Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts(1 day, 17 hours ago)
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Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, put forward a number of alternative approaches to reduce shoplifting. However, they fail to address practical realities and risk creating more issues than they resolve.
The proposal in Amendment 216A would allow shopkeepers to circulate photographic evidence of suspects, including on social media. This raises significant questions about privacy and misidentification. If the accused turns out to be innocent, the shop must pay compensation, but this is fundamentally unworkable and could cause serious harm to innocent people, damaging reputations in ways that money cannot fix.
The noble Lord himself said that this is likely to be able to be worked only in large stores rather than small shops, but the shops most affected by theft are small businesses run by one or two people. Shopkeepers in my area are busy enough running their shops without spending hours reviewing camera footage, creating digital copies and ensuring timestamps.
Clarifying the arrest powers of security staff, as proposed in Amendment 216B, may seem helpful, but increasing their authority to arrest and detain risks misuse and legal challenge. Security staff do not have the same training or accountability as police officers, increasing the chance of wrongful or disproportionate arrest. Video evidence and procedural protections are helpful but not adequate substitutes for professional policing standards.
Finally, Amendment 216C proposes a new offence of conspiracy to commit theft. The noble Lord is right to point to the growing involvement of organised crime. The police have said that international criminals are targeting UK shops in what a Co-op boss describes as “organised looting”. However, I disagree with the noble Lord in respect to the solution he proposes. It seems likely to disproportionately target those committing relatively minor thefts, potentially imposing severe sentences on them of up to 10 years, while doing little to address those orchestrating and controlling those criminal activities.
Shoplifting is undoubtedly out of control, and a new direction is desperately needed. The Liberal Democrats believe the current epidemic is the result of years of ineffective police resourcing, which has left local forces overstretched, underresourced and unable to focus on solving crimes such as shoplifting—I stress the words “unable to” rather than “unwilling to”. We want to see a return to genuine neighbourhood policing, with more police visibility and a staffed police counter in every community. That is why I have tabled Amendments 429 and 430 later on in the Bill.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support the intention behind the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. He is absolutely right to refer to it as theft. It is theft, under Section 1 of the Theft Act 1968. He is right that there is no such offence as shoplifting.
We have all heard the same stories from businesses, large and small: prolific offenders walking out with hundreds of pounds of stock in broad daylight; staff frightened or, in many cases, not allowed to intervene; police too stretched to attend; and, time and again, the same individuals returning to commit offence after offence because they believe, with some justification, that nothing will happen to them.
My noble friend’s first amendment in this group deals with the ability to share clear evidence of theft with those who need to see it. At present, retailers might be reluctant or legally uncertain about whether they can circulate images of offenders, even to neighbouring stores, to their own head office or to crime reduction bodies. Yet, these are precisely the channels that allow patterns of offending to be identified and prolific offenders to be caught.
The amendments set out a lawful, proportionate system. Images can be shared where a theft has occurred, provided the originals are preserved, time-stamped, unedited and sent to the police. This ensures the integrity of evidence and prevents misuse. Importantly, it provides a remedy and compensation if a photograph of the wrong individual is mistakenly published. My only concern here is that being required to pay £300 per day in compensation might deter the shop owner from circulating the evidence.
I am particularly supportive of Amendment 216B. We know that a number of retailers have told their staff to not intervene when they see a person shoplifting. This has led to numerous instances of brazen theft, whereby people walk into a shop, grab armfuls of products and walk out in full sight of security guards and staff. Such scenes make a mockery of law and order. The amendment permits the lawful detention of suspected thieves by trained security staff. Shopkeepers should not have to look on helplessly while brazen thieves simply walk out of the store. What my noble friend proposes is eminently sensible: properly trained staff equipped with body-worn cameras, using only minimum force, operating under strict rules and with constant video recording. This is not a free-for-all; it is the opposite. It is a controlled, transparent, safeguarded process that both protects the rights of suspects and gives retailers the ability to intervene proportionately when theft is happening before their eyes.
The amendment also places obligations on the police when they are called. They must attend promptly, take custody of the suspect, secure the evidence and make decisions based on a full review, not a hurried assessment at the store door. This is entirely right. Retail staff are repeatedly told to detain no one because the police will not come. The amendment would send the opposite message. When retailers correctly do their part, the police must do theirs.
Finally, Amendment 216C addresses a growing and deeply troubling phenomenon, whereby organised gangs loot shops, raid entire streets or retail parks and steal thousands of pounds-worth of goods. These are not opportunists; they are organised criminals. Yet, the system too often charges them with individual, low-value thefts rather than with conspiracy or organised crime offences. The amendment establishes that, where there is reliable evidence of at least 10 thefts involving two or more individuals, a full investigation with conspiracy charges must be instigated where appropriate. The sentencing framework my noble friend proposes is proportionate and targeted: higher penalties for organised groups of five or more and the automatic confiscation of vehicles or property used in the crime. These are necessary deterrents: the current penalties are not.
Taken together, these amendments represent a robust but balanced response to an urgent and worsening problem. They support shopkeepers, empower security staff and assist the police with the collection of evidence.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I begin by, in part, sharing the aspirations of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I agree with him. It is not shoplifting; it is shop theft. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on that same point. When I began my working career 45 years ago after university with the Co-op on a management training course, we called it “leakage”. I found that term offensive then, and I find it offensive now. It is shop theft. So I agree with him that there needs to be an effort made by the Government to tackle this issue.
In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the Home Office is working with police representatives through the National Police Chiefs’ Council to make it easier for retailers to report crime. The current Policing Minister and the previous Policing Minister are now both supporting a Tackling Retail Crime Together strategy launched by the chief constables and industry. We had a summer of action on shop theft, which involved visible policing on the streets and targeting hotspot areas.
This winter, the Home Secretary plans for police forces across England and Wales to partner with local businesses, local councils and police and crime commissioners to target shop theft and anti-social behaviour during the peak retail season. There are plans to put 13,000 extra boots on the ground, from neighbourhood policing through to special constables and PCSOs. The measures in Clause 39, which we debated earlier, try to raise the level of importance of shop theft. As a Government, we recognise that we want to take action on that.
Where I disagree with the noble Lord is on some of these proposals. However, like the noble Lord, Lord Randall, who, again, has great experience of the retail world, I take the issue of shop theft extremely seriously. Probably like him, I am one of the few people in the Chamber tonight who have apprehended a shoplifter and reported them to the police, along with the manager of the shop, and I have been present at the shop theft interview as part of my duties. It was shop theft then and it is shop theft now, and it should not be tolerated, whatever the level of that shop theft.
On the measures the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, brings forward, such as Amendment 216A, which seeks to enable deterrent actions by shopkeepers through the use of video or photographic evidence, it is important that we have evidence such as that supplied by CCTV. Widespread introduction and publication, which is one of the objectives of the noble Lord’s amendment, would meet the objectives of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. However, it would potentially impinge on the rights of individuals, who may or may not be guilty, and could well incite vigilante action and undermine the fundamental presumption of “innocent until proven guilty”. I have no objection to CCTV, but the noble Lord needs to be careful with that, which is the reason why I cannot support the amendment.
Before I move on to the noble Lord’s other amendments, let me say that I appreciated his support for Operation Opal. Retailers are able to refer cases of organised retail crime to Operation Opal, and the national police acquisitive crime intelligence unit then investigates. It is unnecessary to specify that in the legislation because it is an operational issue, but again, it shows the importance we place on the issue of shop theft.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches we welcome the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, and the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, which strengthen and clarify key issues. Amendment 218 from the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, would define how children are affected by child criminal exploitation. This should help police and reduce the chances of inconsistent decisions. It is necessary because, as seen with other crimes where the police or CPS have latitude to define such matters, it often works to the detriment of the child or young person.
Amendment 219 is equally helpful. It would make provision for the occasion when a child has committed something that may not be illegal, but which might lead them into future criminal behaviour. The way that child criminal exploitation works is often very similar to grooming. Without support and education, a child or young person may end up in trouble.
Amendment 222 from the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and recommended by the Children’s Commissioner, clarifies that a perpetrator of child criminal exploitation does not have to believe that the child or young person was under 18. This makes sense as Clause 40 currently provides an easy get-out for perpetrators to say, “But I thought they were 18”. The Joe Dix Foundation welcomes this new stand-alone offence but has also called for a national register for all perpetrators who are convicted of child criminal exploitation. Can I ask the Minister whether this is something the Government might consider?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this important debate. The group largely seeks to clarify the Bill as it stands and that is important when we are addressing child exploitation. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, for the amendments tabled in his name. I know we may not always see eye to eye at the Dispatch Box, but I can wholly support the principle behind his amendments in this group.
It may seem like semantics to clarify that offences may differ in different parts of the United Kingdom, but it is an important point. We must ensure that the legislation allows crimes to be prosecuted only where they are crimes. His Amendments 217 and 220, and the many consequential amendments, aim to ensure that this is the case. Similarly, his Amendments 487 and 493 extend the devolutionary power to make regulations for the area of child criminal exploitation. It is right that this is consistent. Those who create the laws should have the legislative right to make provisions within their remit.
We also broadly support the principles behind the other amendments in this group, which aim to give more protections to children. Amendments 218 and 219, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, seek further to define what constitutes child criminal exploitation and extend the provisions to actions that may support criminal activity while not being criminal themselves.
Amendments 222 and 222A aim to narrow the scope of reasonable excuses that offenders can give when claiming to believe that the child was over the age of 18. The sentiment behind these amendments is a noble one. Whether the adult believed they were a child is largely inconsequential to the exploited child. Therefore, if the adult is not to be prosecuted, the court must be absolutely certain that they did not believe the child was under 18. That being said, I am slightly wary of completely disapplying reasonable excuse as a defence. It would take away the opportunity of defence in the very rare cases where the adult had a genuine and proven reason to believe the child was an adult. As I say, this is very rare, and it is still criminal exploitation, but we must still account for it.
Overall, this group is sensible, procedural and necessary; I therefore offer my support to the Minister’s intentions.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top for their amendments, and to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for putting his name to them and for his supportive comments.
Before I lose the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about a national register, I will just say that the Police National Computer and the child criminal exploitation prevention orders can impose notification requirements on persons subject to orders requiring them to inform the local police of their name and address. I had that on my phone before I peered at my notes, and I did not want to lose that point.
I will start by welcoming Clause 40. It is a positive, forward-looking clause that will help support the reduction of child exploitation. I am grateful for the amendments that have been tabled, and I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for the amendments I have tabled.
Amendment 218, tabled by my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would require that, for the child criminal exploitation offence to have been committed, the perpetrator had used
“threats, physical force, intimidation, persuasion or any other means”
against the child. In doing so, my noble friend seeks to illustrate the ways in which children can be criminally exploited. However, I put it to her that, in specifying the required means by which an adult gets a child to commit criminal conduct, the way in which the amendment is phased risks narrowing the application of the offence, because the prosecution would have to additionally prove those means of exploitation took place. Currently, the child criminal exploitation offence does not require proof that the child was subjected to threats, physical force, intimidation or any other harmful ways in which the child’s compliance was obtained by their exploiter. This is because, as a Government, we are very clear that children cannot consent to their own exploitation, so the offence could be committed regardless of whether and how the child was compelled to engage in the intended criminal activity.
Although my noble friend’s amendment includes the words “any other means”, which mitigates against any narrowing of the scope of the offence, I do not consider it necessary to include an illustrative, non-exhaustive list in this way. It would cause courts potentially to wonder about its purpose as a legal test and may have the unintended consequence of limiting the circumstances in which the child exploitation offence may be made out. I want my noble friend to think about that. I suggest to her that the prosecution wants to get the best case, and, by accepting her amendment, we might end up narrowing the potential success of legislating against this offence.
My noble friend also tabled Amendment 219, which would more specifically capture adults who intend to cause a child
“to engage in actions that support or facilitate”
crime. My noble friend indicated in her speech that the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the offence of child exploitation also includes causing a child to commit an action which, while not itself illegal, can lead to future criminal behaviour. We have looked at this amendment in some detail, but I consider the objective is already met by subsection (1)(a)(iii) of the clause, which captures where the adult does something to the child now to facilitate or make it easier to cause the child to commit a criminal act in the future—the noble Baroness can find this on page 59 of the Bill as currently drafted. I hope she will look at that and reflect on it as part of these discussions, before any further discussion takes place on Report.
Furthermore, actions that support or facilitate crime may already amount to an offence, such as the offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007. Where an adult intentionally causes a child to commit an offence, the child criminal exploitation offence may be committed.
I am grateful for the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, in support of his Amendment 222. This amendment seeks to remove the requirement that, for the child criminal exploitation offence to be committed, it must be proved that the defendant does not reasonably believe that the victim is aged 18 or over. My noble friend Lady Armstrong mentioned the issue of migrants—we are currently examining facial recognition issues in relation to migrants, and we had a discussion about that in the other Bill that I am taking through the House at this moment on immigration very recently. But she makes a very important point. I sympathise with the noble Lord’s desire to ensure that all adults who target children to draw them into crime can be caught by this offence, but that is precisely why the reasonable belief test is important—to ensure that perpetrators who deliberately and intentionally target children to commit crime are correctly identified and prosecuted. If there was no requirement to prove a lack of reasonable belief that the alleged victim was a child, it would risk criminalising people as exploiters of children who genuinely did not intend or contemplate involving a minor in criminality.
We must remember that the child criminal exploitation offence requires no proof of harmful behaviours against the child, such as coercion, force or threats. This goes back to the first point that I mentioned in response to my noble friend’s first amendment. It is committed simply when an adult engages in any contact or conduct towards or in respect of a child intending to cause them to commit a crime. The exploitative nature of this offence is the imbalance of power, which is exercised by an adult in deliberately and purposely seeking to involve a child in crime. Where that is not a factor in a case, as demonstrated by what they believed about the child’s age, there are other more appropriate offences that might be charged. For example, where a person encourages or assists someone to commit an offence regardless of their age, there is already an offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007.
Again, I welcome the discussion that we have had this evening, I welcome the contribution of Action for Children, and I welcome the discussion that we have had from the Children’s Commissioner for England, who called for this amendment due to concerns that perpetrators will seek to take advantage of considerations around the reasonable belief of age to undermine the credibility of victims and potentially escape prosecution. I welcome those contributions to the debate. I want to give them, with my colleagues in the Home Office, serious consideration. However, I make the point to the noble Lord that at the moment we do not consider reasonable belief of age to be a loophole, as is suggested—and in support of that I make a number of points.
First, there is a test of reasonable belief that does not necessarily require that the defendants have specific knowledge about the victim’s age, which would be a higher burden. Secondly, a perpetrator’s claim as to their belief alone will not be enough to escape prosecution, as prosecutors can and, I hope, would establish either that they did not believe the victim was 18 or, even if they did, that that belief was not reasonable. Thirdly, it only applies to children aged 13 to 17, not the most vulnerable children aged under 13. Finally, it follows established precedent in other offences, where the core offending relates to an adult’s conduct towards a child—for example, to child sexual exploitation offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for referring to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, on Amendment 222A—she is not here today. It is commendable that someone has looked at other amendments and decided not to move their own; it is a very un-egotistical way of approaching this business.
Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)
My Lords, I should start by declaring my interest in the register as the chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation, which probably these days should have changed its name to the Modern Slavery Foundation, because that is in fact what we are really dealing with. It was the late, great Lord Field of Birkenhead who first came up with the expression “modern slavery” and I think it is something we should have as a tribute to the late noble Lord, who was a fantastic Member of this and the other House.
I welcome the Government’s intention to address criminal exploitation through the child criminal exploitation offence and cuckooing offence and commend them for doing so; it is very important. However, the offences will not apply to the exploitation of vulnerable young adults over the age of 18 or with issues of cognitive impairment, as far as I can see. I am not a lawyer, as I explained in the last group; I have more skills on marking things down in a sale—and thank goodness we did not have Black Friday in my day.
This is a probing amendment. I believe—I have the figure here—that, in 2024, 774 young adults aged 18 to 24 were referred to the national referral mechanism for criminal exploitation, including alongside other forms of modern slavery, and that 65% of all victims referred were in that age group. As far as I can see, they are not covered and perhaps they should be. What I do not understand—I am very willing to be lectured and taught on this—is what happens if this criminal child exploitation has started for somebody at, say, the age of 15 and a half but does not come to light until they are 18 or 19, which could easily happen. Will they be treated in a different way? As I mentioned very briefly, there are obviously young adults who have cognitive impairment and who in effect—I am sure that this is not the correct expression—have the mental age of a child.
I fully support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones; I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jones also put her name to my amendment. I fully support them and I think that this should go into the Modern Slavery Act, for all the reasons that have been given. I would, however, like some clarification on what can be done about those young adults and where the law we are creating is going to put them.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in this important debate and to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, for introducing this group. These amendments speak to deeply serious issues concerning child criminal exploitation and the protection and coercion of vulnerable people who are manipulated into criminality. The stories behind these legislative questions are tragic and demand considered and compassionate policy-making.
Amendment 232 from the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, would ensure that children criminally exploited under Clause 40 continue to be identified within the modern slavery framework. The intention behind this amendment is clearly to safeguard exploited young people who are groomed and coerced into offending, and we on these Benches recognise the importance of ensuring that systems designed to protect victims do not inadvertently overlook those most in need of support. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response to this amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsWednesday 19th November 2025
(1 day, 17 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-III(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (19 Nov 2025)
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group essentially encompasses several different groups of amendments; perhaps they should have been separated, but we are where we are. Two of those groups within this very large group are, I would argue, quite uncontroversial. I have absolutely no issue with the Government increasing the maximum penalties for the offence in Clause 28 in Scotland, and for extending the provision in Clauses 31, 32 and 35 to Northern Ireland and Scotland. I have no issue with the government amendments about the bulk sale of knives.
I do, however, take issue with government Amendments 71, 72, 73, 74, 85, 86, 110, 111, 129, 130, 141, 142, 170, 171, 185, 186, 187 and 188. These amend the Bill to permit the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying further forms of identification that can be used for age-verification purposes relating to the online sale and the delivery of knives and crossbows. That might seem innocuous at first, but all it takes is to look at the explanatory statements to realise what these amendments are really about. The explanatory statement for Amendment 71 says that the amendment
“allows the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID)”.
That is the point.
What is happening here is that the Government are attempting perhaps to sneak in provisions permitting digital ID by the backdoor. I say that the Government are sneaking these in, because they have not only tabled amendments to change clauses already in the Bill but included the regulation-making power permitting digital ID in the drafting of the new clauses that extend provisions to Northern Ireland and Scotland. On top of that, they have lumped these amendments together with all the others in this enormous group. I can only assume that the Government hoped that perhaps no one would notice their attempts to take the very first step towards legislating for mandatory digital ID. That is why we cannot support these amendments.
The Government will perhaps attempt to play this off as a small and practical change to allow Ministers to retain flexibility by allowing new age-verification processes, but that is a red herring. Digital ID is an affront to our rights, and the Government have repeatedly stated that it will not be mandatory, that it is no big deal and that it will simply make things easier. Yet here we are with the Government seeking to insert provisions for digital ID into the Crime and Policing Bill. They have not even enacted the policy, yet they are already trying to expand its purpose. Does this not tell us all we need to know? They say that it will not be mandatory, but how can we ever be sure of that?
We notified the Government of our opposition to these amendments in advance to let them know that we would not accept any amendments to this Bill, or for that matter any Bill, that enables digital ID. It is in that spirit that I tabled my Amendments 72A, 72B, 87A and 131A to remove provisions in the Bill that permit the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify other identity documents. My Amendments 75A, 75B, 75C, 76A, 76B, 76C, 190A, 190B, 191A and 191B amend the government amendments for that same purpose. If the Government accept these proposed changes to their amendments—that is, if they accept that there can be no power to specify digital ID for the purposes of these clauses—I have no further concerns with them. However, if they do not want to accept my changes to their amendments to remove the ability to specify digital ID for age-verification purposes here, then we will not be able to support them.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.
As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.
As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.
I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.
There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century—I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.
I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.
I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we on this side of the Committee are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing forward this thoughtful group of amendments relating to the controls on offensive weapons. Each of these amendments raise practical questions about the application of current laws that relate to offensive weapons and seek to ensure that legislation designed to protect the public does not inadvertently criminalise legitimate, historically important or professionally supervised activities.
