language

“with intent to provoke a breach of the peace”

is very different from outlawing insulting language likely to cause a person “needless anxiety”. I think even a child could understand the difference between inciting a riot and causing a person mild offence.

Yet this is where we are. A person can claim to have been caused “annoyance” or even “inconvenience”, complain to the police and have another individual investigated and potentially arrested. That is not hyperbole; it is the truth. There is a litany of recent examples that we could trawl through, but many have been mentioned by noble Lords today so I will mention only a few, as briefly as I can.

As we have heard, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 was used to arrest Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the two parents who have been referred to. The same Act was used to arrest a 17 year-old boy for comments he posted on Tom Daley’s Twitter account:

“You let your dad down i hope you know that”.


While this is obviously poor behaviour, to claim it should be a matter for the law and constitutes criminality is deeply concerning. Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 was used to prosecute a person who posted a picture online with a phallus drawn on it; Jordan Barrack was ordered to pay £400 in compensation for a post that did not cause any harm to anyone. Again, how this case ended up as a matter for the authorities is beyond me.

Of fundamental importance is the fact that the terms we are dealing with here are not precise legal concepts. They are elastic, subjective and dependent on perception rather than consequence. The result is uncertainty for the public, inconsistency in enforcement and an unhealthy transfer of quasi-judicial discretion to individual police officers who have recently taken to very liberal and, indeed, unequal enforcement of these laws.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The noble Lord said that he did not rely on Lucy Connolly in his earlier argument; he is now trying to rely on that case here. I am trying to make the point that it is more complex than he made out in his earlier contribution. I would like to make some progress, if I may.

The previous Government’s LGBT survey in 2018 showed that fewer than one in 10 LGBT people reported hate crimes or incidents. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, has explained one of the reasons for that. The other reason, I know from friends who have also experienced this sort of hate crime, is they do not believe that the police will do anything. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young, that that is one of the reasons why there is concern about the police: too often, people who are targeted in this way feel that they do not get the help that they need.

As has been described, there is no single piece of hate crime legislation. It includes aggravated assault, which the noble Lord, Lord Young, was particularly concerned about. The point about hate crime is that it is not just the individual; the protected characteristic means that they and their community are also affected by it. We have spent many hours on previous groups on this Bill discussing the absolute abhorrence of antisemitism. If actions in Israel can cause people in the UK to start attacking members of our Jewish community, either verbally or against a person or their property, then that is absolutely unacceptable. That is one of the reasons why I would never want hate crimes to be removed.

Research by Professor Mark Walters of Sussex University shows that hate crimes do not affect just those individuals targeted; he describes them as having a “ripple effect” through their wider communities. Some people will avoid certain routes and places, and others will not leave home at all, particularly in our Jewish communities at the moment, but the same is true in certain areas for our Muslim communities. If laws about hate crime are weakened or repealed, it would send an appalling message to these communities of faith, as well as to LGBT and disabled people. Do the supporters of the amendment really no longer regard it as important that the state recognises the communities that have protected characteristics—their vulnerability—as warranting distinct legal recognition and criminalisation?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, once again, this has been a very interesting debate and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for tabling Amendment 382G. This amendment contains a line of argument that the Committee began to consider in the previous group: namely, whether the criminal law should concern itself with what people do or whether it should also punish what people are thought to feel or believe.

The provisions targeted by this amendment fall broadly into two categories. First, there are ordinary criminal offences—assault, criminal damage, harassment and public order offences—where existing penalties are increased if the court concludes that the offender was motivated by hostility towards a protected characteristic. Secondly, there are freestanding offences, particularly under the Public Order Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which criminalised the stirring up of hatred, even where no violence or other recognised criminal harm has occurred.

The crux of the debate comes down to this: two identical acts can result in radically different sentences depending not on the harm caused but on an inferred state of mind. That inference might be drawn from sparse or ambiguous evidence, yet it carries profound consequences for liberty. This could make prosecutions more complex, investigations longer and outcomes less predictable—hardly a recipe for clarity or fairness. These laws have grown incrementally and unevenly; they overlap, diverge, and sometimes contradict one another. The result is a body of legislation that is difficult to understand, inconsistently applied and increasingly divorced from public confidence.

This amendment offers the Committee an opportunity to step back and ask whether this approach has genuinely improved justice or whether it has instead distracted our criminal justice system from its core task of tackling real and harmful crime. This is a point that I would particularly like to emphasise. As a former police officer myself, I understand the difficulties in enforcing laws that are passed by a well-meaning Parliament but are incoherent and ill thought through. Part of this problem does indeed lie with us, the lawmakers. Successive Governments and Parliaments have not taken a coherent approach to public order and speech legislation. They have passed statute after statute, simply adding to the already long list of different defences, not thinking to consolidate or repeal existing laws.

When the Public Order Act 1986 passed, it contained seven offences of this nature. The previous Labour Government passed the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sections 28 to 33 of which created racially aggravated offences. They then passed the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which added a new Part 3A to the 1986 Act, and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 added hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation to the list of hate crimes. The Sentencing Act 2020 also permits for any offence to be aggravated by hostility expressed towards any of five characteristics.

This Government are going down the same path, as we have already discussed in Committee. Clauses 107 and 108 of this very Bill contain further provisions criminalising the use of offensive language based on racial hatred aimed towards an emergency worker. If the Government think it is coherent to simply bolt new offences on to the already vast array of legislation, then I respectfully suggest that they are somewhat misguided.

Furthermore, far from promoting cohesion, these provisions have too often deepened division. They have encouraged grievance politics and fostered public mistrust. They have also placed the police in an impossible position, asking them to arbitrate not just behaviour but belief and expression.

There is a further concern about effectiveness. These laws, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea mentioned, are clogging the justice system with cases that pose no real threat to public safety, while doing little to address genuine hatred or violence. At the same time, they have fed a broader culture in which accusations of hate are used to silence debate, discourage inquiry and deter people—artists, teachers, academics and ordinary citizens—from speaking openly.

Freedom of speech is not an abstract luxury; it is a defining feature of our national character and a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy. I thank my noble friend for enabling this fruitful debate and hope that the Government will consider it carefully.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Before my noble friend the Minister stands up, I will briefly intervene to say that at Second Reading, I counted 44 previous statutes that were being amended by the Bill. I just counted five in Amendment 382G. I do not know whether they join the 44 statutes in the Bill itself or whether they stand alone, but the Bill is extremely complex. In the word I used at Second Reading, it is, in this sense, a “monster” of a Bill, not because of the many provisions in it and the other provisions that noble Lords have brought out in it: that is not my point. My point is just on the complexity of the Bill. I beg that there may be a change of mind by Governments and parliamentary draftsmen and that they do not inflict Bills like this on the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

383: Clause 128, page 154, line 12, leave out “Electronically tracked”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the requirement for an officer to have electronically tracked information to enter and search a premises.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we now come to a group of amendments that seeks to improve the Government’s legislation as it currently stands. We broadly agree with the need to expand the police’s search powers, given the rise in shoplifting—that is not a term I particularly like, as it is really Section 1 theft, but I will refer to it as shoplifting for the purposes of this debate—and theft of personal property. Our only divergence is the extent to which we should extend these new powers.

The measures in the Bill are extremely necessary. We are facing an epidemic of petty theft, with phone theft and shoplifting reaching highs. One-third of adults were victims of phone theft last year, with the United Kingdom accounting for roughly 40% of all such thefts in Europe. These phones are then dismantled, deactivated and often sent abroad, with little chance of their owners getting them back.

Shoplifting gangs are terrorising high streets. Theft from shops reached over £2.2 billion last year, narrowing the margins of small independent stores and pushing up costs for the law-abiding public. Electronic stores are often targeted, with owners left helpless by the lack of power bestowed on security guards and the high costs of surveillance. The police must have the means to tackle this crime past their current capabilities. The fact that, once a criminal enters a premises, he can store the stolen goods until a search warrant is issued is not justice—it is an affront to the victim. It is not good enough to hope that officers arrive in time to arrest criminals in public for individuals to have a chance of retrieving their stolen goods. Officers must be able to enter premises without a warrant if the situation requires it.

That is why the Government’s measure is a welcome step. However, they have watered down the measures that we proposed in the Criminal Justice Bill in 2023. Where our measures would have allowed specified officers to search for stolen goods without a warrant if it is not practicable to obtain one, the Government have limited this to goods with obtainable electronic tracking data. The amendments in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie attempt to revert this measure back to its original intent so that it does not solely pertain to electronically tracked goods.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is a point well made and well taken. I add that the powers would, of course, be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the service police, so service police would not suddenly be moving into areas of activity that you would expect the territorial police to be pursuing.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, anticipated that I was winding up. I hope that my comments have reassured the noble Lord that the spirit and intention behind his amendments have been incorporated within the proposals in the Bill. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I give thanks to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I will reiterate my opening speech by saying that I know we all have the same end goal of arresting criminals and preventing thefts. We may have different roads that we believe to be the best way of arriving at that goal, but I am confident that this debate has taken place in a productive and open-minded manner.

At the risk of repeating myself, phone theft and shoplifting, frequently targeted at electronic stores, are not just epidemics but growing ones. Crime is thriving, businesses are closing, and the public are becoming increasingly anxious. A phone is stolen every seven and a half minutes in our capital city. We cannot simply look on at the situation with the hope that it gets better.

The Government must resolve to adopt the framework from our 2023 Bill, and they must now go further. Amendments 383, 384 and 385 in my name would achieve this. They would remove the requirement that a stolen good be electronically traceable and would permit senior officers to use discretion to search premises without a warrant. These amendments answer a problem that requires immediate action. The Government must get a grip on the theft epidemic. Our measures provide them with one of many necessary solutions, and I hope the Minister takes them away for consideration.

Moving on to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I largely agree with his principle that the new clause that introduces new powers should be accompanied by checks and balances. Establishing a code of practice, having an independent mechanism for investigating complaints, providing mandatory training for senior officers and requiring an annual report on the use of the powers in question would act to safeguard the heightened powers officers will gain. This especially holds should the Government incorporate our amendments. We trust the judgment of our officers and believe that they will always make the judgment they think best, but I am conscious that we are entrusting them with more intrusive powers. Mechanisms must exist that counteract any tendencies for this power to be misused, and I believe that the noble Lord’s amendments would achieve that. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 383 withdrawn.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.

These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.

I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I thank the Minister for tabling, and setting out the rationale behind, this group of government amendments. Amendments 393 and 394 authorise the interception of certain communications in order to access online accounts. These amendments represent an additional measure to youth diversion orders on top of the existing powers provided to the authorities under the current drafting of the Bill.

Public safety is and should be the first priority of any Government. Youth diversion orders exist in order to curb and prevent young people from engaging in terrorist activity or associating with those affiliated to terrorist groups that seek to radicalise children. We are supportive of the measures in the Bill to increase the scope and applicability of youth diversion orders, such as Clause 167, which enables chief officers of police with the power to apply for a youth diversion order. These are necessary and proportionate measures that should be implemented in order to mitigate terrorist risk.

We on these Benches are equally supportive of the amendments in this group that are aimed at ensuring that, when youth diversion orders are made, they contain the necessary provisions to enable authorities to carry out their operations as effectively as possible. There is no point in making a youth diversion order if the provisions of that order do not sufficiently provide police with the ability to execute its objective. Terrorists and extremist groups are increasingly turning to online forums and communities in order to identify individuals for radicalisation and to spread misinformation. Therefore, where the courts deem it necessary to issue a youth diversion order, it is right that a provision of such an order can contain the inspection of any online account. Not only will that ensure that young people are kept safe from dangerous and hateful rhetoric, but it will enable authorities to understand who is targeting children and their methods of radicalisation.

It is also important that the imperative to keep the public safe is counterbalanced with appropriate regard for individual liberty. Youth diversion orders contain a number of provisions which impact on people’s daily lives, so it is right that they are sanctioned only where it is considered strictly necessary. I therefore seek assurances from the Minister that these amendments, and youth diversion orders more generally, are accompanied by having the appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate state overreach and the unnecessary deprivation of people’s freedoms and, of course, their right to privacy.

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[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I am absolutely astonished. Until 10 minutes ago, I had no idea that these provisions existed—that a constable without suspicion could seize a person’s devices, interrogate their data and hold on to them more or less indefinitely. Could somebody, perhaps a Minister, tell me in what circumstances suspicionless search like this is justified?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing forward the amendments in question. Amendments 390 and 391 have been well reasoned, and I am particularly happy to offer my support to the principle behind them. Objectivity should be the aim of every piece of legislation, and I welcome any measures towards that end. That is particularly the case when we are dealing with laws that provide the police with powers that can be used at the expense of people’s privacy. Clause 135 does this, allowing constables to extract online information from defendants’ devices should they need to determine whether the person has been involved in an act of terrorism.

I understand the Government’s intention behind this clause, and that it may have implications for national security. However, because of the importance, we should leave as little of its interpretation to human discretion as possible. We are all aware that, while we continue to support our forces, there are occasional instances of bad faith actors and, more generally, mistakes are a natural product of human enterprise. Allowing a constable’s belief to determine whether it is necessary to retain held information is an unnecessary risk that the Government do not need to take.

Similarly, we are not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 390. Individuals who are subjected to these new powers should not have the anxiety of an indefinite investigation hanging over their heads if the authorities do not have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. For that reason, introducing a limit on the amount of time that information can be held without reasonable suspicion is sensible. That said, I am unsure whether three months is long enough for police forces to determine whether retention is necessary. This is especially the case given the heightened stress that a decrease in officer numbers will put forces under. Despite this, I hope the Minister can agree that a limit is a sensible suggestion and update the Committee on the Government’s position.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that noble Lords are going to get the full set today. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 396, which is the meat of this group of amendments. It was proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, and it addresses the profound privacy implications of Clause 138. While the Government describe the clause as a technical clarification of access to DVLA records, we on these Benches and groups such as Big Brother Watch see it as the foundation for a vast national facial recognition database. It is also a massive pre-emption, in our view, of the consultation on live facial recognition which is currently being conducted by the Government.

This amendment provides a specific and essential statutory bar. Authorised persons may not use DVLA information for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. Members of the public applying for driving licences do so to drive cars, not to be placed in a permanent digital lineup without their consent—and we know that facial recognition technology is demonstrably biased, as we discussed earlier today. Expanding its use to a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens would be a grossly disproportionate interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Government claim that this is not their intention, yet they have not put that promise in the Bill.

If the Minister is sincere that this power will not be used for mass biometric surveillance, he should have no objection to this amendment. We cannot allow the end of anonymity in public spaces to be achieved through a legislative back door. We are being asked to buy into a massive extension of police access to biometric information. The technology represents a monumental shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a shift must be governed by Parliament, not by secret police watch lists. As my noble friend Lady Doocey said, this can only lead to further erosion of public trust in the police unless these safeguards are installed.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments raises important questions about the use of data, modern policing techniques and the appropriate safeguards that must accompany them. We are sympathetic to the principle that underpins government Amendment 394A. It respects the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and the constitutional and operational sensitivities around policing. There is a careful balance that must be struck between maintaining consistency across the United Kingdom, respecting the powers of devolved Administrations and ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to keep the public safe.

There is also a parallel balance that must be struck between safeguarding individual liberties and being robust in tackling crime. While we recognise the intent behind the amendment, we also acknowledge that the Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and coherent law enforcement arrangements across all parts of the UK. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response in addressing both these issues.

Amendment 396 would prohibit the use of the DVLA database for searches using live facial recognition technology. It will probably come as no surprise that we are firmly opposed to that restriction, as it would undermine one of the key inputs on which the success of live facial recognition hinges. Live facial recognition is an important and increasingly effective tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It is particularly effective in high-crime environments and transport hubs, where the risk of serious harm is elevated and where rapid identification can make a decisive difference.

