(3 days, 16 hours ago)
Lords ChamberInterestingly, the challenge in the Bill before us is to smash the gangs. That was the statement from the Minister, and the issue of boats crossing the English Channel dominates the Bill and is the one that has been given the most effect. It was, of course, the previous Government who made this such a totem issue that they put it front and above all else, even putting it on the sides of lecterns inside 10 Downing Street. If the Government want to treat this matter—which is so important to the Benches on my right—with the Bill, as has been explained to us, we want to see how we best use our resources to tackle these problems in common.
As I explained earlier, I have visited the Pas-de-Calais to examine all these issues. I was with the French police just after they had arrested the driver of a German motor car that had a blanket over the back seat with teddy bears on top. Underneath was a dinghy of exactly the sort that I had seen on the beach, and which had been demonstrated to us as one of the types that are used. Those dinghies had come from Germany in a German car, the number plate of which I have a photograph of, whose driver was arrested at the French border. I was told quite clearly by the officials there that these things come from across Europe, and that all the machines and bits and pieces are collected and used by different countries. Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey, as well as France and the UK, are all involved in this. Quite clearly, it would be right for the Bill to examine the level of cross co-operation between the forces which are to deal with this.
Europol is, of course, the agency on the continent, and is the one that particularly reflects the chain I have just described. The scope of the relationship between us and Europol is defined by the TCA. I have seen no amendments relating to that agreement, but I am hopeful, as I know many Members of this House are, that we will see big changes to the TCA, which has not been used to give us the best result. It is quite clear that our relationship with Europol is defined by it.
The scope of the co-operation is laid out clearly in Article 567. I will not read everything out, but it includes
“the exchange of information … reports … analysis … information on … participation in training … and … the provision of advice and support”.
Nowhere does it mention joint co-operation in activities to deal with the issues before us. I know that there has been some action, because we have seen it reported. The important aspect is the depth of that action with the body that has responsibility for policing these serious crimes across the parts of the European Union where this matter is arising.
I have some questions on the specifics. First, what is the level of operational development between the British forces and Europol? Have we designated a national contact point, as the agreement outlines, and how many liaison officers do we have? The TCA, to which the previous Government agreed, says:
“The United Kingdom shall ensure that its liaison officers have speedy and, where technically possible, direct access to the relevant domestic databases of the United Kingdom that are necessary for them to fulfil their tasks … The number of liaison officers, the details of their tasks, their rights and obligations and the costs involved shall be governed by working arrangements”.
We need to know what the “working arrangements” are, and whether we have those liaison officers in place. My second question is therefore on the structural relationship. Do we have these liaison officers in place, and are there officers from Europol inside the UK and vice versa? That is what the TCA, which was agreed to by the previous Government, says should happen.
The third element is whether the scope of co-operation in this document is sufficient to tackle the problems that we are now facing with this chain of operations across Europe, and which end up with us. This is an important issue, because we are talking about a serious crime that is being reflected across parts of Europe as well as in the United Kingdom. The relationship is important to us, because it includes the people with the operational ability, but we of course need to know whether there is co-operation in that operational ability. Without understanding that, we cannot be reassured that this matter—which, according to the Conservative Party, is at the top of the issues that the country is facing—will be tackled properly.
My Lords, I knew it would be only a matter of time before the debate turned to the European Union. However, I offer some support on this amendment, which seeks to introduce an annual reporting requirement on co-operation between UK law enforcement agencies and Europol. I do so not out of any dogmatic enthusiasm for greater institutional integration with the European Union, but because it touches on something far more important—that the Government should have a duty to come before Parliament and the British people and show us the work they have been doing to smash the gangs.
We have all these questions already—how many gangs have been dismantled, how many people smugglers have been arrested and what impact that has had on the scale of the crossings—so, once this Bill comes into force, the pressure on the Government to answer them will be even greater. To that end, we think the requirement to report these numbers should be set out in law. This amendment speaks to earlier provisions tabled in our name in which we called for greater transparency about enforcement outcomes. If the Government are serious about stopping the boats, breaking the business model and restoring control, they should welcome the opportunity to show Parliament the evidence.
However, I strike a note of caution. While co-operation with Europol is undoubtedly important, it must be driven by operational need, not ideological nostalgia. This Bill cannot be a backdoor to deeper alignment for its own sake. What matters is whether the relationship delivers results and helps our agencies do their job more effectively. If it does, let us support it; if it does not or if resources would be better deployed elsewhere, we must retain the flexibility to make those choices. I support the principle behind the amendment: let us have the data, see the progress and ensure that decisions about operational co-operation are rooted in the fight against serious crime and not some broader desire to turn back the clock on Brexit. That is the balanced and pragmatic path forward.
The same principle of operational demand underpins our opposition to Amendment 101. We have spoken a lot about giving our law enforcement agencies the tools they need to combat illegal immigration, but we cannot tie their hands. With respect to the noble Baroness, I believe that our authorities can be trusted to determine whether a joint task force with Europol is necessary and I do not think that compelling them to do this in law is particularly sensible.
Our concerns are much the same with Amendment 206. While I am sure that it is well intentioned, I will speak against it. However worthy its stated aim, it rests on a flawed premise: that this Chamber, and individual Members, should be in the business of directing operational law enforcement resources from the Floor of Parliament. Of course we expect the Government to ensure that our law enforcement agencies are adequately resourced. That is a basic responsibility. What I find more difficult to accept is the idea that we should begin legislating where those resources must go, as if we are better placed than the professionals to determine strategic priorities, operational partnerships or the most effective deployment of personnel and technology. Respectfully, what qualifies the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to decide by statute how the National Crime Agency or our police forces should engage with Europol? Are we to micromanage from your Lordships’ House the balance between domestic enforcement and international co-operation? I do not believe those on the front line will thank us for it.
We should not forget that enforcement against illegal migration and human trafficking is a complex, fast-evolving challenge. It requires flexibility, responsiveness and operational freedom, not rigid legal mandates handed down from Westminster. If law enforcement agencies judge that Europol operations offer the best return on effort and resources, then they will and should participate. But if priorities shift or if intelligence and tactical realities require a different focus, they must be free to act accordingly.
This is a debate not about whether we support the fight against people smuggling—we all do—but about whether we think Parliament should start signing away operational discretion and tying the hands of those we rely on to deliver results. That is not a responsible use of legislative power. We need to be guided by practical application, not political aspiration. Let the experts lead and let Government support them in doing so, not box them in. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendment.
My Lords, I have a confession to make—and I hope that noble Lords will bear with me as I make it. As a Member of Parliament, I spent a lot of the period between 2016 and 2019 arguing for a close relationship with Europol when we were agreeing the Brexit referendum and agreements. I put a lot of pressure on the then Prime Minister and Home Secretary to ensure that they valued Europol and our close co-operation with it. I was disappointed in the outcome of the settlements achieved on that relationship. I therefore start from the basis that I believe that the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, are important. The approach of the current Government since 2024 has been to ensure that we encourage and engage in co-operation with Europol and other agencies to achieve the objectives that we have set.
Those figures are extremely impressive—thank goodness for that—but can the Minister explain why over 21,000 people are arriving in the UK on boats?
The noble Lord knows that this is a complex challenge and that the Government are trying to undertake a range of measures to address it. He will also know—we will return to this in more detail later—that, with the scrapping of the Rwanda scheme, we have been able both to process more applications on asylum and to remove people from hotels and shut more hotels. We have also been able to provide greater investment in the sort of co-operation that the Border Security Commander will undertake shortly, and I believe that continued pressure will be placed on that issue. The noble Lord knows that it is a difficult challenge—I am not denying that—but we have a duty to disrupt, and that disruption involves close co-operation with Europol.
I get the sense—I mean this in the nicest possible way—that these are probing amendments to get a view from the Government on the issues around Europol; all three press the Government on where we are with that. The noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Jackson, have challenged the drafting and objectives of the relevant clauses. I will address the first two amendments as probing amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord German, which seek to determine what we are doing with Europol. I accept those challenges and will respond to them.
The Border Security Commander—the legal framework for such a role is in the early clauses of the Bill—will work with a range of international bodies, including Europol, to deliver the Government’s border security objectives, recognising that an international solution is required for the current international, cross-border set of challenges. The recent Organised Immigration Crime Summit brought together over 40 countries and law enforcement bodies, including Europol to unite behind a new approach to dismantle people-smuggling gangs and to deliver on the people’s priorities for a securer border. The amendments are pressing us to address that.
First, there is the argument for an annual report to Parliament. Under the Bill, the Border Security Commander has to provide an annual report to Parliament and his work is very closely linked to that of Europol. We have a very strong relationship with Europol currently and a significant permanent presence in the agency’s headquarters in The Hague. The Home Office will continue to work with Europol to deliver the Government’s border security objectives, and the Border Security Commander has a key role in Europol being one of the agencies through which our objectives are being set.
To answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord German, on joint working with Europol, we have 20 officers embedded as liaison officers in Europol headquarters, with teams across the European community. It would be challenging, and perhaps—dare I say—inappropriate to set statutory requirements that would seek to establish joint taskforce operations when these are currently operational decisions.
Those operational decisions have the full support of government to work closely with Europol to help with data, criminal investigations and to ensure that we work in partnership. That is vital, given that many of the criminal gangs are operating in the European Community—in Germany, France, Belgium and Holland. That is why the Border Security Commander, as well as working closely with Europol, has established and worked with the Calais Group, its member states being France, Belgium, Holland and the United Kingdom, looking at close co-operation in those areas.
We are ensuring that we have adequate resources for law-enforcement agencies to enhance participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations. There is regular interaction with Europol, and the commander is already providing strategic cross-system leadership across current and future threats to UK border security, protecting the UK border and going after the people-smuggling gangs. We believe that the legislation strikes that operational balance but also ensures that law enforcement and the UK intelligence community are supportive of the commander’s approach. By establishing that clear direction and leadership, we are creating a strong, cohesive system to boost the activities of Europol as a whole.
