(7 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
By my count, no fewer than 107 Members have spoken during the two days of this Second Reading debate. I hope that the House will forgive me when I say that, in the time left to me, I shall not be able to respond fully and in detail to each one of those contributions. However, I do want to express my appreciation to all Members who have taken part; and, like the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), I want to single out the hon. Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield), who made a fine maiden speech. Those of us who were in the Chamber to listen, or who read her speech in Hansard, will recall the obvious passion and affection with which she spoke about the different communities that make up her constituency. Let me add that I—and my parliamentary friends—also appreciated the generous tribute that she paid to her predecessor, Sir Julian Brazier, and I thank her for it.
I want to spend the time that I have in trying to address what seem to me to have been the three chief criticisms of the Bill expressed in various quarters of the House during the two days of debate on Second Reading: the question of the underlying principles of EU law; the matter of devolution and the powers of the devolved Administrations; and the issue of the delegated powers that are granted by the Bill. Then, again, I will try to say something about how the Government see the way forward. Let me start, however, by reminding the House why the Bill is needed.
Both the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), neither of whom could be characterised as ardent champions of the leave cause—indeed, I count myself rather in their camp on the issue—said that the Bill does not determine whether or not we leave the European Union. That was a decision that the electorate took democratically last year, and both the fact of our departure and the process and timetable that govern that have to proceed now according to the process and timeframe laid out in article 50 of the treaty on European Union. What the Bill does is enable us to have a coherent, functioning statute book and regulatory system on the day that we leave and thereafter, because at that date—to take the words of article 50—the treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, so the rights and responsibilities that have effect legally in the United Kingdom because of European law will fall away unless they are imported into United Kingdom law by this Bill.
There were many eloquent contributions from Members about the concerns they or their constituents had about the future of various rights—employment rights, environmental rights and so on—that they currently enjoy; the hon. Member for Blaydon (Liz Twist), in recent hours of the debate was one such. My response is that those very employment, environmental and other rights, conferred as a result of EU regulations or judgments of the European Court, are continued by this Bill on a United Kingdom legal basis as part of what my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins) described as the wholesale adoption of European law. I have to say to the official Opposition that to vote against the Bill, as they propose to do, is therefore to vote against continuing those rights on a United Kingdom legal basis. It is to put those rights at risk, and open up the risk of a chaotic departure from the European Union, which is not going to be in the interests of either individuals or businesses in this country.
I give way to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke).
Throughout the discussion on this Bill, it has been entirely uncontroversial for everybody to agree that a Bill is required to ensure continuity and certainty for existing EU legal arrangements, putting them into British law straight away for the future. Will my right hon. Friend give an undertaking that when we move to the Committee stage in a few weeks, or probably about a month, the Government will produce substantial amendments to address what this whole debate has been about: the huge extension to the Government of discretionary powers that go far beyond the limited ambition my right hon. Friend is describing? I would prefer him and the Government to come back, address those issues and turn this Bill into one that resembles the reassuring descriptions of it that keep being given by the Secretary of State for Brexit and by him—two members of the Government whose word I would actually accept implicitly, but in the political world I have known Governments to go back on reassuring words quite frequently.
I want to come on to that point later, but I first give way to the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms).
I invite the Secretary of State to respond to the criticism of his party colleague, the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who is surely absolutely right to describe this as an “appalling monstrosity” of a Bill, which the House, frankly, should throw out.
That is a not a verdict with which I agree. Some of the criticisms of the Bill have been exaggerated up to and beyond the point of hyperbole, and I will seek to explain why.
In concluding my comments about why the Bill is needed, I want to stress that the time available to us under the terms of article 50 is limited. We must assume that in March 2019 this country will leave the European Union. That will be the deadline, and therefore by that date we need not only to have primary legislation enacted, but to have established the new regulatory bodies. We will need to have given effect to the secondary legislation that is proposed under the defined powers laid out in the Bill.
Several right hon. and hon. Members have said, “Yes, certain rights may be being preserved, but what about the general underlying principles of EU law?” As I said earlier, when we leave, the treaties will cease to apply to this country, but under the Bill, the general principles of European law, as recognised by the Court of Justice before exit day, or as embodied in extant European legislation, will be retained in United Kingdom law for the purposes of interpreting retained EU law. Existing sources of rights and domestic rights of action will continue to operate in United Kingdom law undisturbed by the Bill. That includes rights such as the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination. Similarly, notwithstanding our exit from the EU, individuals will continue to be able to challenge secondary legislation and administrative action under our domestic law by way of well-established grounds of judicial review.
To take two important issues that have been raised, all the rights and remedies available under the working time directive or the Equality Act 2010 will remain in force, but they will be enforced through the United Kingdom courts—ultimately, our Supreme Court—rather than through the European courts.
I wonder whether what my right hon. Friend says can actually be correct. The feature of the Bill is that it removes the right of challenge for breach of the general principles of EU law. As a consequence, rights that currently exist and are exercised—indeed, were exercised by our right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union—will in future not be available. That is an important point that the Government will have to consider during the passage of the Bill.
For the most part, those rights are used when they are given effect through specific items of European Union legislation, rather than in the abstract. My right hon. and learned Friend makes an important point, and it is true that after exit it will not be possible for an individual to bring a free-standing claim, or for the courts to quash an administrative action or disapply legislation on the grounds that it breaks one or more of the general principles of European law, except as those principles have been preserved by the Bill—which will be the case if those principles have been given effect through a specific piece of legislation. That position flows logically from the decision by the electorate to leave the European Union, because that does involve separating the United Kingdom’s legal order from the European Union’s legal order.
The issue of devolution has been the subject of much debate among Scottish Members of Parliament—
I am grateful to the Secretary of State for allowing me to intervene and help him with the general principles of EU law, which are respect for human rights and the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination. Those are principles that we in this country should be enormously proud of and embrace, instead of setting them aside. The Bill, in schedule 1, excludes anyone from relying on those general principles before a court, tribunal or public authority.
Those principles of human rights and non-discrimination are embodied in United Kingdom legislation and given effect by our courts. That was the situation 40 years ago, before we entered the European Union, it has remained the situation throughout our membership, and it will continue to be the position, unaffected by this Bill.
As for devolution, every single decision taken by the devolved Administrations will continue to be taken by them. The only question is how we best allocate to the UK Government and to the devolved Administrations the competencies and powers that will return to this country, because the devolution Acts were drafted in the context of this country’s membership of the European Union and the lists of devolved and reserved powers were drawn up against that background. For example, the common fisheries policy includes matters relating to the detailed management and regulation of fisheries, but it also covers EU agreements with third countries, such as the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement, and includes such matters as the UN convention relating to migratory fish stocks—international agreements that one might think should fall naturally to the United Kingdom Government. That will be a matter for continuing discussion between the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations.
We shall need to come forward with some common frameworks to ensure, for example, that a Scottish farmer can sell some of his produce to customers in England or Northern Ireland without having to worry about two different sets of hygiene and food safety regulations, or that a Welsh paint manufacturer can sell freely anywhere in the United Kingdom without having to be concerned about different rules on the regulation of the chemicals in that paint. I am confident that the outcome of negotiations and continuing discussions with the devolved Administrations will be a significant increase in the powers being exercised by those devolved Administrations. That remains the Government’s intention. I can also say to my hon. Friend the Member for East Renfrewshire (Paul Masterton) that, yes, Ministers in the Department for Exiting the European Union and across Government will continue to talk to and listen carefully both to the views of Ministers in the devolved Administrations and to parliamentarians in the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and soon, I hope, in the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Above all, the debate has centred on delegated powers, and I emphasise that the Bill already contains significant safeguards, which the debate has sometimes tended to overlook. Each of the four clauses that authorise secondary legislation has a defined purpose, and a statutory instrument made under such a clause cannot be made to do something else. It has to deliver something that is within the purpose defined in that clause. If we look at clause 7, for example, the power to make a statutory instrument is limited to something that will put right a failure or deficiency in retained EU law
“arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU.”
That power cannot be exercised for any other purpose. A Minister cannot make regulations because he dislikes the underlying policy or indeed because he dislikes the underlying EU law, but only when there is a problem with the operability of a piece of EU law that has been brought about by this country’s departure from the EU.
A similar condition applies to clause 8, which deals with our international obligations. There has been a lot of debate about clause 9, but its powers can be used only for the purpose of implementing the withdrawal agreement. The powers in clause 17 are limited to consequential amendments, and “consequential” has a long-established, tightly defined meaning in parliamentary practice and in law. The idea that there is some sweeping power in the Bill to rewrite the law of the United Kingdom is simply wrong. The statutory instruments may be used only for the purposes set out in the Bill.
In addition, the Government have included sunset clauses. The powers in clauses 7 and 8 lapse two years after exit day, and those in clause 9 lapse on exit day itself. The Bill also includes further safeguards in a list of exclusions from the scope of any delegated legislation, so none of the powers that grant secondary legislation can be used to make retrospective provision, to increase taxation, to create criminal offences or to affect the scope and application of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Despite the assurances incorporated in the wording of the Bill, very genuine, sincere concerns have been expressed on both sides of the House about whether there is sufficient parliamentary control over and scrutiny of how the powers will be used. [Interruption.]
Order. If the Secretary of State would be good enough to face the House, we would all benefit from his mellifluous tones.
It strikes me that there have been constructive comments and suggestions from a range of Members, including my right hon. and learned Friends the Members for Rushcliffe and for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry), my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) and the hon. Members for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) and for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer). Between Second Reading and Committee, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and his team intend to discuss those suggestions further with colleagues on both sides of the House.
We accept that we need to get the balance right—for example, between negative and affirmative procedure and between debates in Committee and debates on the Floor of the House—and, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has already pledged, we wish to discuss further the issue first raised by the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) about linking the timing of SIs under clause 9 to the date of debates on the withdrawal agreement, although we will have to bear in mind the possibility that that agreement might be concluded only very shortly before the date of exit.
My right hon. Friend is discussing matters that will have to be considered in detail in Committee. A sensible programme motion has been tabled, but can the Government assure the House that, if more time is needed because, in truth, we have difficulty getting through the programme within the period specified, they will properly consider making more time available to the House?
We think that the 64 hours that have been guaranteed are reasonable, and they compare with the 39 hours and 17 minutes that the Blair Government granted on the Bill to ratify the Lisbon treaty. We have shown today that, where there is good reason to extend debate further, we are willing to consider it very seriously and carefully indeed. I hope my right hon. and learned Friend will take that assurance in the spirit in which it is intended.
I hope that the House will recognise that it is in the national interest that we put this Bill on the statute book and that we deliver the democratic verdict of the British people in a way that allows businesses and individuals to plan for their future, confident in what the law will be on and after exit day. I hope that the House will therefore give a clear vote for the Bill on Second Reading.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Before I call the Minister, I inform the Committee that he is not feeling well today and, for the sake of clarification, another Minister will come along later.
I am extremely grateful to you, Mr Hoyle. I very much hope that my voice makes it through these remarks.
I rise to support clause 1 stand part and to speak to Government amendments 381, 382 and 383. It may help the House and members of the public if I say that the decisions on those amendments will be taken on days seven and eight.
Clause 1 reads:
“The European Communities Act 1972 is repealed on exit day.”
It is a simple clause, but it could scarcely be more significant. In repealing the European Communities Act 1972, the clause will be a historic step in delivering our exit from the European Union, in accordance with last year’s referendum. I hope that all people on all sides of this issue can agree that the repeal of the Act is a necessary step as we leave the European Union.
Does my hon. Friend recall that the official Opposition voted against the Bill on Second Reading and therefore the repeal of the 1972 Act? They still claim that this Bill is not fit for purpose and that it usurps parliamentary sovereignty, when in fact it does exactly the opposite.
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend and I look forward to seeing whether Opposition Members support clause 1 stand part.
If we were not to repeal the European Communities Act, we would still, from the perspective of EU law, exit the European Union at the end of the article 50 process, but there would be confusion and uncertainty about the law on our own statute book. For example, it would be unclear whether UK or EU law would take precedence if there was a conflict between them. The status of new EU law would also be unclear once the UK left the EU.
I intend first to set out briefly the effect of the European Communities Act on our legal system and the implications of its repeal. The UK is a “dualist” state, meaning that a treaty, even when ratified, does not alter our laws unless it is incorporated into domestic law by legislation. Parliament must pass legislation before the rights and obligations in a treaty have effect in our law. The European Communities Act gave EU law supremacy over UK law. Without it, EU law would not apply in the UK. The 1972 Act has two main provisions. Section 2(1) ensures rights and obligations in the EU treaties and regulations are directly applicable in the UK legal system. They apply directly without the need for Parliament to pass specific domestic implementing legislation. This bears repeating in the context of the clauses to follow.
I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend. He has perhaps anticipated my speech by a few paragraphs.
UK Ministers and Ministers in the devolved Administrations have made nearly 6,000 domestic regulations under section 2(2) on topics as disparate as air fares, public contracts and preserved sardines. The House, of course, has not remained supine in absorbing all this legislation. We have benefited from the tireless work of the European Scrutiny Committee, chaired so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). It has scrutinised a vast number of EU documents, supporting this House in holding Ministers to account when representing our interests in the EU. Its work has been of paramount importance in holding Ministers to account and maximising the voice of this House on EU matters. On occasions, deliberations in this House have influenced the laws adopted by the EU, but ultimately this House was, on every occasion, obliged to implement our EU obligations. We could not refuse new EU law because of our obligations to the EU.
Does my hon. Friend accept that most of this legislation is proposed by the Commission, considered by the Council of Ministers, including a British Minister, and, nowadays, approved by the European Parliament before it becomes law? Can he name a significant European law or regulation that was opposed by the British Government at the time, which the Government are now proposing to repeal? Most Brexiteers cannot think of one.
I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. I think the question at stake here is not whether there are legitimate processes in the EU; it is whether we approve of them. The one that I am always glad to bring to people’s attention is, of course, the ports regulation, which we will have to stick with all the while we are within the EU. It is perhaps unique in being opposed by the owners of ports, trade unions and, it seems, all parties involved with our strategic interests in ports. They are all opposed to that regulation. I very much look forward to the day that we can make our own decisions about how our flourishing private sector infrastructure works.
Does my hon. Friend agree that those who accuse the Government of a power grab would be very happy for unelected EU officials to continue to exercise these powers, rather than an elected Government accountable to this elected Parliament?
In response, vicariously to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), may I point out that most decisions taken by the Council of Ministers are effectively made by consensus behind closed doors, with no record of who said what, how the decision was arrived at, or, unlike this House, with no record of any of the proceedings either?
I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. I thoroughly recommend the report of his Committee relating to that subject.
I think what has been established in this sequence of interventions is that clause 1 could scarcely be of greater constitutional significance. It will repeal the 1972 Act on exit day, removing the mechanism that allows EU law to flow automatically into UK law, and remove one of the widest-ranging powers ever placed on the statute book of the United Kingdom. The repeal makes it clear and unarguable that sovereignty lies here in this Parliament.
If the 1972 Act is repealed before the end of what Ministers call the implementation period but what I prefer to think of as the transition period, what will be the legal basis for our relations with the EU and our free trade agreements with the 57 third countries?
Not just now. [Hon. Members: “Ooh!] I have given way quite a few times. I am now going to make some progress and get on to the amendments.
How we exercise this restored power in the future will be a choice for this place. The Government are clear that we want a smooth and orderly exit, achieved through continuity in the law at the point of exit, as we shall discuss at later stages. For now, I hope that all Members can agree that it is essential that clause 1 stand part of the Bill.
I now turn to today’s amendments. It is fitting that the first amendment debated in Committee is from the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field). He has got to the heart of the matter of when we leave the EU.
I will come to that point.
I listened carefully to the right hon. Gentleman’s speech, and I have great sympathy for the case he makes. I will just pick up on two points. First, on using our time, he has not of course given a time of day in his new clause. One thing I learned during my service in the Royal Air Force is the ambiguity that arises when one implies or deliberately specifies midnight, which of course can be taken as the beginning or end of a day. For that reason, his amendment is technically deficient. I hope that in due course he will choose not to press it to a Division, but will instead accept the Government’s set of amendments, including the consequentials.
I would love the Government to move an amendment specifying 23 hours and 59 minutes on the day we leave, but it should be on our time, not on others’ time or terms. Will they move that amendment to my new clause at a later stage?
Does the Minister not agree that exactly this argument is creating division between us and our European neighbours, which will make it very difficult to create a deep and special partnership?
I do not accept that at all. When the Prime Minister wrote to the President of the European Council in March, she set in train the defined two-year process of article 50, which, unless extended by unanimity, will conclude on 29 March 2019. That is why the Prime Minister said in her Florence speech that the UK would cease to be a member of the EU on that day. That is the Government’s policy.
As I said, I would like to make some progress.
The Government have, however, listened carefully to the debate about the setting of exit day for the statutory purposes of the Bill. There has been some uncertainty about whether the exit day appointed in the Bill would correspond to the day the UK leaves the EU at the end of the article 50 process. The Government sympathise with this uncertainty. This is also an issue on which the Lords Constitution Committee opined in its report in September. It stated:
“We are concerned that the power to define ‘exit day’—a matter that is pivotal to the operation of the Bill—is unduly broad in its scope and flexibility, and that it is not subject to any parliamentary scrutiny procedure.”
Such concerns were further voiced by the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra), for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) and for Wakefield (Mary Creagh) on Second Reading, not least regarding the breadth of the power potentially to set numerous exit days. In fact, there has been a notable disconnect, as we perhaps saw earlier, between Labour Front and Back Benchers on this issue. While several of its Back Benchers have submitted amendments and raised concerns about exit day, its Front-Bench team seem to have refused to acknowledge the need to establish clarity.
We would like to put this issue to rest. We recognise the importance of being crystal clear on the setting of exit day and are keen to provide the certainty that the right hon. Member for Birkenhead and others are seeking. In the light of this, the Government have tabled amendment 381 to clause 14, along with the consequential amendments 382 and 383, which will set exit day at 11 pm on 29 March 2019. Of course, this is slightly different to his amendment, in that it sets a time as well as a date for exit.
I am sorry that the Minister is not feeling well, but does he understand how impossible it is for me to explain to my constituents that they can have certainty about nothing in relation to Brexit as the Government plan it, except, according to him, the date when it will happen?
I wonder whether the Minister is going to admit to the Committee that setting a date for exit is mere political window-dressing. The Prime Minister has told the House that if there is to be a transitional deal, which she wants, her understanding is that it will be under article 50. That means that we will be staying in the single market, staying in the customs union and subject to EU law during the transitional period, so this exit day is simply a sop to Back Benchers. When is the Minister going to tell them the truth?
I will come to the implementation period in a moment, but one of the crucial points is that we need to become a third country in order to conclude our future relationship agreement. The Prime Minister set out in her Florence speech the outline of that implementation period, which would allow practical continuity under new arrangements that would enable us to be a third country and conclude the future relationship agreement.
I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. Does he recognise that there are two different issues relating to exit day? Some of the amendments were tabled to express the fear that there might be multiple exit dates. That is very different from fixing a day. Obviously, under article 50 there is an expiry date, but, as my hon. Friend knows, article 50 itself contains provision for a possible extension of the period if that is what is needed to conclude an agreement. That is why I find the Government’s amendment so strange. It seems to me to fetter the Government, to add nothing to the strength of their negotiating position, and, in fact, potentially to create a very great problem that could be visited on us at a later stage.
My right hon. and learned Friend has made his point with considerable clarity. Of course I accept that the article 50 process involves certain provisions, but I should say to him that a number of learned voices in private expressed concern about the existence of a degree of elasticity in the sunsetting of the powers in the Bill, and, for that reason, were anxious for us to fix the exit date. I should also say to him that, while he made his point with his usual clarity, other Members expressed the view that we should put beyond doubt the time and the date when we leave the European Union, and that is what our amendment does.
The Minister is making a very good speech, but what is not clear—and there is some media speculation about this—is whether, if amendment 381 is passed with the exit date confirmed as it is, the Bill allows that date to be changed subsequently by means of regulation.
The answer to that is no. The point has been raised specifically in respect of the powers in clause 17, which relate to the consequences of the Bill’s enactment. I look forward very much to a full debate on those powers when we reach clause 17, but the short answer to my hon. Friend’s question is no.
No. I did say to my right hon. and learned Friend, and the Committee, that I was going to get on with it. If I give way to him, I will not make the progress that I need to make.
We said on Second Reading that we would listen to the concerns of the House, and our amendment delivers on that promise. Ultimately, the Government want the Bill to provide as much certainty as possible, and we are happy to consider amendments that share that goal. I hope that in the light of this the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) will be willing to withdraw his new clause, and hon. and right hon. Members with related amendments will withdraw them, too.
I am grateful to the Minister for being pretty frank with the Committee now, because if what he says is right, his Government’s set of amendments pave the way for no deal. If I am wrong about that, why did his predecessor, Lord Bridges of Headley, say that he did not believe it would be possible to sort out the divorce bill, the implementation period and the final deal on our withdrawal within the timeframe envisaged? What the Minister is planning for—he should be absolutely frank with the British people about this—is no deal, and he has no mandate from the British people to do that.
I responded on this subject in a recent debate, and I refer the hon. Gentleman to everything I said on that occasion. He is wrong: we are planning to secure a deep and special partnership with the EU, and we intend to achieve that within the implementation period, which the Prime Minister described and set out in her Florence speech, and we look forward to passing the necessary legislation to do it.
Is the Minister aware that the chief financial officer of Aston Martin has said that it would be a semi-catastrophe if the UK went for no deal? Also, why will the Minister not allow the option for article 50 to be extended, to ensure that there was a deal if we were very close to reaching one on the date he has set?
As a responsible Government, we are going to go through the process of making sure that our country is ready to leave the EU without a deal if that proves necessary. We will take the steps to be prepared, as a responsible Government should.
However, this Bill cannot pre-empt the negotiations by putting things into statute before they have been agreed. The Government intend the UK to leave the EU on 29 March 2019, and that is why we intend to put that on the face of the Bill, but we have always been clear that we will bring forward whatever legislation is necessary to implement the agreement we strike with the EU, which is why yesterday my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State announced the Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill, which we will introduce once Parliament has had a chance to vote on the final deal.
This Government take their responsibilities seriously and are committed to ensuring that the UK exits the EU with certainty, continuity and control. It makes no sense to legislate for one piece of legislation on the face of another, and I therefore ask the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford not to press her amendment to a vote. With that, I recommend that clause 1 stand part of the Bill.
I am pleased to speak to amendments 43, 44 and 45, which would give Parliament control over the length and basic terms of the transitional arrangements and allow Parliament to set the clock on the sunset clauses. These are the first of many amendments tabled by the Opposition that we will consider over the next few weeks, all of which have one purpose, which is to improve the Bill. Frankly, it is not helpful when Ministers—and, indeed, the Prime Minister over the weekend—seek to characterise scrutiny and accountability in this House as an attempt to thwart Brexit. It is not. We accept that the British people voted to leave the European Union. It might have been a close vote, but it was a clear vote. That is why we voted to trigger article 50. Whether we leave the European Union is not a matter for debate, but how we do so is crucial for the future of our country. The British people voted to pull out, but they did not vote to lose out. They look to Parliament to secure the best deal, and that includes not stumbling over a cliff edge in March 2019.
I am happy to clarify that we oppose new clause 49.
Whether in relation to new clause 49 or to the Government’s amendments, closing down the opportunity for effective transitional arrangements is deeply self-harming.
I believe that the Labour party wants to have a smooth transition to a good quality future relationship, but I draw to the hon. Gentleman’s attention what the Prime Minister said in her Florence speech:
“Neither is the European Union legally able to conclude an agreement with the UK as an external partner while it is itself still part of the European Union.”
My point is that we need to become a third country before we can conclude the kind of future relationship that I think the hon. Gentleman would like us to have.
I do not disagree with the Minister. It is precisely our point that, during the transitional period, we cannot disable the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union, otherwise we will not achieve the arrangement that we apparently both seek.
The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point, as he always does on these matters, even though he and I may not agree on much. Ruth Davidson and I do not often agree on much either, but she was right that we deserve the truth. This place deserves accountability over the promises that have been made. I wonder whether the Minister, who is in his place and who made those promises as part of Vote Leave, will address the question of what will happen about these promises. They were made to the people before they voted in a plebiscite, and he has some responsibility for that.
The hon. Lady makes a good point. I will take an intervention from the Minister, since I mentioned him, and then I will make progress with my speech.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will read the report published by the Treasury Committee during the referendum campaign. The report, which has my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) on it, calls into question the veracity of claims on both sides of the campaign.
The Minister is trying to absolve himself of responsibility for spending on the health service. If only he had done that before the EU referendum. If only he had stopped people putting it on the side of a bus. It is extraordinary, because those Vote Leavers are Ministers now. They are in the posts that they wanted, and they need to take a bit of responsibility and deliver on their promises. If Labour get into government, Conservative Members will quite rightly expect them to deliver on their promises.
It has been a pleasure to listen to this wide-ranging debate, but I do not intend to summarise it, and nor do I have the time to do so. I did, however, want to do something that the voice of my fellow Under-Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), would not allow him to do, which is to respond to the amendment standing in the name of the hon. Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams), who is not his place, and which has been supported by a number of Opposition Members.
My hon. Friend rightly spoke about how the Bill was about continuity, certainty and control, and that matters to every part of the UK. The hon. Member for Arfon and those who signed his amendment know that we are committed to securing a deal that works for the entire UK—for Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and all parts of England. There is considerable common ground between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations on what we want to get out of this process, and we expect the outcome to be a significant increase in the decision-making power of each devolved Administration. But we are clear that no part of the UK has a veto over leaving the EU; we voted in a referendum as one United Kingdom and we will leave as one United Kingdom. This Government have already shown their commitment to the Sewel convention—
What the Minister has said is very important, and I am listening carefully. Has he sent a signal this evening that he is prepared, and the Government are prepared, to ignore the requirement of the legislative consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly in order to get their way with this Bill? Is that the signal he has sent?
The hon. Lady pre-empts my next point. What I would say before making the point about Wales and Scotland is that of course we all want to see a Northern Ireland Assembly in place and functioning, with power sharing, so that it can give assent to this Bill. The Government have already shown their commitment to the Sewel convention, demonstrated through its inclusion in the Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017, and we are seeking legislative consent for this Bill in the usual way.
I am afraid I cannot give way again at this point. We want to make the positive case for legislative consent and work closely with the devolved Administrations and legislatures to achieve this.
Crucial to understanding this Bill is the ongoing work on common frameworks, which has been mentioned, determining areas where they will and will not be required, which will reduce the scope and effect of clause 11. We acknowledge that that work on common frameworks will be crucial to the consideration of legislative consent.
So the position of the UK Government is that if three of the four legislatures of the UK oppose this, he will ride roughshod over them. This is not a Union; it is a superstate. We are not in a Union; we are in superstate. The only superstate in Europe is the United Kingdom.
The hon. Gentleman does not serve the interests of his own argument. We acknowledge, as I was just about to say, the position that the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government have taken to date on legislative consent to this Bill, but there has not yet been a vote in the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly on this and we remain confident that we will reach a position that can attract support. I want to stress that this Bill takes no decision making away from devolved Administrations or legislatures. We will, of course, return to these issues in more detail on days four and five in Committee.
In the meantime, we are pressing on with our engagement with the Scottish and Welsh Governments. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has been in contact with the Scottish and Welsh Governments on several occasions, and the First Secretary of State has met the Deputy First Minister of Scotland and the First Minister of Wales to progress discussions between Joint Ministerial Committee meetings. In addition, at the recent JMC (EN) on 16 October, the principles that underpin where frameworks will be needed and where they will not be needed were agreed with the Welsh and Scottish Governments. We are now moving into the next phase of this work, with detailed analysis of the policy areas with those Governments. This is a clear sign of progress, but I reiterate the point I made to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon): we would like to see a Northern Ireland Executive in place, with power sharing back in place, so that they can engage further on the official engagement that has taken place. In tandem, officials met officials met yesterday for technical discussions on the amendments proposed by the Scottish and Welsh Governments. In the past week, I have spoken to no fewer than four committees of devolved legislatures with colleagues from across Government, so I welcome their detailed scrutiny.
We will continue this engagement, and we hope to make the case for the Bill in every part of the United Kingdom, but amendment 79 would provide scope for individual vetoes on our exit from the European Union. We have already held a referendum that gave us a clear answer on the question of leaving the EU, which was subsequently endorsed by Parliament through the passage of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. The amendment goes against the grain of both our constitutional settlement and the referendum result, so I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
Would the Minister concede that one man’s veto is another man’s respectful disagreement?
That is absolutely the preference of most sensible observers. We need a transition, of course, because the trade deal arrangements cannot possibly be made adequately by the time of exit day, unless the Secretary of State for International Trade pulls a rabbit out of the hat—perhaps he has been known to do that in the past, but I doubt it will happen this time. The transition period is therefore vital if the UK is to salvage and stitch together a trade arrangement.
We must not forget, moreover, that the 57 existing free trade arrangements with non-EU countries from which the UK benefits by virtue of our EU membership will have to be grandfathered—copied and pasted into UK arrangements. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) talked about the 759 different international treaties. We do not know quite how those will apply. We have to think about the legal framework not just after but during the transition. We have a massively complex set of legal steps to take, yet we have no clarity from Ministers, apart from this concession yesterday that there might be a Bill at some point, possibly after exit day, perhaps with a vacuum—
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right, and that is what we seek to address with amendment 306.
I will briefly address some of the other amendments in the group. We support new clause 14, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), as it sensibly calls for a report to be laid before Parliament on the interpretation of EU law during a transitional period.
We also support amendment 137, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and others, as it seeks to have UK courts pay due regard to any relevant decision of the ECJ when interpreting the new category of retained EU law.
Amendments 202 and 384, in the name of the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford), would allow matters pending on exit day to be referred to the ECJ, which is clearly common sense, and we are pleased to support the amendments. We also support amendments 203, 353 and 354, in the right hon. Gentleman’s name, on the definitions of EU retained law. Amendment 357, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), raises important issues, and I look forward to the Minister’s clarification. We support amendment 358, which would help with the interpretation of EU retained law.
I end on the same note on which I began by urging the Government to accept amendment 278 and its consequential amendments and, in doing so, to put aside their obsession with the ECJ so that we can secure the effective transitional deal with the EU that they, we, business and trade unions want to achieve.
It is a great privilege and pleasure to speak on behalf of the Government on this essential Bill, and particularly on clause 6 and the various amendments proposed to it. The Bill is complex, but at root it boils down to achieving two basic but fundamental objectives, which it is worth bearing in mind as we consider the clause and amendments.
The first is that we are delivering on the referendum by taking back control over our laws, which is a major opportunity; that was the No. 1 reason why people voted to leave the EU in the referendum. The second thing that the Bill does is make sure there is legal certainty, with a smooth transition for citizens and businesses, mitigating one of the key risks of Brexit, which I believe is felt by people whether they voted leave or remain.
It is essential that the Supreme Court has certainty. The first part of clause 6(2) is admirably clear:
“A court or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court”.
Why then have the Government included the following phrase at the end of the provision:
“but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so”?
I think Lord Neuberger has a point, and I give the Minister an opportunity to make the Government’s position clear.
I thank my hon. Friend for that, and I shall come to that point a little later. The basic point that I respectfully make to the House at the outset is that the various clauses and amendments should be judged according to those basic strategic objectives: taking back control over our laws and making sure that there is a smooth legal transition, which I believe is my hon. Friend’s point.
Clause 6 serves both objectives. It sets out how, once we have taken back control over EU law, retained EU law should be interpreted on and after exit day. It makes it clear that once the UK leaves the EU, domestic courts will not be able to refer cases to the European Court—an affirmation of the supremacy of our own courts and our own legal order.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful case. The Select Committee that I chair has looked at the implications for equality law. At the moment, individuals can take cases to the Court of Justice of the European Union and gain decisions there that may have a great impact on their lives, but they will not be able to do that in the future. How should the Government look further at how domestic courts might be able to assess the compatibility of UK law with equality law, to make sure that in the future we do not have any problems in the way our law develops in this area?
First, let me thank my right hon. Friend, the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee, for her intervention and for highlighting this important issue constructively. I have looked carefully at the report of her Committee and had discussions with the Equalities Ministers on the points she has made, so today I can give her the reassurance, and tell the House, that we have commissioned work to be done on an amendment that the Government will table before Report. It will require Ministers to make a statement before the House in the presentation of any Brexit-related primary or secondary legislation on whether and how it is consistent with the Equality Act 2010. I hope that gives her the reassurance she needs that the Government are serious about addressing the legitimate point she has raised.
The point I was making before my right hon. Friend’s intervention was that once the UK leaves the EU, the domestic courts will not be able to refer cases to the ECJ. Clause 6 also provides that domestic courts and tribunals will not be bound by or required to have regard to ECJ decisions made after Brexit.
May I just finish this point, because I am at risk of answering the question before my right hon. and learned Friend puts it? As I say, UK courts will instead be able to take those post-exit judgments into account when making their decisions, if they consider it appropriate to do so, as they can, of course, with judgments of courts from other jurisdictions—common law, around the Commonwealth and elsewhere.
A number of different points feature in all this, but there is one point about the legal certainty, which was raised earlier. It is one thing to be able to take a case to the Supreme Court, but under a previously set up regime people could take it as a reference to the ECJ. Have the Government considered the propriety issues on removing that right for a case that is current? There is an issue to address there. The Government may be able to provide precedent and justification for what they are doing, but the issue troubles me. This strikes me as an odd way of going about things simply for the sake of trying to get rid of the ECJ in one fell swoop, which I think will be rather difficult in any case for other reasons.
I hope that I can give my right hon. and learned Friend some reassurance as the Committee makes progress. Some of what he says relates to clause 5 as much as to clause 6, but let me have a go at addressing it today. We may well return to it next week.
The Prime Minister has accepted that in a transitional period, the European Court of Justice would govern the rules of which we are part. Will the Minister explain to the Committee how that is compatible will clauses 5 and 6, which say that the ECJ will have no further sway after exit day, which the Government propose to set as 29 March 2019? Do the Government intend to amend the Bill as it proceeds through Committee to reconcile those two things, or do they propose to do it in the new Bill that the Secretary of State announced yesterday?
I think the Chair of the Select Committee has answered his own question. The point is that we will produce separate primary legislation to deal with the withdrawal agreement and the terms of any transition. We should not be putting the cart before the horse. This Bill is about making sure that we have at our disposal all the means to implement in UK law any deal, and its terms, as and when it is struck.
If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I shall make a little progress, because I suspect that—
I am going to make a little progress, because I think that some of these queries will be addressed in the discussions on the amendments that others have tabled.
I return to clause 6. For as long as retained EU law remains in force in the UK, it is essential that there is a common understanding of what that law means. That is critical for legal certainty and, in real terms, for the very predictability of law that businesses and individuals rely on every day as they go about their lives. We want to provide the greatest possible certainty—I suspect that, for all the thunder and lightning in this debate, that is a shared objective underpinning it all—and the question is how we achieve that. Clause 6 will ensure that UK courts must continue to interpret retained EU law using the Court of Justice of the European Union’s pre-exit case law and retained general principles of EU law. Any other starting point would be to change the law. That is certainly recognised by the Government.
I am going to make a little more progress, but I will give way to my right hon. Friend in due course.
The crucial point reflected in clause 6 is that the intention is not to fossilise past decisions of the ECJ for ever and a day. The clause provides that our Supreme Court—and, indeed, the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland—will be able to depart from pre-exit case law. In doing so, they will of course apply the same tests as they do when departing from their own case law in the ordinary way.
We have, in my view at least, the finest judiciary in the world. Our courts are fiercely independent of Government, as they have already proved during the Brexit process. The clause will provide them with clarity about how they should interpret retained EU law after exit. As we take back control over our laws, it must be right that the UK Supreme Court, not the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, has the last word on the laws of the land. It is therefore of paramount importance that the clause stands part of the Bill.
The Minister is being very helpful on one aspect of the Bill, which is how the Government think European law should be interpreted once we have finally exited, but he is sidestepping the key point put to him by the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn). As it stands, clause 6 does not reflect current Government policy. It is not putting the cart before the horse to ask whether current Government policy, as represented in the Florence speech, should be reflected in the Bill. The fact is that the Government are seeking, expecting or contemplating the real possibility of a transition period during which we will stay in the single market and customs union and be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. Why is the Bill being presented and urged by the Government in terms that are totally—
I will come to that precise point in the context of new clause 14, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie). The proposed change refers to the transitional period after the UK exits the EU. I thought that the hon. Gentleman put his points in a perfectly reasonable way.
Let me finish my point.
Therefore there will be full transparency and accountability to this House on the issue that the hon. Gentleman feels so strongly about. I urge him to withdraw his new clause, but I will give him one further crack at it.
I am grateful to the Minister for allowing me to probe him on this point. He has suggested that the legal architecture framework for the transitional period will be set out in the Bill that he brings forward for the implementation period. However, it is only possible to agree with that plan if he is guaranteeing that Royal Assent for the implementation Bill will come in ample time before exit day. Clearly, it would be nonsensical to have an implementation piece of legislation that leaves a vacuum between exit day and some later date, when the transition had already started. Can he guarantee that that Bill will be enacted and enshrined in law in good time, well before exit day?
I sense that the hon. Gentleman recognises that he is putting the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse. Of course the implementing legislation relates to the agreement, and we need to have one in place to comply with the terms of any obligations, whether they are under the withdrawal arrangement, the implementation period or the future partnership deal.
I now turn to amendment 357, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), Chair of the Justice Committee.
I agree with what my hon. Friend is saying about new clause 14. May I take him back to clause 6(4)(a)? It says that the Supreme Court “is not bound”. Will that enable it to look at the plain words of the treaties, and not at the previous expansive teleological jurisprudence of the ECJ?
I am not quite sure that I understand my right hon. Friend’s forensic point. It is a feature of the common law that UK courts already take into account and consider principles and precedents from other jurisdictions, but they do so with full autonomy as to how they might apply it, where they have discretion under the normal canons of interpretation. We are effectively seeking to apply the same basic principles, through this Bill, to retained EU law and the interpretation of it.
I am going to make some progress, as I have given way once. I want to turn to some other amendments; otherwise, I will not give them the attention that they rightly deserve. I turn to amendment 357 in the name of the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice.
My right hon. and learned Friend is very tempting, but not at this moment.
I understand the point of amendment 357, which is to provide a default mechanism for transposing EU law where regulations have not been made under clause 7. I can equally see that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst is seeking to make default provision for any gaps that may exist in the law to avoid creating not just legal uncertainty, but any legal potholes that may strew the road that lies ahead. I hope that he does not mind me saying that he is, perhaps inadvertently, reinforcing the case for clause 7 because his concern appears to be with the risk that it might not being used comprehensively enough. I certainly share his concern to avoid legal cliff edges and legal potholes, for which I think he is trying to cater.
I mentioned to the Prime Minister during her statement a few days ago the bear trap that I can see coming up during the transitional period if we are not careful because of the manner in which the European Court operates by the purposive rule; I know my hon. Friend will understand. During the transitional period, when we are faced with a court operating under that rule and not by precedent, we could end up with the European Court dictating to us the basis upon which we would be operating during that period. Does my hon. Friend agree?
The Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee eloquently makes his powerful point. We need to avoid bear traps, cliff edges and potholes, and that is what this Bill does. That is a common goal that we all ought to be trying to pursue, on both sides of the House—whether we voted to leave or remain. I am not convinced that the amendment of the Chair of the Justice Committee would achieve that aim. Despite his best intentions and his rather ingenious drafting, I fear that the amendment would, in practice, create considerably more legal uncertainty, not less.
I will not claim credit for all the ingenuity of the drafting, as I hope I shall make apparent in due course, but what if I told my hon. Friend that it is based on the work of the International Regulatory Strategy Group—one of the most distinguished groups of practitioners in this field? Would he think again about totally dismissing the thing, recognise it as a serious point that needs to be addressed here and engage with it?
I absolutely will not dismiss it. I am happy to think twice, thrice and as many times as my hon. Friend wants to talk to me about it. But let me make a couple of points to illustrate the risk of uncertainty that his amendment would cause. Subsection (A3) of amendment 357 begs the question of whether retained EU law restrains acts or omissions that start within the UK but that may have effects outside of it. Equally, subsection (A5) conflates functions conferred on public bodies with those of the Secretary of State. They are not the same thing. I sense that, underpinning this, he is trying to legislate in advance for unknown unknowns. I understand that temptation but if we go down that path, there is a countervailing but very real risk of increasing, rather than mitigating, the legal uncertainty. With respect, I hope that he can be persuaded to withdraw his amendment.
In order that I might reflect on that as the debate goes forward, perhaps my hon. Friend would like to give me an example of the circumstances in which he thinks my amendment might increase the legal uncertainty, rather than assist it. I will obviously listen to that.
Well, I have just given two examples regarding subsections (A3) and (A5) of my hon. Friend’s amendment, but I would be happy to sit down with him and give some illustrative examples of how, in practical terms, I think that this is not actually the avenue or legal cul-de-sac that he wants to go down.
If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I will now turn to some of the other amendments in order that I give them due consideration in this important debate. In particular, I want to turn to amendment 278 and linked amendments 279 to 284 concerning exit day, which are from the Leader of the Opposition and other hon. Members.
The Prime Minister made it clear in her Florence speech that
“The United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union on 29 March 2019.”
It is clear that the UK will leave the EU at the end of the article 50 process—some of the suggestions around the caveat are wildly unrealistic. The Government have tabled an amendment to make sure the drafting of the Bill is crystal clear on this point and to give the country—businesses and citizens alike—additional certainty and a measure of finality on it.
These amendments would replace that clarity and finality with uncertainty and confusion. They would alter the meaning of the term “exit day” in the Bill, but only for the purposes of the provisions of clause 6. For those purposes, but for those purposes alone, the UK would not leave the EU until the end of the transitional period. I am afraid that that would create damaging legal uncertainty, and the amendments are flawed. They would have the effect that, for the duration of any implementation period that might be agreed—and we hope one will be, sooner rather than later—all the important provisions on the interpretation of retained EU law set out in this clause could not apply; they could take effect, if I have understood correctly, only from the end of that period. Since we have not yet agreed an implementation period with our EU partners, the effect of the amendments would be to create an indefinite and indeterminate transitional period, which rather raises the question of whether the Labour party is really serious about facilitating the process of a smooth Brexit at all.
Rather than seek to confuse the issue, it would be helpful if the Minister clarified whether it is the intention of the Government to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union during the transitional period. Yes or no?
The hon. Gentleman is very kind. He had the chance in his speech to make his rapier-like points. I am dealing with his amendment and the very real risk that, with the greatest will in the world, what her Majesty’s Opposition are proposing will add to, rather than mitigate, the uncertainty. When we go away from the fireworks of this debate, it ought to be our common endeavour to minimise that uncertainty.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union made it clear yesterday that there will be separate primary legislation for the withdrawal agreement and any implementation phase, so these amendments are entirely unnecessary in any event. We have also been clear—I think this addresses the hon. Gentleman’s point—that, in leaving the EU, we will bring an end to the direct jurisdiction of the European Court in the UK.
Our priority must be getting the right arrangements for Britain’s relationship with the EU for the long term.
I have given way to hon. Gentleman before. I am going to make some progress.
That priority means getting a close economic partnership, but out of the single market, out of the customs union and without the direct jurisdiction of the European Court. We want to get to that endgame in a smooth and orderly way, with the minimum of disruption.
That is why we want early agreement on the implementation period—on that much, we are agreed. That may mean we start off with the European Court still governing some of the rules we are part of for that period, but the Government are also clear that if we can bring forward a new dispute resolution mechanism at an earlier stage, we shall do so. These amendments do not allow for that. They prejudge and pre-empt the outcome of negotiations, and they introduce legislative inflexibility by saying that we must keep rules in domestic law that would bind us to the jurisdiction of the European Court after we leave, for the full duration of any implementation period, without our knowing for a second how long that might be. The Government are making the case for legal certainty. The Labour party is proposing legal limbo. We cannot accept that.
I actually agree—I should make this clear to my hon. Friend—about the issue of transition. I find it difficult to see how we can approach transition in the course of this Bill. However, there is an important underlying issue here, because, ultimately, our future relations with the EU will have a very powerful bearing, whether it is in transition or even after transition, on what we want EU law to do and how we want it to be interpreted, depending on transition, or indeed when we have completely gone, and on the extent to which we wish to be in comity with EU law. This is the elephant in the room, and it will have to be debated at some point as the Bill goes through, because some of it does not have to do with transition but has really to do with an entire future relationship, and it marries with great difficulty with the constant reiteration that the ECJ is somehow going to disappear out of the window.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. I absolutely agree that the scope and parameters of the different options will need to be settled, but I think he has implicitly accepted and recognised that that is the subject of diplomacy. As has been said, we cannot put the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse, and I fear that that is what the amendment would do.
I now turn to amendment 202, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) and also relates to amendment 384. In leaving the EU, we will bring about an end to the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, and this Bill is essential to ensuring the sovereignty of our Parliament as we take back democratic control. We understand, of course, the desire to ensure a smooth and orderly exit and continuity for those who have commenced matters before the courts before exit. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) also made this point.
That is why we set out in our July position paper, “Ongoing Union judicial and administrative proceedings”, that we believe that UK cases before the ECJ on exit day should not be interrupted but should be able to continue to a binding judgment. We recognise that parties involved in such cases before the ECJ will have already gone through various stages of the process, potentially including making oral and/or written submissions. We do not think that they should have to repeat those stages before the UK courts, as this would not provide certainty but undermine it. The amendment would add further uncertainty rather than mitigate it. Pending matters before the UK courts will be able to reach a final judgment post exit without needing referral to the European Court. The Bill will convert directly applicable EU law into domestic law, so our domestic courts will then apply to those matters. In this way, we will have certainty about how the jurisdiction of the ECJ in the UK will be brought to an end.
Permitting the European Court to continue ruling on cases that were not before it procedurally on the day of withdrawal, as the amendment proposes, would give rise to considerable uncertainty. It would extend the period under which the European Court would continue to issue judgments in respect of the UK, and it is absolutely impossible to predict how long that may last. Furthermore, after exit day the UK will no longer be a member state of the EU. Under the EU treaties, the European Court itself can rule only on questions referred to it by member state courts, so it follows that without a new and separate international agreement, the references envisaged by the amendment would not, in any event, be possible.
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of the arrangements that were made in relation to the Privy Council when New Zealand chose to have its own supreme court. In fact, cases from New Zealand are still going to the Privy Council. All we are contemplating with these amendments, which I will address in more detail in a moment, is a similar arrangement.
I take the point that the hon. and learned Lady makes, but that is not the same mechanism. It is not analogous and it is not desirable.
I seek clarification on this point. Is the Minister saying that if a right of action has arisen before Brexit day that would have attracted, at the time that it arose, the full protections and a right to referral to the ECJ, that right will not be taken forward and those rights will, in effect, have been retrospectively changed?
I understand the point that my hon. Friend is making, although I do not accept that characterisation. It is absolutely right that cases that are procedurally before the dock of the court, if I may put it like that—that have been lodged before exit day—will continue to conclusion. However, in relation to facts that may or may not give rise to a cause of action at an indeterminate point in the future, we would end up with a long tail of uncertainty if we went down the path that she suggests. I gently say to her that it will be possible to continue those cases before the UK courts because of the way in which we will retain EU law. There would be more, not less, uncertainty for citizens and businesses alike if we allowed the kind of indeterminate access to the court that she suggests.
Surely, the Minister is ignoring the legitimate expectation that I have talked about. Frankly, if the Government do not look again at the matter, it will constitute an abuse of power, because it will remove from individuals rights that they legitimately expected to carry through to the end of a case.
My right hon. Friend makes an interesting point about legitimate expectations. I think there is an equally legitimate expectation, demand and need to have some finality to the legal and institutional arrangements that give rise to cases before the European Court.
Perhaps I can give way to my right hon. Friend when I come on to her amendments.
I turn to amendment 203, tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber, and to the related amendments 353 and 354. They would remove clause 6(7) and partially reinsert it into clause 14. Clause 6(7) provides key definitions of terms in the Bill that are crucial for the proper interpretation and full understanding of its content. Subsection (7) aims to alleviate any potential confusion and ensure that there is no vagueness or ambiguity about the different types of retained law mentioned in the Bill. That is vital for those who read, implement and interpret the Bill, because of the different effects of each type of retained law. The placement of the definitions in clause 6 is specifically designed to make the Bill easier to navigate and more user-friendly, by placing the definitions close to where they are used and deployed in the text.
I am going to make a bit of progress. Wider general definitions are set out in clause 14, and clause 15 provides an index of all the defined terms to make the Bill easier to use as a reference tool. To remove those definitions from clause 6 and only partially to reinsert them into clause 14, as the amendment would do, would undermine the certainty and clarity that we aim to provide.
Without statutory definitions of the different types of retained law, we would undermine the stability of our domestic legal regime after exit and exacerbate the burdens on the court system. Reinserting the definition of “retained domestic case law” into clause 14 would not alleviate that, because it would give rise to the question why that definition had been included, while others had not. Its placement in the body of clause 14, away from its original use in clause 4, would make the text far less easy to navigate—something that we are keen to avoid.
I turn to amendment 137, which is a joint SNP and Liberal Democrat amendment, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). Clause 6(2) will allow our domestic courts and tribunals to take into account any decisions made by the European Court, an EU entity or the EU itself on or after exit day, if they consider it appropriate to do so. That will ensure that our courts are not bound by the decisions of the European Court, while enabling them to consider its subsequent case law if they believe it is appropriate to do so. It is widespread practice in our domestic courts to carry out a similar exercise with the judgments of courts in other jurisdictions—I am thinking particularly of Commonwealth and common law jurisdictions—so, in principle, there is nothing new or particularly different here.
The UK has always been an open and outward-looking country, and our legal traditions reflect that. We pay attention to developments in other jurisdictions, including common law jurisdictions, and we embrace the best that the world has to offer, but we do so on our terms and under our control. That is decided by our courts and, ultimately, it is subject to the legislative will and sovereignty of this House. Amendment 137 is therefore unnecessary, as the Bill already provides that post-exit decisions of the European Court can be considered by the domestic courts.
Amendment 137 would go further, however, in that it would require our courts and tribunals to pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court. What does “due regard” mean? It is not defined and, indeed, it is far from clear. It is evidently intended to go further than clause 6, and tacitly urges our courts to heed, follow or shadow the Luxembourg Court, but there is no clarity about what would count as due consideration. The amendment would alter the inherent discretion the UK courts already have to consider, without fetters, the case law in other jurisdictions, and it seeks to apply to the European Court a procedural requirement that is stronger but so vague that it is liable to create more, not less, confusion. I hope that I have tackled, or at least addressed the concerns that the hon. and learned Lady has expressed in her amendment, and I urge her not to press it.