Equally, across the DVLA, using driver licensing data for law enforcement purposes is not new: nor is it unregulated. Clause 138 ensures that the use of this is accompanied by safeguards, regulation-making powers to the Secretary of State, consultation requirements, a statutory code of practice and annual reporting to Parliament. These measures are designed to ensure proportionality and accountability. To carve out facial recognition from this framework would unnecessarily impede law enforcement’s ability to use the technology effectively. It would also deny the police the ability to use accurate and targeted technology to identify individuals suspected of serious criminality, even where strong safeguards are in place.

I therefore welcome the opportunity for the Minister to expand on how facial recognition fits within this framework and on the safeguards that will ensure that its use is proportionate and effective. But we should be clear that this technology, which can save lives, disrupt violent crime and protect the public, should not be ruled out by default.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, covering the safe, proportionate and fair oversight of abnormal loads, raise an important issue. It was one that I was not particularly aware of until looking into this group of amendments. Clearly, I had not appreciated that this area had been such a social media hit since Second Reading.

We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, about the heritage rail industry and its use of abnormal loads. I have received correspondence via Helen Morgan MP outlining the real challenges for those in the heavy transport sector working with specialist contractors who operate abnormal loads across the UK highways infrastructure. As this correspondence rightly points out, no infrastructure or major engineering project is possible without the heavy transport industry. A number of the amendments seek to address the inconsistencies in how police forces handle heavy transport, abnormal loads and mobile crane movements—issues that directly impact these businesses.

As I understand the situation, there is no national framework regulating when or how police forces charge for escorting or authorising these essential movements. This is leading to, as we have heard, arbitrary and excessive fees in some areas while others provide the service at no cost, creating uncertainty, delays and financial burdens that undermine operational efficiency and investment confidence. One example I have seen is a project to transfer a piling rig through the West Midlands, which we have heard a lot about today. It was delayed due to the unexpected police escort charges and the availability of those escort services.

These amendments, among other things, are looking for the Home Secretary to introduce clear regulations on police charging for escorts and the authorisations, ensuring that we have transparency, proportionality and national consistency. I understand that these amendments have strong industry backing from organisations, including the HTA, the Construction Plant-hire Association and the Road Haulage Association, among others.

I completely understand the thinking behind some of the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on the charging for special police services for abnormal loads. I also agree that there is a concern about different charging regimes and practices. I understand that this may have already been partly addressed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council guidance and a legal framework, but I would like assurance from the Minister that this is the case.

I am sure the Government will not want to change the road vehicles order 2003 without a full consultation and impact assessment, given that this is about the safe movement of abnormal loads on our highways infrastructure. However, there is clearly a need for a consistent national approach across all police forces. Given that many of these abnormal loads are supporting infrastructure and the growth agenda, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Attlee for his long-standing commitment to this very important issue. I would venture to say that there is not another noble Lord in the Committee who cares as deeply as my noble friend does about the topic of abnormal loads.

Amendment 403 seeks to allow the police to authorise an abnormal load driver to break normal traffic rules in order to negotiate the chosen route for the load. Amendment 404 seeks to repeal the power of the police to grant certain police powers to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems that the original intention of Schedule 5 to the Police Reform Act 2002 was that the police have the powers to direct traffic and permit regulations to be broken where necessary. However, few accreditations have made it, as it would effectively allow a self-escorter not to comply with the rules of the road.

Amendment 403 and 404, taken together, would repeal this problem and offer a more flexible solution. Instead of accreditation, Amendment 403 enables the chief constable to grant a traffic regulation dispensation order to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems common sense to provide the Secretary of State with the flexibility needed to decide which regulations should be dispensed with. Moreover, the chief constable would have the authority to outline any conditions they consider necessary, such as the number of escort vehicles to be allowed. These amendments are well thought out, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendment 413 would require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework to manage the fees charged to hauliers by police forces for escorting a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions. This amendment has industry support. A regulatory framework will ensure that the fees charged by police forces are consistent among forces across the country. I know that my noble friend has spent much time engaging with industry stakeholders, so I hope the Minister takes his remarks and amendments seriously. I look forward to the Government’s response.

On Amendment 414, I declare myself as an owner of a shotgun. I associate myself completely with the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. I will leave it there.

I support the principle behind my noble friend’s Amendments 416D and 416M. They are, in essence, clarifying amendments that ensure that the scope of the original measure in question is not used for the abuse of police services for personal gain. The provision of special services is a helpful law that chief officers should be able to draw on with discretion, but the compensation for the use of those services should not come at the expense of the police force’s integrity.

Compensation should ideally be monetary, with, if necessary, the short-term loan of items for specific use, as my noble friend’s amendment lays out, but it should not be equipment for personal use. Similarly, as my noble friend said, it should not be the officers making the decision on the use of special police services who gain financially from overtime payments; it should be those actually working overtime. My noble friend has laid out cases where both these incidents have happened and, once again, we hear of malpractice in the West Midlands Police.

My noble friend is infinitely wiser in his knowledge on this subject than I am, so I will defer to him, but I hope the Minister can address his undoubtedly well-informed points in depth, especially given the questions certain police forces currently face. I once again thank my noble friend for bringing these amendments forward, and I look forward to hearing both his and the Minister’s closing remarks.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and his engagement with me and officials from the Home Office and the Department for Transport on abnormal loads. He brings huge—abnormally large, perhaps I should say—expertise to your Lordships’ House on these matters, and certainly expertise that is unique for this House. I thank him for raising his concerns.

It is good to hear from my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester on this, bringing his experience, particularly as it pertains to the operation of heritage railways. Committee on a Bill is not complete, as far as I am concerned, if I have not talked to my noble friend Lord Faulkner about heritage railways. I have done so a few times—at least on the Employment Rights Act, I remember. Obviously, I note with added respect the new status of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, as a social media influencer, so we should freight his words with even greater import.

On the broader issues raised by these amendments, I am aware that the noble Earl has previously written to the DfT with a report that highlighted specific concerns about the interactions between the West Midlands Police and the heavy haulage industry. He made comments about the chief constable, which are obviously relevant and topical. I think we know what he is talking about, and I will just leave it there; it does not really pertain to the issues in these amendments. That report was appreciated, but it will come as no surprise to the noble Earl—although it may sadden him—that I remind noble Lords that the police are operationally independent from government. Therefore, individual police forces are responsible for making decisions on vehicle escorts based on an assessment of risks to infrastructure and the safety of all road users.

As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, acknowledged, the majority of police forces are making those decisions using their operational independence in a way that he is very satisfied with. The final decision in each case is for the relevant chief officer in discussion with interested local parties. That is set out in public guidance produced by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, National Highways and the College of Policing. However, I fully recognise the importance of constructive dialogue on these operational matters. In that spirit, the policing Minister and I are pleased to have arranged a further meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, which I believe is going to happen next week, as he said, along with the national policing lead for abnormal loads, so that these concerns can be discussed in more detail. This would provide an opportunity to ensure that the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council is being applied consistently and that any unintended consequences for the heavy haulage industry are perfectly understood.

As a further general observation on these amendments, I reassure the noble Earl that the Government keep the special types general order 2003 under regular review to ensure that it remains fit for purpose and reflects operational needs and legal requirements. Where improvements are necessary, these can be made via an amending order, using existing powers under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. This approach ensures that any changes are subject to the established processes for regulatory scrutiny, including impact assessments and public consultation. I hope that that provides the reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, sought in her remarks.

In addition, I acknowledge the representations made by the Heavy Transport Association on this matter in support of the noble Earl’s amendments. The Government recognise the importance of the abnormal load and heavy haulage industry to the UK economy and its critical role in delivering major infrastructure projects across the country, be they in transport, civil engineering or housebuilding. We as a Government are committed to growth, and this is an important part of delivering that commitment. In recognition of this, the Government have supported the efforts made by the NPCC to standardise policing practices for abnormal loads. We strongly encourage police forces across the country to make full use of the new guidance on abnormal loads that was published by the NPCC in May 2025, to ensure that abnormal load hauliers receive a consistent service from the police, no matter where they are operating from. Given this ongoing work to support the industry by the NPCC, I contend that we should allow sufficient time for the new guidance to bed in before considering whether changes to the 2003 order are needed. The guidance is due to be reviewed in May 2027.

As to the specifics of these amendments, as the noble Earl explained, Amendment 403 seeks to confer on the police a power to make traffic regulation dispensation orders. This would allow abnormal load drivers to break normal traffic rules to negotiate their chosen route. While I understand the intention behind this proposal, the Government are not persuaded that it is necessary. Traffic authorities already have the power to make traffic regulation orders under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, and these can provide for precisely the situations described. The Government’s view is that traffic management should remain the responsibility of traffic authorities, which are best placed to consider the wider implications for road safety and network efficiency. Giving this power to the police would blur responsibilities and could lead to inconsistent decision-making.

The Government are also unpersuaded of the case for repealing the provision in the Police Reform Act 2002 that allows the police to accredit certain persons with limited powers to control traffic for the purpose of escorting abnormal loads. Removing this power would mean that only police officers could direct traffic during these movements. The noble Earl has suggested that few accreditations have been made by chief officers utilising these powers. That may be the case, but where such designations have been made, it is inevitably the case that the repeal of these provisions would shift the burden back on to warranted police officers, reduce flexibility in managing abnormal load movements, and lead to delays and higher costs for the haulage industry. These movements often support major infrastructure projects and time-sensitive logistics, so any additional delays could have serious economic consequences. The current system strikes a sensible balance by allowing accredited persons to assist under police oversight, ensuring safety while avoiding unnecessary demands on police time.

I turn to the amendments relating to charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads. Amendments 413 and 502 seek to require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework for fees charged by police forces, while Amendment 416D details how payments should be made and received, and Amendment 416M seeks to prevent individuals who could be financially impacted by a decision concerning escorting an abnormal load from being involved in that decision. While I recognise that the aim of these amendments is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe such a statutory framework is necessary.

Further, a national framework for charging for escorting these loads also already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the costs of policing that has been requested by an individual or organisation. Fee levels are set out in NPCC guidance on special police services and updated annually. Introducing a standardised regulatory framework as envisaged in Amendment 413 would also risk undermining the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country, influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic conditions and the availability of police resources.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I too support the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that Clauses 118 to 120 should be removed altogether from the Bill.

My reasons are twofold. First, I regard it as wrong and unjustified to prohibit people from concealing their identities at demonstrations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said, let alone prohibiting anyone in a designated locality concealing their identity if they so wish. That is what the Bill does, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out. My second point is that the purpose of the clause can only be to enable the use of live facial recognition technology to monitor demonstrations, to enable the authorities to determine who is attending them and, frankly, to take action against them subsequently. I regard that as an offensive justification, certainly given the present state of the technology and the present lack of regulation of live facial recognition.

On the first reason, overall, the prohibition of individuals concealing their identity involves introducing a Big Brother role for the state that is unwelcome and foreign to our notions of democratic freedom. The power may not be Orwellian in scale, but it has nasty totalitarian echoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four. We should remember that the catchphrase of the dictatorship in that novel is, “Big Brother is watching you”, the justified implication being that state observation of individuals is a principal instrument in the toolkit of dictatorship.

No doubt that is the reason why the power to prohibit such concealment is hedged around in the Bill by the complicated regime of designated localities, exempted purposes and limited durations. Those limits on the prohibition of concealing identity are intended to act as a brake on the power, but, in fact, all the weaknesses—mentioned by my noble friend Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others—emphasise how far the power is a fetter on individual freedom.

I fully appreciate that the power to designate a locality under Clause 119 would arise only if a senior police officer reasonably believed that a protest was likely to involve, or has involved, the commission of offences, and that it would be expedient to exercise the power to prevent or limit the commission of offences. However, that must be measured against not only the seriousness of the offences to be avoided, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out, but the right of individuals to wear a disguise, which may be, as others have pointed out, a perfectly reasonable thing to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke of protesters against the Iranian regime. What about journalists, of whatever political persuasion, who wish to report on a protest but do not want to be recognised by the protesters or the public? What about employees, who would rather not be recognised attending a protest by their employers? The employers may have a political objection to the cause that the protesters are pursuing. Any figure who may be publicly recognisable who wishes to take part in, or even just attend, a protest, and wishes not to be recognised, may legitimately have that right to conceal their identity. What about parents who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their children, or adult children who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their parents?

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relied on the public protests of Emmeline Pankhurst and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly objected to that comparison. There were countless other suffragettes who did not want friends or family to know of their support for, or activity as, suffragettes in protests because they might disagree with their family, parents, husbands, wives or friends, or simply out of concern for their own safety. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, expressed the position of ordinary citizens who wish to keep their identities private. I go further: in peacetime, it is the right of people to keep their identities private. The state would have to justify any limit on that power, and it has not done that.

We all agree that everyone has a right to protest but we must all acknowledge that protests can, and often do, involve the commission of offences by some. But the fact that protest may involve, or be likely to involve, the commission of offences by some people does not justify the police or the state in denying everybody in the designated locality the right to conceal their identities. This prohibition says to people that if you take part in or attend the protest, or are in the locality covered by the designation, you must be recognisable. I say to the Minister that that is an unjustifiable arrogation of power by the state. It must be justified by the Government if they wish to legislate for it, and they have not gone anywhere near justifying that arrogation of power.

My second reason for opposing this clause is that the prohibition on concealment of a citizen’s identity can have only the one purpose of enabling them to be monitored on camera, with a view to being identified later. Let us examine that. At its most benign, the power may be directed only against those who commit offences. Where it is for that limited purpose, it can be argued that preventing offences by the persons identified on camera may be a legitimate exercise of the power of the state, but I will repeat the points made by my noble friend Lord Strasburger on that. Just as police officers justify surveillance, so this power, if it were sufficiently defined and limited, might be justifiable, but the purposes of surveillance in the Bill go much further and unacceptably so. A dictatorial state may regard it as permissible to identify supporters of a particular view, political party or cause for the purpose of keeping them under further surveillance; worse still, branding them as trouble-makers for the future; or, at the extreme, taking action against them, ranging from pulling them in for questioning to arrest and unlawful imprisonment.

We have seen abuse of powers such as that in countries all over the world; the country that is currently under consideration is Iran, but it has happened in many others. We prevent abuse of power only by being astute to limit police powers and state infringement of individual liberties in the first place. This is not just an argument about live facial recognition technology, which my noble friend considered—we will discuss that more later—but an important argument about the legitimate limits on state power. Clauses 118 to 120 come nowhere near falling within those limits, even had they been tightly drawn—which they are not, as my noble friend and others have pointed out. For that reason, these clauses really ought to go.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these stand part notices. However, we on these Benches are unable to support her as we have general support for Clauses 118 to 120.

The clauses address a very real and increasingly familiar problem in modern protest policing: the deliberate concealment of identity to frustrate lawful policing and avoid accountability for criminal acts. I am sure that all noble Lords have seen videos circulating on the news and online of protests where large groups of people arrive masked or disguising their identity. Often, the only reason for that is to embolden themselves and each other to commit offences, knowing that their identification and subsequent prosecution will be next to impossible. This undermines both public confidence and the rule of law.

Clause 118 creates a relatively tightly drawn offence that would apply only where a locality has been designated by the police because there is a reasonable belief that a protest is likely to involve, or has involved, criminality. It is not a blanket ban on face coverings. Rather, the clause provides clear statutory defences for those wearing items for health reasons, religious observance or work-related purposes. I do not have concerns that these defences may be abused, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide some assurances as to how he intends that this will not be the practical reality.