Amendment 211 proposes a defence where a weapon is of genuine historical importance. The reasoning behind this amendment is eminently sensible and aligns the treatment of such items with existing defences relating to antiques and curated collections. This is a meaningful distinction between dangerous modern weapons intended for misuse and historical artifacts preserved for cultural or heritage purposes. There is an important question here on proportionality and the scope of reasonable excuse. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on whether existing provisions fully address the concerns raised.
Amendments 212 and 213 relate to the traditional straight police truncheon and agricultural tools. I can tell the Committee that in my 32 years as a police officer, I did not use my truncheon on anybody, but it is very useful for silencing alarms in business premises in the middle of the night when you cannot get the keyholder out of bed. Here too, we recognise the practical issues that these amendments seek to resolve. It is not a controversial belief that items with legitimate ceremonial, historical or agricultural uses should not inadvertently fall within criminal restrictions where there is no evidence of misuse. The examples provided in support of these proposals make clear that the law must operate with fairness and precision, and I hope the Government consider them with due regard.
Amendment 214 addresses a wide range of potential exemptions for visiting forces, emergency services, theatrical and film productions, museums and antiques. These are complex areas with operational realities that deserve serious thought. The amendment raises legitimate questions about how the law accommodates professional and historical circumstances without undermining public safety. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on, and response to, this amendment.
These amendments rightly probe the intersection of criminal law with the heritage and cultural sectors. These are sectors that must be protected. We cannot allow well-meaning legislation unintentionally to criminalise legitimate historical and cultural activities. We look forward to the Minister’s response and assurances that these matters will receive the careful consideration that they merit.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I stand to ask for guidance from the Dispatch Box. When I was doing my national service in the Royal Navy in March 1957—I can date it precisely—I became a midshipman. With that ranking, I was awarded a midshipman’s dirk, which I still hold today. I cannot find that dirk falling under any of the exceptions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. Do I therefore have to table a special amendment to make it lawful for me to continue to hold my midshipman’s dirk?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, the education of townies such as myself continues. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for his Amendments 214A and 438, which aim to deregulate sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders. It had not occurred to me that they would be caught by the legislation, so this measure, explicitly designed to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without increasing risk or danger to the public, seems eminently sensible. Police resources are already stretched, and we are demanding an increased focus on neighbourhood visibility—we have talked about this during the passage of the Bill—so we support sensible deregulation that removes unnecessary bureaucracy without compromising public safety. We support these amendments.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is a group of relatively straightforward and common-sense amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham. It tends to carry out the Government’s own consultation results in a careful and measured way.
Amendment 214A, moved by my noble friend Lord Brady, is a simple procedural measure that implements the Government’s own recommendations. As my noble friend set out, this amendment would not impact, let alone endanger, the public. Sound moderators are inert objects that contain no moving parts. They do not enhance the ability of a firearm, nor is there significant evidence of them being used in crime. The Government have themselves concluded that removing regulation of them will not pose any risk to public safety. I understand the original logic of including them in many firearms regulations, but, in practice, it means that police firearms officers must now obtain a certificate. It is an administrative burden that is not necessary.
Amendment 438 acts much in the same vein. It would require a review of the administrative burdens that noise and flash accessories place upon the police. The Government’s own previous consultation on the latter demonstrated that there is scope here for reform; to expand that to cover other accessories seems a very logical step.
We should aim to remove bureaucratic and administrative hurdles wherever they appear. This is particularly the case for the police, as our forces are under strain. This measure is evidently a small reform among many that should be made and is based on the right principle.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for setting out the case for his Amendments 214A and 438. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who attached their names to Amendment 214A. As the noble Lord, Lord Brady, has explained, the aim is to deregulate the devices known as sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I too must out myself as a townie. As with the previous group, it has been a bit of an education finding out about these items and their uses. They are currently subject to control as they are included in the statutory definition of a firearm set out in Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968. This means that firearms licence holders with a legitimate need for these items are required to apply to the police to include them on their existing firearms licence, and this is obviously at a cost to both the police and the licence holder.
As many noble Lords have noted—indeed, every noble Lord who spoke—removing these items from the legal definition of a firearm would alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments. Because these are entirely inert objects containing no moving parts, they do not of themselves create a risk to public safety, as the noble Lord, Lord Brady, and others have said. The Government have already set out our intention to remove these items from the legal definition of a firearm, and I am therefore sympathetic to the intent behind these amendments.
However, I hope that the noble Lord will understand that I cannot give a commitment at the Dispatch Box this afternoon to bring forward the necessary legislative changes to the Firearms Act in this Bill. If he would agree to withdraw his amendment, I will undertake to update the noble Lord ahead of Report. I will say no more.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward Amendments 214F and 214G, which address a gap in the protections afforded to retail workers under Clause 37. I am also grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate.
The amendments seek to ensure that delivery drivers who are employed as part of the retail and distribution process are fully included in the scope of the proposed offences against retail workers, and that delivery vehicles themselves are recognised as an extension of the retail premises. We understand and support the underlying principle behind these proposals. Delivery drivers in many cases are the face and point of contact between businesses and consumers and they often work alone, sometimes at unsociable hours and in circumstances where they may be exposed to heightened vulnerability and increasing levels of aggression and abuse.
The safety of delivery drivers should not depend on whether they are standing behind a shop counter or stepping out of a branded van. The rise of home delivery as a core component of modern retail means that this work is an integral part of the sector, and it is only right that the law reflects that reality. It is regrettable to read that certain major supermarkets have rolled out bodycams for their delivery drivers in an effort to protect them. I therefore hope the Government will consider carefully how these protections might sensibly be extended to those whose job it is to ensure that goods reach the customer.
Turning to Amendment 351 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston, I fully understand the principle and intent behind this amendment. It raises significant questions about whether the current scope of legal protection is sufficiently broad. The question of whether other public-facing workers, such as in transport, hospitality or civic buildings, face similar risks is one worth raising and discussing. Many of those workers play a crucial role in maintaining order, ensuring safety and supporting essential public functions in spaces accessible to the public.
I similarly thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his Amendment 214FA. This would include premises used by the hospitality industry for the supply of food or drink as part of the definition of retail premises for the purposes of this offence. This is also an important question to pose to the Government, and I hope they consider it with care.
The issues raised by this group of amendments deserve serious consideration. They invite the Government to reflect on whether extra provisions are needed to protect certain public-facing roles and, if so, which roles specifically need to be highlighted. The question that needs to be answered in response to all the amendments in this group is why only retail workers should be afforded a special criminal offence. Does the A&E receptionist not face the threat of violence and intimidation too? What about the bar staff at a nightclub? A wide range of people are at higher risk of assault during the course of their work. If we are to create a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker, it would make sense to expand this. I hope that the Government will give this careful thought and return the clarity in how they intend to address the concerns expressed.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Stowell, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their amendments. I should note—if not declare an interest—that I have been a member of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers for 46 years now. That is a long time. I think it is worth noting that I have an interest in this matter. Indeed, I spent many years trying to raise this very issue when a Member of Parliament and outside Parliament before coming to this House.
I should also say at the outset that I am meeting the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to discuss this matter, and am very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, as well. I had a request from my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton to meet him and the USDAW general secretary, Joanne Thomas. I am also happy to do that between now and Report; it may not be immediately.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I have tabled this notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill, to correct what has become serious misinformation. By way of background, Clause 39 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. That section was inserted into the 1980 Act by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 provides that where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence where the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will only be heard before magistrates’ courts and will not go before the Crown Court. This alteration has become the subject of significant misinformation, largely perpetuated by the party in government. In the 2024 election manifesto, it claimed that this had created
“effective immunity for some shoplifting”
and the Government’s policy paper in the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”. This, of course, is absolutely false. There is no immunity in any form for any shoplifting offences. Allowing an offence to be tried only in a magistrates’ court does not give anyone immunity.
The Sentencing Council’s guidelines for sentencing a person guilty of theft from a shop state that the starting point for low-value shoplifting, with little additional harm to the victim, is a “high-level community order”, with the maximum being a 12-week custodial sentence. For low-value shoplifting, with significant additional harm to the victim, the starting point is 12 weeks’ custody and the maximum is 26 weeks’ custody. It is clear, then, that magistrates’ courts can impose community orders and terms of imprisonment on offenders found guilty of low-value shoplifting. If the Government believe that is immunity, they clearly need to have a serious rethink. I therefore ask the Minister why the Government are making this change, since there is absolutely not immunity for low-value shoplifting. What can they possibly hope that this will achieve?
The reality is that Clause 39 is purely performative. Worse than that, it is performative politics with negative ramifications. Where an offence is triable either way, it is up to the magistrates’ court and the defendant to decide which court finally hears the case. If the magistrates’ court deems itself to have sufficient powers to try the case, a defendant is able to elect the court that their case will be heard by. Are we seriously saying that we will be permitting a person charged with stealing £50-worth of chocolate to be hauled in front of a Crown Court judge and jury? In such a scenario, the most likely sentence would be a community order for a few months’ imprisonment: that sentence would likely be the same whether the case was tried in a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court.
Why enable the possibility for a person charged with low-value shoplifting to elect to go to a Crown Court, simply for them to be handed the same sentence they could have been given in the magistrates’ court? There are around 73,000 criminal cases waiting to be heard by the Crown Courts. Many people are waiting years for their case to be heard. The last thing we need now is for more minor offences to be sent to the Crown Courts, adding to their already sizable backlog. This is not a solution to shoplifting. It is simply another way for a defendant to string out their proceedings. Permitting low-value shoplifting to be tried only summarily does not give shoplifters immunity but will serve only to clog up our already stretched Crown Courts.
What does create an effective immunity for shoplifting is the Government’s Sentencing Bill. Noble Lords will know that the Bill creates the presumption that a custodial sentence of less than 12 months be suspended. Even if a person is given a custodial sentence for low-value shoplifting, they will not serve any time in prison. If that does not give would-be shoplifters more incentive to steal, I do not know what does. Clause 39 is pointless and performative, and would be damaging to the swift passage of justice.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I acknowledge the intention of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I have listened with care to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but we firmly believe that the inclusion of this clause is necessary. There is one thing that we can all agree on: shop theft has risen at any alarming rate in recent years. It is a blight on our society; it causes loss and distress to retailers and it undermines the safety of retail spaces.
This Government are committed to restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, and to protecting businesses from escalating losses. The latest figures from the Office for National Statistics are stark. Shoplifting almost doubled over the past five years, increasing to 530,643 cases in 2025. While multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences, and some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised.
The noble Lord is right that Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act converted theft of goods worth £200 or less from shops to being tried summarily. I completely understand that the argument of the previous Government was that this would increase efficiency by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft and keeping the cases in the magistrates’ court, but it has not worked. Instead, it is not that there is immunity, but there is a perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. My noble friend Lord Hannett referred to this in relation to the previous group of amendments.
Clause 39 will rectify this, and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so; they think it is a waste of time, because they believe that the police will not do anything. The underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable.
We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge, and Clause 39 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously. By removing the financial threshold for so-called low-value shop theft, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime is not going to be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are also making it clear to the retailers that we take this crime seriously, and they should feel encouraged to report it.
I acknowledge the concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that by making shop theft triable either way there is scope for some cases to end up in the Crown Court. However, there are two reasons why the noble Lord does not need to worry about this. The first is that Sir Brian Leveson highlighted in his independent review that the risk is mitigated by the existing sentencing guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework to ensure that the penalties remain proportionate. This means that, in practice, the vast majority of such cases fall well within magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be committed to the Crown Court, for either trial or sentence. We anticipate that the effect on the backlog will be negligible. Secondly, as far as defendants electing trial in the Crown Court is concerned, they already have the ability to do this in relation to the so-called summary only offence. In practice, elections occur only in marginal numbers. There is no evidence to suggest that Clause 39 will change this.
I urge the noble Lord to join us in sending this very clear message—we entirely accept it was always the intention of the previous Government not to decriminalise this—to make it clear to everybody what a serious offence this is. I hope that he is willing to withdraw his opposition to Clause 39 standing part.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am, however, very disappointed by her continued defence of Clause 39. It is absolutely clear that the changes made by the previous Government do not create effective immunity for low-value shoplifting. All shoplifting offences are able to be tried in a magistrates’ court, where the court can impose a custodial sentence if necessary. Drink-driving offences are tried summarily only. I do not see the Government proposing to make that offence triable either way.
The fundamental point is that this change will not help anyone. It will not deter shoplifters. I hardly think a potential shoplifter will suddenly decide to stop because he might be tried in a Crown Court as opposed to a magistrates’ court. It will simply increase the Crown Court backlog without any benefit. This is a matter that I am sure we will return to on Report.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after “subsection (10)” insert “and sections 208A”.(3) After that section insert—“208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.(5) In this section—“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.(4) After section 292 insert—“292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 215 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie speaks to a growing and deeply felt concern shared by communities and retailers across the country—that the persistent and habitual shoplifter is too often left to reoffend, with little intervention, limited consequences and insufficient support to break the cycle of offending. There has been a 13% increase in shoplifting offences in the year ending June 2025.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The first thing we want to do is Clause 39, which, of course, was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. But in addition, this is about making it clear to everybody that it really does matter, and driving it through to the police that there should be no immunities—that there are no levels below to which this should not apply.
For all these reasons, I do believe these amendments are not required, but I would be very happy to discuss the matters further with both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, and I encourage them to speak with me if they feel there are matters that I have not fully taken into account. But, for now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her kind offer.
The amendment of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe focuses on enforcement. If the police do not investigate theft, if they do not take measures to deter and prevent shoplifting, no amount of legislation will change that. Creating a code of practice for low-value shoplifting could be a step in the right direction. Together with my Amendment 215—and I am grateful, I think, for the implied support of the Liberal Democrats—these measures target enforcement and punishment. This is in stark contrast to what the Government are proposing in Clause 39. The effective immunity for shoplifters comes from the inability of the police to catch those who shoplift. It is an issue of enforcement and investigation, which in turn all comes back to police funding and officer numbers—a point made by the noble Baroness Lady Doocey. Better enforcement is what will drive down shoplifting offence rates, not putting those cases before Crown Court judges. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw.
Police Reform
Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts(2 days, 17 hours ago)
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Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I remain confused as to the true purpose of this Statement. The Government announced a police reform White Paper last year, but this has not yet materialised. We now see the Government announcing the abolition of police and crime commissioners. Why have the Government made this particular announcement now, ahead of the publication of the full details of their plans for police reform? More importantly, why is the Home Office fiddling about with PCCs rather than taking real action to reduce crime?
Turning to the content of the Statement, there were two main arguments deployed to support the abolition of police and crime commissioners. The first is that the PCC model has led to the politicisation of the police. But the proposals in the Statement are for oversight of police forces to be moved to the directly elected strategic mayors or local councils. Directly elected mayors are party political, as are councillors. The Government’s solution to the problem of the politicisation of the police is to move control from one elected politician to another. That argument is completely nonsensical. There is no world in which this policy leads to a decreased politicisation of the police.
The other argument the Government have put forward is on accountability. The Minister said in her Statement to the other place that
“the PCC model has weakened local police accountability”,
but there is no evidence for that assertion, and nor did the Home Secretary explain how the Government’s new model would rectify that. We know that where there will not be an elected mayor, the functions of oversight will be undertaken by policing and crime boards. How will transferring the functions of PCCs to boards of councillors and bureaucrats increase accountability?
Further to that, the Minister said that
“we have seen the benefits of the mayoral model, including greater collaboration, visible leadership and local innovation”.
Yet here in London under Sadiq Khan, knife crime is up 86%, five police front counters are being closed altogether, and a 24/7 station front counter is being removed from every borough. The total crime rate has increased from 89.3 per 1,000 people when he took office to 106.4 per 1,000 people in 2024-25. I would hardly call that a success story.
The simple fact is that policing is not overly complicated to get right. It requires common sense, good leadership and practical training. We cannot pretend that everything is rosy, but embarking on some police reform crusade will simply distract us from the real task at hand. The Home Office needs to focus on boosting police numbers, keeping front counters open, stopping officers policing tweets, and cutting crime.
The British people feel that crime and disorder is certainly on the rise. Do the Government seriously think that these changes will have a material impact on the daily lives of the British people? I look forward to what the Minister has to say.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, police and crime commissioners were an innovative idea, but experience has shown they have not delivered as intended. Instead, they have proved to be a costly and flawed experiment, so we welcome their abolition. However, I hope the Minister will be able to provide the House with rather more clarity on what will replace them. We do not believe that transferring PCC powers to mayors is the answer, as this would concentrate even more power in single individuals, with too little scrutiny or accountability.
The proposal for a police and crime lead, described as
“akin to a deputy mayor for policing and crime”,
risks being a rebadged PCC. Unless the legislation is crystal clear, this role could again become a focal point for political leverage over chief constables. It must be made abundantly clear that chief constables retain full operational independence, and that these new leads and boards will not have hire-and-fire powers. If not, we risk repeating the mistakes of the PCC model, drawing policing further into politics rather than strengthening impartial policing by consent.
The Government say that these boards will not be a return to the invisible committees of the past, but this assurance needs substance. How will they work, and how will their work be accessible and visible to the public? The former Metropolitan Police Authority may offer some useful lessons. Having served on that body for seven years, I can attest that no one could describe it as invisible. Its meetings were in public and widely reported, and its scrutiny of senior police officers was robust. Will the Home Office carefully consider what worked in that model before finalising these new arrangements?
I was particularly disappointed to learn from the Minister’s Statement in the House of Commons that the £100 million that could be saved in this Parliament through the abolition of PCC elections will go to the Treasury rather than to front-line policing. An over- stretched police service will find that a very difficult pill to swallow. The Home Office says that reforms to police governance will save at least £20 million a year —enough to fund 320 extra police constables. Can the Minister give a clear undertaking that this money will definitely be spent on recruiting those 320 extra police officers? Saying that something can happen is very different from saying that it will happen.
Finally, rebuilding public trust in police goes far beyond governance. True accountability demands transparency. Will the Government require police forces to publish data on officers under investigation for sexual or domestic abuse, and will they now act to bring police record-keeping in England and Wales into line with Scotland and Northern Ireland, ending the discretionary destruction of police records, as recommended by the Hillsborough Independent Panel?
Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsTuesday 11th November 2025
(1 week, 2 days ago)
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Lord Davies of Gower
“Age assessments: use of scientific methodsThe Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a statutory instrument containing regulations under section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 specifying scientific methods that may be used for the purposes of age assessments.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make regulations to specify scientific methods for assessing a person’s age and to disapply the requirement for consent for scientific methods to be used.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group speaks to an incredibly important issue in the current asylum system. As it stands, there is no standardised method for verifying the age or identity of those who enter the country illegally. These amendments seek to correct that and give the relevant authorities the power to mandate an age test where they consider it necessary. It cannot be right that a person is automatically assumed to be a child if their age is doubted or they lack documentary evidence. We currently exist within a system that grants people claiming asylum innumerable privileges once their applications are processed. People are given a roof over their head, food, electronic devices and many other amenities. Social activities are often offered. Those who need it have access to healthcare. Children are put into schools. Surely the least we should aim for is ensuring that these privileges are not overprescribed to people who should not qualify for them.
The current process does not, unfortunately, provide for this. If the authorities doubt whether someone is of the age they claim to be, there is no lawful way demonstrably to prove the truth. They must give the benefit of the doubt to the age-disputed person, while the same person can avoid taking a definitive scientific age assessment by denying consent. What is worse, incentives exist for people to lie and game the system. It is well documented that asylum NGOs advise that applying as a child offers a better chance of being accepted. A GB News investigation demonstrated a spike in asylum applications, across all nationalities, of people claiming to be 16 or 17. This is what happens when we offer asylum to children and do not include the necessary safeguards.
