Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Report stage
Tuesday 28th October 2025 Lords Chamber

The definitions which are listed in Amendment 2 are too precise. The role is much more one of strategic co-ordination than what I might call waving the rod to make things happen. These amendments introduce constraints, potentially compromising the flexibility that is required to appoint the best person to lead the strategic co-ordination efforts aimed at tackling border security threats and cracking down on illegal entry.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords who have tabled these amendments to allow us to have this discussion again on the Border Security Commander. Let me lay to rest one allegation straight away. This is not a gimmick. This is a serious piece of government policy to put in place a co-ordinating Border Security Command designed to co-ordinate activity across the board, including relations with our security services.

In answer to the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Harper and Lord Swire, and my noble friend Lord Hacking, to date it has secured £150 million of funding; has improved the number of Border Security Command officers to 227; has brought together world leaders from over 40 countries to mobilise the international fight on immigration crime; has disrupted criminal networks; has improved intelligence and strategic coherence; has led an international effort on an anti-smuggling action plan; has signed a proposal with Germany and the Calais Group in France; has launched a new sanctions regime focused on organised crime; and has supported the development of the plans that are being put into the Bill for the Home Secretary.

To answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, on the functions of the commander, Clause 3(4)(b) states that the commander must

“obtain the consent of the Secretary of State to issue the document”.

There is obviously some discussion with the Secretary of State. Ministers set their priority. If the Secretary of State does not agree with the proposed plans, potentially that consent will be a matter of discussion and arrangement. The key point is that there is an official appointed by the UK Government to co-ordinate those important Border Force control issues on border security, to tackle organised immigration crime and to end the facilitation of dangerous small boat crossings.

Yes, it is a difficult task. As the noble Lord, Lord German, has said, it has been inherited from the previous Government. The noble Lord, Lord Swire, asked why we did not employ people to tackle the backlog. Well, let me inform him that we are: we have put about 1,000 extra staff into doing what he has suggested the House does today. The allegation that I want to nail down is that this is a gimmick. It is not a gimmick. It is a serious piece of work that requires an important role in government to secure that work.

Amendments 1 and 2 relate to the Border Security Commander and seek to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander is a civil servant. With due respect to noble Lords, there is a slight misunderstanding. The noble Lord, Lord Swire, argued that we should potentially be drawing on somebody from a wider background. The current Border Security Commander was a senior police officer in the Metropolitan Police and, if this Bill is passed, he will be a member of the Civil Service. The Bill does not require that the post of Border Security Commander be reserved for existing civil servants. Indeed, the current officeholder was recruited externally.

Ultimately, given that the role sits within the Home Office and given that the commander leads a directorate in the department, the commander is a civil servant by that position: it does not mean that they have to be a civil servant by recruitment. There is no requirement that any future recruitment exercise would not seek to identify the most suitable candidate, irrespective of background. Therefore, the amendment is unnecessary.

Amendment 2 seeks to specify the prior experience required to be eligible to be appointed as Border Security Commander. It is important that we have the best talent. There are no limitations on that talent. In the event of a vacancy arising—at the moment, there is no vacancy—the Government have been clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for requiring step change in the UK’s approach to border security, providing a long-term vision, bringing together those individuals, providing leadership and maintaining the integrity of our border and immigration systems, domestically and internationally. That role is reflected in the Bill. The Bill puts the commander on a statutory footing and gives that legal back-up. It has been crafted to ensure that we have the best possible candidate for the role.

The noble Lord, Lord Swire—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I have a very short question. I have listened very carefully and the Minister has been very clear about the nature of the role. What powers will the Border Security Commander have when this Bill becomes law that they do not already have by virtue of being a civil servant reporting to the Home Secretary?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, I think the noble Lord misunderstands the focus of the Bill. The Bill is giving statutory footing to what is now happening. There is a Border Security Commander in post. That Border Security Commander has the roles that we have outlined here, but this puts the post on a statutory footing.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Can the Minister just set out clearly what difference that makes in the real world to dealing with any of these problems? Otherwise, it is just a piece of window dressing.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Let me just say to the noble Lord that I have been through a list of things that the Border Security Commander is doing now—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Without legislation.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Without legislation, but the statutory footing is there to put that position on a statutory footing and to put in place the statutory requirements to produce an annual report, to have the consent of the Home Secretary and to have some accountability to this House. The noble Lord can press the Minister as much as he wishes. I have set out the concrete things that this Border Security Commander has done in the 15 or 16 months that we have been in office and since we appointed Martin Hewitt to the post. It is a good record. These things would not have been done without his activity. The French agreement, the German agreement and the work in Iraq have been done because the Home Secretary enabled them. This was done without statutory backing, but it will be stronger with that statutory backing on the issues of the report, et cetera, to allow the Border Security Commander to do those things. I hope the noble Lord welcomes that but, if he does not, he can vote accordingly, as I always say. Vote accordingly and we will see what happens with those issues. But, ultimately, that is what we are trying to achieve.