There is a very strong operational relationship with Europol, led by the National Crime Agency. The director-general of the National Crime Agency regularly meets with his counterpart, Catherine De Bolle, to discuss relevant matters. The commander himself has engaged heavily with law enforcement since being appointed. We have doubled our presence at Europol, and we hosted Interpol’s general assembly in Glasgow in November 2024. We have also increased the number of embeds from the National Crime Agency in European organisations such as Europol.
On an operational and strategic level, it is in the interests of both Europol—the European Community—and the United Kingdom to have that close co-operation. That is why in the period post the Brexit referendum, I and others argued for that strong relationship: because it was important. As the noble Baroness said herself, a UK citizen, Rob Wainwright, was the leader of Europol when we were in the European Community.
I hope that there is not a sliver of difference between us. However, going back to what the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said, the amendments demand an annual report and taskforce co-operation, with us determining a third-party taskforce to be co-operated with. They also demand areas of resource—which we are dealing with, without the attack on operational independence that that approach may involve.
I thank my noble friend for his attempt to adjudicate between me and my noble friend Lord Jackson. He makes a good point. This is where the state needs to get much better at using data to make policy decisions—by the way, this is not a criticism of the current Government; we had our challenges in office as well—and operational decisions, deal with threats and be nimble enough to recognise that those threats do not remain static but change. The state has to be much better at altering its focus to deal with the threats as they face us today.
I regret that I disagree with my noble friend, as I try not to do so, but I strongly support my noble friend Lord Swire’s amendments, and I hope that they will get a fair hearing from the Government. Even if the Government do not like the way they are drafted or whatever, I hope they will take them away and have a think about whether my noble friend’s amendments make a good point and could be incorporated into the Bill in due course.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for tabling these amendments relating to the provision of biometric information by those seeking entry into the United Kingdom. I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Harper and Lord Jackson for that interesting duel, which contributed greatly to this debate.
Amendment 102 would extend the powers under Section 141 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 by mandating the collection of biometric information from those awaiting deportation, those who have been arrested for an immigration offence and asylum seekers. Currently, the ability to collect fingerprints from such people is optional, and therefore we cannot be certain that immigration officers are collecting enough information to enable sufficient protection of our borders. My noble friend’s amendment goes further and would require the fingerprinting of everyone who is not a British citizen who seeks to enter the country. My noble friend has raised this issue on numerous occasions, and he is right to do so. If we do not know who has entered our country, and indeed who is already here, we cannot take adequate measures to prosecute crimes and deport those with no right to be here.
Importantly, my noble friend is proposing that we use biometric information primarily in cases where the person in question has failed to provide us with any other form of identification that would show who they are, where they came from and why they wished to enter the UK. These are not needlessly intrusive questions. Noble Lords who are lucky enough to travel abroad this summer will be asked exactly those questions, and rightly so. Every nation has to understand who is coming in. As I have mentioned before, the consequences of not knowing can be dire. I remind noble Lords that the massive Iranian terror attack, which was only just intercepted, was plotted by those who arrived without paperwork on small boats and in the back of lorries.
It is a matter of national security that we know who is entering the UK. My noble friend Lord Swire has proposed a sensible amendment to this Bill, which would give our law enforcement agencies the information they need to begin to build up this picture.
Amendment 149 is also built on this principle and seeks to introduce robust powers, allowing immigration officers to search for, seize, retain and make use of identity documents for certain categories of non-British nationals and to issue biometric registration cards in their place. This amendment once again speaks to the fundamental principle of border security: that we must know who is trying to enter the UK and where they are from, and try to determine why. The amendment has clear provision for returning all documents once the relevant period is passed and is a sensible proposal designed to ensure that our immigration officers have access to as much information as possible when making the decisions needed to safeguard our borders.
My Lords, I rise to oppose the question that Clause 37 stand part of the Bill. The Government’s proposal to repeal the safety of Rwanda Act goes to the heart of our differences in this debate. The previous Government introduced a substantive deterrent: people whom the United Kingdom had identified as illegal immigrants or asylum seekers would have to be relocated to Rwanda for processing, asylum and resettlement. Those who were successful in claiming asylum would have remained in Rwanda, and they would not have been permitted to return to the United Kingdom. In this clause, the Government are tearing up that plan. They are instead proposing to introduce a new border commander with no actual command and no required relevant experience, and they are proposing a handful of laws that seek to criminalise supply chains, which are almost entirely located abroad.
We have sought to be helpful to the Government with many of our amendments, but this is a matter on which, unfortunately, we just disagree. We on this side recognise some fundamental truths which the Government seem intent on ignoring. The first is that supply in this matter is driven by demand. The second is that supply will always try to meet demand, even under absolute prohibition. I referred at Second Reading to the 18th Amendment in the United States, which, as I am sure noble Lords will agree, was quite a bit stronger than anything the Government are proposing in the Bill, yet still failed. The third and final truth is that, if you want to stop supply, you need to stop demand. The Government’s approach is obsessed with supply—the supply of boats and ID documents—but there is almost nothing here to affect demand. The simple fact of the matter is that, while there are thousands of people willing to pay massive sums of money to come to the UK illegally, there will be criminal gangs ready to take the money and get them here.
The same can be said for pretty much every other criminal enterprise. The fact that these things are illegal, by definition, does not matter to the criminals who sustain them. The previous Government recognised this fact and decided to go after the demand, by ensuring that those who sought to come to the UK illegally would spend as little time here as possible.
This worked: illegal migrants considering making the channel crossing last year were quoted many times as saying that they were waiting for the Rwanda scheme to be abolished. Migrants in Calais told journalists that they were waiting for Labour to get into government before coming to the UK, because they knew that the party would scrap the Rwanda policy. I put it strongly to your Lordships that this is clear evidence that the Rwanda plan was acting as a deterrent.
Look, if we are going to talk about more people coming, can we go back to 2016? Can the noble Lord tell me how many people arrived on a small boat in 2016, compared with July 2024? I will tell him. There were 400 in 2016 and over 30,000 in 2024. We have a legacy of complete and utter failure by that Government, of which he was a significant member in the Cabinet. These are strong, practical measures; the Rwanda scheme was not, which is why I commend Clause 37 to the House. I ask the noble Lord to reflect on what we have said. If he chooses to vote at some point to remove Clause 37, I and, I think, many other Members of this House will stand together to oppose him.
I thank all the noble Lords who have taken part in this very interesting debate. It has been a microcosm of the numerous debates in your Lordships’ House over the last few years. I was momentarily flattered by being afforded the word “gallant” by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, but I realised quite quickly that it was insincere.
It will not be surprising to noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches and the Government Benches that I disagree with more or less everything that they have said in this debate. In relation to the deterrent, the Government have not created a credible alternative to the Rwanda scheme. They have not grasped the necessity of stopping demand by deterring illegal migrants from making the journey in the first place. I simply cannot understand how they believe that they can stop the boats without a deterrent. The Minister implies that the Bill is a deterrent. The Government claim that simply instituting a Border Security Commander with nothing to command and creating three new offences will deter illegal migrants. This is clearly not the case.
Picking up on a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I remind the Government of what David Coleman, the Emeritus Professor of Demography at the University of Oxford, told the Public Bill Committee in the other place. He said:
“It is, I think, very much second best to the idea of trying to deter migration for asylum claiming in the first place. That, of course, was dismissed by the present Government as being unfeasible, unworkable and unkind, so the Rwanda scheme was scrapped… it seems to me that the only obvious way of deterring movement to Britain is by making the movement to Britain unattractive”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 27/2/25; col. 50.]
Regardless of what the Minister or the Liberal Democrats want to claim, offshoring to a safe third country has worked. As has already been mentioned, particularly by my noble friends, Australia is the only country that has been successful in stopping small boats—by establishing offshore detention facilities in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. This reduced arrivals to virtually zero. It has worked so far for the Government to claim that Rwanda would never have worked. This is manifestly false. I hope that the Government come to realise what a mistake they have made by not instituting a deterrent. However, for now, I will withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.
My Lords, I would like to go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said in pointing out the problems we have with the amendment. Detention centres are used, as the noble Lord said, for those with no legal right to be here—and whether that is a man or a woman who has come with no legal right to be here and who is subject to detention, that is a very good reason. They are also used for those whose identity is being established or where there is a risk of absconding.
If there were no detention after 28 days and, as the noble Baroness proposed, a right to community arrangements instead, we would not be honouring the wish of the people of this country to control illegal migration, or indeed the overall figures. There would be constant fears that people who came here without any right to be here, or whose identity was in doubt or who were at risk of absconding, would likely disappear into the ether and we would have no trace of them.
I also do not think that it is a good idea to suggest that we make gender differences in applying the law. It is very important that the law applies equally to men and women. I am sorry about the children, but I think the message should be to the parents who have put the children in this position, “Do not do it. Do not endanger your children. Do not subject them to the arrangements which must be made if populations are to be protected and the laws upheld. Stay elsewhere”. That would be a very good signal, because we would save children from being put on small boats by what I believe to be irresponsible parents who may be endangering the lives of their very own.
I therefore hope that we keep the detention centres for as long as is needed—and we keep people in them for as long as is needed—under the arrangements now proposed in the Bill, and in existence, so that we can properly process those who have a right to be here and those who have no right to be here.
My Lords, Amendments 102A, 115A, 115B, 115C, 115D, and 115E, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, seek to repeal Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. This section sets out that “relevant persons” may be detained for as long as the Secretary of State deems “reasonably necessary” to carry out examinations or removal, to make an immigration or deportation decision, or to issue removal directions.
As with many of the decisions to repeal sections of the Illegal Migration Act, I question the noble Baroness’s intent on this point. Why does she oppose the exercise of reasonable detention to carry out an examination or to facilitate a removal process? As the Government themselves recognise, these are important powers that allow the Government to facilitate an operable migration system. If even this Government believe that Section 12 should be retained, this tells us something about its necessity.