I will now turn to amendment 303 in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham. I thank her for tabling this amendment and for explaining it, as she did, in a very constructive spirit. I recognise that she is representing the interests of her constituents with her customary tenacity, but I will take a few moments to set out why we have taken our approach to the issues and my difficulties with her amendment.
Clause 6 supports the Bill’s core aim of maximising certainty. It is in no one’s interests for there to be a legal cliff edge. The Bill means that the laws and rules we have now will, as far as possible, continue to apply. It seeks to take a snapshot of EU law immediately before exit day. The Government have been clear that in leaving the EU, we will be bringing to an end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the UK. To maximise certainty, any question about the meaning of retained EU law will be determined in UK courts by reference to ECJ case law as it existed before our exit. Using any other starting point would be to change the law, which is not our objective. Our domestic courts and tribunals will no longer be bound by or required to have regard to any decisions of the European Court after that point, but they can do so if they consider it appropriate. These clear rules of interpretation are set out in clause 6.
May I try again to ask my hon. Friend the question on which both my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), the former Attorney General, and I have been pressing him? My hon. Friend has just said that courts would be bound by judgments of the European Court about retained EU law. I asked him about clause 6(4)(a), which specifically says that
“the Supreme Court is not bound by any retained EU case law”.
It seems to us that he can have it one way or the other, so which is the governing clause—the one saying that the courts are bound to judge in accordance with the previous judgments of the ECJ, or the one saying that the Supreme Court is not bound by such a rule?
The point is that we take a snapshot of EU law, including case law, at the point of exit, but after that the normal rules of precedent will apply both to the Supreme Court and in Scotland. That will allow a departure from any precedents that apply, which again comes back to the question of how we achieve a smooth and orderly transition from retained EU law while making sure that, when push comes to shove as such case law evolves, the UK Supreme Court will have the last word. That is balance struck in the Bill.
I understand that issue, but there is another one. Let us assume for the moment that there is no transition or relationship with the EU at all. Is the Court supposed to apply EU law as currently applied—purposively—or is it supposed to ignore the underlying purpose by which it has constantly been applied heretofore, and in that case, which rules is it supposed to apply? The judiciary have expressed a real concern about what they are supposed to do, because it is quite unclear what Parliament intends. If we forget about a transition or a future relationship, what are they supposed to do? They have rules for interpreting this law at the moment. Are they supposed to stick to those rules when they no longer have an underlying purpose?
I have to be careful about not pre-judging or prejudicing what the courts decide to do, particularly given that the thrust of the Bill is to make sure that judges have autonomy and discretion. The reality is that the issue is dealt with in the Bill. It is possible for the UK courts, in relation to retained case law, to look at the underlying purpose or intention of any piece of legislation or any principles that have been articulated. Moving forward, they are free, of their own volition, to depart from any precedence in the usual way. That already applies in relation to wider common law jurisdictions. The question I would put back to my right hon. and learned Friend is: why on earth, when we are leaving the EU and given that we are an open and outward-looking country that does filter, take interest in and take account of different principles from different jurisdictions, would we put on an further elevated status the case law of the ECJ?
I may be able to assist the Minister with the explanatory notes.
That is kind, but I will make some progress; otherwise I will lose the thread in relation to amendment 303.
The amendment is at odds with the clear and certain position set out in the Bill, because it would continue to bind UK courts to some post-exit ECJ decisions and case law where the matters giving rise to the case have occurred before our exit. Those judgments would continue to be binding even after an implementation period. Strictly interpreted, the amendment would go further still. It would apply to anything happening before exit day and so would also include ECJ judgments on cases referred from outside the UK. For example, a preliminary reference made by another EU member state in relation to the interpretation of EU law might also fall within the scope of the amendment, if the facts of the case arose before exit day. The consequences would be far-reaching and risk creating considerable uncertainty and practical difficulties for the administration of justice.
UK courts and tribunals would continue to be bound by some new ECJ judgments for an indeterminate period. Those binding judgments could continue to be issued long after we have left the EU as cases continue to progress to the European Court from across the EU. Yet those judgments would not have formed part of the snapshot of retained EU case law that, under clause 6(3), will be binding on our courts, so far as is relevant, and subject to the rule in clause 6(4). By contrast, such post-exit judgments would bind our courts in all circumstances, including where the retained version of an EU regulation had since been modified by this Parliament or a devolved Administration. That would create foreseeable and entirely avoidable uncertainty, and it would not be necessary, because individuals whose cause of action predates our exit would, of course, continue to be able to take their case to the domestic courts, even if after exit they cannot reach the European Court. That is the fundamental point in relation to the procedural framework.
I now turn to amendment 304, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham, in relation to retaining ECJ referrals and jurisdiction for anything that happened before exit day. In leaving the EU, we will bring an end to the jurisdiction of the ECJ—we have made that clear. The proposed amendment would frustrate that objective, because our courts could continue to make references to the ECJ in relation to cases where relevant matters have occurred before our withdrawal from the EU. As a result, different rules and processes would apply for those cases, compared with those where the relevant circumstances arose after exit day. That would, I fear, give rise to more not less uncertainty, because it would be impossible to predict for how long UK courts would continue to be subject to binding judgments from Luxembourg.
When we exit the EU, we will know exactly how many pending UK cases are registered with the European Court, awaiting a preliminary reference and thus covered by any proposed agreement we have with the EU on the treatment of pending cases. That is important to deliver certainty about how and when the Court’s jurisdiction in the UK will be brought to an end. The amendment would remove that certainty. Like amendment 303, it is not necessary. Individuals will not lose their ability to vindicate their rights in court after exit. They will be able to take such cases to our domestic courts.
Forgive me, Sir David, but I thought it necessary to address my right hon. Friend’s amendments in detail. Equally, I want to say that I recognise the eloquence and the force with which she champions her constituents. Ministers will take away the underlying issue that she has brought and powerfully moved for consideration. I hope that on that basis she will not feel she needs to press the amendment.
I am following the Minister’s arguments very carefully, with helpful interventions from some of my colleagues. I appreciate that this is a very tricky matter, but it does relate to my constituent. I am therefore grateful that the Minister has undertaken to take the proposal away and look at the principle in relation to this case, because I feel that it would be most unjust not to do so. I have no love for the European Court of Justice and I want the Bill to go through, but not at the cost of justice for my constituent. This case has thrown the matter into stark relief. I am grateful to the Minister for that undertaking and I look forward to talking to him further on the matter.
I thank my right hon. Friend for her constructive approach. We will take that consideration forward after these proceedings.
I will now rattle through the final amendments, so I have done them all justice and given them due consideration. I will turn next to amendment 306, tabled by the Opposition. Clause 6(2) states that our courts are no longer bound by decisions of the European Court after our departure or required to consider in future cases, although they may do so if they believe it to be appropriate. Clause 6 is a vote of confidence in our judiciary: its independence and its expertise. Using similar exercises currently undertaken with court judgments in other jurisdictions, our courts are best placed to decide to what extent, if any, they pay regard to EU law in any case before them.
The intention of amendment 306 is to remove that discretion from clause 6 and replace it with a duty that sets fetters on which aspects of EU case law our judges must consider, although only in certain areas. In practice, that would create a presumption that EU decisions should be followed in those areas. That is the clear intention, but it is inappropriate. It would undermine the purpose of clause 6 in both its fundamental objectives. It would frustrate the return of control to this House and the UK Supreme Court and expose the UK to substantial additional and unnecessary legal uncertainty.
I am going to make a little bit more progress. I have given way to my hon. Friend.
The singling out of these areas of law appears somewhat arbitrary, given other fields the amendment might equally apply to. It would lead to a splintered approach to interpretation of the law and a fragmented UK jurisprudence—more uncertainty, not less. In any case, it is totally unnecessary. The UK has a proud history of ensuring the rights and protections of individuals in this country. The UK has high standards of protection domestically in relation to workers’ rights and human rights. We are recognised as a world leader in delivering robust, rigorous health and safety protections. That record and that commitment is not dependent on our membership of the EU; it is dependent on hon. Members in this House and their eternal vigilance. It will continue to be dependent on that after we leave. I hope that the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and his colleagues in the Labour party will not press amendment 306.
Finally, I turn to amendment 358 tabled by the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), which sets out the ability of UK courts to have regard to material used in the preparation of retained EU law. I hope that this is the point at which I give some reassurance to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). Currently, when interpreting EU law domestically, our courts will look at the language used, as well as considering the legislation’s recitals, legal basis and other language versions to inform their interpretation. We do not want to change how this law is interpreted or to create any fresh uncertainty about its meaning, so the Bill provides for the courts to continue that approach. Clause 6 provides that questions on the validity, meaning or effect of retained EU law will be decided in accordance with retained case law and general principles of EU law. This requires taking a purposive approach to interpretation where the meaning of the provision is unclear, considering relevant documents such as the legislation’s treaty legal base, working papers that may have led to the adoption of the measure and the general principles of EU law. I hope that reassures my hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee and that he will not press his amendment.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful case on each of the amendments, but I am among those concerned about the confusion around the cut-off line. The general principles he just talked about will shift and change. Is there a point by which, when we reference the principles and those principles have changed post-exit, we do not consider them to be the principles we referenced rather than the principles that existed before and are now not modified? At what point do we have the cut-off point?
My right hon. Friend raises an excellent, if rather esoteric, point, but it is also fundamentally about clause 5 and schedule 1. If he can be patient, we will turn to that next week and, I hope, address all his concerns.
To sum up, I hope that I have at least sought to address all the underlying concerns in each of the amendments and, given the need to maximise legal certainty, minimise confusion and ensure a smooth transition, that all hon. Members will make sure that clause 6 stands part of the Bill unamended.
I rise to speak to amendment 137, which stands in my name and, I am happy to say, the names of many other hon. Members on these Benches, and to amendments 202 and 203, which stand in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) and other Members on the SNP Benches. I was particularly delighted to hear the Labour party spokesman say that Labour was supporting my amendment 137, which also has the support of the Trades Union Congress, Justice, the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the Fawcett Society.
I will endeavour to explain in detail why amendment 137 is necessary. In essence, we have tabled it because it is necessary to create legal certainty for individuals and businesses by giving a clear instruction to the courts about how to treat decisions of the European Court of Justice after exit day. I am afraid that the Bill does not give that degree of clarity. The purpose of the amendment is also to protect the judiciary from having to make decisions open to political criticism. We saw some pretty heinous political criticism of judges on the Supreme Court earlier this year, and we have heard judges on that Court express concern about the possibility of not being given proper direction in the Bill. My amendment seeks to address that issue. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our constituents, the amendment will encourage UK rights protections to keep pace with EU rights after Brexit.
Amendment 202 is also about giving certainty to individuals and businesses with cases pending before the domestic courts on exit day. I listened carefully to what the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) said about her amendments, with which I have great sympathy. Amendments 202 and 203 have a similar purpose. I also listened with care to what the Minister said, but I regret that he has not given me any comfort that anything in the Bill will give the certainty required for people in the midst of litigation on exit day. That is why we seek to define a “pending matter” in amendment 384 as
“any litigation which has been commenced in any court or tribunal in the United Kingdom and which is not finally determined at exit day”.
We need clarity. It is not just me who says so, or those who support the amendment; these amendments were drafted with some care by the Law Society of Scotland, and I submit that they are necessary to protect litigants’ legitimate expectations, but I will return to that in a moment.
The underlying theme of all these amendments is the need to create the legal certainty that hon. Members on both sides of the House have referred to today. It is, of course, an absolute requirement of the rule of law that there should be legal certainty. I regret to say, however, that clause 6 does not give that degree of legal certainty. In accordance with our mandate the Scottish National party opposes Brexit, but we understand the need for withdrawal legislation, and we want to reach agreement on it if possible. We also want to ensure that the legislation is properly framed. Clause 6 is not properly framed, because it does not give the certainty that is required.
I am listening with great care to the hon. and learned Lady. She will agree that references to the Court of Justice are made by the courts to interpret a particular provision of EU law, not by individuals. That is an important difference that I am sure she will appreciate.
That is absolutely right, and it is critical. With respect to the Minister of State, that is why I do not think the financial services sector will take much comfort from his rather high-level dismissal of these proposals earlier.
Let me just say what these two amendments, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond), seek to do. They seek to give a general interpretive tool to assist the transposition process. We all accept that that has to happen in that domestication into the statute book. They would interfere with the powers to make regulations conferred by clause 7, but they would reduce the need for regulations. I should have thought that it was preferable not to have to operate by regulation if we could avoid it. If we have a known and established interpretive code, that will save the need to make lots of regulations under clause 7. However, it would also, as the Minister rightly observed, provide a backstop, and that would deal with gaps that are identified but that are not picked up in the transposition process. That is what subsections (A1) and (A2) of amendment 357 would achieve.
These changes draw on rules of interpretation that, as I indicated in my intervention earlier, were proposed by the International Regulatory Strategy Group. That body is co-sponsored by the City of London corporation and TheCityUK, and I am indebted to the Remembrancer’s Office of the City of London corporation for the drafting of these amendments—it takes the credit for the ingenuity.
I absolutely take the spirit in which these amendments are made, and I am grateful to the Remembrancer’s Office, but does my hon. Friend not agree that we need to be cautious? He thinks that this general interpretive approach will, of itself, amend deficiencies, but does the fact not remain that we would still have to amend deficiencies in legislation, even with these otherwise helpful-looking provisions?
I do not disagree with the Solicitor General about that, but I suggest that it is not an either/or scenario. I very much hope that he will indicate that he is prepared to continue working with me and the authors of the amendments to take this forward. I see that he nods his assent, and I am sure that we can find a constructive means of doing so.
Let me explain why this is important. The first of the rules, in subsection (A3), would confine the territorial scope of the retained EU law to the UK. That would put it on the same territorial footing as domestic law, therefore ensuring that as a general principle, retained EU law would no longer enable or require people or businesses in the UK to do, or to stop doing, something in an EU country. It is perfectly logical from that point of view.
The second rule would ensure that reference to a member state in an EU law that has been domesticated was taken, post Brexit, as a reference to the UK. That would ensure that domesticated EU law would in fact fully apply in the domestic sphere, removing any ambiguity on that point. That will be necessary in a large number of instances to avoid the situation in which the UK will, in effect, be treated as a third country for the purposes of its own laws where retained EU law is currently framed by reference to the whole EU. That would be an absurdity, and we are seeking to remove that risk.
The third rule, in subsection (A5), would transfer all the functions exercised by EU bodies to the Secretary of State. I take the Minister’s point that not all those will necessarily be exercised by the Secretary of State. It is not prescriptive in that way—it need not be, and we can talk about that—but it would deal with the many instances where such functions are transferred to an appropriate Secretary of State as well as providing, again, a legislative backstop to cater for circumstances where the alternative arrangements had not been put in place in time, so that there is no cliff edge in that regard.
The fourth rule deals with the many situations where domestic authorities are required, either outright or as a precondition, to exercise their own functions to deal with EU bodies or authorities in member states. What does that mean in practice? It covers, for instance, cases where the UK body has to notify, consult or get the approval of an EU body before taking a particular course of action.
That is entirely right. That rule would preserve the flexibility to co-operate with European partners and to trade into the European markets—regulatory equivalence will be critical to achieving that—and it would do so without the risk of facing any inappropriate legal constraints on the UK’s own operations once we have left.
I am not suggesting that the answer to everything is in this amendment. It is tabled in the spirit of wanting to work with the Government as we move forward, but it does go a long way towards delivering, in a relatively simple manner, the objective of having a functioning statute book on exit day.
Amendment 358 deals with what those who worked on this perceive as a potential gap concerning the interpretation of domesticated EU law. Clause 6(3), as has already been observed, will preserve the effect of case law laid down before exit day. Clause (6)(2) will provide discretion, and we have talked a lot about taking that into account. I listened with interest to the speech by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) regarding her amendment on that point. Again, this amendment does not provide the whole answer, but it raises serious issues that need to be looked at, and I hope that Ministers will do so.
For the sake of clarity, I think that my hon. Friend will find that schedule 8(25) contains enough scope for other documents of the type that he mentions to be considered by the courts. I hope that I have given him enough reassurance on that point.
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for that clarification. Perhaps he could confirm that he is happy to meet me and we can discuss that. [Interruption.] He says that he is of course happy to do so. I am grateful to him for that very constructive response, and characteristically so. That will enable us to deal with things like negotiating texts, which we sometimes know of as the travaux préparatoires within the EU context. [Interruption.] Again, the Solicitor General confirms that that is the sort of thing that we can discuss.
Why is that important to the International Regulatory Strategy Group, and why is the group central to this? Its membership includes virtually all the significant representative institutions of the London financial community: the stock exchange, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, the Association of British Insurers, the British Bankers Association, the City of London corporation and major commercial organisations such as Credit Suisse, Aviva, Allen & Overy, Allianz, Fidelity, HSBC and Lloyds. The list includes all the key underpinners of the City’s operation.
We need to take those important matters into account, and I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his willingness to meet and discuss them. I commend to him and other Ministers the observation made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) about the Francovich cases. It clearly cannot be the Government’s intention to remove people’s opportunity to seek remedies for wrongs that were done prior to our departure. My right hon. Friend raises a critical issue, and it is important to get this right.
I hope that Ministers will observe that the guidance in clause 6(2) is clearly not sufficient to meet the concerns of our senior judiciary and that they have said as much. When Lord Neuberger, a distinguished President of the Supreme Court, says that, ironically, the discretion is so wide that it puts judges at a degree of risk of political attack, he has to be taken seriously. Several right hon. and hon. Members have praised the quality of our judiciary, and I totally agree with them. We ought to listen very carefully when our judiciary say that, as a matter of protection against malicious attack of the sort that they have suffered in the past, they look to Parliament to safeguard their ability to function independently in cases that are quite politicised.
I am listening with care to my hon. Friend. Will he accept from me that there is another danger, namely that by using too many prescriptive words in the Bill, we could fetter the discretion of the courts in a way that they would find equally unacceptable? There is a balance to be struck here.
There is, and that is why it is all the more important—perhaps unusually so—for Government to talk quietly with the judiciary to find out what they are saying. They cannot compromise their independence, but those of us who are in touch with them want to make sure that the Government understand the root of their concerns. I am sure that there is a constructive way forward on that.
I know that the Solicitor General will be aware of the problem, because it was referred to in the Justice Committee’s report in the last Parliament. I also draw his attention to the concerns raised by Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the recently retired Lord Chief Justice, in the evidence that he gave only a couple of days before he retired from that post. He gave a pretty clear steer on the sort of thing that could be helpful and posited various types of language. I hope that the Solicitor General accepts that we need to look further at the matter, and I hope that we can do that constructively as we take the Bill forward.
I am listening with great care to my right hon. Friend. Is not the simple answer that the Supreme Court will apply the rules of precedent in accordance with its practice direction of 50 years ago, which allows it to depart from previous case authority where it appears right to do so? Principles have been set out in domestic law by the Supreme Court and its predecessor, the judicial committee of the House of Lords.
With great respect to the Solicitor General, I draw him back to clause 6(3)(a), which directs the lower court in such a case to continue to apply the retained case law on the basis of ECJ jurisprudence, not Supreme Court jurisprudence. If that is not what the Government intend, they need to redraft clause 6(3)(a). They can have it one way or the other, but we cannot in this country have a legal system that tells our courts to do two different things. That is why the former judges are causing a harouche here. They are not being told what we, as a Parliament, are expecting of them.
What we are seeking to do is, in effect, settle the status of retained EU case law so that it is equivalent to that of Supreme Court authority. That is the explanation of the hierarchy that my right hon. Friend has, very fairly, outlined.
If the Solicitor General is trying to argue that he is aiming for equality between the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, that poses an insoluble problem for the lower court. One has to trump the other, but if the Bill is trying to make out that one trumps the other, it does not do it. It is really quite important for a human being who speaks English and reads the Bill to be able to see which trumps which.
The hon. Gentleman was not here for large parts of the debate; if he reads Hansard, he will see that that was addressed very squarely.
For the benefit of viewers who have just tuned in on BBC Parliament, I am happy to give way to the Minister a second time if he would like to state very clearly for the record whether, in his view, on that fundamental point, the jurisdiction of the ECJ will apply during the transition period. It is a very simple question and it only requires a yes or no answer, but he will not respond.
I have to agree with my hon. Friend, but I am happy to be generous and give way to the Minister again. This is a very simple yes or no question.
The hon. Gentleman is very kind, but neither he nor the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) has been in here for the entirety of the debate. This issue has been addressed squarely. We are not going to pre-empt or prejudice—[Interruption.]
I will pick up two or three points that have been made in this important debate. There have some magnificent contributions, particularly from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). I will start with what he had to say because it is central to the debate.
I appreciate what the Government have been trying to do with clauses 5 and 6 on the way in which retained EU law should be interpreted. I agree with my right hon. Friend that the wording is opaque, although I think that I understand the Government’s intention on the role and supremacy of the Supreme Court in developing law, but that still does not get us away from the fundamental problem that EU law is different from our law. Its rules of interpretation are different and its purpose is different.
We will come back to that problem right through this Bill, whether on the charter of fundamental rights or the general principles of EU law. We cannot just take EU law and drop it into our law without leaving guidance on what the Government expect that law to be used for. I worry that the lack of explanation is most peculiar. It is not a question of wanting to keep EU law—I assume that it will all ultimately go away, anyway—but in the meantime there is a lack of clarity, and I can well understand why the judiciary, particularly the senior judiciary, are troubled by the lack of guidance. It is almost as though the Government have found it too embarrassing to want to grapple with it. They want to maintain continuity, but they do not want to maintain the implication of continuity because that is a difficult message to sell to some Conservative Members.
We will really have to look at this as we go through the Bill, and I am quite prepared to try to help the Government to find a way through. It is not that I want to keep its aura, and there are many Conservative Members who do not like it at all, but the simple fact is that we need to look at it.
The other issues that have been raised are absolutely right, but they are not relevant to this debate. We do not have the slightest clue what the transitional arrangements will be. We will have to have a completely separate piece of legislation to sort that out, and I suspect it will take a long time to go through this House. Ultimately, if we have a long-term agreement, there will be an interesting issue about whether we will be instructing our courts to mirror EU law so as to maintain comity with the Court of Justice of the European Union or risk constantly having to readjust our legal frameworks for the sake of that deep and special relationship.
I do not want to disappoint some of my right hon. and hon. Friends too much, but the harsh reality is that our geographical location and our desire to have a close trading relationship with the European Union will inevitably mean that decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union continue to have a major influence on our law here—I am afraid that was rather disregarded in last year’s referendum. I think that it is called globalisation, and we will have to return to that as we go along.
We have listened carefully to all hon. Members in the various contributions and concerns that have been raised, and taken account of the amendments in this group. There are issues we will take away for further consideration. I refer in particular to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) said about the Equality Act 2010, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) raised her issue powerfully and constructively. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) also raised a number of points, and I think that we can address those. I think that they are covered by clause 6, but I will take them away and we will work further to make sure we provide the clarity that is required.
I am not going to give way; the hon. Gentleman has had his opportunity. Time is running out and I want to give the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) the chance to wind up. We cannot accept amendments that create more rather than less legal certainty, so I urge all hon. Members to pass clause 6 unamended this evening.
I thank Members for a debate that has covered a wide range of issues relating to transition and the application of EU law, but that has also revealed a number of interesting facets of Government policy. It was particularly stark that the Minister, who would not give way just now to my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), could not let the words, “The ECJ would apply during a transition” pass his lips. That was the very phrase the Prime Minister, for it was she, put into the Florence speech. I thought that speech was Government policy, but it turns out apparently not to be—not today.
I will repeat, in terms, exactly what I said earlier. We want an early agreement on an implementation period. As the Prime Minister said in the Florence speech, that may mean we start off with the European Court still governing some rules we are part of for that period, but the Government are also clear that if we can bring forward a new dispute resolution mechanism at an earlier stage, we will do so. The hon. Gentleman should have listened to what I said earlier.
Well, well, well. The number of caveats, little changes and weasel words within that particular obfuscatory explanation were not as clear as what the Prime Minister said at that time. That was fascinating and I suspect the Minister will get a phone call from No. 10 in the morning. New clause 14, which I would like to test the will of the House on, is still very relevant; we need to get clarity from the Government a month after Royal Assent on how exactly transition would apply. It is clear that although they say there will be an Act of Parliament, we do not know that that can be completed and enacted before exit day. We may find ourselves with a vacuum. We need much more clarity from Ministers. The Minister has proven the point and made the case amply, which is why I wish to press new clause 14 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
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This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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I am speaking to amendments on the amendment paper, if the right hon. Gentleman would care to look at them.
I have no great expectation that the Government will accept either Plaid Cymru’s amendment or the SNP’s proposed new clause, which will be decided at a later date, but I want to continue to remind them and their Back Benchers, as well as Opposition Back Benchers, that we do not have a final, irreversible decision on the single market. We might not even have an irreversible decision on the European Union, but we certainly do not yet have an irreversible decision on the single market and membership of the European economic area.
There is a way in which the Government can extricate themselves from the mess that they have created for us; end the torment of 4.5 million people who still do not have an absolute legal guarantee that their children will be allowed to finish at the school at which they have already started; ease the daily growing concerns of businesses the length and breadth of these islands that do not know whether they will be allowed to import raw materials or export finished goods; and ease the concerns of our public services that their essential workers, including care workers, nurses and doctors, may not be able to continue to move here to serve our people. It is all right for the bankers, of course, because there will be an exception for them. They will have free movement, but nurses, doctors and care assistants are apparently not important enough.
Even if, for political reasons, the Government cannot ask their Back Benchers to support amendments either today or during later Committee sittings, I ask them to think very carefully about what I am saying. There has not been a referendum to leave the single market, so the situation can be changed by the will of this Parliament and the support of the Government. They do not have to go back on their promise to respect the result of the referendum to leave the European Union, but they can reverse the headlong charge towards the cliff edge and make sure that the Bill actually delivers what it is supposed to deliver, and that means we have a soft landing instead of falling off the cliff edge in March 2019.
I rise to speak in support of clauses 2 and 3. It is a pleasure to participate at Committee stage, which is one of my favourite stages of debate because it is a time when we can all can come together in a mature way to look at the detail of the Bill and debate it as grown-ups. May I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Government Benches, and indeed to all hon. Members, that I certainly intend to take very seriously the points that have already been made, and those that will be made today, in future Committees days, and—I assure my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) of this—on Report?
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for giving way so early in his remarks. Will he also reflect on: the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802; the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, which was brought in by Disraeli; the 1901 Act brought in by Salisbury; and, if we wind forward to the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, rights, such as maternity and paternity rights, that far exceeded the EU’s minimum guarantees?
My hon. Friend’s point is well made. We are talking about centuries of progress. To bring things right up to date, the Prime Minister made a pledge in her Lancaster House speech, which was underlined in our manifesto—I can underline this again today on behalf of the Government—that the Brexit process will in no way whatever be used to undermine or curtail the rights of workers that are enshrined both in domestic law and in law by virtue of the European Union.
When the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) allowed me to intervene, I asked whether a consensus was emerging. New clause 50 states that all European laws and regulations would be brought on to our statute book by European exit time, but is the Minister saying that that will actually occur and that such an amendment is unnecessary? If that is the case, some of us will not have to move our amendments.
In a nutshell, I would say that the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment and those associated with it are indeed unnecessary. I will set that out in more detail when I come on to address his point and those made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), who spoke to the amendments very helpfully, if I may say so with respect.
The hon. and learned Gentleman knows that I respect him. If we take him and what he is saying at face value, I do not think he has a lot to fear from new clause 55, new clause 25 or the other measures being proposed as they would simply secure what he is saying. However, does he understand why many of us have suspicions when we hear speeches about a low-regulation economy from Members such as the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) that are then retweeted by the Department for International Trade? That is where these deep worries are coming from.
I absolutely understand the concerns of hon. Members on both sides of the Committee. The Government’s policy is clear, and I shall address in further detail where the Government stand on those amendments.
May I make some progress at this stage? I will certainly invite the right hon. Gentleman to intervene later, but I want to develop my arguments on the clauses.
Clause 2 preserves the domestic law we have made to implement our EU obligations. More specifically, the clause will preserve any domestic regulations made under section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of schedule 2 to, the European Communities Act 1972. Without clause 2, such legislation would lapse at the same time as the repeal of the 1972 Act, meaning that there would be substantial holes in our statute book on the day we leave the EU. The clause is therefore essential to preserve our statute book and provide certainty over what our law is. I think that all Members would agree that at the heart of the rule of law is the need for certainty. That was why the Prime Minister put that at the top of her list when she outlined her criteria in the Lancaster House speech, and it was why I campaigned very strongly on that when standing for re-election.
I am listening to the Minister very patiently. He, like other Members who have looked closely at the Bill, will know that clauses 2 and 3 both conclude with a key phrase:
“This section is subject to section 5 and Schedule 1 (exceptions to savings and incorporation).”
We cannot possibly consider clauses 2 and 3 without looking at schedule 1, which removes overnight the general principles of EU law such as non-discrimination, proportionality and respect for fundamental rights.
The Minister may shake his head and he may not agree, but that is in the Bill he is advancing in this Chamber.
With respect to the hon. Lady, I do not agree with her analysis. We will carry out more detailed scrutiny of clause 5 and schedule 1 at a later stage, but I reassure her that clauses 2 and 3 will create certainty which, as I have said, is vital.
We drafted clause 2 in a deliberate way. We have drawn it more widely than to cover just domestic legislation created under the 1972 Act as it will also apply to any other domestic primary or secondary legislation that implements EU obligations. It will apply to any related domestic legislation, any domestic legislation relating to law that will be retained under clauses 3 and 4, and indeed any domestic legislation that is otherwise related to the EU or the European economic area. That ensures that all that legislation will form a part of what we define as retained EU law.
We have done that for two reasons. First, it means that this legislation, where relevant, will be interpreted in the light of pre-exit case law—the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union—and the general principles of EU law, which are provided for in clause 6. That is vital to ensure not only that we save the legislation, but that we provide for it to operate in precisely the same way as it did before, which will prevent legal uncertainty about how such provisions should be interpreted.
Secondly, our approach ensures that to the extent that deficiencies might arise in any legislation as a result of exit, they can be corrected under powers in the Bill. Saving the domestic legislation under this clause will therefore reduce the risk of uncertainty and increase continuity as to the law that applies in the UK. It will also mean that we avoid the famous cliff edge that many hon. Members are worried about when we leave the EU.
I do not want to pursue further the questions about clause 6—we will talk about them anon, and we talked about them yesterday—but while very many of us have no objection to anything my hon. and learned Friend says about the way in which existing law will be incorporated under clauses 2 and 3, does he accept that the issues raised by Members on both sides of the Committee are about the mechanisms by which the Bill seeks to achieve what he describes as correcting deficiencies, but could also be used to do much more than that? Does he therefore accept that the only thing we are currently debating is the mechanism to ensure that more than correcting deficiencies is not done by the technical means of statutory instruments under the negative procedure?
That is the nub of it. I hope that I can reassure right hon. and hon. Members that the Government’s policy is very clear and delineated, and that this is not some out-of-control power grab involving the use of the Bill—this is a framework and process Bill—as a basis to change policy. That is not the intention of the Bill.
The Minister has persuaded me that I do not need to speak to or move new clause 51, which relates to the point raised by the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). Given the general wish in the country to take power back, new clause 51 would provide a place where power is supposed to come back to—the actual authorities—and set the means by which we review what we want to keep, extend, amend and kick out. Will the Government allow us to decide the mechanisms by which we undertake that review?
I take issue with the mechanism in new clause 51, which would be rather burdensome and could increase uncertainty, which would not be good for businesses or citizens, but I will take the spirit in which the right hon. Gentleman tabled it very much to heart and mind when considering how to develop the ongoing dialogue about the means by which this place can sort the wheat from the chaff, if I may use that phrase.
I hope that this will be my last intervention. The purpose of the measure is to make sure that we all know that the task will be massive. I thought the idea preposterous that most of us would be prepared to give up all our other interests to participate in that mega review, which the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said might go on for 20 years, and I thought we could hand back quite a bit of it to the Government, providing we could keep hold of the reins.
The right hon. Gentleman is right to call this task mega. I remind the House that, according to the EU’s legal database, more than 12,000 EU regulations are currently in force here. As for UK domestic legislation, the House of Commons Library indicates that there have been around 7,900 statutory instruments implementing EU legislation. This is indeed a mega task—to coin his phrase.
I accept that there is no intention that the Bill takes away the rights and protections enshrined in EU law and that the Bill does not imply that they will be taken away. The problem is that the Bill enables future Governments to do so, and there is therefore a need to protect those fundamental rights and protections by providing that they can be amended only through primary legislation. They need to be separated from the great mass of technical stuff that can be sifted by the European Scrutiny Committee or other such turbo-charged Select Committees, which could look at the minutiae.
The hon. Gentleman has been a committed pro-European throughout his career. I enjoyed his YouTube videos during the campaign—[Interruption.] I look forward to starring in one. We must not forget, however, that the important sunset provisions in clause 7 limit the use of such powers to two years after 29 March 2019. Clause 9 is now sunsetted to a very restrictive interpretation with regard to the duration of its powers. I hope that that, together with the important policy statements we have made, and are making again today, will give the hon. Gentleman the comfort he is looking for. [Interruption.] He is chuntering away. With respect, perhaps he could hear me out. I am trying to give him the comfort he rightly seeks for his constituents and to reassure him that his fears are unjustified.
My hon. and learned Friend accepts that the problem is that the Bill includes powers that could be used to make drastic reductions in environmental standards and other things without any proper parliamentary process. There is a widespread consensus among remainers and leavers that we do not want the powers to be used in that way. He sounds as though he is about to reassure us that the policy of the present Government is that although they are taking the powers, they have no intention of using them for such purposes. I have the highest regard for him—he is a personal friend—and I quite accept that a Government led by this Prime Minister is not about to use draconian powers to lower standards, as her instincts are quite the other way. Given that the powers are therefore not needed—we do not need a Bill to give us powers that no one wants to use—why can we not amend the Bill to put it beyond doubt that no such attempt will be made? Heaven forfend that my party should swing to the right at any time in its long and distinguished history, but there are members of the present Government who are not excessively fond of lizards and bats, or workers’ rights. We would all be reassured if he undertook to put in the Bill a reduced level of powers.
My right hon. and learned Friend knows that I hold him in the utmost respect—reverence even—but, having discussed the mega task that faces us with the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field), I think he will agree that it is probably safer and wiser for the Government, with a belt-and-braces approach, to make sure that we do not have any slips between cup and lip, and that there are no lacunas or loopholes in the law that could actually endanger these protections and rights.
I share the concerns of the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke). If the Government will not use the powers, why are they giving them to themselves? The Minister talks about dialogue and reassurance, but I have not heard anything practical from him about how he will change the Bill to address these concerns. What is he going to do?
I will come to that, but first I want to deal with the amendments tabled by the hon. Lady’s colleagues.
I need to press on, because other Members want to speak and I am mindful that you, Dame Rosie, want as many as possible to have the opportunity to do so.
I am sorry. I need to press on.
Clause 3 converts the text of direct EU legislation, as it operates at the moment immediately before we leave the EU, into our domestic law. Such existing EU law is currently given legal effect in our law via section 2(1) of the 1972 Act. Without clause 3, those laws would no longer have effect in domestic law when we leave and repeal the 1972 Act. Again, that would leave holes within our domestic law. More specifically, the clause converts EU regulations, as well as certain decisions and tertiary legislation, into domestic law. It also converts adaptations to instruments made for the EEA. The clause is necessary to ensure that we fully keep existing EU laws in force within the UK.
In general, these instruments, or parts of them, will be converted only if they are already in force before exit day, meaning that an EU regulation set to come into force six months after we leave will not be converted into UK law. However, some EU instruments will be in force but will apply only in a staggered way over time, with different parts applying at different times. In those circumstances, only those parts that are stated to apply before exit day will be converted.
I might be anticipating the Minister’s later remarks, but does that not leave us with a possible loophole when we have participated in the preparation of measures that have not yet come into force and we might regard as thoroughly desirable, but we cannot by any means bring them into force?
I will deal briefly with my hon. Friend’s amendment 356. As I was saying, we have some examples here, such as the EU’s fluorinated greenhouse gases regulations, which are stated as applying from 1 January 2015. They include prohibitions on placing certain substances on the market from specific dates, several of which fall after exit day. With respect, however, his amendment could create further confusion, because there needs to be one standard cut-off point at which the snapshot of law is taken, and that is why exit day should apply. When it comes to measures affected by the cut-off point, we will do whatever is necessary before exit day to provide certainty for business, including by bringing forward further legislation, if required, to cater for those particular situations. If I may return to develop—
I will certainly take more interventions, but I am mindful of the time.
May I deal with clause 3? The clause converts only the English language version of the instrument. Other language versions will remain available, as they do now, for interpretive purposes. Finally, as hon. Members would expect, the EU instruments that have never applied in the UK will not be converted under the clause. That includes instruments in respect of the euro and measures in the area of freedom, security and justice in which this country did not choose to participate. Those exempt instruments are described in schedule 6.
The Government have said that they will guarantee existing employment rights derived from the EU, but the EU is also looking at proposals to extend those rights by, for example, requiring employers to give workers on zero-hours contracts a written statement of their pay rates and expected hours of work. Will the Government champion employment protection and require employers to give workers on zero-hours contracts a written statement of their terms and conditions?
The Government, through the Taylor review, have been committed to looking at all aspects related to zero-hours contracts, and this, post-exit day, will be a matter for the House and this Parliament to determine. It may well be that this or a future Government make changes of the sort that the hon. Lady and others are looking for. The fact that we are leaving the EU in no measure whatever rules out the potential for those changes to be made.
May I deal with—
I am sorry, but I need to make progress. I want to deal with the proposals tabled by hon. Members, including the Opposition spokesman.
I will say a little about how we will deal with converted law, which was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. Converted law will become domestic legislation. It will not automatically have the status of either primary or secondary legislation. Indeed, as has already been referenced, paragraph 19 of schedule 8 sets this out:
“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, any retained direct EU legislation is to be treated as primary legislation”.
We all know—including the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), the shadow Secretary of State—about the consequences in terms of incompatibility, the power of the courts and what the House can do to rectify legislation. I think that is an enhancement. It is a welcome initiative and I know the right hon. and learned Gentleman shares my view about that.
Where there are existing pre-exit powers to make subordinate legislation, which is capable of amending retained direct EU legislation such as converted regulations, the converted legislation is to be treated as secondary legislation for the purposes of scrutiny procedures under those pre-exit powers. In other words, we might bring something down to this place and transpose it. We used to use the term “gold plating”, but it has somewhat gone out of fashion now, and I think the Government improved their processes over the years. However, there have been powers to vary, and, in effect, that will be treated as secondary legislation—no change, really, because the House already had those powers with regard to scrutiny.
It follows, then, that where there are not pre-exit powers to make subordinate legislation, we will look case by case at the converted law and determine how it is to be treated. This is the point that has been made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and others: how are we to determine what is what? As I have said, I am keen to ensure that all concerns are properly listened to, and that when we come to further amendments on further days, the Government give full consideration to how to create that mechanism and in what form the House, and indeed the other place, would like it to be administered.
My hon. and learned Friend may be saying what I had hoped he was going to say. May I ask him to be a little more specific? Does he mean that, in due course and in their own time, the Government will come forward with—if I might put it this way—a triage amendment that settles a process for distinguishing between technical deficiency amendments and substantive amendments, and the way in which either is treated?
We are going to continue the dialogue, listening extremely carefully. Indeed, there might be a form of words that we can agree on that satisfies this place. Let us not forget that primary legislation is not the only way we can create this mechanism. There are Standing Order provisions of the House that the House jealously protects and preserves, and the Government are mindful of the need not to trespass on the exclusive cognisance of the House.
I think I must give way to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), who has been waiting for me to allow her to intervene.
I am extremely grateful to the Minister, because I took him at his word. In his opening remarks, he said how much he welcomed consideration in Committee of any Bill because it allowed us to debate in an adult fashion, so I am grateful to him for, at long last, giving way.
May I seek clarification, without the Minister referring to his very complicated notes? People need to understand what is happening, and I would like him to explain, before anyone withdraws or decides not to press their proposal, how directly effective provisions of EU law will be safeguarded. These are rights that arise through EU jurisprudence, not from a directive or a regulation. I want guarantees from him that directly effective provisions are protected beyond the Bill.
One reason the hon. Lady has not heard me outline that concern in detail is that clause 4 is the sweeper clause and my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, will deal with that in the second part of the debate. I assure her that, by the end of today’s proceedings, her concerns will, I hope, have been addressed during the debate on clause 4.
I want to deal with the amendments, having, I hope, made—
May I make progress? I would be grateful, as I need to make progress on the amendments. I think I have been more than generous in giving way. I will move on to try to ensure that I deal with all the points that have been raised.
May I deal first with health and safety legislation? There has been a lot of proper debate about that. The way existing powers are used—the way the UK meets its obligations to implement EU law—is most typically through regulations that are made under the 1972 Act, but regulations are also made under a range of other Acts for these purposes, sometimes in conjunction with the 1972 Act powers and sometimes not. For example, some health and safety regulations are made using the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the 1972 Act where the 1974 Act alone cannot provide the vires, or powers, for those regulations.
One example is the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015. They are made for the purposes of health and safety and of environmental protection, the latter being outside the vires of the 1974 Act. Those regulations prevent and mitigate the effects of major accidents involving dangerous substances, which can cause serious damage and harm to the public and to the environment. The parts of the regulations made under the 1974 Act can continue to be updated after exit under existing powers conferred by that legislation.
As I have set out, clause 2 rightly takes a maximalist approach to preserving direct legislation. It sets it out that any domestic legislation that implements EU obligations or is otherwise related to the EU or the EEA will continue to have effect after our exit. The effect is that those regulations will therefore become retained EU law within the meaning given in the Bill. So it is absolutely right that after we have left the European Union, domestic powers granted by Parliament in other Acts can operate on what will become retained EU law, and as such will be our domestic law. This is so that appropriate changes can be made in future, in line with any domestic policy, where they are within the scope of those powers and the will of this place.
In contrast, the amendments would fetter powers across the statute book that Parliament has already delegated. Relying only on powers set out in this Bill to amend retained EU law would be insufficient and would defeat the purpose of what Parliament has previously set up in the 1974 Act, for example, and other Acts. As I have set out, these powers are in many cases very important and help to deliver functioning regimes. Each of them also contains its own limitations. Those limitations were agreed by Parliament when it agreed to create the powers in question.
The Minister has talked quite a lot about the purpose of this exercise being to provide continuity and certainty, but is it not the case that that will be true only on day one? He cannot guarantee any continuity or certainty on day 100 or day 1,000, but is not that, for many of his colleagues, the whole point of leaving the European Union?
The right hon. Gentleman is old enough and wise enough to know that, while this exercise of freezing the law in time on exit day has to be done, the law is a constantly evolving creature. None of us can stand here and bind the hands of our successors. What we can do, as men and women of good will seeking to achieve as sensible and smooth a Brexit as possible, is provide legal certainty. That is why I am here. That is why I have undertaken to try to deal with this task. That is why this Government are doing everything they can, within the time they have, to get this right.
I have been listening carefully to what my hon. and learned Friend has been saying. Again, there seems to be an overlap. There are issues about how Parliament conducts scrutiny, as my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) has mentioned. That is also covered in proposed new subsection (3) of my new clause 55. There is also the question about modifications to some areas of retained EU law taking place in any way other than by primary legislation, in the longer term. Keeping those two points in mind, may I invite him to go away and see, as the discussion continues, what the Government can come up with by way of a package involving those two elements that might commend itself to the House, bearing in mind the undertaking that he has given to look at this afresh on Report and for the Government to respond positively on Report to what has been said?
Yes, I am happy to do that. That is very much in the spirit what I have already said.
No, I would like to press on, if I may. I am mindful of the time, and I want to make sure that we get these points on record.
I want to deal with the points, which I hope hon. Members want to hear, about the Government’s commitment not only to workers’ rights but to consumer protection rights and environmental obligations—all of which have been very much a part of the work that we have done with our European partners during our 43 years of membership of the European Union. That does not change. I want to move on to some of the other amendments—
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for giving way. This is quite an important issue. A moment ago, I thought that he was on the brink of saying that he would try to come back to the House on Report with the Government’s own legislative proposals to give effect to the good intentions that he has assured us the Government entirely share, but at the last moment he hesitated. When he said yes, was he committing the Government to putting in the legislation the best solution in response to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) in particular, so that we could all be assured that the Bill will leave this House in a way that we entirely unanimously accept?
I am committed to trying to achieve the best solution, whether it is in the Bill or in an amendment to Standing Orders. I will not presume to tie the hands of this place. I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend can take that as a clear assurance that I will do whatever I can to get this right.
The first and most important point to be made about new clause 15, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie)—it has, I think, already been made by several other Members—is that we have strong rights and protections here, domestically, which are not contingent on our future membership of the EU. We have a proud record, and in many areas our standards far exceed the minimum standards required by EU law—for instance, entitlement to annual leave and maternity allowances. When we leave the EU, it will be for this Parliament and, indeed, the devolved legislatures to determine the law and the rights that apply here in the United Kingdom.
I must say to the hon. Member for Nottingham East, with respect, that in my view the new clause would impose an onerous and unnecessary duty on the Government. There will be nothing to stop future Governments of whatever hue, or future Parliaments when exercising their sovereignty, from considering any legislation that the EU or the European Economic Area may make. They need not be obliged to do that; it will be a matter that they can take into consideration. A requirement to report to Parliament each and every time the EU amended its rules would be excessively onerous, given the number of reports that might be made and considered.
Moreover, we do not want to give the inappropriate impression that the path followed by our European partners will always be the path that we as a UK Parliament should follow. While I am entirely supportive of many measures that ensure that we work, converge and keep pace with our European partners, there will of course be plenty of opportunities for us to forge our own path. That, after all, is what the vote was all about.
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for giving way. He is being very generous with his time, and he is making a very useful and, I think, positive speech explaining how the Bill will deal with people’s concerns about the cliff edge and limitations. Does he agree that it also gives us a chance to support the working statute book, ensuring that we look after our own environment, consumer rights, workers’ rights and LBGTI rights?
My hon. Friend is a passionate campaigner on many of those issues. I can reassure her and her constituents that that is precisely what we seek to do.
I hope that I have dealt with the new clauses tabled by the right hon. Member for Birkenhead—
I accept what the Solicitor General said about new clause 50, and I think we should thank him for what he said and what he will try to achieve. New clause 51 is about setting up mechanisms whereby the House could determine how the corpus of legislation and regulation brought into UK law could be reviewed. Will the Solicitor General say a word about that before I go to the Chair and say that I am satisfied in this instance as well?
I hoped that I had responded to new clause 51 in an earlier intervention. It is well intentioned, but the mechanism is too burdensome. It would impose an annual obligation to produce reports which I think would pile Pelion on Ossa, given the amount of work that we have to do in the House anyway because of the unusual circumstances that we face.
I do not think that the House has the appetite to undertake the review, given the ginormous amount of legislation that is coming over to us. I tried to get the Library to describe what would happen. Would this whole place be full of pieces of paper—full of legislation and regulations? How the hell are we, as individuals or groups, going to deal with that?
There is another crucial point. Given what was said by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), might there be discussions before Report about the form in which the Government might bring back the sentiment involved in what the Solicitor General is saying, and what we are all saying, so that we might vote on that?
Yes, indeed.
I shall now move on to new clauses 9, 22, 23 and 29, which is linked to amendment 128, new clause 45 and amendment 217, which is linked to amendment 64. They all in various ways deal with the question of the EEA. As we have said on several occasions, this is not about the UK pursuing an off the shelf arrangement; it is the UK seeking a bespoke arrangement that works for us. In the Florence speech of 22 September—which happens to be my birthday, although I am sure there was no coincidence in that—the Prime Minister set out a vision for the new economic partnership: a new partnership that will empower us to work together in continuing to bring shared prosperity for the generations to come.
I accept of course that we should have on the table the option of creating a bespoke deal for our future relationship, but surely we would want to have a range of options and models on the table as we shape that deep and comprehensive partnership? Why would we want to take one of those potential models off the table now, as it could be the building block of something different coming further down the line?
I always listen to what the hon. Gentleman says with a great deal of interest, but I say in the context of the Bill—although mindful of the constraints of Committee debate—that the thrust of these amendments will not achieve what their movers seek, which is to keep this country in the EEA. That is because all the amendments are based on a mistaken understanding of the UK’s relationship with the EEA. The UK is a party to the EEA agreement in its capacity as an EU member state, so once we leave the EU, the EEA arrangement will no longer be relevant. It does not have a practical effect at international level, and domestic legislation cannot change that.
Will the Minister confirm that one of the few things remain and leave agreed about in the campaign is that we would be leaving the customs union and the single market, and we would not be doing a Norway? [Interruption.] Both sides said that, and the British public understood it.
My right hon. Friend and I were on opposite sides of that debate—indeed, we have been on opposite sides of the debate on Europe for the 20 years and more that I have known him—but I never said in the many arguments I made up and down the country that this was a have your cake and eat it withdrawal: if we voted to leave, it would mean we left the institutions of the EU, which included the customs union and the single market. That is why I campaigned against it, but I accept, as every democrat I know does, the result of the referendum.
I shall now move on, as swiftly as I can, to deal with the effects of these amendments.
I would love to give way to the hon. Lady, but I am mindful of the time, and Mr Hoyle is looking at me in a very stentorian way, so I had better follow that instruction.
There are some potentially detrimental effects of the amendments that I know hon. Members would want to avoid. Amendment 217 seeks to remove the annexes to the EEA agreement from the scope of clause 3. The hon. Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams) is not in his place at present, but the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) is here to represent their party’s interests, and I say to him that that amendment would not allow us to remain in the EEA, for the reasons I have set out, and it would damage the clarity and certainty we aim to provide.
As many hon. Members already know, the EEA agreement effectively extends the single market to three non-EU countries: Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Annexes to the agreement specify which single market rules apply to those countries, along with any necessary adaptations, in order to make the single market properly operate with respect to these countries. Clause 3(2)(b) and (c), which amendment 217 would remove, provide that EU instruments which apply to the EEA will also be converted into domestic law. Those provisions are necessary to ensure that we fully preserve the existing laws and rules that apply here before our exit. They are not, and are not in any way intended to be, a means by which the UK ceases to be a party to the EEA agreement. The retention or otherwise of such annexes within our domestic law will not change that basic fact. The effect of amendment 217 would only be to leave gaps in the law which, as I have set out, would clearly be undesirable.
Will the Solicitor General confirm whether the powers outlined in part 2 of schedule 8 and in clause 8 would allow Ministers to issue an article 127 notification under the EEA agreement?
That is not necessary. The provisions in schedule 8 are all about the frameworks, not the policy, and this Bill is not a vehicle for policy. This is a framework Bill that allows the law to operate within it. That is the distinction that I seek to draw. While I understand and respect the reasons behind the amendments, they do not deliver the policy outcomes that the hon. Lady and others may want.
I will not give way any further.