The result of this system is that many adults are incentivised to masquerade as children, giving themselves a higher chance of being accepted. The state, in contrast, has no way to challenge these people. The prerequisite of consent essentially gives the age-disputed person control over whether they are found to be lying. The consequences have been dire. Take Lawangeen Abdulrahimzai, a proclaimed 14-year-old Afghan who, unbeknown to the state, had shot and killed two men in Serbia on his way to claim asylum in Britain. He was placed in a secondary school and was moved to another school after being found with a knife, there injuring a pupil. Then, two years after arriving in the country, he fatally murdered aspiring marine Tom Roberts in a knife attack. Abdulrahimzai was actually 19 when he entered the country. I understand that this is an extreme case, but it highlights the importance we must give to verifying the identity of those who illegally enter the country. If someone is willing to lie at the very first hurdle, who is to say we can trust them in society afterwards?
Verifying the person’s age is the first step to solving this. It prevents adults being placed in schools among children and highlights potentially illegitimate claims from those attempting to game our generosity. Amendments 63 and 64 achieve this balance. Those claiming asylum would still be given the opportunity to state their age and would not automatically be required to take an age assessment. However, the discretion would ultimately lie with the relevant authorities. If the age of a person is doubted, powers would exist to scientifically test their age without being obstructed by consent claims. This is the bare minimum we should expect from a system that is being perpetually defrauded. Removing the requirement for consent takes the process out of the hands of the asylum seeker, encourages honesty and trust, and disincentivises fraud. That is what an asylum system should aim for.
I look forward very much to hearing what the Minister has to say about this. In the meantime, I beg to move.
Lord Harper (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to support my noble friend Lord Davies. I will also acquaint your Lordships with the information the Government set out in July when the Minister for Border Security and Asylum said what the Government were doing on some of the technology. We discussed in a previous group the potential for artificial intelligence and facial recognition technology to make a big change in this area, and I argued that we should leave open that opportunity. The Minister in a Statement earlier this year confirmed that testing was under way, and said that,
“subject to the results of further testing and assurance … Facial Age Estimation could be fully integrated into the current age assessment system over the course of 2026”.
I do not think the Government’s current position on setting out regulations is that far away from my noble friend’s.
There is a potentially big advantage of this technology, in that previously available scientific tests were not particularly accurate and were medical or invasive in nature, involving MRI scans or X-rays, for example. There are some legitimate reasons why you would not want somebody to be forced to undergo that sort of procedure, and their refusal to undertake such might not be held to be unreasonable. With artificial intelligence and facial recognition technology, there seems to be a very weak case, if any, for refusing to undergo such a test. Subject to the testing being in order, I hope that, if the Government bring it in, they will not give people the opportunity to refuse to undergo it; I see no legitimate case for that. If testing gives Ministers accurate information about somebody’s age, I hope that they will make it mandatory and that if someone refuses to take the test, the presumption of their being a child can be overturned and they will suffer a consequence for not using that technology. So I hope the Minister can update us on how that testing is going and on whether the timeframe the Borders Minister set out earlier this year, hoping that this technology could be rolled out next year, is still on track.
I very strongly support my noble friend’s two amendments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that it is in the interests of the Government to get technology in place that is less intrusive and more accurate and does not rely on X-rays and MRIs, as we have now, for that physical contact. The question of what that development will be is something that we are working through at the moment, and I am expecting that in the latter part of 2026 I will be able to come to this House—if still in post—to argue the case for the implementation of a better facial age estimation technology. I will, on the basis of what the noble Baroness has said, make sure that I can put into the public domain whatever information I think does not compromise the operation. That is the best I can give her today, but I will reflect on what she said and look at whether I can agree to her request. I do not want to give her an immediate response, because there may be reasons why it is not in our interest to put some of that information into the public domain, because people will always try to subsume facial recognition technology or any other method. I will just reflect on that, if I may.
The key point is that these emerging new methods and the regulations applying the automatic assumption of adult provision for refusal to consent to methods of scientific age assessment as set out in the IMA cannot be laid until the specific methods are sufficiently accurate. Because we do not believe that they are going to be, these amendments are not necessary. For those reasons, I hope that we can share common ground with the noble Lord: his objective, my objective, and I think that of every noble Lord who has spoken, is to ensure that we have accurate age assessment. The methodology he has brought forward in these amendments is not the way forward, but I give an assurance to the House that the exploration of other methods is under way and I will report back when those tests are complete. I urge him, therefore, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a short but important debate, and I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed. As I said in my opening remarks, there is clear evidence of adults pretending to be children in order to gain refugee status in the United Kingdom. As boat crossings rise, so does the number of fraudulent asylum claims. This means that there is a high number of unchecked people who should not be here and, perhaps more importantly, a high number of adults in children’s schools. This is a crisis that the Government can and must face head on. Ensuring that people are the age that they claim to be is just one step that we must take to end this crisis, but it is an important step, and Amendments 63 and 64 offer a framework for how it may be done.
Amendment 64 would provide a fair and balanced approach to age assessments. It would not provide the state with overreaching powers to assess anyone who enters the country, but it also would not retreat to the position where the age-disputed person is given the right to deny any form of comprehensive assessment. It would give the relevant authorities the discretion to enforce a scientific test where there are no reasonable grounds not to consent to one. This measure would allow for a fairer immigration system that incentivises honesty, rather than one that rewards fraud.
However, if we are to take away the right to consent when there are no reasonable grounds, then it is just that we also specify which methods may be used to assess age. As I have said, assessing age has become a necessary measure in certain cases, which is why Amendment 64 is so important. Amendment 63 is just as important, as it would allow the Secretary of State to lay out a clear and comprehensive list of scientific methods that may be used to achieve this end.
The current system in place incentivises dishonesty and puts children across the country at risk as a result. These amendments provide a comprehensive framework that goes a long way to resolving that problem, and I hope the Minister considers taking them on board. I have heard what he has said about finding common ground for age assessment, and for now I beg to leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Refusal of asylum claims from illegal entrants(1) The Secretary of State must refuse without consideration an asylum claim, protection claim or a human rights claim made by any person to whom this section applies.(2) This section applies to a person who—(a) commits an offence under sections 24 or 24A of the Immigration Act 1971, or(b) did not come directly to the United Kingdom from a country in which the person’s life and liberty were threatened by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b) a person is not to be taken to have come directly from a country in which their life and liberty were at risk if, in coming from such a country, they passed through or stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom where their life and liberty were not so threatened.(4) Subsection (2)(b) does not apply if a person—(a) entered the United Kingdom lawfully,(b) at the time the person entered the United Kingdom lawfully the person came directly from a safe country, and(c) whilst the person has remained in the United Kingdom the person’s home country has become an unsafe country.(5) Where subsection (4) applies to a person and the person makes an asylum claim, protection claim or human rights claim, the Secretary of State must consider the claim.(6) For the purposes of subsection (4)—(a) a country is a “safe country” if in general a person’s life and liberty would not be threatened by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;(b) a country is an “unsafe country” if in general a person’s life and liberty would be threatened by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;(c) a person entered the United Kingdom lawfully if the person entered the United Kingdom in accordance with the Immigration Acts.(7) A claim refused under subsection (1) cannot be considered under the immigration rules.(8) This section applies to any asylum claim, protection claim or human rights claim that was made by a person to whom this section applies on, after or before the day in which this section comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to refuse any asylum, protection or human rights claim made by a person who enters the United Kingdom illegally.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, in 2013, 20,587 people travelled illegally by boat to Australia. The Australian Government instituted Operation Sovereign Borders, whereby illegal migrants entering by boat are either turned back to their point of departure, returned to their home country or transferred to a third country. Australia established an asylum processing centre in Nauru for this purpose. None of them was allowed to stay in Australia. The year after this policy was introduced, the number of small boat arrivals fell to 450. They went from 20,587 to 450; that is how you successfully protect your borders. That is how you prevent illegal migration and people smuggling. It is done not by handing illegal migrants hotel accommodation, giving them money and then permitting them to make all manner of spurious asylum, protection and modern slavery claims. It has been tried and tested before; it can be done. Yet there are political parties in this country—the Government and Liberal Democrats, here in this Chamber—which still refuse to support such action that has been proven to work.
The Government’s policies on border security, illegal migration and asylum have so far failed. My Amendments 65 and 77 would give the Government the opportunity finally to get a grip and follow the positive example of Australia. They are intended to work in tandem with each other to permit the Government to refuse asylum claims from illegal migrants and remove them to a third-country processing centre.
Amendment 65 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to refuse, without consideration, any asylum protection or human rights claim made by a person who has entered the country illegally. My noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch’s Amendment 65A includes modern slavery claims within that list, and I support that inclusion. The amendment also includes any person who has not come directly from a country where their life or liberty was threatened within the meaning of the refugee convention. My noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth has spoken in detail about that during Committee, and I again echo his arguments. Subsection (4) of the new clause proposed in the amendment includes a crucial safeguard for persons who enter the UK legally but whose home country has become unsafe while they have been in the UK and they subsequently make an asylum or protection claim. In this case, their claim would be able to be considered in the usual manner. This ban on asylum claims from illegal migrants would absolutely act as a deterrent for illegal migration. People will not make the journey across the channel if they know their claims will be automatically refused and they will be swiftly deported.
Amendment 77 follows on from this. It would require the Home Secretary to establish third-country removal centres where we would be able to send those who cannot be returned to their home country. Australia has done this with Nauru and the United States has done it with Uganda, Honduras and Rwanda. The Government claim that the previous Government’s policy of sending illegal migrants to Rwanda was unworkable, yet the United States has done precisely that, and it has worked. Illegal crossings across the US southern border have fallen by 89% in one year. Australia and the United States prove that illegal migration can be stopped, yet we are constantly told that we cannot do the same in this country. That is false. We can replicate their success—all it requires is a recognition of the concerns of the British electorate and a desire genuinely to end illegal entry to the UK. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, the Government have, of course, decided to abandon the Conservative policy of removal to a third country, for which we had an agreement. We urge the Government to retain the Rwanda agreement. As I detailed earlier, the Australian model was a great success.
This week, we have seen the second migrant deported in the one-in, one-out scheme returned to the UK. We have also heard that the Government will be handing asylum seekers £100 a week to move out of hotels and move in with family and friends they may have in the UK. These measures will not deter illegal migration. Channel crossings have continued at an even faster rate.
It does not have to be this way. If we leave the ECHR, ban asylum protection, human rights and modern slavery claims, and deport all illegal migrants then we can establish third-country removal centres and replicate Australia’s success. The Government’s policies do not carry the support of the British people. I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 65.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Exclusion of judicial review of asylum and immigration decisions(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply where— (a) the Secretary of State has made an initial decision in respect of a relevant immigration decision, or(b) the asylum and immigration review board (“the review board”) have made a final decision in respect of a relevant immigration decision under section (Abolition of appeals for immigration decisions).(2) The decision is final, and not liable to be set aside in any court.(3) In particular—(a) no application or petition for judicial review may be made or brought in relation to an initial decision by the Secretary of State or a final decision by the review board;(b) the review board are not to be regarded as having exceeded their powers by reason of any error made in reaching the final decision.(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply where the Secretary of State or the review board is acting or has acted in such a manner which exceeds the Secretary of State’s or the review board’s powers under the Immigration Acts.(5) In this section—“the Immigration Acts” has the same meaning as in section 61 of the UK Borders Act 2007;“relevant immigration decision” means—(a) a decision to make a deportation order under—(i) section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971,(ii) section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007, and(iii) section (Duty to deport illegal entrants) of this Act,(b) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under section 10(1)(a), (b) or (c) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) (removal of person unlawfully in United Kingdom),(c) a decision that an illegal entrant is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under paragraphs 8 to 10 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (control of entry: removal),(d) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions given by virtue of paragraph 10A of that Schedule (family),(e) a refusal to revoke a deportation order under section 5(2) of that Act,(f) a decision to reject an asylum claim, protection claim or human rights claim,(g) a decision to refuse support under section 95 of the immigration and Asylum Act 1999 or section 17 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002,(h) a decision to certify a protection claim or human rights claim as clearly unfounded under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002,(i) a decision to revoke a person’s asylum status or protection status, and(j) a decision not to grant immigration bail.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent judicial review of any immigration decisions, except in a case where the Secretary of State or review board have acted ultra vires.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 68 relates to the exclusion of judicial review of asylum and immigration decisions. It has already been debated. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsMonday 10th November 2025
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (10 Nov 2025)
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I knew there was a reason why I was so nice about the earlier amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I am afraid we do not agree with Amendment 26. The amendment focuses on the power to issue closure notices, a measure which deals directly with the security of the home, which we believe is a fundamental right in our society. A closure notice is an extreme measure, and any power enabling the exclusion of a person from their residence must be subject to the highest legal scrutiny and strict proportionality, and we do not support the amendment.
Social justice groups consistently caution that new powers risk disadvantaging tenants and vulnerable groups. We must remember that, where these orders relate to social housing, they have the potential to render entire families homeless. We believe that the amendment would exacerbate that.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Amendment 26 to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which permits a registered social housing provider to issue a closure notice in respect of premises they own or manage, under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As my noble friend and other noble Lords have stated, a closure notice under Section 76 of that Act is a notice which prohibits a person from accessing specific premises. Currently, such a notice can be issued only by the police or the local authority, but Schedule 2 permits an RSH to also issue such notices.
My noble friend’s amendment would ensure that the RSH provider is able to issue a closure notice for an individual flat in the premises it is responsible for. Given that paragraph (2)(b) of Schedule 2 does not specify that fact, I look forward to the Minister’s answer and hope he might clarify that point.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords for this short but focused debate, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing his amendment. As he has explained, it seeks to allow registered social housing providers to issue a closure notice in relation to an individual flat within a housing block that they own or manage.
The closure power is a fast, flexible power that can be used to protect victims and communities by quickly closing premises that are causing nuisance or disorder. Clause 5 and Schedule 2 extend the closure power to registered social housing providers. Currently, only local authorities and police can issue closure notices. This is despite registered social housing providers often being the initial point of contact for tenants suffering from anti-social behaviour. Now, registered social housing providers will be able to issue closure notices and apply for closure orders, to enable them to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned a specific landlord. Without going into the facts of that case, it is clear that registered social housing providers have to meet regulatory standards set by the regulator of social housing. There is statutory guidance in place, and registered social housing providers are expected to meet the same legal tests as set out in the 2014 Act that the noble Lord mentioned. This will ensure that all relevant agencies have the right tools to tackle anti-social behaviour quickly and effectively. In turn, this will save police and local authorities time, as housing providers will be able to make applications directly, rather than having to rely on the police or local authority to do so on their behalf.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised his concerns about risks of abuse. For instance, he was concerned that extending the power to housing providers might risk it being misused to evict tenants, such as those in rent arrears. There are robust safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of misuse. Like other agencies, housing providers will be required to consult with relevant partners prior to the issuing of a closure notice. This requirement is in addition to the legal test having to be met and the fact that the process will go through the courts.
I want to assure the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and others that premises here means any land or other places, whether enclosed or not, and any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of the premises. This could therefore already include an individual flat within a housing block. Indeed, that would be the expectation: that this targets individual households, rather than whole blocks of flats. We are confident that the current legislative framework and the Bill will cover that and make that clear. On the basis of that clarification—of course, I will reflect on Hansard and the points he specifically raised about the 2014 Act, and I will write to him in more detail if I need to—I hope the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Hampton, for tabling these amendments and all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. Ensuring that anti-social behaviour complaints are adequately handled and delivering a just outcome for the complainants and communities affected without being overly burdensome on the relevant authorities are important principles. These amendments are largely in line with that goal.
This group is particularly important, as anti-social behaviour seems to be on the rise in our streets. As such, it is important that we have the right framework not only for dealing with complaints but for self-correcting any potential mistakes made. With an increased volume, local authorities simply do not have the time to be weighed down by bureaucratic procedures.
For that reason, Amendment 27 raises eyebrows. It is important that we provide the necessary support for those who are harmed by criminal behaviour, but it is also true that this clause would require policing bodies to review responses to complaints about anti-social behaviour, in certain instances. It would place an additional level of administration on to these authorities. As it stands, the amendment seems to cast the net too widely on when impact assessments might be necessary; it would therefore add yet more workload to already strained forces. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s opinion on this matter.
Amendments 28 and 31, however, appear to work to the opposite end. It is right that, when we mandate administrative work from our public servants, we should give them clear guidance on where it is necessary. A discretionary threshold has the potential to encourage local authorities to err on the side of caution and thus review cases that do not merit the time required. Adding a statutory threshold for an ASB case review would both streamline the process and create a more regular system across authorities. This is never a bad thing, and I hope the Minister will consider taking it on board.
I am cautious of Amendment 30 for reasons similar to those that I have already discussed. In principle, the amendment is sound, but adding more bureaucracy to the process by publishing the reasons for not reviewing a case has the potential to take time and attention away from cases that do meet the threshold. Additionally, a statutory threshold would be available for all to see and would set out the criteria needed to meet it. This would surely forgo the need to release the reasons why thresholds were not met.
This is a largely sensible set of amendments that have the interests of both complainants and the respective authorities at heart. I hope that the Minister agrees with what I have just said and look forward to what he says in response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his amendments. I also thank the Victims’ Commissioner, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, both on the amendments and for her work on this issue over many years. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for the comments on this area from the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Clement-Jones, and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, from His Majesty’s Opposition.
Amendment 27 aims to ensure that all victims of repeat anti-social behaviour are subject to an impact assessment, even where the individual has not requested a case review to be undertaken. The Government believe that there is a more effective response to this issue, in that we can ensure that victims are aware of their rights to request a case review. That has been included in updated statutory guidance for front-line staff, which we published in September. The proposals in the amendment would significantly increase the resources required to review anti-social behaviour incidents. The wording of the amendment would mean that even in cases where the victim is satisfied with the response, the police would be required to conduct an impact assessment.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell, has approached this by saying he wishes to work with the Government to look at this. I am happy to have further dialogue with him and the responsible policy Minister in the Home Office post Committee. We can return to it then and examine the nuances. I hope that my initial comments give him a flavour of where the Government currently are.
Amendments 28, 29 and 31 look at the anti-social behaviour case review process and mandate the requirement for there to be an independent chair, for victims to be invited to attend their case review, and to reduce the ability for authorities to add additional caveats that reduce the victim’s abilities to request a case review. I am pleased to say—I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, will accept this and the way that I put it to him—that we have recently updated the statutory guidance to front-line professionals, which already reflects the proposals he has put to the Committee today. I believe that this will create the impact that his amendments intend to bring while still allowing for greater flexibility for circumstances to be treated on an individual basis. Again, if the noble Lord would like further information on the statutory guidance, I am happy to provide that to him and to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, but we think that it meets the objectives of Amendments 28, 29 and 31.
Amendment 30 seeks to require relevant bodies involved in case reviews to publish details on why they have determined that the statutory threshold for a case review was not met. Under existing legislation, it is already a requirement for the relevant bodies to publish the number of times they decided that the review threshold was not met. I highlight to the noble Lord that, through Clause 7, the Government are introducing further requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government. That is for the purpose of us understanding how local agencies are using the powers and tools provided by the 2014 Act, including the question of case review.
If the noble Lord looks at Clause 6 in particular—it is buried in the depths of the undergrowth of Clause 6 but I assure him that it is there—he will see that there will be a new duty for police and crime commissioners to set up a route for victims to request a further review where dissatisfied with the outcome of their case review. This includes where the relevant bodies determined that the threshold was not met for the initial case review. I will give further explanation of Clause 6 when we reach it, but I hope that it meets the objectives that the noble Lord has set out in Amendment 30.
The recently updated guidance on case reviews address many of the same points as these amendments and I hope that it will have the opportunity to bed in. I am happy to send the noble Lord a copy of the guidance, if I am able to, and I assure him that we will monitor the effectiveness of that guidance in improving good practice. He has my commitment that, if necessary, we will revisit the issues again in the near future. Until then, I submit that it would be premature to legislate further on case reviews beyond the measures in the Bill. I hope that with those assurances, the invitation to further discussion and the offer of further information, the noble Lord would be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it is all too often the case that, when the Government say they are bringing minor and technical amendments to a Bill, those amendments are neither minor nor technical in nature. However, with these amendments, that is genuinely the case. There is, therefore, little for me to say in response to this group of amendments. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 was passed by this House earlier this year and, as far as I am aware, the data protection override in Section 106 of that Act was not queried or opposed by noble Lords during its passage, and no amendment was proposed to that clause. I therefore have no issue with these amendments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful and all I say in response is that the sooner we get to Clauses 132 and 192, the better.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, we support Amendment 55A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She has already highlighted the importance of improved data collection around the use of anti-social behaviour legislation. This is essential because it is impossible to gauge the fairness or effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers without adequate data and transparency.