I wonder what the noble Baroness proposes instead. What would she do, for instance, if a person refused to undergo an examination? What would she do if a decision was made to remove a person but, because the state could not detain them, they simply ran off? This does not seem to us to be a reasonable or proportionate amendment and I therefore oppose it on this basis.
Amendment 112 in my name seeks to reintroduce Section 11 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which the Government in this Bill are proposing to repeal. This Section of the Act introduced a new legal power to detain individuals specifically in connection with the Government’s duty to remove people who enter the UK illegally.
Let us be clear about the provisions in this Section. Section 11 provided to immigration officers and the Home Secretary the clear, legal authority to detain people who fell within the removal duty framework, to hold them lawfully during processing and to enforce removals, while also incorporating safeguards for children and pregnant women. What in this do the Government disagree with so much that they feel that they have to repeal this Section of the Act? We are clear on this side of the House that people who come to the United Kingdom illegally must be removed.
I will set out my position briefly and then invite the Minister to explain why he and the Government want to axe this provision from law. We believe, as we have set out before, that those who come to the United Kingdom illegally should not be allowed to remain. What is the purpose of having law if we allow people to break it with no consequence? Is this not the equivalent of allowing shoplifters to hang on to what they have stolen? Is this not the same as allowing those who break into people’s homes to keep hold of the things they have taken after they have been caught?
Without this provision, we are directly allowing people to benefit from their criminality. To us on this side, it is wholly irresponsible for a Government to allow those who break our laws to benefit from their activities. I hope the Minister takes this opportunity to really defend what his Government are doing. To us, the decision to repeal Section 11 seems reckless.
Furthermore, our Amendment 113 similarly seeks to reintroduce Section 13 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which sought to reduce the administrative burden on our courts by reducing the chance that we would be faced with vexatious appeals early on in the detention process. This Section also sought to delay access to immigration bail. This has many benefits, the main one being that it addressed the problem that individuals who crossed illegally could be released on bail before the Home Office could organise their removal, leading to long delays, absconding or the person simply disappearing into the system.
Removing this provision poses a clear risk of complicating the removals process, clogging up the courts and fundamentally undermining the Government’s capacity and ability to get those people who should not be in this country out. I hope the Minister will similarly explain why the Government think this move is a sensible one. Can he assure the House now that this decision will not create any increase in the backlog, and can he confirm that this will not delay the process of removing those who come here illegally? Can he commit now to the reincorporation of Section 13 into this Bill, if any of his answers to those questions are in doubt?
I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments. I first thank my noble friend Lady Lister for moving the amendment on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
I will first acknowledge the question she raised on the adults at risk in detention guidance. I happen to know also that she has tabled a Parliamentary Question, which is due for answer shortly. I expect to respond to the review within a couple of months and any changes in the proposals that are brought forward will be subject to parliamentary approval. I will be answering her question in much more detail in very short order, and I hope that will help her to resolve that issue.
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord German, the shadow Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and my noble friend Lady Lister for their contributions. I will start with Amendments 112 and 113 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel. The amendments seek to retain the powers of detention and the powers to grant immigration bail where a person is subject to the duty to remove under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. They are reliant on the provision to impose a duty to remove on the Secretary of State, which this Government are seeking to repeal.
I will respond very briefly to the points that have been made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, which are, in fact, quite complex, if you look at the range of matters that have been discussed.
First, in trying to be comprehensive, you have to touch a lot of corners. As was described earlier in this debate, and in the debate on Tuesday, the real problem that we are facing is, first, identification and making sure that people who are identified are not punished, and then making sure that they have a swift process through the machinery of the NRM—national referral mechanism—and are then helped to move into a better life. There have to be changes in legislation to bring that together, which is why this suite of amendments is in place.
I have heard references to “international law”. I have to keep saying that it is actually Members of this Parliament who vote to make these international legal frameworks happen. I was not a member of the Council of Europe when that protocol and convention were put in place, but if a framework has the support of the United Kingdom delegation, which is substantial and cross-party, that means it is something that we are contributing to. That is the issue about international frameworks and laws that we set ourselves: we are very much part of the machinery that makes them and puts them in place, especially in the Council of Europe, where I am a member of the Parliamentary Assembly.
I understand why the Home Office argues that modern slavery protections are being abused by people who falsely claim that they are victims to avoid deportation, or who seek to keep serious offenders in the country who would otherwise be removed. I understand that argument, but where is the evidence for that widespread abuse? Perhaps when he sums up, the Minister could tell us whether there has been a sufficient number of cases to lead us to believe that there is abuse of the current system. If there is not widespread abuse, there must be protections and ways in which the Government can deal with these outliers where they think they might happen in the process.
In conclusion, as we heard on Tuesday from the noble Baroness, Lady May, the situation is not improving; it is getting worse, and more adults are being confirmed as victims of trafficking. So we certainly have to come back to this matter to ensure that we have the right legislative underpinning to make it happen.
My Lords, I am afraid that I must disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, yet again, by speaking against the amendments in this group.
I shall touch on each one briefly, starting with Amendment 103, which would repeal Section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act 2024, as set out in the explanatory note. The explanatory note provided by the noble Baroness has a flaw. It fails to recognise that Section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, to which her amendment ultimately pertains, refers both to a person who has claimed to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking in bad faith and to a person who is a threat to public order. Let us be clear about who we are talking about in these amendments: people who have tried to use modern slavery protections in bad faith and people who are a threat to public order and public safety for British citizens. The clause as it stands would allow the Government to remove these people from the United Kingdom and ensure that they would not be eligible for indefinite leave to remain as a result of their claims made in bad faith of eligibility and the modern slavery protections.
We on these Benches raised our concerns about those who would seek to exploit loopholes in modern slavery protections at some length earlier this week. The provisions in Clause 29 of the Illegal Migration Act seek to address this by allowing the Government to identify bad actors who are abusing the system and to remove them from the United Kingdom. Not to do so would be an insult to all those people who suffer at the hands of slave-masters and who should rightly hold a genuine entitlement to protection. The amendment seeks to apply those protections to those who are acting in bad faith or those who are a threat to public order. It is no wonder that even this Government have decided, in their drafting of the Bill, to keep this provision in force.
I seriously question why the noble Baroness seeks to question modern slavery protections in such a way. As such, we cannot support the amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the way in which she has approached the discussion. I hope that I can convince her straight away by saying that the Government are steadfast in their commitment to tackling modern slavery in all its forms and to supporting survivors. That is why we had the debate on Tuesday, in which I re-emphasised that.
Care should be taken to avoid unintentionally weakening the protections afforded to victims of modern slavery and to public order. Repealing the majority of the modern slavery measures in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 would do just that. That Act put protections of and support for potential victims of modern slavery, stemming from the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, into primary domestic legislation for the first time, building on the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The proposed amendments would repeal these.
I come at it from a different perspective from the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. In my view, the measures being lost would include the right to a recovery period in the national referral mechanism; the circumstances in which confirmed victims may be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK; and where the rights and protections can be withheld on the grounds of public order or bad faith, in line with Article 13 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. These measures ensure that support and protections and removal from the modern slavery system are available to all who require them. It is vital to retain them.
Section 29 is the sole modern slavery measure in the Illegal Migration Act 2023 to be retained. It would, if commenced, amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered on a case-by-case basis for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. Here, I share the view of His Majesty’s Official Opposition. Section 29 needs to be retained in its current form so that we can examine the national referral mechanism and agree with partners our priorities for long-term reform.
As I mentioned on Tuesday, Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act sets out a range of measures. It is not necessary to replicate that defence elsewhere in legislation. On restricting information shared in respect of the modern slavery identification, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides certain bodies in England and Wales with a statutory duty to notify the Secretary of State. The information provided for that notification enables the UK to fulfil its international and other obligations.
The duty to notify is discharged for consenting adults by making a referral to the national referral mechanism or, where the adult does not consent, by completing an anonymous entry on the digital system. This information allows us to provide a better picture of modern slavery and helps improve law enforcement responses. It does not include information that identifies the person, unless the person consents to that information being included. Child victims do not need to consent. If a person is identified as a potential victim of modern slavery or trafficking, they are eligible for the recovery period that I mentioned earlier. Imposing restrictions on the information provided would be to the detriment of our obligations to such vulnerable people.
I agree that it is vital that the UK complies with its obligations, including as a signatory to the Council of Europe convention that the noble Lord mentioned. Implementation and compliance with these obligations does not require full incorporation into UK law. I say on behalf of the Government that the UK complies with its obligations under the convention by a combination of measures contained in domestic legislation, guidance and the criminal justice system. The modern slavery statutory guidance provides a framework where we can ensure that the convention continues to be monitored through reporting of the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.
Finally, the Government are committed to ensuring victims can access the necessary support for whatever length of time it is required. Following a positive conclusive grounds decision, confirmed victims of modern slavery receive support from the modern slavery victim care contract and can continue receiving tailored needs-based support through the recovery needs assessment process via the NHS, local authorities and others. That specialist support also includes assistance to access the labour market, vocational training and education and application support for a national insurance number. The Government do not place an overall time limit on how long a victim can remain in support. Following a conclusive grounds decision, victims of modern slavery are considered for temporary permission to stay. That is all important and gives real support to victims of modern slavery.
I have not mentioned the amendments individually, but collectively that response shows that the Government are committed to their international obligations, want to support victims of modern slavery and believe that the retention of the measures in the migration Act is vital to doing that in a fair and appropriate way. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
(5 days, 16 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 63 seeks to future-proof the offence in Clause 18 of endangering another during a sea crossing. As currently drafted, the clause risks failing in its central purpose: to deter and prosecute those whose actions endanger lives at sea, regardless of where they are travelling from. Perhaps we should remind ourselves of what Clause 18 is intended to do. It is designed to create an offence for conduct that places others at serious risk of harm during unauthorised maritime crossings to the United Kingdom. That is a vital and necessary objective, especially given the number of people who choose to make this crossing—the number has breached 20,000 this year so far, a record high—and the very real risks of injury and loss of life for those involved.