The noble Lord, Lord Swire, made an important point about Jo Rowland. I place on record my thanks to Jo for the work that she has done. She has left not through the factual issues that the noble Lord, Lord Swire, mentioned, of failure, but through personal choice to pursue another job outside the Civil Service. That happens all the time with individuals. She has chosen to do that. The Home Office thanks her for her contribution during her time as a civil servant. She was not a civil servant before she came to the Home Office: she worked in the private sector. It is a perfectly legitimate thing to do and we should not let it lie that she has left because of any failure in that position.

[Lord Swire (Con)]

I am reflecting on the Minister’s remarks in answer to my noble friend Lord Harper’s earlier point. If the current situation is that the border commander is operating anyway, without the statutory footing, under whose authority is he currently acting?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

He is acting under the authority of the Home Secretary. If the noble Lord looks at the Bill, he will see that the statutory functions that it provides set out the terms of appointment and designation, as well as the functions, reporting mechanisms and responsibilities of the commander in relation to things such as the intelligence services—which, just for the record, are themselves employing world-class capabilities. Those capabilities, and the people behind them and their operations, are necessarily secret. However, I can confirm that, where it is appropriate, the agencies will be supporting the Border Security Commander in their work, and that they will be subject to the same authorisations that exist currently within a robust oversight regime. There is a whole range of things going on. The Bill is a focus to put them on a statutory basis. I do not think that the amendments, helpful though they are to tease out this discussion, are necessary for us to achieve our objective.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

The Minister just said something that I do not think is in the Bill. He talked about the security services. In Clause 3(3), on the functions of the commander, the Bill says:

“A partner authority must have regard to the strategic priority document in exercising its functions”.


Later, in Clause 3(6), the Bill specifically says that the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ are “not partner authorities”, so they are not obligated to follow the strategic priorities set out by the Border Security Commander. That is correct, because they should be following the strategic priorities set out by the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary respectively. I am not sure that what he said about their working together is quite right.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

By his own admission, the noble Lord did not attend Committee. It is the pity that he did not, because he could have raised some of these questions then. If he chooses to raise them now, on Report, I will give him the same answer. The Border Security Commander is working closely with the security services, and they have authorisation directly from the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary. Quite evidently, when they—or in this case he—are drawing up a plan to examine what needs to be done to solve the common issue of reducing small boat crossings, bringing criminals to justice and helping to speed up the asylum removals that the noble Lord, Lord Swire, referred to, then they are going to discuss and work with the security services. I am straying into a Committee-type session, which the noble Lord did not attend. I would rather stick to Report, which the noble Lord has attended. I think I have answered the questions that he has put before the House.

Turning to Amendment 26, if we return to the position we were in in 2016—which the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and noble Lord, Lord German, would have wished we maintained—we would still be a member of Europol. On a personal note, when I was a Member of the House of Commons, in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 I argued that we retain the capability of Europol and CIS as part of the EU-UK withdrawal agreement. That did not happen. But it is important that we ensure, post-Brexit agreement, that we have as close co-operation as possible with Europol on information gathering and criminal justice delivery capabilities—which the noble Lord and the noble Baroness mentioned. That is important. As we said in Committee, we have a strong existing relationship with Europol. We have around 20 permanent members of staff who work at the multi-agency liaison bureau at the agency’s headquarters in The Hague. The noble Lord asked whether we should have some Europol people here. We currently do not. That is a matter for discussion. Where we are now may be a matter for regret. I voted to remain, but we are where we are. Europol remains an independent organisation. It is accountable to the members of the European Union, and it produces its report to the European Union.

I say to the noble Baroness, and to the noble Lord who supports her, that the proposed new clause in her amendment would require reporting on all aspects of our co-operation with Europol. Ministers, including me, will regularly update Parliament on international law enforcement co-operation, including with Europol. We publish annual minutes of UK-EU specialised committees that monitor and review our trade agreements, including with Europol.

I am mindful that Europol is not a UK body. It answers to the European Commission and its member states, so bilateral co-operation may sometimes be something that we cannot publicly report on. It is not for us to report on some of the issues with Europol, because that is what Europol does. As the noble Baroness mentioned, once upon a time, in days gone by, we did have a British senior official leading Europol. That has changed; we are in a different world now. I assure her that the focus remains on disrupting organised crime, protecting vulnerable people, securing our borders and working in co-operation with Europol to achieve those objectives. To go back to the role of the Border Security Commander, one of his key roles is to oil the machinery of that operation, and work with colleagues who are directly operationally responsible, to make sure that we engender co-operation at a European level.

I therefore respectfully say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that Amendments 1 and 2 are not necessary, and I ask him not to press them. Amendment 26, from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is asking for things that we do not need to do, because we in this House are, in a sense, accountable for that relationship. I cannot report on all matters, but I get the spirit of what she is trying to say. On behalf of the UK Government, I want to have the closest co-operation possible with Europol and the European agencies, because we have a joint interest in tackling the criminal gangs and stopping individuals being exploited in those crossings.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short but useful debate. I thank all those who have participated.

I will say a few words on Amendment 26, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. In addition to the noble Baroness’s comments, I would say that we should be co-ordinating with our European allies on tackling the border crisis in any case. We need to stem the flow of illegal migration through Europe and across the channel, and to disrupt the criminal gangs that operate the smuggling network. However, we should be careful not to see this as some form of silver bullet. The problem cannot be solved simply by striking agreements with other European countries. We know the limited impact that the Government’s so-called “one in, one out” deal has had.