It is our policy that we will not be a member of the EEA or the single market after we leave the EU, so introducing an obligation to produce a report on membership of the EEA, as new clauses 9 and 23 seek to do, is simply unnecessary.
I will now try to deal fairly with the Scottish National party amendments 200 and 201, which the hon. Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) spoke to. While we do not accept that the amendments are necessary, I welcome the chance to set out clearly the meaning of clause 2. Amendments 200 and 201 seek to provide clarity on precisely what is meant by “passed” in the context of the clause. Some have questioned the effect of clause 2 in relation to an Act that may have been passed by the Scottish Parliament, but which has not yet received Royal Assent when the clause is commenced.
We do not believe that there is an ambiguity. Clause 2(2) states that “EU-derived domestic legislation” is an enactment. As enactments can only mean something that has received Royal Assent, an Act of Scottish Parliament that has only been passed cannot fall within this definition, and it would therefore not be categorised as EU-derived domestic legislation for the purposes of the Bill. The reference to “passed” in clause 2 is therefore a reference to the purpose for which the enactment was passed, not the fact of whether it was passed. I hope I have been able to shed light on that area for the hon. Gentleman, and I invite him to withdraw the amendment.
Turning now to Plaid Cymru’s amendment 87, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Arfon, we do not accept the premise that lies behind the change. In trying to circumvent the provisions of clause 11, the amendment pays no heed to the common approaches that are established by EU law or to the crucial consideration that we—the UK Government and the devolved Administrations—must give to where they may or may not be needed in future. What is more, it undermines our aim to provide people with maximum certainty over the laws that will apply on exit day. The amendment would also be practically unable to achieve its underlying aim. The enactments that it takes out of retained EU law would also be taken outside the scope of the powers that this Bill confers on the devolved Administrations to allow them to prepare them for exit day. It would hamper their ability to address the deficiencies that will arise, and it would leave it likely that the laws would remain broken on the day of exit.
The process of making the statute book work for exit day is a joint endeavour between the different Governments and legislatures of the whole United Kingdom. This is an important project that entails a significant workload before exit day, which is why we are actively engaging with the devolved Administrations to build up a shared understanding of where corrections to the statute book would be needed. On that basis, I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.
I hope I have dealt with the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice.
When the Minister talks about bringing forward a package on Report, do I take it that the amendment in my name and in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond) is intended to be in that package?
I am always happy to engage with my hon. Friend and with my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond). I know the spirit in which they tabled the amendment, and I look forward to the dialogue to come.
I commend clauses 2 and 3 to the House.
I would want us to shape those regulations, because we are going to be affected by them. If our near neighbours—500 million residents—operate under one regulatory regime, many of our products and services will have to comply with it. It is far better that we are able to take part in the discussion and shape those regulations. In accordance with the Bill, we may leave the EU—if that does come to pass—but if we were part of the European economic area, we may still have a say on some regulatory changes. I understand the point my hon. Friend is making, but my amendment would not tie the UK to every regulatory change that takes place within the European Union; it would simply make sure that Parliament is informed when the European Union branches off and goes in a different direction. We need to know that information so that we can make a choice as laws change. If the EU takes a different route, we may want to consider doing so ourselves. We may not, but we may. That is simply the point I make in new clause 15.
New clause 55, in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield, and new clause 25, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), address the issue of retained EU laws. Over 20,000 laws and 12,000 regulations will need to be transposed in some way, shape or form. That is a massive process of change and it is still not clear whether we will convert European laws into primary legislation, secondary legislation or something else entirely. It is sensible to have a schedule that lists retained EU laws and I think the suggestions in the new clauses should be accepted.
It may be that not everything can be changed. If there are modifications via primary legislation, we might want the enhanced scrutiny procedure. When the Minister was pressed on this issue, however, he did not in any way give a proper concession to the points made by Members on both sides of the House. We could face circumstances where the EU laws to be modified affect equal pay, the treatment of workers with disabilities, or race and age discrimination. They were not part of primary or secondary UK legislation, but EU laws that we are going to co-opt. If there is to be a change to the set of rules under which we operate, we need much more clarity on whether it will involve this House of Commons doing it in an affirmative way through an enhanced procedure, or, preferably, through primary legislation.
The Minister needs to do more than just promise to look at this matter on Report, because we may not get a Report stage. We have a Committee of the whole House stage, so unless the Bill is amended there will not be a Report stage. The Minister needs to acknowledge that if we do not have a Report stage, any such assurances are not really worth that much.
Yes, there will be a Report stage. I can assure the hon. Gentleman of that.
I look forward to an amendment with an extra comma or full stop to facilitate a Report stage. It is very important that we see that.
My new clause 9 and amendment 64 relate to the EEA. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander) said, the House should make a specific decision about whether to leave the EAA, given that that was not on the ballot paper. It is effectively the single market club, and as a member we have rights and responsibilities to one another, and not just around the freedom of movement of goods and services, people and capital. On non-tariff issues, too, the EEA ensures barrier-free relationships between the UK and the rest of the EU—on competition policy, state aid issues, consumer protection, environmental policies, research and technological development, education and training, tourism and culture and enterprise. All those issues are covered in the EEA agreement. For the Minister to say, “Oh well, it is implied that we are leaving the EEA, so it is not for the House to make a specific decision”, just will not do.
Well, we must leave it to Ministers to speak for themselves, but I have to say that the discussions that I and others had with the Secretary of State, who, as people have remarked in this debate, is of a very different cast of mind from some previous Secretaries of State, suggest to me that actually there will be an environmental protection Bill coming forward. I think that is—[Interruption.] Ah! Maestro! With perfect timing my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State comes into the Chamber, at just the right moment for him to signify with a nod, if nothing more, that the possibility of proper environmental legislation in the form of a new statute is on his mind.
indicated assent.
And his mind is one that is capable of grasping these matters, if ever the mind of a Member of the House of Commons was. The first point, then, is that a proper statutory basis is superior to a specific amendment to the Bill.
I will give way to both hon. Ladies shortly, but first I want to come to a further point that is an important part of the architecture.
I do not personally believe that even the combination of an environmental protection Bill and an NPS emerging from it and under it would be sufficient. This exactly answers the last point of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion. I accept that it is difficult for campaigners and others to use the vehicle of judicial review, which is why I and some of my hon. Friends have advocated what we have proposed, and why we have agreed with the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State is again nodding. That is why we have agreed that it is necessary under that same statute to create a body which is a prosecutorial authority, wholly independent of Government, along the lines of the Victims’ Commissioner, the Children’s Commissioner, the Office for Budget Responsibility, or the Equality and Human Rights Commission—we can choose which model—and which is an entity that is small and lean but, like the Committee on Climate Change, very serious. It would be established under statute, and charged with a duty under statute to ensure that the NPS is observed. I advocated the CCC when I was first working with Tony Juniper to get what became the Climate Change Act accepted in this House, and at an early stage I came to believe that the combination of clarity of objective and a body wholly independent and staffed by serious experts was a powerful mechanism, and so I think it has proved to be.
That point is very well made. I expect that other hon. Members will touch on that in more detail when they speak to amendments 93 to 95.
We support amendments 148 to 150 and new clause 34—the efforts of my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston to remedy deficiencies in the Bill with respect to the rights of children. Her amendments are designed to preserve in domestic law any rights or obligations arising from the UN convention on the rights of the child, to ensure that Ministers act in such a way as to comply with that convention, and to protect from the delegated powers in the Bill the rights and obligations that flow from the convention.
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of clause 4 and to respond to today’s second group of amendments. I also appreciate the constructive tone of the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook).
The two strategic objectives of the Bill are to take back democratic control over our laws, and to do so in a way that ensures a smooth Brexit. Clause 4 helps us to deliver on both aims. Before talking about the amendments and the application of that clause, it is worth briefly explaining the value of clause 4, which is a sweeper provision. Clause 2 retains UK implementing legislation deriving from EU instruments, and clause 3 incorporates direct EU legislation. Clause 4 picks up the other obligations, rights and remedies that would currently have the force of UK law under section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972. In particular, it will ensure that we retain, on day one of exit, general principles of EU law and all directly effective rights. That means rights deriving from EU treaties that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional that they do not require separate bespoke implementing legislation. Instead, to date, they are relied on as national law without reference to any separate implementing legislation.
I am going to make a little progress; I am mindful of your strictures, Mr Streeter. I will take interventions on the amendments, but let me just explain the relevance of clause 4.
I will give just a flavour of the kinds of rights or obligations captured, which would include the EU-derived rights to equal pay and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. In the context of something like competition law, it would include the prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position. The explanatory memorandum gives further illustrations. Ultimately, given that the criteria for directly effective rights are determined judicially, the scope of such rights must be for UK courts to determine. That is why it would not be right for us to draft our own definition or definitive list.
Clause 4 only converts rights as they exist and are recognised immediately before the date of exit. It serves as a snapshot of EU law on the date of exit, and guarantees a smooth legal transition out of the EU—in respect of everything of value, importance and significance—for businesses and citizens up and down the country.
I will come to the precise application shortly, but I am happy to take another intervention if my right hon. and learned Friend does not think I have answered his question sufficiently by the end.
The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) has raised this point: the rubber does not hit the road in this clause when it comes to procedures, such as when we legislate for chemicals. There is no body in this country that legislates, monitors and enforces chemicals; it is all done at a European level. There is no body extant in this country to do that on exit day.
There are bodies that deal with these kinds of things, such as the Health and Safety Executive, but I will come to that when I deal with the sector-specific applications of this principle.
I am going to make some headway because I am mindful, Mr Streeter, of your guidance about interventions. I want to ensure that those who tabled the amendments get a chance to make interventions about their amendments.
I want to turn now to the amendments themselves. We certainly support the sentiment behind new clause 30 and the related amendments, but I am afraid we cannot accept it. Let me briefly try to explain why.
Article 13 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union places an obligation on the European Union when developing certain EU policies and on member states when developing and implementing those EU policies to have full regard to the welfare requirements of animals. The intention of the new clause is to replicate—I am not sure whether it is replicate or duplicate—that obligation in domestic law when we leave the EU.
The reference to animals as sentient beings is, effectively, a statement of fact in article 13, but even though it is, in effect, declaratory, I can reassure the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) that it is already recognised as a matter of domestic law, primarily in the Animal Welfare Act 2006. If an animal is capable of experiencing pain and suffering, it is sentient and therefore afforded protection under that Act.
We have made it clear that we intend to retain our existing standards of animal welfare once we have left the EU and, indeed, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has made clear, to enhance them. The vehicle of this legislation will convert the existing body of EU animal welfare law into UK law. It will make sure that the same protections are in place in the UK and that laws still function effectively after the UK leaves the EU.
In this country—we should be proud to say this—we have some of the highest animal welfare standards in the world, and we intend to remain a world leader in the future. Leaving the EU will not prevent us from further maintaining such standards; in fact, it will free us in some regards to develop our own gold-standard protections on animal welfare. Animals will continue to be recognised as sentient beings under domestic law, in the way I have described. We will consider how we might explicitly reflect that sentience principle in wider UK legislation.
To tack on to the Bill the hon. Lady’s new clause, which simply refers to article 13, would add nothing, however, and she was fairly honest in her speech about the limited practical impact it would have. Given that it is ultimately fairly superfluous, it risks creating legal confusion. Obviously, if she wants to propose improvements to wider UK legislation—I am sure she will, knowing her tenacity—she is free to do so, but this new clause is unnecessary, and it is liable only to generate legal uncertainty. Having addressed some of her concerns, I hope that she will withdraw the new clause, having powerfully and eloquently made her point.
I want to turn now to new clause 60, in the name of the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), who is the Chair of the Environmental Audit Committee, to new clause 67, in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, and to the related amendments dealing with environmental principles.
The UK has always had a strong legal framework for enforcing environmental protections, and that will continue after we leave the EU. The Bill—this legislative vehicle—will convert the existing body of EU environmental law into UK law, making sure that the same protections are in place in the UK and that laws still function effectively after exit.
The Bill will directly preserve these important environmental principles, because they are hardwired into existing directly applicable EU environmental regulations and case law. Just to take two examples, the precautionary principle is included in the registration, evaluation and authorisation of chemicals regulation of 2006 and the invasive alien species regulation of 2014, so it will be preserved by the Bill. I hope that I have gone some way to reassuring the hon. Lady, given what she said earlier.
With the inclusion of judgments on the application of the precautionary principle, EU case law on chemicals, waste and habitats, for example, will also continue to apply and will be preserved by the Bill as a matter of UK law.
I am thrilled the Minister has come back to chemicals, because we spent about three months of our lives looking into the issue. The point is not whether these things exist in our law; the point is that the body that enacts the registration, evaluation and authorisation of chemicals will not exist on exit day, and the registrations that British companies will have paid a quarter of a billion pounds for will fall. That is one of the big problems.
The Chair of the Select Committee makes her point powerfully, and she draws quite an important distinction, which has infused some of the debates today and yesterday—the distinction between copying, pasting and preserving the substantive law and having the institutional framework. If she will allow me, I will shortly address that point squarely.
On the substantive law, I want to make the wider point that, beyond the EU framework, the Government remain committed to the internationally recognised environmental principles set out, for example, in the 1992 Rio declaration, but also in the many other multilateral environmental agreements to which the UK is a party. These include the precautionary principle and the “polluter pays” principle. We also continue to be a party to the Aarhus convention on access to information and decision making on environmental matters, which was referred to earlier. Leaving the EU will not diminish our commitment—
I am going to make a little progress, again mindful of the guidance that I have received.
Leaving the EU will not diminish our commitment to environmental principles. Indeed, it is an opportunity to reinforce them. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who was here earlier and I am sure is coming back, announced only last week our intention to publish a new comprehensive national policy statement setting out the environmental principles driving UK policy, drawing on the EU’s current principles and underpinning future policy making. The point about its relative significance, value and status was very well made by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). I ally myself with his remarks. We will consult on it early next year. This is not just blue-sky thinking—it is coming imminently.
Critically—this touches on the point made by the Chair of the Select Committee—the Secretary of State has also set out plans to consult on a new independent statutory body to hold the Government to account for upholding environmental standards. I hope that that addresses concerns that some hon. Members may have not just about the substantive law but about the institutional checks and oversight that we definitely need to make sure we continue when Britain leaves the EU. I hope that addresses the point that hon. Lady made, which was also mentioned by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion.
Turning to amendments 60, 67 and 28, I certainly understand their intention, but they are unnecessary because of the snapshot of all EU environmental principles that we are already taking at exit day under this Bill. Furthermore, the amendments would alter existing EU principles, at least to some extent—for example, in the way that they apply to public authorities. Given that the Bill’s purpose is to bring into effect the law we have currently, the amendments risk generating a measure of uncertainty and a degree of confusion about the legal position. I hope that I have addressed some of the concerns on the environment, and I urge hon. Members to not to press the relevant amendments.
I turn to amendment 93 in the name of the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy). Many hon. Members have been eloquent in outlining the need to ensure that treaty rights and other provisions falling outside clauses 2 and 3 are still retained in UK domestic law. Clause 4, as I have said, is a broad sweeper provision. It will ensure that as a starting point, all existing rights available in domestic law immediately before exit day as a result of section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 will continue after exit to be recognised and available in our domestic law to the extent that they were before exit day. Clause 4(1) deliberately mirrors the language in the European Communities Act, which for our period of membership of the EU has been used to determine what and how EU law is accurately reflected in UK law. Clause 4 goes no further than section 2(1) of the ECA currently does. It is not intended to capture a narrower set of rights or obligations, or somehow to trim back. It does not make any changes as to how those rights or obligations are enforced in our courts. Deleting clause 4(1)(b) would mean that clause 4 no longer mirrors the ECA.
I understand why the hon. Lady has tabled the amendment, but it would be a rather curious, if not perverse, outcome if what counted as EU law after we depart the Union was expanded to be wider than when we were a member—yet that would be the direct result of her amendment. Perhaps even more importantly, for individuals, businesses, courts and practitioners up and down the country, by changing and inflating the test for what counts as EU law just as we are leaving, the amendment would in practice lead to significant legal confusion after exit with regard to the scope of rights retained. I know that that was not the intention of her amendment, and I hope that she can be persuaded not to press it.
It may well be that this comes from the European Communities Act, but I still find the word “allowed” very difficult to understand in this context, in view of the plain meaning of subsection (1)(a). As one of the questions that we have perpetually raised is that our own domestic courts will have to sort this tangle out, I am concerned about any form of drafting that appears to have an ambiguity in it. It is very hard to understand what paragraph (b) adds, and my hon. Friend has not actually explained that.
I have endeavoured to explain that the aim—and, I believe, the fact—of the Bill and the clause is to reflect and replicate the device used in the ECA. I always listen to what my right hon. and learned Friend says, but if that device has worked reasonably tolerably until now, I question why it cannot continue to serve the same purpose on exit. As ever, if he has a better formulation, I am very happy to look at that with him between now and Report to see whether there is a better way of doing this.
Let us be clear about the intention of clause 4. It is a sweeper provision to make sure that we have an accurate snapshot of EU law reflected in UK law on the date of exit.
I will give way one more time, with the tolerance of the Chair.
That is enormously kind of the Minister, particularly since the Solicitor General earlier this afternoon persuaded me that his colleague would answer the question that I raised with him in an intervention. Before we are asked to agree to clause 4 standing part of the Bill, will the Minister kindly explain clause 4(3)? It states that all of clause 4 is subject not only to clause 5 but, more importantly, to schedule 1, which, as the Minister knows, stops the general principles at midnight on exit day. We listened to a lot of debate and argument yesterday about clarity and certainty for the courts. There is no definition of the general principles of EU law. Why is that, and what does the provision mean in clause 4?
I am glad that the hon. Lady made that intervention. Clauses 2, 3 and 4 are subject to the savings and the caveats in clause 5 and schedule 1. The point about schedule 1 is not that no EU principles will apply after the date of exit, but that that date is the cut-off point for recognising EU principles as reflected in UK law. New principles that may evolve after that point do not become part of UK law; only the ones that arose before that point do. That is the clear intention schedule 1(2). I hope that that gives the hon. Lady some reassurance, but we will come on to talk about the savings in clause 5 and schedule 1 on a separate day next week, when I will be happy to return to that point if she has any outstanding concerns.
Perhaps shortly, but I am going to make some progress now, because I am hearing censorious noises from the Chair and I want to respond very obediently to them.
I turn to amendment 70, in the name of the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford). I think the sentiment behind the amendment is laudable, but I reassure the House that the amendment is unnecessary for the protection of rights. In fact, it is potentially counterproductive. Clause 4 will save all the directly effective rights that arise under the EU treaties to the extent that they are available now; that is the point that I wanted to get across to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon). We have deliberately not included a list of those directly effective rights in clause 4 or in the rest of the Bill, because there is no single, comprehensive and reliable list of all directly effective rights in the EU treaties. They are not set out in legislation—UK, EU or otherwise—but they are determined by the courts. Our approach is therefore based on procedural as well as substantive legal continuity.
The explanatory notes to the Bill set out a list of the articles from the treaty on the functioning of the European Union that the Government consider to contain directly effective rights, which will remain available in domestic law following our departure from the EU. That list, which includes article 157 on the right to equal pay, is intended to be illustrative of some of the rights that will continue to be available under clause 4. If we were to define a single list—especially if it was a non-exhaustive one—and legislate for it, we would inevitably run a significant risk of inadvertently omitting or mis-stating rights that individuals and businesses rely on, or suggesting to the courts that those rights were supposed to have a special status beyond the ones that were not listed.
We can reasonably expect individuals and businesses to want to rely on any list that we produced. Quite reasonably, they may not realise that they can rely on a wider set of rights that are not on any such list. The effect of amendment 70 would be at best to create legal uncertainty, and at worst—this is my concern—to mislead people about the rights available to them. The Government do not want that to happen, and I hope that I have persuaded the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts (Neil Gray) not to press the amendment.
I want to turn as briefly as possible—I will not take any further interventions to allow others to speak—to amendment 148, in the name of the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), who is in her place. It is important that the issue of children’s rights has been raised through the amendment, and I hope I can give her some reassurance. Most importantly, I want to reassure the Committee that the UK’s commitment to children’s rights and the UN convention on the rights of the child is and will remain unwavering. Our ability to support and safeguard children’s rights will not be affected by UK withdrawal from the EU.
Domestically, the rights and best interests of the child are protected in England primarily through the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002, as well as in other legislative measures. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own measures for the protection of children’s rights, in accordance with the UN convention on the rights of the child.
The UK will of course continue to be a party to the UN convention, but amendment 148 is flawed in seeking to apply an EU principle of direct effect to a global UN treaty, which is of course governed by general principles of international treaty interpretation under the Vienna convention and customary international law. I am afraid that that is a recipe for legal confusion.
In any event, we already give effect to all our international obligations under the UN convention. For example, the Children Acts 1989 and 2004 set out a range of duties to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. In 2013, we issued statutory guidance to directors of children’s services, which requires them to have regard to the general principles of the convention and ensure that children and young people are involved in the development and delivery of local services. The Children and Social Work Act 2017 is a further example of how we constantly seek to make sure that we not only protect children’s rights but enhance them.
The Minister says that we already have a number of vehicles to ensure that we give effect to our obligations under the UN convention, but does he not accept that we have had cases in this country of decisions by the courts saying that legislation that is not compatible with the convention is, none the less, not unlawful?
As I have said, we continue to keep these matters under review. If there is a court decision, we will obviously comply with it, whatever it is. I suggest that her amendment would not meaningfully or practically enhance such rights. If what she wants to do is outside the scope of this vehicle—the snapshot that we are taking of EU law and reproducing in UK law—she should make the case for further innovations. She is of course at liberty to do so, and I would expect her to do so.
No, I will make some progress, otherwise I will be in serious trouble. I have taken several interventions.
I must turn to amendment 94, in the name of the hon. Member for Bristol East, who has also tabled amendment 95. I will address the two amendments as briefly as I can. Amendment 94 is intended to include within the scope of clause 4 rights that might arise under EU directives, but which have not yet been recognised by the European Court or the domestic courts, and might only be recognised many years after we have left the EU.
There are three basic objections to amendment 94, notwithstanding the commendable spirit in which the hon. Lady has introduced her amendments. First, amendment 94 is at odds with EU law. It conflicts not just with the UK’s approach, but with the EU’s approach to what counts as—or what the definition is of—a directly effective right. By definition, such rights need to be sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional, and they must be recognised as such by UK courts or the European Court at the date of exit. The effect of her amendment would be to inflate the definition of what counts as EU law at the very moment that we are departing from the EU, which cannot be right.
The second objection is that the amendment would not provide the accurate snapshot of the law that we are seeking to take on departure. From a practical point of view, that would risk confusion for anyone trying to glean the true legal position with any reliability.
The third persuasive argument is that the fact that we are leaving the EU means that we are taking back democratic control of our laws. With that in mind, it would not be right, as the amendment envisages, to retain an ability for thousands of directives—parts of EU law that we are not incorporating—to continue to produce new legal effects long after we have left the EU. That would run in direct conflict with the objective of clause 4 and, indeed, the whole Bill. Given the number of EU directives in force, newly found directly effective rights would have a hugely disruptive effect on UK law.
(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield). At the outset, I would like to thank hon. Members from right across the House for their contributions to today’s debate, whether in speeches or in amendments. The Government will approach the Bill in the spirit of collaboration, and I certainly welcome the constructive contributions and diligent scrutiny hon. Members are rightly providing today. I shall seek to address clause 5, and the Solicitor General will address schedule 1 a bit later in the debate, to make sure we dwell adequately and with due consideration not only on the provisions of the Bill, but on the various issues and amendments, for which I am grateful to hon. Members, that have been raised.
Clause 5 serves two key strategic objectives: taking back democratic control over our laws and making sure we leave the EU in a way that facilitates a smooth Brexit and minimises legal uncertainty. The Bill aims to provide that the laws which apply immediately before exit day will continue to apply in the same way after we leave. Of course, the act of leaving the EU in itself means it is inevitable that some things will not and cannot stay the same. The changes made by clause 5 relate to certain aspects of EU law which are no longer appropriate, or which will not make sense when we leave the EU because we will then cease to be under the obligations that apply to us as an EU member state. The provisions are therefore essential.
Clause 5(1) ends the supremacy of EU law in relation to new law from the date of exit. That is crucial if we are going to give effect to the mandate from the referendum. At the same time, clause 5(2) makes sure that EU law passed before exit still applies as before, for the sake of legal certainty. That is important for mitigating the risks of legal uncertainty that are inevitable and inherent in departure from the EU. The rest of clause 5 reinforces those critical objectives, including by removing the instrument of the charter on fundamental rights as part of domestic law. I want to come on to address that in detail.
May I refer my hon. Friend to clause 5(2)? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), in his rather amazing speech which I think we all found very illuminating, said that this was a completely new principle to be applied in British law. Is it not just a translation of an existing principle in EU law into United Kingdom law for the purposes of a smooth Brexit? Is it not, in fact, less exceptional than being a member of the European Union and allowing a court in a wholly different jurisdiction to impose itself on parliamentary sovereignty?
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention and I will come on to address very carefully the speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I agree that there is an inherent sense that, as we move to change, things are not going to be exactly as they were before. I want to draw a very important distinction. We are leaving the EU and taking back control over our laws and the way we make our laws, so that Members across the House can exercise proper democratic control. At the same time, the substantive law—the rules and the principles—will remain the same, because of the snapshot we are taking on exit day and retaining in UK law, thereby avoiding the putative legal cliff-edge.
I will just make a little bit of progress and then I will give way to my right hon. and learned Friend.
I will address the detail of this by reference to the new clauses and amendments that have been tabled, because they usefully highlight and flag up the different concerns of hon. Members. As a matter of guiding principle, I hope all hon. Members can agree that we should not make changes that exacerbate the risk of legal uncertainty, which I think goes to the point my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) was making in his intervention. Our substantive law will remain the same on exit day, but it would be wrong in principle—indeed, I think we would find it counter- productive in practice—to seek to cling to all the procedural mechanisms that are inherent, intrinsic and inextricable institutional features of EU membership.
I will not give way just for the moment, but I will give way to the hon. and learned Lady shortly.
I will give way shortly to the hon. and learned Lady, because I know she supports some of the amendments.
I turn now to amendments 297, 298 and 299, tabled my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and to amendments 285 and 286, tabled by the leader of the Labour party, the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield wishes to remove any reference to “any rule of law”, which is a reference in the Bill to common law rules in relation to provisions addressing supremacy of EU law. In effect, his amendments—at least as I have understood them, and I stand to be corrected—would allow EU law to continue to trump the common law after the date of exit. However, this would undermine both of the key strategic objectives of the Bill. It would mean in relation to common law rules articulated after exit day that retained EU law trumps them, undermining the UK’s basic constitutional hierarchy that we are seeking to restore and affirm.
Allow me to make the point and then I will give way, because there are two sides to my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment.
Paradoxically, with respect to the relationship between retained EU law and common law rules made up until exit day, my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment would skew the clear and certain snapshot the Bill will take, because retained EU law would no longer supersede common law rules. By removing the common law from the operation of the Bill, I am afraid the amendments would—at least on the Government’s analysis—create considerable uncertainty for business and individuals alike.
No, I want these words removed because they are completely unnecessary. To use that wonderful word that lawyers like to apply, they are otiose—they add absolutely nothing to the Bill. The common law will be adjusted according to the statutory framework in which it operates, so I say with some regret—because someone clearly came up with the idea—that it seems rather poor drafting. Others, whom I consulted because I was puzzled by this, and who have spent their lives drafting precisely this sort of legislation, seem to agree with me. I was trying to help my hon. Friend, not create some devilish plot to scupper Brexit.
I am not sure where this devilish plot has come from—I have made no such suggestion; I was simply pointing out to my right hon. and learned Friend that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex, the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, mentioned earlier, some of the amendments run the risk of creating more, not less, uncertainty, notwithstanding their perfectly laudable and genuine aims.
If my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment were passed, it would no longer be clear how common law rules would interact with a particular provision of retained EU law in the event of a conflict between the two. Across a range of issues, from animal welfare to competition law, the concern is that such an approach would create uncertainty about the legal position of citizens and businesses. I am sure that this was not his intention. I am not looking for devilish plots on either side of the House, but I do fear that that would be the practical reality.
On the subject of devilish plots and “The Screwtape Letters”, may I refer my hon. Friend to chapter 12 of Lord Bingham’s magisterial work, “The Rule of Law and the Sovereignty of Parliament?”? In this context, its reference to the rule of law is highly relevant, simply because it refers, indirectly or directly, to the issue of the constitutional supremacy of law making and the construction placed upon it by the courts themselves. On that issue, the rule of law does, I think, have considerable salience.
My hon. Friend makes a considered and thoughtful point. Given the changes we are making—for the purposes of greater certainty and clarity—I respectfully suggest to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and other hon. Members across the House that it is worth having some clarity and certainty on this point.
I turn now to amendments 285 and 286. We discussed similar amendments from the leader of the Labour party on day one of the Committee in relation to clause 6, and for the same reasons given during that debate, we cannot support them. I note again what the Prime Minister said in her Florence speech:
“The United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union on the 29th March 2019”.
I will not speculate on the contents of the withdrawal agreement. The Government will do whatever is necessary to prepare for our exit and have already made it clear that separate primary legislation will be brought forward to implement the terms of the withdrawal agreement and any implementation period. With that in mind, the amendments would pre-empt and prejudge the outcome of the negotiations and introduce a straitjacket of inflexibility for the duration of any implementation period. We are all in the House committed to securing the very best deal with our EU friends and partners, and I respectfully suggest that the amendments would undermine that objective. I urge the leader of the Labour party not to press them.
The hon. Gentleman said earlier that one of his guiding principles was not to exacerbate any legal uncertainty, but the Exiting the European Union Committee has heard evidence from a senior lawyer that the body of retained law will contain instruments that make explicit reference to the charter. If the charter is not part of retained EU law, how are the courts supposed to interpret the body of retained law that refers to it?
The hon. and learned Lady makes a perfectly respectable and legitimate point, but I will address it in the context of amendment 8, tabled in the name of the my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and amendment 46, tabled in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, both of which, in different ways, seek to retain the charter of fundamental rights in domestic law after exit by removing subsections (4) and (5) of Clause 5. I understand and appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments. Hon. Members are understandably concerned that as we leave the EU we do not see any diminution or reduction in the substantive rights we all enjoy. The Government are unequivocally committed to that objective. I remind the Committee again of the country’s record of pioneering, defending and protecting human rights standards since well before the EU existed and of our ability as a nation to withstand the darker moments in European history that have touched other less fortunate nations.
My hon. Friend reassures us that even without the charter of fundamental rights the House of Commons can be relied upon. That was the argument when the Lisbon treaty was being ratified. There was a widespread feeling that it was not clear whether it would add anything, but we now see that it has added quite a lot, particularly around privacy law, on which the House had never done anything, and now data protection. The lobbies brought to bear on the House if ever we look at privacy by sections of the media and so on are very considerable. Why are we getting rid of a convention that has done no harm and actually has run ahead of this House of Commons at various stages? What will be gained by not leaving open that opportunity for the future?
I will come shortly to my right hon. and learned Friend’s substantive generic point and also touch on the data protection issue he raised.
The Government reaffirm and renew our commitment to human rights law. It is reflected through UK national law, including, most recently, the Human Rights Act, as well as a range of domestic legislation that implements our specific obligations under UN and other international treaties, from the convention against torture to the convention on the rights of the child. Of course, the principal international treaty most relevant to the UK’s human rights laws is the European convention on human rights. I again make crystal clear the Government’s commitment to respecting and remaining a party to the ECHR. There will be no weakening of our human rights protections when we leave the EU.
In fact, we have an opportunity to reinforce and build on our proud tradition of liberty and the protection of rights. We are already in the process of paving the way to ratifying the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women, the Istanbul convention. We are leaving the EU, but our commitment to pan-European standards, human rights and the European co-operation in this area remains undimmed. Furthermore, as the my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is aware, we will introduce an amendment before Report stage, dealing explicitly with the Equality Act 2010 issues that hon. Members have raised, including by requiring Ministers to make a statement before the House on the consistency of any Brexit-related legislation with the Equality Act.
It is worth reinforcing the point that the charter is not the original source of the rights contained within it. It was only intended to catalogue rights that already existed in EU law. Indeed, I am glad that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) intervened, because he wisely noted, as recently as 2011, before a European Committee, that protocol 30 governing the application of the charter
“sets out the boundaries around the charter by confirming that it neither creates nor extends any rights to EU citizens outside those that had existed pre-Lisbon, and it emphasises that member states are required to comply only when giving effect to EU law.”—[Official Report, European Committee B, 14 March 2011; c. 5.]
These rights, codified by the charter, came from a wide variety of sources, including the treaties, EU legislation and, indeed, case law, that recognised fundamental rights as general principles. All those substantive law principles and rights, of which the charter is a reflection not the source, will already be converted into domestic law by the Bill.
It is not necessary, therefore, to retain the charter in order to retain such substantive rights. With that in mind, it is right—this deals with the issue that the hon. Member for Nottingham East raised at the outset—for me to reaffirm the Government’s commitment, which the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union made to the Select Committee, to publish a detailed memorandum setting out how each article of the charter will be reflected in UK law after we leave. I can confirm that we will publish that by 5 December. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, both of whom raised this point. Let me say to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that I am very willing to continue my dialogue with him on these important matters.
Yes, it will, and, as I was about to say, there will indeed be a Report stage. If my right hon. Friend, or any other Member, feels that our analysis is deficient, or that we have missed out a substantive right that risks being removed if the charter is not retained, once the memorandum has been considered I will be happy to sit down with my right hon. Friend—and any other Members—and discuss the issue again.
This has been a long and complex legal argument, but let me summarise it. The issue of data protection is vital to many of my constituents, especially young people online, but it is also vital to our tech and financial services sectors. Can my hon. Friend assure me that there will be no risk of a legal challenge in relation to data protection because of the way in which these provisions are being brought into British law?
I know that my hon. Friend is an expert on these matters because of her time in the European Parliament. I shall be addressing data protection directly, but I shall be happy to give way to her again in due course.
The other argument that has been made about the charter is “If it does nothing wrong or does nothing by itself, where is the harm in keeping it?” However, as was pointed out by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, the charter applies to member states only when they are acting within the scope of EU law. Indeed, it is a specific device intended to codify—not create—rights, and apply them to EU member states and other EU institutions operating within the framework of EU law. It would be curious, if not perverse, to incorporate that instrument directly in UK law, or implement it, at the very moment when we ceased to have the relevant obligations as a member of the EU.
I will make a slight bit of progress, and then I will give way.
Seeking simply to transplant the charter into our domestic law as it stands, dislocated from EU membership —given all the other points that Members have made about the way in which it would apply in practice—would not be appropriate, and, indeed, could introduce needless complexities that all of us, on both sides of the House, should legitimately seek to avoid.
My hon. Friend has addressed my question, but, with great respect, he has failed to give an answer. It is true that the charter was originally proposed as a statement of European values to which all members of the European Union could adhere, but, as we have heard, it has developed. If it is doing no harm, why are the Government going to such lengths to get rid of it as the one specific change in the Bill? Presumably it is because it contains the words “European” and “rights”, and this was intended as a Daily Telegraph gesture to the hard right wing of my party.
My right hon. and learned Friend’s intervention was not in quite the spirit in which we have conducted our proceedings so far, but I shall try to address his underlying concern, and I shall be happy to take another intervention from him shortly if he thinks that I have still not addressed it. He is a demanding customer, but I shall keep on trying.
I am going to make a bit of progress, but I will give way shortly.
Let me, again, be clear about what the Bill does. It takes a snapshot of substantive EU law, including the underlying fundamental rights and principles at the point of exit. It converts those into UK law, where they will sit alongside the Human Rights Act and other UK legislation on human rights. That is a crucial point. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield rather perceptively asked during debates on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008,
“Will the Lord Chancellor confirm that every country that is a member of the European Union is also a signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights? Indeed, I believe that every single one has incorporated it. In view of that, what is the purpose of the charter of fundamental rights?”—[Official Report, 5 February 2008; Vol. 471, c. 804.]
During the same debate, my right hon. and learned Friend made the point, far better than I can—and I say this with all due deference—that the risk of adopting the charter was that it would, at least potentially, run into conflict with domestic human rights law, thereby creating at least the potential for legal confusion. This is the point that I want to make to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe. If we incorporated or implemented the charter, we would in effect be triplicating human rights standards in UK law, opening up wide scope for uncertainty. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield was right about that then, and I think he is right about it now.
With all due respect, I do not understand the point that the Minister is making. The charter is already part of UK law, because we are a member of the European Union.
As we leave the European Union, it will make no sense to retain the institutional framework of membership. What we will do is retain, in the way that I have described very carefully, the substantive rights that were codified in the charter. If, when we publish the memorandum, the hon. and learned Lady, or any Member on either side of the House, thinks that there is a gaping gap, we will be able to address that.
Will the Minister confirm that the evolution of our rights through history shows that the best way in which they are created and defended is through the democratic instincts of the British people, and that they then trust this Parliament to make sure that those rights are fully entrenched? As the Minister has assured those rights, I really do not see what the problem is. What is the threat to those rights? We have a free Parliament representing a free people.
I suppose the theory is that a majoritarian dominance—a Government with a huge majority—would trample on rights and rattle legislation through the House of Commons, as the last Labour Government did with identity cards and proposals for 90 days’ detention without charge. We saw most of that off.
I want to make a little bit of progress, but I will of course give way to the Chair of the Select Committee.
I am grateful to the Minister. He said a moment ago that one of the arguments he was advancing for not incorporating the charter was that it might then come into conflict with our own human rights law. Given that, as we heard from the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), it has been part of our law for some time, can he give the Committee one single example of that happening?
I think that the right hon. Gentleman should look at, for example, the Devine case on prisoner voting. It is very unclear how the case law in the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts meshes together. It is possible to argue in favour of one or the other, but they are not entirely consistent or compatible. When giving evidence to a House of Lords Committee in 2015, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield defended the Strasbourg Court very validly by contrasting it with the “predatory” habits of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. I think that even those who have been the most enthusiastic human rights defenders, and those on the remain side of the argument, will recognise the clash and the inconsistency between those jurisprudences.
I am not going to give way again.
The point I wanted to reaffirm is that, given that the substantive rights codified by the charter will be retained in EU law, it does not make sense to incorporate the EU charter itself, an element of the EU’s institutional architecture designed to regulate EU membership, at precisely the moment when we are leaving.
Does my hon. Friend accept that there may be a third category of rights that are in the charter but are not in the Human Rights Act, and require protection, and that the source of those rights cannot be identified other than in the charter? If so, will he accept the suggestion made by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) that there should be an Act of some sort to deal with them?
As I have made clear, we will publish a memorandum containing article-by-article analysis of the charter and how the substantive underpinning rights at the point at which it is codified can be reflected in UK law. I am happy to continue the dialogue with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset if they believe that any rights have been missed out.
I think that this is probably the right moment to deal with amendment 151, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms), and which relates to the protection of personal data.
I am going to make a bit more progress, but I will give way shortly.
The amendment relates to privacy and protections, an issue that has been mentioned by a number of Members on both sides of the Committee. I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman, respectfully and humbly, that the amendment is not necessary. It is not required because the Data Protection Bill will set high standards for protecting personal data, linked to the general data protection regulation. We will continue to maintain the highest standards of data protection after we leave the European Union. The Bill will also preserve in domestic law existing EU fundamental rights, including data protection rights and underlying case law, which were already part of EU law before the charter came into force. Individuals in the UK will continue to have access to well-established domestic and international mechanisms to bring their cases and obtain appropriate remedies, whether in Strasbourg or under the Human Rights Act, when they consider that their rights have been breached. That includes the right to seek a judicial remedy against data controllers or processers.
I thank the Minister for his words on the Data Protection Bill, which will give strong data protection in the UK. However, my understanding of general data protection regulation in Europe is that it is based on the fundamental principle that people own their own data, whereas the Data Protection Bill does not, as we have drafted it here, start with that fundamental principle. So we either need to amend that Bill or still recognise that principle in order for them to be equivalent; that is what we need to aim for if we want to achieve equivalence.
I thank my hon. Friend; she has made her point in a very careful way. I suggest that that is something for the passage of the Data Protection Bill in due course, if she feels there are gaps in it, and if, after having looked at the memorandum we are publishing, she is not persuaded that we will be reflecting in UK law after exit all the rights.
I am grateful to the Minister for addressing my amendment. Does he accept that it is essential that we avoid a declaration from the European Commission at some point in the future that data protection arrangements in the UK are not adequate, and we must therefore secure an adequacy determination? Does he also accept that not having article 8 somewhere on the UK statute book is an invitation to those elsewhere to find against us when that crunch decision comes?
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that we need to be very careful to navigate our post-Brexit period in a way that minimises litigation. I cannot see that such litigation would be good for the UK and its taxpayers, and it is not good for sustaining a healthy relationship with our EU partners.
We do, of course, have article 8 in the ECHR, which is directly incorporated via the Human Rights Act, but, as I have said, if the right hon. Gentleman feels that any elements of it are not properly transposed into UK law when we publish the memorandum, the correct place for that to be considered will be the Data Protection Bill. The wider point is that the removal of the charter from UK law will not affect—
I am going to make some progress, because I have been speaking for over half an hour and the Solicitor General will want to speak again to address schedule 1.
The substantive rights that individuals already benefit from in the UK when their data is processed will be retained under this Bill. As I have pointed out, the charter is not the source of rights contained within it; it was intended only to catalogue those that existed in EU law at that moment in time.
Finally, I want to address the late new clauses tabled: new clause 78, tabled by the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), and new clause 79. On the impact our departure from the EU might have on equalities legislation, I again reaffirm the commitment I made on day one in Committee to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller), the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee, when we discussed this issue at some length. I understand the intention behind this amendment and can reassure the right hon. Gentleman that there will be no reduction in the substantive equalities protections when we leave the EU. Equally, the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment presents some very real practical difficulties, not least his attempt effectively to copy and paste the procedural model used in the Human Rights Act and then put it into this Bill for the equalities purposes.
The Human Rights Act assesses compatibility according to an international instrument, the ECHR, which is not the same. There is not an equivalent that applies to the Equality Act, but I am more than happy to reaffirm the commitment I made to my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee that the Government will bring forward an amendment before Report stage that will require Ministers to make a statement before this House in the presentation of any Brexit-related primary or secondary legislation on whether and how it is consistent with the Equality Act. I hope that reassures the right hon. Gentleman that the Government are serious about addressing the issue he has rightly raised.
New clause 79 suggests a procedural device for incorporating certain EEA-related rules into UK law. This is entirely unnecessary given the wider snapshot of EU law this Bill will take at the point of exit.
I hope I have tackled, or at least have endeavoured to tackle—
As I said at the opening of my remarks, given the intention to address clause 5 in some detail and all the underlying amendments, we have split this up and the Solicitor General will address schedule 1 and all my right hon. and learned Friend’s concerns around Francovich and general principles in due course.
I hope I have tackled hon. Members’ concerns, at least in relation to clause 5 and the charter, and I urge hon. Members not to press their amendments to a vote. This Government and the ministerial team have listened, and we will continue to reflect carefully on all the arguments made today. Equally, the Government believe the exceptions to retained EU law contained in clause 5 are right as we carefully seek to separate our legal system from that of the EU, restore democratic control to this House, and do so in a way that leaves more, not less, legal certainty. I urge hon. Members to withdraw their amendments and to pass clause 5 unamended.
I rise to give my support and that of the Scottish National party to the amendments designed to retain the charter of fundamental rights in domestic law, and those designed to preserve legal remedies for individuals and businesses to enforce these rights in the courts and to be compensated when the rights are breached.
It is heartening to see such strong cross-party support for these amendments. I very much hope that the Conservative rebels will have the courage of their convictions to push these amendments to a vote tonight, despite the unpleasant pressure they have been subjected to as a result of the actions of certain newspapers. That is a matter for them. There are other cross-party amendments on the charter that I am sure will be pressed to a vote if those in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) are not.
Before I address why the SNP supports these amendments, I have a crucial question for the Minister. It needs to be answered, not for my benefit, but for the benefit of the whole House and, indeed, the country. The clause we are debating revolves around the supremacy of EU law and whether the charter will be part of domestic law after exit day, but, as has already been mentioned in our debate, this morning the Prime Minister’s official spokesman told a routine Westminster briefing that the Government expect
“the ECJ’s role to be unchanged during an ‘implementation period’ of around two years following the official Brexit date in March 2019”.
Are those on the Treasury Bench aware of that statement? Can they explain to us how it impacts on what we are debating today? If the Prime Minister is of the view, as her spokesman has said, that the Court of Justice’s role will be unchanged during a two-year implementation period from exit day, not only is the rather ridiculous amendment brought to this House by the Government last week defining exit day rendered utterly meaningless, but much of the debate we are having this afternoon about clause 5 and, indeed, the debate we had last week about clause 6 and other clauses are rendered meaningless.
I am not trying to score a party political point here. This is a matter of legal certainty which is of the utmost importance to all UK citizens and to UK business and universities. Which is it? Is what the Prime Minister’s official spokesman said this morning correct? Is the Court of Justice’s role going to continue unchanged during a two-year implementation period and, if so, how does that impact what we are debating today? I am very happy for the Minister to intervene on me to clarify that, but if he wishes to take advice, I am sure that his ministerial colleague the Solicitor General will clarify that vital point and the impact of the Prime Minister’s statement this morning on the entirety of this Bill, and most particularly the clause we are debating.
In any event, if this somewhat holed-beneath-the-waterline Bill is to survive and limp on, the SNP commits itself wholeheartedly to the amendments to keep the charter of fundamental rights, to keep individuals’ and businesses’ rights to sue and enforce, and to make those rights meaningful, because that is what the individual right of enforcement and Francovich damages are all about: making rights meaningful. For anyone who has studied law, a right without a remedy is a pretty useless thing; it is trite law.
The Scottish Government published their programme for government earlier this year, and reiterated their commitment to international human rights norms. It is important to remember that human rights are not wholly reserved by this Parliament when it comes to the devolution settlement, so what the Scottish Government choose to do could be very important, particularly if Scotland is to be taken out of the European Union against her will. My colleagues in the Scottish Government have emphasised that it is essential that existing safeguards are not undermined by Brexit, and that the rights enjoyed by everyone in these islands, as EU citizens, need to be permanently locked into a future deal. That is why we oppose the removal of the EU charter of fundamental rights from domestic law, and why we opposed the Government’s previous desire to repeal the Human Rights Act.
I was interested in the Minister’s reiteration—in fairness, this has been reiterated by the Government several times as part of this debate—that there is no intention to withdraw from the European convention on human rights. But, as I have already said, rights without remedies are not much use. The great thing about the Human Rights Act was that it gave UK citizens the opportunity to enforce their rights by raising actions in the courts of their own jurisdiction. Will the Minister—or the Solicitor General, when he gets to his feet—confirm the Government’s intentions regarding the Human Rights Act?
I think I have already said this, but I am very happy to reaffirm for the hon. and learned Lady that the Government have no plans to withdraw from the ECHR, or to revise or repeal the Human Rights Act.
I am grateful to the Minister for that. I had understood that the revision and repeal of the Human Rights Act was on the back burner, but Members on this side of the House and many Conservative Members can celebrate a great victory if that plan has now been dropped and the Government are backing down on it. Unfortunately, I very much doubt that we will be in the mood for celebration as we are facing the Government’s chaotic plans for Brexit, and that is what we have to discuss today.
My colleagues in the Scottish Government in Edinburgh have recently reiterated their firm commitment to the idea that international human rights norms should not just be signed up to by the jurisdictions of these islands, but should be given direct effect by giving individuals and businesses the opportunity to raise and realise their rights in the courts. The Scottish Government have indicated that they intend to
“implement the socio-economic duty in the Equality Act 2010 by the end of this year, placing a requirement on key parts of the public sector, including Scottish Ministers, to have due regard to reducing the inequalities caused by socio-economic disadvantage when taking strategic decisions. This is a key component of our approach to tackling poverty.”
The Scottish Government also committed in their programme for government to look at how they can further embed human, social, cultural and economic rights, including the UN convention on the rights of the child. That is an indication that the Scottish Government’s direction of travel on international human rights norms is very different from the UK Government’s. It reflects the fact, as I said earlier, that human rights are not a reserved matter save in so far as the repeal or amendment of the Human Rights Act is concerned. Indeed, the Scottish Government have the power to legislate to protect human rights and intend to do so.
That leads me to comment briefly on new clause 78 and a new right in relation to equality that is intended to apply across the United Kingdom. There is a laudable intention behind the new clause, but its application in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would require discussion with and the consent of devolved Administrations, if it were to be incorporated into the devolution statutes. The Scottish Government’s and Scottish National party’s position on human rights also reflects the wishes of voters in Scotland, who voted to remain in the EU by a considerable margin and voted in considerably larger numbers for parties that support international human rights norms than for those that do not.
It is about time that this Parliament started to recognise that views across these islands are quite divergent from the sort of Brexit that the Government are proposing. The cross-party amendments would go some way towards the aim of keeping us in the charter and keeping remedies for UK citizens. Of course, that is not to say that there are not many people in England and Wales who voted to leave and also wish to see the charter of fundamental rights preserved. We heard, if I may say so, a typically eloquent speech by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield, who said that the rights that have come into our law as a result of our membership of the European Union have done good across these islands, particularly for the most vulnerable people in our society. One would hope that we could agree on that on a cross-party basis.
A lot of misinformation is going around about the charter, and that stems from a resistance to the idea that it is either desirable or necessary for international human rights norms to have direct effect in the United Kingdom. We have to recognise that the logical result of that antipathy to giving direct effect to international human rights norms is to take away rights, and the ability to realise them, from British citizens and businesses. That is surely not a desirable state of affairs, no matter which side of the House one sits on.
As we have heard from a number of hon. Members, the Government have tried to reassure us that importing EU law without also importing the charter will make no difference to the protection of rights in the various jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. Indeed, they state in paragraphs 99 and 100 of the explanatory notes to the Bill that it is unnecessary to include the charter as part of retained law because it merely codifies rights and principles already inherent in EU law. That is what the Minister told us from the Dispatch Box. As others have said, that rather begs a question: if it is just a simple codification, why bother not incorporating the charter?
As I pointed out in an intervention on the Minister, the Exiting the European Union Committee heard evidence from a senior legal academic who said that there will be legislation in retained EU law that refers to the charter, so there will be a lack of legal certainty if the charter is not there. The Minister would no doubt say, “Yes, but the general principles will still be there.” But the charter existed as a codification of the general principles in order to make them more readily accessible.