However, as it stands, Clause 18 applies only to those travelling from France, Belgium or the Netherlands. I understand completely that those three countries are where the small boats are currently leaving from, but it is not necessarily true that this will always be the case. While this territorial limitation is not entirely arbitrary, it is illogical—it is predicated on a snapshot of today’s dominant routes, but we know all too well that the modus operandi of smuggling gangs is constantly evolving. Routes shift; departure points change. Those intent on profiting from human desperation will exploit any gap in enforcement or jurisdiction that we leave behind. What happens when a boat departs from Denmark, Germany or further afield? What if a criminal network re-routes its operations through new maritime channels not explicitly listed in the Bill? Are we to say that the same dangerous conduct, the same reckless disregard for life, somehow falls outside the scope of the offence? That is not a credible position, and neither is it a safe one. This amendment would ensure that the law is not constrained by geography. It would ensure that we legislate for principle, not convenience; that we criminalise the act of endangerment itself, wherever it occurs, not merely based on where the journey begins.
Our Amendment 64 in this group speaks to another critical shortcoming. The Bill as drafted appears to require a discrete, identifiable act that causes or risks serious harm, but in the case of these maritime crossings, the danger is not always the result of a single act. It is inherent in the crossing itself. It lies in the overcrowding, the use of flimsy dinghies and the absence of life jackets, navigation tools or any basic safety standard.
The act of stepping aboard such a vessel with others, knowing that it is patently unsafe, is itself the creation of danger and the act which places lives at risk. This very principle was, at the end of last week, endorsed by the Home Secretary, when she said that:
“Everybody who is arriving on a boat where a child’s life has been lost, frankly, should be facing prosecution … If you get on to a boat which is so crowded that a child is crushed to death in the middle of that boat … you should face some responsibility and accountability for that”.
We wholeheartedly agree, and our amendment seeks to incorporate this principle of collective responsibility into the Bill. Our amendment differs from the principle set out by the Home Secretary in one important way. It recognises this risk pre-emptively. It does not require tragedy to occur before the law is broken. If we are serious about saving lives, we cannot wait for them to be lost before we act. We need to intervene to ensure that actions taken to endanger life are themselves illegal.
The Government already recognise that the act of getting into a boat is dangerous and that everyone who gets into that boat is thereby creating a risk for other people. We therefore hope that they will agree that this principle should be applied proactively to save life, not just reactively once it has already been lost, and adopt this amendment to the Bill. The amendment is about targeting those who act with recklessness or self-interest in ways that expose others to mortal peril. We all recognise that the act of getting into a boat is creating that risk. This is our opportunity to combat those who, regardless, choose to do so.
The House has a duty not only to scrutinise the law but to ensure that it aligns with lived realities. Our amendments would make it clearer, more enforceable and more consistent with the Government’s stated goals.
On the other amendments in the group, Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would insert a requirement that for an offence to be committed under Clause 18, the individual must have acted “intentionally or recklessly”. The stated aim is to ensure that the offence targets people smugglers rather than those seeking asylum. However, this entirely misunderstands the purpose of the clause and the reality of these dangerous sea crossings. The threshold for this offence is already clear. It requires that a person commits an act that causes or creates a risk of death or serious injury during an illegal maritime journey.
As we have rightly recognised in our own amendment, the very act of boarding a dangerously overcrowded and ill-equipped vessel to cross the channel is reckless. It is done not in ignorance but knowingly, with an awareness of the risks not just to oneself but to others on board. This therefore automatically meets the “intentionally or recklessly” threshold that the noble Baroness talks about. To insert this new mental element, “intentionally or recklessly”, is not a clarification but an unnecessary restriction. It risks introducing a legal loophole that could allow individuals to escape prosecution, even where their actions had demonstrably endangered lives. We must not forget that the endangerment to life is a collective responsibility. The people whom we are talking about have knowingly made the decision to endanger themselves and, crucially, others.
This offence is not designed to criminalise those merely seeking safety; it is designed to ensure that anyone, whether a smuggler, pilot or fellow traveller, who engages in conduct that places lives in jeopardy can be held accountable. We cannot allow the law to be softened to the point where it fails to deter the reckless behaviour that is putting people, including children, at risk. This is not an academic concern. People have died making this crossing. People will continue to die making it unless we take robust action now which recognises the danger that this collective action creates.
Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, addresses a similar point and falls to the same problem in assuming that endangerment to life is an act that can be limited to a small number of people who are likely not on the boat at all. We must ensure that we prosecute people for the actions that they take, the risks that they run and the danger that they pose to others. Whether this is done for personal or financial gain is an unnecessary additional clarification which misses the point that the people whom we are talking about have endangered lives and well-being simply by choosing to get into the boat in the first place.
Finally, Amendment 67, in the name of my noble friend Lady May, serves as an important reminder in this debate that we need to consider the plight of those acting under duress of slavery, but I have to say to her that we have the same concerns about this amendment as those which I raised earlier. I am conscious of what my noble friend Lord Cameron said on an earlier amendment, which is that it risked creating a loophole which could be exploited by bad actors looking for a way to get out of being held to account for the crimes they will be committing. That said, I welcome the amendment from my noble friend, again on the grounds that it raises important issues which I hope the Minister will fully address in his response. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken. Clause 18 seeks to address a very real threat to life, but none the less confines itself to an arbitrary, narrow set of departure points, as if dangerous crossings were the exclusive preserve of the channel route. This is plainly not the case, and it is naive to legislate as though it were. If we want to future-proof our border laws, they must reflect the realities of irregular migration as they evolve; we must not freeze them in the present moment and base them on the sort of activity we see now, rather than that which could emerge in the future.
More than that, the amendments go to the heart of what it means to endanger life at sea. The danger does not begin when a trafficker pushes someone overboard. It begins the moment an individual, whether an organiser or a participant, boards an unseaworthy vessel, knowing it is not fit for the journey and puts lives at risk, often doing so for profit. I want to emphasise the point that we are not seeking to criminalise desperation. We are seeking to hold accountable those who, through their actions, their choices or their complicity endanger the lives of others. I will consider what the Minister has said but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I also have Amendment 209 in this group. Clause 19 defines “relevant person” for the purposes of search and so on in relation to what these days are simply called “devices”. There are other terms in Clauses 20 to 23. The amendment particularly goes to the point of retrospectivity. The clause provides that a relevant person is someone who has entered or arrived, whether before or after the section comes into force. The amendment would leave in as a subject someone who has entered in breach of a deportation order. It seems to me that there is a rather different flavour to retrospectivity here, because the individual knows what he is doing. Having been on the receiving end of a deportation order, he can hardly ignore that that is going to be relevant.
In the other cases, the wording puts it into the future: if the person
“requires leave … requires entry clearance … is required … not to travel … without an electronic travel authorisation”.
In parentheses, I wondered about the term “entered” compared with “arrived”, which I think might technically be the position, and the Explanatory Notes do not seem to help—but that is by the way. That first amendment would deal in all but one of the cases in this clause with the retrospective element.
Amendment 209 would require the affirmative procedure for regulations under Clause 25, extending powers to persons designated by the Secretary of State. This is a point made by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. As we said in our report, the committee has
“previously raised concerns about the extension to persons who are not recognised legal officials of powers which might be used to interfere with individual liberty”.
The Government say that the requirements would not create any new powers; they would extend the cohort of people who can use the powers, and the Secretary of State can impose such safeguards as she considers appropriate. The Constitution Committee reminds the Committee not only that it has previously raised these concerns but that the safeguards about designation of other people should be set out on the face of the Bill, so that this is not left to the discretion of the Secretary of State.
The affirmative procedure is of some assistance in scrutinising—but not really blocking—the provisions. It would, of course, enable parliamentarians to debate and scrutinise in public this power of the Secretary of State to designate whoever it might be.
The Bar Council has raised another issue on the provision that the Bill will allow civil servants, if so designated, to access and keep information found on devices. A police constable exercising powers such as these needs authorisation from a superintendent; that is the usual level of authorisation. This Bill will allow junior Home Office civil servants and immigration officials to do so without oversight.
The Bar Council has briefed on its concern about the potential for violating the rights of privacy and legal privilege of people who may have entered the UK years ago and are engaged in legal proceedings against the Home Office.
So, that is a range of concerns, which I hope would be addressed by my amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, it would be remiss of me if I did not begin my remarks on this group by mentioning the puzzling inclusion of Clauses 20 to 23 in the Bill, given that these powers already exist in statute. Section 15 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Illegal Migration Act 2023 already grant these exact same powers of search, seizure and access for electronic devices. Rather than retain the provisions that are already law, the Government are repealing those parts of the Illegal Migration Act and then re-enacting them through this Bill; I would submit that that does not really make much sense.
In fact, the wording of the sections that the Government are repealing are virtually identical to the clauses in the Bill. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act says:
“An immigration officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article, if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”,
while Clause 20(1) of the Bill says:
“An authorised officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”.
The only difference is that the Bill grants the powers to an authorised officer rather than an immigration officer. I understand the purpose of the distinction, as Clause 19 states that under the Bill the powers will be able to be used by police officers as well as immigration officers. I have no issue with that, but why repeal the whole of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act simply to replace one word?
The similarities continue. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act authorises the search of vehicles and containers for electronic devices, and Clause 20(6) of the Bill does exact same thing. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 2 authorises the search of premises for an electronic device, while Clause 20(5) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 authorises the search the person’s property for an electronic device, while Clause 20(4) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 authorises the seizure of electronic devices, while Clause 21(1) of the Bill does the exact same thing and has precisely the same wording. I could go on, but I believe it should be blindingly obvious that there is no practical purpose to Clauses 20 to 23; they are simply regurgitated provisions of already existing statute that the Government are performatively repealing.