We also support Clause 7. It is important to have more transparency around how these powers are used by local authorities and housing providers. The evidence is that they already have this information but are failing to share it. As a result, little is known about how these powers are being used in practice.
The charity Crisis wants the Government to go further by making this information publicly available. This would provide full transparency around patterns of anti-social behaviour and the powers used to tackle it. Is this something the Government might consider? Perhaps the Minister could let us know.
The police, too, must improve their recording practices around anti-social behaviour. A report last year by HMICFRS found that some forces’ recording is very poor, while others do not always record the use of statutory powers. We believe that transparency is key to ensuring that future orders are applied reasonably and proportionately, and to prevent discrimination.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra, as ever, raises a serious and pertinent point with his Amendment 35. Clause 7 permits the Secretary of State, by regulations, to require authorities to provide them with information about anti-social behaviour. Unfortunately, Clause 7 contains rather vague requirements on what information the regulations might contain. It would perhaps be helpful for the Minister to provide the Committee with some concrete examples of what might be included. My noble friend is absolutely right that social media posts should not be included in any of the guidance.
With Amendment 55A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my fear is that the police and the Home Office, already overburdened with creating statistics, will yet again be further burdened. Perhaps this is not the way forward.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to both the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for these two amendments.
As the noble Lord explained, Amendment 35 relates to the new power in Clause 7 for the Home Secretary to make regulations requiring relevant authorities, including local councils and social housing providers, to report information on anti-social behaviour. The amendment would mean that those regulations would not be able to request information from the relevant authorities about things that are considered anti-social or indeed anti-social messages. We will come on to the non-crime hate incident issues that the noble Lord has a concern about, but currently Clause 7 would allow information to be requested on reports of anti-social behaviour made to an authority, responses of the authority and anti-social behaviour case reviews carried out by the relevant authority. Anti-social behaviour can come in various forms, and it is important that the regulation-making power can address this.
Information held by central government on anti-social behaviour is in some areas limited. This has led to a significant evidence gap in the national picture of anti-social behaviour. I mentioned the 1 million incidents per year, but there is still an evidence gap in that picture of anti-social behaviour. The new clause will change this to ensure stronger and more comprehensive understanding of ASB incidents and interventions, but we want to make sure that Clause 7 creates a regulation-making power only. Regulations will then be made following the passage of the Bill to specify the information that agencies must provide. Going back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, indicated, this may be information they already have but do not necessarily share.
I assure the noble Lord that regulations are being developed in close consultation with the relevant practitioners, including local authorities and social housing providers, to understand what information is held on anti-social behaviour and the impact that this requirement may have upon them, for the very reasons that the noble Lord mentioned. We will of course make sure that any new requirements are reasonable and proportionate but meet the Government’s objective of having a wider understanding of some of the trends and information.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Increased penalties for littering offences(1) The Environmental Protection Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 88 (fixed penalty notices for leaving litter)—(a) in subsection (6A)(b)(i), for “£100” substitute “£125”;(b) in subsection (6A)(b)(ii), for “£75” substitute “£94”;(c) in subsection (8C) (England, Wales and Scotland versions), for “level 3” substitute “level 4”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase penalties for littering and related offences. It raises fixed penalties in England and Wales by 25 per cent and moves the maximum fine levels up one tier on the standard scale.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses three separate but related offences: increasing the penalties for littering and dog fouling offences and introducing a specific offence of littering on public transport.
Littering may appear to be a minor problem when juxtaposed with some of the issues discussed in the Bill, but it is one of the most prominent anti-social offences to plague towns and communities. Littering is one of the most visible forms of environmental degradation, affecting not only the appearance of our streets and greenery but degrading our sense of public pride and community. Littering is associated with signs of a neglected area, and it sends a powerful negative message about standards and civic responsibility.
The scale of this problem is undeniable. Keep Britain Tidy estimates that local authorities in England alone spend around £1 billion each year clearing litter and fly-tipped waste. Almost 80% of our streets in England are affected by littering to some degree, with the most common items including food and drink packaging, cigarette ends and sweet wrappers.
The Government’s own figures show that local councils issue fewer than 50,000 fixed penalty notices a year, despite the widespread scale of the problem. This is why my amendments seek to increase the penalties for littering offences. The current fixed penalty levels were last revised in 2018, when the maximum fine was raised to £150. Since then, both inflation and enforcement costs have risen considerably. As time has gone on, therefore, the deterrent effect of the penalty has been eroded. An uplift is thus justified and necessary. A higher penalty would reflect the real cost to communities and to local authorities, and would send a clear message that littering is not a low-level or victimless offence.
The same logic applies to my amendment concerning dog fouling offences. It is true that some progress has been made through awareness campaigns, but the problem persists in many communities. It is unpleasant, unsanitary and requires local authorities to bear the cost of cleaning it up. It is therefore only right that penalties are raised to reflect both the nuisance and costs incurred. I hope the Government agree that more must be done to combat littering and dog fouling offences.
The negative effects of littering are felt most in highly frequented public places. Public transport is one such area of public life where the harm of littering is exacerbated. It is a growing problem on our trains, buses, trams and underground systems. Anyone using public transport on a Saturday or Sunday morning will no doubt have experienced the scale of rubbish left behind from the thoughtless few of the night before. The accumulation of food packaging, coffee cups, bottles and newspapers left behind by passengers is a saddening sight and must be addressed. Littering on public transport causes expensive inconvenience for operators and diminishes the travelling experience for others. Often, passengers would rather stand than sit on dirty seats. A distinct offence of littering on public transport would underline the responsibility of passengers in shared public places and support transport authorities in maintaining standards of cleanliness and safety.
These amendments are not about punishing people for the sake of it; they are about upholding civic standards and ensuring that those who do the right thing are not let down by those who do not. They are about fairness: the costs of litter removal fall on local taxpayers, transport users and businesses, rather than on those responsible for creating the mess. It is time the Government took a firmer stance on the few who ruin the enjoyment of Britain’s streets for the many. Higher penalties and clearer offences would, in my view, provide both the incentive and the clarity needed to improve compliance.
I hope the Government will view these proposals in that spirit—not as punitive but as a practical contribution to cleaner, safer public spaces and to civic pride. I look forward to hearing from the Minister, and from across the Committee, on how the Government intend to continue building on their anti-littering strategy and supporting local authorities in enforcement. I am sure many noble Lords will have received letters and emails from constituents complaining about the state of local streets and the scale of litter they must contend with. They are right to be concerned. The cost to our environment, our economy and our collective morale is far greater than the individual cost of a packet or a coffee cup dropped out of selfish behaviour. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend. My only criticism is that the proposed increase for the penalties is not high enough, but at least it is a very good start. I declare an interest, as on the register: I am a director of the community interest company, Clean Streets, which works with Keep Britain Tidy to try to reduce cigarette litter on the streets, with considerable success.
In about 1995, I was privileged to make an official visit to Commissioner Bratton in New York, who pioneered the broken window theory—I am sure the Minister is aware of it. As he discovered, if there is a street with one broken window and no one does anything about it, very soon there will be more broken windows, then litter and rubbish lying in the street, and then low-life people, as they call them in America, move in. He said that you would start with a street with a broken window and, within a couple of years, end up with garbage and then a drug den. I actually visited one where they were trying to batter down a steel door to get the druggies out.
I am not suggesting that a little litter would cause that here, but there was an experiment cited by the excellent nudge unit, set up by Oliver Letwin, when he was in government. The experiment was carried out in the Netherlands, where, for one week, they looked at a bicycle parking lot. They pressure-washed the whole thing, scrubbed it and kept it clean, and over the course of that week not a single bit of litter was left there and no damage was caused. The following week, they put bits of litter in the parking lot—a bottle here and an empty cigarette box there—and, within days, the whole place got more and more litter, because people thought it was an okay thing to do. If people see one bit of rubbish, they think they can just add their rubbish to it as well.
Littering is not only unsightly but highly dangerous. Cigarette litter, in particular, is dangerous—not from the cigarettes themselves but from the filters, which have microplastics in them. It causes enormous costs to councils to clean up.
A couple of months ago, serving on the Council of Europe, I attended an official meeting in Venice. It was the first time I had been there. It is not very wheelchair friendly, but I did manage to get around. After four or five days in Venice—I paid to stay on for some extra days—I was impressed that there was not a single scrap of litter anywhere on the streets. One could not move for tourists, but there was not a single scrap of litter. There were signs everywhere, saying “Keep Venice Clean”. People, mainly ladies, were going round with their big two-wheeled barrels collecting garbage from people’s homes. It was impressive.
I was even more impressed that everyone seemed to have a dog—the widest variety of dog breeds I have ever seen—but there was only one occasion in five days where I saw dog mess on the pavement. The view was that, if you have a dog, you clean up after it. It is an extraordinary place. When I am on my wheelchair in London or anywhere else—trying to avoid the people on their mobile phones who walk into me—I am looking down all the time as I dare not drive through dog dirt on the pavement because I can never get it off the wheels. I manage to avoid it, but that is what I must to do in my own country. I cannot take the risk in a wheelchair of driving through the dog mess we find on the pavements. To be fair, in Victoria Tower Gardens, where I see people exercising their dogs, they all have the little poop-scoop bag and they pick up the mess and that is very good, but there is too much dog mess on the pavements.
We need tougher sanctions. We need the highest possible penalties, particularly for fouling and leaving mess on the pavement. I know the penalties are there already, but they have not been enforced rigorously enough. My friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, might condemn the private companies that move in and start imposing more fines for the ridiculous dropping of litter, but perhaps they could move in and start imposing them, and catch out the people who are leaving the dog mess on the pavement. I almost tried to do it myself on one occasion, when I came across similar dog mess in the same spot three days in a row. I was tempted to get up at 5 am, sit there with my camera to catch the person doing it and report him or her to Westminster City Council.
We need enforcement on this. Goodness knows how colleagues in this place who are blind and who have guide dogs manage to avoid it—I hope the dogs do—but others may not avoid it and will walk through it. It is filthy and disgusting, and a very serious health hazard. I support the amendments in the names of my noble friends, and I urge the Government to consider all aspects of making tougher penalties for litter and tougher enforcement penalties for dog mess on the pavement.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Sorry, I thought the noble Lord was gearing up to make further comments.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling the amendments. I agree with him and everybody else who has spoken that fly-tipping, littering and dog fouling are not victimless crimes; they blight our communities. I find it very annoying to see not just dog mess in bushes but stuff thrown out of car windows and stuff left on trains that is not picked up. An important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, is that some of this is also about improving behavioural change and encouraging people not to tolerate this. Never mind fines or responsibilities, it is about not tolerating this as a society.
Having said that, the amendments themselves are unnecessary in this case, and I will try to explain why. Local authorities can already issue fixed-penalty notices for littering of up to £500, which is greater than the proposed penalties in the amendment. In addition, local authorities already have the power to issue public space protection orders to tackle persistent anti-social behaviour, including dog fouling. As we have debated, Clause 4 raises the maximum penalty for the breach of PSPOs from £100 to £500, so there is already an upward target in terms of the amount of potential fine. This is not meant as a snide point, but I say to the noble Lord that the Dog (Fouling of Land) Act 1996 has been repealed and replaced; I cannot amend it because it does not exist any more.
The argument I put to the House is that local authorities are best placed to set the level of these penalties in their area, taking into account the characteristics of the community, which might even include ability to pay. Outside of issuing a fixed-penalty notice, those prosecuted for littering can also face, on conviction, a fine of up to £2,500. I do not believe that increasing the fine available to someone who fails to give their name and address to an enforcement officer issuing them a fine is appropriate, with a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale—currently £1,000—being the appropriate level in these circumstances.
Amendment 38 makes a very important point about littering on public transport becoming a specific offence. I pay tribute to the people whom the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, mentioned: the people who go up and down trains, collecting rubbish on behalf of the company. They are also the people who helped protect us last week in the LNER attack. They fulfil a very important function as a whole.
However, the British Transport Police and the railway operators already have the power to enforce the railway by-laws and prevent unacceptable behaviour on both heavy and light railway. That includes fines of up to £1,000. On the noble Lord’s late-night train back, in theory, a £1,000 fine for littering could be issued. By-laws are controlled by each individual devolved area, which will have its own by-laws around littering and enforcement.
That takes me to the other point—I do not mean to be cocky in the way I say this—that the amendments, as proposed, seek to amend the law in Scotland and Wales as well as for England, and they deal with matters that are devolved to Scotland and to the Senedd in Wales. As such, it would not be appropriate to include such measures in the Bill without the consent of the legislatures, which at the moment we do not have and have not sought.
Finally, I think it is of benefit to noble Lords if I briefly outline the steps the Government are taking to reduce littering among our communities. There is a Pride in Place Strategy, which sets out how Government will support local action—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, mentioned—by bringing forward statutory enforcement guidance on littering, modernising the code of practice that outlines the cleaning standards expected of local authorities and refreshing best practice guidance on powers available to local councils to force land and building owners to clean up their premises.
Having had the opportunity to debate all these issues, I think that the amendments make an extremely important point, and I am not trying to downgrade the points that have been made by noble Lords. Litter is an extremely important issue, but the approach taken in these amendments is not one that I can support—but not because I am not interested in the issue itself. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment and not to move the other amendments, but we can still discuss it further at some point, no doubt on Report.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am most grateful to those who have contributed and spoken in support of this group of amendments and, indeed, for the Minister’s response, although I was a little disappointed by the scepticism of colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches.
These matters go to the heart of civic pride and the everyday quality of life that our constituents rightly expect. The present system of penalties is no longer an adequate deterrent, having not been amended for many years. As has been observed, local authorities spend hundreds of millions of pounds every year clearing up after those who show little regard for the public realm. When the maximum fine for littering has remained unchanged since 2018, its real-term value has fallen sharply. Fines are now too often treated as a minor inconvenience rather than a genuine consequence for selfish behaviour. My amendments seek to address that imbalance and ensure that penalties once again reflect the true cost to our communities. Our buses, trains and underground systems are shared spaces used by millions every day. They should be clean spaces, not repositories for discarded coffee cups and beer bottles.
As I mentioned in my opening speech, although awareness of dog fouling has improved, enforcement remains inconsistent and penalties insufficient. It is only fair that those who allow this behaviour to persist should face meaningful consequences, rather than leaving their neighbours and local councils to deal with the aftermath.
These amendments are modest practical steps towards restoring civic responsibility and pride in our shared environment. They are not intended to be punitive; they are about accountability and respect for the public spaces we all enjoy. I hope that the Government will take note of the strength of feeling by travellers and the public at large and will continue to work with local authorities and communities to tackle the persistent blight of dog fouling and littering, especially on public transport. But for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsMonday 10th November 2025
(1 week, 3 days ago)
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Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks we have heard from around the Chamber, including from my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the seriousness of anti-social behaviour and the rationale of the Government in bringing forward the measures that they have in this part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, summed it up as the requirement for an effective and functioning system—hear, hear to that.
My concern is aligned with the sentiment, if not the letter, of Amendment 1, which would require the Government to explain why they feel that this set of measures, including respect orders, will work, when previous similar measures—ASBIs and so forth—have not worked to the extent, perhaps, that the Ministers who championed them when they were originally brought in expected. I do not believe that this is the moment for an independent review, but I think the Minister could give the Committee a detailed explanation of the specific circumstances in which he feels that these new respect orders will be deployed, why they are more likely to work than the existing arrangements and, in particular, the degree to which they will really make a difference. The Minister has brought forward these measures for the approval of Parliament, and he must be able to justify the result he expects them to have once they are implemented.
We know that that Governments of all flavours—this is not a specific reflection on the current Government—tend to reach for the statute book to address knotty problems, when in fact the answer may equally lie in better execution of existing powers. That probably is the overall challenge that has been put to the Minister this afternoon. I very much look forward to his answer.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the speakers in this debate so far. This Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. Sorry.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
No problem.
My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly to Amendments 4, 5 and 7 in my name. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has made a very clear case for each one, so I will speak briefly. I put on record my thanks to Justice, which has gathered insights from so many people working in this field and it has been really interesting reading case studies that are backed up by very clear evidence.
These amendments would provide essential safeguards, ensuring the powers contained within respect orders are proportionate. Amendment 4 would require orders to be made only where there is evidence of actual conduct, not speculation about what a person might do in future. Amendment 7 would ensure that an order is imposed with a clear end date, capped at two years. In my opinion, it is wrong that an individual could be subject to potentially serious restrictions in perpetuity as a result of behaviour that falls below the criminal threshold. In Amendment 5, we want to change the “just and convenient” threshold generally applied in civil proceedings to “necessary and proportionate”. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put a very good case for this—much better than I could ever do, so I will not try.
Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, calling for an independent review of existing anti-social behaviour powers before respect orders are rolled out, would improve the Bill considerably, because precisely what laws are already used, and what works in practice, is critical to their success.
On the subject of likely success, I welcome the fact that respect orders can include positive requirements that people have to, for example, attend rehabilitation—perhaps to deal with addictions to drugs or drink or both. However, such requirements can work only if every region has capacity in drug and alcohol treatment programmes. I am sure the Minister is aware that only 12 of the 43 police forces returned data last year on how many cases were referred for such treatment. Without that information, we cannot know how such rehabilitation can work. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister, when he responds, about what efforts are being made to ensure there are places available. Legislation alone is no good without resources.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I did want to hear what she had to say, but my enthusiasm to move on overtook me, unfortunately. I must learn to ignore nods from the Government Bench opposite as well.
As I said, the Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. On these Benches, we are not entirely sure of the need for new anti-social behaviour laws, and the validity of the proposed measure will be touched on more thoroughly in group 3. We feel the focus should be on enforcement first and foremost.
But as this proposal will become law, there are several individual parts of it that would benefit from being amended. I begin with Amendment 2 in my name, which is intended to probe the age at which a person can be given a respect order. The Bill states that this will be 18 and that younger offenders will be subject to a youth injunction. I cannot see why there should be two different powers to deal with the same behaviours. One of the benefits of anti-social behaviour injunctions is that they can apply to any person over the age of 10, rather than having different powers for different age groups.
To set the age minimum at 16 seems like common sense, and I would be surprised if the Minister disagrees with me. It is, after all, his party that believes in treating children of that age as adults. Why should 16 year-olds be allowed to choose the people who create anti-social behaviour laws, but simultaneously be exempt from those laws? Perhaps the Minister can explain the rationale, should he oppose the amendment.
Amendment 6 aims to ensure that an issued respect order does not place excessive restrictions on the recipient. It is similar to Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in seeking to ensure that orders are “necessary and proportionate”. As it stands, respect orders may require the recipient to do anything specified by the court—a power that does not contain any internal safeguards. This could lead to massive judicial overreach. The amendment in my name seeks to ensure that this is not the case. It is fair and proportionate that a recipient may be prohibited from doing anything that may cause a repeat of that which required an order in the first place. Prohibiting those actions is just, but that is where the powers of prohibition should end. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this potential issue with the proposed policy.
Amendment 11 would remove perhaps the most egregious part of this clause: giving the Secretary of State complete discretion not only over which authorities fall under the scope of respect orders, but the definitions that define respect orders themselves. It means that the already strong and limiting orders can be altered and twisted by whichever Home Secretary happens to be in office. I am sure each noble Lord could think of a different set of hands that they would not want this power to reside in. The amendment in my name would prevent that occurring and leave this already forceful power as it is.
Amendments 13 and 14 seek to improve the clarity in the chain of command in issuing orders. In a policy with so many moving parts, efficiency is key. A respect order would currently appoint a supervisor, who would then have the discretion to inform an
“appropriate chief officer of police”
if the offender lives in more than one area. This adds an extra layer of responsibility to a supervisor already charged with monitoring the respect order’s recipient. I can foresee potential mix-ups and miscommunications whereby either no or multiple chief officers believe themselves to be responsible for a recipient. The easy solution would be to specify the relevant chief officer alongside the supervisor, disaggregating the chain of appointments and improving clarity. I hope the Minister considers this point.