I am interested to see the list that the Minister is going to produce on 5 December, but he could make his life a lot easier—I know that he and his colleagues have a lot on their plate at the moment—if he just incorporated the charter, rather than running around with bits of paper listing the general principles when they are all listed in the charter anyway. Surely that would be the logical and practical thing to do; unless there is, to use someone else’s phrase, some devilish plot, whereby removing the charter of fundamental rights means that rights will be removed. There is some evidential basis for believing that at least some Government Members think it is a good thing not to incorporate the charter of fundamental rights because it includes rights that they do not like. I am sorry to single out one Government Member, but I did read the article in The Sun yesterday by the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes). I am not normally a reader of The Sun, but it caught my eye on Google that it contained an article about the charter of fundamental rights and I thought that every newspaper should be given a chance from time to time, so I had a little look. Like me, the hon. Lady is a lawyer, and she writes:
“This week Parliament will be asked to vote on whether to incorporate the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights into UK law. If Labour, acting with others, manage to force this through there will be legal chaos. Not only will it hand new and long lasting powers to UK courts”,
but it has also
“crept into many areas of UK law, from asylum to even national security.”
So there we have it in the words of at least one Conservative Member. There are things in the charter of fundamental rights that some on the Government Benches do not wish to be incorporated into our law.
Indeed I will. The hon. Lady has, in her usual clear and incisive way, anticipated something that I was going to come to in a minute. Perhaps I will deal with it now, before I come to my list. As she says, the protection of fundamental rights is absolutely central to the Good Friday agreement, and has its own section in that agreement. The fact that the Bill will take the charter out of retained law raises concerns in this respect. The Good Friday agreement requires at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights in Ireland and Northern Ireland. If the charter is taken out of domestic law, there will be no such equivalent protection of human rights in Ireland and Northern Ireland, because once the UK withdraws from the EU, Northern Ireland will no longer benefit from the charter’s protections. This could pose significant problems for the Good Friday agreement—[Interruption.] The Solicitor General is shaking his head—
I am listening with great care to the hon. and learned Lady’s remarks and to the interventions that she has taken. Let us not forget that the Good Friday agreement was written in 1998, and that the charter of fundamental rights appeared in 2007. It is the European convention on human rights that is the key governing principle here, not the charter.
I support those amendments that seek to ensure that the charter of fundamental rights is not exempted when we transfer powers from the EU after Brexit. Like many people I expect, I have received a lot of correspondence from constituents, and I wanted to start by reading from one—because time is short I will just read the last section of a letter from one of my constituents, Andrew Connarty:
“I feel that the EU and its legislative and judicial bodies protect me as a citizen and have a process of checks in place to protect my human rights, my legal rights and provide me with security. A lot of conversation in the media covers the rights of EU citizens in the UK who are foreign nationals, but what about the rights of EU citizens in the UK who are British nationals?”
Andrew Connarty is one of the great number of people in this country who are fearful of what is about to happen. For them, the process of leaving the EU is not some great liberation or removal of an alien superstate that oppresses them and over-regulates them. They see this as a loss of something of themselves; they see themselves as being diminished and lessened by this process.
Some on the Government Benches will say, “Well, that view does exist, but it is the view of a small liberal elite”. Indeed, a Member earlier tried to taunt a colleague by suggesting that the vote for remain in her constituency could not possibly have been motivated by concern about the charter of fundamental rights. I accept that the great mass of people are probably completely unaware of what particular rights we are talking about, but that does not mean they are unconcerned about them. Joni Mitchell probably summed it up best with the line,
“you don’t know what you’ve got
‘Till it’s gone.”
The reason is that by their very nature political rights do not put obligations on the rights holder—they do not have to be defended and claimed every day; they put obligations on everyone else. We all have to respect the rights of others. In particular, private corporations and public institutions have to respect the rights of others. It is not until they are changed and that relationship alters that people understand that something has been taken away from them. That is why it is absolutely vital that we educate people about the process now happening.
There was some debate about whether the rights in the charter are substantial at all, about whether they mean very much and about whether they are covered elsewhere in legislation. In 2006, this Parliament established the Equality and Human Rights Commission to advise us on such matters. I have read its briefing—I suspect most have—in which it cites clear examples of articles in the charter that are not replicated in other forms of legislation and states that, if the charter is not transferred or incorporated into British law, these rights will be lost. They include—I will not read them all: article 22 on child labour; article 8 on the right to be forgotten on the internet; article 26 on independence for disabled people; and article 24 on the access of children to both parents. These are rights that we have now that we will not have if the charter does not come over post Brexit.
It is not necessary to lose these rights in order to achieve Brexit. I say to the Brexiteers: I am not one of you but you can have Brexit without losing these rights. It is entirely possible. We do not need to do this, so why are we discussing it at all? The Minister said earlier that it makes no sense to have the charter if we are not a member of the EU, because it refers to the EU, yet the entire canon of European law is being taken over and incorporated into British statute, and this charter goes along with it to give citizens rights in respect of it. It makes total sense, therefore, to bring the charter over in the process of repatriating these powers.
There has been talk that it would be silly to bring the charter over because it would create anomalies and inconsistencies with other parts of the Bill, but the Bill already recognises that there are a million anomalies in the process and makes provisions to deal with them. We wonder, then, what is so special about the charter that it cannot happen there, too. Leaving that to one side, however, the most telling argument, as colleagues have said throughout the last six hours, is surely that it is operational at the minute. Why is our legal system not grinding to a halt under the pressure of these contradictions if they are so great? The truth is they are not so great. It works at the minute, and there is no reason it could not continue to work beyond 2019.
In the absence of a rational argument for the retention of clause 5 and schedule 1, I am compelled to find myself reaching the same conclusion as the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke): what is happening here is pure politics. There are those on the other side who will be satisfied by being thrown this bone, and, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman put it himself, the idea of being able to get rid of a provision that includes both the word “Europe” and the word “rights” creates a double salivation, but I do not think that it just about sating those who are so Europhobic that they will get pleasure from this; I think there is something else going on as well.
The hon. Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach), who is no longer in the Chamber, said earlier that the Government did not intend to remove or weaken our human rights, and I take that at face value. The Government have certainly not come here and said that that is their intention. In fact, no Members—or almost none—have said today that they want to remove people’s human rights, to weaken protection at work, or to lessen consumer protection laws in this country, although I rather fear that the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) nearly let the cat out of the bag when he referred to “the wrong people” having rights in the charter.
The hon. Gentleman talked about the repatriation of powers so that he could have “real human rights” in this country. I dread to think what he means by “real human rights”. I find him an honourable fellow and I am sure that he means no malintent, but I know that there are plenty of people in our society and in our community who will take advantage of any roll-back of civil and human rights protection to ensure that our religious and political freedoms are constrained so that they can adhere to theirs. I think we need to be eternally vigilant, and I hope very much that the Government will feel able to think again.
I say this to those in the centre ground of the Tory party: “If you are just trying to keep the good ship together and keep every faction on board, and if you think that by giving this concession on human rights you will shore up the Government’s support, remember that your former leader David Cameron thought he would be able to do that by having a Brexit referendum in the first place, and look how that has worked out.” I sincerely say to them, “Once bitten, twice shy. Please think again.”
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard). Let me take this opportunity to assure him yet again that our commitment to rights and freedoms remains absolute. I spent nearly 20 years at the criminal Bar dealing with the liberty of the individual. Indeed, I think I was a human rights lawyer before we even coined the phrase, as were many other Members on both sides of the House.
The point has already been made that our rights and freedoms long pre-date modern developments, but modern developments have no doubt helped to sustain, improve and enhance the range of those freedoms. The fundamental question that we seek to ask about the charter is whether, in the final analysis—as we are no longer to be members of the European Union—it adds anything relevant or material to the sophisticated and developing body of law that has evolved over generations. I do not think so, and I have reached that conclusion after extremely careful thought.
It is tempting, after a long debate, to try and treat this as a Second Reading wind-up, but we are far from that. Other Members are anxious to take part, and I am mindful of the time. I will therefore be true to the principles of debate in Committee, and deal with schedule 1, which I hope will be agreed to. In doing so, however, I will address the various amendments that have been tabled on pages 8 to 12 of the amendment paper—which is still the same size although we are now on day three of the Committee stage, and I am pretty confident that that will remain the case.
Before my hon. and learned Friend moves on—very authoritatively, I am sure—to the details of the amendments, may I point out that he has just made an important statement? He said that he had thought about whether retaining the charter of fundamental rights after we had left would add anything to our legal rights in this country beyond what we already have. In the past half hour, we have heard my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) describe what she calls the third category of rights, which do not appear anywhere else in our law, and we have just heard the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard) list three or four rights in the charter that are not replicated anywhere else. Which of those rights would the Solicitor General be happy to see abandoned? What is going to happen to the third category of rights? He must explain why he does not think the charter adds anything, given that the main reason people are trying to get rid of it is that it has extended the scope of European-sponsored human rights law in this country.
As the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) has mentioned, the Government will, on 5 December, publish their full analysis of the sources of the rights that we have been talking about. I remind my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the underlying principles of EU law from which the charter has been developed will be part of the body of law that we bring down to the UK, and will be able to be relied upon.
Is not the answer to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the rights might not be replicated in our existing law but the protections will be? The fact that a general statement of a right is not replicated verbatim in our law does not mean that those rights are not otherwise protected adequately and fully by our laws.
I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, but I feel as though I am about to become a proxy in a debate between him and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, so I will now develop my point.
If I may, I will move on to amendment 10, which would remove paragraphs 1 to 3 from schedule 1. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) earlier drew the attention of the Committee to these important matters, and I am grateful to him for the constructive way in which he has sought to approach this issue. First, we cannot agree to the removal of paragraph 1 because the effect would be to create huge uncertainty. How would our domestic courts approach the task of assessing challenges to the validity of converted law? That is a job that they have never had before. Who would defend those challenges? What remedies would be available to the courts? How could converted law that was found to be invalid be replaced? The amendment does not deal with any of those vital questions.
Similarly, we cannot accept that paragraph 2 should be removed from the schedule. There is no single definitive list of the general principles. They are discovered and developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Paragraph 2 in its current form maximises certainty by specifying a clear cut-off point and stating that a general principle needs to have been recognised by the Court before we exit. Without that, it would be completely unclear which general principles could be used as the basis for a challenge. It is not even clear whether post-exit CJEU jurisprudence could be taken into account, and so whether new principles couldbe discovered after exit. That would be completely inappropriate.
I would like gently to point out that I did not propose deleting the interpretation provision 5(2). Admittedly, it does not interpret anything because the rest is gone, but it nevertheless made it pretty clear that we were talking about retained EU law and that such law was created prior to the date of our exit.
I think that my right hon. and learned Friend has answered his own point. Without sub-paragraph (2), paragraph 5(2) becomes rather difficult to apply. I want to get to the nub of his concern, however, which is paragraph 3 of the schedule. We recognise the strength of the views that he and other Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed on this issue, many of whom have spoken this afternoon. We are listening, and we are prepared to look again at this issue to ensure that we are taking an approach that can command the support of the Committee.
Simply removing paragraph 3 in its entirety, however, is not something that we could agree to. It would result in an open-ended right of challenge based on the general principles of EU law, however they are defined, after exit. It would mean that domestic legislation, both secondary and primary, rules of law and executive action could be disapplied or quashed if found to be incompatible with those actions. Currently, the general principles apply when a member state is
“acting within the scope of EU law”,
so after exit the circumstances in which the general principles could be relied upon would not be clear.
Allowing courts to overturn Acts of Parliament, outside the context of EU law, on the basis of incompatibility with these principles would be alien to our legal system and would offend against parliamentary sovereignty.
My hon. and learned Friend raised the question of scope and when this would apply, but it seems to me that he was answering his own question, because it comes when there is a clash between the law that has been retained and has supremacy and any domestic legislation. It is precisely because the supremacy of the retained EU law is kept that it is necessary also to have the potential for the general principles to have that supremacy as well, because they are essential to the purpose of interpretation of that law.
I wanted to deal with the issue in this way, because it seems to me that the nub of the issue that my right hon. and learned Friend is concerned about is with regard to the rights of challenge relating to pre-exit causes of action. It would be possible to retain those, and in relation to executive action even after exit in areas covered by retained EU law. We can agree that there should be appropriate mechanisms for challenging the actions of the Executive. I am happy to discuss further with him what might be needed. I am also willing to discuss whether there needs to be some further route of challenge on secondary legislation.
The rights landscape is indeed complex, and we are seeking with this Bill to maximise and not remove any substantive rights that UK citizens currently enjoy. In view of my commitment to look at this again, I invite my right hon. and learned Friend not to press amendment 10 and to agree to work with us in this shared endeavour. The Government will bring forward our own amendments on Report for the purposes of clarifying paragraph 3 of schedule 1.
I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, who has just said some of the words that many of us hoped to hear, which is that Government amendments to that effect will come forward on Report. Will that include an appropriate amendment to paragraph 3(1) on the private rights of action?
Let me turn to paragraph 3(1) of schedule 1 to be absolutely clear. I am interested in looking at all aspects of that provision: sub-paragraphs (1) and (2).
I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, who has made a really important concession at the Dispatch Box, which I much appreciate. It clearly reflects the disquiet that has been shown across the House. I can tell him now that, in the light of that, I will not be pressing my amendment to a vote. However, it is clear from what he has said that although some of the issues that I have raised have been met, I ought to put it on record that it is also clear that the issue about whether this could be used to disapply primary legislation appears to remain an area of potential disagreement between us, which I hope we may be able to iron out. I have to say that it is a strange area of disagreement, given that elsewhere we have precisely the possibility of that happening, by virtue of keeping the supremacy of retained EU law.
As I have said, I want to ensure that the dialogue that has been opened continues. My right hon. and learned Friend knows that at all times the spirit with which he and other hon. Members have tabled amendments has been entirely understood and respected by those on the Treasury Bench. We have never sought to pillory Members for doing the job of scrutinising legislation. I have been there myself many times and can remember tabling dozens of amendments in order to probe the Government’s intentions in a Bill.
We are making some progress, but I point out that I am the second name on the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), and I shall inquire of the Chair between now and the end of the debate whether I have a right to call for a vote on those amendments, which I think I may have. I am extremely glad to hear the Solicitor General say that he will bring forward a Government amendment, because he has vigorously rejected just about every argument that my right hon. and learned Friend has used throughout the debate and has stuck rigidly to the interpretation of the Bill as it stands—with which we started. Will the Government’s amendment at least seek a compromise if it does not move completely towards my right hon. and learned Friend’s arguments? It is no good fobbing us off with more discussion if the amendment will not actually change the policy.
With respect to my right hon. and learned Friend, I have talked in detail about the various paragraphs of schedule 1, and I have been looking in particular at paragraph 3. In response to the clarifications sought by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), I made sure that all of paragraph 3 would be the subject of that clarification and the tabling of an amendment. Neither my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe nor I are fans of having our cake and eating it when it comes to EU withdrawal and, with respect, I am offering something substantial here that will certainly satisfy him this evening.
I hope that the Solicitor General will be good enough to look at the deficiencies in amendment 10. Paragraph 5 of schedule 1 deals with interpretation and therefore also applies to paragraphs 1 to 3. As he quite rightly said before he took the intervention, the matter is being scrutinised. As Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, we have it on our agenda, and we are scrutinising all such matters and will continue to do so, because we want to be sure that this House is not overridden by disapplication.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I am always interested in looking at how one particular paragraph of a schedule applies to another, but I am particularly interested in paragraph 3.
I will give way to the hon. Lady, who has been very tenacious. Please forgive me.
Patience is a virtue, and I am not blessed with an abundance of it, so I am grateful to the Solicitor General for taking my intervention, even if I have been bobbing up and down for ages.
The Solicitor General has made an important concession this evening, and I respect that. When he carries out his promised review of the Bill’s impact on rights and the general principles, may I invite him to look carefully at the impact on the Good Friday agreement? The Bill is being used in a divisive manner at home in Northern Ireland, where it is being exploited by those who wish to do so, so it would be enormously helpful if the Solicitor General could reassure us that the Bill will not have a negative impact on the Good Friday agreement.
I know that the hon. Lady has a deep, long-term commitment to ensuring that the Good Friday agreement and the subsequent progress are maintained, and I share that commitment 100%. While I may not have the same knowledge that she has of Northern Ireland, I am sensitive to and understand the fact that there is still no essential consensus about what human rights should mean for every corner of Northern Ireland. It is in that spirit that I will be happy to ensure that the impacts on Northern Ireland are fully considered at all stages of any review, re-examination or clarification of the Bill. I am grateful to her for making that observation.
I had better make some progress, but I certainly will give way to the hon. and learned Lady in a moment.
If the intervention relates to the point I was making, I will give way.
I thank the Solicitor General for giving way. It is important that the House has clarity on the content of the memorandum he proposes to publish on 5 December. He has said that the memorandum will seek to identify the sources of each right contained within the charter. He has heard in today’s debate that there is concern on both sides of the House that he will not be able to identify the sources of every single one of those rights, and a number of instances have been cited. Will he also undertake that, where there are gaps, his review will outline what action the Government are preparing to take to fill those gaps so that, at the point of exit, we retain all the existing rights?
I make it clear that, in the words of both the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, today and, previously, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, we are seeking to publish such details. If there are any further concerns, we can have a continuing dialogue to ensure that the information is in a comprehensive form that seeks to address the issues raised today and elsewhere. The publication on 5 December will therefore be a meaningful event that assists everybody in greater understanding and assists greater progress on getting this process right.
On the question of general principles, I emphasise that there are good reasons to say why it would not be appropriate to incorporate the constitutional and administrative principles of the EU as free-standing principles in our law by inserting a specific right of action, or to incorporate the remedy of striking down domestic legislation based on incompatibility with EU law principles, when we are no longer a member of that institution. First, some of these principles will, indeed, cease to make sense when we have left, except for the purpose of interpreting retained EU law, whereas other principles are already, and will continue to be, reflected elsewhere in our domestic law anyway.
Has not the Solicitor General, again, just answered his own question? I appreciate that some of the general principles will evaporate because they cease to be relevant, but those that are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law must still be relevant because they will be used as a tool and aid to interpretation. In those circumstances, why should an individual or a business be deprived of raising them as arguments for saying that, in fact, this law is supposed to be supreme, and therefore able to overcome our own domestic legislation, and ask why the general principles cannot be used to have that bit of offending domestic legislation set aside? I just do not understand the rationale.
The rationale is quite straightforward in the sense that, in seeking to achieve maximum certainty, there is danger in allowing the system to create a situation in which the law might rapidly degrade in a way that does not achieve such stability and certainty. I accept it is almost reverse logic, but there is logic in trying to make sure that we have an identifiable and pretty understandable body of retained EU law.
I give the example of the EU principle of good administration, which will not have any relevance to our UK law after exit because, of course, the bodies vested in EU agencies will be returned here and all the normal domestic rules about the exercise of such powers by public bodies will apply. Another example is the principle of subsidiarity, which does not make sense outside the concept of EU membership.
Secondly, the Bill will, of course, take a snapshot of the law as it stands at the moment we leave. Retaining a right of action based on general principles of EU law, which will of course change in the future, would lead to uncertainty for businesses and individuals about their rights and obligations if we end up in a situation where pre-exit legislation could be struck down, or where administrative decisions could be challenged, on the basis of those principles.
In other words, that is an echo of what I was just saying to my right hon. and learned Friend. This is particularly the case given the uncertainty about the way in which principles could develop or about the circumstances in which they would apply after exit. It would make no sense to bind ourselves to such an imprecise, open-ended and uncertain set of principles—it does not mitigate legal uncertainty, but increases it. It makes no sense, once we are no longer an EU member state, to bind ourselves to a set of principles that are the EU’s judge-made constitutional principles, when we have our own constitutional and common-law principles. Such an approach risks duplication and confusion.
Perhaps more fundamentally, outside the context of EU law, the ability for courts to disapply primary legislation is just inconsistent with the way our constitution works and the balance of powers that has to exist between the legislative and judicial branches.
I thank the Solicitor General for saying that he is going to look seriously at these points during the Committee stage. The point of bringing EU law into the UK law is to give certainty. Each of those European regulations has strict articles—the letter of the law—and the recitals, which give guidance as to how it is to be interpreted and implemented. Will he assure me that he will seek to ensure that our judges will look at not only the articles, but the recitals—the principles behind it?
I can assure my hon. Friend that that will be the case. We had a debate about this in a slightly different context earlier in Committee, but I can assure her that all that material is relevant for any court that might have to interpret it.
I am just reminding the Solicitor General that I asked him to answer a crucial point earlier relating to the statement made by the Prime Minister’s spokesperson that the Government expect the ECJ’s role to be unchanged during an implementation period of two years following the official Brexit date in March 2019. If that is so, it completely undermines the premise of clause 5 and schedule 1, which revolve around exit day. Is he seriously still considering allowing these clauses to stand part of the Bill, in the light of what was said this morning?
The hon. and learned Lady has a keen memory and she will not have forgotten the Government’s commitment to a separate withdrawal agreement Bill, within which will be provisions relating to the implementation, the interim, the transition period— call it what you will. It is to that period that the Prime Minister was addressing her remarks. The fact that this Bill is taking a particular course on legal exit is nothing to do with the transition period, which has to be a separate matter, and the Government have rightly made it clear that they will bring legislation to this House in order for it to determine the law when it comes to the transitional period.
I really must press on now. The right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) made the most important reference to the data protection amendment that stands in his name, but the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara) also spoke well about this. Let me just make these observations: the UK does not have to be subject to the charter in order to benefit from adequacy decisions on data protection once we leave the EU, because the charter applies to EU institutions and EU member states when acting within the scope of EU law. Countries that benefit from adequacy are third countries and are not required to be subject to the charter. There are many examples of countries that have adequacy by virtue of the data protection directive of 1995, including Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay, Argentina and the Faroe Islands.
I must also deal briefly with the further effects of amendments 101 and 336, which specifically seek to set out an ostensibly broader definition of which general principles are to be retained under the Bill to include principles as they are recognised in any EU legislation as well as case law.
I am sorry but I must press on.
The first point to make on the amendments is that whereas some of the general principles are now set out expressly in the EU treaties, the general principles were first recognised by the European Court of Justice. They were and are judge-made law, and all the principles ultimately have a basis in case law.
We debated the inclusion of article 191 of the Lisbon treaty on the functioning of the European Union at length on day two of Committee, so I will not repeat those arguments here. That said, though, I wish to re-state that the inclusion of article 191 would risk going further than the existing principles that are set out in EU and UK law today. The requirements that the amendments set out do not exist today in either EU or domestic law. If the amendments were made, they would require the courts to interpret all legislation compatibly with the environmental principles. Given that the Bill’s purpose is to bring into effect the law that we have currently, the amendments regrettably risk generating a measure of uncertainty and a degree of confusion about the legal position.
May I return to clause 5(1)? It states:
“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day.”
Will the Solicitor General please look at that in light of the Government’s excellent determination that we will still effectively be subject to the ECJ during the beginning of the transition period, because if that is to be the case, it is not consistent with clause 5(1)?
I know that my right hon. Friend listens carefully to everything I say, and I am sure she would agree, first, that the transition period rightly has to be the subject of separate legislation—the Bill on the withdrawal agreement that will come before the House in due course—and secondly, that we have to cater in this Bill for as high a degree of certainty as possible for that legal exit date. That certainty is an important first step before we get into the question of transition—that interim period that I accept needs to be underpinned by primary legislation passed by this House, but which is a separate and distinct stage. I do not think there is any contradiction between the position that we want to take in a transition period—subject, of course, to the negotiation—and the clear position that we want to take in the Bill.
Before that intervention, I was dealing with amendments 101 and 336. Amendment 336 goes further, in that it would give a right of action based on a failure to comply with the environmental principles, and legislation would be at risk of being struck down by the courts if it was not compatible with them. I hope that Members were reassured and encouraged by the announcement by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs on 12 November of our intention to create a new comprehensive policy statement setting out the environmental principles. That statement will draw on the EU’s current principles and will of course underpin future policy making.
The Bill takes the right approach by retaining the principles as they have been recognised by the European Court, thereby providing the greatest possible clarity and certainty. Amendment 336 would alter the approach to the taking of that snapshot of EU law as it applies immediately before exit day. It effectively prejudges the outcome of the negotiations and introduces inflexibility, by seeking to bind us to decisions made by the European Court on general principles for the full duration of any implementation period. That pre-empts and prejudices the outcome of the negotiations. On that basis, I urge right hon. and hon. Members not to press their amendments.
Paragraph 4 of schedule 1 removes the right to what are commonly referred to as Francovich damages from our domestic law after exit. That form of damages is a specific EU-law remedy that arises only in certain limited circumstances when an EU member state, or an arm of that state, has committed a “sufficiently serious” breach of its EU law obligations and there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage. This is not a wide-ranging general right to sue the Government; rather, it is inextricably linked to and constrained by EU membership. Nor, as some have suggested, is this an everyday course of action for the average citizen. The number of actual Francovich cases heard by UK courts over the past 26 years is relatively low. Estimates vary, but studies suggest that, in the 20 years following the decision in Francovich, there had only been between 22 and 25 cases.
No, I will not give way, as I need to develop my point.
For example, in 2015, in their legal challenges to the domestic legislation standardising the packaging of tobacco products, the tobacco companies reserved their right to claim Francovich damages should they succeed on the substance of their claims against the Government. I make this point because any suggestion that removing the Francovich procedure reduces access to justice for the average citizen is not reflected in the UK experience.
I am very grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. I understand everything that he is saying. He knows what I have said about Francovich damages and their disappearance being inevitable, but the point about the transition is key. I have to say to him that it is not a comfortable argument for a Law Officer of the Crown to make to suggest that just one person, or one business, being deprived of a legal right is an acceptable circumstance, because it plainly is not.
I did not say that. If that was the impression that was created, I am afraid that my right hon. and learned Friend is mistaken. What I am talking about is trying to balance out and put into context the use of this particular procedure, which needs to be done because we have not heard the other side of the argument. That is what I am seeking to do.
By contrast, all existing domestic law routes of challenge and remedies for breaches of retained EU law will remain undisturbed. For example, this provision does not affect any specific statutory rights to claim damages in respect of breaches of retained EU law—such as under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015—or the case law which applies to the interpretation of any such provisions. Nor does it affect the right to challenge the decisions of public bodies by way of judicial review. Claimants will also still be able to seek remedies through the law of tort, by establishing negligence or by a breach of statutory duty, and they will also still be able to make a claim for restitution for unlawfully levied tax or charges.
The existing right to Francovich damages is linked to EU membership and the obligations that we have as a member state to the EU at an international level. There is clearly a difference between substantive EU law, which is being kept by the Bill to prevent legal uncertainty, and the supranational procedural rules, principles and frameworks that will no longer be appropriate once we have left the EU.
Let me turn briefly to amendments 139 and 302, which take a slightly different approach. They would maintain the right to Francovich damages in domestic law, but only in relation to pre-exit causes of action. Amendment 335 would similarly maintain the right to Francovich damages in domestic law for causes of action occurring during any transitional period. The Bill sets out elsewhere—at paragraph 27 of schedule 8—that the exclusion of the right to Francovich damages would apply only in relation to claims that are brought after exit day.
I would like to assure my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan), and indeed all Members, that we will consider further whether any additional specific and more detailed transitional arrangements should be set out in regulations.
I am delighted to hear the Solicitor General say that. As he will appreciate, the point is a very simple one: it must be the case that the damages are available if the action takes place before exit day. It is a very basic principle of law and quite easy to correct.
Perhaps I can forgive my right hon. and learned Friend his eagerness to hear the remarks that I was going to make. I am sure that when this debate finishes he and I will continue the dialogue that we have had for some time about these matters.
It would not be right to maintain, in general, such an open-ended right to this form of damages after exit for any and all potential pre-exit causes of action. I am concerned that we would end up with an almost indefinite trail of cases. That is not good for certainty, and it is not good for the transition we want to make.
Before the Solicitor General finishes his remarks, may I say, as a non-lawyer listening to what has largely been a debate between distinguished legal minds on both sides of the House, that two things strike me as important? The first is that this debate has really been about legislative quality control, rather than political Punch and Judy, and that should be very reassuring for anybody watching this debate. The second is that the tone with which my hon. and learned Friend and his colleagues have engaged with colleagues on both sides of the House to find a way through and to make the best law sends a fantastically powerful message. Will he guarantee to continue working in this spirit to take the Bill forward?
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for making that observation. [Interruption.] I can assure Opposition Members that I have listened carefully to the submissions and observations by Members on both sides of the House, in the true spirit of Committee.
I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for giving way, because, unfortunately, I was not able to be in the Chamber for a large part of the debate, as I was chairing a Bill Committee. I thank him for taking into consideration the points I raised on behalf of my constituent concerning Francovich. I hope that what he is a saying from the Dispatch Box will go a long way towards providing the comfort and certainty my constituent requires. May I thank those on the Front Bench for listening to the points I made in the debate the other day? I hope this will move us towards a successful conclusion in the case of my constituent.
I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend.
For the reasons I have outlined, I would, with the greatest of respect, and in the spirit of comradeship almost, urge hon. and right hon. Members not to press their amendments.
In summation, we have listened and we will continue to reflect carefully on all the arguments that have been made today. The Government believe that the approach we are taking is the right one as we carefully separate our legal system from that of the EU and restore democratic control to this Parliament. I commend schedule 1 to the Committee.
I rise to speak in support of amendments 8, 46 and 79, the excellent amendments 101 and 105 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), amendment 151 and, given the list rattled off by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), a whole lot more as well.
While I have enjoyed the opportunity today to intervene on the legal debates the hon. Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) pointed to, it is also important, as we come towards the end of today’s debate, to think about general principles—to take a step back and to think about the politics of what we are debating today, as opposed to just the legal issues, which I may touch on briefly.
The EU charter of fundamental rights is exactly what it says on the tin: it is a statement of fundamental principles—an anchor—with which European legislation must comply. It protects the grounding of what we deem to be acceptable in our democracy. Legislative details are, of course, for debate, but we must anchor them to those fundamental rights because, as we have heard today, failure to do that can lead to actions in the courts and the awarding of damages.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, who is not in his place, said from the Dispatch Box earlier that the EU charter has no standing and therefore means nothing, but I respectfully disagree. When my constituents have the right to bring actions in the courts, and in certain circumstances to receive damages, that has value—that means something to citizens. Those are fundamental, enforceable rights, which we should be proud of.
It is right to say, of course, that the UK need only respect these rights when implementing EU law, but, as we know too well, and as we will learn over the coming weeks and months, the tsunami of EU law that we seek to copy and paste into UK law comes with principles we must protect.
My earlier intervention provides one example of why the Government’s policy is nonsensical. The fact that we are bringing ECJ case law into UK Supreme Court case law under the Bill means that the case law around the charter of fundamental rights will be in the case law of this country, yet we are not willing to bring the charter with it. That cannot make sense unless the Government are saying that they wish to pick the cases out of ECJ jurisprudence when they give them UK Supreme Court status.
My right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) raised very powerfully the issue of adequacy and equivalence in relation to the Data Protection Bill. The Government may find it politically uncomfortable to recognise the obvious fact that on financial services, data protection and other issues where we seek to maintain equivalence in the European market, we must track and embed EU jurisprudence in order to do so. In the context of the general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Bill, that means respecting the fundamental right that one’s data is protected under the EU charter.
In the absence of those on the Treasury Bench saying to me and to the Committee which of these rights they so vehemently disagree with, I am left to draw the conclusion, in common with the Father of the House, that the only thing the Government seem to be unhappy with about the charter of fundamental rights is that is preceded by the letters E and U. Yet my constituents will suffer losses in rights and losses in their ability to enforce those rights. This is not a question of ideological Brexit party politics but of fundamental rights that are enforceable by my constituents and the citizens of this country. We cannot play politics with these issues. If we fail to keep the charter of fundamental rights, we fail to ensure that the laws brought in under this Bill are anchored to the fundamental principles on which they are drafted. As we have heard, that leaves judges to interpret the rights of citizens in the direction of the winds of the day without the statutory anchor that holds them true to their underlying principles.
Having touched on legal issues, I will move on to the general principles. If we lift our heads out of the bucket of sand that is Brexit and look around us, we must ask what repealing the charter of fundamental rights says about the type of country we are and wish to be. One of the outcomes of this Brexit process is that with the removal of the charter we have failed to set out a vision of an acceptable basis for a developed, modern democracy like Britain. That is why I support the amendments. I sense that we have lost our way, because removing these fundamental rights says something about who we are and how we should conduct business as a country. The pride that all of us share in what it means to be British and our influence in the world is based on the standards that we set at home and abroad. The purpose of having the EU charter of fundamental rights is to make a statement of the standards that we should be proud of as a developed, modern democracy. I, for one, want to continue to be proud of my country.
Speaking as a desperate remoaner, and a proud one, I have to say loud and clear that the direction of travel that we are seeing through this mess of a negotiation on Brexit, and the fact that we are debating something as nonsensical as removing the EU charter when it causes us no problems and we are bringing ECJ case law into the case law of the UK anyway, shows that we do not know what type of country we want to deliver for our citizens. In the context of losing thousands of jobs from agencies relocating and, for the first time ever, losing our seat on the UN International Court of Justice, I am filled with desperation about what type of country we are seeking to deliver.
I do not see from this Government a vision of what Britain looks like in future, and removing these fundamental rights goes to the heart of that. I want my constituents and the citizens of this country, and citizens around the world, to look to Britain to see that we protect and recognise these fundamental rights—rights that we should be proud of. I think that as Brexit continues to unfold and my constituents, and others, continue to see the losses they are suffering as a consequence of the referendum —the loss of access to the single market, the loss of access to the customs union, and today the loss of rights that are currently protected in law—they deserve the right to change their mind.
I say once again to Government Members on the Treasury Bench, who are no doubt listening intently to my comments—[Laughter.] Thank you. I say to them that this is clearly a question of politics, rather than of law, as we have heard today. I plead with them to put the ideological Brexit party politics to one side, bring sense to the Dispatch Box and protect the enforceable rights of my constituents and the citizens of this country, as proudly set out in the EU charter of fundamental rights.
As a matter of fact, my hon. Friend and I may be the only two Government Members who believe in having a written constitution. I thought I was the only one—
There are three of us. I am very grateful. [Hon. Members: “Four.”] Let us not count. In any event, the number is small.
Does my hon. Friend agree that, in the interim, it would be a good step if the rights we identify, as a result of the Government’s analysis, as coming out of the charter—the third category rights—should in due course, although not of course in this Bill, be added to the Human Rights Act in a way that at least enables such a degree of entrenchment?
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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I will give way later.
The Scottish and Welsh Governments have tabled a number of key amendments to the Bill—amendments 164, 165, and 183 to 188—through SNP Members and Labour Members. I am delighted that these amendments have all been selected for debate today, and I will leave my friends to speak to the amendments in their own names. It must be recognised that there is deep disapproval from the devolved Administrations in Cardiff and in Edinburgh about not only how this legislation was drafted, but the extent to which it disrupts the functioning of devolved competences.
During the referendum campaign last year, Scotland was promised all sorts of powers. The Environment Secretary told BBC Scotland that Scotland would get immigration powers with a leave vote. The former Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston promised Scotland powers over fishing and agriculture. But here we are, 17 months after the referendum. There are no new powers for Scotland. In fact, Brexit means Scotland losing powers. [Interruption.] I can hear huffing from the Government Benches. I invite any Government Member to rise now and name one power—just one—that will come back to Scotland as a consequence of Brexit.
At the start of his remarks, the right hon. Gentleman sought to give us feedback from the meeting that I held with the First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Scotland and the Minister responsible for exit. If the right hon. Gentleman had been party to those discussions, he would know that all 111 powers were subject to discussion between the two Governments, and the two Governments will bring forward their proposals in due course. This power grab talk and this naming one power—it is pantomime. What this Government are involved in is the reality of negotiating a way forward on this matter.
I ask the hon. Gentleman to seriously consider what he has just said. He said that most of the 111 powers are technical and regulatory. Is he aware that the list affects huge swathes of our justice system in Scotland? Does he consider our devolved justice system and separate legal system to be simply technical and regulatory matters?
Thank you, Dame Rosie. I shall attempt to keep my remarks within the time limit handed down by the Chair, at least 20 minutes ago.
As a member of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, I have been in the privileged position of being able to talk, both formally and informally, with constitutional and political experts about many things, including clause 11. As part of the process of formulating our latest report, the Committee’s Chair, the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), and I travelled to Edinburgh and took evidence from panels of experts over two days. It was an enlightening and informative experience.
Under clause 11, a potential 111 powers that could be devolved to Scotland will be held at Westminster until such time as the UK Parliament sees fit to devolve them. The UK Government’s stance is, “Trust us; we’ll do the right thing.” And trust them we have over the years: we trusted them to deliver the Calman report but they did not; we trusted them to deliver on the Smith commission but they did not; we looked to the Sewel convention and we saw right through it; and we listened to, and were influenced by, a vow that was not a vow.
In September 2014, the then Prime Minster David Cameron told us that we were a “family of nations”. We were told that Scotland could lead, not that the Government would attempt to put a lead on Scotland, but every amendment requested by SNP MPs, who were democratically elected to represent the citizens of Scotland, was voted down. When we voted to stay in the EU, our views were ignored. When we asked to sit at the table during the negotiations, we were snubbed. I can assure the Minister that the words “the cheque is in the post” and the promise that you will respect me in the morning will not work any more.
I am well aware of the cold, hard fact that the UK Government do not have to do anything, but Scotland is not a faithful hunting dog standing at its master’s heel, waiting on its orders. Scotland in the Union is a concept rooted in the past. The ties that bind us come from, in part, a shared history—a history of conflict and conquest—but the sun set on the empire a long time ago. It might come as a surprise to some, but 59 colonies have walked away from the empire and, as a new dawn rises, so does Scotland. We want a different future from the one set out for us, but Scotland cannot choose its own future when we have to seek permission to do so.
Clause 11 does not set out a timetable for transition. Professors Richard Rawlings and Alan Page have both raised concerns that clause 11 is described as a transition agreement, but that there is no provision for that in the Bill. Despite that, we are currently designing our Scotland. Civic Scotland, combined with academia and business, is already coming together to design the country we want to live in. Discussions in think-tanks and at public meetings about the Scotland we want to be are common occurrences. There is a growing awareness that Scotland, with the right powers, can reform our energy business, banking sector, and agriculture and fishing industries.
We could even negotiate our own trade deals, like Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands do. The Faroe Islands negotiate their own trade deals because the Danish Government respect and trust them. We could each define our own future and still be trading partners and valued neighbours, while continuing to help and support each other, but only if that is achieved through mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty. And there is the rub: clause 11 shows no respect or trust for Scotland or any of the devolved authorities.
Dr Tobias Lock, a senior lecturer at Edinburgh Law School, has said:
“The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill will result in a shift in balance between the powers Westminster has in practice and the powers Holyrood has in practice with Westminster’s powers being augmented and Holyrood's staying the same.”
That concern is shared by Professor Nicola McEwen, professor of territorial politics at the University of Edinburgh. She identifies that clause 11 is fundamentally a problem of trust. The UK Government do not trust the devolved Governments to refrain from using repatriated powers to create policy and regulatory divergence that might harm the UK’s internal market and create problems in trade negotiations. This, she argues, overlooks the considerable constitutional authority that the UK Parliament already retains over market regulation, trade, and the making and implementation of international treaties. For their part, the Scottish and Welsh Governments do not trust the commitment of the UK Government to devolve repatriated powers after Brexit and/or to agree and govern UK common frameworks on a genuinely co-operative basis. Once the existing imbalance has been augmented, when will it be realigned?
Scotland, if given the right powers, could negotiate with the European economic area and European Free Trade Association to seek what is best for Scotland but not detrimental to the rest of the UK. However, we are hamstrung by a UK Government who are scared of their own shadow, constantly looking over their shoulder and wondering from where the next challenge or crisis will emerge. We have a UK Government propped up by bluster and buffoonery.
Individuals may be protected by personal wealth that generates self-confidence and self-assurance, and supports a “devil may care” attitude—one that nudges us forward, assuring us that it will be all right on the night—but the vast majority of people in the UK are less well protected from the economic turmoil that lies ahead. They have concerns about jobs, pensions and visas. They have rightly turned to the UK Government time and again for reassurance, but their concerns are not being addressed. All that has been offered is a sickly mix of jingoistic imperialism. The Scottish Government wish to bring clarity and seek the powers to govern responsibly, but clause 11 does not provide that authority or opportunity. It must be amended forthwith, and the powers due to the Scottish Parliament—powers that will be best used by the Scottish Government, in the best interests of the citizens of Scotland—must be repatriated to the Scottish Parliament immediately after the UK leaves the European Union.
I rise to support clause 11 and schedule 3. Let me say at the outset how grateful I am to all Members for their contributions to the six-hour debate that we have had so far today, and for the thoughtful consideration that has been given to this part of the Bill. I assure the Committee that I shall listen carefully to, and take very seriously, all the views that are expressed on these issues.
The Government have been clear about the fact that the Bill is about continuity, certainty and control. That applies equally, and without exception, to people in businesses in all parts of the United Kingdom. Clause 11 is about delivering certainty while guaranteeing all the existing powers of the devolved institutions. The current devolution settlements reflect the UK’s membership of the EU, and on that basis, they provide that devolved institutions cannot act or legislate in a way that is incompatible with EU law.
I apologise to the Minister for interrupting him so early in his speech. Many members of his own party have said that clause 11 is deficient and requires amendment. Does he believe that, and, if so, how does he intend to amend it to make it less deficient?
I will set out the Government’s position in due course during my speech. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman intervened within 30 seconds of the beginning of my speech, and he is not accepting the answer that I have barely been able to give. I hope he will appreciate that I have a speech about the amendments to get through. When it comes to the clause itself, however, we are interested in the views of all Members and all devolved Administrations, and, above all, we are seeking a legislative consent motion. We are determined to approach the clause with a view to consensus.
As I was saying, the current devolution settlements provide that devolved institutions cannot act or legislate in a way that is incompatible with EU law. That has provided common, overarching laws and approaches throughout the UK while we have been in the EU. Those common approaches and laws have meant that businesses, regardless of where they are based in the United Kingdom, can trade with each other in the knowledge that they share agreed standards.
The Minister is making an important point about businesses being able to trade. Given the amendments that we have been discussing and the importance of consultation with the devolved Administrations, will the Minister tell me whether the proposals that were put forward in Brussels today on the Northern Ireland-Irish border were discussed with the First Ministers of Wales, Scotland or, indeed, Northern Ireland?
It is not for me to comment, during a Committee stage, on the process of European negotiations. There is a time and a place for that. I am not going to get into a discussion with the hon. Gentleman about the process of EU negotiations. We must ensure that the Prime Minister has the opportunity to reach out to Brussels, but I am here to discuss clause 11 and schedule 3 and the amendments, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will allow me to continue to do so.
I was talking about the common approaches that enable us to trade with each other in the knowledge that we share agreed standards. We have agreed approaches on how to manage our common resources, and the UK can enter into international agreements knowing that we, as a country, can meet our obligations. As we leave the EU, the simple question is about where we need to retain the common approaches in EU law and where we do not. In the immediate term, clause 11 and part 1 of schedule 3 create a mechanism for those common approaches to continue to apply throughout the UK after exit.
The Minister speaks of common approaches across the EU. We have heard today about the possibility of an alignment between the Northern Irish arrangements and those of the Republic and the rest of the EU. How will we retain those common approaches if, for instance, the UK negotiates a new trade deal post-customs union, and we end up with circumstances in which that would, or would not, apply to Northern Ireland? How on earth can the Minister reconcile that with the offer that the Government have been talking about today?
I note that the hon. Gentleman has just walked into the Chamber. He is welcome to make a speech later on setting out his own principles; I would listen to that very carefully. I am addressing clause 11 and schedule 3 to the Bill. There is a time and a place for the wider discussions he wants.
On the temporary nature of these proposals, why have the Government not chosen just to put in place a sunset clause? Why is no date indicated, because the lack of one creates an enormous amount of uncertainty for everyone?
The issue around placing a sunset clause on this provision is that, in a way, it creates an artificial cliff edge. The sole purpose of clause 11 is to ensure that the UK statute book is complete on exit day. We want to ensure that we work towards common frameworks, and that we can ensure that, when we have that statute book prepared for exit day, we have common frameworks and non-common frameworks in place. Having a sunset clause creates an artificial cliff edge to work towards that date, whereas we might want to create some of those frameworks before that date, and there might need to be some corrections to the withdrawal agreement and the EU withdrawal agreement Bill that has been announced, and some deficiencies that need to be corrected. Having a sunset clause is therefore unhelpful for the purposes of this clause in itself.
Returning to the issue of the policy areas where EU law intersects with devolved competence, as I have said, common frameworks will not always be required, or can be achieved through non-legislative means like concordats, and in such cases clause 11 provides a mechanism to release decision-making powers from the temporary competence arrangement through the Order in Council procedure, giving new powers to the devolved Administrations.
I am listening carefully to the Minister’s speech, but I am not hearing much about addressing the concerns of the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies, which are clearly saying that what is being proposed drives a coach and horses through the devolution settlement. How on earth is the Minister going to take on board their real concerns about what this Bill does to devolution, not least through clause 11?
I have listened for six hours to the concerns of Members, but outside this Chamber there is an entire process that I want to touch on later in my speech, and which I hope the hon. Gentleman will reflect upon. There might be hostility in this Chamber from those who say that the Government are somehow taking clause 11 and ripping up the devolution settlement, but that is hyperbole. Clause 11 is a temporary competence limit that is being applied simply by taking EU law and it becoming EU retained law.
No, not at the moment.
There are no powers that the devolved Administrations currently have that they will be losing. We have therefore had tremendous engagement on the framework that we are delivering, and I will touch on that engagement shortly. In particular, in the JMC (EN) process there has been huge good will from the colleagues of the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) in the Scottish Government, and his officials, above all, working tirelessly behind the scenes, trying to deliver on what we need to do.
The Minister uses the word “temporary”. How long is temporary, and why is that not specified in the Bill?
The hon. Gentleman points to the word “temporary”, and I repeat that this is a temporary competence limit—[Interruption.] He wants to know how long temporary is. It is as long as it takes to ensure that we have a complete statute book that is in the interests of continuity, certainty and control for UK businesses. We want to ensure that we have time to be able to correct the statute book and ensure that this is done properly. To create an artificial time limit would be unhelpful to this process. As he knows, the First Minister of Wales is going forward with the JMC (EN) process. That engagement is taking place, and I will talk about that later in my speech. This means that when it comes to ensuring that we have the temporary competence limit on the face of the Bill, the Order in Council process gives new—
No, I have given way a lot—[Interruption.] I am going to carry on with my speech; otherwise I will not get through it. Other Members want to speak, and although I could stand here and take up all the rest of the time, I think it would be inappropriate to do so.
The Order in Council procedure will provide an opportunity for those powers to be returned to the devolved Administrations. This highlights a well-established procedure for adapting the parameters of the devolved competence, which requires debate and approval in the UK Parliament and the relevant devolved legislatures. It is absolutely right that the devolved legislatures are able to debate and consider any additional areas of competence being released to them through this mechanism. Of course we acknowledge that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have taken a different view on the mechanism to provide the necessary certainty, but we are in agreement that common frameworks will be needed in some areas. In some cases, legislative frameworks might be required, and we hope to continue working closely with our counterparts in the devolved Administrations to establish exactly what those will look like.
I am puzzled. The Minister has made it clear that the Government’s intention is to maintain the current legislative situation, so far as the clause is concerned. Why then did he not seek agreement with the Welsh and Scottish Governments before he brought this legislation to the Chamber? Why did he not achieve a resolved position before coming to the Chamber with the Bill?
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the clock is ticking, and that we have a limited amount of time in which to ensure that our statute book is prepared for exit day. We are determined to do that, because we need that certainty, control and stability. Businesses need to know that the statute book will be complete on exit day.
We have had a tremendous amount of engagement with our Welsh and Scottish partners, and I am perfectly happy to place in the Library records of the meetings between the First Secretary of State and his counterparts so that Members can see the level of engagement involved. I think that they would be quite struck by the number of meetings that have taken place and the work that has gone on behind the scenes. Members might be hostile in the Chamber today, but their Welsh and Scottish counterparts are working constructively with the UK Government because they recognise that we need some serious politics here and that we need to ensure that we have certainty and control for businesses.
No, only once for each person. I will give way to the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford).
Why will having a Brexit date give certainty and clarity, yet having a date on which the powers would move to the devolved Governments is considered unacceptable?
We will be discussing the clause 10 powers to which the hon. Lady refers on a separate day—on the morning of day five. Clause 11 is about ensuring that the statute book is prepared for exit day. In a way, exit day provides that temporary limit. We know that we need to make changes to the common framework, but beyond that, we do not yet know what the negotiation period will look like when it comes to ensuring that we need an implementation period. That is why we cannot necessarily provide that certainty.
I will give way to the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) now.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Clause 11(3) refers to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Is the position for Scotland and Wales the same in the Bill as it is for Northern Ireland, given that the Good Friday agreement is underpinned by an international treaty between two countries and that it explicitly mentions the European Union?
We are moving on to some of the clause 10 issues around international obligations, but when it comes to schedule 3, which I had hoped to touch upon later in my speech, we are determined to ensure that we obtain legislative consent from all the relevant devolved Administrations. Although the Assembly is absent, we are already working with officials in Northern Ireland to ensure that their perspective is reflected, but we are determined to move forward as the United Kingdom, which includes Northern Ireland.
Does the Minister envisage requesting the legislative consent motions before explaining what amendments the Government are going to make to the Bill?
As I have stated, the Government’s intention is to seek legislative consent for the Bill from all the devolved Administrations, where possible. We have already seen legislative consent memorandums being tabled in Scotland and Wales, and we are determined to ensure that we work with all our devolved partners and with officials in Northern Ireland and that we legislate on behalf of the United Kingdom.
I am going to carry on with my speech. The hon. Gentleman has already intervened and now he decides to—[Interruption.]
Order. We cannot have sedentary interventions. If the Minister wants to give way, he will give way.
We have been working closely with the devolved Administrations on these questions and will continue to do so, progressing the discussions and the necessary analysis of where common approaches are and are not needed, through ongoing bilateral and multilateral discussions between Ministers and officials.
In an excellent speech, my right hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones) highlighted the important progress that was made at the recent JMC (EN) meeting on 16 October, when the UK Government, the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government agreed to a set of principles to identify where we will need frameworks. Given the myth busting that needs to take place around the JMC (EN) process and given how open and transparent it already is, it may be appropriate to quote from a communiqué regarding an agreement by all the devolved Governments and the First Secretary of State on the definition and principles of the common frameworks. It states:
“As the UK leaves the European Union, the Government of the United Kingdom and the devolved administrations agree to work together to establish common approaches in some areas that are currently governed by EU law, but that are otherwise within areas of competence of the devolved administrations or legislatures. A framework will set out a common UK, or GB, approach and how it will be operated and governed. This may consist of common goals, minimum or maximum standards, harmonisation, limits on action, or mutual recognition, depending on the policy area and the objectives being pursued. Frameworks may be implemented by legislation, by executive action, by memorandums of understanding, or by other means depending on the context in which the framework is intended to operate.”
