Speeches made during Parliamentary debates are recorded in Hansard. For ease of browsing we have grouped debates into individual, departmental and legislative categories.
These initiatives were driven by Lord Alton of Liverpool, and are more likely to reflect personal policy preferences.
The Bill failed to complete its passage through Parliament before the end of the session. This means the Bill will make no further progress. A Bill to make provision for the regulation of the re-export of military equipment and goods further to their original exportation from the United Kingdom.
A Bill to provide for the High Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Court of Session in Scotland to make preliminary determinations concerning the undertakings made by the United Kingdom as a Contracting Party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) under international law; for the referral of such determinations to relevant international courts or organisations; for response to reports on genocide; and for connected purposes.
A Bill to amend the Mesothelioma Act 2014.
A Bill to provide for the High Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Court of Session in Scotland to make preliminary determinations concerning the undertakings made by the United Kingdom as a Contracting Party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) under international law; for the referral of such determinations to relevant international courts or organisations; for response to reports on genocide; and for connected purposes.
A Bill to prohibit the falsification of slavery and human trafficking statements; to establish minimum standards of transparency in supply chains in relation to modern slavery and human trafficking; to prohibit companies using supply chains which fail to demonstrate minimum standards of transparency; and for connected purposes
A bill to provide for the High Court of England and Wales to make a preliminary finding on cases of alleged genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes; and for the subsequent referral of such findings to the International Criminal Court or a special tribunal
A Bill to provide for the High Court of England and Wales to make a preliminary finding on cases of alleged genocide; and for the subsequent referral of such findings to the International Criminal Court or a special tribunal.
A bill to amend the Mesothelioma Act 2014.
First reading took place on 21 January. This stage is a formality that signals the start of the Bill's journey through the Lords.Second reading - the general debate on all aspects of the Bill - is yet to be scheduled.The 2013-14 session of parliament has prorogued and this Bill will make no further progress. A bill to amend the Mesothelioma Act 2014
Lord Alton of Liverpool has not co-sponsored any Bills in the current parliamentary sitting
All passholders are subject to vetting, and Parliament follows the Government vetting framework and is regulated by the Government’s statement of vetting policy. Parliament’s vetting processes draw on data provided by the relevant national authorities. More information can be found in Parliament’s National Security Vetting booklet. I am constrained in what further I can share widely on Parliament’s security measures.
Parliament works with the relevant national authorities to keep all potential threats to Parliament, parliamentarians and parliamentary democracy under constant review and ensure our mitigations are appropriate. This includes the threat posed by foreign state interference. Parliament is also represented at the Defending Democracy taskforce which is chaired by the Security Minister.
Witnesses to House of Lords Select Committee inquiries are not required to make declarations of this kind and there are no plans to introduce such a requirement. The large majority of witnesses are unlikely to have any such involvement and Committee members are best placed to understand which witnesses might represent such a threat and to raise queries about those witnesses both before a committee session and, if necessary, during it.
No such visit had been planned for the House of Lords part of the parliamentary estate. Neither House routinely consults with the other regarding bookings taken for use of their facilities.
The Attorney General’s consent is required for the prosecution in England and Wales of several international crimes. These include: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, contrary to the Geneva Conventions Act 1957; genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, contrary to the International Criminal Court Act 2001; torture, contrary to the Criminal Justice Act 1988; and hostage-taking, contrary to the Taking of Hostages Act 1982. In the last five years, in relation to the above international crimes, the Attorney General’s Office has received one application for consent to prosecute. Consent was not granted. |
His Majesty’s Government does not collate statistics on trials in UK domestic courts for international crimes.
The International Criminal Court Act 2001 and The International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 allows jurisdiction over the offences of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed abroad by any person who: (i) is/was a UK national or UK resident at the time of the crime; or (ii) became a UK national or UK resident after the crime and still resides in the UK when proceedings are brought. Criminal law in the United Kingdom provides for universal jurisdiction over the crimes of torture and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, allowing prosecutorial authorities to investigate and prosecute these offences under certain conditions when they were committed abroad by foreign nationals. The relevant prosecuting authorities from across the UK will bring individuals to justice wherever possible, in line with their respective prosecutorial policies. Universal jurisdiction has been applied in the past in the UK, including in the case against Agnes Taylor who was accused of participating in crimes of torture during the first Liberian Civil War.