Clauses 119 and 120 provide for necessary safeguards and structures relating to the powers of Clause 118. They stipulate that designation must be time limited, based on a reasonable belief and authorised at an appropriate level. There are explicit requirements to notify the public of the designation, the nature of the offence and the period for which it applies. These safeguards are consistent with other provisions of the Public Order Act that relate to police powers to impose conditions on assemblies and processions.

Removing these clauses would make policing protests even more difficult, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, outlined. Offenders who attend protests with the primary intent to commit crimes, whether related to the protest topic or not, will be able to evade justice more easily. The vast majority of peaceful protesters are unfairly associated with disorder that they did not cause. Effective policing protects the right to protest by isolating and deterring criminal behaviour within it. For those reasons, we cannot support the stand part notices in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling her intention to remove Clauses 118 to 120. The Committee is aware of the purpose of those clauses. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, for the broad principle of the clauses.

I start by referring the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to the front page of the Bill. She will see that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint—which is me—has made the statement that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, which answers the first point that she put to me.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

369A: Clause 121, page 149, line 32, at end insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of the defence in subsection (3), a person does not have a reasonable excuse by way of an honestly or sincerely held political belief, irrespective of the nature of the belief.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that a person cannot claim a reasonable excuse for the possession of a pyrotechnic article at a protest because of a sincerely held political belief.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, ever since the Supreme Court ruled in the DPP v Ziegler in 2021, the state of public order and protest law in this country has been nothing less than a confused mess. As Policy Exchange noted in its report, ‘Might is Right?’, we have entered an era of increasingly disruptive protests. We have seen severe disruption from the likes of Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion and pro-Palestinian groups. My amendments together seek to restore clarity and proportionality to our public order law following the deeply troubling consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziegler.

The starting point must be an uncomfortable truth: the law as it now stands has tilted too far in favour of those who seek to justify criminality and serious disruption on the basis of contentious political beliefs. That tilt did not arise from legislation passed by Parliament but from judicial interpretation. It has been Parliament’s clear intention to prevent such actions occurring in the name of protest—that is evident in the legislation that has been passed in recent years—but the will of Parliament has been, to at least some degree, undermined by the judiciary, most notably in the Ziegler ruling, which has elevated protest-related rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights above the practical ability of the state to prevent intimidation, obstruction and damage. I argue that the proportionality analysis mandated by the Human Rights Act 1998 has migrated from being a safeguard of last resort to being a routine defence for conduct that Parliament has plainly intended to criminalise.

In effect, the courts are being invited to weigh the importance of a cause against the harm done to the public. That is not the rule of law; it is moral relativism dressed up as jurisprudence. These amendments offer a direct and refreshingly simple response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord did not take my comments in that vein. It is completely unacceptable for individuals to have their lives disrupted by that level of protest, but it is for the police on site to determine. I was not there on the night; I did not witness the protest. I read about the concerns prior to today, and during the course of this debate I have examined again the reports that have occurred. But it is for a police officer on site to determine. Under existing legislation, there are offences of harassment, of inciting violence and other offences and, as the noble Lord knows, because we have debated this at Second Reading, there are measures in the Bill to ensure that people can, with the police, determine a protest route and the regularity of a protest as part of the proposals in this legislation. I am not ducking the question; it is important that people have the right to live their lives in freedom, and to enjoy a restaurant meal. But I cannot be the police on the night, determining whether the offences that are potentially covered currently by law are exercised by the police. I hope the noble Lord will accept the comments that I have made. With that, I invite the noble Lord not to press the proposed amendments, and to revisit them should he so wish.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to those who have supported my amendments and even to noble Lords who disagreed with them, because this discussion has laid down the real issue before us: who decides where the limits of protest lie —Parliament or the courts?

Much of the criticism rests on the claim that removing reasonable excuse defences is somehow draconian. I profoundly disagree. I say to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that peaceful protest remains fully protected. These amendments address not expression but coercion, not persuasion but disruption, not dissent but deliberate law-breaking carried out in the expectation that the courts will excuse it after the fact.

That expectation is not hypothetical. It is precisely what flowed from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ziegler. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his interpretation of the law as it stands, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, for his further clarification. The Ziegler decision has encouraged protesters to view arrest as a tactical step, confident that they can later invoke proportionality, sincerity of belief and human rights arguments to defeat prosecution. We saw this with a recent case, whereby Just Stop Oil protesters threw powder paint at the historic Stonehenge. They were acquitted, of course, on all counts. The result is uncertainty for the police, frustration for the public and an erosion of respect for the law.

Noble Lords may agree that the answer lies in better guidance or more nuanced drafting, but we have been down that road. The debates on the Public Order Act 2023, particularly those led by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, were an earnest attempt to clarify the law while retaining reasonable excuse defences, but Labour denied the opportunity to do so. The outcome has been complexity layered upon complexity, and still the courts are left to decide case by case whether obstruction, damage, or intimidation was worth it, given the cause advanced.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

370: After Clause 122, insert the following new Clause—
“Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructureAfter section 8 of the Public Order Act 2023 (key national infrastructure) insert—“8A Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructure(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) they do an act which causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to—(i) two or more individuals, or(ii) an organisation,in their use or operation of road transport infrastructure, and(b) they intend that act to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (a).(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).(4) In this section—“the maximum term for summary offences” has the meaning given by section 6(4); “road transport infrastructure” has the meaning given by section 8(2);“trade dispute” has the meaning given by section 7(10).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause creates a new offence of creating serious disruption to road transport infrastructure.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 370 would create an offence of intentionally causing disruption to road traffic infrastructure where the action in question affects multiple individuals or organisations. The amendment originates from the growth, in recent years, of protests designed to cause maximum public disruption to further narrow ideological ends. Activist groups comprising self-aggrandizing ideologues began to realise that, by taking part in large-scale obstructions that affected the law-abiding public, they could get their causes into newspaper headlines and Twitter feeds. The consequence was that groups such as Just Stop Oil became household names through their disruptive tactics. They targeted the lives of everyday people, disrupting people’s livelihoods and hampering the functioning of society.

The most damaging of these protests has become the disruption to road traffic. Protesters sit on busy roads and grind traffic to a halt. People are late for jobs, emergency services are delayed and police time is wasted, and it is the public who, ultimately, must pay the price. In 2022, Just Stop Oil shut down the M25 for four successive days, causing more than 50,000 hours of vehicle delay to over 700,000 vehicles. This cost the public over £700,000, and the cost to the Metropolitan Police was over £1.1 million. Despite 45 people engaging in the protest, only five organisers were arrested and held in custody. If we do not punish those who cause such obscene disruption, we leave the public vulnerable to further disorder.

The Government have taken forward several measures from our previous Criminal Justice Bill, including the provisions to ban possession of pyrotechnics at protests, the new offence of concealing one’s identity at a protest and the prohibition on climbing on specified memorials. However, it is a shame they have neglected to carry forward this particular measure to prevent serious disruption on roads. Avoiding prosecuting disruptive individuals ultimately comes at the expense of the public. I hope the Government can recognise this and will reconsider the amendment.

My further two amendments in this group respond to a stark reality. We have seen successive waves of disruptive protests that have strained our communities, stretched the capacity of our police forces, and left the public questioning whether the law was operating as intended. It is abundantly clear that undue weight has too often been placed on the rights of disruptive activists at the expense of the rights, well-being and interests of the wider public.

Take, for example, the recent Palestine-related demonstrations. The Metropolitan Police has stated that the costs of policing these protests in London between October 2023 and June 2024 were £42.9 million. Some 51,799 Metropolitan Police officers’ shifts and 9,639 police officer shifts from officers usually based outside the Metropolitan Police area were required. Further, 6,339 police officers have had rest days cancelled between October 2023 and April 2024, all of which will eventually have to be repaid to those officers. Such demands on police capacity inevitably divert resources away from policing crime and protecting vulnerable communities.

It is against this backdrop that Amendment 382A seeks to empower chief officers to act decisively. By way of background, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 currently permits the chief officer of a police force to apply to the local council for an order to prohibit the holding of all demonstrations in a particular area for a period of up to three months. The threshold, as it currently stands, is that the chief officer of police reasonably believes that the powers in Section 12 of the Act—that is, the power to impose conditions on protests—are insufficient to prevent serious public disorder.

However, this threshold of “serious public disorder” overlooks a number of further factors. It does not consider the potential for property damage, the impact on the rights of others not involved in those protests, or the demands placed on police resources. My amendment would replace Section 13(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 to introduce the ability for the relevant chief officer to consider the risk of

“serious public disorder … serious damage to property … serious disruption to the life of the community”

and

“undue demands on the police”.

There is precedent for this. Section 11 of the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 permits the police to prohibit processions if they believe that the protest would place undue demands on the police or military forces. Although I recognise the unique historical context of public processions and assemblies in Northern Ireland, there is no reason why, with modern protest tactics, police forces in England and Wales should not also be able to consider the cost and burden on the police imposed by the policing of the protest.

On Amendment 382C, the existing six-day notice period for marches under Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 simply is not fit for modern policing needs. When tens of thousands of officers must be mobilised at short notice to manage demonstrations that may span multiple days and locations, six days’ advance notice does not provide sufficient time for intelligence assessment, resourcing and engagement with organisers. Extending this to 28 days would acknowledge the complexity and scale of contemporary protest events. It is a proportionate adjustment that gives police forces the lead-in they need without unduly restricting peaceful protest.

I emphasise that these amendments support peaceful, lawful expression, which is a cornerstone of our democracy. They do not, and are not intended to, curtail genuine dissent. They do, however, ensure that, in protecting the ability to protest, we do not trample the rights of those affected by serious destruction.

We are often reminded that the right to protest must be balanced with the rights of others. I put it to noble Lords that these amendments deliver that balance. I beg to move.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend on the Front Bench. I think we grossly underestimate how much damage to the UK economy is caused by stopping motorways, particularly the M25. I have not seen authoritative figures for how much it costs to block a motorway, which happens with road traffic accidents. Years ago, I saw a figure of £0.75 million per hour. I do not know whether the Minister has a figure for how much it costs when the M25 or another important motorway is closed. It is not just the effect on motorists; it is the effect on industry, transport and supply chains, and the need to build in extra float in the transport system to allow for that. So, I strongly support my noble friend in everything he said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Harper. I add that into the mix of the debate today, but I still come to the conclusion that existing legislation, however it is interpreted, covers this. Therefore—for the last time, I hope—I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short debate, but I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed and to my noble friend Lord Attlee for supporting my amendments.

The police are charged not only with facilitating lawful protest but with protecting the safety and liberties of all citizens, yet the current legal framework, I suggest, often leaves officers with insufficient tools to intervene meaningfully before disruption becomes entrenched. Amendment 382A strikes at the core of this problem by allowing chief officers to seek prohibition in defined circumstances, including where marches are likely to cause serious disorder, damage or disruption or to place undue demand on limited policing resources. We align the law with operational reality and public expectations.

What do the public expect? Polling shows that large majorities support police intervention in protest scenarios that go beyond peaceful lawful conduct. They reveal a public who very much distinguish between legitimate expression and conduct that crosses into intimidation and disorder. Similarly, extending the notice period to 28 days is a common-sense enhancement that gives police and local authorities the time needed to prepare for large and potentially complex processions. This is about ensuring the responsible ordering of protest in a way that protects public safety, minimises disruption and allows ordinary citizens to go about their lives.

These amendments are a measured, evidence-based response to the challenge of protest policing in the 21st century. I hear what the Minister says, but I hope the Government can give them some serious consideration. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 370 withdrawn.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord is right that both the security services and the Government have taken a very serious view of the threat of the Iranian regime at home and abroad. That is why the Government have undertaken to impose the financial sanctions and travel bans I referred to in my answer to my noble friend Lord Cryer. We keep proscription under review. That does not mean that we do not keep security issues under review at all times as well. We will take whatever action is required to protect Britain and British citizens and to ensure that we deflate the conflation that is happening now in Iran.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

The United Arab Emirates is advising its students that British academic institutions are being used to radicalise students by Islamist groups with links to Iran. How concerned are the Government about the impact on our international reputation and our universities, and what do the Government propose to do about it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I have said to the House already, the security services are very aware of the potential threat from Iranian forces and Iranian operatives. The foreign influence registration scheme has been in place and we have the Iranian regime in the first tier of that scheme, so it is a criminal offence to support foreign activity from Iran in the United Kingdom, with a severe penalty of five years’ imprisonment. As I have said, we have also sanctioned individuals so that they cannot travel to the United Kingdom when they are known to us, and their finances are frozen. We keep all matters under review; the question of proscription is one of those matters that we will continue to review.

Defending Democracy Taskforce

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is not acceptable for foreign nations to threaten individuals who happen to reside in the United Kingdom, and I condemn any actions taken by foreign nations to do that. As I have said to the noble Lord on a number of occasions previously, if there are particular individuals who wish to draw concerns to the attention of the Home Office, we will examine those concerns and look at how we can protect those individuals.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, following on from the last question, the Defending Democracy Taskforce has the explicit aim of protecting the democratic integrity of the United Kingdom. Given that Reform UK’s former leader in Wales has been sentenced for taking bribes from Russia, and that Iranian bots have been found to be behind thousands of pro-Scottish independence social media accounts, what are the Government doing—indeed, what can they do—to deal with and counter such threats to the integrity of the union by the Russian and Iranian regimes?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Mr Gill is in prison now because the counterterrorism police of the security services in the United Kingdom brought evidence together, sufficient for prosecution, which proved he was acting as a traitor to this country by promoting information on behalf of a foreign nation and that he had taken money to do that. That is not acceptable and should send a warning to all who would potentially undertake that type of activity in the future. We keep under constant review potential threats and misinformation. We will continue to take action through the Online Safety Act and the review that my honourable friend the Security Minister is currently undertaking. Foreign interference in our democratic process is not acceptable and Mr Gill’s jail sentence is evidence that we will take action.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

If the Government are serious about the work of the Select Committee on fraud and about doing something about this, the least they can do is accept the recommendation and the amendment; publish a report indicating how the telecommunications companies might be brought within the embrace of the penalty regime; and consult on it so that we can take it to the next stage. I hope that there will be a positive response to this amendment from the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for bringing forward this amendment, which addresses a very important issue. According to UK Finance, authorised push payment fraud accounted for almost 41% of fraud losses in the first half of last year, while unauthorised fraud decreased by 3% on the year. APP increased by 12%. It is clearly a pressing issue, and I am grateful that we have the opportunity to debate it.

The proposition in question would require technology and telecommunications companies, first, to owe a duty of care to their customers to prevent fraud occurring on their platforms and services in general. I do not see an issue with this in principle. Companies should attempt to protect their customers from fraud by implementing general safeguarding measures that prevent against common tactics such as impersonation. I would rather that this did not come from government intervention but was instead the product of a competitive industry, but I recognise that there is only so much that the market can achieve in the short term. I look forward to hearing the Government’s position on this.

I am a little more hesitant to offer support to the second condition of the noble Lord’s amendment, which would require technology and telecommunications companies to contribute to the costs of reimbursing victims of APP fraud that has occurred on their platforms or services. While I acknowledge that there is already an existing framework for company reimbursement in the form of the PSR’s mandatory reimbursement measures of October 2024, I am not certain that the policy is transferable to technology and communications companies.

The PSR requires banks and payment firms to split reimbursement costs evenly between the sending and receiving institutions, and it is very easy to discern which companies are responsible and therefore liable for payment. Adding technology and communication companies into that framework is not so straightforward. These companies are essentially a third party in the actual fraud occurring: they are neither the sender nor the recipient of the defrauded money; they are the medium through which fraud is made possible but not through which it actually occurs. Responsibility for the fraud and subsequent reimbursement does not seem to me to be as clear cut with technology companies as it is with banks and payment firms.

