Lord Alton of Liverpool Portrait

Lord Alton of Liverpool

Crossbench - Life peer

Became Member: 12th June 1997



Division Voting information

During the current Parliament, Lord Alton of Liverpool has voted in 436 divisions, and never against the majority of their Party.
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Debates during the 2019 Parliament

Speeches made during Parliamentary debates are recorded in Hansard. For ease of browsing we have grouped debates into individual, departmental and legislative categories.

Sparring Partners
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Conservative)
Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
(161 debate interactions)
Baroness Goldie (Conservative)
(30 debate interactions)
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Department Debates
Home Office
(100 debate contributions)
Department of Health and Social Care
(34 debate contributions)
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Legislation Debates
Nationality and Borders Act 2022
(16,350 words contributed)
Procurement Act 2023
(13,300 words contributed)
Trade Bill 2019-21
(9,884 words contributed)
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View all Lord Alton of Liverpool's debates

Lords initiatives

These initiatives were driven by Lord Alton of Liverpool, and are more likely to reflect personal policy preferences.


9 Bills introduced by Lord Alton of Liverpool


The Bill failed to complete its passage through Parliament before the end of the session. This means the Bill will make no further progress. A Bill to make provision for the regulation of the re-export of military equipment and goods further to their original exportation from the United Kingdom.

Lords Completed
Commons - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading: House Of Commons
Thursday 27th January 2011

A Bill to provide for the High Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Court of Session in Scotland to make preliminary determinations concerning the undertakings made by the United Kingdom as a Contracting Party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) under international law; for the referral of such determinations to relevant international courts or organisations; for response to reports on genocide; and for connected purposes.

Lords - 40%

Last Event - 2nd Reading
Friday 28th October 2022
(Read Debate)

A Bill to amend the Mesothelioma Act 2014.

Lords - 40%

Last Event - 2nd Reading : House Of Lords
Friday 20th November 2015

A Bill to provide for the High Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Court of Session in Scotland to make preliminary determinations concerning the undertakings made by the United Kingdom as a Contracting Party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) under international law; for the referral of such determinations to relevant international courts or organisations; for response to reports on genocide; and for connected purposes.

Lords - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading
Monday 4th December 2023
(Read Debate)

A Bill to prohibit the falsification of slavery and human trafficking statements; to establish minimum standards of transparency in supply chains in relation to modern slavery and human trafficking; to prohibit companies using supply chains which fail to demonstrate minimum standards of transparency; and for connected purposes

Lords - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading
Tuesday 15th June 2021
(Read Debate)

A bill to provide for the High Court of England and Wales to make a preliminary finding on cases of alleged genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes; and for the subsequent referral of such findings to the International Criminal Court or a special tribunal

Commons - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading
Wednesday 5th February 2020
(Read Debate)

A Bill to provide for the High Court of England and Wales to make a preliminary finding on cases of alleged genocide; and for the subsequent referral of such findings to the International Criminal Court or a special tribunal.

Lords - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading : House Of Lords
Monday 13th June 2016

A bill to amend the Mesothelioma Act 2014.

Lords - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading: House Of Lords
Thursday 17th July 2014

First reading took place on 21 January. This stage is a formality that signals the start of the Bill's journey through the Lords.Second reading - the general debate on all aspects of the Bill - is yet to be scheduled.The 2013-14 session of parliament has prorogued and this Bill will make no further progress. A bill to amend the Mesothelioma Act 2014

Lords - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading: House Of Lords
Tuesday 21st January 2014

Lord Alton of Liverpool has not co-sponsored any Bills in the current parliamentary sitting


Latest 50 Written Questions

(View all written questions)
Written Questions can be tabled by MPs and Lords to request specific information information on the work, policy and activities of a Government Department
3 Other Department Questions
12th Sep 2023
To ask the Senior Deputy Speaker what support the Houses of Lords Administration receives from His Majesty’s Government regarding the issuing of parliamentary passes and the vetting of individuals when passes are requested; and what consideration he has given to a review into the activities of hostile states and the subversion of parliamentary democracy in the House of Lords.

All passholders are subject to vetting, and Parliament follows the Government vetting framework and is regulated by the Government’s statement of vetting policy. Parliament’s vetting processes draw on data provided by the relevant national authorities. More information can be found in Parliament’s National Security Vetting booklet. I am constrained in what further I can share widely on Parliament’s security measures.