The Counter Terrorism Division within the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is responsible for prosecuting core international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) and applies the principle of universal jurisdiction when necessary.
Universal jurisdiction helps to ensure that the UK does not provide a safe haven for war criminals or those who commit other serious violations of international law, and the CPS will continue to bring individuals to justice wherever possible. Any decision to prosecute offences of universal jurisdiction in England and Wales is governed by the same principles that apply to any other prosecution and must be in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
The decision not to pursue an appeal in these cases was made by the CPS team managing the original prosecution after seeking advice from senior counsel. Prosecution decisions are made independently from Government. The Director of Public Prosecutions did not provide advice on these cases.
To bring an appeal, the prosecution would have to be able to show that the Judge’s decision was wrong in law, that he had made an error about the facts or that his decision was otherwise unreasonable. After careful consideration, especially for the families involved, the CPS concluded that it could not meet this test.
On 26 May 2021, the CPS issued a public statement on this ruling and has confirmed publicly that the decision not to appeal was based on the conclusion that the legal test was not met.
The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) did not advise on these cases and there is no DPP advice to publish. Whenever appropriate the CPS will look to provide more detailed explanations about its decision making on its website.
Throughout criminal proceedings relating to the Hillsborough disaster, the CPS has issued regular press statements, and published reasons for its decision making. In particular, in June 2017, the CPS published a public statement following the decision to charge the three individuals with perverting the course of justice alongside other suspects referred for a charging decision at the same time.
On 26 May 2021 the CPS issued a public statement on this ruling and has confirmed publicly that the decision not to appeal was based on the conclusion that the legal test to do so was not met.
As set out in the Ministerial Code, there is an established regime in place for the declaration and management of interests held by ministers. This ensures that steps are taken to avoid or mitigate any potential or perceived conflicts of interest. Under the terms of the Ministerial Code Ministers must ensure that no conflict arises or could reasonably be perceived to arise, between their ministerial position and their private interests, financial or otherwise. The Ministerial Code is the responsibility of the Prime Minister. There are no current plans to update the Ministerial interests’ provisions in the Code.
Chapter 7 of the Ministerial Code provides detail on the procedure ministers must follow regarding their private interests. In particular it states, “it is the personal responsibility of each Minister to decide whether and what action is needed to avoid a conflict or the perception of a conflict”.
More information about the process by which ministerial interests are managed is available in the Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests and the List of Ministers Interests. These are available on GOV.UK.
It is a long-standing policy that the Government does not comment on security arrangements including the details of security systems. However, the UK takes national security extremely seriously and has taken robust action to secure and protect its national security infrastructure.
Following Royal Assent of the Procurement Act on 26 October 2023 the Government committed to publishing a timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of China from sensitive sites within six months. This timeline is due to be published by 26 April.
Sensitive sites were defined “as any building or complex that routinely holds secret material or above; any location that hosts a significant proportion of officials holding developed vetting clearance; any location which is routinely used by Ministers; and any government location covered under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.”
While local authorities may choose to follow the lead of central government in removing surveillance equipment they are under no obligation to do so. We encourage all organisations to follow NCSC supply chain security guidance when selecting a technology supplier. This guidance clearly sets the security standards that suppliers should meet and the considerations that organisations should be making during the procurement process.
Resilience is a top priority for this government. Ministers and officials regularly engage with International partners to learn from and share good practice in relation to resilience. There are no current plans to replicate Sweden’s model of civic duty.
The UK already has many reservist programmes: these include programmes for the armed forces, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, Mountain Rescue, Retained Firefighters, Coastguard volunteers, NHS volunteers and special constables.
The Government has set out its ambition for a whole of society approach to resilience in the Resilience Framework. The Deputy Prime Minister’s first annual statement to Parliament on resilience offered more detail on plans to build on the community spirit in our country and the willingness of individuals to volunteer in a crisis by developing an index of volunteering opportunities.
To support the broader training offer the Government has committed to the development of a UK Resilience Academy that will provide a full suite of learning and training opportunities for the whole of society.
The Government monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest. We do not routinely comment on individual transactions. As an open economy, the government welcomes foreign trade and investment where it supports growth and jobs in the UK, meets our stringent legal and regulatory requirements, and does not compromise our national security. However, the government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security where we identify concerns.