Secondly, the second measure in the noble Lord’s amendment is not thorough enough to support, even if my worries were addressed. The PSR mandatory reimbursement policy, enacted a year and a half ago, was the product of almost seven years of deliberation and policy-making; extending this measure to a whole new industry should face more scrutiny than that which can be achieved for a single amendment. The amendment itself raises questions as to which companies will qualify, what will their contributions be, and how these will fit within the existing requirements placed upon banks and payment firms. These are just a few questions, but there are many more that will need answering if we are seriously to consider this measure as a law.

That is not to say that APP reimbursement has not proved an effective tool in mitigating the harmful effects of fraud. According to the 12 months of available data since the PSR introduced mandatory reimbursement for APP fraud victims by banks and payment firms, 88% of lost money in scope has been returned to victims. Nor is it to say that technology and communication companies will not in future be the vehicle by which APP is committed—ever-popular social media and the ever-increasing AI industry will make sure of that. It is simply to say that we do not know enough about the implementation of this measure to support it. I appreciate its aim, and I agree that something must be done to tackle this specific type of APP, but at the moment I am not sure that the amendment adequately achieves that, so I look forward to hearing what the noble Lord has to say in closing.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, this Government are deeply concerned by the devastating impact online fraud can have on individual victims, both financially and emotionally. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for tabling this amendment, to the noble Lord, Lord Young, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for helping us to understand and acknowledge the importance of this issue. The Government recognise the importance of preserving trust in digital communications and online spaces in order that all our hard-working businesses operating in the UK can grow and prosper. We recognise that incentives are important for accountability for all stakeholders.

The Government have seen a significant contribution from the banking sector in preventing fraud and supporting victims in response to the Payment Systems Regulator’s new authorised push payment scams reimbursement requirement. In the first nine months of the APP reimbursement scheme, 88% of eligible losses were reimbursed, with £112 million returned to victims. These figures reflect a strong and sustained commitment to protecting consumers—a positive trajectory that deserves recognition. While we are on the PSR scheme, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked about the transition of PSR into the FCA. It is worth noting that we consulted on that planned merger of PSR into the FCA in September and October last year. We are currently considering the responses to that consultation and will bring forward further proposals in due course. He would expect me to say that we want to manage this process in a way that very much does not undermine the work that the Payment Systems Regulator is already doing to ensure that this system works well.

However, every part of an ecosystem must play a meaningful role in fraud prevention, including the telecommunications and tech sector. The Government have already taken steps to ensure that the tech and telecommunications sectors are rightly incentivised to proactively tackle fraud on their networks. The Online Safety Act requires in-scope companies to take proactive steps to stop fraudulent content appearing on the platform and to remove fraudulent material quickly when they become aware of it. If they do not, they risk facing the full regulatory costs of failing to comply, which can extend to 10% of their global revenue.

Ofcom’s duties on user-generated content are now in force in relation to several online harms, including fraud, and the regulator is already assessing platforms’ compliance. Further duties concerning action against fraudulent advertising will be consulted on this year and are likely to come into effect in 2027.

The telecoms sector is subject to regulation that requires providers to block calls that appear to be from scammers and to prevent scammers from using telephone numbers. It is fair to point out that there has been a fair amount of success already in that effort. Voluntary action has proved effective, and under the first telecoms charter operators have introduced firewalls that have stopped more than 1 billion scam text messages since January 2022, so that indicates the scale of both the problem and the progress that has been made.

We are also working with the sector and Ofcom on a number of innovative further actions to tackle the criminal abuse of telecoms networks. The Government launched the second Telecoms Fraud Charter in November 2025. This is an ambitious charter that covers 50 actions the telecoms industry will implement to tackle fraud within the sector. It includes developing new AI systems to detect and prevent fraud, building a new call-tracing system to track down fraudulent communications and upgrading the UK’s networks to enable new features to protect customers from spoof calls. This is a voluntary commitment from the telecoms sector that aims to strengthen efforts to further identify, block and disrupt telecoms fraud through enhanced industry collaboration and robust duty of care towards UK consumers and smaller telecoms businesses that have themselves been victims of fraud. The previous Telecoms Fraud Charter helped UK mobile network operators to block over 1 billion scam messages through the implementation of firewalls. We want to go further than that, which is what the new telecoms charter seeks to achieve.

In addition, Ofcom launched a consultation in October, outlining new rules on how mobile providers must stop scammers sending mobile messages. These proposals draw on existing best practice in the mobile sector and are intended to both prevent scammers accessing mobile messaging services and stop their activities where they have gained access. Last July, Ofcom also published a consultation on new rules to stop scammers outside the UK reaching people and businesses with calls that imitate UK mobile numbers, and these are likely to be introduced this year. We expect these measures to address gaps in the industry’s existing counterscam measures, and to significantly reduce the risk of individuals and businesses receiving scam messages.

Furthermore, in the upcoming fraud strategy, which we discussed earlier in Committee, and which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the Government will explore options to make it harder for criminals to exploit UK telecoms networks to commit fraud. The noble Lord tempted me to stray off the primrose path of prudence when it comes to timing; I am afraid I cannot do any better than repeat what my noble friend the Minister said: it will be coming in due course. Obviously, we have some time left even in Committee, let alone further stages of this Bill, so I am afraid I can make no commitments there.

The Government will continue monitoring developments in this area to ensure the telecommunications and tech industries remain accountable for delivering on their commitments to tackle fraud and the criminal abuse of their services, in line with the plan we will set out in our soon-to-be-published fraud strategy. However, where insufficient progress is being made in reducing abuse of telecoms networks or tech platforms for the purposes of fraud, the Government, and regulators, will not hesitate to take necessary measures to compel further action. I am on common ground with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who critiqued the amendment, describing the concern it shows for the intermediary nature of the liability some telecoms platforms would be under. It is a fact that a tech sector reimbursement scheme would undermine the UK’s long-standing intermediary liability regime, which means that platforms are not liable for illegal content posted by users provided they are unaware of the unlawful activity, and which underpins the interactive internet and is a cornerstone of digital innovation. I share his concern that a departure from intermediary liability would leave the UK out of sync with our international partners and potentially threaten growth of the UK’s digital economy.

Therefore, in view of the clear plan we are putting in place to tackle fraud, it is the Government’s assessment that the measures set out in this amendment are not necessary at this time, and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly commend the report of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, which I have read. My purpose in speaking, very briefly, is to interrogate Amendment 369, in the light of what we already have.

What we already have was very well put in a report by David Spencer of Policy Exchange, the director of which is my noble friend Lord Godson. David Spencer put the current balance very well, I think in his report A Long, Long Way to Go. He wrote:

“The Human Rights Act 1998 does not refer to a ‘Right to Protest’ – the relevant rights are the ‘Right to freedom of expression’ (Article 10) and ‘Right to freedom of peaceful assembly’ (Article 11). However, the sense that many of the recent wave of protests have been ‘peaceful’ by any ordinary understanding of the word – particularly when filled with antisemitic chanting through mobile sound amplifiers, calls for ‘jihad’ on the streets of London, or the use of criminal damage as a tactic – is clearly false. Further, Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights”—


and this is the point about balance that other noble Lords have made—

“in that they can be restricted where it is necessary and proportionate to protect public safety, prevent crime and protect the rights and freedoms of others”.

I myself think that the balance in the Human Rights Act really puts the matter rather well when it refers to this right of peaceful assembly. Peaceful assembly surely does not mean that the protest must be meek and mild. One must expect protests to be noisy, turbulent, robust and, up to a point, disruptive. But the right of protests to be disruptive, as the noble Lord, Lord Walney, said a few moments ago, must be balanced against the right of others not to have their lives disrupted. That is the balance of the thing.

Furthermore, just in closing, there is a very difficult issue here that David Spencer raises very profoundly about some of the language that has been used in demonstrations that is very close to—trembling on the verge of—incitement. In a country where we have seen what happened in the synagogue in Manchester, and where attacks are carried out on other institutions, we have to bear that in mind.

In short, it seems to me this amendment is either reproducing what is already in the Human Rights Act, in which case it is unnecessary, or it is complicating it, in which case it should not really be there. My own sense is that it is complicating it, and that it makes no sense at all to scatter different rights willy-nilly in different pieces of legislation, rather than—if one is going to set positive rights out in statute—putting them in one place in the Human Rights Act, which is what has been done. So I think that the balance we have got is satisfactory and that the amendment does not really stand up to robust interrogation.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for bringing forward these amendments. The importance of peaceful protest in a free and democratic society is of course a principle supported by all noble Lords. I want to be clear at the outset that no one on the Benches on this side questions either the legitimacy or the constitutional right to protest.

I first turn to Amendment 369, which seeks to place an express statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986. This amendment risks solving a problem that does not exist. That is our belief. The right to protest is already deeply embedded in our constitutional and legal framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has so carefully explained. It is recognised in common law, it long predates our membership of the European Convention on Human Rights and it has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts as a fundamental freedom in our democratic tradition. Crucially, this right has never been absolute. Historically, it has always existed alongside the equally important duties of the state to maintain public order, protect public safety and safeguard the rights and freedoms of others. That careful balance has evolved over centuries through common law and legislation. It is not at all clear that reinstating the right to protest in statutory form would add meaningful protection beyond what already exists.

There is a real risk that codifying such a broad and long-standing right in statue could have unintended consequences. By setting out open-ended duties on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate protest, the amendment would inevitably invite further litigation and judicial interpretation. Decisions about the proper balance between protest rights and competing public interests, such as disruption to essential services or public safety, could increasingly be determined in the courts rather than by Parliament or accountable Ministers. That risks further frustrating the will of the Executive and of Parliament. I do not believe that placing an express right to protest into statute is either necessary or desirable. Our system has functioned for generations without such a provision and it is not evident that this long-standing settlement is now deficient.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require an independent review of the existing legislative framework governing protest. We on these Benches are unconvinced of the case for such a review. The Acts listed have been subject to extensive parliamentary scrutiny and their compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights has been debated at length in both Houses. We do not support proposed new subsection (5) in this amendment, which would require the review to have regard to the impacts of legislation on the exercise of rights under the ECHR. The ECHR is already subject to unwelcome litigation which brings about perverse outcomes that were never intended at its commencement: there are plenty of examples of that. An additional independent review would be unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative, consuming time and public resources without a clear or compelling purpose. For these reasons, we on these Benches do not support either amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and to further discussion of how best to uphold both the right to protest and the rule of law in a balanced and proportionate way.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope it does not surprise noble Lords if I confess that I have been on the odd protest in my time. I have quite enjoyed the freedom to have a protest. I have protested against the apartheid Government, against the National Front and, if the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will bear with me, against his Government when he served as a Minister.

The right to peaceful protest is an important part of our democratic society. It is a long-standing tradition in this country that people are free to gather together and demonstrate their views, provided they do so within the law. This Government are committed to protecting and preserving that right. I hope that that gives some succour to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and indeed others who have spoken in favour.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out his case for the two amendments on public order. Amendment 369 seeks to introduce a statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986, along with a duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate that right. I understand the concerns that he has put and I accept and appreciate those concerns, but, as has been said, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, these protections are already firmly established in UK law. Public authorities are required under the Human Rights Act 1998, passed by a previous Government in which I was pleased to serve, to act in accordance with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly set out in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, as has been said by a number of noble Lords today, including the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies of Gower, and as set out in the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, these rights are qualified. This point is illustrated by Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. On that qualification, I am not going to get into the argument between the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Blencathra, but for the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others who have argued for the amendment today, the key point is that that right, as has been said, can be restricted only where restriction is lawful, proportionate and justified. The right to peaceful protest is also recognised under the common law and creating a separate statutory provision risks duplicating existing protections, which could lead to confusion in how the law is interpreted and applied. It might also complicate operational policing without offering any additional legal safeguards.

I have to say that I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, that there is a fundamental right to protest. But I respectfully submit, as I think he argued in his contribution, that the amendment would not strengthen that commitments and might indeed introduce uncertainty into the law. That is a very valid and important point, because existing legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998 and Articles 10 and 11, qualified rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, set out the issues that again were ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the right to protest exists: it is one that I cherish and have exercised myself and may even exercise myself again in the future, who knows? It is an important right, but his amendment would cause confusion and water down the ability to provide that security of protest under the existing legislation. Therefore, I ask him ultimately to not press it further.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require the Government to commission an independent review of the existing protest legislation within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said that the Government called the review post the tabling of this amendment. We proposed the review on 5 October last year. The Home Secretary announced an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation on 5 October last year and I suggest that Amendment 371, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would essentially be what the Government have already ordered and would, if agreed today, negate the purpose of what the Government have already ordered and extend the review that we have already ordered still further by establishing that review in law.

We announced the review on 5 October because of the very issues that all noble Lords have mentioned about balancing the right to peaceful protest and the right to enjoy non-harassment, the right to potentially go to a synagogue, or the right to go about your daily business. Those issues are extremely important, which is why the Home Secretary has appointed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, as one of the people to undertake the review. His independence and expertise will ensure a rigorous, impartial review. He will have the help and support of former assistant chief constable Owen Weatherill, who brings operational experience from his role with the National Police Chiefs’ Council as lead for civil contingencies and national mobilisation. That independent review reaffirms this Government’s ongoing commitment to keep public order legislation under review.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting short debate. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this group of amendments, each of which addresses the issue of safety on our public transport networks, whether of passengers, workers or those tasked with policing them. The amendments before us reflect genuine concern about how effectively our current frameworks protect people from violence, intimidation and abuse in transport settings, and they deserve careful consideration from the Minister.

I begin with Amendment 356A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Morgan, which would place a duty on the British Transport Police to

“take all reasonable steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains”.

Violence against women and girls remains an appalling and persistent problem. Just yesterday, the Government and Liberal Democrats joined together to defeat a Conservative amendment to the Sentencing Bill that would have exempted sexual offenders and domestic abusers from the automatic presumption of a suspended sentence. For victims of sexual assault or domestic abuse, the distinction between a custodial sentence and a suspended sentence is not an abstract policy question; it is the difference between knowing that their abuser has been removed from the community, and knowing that they remain at liberty.

That point is reinforced by the Government’s recent recognition of the scale of the problem. Violence against women and girls has been described by the Home Secretary as a “national emergency”. The Government have trialled domestic abuse protection orders to track domestic abusers. But the most effective way to protect victims is to ensure that offenders face custodial sentences for their crimes. A Government who oppose that principle are not a Government who can claim to hold violence against women and girls as a priority.

In the year ending 2024, police recorded more than 106,000 sexual offences in England and Wales—an increase of around 10% on the previous year. Women continue to report feeling unsafe on public transport, particularly during off-peak hours and at night. This amendment recognises that prevention must go beyond enforcement alone. Its emphasis on data sharing and engagement with train design reflects the reality that safety is shaped by visibility and co-ordination. These are practical, forward-looking measures that deserve serious engagement from the Government. I hope the Minister considers them carefully.

Amendment 356F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, proposes a new offence of assaulting a public transport worker. Abuse and violence directed at front-line transport staff has increased markedly in recent years, with British Transport Police data showing a significant rise in assaults on railway employees. Public transport workers perform an essential public service, often in challenging circumstances, and they should be able to do so without fear of violence or intimidation.

Amendment 399, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, addresses a long-standing operational problem: inconsistent and delayed access to railway CCTV footage. Timely access to high-quality CCTV is often critical to identifying suspects, supporting victims and securing prosecutions. Establishing clear legal requirements for accessibility and technical standards would help to remove the barriers that currently frustrate investigations and undermine confidence.