There is so much more that the Government could and should be doing to tackle the fully blown crisis at our border. They need to eliminate the pull factors and implement an effective deterrent. We had hoped the Government would take a long, hard look at their current policy, implement a serious and credible deterrent to prevent people crossing the channel in small boats, and present us with a commander with authority, rather than a commander with nothing to command. Evidently, that is not the case. We will watch very carefully and scrutinise the role of the commander. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord German (LD)]

I support my noble friend Lady Hamwee and will ask a couple of questions about the “concerned in” area. The Government’s Amendments 4 and 8 further expand the scope of offences in Clauses 13 and 14 by introducing this liability to be “concerned in” the supply or handling of articles. I understand that some of this phraseology is also in some of our counterterrorism laws, and I wonder whether it has been drawn from those very serious laws and just put in this in the moment.

The original intention of Clauses 13 to 17 was to target the activities of facilitators and organised criminal gangs. As my noble friend says, the worry is that the expansion of the offences risks inadvertently criminalising people who should be protected and providing unintended harms to those who are most vulnerable.

I have one other point about criminalising non-criminal actors. Perhaps the Minister could say a little word about legal practitioners. There is a certain ambiguity created by these broad offences which might risk affecting legal practitioners who provide legitimate services. Perhaps he could tell us whether that can be explicitly put into the Bill or explicitly ruled out of the amendments that the Government have put before us today.

In summary, these government amendments are seeking to widen further the extraterritorial counterterror-style offences. In turn, that requires statutory guardrails to prevent them targeting vulnerable individuals, and legal representation and legal practitioners, instead of solely the organised crime networks. I hope the Minister can put that matter to rest.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this short but worthwhile debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for tabling Amendments 3 and 6, and to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for speaking to them. These seek to criminalise possession with intent to supply and to ensure that those who arrange for a relevant item to be received by a third party fall into the scope of the offence.

As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, acknowledged, in response to the debate that we had in Committee on these amendments, the Government have tabled Amendments 4, 5, 8, 9, 16 and 17. These build on proposals advanced by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron, in Committee and, indeed, this evening on Report.

In refining the approach, we have tabled amendments that ensure that individuals who are concerned in the supply chain can be held accountable where they know that their actions are enabling criminal activity, and that those who are knowingly concerned in supplying articles for use in immigration crime fall in scope. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, noted, criminals are always developing new ways to pursue organised immigration crime, and we have to stay on top of them. These amendments are part of the package of measures in the Bill, and that is why we have tabled these government amendments, to address the concerns around third-party supply that were noted in Committee.

I believe that this matches the intent in the noble Lords’ amendments, both on Report and in Committee, by ensuring that those who are concerned in the supply of, or the making of an offer to supply, a relevant article for use in immigration crime, and those who are concerned in the handling of a relevant article for use in immigration crime, are in scope of this offence. As such, I hope that noble Lords are content with the government amendments and will not press theirs.

This is a proportionate and necessary step, one that targets the infrastructure behind the wicked trade of organised immigration crime. It allows us to disrupt the actions of not only those who commit offences directly but those who facilitate them through the provision of tools, materials or services. As we have already heard tonight, organised immigration crime works internationally, through networks of facilitators and organisers. This new offence, strengthened by this amendment, is about acting before the facilitation offences have happened, to prevent crossings and the risking of life, and everything that goes with it.

These amendments have safeguards in place, reflecting our wider discussion on this aspect, in that the individual must be knowingly engaged in facilitation to fall into scope, and law enforcement must be able to prove that knowledge, protecting those who act in good faith from these offences.

I turn to some of the questions and points raised. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and, from the Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord German, raised concerns about the language in the Bill and its precision.

First, on how “concerned in” is any different from the “handling” wording in the Bill—as Lord German asked—the Bill equips law enforcement with counter- terror-style powers to disrupt and dismantle smuggling operations far earlier, well before a boat is launched from the French coast and lives are put at risk. The amendment strengthens these powers, setting out that someone does not need to smuggle people into the UK themselves to face jail time. Law enforcement can also use these powers to go after people playing other roles in smuggling operations. This may include, for instance, providing a lorry to try smuggling people into the UK, sending money to buy small boat parts, or storing dinghies in warehouses knowing full well that they are being used for channel crossings.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about the breadth and vagueness of the use of “concerned in”. Would it, for instance, capture those who are selling boat equipment to sailors? To be clear, that is not the intention here. All that is changing with this amendment is setting out that someone involved in people-smuggling operations can face jail time, not just those smuggling people into the UK themselves.

To go to the heart of whether this is an overreach, which I think is the concern coming from the Liberal Democrat Benches, let us be absolutely clear, and I think we can all agree on this: vile people smugglers are wreaking havoc on our borders and are putting lives at risk to line their own pockets. None the less, law enforcement must follow a strict legal test and prove that someone knew the activity was part of smuggling operations. As with any criminal offence, independent prosecutors will look at all factors when considering prosecution and judge every case on its merits. Indeed, the officers who are carrying out potential seizures and applying for arrest warrants will bear in mind the usual high bar of evidential standards that prosecutors require for a successful prosecution. Nothing changes there.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked about the impact on legal practitioners. To be clear, this is about supplying goods, not services. There is a clear difference between people who want to supply dinghies to get people across the channel and those who are supplying people with legal services to defend an appeal claim for asylum, for instance.