The communiqué then goes on to set out some important principles for where common frameworks
“will be established where they are necessary in order to: enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence; ensure compliance with international obligations”.
I may be able to save the Minister a job here. New clause 64 includes what he is reading out, word for word. Given that he supports the principles, is he not inclined to accept new clause 64?
The hon. Lady did not touch on the communiqué and seemed to push it to one side without acknowledging the importance of the process. When the JMC (EN) process is taking place, her new clause is unnecessary. I will touch on why it is unnecessary to legislate when we have all this work ongoing to provide flexibility for the devolved Administrations to draw up a communiqué exactly like this one.
To carry on with what I was saying, common frameworks will
“enable the management of common resources; administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element; safeguard the security of the UK.”
The frameworks will also
“respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability of the devolved legislatures, and will therefore: be based on established conventions and practices, including that the competence of the devolved institutions will not normally be adjusted without their consent; maintain, as a minimum, equivalent flexibility for tailoring policies to the specific needs of each territory as is afforded by current EU rules; lead to a significant increase in decision-making powers for the devolved administrations.”
In the absence of Northern Ireland Executive Ministers, the Northern Ireland civil service will continue to be part of these discussions. We are building on the positive and constructive joint working between our Administrations to continue to accelerate our progress on common approaches. For example, there is ongoing work between officials from the devolved Administrations and the UK Government on how policy areas intersect with the devolution settlement. There have been several deep dives into those policy areas, and the work will be presented at the next JMC (EN) on 12 December, where we hope to make further progress by assessing more of the detailed work that has been carried out.
How does the UK Government’s approach to working together with the devolved Administrations differ from their approach to working together with, say, Dublin and the other members of the EU27? Is one not a meeting of equals and the other a meeting of master and underling?
The work on the common frameworks that clause 11 addresses points to the fact that we are keenly working with the devolved Administrations on drawing up those frameworks. We have an absolute commitment to ensuring that we can look at the principles that were agreed between our Governments on 16 October and that explicitly recognise that frameworks will not be needed in many of the areas currently governed by EU law.
As we have said from the outset, the Bill starts a process that will lead to a significant increase in decision-making powers. That is not a power grab. We are ensuring that more powers go back to the devolved Administrations and legislatures.
The Minister talks about the constructive relationship with the devolved Administrations. Has he taken time to look at what they have said about the shambles today?
A bit of a wasted intervention. I am here to talk about clause 11. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has read the clause, but he came in slightly late.
The hon. Gentleman is very kind, but we are discussing the effect of clause 11 and schedule 3 —that is the purpose of Committee.
I have already given way.
We want to build momentum over the coming months in the continued bilateral and multilateral discussions between Ministers and officials. Let me be clear that the Government are the party committed to devolution. Our record shows that, and we will continue to press on with devolution. Working through these frameworks is part of that, but we also want to protect the benefits of our Union across the UK and across each of our constituent nations, benefiting us all.
No.
I am grateful to hon. Members for raising important points of detail on the ongoing framework process. They are right to acknowledge that work has been done today on agreeing the guiding principles for the future frameworks, and that the further analysis is the product of the ongoing engagement between officials and Ministers in the UK Government and the devolved Administrations. Of course, the outcomes of those discussions are important not just to Governments but, most crucially, to the people and businesses across the UK to whom the rules apply.
The Minister is talking about the impact on people in the UK. Under the Good Friday agreement, people in Northern Ireland can choose to be British or Irish, or both. Will that remain the case after Brexit? If so, seeing as Ireland remains a member of the EU, will people in Northern Ireland still be able to choose to be EU citizens?
I do not disagree with what the hon. Lady says. It is important to note that, when it comes to the common frameworks procedure, the communiqué agreed on 16 October states:
“Frameworks will ensure recognition of the economic and social linkages between Northern Ireland and Ireland and that Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK that shares a land frontier with the EU. They will also adhere to the Belfast Agreement.”
By way of myth busting, it is not the case whatsoever that the Good Friday agreement will somehow be affected.
Clause 11 introduces part 1 of schedule 3, which makes the same provisions in relation to devolved Executive competence—that is, any secondary legislation that the devolved Administrations might make. In addition, provisions in the Bill extend competence to the devolved Administrations so that devolved Ministers can exercise the powers provided by clause 10 and schedule 2 to make the statute book operate effectively once we have left the EU.
In recognition of the current standing of the existing devolution settlements, part 2 of schedule 3 ensures that a significant number of corrections are made to the devolution statutes arising from the UK’s exit from the EU. Together, clause 11 and schedule 3 preserve the current scope of devolved competence. They ensure that any decision that could have been taken by the devolved Administrations and legislatures prior to exit day can still be made after exit day, and that devolved Ministers can exercise powers to make sure that law in areas of devolved competence works correctly. They set up the Order-in-Council process, which will allow for an increase in decision-making powers of the devolved institutions as discussions with the devolved Administrations on common frameworks progress. The Government have repeatedly stated, as I have today, that this is a temporary arrangement; it is a safeguard against a cliff-edge situation as we leave the EU to provide certainty for people and businesses in all parts of the UK. Just as importantly, it allows time for discussion about the future: on where common approaches are needed and where they are not. It is our overriding aim to work with the devolved Administrations to define which areas need frameworks and which do not as soon as possible.
It was absolutely right for the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) in the debate on clause 2 to raise the matter of consultation with the political parties in Northern Ireland in the absence of a power-sharing Executive. I would like to reassure her that this Government value the views of those parties on the devolution provisions in the Bill, and officials have provided briefings on the Bill to each of the parties represented in the Northern Ireland Assembly that wanted them. In addition, officials have been engaging with their counterparts in the Northern Ireland civil service on the technical and legal aspects of the Bill to make sure it operates properly in the context of Northern Ireland law. That is, of course, no substitute for a devolved Government in Northern Ireland, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland continues to prioritise the talks between parties to restore the power-sharing Executive. This Government are sincere in their wish to discuss these matters, particularly with regard to common frameworks, with the Northern Ireland Executive when they are restored.
I reiterate that I welcome scrutiny by the House on the approach the Government have taken. I also welcome the vital contributions that the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government, and the devolved legislatures, have made to today’s debate by publishing their views on how—
I feel that the Minister may be finishing his remarks. I intervened at the beginning of his speech to ask whether he would tell us where he thinks clause 11 is deficient, as many of his colleagues have said it is, and how he thinks that, as the Minister responsible for it, he is going to fix those deficiencies.
As I stated at the opening of my remarks, and as I will state throughout my speech and at the end of my remarks, we are open to hearing from those who seriously want to look at this Bill and consider how we productively ensure that our statute book is complete on exit day. We are in a Committee stage at the moment and there is a process to go through here, and there is a process outside this House in the JMC, which I have spoken about. It is not for me as a Minister to prejudge the discussions that may take place at JMC (EN) next week, on 12 December. What I will say is that I will ensure that when it comes to the agenda of that meeting, the discussions that have taken place in Committee are reflected and discussed in JMC (EN).
I thank the Minister for what he is saying, but it is clear that the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government, and Members of this House working with them, have proposed clear and specific amendments that are not about blocking the Bill or undoing Brexit; they are about retaining a stable constitutional settlement in these islands. Will he accept those amendments, as his colleague the Secretary of State for Scotland said he might?
I am discussing whether the clause should stand part of the Bill and I am about to turn to the hon. Gentleman’s amendments. I hope that he can wait in eager anticipation for my remarks and that he will not be disappointed, although he may be.
I reiterate that I welcome scrutiny by the House on the approach that the Government have taken. As I said, I also welcome the vital contributions the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and devolved legislatures have made in this debate by publishing their views on how devolution aspects of the Bill might be improved. This Government are clear that we want to consider all those views and make improvements to the Bill where we can, but I also emphasise that it is right that we provide certainty across the UK, as this clause seeks to do, and do not take any action to undermine the integrity of our United Kingdom.
I will also take a moment to reflect on the insightful contribution made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), informed by the evidence to and input from the members of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee. He made a number of pertinent points and I will turn to those now. He is right to say that leaving the EU is that opportunity to revisit some key constitutional questions. As I have set out today, the Government’s aim in introducing clause 11 is to do precisely that: to give us time to give these important issues the consideration they deserve.
We welcome the views of experts such as my hon. Friend and his Committee on these issues of intergovernmental institutional relationships. The Government are ensuring that we engage with other external experts such as leading academics on these questions. What we are focused on today is how we provide that certainty and continuity we need in the law on exit day and how we give ourselves time to consider the issues properly and reach the right answers. I welcome my hon. Friend’s continued contributions to this discussion.
New clause 64, which relates to the creation of common frameworks, comprise three subsections and I will take each in turn. First, the new clause would require the Government to lay their proposals for the replacement of European frameworks with UK ones before each House of Parliament. It is not the position of the UK Government, or of the devolved Administrations, that the existing UK frameworks will be replaced by our own common frameworks in every instance. Instead, we expect more power to sit directly with the devolved Administrations as a result of our leaving the EU.
As I mentioned earlier, we are working closely with the devolved Administrations to determine where future frameworks, whether legislative or non-legislative, will be required in each of the policy areas in question. Although joint conclusions have not been drawn at this point—as I have stated, I do not want to prejudice the outcome of the discussions with the devolved Administrations—we believe that the majority of policy areas will not require legislative frameworks.
Surely the determination is very simple. It is set down in the Scotland Act 1998 that what is not reserved is devolved, so if it comes from Europe, it will be devolved. It is set down and it is simple. It should not be up to the Minister to be judge and jury. He talks about partnership, but he should respect the law.
As I set out clearly at the beginning of my speech, when current EU law—which it is the UK’s position not to breach—is transferred to become retained EU law, we need to look at the areas where we need to create common frameworks. That is the position that the hon. Gentleman’s own Brexit Minister, Mike Russell, has taken. Mike Russell signed the communiqué and agreed to look at these common approaches and to look at retained EU law being transferred across.
The hon. Gentleman should speak to members of the Scottish Government, because they seem to understand the need to work with the UK Government to come up with common frameworks. He seems to be unaware of the process of engagement that is taking place outside the House. His constituents will not thank him for bringing up constitutional points and not acknowledging that, in looking at the common frameworks procedure and at EU law, we need to ensure that, when it comes to exit day, there is certainty, control and stability in respect of our statute book. We need to ensure that clause 11 provides for that.
Should our detailed discussions conclude that UK-wide or parallel legislation is necessary, both Houses of Parliament will of course have an important role to play in scrutinising the detailed proposals. Where policy areas are released from the temporary arrangements provided for in clause 11, the Order in Council process provides a mechanism to do precisely that to ensure that these decisions are subject to careful scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament and the relevant devolved legislatures.
Secondly, the new clause would permit the establishment of frameworks only where the criteria set out in it are met. That is also unnecessary. Although I agree with the criteria, which, as the hon. Member for Darlington (Jenny Chapman) pointed out, have been lifted by and large from the broader principles that underpin the creation of frameworks, they form only one part of the picture. The broader principles were agreed by the UK, Scottish and Welsh Governments at the meeting of the JMC (EN) on 16 October and were published in the communiqué that I have put on the record. To ensure that the interests of Northern Ireland were heard, a senior official from the Northern Ireland civil service was in attendance.
Those broader principles recognise, among other things, the importance of a wider range of issues, including
“the economic and social linkages between Northern Ireland and Ireland”.
Not only do we have an established set of detailed principles; we have put those principles into practice through a process of ongoing engagement and analysis with the devolved Administrations on where common frameworks are or are not needed. It therefore follows that the more limited set of criteria in the new clause is unnecessary.
Finally, the new clause would permit the creation of frameworks only if they were subject to consultation agreements with the affected devolved Administrations. Once again, that is unnecessary. As the agreed principles published in the communiqué make clear:
“It will be the aim of all parties to agree where there is a need for common frameworks and the content of them.”
The Government are committed to intensive discussions on the areas where common frameworks will and will not be required with the devolved Administrations, and those are happening right now. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Darlington to withdraw the new clause.
New clause 65 seeks to enshrine the Joint Ministerial Committee in legislation. The Joint Ministerial Committee is a forum for the UK Government and the devolved Administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to discuss matters of joint interest and is underpinned by a memorandum of understanding between the four Administrations. Specifically, it provides for a focus of intergovernmental relations and allows attending Ministers to present the positions of their own Administration in a multilateral setting. There is no need to enshrine the JMC provisions in legislation as set out in new clause 65. Indeed, doing so would place limitations on the ability of the members to adapt to what is a rapidly changing political landscape.
The current basis for the JMC has been agreed by all four Administrations and allows for wide-ranging discussions, including on topical issues such as EU exit. The JMC, as set out by the written agreements, must remain adaptable enough to address those four Governments’ interests. If this clause were to be added to the statute book, it could severely hamper the JMC’s ability to do so.
The scope of the committee and its supporting sub-committees is not solely to discuss the domestic impact of EU exit and negotiations with the EU. The JMC plenary, which is chaired by the Prime Minister, should also continue to discuss matters agreed by the Administrations as set out by the terms of reference under subsection (1) (a). As drafted, new clause 65 would significantly limit the scope of the Joint Ministerial Committee. The provisions under subsection (1) are already being demonstrated through the JMC on EU negotiations sub-committee. My right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State chaired the most recent JMC (EN) meeting on 16 October and will chair a further meeting on 12 December to build on those discussions that have taken place so far.
There are also other sub-committees that are equally important for the integrity of intergovernmental relations. The provisions under subsection (5) stipulate that either my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister or my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union must chair all further meetings of the Joint Ministerial Committee until a withdrawal agreement is concluded. That would ignore the role of my right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State who chairs what I am sure will be recognised as an important sub-committee on EU negotiations as well as other sub-committees of the JMC that already exist, such as the sub-committee on Europe. Such provisions will remove the flexibility afforded to the Joint Ministerial Committee to adapt and evolve.
The existing written agreements coupled with the ongoing multilateral and bilateral engagement between Ministers and officials make this new clause redundant. The versatility of the committee is achieved through consensus of the participating Administrations and therefore we urge the Opposition not to press their amendment.
The hon. Gentleman talked earlier about co-operation and listening. Our party represents the Government of Scotland. Then there is the party that represents the Government of Wales. In this spirit of co-operation, which amendments will he be taking from either of those parties?
I am currently going through the list of amendments and setting out the Government’s position on them. When it comes to looking at the Bill, the Government will listen to those who seek to improve it constructively. We are in Committee at the moment, and we have amendments and legislative consent memorandums that have been tabled by the Welsh and the Scottish Governments. The Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr Walker), and I have been to Scotland to give evidence. My hon. Friend has also given evidence to Welsh Select Committees. We are determined that it is not just SNP Members who have a veto over this process. There is a consensus that we need to seek across all devolved Administrations—
I have given way to the hon. Gentleman several times; I will not do so again.
No, I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman came in relatively late. I have given way to him several times. I am making my point in response to the amendment, which he does not even want to listen to. The point is that there is a reasonableness test: the UK Government are determined to be the reasonable partner, but we will listen to anyone who puts forward amendments to the Bill and who is determined to ensure that our statute book is protected on exit day, that the UK integral internal market is protected, and that we have that stability, certainty and control that we need for businesses and for the people of Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland, as they will not thank us if we do not work together to ensure that that is achieved. The point of clause 11 is to ensure that we have that stability, certainty and control.
I now turn to amendment 337, which is to be read with amendment 42 and new clause 64. It provides that existing EU law limits on devolved competence will remain in place until the end of the transitional period. At that point, amendment 42 would give the devolved Administrations and legislatures the power to legislate in relation to those matters currently subject to EU law but that are otherwise devolved.
I will discuss amendments 90 to 92, 132 to 134 and 164, which essentially provide the same effect as that of 42, which means that the devolved institutions will be able to diverge from those retained EU law frameworks after exit day. I will also deal with consequential amendments 177 to 179, 181, 185 and 191 to 193, which flow from those substantive amendments. I understand the intention behind these amendments, but we cannot agree with the effects. I have already set out the measures in clause 11 that establish the temporary arrangement that maintains the currents parameters of devolved competence, taking no decision-making power away from the devolved Administrations or legislatures. This means that where we have common approaches across the UK by virtue of EU law, they will continue to apply as they currently do after exit day.
It is vital that we provide certainty to businesses and to people who live and work across the UK, and that laws in place remain consistent while we work with the devolved Administrations to consider where we may need common approaches and where we do not. The amendments risk undermining not only that certainty, but out precious Union. Let me be clear: this Government are committed to ensuring that power sits closer to the people than ever before. Our commitment to strengthening the devolution settlements is clear from the statute book with, most recently, the Wales Act 2017 and the Scotland Act 2016, which has made the Scottish Parliament one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world.
In line with our commitment to devolution, we have been clear that we expect the process of leaving the EU to result in a significant increase in the decision-making powers of the devolved Administrations. But we are also clear about how this must happen. We need careful analysis with the devolved Administrations to determine the areas where common UK-wide or GB-wide approaches need to be retained, and the areas where they do not.
The Minister is addressing the amendments in my name and those of my hon. Friends. The hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Paul Masterton) said that he agreed with the principles of my amendments 164 and 165, and that, although he would not vote for them, he expected that the Government would come back with something different to deal with the deficiencies in clause 11. I have not quite heard the Minister admit that the clause has deficiencies. What will he bring back to the Committee that it can vote on that will satisfy his own Scottish Conservative Members with regard to the principles of amendments 164 and 165?
I have already stated that the Government are prepared to listen to all those who seek to improve the Bill. We will use this opportunity to reflect on all the speeches made by hon. Members in Committee; that is what Committee is for. I have stated a commitment to ensuring that the content of today’s debate is shared with all members of the JMC (EN) on 12 December. There is a process to look at the establishment of common frameworks, and the careful analysis needs to take place with the consent of or working with the devolved Administrations and their officials. I am pleased that we have made good progress on this with the agreement at JMC (EN) with the Scottish and Welsh Governments on the principles that will guide our future framework discussions.
The Minister is being generous in giving way. My name is on a number of these amendments. Will he be absolutely clear on one point? The Welsh Government and the Scottish Government have tabled amendments in good faith that are aimed at being constructive and making the Bill more sensible, with the support of many Members across the Committee. Indeed, Members of the Minister’s own party have pointed out problems with the Bill. Am I correct that, despite those points, he is not going to accept any of the amendments?
We have always made it clear that we stand ready to listen to those who offer improvements to the Bill. Engagement at all levels of government—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman does not want to listen to what I have to say. He wants me to accept an amendment; I have given way several times, yet he is not prepared to listen to what the Minister has to say. Engagement at all levels of government is a usual part of the process, and this engagement must be at all levels of discussion, not just that which takes place in this Chamber. We want to work with the devolved Administrations, and we have been clear that we would like all parts of the UK to come together in support of this legislation, which is crucial for delivering the outcome of the referendum.
We continue to believe that the provisions in clause 11 are vital to providing the necessary immediate certainty to people and businesses while we discuss where common frameworks are and are not needed. We recognise that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have taken different positions from our approach, and we welcome the contribution to the debate. We remain open to suggestions and thoughts about how to ensure that the Bill works to deliver a functioning statute book for all parts of the UK. However, we cannot accept changes that would undermine the UK’s internal market or increase difficulties for people and businesses.
We are also clear how this process must happen. As I have said, we need the analyses to take place. We are clear that we will make progress with the JMC (EN), and that we will ensure that our final analysis indicates that legislative frameworks will be unnecessary for a majority of those policy areas. Following the agreement of the principles of the JMC (EN), we have already commenced work with the devolved Administrations, building on the work that is taking place at both ministerial and official level to make quick progress on the potential role for frameworks in some specific policies areas including agriculture, justice, home affairs and public health, where deep dives have taken place with officials from all Administrations. This work is allowing us to explore the different form the frameworks could take.
I should say that a legislative framework is by no means the only method. Indeed, as I said, legislative frameworks are likely to be used in a limited number of areas. There is far more use for non-legislative frameworks, including memorandums of understanding, concordats and informal collaborative working arrangements, as already happens.
In removing clause 11, these amendments fail to recognise the importance and value of our internal market and of having consistent rules for individuals and companies. They pre-empt the vital work we are undertaking with the devolved Administrations, and prejudge the outcome of our negotiations with the EU. Until we know the outcome of those negotiations, we cannot have certainty over how these powers, in places, will relate to our future relationship with the EU or, therefore, at what level they should be exercised in the future.
I note that Members have referred to evidence given to various Committees. I have heard their points, but it is important to come back to the motivation and need for the Bill: to provide certainty and control.
Sir Stephen Laws, formerly first parliamentary counsel, has pointed out that the devolution settlements were agreed in the context of our EU membership. That is why we are focusing through our discussions on common frameworks with the devolved Administrations on what our constitutional arrangements should be outside the context of our EU membership. That is what the provisions in the Bill give us the space to do, by maintaining the parameters of devolved competence.
I stress again that the mechanism here is not an end; it is an important first step in the process of returning these powers from the EU to the UK, enabling us to do the necessary work to determine where further powers can be released to the devolved Administrations.
I must reiterate that I understand the intention behind the amendments—that powers sit at the right level once we have left the EU. I am clear that the process we are going through does not change our unshakeable commitment to ensure that devolution in the UK is even further strengthened so that we may have more devolution and more union across the UK.
I turn now to amendment 165, which I will take with consequential amendments 180, 182 to 191, 194 and 195, tabled by the hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray). Amendment 165 would allow the Scottish and Welsh Governments to make secondary legislation to change retained EU law in the areas that are currently subject to EU law. Taken together with other provisions of the Bill, part 1 of schedule 3 is intended to maintain the common frameworks across the UK that have been created by EU law. In particular, that will ensure that no new barriers to people living and doing business across the UK are created after we leave the EU.
As I have made clear, the Bill guarantees that the current decision-making powers of the devolved Administrations are respected. Anything the devolved Administrations could do before exit day they will be able to do after exit day. Our priority must now be to prepare our statute book for exit, and we want to work closely with the devolved Administrations to do that.
It is through the work on the common frameworks and the discussions with the devolved Administrations that we can make progress on specific areas and seize the opportunities to improve policy in the UK. As I mentioned earlier, the next JMC (EN) is scheduled to take place on 12 December, and it will continue that accelerated process of assessing where frameworks are needed and where they are not. We will prioritise those areas of greatest interest and significance.
We very much hope to see further steps forward, but it is right that we do these things in discussion and collaboratively with all Governments across the UK. Once it has been agreed through ongoing engagement, which this Government are committed to, where common frameworks are not required, we can use the Order in Council power to release decision-making powers to devolved Administrations. For that reason, the amendment is unnecessary, and we would urge the hon. Gentleman not to press it.
Let me turn now to amendment 72, tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford), which would enshrine a requirement for the Government to seek a legislative consent motion from the devolved legislatures. As the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester, said on day one of Committee stage, we want to make a positive case in favour of legislative consent for this vital piece of legislation and to work closely with the devolved Administrations and legislatures to achieve that. As I have mentioned, there has been an extensive programme of engagement with the Scottish and Welsh Governments and legislatures. In the absence of the Executive in Northern Ireland, official level engagement also continues with the Northern Ireland civil service.
We do not recognise the need for this amendment. The Government have already explicitly recognised the role of the Sewel convention in the Wales Act 2017 and the Scotland Act 2016. I ask hon. Members to look at our track record: we are committed to the devolution settlements and the conventions that we have established.
We continue to believe in the importance of the Bill, which is in the national interest, and we will work to deliver it with the devolved Administrations. The question of ensuring certainty both for our statute book and our internal market when we leave the EU is of great significance to all parts of the UK. We would like all parts of the UK to come together in support of this legislation, which is vital to the securing of a smooth and orderly exit. I urge the hon. Member for Darlington (Jenny Chapman) to withdraw the motion.
I was going to reassure the hon. Member for Stirling (Stephen Kerr), who is no longer in the Chamber, that, given the lateness of the hour, I can do nothing other than be reasonable and mild mannered in my presentation. He seemed fearful that SNP Members would go berserk and worried that we were putting our case with too much passion. Let me try to put this as reasonably as I can.
I want to agree with Members who have talked about the positive cross-party nature of what is happening. There are three parties on the Opposition side of the House that differ quite significantly on our preferred constitutional outcome or endgame for Scotland, but we are united in trying to defend the gains of devolution that have been made during the past 20 years. Indeed, I think that some of the Scottish Tories might feel that way too, given the discussions we have had in the Scottish Affairs Committee. They seem too timorous to exercise that conviction by going through the Lobby with us tonight, but perhaps they will be persuaded in the fullness of time.
By way of context, we need to remember two things. One is how the interplay between the referendums of 2014 and 2016 in Scotland affects this debate. I was on the losing side in 2014—I lost the Scottish independence campaign—and I accept that result. However, it is important in understanding why Scotland voted to remain in the United Kingdom to look at some of the assurances that were given by the people who won that campaign, because that affects this debate. I am going to talk not about the obvious one, which is what was said about EU membership itself, but about two other things.
First, all parties that campaigned for a no vote in the 2014 referendum went out of their way to stress that there was no threat to the devolution settlement, and that they would defend and extend it. The other assurance given was that should Scotland vote to remain in a political Union with England, Wales and Northern Ireland, this was not a matter of one country being subsumed into a much larger neighbour, but the creation of a partnership of equals—a multinational yet unitary state—with the views of Scotland therefore respected in any future debates. I am now calling to collect from this Government on both their respect for and commitment to devolution because, as far as I can see, the way in which clause 11 is currently written means that it recognises neither of those points. It is regrettable that at this relatively advanced stage of our discussions on the Bill, we still do not have any agreement whatsoever about some basic things.
The other factor we need to remember by way of context is of course the debate about devolution itself. I was heavily involved in the campaign that led to the creation of the Scottish Parliament, arguing for yes, yes in 1997. I was not in the House when Members debated the Bill that became the Scotland Act 1998, but I observed the proceedings and we can read the transcripts. We know that Parliament, led by the late Donald Dewar, clearly took a maximalist position. It basically said that everything should be devolved unless there was a case for its not being so, which is why the 1998 Act lists not the powers that are devolved, but the powers that are reserved.
If we had not been in the European Union when Parliament was debating the Act, how many of the 111 areas of responsibility would have been reserved and how many would have been devolved to the Scottish Government? The truth is that practically all of them would have been devolved without question, because there would have been no compelling case for reserving them. I think that people misunderstand the nature of the debate when they talk about the transfer of competences from the EU to the UK following Brexit.
Let us be quite clear that the reason why the European Union currently has some legislative competence in devolved areas is to ensure compliance with the treaty on European Union. That is what this is about. If Brexit goes ahead and we come out of the European Union, that, de facto, will not be required, so whatever the UK Government say about taking on these areas of competence, it will not be about complying with the terms of the treaty on European Union. The only thing it can be about, given that we already have a single economy in the United Kingdom, is convergence on policy. The transfer raises the possibility that we will move from compliance with international agreements to compliance with domestic policy. That is what I mean by a power grab, because it represents a severe potential constraint on the ability of the Scottish Parliament to legislate and act in its devolved areas.
Ministers will say, “That’s not the intention. This is a drop-off point for the powers so that we can then decide the best way for them to go to their final resting place.” I have to say to them that we are politicians, not psychics. We have to deal with what is written in the Bill that they have brought before us, not their intentions for what might happen as they go towards their endgame. What is written in the Bill is most clearly not what is being argued for by Ministers. If that were the case, we would have a schedule by now outlining which of the 111 powers can go straight to the devolved authorities on exit day, which of them definitely need to be reserved in the context of the 1998 Act, and which of them need further exploration through some sort of process, but we have heard nothing about a single one of them.
I say to Ministers that, even from a public relations point of view, would it not have been sensible to at least chuck a few of these powers the way of the devolved Administrations? No. 9 on the list is about blood safety. What is it about the Scottish health service and blood transfusion service that they do not trust? Why on earth would blood safety need to be reserved to the UK? Energy efficiency is another power on the list. Is it the end of the world if Scotland pioneers aspects of efficient energy use and perhaps leads the way in the UK? How is that a threat to the Union? Why do Ministers need to keep those powers? There are other examples that illustrate the ridiculousness of arguing that there should be even a temporary drop-off of these powers at Westminster. Such powers should clearly go to the devolved Administrations.
I am left wondering why this is being done. The obvious first answer is the phenomenal degree of administrative competence involved. I think that there is malintent on the part of some Conservative Members, but probably not on the part of its Front Benchers. However, I think Ministers have got themselves into a situation in which, because they have been incapable of producing a plan, they simply have no option but to say, “Trust us for now; we’ll do the best thing in the end.” It is very difficult for this Parliament to accept those assurances.
I think there is another red herring with the idea that a further reason why these powers need to be retained and examined further is that there might otherwise be interference with the United Kingdom’s ability to strut the post-Brexit globe in its ambition for “Empire 2.0”. There is a fearfulness that people in Scotland or Wales might act like the Wallonians and try to frustrate the creation of an international trade agreement. How ridiculous is that? Would it really matter if the Scottish Government introduced a policy that said, “We don’t wish to have genetically modified food in our food chain”? How is that a threat to an international trade agreement? All that would need to be done would be simply to specify that that was what people would need to deal with in Scotland, and that anybody wishing to sign the agreement would, quite reasonably, be able to do so.
The only way that that could become a threat to post-Brexit deals would be if there was a suggestion that the Scottish Government and the Welsh Assembly should take to themselves a power to veto a future UK international trade agreement, but no such power is being discussed. It is ridiculous that we should not by now be discussing which powers are going where, rather than arguing that nothing can be done apart from a power grab by the Westminster Government.
Finally, the common frameworks that we need for these 111 areas are going to be entirely different, depending on the individual area. In some cases, it might just be a simple matter of agencies north and south of the border talking to each other and sharing best practice. There are probably very few areas that actually require a full-blown statutory regulatory framework across the United Kingdom.
indicated assent.
The Ministers are nodding their heads. If that is the case, why have they not identified them? Why not bring forward proposals for dealing with the joint arrangements? I do not attribute malintent to those on the Government Front Bench, but there are people within the Conservative party—I see that the Scottish Tories have gone home—[Interruption.] I am sorry; they have left the hon. Member for Gordon (Colin Clark) as the lone representative. [Interruption.] Two of yer! I withdraw the remark; only 80% of them have gone home.
Conservative Members talk about the process we are engaged in. We are engaged in a process of considering amendments to a Bill. I say to the Scottish Conservatives that they should think again about going through the Lobby with the Government tonight, because if they do so, they will give the Government succour, rather than putting pressure on them to come forward and make agreements and changes. If that happens, it will provide sustenance to those Conservative Members who never believed in devolution in the first place, and who will use Brexit as an opportunity to roll it back and take power to the centre.
Under Standing Order No. 83D(4), I must now put the single stand part question.
Question put (single Question on successive provisions of the Bill), That clause 11 stand part of the Bill; and that schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
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This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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No, I do not agree with that at all and I will not be tempted into some kind of debate about it. If the hon. Gentleman wants to make a speech to that effect, he is very welcome to do so, but I will not agree with him.
Those elements of the agreement matter not only because they were necessary to bring lasting peace, but because they have enabled the economic rebirth of Northern Ireland. Nothing harms the prospects of young people or businesses like uncertainty and instability. Northern Ireland benefits from natural beauty, the ingenuity, creativity and resilience of its people, and a shared determination to never return to the suffering of the past. As a non-partisan coalition of businesses put it, we must ensure that
“society in Northern Ireland does not become collateral damage in any Brexit discussions.”
The Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Confederation of British Industry in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action and the Ulster Farmers Union got it right when they produced an agreed position on the Brexit negotiations. They say that an “open frictionless border” must be maintained between Ireland and Northern Ireland, and between Great Britain and the island of Ireland. They say that
“Brexit must not be used as a pretext to dismantle hard won workers’ rights or to drive down employment standards”.
On this and on many other issues, the Labour party is as one with the people of Northern Ireland. There must be no hard border, the preservation of the common travel area between Ireland and the UK, no undermining of the Good Friday agreement, and full involvement of workers’ representatives, business and the community and voluntary sectors in articulating the concerns and protecting the interests of all citizens of Northern Ireland.
Indeed, everybody sensible who examines this issue in any depth soon reaches the conclusion that the Government must do what they have as yet failed to do and answer the question of how they plan to achieve their objective of no physical infrastructure and no customs border, as outlined in their position paper earlier this year. But answer it they must, because a hardening of the border will undoubtedly harm business and the economy. I was left in no doubt about that when I met farmers and business leaders in Northern Ireland recently. It will also harm the everyday lives of those who frequently cross the border for social, cultural, leisure, educational or health reasons. Whether it is because of the outstanding work that has been done by CAWT—co-operation and working together—in recent years to make sure that the border is not a barrier to accessing healthcare or the thriving agri-food trade that makes up 33% of north-south trade, avoiding a hard border must be our ambition.
If we are to have non-negotiable issues, the avoidance of a hard border in Northern Ireland should be the thickest and most indelible of red lines. As the Brexit Select Committee said in its report:
“We also recognise the unique challenges posed by the need to preserve the peace settlement in Northern Ireland, including issues that go far beyond trade and customs.”
Everybody knows that this is not just about moving butter; it is about daily life and identity for thousands of people. The Select Committee goes on to ask: how will the Government avoid a hard border if no deal is reached by 29 March 2019?
Continued progress in Northern Ireland goes hand in hand with prosperity and stability. The Good Friday agreement and subsequent agreements have provided certainty about the continuation of an approach to the future of Northern Ireland that is shared between the British and Irish Governments and the people of Northern Ireland. Putting a commitment to the agreement on the face of the Bill and preventing Ministers from legislating in any way that is contrary to the agreement would provide some of the clarity, certainty and reassurance that the businesses and citizens of Northern Ireland say they need.
Let us pause to reflect on the heart of the issue that the Good Friday agreement settled: the violence between communities and traditions that raged for generations and that took and scarred so many lives in Northern Ireland. Today, the people of Northern Ireland, so many of whom were affected by the troubles, will be watching, waiting and hoping that the Government can offer a cast-iron guarantee that the Good Friday agreement will be protected and preserved in every sense. There has been much talk of red lines as we have debated Brexit since the vote to leave. Maintaining our commitment to the Good Friday agreement and guaranteeing that Ministers cannot legislate incompatibly with it should be a red line for every last one of us in this Parliament.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Darlington (Jenny Chapman) and I echo many of the sentiments she has voiced from the Dispatch Box.
I have reordered my speech so that I can turn quickly to the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) and to the importance of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. First, I will speak briefly to clause 10 stand part. As those who have studied the Bill will recognise, clause 10 is very short. Schedule 2, which relates to it, is rather more complex and we have a huge number of amendments to schedule 2. I therefore ask whether interventions on those various amendments can wait until we have dealt with the important issue of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.
Clause 10 and schedule 2 are straightforward but essential. They provide the devolved Administrations with the powers they need to prepare our statute book for leaving the EU by dealing with deficiencies in retained EU law, ensuring ongoing compliance with international obligations and implementing the withdrawal agreement. As we set out in the White Paper, the task of preparing our statute book for exit is one that we share with the devolved Administrations. The law that will be preserved under the Bill has effect in areas that are devolved, as well as those that are not. We will leave the EU as one United Kingdom, but devolution is a vital part of that United Kingdom, and it is right that ensuring that there is certainty and continuity should be a shared and collective endeavour in which every Parliament and Assembly plays its part.
It is absolutely right, therefore, that we equip the devolved Administrations with the powers they need to correct the laws for which they are responsible, just as it is right for the UK Government to have powers to correct those laws that affect the UK as a whole. It is important, as we have, to set the parameters for those powers. We believe that we have achieved the right balance by focusing on the specific aims of the powers and by applying safeguards. That will ensure, for instance, that they are not used in ways that might disrupt the ongoing EU negotiations or the workings of our internal market. Today is an opportunity for the Committee to examine how we have struck that balance, and I will continue to listen with great interest to the views of Members across the Committee.
I am grateful for the contributions that have been made by committees in the devolved legislatures to the debate that we are having today. I am also grateful to those who gave evidence to those committees. These are complex matters and I welcome their engagement and the attention that these issues have been given. We will consider carefully all the evidence that has been put forward by those committees in today’s debate.
We have heard a huge amount in this debate about the importance of the Belfast agreement. I say to the hon. Member for North Down that we appreciate enormously the attention and work she has put into the new clause. Her new clause seeks to clarify that any Ministers using the powers in the Bill would have to have regard to, and abide by, the Belfast agreement. We absolutely recognise the importance of the issue that she raises. I think I can safely say that her opening speech was one of the most powerful evocations of the importance of that agreement. I pay tribute to her for the courage and clarity of her remarks.
The Minister has told us that he is not going to accept new clause 70. Timing is important, too. Does he realise the signal that will be sent out if Ministers ask their party to vote against it at the end of this debate?
Let me reiterate to the right hon. Gentleman that we are absolutely committed to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.
I will now turn to some of the technical detail on new clause 70, because it is important to reflect that, as I said at the beginning, we support the principles behind it.
If my right hon. Friend will give me a moment, she may be interested in what I have to say next.
I do appreciate the enormous effort that the hon. Member for North Down has put into drafting new clause 70, but we could not currently accept it. There are some concerns around it. It goes further than requiring Ministers and devolved Departments to have regard to the key principles. Subsection (4)(a) would require the Secretary of State to refuse consent to reserved provisions in devolved legislation unless the provision is necessary only as a direct consequence of the UK’s exit from the EU. This would place a much greater constraint on the provision than can be made for Northern Ireland as compared with the rest of the UK, even in circumstances where there is no impact on the Belfast agreement. As I said earlier, this Bill cannot be used to amend the Belfast agreement. It would create doubt and uncertainty on the use of these powers if we suggested otherwise. The Northern Ireland Act can be amended only in the very limited circumstances that I have already addressed.
I therefore urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the motion, but to work with us. We will work with Members across the House to absolutely ensure that the Belfast agreement is respected as we move forward.
I have a very high regard for the Minister, but I have to say that I am profoundly disappointed by what he has said. I am not a legislative draftsman. Technically, there may be difficulties with this new clause, but, for goodness’ sake, the Government absolutely have to put the principles of the Good Friday agreement into this Bill. That is where the Government need to stand with all the people of Northern Ireland and say to them that, even if we are leaving Europe, as we are doing—Brexit is going to happen—we are not going to allow that decision to undermine the sterling work and the peace and stability of the Good Friday agreement. I am pleading with the Government to give a commitment that they will look at the technicalities, and change the technicalities, but accept this new clause this afternoon.
Our commitment to the Belfast agreement is absolutely clear. We are committed to it. We are not changing it as a result of this Bill. The Bill would not allow us to do that. We are protecting the Northern Ireland Act in this Bill. We will work with the hon. Lady and with hon. Gentlemen and hon. Ladies in all parts of the House to secure the legacy of the Belfast agreement.
My hon. Friend keeps reiterating, with ever greater passion, the Government’s 110% commitment to the Belfast agreement. The reason for not putting it into the Bill is, with great respect, an extremely obscure drafting point, which I have tried to follow but cannot quite, because the provision that he refers to is extremely narrow indeed. It applies to possibilities that may arise after withdrawal from Europe—minor consequences. If there is anything wrong with the drafting, the Government can correct that on Report and they will probably not meet any passionate resistance from anyone in the House. In view of what the Minister said, the Government should show their commitment by accepting the new clause, and all this other footnote stuff can be sorted out at a later stage.
I have great respect for my right hon. and learned Friend. On the point that he makes, the Government have absolutely accepted their commitments to the Belfast agreement. It is already a matter of international law. We are committed to that agreement. It is annexed to the British-Irish treaty, and we will continue to respect it in the way in which we approach this whole issue. We will work across the House, as we always have, constructively to ensure that the approach that we take is absolutely in line with the Belfast agreement, and we have done that throughout this process.
I, too, share the serious disappointment expressed by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon). I reiterate the comments that have just been made by the Father of the House. It would send the strongest signal if the Government accepted the new clause, coming back to the House to correct any technical deficiencies at a later stage. The Government are going to ask Members to vote against the principle of the Belfast agreement, which is an extraordinary thing to do. [Interruption.] No matter what the Minister says, that is a very dangerous situation.
Let me make it clear to the hon. Gentleman that no one who supports the Bill will vote against any principles in the Belfast agreement. It is absolutely clear that the Belfast agreement is protected and is something that we intend absolutely to continue to deliver on. We cannot accept an amendment that, in this case, would create doubt about the protection of the Northern Ireland Act. We need to ensure that through this process we create continuity and certainty. I again urge the hon. Member for North Down not to press the new clause, because our commitment is absolute. We will meet that commitment to the Belfast agreement. If she does press the new clause to a vote, that could create the wrong impression for some people outside the House.
In all honesty, no one in the House who has ever been a Minister or has had any responsibility at all understands what the Minister is talking about. Minister after Minister has accepted amendments with which they agreed, then asked their draftsmen to sort out any technical issues. Instead of doing the sensible thing and doing that, the Minister and Government Whips—if, as I hope, the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) pushes the new clause to a vote—will ask their MPs to vote against the principles of the Good Friday agreement. That is how it will be seen by people who look at votes in the House.
Let me repeat to the hon. Gentleman what I have made very, very clear: no one in the House would be voting against those principles. The Government absolutely support those principles, which are enshrined in the Northern Ireland Act, which is protected under the Bill.
I urge the Minister to hold his ground. My principal difficulty with new clause 70 is that it is purely declaratory. He has made it as clear as he possibly can that the Government are committed to the Good Friday agreement, as are we all. The Minister and his colleagues have resisted declaratory amendments to the Bill, and they should do so again on this occasion.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who chairs the Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs. I was pleased to give evidence to his Committee the other day on the importance of these issues. I can assure hon. Members across the House that we absolutely have put the importance of no hard border in Northern Ireland and the importance of our commitments under the Belfast agreement at the heart of our approach from the beginning.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way once again. I have to say to him ever so gently but firmly that that is a high-risk strategy. The message will be sent from the House that there is no support in the Government for the principles of the Good Friday agreement if that is not taken up—[Interruption.] Would the hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley) give me a moment? It would be enormously helpful—it is the principles of the Good Friday agreement: that is what new clause 70 embodies. It does not expand on them—it reflects the principles of the agreement—so will the Minister, instead of putting that high-risk strategy to the House, give a clear commitment that he will take away my new clause and work on it, with a view positively to reflect the tone and spirit in which it was drafted in the first place?
I absolutely give the commitment that we will take away the hon. Lady’s new clause and will ensure throughout the whole of the process that we protect the principles of the Good Friday/Belfast agreement. That is something that we are absolutely committed to doing and I can tell the hon. Lady that nobody in this House will be voting against any principles in the Belfast agreement. It is crucial that we make that point clear.
I am grateful to the Minister, who is being extremely generous with his time. We do not for a minute doubt his commitment to the Good Friday/Belfast agreement. However, we on the Opposition Benches take incredibly seriously our bipartisan approach on Northern Ireland, and in that context I put it to him that he must listen to the statement from the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), who says that in Northern Ireland this will be perceived as a backward step in support for the Good Friday/Belfast agreement by the Conservative Government. That is why he must think again.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, and for his comment earlier. I agree that we should continue to work on this issue in a bipartisan way, and not just in a bipartisan way but with all parties in Northern Ireland, and with the hon. Member for North Down, in taking this issue forward and providing all assurances that the legal protections in international law and the Northern Ireland Act, as well as all our commitments under the Belfast agreement, are met.
May I just say to the Minister that I have not had a single email, letter or phone call, or any contact, from my 100,000 constituents in Northern Ireland asking me to vote for this new clause? The idea that people in Northern Ireland are sitting back with bated breath waiting for the new clause of the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) to be passed so that the Good Friday/Belfast agreement can be secured is unreal.
The Good Friday/Belfast agreement is and will continue to be secure.
I want to move on, and will turn to amendment 89, tabled by the hon. Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams), along with amendments 313 to 316, tabled by the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock). These amendments would prevent UK Ministers from being able to use powers in the Bill in areas of otherwise devolved competence. Additionally, the hon. Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins), whom we have heard from today, has tabled amendments 161 to 163, which would require the consent of devolved Administrations for UK Ministers to exercise their powers in devolved areas.
I would like to take this opportunity to stress a simple but important fact: the concurrent powers in the Bill do not undermine the devolution settlement. Rather they give the UK Government and devolved Administrations the tools required to respond to the shared challenge of ensuring the operability of our statute book in a collaborative way. This reflects current practice. Concurrent functions have always been a normal part of our devolution arrangements and they are an important tool in ensuring that we can work together in the most efficient way. Take, for instance, new schedule 3A to the Government of Wales Act 2006, which lists no fewer than 34 laws containing concurrent functions for UK and Welsh Ministers, including powers to make subordinate legislation. We should not forget that section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 is concurrent and is routinely used to make a single set of regulations to implement directives relating to devolved matters, such as the Marine Strategy Regulations 2010. Removing the concurrent tool would remove the vital flexibility from which we and the devolved Administrations already benefit in preparing our statute book. Such flexibility and greater efficiency will be crucial if we are to achieve the considerable task ahead of having a complete and functioning statute book on exit day.
Amendments 161 to 163, tabled by the hon. Member for North East Fife, would add to the process additional layers that have not previously been needed for equivalent powers by requiring consent from devolved Ministers. This might render the Government and the devolved Administrations unable to ready the statute book for exit day, and they therefore threaten the legal certainty that the Bill is meant to deliver.
Let me remind Members on both sides of the Committee that the Government have already committed that we will not normally legislate to amend EU-derived domestic law relating to devolved matters using any of the powers in the Bill without the agreement of the devolved Administrations. The powers build on the existing successful ways of working between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations, and the Government have committed to this ongoing collaborative working. I therefore urge those hon. Members not to press their amendments.
I now turn to amendments 158, 159, 318, 320 and 321, tabled by the hon. Members for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) and for Aberavon. Taken together, the amendments would prevent amendment of the devolution statutes using the powers in clauses 7 to 9 and 17. In addition, amendment 160, in the name of the hon. Member for North East Fife, would require the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers if the Scotland Act 1998 or the Government of Wales Act 2006 were amended using the power in clause 9.
I want to start by saying that I have listened to and I am grateful for the debate we have already had on these amendments both in this Parliament and in Committees in other Parliaments. The Committee is right to pay careful attention to any changes to the devolution settlements, so I thank the hon. Members who have tabled these amendments and the Committees of the devolved legislatures that have drafted some of them for drawing attention to these issues.
A number of references in the provisions of the devolution statutes will not make sense once we leave the EU and will need correcting to ensure our statute book continues to function. We recognise the standing of these Acts, and for this reason we have corrected as many deficiencies as possible in the Bill—in part 2 of schedule 3. As Members will no doubt have noticed, these corrections are technical and I stress that they are devolution-neutral. They do not substantively change the boundaries of competence; nor will any of the corrections that are still to be made.
I want to reassure the Committee that we intend to correct the remaining deficiencies by working collaboratively and transparently with the devolved Administrations. Where possible, this will include correcting deficiencies using the existing powers such Acts already contain for amending the reservation schedules. This process with the devolved Administrations is already under way.
Specifically on the power to implement the withdrawal agreement—the topic of amendment 320, in the name of the hon. Member for Aberavon—it can be used to modify the devolution statutes only where it is appropriate to implement the agreement that will result from our negotiations with the EU. It cannot be used to modify them in any other way, and it simply is not true that any UK Minister can make any change they like to the devolution settlements. I hope I have reassured the Committee that the Government do understand that concern, but the amendment does not support our aim of a smooth and orderly exit.
Similarly, amendments 159 and 319 seek to restrict the use of the international obligations power to modify the Scotland Act or the Government of Wales Act. I want to be clear that these powers cannot be used to unpick or substantively change the devolution settlements. As I am sure the Committee will recognise, it is quite normal to use delegated powers in such a way. They have previously been used to amend the devolution statutes to ensure that our laws reflect the most accurate position in law, and ultimately to ensure that we fulfil our international obligations.
I am slightly concerned that the Minister will sit down before he has had a chance to make any comment on amendment 338, in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends, which would prevent Ministers from legislating in any way incompatible with the Good Friday agreement. I am sorry to refer him back to that, but I am concerned that he has not yet said anything about this amendment.
I apologise to the hon. Lady. I think I mentioned that amendment in the run-up to addressing the detail of new clause 70 in the name of the hon. Member for North Down, but let me say that Ministers will not and cannot legislate incompatibly with the Good Friday agreement. We are bound by that agreement, and I have been very clear that this Government remain absolutely committed to the Good Friday agreement and have already put our obligations under it at the heart of our commitments.
On amendment 160 in the name of the hon. Member for North East Fife, I want to comment on the fact that such powers have previously been used, because it is important to recognise that this issue has already been addressed. For instance, the Treaty of Lisbon (Changes in Terminology) Order 2011, which was made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act, amended the Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006 to give effect to new terminology relating to the European Union. Leaving the EU will require changes of a similar technical nature across the settlements, and that is what the powers enable.
I thank the Minister for going into such detail. Earlier today, the Secretary of State for Scotland said he would be introducing changes. To which amendments might those changes refer and when might they take place?
I cannot say at this stage, but let me repeat that in both this debate and the debate on clause 11, we have been clear that we are listening to the Committee and engaging with it, and we will give the matters raised careful consideration. I think the comments made by the Secretary of State for Scotland reflect that approach. It is important that we move forward together with all the devolved Administrations and ensure that the United Kingdom and each part of it can deal properly with their statute book.
I know the Minister wants to make progress, but I have grave fears. Is there not some way we can sort out the business of new clause 70? I am not saying that the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) should withdraw it, but it seems to me that there is a better way. I do not know whether the hon. Lady has met the Minister and the Solicitor General, but we should put a meeting together and get it sorted out—get the assurances. I trust the Minister and what he says at the Dispatch Box, but there is going to be a big problem with misinterpreting any vote against the new clause. It needs to be sorted, and I suggest that the hon. Lady and the Minister meet to see whether this can be sorted out.
I am happy to take up my right hon. Friend’s suggestion, and to work with the hon. Member for North Down and Members in all parts of the House. The hon. Lady has expressed a strong position and I will work with her to ensure that, as we go through this process, we do everything in our power to continue to protect the Good Friday agreement. My right hon. Friend makes a constructive suggestion, which I welcome.
Clause 17 is the subject of amendment 321, tabled by the hon. Member for Aberavon, whom we have missed in these debates. I emphasise that we have sought to include the majority of consequential amendments needed to the devolution settlements in the Bill, in schedule 3 part 2, but we must be equipped to fix any additional problems that come to light and this standard power, constrained by case law, is the right way to do any tidying up—for example, of cross-references—that could be needed as a result of the Bill coming into force.