Amendment 20 seeks to require that risk assessments are the basis of respect order applications. It seems wrong that, despite being required to carry out a risk assessment, an applicant can apply for a respect order without having to reference it to the court. Respect orders are potentially very freedom-limiting; the court that issues them should be able to reference the risks posed by the recipient as a justification for these sanctions. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on the first day in Committee on the Crime and Policing Bill. I feel like I am at base camp at the start of a climb to Mount Everest—but, as ever, Mount Everest has been conquered, as I am sure the Bill will eventually be as well. It feels like we are at the very start of a long, fruitful and productive process.
I will start by outlining a little about respect orders, because it is important to put them into the general context of why the Government are doing what they are doing. There were over 1 million recorded incidents of anti-social behaviour in the last year for which records exist. That is an awful lot of anti-social behaviour and does not include even the underreporting that may well exist.
There is a government manifesto commitment to take action on respect orders. The new orders will enable courts to both ban offenders from engaging in harmful anti-social behaviour, and/or—as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, noted—impose positive requirements to tackle the root cause of anti-social behaviour. That could be anger management or alcohol or drug awareness courses, which will hopefully tackle the root cause of that anti-social behaviour and stop it occurring.
Unlike existing ASB civil injunctions, breach will be a criminal offence enforceable by arrest and tried in the criminal courts. That goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. This goes to court only if an individual breaches the order put on them—the purpose of the order is to stop the behaviour taking place. Penalties for breach will include community sentences, unlimited fines and potentially prison time for the most serious breaches, but only on a breach. That is a really important point to recognise in our discussions today.
Because there are so many amendments in this group, although it is a slow process I will take the amendments in turn. Amendment 1, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, my noble friends Lady Whitaker and Lord Hacking, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, would require a Home Secretary within six months of the Bill becoming law to undertake a review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, prior to introducing respect orders.
First, the introduction of respect orders was a manifesto commitment, so the Government have put some thought into it. I also assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to ensuring that the powers to address anti-social behaviour remain effective. As such, they are subject to continuous review. I do not want to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but there will not be a pilot on this, because the Home Office has regularly engaged with front-line practitioners and with the ASB sector to better understand how the powers of the 2014 Act are used and where improvements can be made.
In addition, under the last Government the department launched a public consultation in 2023 to understand how powers could be used more consistently and effectively. That consultation has helped inform the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 7 of the Bill, which, to aid this ongoing evaluation process, provides for new requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government to help us continually improve and review.
Therefore, the provisions in Clause 1 deliver on the manifesto commitment. We need to press ahead with respect orders as soon as possible to ensure that the police, local authorities and others have the effective powers to tackle the 1 million cases per year. Amendment 1 would require us to have a costly and unnecessary review, and it would slow and cause delay in the rollout. Therefore, with respect, I cannot accept it either today or on Report.
Amendments 2 and 3 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, seek to lower the age at which respondents can receive a respect order from 18 to 16, or indeed to 14. Again, I hope the noble Lords understand that the Government do not wish to criminalise young people unless it is absolutely necessary, which is why our manifesto was clear that respect orders were aimed at tackling anti-social behaviour perpetrated by adults. The noble Lord, Lord Bailey, made some very valid points on that in relation to the potential criminalisation of younger people.
That does not mean there is no provision for the relevant agencies to deal with youth-related anti-social behaviour. The respect order, while replacing the civil injunction for adults, will remain in place for those under the age of 18, renamed as the youth injunction. Importantly, this will enable youth courts to impose behaviour requirements on younger offenders without resulting in criminalisation if they breach the injunction. There is still the potential for those orders to be placed, but it does not involve criminalisation.
Amendments 4 and 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and others would amend the legal test for issuing a respect order. Amendment 4 would mean that a respect order could be issued only in relation to ASB that a respondent had already engaged in, and not where the respondent had threatened to engage in this behaviour, as is the case with existing civil injunctions.
I stress to the House that respect orders are fundamentally preventive in nature. They are designed to stop bad behaviour by putting in place a restraining order that says, in effect, “Don’t do these particular actions”. If the offender abides by the terms of the order, there will be no further sanctions. That is an important point for the House to understand and grasp from the Government’s perspective. Anti-social behaviour can be insidious and difficult to prove and it can take many forms. We know that the threat of aggressive or anti-social behaviour can often escalate quickly into more serious, violent and criminal behaviour —a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. That is why it is crucial that we retain the ability to issue an order against those threatening to engage in ASB, in order to prevent that harm before it happens.
Amendment 5, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would change the legal test for issuing a respect order, so that that the court would need to find it “necessary and proportionate” to issue the order to prevent the respondent engaging in anti-social behaviour, rather than using the legal test as currently drafted, in which the court must find it “just and convenient” to do so. The current “just and convenient” language mirrors that of the civil injunction and is therefore familiar to the courts.
Let me be clear—this again goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that the current threshold still requires a judge, with all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails, to be satisfied that the issuing of an order is just, reasonable and fair. Courts will already take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of their duties under the Human Rights Act. Given these considerations, the benefits of amending the legal test in this way are limited.
Moving on to Amendment 6—
Lord Davies of Gower
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we must ensure that courts can operate within their means. If we issue them with new responsibilities, we have to be sure that they have the capacity to fulfil them. Unfortunately, in restricting respect orders to the High Court and county courts, the Government risk not providing the bandwidth to deal with new orders.
At the end of Labour’s first year in office, the Crown Court backlog suffered an annual increase of 11%. There are over 74,000 cases waiting to be judged. Of course, that burden is not entirely at the door of the Crown Courts, but a considerable number of the outstanding cases will require their use. County courts are in a better—but still not ideal—state. The average time for justice to be delivered is just over 49 weeks. Reflecting on this, it makes sense for the Government to divide the responsibilities for the new respect orders as widely as possible. The logical conclusion is to permit an application for a respect order to be made to a magistrates’ court.
If respect orders were confined to the serious criminality that we expect to be dealt with by the High Court and county courts, I would accept placing additional pressures on to them and excluding magistrates’ courts. It is right that those facing serious harassment or other forms of anti-social behaviour have the ability to make application to these courts, but the scope for respect orders is far wider than that. The definition of anti-social behaviour is to include actions causing alarm and distress. These are two very subjective metrics: they are fundamentally different from harassment and more serious forms of anti-social behaviour. So I see no reason why magistrates’ courts should not be available to deal with these less serious and potentially menial forms of anti-social behaviour. This is the reasoning behind Amendments 8 and 16, tabled in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie.
There is also precedent for this. When the last Labour Government introduced anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, they could be made only by a magistrates’ court. This recognised that anti-social behaviour should be the purview of summary justice. The Minister might argue that the Government are simply replicating the application process for anti-social behaviour injunctions and that they were the action of the previous Government. That may be a fair criticism, but that would not mean that the Government are right. Simply following the case of previous legislation does not automatically mean that the legislation before us today is following the right path; nor does it acknowledge the very different state of the backlog in the High Court and county courts today, as opposed to 2014. It makes far more sense to permit the use of magistrates’ courts for this purpose today, given the historic case burden.
Finally, I can see no downside to this. It will permit burden-sharing between three types of courts. It would not alter the nature of the orders, nor the process by which they are made. But it would make some progress toward reducing the waiting time for the making of a respect order. Surely the Government do not want to see a 49-week wait for a respect order to be made. Would that not hamper the effectiveness of these supposedly tough new respect orders? I hope the Minister will consider these amendments carefully and sensibly.
The other amendments in this group seek to minimise the pressure placed on our courts by the new measures and ensure that our shared principles of justice are upheld. Interim respect orders interact with the principle of innocent until proven guilty. They can be made following a court adjournment up until the final court hearing. They have the same function as a regular respect order and can impose the same restrictions. I am conscious that this may sometimes be necessary. I reiterate the debilitated state of our courts and the fact that adjournment is sometimes out of their hands, even if the defendant is likely to engage in further anti-social behaviour. In these occasional instances, I can understand the need for an interim respect order.
Amendment 15 aims to find a balance, creating a presumption against issuing an interim order, while still leaving the option open. Amendment 19 exists to forward the argument that these orders can be issued to prevent only further harassment, and not the vague concepts of alarm and distress. These amendments aim to ease the administrative burden on the courts. Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against a decision to refuse to issue an interim respect order, the defendant is notified. It is right that a person should know when they might be subjected to a respect order, especially when they have not yet been proven guilty. I beg to move Amendment 8.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I have just a few comments. I am quite concerned that the latest figures show that the magistrates’ courts’ backlog of cases to be heard reached 361,000 as of September 2025, a record high and a significant increase on previous years. In the other place, the Minister said the legal test for respect orders was being kept “broad and flexible” to enable them to be used for a wide range of anti-social behaviours. Again, this suggests significant extra pressure on courts. Jamming up the system further is not going to help victims. Can the Minister say what the Government’s assessment is of the impact on the wider criminal justice system?
Giving evidence in the other place, the Police Federation also pointed to the pressure these orders would put on custody places, saying that infrastructure was needed to make new legislation “effective and believable”. Perhaps the Minister could also address that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is a very wide question, my Lords. Let me say that the purpose of Committee is to provide a significant number of days for Members from all sides of the House—as we have had today, from the government side as well as from the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats—to test Ministers and raise points. If the noble Baroness has points she wishes to raise during the passage of the Bill, as ever, I will try to answer them, either on the Floor of this House or in writing afterwards.
The noble Baroness asks whether things have changed. Even today, there are a number of amendments that the Government have brought forward in the groups of amendments that we are deliberating on today. Things move; the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, was saying with regard to the immigration Bill that a number of things have changed over the course of time, and things move. It is now 16 months since the King’s Speech which introduced this legislation. We continue to monitor and move; where necessary we bring forward amendments, and I am open to testing on all matters at all times. But I would welcome the noble Lord withdrawing his amendment today.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and to those who have contributed. I know we all have the interests of a functioning justice system at heart, and the discussion has reflected that. We must approach this debate with pragmatism as our guiding principle. That means that, when legislating for new crimes, the best outcome is the one that sees offences prosecuted. In a perfect world, perhaps the Crown Courts and the county courts alone would have the capacity to handle these new respect orders. But, as I have outlined, the courts system is incredibly backlogged, and it is therefore necessary to use as many courts as possible to deliver the policy.
Considering the scope of respect orders on top of that, my amendments and the amendments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie are perfectly reasonable. To consider causing alarm as on the same level as causing harassment, as prosecuting them in the same courts effectively does, defies sense. Making use of magistrates’ courts is both the rational and practical solution to this problem.
Similarly, approaching interim respect orders from a more conservative standpoint would be prudent. They are very illiberal measures and should be used only in the most necessary circumstances. Amendments, such as those tabled in my name, to create presumptions against them and to narrow the preview of their power seek to ensure that this is the case.
I hope that the Minister will agree with the important principles behind these amendments and will perhaps take them away and consider them, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I have tabled and de-grouped this clause stand-part notice because it would be helpful to the Committee to probe the real purpose of respect orders. We have no plans to insist that this part of the Bill be removed on Report.
This Government appear to be making the same errors as those of the previous Labour Administration. The Blair Government seemed to believe that, the more they legislated on crime and anti-social behaviour, the less of that behaviour there would be. We saw Act after Act, many repealing or amending Acts that they had passed merely a few years before. This flurry of lawmaking meant that, by the end of its term in office, Labour had created 14 different powers for police to tackle anti-social behaviour and criminality. My noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead undertook to simplify this system by condensing all these measures into just six powers. However, with this Bill we see that old pattern of the new-Labour years re-emerging. This Bill creates four new powers: respect orders, youth injunctions, housing injunctions and youth diversion orders. I cannot see what real-world impact this will make.
As I said at Second Reading, the concept of respect orders appears to be little more than a gimmick. It is legislative action to make the Government appear to be tough on anti-social behaviour when in fact they are not. Respect orders are no different from the existing anti-social behaviour injunctions. Applications for both are made by the same list of people to the same cause. The requirements that can be placed on the respondent are the same for ASB injunctions and respect orders. Both permit the making of an interim order or injunction. Both permit the exclusion of a person from their home in the case of serious violence or risk of harm. Both permit the variation or discharge of the order or injunction. They are, in almost every aspect, exactly the same.
The only difference is that one is a civil order and the other a criminal order. The Bill creates a criminal offence of breaching a condition of a respect order. A person found guilty of that offence on conviction or indictment is liable to a jail sentence of up to two years. Anti-social behaviour injunctions, however, do not have a specific criminal offence attached to them. A person who breaches a condition of an ASB injunction does not commit an offence of breaching the injunction. The Government have argued that this difference makes their respect orders tougher and therefore justified. However, this overlooks two important facts.
First, the court granting the ASB injunction can attach a power of arrest to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 9 of that Act states that
“a constable may arrest the respondent without warrant”
where they believe that the person has breached a condition of their injunction. The person arrested for a breach of their injunction can then be charged with contempt of court, which carries a punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment. It is entirely understandable that the Government wish to introduce a specific criminal offence of breaching conditions. It is easier to prosecute someone who breaches their respect order than to prosecute someone for contempt of court for breaching their injunction. That is not least because a police officer would have to know that a person had an injunction against them, that they had breached the condition and that their injunction contained a power of arrest. It is also because, even though ASB injunctions are civil orders, the criminal standard of proof is applied when determining whether a person has breached a condition.
I understand this entirely, but it does not explain why the Government are seeking to replace injunctions in their entirety. Surely, given that every other aspect is the same, it would be far easier and more expeditious to retain the injunctions and simply amend them to create an offence of breach of conditions. That would mean that the ASB injunctions remain in place but they have the same power of enforcement. Why did the Government not follow this route? Why did they not simply amend the anti-social behaviour injunctions, as opposed to creating a whole new class of order?
The answer cannot be that one is a civil order and one a criminal order because, as I have demonstrated, the civil order could easily have been upgraded to criminal status by way of legislative amendment. I would hazard a guess and say that the reason is perhaps bluster. Is it not the case that the Government wanted to seem to be tough on crime, so they came up with a rehash of ASBOs with a slightly catchier name? These new respect orders will likely have little effect on reducing anti-social behaviour. What would have a positive impact would be to increase the number of police officers. Unfortunately, the Government have failed on that front. Since they entered office, the total police officer headcount has fallen by 1,316. That record to date stands in stark contrast to the previous Government’s successful recruitment of 20,000 additional police officers during the last Parliament.
If the Government are serious about getting tough on crime, they should stop the gimmicks and start with enforcement. I beg to move.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have listened to the quite detailed discussion that we have had so far in our attempt at line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill in relation to respect orders. Weighing up the pros and rather more cons, I am very aware that what I am going to say might seem glib about anti-social behaviour. People listening in might think, “This crowd who are raising problems of civil liberties are not aware of the real scourge of anti-social behaviour and the impact and the misery that it can cause on ordinary people’s lives”. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, gave us a taste of what that anti-social activity can feel like in local areas. I recognised the descriptions from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, of young people potentially running amok in local areas. Where I live, that has been known to happen, so I recognise that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I accept that, but it would be fair to say that I would be making promises or guessing about issues that I could not guarantee. But I can guarantee for the noble Viscount that we will monitor the use of this and that the measures that I have already outlined—those in the Bill, those on police numbers and the focus that we are putting on certain police initiatives through central government discussion with the National Police Chiefs’ Council—will make a difference. They will be judged on that.
Self-evidently, a manifesto commitment to reduce and tackle anti-social behaviour requires this Minister, this Government and this Home Secretary to go back to the electorate, at some point, to say, “That is the difference that we have made”. While I cannot give the noble Viscount an aperitif today, I hope I can give him a full-course meal after the discussions have taken place further down stream.
It is important, as we have just heard, that if perpetrators breach an injunction multiple times, the police cannot take action unless they take them to court. Under this measure, there will be a criminal action so police can take action immediately.
I wish to tell the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that, for a respect order to be issued, two tests must be satisfied. First, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has engaged in or threatened to engage in anti-social behaviour as defined. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that issuing the respect order is just and convenient. A further safeguard introduced is that the relevant authorities carry out risk assessments prior to the respect order being put in place.
These clauses, about which the noble Lord has quite rightly asked questions, are important and I wish to see them retained in the Bill. I am grateful for his overall indication that, when it comes to determining that, he will not oppose these clauses, but I will take away his comments and I hope to continue our discussions in the positive way that we have to date.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I am grateful for the contributions made and to the Minister for his response. Of course, I have no intention of opposing the passage of respect orders. They were part of the Government’s election manifesto and, as such, shall become the law of the land. This does not prevent my criticising them. Indeed, simply because they were part of the Government’s manifesto does not mean that they are a good idea that would have a positive impact on the streets of Britain.
I have provided substantive justification for why I believe that respect orders are, simply put, an effort to paint a picture of a Government bearing down on crime and anti-social behaviour when, in reality, they are not. The proof will be in the pudding; we will see whether the Prime Minister’s so-called tough new respect orders have any actual impact, in due course. For now, I will leave it there.
Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsWednesday 5th November 2025
(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 View all Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 136-III Third marshalled list for Report - (4 Nov 2025)
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, before the noble Lord finally winds up, I have two points to make. One is in respect of the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, about Written Answers. We have all had many of them, and they have sometimes been useful and sometimes been awful. This is a problem of not just this Government; it goes back many years. The answer is just to keep going, but I sympathise with the noble Lord.
I am a member of the Science and Technology Committee of this House. We spend a lot of time talking about the shortage of researchers and students coming into our universities. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, is a very good example of how to come in properly; he passed all the exams and made a career of it. But there are an awful lot of other people who do not get here because of the difficulties, cost and delay of these processes.
I do not think it really matters how they come. It is easy to criticise people because they come in a small boat or because they get a visa in some other way. We really need to look and see how we can attract the best possible students in the world to help our research and technology industries here. We have got the opportunities from many who would prefer to leave the United States at the moment. All over, if we do not get the students, we are not going to achieve our academic success. I do not think the amendments in this group are the way forward.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 35 from my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Amendment 71 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. We have seen disturbing instances of very serious offending by non-UK nationals on student visas. For example, there is the case of Zhenhao Zou, a Chinese national and PhD student at University College, London, who was convicted in March 2025 of multiple rapes of women in the UK and China, and who is now serving a life sentence with a minimum term of 24 years.
The existence of such a case shows that the student route is not free of risk, yet we currently have no published data on how many overseas students commit crimes, have their visas revoked or are deported. Without that transparency, Parliament and the public are effectively working in the dark.
Lord Oates (LD)
My Lords, I will not repeat the comprehensive arguments my noble friend has so eloquently set out in support of this amendment. I want to focus briefly on the point she highlighted that, by allowing settled status to expire rather than revoking or cancelling it, the Home Office is sidestepping a proportionality assessment and denying the status-holder a right of appeal.
The Home Office says that this is a generous thing to do to give people a bit more time before their status is lost but, as my noble friend has set out, it is in fact letting status-holders slide off a cliff without the withdrawal agreement safeguards. This should not be allowed to happen, fundamentally because the Home Office—extraordinary though it may seem—may be wrong in its assessments that status was granted in error. Regrettably, the Home Office has been known to make mistakes in the past—in fact, frequent mistakes, often with catastrophic human consequences.
This amendment would ensure that, where such errors are made, the victims of those errors are afforded the procedural safeguards that they should be. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, said in reply to me that those whose settled status was lapsed by the Home Office would be
“informed that they can reapply to the EUSS. If such an application is made and refused, it will give rise to a right of appeal. Any family member application that is refused because the sponsor was granted EUSS status in error also attracts a right of appeal”.
These are safeguards that the Minister said
“I hope the noble Lord will find adequate … in both these cases”.—[Official Report, 8/9/25; col. 1186.]
I regret that we do not believe they are adequate because this is not a right of appeal against the decision to allow status to lapse. It is a right of appeal against the refusal of a new application, which means that if the person concerned chooses to appeal, they are challenging a different decision, and the tribunal may well not allow the same arguments to be presented. Pre-settled status could also expire in the meantime, while awaiting appeal on the new application.