Lastly, I turn to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, who asked for the bigger picture. This Bill is about making it harder for vile smugglers to operate. The new counterterror-style powers equip law enforcement with the tools that it needs to act earlier against the smugglers. I would say to the noble Lord that even one prosecution that stops a smuggler in their tracks could save countless lives. We have seen over many summers the number of people who are crammed on to those boats. If we can stop any single boat launching, through getting those dinghies seized earlier, that will have a material impact in saving lives.

This is tough legislation that builds upon the surge in operational action against people-smuggling networks. The National Crime Agency carried out around 350 disruptions on organised immigration crime networks—its highest level on record and a 40% increase on the previous year. Through these amendments, we send a clear and unequivocal message: those who enable immigration crime, whether through direct action or indirect facilitation, will face consequences. This aligns with the Government’s broader commitment to stop the boats and dismantle the nefarious networks that profit from the evil of human exploitation, and reinforces our resolve to tackle every link in the chain of illegal migration.

The Government’s approach has been clear from taking office: to go after the gangs. We need these offences enacted to allow operational colleagues to do their jobs. They will strengthen our ability to prosecute facilitators and reinforce our stance that nobody concerned in the supply of articles for use in such offences should be beyond the reach of the law.

Having said that, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to withdraw his amendment. We shall then formally move the government amendments in this group.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this short group. I have just one observation on the comments from the noble Lord, Lord German, around the phrase “concerned in”, which appears in the amendments. He stated that it appears in counterterrorism law. It also appears frequently in the criminal law around misuse of drugs. I would suggest that the criminal courts are well used to both interpreting and applying that phrase; there is a wealth of case law on it. I would also suggest that it is not unusual, difficult or exceptional phraseology.

I am very grateful for the assurances from the Minister. It is very welcome that the Government have listened to our concerns and addressed them with these amendments. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 3.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

4: Clause 13, page 7, line 12, at end insert—
“(1A) A person (“P”) commits an offence if—(a) P is concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply, a relevant article to another person, and(b) at any time when P is concerned in that act, P knows that the relevant article is to be used by any person in connection with an offence under section 24 or 25 of the Immigration Act 1971.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would expand the offence in clause 13 to cover being concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply, a relevant article for use in immigration crime.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her Amendment 7, and I shall speak to it in a moment. First, I shall speak to Amendments 10 and 11 in my name. I hope, for all the difficulties about some of the issues that the noble Lord, Lord German, has raised in relation to shaving, it is an attempt by the Government to meet the objectives of the noble Baroness’s original amendment in Committee as well as the report on the Bill from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which raised this as a matter of some importance.

I reflected on it after Committee and asked officials to draw up amendments, and amendments have been drawn up that allow essential items such as soap, tooth- paste and sanitary products to be used. Amendment 11 is there because there are things such as razor blades, or things such as a glass container that could be broken and be available as a weapon, and things such as aerosol cans that can be sprayed in people’s faces, which have to be exempted.

I confess that the question of shaving is one that might be worthy of further reflection and discussion, but we are where we are. This is not a pejorative statement, but some people who arrive will have beards; the ones who do not can wash with soap, use toothpaste and do all those things. Potentially, at some point, they can shave in a more controlled circumstance at a later date. Let us just reflect on that. It is an interesting point for debate but, ultimately, we have tried to settle on a reasonable compromise to meet the objectives of the Committee’s pressure on the Government and the Joint Committee report. I commend Amendments 10 and 11 to the House as they stand.

I have more difficulty with the noble Baroness’s Amendments 7 and 12. I appreciate that the intent of Amendment 12 is to safeguard legitimate legal professionals. I stress that the clause already provides a “reasonable excuse” defence, as she knows. The amendment, by explicitly referencing Section 12(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007, on the very points that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned—as indeed did the noble Lord, Lord Davies—narrows that defence rather than strengthening it.

Clause 16 is designed to target those who collect sensitive information for the purpose of facilitating immigration crime. It is not in any way, shape or form aimed at those who want to provide bona fide legal advice who are acting within the law. The offences will be intelligence-led and focused on organised criminal activity, not on those providing lawful counsel. For legal advisers to fall into scope of this clause, they would have to be, for example, gathering or providing information or advice to clients on how to make a clandestine crossing to the UK. That is not what legal advice is supposed to be in this circumstance. For once, I find myself in compadre with the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Harper, on that point, and I respectfully ask the noble Baroness not to press that amendment.

Amendment 7, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to exclude from liability those who handle articles likely to be used in immigration crime, if the intended user is themselves or a member of their immediate family. If I wanted to help to support somebody, I might well claim that I am a member of the immediate family and have an immediate family member supplying me with information—and there might well be organised criminal gangs which exploit family ties by pressure or other means to ensure that they mask that facilitation.