Parliament works with the relevant national authorities to keep all potential threats to Parliament, parliamentarians and parliamentary democracy under constant review and ensure our mitigations are appropriate. This includes the threat posed by foreign state interference. Parliament is also represented at the Defending Democracy taskforce which is chaired by the Security Minister.

20th Jan 2022
To ask the Senior Deputy Speaker whether witnesses to House of Lords select committee inquiries will be required to declare whether (1) they, or (2) institutions and companies in which they are involved, receive (a) remuneration, (b) endowments, or (c) financial support, from counties identified in the Integrated Review as representing a threat to UK interests.

Witnesses to House of Lords Select Committee inquiries are not required to make declarations of this kind and there are no plans to introduce such a requirement. The large majority of witnesses are unlikely to have any such involvement and Committee members are best placed to understand which witnesses might represent such a threat and to raise queries about those witnesses both before a committee session and, if necessary, during it.

9th Sep 2021
To ask the Senior Deputy Speaker whether House of Lords authorities were consulted ahead of the visit of the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to the parliamentary estate.

No such visit had been planned for the House of Lords part of the parliamentary estate. Neither House routinely consults with the other regarding bookings taken for use of their facilities.

26th Apr 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Stewart of Dirleton on 25 April (HL6969), how many requests to prosecute cases of international crimes were received by the Attorney General in the last five years; and how many of those were granted.

The Attorney General’s consent is required for the prosecution in England and Wales of several international crimes. These include: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, contrary to the Geneva Conventions Act 1957; genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, contrary to the International Criminal Court Act 2001; torture, contrary to the Criminal Justice Act 1988; and hostage-taking, contrary to the Taking of Hostages Act 1982. In the last five years, in relation to the above international crimes, the Attorney General’s Office has received one application for consent to prosecute. Consent was not granted.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Advocate General for Scotland
29th Mar 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government how many people have been tried by domestic courts for international crimes in the last five years.

His Majesty’s Government does not collate statistics on trials in UK domestic courts for international crimes.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Advocate General for Scotland
28th Mar 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what consideration they have given to applying universal jurisdiction as a means of bringing to justice those who have committed atrocity crimes, but have evaded prosecution in international courts or domestic courts in other jurisdictions.

The International Criminal Court Act 2001 and The International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 allows jurisdiction over the offences of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed abroad by any person who: (i) is/was a UK national or UK resident at the time of the crime; or (ii) became a UK national or UK resident after the crime and still resides in the UK when proceedings are brought. Criminal law in the United Kingdom provides for universal jurisdiction over the crimes of torture and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, allowing prosecutorial authorities to investigate and prosecute these offences under certain conditions when they were committed abroad by foreign nationals. The relevant prosecuting authorities from across the UK will bring individuals to justice wherever possible, in line with their respective prosecutorial policies. Universal jurisdiction has been applied in the past in the UK, including in the case against Agnes Taylor who was accused of participating in crimes of torture during the first Liberian Civil War.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Advocate General for Scotland
18th Jan 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the UK's use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes of (1) genocide, (2) crimes against humanity, and (3) war crimes.

The Counter Terrorism Division within the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is responsible for prosecuting core international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) and applies the principle of universal jurisdiction when necessary.

Universal jurisdiction helps to ensure that the UK does not provide a safe haven for war criminals or those who commit other serious violations of international law, and the CPS will continue to bring individuals to justice wherever possible. Any decision to prosecute offences of universal jurisdiction in England and Wales is governed by the same principles that apply to any other prosecution and must be in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Advocate General for Scotland
16th Jun 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the answer by Lord Wolfson of Tredegar on 14 June concerning recent acquittals in the case of perverting the Court of Justice in relation to the Hillsborough disaster (HL Deb, cols 1668–71), what discussions they have had with the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) as to why the decision of the Court was not appealed; whether the DPP gave advice on the decision not to appeal; and whether the DPP intends to publish the advice not to appeal.

The decision not to pursue an appeal in these cases was made by the CPS team managing the original prosecution after seeking advice from senior counsel. Prosecution decisions are made independently from Government. The Director of Public Prosecutions did not provide advice on these cases.

To bring an appeal, the prosecution would have to be able to show that the Judge’s decision was wrong in law, that he had made an error about the facts or that his decision was otherwise unreasonable. After careful consideration, especially for the families involved, the CPS concluded that it could not meet this test.