Taken together, these amendments highlight a broader concern. Although the Government have articulated ambitions around tackling violence against women and girls and improving safety on public transport, there remains a gap between aspiration and implementation. Too often, victims, police and front-line workers encounter fragmented responsibilities, inconsistent standards and slow operational responses. What is needed is clear leadership, stronger co-ordination between agencies and a willingness to embed prevention into the everyday operation of our transport networks.

We on these Benches are clear that public transport must be safe and accessible for all, and that violence, whether against women passengers or workers, must be actively prevented, not merely responded to after the fact. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that the objectives reflected in these amendments are delivered in practice and how they will translate stated commitments into real-world safety improvements.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, for Amendment 356A, and I am glad we have reached it today. We hoped to reach it prior to Christmas, but time did not permit. I know that she has championed this issue in the House before, and I welcome her contribution pressing the Government today. I also welcome the slight widening of the debate by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester to look at metro services.

I note the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and the terrible case of Claudia Lawrence. She has written to me separately on that. I have already instigated with my colleagues in the Home Office a response to the issues that she has raised. I hope she will forgive me if I concentrate on other matters today, but that is not off my agenda.

I know the whole Committee will support the fact that the Government have taken action on violence against women and girls, which is intolerable anywhere, including on the railway. The noble Baroness referenced the Government’s strategy on halving violence against women and girls, which was published in the House of Commons on the last day before Christmas. The Statement repeat has not happened in this House because the Opposition did not want it. That is fine—I understand that—but the commitment from the Government is very clear, and the recently published strategy to halve violence against women and girls is vital.

I also take the points on behaviour made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which is an encouraging comment as part of that because the points he made are valid, and I accept them. The British Transport Police is essential in helping us to deliver that objective of halving violence against women and girls, alongside police counterparts in Home Office forces. It may be helpful to the Committee to say that the British Transport Police, as the police force for the railway, is already required to prevent crime, and that includes the offences set out in the amendment. The British Transport Police undertakes activities across the railway to encourage victims and bystanders to report offences, and indeed poor behaviour, and will relentlessly pursue offenders. In BTP Policing Plan 2025-27, it has given specific commitments to prevent violence against women and girls through:

“Effective and sensitive investigation and robust offender management”,


and:

“Targeted activity to identify and apprehend those intent on offending”.


If it helps the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, I am very happy to provide, through my colleagues in the Department for Transport, a further meeting for her to look at that work and understand it at first hand.

The noble Baroness also mentioned rolling stock companies and the manufacture and leasing of trains to train operating companies. The design of trains is defined not by the rolling stock company but by the train operating company. Therefore, the proposal that the British Transport Police shares data on violence against women and girls with rolling stock companies would not lead to improvements in the design of train carriages, but I take her point. The British Transport Police already shares crime data with train operating companies, which can feed into the British Transport Police policing plans.

The noble Baroness will also, I hope, be aware that the Rail Safety and Standards Board already publishes key train requirement guidance that is used by train operating companies when ordering new trains. This helps detail the features that are to be included in the specification. The content of the document is prepared by a group of rolling stock experts representing train operating companies, manufacturers, leasing companies, industry bodies and the Department for Transport. Following input from security experts in the Department for Transport and BTP, new content has recently been prepared that includes additional measures to do exactly what the noble Baroness wishes, to enhance personal security, including those that seek to reduce violence against women and girls. The content has been included in a draft of the document that will be submitted for consultation with the rail industry. The intention— I hope this is helpful for the noble Baroness—is that it will be published in spring 2026. While it is not the legislative back-up that she is seeking in the amendment, I hope it meets the objective of the very valid points she has made today.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned sentencing. We had a full debate yesterday on the Sentencing Bill and the House made its decisions on it. There is a difference between us on that, but I want to see offenders brought to justice and people caught. That is an important part of our proposals regarding the prevention measures and the performance of the British Transport Police on these issues.

Amendment 356F in the name of my noble friend Lord Hendy includes the introduction of a stand-alone offence of assaulting a public transport worker. Before I refer to what he has said, I will address the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. First, I confirm that we are having a meeting. It is in the plan; it will be sorted and is coming down the line very quickly. She referred to Clause 37 and the stand-alone offence on retail workers. We have taken the view that there should be a stand-alone offence because retail workers are upholding the law for the state on sales of alcohol, drugs, knives, cigarettes and a range of other matters. But I agree with her that it is essential that transport workers feel safe going about their job. There is no place for abuse and assault of any worker, and I know we will all agree with that.

The attack in Huntingdon in early November shocked and horrified us all. Tributes were paid at the time to the railway staff who stood in the way of alleged attackers and did their duty, and those matters will come to court in due course. But I must stress the important point—this goes to the heart of what my noble friend said—that if a public transport worker suffers violence or abuse at work, it is essential that they report it to the police so it can be investigated. We take that seriously in the police, the transport police and the railway, and elsewhere in the Home Office. As the dedicated police service for the railway, the British Transport Police is able to provide further reassurance to rail staff that it is there to protect them and will arrest offenders quickly.

The key point I want to make to my noble friend is that transport workers are already protected in legislation, as the noble Baroness touched on. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 makes offences against public-facing workers, in which transport workers would be included, an aggravating factor that the courts must consider in sentencing. As I said earlier in Committee, everybody is protected from assault. It is criminalised under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and that long-standing piece of legislation, the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The key point in this case is that transport workers are covered by that legislation, whereas—to return to Clause 37—retail workers were not covered in the way that public-facing workers are in relation to police and others. They are still covered by the main offences of the Criminal Justice Act, but the aggravating factor that we are introducing under Clause 37 deals with retail workers specifically. I am happy to discuss Clause 37 with the noble Baroness when we have the opportunity to meet very shortly regarding her concerns about the legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

356H: Clause 110, page 141, line 31, at end insert—
“(2A) It is an offence for a person—(a) to have in their possession with intent to supply, or(b) be concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply,an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with a relevant offence.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would include a person concerned in the supplying of an electric device for use in vehicle offences within the scope of the offence in clause 110.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 356H is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. It seeks to strengthen Clause 110 by ensuring that those who are concerned in the supplying of electronic devices used in vehicle theft are brought within the scope of the new offence.

Vehicle crime remains a persistent and evolving challenge. Organised criminal networks are increasingly turning to sophisticated electronic devices—such as signal jammers, key programmers, and relay attack tools—to bypass modern vehicle security systems. These devices are not sold in back alleys alone: they are traded online, often under the guise of legitimate diagnostic equipment, and then misused to facilitate theft. The law must keep pace with this reality. Clause 110 rightly takes some steps towards addressing this growing problem, and I welcome the new provisions.

However, I have one particular question for the Minister. What is the difference between this new offence and the offence of going equipped for stealing under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968? I note the different maximum penalties, being three years’ imprisonment for the Section 25 offence and five years’ imprisonment for the new offence in Clause 110, but is that the only difference? I ask this not to be overly critical but simply to understand the rationale behind the inclusion of this new offence.

I recognise that electronic devices for stealing vehicles are a new and evolving problem, and, as such, the new offence must be watertight. That is why I have tabled my amendment. I am sure the Minister will have a sense of déjà vu when speaking to this amendment. It is similar in nature to the amendment we tabled in Committee to Clause 13 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill last year. In that Bill, our amendment sought to add possession with the intent to supply to the new criminal offence of supplying an article for use in immigration crime. The Government listened to us and tabled their own amendment on Report to widen the scope of that offence to include being concerned in the supply of a relevant article. Amendment 356H is intended to close the same possible loophole in Clause 110 as existed in the original drafting of Clause 13 of the border security Bill.

Clause 110 contains two separate offences. Subsection (1) states:

“It is an offence to possess an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with a relevant offence”.


Subsection (2) states:

“It is an offence to import, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply”


such a device. That captures quite a wide range of activities, but what is missing from this aspect of the offence is possession with intent to supply such a device, or any other activity relating to the supply of these devices.

My amendment would address this gap by including two further offences. It explicitly includes possession with intent to supply an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device would be used in connection with the theft offence. It contains the same language that the Government brought forward for the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill. Proposed new paragraph (b) in the amendment therefore states that a person commits an offence if they are

“concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply”

such an electronic device. This would, I believe, capture those who are knowingly involved in the chain of supply: those who broker deals, advertise devices or otherwise facilitate their distribution.

Without this amendment, there is a risk that individuals who play a crucial role in enabling vehicle theft will escape liability simply because they are not the final supplier. That is a loophole we cannot afford to leave open. Given that the Government accepted that this was a gap in what is now the Section 13 offence in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, I hope the Minister will agree that it is a loophole in this offence that should be closed. I beg to move.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, we support the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. He has hit the nail on the head with this amendment about the intent to supply electronic devices for car theft, which has become an epidemic in this country. Data assessed by colleagues in the other House revealed that, in 2024, 75% of vehicle thefts were unsolved and only 2% resulted in a suspect being charged or summonsed, with 95,000 cases being unsolved. In November 2025, a BBC report showed that keyless car theft devices used by criminals can be found online and retail for around £20,000. According to that report, video guides and devices can be easily found online, allowing access to high-end cars such as Jaguars and Range Rovers and upwards. The Bill provides an offence for owning such a device. This amendment would address the potential loophole for those supplying the device.

I wait with interest to hear the Minister’s response. Motorists are taxed to the hilt, and pay road charges and congestion charges. I do not think it is unreasonable that the Government try to do something to protect motorists’ vehicles. All the money goes in—we pay our road taxes and our insurance. The numbers are staggering, with 95,000 cases last year unsolved. If you own a reasonably priced car, after working hard, there should be something to protect you from the people supplying the equipment rather just than the person using the equipment. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for explaining the purpose of this amendment. He is right to highlight the importance of the issue that it raises. The Met estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle theft, so I am glad that we have the opportunity to debate Clause 110 and the important measures it takes in relation to vehicle theft.

I certainly understand the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to make the offence in Clause 110 as tight as possible, but I hope to persuade him, and your Lordships’ Committee, that the amendment is unnecessary. In particular, I do not believe that there is a gap in the offences provided for in Clause 110. Further, the amendment would require the police and prosecution to prove intent, rather than the burden being on the defendant to do so. This would have the effect of weakening the offence, as it would place a higher bar on the prosecution to secure a conviction.

By way of background, Clause 110 provides for two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply these devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or the theft of anything in a vehicle.

This amendment seeks to extend those offences to include a person concerned in the supplying of an electronic device for use in vehicle offences. However, Clause 110 already makes provision for it to be an offence to possess a device where it appears that there could be an intention to supply. It outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it was on the premises at the same time as the accused, or on the premises of which the accused was the occupier or a habitual user other than as a member of the public. I point out that the amendment would require the prosecution to prove intent to use the device to commit theft. As I have already said, this is a higher bar than the clause as drafted.

Clause 110 outlines:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence … to show that the person did not intend or suspect that the device would be used in connection”


with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. A court can therefore infer that the articles in question are intended for use in vehicle theft. This reflects the fact that there are likely to be few legitimate uses for those specified articles. It is appropriate to expect that those who are involved with such articles should be alert to the possible use of the articles for criminal purposes. The amendment states that it would be

“an offence for a person to … be concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply, an electronic device”.

I am not sure that such wording materially expands the scope of the offence. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine who may be captured by such wording who will not already be captured by the existing wording in the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked a specific question around whether offenders could be charged with going equipped to commit theft under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968. These existing offences put the burden on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s intention to steal a vehicle or something from inside the vehicle. This new offence places the burden on the defendant to prove that they were not intending to steal a vehicle, or that the device would not be used to steal a vehicle or commit vehicle crime.

I note that, in his contribution, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, asked about the online sale of devices. Under the Online Safety Act 2023, there is a new duty placed on social media and tech companies to prevent the advertisement of stolen goods and devices that facilitate crime. Online sales platforms will block adverts and listings for items that are illegal to sell; sales platforms already do this for other illegal items.

On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, with respect to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, it is fair to say the offence deals with a different set of circumstances from the offences in that Act. However, we will take away the comments and ensure that there are no gaps in the offence. I appreciate him raising the point.

For all these reasons, I am not persuaded that the amendment is required, and I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw it.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Goschen and to the Liberal Democrats for their support for this amendment. The purpose of the amendment is not to widen the offence indiscriminately but to ensure that Clause 110 operates as Parliament clearly intends. Without explicitly including those who are concerned in supplying these devices, the offence risks capturing only the least sophisticated actors, while leaving untouched those who organise, promote and enable the trade from behind the scenes.

The reality of modern vehicle crime is that it is technologically advanced and often commercially organised, and those involved in supply chains are frequently well aware of the criminal end use of the devices they help distribute. Yet they structure their involvement precisely to avoid possession, and that is a gap that criminals will exploit if we allow it to remain. I hope that the Minister will reflect on the constructive nature of this proposal, given that the Government are aware of and have acknowledged the potential gap in the legislation. But for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 356H withdrawn.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I start with a simple question: where on earth are the regulations that we were promised way back in 2023 when we passed the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act? I took that Bill through this House with all-party support, getting Royal Assent in July 2023. The Home Office promised that it would consult urgently on the necessary regulations and started that consultation immediately.

The consultation closed in July 2024, but the Government announced their conclusions only on 17 October 2025 and have dumped some of the most important provisions of the Act. It will now apply only to new all-terrain vehicles with forensic marking and registration, and to removable GPS units. Dumped are the proposals for immobilisers and extending it to other agricultural machinery. A £5,000 quad bike is protected, but not the £500,000 combine harvester. If someone breaks into the £300,000 John Deere tractor and steals the £10,000 GPS unit, that is covered, but not the John Deere itself. I saw one advert for a GPS that said, “Put this in your tractor, and you will be able to track it if the tractor is stolen”. Well, that is only if a farmer makes it impossible to remove and the thief has to steal the tractor as well as the GPS unit.

Dumping the proposals covering hand tools may be a wise measure, even though an incredible number are stolen. I accept that a forensic marking and registration scheme for power tools needs more time if it is ever to happen. It is estimated that the power tools market may have reached £1.5 billion in 2025. Professional power tools average about £200 each; a DeWalt combi kit of six tools sharing the same battery will come in at about £1,000. Therefore, if tradesmen are spending about £1.5 billion on £200 per item tools, that is over 7 million new tools bought per annum—I think I have half of them in my own garage, actually, but that is another matter. It would be a massive logistical task to register those 7 million tools, but large machinery is different.

Last year, 10,241 tractors, worth £1.6 billion, and 400 combine harvesters, worth £160 million, were registered in the UK. Some 34,000 excavators, diggers and earth-moving machines were sold, worth £1.5 billion, while 8,000 ATVs were sold with a total value of just £80 million. We will therefore have 44,000 big machines worth £3.4 billion with no forensic marking or isolator scheme, but we will have one for just 8,000 ATVs worth a mere £80 million. I do not understand the sense or wisdom of that. If it is possible to devise a forensic marking registration scheme for 8,000 vehicles, it should not be rocket science to devise one for 44,000 vehicles worth 42 times more. I therefore urge the Home Office to lay the ATV and GPS regulations immediately and then get on with drafting the next phase of those regulations to apply them to big farm machinery and construction equipment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses an issue that will be immediately recognisable to many people across the country: the theft of essential equipment from those who rely on it for their living. Turning first to Amendment 357, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, we broadly support the intention behind extending the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023. This was an Act brought in by the Conservative Government to protect businessmen and tradespeople, and the noble Baroness’s amendment would ensure that it explicitly includes GPS equipment. Technology becomes ever more central to commercial activity, particularly in agriculture, construction and logistics. It is therefore right that the law keeps pace with the evolving nature of equipment theft. GPS units are high-value, easily resold and frequently targeted. Bringing them clearly within scope of the Act is a sensible and proportionate step to help disrupt illicit resale markets.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support Amendment 358 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, who have made the case extremely well today. I pay tribute to the Fraud Act committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and I shall quote from it extensively in the next group.