Clause 14 already requires that the article is “likely to be used in the course of immigration crime”. This threshold ensures that only those knowingly contributing to criminal activity are captured. I reassure the noble Baroness that I have been clear throughout the Bill’s progress that this House has a reasonable excuse on the face of the Bill, which is non exhaustive. Given the intention of this offence, and while respecting that the decision to prosecute is made entirely independently of government, I would expect that it would not generally be an operational or public interest matter to pursue people handling items in genuine pursuit of asylum or on behalf of family members. The CPS or any other legal entity that wishes to examine this matter would look at the intent behind the clause. The reasonable defence we have in Clause 14 is one I would refer the noble Baroness to and would hope to have her support on.

The law must remain clear and enforceable. The current drafting provides flexibility and discretion without compromising the clause’s intent. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will both withdraw Amendment 7 and not move Amendment 12 when it is reached. I commend Amendments 10 and 11 to the House as meeting the objectives the House ordered me to look at—in a nice, friendly way—in Committee.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I do not want to go over points that have already been made and which were made in Committee at greater length. However, I think it notable that work done by lawyers cannot, in the Government’s mind, be explicitly referred to. Perhaps I am particularly influenced by the work the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, is doing on the rule of law, or maybe not.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, said that a lawyer should not set out—I am paraphrasing—to support a criminal activity by his client. I do not think things are that black and white. Everyone is entitled to a defence. With items such as the documents and information referred to in Clause 16, the client is entitled to have the reason for having those argued, or to argue whether they fall within Clause 16(1). It is a case of blame the lawyers again—“let’s kill all the lawyers”. It is a point of considerable principle to me that the rule of law should be upheld, and that includes citizens being entitled to be supported by lawyers. However, I beg leave to withdraw—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

The noble Baroness implied that I am being pejorative about lawyers; I am not. If lawyers are doing what they are supposed to do, there is no problem at all. This clause specifically states that the person would be committing an offence only if they were collecting the information or using it in order to prepare for an offence. Somebody doing legitimate legal activity is not committing an offence. I strongly support the rule of law and lawyers doing legal work, just not lawyers who think their job is to facilitate immigration crime. I think the clause is therefore very well drafted.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I remind noble Lords that concluding speeches to press or withdraw an amendment should be brief and should not be subject to intervention. That is a normal courtesy of the House, according to the Companion.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

If I may stand up, not having sat down, I do not think the noble Lord would argue that somebody who has beaten a person up, for example, should not be entitled to a defence because it is an offence. We do not know the position until that person has been through the process. However, we should not weary the House—I do not want to imply that the noble Lord is wearying the House—by taking this further, so I again beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

8: Clause 14, page 8, line 11, at end insert—
“(2A) A person (“P”) commits an offence if, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (2B), P is concerned in—(a) the receipt of, or the arranging to receive, a relevant article from another person, or(b) the removal or disposal of a relevant article for the benefit of another person.(2B) Those circumstances are where, at any time when P is concerned in an act as mentioned in subsection (2A), P knows that the relevant article has been, is being, or is to be used by P or any other person in connection with an offence under section 24 or 25 of the Immigration Act 1971.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would expand the offence in clause 14 to cover being concerned in the handling of a relevant article for use in immigration crime.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

10: Clause 15, page 8, line 35, at end insert—
“(ca) any thing or substance designed for use for the purposes of personal cleanliness or personal hygiene,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would exempt products designed for use for the purposes of personal cleanliness or hygiene from the offences in clauses 13 and 14.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

13: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Online advertising of unlawful immigration services(1) A person commits an offence if— (a) the person creates, or causes the creation of, material whose purpose is, or effect will be, to promote an unlawful immigration service, and(b) the person knows or has reason to suspect—(i) that the material will be published on an internet service, and(ii) that the material has that purpose or will have that effect.(2) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person publishes material on an internet service or causes the publication of material on such a service,(b) the purpose of the material is, or the effect of the material will be, to promote an unlawful immigration service, and(c) the person knows or has reason to suspect—(i) that they are publishing the material or (as the case may be) that they are causing its publication, and(ii) that the material has that purpose or will have that effect.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person’s action was for the purposes of—(a) carrying out, or facilitating the carrying out of, work as a journalist, or(b) the publication of academic research.(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(d) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(5) In this section “material” means anything which consists of or includes—(a) text or moving or still images, or(b) speech or music.(6) In this section—(a) “unlawful immigration service” means a service whose purpose is to facilitate the commission of—(i) an offence under any of the Immigration Acts,(ii) a breach of immigration law (other than such an offence), or(iii) an offence under section 4, 5 or 6 of the Identity Documents Act 2010 in relation to an identity document within any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 7(1) of that Act,whether by providing goods or services, or both, or anything else;(b) “immigration law” has the meaning given by section 25(2) of the Immigration Act 1971.(7) In this section “publish” means make available to the public at large or any section of the public, whether or not in return for payment or any other form of consideration.(8) In this section “internet service” means a service that is made available by means of—(a) the internet, or (b) a combination of the internet and an electronic communications service (as defined by section 32(2) of the Communications Act 2003).(9) This section is subject to section (Application of section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) to internet service providers).”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause creates offences relating to the creation and publication of material promoting unlawful immigration services.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I think it is important to outline to noble Lords the policy objective underpinning this measure, which is essentially to give us a further measure to tackle the facilitation of organised immigration crime online and to ensure that law enforcement agencies have appropriate tools to break down organised crime groups’ exploitation of the online market, including social media.