The hon. Gentleman also tabled amendments 322 to 327, which would constrain Welsh Ministers’ ability to modify the Government of Wales Act 2006, including removing their ability to correct those parts of the Act that currently fall within devolved responsibility. The 2006 Act is, for the most part, a protected enactment, which means that it cannot generally be modified by the devolved institutions. That makes sense, because the Act sets out how powers are devolved to Wales, but there are certain exceptions to that protection: that is, where it is agreed that it should be within the legislative competence of the Assembly to modify that Act. That was agreed by this Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales when the 2006 Act was passed and again when the Wales Act 2017 was passed.
Ensuring that devolved Ministers have those powers follows the reasoning and decisions made in enacting those Acts and respects the decision of this House and that of the National Assembly for Wales in giving consent. We think it right that, in those areas, Welsh Ministers should be able to use their power to correct deficiencies. Where Welsh Ministers need to make corrections to the 2006 Act, the National Assembly will of course have the ability to scrutinise any changes and to set out the approach to scrutiny that it proposes to take. We do not think, therefore, that the amendments would place a reasonable restriction on Welsh Ministers, as it would put them at significant disadvantage in ensuring that the 2006 Act is fit for purpose, legally sound, and reflects the context of leaving the European Union. I urge the hon. Member for Aberavon not to press those amendments.
The cross-party amendments would not have been tabled, or indeed recommended by the Welsh and Scottish Governments, if everything was hunky-dory and fine in the negotiations between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations. We got some movement from the Secretary of State for Scotland this morning. Will the Under-Secretary of State also move on amendment 158, which stands in my name, and perhaps on some of the other concerns that the Welsh and Scottish Governments have set out so clearly?
I absolutely respect the effort of, and have referred a number of times to the evidence collected by, Committees; some of these amendments are tabled by Committees, and we respect that. We want to engage with them, which is why I am trying to give a comprehensive response on all these matters. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be pleased with some of the things I have to say. We absolutely want to engage with the Committees, because I recognise that we are talking about important institutions that we need to engage with successfully. With that in mind, I have been to give evidence to Committees of the Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, so I say to the hon. Gentleman: keep listening.
I am grateful to the Minister for his detailed responses. He talks about consulting. In an internal market, about which the Minister has spoken, there are different states that have an equal say. What will the arbitration mechanism be and will the Government go further than merely consulting the devolved Administrations?
As we discussed in great detail on day 4, direct Government-to-Government contact is happening on those issues. We have the JMC process—it will meet next week—and I hope that we can all agree ways to move forward that allow this to be delivered for each part of the UK. The consultation process will ensure that we take the approach that works best for the UK as a whole and takes into account the needs of each part of the UK. It will also ensure that existing common approaches are not undermined while we work through with the devolved Administrations where they will and will not apply.
The Minister failed to answer the question that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins) asked. What will the arbitration mechanism be for deciding that?
I do not want to pre-empt the agreement that I believe can and will be reached in the not-too-distant future through the JMC process. That is not what we are legislating for. We are legislating for providing continuity and certainty across the UK. I have just described how we can ensure that that delivers for every part of the UK. That is important.
Amendments 168 and 175 are related to the amendments I have just discussed. They would remove the restrictions on devolved authorities using the correcting power and the withdrawal agreement power to confer functions that correspond to EU tertiary legislation. Examples of tertiary legislation include the vast majority of the technical detail of financial services law, which is set out in a form of tertiary legislation known as binding technical standards. They are functions that are currently exercised at EU level. Just as with direct, retained EU laws, the rules made under them apply uniformly across the UK. We therefore believe that where such functions need to continue, it is right and consistent with our overall approach for the decisions about who should exercise them to sit at UK level. Of course, it will be possible for UK Ministers to confer such functions on the devolved Administrations or devolved public bodies, if we agree together that that is appropriate. That will be subject to the wider negotiations on shared frameworks.
I will deal with amendments 166 and 170, again tabled by the hon. Member for North East Fife and amendment 173, which the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth tabled. They would allow the devolved Administrations to sub-delegate the powers conferred on them by schedule 2. We do not advocate prohibiting sub-delegation by the devolved Administrations in every circumstance. It is explicit on the face of the Bill that sub-delegation is permitted for rules and procedures for courts and tribunals. Rather, it is our view that these powers should not be broader than is appropriate, and that sub-delegation by devolved Administrations should therefore not be admitted in every circumstance. However, as I said to the Committees, I should welcome any examples of areas in which Members believe that sub-delegation by devolved Administrations would be needed, and I will take away and consider any examples that are provided today. We are having discussions with the devolved Administrations as well, so they will also have opportunities to provide such examples.
Amendment 317 would take the unusual step of conferring on Welsh Ministers the power to make consequential and transitional provision. That is because the corresponding amendment to clause 17 would prevent UK Ministers from using the power in relation to matters that are within the competence of Welsh Ministers. It is not normal to confer such powers on devolved Ministers in an Act of Parliament. The Wales Act 2017 contained the power, but conferred it only on UK Ministers. Despite the great constitutional significance of that Act, there were neither calls for the power to be taken from UK Ministers in relation to devolved matters in Wales, nor calls for it to be granted to Welsh Ministers.
In the interests of transparency and accountability, we have sought to include in the Bill a number of significant consequential and transitional provisions that are necessary in relation to devolved matters. I should welcome any further explanation of instances in which devolved Administrations would need to make such types of consequential amendment. We do not currently think that there is any need for the power to be conferred on devolved Ministers as a result of the Bill that would reverse usual practice, and I urge Members not to press the amendment to a vote.
Let me finally deal with amendments 169, 172 and 176. I thank Members for their careful consideration of these technical provisions. The amendments relate to clauses that provide safeguards to ensure that due consideration is given when Ministers in devolved Administrations use their powers in ways that have implications for the rest of the UK. The amendments would, in effect, convert the requirements for devolved Ministers to gain the consent of UK Ministers when exercising the powers in certain circumstances into consultation requirements.
Let me turn first to the requirements included for international obligations and withdrawal agreement powers. Here the safeguards are focused principally on obligations that will need to be met at a UK level: the management of UK-wide quotas and our UK obligations under the World Trade Organisation agreement. We therefore believe that there is an important role for the UK Government to play in agreeing such amendments in these limited circumstances, given the broader consequences for other parts of the UK. Indeed, where the powers exist in order to implement the UK’s international agreements, it is important that that can be done expeditiously and fairly within the UK so that we can meet those international obligations, and that requires a common view across the UK.
Again, we have taken the view that the right approach is to require consent for that purpose. A requirement of consent provides a clear and decisive process for us to ensure that the interests of each part of the UK are taken into account. The requirements included for the correcting power are primarily concerned with our relationship with the EU. It is right that we consider any use of such powers that could prejudice the EU negotiations, and that is why we think it is right to include the consent requirements in the Bill.
I have made it clear that the Government stand ready to listen to those who have sincere suggestions for how we might improve the Bill. Today we have had a useful debate on this subject, and hon. Members have made the case that requiring consent might not be the right approach to the practical problem that I have described in relation to the correcting power in particular. Scottish Conservative Members and others have expressed concern about the issue. However, I assure the Committee that we will take away and carefully reflect on the suggestions that have been made today, and consider whether sufficient assurances can be provided through different means.
May I take the Minister back to new clause 70? Given the signals and impressions given by the House over many years in relation to British-Irish relations, he will appreciate the importance of what is happening today. Can he tell us when the Government decided not to accept the new clause? I understand that it was tabled several weeks ago. Did the Government make that decision before the weekend, or in the last few days?
The Government have made their position absolutely clear, but let me again reiterate our firm commitment to the principles of the Belfast agreement, and to ensuring that we respect and meet those principles throughout this process. I have offered to meet the hon. Member for North Down to continue this conversation and ensure that we do everything we can to meet those commitments throughout the process. I think it is important that we are listening and responding to these debates on behalf of the whole United Kingdom.
I conclude by extending my gratitude to Members for their thoughtful consideration of all these provisions. To allow us the time to consider the comments made and their important practical implications, including for our negotiations, I urge Members not to press their amendments today, but I reiterate the offer to continue to work with the hon. Lady and all others across this House, to ensure that we deliver on the principles and our commitments under the Belfast agreement.
This has been a wonderful debate, and I greatly appreciate the contributions from all sides, even when they disagreed with new clause 70 and even when they were made by Members of the DUP who disagreed with new clause 70. Despite my disappointment, which is real, and that of other Members, the greater objective is to maintain the Good Friday agreement and its respect and integrity, and to ensure that we do nothing in this House that gives succour to dissident republicans or increases the risk of terrorism. I will therefore not press the new clause to a vote.
I will, however, accept the very nice invitation to tea with the Minister, but I do not just want tea and buns. I want a commitment from him now—I want him to intervene on me—that the Good Friday agreement will be preserved in some other form, if not today.
I give the hon. Lady that commitment. The Good Friday agreement is an absolute commitment that we stand by and it will be preserved. I will work with the hon. Lady, as I have been invited to do, to ensure that through the whole of the process we deliver on the principles.
I will take that as a commitment that at tea we will agree that the Good Friday agreement will be written into the next Bill—perhaps the withdrawal Bill. The Minister just has to nod.
As I said to the hon. Lady in the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, we are in the process of negotiating the withdrawal agreement and therefore we cannot pre-empt the detail of the Bill. Clearly, we want to enshrine the principles in the withdrawal agreement and that Bill will legislate for that. There is a logic to what she says and I am happy to follow up and discuss it further.
With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Corresponding powers involving devolved authorities
Amendment proposed: 167, page 17, line 9, at end insert—
“(3) This paragraph does not apply to regulations made under this Part by the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers.”—(Stephen Gethins.)
This amendment would provide that the power of the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 1 of Schedule 2 extends to amending directly applicable EU law incorporated into UK law, in line with a Minister of the Crown’s power in Clause 7.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I was here for seven hours on Monday before I spoke, so I feel that I can say at least a few words today.
We face a fundamental choice in this debate. Are we still a parliamentary democracy, or do we simply—because of a very narrow vote on 23 June 2016—take our eyes off of the detail and go like lemmings towards anything in order to implement a decision that is thought to be irreversible? The leave campaign told us that it was about taking back control. The reality is that this Parliament must assert itself and take back control from an overweening and incompetent Executive who want Henry VIII powers in their Bill and wish us just to be supine—to lie down and accept anything that they come forward with.
That is why my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) tabled new clause 17, which I am delighted to support. It would mean that there has to be an independent assessment of the costs of the Government’s proposals. We in this House—this democratic Parliament —can then assert centuries-old tradition against overweening Executive power. We can decide democratically. We can assert and take back control. That is why we need to vote for new clause 17 and support the associated amendments.
I thank right hon. and hon. Members for their participation in this debate. I congratulate the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) on his new clause, because he has achieved a considerable widening of the debate’s scope, which has led to a wide range of contributions.
Clause 12 is not about paying any negotiated financial settlement. It is about ensuring that Parliament has authorised the Government and the devolved Administrations to incur expenditure under this Bill. It is also about the preparation for the making of statutory instruments under the powers of the Bill or under existing powers to make subordinate legislation as modified by or under the Bill. The clause has two functions. The main text of the clause is concerned with parliamentary approval for the Government to spend money. The clause also gives effect to schedule 4, which is concerned with fees and charges by which the Government, devolved Administrations and arm’s-length bodies raise money.
Clause 12 and schedule 4 will ensure that all the money that might flow into and out of the Exchequer as a consequence of this Bill is proper and respects the long-established rules for the relationship between this House and the Treasury, as laid down in the 1932 Public Accounts Committee concordat and the Treasury guidance in “Managing public money”.
Taking back control of functions the UK has long delegated to European Union institutions may cost money. That expenditure will come from the use of the powers in the Bill. Although at this stage in the negotiations it is too early to say precisely what that expenditure will be, it might involve expanding public authorities in the UK, recruitment at those authorities or setting up new IT systems. That is not to say that the UK cannot perform those functions more efficiently and, crucially, at a lower cost than the European Union, but clearly we cannot say that it will cost the Government nothing at all to carry out the new responsibilities. It is therefore vital that the financial aspects of taking back control and preparing to take a fully independent position on the world stage are put on a sound and proper footing.
Does the Minister accept that we should hope that those fees and charges will be lower than those that have been paid until now to EU institutions?
I am happy to tell the right hon. Gentleman that, as a good Conservative, I certainly hope to reduce the costs on businesses and individuals. I will come to his amendments in a moment.
New clause 17 and amendment 54 show an understandable desire to protect the role of this House, but they are not necessary. The Government have always been clear that the negotiated financial settlement will be part of our withdrawal agreement and that the House will be given a vote on that agreement. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union was very clear on 13 November when he announced the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. He said that, as one of the principal elements of our agreement with the EU, we expect that legislation to include authorisation to pay any financial settlement that is negotiated with the EU. The Bill we are debating today is about ensuring that the statute book is operational on exit day, not about paying any settlement. The same argument applies to new clause 80.
The Minister says that there will be an opportunity to vote on the finances, but only as part of the entirety of the proposed withdrawal agreement. Would it not be proper, as is the case with many other financial issues, for the House separately to authorise financial expenditure in relation to exiting the European Union? Surely the Government should commit to that power for the House of Commons, or will he deny us that opportunity?
I am confused by the hon. Gentleman, because he is such a diligent Member of the House. I explained moments ago that we will bring forward the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, which will cover any financial settlement, among other withdrawal issues. I would of course expect that Bill to go through the normal legislative processes, during which he and other right hon. and hon. Gentlemen will have a full opportunity to scrutinise those provisions.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms). The power in part 1 of schedule 4 can be used to create fees and charges of the type that amendment 153 is concerned with. That power can be used to establish new fees only in relation to functions being transferred to UK entities under the powers in this Bill. In most cases, one might expect that it will be replacing a fee set at EU level, but in some cases it may be right that it will be better value for the taxpayer and for users of the services to create a new fee to pay for functions that the UK previously funded through the EU budget.
Amendment 152 does not recognise the need for adjustments to other, peripheral aspects of the fees regime in connection with charging fees or other charges—for example, arrangements for refunds, which I think all Members can agree should be possible so as not to leave ordinary hard-working fee payers unfairly out of pocket. Furthermore, future Governments, in the fullness of time, may wish to simplify charges, amalgamate them, or charge less for one function or another.
In future it may be necessary to do all sorts of things, but surely the powers in this Bill should not be used to impose new charges on businesses that are not being paid at the moment.
This Bill, first and foremost, is about exiting the European Union successfully, with certainty, continuity and control, as the right hon. Gentleman will know. I draw his attention to schedule 2(7), which makes it very clear that in the event that a provision imposed a fee or charge, or conferred a power to sub-delegate, it would go to the affirmative procedure and this House would have the opportunity to vote on it.
I turn to amendment 339 on sub-delegation. It is right that this House keeps strict control over all financial matters, but this Bill is about ensuring continuity. I remind the Committee that this power is available only if the public authority is taking on a new—[Interruption.]
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but there is quite a lot of hubble and bubble from Members who have not been in the debate. Members who have been here for the past three hours wish to listen to the Minister’s response.
Thank you, Mr Hanson.
The power is available only if the public authority is taking on a new function under this Bill, and the fees and charges must be in connection with that function. The amendment would force Ministers to exercise this power on behalf of public authorities, such as the Financial Conduct Authority, which this House has made statutorily independent from Ministers. The Government believe that it is right that where Parliament has already granted the power to set up rules within these independent regulators, fees and charges of the type envisaged by this power should continue to be exercised by those public authorities. For good reasons, they have been made independent of Government, and Parliament should have the option to maintain that status quo. I stress that the terms on which any public authority would be able to raise fees and other charges will be set in the statutory instrument that delegates the power to them; and that, as I said, any such delegation would trigger the affirmative procedure, ensuring that this House considers and approves any delegation of the power and how it would be exercised.
Amendment 340 on cost recovery has the disadvantage that it would prohibit what I hope Labour Members would consider to be progressive principles of ensuring a spreading of the burden of regulation. It also might not allow regulators to cover the cost of enforcement.
Clause 12 and schedule 4 are about delivering a successful EU exit with certainty, continuity and control. Clause 12 is not about enabling the payment of any negotiated financial settlement, and neither is schedule 4 about subverting the normal process of raising taxation. The amendments muddy the waters of what these provisions are for. These provisions are simply about ensuring that the financial aspects of taking back control and preparing to take a fully independent position on the world stage are put on a sound and proper footing.
The Minister said that he thought that all the amendments muddied the water, but he has also said that it was right that Parliament should have a vote on the money—on the divorce bill—and that there should be parliamentary oversight of any additional controls. Why then is he not going to accept amendments that simply ensure that that is the case? Just what kind of control is he seeking to take back?
As the hon. Lady would expect me to say, what I want is Parliament to have proper control over our laws, our money, our borders and our trade policy. Having expressed my gratitude for her intervention, I hope that I have tackled right hon. and hon. Members’ concerns, and I urge them not to press the amendments.
I have heard what the Minister said. In fact, he even had the gall to use the phrase, “take back control” while simultaneously telling Parliament that it cannot have a separate, free-standing vote on this massive divorce bill, which will potentially cost the constituents of every single Member in the Chamber—every man, woman and child—up to £1,000 a head. They expect accountability for those decisions, and I want all those hon. Members, particularly those who advocated a hard Brexit, and who still potentially advocate going over the cliff edge into World Trade Organisation terrain, to walk through the Lobby and be held accountable for the amount of money that it will cost taxpayers for decades to come. That is why I do not wish to withdraw new clause 17. I believe that Parliament should exercise control over those amounts of money. Let us take back control and have accountability for those sums of money. I wish to push this to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Except of course it is, because if the amendment is accepted, as the Government intend, the committee will be empowered to make a recommendation to have something debated by the affirmative procedure in the House should such an eventuality arise. In those circumstances, if we have an assurance from the Dispatch Box that something will be so debated, the hon. Gentleman and I will be able to join forces to prevent such a thing from happening. That is a genuine lock, and this debate depends on whether we want to engage in party political games or whether we want a serious approach to ensuring ministerial accountability. Amendment 397 is serious, and my hon. Friends and I are keen to ensure that its changes are made. I note that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) has also put his name to the amendment, which gives me great comfort that it is a serious effort to cure the problem.
On the point made by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) about amending the Act, which I will refer to in my own speech, I just want to draw the Committee’s attention to paragraph 6 (2)(g) of Schedule 7. For us to amend the Act, any change would have to relate to the withdrawal agreement and its implementation and would be subject to a vote in both Houses.
That is indeed true. I suppose that Opposition Members would tend to argue that only the courts could enforce that, which is an oddity with the principle of comity, but I think we are dancing on the heads of pins here. I am confident that the Government do not intend to use that power to get rid of the constraints within the Bill. I am equally confident that the serious issue here is whether significant changes are proposed by the negative procedure and, I repeat, the Procedure Committee amendment seems to handle that serious issue, which is in contrast to the highly hypothetical considerations that have already been put before the Committee.
Amendments 62 and 63 were, in a different form, the subject of some serious discussions earlier in Committee. They relate to how we bring the important environmental principles in the treaty on the functioning of the European Union into English law at the time of withdrawal and to how we replace the useful role that the Commission has played in being an independent enforcement agency for environmental law that is governed by those principles in its procedures and substantive actions.
I will give way in a moment, but I want to give a third example, which the Minister may also wish to talk about, regarding the common agricultural policy. At the moment, Scottish farmers are waiting on £160 million of refund payments under the CAP because of the way that it was changed in recent years. The way in which those payments are to be distributed is currently the subject of EU regulations, but what if the Government felt that that was somehow unfair and they wanted to change it? Then, without reference to primary legislation and or to Parliament, they could do so, and the material amount of money that farmers would get would be different from what they expect now. That is just a simple illustration of how these policies could change. I now happily give way to the Minister if he still wants to intervene.
Could the hon. Gentleman revisit each of the examples he has given and explain why he thinks that they would be deficiencies arising from our withdrawal from the EU, because having listened carefully to him, I do not think that, as my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General is saying, any of them could be classed as deficiencies arising from our withdrawal?
I do not think that they are deficiencies—that is not my point. My point is that a Minister or a future Minister might regard them as deficiencies, and therefore might change the law in this way.
My hon. Friend raises an excellent point, which has also been raised by the European Chemicals Agency. Those registrations, which will have cost our businesses £250 million, will fall on exit day. I know that that particular agency does allow third countries to participate, but when I tabled a parliamentary question to various Departments about the work they had done to prepare to duplicate the work of those regulatory agencies, I got a series of flannel-type replies that essentially said, “We don’t know how much it is going to cost, we don’t know what the system is going to be and we haven’t really started the work.” That is simply not good enough. Businesses and citizens deserve certainty. We are going to need between 800 and 1,000 statutory instruments before exit day to correct retained law. In a letter to the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee in September, the Environment Secretary said that there were 850 pieces of legislation relating to his Department that would no longer work after exit day unless they were corrected. That is an absolutely huge body of law.
Clause 7, as we have heard, gives Ministers powers to make regulations that they believe are appropriate—again, I dispute what “appropriate” might be—to
“prevent, remedy or mitigate…any failure of EU retained law to operate effectively”—
again, how do we know what the full scope of this clause will cover? This is a huge amount of law—
“or…any other deficiency in retained EU law”
where this arises from exit. The Bill’s explanatory notes contain a worrying and rather brazen example of what this means. They use the example of the UK having to obtain an opinion from the EU Commission, stating:
“In this instance the power to correct the law would allow the Government to amend UK domestic legislation to either replace the reference to the Commission with a UK body”—
should the Government decide to have one—
“or remove this requirement completely.”
Once we start to see the removal of reporting and enforcement requirements, we get to the heart of the Bill, which is that Brexit is a deregulators’ charter. This is about taking rights away and about ensuring that environmental and social rights are lost to our citizens. I do not want to see Ministers making those sweeping changes with no scrutiny in this place.
In part 1 of schedule 7, paragraph 3(2) waives the affirmative procedure for regulations where the Minister is of the opinion that
“by reason of urgency, it is necessary to make the regulations without a draft being so laid and approved.”
That basically says that the Government will not consult this House if the matter is urgent. They have said that they will accept the amendments tabled by the Procedure Committee Chair, the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), but those provisions could be waived if a Minister was of the opinion that the regulations were urgent. The Government want to pass 800 to 1,000 statutory instruments, 850 of which are in the environment sphere. Can anyone tell me which of those regulations will not be urgent, given that they need to be passed before exit day?
I thank the Minister for that clarification.
What could possibly be watered down? The Environmental Audit Committee asked the Transport Secretary for a guarantee that air quality standards would not be watered down after Brexit, but he refused to give us that guarantee, saying that he found it
“hard to believe that any Minister is going to stand before this House and argue for a reduction in air quality standards.”
He is right. No Minister will have to stand before this House and argue for that, because the Bill does away with that requirement. We saw the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union’s mask slip once before during his statement to this House on the White Paper, when he said:
“This is about reversing—well, not reversing but amending—and dealing with 40 years’ accumulated policy and law.”—[Official Report, 2 February 2017; Vol. 620, c. 1220.]
That was a Freudian slip that I return to time and again. We have also seen that from the Environment Secretary. Paeans have been heaped on his head, but in April, between his visiting Donald Trump in January and his rehabilitation to the Cabinet, he railed against the habitats directive, which he now somehow wants to protect from himself. He talked about homes in his constituency being governed by the habitats directive and how onerous it was for developers to have to offset their projects with green spaces. There is obviously more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents, but he was a deregulator before his damascene conversion. He is now deeply penitent, spending his day listening to the experts, and has since acknowledged that the environment needs to be protected from
“the unscrupulous, unprincipled, or careless”.
I wonder which of his colleagues he had in mind and who may yet succeed him at DEFRA.
How might Ministers go about watering down EU standards? The 2008 classification, labelling and packaging regulation or CLP regulation—CLP means something quite different in Labour terminology—is an example of direct EU legislation under clause 3, which will become retained EU law under clause 6. The CLP regulation aligns the EU’s system of classifying, labelling and packaging chemical substances. It enables chemical products to be traded in the European single market while protecting workers, consumers and the environment. It is why drain cleaners—the sulphuric acid that has been used in the terrible acid attacks—and paint strippers bear the red diamond hazard signs, with which we are all familiar. The regulation will need to be corrected after exit day, but the corrections proposed in the Government’s delegated powers memorandum show how the CLP regulation would be dramatically watered down.
The draft statutory instrument proposes to omit article 46 of the CLP regulation. Article 46 obliges the Government to enforce the safety standards in the regulation and to report on how well those standards are being enforced. In that draft SI, the Government say that because the Commission does not exist, they do not need to report to the Commission, and because they do not need to report, they do not need to enforce. This is a granular and detailed amendment, but that is the sort of thing that the proposed sifting committee will have to consider with an electron microscope to get to the heart of every single deficiency, some of which—with the best will in the world—will not appear until there is a legal challenge. We do not want the labelling and packaging of dangerous chemicals not to be enforced and not reported to any body. Some hon. Members may not be as sceptical as I am about Ministers’ intentions, but none of us can predict the future. We have had three Environment Secretaries in as many years.
Amendment 138 would protect retained EU environmental law, requiring Ministers to certify that they are satisfied that regulations made under clause 7 will not remove or reduce any environmental protection provided by retained EU law. That certification—similar to that created by the Human Rights Act—would be justiciable, meaning that it can be challenged in a court of law. An individual or group could apply for a judicial review if they felt that regulations made under clause 7 had removed or reduced environmental protection. That would not delay leaving the EU, but it would provide a vital check on the powers in clause 7, and it protects the protections.
I very much agree with the hon. Lady. It is not right and it is not fair. It also, as she rightly identified, does not reflect leave voters. We have got ourselves into a ludicrous situation whereby a very small number of people in this place, in this Government, and indeed in the country at large, suddenly seem to be running the show. That is not right, because they do not reflect leave voters, who, overwhelmingly, are pragmatic, sensible people who unite with the overwhelming majority of people who voted remain and who, frankly, want us all to get together, move on, get the best deal, and get on with Brexit.
That, I think, is where the British people are. I think they are also uneasy, worried and rather queasy because of all the things that we have spoken about in this place. They now realise, as I think my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said, that it is very difficult, this Brexit. It is indeed difficult to deliver it, and many people thought from the rhetoric of the leave campaign that it would be oh, so easy. Indeed, others—such as the Secretary of State, who is beautifully arriving in the Chamber—believed that a trade deal would be done in but a day and a half.
I am being pragmatic, so I am not going to make any more such points; I am going to try to move the discussion on. But I urge all members of Her Majesty’s Government, especially those in the most important positions, to please reach out to the remainers—now often called former remainers—who made up the 48%. I urge those Government members not to tar us with the paintbrush that they may have used for many years, but to try to build a consensus. That means that the Government need to give a little bit more than they have given so far.
The reason why I support the single market, the customs union and the positive benefits of immigration is not that I am some treacherous mutineer. My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham is hardly some sort of Brexit mutineer, but he is an excellent example of someone who quite properly tables a probing new clause because he is doing his job as a Member of Parliament. That is why amendments have been tabled by all manner of people, and they have been supported in a cross-party manner to a degree that apparently has not been seen for a very long time. That is commendable.
I am no rebel, because like many of my former Back-Bench colleagues who now sit on the Front Bench, I made it very clear to the good people of Broxtowe that I was standing as a Conservative but I did not endorse my party’s manifesto in relation to the single market and the customs union. Sitting on the Front Bench today are hon. Members who, in the past, stood quite properly in their constituencies as Conservatives while making it very clear that they did not support our party’s policy on the European Union and would campaign for us to withdraw. I make no criticism of that. I say, “Thank goodness,” because that is what we want in a good, healthy democracy. But it is ironic, is it not, that the Secretary of State has rebelled, I think, some 30 times on European matters?
He says, “More.” I do not criticise him for doing so. I bet he has never been called a Brexit mutineer—well, he would not have been called a Brexit mutineer, but I am as sure as anything that he has not been abused in the same way as other people who have had the temerity to table an amendment and see it through. The Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) rebelled, I think, some 30 times between 2010 and 2015. He and the Secretary of State will understand how important it is for us, having made our case clear to our electorate, to be true to the principles on which we stood and got elected. When we come here, if we do nothing else, we must surely uphold those principles—our mandate—by tabling amendments and voting for them.
If the Government are genuine about getting a good deal and healing the great divide—I very much hope that Ministers understand the damage that is still being caused to our country and the importance of healing the divide—they must reach out tomorrow, if not today, and do the right thing so that we get the right result. That will enable us to build on the consensus that broke out on Friday and move forward with delivering Brexit to get the best deal for everybody in our country.
I rise to speak to clause 7 and to amendment 391, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, which puts the Government’s commitment to transparency into the Bill by requiring that the explanatory memorandums relating to each statutory instrument must include a number of specific statements. I would like to put it on the record that the Government will support the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) on behalf of the Procedure Committee—I will be happy to move them formally if the Chair does not call them for separate decisions. I see from my speaking notes that I am due to speak to approximately 134 amendments, so I apologise in advance if I deal with any of them superficially.
The Government do not propose delegated powers lightly; we do so only when we are confident that secondary legislation is the most appropriate way to address an issue. This House is right to guard jealously its rights and privileges. It is for the purpose of taking back control to this Parliament that millions of people voted to leave the European Union. We want to limit any powers that we are seeking, in so far as we can, while ensuring that they can meet the imperative of delivering a working statute book on exit day.
The power in clause 7 is essential to achieve continuity and stability in the law. The day the UK leaves the EU is drawing ever nearer. If we simply stop at converting and preserving retained EU law, the day after exit the UK statute book will contain many thousands of inaccuracies, holes and provisions that are not appropriate. That would have real-world consequences, leaving errors in the laws that businesses and individuals, sometimes unknowingly, rely on every day. I am grateful that the general premise that we need to take these steps has been accepted by Members on both sides of the Committee and on the Labour Front Bench.
The power in clause 7 is intrinsically limited. As I and other Ministers, including the Secretary of State, have said from this Dispatch Box, it is not a power for Ministers to change law simply because they did not like it before we left the EU. Clause 7(1) is clear that Ministers may only do what is
“appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate—
(a) any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively, or
(b) any other deficiency in retained EU law,
arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU.”
If an issue does not arise from our withdrawal from the EU, Ministers may not amend the law using the powers in the clause.
Clause 7 is required to address failures to operate and deficiencies where the law does not operate effectively—for example, with reciprocal arrangements between the UK and the EU that have not formed part of any new agreement. Subsection (2) illustrates what these deficiencies might be. The clause is also subject to a number of direct limitations: it sunsets two years after exit day; and, as listed in subsection (6), it cannot impose or increase taxation, make retrospective provision, create certain types of criminal offence, implement the withdrawal agreement, amend the Human Rights Act 1998 or amend some sections of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
Will the Minister clarify from the Dispatch Box that Opposition Members’ assertions that it would be possible under the provisions for the Government to introduce secondary instruments that changed the safeguards in the Bill are misplaced because no court would allow that to happen under the provisions of appropriateness and deficiencies?
I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend. I will come on to the specific differences between clause 7 and clause 9 in relation to the power to amend the Act, but I will say now that the Act itself cannot be amended under clause 7. I will come on to develop that point later.
Clause 7(5) lists some possible uses of the power. These could range from fairly mechanistic changes to correct inaccurate references, to more substantial changes to transfer important functions and services from EU institutions to UK equivalents. Both types of change are important to keep the law functioning appropriately. At this stage, we do not know for certain what corrections might need to be made. The negotiations continue and there is a large volume of law to correct in a short space of time.
If I may, I will explain my approach to interventions, which I should have mentioned at the beginning of my speech. My speech has about 24 sections to address the 130 amendments that have been tabled. With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I would like to finish speaking on clause 7 stand part before I come on to his amendment. If he will allow me, I will give way to him then.
Secondary legislation made under this power is subject to entirely normal parliamentary procedures. I will come on to talk more about how we ensure sufficient scrutiny of secondary legislation when I speak to the amendments. The Government have always been clear that we will listen to the concerns of Parliament during the passage of the Bill and reflect on its concerns. We are committed to ensuring that Parliament has the right opportunities to scrutinise the Bill and its powers, so I am glad to have the opportunity to address concerns that have motivated many Members to table amendments to the scrutiny provisions in the Bill, alongside the debate on the powers themselves.
We should, however, all be in no doubt that without this power vital functions could not be carried out because they would not be provided for in our law. The UK could have obligations to the EU still existing in statute that would not reflect the reality of our new relationship. There would be confusing errors and gaps in our law. I say again that we do not take lightly the creation of delegated powers, but neither do we take lightly the imperative to deliver a stable, orderly exit that maximises certainty for the UK. Clause 7 is essential to achieving that task.
New clause 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), calls for an independent report into the constitutional implication of the powers in clause 7. There have already been a number of such reports and this is likely to continue. For example, the report he suggests sounds similar to the excellent and thoughtful report published recently by the Exiting the European Union Committee. A requirement for one more report after Royal Assent would, it seems to me, add little to the Bill and the definition of its powers. I reassure the House that the Government have listened to Members and to the Committees that have reported on the Bill.
I will turn a little later to amendments 392 to 398, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, but I am glad to report that the Government said yesterday that we would accept the amendments to enhance scrutiny of the powers through a sifting committee. Taken together with Government amendment 391 on the content of explanatory memorandums, we believe the amendments deliver more than the sum of their parts, so the House can be assured of the effective scrutiny of the powers in the Bill. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Nottingham East, but I will give way if he still wishes to intervene.
The Minister mentioned clause 7(5) in relation to the regulatory powers to replace, modify or abolish public service functions. He will know that one of my amendments would delete the Government’s ability to abolish functions by those orders. I wonder whether he could give us examples of public service functions or regulatory activities currently undertaken that the Government may wish to abolish.
I will come back to that later, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman for a start that the translation functions of the European Union and various institutions will no longer be required.
I come now to amendment 1, from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). It has support from all sides of the Committee including, I do not mind telling him, from me, in spirit. The Secretary of State has asked me to put on record that he, too, is sympathetic to the idea of narrowing the Ministers’ discretion. My right hon. and learned Friend seeks to restrict the power of Ministers to make regulations to amend retained EU law to cases where the EU law is deficient only in the way set out in the Bill.
We have listened carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) and others, and the specific proposal in amendment 1 and amendment 56, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, is to convert the illustrative list of potential deficiencies in the law in clause 7(2) to an exhaustive list. As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, we do not think that it is possible to do that at this stage.
We know that there will be thousands of deficiencies across our statute book and it is impossible at this stage definitively to list all the different kinds of deficiencies that might arise on exit day. To attempt to do so risks requiring significant volumes of further primary legislation on issues that will not warrant taking up parliamentary time. The specifics of the deficiencies will inevitably vary between cases and it will therefore not be possible to provide a definition that accompanies them all, as amendments 264 and 265, tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford), also seek to do. An exhaustive list would risk omitting important deficiencies, so rendering the powers in clause 7 unable to rectify the statute book. To require primary legislation in such circumstances would undermine the purpose of the Bill and the usual justifications for secondary legislation, such as technical detail, readability and, crucially, the management of time.
We cannot risk undermining the laws on which businesses and individuals rely every day. Our goals are to exit the EU with certainty, continuity and control. However, I listened extremely carefully to the speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, my constituency neighbour, and to his appeal for us properly to consider this issue. I hope that he will not mind my saying that I think that we have already properly considered the issue, but we are perfectly willing to work with him and others to continue to reflect on this point with an eye on Report. We heard a very informative intervention on this point from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox). My right hon. and learned Friend will know that we are wrestling with the susceptibility of what we do to judicial review, which might undermine the certainty that we are trying to deliver.
I understand that, and I realise that I am setting a bit of a challenge. Of course, amendment 1 is only one way to deal with this. Interestingly, amendment 1 is the least justiciable route because of its clarity. Other amendments, such as amendment 2, do raise the issue of justiciability. One way or the other—I put this challenge to my hon. Friend—the Government will have to come back with something that tempers the starkness of these powers. I leave it to my hon. Friend’s discretion, which is precisely why I have not tried to fetter him over this.
I wonder whether my hon. Friend might be attracted by this idea. At the moment, as drafted, the clause gives an inclusive, non-exhaustive list of examples, but I wonder whether the principle of ejusdem generis might not assist us if it were slightly redrafted. One could draft it so that any extensions beyond the inclusive list had to be of the same kind or species as those that were listed. That might give some comfort, if they have to be of a similar character to those enumerated in the Bill.
I am extremely grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, and I would be happy to meet him, our legal team and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield to take their suggestions on board. I am keen to address this, and I know that the Secretary of State is keen to do so, but I am not in a position today to have tabled or accepted an amendment. I ask them to bear with me and have further meetings with us and our legal teams to try to find a way through.
The Minister is being very generous and carefully considered in his responses. May I just check what he has said? Is he saying that he intends, if he can, to bring forward an amendment, perhaps on Report, to fix this, after these conversations have taken place, given the sympathy he says both he and the Secretary of State have for the amendments, or is he unable to give that promise to the Committee?
I will be very straightforward with my hon. Friend: we are keen to move on this issue, but, as several hon. and learned Friends have acknowledged, it is a tricky issue, so we will need to reflect further on how a movement might take place. The Attorney General, who is in his place, and the other Law Officers are well aware of this issue, but we are conscious of the imperative of being able to deal with deficiencies in the statute book, as well as of the advice of hon. and learned Friends.
I am sure that the Minister will deal with this on some of the other amendments, but the other limb of this is whether certain categories of retained EU law need special protection. All that, I suggest, needs to be looked at as a whole. I am convinced that if the Government do that, they will probably be able to come up with the right solution, and one that commands the confidence of the House.
Will my hon. Friend allow me to intervene?
My hon. Friend has taken several interventions. Some of us have loyally supported Ministers throughout this process, and we want him to be robust, keep his lead in his pencil, deliver the Bill and ensure that none of our laws are left in limbo. I encourage him to the last.
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for his robust support, and I shall certainly watch out for my lead.
Our approach is to provide for the greatest possible scrutiny and transparency of the statutory instruments as they come forward. We began that process of providing transparency in the delegated powers memorandum accompanying the Bill, and in recent days we have published further information on how clause 7 would be used, including yesterday two draft SIs in the key area of workers’ rights, but there is more we can do to provide for scrutiny and transparency, which brings me to amendments 391 and 392 to 398, which will come before the Committee for a vote tomorrow.
I am pleased to repeat that the Government intend tomorrow to accept amendments 392 to 398, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, who is not here, but who nevertheless is a great champion of Parliament against the Executive, as he has demonstrated on multiple occasions. The Procedure Committee, which he chairs, agreed the amendments unanimously. I pay particular tribute to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, whose report informed the Committee’s work, I understand. If his amendments are not moved separately, the Government will be happy to move them formally at the appropriate moment.
The amendments will establish a sifting committee in the House to look at instruments made under the power in clause 7 and two other key powers in clauses 8 and 9. I draw the Committee’s attention to the draft Standing Orders that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House has published to establish a new Select Committee to consider the negative instruments in the way that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne proposes. The amendments draw on the expertise of the Procedure Committee, and the Government believe that they offer a solution that will give transparency to the House over the Government’s choice of procedure and ensure that the House can recommend that any negative instrument under clauses 7 to 9 instead be debated and voted upon as an affirmative instrument.
The Government have also tabled amendment 391, which will place our commitments to transparency in the Bill and require that explanatory memorandums relating to each statutory instrument include a number of specific statements. The amendments are aimed at improving the scrutiny and transparency of the SIs that are to come. If the House accepts them, they will together be more than the sum of their parts. The combination of the proposals of the Committee and the Government will mean that any deficiency the Government identify in retained EU law will be transparent to the House. In the light of this information, or any other concerns, the House will have a mechanism to propose a negative instrument for the increased scrutiny provided by a debate and a vote in the House.
I particularly noted what my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) said about the political costs of not complying with the Committee’s recommendation. She nods; I am grateful. I am confident that, given that this proposal is in harmony with the way in which other Select Committees work in relation to the Government, it will provide an adequate means of holding Ministers to account on the choice of procedure.
In the absence of the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), whose proposal this is, does the Minister envisage introducing the enhanced sift procedure—the mechanism for informing other Select Committees or Members with a particular interest in a subject—on Report?
The hon. Lady has put her point on the record, but what we are doing is accepting the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne. I also draw her attention to the Standing Orders.
A number of Members have referred to the general need for a reform of the scrutiny of statutory instruments. I spent a very informative weekend reading the Hansard Society’s book “The Devil is in the Detail”, which I recommend to any Member who wishes to be fully apprised of the case for the reform of delegated legislation, but I must add that this is not the moment for a complete reform of secondary legislation. What we need to do is accept the amendments from the Procedure Committee, and to move forward.
May I make a very brief observation about the sifting committee and the expertise? In my experience, the scrutiny of detailed European legislation is sometimes best performed by people with expertise in it. That is why the House of Lords EU Committee has sub-committees on financial affairs, external affairs, energy and environment, justice, home affairs and so forth. Would my hon. Friend at least consider using a sub-committee of that kind, given that it might enable him to complete the sifting process more quickly?
I think that my hon. Friend has made a strong case for her membership of the sifting committee. I hope that, if the Whips Office has heard her appeal, she will become a member in due course and will enjoy it very much indeed.
Let me now deal with amendment 2. Conditions similar to those in the amendment, tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, are proposed by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) in amendment 48. Again, we have significant sympathy with the intention behind the amendments. However, they would introduce new terms into the law and invite substantial litigation, with consequent uncertainty about the meaning of the law as we exit the EU.
May I just finish making my case? I must point out to my right hon. and learned Friend that I can speak for two or three hours if I take all the interventions, or I can press on.
I hope to give the Committee some reassurance. Any provision made under clause 7 must be an appropriate means of correcting a deficiency in retained EU law arising from withdrawal. It is a strong test, and it represents a significant limit on the provisions made under clause 7. The limit can ultimately be guarded by the courts, although I note what my right hon. and learned Friend said about that. However, the right place in which to determine which changes in the law are appropriate is Parliament, which is why I hope Members will accept that their concerns have been addressed by the provisions that we have made for greater scrutiny and transparency in the case of each statutory instrument.
I have noted my hon. Friend’s comments, and I appreciate them, but may I take him back for a moment? All these issues are linked. I acknowledge the contribution from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), but let me return to the discussion of amendment 1. One possibility might be that the list could only be added to by a statutory instrument. After all, given the extensive powers in the Bill, it would present a double lock. If the Government wanted a new power, or area of power, they could secure it through an SI anyway, because of the extent of the power that we are giving to them. The Minister might like to consider that point.
I shall return to the clause 7 versus clause 9 argument a little later.
Amendments 3 and 4 were also tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend. The Government agree with his goal of ensuring that instruments under the Bill are accompanied by all the information that the House, the public and, indeed, the sifting committee need in order to understand what they can do and why. We also agree that more can be done to ensure that the House has the proper opportunities to scrutinise the instruments. As I have said, the Government have therefore accepted the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, and we will also table amendments to address long-standing concerns about information. The Government believe that the proposed committee represents an option that balances our concerns about the ability to plan and the limited time available before exit day with some Members’ well-stated and long-standing concerns about the efficacy of the scrutiny of negative SIs in this House. Those amendments will address the unique challenge posed by the secondary legislation under this Bill, ensuring that the Government’s reasoning on procedure is transparent to the House and that the House can recommend that any negative instrument should instead be an affirmative one.
Beyond all that, the Government have tabled amendment 391 which will require that explanatory memorandums are alongside each SI and include a number of specific statements aimed at ensuring the transparency of SIs that are to come, and act as an aid to this House, providing more effective scrutiny. These statements will explain, for instruments made under the main powers in this Bill, what any relevant EU law did before exit day, what is being changed, and why the Minister considers that this is no more than is appropriate. They will also contain information regarding the impact of the instrument on equalities legislation. The wording of our amendment and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne differs from that proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, but, as he has said, he has put his name to it and I am pleased that we are therefore able to move forward.
I turn now to the issue of what is necessary and amendments 49, 65, 205 to 208, 216 and new clause 24. Amendments 49 and 65 bring us to the important debate about whether the power in clause 7 should allow necessary corrections or appropriate corrections. “Necessary” is a very strict test, which we would expect to be interpreted by a court as logically essential. Where two or more choices as to how to correct EU law are available to Ministers, arguably neither would be logically essential because there would be an alternative. Ministers therefore need to choose the most appropriate course. If two UK agencies, such as the Bank of England or the Financial Conduct Authority, could arguably carry out a particular function, the Government must propose which would be the more appropriate choice. Also, if the UK and the EU do not agree to retain an existing reciprocal arrangement and the EU therefore ceases to fulfil its side of the obligations, the UK could decide it is not appropriate for the UK to provide one-sided entitlements to the EU27; it might not be legally necessary for the UK to stop upholding one side of the obligation, but it might not be appropriate for us to continue if the EU is not doing so.
It is my understanding that the Minister is saying that courts that were told that Ministers had two options, both of which might be necessary solutions to a particular problem, would therefore say that neither passed the necessity test because Ministers had chosen between the two of them. That sounds utterly ludicrous as a way in which the courts would make a decision. Will the Minister elaborate by providing a case law example of a situation where the courts have been given such a necessity test and have decided to rip up all necessary options on the basis that there were too many necessary choices?
I will see whether, before I sit down, my memory can be jogged on an example of case law, but I am only a humble aerospace and software engineer and I do not mind saying to the right hon. Lady that I have sometimes observed that we dance on the head of a pin over particular words. In order to protect the law and the public purse, I think the Law Officers would require me to take appropriate advice from lawyers on the nature of these words and to abide by it as we proceed through the legislation.
Earlier in our debate, the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) said that we all know what “appropriate” means and so would a court. Can the Minister tell us what “appropriate” means in this context?
I think what we would say to the hon. and learned Lady is that “appropriate” will follow the plain English definition, which she will find in various places, but what I want to do is move on.
I want to set out why it is important that the test of appropriateness extends to the use of the power in clauses 8 and 17, to which the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber has tabled amendments 205, 207, 208 and 216. For example, leaving the EU, the customs union and the single market may alter the way in which the UK complies with its international legal obligations in relation to taxation, and there will not always be a clear single choice about how to comply with those obligations. Clause 8 will give Ministers the flexibility, as necessary, to make those changes. Using the word “necessary” would risk constraining the use of the power to the extent that where it is appropriate for the UK to adjust our domestic legislation to ensure compliance with international obligations but where there are multiple ways to do so, we might not be able to ensure compliance with our important obligations under international law, thereby undermining the core intention of clause 8.
Order. This is a rather long intervention, and the Minister has made it clear that he does not wish to take too many more interventions as he is seeking to make progress.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare for putting his own clarification into my remarks.
The Government wish to take the minimum powers necessary—the minimum powers required—to do the job before us, which is to deliver a working statute book by exit day. We do not intend to make any major changes of policy beyond those that are appropriate to deliver a working statute book, where the law after exit day is substantially the same as the law before exit day, so that individuals and businesses can rely on it. The issue surrounding the definitions of “necessary” and “appropriate” is a technical and legal one, rather than a general issue of intent, and I stand by what we have said. We understand that “necessary” would be interpreted as logically essential and could land us with the problem that I have illustrated, with Ministers facing a number of choices about how to proceed. So if I may, I will leave that issue there.
The use of the word “equivalent” in new clause 24 is just as problematic. Returning to the example of a reciprocal arrangement that no longer exists, if we were —with the support of this House and entirely appropriately in line with our agreements with the EU—to end the obligations that were placed on the UK in law, this new clause could lead to a court taking the view that that would not be keeping the equivalent scope, purpose and effect of the law in relation to how the law stood before exit. This would undermine the Bill’s core objective of maintaining a functioning statute book once we leave the EU. I therefore urge right hon. and hon. Members not to press their proposed amendments, and the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) to withdraw her new clause.
I now want to address new clauses 1, 6 and 26, and amendments 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 68, 129 and 130, tabled by the Leader of the Opposition and others. These would all change the scrutiny process for secondary legislation made under the Bill. We have heard some fine speeches from distinguished parliamentarians, and it is clear that a great deal of thought has gone into the amendments and the arguments supporting them. First, let me be clear that we are committed to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny throughout the whole process of our withdrawal from the EU—Members will know that we make statements, Committee appearances and so on—and, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has already made clear, Parliament will have a vote on the contents of the withdrawal agreement. Crucially, where we are seeking not to replicate current arrangements but to take substantially new approaches, there will be separate pieces of primary legislation for Parliament to work through, as we are beginning to see with the legislation that is being introduced.
However, we must be mindful of the large volume of statutory instruments necessary and the limited time available to work through them if we are to provide certainty and stability on exit. We are working to the timetable of the article 50 process, and there is over 40 years of EU law to consider and correct to ensure that our statute book functions properly on our exit from the EU. According to EUR-Lex—the EU’s legal database—more than 12,000 EU regulations and over 6,000 EU directives are currently in force across the EU. If the majority of statutory instruments do not complete the parliamentary process before we leave the EU, there will be significant gaps in domestic law, which could raise real problems with real consequences. Our law currently gives powers to EU regulators across a wide range of areas that affect people’s lives, from aviation safety to the environment, and we therefore have a duty to act.
New clauses 1 and 26 and amendments 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 68, 129 and 130 would all give a parliamentary committee or either House of Parliament the role of deciding the scrutiny procedure that each statutory instrument must follow. We are sympathetic to the intention behind the amendments, which is why we made our announcement in relation to the Procedure Committee’s recommendations. All that is in harmony with the existing arrangements for the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords.
Amendments 34, 37 and 40, tabled by the Leader of the Opposition, would apply the affirmative procedure to a statutory instrument of sufficient policy interest, which is ambiguous and does not involve a practical, clear trigger for the affirmative procedure. Ultimately, it would end up being for the courts to decide what is “of sufficient policy interest”, creating legal uncertainty, which is contrary to the Bill’s central aim. I hope that Opposition Members will agree that that has been superseded by our commitment to the sifting committee.
Amendment 22, tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), would introduce a means for the Leader of the Opposition or a certain number of MPs to trigger an automatic debate on an SI made under the negative procedure. Again, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that that has been superseded by the sifting committee.
I will now address several amendments relating to the important matter of environmental protection, on which this Government have a proud record. Amendments 96, 97, 98, 138, 333 and 334 and new clauses 27, 62 and 63 were tabled by the Leader of the Opposition and others. We agree with the intentions behind the amendments and new clauses and understand hon. Members’ concerns, but it is essential that the clause 7 power exists as drafted in the Bill. Its purpose is to make changes, often of a technical nature, to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law. While simple in nature, it is essential to ensuring that legislation that protects the environment and rights remains consistent and continues to function effectively once we leave the EU.
Turning to new clauses 27, 62 and 63, the UK has always had a strong legal framework for environmental protections, and that will continue. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has recognised the risk of the governance gap, which has been explained, and that is why he announced on 12 November our intention to consult on a new independent and statutory body to advise and challenge the Government, and potentially other public bodies, on the environment, stepping in when needed to hold bodies to account and to enforce standards. We will consult on the specific scope and powers of the new body early next year. We understand the intention behind the new clauses, but they would create problems for our framework of environmental governance, about which we have made announcements.