This amendment would rightly ensure that the definition of a specified article included devices capable of using virtual subscriber identity modules, not just physical SIM cards. As we have heard, the criminal landscape evolves rapidly. If we legislate only for plastic SIMs, criminals will simply pivot to readily available virtual SIM technology. By incorporating virtual SIMs into the definition now, we will help to future-proof these provisions and make them genuinely effective against highly scalable, technology-enabled fraud.

Clauses 112 to 117 quite rightly seek to address the serious and growing problem of SIM farms being used at scale to perpetrate fraud and other abuses—it was very interesting to hear the quotes of the noble Lord, Lord Young, from the Select Committee’s report, which demonstrates that the problem has been with us for several years now—but, as drafted, Clause 114 risks being a technological step behind the criminals. As we have heard, it refers to devices capable of using physical SIM cards, but the market is already rapidly moving towards virtual or embedded SIMs. Indeed, I have an iPad in my hand that has a virtual SIM inside it—no physical SIM card at all. If the Bill focuses only on the plastic card and not the underlying functionality, it will leave an obvious loophole that organised criminals will quickly exploit.

The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke of “entrepreneurial” but not in a good way. We know that fraudsters are highly adaptive. As mobile operators deploy more robust controls on physical SIMs—I suspect not enough for the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—and as handsets and routers increasingly use eSIMs or other virtual identities, those intent on running industrial-scale smishing and scam operations will migrate to those platforms. If we legislate today for yesterday’s technology, we will simply displace the problem from one category of device to another and be back here in a few years’ time having the same debate. I hope the Minister will be able either to accept the amendment or to confirm that the Government will bring forward their own wording—there is always a bit of “not invented here” with these things. Without that assurance, there is a real risk that this part of the Bill will be lacking in force from the day it comes into effect.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for speaking to this group. On his Amendment 358, I agree that the Government should look to make provisions that account for all forms of SIM cards used in SIM farms. As the noble Lord stated, the current drafting of Clause 114 does not encompass eSIM cards in the devices used for SIM farming. Given the number of mobile phones that now use eSIMs, this really should be amended.

This speaks to the larger issue of defining provisions ahead of legislation coming into force. When changes are being made to the legality of certain products, suppliers and consumers should be made aware well in advance; behaviours will have to change with reform. This is a case of not just courtesy but constitutional propriety. That is the reasoning behind my Amendments 358A and 538A.

Legislating for the criminalisation of specific devices and software related to fraud should not be done on a whim. Individuals should not wake up one day and possess an illegal device or software that was considered legal a day before, with no warning of the coming change. Some notice must be given. Currently, the Bill simply permits Ministers to specify a device whenever they wish. There is no requirement for those regulations to come into force before the new offences of possession and supply come into force. My amendments would ensure, in the interests of fairness and the rule of law, that the new offences could not come into force until at least three months had passed from the making of the regulations defining the articles.

I believe that a period of three months before the possession and supply of certain articles becomes illegal is sufficient for people to change their habits and businesses to change their models. We in this House would be doing the public a disservice if we did not provide them with the necessary time to adapt. I hope the Minister agrees with this reasoning. I hope he will consider the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and, as always, I look forward very much to hearing his reply.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I first give my appreciation to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Vaux of Harrowden, in producing their report on this matter. It was during my enforced sabbatical from Parliament, so I was not party to the discussions at that stage. It is useful to have that continuum of discussion, and the previous Government’s initial intentions have been carried forward by this Government as a whole.

Amendment 358, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, mentioned, would expand the definition of SIM cards. To be clear, the Government’s consultation and evidence gathering as part of the preparation for this Bill focused on physical SIM cards, which are where the current and most significant threats arise and what these clauses seek to address. The provisions in the Bill are designed to tackle the misuse of physical SIM farms, which are widely used for criminal purposes such as fraud and spam. We are all aware of how that manifests on our phones and those of people we know and work with.

Virtual SIM technology is developing, but it is not currently presenting the same scale of risk, and the evidence we have from the consultation does not support extending the ban at this time. Physical SIM farms pose a significant and immediate threat because they enable large-scale criminal activity. Unlike virtual SIMs, physical SIM cards are harder to trace, as they are not inherently linked to a specific handset or verified identity. Their anonymity makes them ideal for fraud, phishing and mass spam campaigns.

Furthermore, the trade in physical SIM cards creates a black market where thousands of cards can be bought and sold with minimal or no oversight. This flow of unregistered SIMs fuels organised crime, facilitates money laundering and undermines law enforcement efforts. Virtual SIM technology, by contrast, is generally more secure and traceable because it requires integration with the device software and often involves stronger identity checks. At present, I say again, there is no evidence of virtual SIMs being exploited at scale for criminal purposes. Our focus therefore remains on the tangible and proven harm caused by physical SIM cards.

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[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support strongly the comments of my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the principle of the amendment laid by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This is a timely amendment, possibly timelier than the noble Lord anticipated, because today the Government have announced the promotion of a Minister to promulgate digital IDs among the population.

Digital IDs are going to have a huge vista and connection, not just in linking to personal data but in other areas of life: in the relationship between the state and the individual; and in the payment of parking tickets, road tolls, stamp duty and fishing licences—a different sort of fishing, as it begins with an “f”, not a “p”. So I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the thrust of the amendment, although I accept that some polishing is required.

If the Government are to promote digital IDs, the population at large need to have confidence not just that they will be correctly introduced but that there are safeguards against such impersonation. I strongly support the principle of this amendment and say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that if the Government resist it in principle, what confidence can the man in the street have that the Government are sincere about the safeguards they intend to introduce, alongside their intention for digital IDs—to get that balance right between the state and the individual, coupled together against the criminal?

We need to bring this back on Report. I hope the Minister is prepared to meet the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others to address this principle, so that the Government get off on the right foot, if they intend to promote digital IDs, and not resist this, because there is a world of pain if they do.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling this amendment. I know that the creation of a specific identity offence has been a long-standing concern of his, so I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this debate. I tentatively support the principle behind his amendment, although this issue is deserving of more scrutiny and thought than we are perhaps able to give it as an amendment in Committee.

I recognise the impetus for this amendment. Identity theft has long been the primary means by which criminals commit fraud; and, with a booming online world exacerbated by the introduction of artificial intelligence, digital identity theft is fast becoming a serious issue. CIFAS, the leading non-profit fraud prevention service, has documented the rise in identity theft. Last year, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, over 420,000 fraud cases were filed to the national fraud database, a 13% increase on the previous year. The main driver of this increase was identity fraud, with 250,000 filings, representing a 5% annual increase.

CIFAS cites online fraud as a primary cause of this increase; AI and generative technologies enable criminals to exploit people at speed and scale. Documents and identity cards are being forged at a more sophisticated level than before, with many now able to pass verification checks. Targets are often the elderly, as criminals target the least technologically capable and therefore most vulnerable victims.

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[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, especially Amendments 360 and 362, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes.

Like others, I welcome that the Government appear to have seen value in the introduction of a statutory defence for cyber security researchers. I hope that this will result in the updating of the Computer Misuse Act, for which, like others, I have been campaigning for about a decade. When it was passed, that Act was perfectly valid, but the market conditions, which have been described by colleagues, were extraordinarily different. As my noble friend Lord Holmes has rightly said, the Act is now not just neutral in the scene but actively doing damage to our national security.

The Act prevents or discourages those professionals whose work lies in researching things such as vulnerabilities in the system or threat intelligence from doing that work, because of the possibility of finding themselves in trouble with the law. It is therefore very important that we organise ourselves so that such challenges, if they exist, can be defended against as they come forward, and that the activities of our professionals can be both supported and encouraged.

I hope that, in drafting the legislation, the Government will ensure that they cover all aspects of this particular difficulty—not just vulnerabilities in the system but particularly threat intelligence, which, if we think about it for a moment, is becoming increasingly important. We need to know what is wrong with the system, and we need to know it early and before it is capable of doing real damage in each case.

This is an important amendment. When he replies, can the Minister give an assurance that the amendments that the Government will bring forward, I hope, will cover both the question of vulnerabilities and the issue of threat intelligence?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for tabling the amendments in this group.

To start with Amendment 360, I welcome the noble Lord’s aims. When a crime is detected or prevented, it is a sensible principle that the individual responsible for detection or prevention should not be punished. That said, the amendment is perhaps too wide in its scope. It mentions nothing of proportionality, which leads me to worry that it could end up being used as a defence for an individual who has committed a far greater crime than that which they claim to have been preventing. Similarly, “public interest” is broad and undefined, and I would appreciate it if the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, could clarify what would fall under this defence.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

365: After Clause 117, insert the following new Clause—
“Increased penalties for fare dodging(1) Section 5 of the Regulations of Railways Act 1889 (penalty for avoiding payment of fare) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), for “level 2” substitute “level 4”.(3) In subsection (3)—(a) for “level 3”, in each place in which it appears, substitute “level 5”, and(b) for “three months” substitute “six months”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase the penalties for passengers who fail or refuse to pay railway fares and those who travel or attempt to travel without having paid for previous fares.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group addresses two of the most significant criminal challenges facing our railways: fare dodging and freight crime. First, my Amendment 365 seeks to increase the penalties for fare dodging on the railways. It was reported towards the end of last year that one in 20 London Underground passengers was dodging fares. Transport for London has estimated its losses at around £130 million over the last year, with losses across the whole railway network potentially reaching £330 million. This is not a victimless crime. Those losses do not simply disappear into the ether. Every penny not paid in rail fare means less money for improvements to services, less money for infrastructure upgrades and higher fares for the vast majority of law-abiding passengers who do pay their fares.

Often, fare evasion is a crime committed in conjunction with other more serious offences. Some of those who have been stopped and searched by police for fare evasion have been found with knives and drugs. This amendment would increase the maximum fine that can be issued by officers of the railway operators for fare evasion from level 2 to level 4 on the standard scale, therefore bringing the maximum penalty from £500 to £2,500. Furthermore, it would increase the maximum penalties that can be handed out on summary conviction to a level 5 fine or a term of imprisonment of up to six months.

The existing penalties were fixed at the current levels through the Criminal Justice Act 1982, meaning they were set a number of decades ago. Given the scale of the problem, it is clear that these penalties do not reflect either the seriousness of persistent fare evasion or the reality that some offenders treat the current regime as a calculated risk. This amendment would also increase the maximum penalties available to the courts, particularly for repeat or aggravated offenders, while leaving full discretion with magistrates to distinguish between genuine error and deliberate fraud.

This is about not just punishment but enforcement. Railway staff, especially at Transport for London, need to be trained to confront those bumping barriers and take action. It is an all too common occurrence to see staff simply watching as people jump the barriers.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this short but important debate, and raising these important issues. As we are discussing rail issues, I should first draw noble Lords’ attention to my interests, as declared in the register. I am former employee and current shareholder of a transport operator, FirstGroup, and a former employee and current member of a rail union, the Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association. So I am both staff side and management: it balances out.

I turn first to Amendment 365, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seeks to increase the fines for fare dodging. The Government are committed to ensuring that everyone who travels on the railway pays the correct fare for their journey, and train operating companies have multiple mechanisms in place to prevent passengers travelling without the correct ticket. This includes the provisions set out in the Railways Act, but also use of the civil enforcement regime for penalty fares. In 2022, the penalty was raised from £20 to £100, and this has had a positive impact on reducing fare evasion and preventing fraud on the railway, which of course we all want to see.

Issuing penalty fares is one way of tackling fare dodging, but other measures can be taken. I am pleased to say that we had quite an extensive debate on these. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, acknowledged, the Office of Rail and Road has been asked to consider improvements to the industry’s revenue protection practices. Last year, it published its review setting out five recommendations, which my colleague the Secretary of State for Transport accepted in full.

It is probably worth very quickly going through the recommendations, which were: make buying the right ticket simpler and easier, strengthen consistency in how passengers are treated when ticket issues arise, introduce greater consistency and fairness in the use of prosecutions, make information and revenue protection easy to access and understand, and provide greater co-ordination, oversight and transparency of revenue protection activity. I hope, to an extent, those address the very valid concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, expressed about complexity, which were shared by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. We all want to encourage rail travel; we do not want to discourage it by making the system too complex, and we do not want to penalise those who are truly acting in good faith. At the same time, it is important that we prevent fare dodging and make sure that there is a proper regime to prevent it.

Fare simplification is at the heart of this, as many noble Lords said in the debate on these amendments. I can confirm that this is very much part of the Government’s plans for rail reforms as part of the creation of Great British Railways. It is probably up to individual train operators and other public transport operators to promote their own campaigns on fare dodging but, to pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it is the case that whether you are travelling on the Tube or national rail, you cannot go far without seeing posters and public information about fare dodging. This is about the balance between promoting responsible behaviour and a penalising and enforcement regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and others talked about enforcement. On TfL, I share his experience. Maybe I use the Tube a little more than he does, but multiple times I have seen plainclothes crews both on Tube trains and at ticket barriers. I saw one at King’s Cross Tube station ticket barrier just last week. There was a large gang of enforcement officers waiting to catch people trying to get in by tailgating those who were paying fares through the automatic gates. So transport operators are very much aware of their responsibilities.

To be clear on the ORR review, a number of contributions focused not on national rail but on the Tube, and obviously that is operated by Transport for London, a devolved body that is overseen ultimately by the Mayor of London. I want to inform noble Lords that the ORR spoke to TfL as part of its review and it is of course up to TfL whether it takes on its recommendations. When it comes to national rail operators, the ORR has a full purview.

On Amendment 368A, the Government are very aware of the rising frequency of freight crime and the significant and damaging impact it can have on businesses and drivers. We are determined to crack down on it. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, talked very much in the context of rail freight, but of course this is a problem for road freight as well. The incidence of cargo theft, where criminals are ripping the sides of lorries and taking the goods inside, is frightening for dedicated HGV drivers across the UK, and the perception that this crime is low-risk and high-reward is unacceptable and one that we want to change. Whether it is on the rail or the road, we share the noble Lord’s determination to do something about it.

Working with the police, the Home Office has agreed to create a freight crime flag which will be attached to any applicable crime, whether it is on the road or on rail. It will apply across all police forces, including the British Transport Police, which of course polices the railways. The data will be collected as part of the annual data return to the Home Office. The flag is currently being piloted in a small number of forces and, following this, the intention is to roll it out across all forces. The benefit of using a flag, as opposed to creating new crime classifications, is that in a case where, for instance, a driver has their vehicle or load stolen and violence is used or threatened against them, the crime that would be recorded would be robbery, as opposed to vehicle crime. The flag, however, would identify the robbery as a freight crime.

However, we will monitor the implementation of the flag. We are about half way through the six-month pilot, so we will keep a close eye on how this is panning out and consider whether further steps are required in the future. We know that having a code or a flag would not of itself solve the problem. Victims should always report crime to the police, and we expect police to investigate. However, as noble Lords would expect me to say, it is for chief constables to allocate resources for such investigations in line with local policing priorities.

I also acknowledge the worrying involvement of serious and organised criminals in committing freight crime. These individuals are damaging this country’s global reputation and are costing us billions each year. The Government are committed to tackling serious and organised crime in all its forms and are working with policing to that end. We are working closely with the National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service and with Opal, the police’s national intelligence unit focused on serious organised acquisitive crime, including a vehicle crime intelligence desk which covers freight crime.