The Cabinet Office has not had discussions with Hikvision regarding the removal of surveillance cameras produced by companies subject to China's National Intelligence Law. A letter was written on 1 August 2023 to confirm the position of the Government in respect of the Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022.
We have had regular internal discussions about protecting the UK’s public procurement supply chain.
It has not proved possible to respond to this question in the time available before Prorogation. Ministers will correspond directly with the Member.
It has not proved possible to respond to this question in the time available before Prorogation. Ministers will correspond directly with the Member.
I am pleased to refer the noble Lord to the upcoming debate on the government’s position on the long-term strategic challenges posed by China, to be held in the House of Lords on 19 October.
I refer the noble Lord to the written statement of 14 September 2023, Official Report, HLWS1012. I also refer to the answer of 11 September 2023, Official Report, Column 773.
HM Government is considering each of the recommendations and conclusions in the Intelligence & Security Committee’s report on China and will publish a full response to the report in due course, as per the Memorandum of Understanding agreed between the government and the committee.
The Government introduced new measures ahead of the Commons Report stage to strengthen the Procurement Bill's provisions on national security.
The Government will create a permanent National Security Unit for Procurement within the Cabinet Office which will play a vital role in minimising the risk of suppliers that pose a threat to national security, winning public contracts. Underpinning the Unit will be a new legislative duty on ministers to keep under review suppliers for investigation for potential debarment on national security grounds. The Government will also introduce new, mandatory debarments for specific types of contracts. The new clauses will enable Ministers to mandate that a supplier is excluded from specific types of contracts (for goods, works or services) where the supplier poses an unacceptable risk.
We will lay before Parliament, within six months of Royal Assent, a timeline for the removal of any surveillance equipment provided by suppliers subject to the National Intelligence Law of China from sensitive sites. We will explicitly commit to remove the equipment from sites where the risk is most acute and ensure the Government can be held to account on its promises.
Taken together, these measures ensure both that current equipment will be removed and that there will be stringent security mechanisms applying to any future contracts.
The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.
It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.
Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.
The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.
The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.
It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.
Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.
The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.
The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.
It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.
Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.
The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.
The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.
It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.
Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.
The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.
The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.
It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.
Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.
The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.
The UK has serious concerns regarding the Chinese State’s use of technologies in ways that violate human rights and harm individuals and societies, including China’s use of high tech surveillance to disproportionately target Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. We are aware of a number of Chinese technology companies reportedly linked to violations taking place in Xinjiang, and are monitoring the situation closely. However, we are unable to comment on specific security arrangements or procedures.
We will always put national security first, and we have a range of measures in place to scrutinise the integrity of our arrangements. On 24 November 2022, the Government announced that Departments should cease deployment of visual surveillance systems produced by companies subject to China’s National Intelligence Law onto sensitive sites. In June 2023, we committed to publishing a timeline for the removal of this equipment.
The UK has serious concerns regarding the Chinese State’s use of technologies in ways that violate human rights and harm individuals and societies, including China’s use of high tech surveillance to disproportionately target Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. We are aware of a number of Chinese technology companies reportedly linked to violations taking place in Xinjiang, and are monitoring the situation closely. However, we are unable to comment on specific security arrangements or procedures.
We will always put national security first, and we have a range of measures in place to scrutinise the integrity of our arrangements. On 24 November 2022, the Government announced that Departments should cease deployment of visual surveillance systems produced by companies subject to China’s National Intelligence Law onto sensitive sites. In June 2023, we committed to publishing a timeline for the removal of this equipment.
The government keeps the risk associated with technologies such as visual surveillance equipment under close review. The installation of firmware updates to address known vulnerabilities forms part of routine departmental security procedures.
In December 2022, the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster laid a Written Statement before Parliament which instructed government departments to cease deployment of such equipment onto sensitive sites, where it is produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. The WMS advised that no such equipment should be connected to departmental core networks and that they should consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades.
The Procurement Bill contains a robust and comprehensive framework of exclusion grounds, including new grounds on both modern slavery and national security, together with groundbreaking provisions for a centralised debarment list. This is sufficient to ensure that suppliers and subcontractors which are involved in forced labour, or which pose an unacceptable security risk, are prevented from competing for public contracts.
Separately, following a review of security risks, the Government has instructed departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment on sensitive sites, where it is produced by companies that are subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. Implementation of this instruction is already underway.
We will continue to keep the situation under review, and are ready to take further steps if necessary.