I turn to one of the very few aspects of the powers relating to electronic devices that the Government have actually changed. My Amendment 69 is intended to probe the Government’s definition of “relevant articles” from which electronic information can be accessed and stored under Clauses 20 to 23. As drafted, the Bill essentially defines that as any electronic item that could contain information relating to an offence under Section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971. Consequently, the powers under Clauses 20 to 23 can currently be used only to garner information relating to the facilitation of unlawful entry or the illegal facilitation of the arrival of asylum seekers.
However, those are not the only offences that immigration officers might need to access electronic devices to investigate. For example, what about the information on electronic devices pertaining to offences under Section 24 or Section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971? If the Bill is aimed at tackling illegal immigration and protecting our border security, should it not address that in its totality? Why should immigration officers and police officers not be able to utilise information they have gleaned from the electronic devices of illegal entrants as evidence of the commission of the offences of illegal entry or the use of deception to gain leave to enter or remain? Is the prevention of those offences not crucial to our border security?
The previous Government recognised that these powers need to extend to information relating to a wider range of offences, which is why in the Illegal Migration Act we did not limit the definition of electronic devices in such a way. Rather, relevant articles were defined as anything containing information related to
“any function of an immigration officer, or … of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality”.
That offered a far wider-ranging power to investigate the whole plethora of immigration crimes, all of which would fall under the Government’s definition of border security in Clause 3 of the Bill.
The Prime Minister has spoken on many occasions of giving the Border Security Commander counter- terrorism-like powers. I have to say to the Minister that the substance of what is contained in Clauses 19 to 23 is utterly consistent with the tough language that the Government have been throwing around, and if they are indeed serious about matching their rhetoric with their actions then they should accept Amendment 69 and expand the definition of relevant articles in Clause 19.
I always hope to be helpful to the noble Lord. I suggest that we consider those matters in some detail when we reach Clause 33. These amendments relate to the additional powers for the National Crime Agency and bringing the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Police Service of Scotland into the remit of the legislation. They have all been done in consultation with the three responsible bodies—the Home Secretary and the two devolved Administrations. I am very happy to examine Clause 33, but I think it would be in order to do so just after Clause 32 and before Clause 34.
My Lords, we appreciate that, as the Government go through the Bill, they will make minor adjustments to the language or corrective amendments to tighten it up, but the amendments in this group incorporate substantial changes that could well have been included in the Bill before. The fact that we are now turning to 17 government amendments, with at least eight substantive ones, speaks to the fact that the Bill could have been more carefully drafted. I will not take too much time dwelling on this issue, but it is important to raise that we on this side have been clear throughout Committee that we need to develop legislation that is robust and unambiguous and that can tackle this serious problem. That the Government are only just realising at this late stage that they have missed out key provisions perhaps does not inspire confidence.
Broadly speaking, we support the amendments in this group, in so far as they allow the more effective enforcement of some of the provisions in this Bill, in particular specifying that the NCA will have the capability to seize relevant articles and exercise reasonable force. However, we need to make sure that these powers are exercised with due care and proper procedure and process. I hope the Minister will set out how this will be ensured.
My Lords, our amendments in this group speak to the important principle that, if we are going to do something serious about this issue, we need to make sure those who will be undertaking that vital work are given all the tools they need.
Amendment 72 removes the restriction under Clause 20 that a person may be searched only once. That limitation is both arbitrary and impractical. In the real world, people arriving in the UK illegally may conceal items, documents, electronic devices and false identification, only to reveal or discard them later. Preventing further searches, even when officers have fresh grounds for suspicion, is not a safeguard; it is a gift to traffickers and smugglers. This amendment would correct that mistake and restore operational flexibility where there is lawful cause. Indeed, we need look no further than the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for precedent and recognition of this fact; it permits multiple searches of a person if there are reasonable grounds. This is a commonplace power and we must ensure that it is incorporated in the Bill if we are to effectively tackle this sort of criminality.
Furthermore, Amendment 73 removes the requirement that a person must have been on the premises before a search can take place. Criminal organisations are constantly adapting their tactics, using safe houses, transferring items between locations and avoiding detection by not being physically present. By tying an officer’s hands to whether a suspect was on the premises at a precise moment, we risk losing vital evidence and allowing dangerous networks to evade accountability. This change would ensure that we are not outwitted by legal technicalities.
Furthermore, Amendment 74 removes unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles that require prior authorisation from an inspector and notification to a superintendent for a constable to conduct a search. Amendment 78 applies this principle to the seizure of relevant articles. Of course, oversight is vital, but we must not confuse oversight with obstruction. Our officers already operate within a strict legal framework and we are of the view that adding yet another layer of sign-off, particularly in time-sensitive operations, risks slowing down action, delaying disruption and missing crucial opportunities to intercept criminal activity. Officers need to be able to respond quickly, flexibly and effectively if we are to stand up to those who violate our borders. Indeed, constables are not subject to this requirement to seek permission to conduct a search under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and in Section 18 of that Act, police offers are only required to inform an officer of at least the rank of inspector as soon as is practicable after they have conducted a search, not before. This provision to seek permission is therefore unnecessary and not in line with the relevant existing legislation.
These amendments are about restoring operational realism and strengthening our capacity to protect. If we are serious about securing our borders, cracking down on illegal entry and dismantling the networks that exploit vulnerable people for profit, we must give our officers the clear, workable powers they require. These amendments are sensible proposals that would cut back bureaucracy and allow us to get on and deal with this problem more effectively.
Finally, Amendment 91 would remove the requirement that a constable must obtain authorisation from an inspector and that the inspector must notify a super- intendent before accessing, copying or using information from a relevant article seized under Clause 23. We need to be clear on this. Clause 23 deals with information that may relate to the commission of serious immigration offences. In such cases, time is not a luxury. It is often the difference between success and failure—between a dismantled network and a missed opportunity. Indeed, this issue runs through all the amendments that I have spoken to in this group.
The current drafting imposes a two-tier authorisation system before any such information can even begin to be examined. The requirement to obtain inspector-level authorisation for each individual access, and then to escalate that to a superintendent, adds a bureaucratic burden that could hinder fast-moving investigations, especially when such information could reveal links to other suspects, routes and wider criminal infrastructure. Our amendment would ensure that our officers have the practical powers they need in a way that means they can be exercised with urgency and purpose. The constable will still be required to act lawfully, proportionately and within the scope of the clause, but removing these layers of procedural delay would ensure that our enforcement efforts are not undermined by red tape.
We cannot, on the one hand, claim to be taking a tough stance on illegal immigration and organised criminality and, on the other, design a framework that ties the hands of those trying to enforce the law. Amendment 91 works alongside our other amendments in this group to correct that imbalance. It would strengthen our operational capability while retaining the legal and ethical standards we rightly demand. I urge the Committee to support these amendments, and I beg to move.
I rise to speak to the amendments tabled by noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench. As we have heard, Amendment 72 proposes to remove the requirement for an authorised officer to ensure that a person has not previously been searched using these powers. I respectfully but robustly oppose this proposed change. These are intrusive powers that allow for the physical searching of individuals who are not under arrest and could be victims or witnesses. To apply such powers multiple times to the same person without any procedural check not only is disproportionate but risks undermining public confidence in the fairness and proportionality of our system. We must remember that this safeguard was introduced for good reason. It was informed by lessons learned from previous misuse that led to legal challenge. Its inclusion has helped to address legitimate concerns about the potential for abuse of power.
Amendment 73 proposes removing the requirement that the relevant person must have been on the premises when, or immediately before, they were encountered by an authorised officer. We respectfully oppose this change. This safeguard is essential. It ensures that there is a clear and direct link between the individual suspected of possessing a relevant article and the premises being searched. Without it, the power becomes too broad, allowing searches of premises even when there is no reasonable basis to believe the person was ever present. The presence of the individual is often the only factual basis upon which an officer can form reasonable grounds to suspect that a device or article is located there. Removing this requirement risks turning suspicion into speculation.
Amendments 74, 78 and 91 propose removing the requirement for police constables and National Crime Agency officers to obtain authorisation from an inspector or equivalent grade before exercising powers under Clauses 20, 21 and 23. Furthermore, the amendments would remove the requirement that an inspector notifies a superintendent or equivalent grade as soon as reasonably practicable. We strongly oppose these proposed changes. These are significant intrusive powers, and the current authorisation process is not an administrative burden. Rather, it is a vital safeguard to ensure the powers are applied with proportionality, due process and respect to the legal system. It ensures that decisions to use the powers where we are obtaining personal data and privacy are subject to senior oversight and scrutiny, helping to prevent misuse and maintaining public confidence and trust in those who use the powers and in the Government.
Unlike immigration officers, who may use these powers more routinely, police and NCA officers may not exercise them as frequently. That makes the case for retaining oversight stronger, not weaker. Removing this safeguard risks inconsistent application of the powers and undermines the legal and ethical standards we have worked very hard to uphold. Again, we want the system that we are introducing to command confidence across all of society. That means that we have to balance powers given to the authorities with safeguards and proportionality. We must ensure that these powers are used lawfully, proportionately and effectively. Retaining the requirement for senior authorisation is an essential part of achieving that balance.
For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, at the heart of this group of amendments lies the proposition that, if we are to confront the scale and complexity of illegal entry into this country, and indeed the criminal networks that are facilitating it, we must empower those on the front line to act swiftly, decisively and within a framework that reflects operational reality, not burdensome bureaucracy.
We on these Benches have listened carefully to what the Minister has said, but I am afraid that I have heard no compelling justification for why officers should be constrained to a single search, even in circumstances where new evidence arises, nor have we been given assurance that the narrow drafting of the premises clause will not impede investigations where criminal activity is thought to be located. I say to the Minister that those who orchestrate illegal crossings are not bound by procedure or protocol. Current legislation with regard to searches does not require such restrictions, so why should it apply here?
Under the current drafting of Clauses 20 to 23, the Bill proposes the imposition of a procedural bottleneck on our officers, who are working under pressure, often with incomplete information and in fast-moving, high-risk environments. We expect these officers to deliver results. Indeed, the Minister and his Government have staked a huge amount of political capital on these officers delivering results. Therefore, we need to make sure that we take decisions in this place so that those officers are equipped and empowered to get the job done.