On 26 May 2021, the CPS issued a public statement on this ruling and has confirmed publicly that the decision not to appeal was based on the conclusion that the legal test was not met.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Advocate General for Scotland
15th Jun 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the answer by Lord Wolfson of Tredegar on 14 June concerning recent acquittals in the case of perverting the Court of Justice in relation to the Hillsborough disaster (HL Deb, cols 1668–71), what plans they have to ask the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to revert to the practice of earlier DPPs of publishing their advice on their website.

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) did not advise on these cases and there is no DPP advice to publish. Whenever appropriate the CPS will look to provide more detailed explanations about its decision making on its website.

Throughout criminal proceedings relating to the Hillsborough disaster, the CPS has issued regular press statements, and published reasons for its decision making. In particular, in June 2017, the CPS published a public statement following the decision to charge the three individuals with perverting the course of justice alongside other suspects referred for a charging decision at the same time.

On 26 May 2021 the CPS issued a public statement on this ruling and has confirmed publicly that the decision not to appeal was based on the conclusion that the legal test to do so was not met.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Advocate General for Scotland
30th Jan 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of Sweden's decision to reinstate civic duty for 18-year-olds, including training in emergency services and the maintenance of vital infrastructure, and of the similar model in Norway; and what consideration they have given, if any, to introducing a comparable model in the UK.

Resilience is a top priority for this government. Ministers and officials regularly engage with International partners to learn from and share good practice in relation to resilience. There are no current plans to replicate Sweden’s model of civic duty.

The UK already has many reservist programmes: these include programmes for the armed forces, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, Mountain Rescue, Retained Firefighters, Coastguard volunteers, NHS volunteers and special constables.

The Government has set out its ambition for a whole of society approach to resilience in the Resilience Framework. The Deputy Prime Minister’s first annual statement to Parliament on resilience offered more detail on plans to build on the community spirit in our country and the willingness of individuals to volunteer in a crisis by developing an index of volunteering opportunities.

To support the broader training offer the Government has committed to the development of a UK Resilience Academy that will provide a full suite of learning and training opportunities for the whole of society.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
15th Jan 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to investigate the proposed acquisition of the Telegraph Media Group by RedBird IMI under the National Security and Investment Act 2021.

The Government monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest. We do not routinely comment on individual transactions. As an open economy, the government welcomes foreign trade and investment where it supports growth and jobs in the UK, meets our stringent legal and regulatory requirements, and does not compromise our national security. However, the government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security where we identify concerns.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
8th Nov 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what discussions they have had (1) with, or (2) about, Hikvision regarding the removal of surveillance cameras which comply with China’s National Intelligence Law from (a) sensitive sites, and (b) the UK’s public procurement supply chain.

The Cabinet Office has not had discussions with Hikvision regarding the removal of surveillance cameras produced by companies subject to China's National Intelligence Law. A letter was written on 1 August 2023 to confirm the position of the Government in respect of the Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022.

We have had regular internal discussions about protecting the UK’s public procurement supply chain.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
7th Nov 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether the Procurement Act 2023 obliges police forces to remove Chinese-made surveillance equipment from sensitive sites.

The Procurement Act 2023 does not oblige police forces to remove Chinese-made surveillance equipment from their estate. The government has committed to remove from sensitive government sites all surveillance equipment subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. This commitment does not extend to the wider public sector. However, public sector organisations, including police forces, may choose to mirror the action and I understand some have already done so.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
25th Oct 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether officials have met with Hikvision in the last year to discuss the Procurement Bill; and if so, what was discussed.

It has not proved possible to respond to this question in the time available before Prorogation. Ministers will correspond directly with the Member.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
19th Sep 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government, following the publication on 14 September of their response to the report from the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, China, when they will move a motion for debate to enable the House of Lords to discuss its findings and recommendations.

I am pleased to refer the noble Lord to the upcoming debate on the government’s position on the long-term strategic challenges posed by China, to be held in the House of Lords on 19 October.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
12th Sep 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government when they plan to respond to the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament China [HC 1605], published on 13 July; and whether they plan to hold a debate on the report.

I refer the noble Lord to the written statement of 14 September 2023, Official Report, HLWS1012. I also refer to the answer of 11 September 2023, Official Report, Column 773.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
13th Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to initial a debate in the House of Lords on the threat to UK security from the People’s Republic of China, particularly given the findings of the Report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, published on 13 July.