In closing, I thank the Minister for his engagement with my noble friend and myself on this issue. But, as he will appreciate from what my noble friend has said, we do not accept that the safeguards he referred to in Committee are sufficient. Therefore, we ask him, first, obviously, to accept this amendment, but if he is not willing to do so, to get the Government to reflect again and come back with a proposal that would meet these concerns.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, as indicated in Committee, we have little issue with Clause 42. If the Government believe that it is also in line with the withdrawal agreement, we do not have concerns about it standing part of the Bill.
I listened to the argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. While I understand her concerns, we are satisfied that Clause 42 does not undermine the protections for European Union, European Economic Area and Swiss nationals and their family members who have leave to enter or remain in the UK granted under the EU settlement scheme. The government amendments in this group simply alter the commencement of Clause 42 so that it comes into effect on Royal Assent. Given that we have little issue with this clause, we are satisfied that its commencement on Royal Assent is not inappropriate.
I will only ask one question of the Minister. Can he explain whether he expects Clause 42 to increase administrative burdens on the Home Office and, if so, what steps have been taken to increase administrative capacity?
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for her amendment. I assure her that there is nothing nerdy about putting amendments down in this field. As a fellow nerd on many other topics, I welcome her contribution to the debate.
The amendments, as the noble Baroness has said, are on the important issue of the discussion on the safeguards for loss of status under the EU settlement scheme. I welcome the fact that the noble Baroness, the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and I have had some meetings. I think we have got a position whereby Clause 42 is welcome. I am pleased that they welcome the addition of Clause 42, because it provides legal clarity for EU citizens and their family members with EUSS status who are in scope of the withdrawal agreement, and it is the source of their rights in the UK. I hope, therefore, that they welcome Amendments 81 and 83. These will mean that Clause 42 comes into force on the day of Royal Assent, rather than two months later as was originally planned, so that those rights are guaranteed from when the Bill receives Royal Assent. I will move those amendments in due course.
The nub of the question goes to the nub of the nerdery of the noble Baroness, which we discussed when she introduced her amendments. The EUSS is more generous than the withdrawal agreement requires. As we know, there are two cohorts of EU citizens with EUSS status: the “true” cohort, who are in scope of the agreement because they were economically active in the UK at the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020, and the “extra” cohort, who were resident in the UK at the end of the transition period but did not meet the technical requirements of free movement law. Clause 42 ensures that both cohorts will be treated equally in UK law by providing that all EU citizens and family members with EUSS status will be treated as being withdrawal agreement beneficiaries. This is a significant measure that gives legal effect to what has been the UK’s approach since the start of the EUSS.
Amendment 36 would remove subsection (2)(c). Its effect would be to confer withdrawal agreement rights in the UK on those who do not qualify for them because they do not qualify for EUSS status. Worse, it would mean that pre-settled status granted in error could not be curtailed or allowed to expire, because the withdrawal agreement does not permit rights to be lost on that basis.
The amendment would give such people unwarranted preferential treatment over those whose EUSS application was correctly refused. It would also undermine the integrity of the EUSS system by giving them the same rights in the UK as those of a pre-settled status holder who complied with requirements for that status. Those are outcomes that we cannot accept. A person whose EUSS status has been granted in error will not be in the “true” or “extra” cohort and should not benefit from Clause 42.
None the less, none of this detracts from the proper safeguards against the loss of EUSS status. The noble Baroness is right to emphasise the importance of that issue, as are the stakeholders who have been engaging with the Home Office on this point. Nothing in Clause 42 affects the withdrawal agreement-compliant appeal rights in UK law for the refusal or removal of EUSS status. There is nothing disproportionate about allowing a pre-settled status granted in error to expire after its five-year term, given that the person had no entitlement to that limited leave in the first place.
The noble Baroness and the noble Lord talked about Home Office errors. I would argue that the person will have been given every opportunity to show that their pre-settled status was granted correctly, and will have failed to do so. As with erroneous grants of limited leave in other immigration routes, our approach allows people to stay in the UK with the right to work for the remaining period of that leave.
Importantly, it is also open for the person to reapply for EUSS status, and, if refused, they will have the right of appeal. The noble Lord, Lord Oates, mentioned this. I said this to him in Committee, and I think that I have also written to him and spoken to him about it in our meetings outside the Chamber. It also applies to any family member whose application is refused because their sponsor’s EUSS status was granted in error.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for returning to this matter. I hope I have set down that those settled rights will exist under Clause 42. In the event of errors, there are rights of appeal, as well as an existing allowance to continue work in that particular period.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I understand that the government amendments in this group would place limits on the circumstances in which conditions referred to in new sub-paragraphs (vi) to (x) of Section 3(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971, as inserted by Clause 43(2), may be attached to a person’s limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. This does not require too much comment from me. This is, in my view, a tidying-up amendment which would clarify the circumstances in which these conditions can be imposed.
Clarity on this point is welcome. Can the Minister explain how the circumstances could be altered to either augment or narrow the scope of the circumstances which would come under this section? As we all know, the nature of the threats we face can change, and it is important that we do not have an unwieldy and prescriptive list to which these conditions can only be applied, although, that being said, it is imperative that this does not undermine the role of Parliament in scrutinising what comes under this section. If the Minister could update the House on how this balance will be achieved with respect to his amendments, I would be very grateful.
On Amendment 41, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, while I appreciate some of the intention behind this amendment, I cannot support it. If we want to maintain the integrity of the immigration system, we simply must ensure that those awaiting removal or further decision remain within the reach of the authorities. In short, while I understand the desire to make the system more flexible, this amendment would do so at the expense of the very oversight and accountability that make immigration bail credible and enforceable. For those reasons, I do not believe it would be wise to support it.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. The government amendments were tabled in response to requests in Committee, not just from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—who I hope to see back in her place as soon as possible—but the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and others, including Members from the Opposition Back Benches and Front Bench. I hope I can reassure the noble Lord that we have taken all those matters into account in bringing forward the amendment today.
On Amendment 41, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bach, I welcome the opportunity to discuss this issue with him outside the Chamber and get clarification on the points he is pressing me to examine. I hope that the explanation I give him now will meet his points of concern, but we will see whether that is in fact the case. We believe that the amendment, while testing the Government, is ultimately dealt with in other ways, and would make no material difference to the operation of the legislation. The Bounar case, which my noble friend mentioned, pre-dated changes to our bail accommodation guidance. The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal decision was handed down in December 2024, and the Home Office guidance was republished on 31 January 2025.
There is a key extract from the guidance that I want to read to my noble friend, so I hope the House will bear with me:
“Where an individual is not subject to a residence condition, but they are applying for accommodation under Schedule 10, they may request for their bail conditions to be varied to include a residence condition on the BAIL 409 application form. Bail conditions can be varied to include a residence condition at an address yet to be specified, where the individual does not have a residence condition imposed and a refusal of accommodation would be in breach of their Article 3 ECHR rights”.
The key point for me in that extract is that in the case of Bounar the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal found that the person could not be given bail accommodation because they did not have a bail residence condition. Although that is technically correct, I believe and hope that our guidance—and I hope this satisfies my noble friend—now makes it clear that bail can be varied to impose a residence condition that will enable a person to be granted bail conditions, where to refuse to do so would breach the person’s human rights under Article 3. The key point that I emphasise to my noble friend is that our guidance is now clear that the situation in Bounar should not arise. If the person requires a bail condition in order to prevent an Article 3 breach, we will create one rather than refusing the application, and the courts can now apply that, as our guidance makes clear.
I am genuinely grateful for the discussions that I have had had with my noble friend outside both Committee and Report. He has raised these issues with me regarding the Bounar case as recently as today, outside the Chamber, prior to Report commencing. I have tried to give him an answer based on our legal interpretation of the understanding of that case in relation to our guidance, and I hope that, with that clarification, he is able to reflect on that, if not today then later in Hansard. I am happy to have further discussions with him about the application outside the Chamber at a later date, but I hope that the explanation I have given meets the objectives in his amendment, and I ask him not to press it.
Lord Davies of Gower
“Abolition of Immigration Tribunals(1) The Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-Tier Tribunal is abolished.(2) The Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal is abolished.(3) The Transfer of Functions of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal Order 2010 is repealed.(4) In paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 omit sub-paragraphs (5) and (6).(5) The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 is amended in accordance with subsections (6) and (7).(6) In section 94—(a) omit subsection (3)(b), and(b) omit subsection (4).(7) Section 103 is repealed.(8) In section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, omit subsection (10A).(9) In section (8) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004—(a) omit subsection (7)(c), and(b) omit subsection (9A).(10) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended in accordance with subsections (16).(11) In section 36 omit subsections (3A) and (3B).(12) In Schedule 10 (immigration bail) of the Immigration Act 2016—(a) omit paragraph 1(3),(b) in paragraph 2—(i) in sub-paragraph (1) omit “or the first-tier tribunal”,(ii) omit sub-paragraphs (7) and (8),(c) in paragraph 3—(i) in sub-paragraph (1) omit “or the first-tier tribunal”,(ii) in sub-paragraph (2)(f) omit “or the first-tier tribunal”,(iii) omit sub-paragraphs (3) and (4),(iv) in sub-paragraph (5) omit “or the first-tier tribunal”,(v) omit sub-paragraph (6),(d) in paragraph 4 omit “or the first-tier tribunal.”,(e) omit paragraph 5(5),(f) in paragraph (6)—(i) omit sub-paragraphs (3), (4) and (5),(ii) in sub-paragraph (6) omit “or the first-tier tribunal”,(iii) omit sub-paragraph (7),(g) omit paragraph 7(1)(a)(ii),(h) omit paragraph 8, (i) in paragraph 10—(i) in sub-paragraph (9)(a) for “the relevant authority” substitute “the Secretary of State”,(ii) omit sub-paragraph (10),(iii) in sub-paragraphs (11), (12) and (13) for each reference to “the relevant authority” substitute “the Secretary of State”,(j) omit paragraph 11,(k) omit paragraph 12.(13) In the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 omit sections 27, 54 and 55.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would abolish the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First and Upper Tier Tribunals, so that no person can bring judicial appeal immigration and asylum decisions.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, before the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, passed by the Labour Government of Harold Wilson, there was no general right of appeal against Home Office immigration decisions. After the establishment by that Act of the system of adjudicators and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, we have had several revisions of the system of appeals. We had the Immigration Appellate Authority, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, established in 2005, and then the current asylum and immigration chamber of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal was created just five years later. With all these revisions and the litany of law that has grown out of immigration and asylum matters, we have ended up in a situation whereby the entire system is held in perpetual limbo.
The system as it stands incentivises endless appeals, procedural delays and the recycling of unfounded claims, all at the expense of the British taxpayer. We know the appeal and judicial review systems surrounding asylum and immigration cases have become a tool used by illegal migrants who should be deported to prevent their removal. There are cases where people have made repeated claims over time, covering human rights, modern slavery and asylum. These claims are often made at the last minute to prevent removal and are sometimes on completely contradictory grounds. For example, one man made a claim as an Iraqi and, when that was rejected, then made a further claim saying he was in fact Iranian. It took eight years to deport a Somali man, Yaqub Ahmed, who gang-raped a 16 year-old girl in 2008 following his release from prison. He used multiple modern slavery, human rights and asylum claims, costing taxpayers huge sums before eventually being deported in 2023.
Amendment 46 would abolish the immigration and asylum chambers of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals. This would prevent any person bringing a judicial appeal to a court or tribunal. Amendment 47 would remove the ability of any person to make an appeal to a court or tribunal in respect of an initial decision for an immigration or asylum matter. The decisions that cannot be appealed include any deportation order or removal directions; a decision to decline immigration bail; a decision to refuse asylum support; or a decision to refuse an asylum or protection claim.
The amendment includes a right of administrative review to a review board in the Home Office, which would consider initial decisions where there is an error in application of the law or rules but could not reconsider the substantive material of the decision. It would be able to overturn the initial decision if and only if it was satisfied it was made in error. The Secretary of State would have to make provisions about the review board by way of regulations subject to the negative procedure. The underlying principle here is that the judicial system should not have any role in the immigration and asylum process. As I have already stated, this used to be the norm. Instead, all reviews of any immigration decision will be decided by the review board in the Home Office.
Amendment 68 takes us to the logical conclusion: the removal of the ability to judicially review immigration decisions. The only exception here would be where the Home Secretary has acted outside their powers under the Immigration Acts. Importantly, it would not include review on the grounds of unreasonableness, proportionality, or the merits of a particular case. The current system diverts scarce resources away from those in genuine need. Every pound spent on repeat litigation is a pound not spent on border security, faster processing or refugee support. True compassion is helping the genuine and deterring abuse of the system. I beg to move.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, there cannot be any doubt that the system which has been working—if that is the right word—for some considerable time is very unsatisfactory. I think that is probably recognised by the Government and was certainly recognised by the previous Government. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, summarised the complex system that currently prevails, whereby applications are made and there are appeals and the like.
I should perhaps add that, until relatively recently, it was possible to judicially review the decision of the Upper Tribunal. The Supreme Court, in a case called Cart, had decided that, so there was yet another avenue available to those who wished to use the full possibilities inherent in the system. Parliament decided that that Supreme Court decision ought to be reversed. I declare an interest as having been chair of the Independent Review of Administrative Law. We recommended that and it was, in fact, supported by a number of judges who had sat on the decision itself. It became law, so these things are not sacrosanct.
As far as judicial review generally is concerned, I simply ask the Minister this. The ouster clause, as they tend to be described, in Amendment 68 is not a complete ouster but it is a substantial one. There was an indication in remarks that the Minister made earlier that any sort of ouster might be considered to violate the rule of law. Although there have been various obiter dicta of judges—I think in particular of the well-known case of Privacy International—suggesting that the courts could ultimately refuse to recognise an ouster clause, the Independent Review of Administrative Law took the view that Parliament was ultimately sovereign. It may or may not be a good idea to oust the courts, and that is a matter that Parliament will have to consider on the specific facts. I would very much like to know what the Government’s general view on that is.
What I want to address at this moment is the amendment in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Murray, Lord Jackson and Lord Lilley, in relation to the Human Rights Act. This Bill, entitled “Border Security”, was the Government’s first response to the various attempts by previous Governments to cope with illegal migration. The opposition to the various Bills that went through this House was firm, but I was never quite clear what the policy was on the part of the Labour Party. Ultimately, it came down to the idea that the Government would crack down on the smuggler gangs. The word “crackdown” came often into the debates, and the future Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, was held out as being just the man to crack down because of his experience as the Director of Public Prosecutions. Now, I yield to no one in my admiration for his discharge of that role, but I was always somewhat confused by the idea that someone who was in charge of macro decision-making as the Director of Public Prosecutions was in some way fitted to crack down on smuggler gangs.
The crackdown was apparently to start straight away when the Government came into power some 15 months ago, but I think it is fair to say that it has not been a success. We can see the figures, and I do not wish to weary the House with what those figures are. The Bill, which in some ways is uncontroversial, gives a little extra power to allow that crackdown to take place, but what we really have here is a complete vacuum of policy on the part of the Government. We know they did not like the Rwanda scheme, but what is to replace it? The position of those who opposed the previous Government was that we could not do anything to in any way amend the ECHR or the Human Rights Act, both of which obviously play a significant part in the whole process of gaining asylum, and anyone who suggested as much was considered almost to be in the headbanger category.
Things have moved on a bit, and a number of senior Labour figures are saying that we really need to think again about the ECHR. Indeed, I think 17 nations, members of the Council of Europe, are considering trying to do something about the ECHR in view of the fact that so many European countries do not find it to be working satisfactorily. When the Attorney-General, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, gave evidence before a committee, he said that that might take as much as 10 years, but this is an emergency, and I am sure the Government will acknowledge that.
As for the amendment of the Human Rights Act, when I asked the Minister in Committee, he confirmed that there was no way in which there would be any amendment of the Human Rights Act—I have on me what he said in Hansard—nor would there be any deviation from the ECHR. That begs the question as to what is going to happen. What is going to fill the policy vacuum? The previous Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, made some noises to the effect that the situation was far from satisfactory and something needed to be done, and her successor, Shabana Mahmood, has said that nothing is off the table. We know that nothing is off the table but we are entirely unclear as to what is on it, and it really is time that we knew.
I can remind the noble Lord that he said in Committee, on 13 October:
“I hope to assure the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that we will legislate to reform our approach to the application of Article 8 in the immigration system so that fewer cases are treated as exceptional. We will set out how and when someone can make a claim. We are also reviewing the application of Article 3”.—[Official Report, 13/10/25; col. 132.]
How is that going to happen? Apparently there is going to be no amendment of the HRA and any changes to the ECHR are in the far distant future, yet he said to the Committee that there was going to be legislation. The only form of legislation that seems to be at all possible is some form of legislation that says that these decisions are not satisfactory and so the approach has got to be changed—in other words, guidance to judges. I am concerned about that, as it would be interference with judicial independence. The Government ought to have the courage, if they think the law is wrong, to change it. The Human Rights Act is a domestic statute and can be amended.
I come with help, I hope. The amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Murray, Lord Jackson and Lord Lilley, provides for the suspension of the Human Rights Act in the face of this emergency. It is a domestic statute, and the powers of the Government enable them to do that if necessary. It may be that that will at least help. I do not pretend that changes to the Human Rights Act are the complete answer to the almost intractable problem that we face, but it is a very real suggestion. It is contained in the amendment and I suggest that the Government should take it seriously.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let me phrase it this way: the Government will always bring before the House, in the form of a Statement, matters on which we intend to provide policy changes. When we are in a position to make further policy announcements in this area, there will undoubtedly be a Statement in the House of Commons and in this House that Members can question and examine in detail. That Statement may include signalling for legislation; the two things are not incompatible. I know I said this in September and I have said it again today, but that is the direction of travel, and when we are in a position to make clear the policy direction the Government wish to take for public scrutiny, we will make that Statement and bring forward proposals accordingly. I hope that satisfies the noble Lord.
I cannot agree to the amendments, and I hope that Members will not press them. I hope too that, if nothing else, the case I have made today on Report is as clear as I can make it in the circumstances.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been an important and interesting debate. I rather suspected that the Liberal Democrats and the Government would decline to support these amendments. I am aware of some of the concerns noble Lords have. I listened very carefully to what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, had to say, but the public want us to end illegal migration via small boat crossings. They want us to deport illegal entrants. Ending the legal logjam of endless appeals is crucial to giving the Government the ability to get a grip on this border crisis. If the Government are too weak to act, then I submit that we will have to try to force them to. On that basis, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Davies of Gower
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the rebuttable presumptions in new subsections (5ZA) inserted into section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so that a refugee convicted of a sexual offence would be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime for the purposes of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, therefore permitting their deportation.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, in Committee, my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel raised the reinsertion of the rebuttable presumption into Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. As he explained, that section contains our domestic interpretation of Article 33 of the refugee convention. The article relates to the refoulement of refugees, and states that a refugee can be returned to their home country if they are
“convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime”
and constitute
“a danger to the community”.
Initially, Section 72 contained two sets of presumptions that could be rebutted in court: first, that the refugee in question is presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime; and, secondly, that they are presumed to constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 removed the first rebuttable presumption, owing to ambiguity surrounding which elements of that test an individual could rebut. The Act clarified that the only rebuttable presumption is the presumption that a person constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom.
Clause 48 of the Bill seeks to alter the definition of “particularly serious crime” for the purposes of Article 33(2). It includes an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. However, the inserted subsections (5ZA) and (5ZB) state:
“A person is to be presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if”—
thereby reintroducing the rebuttable presumption that was removed by the 2022 Act.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, the Government are committed to complying with their international obligations, including those set out in the refugee convention. A key principle of the refugee convention is the non-refoulement of refugees to a place or territory where there is a real risk that they will be subject to persecution. However, the convention, as we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord German, recognises that there must be limited exceptions to this principle. Article 33(2) of the convention allows the refoulement refugees when they are a danger to the security of the UK or have committed a particularly serious crime and, as a result, constitute a danger to the community.
Clause 48 goes further than previous amendments made by the Nationality and Borders Act by redefining the term “particularly serious crime” for exclusion purposes to now include individuals who have received a conviction for a sexual offence, including under Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. That is because the Government recognise the devastating impact of sexual violence on victims and our communities and are fully committed to tackling sexual offences and halving violence against women and girls in a decade.