These amendments would not lower standards; they would reduce delay and would not undermine safeguards. They would ensure that the law serves those it is meant to protect, not those who seek to exploit its gaps. If we are truly committed to securing our borders, upholding the rule of law and dismantling the infrastructure of exploitation that underpins these crossings, we must match the rhetoric with reality. These amendments certainly speak to our ambition, which is to give the officers the tools they need to do their jobs effectively.
My Lords, having supported the noble Baroness on her previous amendments, from these Benches we do so on these, too.
My Lords, I will speak briefly on Amendments 84 and 90, tabled by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead. These amendments raise a serious and important concern that we believe merits the attention of the Committee. It seeks to ensure that, where personal belongings are retained by the authorities under Clause 23, particularly in the case of potential victims of modern slavery, those items and the information they contain are preserved in a manner that allows them to be relied on as part of a national referral mechanism determination.
For many victims of trafficking, the evidence contained on a mobile phone or similar device may be the only proof they possess of their exploitation, whether that be messages, photographs or location data. To risk the loss, corruption or mishandling of that data would not only undermine the pursuit of justice but could place the individual concerned at even greater risk. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. These protections are vital.
That said, we also recognise that many of these safeguards may already be provided for under the existing statutory framework, particularly under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which governs how evidence is secured and handled. But I accept what my noble friend said earlier about retention by police in some cases. If the Minister can offer the Committee reassurance that those protections already apply in the context of Clause 23 and that the rights of potential victims are adequately safeguarded in practice, that will be most welcome. This amendment raises a proper, necessary point of clarification and we hope the Government will respond accordingly.
My Lords, in addressing Amendments 84 and 90 proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, I first take the opportunity to pay tribute to her work in this area, particularly as chair of the Global Commission on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, and indeed I acknowledge and pay tribute to her continued dedication to protecting vulnerable individuals. However, having said that—there is always a “however”—we feel that the amendments that she has tabled are not entirely necessary.
The amendments seek to introduce a statutory requirement to protect seized or surrendered items so they may later be used as evidence in court or in the national referral mechanism. Although obviously we agree with the intention behind them, we believe that they are unnecessary. The policy objective underpinning this measure is to ensure that the United Kingdom has the necessary powers to search for, seize, retain and use information from electronic devices belonging to irregular entrants or arrivals in relation to facilitation offences. These powers are vital to disrupting the operations of organised crime groups that exploit vulnerable individuals. It is essential that the focus of these powers is not changed and that authorised officers are fully equipped to use them effectively.
First, the current legislative framework already provides robust safeguards for the handling of personal property—notwithstanding the exchange with the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hanson, which I am afraid I was not in the Chamber for, on the operation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The Bill ensures that any electronic devices seized are treated appropriately and that any data they contain is preserved and processed in accordance with data protection laws, evidentiary standards and human rights obligations.
Safeguards are particularly important in the context of modern slavery and human trafficking, where, as we have heard, victims may be in possession of devices that contain sensitive personal information, indeed evidence of exploitation, or communications with support services. The Bill ensures that such material is handled with care and integrity, protecting both the individual’s privacy and the integrity of any ongoing investigation.
We recognise the importance of timely access to personal devices, particularly for victims of modern slavery, who may rely on them for communication, evidence or support. If we are able to successfully download relevant data from a device, we will return the phone to the individual at the earliest opportunity. If the device is still required for the purposes of investigation, we will retain it for only as long as is reasonably necessary. If the device must be retained, we can provide the victim with any downloaded material they may need to support a national referral mechanism application or to access support services.
As I said, the Bill makes it clear that devices and other personal property will be retained only for as long as necessary. Once they are no longer required for the purpose for which they are seized. they must be returned to the individual as soon as is practicable. This approach, we feel, strikes the right balance between empowering law enforcement to act decisively against organised immigration crime and trafficking networks, while safeguarding the rights and dignity of individuals, particularly those who may be victims of modern slavery. Given that, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
(5 days, 16 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first of all, I want to congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady May, for getting legislation about modern slavery on to the statute books. I want to say thank you very much, because we have people—some from my own country—coming here under that very disheartening reality. The second thing I want to mention is what the noble Baroness did with the Hillsborough inquiry. She resolved a lot of pain for a lot of people in Liverpool, so I wanted to say thank you for that.
The question I want to ask is this. Under Amendment 47, the line of defence would be that they were
“acting under the duress of slavery”.
What about a member of one of these criminal gangs that are bringing people over? They could easily say as their defence, “I was under duress when I did what I have done”. What would be the response to such a line of defence?
My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by my noble friend Lady May, raise some interesting questions that I hope the Government will be able to address.
Modern slavery is of course an extremely serious issue. As the recent report from the Global Commission on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking—which is most ably chaired by my noble friend—made clear, the effect that this brutal trade can have on the people involved is truly harrowing. It is right that the Government take this opportunity to outline how they will incorporate protections for those who are acting under duress of slavery into the immigration system. I welcome my noble friend’s amendment in so far as it provides the Government with an opportunity to address this important issue.
However, I want to raise a cautious concern about one particular aspect of the amendment, which is that the protection would apply only once someone’s status as having acted under the duress of slavery had been established. I understand that determining this status would involve going through the national referral mechanism, which, as noble Lords across the Committee will be well aware, faces severe backlogs. Not only that but, as the UN themselves has highlighted, far fewer foreign applicants under the NRM actually have a decision made in their favour, suggesting that immigrants are increasingly applying to the NRM on the basis that this will delay any decision to remove them, rather than because they have genuine grounds for a claim. That raises the question of whether the amendment would risk creating another loophole and another incentive for those crossing in small boats to delay any decision on their application in the full knowledge that the NRM mechanism already is severely delayed and backlogged.
It is the duty of the Government to seek to protect those who are under duress of slavery. As I have said, the amendment might risk creating a considerable loophole that could be easily exploited by bad actors. That is not to say that I do not support the intent behind the amendment, but I will be paying close attention to what the Minister has to say on this point.
On Amendment 49, we agree that this is an important provision and that it makes complete sense to be assured that articles will be both protected and kept in a condition that will allow them to be used and referred to in any future case. As my noble friend has already alluded to, my understanding is that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers will already cover this, and that if any seized articles were lost or damaged then that would perhaps be a disciplinary matter for the officer involved. We therefore question whether a protection in the Bill in the form of this amendment is necessary, but the point that my noble friend raises is an important one. We will join her in seeking strong assurances from the Minister that these articles will be protected and kept in a condition that will allow them to be used in the future.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, for tabling these amendments and instigating this discussion. I am grateful for the efforts that she took as Home Secretary, all those years ago, to establish the first Modern Slavery Act, following the very good process that the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, mentioned. As I recall, having been the shadow at the time, that process had Frank Field, among others, chairing cross-party pre-legislative scrutiny efforts, which led to the legislation—the Act whose implementation my right honourable friend the current Home Secretary and I, as Members of Parliament, shadowed at the time.
It is one thing to pass an Act—we have all done that many times in this House and other Houses—but it is quite another to retain what I sense is a lifelong interest and passion for the issue. I say to the noble Baroness, 10 years on, that it is a tribute to her commitment at the time that she continues to do that. I also pay tribute to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lord, Lord Randall, in his absence, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton. All four have now formed a sort of coalition—I think we will call them the quartet after the earlier intervention by colleagues—that is taking a real interest in the development of this issue. I was pleased to address, on behalf of the Government, a reception in the House of Lords a couple of weeks ago at which the noble Baroness, Lady May, appeared virtually to look at the next stages of tackling this issue.
Having said all that, I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that the amendments she has tabled today are covered by existing legislation. I am willing to be tested on that, but I hope I can give her that reassurance. She raised these issues at Second Reading and I hoped I had given her such reassurances then.
Amendment 47 seeks to provide a reasonable excuse for articles for use in immigration crime for those who are acting under duress of slavery, a point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu. I put it to the noble Baroness and the other noble Lords that the protections she is seeking are covered by Section 45 of the very Modern Slavery Act 2015 that was legislated for at that time. Going back to the point mentioned by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, Section 45 provides a statutory defence against prosecution where an individual was compelled to commit an offence as a result of their exploitation. That is very clear in the Modern Slavery Act, which—this is my view and that of my legal advisers in the Home Office, and I hope it has been echoed again today—can be interpreted to mean that, in the event of trafficking from modern slavery, all of the provisions of the Bill can be dealt with by that statutory defence. We can debate that, but I hope it will eventually satisfy the noble Baroness’s noble intention in bringing forward the amendment today.
(6 days, 16 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am sure that all parliamentarians will agree that tackling money laundering is a shared mission across both Houses to create a safer society and support our economy. I am proud that the previous Conservative Government introduced the economic crime levy, which raises some £100 million per year from the anti-money laundering sector. I am pleased that today’s proposals build on this legacy of tackling money laundering.
These proposals will raise the threshold for two exemptions that apply to principal money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 from £1,000 to £3,000. This will reduce the resourcing burden on law enforcement and enable our officers to dedicate more time to activities that yield greater asset denial and to disrupting criminal operations more effectively.
If we look at the number of defence against money laundering reports submitted to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit in 2024, we can see why there is a case for raising the threshold. In 2024, 23,000 reports were submitted relating to transactions between £1,000 and £3,000. Of these, only 182 were refused, leading to £209,565 of assets denied. This represents 0.1% of all assets denied as a result of defence against money laundering reports in 2024.