Online platforms are exploited at scale to promote unlawful immigration services such as small boat crossings and the provision of fraudulent travel documents, and they allow organised crime groups to generate significant profits at the expense of vulnerable migrants. Approximately 80% of migrants arriving via small boats who have been debriefed by Home Office officials have stated that they used social media at a point in their irregular migration journey to either locate or communicate with an organised crime group or its agent. It is therefore essential that we take steps to put pressure on this by providing legislative back-up to the objective of reducing migrant crossings facilitated by social media.

Amendment 13 introduces an offence that criminalises the creation or publication, or indeed causing the creation or publication, of material whose purpose is or has the effect of promoting an unlawful immigration service. Such material will be considered criminal where the person knows or suspects that the material will be published on the internet, or that it has the purpose or will have the effect of promoting unlawful immigration services. There is a clear difference, if we look at the matters before the House today, between legitimate immigration and advice services, and those which offer unlawful services that facilitate breaches in the law of this land and risk our border security. Only online material that clearly has the purpose and intended effect of promoting unlawful immigration is in the scope of this offence, and I think it right that it should be. Exploitation of the online environment is something that organised crime groups are very familiar with and use to promote their services. I think it is widely known and discussed in the public domain, and this Government intend to do something about it.

The amendment will provide law enforcement with another offence to prosecute this type of online activity and will enable easier intervention compared to existing legislation. Under this offence, online material will not need to be linked to a specific instance or attempt of unlawful immigration, as is the case with existing legislation such as Section 5 of the Immigration Act 1971. Specifically criminalising the promotion of unlawful immigration services may lead to better prosecution outcomes, potentially including additional counts on indictment and longer sentences for facilitation of organised immigration crime. I think the whole House will welcome that.

Facilitation tactics have evolved, and it is right that we evolve in response. This complements illegal content duties for online companies under the Online Safety Act—which had its genesis under the previous Government, with opposition support, and the passage of which was completed by this Government—by explicitly criminalising the act of creating or publishing this type of content. Our determination to disrupt organised crime groups is clear, and that is why we are looking at this offence on Report today.

There are intermediate liability protections in place for online platforms, including social media, under Amendment 15, to emphasise that the focus is on those who are creating and publishing the content. Platforms will remain subject to existing duties relating to the management of illegal content, including that relating to organised immigration crime.

Online facilitation or organisation of immigration crime has no borders and therefore the majority of related online material identified is assessed—sadly—as posted overseas. It is therefore important that, through Amendment 18, the offence has extraterritorial effect and can be applied to online material created or published anywhere in the world, or by a person of any nationality. That is an important safeguard; again, it will take some work, but it is important that we put that down as an appropriate tool for those who operate from abroad. When we have those arrangements, we can in some cases extradite individuals to face justice in the United Kingdom if we have the relevant agreements.

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[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support what the Minister said and this group of amendments. I have a couple of questions, but he set out clearly for your Lordships’ House the scope of the use of online tools by organised crime groups to facilitate these offences.

I think that the Minister touched on the gaps in the law around having to be specific about certain offences. It would be helpful—either when he sums up, or perhaps he could write to us—to give us one piece of data on the interviewing of those who committed offences in scope. It would be useful to know about the existing scale of the use of this type of material, or the extent to which it facilitates immigration crime. I do not know whether it is that easy to set it out, but I am keen to understand, when these offences become law, the potential reduction in the crime committed as a result of it. He may be able to help us now.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I said in my introductory remarks, from debriefing, around 80% of people say they had an initial contact, inquiry or facilitation via social media. In essence, that means that potentially 80% of initial migrant crossings are generated through contact via social media. As with any crime, it is difficult to say what the target for reducing that would be, but the point is that it is not currently an offence. If this legislation is passed, it will be, and that gives us scope, in co-operation with partners, to go upstream. If those individuals are abroad, as the amendments later in the group suggest, then in countries where we have extradition agreements, and if we can find the individuals, we can bring them to justice.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister. I did listen and—he should not worry—I am not trying to pretend that he thinks that therefore we can reduce offences by 80% overnight. It would just be helpful to have a sense of what impact this might have. I also welcome the extraterritoriality clauses, because he is right that it means that we can use extradition offences, but we can also use some of the other tools that we have at our disposal once we can demonstrate that there are offences.

My specific question picks up Amendment 14. I agree with the Minister that there should be defences, or carve-outs, for internet service providers that are carrying out their lawful activities. I want to probe him specifically on subsection (1)(b)(ii) of the new clause inserted by the amendment, which states:

“An internet service provider does not commit an offence … if the provider does not … select the recipient of the transmission”.


I want to probe this a bit. If the algorithms or techniques used by service providers or social media to push messages at people are set up so they push some of these unlawful messages, is that activity—because they are in effect selecting the recipient of those messages—potentially an offence? By the way, for the avoidance of doubt, if their algorithms are pushing messages that facilitate crime at people, then, arguably, they probably should be falling foul of this, because we want them to then take steps to make sure that their algorithms are not pushing these messages at people. I just wanted to test the extent to which they would be liable.