HM Government is considering each of the recommendations and conclusions in the Intelligence & Security Committee’s report on China and will publish a full response to the report in due course, as per the Memorandum of Understanding agreed between the government and the committee.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
10th Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the BBC Panorama programme ‘Is China watching you?’, broadcast on 26 June; and what plans they have, if any, to bring forward further amendments to the Procurement Bill to address the dangers to national security and privacy identified in the Panorama documentary.

The Government introduced new measures ahead of the Commons Report stage to strengthen the Procurement Bill's provisions on national security.

The Government will create a permanent National Security Unit for Procurement within the Cabinet Office which will play a vital role in minimising the risk of suppliers that pose a threat to national security, winning public contracts. Underpinning the Unit will be a new legislative duty on ministers to keep under review suppliers for investigation for potential debarment on national security grounds. The Government will also introduce new, mandatory debarments for specific types of contracts. The new clauses will enable Ministers to mandate that a supplier is excluded from specific types of contracts (for goods, works or services) where the supplier poses an unacceptable risk.

We will lay before Parliament, within six months of Royal Assent, a timeline for the removal of any surveillance equipment provided by suppliers subject to the National Intelligence Law of China from sensitive sites. We will explicitly commit to remove the equipment from sites where the risk is most acute and ensure the Government can be held to account on its promises.

Taken together, these measures ensure both that current equipment will be removed and that there will be stringent security mechanisms applying to any future contracts.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
10th Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government which locations they believe to be 'sensitive sites' where surveillance cameras with links to the People’s Republic of China should not be located; how many such sites exist; and how many cameras are involved.

The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.

The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.

It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.

Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.


The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
10th Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government (1) what assessment they have made of the conclusion of Professor Fraser Sampson that "the need for a review [of surveillance cameras] is supported by the evidenced risks”, and (2) whether the Paymaster General will respond positively to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s request for a meeting; and whether such a meeting can be held before the Procurement Bill is given further consideration in the House of Lords.

The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.

The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.

It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.

Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.


The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
10th Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Statement by the then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on 24 November 2022 (HCWS386), how they plan to implement the cessation of the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China onto sensitive sites.

The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.

The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.

It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.

Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.


The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
10th Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what is their response to the call from Professor Fraser Sampson, Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, for a review of public space surveillance.

The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.

The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.

It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.

Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.


The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
10th Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will respond to the letter from Professor Fraser Sampson, Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, to the Paymaster General and Minister for the Cabinet Office, concerning the ethical and security issues raised by surveillance camera technology.

The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.

The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.

It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.

Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.


The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
3rd Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether Hikvision Cameras within the UK contain ‘ethnicity alerts’ algorithms that have been used to (1) target, and (2) detain, Uyghur Muslims in China.

The UK has serious concerns regarding the Chinese State’s use of technologies in ways that violate human rights and harm individuals and societies, including China’s use of high tech surveillance to disproportionately target Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. We are aware of a number of Chinese technology companies reportedly linked to violations taking place in Xinjiang, and are monitoring the situation closely. However, we are unable to comment on specific security arrangements or procedures.

We will always put national security first, and we have a range of measures in place to scrutinise the integrity of our arrangements. On 24 November 2022, the Government announced that Departments should cease deployment of visual surveillance systems produced by companies subject to China’s National Intelligence Law onto sensitive sites. In June 2023, we committed to publishing a timeline for the removal of this equipment.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
3rd Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether Hikvision cameras in the UK contain any software to track ethnoreligious individuals targeted by the Chinese State.

The UK has serious concerns regarding the Chinese State’s use of technologies in ways that violate human rights and harm individuals and societies, including China’s use of high tech surveillance to disproportionately target Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. We are aware of a number of Chinese technology companies reportedly linked to violations taking place in Xinjiang, and are monitoring the situation closely. However, we are unable to comment on specific security arrangements or procedures.

We will always put national security first, and we have a range of measures in place to scrutinise the integrity of our arrangements. On 24 November 2022, the Government announced that Departments should cease deployment of visual surveillance systems produced by companies subject to China’s National Intelligence Law onto sensitive sites. In June 2023, we committed to publishing a timeline for the removal of this equipment.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
3rd Jul 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether all Hikvision camera-operated government departments have been updated to fix a known ‘backdoor’ hacking vulnerability identified by BBC Panorama, published on 26 June.