It is both necessary and appropriate that we ease the pressure on enforcement agencies at this level and allow resources to be focused where they can have the greatest impact on tackling the most serious crimes. This policy area has been under review following the threshold rise in 2023, and a targeted consultation was carried out on money laundering reports. The outcome of the consultation shows strong support for increasing the threshold to at least £3,000. Respondents cited multiple benefits, including a reduction in the reporting burden, the reallocation of resources to higher-value investigations, and improved outcomes for customers, particularly by reducing the number of legitimate account users who face access issues. Raising the threshold to £3,000 is supported by the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, which believes it will also reduce the reporting burden on business and free up its resources to focus more on high-value activity.
Although the case is clear to raise the threshold, the Government must also be aware of the potential risks of criminals splitting transactions to come under the threshold. This was raised by a respondent in the consultation. Although mechanisms are in place, this must be a consideration. I ask the Minister to confirm that crime rates under that £3,000 level will be monitored and that the threshold will be changed again if it becomes necessary.
In conclusion, I support today’s proposals, which will help to tackle money laundering. There is no place for crime groups attempting to launder their illicit funds through the UK financial system. It is right that we prioritise resourcing for the highest crimes.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for having a shared approach to money laundering. He is right to point to the fact that there has been a consultation on this matter. He is also right to point out that, in essence, there is a shared understanding between all parties that the money laundering threshold needed to be reviewed. The figure of £3,000 that we have put in this order sets a balance. We will always keep it under review—there is potential for higher figures, which have been discussed as part of the consultation—but we have settled on a threshold of £3,000, which strikes the appropriate balance between reducing low-value reporting and mitigating the potential loss of asset denial outcomes.
The noble Lord is right to say that we need to ensure that we examine the risk of criminals splitting transactions into smaller amounts and seeking to avoid detection. The raising of the threshold is data led. It addresses an acute consumer duty risk and creates capacity in firms to tackle higher-value, more societally impacting economic crimes, all of which outweighs the residual risk of criminals circumventing the threshold limit as of now. The noble Lord was right to point to the very low level of transactions of interest between £1,000 and £3,000 in the previous regime, which resulted in further examination.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support. I can assure him that we will keep all matters under review, including the performance of this threshold, but I take and welcome his considered support. I commend the order to the Committee.
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025, which rightly moves to proscribe the group Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation under UK law.
The right to protest peacefully is a fundamental cornerstone of our democracy, as many noble Lords have expressed here this afternoon. It is a right that generations have fought to protect, but there is, and must be, a clear line between legitimate protest and violent coercion and wanton damage. Palestine Action has crossed that line repeatedly and deliberately, as its actions at RAF Brize Norton last month, which we have heard about, made absolutely clear.
This is not a question of silencing dissent, nor of suppressing pro-Palestinian voices; it is a move to uphold the rule of law and our true freedoms. It is intended to protect the public from targeted, dangerous and ideologically motivated criminal acts. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has tabled an amendment to regret the proscription of Palestine Action. She set out that she is concerned that civil disobedience is being misinterpreted. We on this side are clear that Palestine Action’s actions do in fact cross a line. Civil disobedience is one thing, but breaking into, attacking and seriously damaging our national defence infrastructure is another, as was made clear by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
If the noble Baroness does not want to take my word for it, maybe she will listen to the words of the group itself, previously cited by the Minister. Palestine Action’s own training materials have stated that it is
“not a non-violent organisation”.
The group has a footprint in all 45 policing regions in the UK and has pledged to escalate its campaign. A group that openly admits its intention to be violent cannot be disregarded as a threat in the way that the noble Baroness proposed. A group that advances its views through violence is itself a direct threat to the integrity of free speech in our country.
It is clear that Palestine Action’s entire modus operandi is to use direct, violent action in pursuit of political ends. Its members do not operate through petitions, campaigns or democratic engagement; they operate through sabotage, criminal damage and threats. They have repeatedly targeted companies involved in the UK defence sector, often without regard for legality. They do so with the explicit intention of coercing change through unlawful means.
The group was established on 30 July 2020, when activists broke into and vandalised the interior of the UK headquarters of Elbit Systems in London. From the very beginning, members of this group have been intent on causing damage and have acted to assert their views through criminal violence. Is that not the rightful definition of a terrorist organisation?
Time and time again, Palestine Action’s activities have endangered third parties. They have vandalised property, occupied buildings and attacked not only private companies but critical components of our national defence. Its tactics are both calculated and militant.
When a group pursues its aims, not through democratic discourse, but through organised campaigns of destruction and violence, and strives to terrorise legitimate businesses and opinion-formers, its acts are those of terrorism as defined by the law. This order does not criminalise views; it outlaws those who use terror and violence to force their views on others.
To fail to act would send a message that violent extremism would be tolerated if it is dressed up as enthusiastic activism. We cannot allow such ambiguity. We must be consistent. This country has proscribed far-right groups that promote violence under the banner of nationalism; it did so in the 1930s against the Blackshirts. We cannot allow such abhorrent methods today. We must apply the same standard to all who use violence and intimidation and who seek to advance political causes by criminal means against law-abiding members of society.
This proscription does not ban support for Palestinian rights or peaceful demonstrations; it is a necessary step to uphold public safety and the democratic rule of law. There are other voices lawfully making the case for Palestine and Palestinians; Palestine Action is not one of them. We support this order in its entirety because we believe in protecting the public, defending our democracy and drawing a firm line against those who would use violence to impose their political will. We therefore welcome the Government bringing this order and are pleased to support it.
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to what has been a thorough and testing debate. Having introduced the order on behalf of the Government, it is my responsibility to respond to the points that have been made today. All three organisations in the order before us—this is a very important point for Members to remember—are subject to the same tests under the 2000 Act that this House and the House of Commons passed and put in place for 25 years, along with, to date, around 80 proscription orders that were passed under similar tests.
This debate is not about whether you support the rights of the Palestinian people to a homeland, whether you are appalled at the actions of the Israeli Government, or whether you think the Israeli Government are acting fairly and proportionately following the Hamas kidnappings and murders. This is not about that issue. It is not, dare I say it, about the right to protest. I served with my noble friend Lord Hain in Northern Ireland for two years, and I have some admiration for the way that he has approached some of the issues that I shared. I said at the outset that I have been carried out of a building for protesting the apartheid regime, I protested against the fascist regime in Chile and I have been on a picket line during the miners’ strike. I have been involved in protests across my political life that have been fair and open, but not those that have not led to harassment, intimidation, violence and criminal damage.
Noble Lords in this debate have, dare I say it, fallen into two camps—with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who asked legitimate questions that I will return to. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the noble Lords, Lord Harper, Lord Beamish, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, Lord Austin of Dudley, Lord Turnberg, Lord Carlile, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, and the Official Opposition have all, in one way or another, supported the approach that the Government have taken.
From this Front Bench, I recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has tabled an important amendment that has generated this debate—which is an important part of the democracy that I believe we should stand up for. She has had support from my noble friends Lord Hain and Lady O’Grady, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Bennett. Again, she has put forward a legitimate point of view, but I want to draw noble Lords back to the essence of this debate.
Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe organisations that she believes are concerned with terrorism. There is a clear definition of terrorism in that Act, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said, has stood the test of time:
“‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action … designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public”
and the actions used or threatened must involve
“serious violence against a person … serious damage to property … endangers a person’s life … creates a serious risk to … health … or … is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”.
I say again that all three organisations in this order are being judged on their actions as to whether they are committing or participating in acts of terrorism, preparing for terrorism, promoting terrorism or are otherwise concerned with terrorism. If that statutory test is met, factors that the Home Secretary takes into account include the nature and scale of the organisation, the specific threat, the extent of the presence and the need to have support from members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.
The Home Secretary does not sit in 2 Marsham Street and say, “What’s happening today? Should I proscribe these organisations?” There is a decision, which is never taken lightly. That decision has robust processes in place to ensure the evidence is available and is carefully reviewed and considered. The decision to proscribe Palestine Action has been taken with significant considerations, which include technical assessments, deep engagement with the subject matter, experts from across government, policy officials, law enforcement and a proscription advisory group that makes recommendations to the Home Secretary to determine whether that proscription is legitimate.
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend goes right to the heart of the Question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham. Individuals from any community, in this case the Jewish community, have the right to enjoy their lives without intimidation, threat or harassment, or indeed calls for death to be implemented on sections of a community. There is a role for peaceful protest and for argument about who and what happens in the Palestine-Israeli situation; that is perfectly legitimate. It is not legitimate to move that into harassment, intimidation or death threats.
With regard to the BBC, as I have mentioned, my right honourable friend is in active negotiation and discussion with the chair of the BBC. I am sure she will make further statements. Indeed, this very morning at DCMS Questions in the House of Commons, she answered further questions on this. There are certainly lessons to be learned, but I reassure my noble friend that members of the Jewish community, and indeed members of any community who face harassment and intimidation, deserve the support of the law, which is why Avon and Somerset Police are currently investigating to see whether that criminal threshold has been crossed.
My Lords, the Hamas attacks of 7 October targeted innocent people attending a music festival, so it was horrifying to see the events at Glastonbury. Yesterday, during a protest in Whitehall, protesters were repeating the very same chant used by those performers at Glastonbury and currently under investigation by police. Can the Minister confirm that the Government share the view that this calling for the death of Israeli soldiers is incitement to violence, and can he confirm that, in the interest of applying the law equally, leading on from the point made by my noble friend Lord Bellingham, the same action will be taken against those who incite violence on our streets, not just those who do so from a stage?
I hope that I can again reassure the noble Lord. Legislation is in place, and his Government previously and this Government now want to see that legislation implemented when the police judge that criminal thresholds have been crossed. It is not for Ministers to determine whether a criminal threshold has been crossed; it is for the police to present a case to the Crown Prosecution Service, for the Crown Prosecution Service to put that to the courts and for a jury to convict or otherwise on the basis of evidence supplied. But I am supportive of his general aim. It is important that harassment, intimidation, threats and calls for death are seen as the serious criminal events that they potentially are. Therefore, it is right and proper that in this case Avon and Somerset Police follow that through, and it is right and proper that in any event, be it at a music festival, a football ground, a street protest or anything else, people have the right to protest but not the right to threaten, harass, intimidate or call for death.