I hope in my response I have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord, Davies, that we accept the spirit of his Amendment 368A and are working to address the issues he has raised in tabling the amendment. I hope too that the noble Lord will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 365 to be necessary. For all of these reasons, I invite him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions: my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Goschen, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, for his very interesting examples.

I hope we have been able to impress on the Government the importance of tackling railway crime. I have travelled for over 50 years now on the London Underground, and things have improved immensely with the new security gates, et cetera, but still we see people avoiding payment by tailgating, which is something we have to challenge and stop. I hope the Government will look at addressing these issues, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 365 withdrawn.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Jackson on the quality of the amendment he drafted. I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe on the superb speech she made setting out why this amendment is necessary. As we know, it addresses one of the fastest-growing forms of organised crime in the UK: the theft and rapid export of mobile phones—thousands and thousands of them. These are no longer opportunistic street offences. As noble Lords have said, they are part of a highly profitable, highly mobile criminal market that depends on one thing above all else: the ability to reactivate and resell the stolen devices abroad.

A couple of years ago, I was outside Victoria station, at the end of Victoria Street, waiting to cross the road. I saw a woman waiting for the pedestrian lights to change, holding her mobile phone out—I think she was trying to read the map—almost like a Geiger counter. Then I saw two guys on a motor scooter coming around the corner and I tried to shout to her to put her phone away, but too late—it was snatched in seconds.

That was a couple of years ago, when I think there were motor scooter gangs doing it. Now, as we have seen—we were talking about the e-bike problem in our debates on the Bill before Christmas—there are lots of videos of these guys on their very fast bikes, snatching phones, and I believe the Met now has a response squad on those high-powered bikes chasing the phone thieves. So it is a big problem, particularly in London.

At present, our defences are simply not keeping pace. IMEI blocking helps, but criminals now routinely bypass it by altering identifiers or moving devices to jurisdictions where UK blacklists are ignored. What they cannot bypass is the cloud. As noble Lords have said, modern smartphones are useless without access to the cloud-based services that power authentication, updates, storage and app ecosystems.

The amendment therefore introduces a very simple, proportionate requirement. When a user reports their phone lost or stolen, cloud service providers must take reasonable steps to block that specific device from accessing their services. If a stolen phone cannot be reactivated, it cannot be resold. If it cannot be resold, it is not worth stealing. It is as simple as that.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe hinted that the phone companies may possibly have a financial benefit from not co-operating here. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, was more blatant. I will be more blatant still. I am absolutely certain that they are conspiring not to co-operate so that they can sell more phones. We were discussing all-terrain vehicles a couple of hours ago. When the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Bill was going through, the police officers who were advising us said that they had heard from some of the big manufacturers of ATVs—the ones which make motorbikes with locks you cannot penetrate—that they were deliberately putting rubbish locks on the ATVs because when the £8,000 quad bike was stolen, the farmer immediately replaced it. They saw a market in goods being stolen. I think the big phone companies see exactly the same thing: there is a market in replacement phones.

The noble Lord asked: why do the British Government not do something about it? I suspect it is mega US-UK politics. If we said we were going to restrict the ability of Apple, Google and others to sell their phones here, I think we would have Mr Trump seeking to invade us next week, so I suspect there are geopolitical problems there.

The amendment also ensures proper safeguards: verification before blocking, a clear appeals process, and a role for the Secretary of State in setting technical standards. It strengthens law enforcement by requiring timely notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, giving them valuable intelligence on organised theft. This is not about burdening industry. It is about ensuring that all providers meet a consistent baseline of responsible behaviour—one that many already follow voluntarily, but which criminals exploit when it is not universal.

I conclude by saying that we have an opportunity here to collapse the economic incentive that drives mobile phone theft. Cloud-based blocking is practical, proportionate and overdue, and I commend the amendment to the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling these excellent amendments, and to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving Amendment 366 on his behalf.

This amendment is driven by a simple proposition: if we are to bear down on the scourge of phone theft, we must remove the profit motive, because it is precisely this incentive to profit that drives the vast industry behind phone theft. Too often, the criminal justice system is left trying to deal with the consequences of crime after the event, rather than addressing the incentives that fuel it in the first place. Phone theft is now a high-volume, high-impact crime, particularly in our cities, and it causes not only financial loss but real fear and disruption to victims’ lives.

What this amendment seeks to do is eminently practical. It asks cloud service providers, which already control the digital lifeline that makes a smartphone valuable, to take responsible and timely steps to deny access to those services once a device is verified as lost or stolen. A phone that cannot access cloud backups, app stores, authentication, service or updates rapidly becomes worthless on the secondary market, whether at home or abroad.

This is not a novel idea nor an untested one. As many noble Lords will know, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has examined this issue in detail. In its recent correspondence with Ministers and technology companies, the committee highlighted both the scale of the problem and the frustrating gap between what is technically possible and what is currently being done. The committee made it clear that voluntary action has been uneven, that existing measures are inconsistently applied across platforms, and that stronger co-ordination, potentially underpinned by legislation, may be required if we are serious about prevention. This amendment directly reflects that evidence-based work and gives effect to its central recommendations.

Importantly, the amendment builds in safeguards for users to appeal or reverse a block where a mistake has been made or a device is recovered. It leaves the detailed technical standards, timelines and sanctions to secondary legislation, allowing flexibility and proper consultation with industry, and it recognises the importance of law enforcement by requiring prompt notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, strengthening intelligence and disruption efforts. Fundamentally, if we can force cloud service providers to implement this provision, we can break the cycle of phone theft. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for taking up the cudgels on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I thought I had got away with it when I did not see him in the Chamber, but the noble Baroness turned up at the last minute, like the cavalry, and charged in to raise this very important issue, which I appreciate her doing. She is right to do so because, self-evidently, mobile phone theft is unacceptable. It is a significant criminal operation—as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it involves overseas criminal gangs—and a great inconvenience, cost and discomfort to many people. We need collectively to take action to support the reduction of mobile phone theft.

Amendment 366, moved by the noble Baroness on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, would require technology companies which offer cloud-based services to use technical measures, such as cloud-based blocking, to prevent access to cloud-based services after a device by a registered user has been lost or stolen. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Blencathra—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench of His Majesty’s Opposition—expressed support for that principle and indicated that it is one method of tackling the scourge of mobile phone theft.

I share the noble Baroness’s concern about the theft of mobile phones and other devices that host cloud-based services. The number of thefts is too high and we are determined to get it down. I agree that urgent action is required to make sure that the companies which design these devices—to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—play their part and do absolutely everything they can to ensure that a stolen mobile phone is not a valuable commodity and therefore not worth stealing.

I share the intent to reduce mobile phone theft, but I suggest to the noble Baroness that there are a number of potential practical challenges in the proposed approach that I am uncertain whether we would currently be able to overcome. Many apps on mobile phone devices have some element of cloud access, so the range of companies in scope of the provision would appear to be extremely broad. In addition, disabling all cloud services could, for example, stop tracking and recovery of mobile phones, especially if the tracking function relies on cloud connectivity. That would impede law enforcement’s ability to identify locations to which stolen devices are taken.

As noble Lords will note, there is a measure in the Bill to ensure that tracking of mobile phones is dealt with in a much speedier and more effective way without the need for warrants. The Government are working with industry and law enforcement partners on the delivery of practical and effective measures. As the noble Baroness said, there was a very productive round table in February which brought together police, technology companies and others to look at how we can do what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, recommended: break the business model of mobile phone theft.

The summit resulted in clear commitments from attendees, including data sharing on mobile phone theft to get a comprehensive picture. There was also a range of other measures, including the police stepping up their operational response. Members will have seen this particularly in London, where the Metropolitan Police—I also pay tribute to the City of London Police—has targeted high areas of that activity as an operational response to catching criminals responsible for these crimes. As I have mentioned, the Bill gives police powers to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items, which would be negated if the tracking element was not allowed. That will help in seriously tackling this issue by enabling the tracking down of stolen mobile phones to particular properties.

As a result of the summit, technology companies and policing partners have continued to work together and there have been a number of working groups looking collectively at tech, operational issues of street action by police forces and other issues, although the main committee has not been reconvened. We have had a change of Home Secretary since the summit took place, so I will go back to the Home Secretary’s office about the potential for reconvening the major group, because it is important that that is done and seen through.

Shamima Begum

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I respect the noble Lord and his representations, but the decision in relation to the individual case was taken having considered evidence and supported by both the previous Government and this Government. With the litigation that is currently ongoing in the European court, I cannot say much from this Dispatch Box. I hope that the noble Lord understands that; I would like to be able to give him further information, but I cannot.

The noble Lord will have noticed that this very weekend the UK Government took action against Daesh and will continue to do so. The prosecution issues that he mentioned are for the courts and the legal system and not for me as a Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the position of the Official Opposition is clear: it was a Conservative Government who stripped Shamima Begum of her citizenship, and it is our unequivocal view that she should never be allowed to return to Britain—I sincerely hope that that is the Government’s view as well. However, it is not just Shamima Begum who poses a risk to the British people. Given all that we know about Alaa Abd el-Fattah, do the Government regret welcoming him with open arms as well?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s support for the current position. We have contested and are contesting the position with the appeal in the European Court of Human Rights now, which shows that we support the original decision.

With regard to the individual that the noble Lord mentioned, he will know that the Foreign Secretary has ordered an inquiry into why we did not have information about some of the comments that he made. The noble Lord will know that the Prime Minister has made comments on that as well, which I support, and he will know that there are many people in both Houses who gave support for that individual. Subsequently, we need to investigate the due diligence as to why the comments that were made were not considered. I await the Foreign Secretary’s report before commenting further.

Violence against Women and Girls Strategy

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Those steps are all having an impact, but to give every woman and girl the safety and security they deserve, a complete reset is needed. Through the strategy, we will go further than ever before in our efforts to deliver real and lasting change, and provide every woman and girl across the country with the safety and security that they deserve”.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we have been promised this strategy all year. It was supposed to be published before the Summer Recess, and then we were told that it would be delayed. On 27 November, the Minister said that it would be coming very soon. We were finally told this week that it will be published tomorrow. Constant delays seem to be a common occurrence. Can the Minister tell us why this has been so delayed? Secondly, there have been reports, including in The Spectator this week, from some working in the sector that they have been told about fresh cuts to services. Can the Minister tell us whether this is true?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I said on 27 November that the strategy would be published soon, and I think 18 December is soon. It will be published tomorrow. I know that Members of this House have been pressing me to publish the Statement as soon as possible. The Statement will be delivered in the House of Commons tomorrow, and, if the Opposition so wish, I stand ready to deliver it in this House at the earliest opportunity—which I expect will be in the new year.

The noble Lord asks whether there will be cuts in services and why this strategy has been “delayed”. I remind the noble Lord that this is a strategy with an ambition to halve violence against women and girls over a 10-year period. That is a significant and complex but deliverable commitment. To achieve that commitment, through 12 meetings across the sector we have consulted with a range of individuals, and consulted across government and with the police and women’s organisations involved in domestic violence.

The strategy will be published tomorrow in full, and I hope it will be welcomed. It will have a series of measurable metrics to achieve that halving of violence against women and girls. The strategy is complex, but I hope the noble Lord will invite me to deliver a Statement in the new year providing more detail, which I will happily do.

The noble Lord asks about cuts in funding. We will be announcing a package of funding measures tomorrow as part of the violence against women and girls strategy. In May, the Government announced a £19.9 million investment to tackle violence against women and girls. In July, we announced a £53 million investment to fund the four-year rollout of the Drive project. This year, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has committed £19 million to domestic abuse safe accommodation, and local authorities will receive £500 million over the next three years to support safe accommodation. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice has committed £500 million to invest in vital support services that help domestic abuse victims navigate the justice process. That is what we have done so far. Tomorrow, the strategy will set out in more detail the funding options and deliverables that we will use to deliver on halving violence against women in girls over the next 10 years. I hope the noble Lord will welcome it when it comes.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to the group of amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin in what I might say was rather a poignant way.

The amendments probe the liability of courier companies, specifically for the actions of their employees who use cycling as their method of transportation. My noble friend Lord Shinkwin spoke of the threat posed by these cyclists to a disabled person, for example. Amendment 346C, tabled by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin, asks for a review looking at how the law could be changed to ensure that bicycle courier companies are held accountable for their riders.

Noble Lords will be aware of the explosive growth of bicycle delivery and courier services, and many of those courier companies are not held responsible for the dangerous manner in which their riders behave. Many of the most dangerous incidents are caused by delivery riders under pressure to meet tight deadlines and often operating fast, heavy e-bikes. Holding companies responsible, or at least requiring a public review of their practices, would help deter irresponsible riding and shift the burden back on to the companies that profit from high-speed delivery models. A review of this kind would also allow us to examine the employment models used by these companies, the incentives placed on riders and the adequacy of training, supervision and enforcement mechanisms. It would provide a valuable evidence base for any future legislative change, rather than relying on piecemeal responses to individual incidents.

I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for Amendment 416K and the passion with which he spoke in support of it. It would give the police power to issue fines of an unlimited amount to delivery companies for dangerous cycling offences

“under sections 27A (causing death by dangerous cycling), 27B (causing serious injury by dangerous cycling), 28B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) or 28C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) of the Road Traffic Act 1988”.

We support the intention behind the amendment, whose aim is to hold companies that hire large numbers of delivery drivers to account for the actions of their hired staff. This is an important principle and touches on the important points of what frameworks and policies companies have in place to ensure that their own staff are abiding by the laws of the road. While questions would clearly need to be addressed around proportionality, enforcement and evidential thresholds, the amendment raises legitimate concerns about the status quo. I hope the amendment has made the Government reflect on whether current penalties fall too heavily on individual riders, while the companies that benefit financially from the delivery model escape meaningful consequences. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendment 481, tabled by my noble friend Lord McColl of Dulwich, proposes a review into bicycle and motorcycle delivery services and their potential links to criminal activity. We are broadly supportive of the principle behind the amendment. It seeks to shine a light on a range of issues that are often raised by residents and local authorities, including concerns about organised crime, exploitation, immigration compliance and the impact of delivery riders on community safety.

Taken together, these amendments raise serious and timely questions about accountability, public safety and the responsibility of large delivery platforms. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is absolutely right that the Government must acknowledge the argument and come up with answers. The words of my noble friend Lord Goschen summed it up perfectly: this is an opportunity to do something positive about a very real problem, and to do it now in this Bill. I hope the Government will engage constructively with the issues raised and set out how they intend to ensure that the rapid growth of this sector does not come at the expense of safety and public confidence.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments, in their different ways, seek to extend liability for the unlawful actions of cyclists to their employers or contractors. Amendment 346C, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, proposes a review of the new cycling offences provided for in Clause 106 one year after the clause comes into force. He set out its provisions with clarity, his customary humility and his personal perspective, and we are all grateful for him doing so. As I understand the noble Lord, the intention of such a review is to assess whether the new offences have impacted the standard of cycling by delivery riders, and whether further changes in the law are required to ensure that their employers or contractors take greater responsibility for the cycling standards of their workers.

To be clear, these offences apply to all cyclists regardless of the purpose of their journey or whether they are paid to do it. I, of course, recognise the very real concerns around the behaviour of delivery riders that we have discussed in this group of amendments, but I completely reject the idea from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that we are somehow being complacent and ignoring the issue. The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, talked about the importance of using the opportunity to do something positive, and I will come on to that in a second. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for sharing her experience from City Hall of the Greater London Authority, the mayor’s office and TfL.