The government keeps the risk associated with technologies such as visual surveillance equipment under close review. The installation of firmware updates to address known vulnerabilities forms part of routine departmental security procedures.

In December 2022, the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster laid a Written Statement before Parliament which instructed government departments to cease deployment of such equipment onto sensitive sites, where it is produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. The WMS advised that no such equipment should be connected to departmental core networks and that they should consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
27th Feb 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government why they proposed an amendment to the Procurement Bill to delete the requirement for a timetable to be set for the removal of Chinese-made security cameras with potential links to slave labour and with implications for national security.

The Procurement Bill contains a robust and comprehensive framework of exclusion grounds, including new grounds on both modern slavery and national security, together with groundbreaking provisions for a centralised debarment list. This is sufficient to ensure that suppliers and subcontractors which are involved in forced labour, or which pose an unacceptable security risk, are prevented from competing for public contracts.

Separately, following a review of security risks, the Government has instructed departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment on sensitive sites, where it is produced by companies that are subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. Implementation of this instruction is already underway.

We will continue to keep the situation under review, and are ready to take further steps if necessary.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
23rd Jan 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what is their timetable for the removal of Hikvision cameras from all buildings in public ownership in the UK.

On 24 November 2022, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster laid a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) instructing departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment on sensitive sites on the government estate, where such equipment is produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. Departments have been advised to consider whether there are sites outside the definition of sensitive sites to which they would wish to extend the same risk mitigation.


Wider public bodies generally operate with some independence from central government and are free to make their own choices around purchasing and contracting. We encourage all organisations to follow NCSC supply chain security guidance when selecting a technology supplier. This guidance clearly sets the security standards that suppliers should meet and the considerations that organisations should be making during the procurement process.


Specific details regarding the use of security systems by government departments are withheld on national security grounds. This has been the case under successive administrations. Government keeps the security of our personnel, information, assets, and estate under constant review.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
21st Nov 2022
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the letter from Baroness Neville-Rolfe on 9 November regarding the hospital being built in Hangzhou, China, by the International Hospital Group, whether it will include organ transplantation facilities.

The hospital being built in Hangzhou, China, referred to in Baroness Neville-Rolfe’s correspondence of 9 November, has neither the relevant licences nor capability to perform organ transplants of any kind, and there are no plans to apply for such licences.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
12th May 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Cabinet Office will offer written guidance on the use of Chinese-made cameras in government departments; and whether they intend to include provisions in the Procurement Bill to prevent the purchase of (1) equipment, or (2) commodities, linked to states accused of (a) genocide, or (b) slave labour.

As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the make and model of security systems are withheld on national security grounds

The Procurement Bill will strengthen the approach to excluding suppliers from bidding for public contracts where there is clear evidence of their involvement in forced labour or other Modern Slavery practices. We are also taking action in the Bill to clarify that any serious breach of ethical standards applicable to a supplier can be considered to be professional misconduct, which may lead to exclusion.

Lord True
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
12th May 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government, following the decision by the Department of Health and Social Care to remove (1) Hikvision, and (2) Dahua, technology cameras from their premises, what plans other government departments have, if any, to also remove those cameras from their premises.

As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the make and model of security systems are withheld on national security grounds.

Lord True
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
28th Feb 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Williams of Trafford on 22 February (HL6066), when the draft Public Procurement Bill will be published; and when they expect it to be introduced in the House of Lords.

The Government will bring forward legislation to reform public procurement when parliamentary time allows. Further details of what will be included in the proposed bill can be found in our Green Paper Consultation Response, 'Transforming Public Procurement: Government response to consultation', published in December 2021.

Lord True
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
24th Feb 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many surveillance technology cameras in government departments have facial recognition software; and whether they have made any assessment of the cost of removing Hikivision and other Chinese-made surveillance technology cameras from government buildings.

As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the capability and use of security systems by government departments are withheld on national security grounds.

Lord True
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
9th Feb 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the national security implications of government departments using Chinese-made surveillance cameras and technology; and what assessment they have made of the use of such cameras by (1) local councils, (2) schools, and (3) NHS trusts.

As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the use of security systems by public bodies are withheld on national security grounds.

Lord True
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
17th Nov 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the number of government advisors who have links to, or investments in, Chinese companies; and how many Chinese companies have representatives participating in trade or business advisory groups convened by Her Majesty's Government.

Ministers and officials meet with a wide range of stakeholders in the course of normal business. Details of all official meetings by ministers are published on the government website.