On 24 November 2022, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster laid a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) instructing departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment on sensitive sites on the government estate, where such equipment is produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. Departments have been advised to consider whether there are sites outside the definition of sensitive sites to which they would wish to extend the same risk mitigation.
Wider public bodies generally operate with some independence from central government and are free to make their own choices around purchasing and contracting. We encourage all organisations to follow NCSC supply chain security guidance when selecting a technology supplier. This guidance clearly sets the security standards that suppliers should meet and the considerations that organisations should be making during the procurement process.
Specific details regarding the use of security systems by government departments are withheld on national security grounds. This has been the case under successive administrations. Government keeps the security of our personnel, information, assets, and estate under constant review.
The hospital being built in Hangzhou, China, referred to in Baroness Neville-Rolfe’s correspondence of 9 November, has neither the relevant licences nor capability to perform organ transplants of any kind, and there are no plans to apply for such licences.
As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the make and model of security systems are withheld on national security grounds
The Procurement Bill will strengthen the approach to excluding suppliers from bidding for public contracts where there is clear evidence of their involvement in forced labour or other Modern Slavery practices. We are also taking action in the Bill to clarify that any serious breach of ethical standards applicable to a supplier can be considered to be professional misconduct, which may lead to exclusion.
As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the make and model of security systems are withheld on national security grounds.
The Government will bring forward legislation to reform public procurement when parliamentary time allows. Further details of what will be included in the proposed bill can be found in our Green Paper Consultation Response, 'Transforming Public Procurement: Government response to consultation', published in December 2021.
As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the capability and use of security systems by government departments are withheld on national security grounds.
As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the use of security systems by public bodies are withheld on national security grounds.
Ministers and officials meet with a wide range of stakeholders in the course of normal business. Details of all official meetings by ministers are published on the government website.
Where ministers appoint specific advisers or members of an advisory group, any relevant outside interests should be declared and considered before appointments are made.
I can confirm to the noble Lord that a response to this letter was sent from the Leader of the House of Commons on 20 October 2020.
The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority. I have therefore asked the Authority to respond.
Dear Lord Alton,
As National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority, I am responding to your Parliamentary Question asking what assessment has been made of the report by Adelina Comas-Herrera and Jose-Luis Fernandez at the London School of Economics England: Estimates of mortality of care home residents linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, published on 12 May, which found that data on deaths in care homes directly attributed to COVID-19 underestimate the impact of the pandemic on care home residents, and that such data accounted for an estimated 41.6 per cent of all excess deaths in care homes; what assessment they have made of the accuracy of the data provided by the Office for National Statistics that 8,314 people had died from COVID-19 in care homes from 13 March to 8 May; what were the causes of the additional 10,000 recorded deaths in care homes during that period between 13 March and 1 May as set out in the report; and whether the total number of deaths over that period represents 18,000 more than the average estimate in previous years (HL4465).
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) is responsible for publishing mortality statistics for deaths registered in England and Wales. The most recent year for which mortality statistics are available is 2018[1]. However, we do publish provisional statistics for weekly deaths registrations, which are currently published for deaths registered up to 8 May 2020[2]. National Records Scotland (NRS) and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) are responsible for publishing the number of deaths registered in Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively.
Cause of death is defined using the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th edition (ICD-10). Deaths involving COVID-19 are identified by the ICD-10 codes U07.1 and U07.2.
We are working with the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and Public Health England (PHE) to better understand deaths that are occurring in care homes. From 28 April 2020, we have published counts of deaths reported by care home operators to the CQC involving COVID-19, in our provisional statistics for weekly death registrations release. We have also provided information about the different data sources in our comparison article[3] that was last updated on 19 May 2020.
The weekly mortality statistics published for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are all designated as National Statistics, meaning they meet the Code of Practice for official statistics requirements of trust, quality and value. The most up-to-date figures for the number of registered deaths in care homes in England and Wales involving COVID-19 are contained in the ONS weekly deaths bulletin[4] and accompanying dataset[5] published on 19 May 2020. The year-to-date analysis in this report showed there were 9,980 deaths involving COVID-19 in care homes up to the week ending 8 May 2020 (these figures represent provisional numbers for deaths where COVID-19 or suspected COVID-19 was mentioned anywhere on the death certificate). The analysis also showed there were 21,753 excess deaths that occurred in care homes up to the week ending 8 May 2020 as compared to the previous five-year average over the same period.