I have a final comment. The noble Lord is right to distinguish between those creating this material that is facilitating offences, but what liability is there if those providing those internet services are involved in this activity? The offences at the moment include imprisonment, which can be used on people but not on corporate bodies. There are also fines involved in this.

One of the debates we had on what became the Online Safety Act, which the noble Lord mentioned, is that, to get these offences to bite on large global corporations with turnovers and profits of many billions of pounds, there must be quite draconian financial penalties to get them to sit up and take notice. There was a big debate about that when the Government of which I was a Member, and the subsequent Government, were passing the Online Safety Act and the subsequent legislation.

I therefore want to understand this: if there were social media or internet service providers who were helping this, or not taking steps to mitigate this, what offences would they potentially be guilty of? Does the Minister think the potential sanctions are sufficient that those organisations, particularly those based overseas and not easily reachable by our legislative tools, would be sufficiently able to be reached by them?

Just so the House is not in any doubt, I say that I strongly support this range of amendments to create these offences. It is quite clear that, in all the coverage you see of all the people coming into the United Kingdom illegally, they all have phones and electronic communication devices: it is a key part of how these crimes are committed. I strongly support the law being strengthened to deal with it and the Minister has my support.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have tabled a raft of amendments criminalising the online advertisement of unlawful immigration services. We know that this is a major source of business for the trafficking gangs and, as such, if the advertising methods can be targeted and disrupted then this should go some way to removing a key part of the business model.

The Government’s impact assessment on this new policy acknowledges that

“it is expected that there will be a small number of arrests under this offence, as the majority of activity is assessed to take place overseas”

The key to the success here will, therefore, lie in enforcement and international compliance, so what steps have the Government taken to push other countries to take action and remove online posts and sites that publish this sort of material? How are they supporting the National Crime Agency to go further with its investigations and campaigns? I look forward to what the Minister has to say on that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope that I can try to reflect on the serious questions posed about the implications of the legislation proposed before the House today on Report. I will try to answer as best I can, but I hope that the broad thrust of what we are trying to achieve, which is to make life harder for criminals to use social media to recruit migrants to cross the channel on dangerous journeys, is accepted by the House as a whole.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned a number of points that we would like to reflect on before giving him a definitive answer. He supports the broad purpose of the legislation, but I will make sure that we write to him to cover some of those points.

The noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Harper, raised legitimate issues—supported by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench—about the difference that the offence will make, its impact and how we deal with people to ensure that it is put in place overseas. The noble Viscount said that if it helps one person, it would be a good thing to do. That remains true. We hope it will disrupt significantly more than that. We have not put a figure on that, but the principle is that it is an additional tool for police and enforcement agencies to take criminal action where other areas are potentially not currently open.

The enforcement of that means that, for countries with which we have extradition agreements, if we identify someone and they are arrested, they can be brought back to the UK for justice. Alternatively, an individual who is resident in the UK could be arrested once our intelligence services and others—including the National Crime Agency—track them down. Alternately, they could be individuals of a foreign nationality who are behind some of these websites or social media channels and visit the UK, and who might accordingly find themselves arrested in the UK for those crimes. So we have a range of extra tools.

With due respect to the noble Viscount, I cannot quantify that in a way that says we will reduce it by 10% or arrest 50 people on the back of that. What we can do is to put another tool in place to help disrupt those criminals. This goes to the point that the noble Lord Davies of Gower mentioned. The Home Office is working closely with the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement partners to ensure that they focus their funding on some of the new tools that they need to use in order to help crack down on this type of crime.

I know from talking to the National Crime Agency—without putting in the public domain confidences that would help criminals—that it is looking at how we can support more officers while also using smarter intelligence gathering and utilising different skills in officers to focus on this emerging market for immigration and migration crimes. All those things are important.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made a number of points about Amendment 14. I draw her attention to the opening line of the proposed new clause in that amendment:

“Application of section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) to internet service providers”.


The key point I want to put to the noble Baroness is about “unlawful immigration services”. She asked whether people would be hit by this proposed new clause in the event of them writing about their experiences. No, they would not, because they are not advertising unlawful immigration services. The purpose of this provision is to focus specifically on the criminals who are organising immigration crime. It will not be used in isolation; it will be part of the measures both inside and outside of the Bill, and we are looking to criminalise the critical component of the people-smuggling gangs’ business model.

The noble Baroness also pointed to a number of parts in the legislation. She asked whether Section 2 automatic, intermediate or transient and whether Section 14(3) is automatic, immediate or temporary? I can say to her only that I have described the policy objective that we have set, and the wording we have is the wording that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel has brought forward to help us achieve that policy objective.

I will reflect on what she said—if there are areas of interest, I will write to her—but I hope that she can look at the bigger picture, which is that is not about criminalising people who do not deserve to be criminalised. It is about criminalising people who are using social media platforms, such as Google, Facebook, Twitter or X—whatever you want to call it these days—to promote their business and to encourage people to undertake illegal crossings. I go back to the initial point in my opening speech: 80% of individuals debriefed by us who have crossed said that their initial contact was via social media. That is the key point that Clause 14 intends to grasp, so I commend it, as well as Clause 13, to the House.