Where ministers appoint specific advisers or members of an advisory group, any relevant outside interests should be declared and considered before appointments are made.

Lord True
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
12th Oct 2020
To ask Her Majesty's Government when they intend to respond to the letter relating to skeleton bills and skeleton provision sent to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office and the Leader of the House of Commons by the Chairs of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on 25 September.

I can confirm to the noble Lord that a response to this letter was sent from the Leader of the House of Commons on 20 October 2020.

Lord True
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
14th May 2020
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the report by Adelina Comas-Herrera and Jose-Luis Fernandez at the London School of Economics England: Estimates of mortality of care home residents linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, published on 12 May, which found that “data on deaths in care homes directly attributed to COVID- 19 underestimate the impact of the pandemic on care home residents” and that such data accounted for “an estimate 41.6 per cent of all excess deaths in care homes”; what assessment they have made of the accuracy of the data provided by the Office for National Statistics that 8,314 people had died from COVID-19 in care homes from 13 March to 8 May; what were the causes of the additional 10,000 recorded deaths in care homes during that period between 13 March and 1 May as set out in the report; and whether the total number of deaths over that period represents 18,000 more than the average estimate in previous years.

The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority. I have therefore asked the Authority to respond.

Dear Lord Alton,

As National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority, I am responding to your Parliamentary Question asking what assessment has been made of the report by Adelina Comas-Herrera and Jose-Luis Fernandez at the London School of Economics England: Estimates of mortality of care home residents linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, published on 12 May, which found that data on deaths in care homes directly attributed to COVID-19 underestimate the impact of the pandemic on care home residents, and that such data accounted for an estimated 41.6 per cent of all excess deaths in care homes; what assessment they have made of the accuracy of the data provided by the Office for National Statistics that 8,314 people had died from COVID-19 in care homes from 13 March to 8 May; what were the causes of the additional 10,000 recorded deaths in care homes during that period between 13 March and 1 May as set out in the report; and whether the total number of deaths over that period represents 18,000 more than the average estimate in previous years (HL4465).

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) is responsible for publishing mortality statistics for deaths registered in England and Wales. The most recent year for which mortality statistics are available is 2018[1]. However, we do publish provisional statistics for weekly deaths registrations, which are currently published for deaths registered up to 8 May 2020[2]. National Records Scotland (NRS) and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) are responsible for publishing the number of deaths registered in Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively.

Cause of death is defined using the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th edition (ICD-10). Deaths involving COVID-19 are identified by the ICD-10 codes U07.1 and U07.2.

We are working with the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and Public Health England (PHE) to better understand deaths that are occurring in care homes. From 28 April 2020, we have published counts of deaths reported by care home operators to the CQC involving COVID-19, in our provisional statistics for weekly death registrations release. We have also provided information about the different data sources in our comparison article[3] that was last updated on 19 May 2020.

The weekly mortality statistics published for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are all designated as National Statistics, meaning they meet the Code of Practice for official statistics requirements of trust, quality and value. The most up-to-date figures for the number of registered deaths in care homes in England and Wales involving COVID-19 are contained in the ONS weekly deaths bulletin[4] and accompanying dataset[5] published on 19 May 2020. The year-to-date analysis in this report showed there were 9,980 deaths involving COVID-19 in care homes up to the week ending 8 May 2020 (these figures represent provisional numbers for deaths where COVID-19 or suspected COVID-19 was mentioned anywhere on the death certificate). The analysis also showed there were 21,753 excess deaths that occurred in care homes up to the week ending 8 May 2020 as compared to the previous five-year average over the same period.

On 15 May 2020, we published further analysis of deaths involving COVID-19 in the care sector in England and Wales[6]. This report provides breakdowns of deaths involving COVID-19 in the care sector, by: characteristics of the deceased; place of death; geographical location; leading cause of death; and, pre-existing conditions. Included are figures on the number of deaths of recipients of domiciliary care, derived from data provided by the Care Quality Commission.

The analysis in this report found that since the beginning of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic (between the period 2 March and 1 May 2020, registered up to the 9 May 2020):

  • there were 45,899 deaths of care home residents (wherever the death occurred); of these 12,526 involved COVID-19, which is 27.3% of all deaths of care home residents.
  • COVID-19 was the leading cause of death in male care home residents, accounting for 30.3% deaths, and the second leading cause of death in female care home residents, after Dementia and Alzheimer disease, accounting for 23.5% of deaths.
  • Dementia and Alzheimer disease was the most common main pre-existing condition found among deaths involving COVID-19 and was involved in 42.5% of all deaths of care home residents involving COVID-19.