Importantly, as it stands, Clause 48 allows an individual to rebut the presumptions both that they have committed a particularly serious crime and that, as a result, they constitute a danger to the community. Amendment 48, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to remove the “particularly serious” rebuttable presumption. This would mean that asylum seekers or refugees who receive convictions for Schedule 3 sex offences would be considered for exclusion from the refugee convention, with no ability to rebut the presumption that they have committed a particularly serious crime.
Similarly, Amendment 49 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to remove the same rebuttable presumption for sexual offenders convicted outside of the United Kingdom where that offence would have also constituted a Schedule 3 sexual offence had it been committed in the UK.
The noble Lord’s Amendments 50 to 54 inclusive seek to make a number of changes to the provision, including removing the presumption that, where an individual is considered to have committed a “particularly serious crime” in relation to a Schedule 3 sex offence, they constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom as a result. There is no definition of a “particularly serious crime” in the refugee convention and no direct uniformity in the interpretation adopted by other state parties. It is open to the UK to interpret the term in good faith, and that is what we are seeking to adjust with Clause 48. A good-faith interpretation, in our view, requires consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words and respecting the guarantees provided by the convention as a whole. I hope that I am not going too far when I say that the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord German, reflects that we have the balance right in what we are trying to do with Clause 48.
The rebuttable presumption mechanism provides a safeguard for individual offenders to rebut based on their individual circumstances. However, at the same time, it is important to note that Parliament has presumed such offences will be considered particularly serious crimes for these purposes. Not only have those who receive convictions for Schedule 3 sex offences failed to respect the laws of the UK by committing heinous acts, but they have also undermined public confidence in the ability of the state to protect the public. But this measure is limited by our obligations under the convention. Both the rebuttable presumptions must remain as a practical measure to ensure that we adopt a lawful approach. We contend that the Government, in proposing Clause 48, have the balance right. For that reason, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I regret that the Government have not listened to the arguments advanced here. Clause 48 will complicate this area of law by reintroducing the confusion that was cleared up by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. No noble Lord raised any issue with that change at the time, so there is no reason to be reintroducing the rebuttable presumption. It is surely farcical that convictions for sexual offences could be argued to be not particularly serious crimes, when no other offence could be so argued. This seems like a case of intransigence on the part of the Government and a denial of the clear error they have made. As disappointing as this is, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, it falls to me to say thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for taking this so far. I have had the temerity—he knows I have said this to him privately—to say that he probably ranks in this Chamber as a national treasure. That is because—I know he will not like it—if you have had his experiences and you have devoted your life to ensuring that the chance that you have had in life is given to others, you cannot fail to support this amendment. It is absolutely fundamental that children should have the right to be with their parents, and it is fundamental that we are currently denying them that opportunity. This amendment is so tightly written and so tightly executed that it is not going to take a large number of people: it is not going to take huge numbers from all over the world, it is a small number of children.
Those of us who have been on the beaches and in the background in Calais and Dunkirk know that children sometimes find themselves there in the most appalling circumstances. What are you to do as a parent if you have a child whom you cannot get to come to you? That is the most terrible thing you could possibly imagine to impose on parents. So I have no doubt that the empathy of this House is not just for the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, but the causes he has put forward and this very tight amendment. It deserves the support of all sides of this Parliament and I hope the noble Lord will put it to a vote so we can all vote for it.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it is not that there are no means to enter the country, nor that families are being involuntarily separated at the French border; it is that we continue to allow unfettered and illegal entrance to the country and offer the amenities that make separating from one’s family a worthwhile choice for some. So, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for whom I have enormous regard, I submit that the amendment perhaps does nothing to solve these issues.
I understand that, in attempting to provide a legal route for asylum-seeking children to reunite with their families, the noble Lord’s intentions are well-meaning and indeed magnanimous. In practice, however, I suggest that his amendment might well cause even more issues with the asylum system and that more families would be split up. Those considering crossing the channel and illegally entering our country would be even more emboldened to do so if they were given the impression that having to part ways with their children would be a temporary measure. There is a great risk that more parents would board small boats, making the dangerous and sometimes fatal channel crossing. Their children, left behind with the promise of a future reunion, would be left exposed to the dangerous gangs that control the people-trafficking operations into this country.
To solve the issue of separated families, we must focus on what we can control. It is not in our power to force the migrants in France to remain with their families, but we can show them that the journey over here is not worth the risk, by taking away the luxuries offered on arrival, denying asylum claims after illegal entering and making it clear that, should you choose to leave your family, it is not the British state’s responsibility to reunite. These are clear and effective ways to solve the crisis. Unfortunately, this amendment incentivises the first set of prospects. It would fundamentally worsen the asylum crisis and, as such, I submit, it is not well judged.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Dubsfor tabling the amendment and for bringing to it not just his passion on this issue but his personal experience. I cannot imagine how my noble friend faced these issues as a child himself and I fully understand, and hope have empathy with, the driving motivation that he has brought to the House today.
The noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, Lord Arbuthnot, Lord Wigley and Lord German, the noble and learned Baroness, |Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friends Lady Lister and Lord Berkeley, all spoke in support. However, I find myself, along with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, being a voice that will have to test my noble friend’s aspirations in this amendment and try to offer him a way through that understands the issues he has raised, at the same time as putting down the policy that the Government seek to have this House endorse in relation to the Bill.
The amendment, in effect, seeks to significantly expand the qualifying relationship eligibility for family reunion and make redundant the appendix child-relative policy by removing all current financial requirements on accommodation, maintenance, the immigration health surcharge and application fees, as well as the current exceptionality test of that route. My noble friend’s amendment would seek to ensure that the asylum-seeking children include children
“under the age of 18 … the child, sibling, half-sibling, niece, nephew, grandchild, or stepchild of the person granted protection status”.
I make it clear to the whole House that the Government firmly uphold the principle of family unity, especially for vulnerable children. Self-evidently, we have to recognise that families can become fragmented because of the nature of conflict and persecution, and because of the speed and manner in which those seeking asylum are often forced to flee their country.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, I find myself in the unusual position of supporting this amendment, in the interests of transparency in the matters that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, raised.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for Amendment 56, which would ensure that judgments from the First-tier Tribunal immigration and asylum chamber are published. It is not enough that justice is done; it must be seen to be done. This amendment goes to the heart of that principle. Decisions taken in the immigration and asylum chamber affect people’s lives in the most profound way. It is therefore essential that those decisions are open to scrutiny and that the reasoning behind them can be examined by the public, Parliament and the press. Transparency is the cornerstone of public confidence in our legal system. Where judgments are hidden, mistrust grows. There have been too many occasions where controversial or apparently inconsistent rulings have circulated in the media without the full facts being available.
That lack of visibility risks undermining both the independence of our tribunals and the confidence of the public in their fairness. Publishing these judgments will help improve public understanding of how decisions are made and the principle that underpins them. Importantly, this amendment is carefully drafted; it includes clear safeguards to allow for anonymity when necessary. Personal details and sensitive information can and should be protected, particularly when disclosure might endanger an applicant or compromise ongoing proceedings. The amendment strikes the right balance between transparency and privacy. It is only right that the public should be able to see how the law is being applied in their name, especially in an area that attracts so much public attention and debate. By opening up this process to proper scrutiny, we strengthen accountability and trust in the system.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 70 and 85 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who is not with us today for reasons I explained earlier. We listened to what was said in Committee and this amendment mirrors what was placed on the agenda then. But, in tabling this amendment, we have made some changes, one of which is the need for biometrics to be taken prior to travel, and the amendment also proposes a capped scheme to control numbers and an initial pilot of 12 months minimum in order to have the opportunity to evaluate it.
To try to explain this scheme, which is basically about a legal route into the United Kingdom, I will just refer to the United States. A similar scheme to the one we are proposing—not exactly the same, but similar—was instituted there, and the US Government were able to reduce illegal border crossings from Mexico across the US border by 77% between December 2023 and August 2024: that is, in nine months.
It was achieved through a three-pronged approach, one of which was, of course, diplomatic efforts to make sure that there was a strong ability to manage the system in the countries where people started, and also then taking a tough approach to the irregular border crossings, significantly reducing the chance of successfully claiming asylum for those arriving without permission, and a substantial official scheme through which people could apply to come to the country. That is the bit that, of course, the humanitarian travel permit relates to.
The result in the United States was that it simply was not worth the expense of paying the smugglers any more and it undermined their business entirely. That is because you cannot look at just one side of the demand-supply equation. The demand is being met by the smugglers, and we have to touch both sides. Without a form of legal route, you will not get that demand reduced.
I will try to explain it very straightforwardly. In the United Kingdom, we put up with queues. We may not like them, but we follow, if there is a queue, in a proper and orderly manner—mostly. If somebody pushes in, either they do not get served when they get to the front, or they get sent to the back of the queue. This scheme means to do exactly that—to provide a scheme where there is a queue in which people can come to the United Kingdom. If you decide to jump the queue by taking the smugglers route, you get put to the back of the queue again.
That means, of course, that you have to have a quota attached to the scheme, and because the law in this country says that you cannot make a claim for asylum unless you are here, you have to have a travel permit in order to come here. But that would be controlled right back at the beginning of the journey. If you have paid a slab of money to a smuggler back in Egypt or Libya, you are certainly not going to be put off when you get to the end of the route. It is certainly the case that you need to tackle this right back at the beginning. This whole scheme is about trying to create a legal route and being tough on anyone who tries to jump the queue by coming in irregularly and moving them to the back of the queue.
It does not matter if the queue is not moving very quickly; what matters is that it is moving. It is surprising that people will be prepared to wait, as they did in the United States, where, in the case of Haiti, instead of 10,000 people turning up at the US border, it was just a handful every month. That is because people said, “It’s not worth my while doing that”. They saw that joining the queue meant that at some stage they would get to the front of that queue.
It works much better, of course, if you are doing it with other countries as well, because you can collectively create these routes, which can be dealt with in a very efficient way. That way, we control the borders. That is what this is about. It is a different sort of approach from what is suggested by putting your hands up and saying, “You can’t get in”, and “We’ll stop you in every way possible”, and all that stuff. That did not work.
It may be that, in time, the pressures to try to deal with this across the channel may well work in reducing the numbers. But we are looking at changing the whole model so that the smugglers’ model does not work. It has been tried and tested. That is why, if we are going to use this in a European context, it is important that it is done with a capped model, with one particular country perhaps, and certainly for 12 months, so that we can find out whether we can make this work here in Europe as well.
This system, this scheme, is one that is designed to provide safe routes and to take away the business of the smugglers. It will not solve it all, but if it reduces it by 77%, as was the case in the United States of America, it is certainly worth doing.
That is what this amendment is about. The other amendment, with which it is associated, is simply to create a pilot scheme with a capped number of people in it. I hope that we will consider this when we come back to it later in this debate.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have brought forward this group of amendments concerning safe and legal routes and humanitarian travel permits. We recognise the compassion and concern that underpin these proposals. We cannot dispute that the United Kingdom has played its part in providing refuge to those fleeing war and persecution, but it is important to remind the House that the United Kingdom has a proud record of providing such safe and legal routes, which have brought many people to safety without the need to undertake dangerous journeys or place themselves in the hands of criminal gangs.
Through the Hong Kong British national (overseas) visa route, we have offered a secure and permanent home to those with whom we share deep historical ties. More than 180,000 people from Hong Kong have already come to the United Kingdom under this route, one of the most generous immigration offers in our nation’s history. Likewise, our Ukrainian family scheme and Homes for Ukraine programme have provided sanctuary to more than 200,000 people since 2022. Those fleeing Putin’s brutal invasion have found not just safety but welcome and support in communities across our country. In addition, our resettlement programmes for those affected by the conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan remain among the largest of their kind anywhere in Europe. The UK has resettled more than 25,000 vulnerable people through the Syrian scheme and continues to support Afghans who served alongside our forces.
The United Kingdom has therefore demonstrated through actions, not just words, that we are willing to provide safe, legal and managed routes for those in need. What we must now avoid is creating parallel systems that risk undermining the integrity of our immigration framework or diverting resources from routes that are already working effectively. Britain has done and continues to do its part. Our focus must remain on maintaining fairness, control and compassion in our asylum system, ensuring that help is targeted where it is most needed and delivered through routes that are safe, sustainable and properly managed.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all contributors to this debate. I am acutely conscious that I stand between noble Lords and the Recess—rather a short Recess, as it happens, but nevertheless. Before I make my remarks, I want to say that it is a pleasure to see the noble Lord, Lord Alton, back in his place. I thought he sounded on pretty good form, but if he is not fully back to top form, I hope he soon will be.
Amendment 61 deals with the Ukrainian scheme. I hope that everyone in your Lordships’ House knows that the UK remains unwavering in its support for the people of Ukraine and the scheme that we have in place. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, asked us to look again, and we have done that. Our commitment to the scheme is demonstrated by the Government’s recent 24-month extension to the Ukraine permission extension scheme, providing clarity and reassurance to Ukrainians living in the UK under the visa scheme. However, from the outset the Government have maintained— I think everybody knows this, not just in your Lordships’ House but in the country more widely—that these schemes are temporary and do not provide a direct route to settlement. They reflect a generous and meaningful commitment to support those displaced by the conflict, and they have been widely supported throughout the country. The Ukrainian Government share with us a strong desire for their citizens to return and contribute to Ukraine’s future recovery.
On Amendments 70 and 85, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, let me reaffirm, as acknowledged by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, the United Kingdom’s proud record of offering sanctuary to those fleeing war, persecution and oppression around the world. We have a strong history of protecting people in those situations. The UK operates global safe and legal routes for refugees, including the UK resettlement scheme in partnership with the UN Refugee Agency, the UNHCR.
However, there is no provision within our Immigration Rules for someone to be allowed to travel to the UK to seek asylum. While we sympathise with people in many difficult situations around the world, we could not possibly consider a scheme that accepts applications from large numbers of individuals overseas. I hope the noble Lord, Lord German, will forgive me for not commenting on the situation in the United States. Those who need international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. Safe and legal routes are nevertheless an important part of the Government’s wider strategy to restore control over the immigration system. The immigration White Paper published in May 2025 announced a review of refugee sponsorship and resettlement, and further details will be set out in due course.
Amendment 70 includes a provision that relates to biometrics. Biometrics, in the form of fingerprints and facial images, underpin the current UK immigration system to support identity assurance and suitability checks on foreign nationals who are subject to immigration control. They enable us to pay comprehensive checks against immigration and criminal records to help identify those who pose a threat to our national security, public safety or immigration controls, or who are likely to breach our laws if they are allowed to come to the UK.
Huntingdon Train Attack
Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
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Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I express heartfelt sympathies from these Benches to all those injured in this horrifying attack, to their families and to everyone else affected. I also join others in paying tribute to the British Transport Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, Cambridgeshire Fire and Rescue Service, and the East of England Ambulance Service. Their swift response, arriving within eight minutes of the first 999 call, brought an end to the violence and no doubt saved lives.
Above all, I acknowledge the astonishing bravery of the passengers and crew aboard the train. I pay particular tribute to Samir Zitouni, a man who, in an effort to protect others, ran towards the attacker and now remains critically injured in hospital. He went to work that day to serve the public. He has become a hero to the nation, and we wish him a full and speedy recovery.
It now appears that the individual charged, Anthony Williams, may have been connected to three prior knife incidents, including the stabbing of a 14 year-old in Peterborough. The Home Secretary rightly said that while investigations are ongoing she cannot comment on those events. When the case concludes, it is vital that a full account is given of what was known, when and by whom. Only through transparency can lessons be learned to prevent such atrocities occurring again.
The Home Secretary also noted that knife crime has fallen in recent years; that progress is very welcome. It is not my intention to politicise this tragedy, but I will make a couple of observations as more can and must be done. If the Government are to make good on their manifesto promise to halve knife crime by 2030, they must take a tougher stance against those who carry and use knives.
When the Crime and Policing Bill was before the other place, my colleagues tabled an amendment to raise the maximum sentence for the possession of a bladed weapon with intent to commit violence from four to 14 years. Disappointingly, the Government opposed that measure. As the Bill comes through this Chamber, I hope that noble Lords will reconsider. There can be no ambiguity: those who carry and use knives should face serious custodial sentences.
Equally, there is a widespread concern that the forthcoming Sentencing Bill risks moving in the opposite direction. The prospect of offenders being released earlier—or, in some cases, not serving their sentences in custody at all—sends the wrong message to dangerous criminals. The public are entitled to expect that those who commit violent crimes are punished proportionately and that justice is served.
On these Benches, we welcome the Home Secretary’s openness to using technology to innovate in how knife crime is tackled, such as through knife detection scanning and live facial recognition. Both have shown promise in identifying dangerous individuals and intercepting weapons. We hope that the Government can roll out live facial recognition technology at pace and that it will not be unduly delayed by further consultations. It is particularly needed in high-crime areas, many of which are centred around transport hubs.
The Government must also ramp up the use of stop and search. The former Metropolitan Police chief scientific officer found that increasing stop and search in London to 2011 levels would reduce knife homicides by around a third. I can personally vouch for the effectiveness of stop and search. When used intelligently and fairly, it saves lives. That is why the Conservatives sought to amend the Crime and Policing Bill to lower its threshold, but this was once again opposed by the Government. The police must have the powers to act decisively when intelligence suggests that lives are risk.
This country has witnessed too many tragedies of this kind. Each incident compels us to ask the same question: what more could have been done? When the investigation concludes, the Government must ensure that every department—whether it be the police, transport or probation—examines its role and translates the lessons into action, not just reports. We on these Benches welcome the Home Secretary’s commitment to halving knife crime, but words alone are not enough. It will require robust sentencing, an expansion of policing powers, and investment in technology. It will require the political courage to act decisively in the interests of public safety.
In the aftermath of this horrific attack, we have seen both the worst and the best of humanity. So, in closing, I say to the Minister: we owe it to the Huntingdon victims and to every victim of knife crime to ensure that this tragedy is a turning point, so that the public can have faith that our law enforcement and justice systems are well equipped to protect our streets and deliver justice.
Extradition Act 2003 (Amendment to Designations) Order 2025
Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts(3 weeks ago)
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Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for their contributions. While we on this side do not believe a regret amendment is necessary, I thank her for bringing to light the plight of Hong Kongers. As has already been mentioned, the case of Jimmy Lai ever serves as a reminder of how people’s freedoms continue to be curtailed.
The removal of Zimbabwe from the Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 Territories) Order 2003 is certainly not controversial. It unfortunately left the Commonwealth in 2003, and as such has not been party to the London scheme for extradition in the Commonwealth since that date. As the Minister has already quite correctly mentioned, the fact that Zimbabwe has not since been de-designated represents nothing more than an oversight, and it is right that the Government are correcting that. Similarly, it is welcome that the Government are designating Chile in this order, following their accession to the 1957 extradition convention.
The final change—the change targeted in the Liberal Democrats’ regret amendment—is the removal of Hong Kong from Article 2 of the 2003 order. This reflects the fact that we suspended our extradition treaty with Hong Kong in 2020 following the national security law and the crackdown on pro-democracy activists by the authoritarian communist regime in China. Since the treaty is suspended, there is currently no formal framework for extradition between the UK and Hong Kong, and that is right: we should not be under an obligation to extradite anyone to a state with the kind of repressive laws we now see in place in Hong Kong. The removal of the designation does not represent any change in our policy, therefore; it simply formalises the position that there is now no extradition treaty in force between the UK and Hong Kong. I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that the rights of Hong Kongers must be protected, but I do not believe this draft order will do anything to detriment them. They will not be at any more risk of extradition than before.
I have one question for the Minister. Give that Hong Kong will now be treated the same as all other non-treaty states under the Extradition Act, requests will be made and assessed on a case-by-case basis. I am grateful for the Minister’s comments in his opening remarks, but I ask again: can the Government absolutely assure the House that they will not co-operate with the authorities in Hong Kong regarding the extradition of Hong Kongers, so that we are never complicit in the subjugation of Hong Kongers by the Chinese Communist Party?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the very broad support that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has given for the order. Essentially, the speakers today have agreed that the measures regarding Zimbabwe and Chile are necessary, right and proper; the only queries we have had relate to Hong Kong, so I will park Chile and Zimbabwe and concentrate precisely on Hong Kong in winding up.