[Lord German (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, is it possible, whether by letter or verbally, to know whether this clause will affect the biggest online platform—the one which is doing all the damage that this refers to?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

This is the guarantee that I give all noble Lords. It is right that I am questioned on these matters. It is right that we poke around and look at the detail in the woods—the big picture that I have established. But, ultimately, this is legislation. I have given the assurances that I can. I will look at the comments from all noble Lords, including the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, who have spoken in this debate. If there are point on which they are not satisfied, I will write to them in due course.

The noble Lord, Lord German, mentioned internet service providers and a number of the bigger players, such as Facebook, TikTok and Telegram. The clause expressly provides intermediate liability protections for internet services such as social media companies, meaning that they will not be impacted by this offence. It will be the individuals who are promoting unlawful immigration services online who are targeted. I will look again at the noble Lord’s comments in the cold light of day. If I need to write to reassure him, or to provide clarification, or because he has suggested items that we should look at further on another occasion, it will be important to do so.

I hope that, with the assurances that I have given and the case I have made, the House can agree to the new clauses before us today.

Amendment 13 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

14: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Application of section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) to internet service providers(1) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(2) The references in subsection (1) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(3) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if— (a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on obtaining actual knowledge of a matter within subsection (4), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(4) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(5) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) the provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it was, or contained, material whose purpose was, or effect would be, to promote an unlawful immigration service, and(b) on obtaining actual knowledge that the information was, or contained, such material, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(6) Section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services)(5) and (6) applies for the purposes of this section.(7) In this section—“internet service provider” means a provider of—(a) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(b) a service that provides access to the internet;“user” , in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause makes provision about the liability of internet service providers under my first new clause to be inserted after clause 16.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

16: Clause 17, page 10, line 33, after “13(1)” insert “or (1A)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 13 at page 7, line 12.

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[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment would significantly alter Clause 18 and capture all people in these boats. Every one of them would come under the power of this clause. It treats the vulnerable asylum seekers as criminals and is inconsistent with targeting specific criminal behaviour.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, as I hope everyone in your Lordships’ House knows, the Government are absolutely committed to action to prevent illegal migration, dangerous crossings and—specifically in relation to this amendment—fatalities at sea.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, who also proposed this in Committee. The noble Lord has been consistent in wanting to ensure that the scope of these provisions does the job of breaking up these criminal gangs, and the smuggling. I think we are all on the same page on that.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

23: Clause 32, page 26, line 38, leave out “the data protection legislation or”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a specific data protection legislation override which has become redundant as a result of the enactment of the general data protection legislation override by section 106 of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Amendments 23, 24 and 25 in my name amend the text of Clause 32, which relates to general provision about disclosure with respect to Clauses 27 to 31, and the specific application of the data protection legislation in the Data Protection Act 2018.

I hope that noble Lords will recollect that it was but a few months ago when we considered the Bill that went on to become the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. Section 106 of that Act came into force on 20 August 2025. From that date, provisions in Acts that require or authorise the processing of personal data are automatically read as being subject to data protection law.

In practice, this makes express reference to data protection legislation unnecessary in statutes subsequently enacted in Parliament. That means that, in effect, the protections afforded by the Data Protection Act 2018 continue to apply to these clauses, which relate to the disclosure and sharing of HMRC’s customs and the DVLA’s trailer registration information.

It is not necessary or good lawmaking to duplicate these protections by placing unnecessary words on the statute book. These three amendments ensure that we are tying up and tidying up the issue. Amendment 23, and the two consequential Amendments 24 and 25, are technical in nature.

I want to listen to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has to say on Amendment 62, which he will address very shortly, but, while I am speaking—potentially to save the House time—I will reiterate my previous reassurances to the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron, that using personal data for legitimate purposes such as immigration control is already permitted under data protection law. It would therefore be not only disproportionate but unnecessary to disapply data protection rules in a blanket fashion for certain groups that include some of the most vulnerable people in our society, including victims of trafficking. I will listen to what the noble Lord says, but I gave reassurances in Committee and now is an opportunity to repeat them. Obviously, the noble Lord will speak to his amendment and, if he wishes to discuss it further, we can, but I ultimately hope that he will not move it.

[Lord German (LD)]

Just before the noble Lord speaks to Amendment 62, I want to say that these Benches support the Minister.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I was glad to hear the Minister use the phrases “vulnerable group” and “blanket fashion”. I think I have quoted him more or less correctly. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to alter the Data Protection Act by creating the possibility of the Secretary of State making an immigration exception decision. The noble Lord would take out of the list of circumstances to which the Act requires the Secretary of State to have regard all the rights and freedoms of the data subject, including the subject’s convention rights, and the UK’s obligations under the refugee and trafficking conventions. We are not on the same page.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness and, again, think we are on the same page on this point. As I have indicated already, the key thing about the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is that it would disapply data protection rules in, as I was quoted, a blanket fashion for certain groups that include some of the most vulnerable people in our society, such as the victims of trafficking. Therefore, it is too wide, and I ask him not to move it.

However, I am grateful for the noble Lord’s support for the changes in these technical amendments to the legislation, which needs updating since it began its passage in the House of Commons some time ago. I beg to move Amendment 23.

Amendment 23 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

24: Clause 32, page 26, line 39, leave out from “legislation” to end of line 40
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my first amendment to clause 32.