No specific assessment has yet been made of the estimates presented in the preprint article by Adelina Comas-Herrera and Jose-Luis Fernandez released on 12 May 2020. The ONS is publishing a report on the increase in non-COVID-19 deaths observed in weekly deaths statistics, with a provisional publication date of 29 May. This is mentioned in the ONS’s statement of upcoming analysis on deaths and coronavirus (COVID-19)[7]. The report will analyse how the number of non-COVID-19 deaths occurring in different places of death (including care homes), for different age groups and for different causes of death differ from previous years’ data and will suggest how these findings correspond with possible reasons for the increase.

Yours sincerely

Professor Sir Ian Diamond

[1]https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/datasets/deathsregisteredinenglandandwalesseriesdrreferencetables

[2]https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/bulletins/deathsregisteredweeklyinenglandandwalesprovisional/weekending8may2020

[3]https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/articles/comparisonofweeklydeathoccurrencesinenglandandwales/latest

[4]https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/bulletins/deathsregisteredweeklyinenglandandwalesprovisional/weekending8may2020

[5]https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/datasets/weeklyprovisionalfiguresondeathsregisteredinenglandandwales

[6]https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/articles/deathsinvolvingcovid19inthecaresectorenglandandwales/deathsoccurringupto1may2020andregisteredupto9may2020provisional

[7]https://www.ons.gov.uk/news/statementsandletters/statementofupcominganalysisondeathsandcoronaviruscovid19

Lord True
Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
10th Jan 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they plan to adapt the process under section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 for when third-party states accede to plurilateral trade agreements after UK implementing legislation has been passed.

The Government currently has no plans to make changes to the process under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRAG). Where a third-party state’s accession to a plurilateral trade agreement would require the UK to ratify a treaty in accordance with terms of CRAG, that process will apply.

It is Government policy that ratification of an agreement should only take place once necessary domestic legislation is in place.

As the Government pursues its ambitious trade agenda, we will continue to ensure arrangements remain fit for purpose.

Lord Johnson of Lainston
Minister of State (Department for Business and Trade)
13th Sep 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government, with reference to the most recent visit by Lord Johnson of Lainston to the People’s Republic of China, who he met; what he discussed; what response he received to any representations he may have made on the government of China's treatment of the Uyghur minority, threats to Taiwan, and imprisonment of pro-democracy advocates and lawmakers in Hong Kong, including the British citizen Jimmy Lai.

In China, I met businesses and investors. Whilst attending the China International Fair for Trade in Services, I was briefly introduced to the Minister of Commerce and the Party Secretary of Beijing. I expressed support for our trade and investment relationship, where it is consistent with our values and national security.

On 30 August, The Foreign Secretary visited China meeting senior government figures. He emphasised the UK's position on the mass incarceration of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and raised rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, including the case of Jimmy Lai.

Lord Johnson of Lainston
Minister of State (Department for Business and Trade)
4th Sep 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to review the export control criteria used by the UK Trade and Investment Office following reports that it approved a partnership between the University of Cambridge and a subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned military technology company that does an estimated 60 per cent of its business with the Chinese military, which reportedly involved the appointment of a former Chinese Communist Party politician to the university's partnership programme.

The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) is responsible for licensing the export and transfer of controlled goods and technology, including where this occurs through academic collaboration. The ECJU has no record of having granted an export licence for the University of Cambridge with the Beijing Institute of Aerospace Control Devices.

HM Government is committed to maintaining a robust and transparent export control regime. The Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, introduced in 2021, continue to provide a thorough risk assessment framework for assessing all export licence applications, including those relating to academic collaboration.

If the ECJU were presented with credible evidence of a breach of export controls, we would take these allegations seriously. We will not support collaborations which compromise our national security.

Lord Offord of Garvel
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Business and Trade)
5th Jun 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what analysis they have made of any alleged atrocities in India as part of the process of agreeing a free trade agreement with India, for the purposes of giving effect to section 3 of the Trade Act 2021.

The Government has not made an analysis per the Lord's question, as no responsible House of Commons or House of Lords committee has published a report concerning India pursuant to section 3 of the Trade Act 2021.