I hope I have given the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, a very clear assurance in my opening remarks, but, for the avoidance of doubt, this instrument does not place any new obligations on the UK Government to seek extradition from these countries or, indeed, to accept extradition from them, particularly in relation to Hong Kong. It also does not change any of the powers available to the UK courts to consider any extradition request on its individual merits; it does not impact on the power of UK judges to bar extradition; and, particularly in relation to Hong Kong, it does not revive the suspended treaty, and nor does it create any new powers. On the contrary, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, recognised, it formally recognises the suspension by removing Hong Kong’s designation under the Extradition Act 2003.
On the specific question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, requests will be considered on a case-by-case basis. I cannot guarantee that no extradition will ever take place, for the reasons we have said, but it will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis and will not be automatic. We remain steadfast in our commitment to protecting those who have sought refuge here; importantly, no individual will be extradited where there is a risk of persecution. I hope that satisfies the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.
The British national (overseas) route for Hong Kongers is a historic and moral commitment. Those with BNO status and their eligible family members can apply to come to the UK. Since that route has opened, close to 225,000 visas have been granted to Hong Kongers.
I hope that today’s debate and the comments I have made give reassurance. If I may, I will take away the detailed questions the noble Baroness has asked, but I hope that that is a general reassurance. I will also look at what we can do over and above this debate to ensure that we give notice of the impact of all three orders, so that that is widely known by those who may be impacted, and that some reassurance is given.
Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill
Lord Davies of Gower ExcerptsTuesday 28th October 2025
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 View all Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 136-I(b) Amendment for Report (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (28 Oct 2025)
Lord Davies of Gower
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open our first few hours of debate on Report. Noble Lords who have taken an interest in the Bill throughout our deliberations so far may recognise Amendments 1 and 2. At both Second Reading and in Committee, I said that this new commander was little more than a gimmick. I had hoped that, come Report, I would have heard more persuasive reasons to change my opinion of the Government’s policy. Unfortunately, I have not.
Since we finished Committee on the Bill, 589 people have entered the United Kingdom illegally via small boats. Since the start of this year, 36,954 migrants have crossed the channel. It does not take a genius to figure out that this Government’s policies are not working. The Government entered office with a promise to “smash the gangs”, end the use of hotel accommodation and prevent illegal crossings. They have done none of those things. In fact, the problems have exacerbated.
My Amendments 1 and 2 seek to make minor changes to the method of appointment of the commander. In my opinion, this is an important and strategic role. I will not pretend they are seismic alterations that will shift the dial demonstrably. They are, nevertheless, intended to make an important point that I genuinely hope the Government will take on board.
The point is that the whole of Chapter 1 of the Bill is essentially pointless. The commander is already in post and the Bill provides no substantive new powers. In Committee, when asked by my noble friend Lord Goschen what the commander will be able to do under the provisions of the Bill provisions that his office cannot do already, the Minister said:
“The clauses in Chapter 1—for example, ‘Duty to prepare annual reports’, ‘Duties of cooperation etc’ and ‘The Board’ overseeing all that—underpinned by statutory function give this House the confidence that there is a legislative background to those requirements”.—[Official Report, 26/6/25; col. 395.]
So it appears the Government believe that designating a civil servant as a commander and granting them the ability to prepare a report and to chair a board meeting every now and then is the solution to all our border security woes.
Noble Lords will be aware of the report into the operation of the Civil Service within the Home Office. How can we have faith that another civil servant in post as the commander would make any difference? Amendments 1 and 2 are intended to press the point that the commander, if their appointment is ever to be anything more than pure performance politics, needs to be more than simply a civil servant. It is wise, is it not, to have a guarantee in the Bill that the commander will be a senior law enforcement or military officer, so as to ensure the requisite competence, leadership and experience is brought to the role.
I have one question for the Minister. Earlier this year, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration investigated the Home Office’s operation to deter and detect clandestine entrance to the UK. The first recommendation of the independent inspector was to:
“Designate a Home Office-wide ‘owner’ for clandestine entry”.
In the Government’s response, the Home Office agreed with that recommendation and said that the
“Border Security Command … will ultimately provide the structure to support this role”.
However, it said that it will not implement that recommendation until October 2026. We have a Border Security Commander who the Government tell us is critical to co-ordinating our response to threats to border security, and yet they are not willing to make him responsible for tackling all methods of clandestine entry until next year. Why is this?
Does this not demonstrate the issue with this Government’s approach to the problem? Every can must be kicked down a very long and winding road. Why not designate the commander as the Home Office-wide “owner” for clandestine entry now? Why wait until next year? It is unfortunate, and we on these Benches will be pushing the Government to go much further over the course of Report. The British public want this border crisis solved, and they are watching. I beg to move.
Lord Swire (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Davies in his amendments. They seem to me to be eminently sensible. I wholly concur with him, as do most people increasingly in the country, that there is no sense of urgency, no sense of grip and a total lack of confidence when it comes to the Government’s handling of the immigration crisis.
The appointment of a Border Security Commander, and limiting that appointment to a civil servant, is a mistake, particularly when we look at other civil servants. When I was a Minister, I had excellent civil servants, and I have nothing to say against them. The great majority of them do an extremely good job. But when we have Joanna Rowland, the Home Office’s director-general for customer services, in charge of accommodating asylum seekers, standing down because of the failure of that, why should we have faith that someone just selected from the Civil Service should be appropriate to fulfil this role?
We are missing a huge mistake in this whole immigration debate. There is a huge backlog in the processing of asylum cases. Why have the Government not come forward with an idea of having an equivalent to Nightingale hospitals, which is what we had during the Covid pandemic, to process this? In my opinion, there is a whole raft of professionals in this country who are retired far too early. We in this House are the last vestiges of people who never retire, but there are an awful lot of people in this House who have retired, or been forced to retire, from their professions—be they judges, solicitors, army officers from the military or magistrates—who would willingly serve, if encouraged to do so, on a series of tribunals up and down the country, so as to better process the backlog in immigration cases.
If you look at the appointment of this incredibly important role, the Border Security Commander is in charge of liaising with Border Force, the National Crime Agency, the Immigration Service and Immigration Enforcement, and the goal is to deliver a safe and effective border. That has not happened to date. I just do not understand the rationale behind why this legislation is limiting the appointment of such a person, with the very narrow criteria that it has, to a civil servant. There must be plenty of other people out there who would be qualified to do this job who are not necessarily from the Civil Service.
I urge the Government to underline the sense of crisis there is in this country. It is benefiting parties and groups in this country that we would rather it did not, because there is a feeling up and down the country that the Government simply have not got control of our borders. There are those who may argue that the appointment of this individual is totemic, that they do not have sufficient power and that the powers will not kick in until later. Those are other arguments. My argument is that, if we have a national crisis which is set to get only worse, we should look at the whole cadre of recently retired professionals who would step up to serve, right across the board, in dealing with the backlog and this immigration crisis. We should look at the best candidates available to fulfil this particular job and not limit it to somebody from the Civil Service.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
By his own admission, the noble Lord did not attend Committee. It is the pity that he did not, because he could have raised some of these questions then. If he chooses to raise them now, on Report, I will give him the same answer. The Border Security Commander is working closely with the security services, and they have authorisation directly from the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary. Quite evidently, when they—or in this case he—are drawing up a plan to examine what needs to be done to solve the common issue of reducing small boat crossings, bringing criminals to justice and helping to speed up the asylum removals that the noble Lord, Lord Swire, referred to, then they are going to discuss and work with the security services. I am straying into a Committee-type session, which the noble Lord did not attend. I would rather stick to Report, which the noble Lord has attended. I think I have answered the questions that he has put before the House.
Turning to Amendment 26, if we return to the position we were in in 2016—which the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and noble Lord, Lord German, would have wished we maintained—we would still be a member of Europol. On a personal note, when I was a Member of the House of Commons, in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 I argued that we retain the capability of Europol and CIS as part of the EU-UK withdrawal agreement. That did not happen. But it is important that we ensure, post-Brexit agreement, that we have as close co-operation as possible with Europol on information gathering and criminal justice delivery capabilities—which the noble Lord and the noble Baroness mentioned. That is important. As we said in Committee, we have a strong existing relationship with Europol. We have around 20 permanent members of staff who work at the multi-agency liaison bureau at the agency’s headquarters in The Hague. The noble Lord asked whether we should have some Europol people here. We currently do not. That is a matter for discussion. Where we are now may be a matter for regret. I voted to remain, but we are where we are. Europol remains an independent organisation. It is accountable to the members of the European Union, and it produces its report to the European Union.
I say to the noble Baroness, and to the noble Lord who supports her, that the proposed new clause in her amendment would require reporting on all aspects of our co-operation with Europol. Ministers, including me, will regularly update Parliament on international law enforcement co-operation, including with Europol. We publish annual minutes of UK-EU specialised committees that monitor and review our trade agreements, including with Europol.
I am mindful that Europol is not a UK body. It answers to the European Commission and its member states, so bilateral co-operation may sometimes be something that we cannot publicly report on. It is not for us to report on some of the issues with Europol, because that is what Europol does. As the noble Baroness mentioned, once upon a time, in days gone by, we did have a British senior official leading Europol. That has changed; we are in a different world now. I assure her that the focus remains on disrupting organised crime, protecting vulnerable people, securing our borders and working in co-operation with Europol to achieve those objectives. To go back to the role of the Border Security Commander, one of his key roles is to oil the machinery of that operation, and work with colleagues who are directly operationally responsible, to make sure that we engender co-operation at a European level.
I therefore respectfully say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that Amendments 1 and 2 are not necessary, and I ask him not to press them. Amendment 26, from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is asking for things that we do not need to do, because we in this House are, in a sense, accountable for that relationship. I cannot report on all matters, but I get the spirit of what she is trying to say. On behalf of the UK Government, I want to have the closest co-operation possible with Europol and the European agencies, because we have a joint interest in tackling the criminal gangs and stopping individuals being exploited in those crossings.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this has been a short but useful debate. I thank all those who have participated.
I will say a few words on Amendment 26, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. In addition to the noble Baroness’s comments, I would say that we should be co-ordinating with our European allies on tackling the border crisis in any case. We need to stem the flow of illegal migration through Europe and across the channel, and to disrupt the criminal gangs that operate the smuggling network. However, we should be careful not to see this as some form of silver bullet. The problem cannot be solved simply by striking agreements with other European countries. We know the limited impact that the Government’s so-called “one in, one out” deal has had.
There is so much more that the Government could and should be doing to tackle the fully blown crisis at our border. They need to eliminate the pull factors and implement an effective deterrent. We had hoped the Government would take a long, hard look at their current policy, implement a serious and credible deterrent to prevent people crossing the channel in small boats, and present us with a commander with authority, rather than a commander with nothing to command. Evidently, that is not the case. We will watch very carefully and scrutinise the role of the commander. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the Minister for tabling these amendments. I say at the outset that I am content with the government amendments in this group, but perhaps a little less so with the noble Baroness’s.
Amendments 7 and 12 would create gaps in the new offences that would be susceptible to abuse. Those who enter the United Kingdom without valid leave to enter are committing an offence. Those who handle articles which are to be used to facilitate a person’s unlawful entry, contrary to Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, will be committing an offence. That is right, but the exception created by Amendment 7 would mean that a person entering the country illegally could not themselves be found criminally liable for the handling of such articles. If that person intends to use that article themselves to enter illegally, I cannot possibly see why they should be excluded from the commission of the new offence in Clause 14.
Amendment 12 raises a question about the “reasonable excuse” defence under Clause 16 and whether it would extend to those carrying out legitimate legal services. I am sure that the Government have no intention of criminalising legitimate legal activity but, at the same time, we know all too well that there is an army of lawyers working for so-called human rights charities and non-governmental organisations who indeed seek to use ever more ingenious legal methods to circumvent legitimate deportations and removals.
Amendments 10 and 11 concern the offences relating to prohibited items in accommodation or transport facilities. Government Amendment 10 proposes to exempt items
“designed for use for the purposes of personal cleanliness or personal hygiene”
from the relevant offences, and Amendment 11 sensibly limits that exemption so that dangerous articles, such as blades, glass or aerosols, are not inadvertently permitted.
These amendments appear to be a reasonable and pragmatic attempt to ensure that the legislation does not extend beyond its intended purpose. We do not want to see a situation in which a detainee or asylum seeker could be criminalised for possessing a bar of soap or toothpaste, and the carve-outs in Amendment 11 should ensure that safety is not compromised.
Lord German (LD)
I shall add one more difficult question to the lump sum of woes that the Minister has just received, and that is in respect of the most used platform in this area, which is Telegram. Telegram is a company based in the British Virgin Islands, but the people behind it are a moveable feast and very secretive. As the Minister will know, of course, formerly VK sprang out of Russian influence, but Telegram is the biggest alt messaging platform in the world and the one that is more frequently used by people in the world in the area that these clauses are meant to deal with.
Having spent the best part of two years in developing the Online Safety Bill, we know that the question is how you make sure you get at a body such as the people who own Telegram, who will obviously be among the most important people in respect of these new clauses. It is not that it is not worth trying, but I query how easy it is going to be and whether there is—I do not expect a detailed answer because otherwise that will be giving away the processes—a way in which this particular platform would be caught by this and would be able to be tracked down and held to account.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, the Government have tabled a raft of amendments criminalising the online advertisement of unlawful immigration services. We know that this is a major source of business for the trafficking gangs and, as such, if the advertising methods can be targeted and disrupted then this should go some way to removing a key part of the business model.
The Government’s impact assessment on this new policy acknowledges that
“it is expected that there will be a small number of arrests under this offence, as the majority of activity is assessed to take place overseas”
The key to the success here will, therefore, lie in enforcement and international compliance, so what steps have the Government taken to push other countries to take action and remove online posts and sites that publish this sort of material? How are they supporting the National Crime Agency to go further with its investigations and campaigns? I look forward to what the Minister has to say on that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope that I can try to reflect on the serious questions posed about the implications of the legislation proposed before the House today on Report. I will try to answer as best I can, but I hope that the broad thrust of what we are trying to achieve, which is to make life harder for criminals to use social media to recruit migrants to cross the channel on dangerous journeys, is accepted by the House as a whole.
The noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned a number of points that we would like to reflect on before giving him a definitive answer. He supports the broad purpose of the legislation, but I will make sure that we write to him to cover some of those points.
The noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Harper, raised legitimate issues—supported by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench—about the difference that the offence will make, its impact and how we deal with people to ensure that it is put in place overseas. The noble Viscount said that if it helps one person, it would be a good thing to do. That remains true. We hope it will disrupt significantly more than that. We have not put a figure on that, but the principle is that it is an additional tool for police and enforcement agencies to take criminal action where other areas are potentially not currently open.
The enforcement of that means that, for countries with which we have extradition agreements, if we identify someone and they are arrested, they can be brought back to the UK for justice. Alternatively, an individual who is resident in the UK could be arrested once our intelligence services and others—including the National Crime Agency—track them down. Alternately, they could be individuals of a foreign nationality who are behind some of these websites or social media channels and visit the UK, and who might accordingly find themselves arrested in the UK for those crimes. So we have a range of extra tools.
With due respect to the noble Viscount, I cannot quantify that in a way that says we will reduce it by 10% or arrest 50 people on the back of that. What we can do is to put another tool in place to help disrupt those criminals. This goes to the point that the noble Lord Davies of Gower mentioned. The Home Office is working closely with the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement partners to ensure that they focus their funding on some of the new tools that they need to use in order to help crack down on this type of crime.
I know from talking to the National Crime Agency—without putting in the public domain confidences that would help criminals—that it is looking at how we can support more officers while also using smarter intelligence gathering and utilising different skills in officers to focus on this emerging market for immigration and migration crimes. All those things are important.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made a number of points about Amendment 14. I draw her attention to the opening line of the proposed new clause in that amendment:
“Application of section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) to internet service providers”.
The key point I want to put to the noble Baroness is about “unlawful immigration services”. She asked whether people would be hit by this proposed new clause in the event of them writing about their experiences. No, they would not, because they are not advertising unlawful immigration services. The purpose of this provision is to focus specifically on the criminals who are organising immigration crime. It will not be used in isolation; it will be part of the measures both inside and outside of the Bill, and we are looking to criminalise the critical component of the people-smuggling gangs’ business model.
The noble Baroness also pointed to a number of parts in the legislation. She asked whether Section 2 automatic, intermediate or transient and whether Section 14(3) is automatic, immediate or temporary? I can say to her only that I have described the policy objective that we have set, and the wording we have is the wording that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel has brought forward to help us achieve that policy objective.
I will reflect on what she said—if there are areas of interest, I will write to her—but I hope that she can look at the bigger picture, which is that is not about criminalising people who do not deserve to be criminalised. It is about criminalising people who are using social media platforms, such as Google, Facebook, Twitter or X—whatever you want to call it these days—to promote their business and to encourage people to undertake illegal crossings. I go back to the initial point in my opening speech: 80% of individuals debriefed by us who have crossed said that their initial contact was via social media. That is the key point that Clause 14 intends to grasp, so I commend it, as well as Clause 13, to the House.
Lord Davies of Gower
“(c) the vessel in which the person travelled could not reasonably have been thought to be safe for the purposes of reaching the United Kingdom.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would apply the new offence of endangering another during a sea crossing to the UK to any individual who tries to enter the UK illegally and makes their journey in an unseaworthy vessel, removing the requirement for the individual to have done an act to cause or create a risk of death or serious injury.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this is a short and simple group with one simple amendment, so I will speak briefly. I moved this amendment in Committee to highlight that, as drafted, I suspect that the offence might not be utilised as much as it could be. This amendment is intended to apply the new offence of endangering another to any individual who makes a sea crossing with the intent of gaining unlawful entry in an unseaworthy vessel. This would remove the requirement for an individual to have done a particular act to create risk of death or serious injury.
The principle here is that if a person has crossed the channel in a small boat or dinghy then they have, by definition, created a risk of death or injury. No small boat packed with a large number of people can be considered safe to cross the busiest shipping lane in the world. By being in that boat, you are endangering the lives of all others in that boat. The Minister said in Committee that the reality is that none of the vessels can reasonably be considered safe, which means that the amendment would capture all those making a journey. I agree with the Minister that these journeys cannot be considered safe. Surely if this clause is to have any meaning at all, it must be expounded to capture those who are making these journeys unsafe. This amendment seeks to make that completely clear and, as such, ensure that the offence in Clause 18 can be applied to those it is intended to target. I beg to move.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, this amendment would significantly alter Clause 18 and capture all people in these boats. Every one of them would come under the power of this clause. It treats the vulnerable asylum seekers as criminals and is inconsistent with targeting specific criminal behaviour.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s comments. This is about preventing fatalities at sea and, as I said in my opening remarks, no boat packed with a large number of people can be considered safe to cross the busiest shipping lane in the world. However, I hear what the Minister says, so for now I will withdraw the amendment.
Lord German (LD)
Just before the noble Lord speaks to Amendment 62, I want to say that these Benches support the Minister.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 62 was also tabled in Committee. Its intent is to disapply data protection laws and regulations for a data subject who has entered the UK illegally or who is a foreign national offender.
The purpose here is, in essence, the same as in Clauses 27 to 31: it is intended to reduce the barriers to data sharing between the relevant law enforcement and immigration services. We feel that data protection legislation should not stand in the way of our ability to protect our borders; it should act as a block on action, not as a shield behind which those who have committed immigration offences can hide. In the same manner as human rights legislation, data protection legislation is not meant to be used to protect those who have broken the law, who have entered illegally or who are trying to prevent their lawful deportation. I will not be pressing this amendment to a Division, obviously, but I hope the Minister has listened to what I have to say.
I understand the purpose of the government amendments in this group, which are removing provisions that are now redundant due to the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. As such, I take no issue with them.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I was glad to hear the Minister use the phrases “vulnerable group” and “blanket fashion”. I think I have quoted him more or less correctly. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to alter the Data Protection Act by creating the possibility of the Secretary of State making an immigration exception decision. The noble Lord would take out of the list of circumstances to which the Act requires the Secretary of State to have regard all the rights and freedoms of the data subject, including the subject’s convention rights, and the UK’s obligations under the refugee and trafficking conventions. We are not on the same page.