(1 week, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, next to North Korea, the UK rates as one of the countries with the greatest surveillance presence—which, I might add, is no bad thing in my book. We heard from the Government that they are exploring whether legislation on facial recognition technology is necessary. What steps are they taking to address the great deal of public concern that clearly exists about this issue? How might this tie in with the Government’s position on ID cards?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support for a range of surveillance methods. CCTV, for example, is one of the greatest crime prevention tools brought in in the last 30 years. It shows what happened at an event, not what might have been perceived to have happened, so it is very valuable. With DNA, CCTV and, potentially, facial recognition technology, progress is made through public confidence; and the Peelian principle of the police having the trust of the community is paramount. Going back to question of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that is why we have consulted to get a range of views on this issue before potentially bringing forward better regulation to meet the very issue my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has raised.
As to ID cards, when I was last a Home Office Minister, in 2009-10, we had ID cards; in fact, I had ID card number 3, I think. It proved to be useless because the Government he supported abolished ID cards in around 2011. If he wishes to bring them back, that is a debate we can have, and I look forward to engaging with him on it in due course. But it was not me who abolished them.
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, we on this side recognise the Government’s intention to update the Investigatory Powers Act introduced by the previous Government, and we are supportive of introducing measures that protect the public by giving law enforcement the tools they need to prevent and prosecute crime.
As noble Lords across the Committee are aware, technology is a fast-moving space. As society’s use of technology changes, it is essential that we adapt and it is imperative that our public authorities are fully equipped with capabilities to prevent criminals exploiting technology features, hiding their identity, evading detection and putting the public at risk.
This statutory instrument amends the Investigatory Powers Act by providing 11 new public authorities with the power to obtain communications data. Seven of the new public authorities listed will have the power to apply for an independently approved authorisation to compel telecommunications and postal operators to disclose communication data. The remaining four entries are English ambulance trust services that were previously designated under the definition of an ambulance trust in England, which included a total of 10 ambulance services in England. Under the changes, this definition has been removed and replaced with individual entries, as six of these ambulance services have confirmed they no longer require the communication data powers.
Following the Home Office’s review of Schedule 4, this instrument ensures that only public authorities with a need to acquire communications data will be able to request access. While we on these Benches do not oppose the amendments being made, we must question why certain ambulance services will hold the ability to retain this power over other ambulance services.
We recognise that some ambulance services should retain these powers, which may help in preventing serious injury or death, but we must consider whether the inconsistent treatment of ambulance services presents any future risks. We understand that access to communications data is useful for some ambulance services, but we must not rule out that others might require access in future. Can the Minister assure us that services requiring access in future will not be unduly limited or delayed if judged to be in the pursuit of legitimate public interest?
We recognise that these powers are necessary, but they need to be complemented by adequate resources if they are to be wielded effectively. Can the Minister therefore update us on what consultations his department has undertaken with the public authorities empowered by the regulations? Can he confirm that those authorities have adequate resources and legal advice on the use of the new powers?
We recognise that the addition of entries to Schedule 4 increases the demand and strain on the resources of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. This concern has been raised in Brian Leveson’s annual report on the use of communications data. It is essential that the Government consider ways to reduce pressures on the operational effectiveness of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. Can the Minister set out what steps will be taken to address this?
In conclusion, while we do not oppose the measures being introduced, we would like some reassurance that those ambulance services that have been excluded will not be disadvantaged in the pursuit of preventing injury or death. We urge the Minister to recognise the impact of the amendments on the resources of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office and ask for further clarification on how these authorities will be supported in exercising these powers in the interests of the public.
I am grateful to noble Lords for the short and useful debate. As my noble friend Lord Jones, who I have known for a very long time, said, it is useful to challenge the Executive on a number of matters to date.
If I may, I will start with my noble friend Lord Jones, who made an all-encompassing comment regarding the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The current IPC is Sir Brian Leveson. He will be well known to Members of this House and has served in a number of capacities, including as a High Court judge. The commissioner is assisted by a team of 13 commissioners, who must all have held senior judicial office. Together they are responsible for the use of investigatory powers by public authorities. They are supported by a body of civil servants, known as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which includes authorising officers and inspectors. Self-evidently, as I mentioned earlier, they were put in place by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Their responsibilities include a statutory obligation to inspect the use of certain investigatory powers and to exercise delegated functions, as part of which they independently review communications data under Section 60A applications submitted by public authorities.
My noble friend touched on a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the budget. In the financial year 2023-24, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office operated within a budget of £15.74 million, of which it spent only £13.06 million. That was confirmed in the IPCO annual report 2023, which was published in May of this year. I hope that helps my noble friend.
I am grateful for his service, not just in both Houses but on the Intelligence and Security Committee, and for his kind words about my service. I hope that also answers in part the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper—who I will come back to in a moment—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.
The noble Lord, Lord Harper, made a very valid point about what the process is for a public authority to be added to Schedule 4. Public authorities can be added to Schedule 4 either through primary legislation or by the use of a delegated power provided at Section 71. The delegated power provided at Section 71 provides that we have an enhanced affirmative procedure, which includes the requirement for a 12-week statutory consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
The changes being made here are, in a sense, the result of the bodies themselves asking either to be included or removed from the Act. If they wanted to be added to Schedule 4, they had to supply a very comprehensive business case that officials in the Home Office have examined and evaluated in some detail. The Home Office has then had to include a 12-week consultation process with public authorities and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. In this case, the consultation period for the new additions began on 23 October 2024 and completed on 17 January 2025. The IPC agreed that the seven public authorities had made a clear case for access, and the IPC response informed the Home Secretary’s policy assessment to include the amendments in the regulations that we have put before the Grand Committee today.
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to my noble friend. He mentioned a report, which was from 2023. This Government have been very clear that, as I said in my original Answer to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, we need to provide accommodation that meets all contractual standards and is safe, fit for purpose and properly equipped. The contractual standards, which are in the Asylum Accommodation and Support Contracts, must meet decency levels and be maintained. That is the objective of this Government. As I say, the details my noble friend gave are from 2023.
My Lords, if the Minister wants to talk about voting against the Government, perhaps he might like to recall that his party voted more than 130 times against our Bill designed to avoid this situation. Under the Conservatives, the number of asylum seekers being housed in hotels decreased in three consecutive quarters prior to Labour coming into office. Since Labour gained power, the number of asylum seekers housed in hotels has risen by some 29%. At what point does the Minister think his Government will honour their manifesto, given that small boat arrivals are now over 20,000, which is an increase of around 50% on this time last year?
The Government set a clear direction of travel on reducing hotels, tackling the asylum backlog, trying to prevent people coming to this country unfairly in the first place and, when they do claim asylum, processing those claims much quicker. I point the noble Lord to one figure, which I hope is helpful to him. That figure is 9,208, which is the number of people who have been removed from the United Kingdom up to the end of 2024, since the general election. This compares with an average figure of around 2,000 for the previous Government during their term of office. The noble Lord and his Government got us into the position of a rise in hotel numbers to a maximum of 400, a rising cost to £9 million, a record number of people coming to this country, a failure to remove people who are being denied asylum, and a failure to process asylum claims in a speedy and effective way. We are clearing up his mess and doing the best we can to achieve that.
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument. In the coming weeks, we will be preparing to support our home nations in what will be a proud moment for Britain. The 2025 UEFA European Women’s Championship will be held in Switzerland. I am delighted that, this year, both the England and Wales women’s national teams have qualified for this prestigious moment. For Wales, this monumental occasion will mark the first time they have qualified at the European Women’s Championship. For our defending champions, England, this will be their 10th appearance at the competition. If I may say so, in the spirit of good internation relationships, I wish both teams well, and both are to be congratulated on having the opportunity to appear there.
We must recognise the symbolic significance of historical moments such as this for future generations of female footballers and athletes. Last year, the Football Association reported a 56% increase in the number of women and girls playing football. Between 2020 and 2024 alone, the number of female coaches rose by 88% and the number of referees increased by 113%. That is why it is essential for us to support the statutory instrument introduced today, which proposes a temporary extension of licensing hours across England and Wales should either or both teams progress to the semi-finals or the final.
The extension of the licensing hours comes after overwhelming support from a Home Office consultation. Under the instrument, the normal licensing requirements of submitting a temporary event notice application and the £21 fee to the local authority will not apply. The extension will apply only to the sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises, such as bars and pubs, but will not be applicable to off-trade premises, including supermarkets and off licences.
We must recognise that this occasion is one that can help support local pubs in England and Wales, many of which have faced challenges over recent years, with an unprecedented number of closures. During the Lioness’s 2022 triumph, a peak of 17.4 million viewers tuned into the BBC1 programme, making it the most watched women’s football game on UK television. An additional 5.9 million viewers streamed the game online to watch on the BBC iPlayer and the BBC Sport website and app.
Not only will the extension of licensing hours help boost business for pubs and bars but it will allow them to accommodate the increase in demand during these key tournament dates. Fundamentally, this is an opportunity for us to come together and cheer on our national teams, who have done so much to inspire people across the country. I am sure that both sides of the Committee will agree with the positive benefits of the statutory instrument raised in today’s debate, from inspiring the next generation of footballers to boosting our local businesses. We have lots to celebrate over the coming weeks, and I am sure noble Lords will join me in wishing the very best to both Wales and England for the tournament.
I am grateful to the three noble Lords for their contributions. The noble Lords, Lord Hayward and Lord Addington, have moved the goalposts slightly, in the sense that this was a women’s football order. It has had a full consultation, which has given the support to date that I have mentioned. Noble Lords have made a very compelling case for the Women’s Rugby World Cup based in the United Kingdom to be considered. I will certainly consider those representations, and I will get back to both noble Lords. At the moment, there are no plans in the Home Office for such an order, but that does not mean that we cannot consider it. However, there needs to be a public consultation, because we have to do that. I will have to reflect on whether that would fit in with the timescales for the event that both noble Lords mentioned.