We of course recognise the concerns about the behaviour of delivery riders, but it is harder to find firm evidence to suggest that their behaviour is so demonstrably worse than that of other groups that it is necessary to single them out for review—hard evidence, I would say, looking at the faces of some noble Lords opposite. Furthermore, it is not clear what such a review would achieve. The Health and Safety Executive’s guidance already makes it clear that those who drive or ride for work should have the skills and expertise required to be safe on the road. The key thing here is that the Department for Transport—we discussed this on Monday in Committee; certainly, I spoke to it on one of the later groups—is also developing a new road safety strategy, and we will set out more details shortly. That will be a holistic strategy around all elements of road safety including pedestrians, cyclists, motorcyclists, road users and public transport drivers—the whole gamut. I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that is the opportunity for us to do something positive and take a holistic approach to improving road safety. We are not playing down these issues but just trying to find the best way of approaching them in a sense that is complete and wholescale rather than piecemeal.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, as we discussed earlier, we have seen a huge rise in fast food and other deliveries by e-bikes and e-scooters across our cities, and of course internationally too. The whole model for these deliveries is based on time— carrying out as many deliveries as possible in as short a time as possible. This constant pressure can lead to riders taking risks that endanger not only themselves but other road users and pedestrians. These risks include installing bigger batteries.

This group of amendments is timely and of the moment, given the rise in these bikes and scooters. However, kits are increasingly being bought online that are used to adapt regular cycles into e-cycles. These are causing not only serious safety issues on our streets but fire safety issues, as we have already heard. Therefore, the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, look to tackle both the fire and road safety issues associated with non-compliant lithium-ion batteries. It does feel like there is a loophole in the law whereby unsafe batteries are being sold in the UK and are having a devastating effect. These are important issues, and I hope we hear some clear progress in this area from the Government.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as was mentioned earlier in Committee when speaking to Amendment 346, we take the issue of bike alterations very seriously. My noble friend Lord Blencathra raises a similar issue with these amendments, and, in placing the onus on suppliers, a two-pronged approach to tackling the issue is welcome.

We know that many of the most dangerous e-bikes on our roads are not the result of amateur tinkering alone. They are enabled by a market that supplies batteries far in excess of the 250-watt limit set out in law, or batteries that fail to meet even the most basic safety standards for lithium-ion technology. These batteries transform what should be a pedal-assisted cycle into something much closer to an unregistered electric motorcycle, which is often capable of significant speed and acceleration, and frequently used in dense urban areas, on pavements and in shared spaces.

There is also a wider public safety dimension. Unsafe lithium-ion batteries are not merely a road safety issue; they are a growing fire risk in homes, flats and shared accommodation. The London Fire Brigade and other services have repeatedly warned about fires caused by substandard e-bike batteries, often supplied online with little oversight and no meaningful accountability. This amendment would reinforce the message that safety standards are not optional, and that those who profit from ignoring them may—indeed, should—face consequences.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am grateful to the nobleLord, Lord Blencathra, for his amendments on the regulation of e-bike batteries. Your Lordships’ House may recall the recent passage through this House of the Product Regulation and Metrology Act, which received Royal Assent in July and underlines the Government’s determination to take action on this point. Amendment 346D would provide for the prosecution of any person who had supplied an unsafe battery to an individual who was subsequently convicted of any of the offences in Clause 106 of the Bill.

While an unsafe battery—and by this I mean one that does not comply with existing product safety standards—could put the e-bike at risk of catching fire, particularly while placed on charge, as we have heard from many noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, this would not directly lead to a person riding their cycle carelessly or dangerously. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, anticipated my argument and posited it more eloquently than I might have done. The battery is simply that which powers the e-bike: it cannot, on its own, enable the rider to overcome speed or power restrictions provided for in regulations. This would come from a broader set of modifications concerning the electric motor and other component parts, and I will come on to that in a bit. As the battery would not play a direct role in any incident leading to a prosecution of the kind provided for at Clause 106, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will see that this amendment is not required.

In moving his amendment, the noble Lord also talked about the chips that allow bikes to be driven at frankly hair-raising speeds that make them unsafe for the user, let alone others. To be clear, those modifications are already illegal: e-bikes with those chips do not comply with the electrically assisted pedal cycle regulations. Therefore, there is already a law in place to cover this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in opposing the proposition that Clause 107 should stand part of the Bill, I will speak also to my opposition to Clauses 108 and 109. These clauses were added by the Government without any debate on Report in the other place; therefore, they have not been subjected to the detailed scrutiny that they deserve. It is only right that, as the revising Chamber, we should fulfil our duty in that respect.

I will be clear from the outset that we on these Benches do not doubt for a moment the courage, dedication and indispensable role of our emergency workers. Indeed, the previous Conservative Government legislated to bring forward the specific offence of assaulting an emergency worker through the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018. However, we must also ensure that the criminal law remains proportionate, coherent and workable, and in our view these clauses fail that test. Clauses 107, 108 and 109 introduce a series of new offences on the racial or religiously aggravated abuse of emergency workers. The Government present these measures as necessary enhancements to the law to protect emergency workers from abuse motivated by racial or religious hostility. No one disputes the seriousness of such conduct. But these clauses do not simply strengthen existing protections; they create overlapping, confusing and potentially sweeping new offences that go beyond what is necessary or desirable in a free society.

The provisions duplicate offences that are already well established in our law. Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour motivated by racial or religious hostility is already an offence under Sections 18 and 29B of the Public Order Act 1986. I completely understand that those offences cannot be committed inside a dwelling, while the new offences in Clauses 107 and 108 can be committed inside a person’s house. That is a key difference between these offences.

Both clauses also require the conduct to be racially or religiously hostile, but, again, that aggravation is already captured by the criminal law. Section 66 of the Sentencing Code creates a statutory aggravating factor for any offence based on racial and religious hostility. Furthermore, Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 creates a specific offence of using words or behaviour that cause “harassment, alarm or distress” and are religiously or racially aggravated. That offence can be committed inside a dwelling, so a person who racially abuses an emergency worker inside their home can already be prosecuted under the Crime and Disorder Act 1988. It is abundantly clear that there is absolutely no need for these new offences.

Clause 107 in particular casts an extraordinarily wide net. It includes not only threatening but insulting behaviour. This is a highly subjective term that will not create clarity or certainty—but do not take my word for it. The Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has criticised these clauses for this precise reason. Its 11th report states:

“Clause 107 criminalises ‘insults’ and clause 108 introduces the term ‘distress’. This potentially leaves people open to criminal sanction on a subjective basis. In addition, clause 108 includes a defence for ‘reasonable conduct’, which is not defined. As a result, the precise scope of these clauses, and the criminal offences contained within them, is uncertain”.


In Clause 108, matters become even more troubling. The clause would criminalise conduct merely likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, again with the addition of racial or religious hostility, but with penalties that do not align with the broader public order framework. Here we see threatening or abusive behaviour that is already covered elsewhere reframed in a way that risks catching behaviour far removed from the core of criminal wrongdoing. While a defendant may raise a defence, the burden-shifting mechanism in subsection (7) is unusual and risks being applied inconsistently.

It is a long-standing principle that the criminal law should be carefully calibrated, limited to what is necessary and drafted so that ordinary citizens can understand the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. The law must be strong where it matters, not sprawling and duplicative. When Parliament repeatedly layers offence upon offence, we risk incoherence, overcriminalisation and legal uncertainty, none of which helps emergency workers or the public. If the Government believe that the existing framework is insufficient, they should amend those statutes directly and not create parallel criminal regimes that overlap and contradict one another.

In conclusion, Clauses 107 and 108 are unnecessary and duplicative and risk expanding the criminal law in ways that Parliament has previously rejected. They confuse rather than clarify. They undermine coherence rather than strengthen protection. We owe emergency workers the best possible statutory safeguards, but they must be safeguards that work. These clauses do not. For that reason, and in the interests of principled and proportionate criminal law, I urge the Committee to oppose Clauses 107 and 108.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly because we have very important business in future amendments. I heartily endorse the comments of my noble friend on the Front Bench. Why were these proposals—which, after all, attract cross- party support, as indeed the 2018 legislation did—not brought forward for pre-legislative scrutiny or debate and discussion at an earlier stage in the other place? They were introduced only at a later stage. For all the reasons my noble friend gave, there would have been a proper debate about whether it is right to bring forward legislation that includes potential incarceration for up to two years for an offence. In fact, it is quite incongruent because it does not look at sexual orientation and disability, for instance, only racially biased hate crime in private dwellings. Why was it not brought forward at an earlier stage, when I think all sides of the House would have been predisposed to support it and debate it properly?

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not think I am being illiberal, although I accept that the noble Baroness may have a different view on that. Later in the consideration of amendments, we will come to those of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that seek to further define some of the aspects of Clause 109. I am happy to look at the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but the judgment we have made is that these clauses should remain part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has asked that they be removed. That is a clear difference between us. I have explained why they should be included; he has explained why he believes they should not. If he wishes to take that stance on Report, we can have a discussion about that.

For ease of recall, I have just been passed a copy of a long letter about the Bill and these clauses, which I have been reminded that I sent to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, on 12 November. The letter answers some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised. I do not know whether this four-page letter has been made public, but I am happy to place a copy of it in the Library for the noble Lord and anybody else to examine.

Obviously, there will be the opportunity on Report for the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to again table his clause stand part notices and/or for any Member of the House, once they have had an opportunity to look at the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to table amendments to meet the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has mentioned. We support these clauses, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will reflect on that and not seek to remove them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for responding to this debate. I spent 32 years as a police officer and an emergency worker, and I am still not persuaded by these clauses. As I established in my opening speech, all scenarios for criminalising racially or religiously aggravated abuse of emergency workers are already covered by the criminal law, and this is mere repetition. There exists a raft of legislation which permits the prosecution of a person who commits such conduct. The Sentencing Code already provides for any offence to be aggravated by racial or religious hostility. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 creates a specific criminal offence for using racially or religiously hostile language. The Public Order Act 1986 also contains such provisions. It is absolutely not correct to claim that emergency workers need further protection under the law when it comes to abusive language.

The Bill therefore creates duplicate offences with different thresholds and different maximum penalties, all while leaving the existing offences untouched. How is this meant to improve enforcement? How are police officers supposed to choose which offence fits which circumstance? The Government have not offered an answer, I am afraid. By creating new stand-alone offences that replicate existing ones, the Government risk producing confusion rather than clarity. Police officers, paramedics and other emergency workers deserve a legal framework that is simple, enforceable and unambiguous.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have said this already in my responses to the noble Lord in Committee, but I think it is important that I comment on what I said in the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to re-emphasises the point. The offences under the Public Order Act 1986 have been interpreted by the law over the years, but, essentially, they do not relate to private dwellings. The clauses in the Bill are about private dwellings and give greater clarification. That is the point I put to the noble Lord. In the four-page letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, which I will happily put in the Library, that is one of the key points that I make, as I have in this debate. I re-emphasise that in response to the noble Lord’s closing remarks.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am grateful for that. Perhaps it would be easier to amend the original law on this, rather than introduce it in these clauses.

As I said, police officers, paramedics and other emergency workers deserve a legal framework that is simple, enforceable and unambiguous, and what is before us is none of those things. Given the poor defence offered by the Government, I think this may be an issue that we have to return to on Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 107 agreed.

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[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, have inspired me to speak. I support the amendment and would add another set of people who do exactly the same: spiritual faith healers. They do coercive and controlling behaviour and target the most vulnerable. They do all the things mentioned. In certain minority ethnic communities, they will target vulnerable women, for example, and take large amounts of cash from them. I do not expect noble Lords to amend this proposed new clause to add those sets of people, because they obviously want to maximise their chances of getting their clause through, but they have inspired me to think about replicating their amendment and perhaps proposing it for future legislation. So the Minister can expect a letter from me to discuss this further—which also amounts to spiritual abuse.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for tabling this considered amendment. Controlling or coercive behaviour is currently legislated against if the offender is or has been

“in an intimate or family relationship”

with the victim. This amendment uses the framework of Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and applies it to offenders providing psychotherapeutic or counselling services.

I understand the reasoning behind the noble Lord’s amendment. The original offence is in place because being in an intimate or familial relationship puts both parties in a unique position of proximity. These positions of trust carry a heightened risk of becoming exploitative, and thus legislation exists to recognize this. Psychotherapy and counselling services carry a similar risk; they put patients in extremely open and often vulnerable positions as they entrust the provider with their confidence. Controlling or coercive behaviour becomes more likely given the power dynamics in these relationships and I see no reason why, in principle, the law should not extend past protecting familial or intimate relationships to encompass certain intimate services.

This conclusion is backed up by recent research into mental health services. Earlier this year, the University of Hertfordshire found more than 750 incidents of violence and coercion by staff. These include instances of verbal abuse, intentional neglect and even cases of physical violence. I do not intend to extrapolate from that study and make it seem as if it represents the entirety of our mental health services—I hope it does not. This is an under-investigated area and we do not yet know the scale of neglect in our services, but the most serious conclusion that can be drawn from it is the fact that, of these 750 offences, only four official complaints were made and, of those four complaints, a single one was upheld. Whether the reason for that was ignorance of reporting mechanisms, intimidation by staff or the inexistence of the legal means, it represents a failure of the system.

The least we should do as legislators is promise to further examine the reasons behind those failings: something I hope the Minister can assure us the Government will do. If the Government conclude there is a gap in the law, and that vulnerable people attending psychotherapy or counselling services are being controlled or coerced without the legal means to get justice, I hope that they will consider the amendment in question.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for returning to this issue. I give him credit for his persistence. I welcome the support for these measures from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for sharing his personal experiences and to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath for reminding us that this issue was raised even back as far as 2001. I am also grateful for my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark making a guest appearance in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Marks; it is always helpful to see that, as I am speaking for the Government on this occasion. I am also grateful for the constructive comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, with regard to these issues.

Amendment 347, as we are clear, seeks to create an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour for psychotherapists and counsellors providing services to clients, by replicating the coercive or controlling behaviour offence under Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has previously shared concerns—he has repeated them today—about unscrupulous therapists taking advantage of their clients’ vulnerabilities by supplanting parents and families in the affections and minds of their clients, for the purposes of turning them against their friends and family through the process called transference. I entirely agree with him that this is a serious issue that deserves careful consideration. Again, I reflect on what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said in that regard. However, the question for the Committee is whether there is an argument to legislate at this time or whether there are other means to examine the outcomes that the noble Lord seeks. I suggest that for the moment that, for reasons I will explain, legislation would not necessarily be the way forward in this case.

Asylum Accommodation

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 16th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I think the noble Baroness will know that the UK Government, with this Labour Party now as the prime mover, have invested a considerable amount of resource in improving accommodation for troops across the country, including the biggest-ever engagement in improving accommodation for service men and women in their communities. That is one thing we are trying to do. We are, at the moment, looking at Cameron barracks as one of the options. We are undertaking due diligence, and no final decisions have been taken. In the event of any decision being taken, we will make sure that the accommodation is up to a decent standard, which I think is only fair to those who are using it.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, on the question of barracks, Crowborough barracks in East Sussex is routinely used for the Kent and Sussex Army Cadet Forces as well as the local school CCFs, but it seems that the Home Office will now be turfing them out and using the barracks for accommodation for asylum seekers. At the same time, the Government say they want to support young people. Do the Government really think that this is a good example of how to treat and invest in tomorrow’s UK citizens?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As the noble Lord will know, we have announced that we wish to examine the opportunity for Crowborough barracks. We are under- taking due diligence at the moment. That involves discussions with a range of authorities, including the police, local authorities, the local health service and, indeed, the local Member of Parliament. No final decision has been taken as yet.