New clause 27 would go further than the existing governance mechanisms for environmental protections set out in EU and UK law. For example, it would require the Government to give powers to this new independent body or bodies to set standards or targets and to co-ordinate action on the environment. Within the current EU mechanism, the exercise of those powers, such as legislating to set standards, would typically involve the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament; it does not normally rest solely with an independent body or bodies. Legislating for new standards and targets should be a matter for our Parliament in future.
New clause 62 would prejudge the consultation’s outcome and would necessarily limit the possible remit of a new body by requiring that it be established by regulations under clause 7. This power for functions currently exercised by EU institutions could be replicated by being given to UK bodies to exercise. Therefore, for example, significant domestic changes to the law post EU exit or new areas of the environment would fall outside its remit.
While we support the intention behind amendments 97, 98, 96, 138, 333, 334 and new clauses 62 and 63, they give no definition of what an environmental protection is or precisely how one might know that such protections were being weakened or narrowed. We believe that the hon. Members would be preparing the starting gun for a vast quantity of litigation so we cannot accept the amendments to clause 7, 8 or 9 or the new clauses.
Allow me to reiterate, Mr Streeter. Clause 7 powers are temporary powers limited in scope. Restricting the use of those powers further, as many of the amendments seek to do, would threaten rights and protections established in domestic and EU law, which we will be retaining. This is contrary to what I believe is the intention behind many of the amendments, so restricting the power as proposed would be counterproductive and we cannot accept the amendments.
Amendments 25, 26, 27, 52, 109, 111, 115, 266, 268, 267, 222, 363 to 373 and new clause 76, plus those amendments consequential on them, deal with the protection of rights in relation to the power in clause 7 or parallel restrictions in clauses 8 and 9. The UK has a long tradition of ensuring that our rights and liberties are protected domestically and of fulfilling our international human rights obligations. The decision to leave the EU does not change that. I reiterate the Government’s firm commitment to protecting rights throughout the EU exit process. As we have debated previously, the Bill ensures that, so far as possible, the laws we have immediately before exit day will continue to apply. As part of this approach, clause 4 will continue to make available any rights and so on which currently flow into domestic law through section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 within the overall scheme of the Bill.
Moreover, the clause 7 power is already restricted so that it cannot amend, repeal or revoke the Human Rights Act 1998 or any subordinate legislation made under it. The restrictions sought by amendments 25, 109, 363 and 364 are therefore not necessary. I am aware that amendments 365, 26, 366 and 367 would place the same restrictions on the powers in clause 8. The clause 8 power is already restricted so that it cannot amend, repeal or revoke the Human Rights 1998 or any subordinate legislation made under it. The restrictions sought by amendments 365 to 367 are therefore not necessary.
I will come on to the Equality Act within a page.
Amendments 52, 266, 267, 268, 370, 371 and 372 have been tabled by the right hon. Members for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford, for Ross, Skye and Lochaber and for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake). They would prevent any changes to the Equality Act. As part of the Government’s clear commitment to maintaining equalities protections throughout the process of EU exit, we have tabled amendment 391, which will ensure that the amendments that will be made to equalities legislation under this and certain other powers in the Bill are transparent, and provide confirmation that the Minister has had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct prohibited under the Equality Act.
Indeed, hon. Members may not be aware that the Government have already published a document on our website setting out the changes that we intend to make to the Equality Act, making it clear that they are limited to technical adjustments that are designed to ensure that the protections established in the Act continue to operate after exit.
Let me just run through them for the right hon. Gentleman. They include: references to the European Parliament; references to future EU obligations, including new EU obligations implemented under the European Communities Act 1972; references to EU law as a generic term and harmonisation measures; references to specific EU directives which are set out in the paper; and, finally, references to the UK as part of the European economic area. So I commend that paper to right hon. and hon. Members who are interested and/or concerned about it. With that in mind, as changes are necessary, as set out in the paper, I urge right hon. and hon. Members not to press their amendments.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for putting me right on that point, but I shall now have to press on rather than explore it. [Interruption.] I am not in a position to answer it, but I will see whether my memory can be jogged.
I turn to the issue of children’s rights, where I am grateful that I have the opportunity to discuss amendment 332 and new clause 53, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton). I congratulate him on the powerful speech he made, reminding the House of its obligations. His new clause has received broad support across the House, including from my right hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan), the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), among others. This new clause and amendment 332, tabled by the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), give me the opportunity to clarify our position on child refugee family reunion and asylum seekers.
The Government’s commitment to children’s rights and the United Nations convention on the rights of the child is and will remain unwavering. Our ability to support and safeguard children’s rights will not be affected by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Domestically, the rights and best interests of a child are already protected through the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002, in addition to other legislative measures across the UK. Existing laws and commitments already safeguard children’s rights.
The Government support the principle of family unity and we have in place a comprehensive framework so that families can be reunited safely. The Dublin regulation itself is not and has not been a family reunification route. It confers no right to remain in the UK on family grounds and there is no provision for children to apply for family reunification under it. Crucially, the Dublin regulation creates a two-way process that requires the co-operation of 31 other countries. We cannot declare that we are going to preserve its terms when we need the co-operation of other countries to make it work.
We understand our moral responsibility to those in need of international protection, and that will not change as we leave the European Union. We value co-operation with our European partners on asylum and we want that co-operation to continue, but the way to ensure that is through the negotiations, not by making changes to the Bill before we have been able to make progress on this matter. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham and those who support his new clause but, as he said, changes are required in immigration rules. I am grateful to him for his stating the probing nature of the new clause. I ask him to work with Ministers, whom I think he said he has now met, to deliver the right changes to the immigration rules.
I am grateful for the Minister’s clarification, and I do hope that we can make some progress in, say, an immigration Bill. Nevertheless, will he explain to me why it requires the co-operation and agreement of 31 other countries for the UK to be able to say that we will take genuine unaccompanied asylum-seeking children with relatives who are legitimately in this country but who happen not to be their parents?
My hon. Friend makes his case with particular force. I am sorry to have to tell him that I am not in a position to accept his new clause on that basis. I ask him to work with members of the Government on the immigration Bill that will contain the measures that he and the rest of us wish to see to ensure that we meet our humanitarian obligations.
The Minister’s colleagues gave a statement on 1 November 2016 that made the commitment to take children from Europe, and it is those children whose rights under the Dublin regulation would be taken away. Can he understand the concern about the fact that he has just announced that the requirement to work with 31 other countries would supersede that? Will he give a cast-iron guarantee that the commitment made in that statement on 1 November 2016 to take children from Europe and to do our fair share for refugee children will be honoured in full?
These are matters for my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and the Bills for which her Department is responsible. I hope the hon. Lady will forgive me and understand that it is with the Home Office that these matters need to be taken forward. This Bill is about how we leave the European Union with certainty, continuity and control in our statute book.
Amendments 15 and 16 are on the power to deal with deficiency—
I understand my hon. Friend’s difficulties. He is responding to new clauses and amendments on an amazingly wide range of topics that keep going into other departmental areas, but it is quite useless if the winding-up speech consists of the Minister saying in a series of statements that he is in no position to answer the questions. If there is an important Home Office question, as there is with the issue of child refugees, it would be normal for a Home Office Minister to be in attendance and to rise in some suitable way to answer the debate. My hon. Friend is reading very competently his carefully prepared brief, which concludes at every stage by saying, “I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.”
I am grateful for my right hon. and learned Friend’s intervention, which has disappointed me neither in the sympathy that he expressed for my predicament nor in the sting in its tail. The Bill is the responsibility of the Department for Exiting the European Union, with the collaboration of other Ministers who are assisting in its passage. He is absolutely right that it covers a wide range of issues. I believe that I have given an answer on the particular point raised.
On two points of technical legal detail, I have asked for my memory to be jogged in the course of the debate, and I very much hope that I will be able to give an answer before I sit down. My right hon. and learned Friend will understand that I am not, like him, a learned Member of this House; I am a humble aerospace and software engineer. It is necessary for me to go through the clauses of the Bill that relate to parliamentary scrutiny and do not require technical legal expertise.
I will not give way, because I need to make progress and to keep my remarks to some form of limit.
Amendments 15 and 16, tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, seek to narrow the categories of deficiencies arising from our withdrawal from the EU. The removal of clause 7(8), as amendment 16 proposes, would restrict our ability to keep the law functioning as it does now. Subsection (8) is about deficiencies arising not only from withdrawal, but from how the Bill works. For example, the Bill does not preserve directives themselves, as we have already debated, but instead preserves the UK law, which implements them. In some instances, there are provisions in directives, giving powers or placing restrictions on Government or on EU institutions or agencies, which it would not have made sense to transpose in UK law, but which then need to be incorporated in order for the law to continue to function as it did before exit. For example, the Commission currently holds a power to restrict the disclosure of confidential information in the financial services sector, which is referenced by UK implementation of the capital requirements directive 2013, but which will need to be transferred to the UK. We might also want to transfer powers that the Commission currently has to define what counts as hazardous waste, which is currently in the waste framework directive.
Subsection (8) allows the clause 7 power to correct deficiencies that arise from that withdrawal together with the operation of the Bill. For example, it might be appropriate to lift a relevant part of a directive and insert it into UK law in order to keep the law functioning as close as possible to how it does presently.
Well, I am extremely grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend, who I am very happy to see does remain my friend, as well as my constituency neighbour. I cannot tell him how happy I am to discover that that is the case.
Earlier, my right hon. and learned Friend asked me why Government could not accept additional protections requirements in amendment 13, given that that appears in other legislation. A similar test does appear in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, but the powers in that Act are rarely used, in part because of its complicated requirements. Moreover, the detail of that Act and its powers justify such a test as it is about deregulation. We consider that the existing restrictions in clause 9 are the right ones.
I move forward to amendments 131, 269 to 271, and 359 on restriction of the powers relating to EU citizens’ rights. Since those amendments were tabled, we have secured much-needed agreement on citizens’ rights through our negotiations. I hope Members will be glad that we have now made sufficient progress, subject to the European Council meeting, and that we will be able to move forwards.
The final agreement with the European Union on citizens’ rights is still subject to our negotiations with the EU. However, of course, we expect to give effect to those in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. The House will therefore have both a meaningful vote on the agreement and on its debates on the primary legislation necessary to implement it. I therefore invite hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.
On amendment 359, we seek clarity on the current wording in relation to deficiency by means of a loss of reciprocity. We want to clarify that the Government do not intend to use it in a broad sense—in theory, it could be used in a very wide sense. In fact, it is intended to be narrow, so that major changes to policy, such as citizens’ rights to work or to come to this country, will be effected by primary regulation, not by regulation under clause 7.
I understand my hon. Friend’s point. Just to reassure him: it is our firm intention to carry through the agreement, which he can read in the joint report of the negotiators, into legislation so that citizens can rely on it in the United Kingdom through that withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, which I hope we can put before the House in due course.
Amendments 31, 32 and 57 seek to remove so-called Henry VIII powers. I can confirm that amendment 32 is not necessary because the power in clause 7 cannot be used to amend the Act itself. It would be outside the scope of the power—ultra vires. Neither can the power in clause 8 be used for this purpose. Let me be clear: only the power in clause 9 states that it can amend the Bill. None of the other powers in the Bill make that statement. As I said earlier in an intervention, in the event that the use of a clause 9 power is proposed to amend the Act, it would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
My hon. Friend touches on an important issue. Might it not be the case that any such power done by regulation ought to be done by affirmative resolution? I just suggest that that might be the solution to dealing with tertiary powers, because of their unusual nature. In view of the list he has given us, it seems to me that, in all likelihood, these things would be done by affirmative resolution, but that is something the Government might like to consider between now and Report.
I just draw my right hon. and learned Friend’s attention to paragraph 1(2)(c) of part 1 of schedule 7, which would require that the affirmative procedure be used if a provision
“provides for any function of an EU entity or public authority in a member State of making an instrument of a legislative character to be exercisable instead by a public authority in the United Kingdom”.
So instruments of a legislative character coming across would trigger the affirmative.
There are also some matters in relation to fees and charges, which we discussed earlier in the debate. What I would say to my right hon. and learned Friend is that, where he has doubts, we have agreed to the sifting committee, and if he is concerned, I hope he will consider membership of that committee so that he can play his part in seeing through this set of measures.
May I apologise, as Chair of the Procedure Committee, for arriving late to my hon. Friend’s speech? I thought I had missed all of his speech, then I realised I had missed half of it, but it now seems that I have only missed a third of it. However, I do apologise for arriving late, and I hope he accepts that apology at face value.
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend.
Let me return to my notes in order that I might give the Committee an accurate presentation of these measures. Where this type of specialist legislative function exists at EU level, we will need to ensure that the responsibility is transferred to the appropriate UK body so that the UK has a fully functioning regulatory regime in time for day one of EU exit. This might be the case where, for example, it is more appropriate for the Health and Safety Executive in the UK to update lists of regulated chemicals than the Secretary of State, or where it would make sense for the Prudential Regulation Authority to take on responsibility for updating monthly the detailed methodology that insurance firms must use to prudently assess their liabilities. Both these legislative functions are currently carried out at EU level and will need to be taken on by the appropriate UK regulator after exit.
To reply to the point made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, any SIs made under clause 7 that transfer a legislative function or create or amend any power to legislate will be subject to the affirmative procedure. This is provided for in schedule 7. Therefore, Parliament will be able to debate any transfer of powers and consider the proposed scope of such powers and the scrutiny proposed for their future exercise, which will be set out in any instrument conveying that power. Recognising that some of the existing EU regulation that will be incorporated into UK law will be of a specialised and technical nature, clause 7 allows the power to fix deficiencies to be sub-delegated to the UK body that is best placed to perform the task. EU binding technical standards—the detailed technical rules developed by EU regulators for financial services—are a good example of where we might sub-delegate the clause 7 power. These standards, which run to almost 10,000 pages, do not make policy choices but fill out the detail of how firms need to comply with requirements set in higher legislation. The PRA and the FCA have played a leading role in the EU to develop these standards, and so they already have the necessary resource and expertise to review and correct these standards so that they operate effectively in the UK from day one of exit. I appreciate the concerns of my right hon. and learned Friend and the hon. Member for Nottingham East, but I hope I have demonstrated why we cannot accept these amendments.
Amendments 17, 360 and new clause 35 require additional information. As I have said, we have tabled amendment 391, which will require the explanatory memorandums alongside each statutory instrument to include a number of specific statements aimed at ensuring the transparency of the SIs that are to come and acting as an aid to the most effective scrutiny that this House can provide.
I would like to take a particularly special moment to reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), in whose name amendment 360 is tabled, that we have laid in the Library draft SIs that will help everyone to understand the sorts of changes that we might need to make under clause 7. I would like to reassure him that the Treasury has been engaging with the financial services industry extensively since the EU referendum on the range of issues affecting the sector as we withdraw from the EU. That engagement continues and it includes regular official and ministerial discussion with industry and trade associations and bodies such as the International Regulatory and Strategy Group. That includes discussions on our approach to the domestication of EU financial services regulation through this Bill. That will continue and grow throughout 2018. The Treasury is also working closely with the Bank of England and the FCA to ensure the UK’s smooth and orderly withdrawal from the European Union.
By supporting a close working partnership between industry, regulators and Government, the Government will ensure that their approach to domesticating EU financial services regulation is well understood and based on input from stakeholders. Consistent with the objectives of this Bill, the approach in financial services is to provide certainty and continuity for firms after exit with the UK maintaining high regulatory standards. Financial services is one of the areas where a bold and ambitious free trade agreement could be sought. We are ambitious for that deal and we would do nothing in clause 7 to undermine it.
I am grateful to the Minister for devoting that portion of his speech to the detail on financial services. That is important for the City, as he knows, and the proposal to publish draft statutory instruments is a well-tested and welcome route.
I have a quick question about financial services legislation and deficiencies. I want to get it clear in my head, as a non-lawyer, that deficiencies would not cover material policy changes. For example, European banks, including British banks, currently do not have to hold any capital against sovereign debt issued by EU member states. Changing that could be considered to be dealing with a deficiency, because we will no longer be a member state, but it would be a policy change. Will the Minister confirm that that sort of amendment would be picked up and would go through the affirmative procedure?
The committee will be busy, and that is why I am so grateful for the fact that several hon. Members—presumably including the hon. Gentleman—seem to be volunteering to do the important duty of serving on it, which no one should take lightly. I say to my hon. Friend that we have been extremely clear that any major change will come through primary legislation, but I cannot say that there will be no policy changes at all, however minor. The reality is that if a function comes back to the UK and we have to make a choice about whether it is allocated to the PRA or the FCA, that could be described as a policy choice.
I want to be clear with the Committee. I cannot say that there will be no policy changes whatever, but I can say that the Bill is about certainty, continuity and control. It is about making sure that the law works the day after we exit in substantially the same way as it worked the day before, from the point of view of those who are subjected to it. I can see that my hon. Friend brings great insight to the matter.
On a related point about the new sifting committee, will the Minister outline the Government’s view—this is partly a matter for Standing Orders—on how the chair of that committee would be appointed and whether Parliament could have a role in the election of the chair, rather than the post being appointed by the Government?
The hon. Gentleman has been generous enough to say that he appreciates that that is a matter for Standing Orders. I am very sensitive to the role and powers of Parliament, which we have discussed throughout proceedings on the Bill. As a Minister, I really do not want to stand at the Dispatch Box and trespass—in this debate, of all places—on Parliament’s right to set its own Standing Orders.
We based the model on the European Scrutiny Committee, in which the Chairman is appointed.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend.
I move on to consent from the devolved Administrations. Amendments 73, 233, 239 and 240 were tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber and the hon. Members for Airdrie and Shotts (Neil Gray) and for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins). Taking the right hon. Gentleman’s amendments together, we are committed to continuing to respect the devolution settlement fully. We will work closely with the devolved Administrations as we develop fisheries and agricultural legislation, which will be brought through by separate Bills to deliver an approach that works for the whole United Kingdom.
At this point, I hope that the Committee will not mind if I refer to points raised in our previous debate on devolution. Amendments were tabled about a restriction on the power relating to national security. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said, we are proposing a bold new strategic agreement that provides a comprehensive framework for future security, law enforcement and criminal justice co-operation—a treaty between the UK and the EU—that would complement our existing extensive and mature bilateral relationships with our European friends to promote our common security. That is just one outworking of the Government’s commitment to national security.
I now turn—I think, finally—to amendment 385 and new clause 77. Amendment 385, tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips), seeks to replicate the protections in part 3 of the Criminal Justice (European Protection Order) (England and Wales) Regulations 2014 in relation to protected persons. As I understand it, the amendment seeks to provide that the relevant authorities in England and Wales would continue to recognise and act on the orders made under the EU directive by the remaining member states, whether or not they act on ours.
I congratulate the hon. Lady on her powerful speech, but we cannot accept the amendment at this time because our continued co-operation with other EU member states’ courts is a matter to be negotiated. The outcome of the negotiations is not yet certain, and it would therefore be premature to seek to replicate in our law one side of a reciprocal arrangement that may not continue. However, I am happy to make it clear that if the forthcoming negotiations produce an agreement to continue access to the regime established under the directive, or something like it, appropriate steps in legislation will be brought forward to implement it at that time. I therefore urge her not to press her amendment.
I hear what the Minister is saying and I take on board that this has to go through the new negotiations. What I am trying to do with the amendment is to ask Ministers to remember that this needs to go through the negotiations, because it was completely missing from the White Paper on the earlier negotiations.
The hon. Lady’s point is well made and has been heard by me and my right hon. and hon. Friends, and I am grateful to her for making it.
The hon. Lady also tabled new clause 77. It may assist the Committee if I explain that the Government are taking forward a range of work to tackle violence against women and girls and that we are already required to lay annual reports before Parliament on the issue in the context of the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence—the Istanbul convention.
The coalition signed the Istanbul convention in 2012 to demonstrate its strong commitment to tackling violence against women and girls, and this Government have made absolutely clear our commitment to ratifying it. The convention seeks to continue promoting international co-operation on this issue. Indeed, it is the first pan-European legally binding instrument that provides a comprehensive set of standards to prevent and combat violence against women.
The hon. Lady will know that we have engaged and will continue to engage with a range of international partners, including the EU, in our efforts to tackle this issue. For example, we recently participated in work with the Council of Europe—as Members will know, it includes both EU and non-EU member states—to develop a best practice guide on stopping forced marriage and female genital mutilation.
I know the hon. Lady desires ensuring that Parliament is updated on this issue. As she will be aware, on 1 November we laid the first report on progress towards ratification of the convention, as required by the Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Ratification of Convention) Act 2017. The report, which we are required to lay annually, sets out the action we are taking to tackle violence against women and girls and how we comply with the measures set out in the convention. In addition, once the UK has ratified it, we will be required to submit regular reports on compliance to the Council of Europe. As right hon. and hon. Members will appreciate, we want to avoid duplicating our existing reporting requirements in this area.
We are committed to doing all we can to address violence against women and girls both domestically and internationally. As the hon. Lady will be aware, our cross-Government strategy outlines our ambition that no victim of abuse is turned away from the support they need. It is underpinned by increased funding of £100 million, and a national statement of expectations sets out a clear blueprint for good local commissioning and service provision. I hope that I have reassured the hon. Lady that the Government have been, and will continue to be, committed to tackling violence against women and girls and to updating the House on our work in this area and that she will therefore not press her new clause.
The right hon. Gentleman enjoys a jest, but I hope that the Committee will understand that, as I set out at the beginning of my speech—I have now been on my feet for an hour and 20 minutes, compared with an indication that I would take an hour, so I needed to pare down my remarks—it is not the Government’s policy, as he knows, to remain in the single market and the customs union.
In the interests of allowing other hon. Members to contribute to the debate, I will conclude my remarks. We face an unprecedented legislative challenge, to which the power in clause 7 is the only practical solution. The power is only a temporary solution to achieving our key objective: a functioning statute book in time for exit day. The Government believe that we have made significant concessions on the issue, both with the sifting committee and by putting into statute the requirement to include certain information in the explanatory memorandums. I hope that those concessions have tackled the concerns expressed throughout our consideration of these amendments. I am conscious of the commitment I gave to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield in relation to the scope of the powers, and I look forward to working with him. I will finish by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne for all that he has done, with the unanimous support of the Procedure Committee, to ensure that the House has the proposal for a sifting committee.
It is a great pleasure to follow the Minister, who presented a rather unbending policy posture this afternoon, but with his usual great good humour. On Second Reading I spoke mainly about the problem of the Henry VIII powers and the excessive use of delegated legislation in the Bill, and I feel justified, given the criticism outside the House that this was a power grab by Ministers.
When looking at clause 7, there are two big issues that we need to address: the scope and content of the delegated legislation, and the institutional architecture. I was therefore pleased to be a member of the Procedure Committee when it agreed to a report that acknowledged the problem and said that the House has a unique and unprecedented requirement and that we need special mechanisms to suit the task ahead. When I first told the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) last January that we should be looking into the Henry VIII powers, I think he was rather underwhelmed, but I think that now, on reflection, he is pleased that we did so. Only he could have secured a consensus between, for example, the hon. Members for Chichester (Gillian Keegan) and for Wellingborough (Mr Bone), the Scottish National party and me, which is a great credit to him. Our report sought a committee of the House to oversee all the delegated legislation.
I am happy to support amendments 393, 395, 396 and 397, which will put in the Bill the requirement for a sifting committee. I am even more pleased that the Government have accepted those amendments—the first changes they have accepted since publishing the proposals last summer. They will give the House a key role in overseeing the delegated legislation. As the Minister said, it is extremely important that Ministers will be required to produce explanatory memorandums. Without those, the committee would have a next to impossible task.
I think that the approach whereby the committee will give advice to Ministers so that statutory instruments can be upgraded from the negative to the affirmative resolution procedure is absolutely essential, because it means that the committee will be able to say that on some issues there must be a debate and a vote of the whole House, or that Ministers must provide an adequate explanation. I also think that the timetable that we have set out, of 10 days, is reasonable. However, I have some doubts about amendments 394 and 398, which would allow Ministers to step outside the process when they believe that the matter under consideration is urgent, because, as we all know, that could be abused by being stretched in a way that undermines the process.
I know that hon. Members, particularly those on the Opposition Benches, are somewhat doubtful about the efficacy of the amendments, but I pray in aid the Hansard Society’s assessment—I think it is the most neutral and impartial assessment one could look for—which agrees that the procedure has been strengthened. There is now a requirement to lay accompanying documents. The House will have more power, and the committee will be able to refer statutory instruments to further debate and upgrade the level of scrutiny.
I regret that the amendments do not reflect fully the report that the Procedure Committee published in November, which said that there should be a scrutiny reserve. That is what the European Scrutiny Committee has and I think that that would be better. It would also be better if Ministers followed the Committee’s recommendation to publish now a full list of the delegated legislation they expect to bring forward.
The amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), who is on the Opposition Front Bench, would strengthen the process significantly by ensuring that Parliament was able to decide rather than just be consulted. He referred to the terrible saga of tuition fees, where the House was ignored by the Government. That is not reassuring and Ministers must know that. Indeed, one wonders at Ministers who did that knowing that this proposed legislation would be brought forward with a great package of statutory instruments under the negative procedure. That seems to be an extraordinary bit of behaviour. My hon. Friend also tabled amendments that would enable raising the scrutiny level to super-affirmative. Perhaps Ministers should still consider that.
Hon. Members interested in the sifting committee’s terms of reference, make-up and membership will have another opportunity to debate them when the Standing Orders come forward. The Leader of the House put forward some Standing Orders, but they are amendable. If hon. Members wish to change them, it is open for them to do so. I remind all hon. Members on both sides of the House that House business is not whipped business, so they do not need to fear—[Interruption.] I can see one Minister looking at me quizzically. House business is not whipped business, so Members can take a view in line with their conscience on what they think would make for the strongest sifting committee.
On the scope of clause 7 and the content and substance of the statutory instruments, Ministers are being very inflexible and I do not think that that will serve them well. My constituents have contacted me—I am sure other hon. Members have been contacted—with their concerns about environmental policy and animal sentience. I know Ministers have another route for dealing with the animal sentience issue. We also have very strong concerns about children’s rights. In September, we had a very good seminar on children’s rights led by Liverpool University’s law department, which brought together people with concerns about this issue from all parts of the United Kingdom, including Scotland and Northern Ireland. I really feel that the Minister’s response on new clause 53 and the position of child refugees is very disappointing, as is what he said about the UN convention on the rights of the child, which is covered by amendments 149 and 150. Now, that has not been debated today, but we will be voting on it later.
I want to point out to the Minister that he cannot rely on the Children Act 1989, which contains provisions on the best interests of the child, in the way he seems to think he can, because it applies only in certain classes of case referring to children. For example, it does not apply to housing decisions. It is simply not the case that the child’s best interest always has priority in English law, and if we wanted to do something about that we would incorporate the UN convention on the rights of the child into English law, as we did with the European convention on human rights and the Human Rights Act in 1998.
The Minister was very forthcoming in his debate with the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) on the question of looking again at the definition of deficiencies and the list of examples in the Bill. However, many hon. Members will have been extremely disappointed by his inflexibility and failure to shift on the question of whether the negative resolution process can be used where the Minister thinks it is appropriate and not necessary. This was covered by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) in amendment 68 and my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) in amendment 49. I have to say to the Minister that I do not think that he convinced many Opposition Members on that.
Similarly, on tertiary legislation, it is incredible to argue that the financial regulators are not making policy choices. They are. It may well be that they are in a better position given the length, complexity and technical nature of such matters to be the people responsible for those regulations. It may well be that they are in a better position to do that than Members of this House, but I do not think the Minister should claim that policy choices are not being made here, because they clearly are being made all the time.
I will have to check the record—I was just flicking through my speaking notes—but I am sure that when I said that there were no policy decisions, that was about a 10,000 page document about how institutions were to comply with regulations. On the particular point about tertiary legislation and the financial regulation system, I feel sure that when the hon. Lady and I served together on the Treasury Committee she would have been as indefatigable a defender of the independence of the Bank of England as I would have been. Surely she does not want to undermine that.
I do not wish to undermine that. I just want the Minister to present what I believe to be a more accurate picture to the House about the content of tertiary legislation. That is the point that I am making.
It simply comes down to the fact that clause 7 gives Ministers too much scope. That brings into doubt whether the stated intention of the Bill, which is, simply, to translate the body of European law on to the UK statute book, is all that can happen once the Bill is passed. That is the problem with it.
The thing that will probably most concern our constituents is the proposal to abolish the functions of the EU agencies. That is extremely worrying and we do not get clear answers from Ministers on individual cases. My hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh) spoke about this in relation to the European Environment Agency and the European Chemicals Agency. The Minister will have seen, as I did yesterday, on the front page of the Financial Times the pressure from the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industries over chemicals and medicines safety regulations. When we ask Ministers in other Departments what will happen, we do not get any certainty. This is not at all reassuring. There are big risks for the economy if we do not handle this much better than the Government are handling it now. The issue of the regulations of the agencies is the thing that can have the most significant impact on the economy. Whatever else people voted for when they voted to leave the EU, they certainly did not vote to lose jobs and be poorer.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I think the hon. Lady is right. The Minister will be able to clarify this later, but I think it is a key point that the vote on the primary legislation— on the implementation of the Bill—will not happen until after the treaty has been ratified. I think that there is still some confusion about whether the vote on a motion, or a resolution, will happen before or after the ratification of the treaty, but the main point I want to make about the weakness of trying to do this simply through a resolution is that it is the primary legislation that counts, and it is clear from what the Minister has said, and what has been said in the written ministerial statement, that the primary legislation vote, the statutory vote, will not happen until after the ratification and the whole legal process have been completed.
The written ministerial statement makes it very clear that the meaningful vote will come after the negotiations have been concluded, but before ratification. That is precisely why it was published today.
I think that there is a big difference between us on the word “meaningful”. I shall be happy to give way to the Minister again, but I think that he should clarify the position, and confirm that the only vote that we will have before the ratification of the treaty is a vote on a motion.
We are talking about a “take it or leave it” deal, and about a “take it or leave it” vote on the completed deal. That is the only thing that is there, even in the written ministerial statement; and there is no guarantee in the legislation, by the way. The Minister is not proposing to put that on the face of the Bill. Even if we take the written ministerial statement in good faith, and even if we rip up our commitment to putting things on the face of the Bill, all that the Minister has given us is the possibility of a vote on a motion, not a vote on primary legislation before the ratification of the treaty.
No. The hon. Gentleman can point and hail as many cabs as he wants, but I am not going to give way to him again because others wish to speak.
All too often, the Government have urged us to accept clause 9 and the related measures on the basis of trust alone. As has already been said, it is just too difficult to see how we can put that trust in their hands. For a start, they have systematically ignored resolutions of the House over the past seven years; they have regularly refused to allow annulment debates on statutory instruments so that they could be meaningful—they have refused to do that even when they have guaranteed at the Dispatch Box that they were going to do so; and they have insisted on having majorities on all Committees. I fear that if we allow the Government to have excessive powers, they will tend to use every single one of those powers. The truth is that they seem to want a carte blanche.
I wish the Government welcomed the role of Parliament in this process, but I just do not detect that. The devil will be in the detail. The Government cannot just bamboozle the people with verbiage that has absolutely no meaning whatsoever: “Brexit means Brexit”, “a red, white and blue Brexit”, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, and all the rest of it. It is a denigration of the English language, let alone anything else.
What we actually need is a Bill, with words in it that have legal effect, because, in the end, this is an existential matter for Parliament. Are we really a sovereign Parliament if we surrender our power to the Government? Not really. Are we really a representative democracy if MPs are denied a truly meaningful role in the process? Not really. Are we really a United Kingdom Parliament if we carry only 52% of the country with us? Not really.
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who made some very serious constitutional points with great colour and eloquence. I am grateful to hon. and right hon. Members who have contributed to this debate through their various amendments and speeches. My approach over the course of my speech—I suspect that it will take me an hour to get through it—will be to take clause 9 first, and then to come on to clauses 16 and 17 as well as schedule 7.
It may be helpful to hon. Members who want to intervene to know that I will first explain the function of clause 9 and why it is necessary, and then set out some of the illustrations that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook) suggested were required. I will come on to talk about the limits, and then I will address the amendments, including amendment 7, which was tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). The key issue will come down to timing, so I will also touch on that, but first, let me set the scene.
Clause 9 highlights the interaction between diplomacy at the international level and the domestic legislative preparation for Brexit. The Government are committed to securing the best deal that we can with our EU partners for the whole United Kingdom against the very acute time pressure set out under the article 50 process imposed on us.
Clause 9 enables regulations to be made for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement. It is now, as hon. Members have said, a supplementary provision to give us agility in the negotiations and the flexibility of legislative procedure to deliver the best deal under time pressure. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union announced to this House on 13 November the Government’s intention to bring forward new primary legislation in the form of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill to give effect to the major elements of the withdrawal agreement. That will include citizens’ rights, the implementation period, the financial settlement and the other issues wrapped up within the exit negotiations.
May I just make a little progress?
I am not sure whether every hon. Member has had a chance to read the written ministerial statement that was published today—it is entitled “Procedures for the Approval and Implementation of EU Exit Agreements”—but it is worth taking a look at it with regard to some of the concerns that have been expressed. We intend to introduce the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill after there has been a successful vote on the final deal in Parliament. Notwithstanding that, it remains essential that clause 9 stands part of this Bill. We do not yet know the precise shape or outcome of future negotiations, and it is important that the necessary legislative mechanisms are available to us so that we fully implement the withdrawal agreement in time for the exit date.
I will make a small amount of progress but then, of course, I will take the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention.
There will be a wide range of more technical separation issues that will need to be legislated for in time for our exit on 29 March 2019. Some will be better suited to secondary legislation, and it would not be practical to account for the sheer volume of all these issues in primary legislation. It is of course not uncommon for the principles of an international agreement to be implemented, at least to some degree, through secondary legislation. To give just one example, the Nuclear Installations (Liability for Damage) Order 2016 implements the 2004 protocol to the convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy.
As for how we implement such secondary legislation, clause 9—this is the crux—offers a material benefit in terms of timing. We would be able to start—not complete—laying some of the statutory instruments soon after reaching agreement with our EU friends alongside the passage of new primary legislation. It is impossible to say with 100% precision at this point all the technical regulations that will be required to implement the withdrawal agreement before the full terms have been negotiated. That is obvious, and is accepted by Members on both sides of the House. However, some regulations might be required, and some will require a lead time of several months, so we need to reserve the ability to use clause 9 as soon as practically possible after a deal has been concluded. If we waited for further primary legislation to receive Royal Assent, that might be too late and we could be too squeezed for time, even in the scenario in which we reach an agreement in October, as is our current aim.
Does the Minister recognise my point about the situation that EU nationals are in now? Will the Government consider moving their issue into the immigration Bill, which should be coming imminently, rather than leaving them in limbo for another year?
All hon. Members should heartily welcome the agreement we have reached on the principles that will protect the 3 million EU nationals in this country—we want them to stay and to know they are valued—and the 1 million British expats abroad. Of course, there is still a significant amount of detail in the withdrawal agreement that will need to be worked up, so the hon. Lady may be putting the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse. Can we at least recognise that we have made substantial progress—and substantial progress from the EU’s point of view—which is why we are proceeding to trade talks?
I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman shortly. He has been very patient and I did say that would take his amendment. Sorry, I meant that I would take his intervention, not his amendment—just teasing.
Clause 9 is not intended to be used to implement major elements of the withdrawal agreement. Its role will be to assist with making regulations to deal with the more technical separation issues that are better suited to secondary legislation. There will be a large number of such regulations and they will need to be in place in time for exit day.
The Minister said that the House would vote on a resolution. This morning’s written ministerial statement also refers to the House voting on a resolution on the final agreement. What would the Government’s response be if the House were to vote against that resolution? What would it mean for Parliament and for the country?
I will come to that. It is very clear that we would not be able to proceed with the withdrawal agreement, but that does not mean that we would stop Brexit from happening. That is set out very clearly in the written statement, which also repeats points that have been made before in statements at the Dispatch Box.
I am just going to make a bit more progress.
I will address the point raised by the Labour spokesperson, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, because I think he was on to something regarding the need to spell out and illustrate, albeit not necessarily exhaustively, the kinds of scenarios in which clause 9 remains relevant in the light of the proposed primary legislation. Let me offer a few illustrative examples.
Clause 9 may be required to legislate for the position of ongoing administrative proceedings when we leave the EU. This is a broad basket of technical issues, including the technical aspects of ongoing proceedings on competition and anti-trust issues under regulation 1/2003, for example, which sets out the co-ordination between the Commission and national competition authorities. Another example is the ongoing procedures on concentrations between undertakings in mergers under regulation 139/2004, and the allocation of jurisdiction between the EU and national authorities. These detailed and technical issues do not need to be put on the face of a Bill, but they must be legislated for in time for exit.
Another area for which clause 9 could be used relates to the privileges and immunities afforded by the UK to the EU—its institutions, bodies and staff—post exit. Privileges and immunities are a standard feature of international law, and are generally considered necessary for the proper functioning of international organisations. Privileges and immunities for the EU are currently implemented under protocol 7 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. After exit, the EU will continue to require privileges and immunities to cover any functions it has, although the precise contours may differ according to the deal that we strike. Our agreement on privileges and immunities will need to be implemented in domestic legislation.
The point is that clause 9 is so widely drafted that it could apply to absolutely anything that could be linked with EU withdrawal. I am sure that the Department for Exiting the European Union has done a great deal of analysis—indeed, the Minister is showing that in his speech—of the areas that may be affected at the point of withdrawal. Surely that is the point at which the Government need to come to the House and, rather than speculating about what might be affected, actually identify that to us so that the powers can be limited precisely to those areas for which the Government need them.
I thank my hon. Friend for the constructive way she makes her point. Of course, until we have the withdrawal agreement, we will not know precisely the nature of the technical—
May I at least give the answer before my right hon. and learned Friend jumps in?
That is why the agility that clause 9 gives us is important. I do not mean to correct my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) in a lawyerly way, but it is not quite right to say that clause 9 can legislate for anything in the context of departing the EU. It relates only to the withdrawal agreement, and I think she said it related to withdrawing from the EU.
Another illustration of what clause 9 could be used for is the spelling out of the technical detail of how ongoing UK cases at the European Court of Justice should be handled, and how the UK courts should treat resulting judgments. Some of that might be done under this Bill, and some under the withdrawal agreement, but we will need to clarify things such as the types of cases that would be in scope and the precise procedural points in terms of whether a case could be considered to be pending, among others. Without that clarification, how such cases should be treated might not be clear. We would run the risk of legal uncertainty, as well as uncertainty for the individuals involved in those cases.
I do not want to make too much of that before my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield jumps in. He is quite right—he has made this point before, and he may want to hear me out before I take his intervention—that, in 2016, there were 23 preliminary references from UK courts and just one infraction case against the UK. So we do not expect this issue to affect large numbers. None the less, for those affected, it is still important to get this right.
I want to understand this, because it is rather important. We are going to enact a withdrawal agreement Bill—I think that is what it is called. I would expect that to have statutory instrument powers—the very statutory instrument powers we can consider in relation to the scope of the withdrawal agreement when deciding what we then enact by secondary legislation to take us out. I begin to wonder whether, in fact, it is the Government’s intention not to have any statutory instruments made under that agreement at all, but to seek to make them entirely through the mechanism of clause 9 before we have had the opportunity of considering what we actually want. That is why clause 9 is, I have to say to my hon. Friend, so mischievous. While I would be prepared to listen to some great exception, abandoning the normal legislative process in this way seems to be utterly undesirable, so I would press my hon. Friend on what is going to happen with this withdrawal agreement Bill. Are we going to have secondary legislation under it?
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. I should just say to my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury that I will come on to talk about the restraints on the exercise of clause 9 later. However, in relation to my right hon. and learned Friend’s point, if we waited for the withdrawal agreement Bill not just to be introduced after the withdrawal agreement has been signed but to be fully enacted—if we waited for it to complete its full passage—we would not have time to deal with the volume of technical secondary legislation that we need to put through.
No, that is not right. We would be required to wait for the withdrawal agreement Bill to be enacted, so that is not right.
No, I am going to make some progress.
I know that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is engaging with this very seriously and constructively and that he is frustrated, but there is no getting around the timing issue that we have.
No, I am going to make some progress.
Nor is there any getting around the long tail of technical, regulatory secondary legislation that we will need to get through if we want to provide the legal certainty that will make for a smooth Brexit.
I will give way to the right hon. Lady later, and I am coming on to talk about her amendment.
I just want to address the point made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich about illustrations of what this power will be used for, because I hope that that will serve to assuage some of the concerns. The power could also be used to legislate, for example, for the status of goods that have been placed on the UK market at the time of our withdrawal, subject, of course, to what we agree with the EU on that. That could include a whole range of very technical, detailed measures to ensure that EU products continue to be made available in the UK, with no additional requirements on relabelling; to define what is meant by “placed on the market” for those products that benefit from the measures agreed; or to establish measures to facilitate continued oversight of those products. Again, these examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. However, I hope that I have at least addressed the kinds of cases that we are talking about, and also given an idea of the scale and volume of the technical separation issues that will need to be legislated for in time for exit day. Clause 9 will make an important contribution to a smooth Brexit in precisely those areas.
Timing is the crucial issue. Given that there are many examples of an accelerated process being used to get primary legislation through this place on many different matters, including in a single day when that has been necessary, why would it not be possible, if time was starting to run out, to have a very simple one or two-clause Bill that would do the bits of things on which the Minister needs to get agreement and to put the secondary powers in place, and therefore at least have a vote on primary legislation? Why is it not possible to do that very quickly to deal with the concerns that have been expressed?
It is just not practicable. I will come on to address the timeframe for how we are going to approach the agreement, the meaningful vote on a resolution, and then the withdrawal agreement Bill.
Does not my hon. Friend think that there should be a trigger within clause 9 to require the consent of the House to the overall withdrawal agreement that is reached before the powers are exercised? Otherwise those powers are unrestrained, and that seems wrong. Does he have a view on that?
My right hon. and learned Friend touches on a very important principle. I hope that I will be able to give him satisfaction on that precise point later.
Having dealt with the technical scope of the power and some illustrations of the scale of what it is going to be used for, and before I address the timing issues, I want to touch on the limitations and parameters—
I will give way to my right hon. Friend later. If she will just be patient, I want to make a bit of progress, given the time available.
It is worth looking very carefully at the limitations and parameters constraining the exercise of clause 9. It can only be used to implement the withdrawal agreement, and even then subsection (3) makes it clear that it cannot be used to levy taxation, to make retrospective provision, to create relevant criminal offences, or to repeal or amend the Human Rights Act 1998. Paragraph 6 of schedule 7 further requires the affirmative procedure in a whole range of scenarios, from the establishment of new public authority functions to the imposition of any fee exercised by any such authority. Critically—I am not sure that all hon. Members have picked this up—the power endures only until exit day. Its operation is shorter than that under clause 7. On the Government’s current expected timetable, it would, in practice, be used for only about six months, so it is not the open-ended power that some have suggested.
In addition, the Government have accepted the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) to establish a sifting committee to advise on the scrutiny procedures used for secondary legislation under the Bill. That will apply to this clause. That is on top of the Government amendment tabled last week that mandates Ministers to provide explanatory material for all the statutory instruments made under the principal powers of the Bill. We are listening. We are committed to making sure that Parliament plays a crucial role—a fully transparent scrutiny role—in the exercise of clause 9.
In sum, the power under clause 9 is required to legislate domestically for the large number of more technical separation issues that must be settled in time for exit day if we are to have the smooth Brexit that, whether we voted leave or remain, we all agree is crucial from here on in. The regulations—
I will just finish this point before I finally give way to my right hon. Friend, who has been very patient.
The regulations will be subject to the established methods of parliamentary scrutiny, with additional scrutiny provided by the new sifting committee. This is a time-limited and constrained power, but it is also an important power to help us to prepare for a smooth Brexit.
Will my hon. Friend confirm that the Bill was drafted before the general election on 8 June? If I am wrong about that, could he please tell us when the Bill was drafted?
As someone who was brought into government reasonably recently and on to the Committee even more recently, I would have to check. I am happy to provide that clarity by the end of proceedings. I suspect that the process has been an iterative one, but let me see whether I can come back to my right hon. Friend on that.
Clause 9 is not just an important part of the procedural toolkit; it serves a much bigger function that we must not overlook. It sends a message of clarity and confidence to our EU partners that we are ready, willing and able to conclude and implement a deal. By the same virtue, it sends an equally important message to our citizens and businesses that we are equipped to secure a smooth legal transition. I understand the concerns raised through the various amendments, and we should debate them. I will come on to them, and I hope that I will be able to give hon. Members some further reassurance.
May I ask the Minister two questions? First, in respect of the statement made by the Brexit Secretary this morning, can the Minister confirm that the withdrawal agreement Bill is not guaranteed to come before the House for a vote before exit day? All the statement says is that the Bill will be introduced before exit day.
Secondly, why do the Government find so objectionable the idea of activating, if necessary, the third part of article 50, which allows for the Government to ask for an extension if we run out of time as a result of the many unforeseen practical problems? Ministers are talking from the Dispatch Box as though that third part of article 50 did not exist. Why was it included, if not to allow for an extension if the time expires and we have not achieved what we want?
I have enjoyed having proper debates with the hon. Gentleman both during the referendum and since. I point out that, as the written ministerial statement makes clear,
“the substantive provisions will only take effect from the moment of exit.”
I know that he wants to drag me down into the territory of the no deal scenario and Parliament’s ability to send the Government back to renegotiate. As a former Foreign Office lawyer who spent six years in that Department and worked on EU matters, in practice I think it unlikely that that would be meaningful in any way, shape or form. The point has been made in the debate that if that looked likely, we would be positively incentivising the EU to give us, and we would end up with, worse terms. [Interruption.] It is not pure speculation; it is grounded on six years of working as a lawyer in the Foreign Office and conducting negotiations. [Interruption.]
Order. [Interruption.] Order. The hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) should not have been shouting in the first place, and he definitely should not have been shouting over me as I called for order. We are having a very detailed discussion here, which does not lend itself to shouting from Members on one Bench or the other.
Thank you, Mrs Laing. Many of the amendments that have been tabled have focused on the exact nature of the regulations that will be made under the power in clause 9. The exact use of the power will, of course, depend on the content of the withdrawal agreement that we reach with the EU. That agreement will be debated and voted on by this Parliament. The Government have made a clear commitment on that, and it should not be prejudiced or pre-empted now. There has been a lot of talk about a meaningful vote in this House, and the hon. Member for Streatham (Chuka Umunna) has raised the matter again. I will come on to that, and to the key issue of timing. May I say to hon. Members gently, and with the greatest respect, that such a vote would be pretty meaningless in any event if we were not ready to implement on time the deal that we want to do with the EU?
I thought a moment ago that the Minister was rejecting the idea of a meaningful vote, but I am delighted to hear that he is getting on to it. Does he accept that it is perfectly likely that as the negotiations come to an end, the Government will want to enter into a deal, but they will have given in to pressure from the right wing of the Cabinet and Back-Bench Members of the party and rejected various things on offer from other EU members? That is a far more likely scenario than no deal being the other EU members’ preferred option. In such a case, it would be absolutely essential that the first thing we had was a parliamentary decision on a meaningful vote. We could then legislate, once that particular British issue had been resolved where it should be resolved—in Parliament.
From my experience, I must say that I think that is a rather rose-tinted perspective on EU negotiations. I should also say that the same arguments were made about my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister going into the phase 1 negotiations, yet we are on the cusp of formal ratification of the joint report dealing with the first phase issues. The Prime Minister has made some difficult compromises and shown flexibility precisely to get the deal that I think my right hon. and learned Friend welcomes—I also welcome it—even though we were on different sides during the referendum campaign.
I turn to new clauses 3 and 75, which attempt to remove clause 9 wholesale from the Bill. They would undermine one of the important strategic objectives of the Bill, which is to provide the legal means to implement the withdrawal agreement thoroughly in domestic law. I hope I have explained the important, albeit residual, role that clause 9 stands to play in light of the separate primary legislation covering the withdrawal agreement. To remove clause 9 would increase the legal uncertainty, and I hope that the new clauses will not be pressed.
I want to spend a little bit of time focusing on amendments 7, 47 and 355 and new clause 68, but particularly on amendment 7 in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. May I say at the outset that I do not think he has any ulterior motive in tabling the amendment? I have had a number of constructive conversations with him, and I look forward to more in the future. By dint of that, I hope he accepts that I have followed through on every assurance I have given him, and that I have not failed to live up to the undertakings I have given him. It is in that spirit that we on both sides of the debate need to proceed as the Bill goes through the House.
Amendments 7 and 355 call for a separate statute to be enacted approving the withdrawal agreement before the powers in clause 9 can be used. There are a number of problems with doing so. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) mentioned the constitutional issue, and I agree with him about that. From a practical point of view, however, the crucial problem is the effect that amendment 7 would have in significantly curtailing the timely advantage that we will gain from clause 9. One of the key benefits of the clause is the ability to start to use it reasonably swiftly after the withdrawal agreement has been reached.
To add an unnecessary Bill to the parliamentary agenda—in addition to Parliament’s meaningful vote, as set out in today’s written ministerial statement, and on top of the new withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill—would be restrictive enough. However, to make the first use of the powers in clause 9 wait until the additional legislation has fully passed through Parliament would unduly compress the time we will have to prepare the legislative groundwork, and would risk greater uncertainty. With the greatest respect in the world, I am afraid that is why the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is defective.
If I may, I will finish my comments on this amendment, and I will then let my right hon. and learned Friend critique them in the round. I suspect such a critique is coming.
In rare and exceptional cases, we may need to exercise the powers in clause 9 to pass statutory instruments before the final enactment of the primary legislation, which will be on the date of exit. Let me give an illustration of why it may be necessary for operational changes to be in put in place before that point. An example is where specific statutory authority is needed for a monitoring body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement on citizens’ rights, if that cannot be done in advance under other primary legislation. Such a body would need to be set up beforehand so that it was ready to operate on day one, but we may not know its precise content and contours until relatively late on in the negotiations.
Yes, the potential scope for reliance on clause 9 has been reduced by the Government’s commitment to primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period, but it is still important to retain it. The fetter imposed by amendment 7 would risk materially damaging responsible preparations for exit, including in sensitive areas such as citizens’ rights. I know that that is not the intention of my right hon. and learned Friend, to whom I am very happy to give way.
I am again most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. He will know—I touched on this in my comments—that when this issue was first raised, I suggested that one possibility might be to allow statutory instruments to be laid and voted on by this House prior to the enactment of the further statute, but not allow them to be brought into force until that further statute had been enacted. That would allow the House to stop the statutory process if it was not happy with it. As I understand it, the further statute has to be enacted before the date we leave, because without it we do not have the powers to pull out. In those circumstances, I find it impossible to understand why my suggestion might not solve his problem. I think he will agree that that is where our dialogue stopped. If he actually wants to do something even before that, I have to say to him that, as a matter of principle, I object.