The UK has engaged with India on a range of human rights matters, working with Union and State Governments, and with Non-Governmental Organisations, to build capacity and share expertise to promote human rights for all. This is undertaken on an ongoing basis and separately to the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement.

Lord Offord of Garvel
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Business and Trade)
18th May 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Johnson of Lainston on 18 May (HL 7382), whether Lord Johnson of Lainston raised any plans to end democratic elections for district councils with officials in Hong Kong; and whether they have made any assessment of whether any such plans are compliant with China’s obligations under the Sino–British Joint Declaration.

During his visit, Lord Johnson raised the deterioration of civil and political rights in Hong Kong, along with trade and investment matters.

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is responsible for monitoring compliance with the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, including its application to democratic elections for district councils in Hong Kong. The detail of these issues does not fall within Lord Johnson’s portfolio.

Lord Offord of Garvel
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Business and Trade)
24th Apr 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether Lord Johnson of Lainston raised (1) democracy in Hong Kong, (2) the military intimidation of Taiwan, or (3) the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, during his recent meetings to promote business ties with Hong Kong treasury minister, Christopher Hui.

The Integrated Review Refresh sets the direction across Government for a consistent, coherent, and robust approach to China, rooted in our national interest and values. That extends to our approach on Hong Kong.

The 'engage' strand of the United Kingdom's policy towards China involves maintaining channels of communication with China and Hong Kong. The ‘align’ strand involves standing with allies to push back against behaviours that undermine international law or violate human rights. My meeting with the Hong Kong Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury provided the opportunity to raise several significant issues, including democracy concerns.

Lord Johnson of Lainston
Minister of State (Department for Business and Trade)
25th Oct 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of (1) the ecological damage caused by the war in Ukraine, and (2) how that damage contributes to the global ecological crisis; and how they are planning to address this at the upcoming COP 28 in December.

It has not proved possible to respond to this question in the time available before Prorogation. Ministers will correspond directly with the noble Lord.

Lord Callanan
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
24th Apr 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether their cost-benefit analyses of wind, solar, nuclear and tidal power take account of (1) the episodic nature of wind and solar power sources, and (2) the short service life of nuclear power facilities and their expensive hazardous waste; and whether their energy policy takes account of the capacity of tidal power stations to provide (a) a sea defence, and (b) a transport link, in addition to the generation of electricity.

Levelised Costs of Electricity for generation technologies are reported in the Generation Costs Report. They compare the lifetime costs for a plant (construction, operating, and decommissioning costs) against the plant's expected lifetime generation. They do not consider site specific benefits or costs.

In 2010, the Government published a review of tidal barrages or lagoons in the Severn Estuary; this considered flood defence and transport links. It concluded there was no strategic case for a publicly funded Severn tidal range project. The Government remains open to considering well-developed proposals for tidal range projects in the bays and estuaries around our coastlines.

Lord Callanan
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
24th Apr 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of (1) proposals for constructing a tidal barrage between Cardiff and Weston-super-Mare, and (2) the number of people living further up the estuary who would be protected from sea flooding.

The Government undertook a detailed review onto the strategic value of a tidal barrage in the Severn which reported in 2010. Due to the significant costs, environmental and economic impacts, the study concluded that there was no strategic case for a publicly-funded Severn Tidal barrage.

The Government remains open to considering well-developed proposals for harnessing the tidal range energy around our coastlines.

The Government has included revised guidance on tidal energy in the energy National Policy Statements which have recently been published for consultation. To be granted planning consent, any project would need to ensure environmental impacts are sufficiently mitigated.

Lord Callanan
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
24th Apr 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have made any study of the tidal power stations at (1) Shashan in China, and (2) Rance in France, including a comparison of the life span and cost of decommissioning nuclear power stations; whether they are aware of any tidal barrage scheme being decommissioned; and how they assess the longevity of tidal power by comparison to other energy sources.

The Government has not undertaken any specific studies of the Shashan and Rance tidal power stations nor has it commissioned an assessment to compare the life span and costs of decommissioning for tidal and nuclear power stations.

Any proposed tidal range schemes would need to demonstrate strong evidence of value for money in the context of other low-carbon technologies inclusive of life span and costs of decommissioning, as well as details of their associated energy system benefits and environmental impact mitigation strategies before the Government could take a view on their potential or on the funding models appropriate for exploration.

Lord Callanan
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)