On 15 May 2020, we published further analysis of deaths involving COVID-19 in the care sector in England and Wales[6]. This report provides breakdowns of deaths involving COVID-19 in the care sector, by: characteristics of the deceased; place of death; geographical location; leading cause of death; and, pre-existing conditions. Included are figures on the number of deaths of recipients of domiciliary care, derived from data provided by the Care Quality Commission.
The analysis in this report found that since the beginning of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic (between the period 2 March and 1 May 2020, registered up to the 9 May 2020):
No specific assessment has yet been made of the estimates presented in the preprint article by Adelina Comas-Herrera and Jose-Luis Fernandez released on 12 May 2020. The ONS is publishing a report on the increase in non-COVID-19 deaths observed in weekly deaths statistics, with a provisional publication date of 29 May. This is mentioned in the ONS’s statement of upcoming analysis on deaths and coronavirus (COVID-19)[7]. The report will analyse how the number of non-COVID-19 deaths occurring in different places of death (including care homes), for different age groups and for different causes of death differ from previous years’ data and will suggest how these findings correspond with possible reasons for the increase.
Yours sincerely
Professor Sir Ian Diamond
The Government currently has no plans to make changes to the process under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRAG). Where a third-party state’s accession to a plurilateral trade agreement would require the UK to ratify a treaty in accordance with terms of CRAG, that process will apply.
It is Government policy that ratification of an agreement should only take place once necessary domestic legislation is in place.
As the Government pursues its ambitious trade agenda, we will continue to ensure arrangements remain fit for purpose.
In China, I met businesses and investors. Whilst attending the China International Fair for Trade in Services, I was briefly introduced to the Minister of Commerce and the Party Secretary of Beijing. I expressed support for our trade and investment relationship, where it is consistent with our values and national security.
On 30 August, The Foreign Secretary visited China meeting senior government figures. He emphasised the UK's position on the mass incarceration of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and raised rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, including the case of Jimmy Lai.
The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) is responsible for licensing the export and transfer of controlled goods and technology, including where this occurs through academic collaboration. The ECJU has no record of having granted an export licence for the University of Cambridge with the Beijing Institute of Aerospace Control Devices.
HM Government is committed to maintaining a robust and transparent export control regime. The Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, introduced in 2021, continue to provide a thorough risk assessment framework for assessing all export licence applications, including those relating to academic collaboration.
If the ECJU were presented with credible evidence of a breach of export controls, we would take these allegations seriously. We will not support collaborations which compromise our national security.
The Government has not made an analysis per the Lord's question, as no responsible House of Commons or House of Lords committee has published a report concerning India pursuant to section 3 of the Trade Act 2021.
The UK has engaged with India on a range of human rights matters, working with Union and State Governments, and with Non-Governmental Organisations, to build capacity and share expertise to promote human rights for all. This is undertaken on an ongoing basis and separately to the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement.
During his visit, Lord Johnson raised the deterioration of civil and political rights in Hong Kong, along with trade and investment matters.
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is responsible for monitoring compliance with the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, including its application to democratic elections for district councils in Hong Kong. The detail of these issues does not fall within Lord Johnson’s portfolio.
The Integrated Review Refresh sets the direction across Government for a consistent, coherent, and robust approach to China, rooted in our national interest and values. That extends to our approach on Hong Kong.
The 'engage' strand of the United Kingdom's policy towards China involves maintaining channels of communication with China and Hong Kong. The ‘align’ strand involves standing with allies to push back against behaviours that undermine international law or violate human rights. My meeting with the Hong Kong Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury provided the opportunity to raise several significant issues, including democracy concerns.
It has not proved possible to respond to this question in the time available before Prorogation. Ministers will correspond directly with the noble Lord.
Levelised Costs of Electricity for generation technologies are reported in the Generation Costs Report. They compare the lifetime costs for a plant (construction, operating, and decommissioning costs) against the plant's expected lifetime generation. They do not consider site specific benefits or costs.
In 2010, the Government published a review of tidal barrages or lagoons in the Severn Estuary; this considered flood defence and transport links. It concluded there was no strategic case for a publicly funded Severn tidal range project. The Government remains open to considering well-developed proposals for tidal range projects in the bays and estuaries around our coastlines.