My right hon. and learned Friend is right about almost everything; the only point he is not right about is that I think he will find that my suggestion to him was the appropriate way to deal with that. I will come on to give him precisely the assurance he is asking for, although we have not had a chance to get it on to the face of the Bill. I would argue that a political assurance, which I will give him on top of the others that have been given, ought adequately to address his concerns.
With the genuine and material risk of my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment in mind, I hope I can go further, bridge the gap and reassure hon. Members, and assuage any residual concerns they may have about the operation of clause 9 in practice. I want to provide three very clear assurances to the House.
First, secondary legislation passed under clause 9 will either be affirmative or considered by the Committee established under the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne. Secondly, the Government are committed to publishing such statutory instruments in draft as far as possible, as early as possible, to facilitate maximum scrutiny, which is another point we have discussed.
Thirdly, we expect that the vast majority of statutory instruments enacted under clause 9 will not come into force until exit day, when the withdrawal agreement comes into force. But I can give my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and the Committee, the concrete assurance that, following the timeframe set out in today’s written ministerial statement, none of the SIs introduced under clause 9 will come into effect until Parliament has voted on the final deal. I hope that that provides important reassurance and is sufficient for hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.
That approach has two advantages. First, it retains our ability to use clause 9 in time to fully implement the withdrawal agreement. It also squarely addresses the concern, fairly and honestly reflected in amendment 7, that there should be a meaningful vote—the critical point made by my right hon. and learned Friend—and that we should not bring new law implementing the withdrawal agreement into effect if Parliament votes that agreement down.
The hon. Lady, as ever, sums up the situation very neatly. Clause 9 is absolutely necessary to make sure that we can fully implement the withdrawal agreement and provide legal certainty. The problem with amendment 7 is that it emasculates that ability because of the time pressure it places on us. That is why, with the greatest respect to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, it is not an effective amendment and we cannot accept it.
We have only two hours left, and I want to make some progress, but I give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset.
I think that my hon. Friend is suggesting a route to solving the problem raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). Could not the requirement that the resolution be sanctioned by the House before the implementation of those orders be put into a revised version of clause 9 on Report?
I would hope that the assurances we have made, along with the written ministerial statement, are adequate, but there is nothing stopping any hon. Member coming back and having another go. We have—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Rhondda is sitting there tapping knowingly. He has been talking about the separation of powers between the legislature and the Executive, and now I am being asked to correct homework for hon. Members. That is not necessarily the course on which to proceed. What I will do, as we have done all along and as I think as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield knows, is to continue to discuss all these matters with my right hon. and hon. Friends as we progress. The important point to understand—we have not had a huge amount of time to go into the details of what the compromise assurances might be—is that at the moment amendment 7 is defective and would have very real consequences for our ability to deliver on the deal we do with our European partners.
Does that mean, therefore, that the Government would accept an amendment on Report that put on the face of the Bill that there would be a vote, as is stated in the written statement, on a resolution in both Houses of Parliament that would cover the withdrawal agreement and the terms of our future relationship? Is that what the Minister is saying?
What I am saying is that my hon. Friend has had an assurance, given by me at the Dispatch Box, that I hope addresses his concern. If hon. Members want to come back on Report with further amendments, I will continue to give them proper consideration. I think all hon. Members who have dealt with me directly have found that I have been true to that commitment.
No, I am not going to give way again.
Amendment 47, tabled by the Chair of the Exiting the European Union Committee, is slightly different in that it would make the use of clause 9 dependent on approval of the withdrawal agreement by both Houses without specifying statute. Similar timing concerns apply. We would need to retain the option to ready statutory instruments before such approval, but I have made clear, and I make clear again, that they would not enter into force until Parliament had held its meaningful vote.
New clause 68 replicates the provisions of amendment 47, with the addition that the Government must seek the approval of Parliament no later than three months before the date of exit. We cannot bind ourselves to such strict sequencing constraints when the latter stages of the negotiations remain unknown. To do so, in fact, would be irresponsible. It is also a vague and arguably defective new clause, I say with the greatest respect, because it is not clear whether by the “conclusion” of the agreement the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) means finalisation of the text, signature, ratification or entry into force. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will not press their new clauses and amendments.
I am going to make some progress.
Amendment 116 would require a referendum on accepting the deal or remaining in the EU before the clause 9 power could be used. I do not think that is feasible, and it is not desirable. The Government are clear that the British people have voted to leave the EU. We will deliver on their direction. We will deliver on their mandate. Frankly, this is a pretty thinly veiled attempt to block Brexit and defy the result of the referendum, in contrast to some of the other, legitimate, concerns raised across the House. If hon. Members wanted to hold a second referendum on the terms agreed with the EU, the proper time and place to argue for such a requirement was when the EU Referendum Act 2015 was passed. I therefore urge that the amendment not be pressed.
New clause 4 would require separate legislation to set the exit day, and new clause 66 states that the exit day cannot be set before Parliament has given its approval for the terms of the withdrawal agreement. The Government accept the case for legislative prescription of the exit day for the sake of finality and legal certainty, so I hope that the new clause has been rendered unnecessary.
New clause 19 and amendment 55 mandate that the power in clause 9 cannot be used until the publication of the withdrawal agreement, and that it should not be available until all other exit Bills have passed. It is clear that regulations cannot be made under clause 9 until an agreement exists and its contents are known. It is not necessary, then, to require on top of that that the agreement be published and placed in the House of Commons and House of Lords Libraries before the power can be relied on. It is of course standard practice to lay international treaties before Parliament under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Equally, it is not right to tie the use of this power to the publication of other primary legislation passed in this Session. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) not to press the amendment.
Amendment 361 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), who is the Chair of the Justice Committee.
The amendment would create a separate power to legislate for the implementation period. I hope that the Government’s announcement of a separate Bill—primary legislation—covering the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period addresses his concern.
I am grateful for that. It was intended as a probing amendment, particularly to ensure that these issues were ventilated. Given the assurances in previous days of the debate, I obviously will not push it. While I am on my feet, however, may I ask the Minister to reflect again on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Jeremy Lefroy)? I really think that the Government would find a means of resolving these matters if they were to bring forward their own amendment in the form suggested.
I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. I hope he understands how, in good faith, I am seeking to engage with hon. Members on all sides of the House. It was my suggestion that the assurance would be made to him. We will reflect further as we lead into Report—
I mentioned the wrong constituency name. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford would not at all want to be involved in that matter. The Minister knew who I meant. It was my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) who made the point, and I hope that the Minister will consider it.
My hon. Friend’s point is well made.
I turn now to equalities legislation. Last week, the Government tabled amendment 391 to schedule 7. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said that the Government had not come back with any amendments in response to requests. This is a clear example of where we have listened and returned. The amendment will require Ministers to state in writing, when using the powers in clauses 7 to 9, whether they amend equalities legislation and that they have
“so far as required to do so by equalities legislation, had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under the Equality Act 2010.”
The right hon. Gentleman is quick off the mark. I am about to address his point. When the Bill was introduced, the Government published an equalities analysis of the Bill, and I can reassure the Committee and him—I know that he raised this on a previous day—that, as promised, we will make a similar statement in relation to all other Brexit primary legislation that has been or will be introduced to this House. I pay tribute—if she is here—to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller), the Chair of the Women and Equalities Select Committee, for raising this important issue and for her advice in helping us to address it in a sensible and practical way.
The amendment has been tabled, and I am giving the right hon. Gentleman the assurance now that the same formula will be applied to all Brexit-related primary legislation, so he can take that one to the bank.
I turn now to amendment 19, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda. I understand his position and what he is trying to establish, but if the regulations made under clause 9 were to lapse two years after exit day, it would set a very rigid legislative timeframe for the Government and risk unnecessary disruption. If the two-year deadline expired unmet, it would create holes or risk creating holes in the statute book. I sympathise with the intentions behind the amendment, and I just wonder whether it was intended to tempt Eurosceptics on the Government Benches, but it is too rigid a fetter on Parliament’s ability to manage its legislative priorities between now and 2021, and it would risk exacerbating the very uncertainty that the Bill is designed to reduce.
Amendments 74 and 75 attempt to tie the use of clause 9 to our continued membership of the single market and the customs union. The Government have been clear that we are leaving the EU, and that necessarily means we are leaving the single market and the customs union. The amendments rehash old ground. The Government are clear that we are seeking a deep and special partnership with the EU, including as frictionless free trade as possible, and that will inevitably be linked to the withdrawal agreement. It is good news that we are moving to the negotiations on that area, following the success of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and the Prime Minister. The amendments, with the greatest respect to their SNP authors, would be counterproductive on their own terms, because they would undermine our ability to secure and implement the withdrawal agreement, which itself will be necessary for agreeing the future partnership agreement and maintaining barrier-free trade.
I have listened carefully to my hon. Friend’s argument on clause 9. It seems to me that the initial intention was to do the withdrawal agreement by regulation, since when the principle of a withdrawal agreement implementation Bill has been conceded. Under the circumstances, is not the proper thing to withdraw clause 9, to prevent Opposition Members, particularly from the SNP, from using it as a Christmas tree to put Brexit-stopping measures in place?
The problem is that clause 9, although now of residual use and scope, remains vital if we want the smooth Brexit that hon. Members in all parts of the House profess to want.
In fairness, we have spent a lot of time on those amendments. I want now to turn to amendments 142, 143, 275 and 156 and new clause 38, which seek to restrict the use of clause 9 with respect to citizens’ rights. As the Prime Minister reiterated in her speech in Florence on 22 September and since, we value the contributions of EU citizens living in the UK. We want them to stay. That is why the Government repeatedly made it clear that securing the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK on exit, and equally the rights of UK nationals living on the continent, was a top priority. I am sure the whole House will join me in welcoming the fact that the joint report by the UK and EU negotiators published last Friday forms the basis of the agreement after the first phase of negotiations, which will cover the rights of EU citizens here and British citizens on the continent, giving them the security, the assurances and the confidence they need.
Again, I acknowledge the vital contribution that EU citizens make to our economy and our social and national life. We will ensure that EU citizens living in the UK at the date to be specified in the light of the negotiations will be able to apply for settled status under UK immigration law once they have completed five years’ residence here. In the light of the agreement reached, I hope that hon. Members will not press those amendments.
New clause 38 and amendment 156, meanwhile, cover the specific issue of Irish citizens’ rights. Maintaining the common travel area with Ireland, protecting the reciprocal rights of British and Irish citizens, is a primary objective for the UK and has been since the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech in January. The common travel area arrangements between the UK and Ireland and the Crown dependencies, and the associated rights, have existed for many years. They pre-date the UK and Ireland’s membership of the European Union. Although it extends to the whole of the UK, the value of the common travel area and associated rights is clearly most felt in Northern Ireland. These arrangements facilitate, among other things, the north-south co-operation provided for in the Good Friday agreement and daily life on the island of Ireland.
There is a strong appetite on both sides of the border and in all parts of the UK to maintain those rights. They are distinct from EU membership and are already provided for by domestic legislation. The joint report by UK and EU negotiators safeguards these interests. Given that agreement and the strong commitment from both the UK Government and, in fairness, the European Commission that these arrangements are protected and will be protected, new clause 38 and amendment 156 are unnecessary, and I respectfully ask hon. Members not to press them.
I am very grateful indeed to the Minister for allowing me to intervene. I just want him to clarify a very important issue. We are talking about clause 9 and amendments to it. The Minister and his colleagues will know that any regulations that could be made under clause 7 are restricted, in that they cannot create new criminal offences, cannot have retrospective effect and cannot affect the Human Rights Act. Those exemptions are mirrored in clause 9, apart from the reference to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the protections given to the Good Friday agreement. In the light of the Prime Minister’s statement to the House on Monday about the commitments to the Northern Ireland Act and the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, why is there such a glaring omission in clause 9, in terms of the protections offered to the Northern Ireland Act?
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. There is absolutely no intention to use clause 9 in any way that would disrupt the Belfast agreement. The short answer to her is that these are just different technical devices, dealing with different technical aspects of withdrawal.
Forgive me for correcting the Minister. I do not mean to be rude, but clauses 7 to 9 extend to Northern Ireland, so these powers will also be extended to Northern Ireland—schedule 2 extends them to Northern Ireland—so if we had an Executive up and running again, Ministers in a devolved Assembly could make regulations that affected the Good Friday agreement. The protection to the Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—has to be written into clause 9, so I suggest that the Government take it away tonight, redraft it and come back on Report with something that satisfies everyone in this House, including the Minister.
It is important that any changes that may need to be made to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to ensure that the UK can honour its international commitments can be made. Any such changes could be made only to ensure ongoing compliance with our international obligations, and could not substantively change the agreed devolution settlement or deviate from the terms of the Belfast agreement. I should be happy to write to the hon. Lady and spell that out in more detail.
As a new Member, I have listened intently as many Members on both sides of the Committee—some who voted to remain and others who voted to leave—have talked about the fundamental flaws in clause 9. The rest of the world is watching how we regulate at the moment. Will the Minister give an undertaking that the Government will come up with amendments to clause 9 on Report?
As I said earlier, clause 9 retains the residual necessity to provide us with agility in these negotiations. I think that I have given the assurances on substance that Conservative Members and, I believe, some Opposition Members wished to hear. If other Members want to table amendments on Report, I will of course continue the dialogue in which I have engaged all along.
I am going to make some progress, because I have been on my feet for some time.
I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman, because I have given way to him already. I am going to make some progress.
Order. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) knows better—and he also knows better than to raise his eyebrows because I have called for order. He does it often enough, and it is not his job.
A number of Members have tabled amendments seeking to maintain the UK’s membership of EU agencies, institutions and international agreements, as well as our participation in EU programmes and access to EU systems and databases. They also seek to ensure that measures are put in place so that we are ready domestically to thrive when we leave the EU. Those amendments include amendments 196 to 199, 241 to 261, 276, 224 and 225, and a number of others.
The Government recognise that a large number of the UK’s relationships with non-EU partners and international organisations are linked to our membership of the EU, and specifically to the Euratom treaty, which deals with nuclear co-operation. Maintaining close links after we leave is important, and in many cases will be in the interests of both the UK and the EU.
I know that my hon. Friend has been on his feet for 50 minutes. We should be happy to have another 50 minutes, because he is doing brilliantly. He has just mentioned Euratom. As he knows, amendment 300 was signed by more Members than any of the other amendments. I hate to keep asking him to come back with proposals on Report, but will he give a commitment that the Government will at least publish a strategy for their future relationship with Euratom by then, and that the strategy will be updated quarterly so that we can maintain progress? As I said in my speech earlier, Ministers have been brilliant on this issue, but we do need to partner with them.
The Government intend to present a written ministerial statement to Parliament before Report which will set out our vision, or strategy, for a close association with Euratom. I hope that the commitment to that statement will reassure my right hon. Friend, and that he will not feel the need to press his amendment to a vote.
I want to make some progress, but I will give way once to the hon. Lady.
On the subject of amendment 300, will the Minister confirm that the Government intend any implementation period for leaving the EU to apply to leaving Euratom as well?
That will be addressed in the written ministerial statement and the strategy that will be forthcoming very shortly, and the hon. Lady will have an opportunity for scrutiny then.
We will work with the Commission on addressing those international agreements when the parties have a shared stake, and a shared interest, in continuity. Similarly, the Government recognise the need to maintain a strong relationship with the EU in the future. We are seeking to forge a deep and special partnership with our EU friends, and our relationship with the EU’s agencies and bodies on exit will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. No final decisions have yet been made on our future relationship with the EU’s agencies and bodies after leaving the EU, and we are carefully considering a range of options. Where there is a demonstrable national interest in pursuing a continued relationship with an agency or other EU body, the Government will look very carefully at whether and how we can pursue that, and of course it is a matter for negotiations.
That brings me to why these amendments are, while well-intentioned, unhelpful. The first reason is because negotiations are ongoing and we cannot allow our negotiating position to be prejudiced or pre-empted. The Government are working to achieve the best possible deal with the EU. We welcome the constructive and thoughtful amendments from hon. Members, but we cannot accept any that might undermine the Government’s negotiating position or restrict our room for manoeuvre, not least in terms of striking the kind of arrangements that hon. Members in tabling these amendments want to see.
I am going to make some more progress, if I may.
Secondly, the Government have committed to ensuring that the withdrawal agreement with the EU can be fully implemented in UK law by exit day. The clause 9 power to implement the withdrawal agreement will be crucial in achieving this in the way I have described. This power will help to ensure we are in a position to swiftly implement the contents of the withdrawal agreement required to be in place for day one, ensuring maximum legal certainty upon exit. Again, I respectfully remind hon. Members that, if the UK is unable to implement the withdrawal agreement in time, that risks us being unable to meet our obligations under international law and scuppering the prospects of the very deal I think Members on all sides want to achieve.
To ensure a smooth and orderly exit, it is essential that appropriate legislative changes have been made by the point of exit. We want to give ourselves the capability to make those appropriate changes swiftly, and to support businesses and individuals and make sure the country is ready. The power in the Bill enables that, and those aims will be put at risk by these amendments.
I now turn briefly to amendments 227, 228 and 229, which prevent the clause 9 power from being used until a number of economic assessments have been published. The Government have been undertaking rigorous and extensive analysis to support our exit negotiations, to define our future partnership with the EU and to inform our understanding of how EU exit will affect the UK’s domestic policies. The Government have already established a process for providing economic and fiscal reports. The OBR independently produces official forecasts for the Government and is required to produce detailed five-year forecasts for the economy and public finances twice a year at autumn Budget and spring statement. Those forecasts reflect publicly stated Government policy at the time that those forecasts are made, and that includes policy on leaving the EU.
We have been very clear that we will not disclose material that might undermine the UK in the negotiations. In particular, in any negotiation, information on potential economic considerations is very important to the negotiating capital and negotiating position of all parties.
The Government want to get the best deal for the UK and hope—and, indeed, are confident—that this House is united in that goal, even if the means to achieve it may differ on some aspects of detail, and we do not want the UK’s negotiating position to be undermined. For that reason, we cannot support those amendments.
Amendment 230 requests an assessment of the broader responsibility of the Treasury. That is unnecessary. The Treasury’s core purpose is to be an effective finance and economics Ministry. As a finance Ministry, the Treasury will continue to account for public expenditure and manage the public finances. As an economics Ministry, it will continue to prioritise policy that reduces obstacles to growth, and manage key relationships with finance Ministries overseas. The Government do not see the UK’s withdrawal from the EU changing those core responsibilities of the Treasury, and an assessment to confirm that would be a waste of valuable public finances and is unnecessary.
I turn now to amendments 262 and 263. The Government recognise the huge importance of the legal services sector to the UK economy; it contributed £24 billion in 2015. The Government also recognise that legal services underpin many other important parts of the UK economy, including financial services, manufacturing and the creative industries. We propose a bold and ambitious partnership between the UK and the EU, and we will prioritise securing the freest trade possible in services. The Government are committed to securing the best deal for the legal profession.
In the Government’s July position paper, “Ongoing Union judicial and administrative proceedings”, the Government also made it clear that leaving the EU will end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court. At the same time, the UK is committed to minimising uncertainty and disruption for individuals and businesses, including those arising from changes in the treatment of cases pending at the time of exit. That is why we want an agreement on an implementation period based on the existing structure of rules and regulations, so that there is only one set of changes. The laying of such reports, as proposed in the amendments, would delay and impede the important legislative work necessary to prepare the legal services sector for all possible negotiation outcomes, and I urge hon. Members to withdraw the amendments.
Amendment 343 would prevent regulations from being made under clause 9 before the Secretary of State had laid before Parliament a strategy for a food standards framework after EU withdrawal. The UK has a world-leading set of standards on food safety and quality, backed up by a rigorous legislative framework. The Department of Health, the Food Standards Agency and other relevant Government bodies are working closely together to ensure that the regulatory regime for food safety remains robust as Britain leaves the EU. The Government are committed to ensuring high food standards at home and promoting high standards internationally. There will be opportunities to build on our world-leading reputation for quality and standards, but it would not be appropriate for the Government to tie their use of the clause 9 power to the publishing of any individual or particular reports.
The purpose of clause 9 is to incorporate the withdrawal agreement fully and comprehensively into UK law, so that we can fulfil our obligations under the withdrawal agreement and under international law. The power is not intended to be used to report on the Government’s post-exit domestic strategy. To caveat the power or to define it in that way would cause uncertainty, both for our EU partners and for businesses and citizens in this country. I hope that I have addressed as many of the amendments relating to clause 9 as possible, and that clause 9 will now stand part of the Bill unamended.
I shall now turn briefly to clauses 16 and 17 and schedule 7. Clause 16 gives effect to schedule 7, which provides for the parliamentary scrutiny of the secondary legislation made under the powers in the Bill, including under clause 9. The Bill attempts to strike a balance between the need to prepare our statute book in time for the end of the article 50 process and the need, on the other side, for Parliament to undertake proper scrutiny. The Bill does this using long-established parliamentary procedures. These are the usual procedures that have been used by all Governments for decades with no dilution of the normal scrutiny process.
However, the Government have always said that we would listen and reflect on the concerns raised by the House. We understand the concern that there might not be enough scrutiny of the instruments made under the Bill. That is why the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), made it clear in the Committee yesterday that the Government would support the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), which I hope will be supported by the whole of this Committee.
These amendments draw on the Procedure Committee’s expertise and its recent interim report, and will ensure that the House has an opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of the use of the procedure for instruments made under the three main powers in the Bill. The amendments do this without undermining the certainty that we wish to provide. For instruments brought forward under clause 9, as with the other powers in the Bill, this means that where the Government propose the negative procedure for an instrument, the House will be able to recommend that it should instead be debated and voted on as an affirmative instrument, giving an even clearer voice to this House in scrutinising how these powers are used. Other instruments, if not made using the urgency procedure—which I will come to—will be affirmative, guaranteeing the opportunity for a debate on the instrument.
Schedule 7 sets out a series of triggers for the use of the affirmative procedure. These are for some of the substantial uses of the power or for those where more complex decisions are required—for example, creating a new public body, creating new fees or other charges, or creating new powers to legislate. The Minister responsible for the instrument can also choose the affirmative procedure even where the instrument does not meet any of the tests in schedule 7. We have taken the same approach to changes to either primary or secondary legislation. Some changes to primary legislation can be mechanistic and minor, and adopting the affirmative procedure for small corrections to primary legislation would be impractical. Instead, the requirement for affirmative procedures is based on the type of change rather than the type of legislation in which the change is being made.
In rare cases, there are urgency procedures, both in the Bill as introduced and in the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee. I can assure the Committee that we would only use those procedures very sparingly—for example, in cases where there was a clear practical reason to have a correction made in time for exit day or for a particular other day when limited time was available. Such a situation could arise, for example, because the content of a particular statutory instrument was dependent on a negotiation that took place nearer the end of the exit process. I know there are amendments on the paper today, such as those in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie)—I am trying to see whether he is still in his place, but no, he is not at the moment—which seek to restrict the use of this power to “emergency” situations. I hope the Committee will understand that the word “emergency” is not quite right in these circumstances, and that “urgency” is the more accurate description if we are to ensure that we have legal certainty.
Finally—I am grateful to the Committee for its patience—clause 17 is designed to make consequential and transitional provision to other laws as a result, not of our exit from the EU, but of the operation of the Bill. It contains powers to ensure that the Bill is properly bedded into the statute book and could be used, for instance, for housekeeping tasks such as revoking designation orders.
This debate started with an extremely eloquent and passionate contribution by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) on the meaningful vote that this House has been promised, on the timing of that vote, and on how we can ensure that the Government do not proceed with the detail of the withdrawal agreement, and probably the ultimate trade agreement, without the consent of this House. My hon. Friend the Minister has spent an extremely valuable hour taking us through the foothills of the drafting of the Bill and the administrative procedures that might be necessary before we leave. I asked him for a political argument if he wants to resist the idea, put forward by many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, that this House demands a meaningful vote before the Government actually start enacting the outcome of any agreement they have made, so does he have a little time to address that? Is there anything left in his notes that covers that?
I welcome the chance to reiterate what has already been said and what is already set out in the written ministerial statement: we will guarantee that there will be a meaningful vote in this House, and that none of statutory instruments introduced under clause 9 will enter into force until we have had that meaningful vote. That squarely addresses the substantive issue that my right hon. and learned Friend is getting at. He criticises me for dealing with all the other amendments, but it is only fair in the proper course of parliamentary proceedings to ensure that all amendments from all hon. Members are fairly addressed.
I will not. I am going to finish, because I have been at it for well over an hour and I want to make my final points and give other Members the opportunity to have their say.
Orders under clause 7 will designate Ministers so that they can exercise the power in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 to implement EU obligations. Once the 1972 Act is repealed, designation orders will be redundant, so we need to be able to tidy up such laws on the statute book. Hon. Members will know that consequential provisions are a standard part of many pieces of legislation, even legislation of constitutional importance such as the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 or the devolution Acts. Equally, transitional provisions are a standard way of smoothing the application of a change in the UK statute book.
The Bill already includes the lengthy schedule 8, which contains consequential amendments, but some more may be needed, and it will take time for departmental experts to identify and correctly resolve others. For example, the Bill amends the definition of “enactment” in the Interpretation Act 1978, and Departments will need to review all the references to “enactment” across the whole statute book to identify any that need amending as a consequence of the Bill. That is not a novel use of a consequential power, because the definition of “enactment” was inserted into the 1978 Act by the Scotland Act 1998, and the consequential power in the 1998 Act was then used to amend other references as a consequence. The Government are therefore taking a normal power to make these and other important but technical consequential amendments as they are identified.
Hon. Members will know that transitional, transitory and saving provisions are standard ways to smooth the introduction of change to the statute book. As with clause 9, it is important that we can provide legal certainty to everyone in the UK, from businesses to individual citizens. For example, the Bill removes the UK from the direct jurisdiction of the Luxembourg Court, but the UK will remain a full member of the EU up until the very moment of exit. The power could therefore make specific provision for court cases still before a court on exit day. Again, schedule 8 introduces some of those measures, but Government will need some residual flexibility to ensure that we do not create uncertainty as we leave. I can reassure the Committee that the Government cannot abuse such powers. Case law and an array of legal authorities provide a very narrow scope for the exercise of the powers, which are necessary to ensure that we can enable a process of exit from the EU that promotes maximum certainty. I commend clauses 16 and 17 and schedule 7 to the Committee.
I have listened carefully to the many esoteric legal arguments that have been advanced this evening. I am afraid that my comments will be far more prosaic and practical. I was on the remain side of the referendum debate, but, like most of my colleagues, I am now focusing on trying to secure the best possible deal, and that deal must centre on what a meaningful vote would be.
What does “a meaningful vote” mean? If it means “deal or no deal”, I think that that is a recipe for securing the best possible deal, but if it means “deal or no deal, or go back to the negotiating table”, perhaps indefinitely and with no time limit, I think that that is counterproductive. It would be detrimental, and would undermine our negotiating position. I am not suggesting for a second that that is the desire of those who promote a meaningful vote of that kind, but I think that that would be the effect.
Rather than looking only at the legal context, we need also to look at the political, economic and financial contexts. Of course the negotiations were always going to be difficult after 44 years of integration with the European Union, but they will also be difficult because of the European Union’s position. The EU clearly does not want us to leave, which is understandable for some of the reasons that I have given, but also, primarily, it does not want others to leave, and that must be its priority during the negotiations. If this were a marriage of equals and therefore a divorce of equals, that meaningful vote with those three different options would be fine, but that is not where we are. Of course, the EU also recognises that 75% of Members of Parliament were on the remain side of the argument.
We have to look at the EU’s perspective as well as that of the UK, which is why I think that the Prime Minister was not only right to offer a fair deal in her Florence speech, but right to say that we would not be afraid to walk away with no deal. That gives the EU one chance to get this right, whereas a meaningful vote-plus would give the EU many, many chances to get this right—to give the worst possible deal to get it right. Its incentive would be to put the worst deal on the table initially, knowing that Parliament would reject it and keep going back to the table. That cannot be the right negotiating position.
None of us wants to leave on the basis of no deal. WTO rules would clearly not be in the country’s interests, and it would not be in my own interests outside Parliament either. Nevertheless, I do not want to be locked into an organisation that simply will not let us leave other than on disadvantageous terms.
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Let me say to him that—reflecting the mood of the Committee, having taken advice, and, in particular, having listened very carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin)—the Government are willing to return on Report with an amendment on the face of the Bill clarifying the undertaking and assurance that I gave in my speech that statutory instruments under clause 9 will not come into force until we have had a meaningful vote in Parliament.
I hope that the Minister’s intervention will satisfy some of my colleagues.
Let me end by saying that I will be supporting the Government this evening. In my view, it is time for us to grit our teeth and simply get on with it.
The Government have now made it clear that the House will have a final meaningful vote on the EU withdrawal agreement before the UK leaves, which is extraordinarily important because the last point in the process of withdrawal is actually the vote in the European Parliament. My former colleagues—the ones who are trying to help us get an amicable agreement in that Parliament—have told me that unless there is a full democratic process here, there will be people who try to scupper the deal in that last vote in the European Parliament. The rest of the world is watching how we legislate, and transparency is important.
I am new to British legislation, but I have heard it time and again from Members as diverse as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) that the powers in clause 9 are inappropriate, too strong and could mean that the Government are able to make material changes to legislation without a scrutiny process before we leave. I am therefore extremely pleased that the Minister made his announcement at the last minute. If he would like to, I would love him to intervene once more to ensure that everybody has heard exactly what he said.
I am delighted to intervene again and, reflecting the mood of the House, I can tell my hon. Friend that we are willing to return on Report to put an amendment on the face of the Bill making it crystal clear that statutory instruments under clause 9 will not enter into force until we have had a meaningful vote in Parliament.
I absolutely agree. A delegation from across the EU—from Spain, France and many other countries—came to my constituency to meet and work with our children. It was so incredible to see the friendships that were struck up and the experiences that were shared. The thought that my three-year-old niece, or any children that I have, will not get to experience that is heart-breaking. We should all reflect on that. What are the young people of the nations of the UK going to miss out on because of the poor decision making and the poor decisions that are being pushed by this UK Government?
The Executive powers provided in clause 8 put current UK international obligations under serious threat. As we know, the UK Government cannot be trusted to uphold international obligations. We have seen time and again instances of them turning a blind eye to our obligations. In Yemen, for example, more than 300 incidents that could violate international law have been tracked by the Ministry of Defence since the conflict began two years ago, yet the UK continues to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.
One of my hon. Friends talked about the Trade Union Act 2016 and how workers’ rights have been rolled back. When all this power comes back, supposedly, to the UK, what faith can we have that our rights and obligations will be upheld by this Government?
We have spoken about Erasmus, regulations and what our young people are going to do. I strongly believe that the whole rhetoric in this process has been damaging. Some of the phrases that have emerged, the slogans that have been put on the side of buses and the way that political discourse has developed during this period echo, sadly, the Trump Administration. That scares me and, I am sure, many others deeply. We hear that Brexit means Brexit, that it will be a red, white and blue Brexit, that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, that there are economic impact studies, there are no economic impact studies—yes there are, oh no there are not—and that the post-Brexit trade deal will be the easiest in human history. We have had a political hokey-cokey on the grandest scale and who are going to be the ones who lose out the most? It is going to be the young people of our nations who have to deal with the impact of Brexit and clean up the mess that many in this Government seem hell-bent on creating. For their sake—for your children’s sake—and for the future of all our nations in the UK, let us stop this madness.
It has been a pleasure to listen to this wide-ranging debate and to hear some of the speeches, not all of which seemed to be specifically about clause 8. I compliment my opposite number, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), who very accurately described the clause.
I do have a speech on clause 8 and I would like to raise some specific points, but I am slightly concerned that the Minister might now be about to speak for 15 minutes, in the tradition that he started yesterday, and I am worried that he will not be able to respond to my specific points.
I am very happy to do my best endeavours to ensure that the hon. Lady does get five minutes to make her speech; she often has interesting points to bring to these debates. Let me discuss briefly, therefore, what clause 8 is for.
As we leave the EU, it is essential that the Government can ensure that we do not breach any of the UK’s international obligations. These international obligations stretch from our promises to other nations, some of which were mentioned by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), to those we have undertaken as a sovereign and responsible participant in international organisations such as the Council of Europe and global ones such as the WTO. This need to prevent breaches of our international obligations is the reasoning behind the clause.
I appreciate the Minister’s explanation of the scope of clause 8. Does he agree that, just like clause 7, clause 8 is limited in that it relates only to withdrawal issues and is a sunset clause?
My hon. Friend make a good point on the exact matter that I was going to come to in a moment; she pre-empts me brilliantly.
Clause 8 is needed—I think that this answers the point made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich—because not all the UK’s international obligations that might be affected by withdrawing from the EU are implemented domestically in what will be retained EU law. Those which are implemented elsewhere are therefore out of scope of the correcting power in clause 7. In addition, there are restrictions on the use of clause 7 relating to, for example, taxation that might, in some circumstances, prevent important changes to comply with international arrangements from being made. We need this power because we need to be prepared for all eventualities.
I would like to clarify that any SIs made under clause 8 that transfer a legislative function, or create or amend any power to legislate, will be subject to the affirmative procedure, as provided for in clause 7. Therefore, Parliament will be able to debate any transfer of powers, and consider the proposed scope of such powers and the scrutiny proposed for their future exercise. Clause 8 gives Ministers a temporary and limited power, as my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) said, to make regulations to prevent or remedy breaches of international obligations. The provision contained in the secondary legislation must be an appropriate way of doing so and will have to pass before this House under the parliamentary procedures that we have been discussing over the past couple of days. In addition to its limited goals, the power is subject to a number of further limitations. It expires two years after exit day and, as listed in subsection (3), it cannot “make retrospective provision”, create certain types of criminal offence,
“implement the withdrawal agreement, or…amend…the Human Rights Act”.
Perhaps I can respond to the hon. Lady’s intervention before she even makes it. It is important that we have the power to maintain all our international obligations. As we have discussed in a previous debate, one of those international obligations is to the international element of the Belfast agreement. We will absolutely maintain our commitment to that.
I am grateful to the Minister for pre-empting the intervention, but he is referring to my earlier intervention regarding clause 9. Will he use this opportunity to confirm at the Dispatch Box that neither clause 8 nor clause 9, which we have just passed as amended, will be used in any circumstances to amend the Good Friday agreement by regulation?
At all—by regulation or in any other way.
I will turn briefly to the amendments and respond to new clause 20 in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham East. My Department is leading cross-Government work to assess and act on the international agreements for which, as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, arrangements will need to be made to ensure continuity for businesses and individuals. Any that require implementing legislation or parliamentary scrutiny before ratification will go through the appropriate, well-established procedures. We are working with our international partners to identify the full range of our agreements that might be impacted by our exit from the EU, and we will be taking their views into account. It would not be appropriate at this stage to publish the type of assessment proposed in new clause 20. Doing so would prejudice the outcome of these discussions and how any action would be put into practice.
I am just looking for a small concession. If the Minister will not do an assessment, will he at least publish a list? The Financial Times has its list of the 759 treaties. Could we have some information from the Government in the public domain about the task that has to be undertaken? That, at least, would be a welcome step.
We will be coming forward with more information on this front in due course. However, a lot of the hon. Gentleman’s speech was specifically about trade issues, and we have a Trade Bill that deals specifically with those issues. If I might gently say, a lot of what the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) talked about related to the content of the Trade Bill rather than this Bill.
We do recognise the need to promote stability for businesses and individuals, and we will aim to transition agreements as seamlessly as possible. I listened carefully to the hon. Member for Swansea West—I am afraid he is no longer in his place—and I would like to reassure him that this clause has nothing to do with future trade agreements. It is purely to do with our existing international commitments and how we make sure we continue to meet them in the context of leaving the EU.
Clause 8 is a very specific power, which will be available only where a breach of our current international obligations arises from the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. It ensures that we will be able to continue to honour international obligations, which might otherwise be affected by our withdrawal, and it is key to ensuring that we can take our place on the global stage as a fully independent nation. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Members for Nottingham East and for Swansea West will consider not pressing their amendments.
I want to address amendment 345 in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. It is well intentioned but unnecessary. The power in clause 8 has a narrow and specific purpose, and can be used where our international obligations might be breached as a result of leaving the EU. World Health Organisation guidelines are not international obligations; they are used to inform air quality standards in international and EU legislation, but they do not, of themselves, form an obligation to be complied with.
The UK has a strong track record on protecting our environment, and in leaving the EU, we will safeguard and improve on that. The whole purpose of this clause is to ensure that we leave the EU with maximum certainty, continuity and control, and that, as far as possible, the same rules, laws and international obligations apply on the day after exit as on the day before.
Of course, some of the existing mechanisms that allow scrutiny of environmental targets and standards by Governments will not be carried over into our law, and that is why the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced on 12 November our intention to consult on a new, independent statutory body to advise and challenge Government, and potentially other bodies—
I am going to give the hon. Lady a chance to speak, so I hope she will wait.
That body will also potentially advise and challenge other bodies on environmental legislation, stepping in when needed to hold them to account and to enforce standards. The Government will consult on the specific scope and powers of that body early next year.
We have a number of amendments—from the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) and the hon. Member for Wakefield, whom I will do my best to give a chance to speak—that seek to place further restrictions on the use of the clause 8 power, beyond those already in the clause. These amendments give me another opportunity to restate our firm commitment to ensuring that environmental protections and the rights of individuals—particularly EU citizens resident in the UK—are maintained as we bring EU law on to the UK statute book. This commitment will be reflected in the use of this clause to ensure that, from day one of withdrawal from the EU, the UK is able to comply with its international obligations.
As we stressed during yesterday’s debate on clause 7, the defence and security of the realm is always the first duty of Government, and the Government are absolutely committed to national security and securing the right future arrangements for security with the EU. I would like to take the opportunity to reassure the Committee that we cannot see that anything that damages our national security would be an appropriate way to ensure continued compliance with international obligations. The same would be true of any change to equalities legislation.
All these amendments are well intentioned, but we have been clear in previous debates that we will preserve rights through this Bill, and not reduce them. In those earlier debates, we also set out that, by giving no definition of what, for example, an environmental protection is, or how one might judge that such a protection was being weakened, amendments along these lines risk unnecessary litigation, undermining the certainty that this Bill aims to create.
In the specific context of clause 8, which is about upholding our international obligations, it is very difficult to see how that could do anything other than require us to preserve rights and protections. Parliament has already approved the UK being party to a number of international conventions and international organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation. We are committed to these international relationships. A key part of that is ensuring that we fully comply with our international obligations. Leaving the customs union and the single market may alter the way in which the UK complies with some of these obligations, specifically with regard to the treatment of WTO most favoured nation status.
Amendment 292 in the name of the hon. Member for Wakefield—I know that she wants to speak to it—does not acknowledge these changes in respect of taxation, or the fact that there will not always be a clear choice about how to comply with such obligations in future. Clause 8 gives Ministers the flexibility to make those changes. Of course, however, we will listen to what she has to say. I understand the honourable intentions behind these amendments, but we believe that this clause is well drafted to continue to meet our international obligations.
The UK is a nation whose word is its bond. This Government introduced the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill to ensure a smooth and orderly exit from the EU. Our desire to leave the EU in this way applies both to the actions we take domestically and to our actions in relation to international partners. Clause 8 is key to delivering that, and I commend it to the Committee.
I thank the Minister for rushing through his speech so that I get the chance to have my five minutes to talk about amendment 292.
Clause 8 allows Ministers to make any regulations to prevent or remedy any breach in our international obligations as we leave the EU, but it also contains a Henry VIII power allowing for those regulations to do anything that an Act of Parliament can do. That includes amending or repealing any Act of Parliament ever passed. It is the most extraordinary and unusual power. I was going to raise the Northern Ireland Act 1998, so I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) for getting the Minister on the record on that.
The Government have been very scant on the details about the sorts of international obligations that may be affected. They have also been unable to say—I was listening carefully to the Minister—why regulations under clause 8 can impose or increase taxation. We do not want to end up in a situation where the Government can raise tax-like charges by statutory instrument. That gives away the supremacy of this place on taxation. The “appropriateness” test is too broad, and it undermines the supremacy of Parliament. We cannot have taxation by the back door.
Crucially, I did not hear the Minister say anything about tertiary legislation. We have focused a lot on SIs—the secondary stuff. Tertiary legislation enables a new public body that needs to be set up, such as a chemicals body, to charge fees. This may not be controversial at first, but there may come a time when such bodies want to increase the fees, as happened when the Ministry of Justice wanted to increase probate fees by, I think, 1,500%. Why is there a double standard in clause 8 as regards secondary and tertiary legislation? We want tertiary legislation to be given the same parliamentary control and the same time limits as secondary legislation. My amendment 292 seeks to restore the supremacy of the House on financial matters.
I want briefly to deal with the environmental regulation that the Minister talked about. The Government currently have a “one in, three out” rule. Many of our environmental regulations come from international mixed agreements signed and ratified, as he said, by the UK and the EU; some are bilateral and some are multilateral. The Environmental Audit Committee has been looking at our progress in reducing fluorinated gases. These are very powerful greenhouse gases with a global warming potential 14,000 times more harmful than carbon dioxide. They are in commercial refrigeration systems, in our car air-conditioning systems, and in 70% of the 60 million asthma inhalers that we use in this country every year. Targets for reducing those gases are set and monitored by the European Union, but we are also a signatory to the UN framework, so it is a mixed agreement. We have just ratified the Kigali amendment to reduce F-gases by 85% by 2036. That agreement is monitored by the EU, so the Bill will convert the regulation into UK law and we will need new regulations.
The explanatory memorandum states that the new regulations may be subject to the Government’s “one in, three out” rule. We cannot have the Government making hundreds, if not thousands, of new regulations that get caught under that absurd administrative rule, so I want the Minister to assure the House that it will be scrapped. I have written about that as the Committee Chair, and Lord Henley has said that there is no clarity about it and no decision has been made. That has to change.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The point I am seeking to make is that having vigorously resisted my amendment, which I tabled for the benefit of everybody living in the UK in relation to issues of certainty about the interpretation of retained EU law after exit day, the Government have now conceded some ground—they are going to provide that certainty for EU citizens living in the UK—so why, if it is good enough for EU citizens living in the UK, is it not good enough for UK citizens living in the UK? Perhaps even more importantly—this adds force to my argument—senior members of the judiciary, both current and retired, have very serious concerns that the wording in the Bill as it stands will involve them in having to make political decisions.
In the past few days, we have seen the kind of vicious opprobrium that can be levelled at those who are seen to have made political decisions on the constitution where the EU is concerned, and earlier this year we saw the level of opprobrium directed at senior members of the judiciary for applying the law. The judiciary’s concern, therefore, is very real. I am not here just to advocate for the judiciary; I am here to advocate for democracy, the separation of powers, and the protection of the constitution. I may well have, as my ultimate goal, an independent Scotland with its own written constitution, but as long as Scotland remains part of the United Kingdom I am very interested in preserving UK citizens’ rights and democracy in the UK as a whole and protecting the notion of separation of powers within the constitution.
The Government do not have to take my word for it. They should look very closely at the evidence given to the House of Lords EU Justice Sub-Committee on 21 November. Lord Hope of Craighead pointed out that clause 6(2), as presently drafted, gives them a discretionary freedom rather than an obligation. Lord Neuberger, the former President of the Supreme Court, said:
“Clause 6(2), as drafted—it is a matter for a judge whether, and if so in what way, to take into account a decision of the Court of Justice on the same point in the regulation or directive, rather than in our statute. The problem for a judge is whether to take into account diplomatic, political or economic factors when deciding whether to follow the decision of the CJEU. These are normally decisions for the legislature, either to make or to tell judges what to do. We talked about our system in this country of judges being given a wide discretion, but this is an uncomfortably wide discretion, because a judge will have to take into account, or in some cases will be asked to take into account, factors that are rather unusual for a judge to have to take into account and that have political implications. It would be better if we did not maintain this system of judges being free to take decisions into account if they saw fit, if they were given some guidance as to the factors which they can and cannot take into account. Otherwise we are getting judges to step into the political arena.”
The issue of how the judiciary are to be given guidance on the interpretation of retained EU law arises directly from the wording of schedule 5 and takes us back to the wording of clause 6(2).
The Solicitor General is raising his eyebrows at me, but if he looks carefully at schedule 5, as I am sure he has, he will see that it talks about the procedure for interpreting retained EU law. That is why I am revisiting these issues. I am also revisiting them because former Supreme Court judges Lord Neuberger and Lord Hope gave this evidence to the House of Lords after our discussions on clause 6(2) in this House. It is new evidence that the Government really should take away and look at before Report.
I am very grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield for agreeing with me on this point. I would expect him to do so, because he, like me, will be paying very careful regard to what current senior judges and retired judges are saying.
I would like to conclude by quoting what Lord Thomas said to the House of Lords Committee after Lord Neuberger and Lord Hope had given their evidence. He said that he entirely agreed:
“It will be a very real problem for future judicial independence and the rule of law if this”—
the guidance—
“is not clarified.”
Put briefly, the problem is that leaving domestic courts free to make independent judgments on such crucial constitutional issues raises the prospect of politicising the judiciary’s institutional role in the Brexit process, resulting, potentially, in further regrettable attacks on the integrity of UK judges like those we saw earlier this year and last week. I therefore ask the Minister to address this problem before Report. I have no doubt that it will be addressed in the House of Lords, but I think it should be addressed in the elected House. The elected House should sort this out and not leave it to their lordships.
Given the spirit in which the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) moved new clause 21, I was anticipating some form of Christmas truce, and that we would perhaps emerge from our trench lines and play football. As the debate went on, however—this is inevitable on such issues—divisions soon emerged. We have had quite a fierce debate on aspects of the policy surrounding our exit from the EU. First, there was the question of when an impact assessment is not an impact assessment. We then—I am not criticising the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry)—started down the road of, in effect, reopening the debate on clause 6(2). I did raise my eyebrows at her. I take the point that there is a link with schedule 5, but she will immediately recognise that the schedule tries to answer the old question of whether the recognition or understanding of EU law for the purposes of judicial interpretation is a question of fact or a question of law. It is a mechanism to an end, rather than the means of interpretation itself, which is of course within clause 6.
My point is that, having rightly conceded that it is a question of law, the Government need to address how that law is interpreted by the judiciary.
I was about to say to the hon. and learned Lady that, tempted though I am to embark on a long debate with her about why it is important that those who criticise clause 6(2) come up with some sensible alternatives, I am conscious that the Mace is under the Table and that this is a debate in Committee on clause 13 and schedule 5. I do, however, commend to her the evidence I gave to the Lords Constitution Committee last week, at which the very questions she raises were asked of me by Lord Judge and Lord Pannick. In discussion with them, I made the point that, for example, a check list of dos and don’ts for judges would not be an appropriate way forward. There was a measure of agreement with that assertion, but inevitably these issues will be considered in the other place. Having said that, I think that she is right to make no apology for airing these matters in this House, because it is vital, on a Bill as important as this, that we, as elected Members, inform the other place that we have not given it cursory examination, but considered it very carefully indeed. To that extent, I am extremely grateful to her.
There have been many interesting and important contributions to the debate, and I urge the Committee to agree to clause 13 and schedule 5. It is good to see the hon. Member for Nottingham East back in the Chamber. I took the spirit with which he moved his new clause to heart, and I hope that I can respond in kind to him, but there is one word that perhaps sums up the debate, and indeed my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), who used it himself: sesquipedalian. It is a synonym for polysyllabic, and I am afraid that it is inevitable in such a debate that we will use words of more than two, three or, dare I say, four syllables. I will, however, try to curb my natural inclination to enjoy such diversions and to meet the hon. Gentleman’s argument that we speak in plain English.
On schedule 5, which is the meat of this debate, it is worth reminding ourselves—I say this particularly in response to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—that we are talking about means of publication and the rules of evidence to be applied. It is important that I gently remind hon. Members of that, lest we start to soar again into the stratosphere of constitutional debate and get unduly worried about the Government seeking to accrue massive power, when really we are talking about, first, how all this information can be presented to the public and, secondly, how the courts should be enjoined to take notice of it.
I will go through the points raised by my right hon. and learned Friend, particularly with regard, first, to paragraph 2 in part 1 on exceptions from the duty to publish. It is important to note that the direction power under paragraph 2(2) does not allow a Minister to make something retained EU law; it is there merely to enable the Government to ensure that legislation that is obviously not retained EU law does not have to be published. We are trying to minimise the potential for confusion, but we have to be realistic. It will not be possible to ensure without exception that only retained EU legislation is published. We do not think—quite properly, in my opinion—that it is the place of the Queen’s printer to make the determination of what such legislation is. That is why the Bill, quite reasonably, gives powers to Ministers to do this instead.
The powers in part 2 are not quite as alarming as might have appeared at first blush. They are clear and limited. The purpose of the creation of new rules of evidence is to allow them to sit alongside existing rules, including those in primary legislation. Importantly, these powers are subject to the affirmative procedure, which ensures a vote in this House. I will give my right hon. and learned Friend two examples of where the power to make a direction under paragraph 2 may be used in respect of all or part of an instrument. The first would concern an EU decision addressed only to a member state other than the UK. For example, the small hive beetle is a particular issue in Italy, and Commission implementing decision 2014/909 concerns certain protective measures with regard to confirmed occurrences of that insect. It is addressed only to Italy and quite clearly should not be published as part of EU retained law.
As I have said, this is a power of publication. It is important not only that we formally delete it, as my right hon. and learned Friend says, but that we provide that it does not end up in the wrong place and thereby mislead the reader or those who want to find an authoritative source for retained EU law. Another example would be EU regulations that have entered into force but are only partially applicable here immediately before exit day. One example is regulation 2016/2031 on protective measures against pests of plants, which has entered into force. One provision applies now, but the rest will apply in the EU only after exit day. To answer him directly, that is why the power exists.
I shall move on to paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraph 3, as the keenest Members will have observed, is based on section 3(1) of the 1972 Act, which provides that
“any question as to the meaning or effect of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any EU instrument, shall be treated as a question of law”,
and, of course, when something is a question of law, a court can determine the meaning of that law for its own purposes. Foreign law is normally a question of fact to be pleaded and then proved, often by recourse to expert evidence. Quite rightly, however, we want to allow a question of EU law to continue to be treated as a question of law after exit day, for certain purposes, such as when it is necessary to decide the question of EU law for the purposes of interpreting retained EU law in legal proceedings here.
Will the Solicitor General take a moment to explain the status of the long preambles to EU regulations and directives? We are taking all this back, so what is their status to be? How will the courts interpret the preambles to regulations and directives that become part of retained EU law?
Like any other part of a document, it will, of course, have effect. A preamble is an important statement. It is different from, say, an explanatory note or accompanying document—it is part of the measure and therefore will have force. We are seeking to download that documentation and make it part of our domestic law so that when we read it across, people will know that it is part of our domestic law, albeit in that category of retained EU law.
The hon. and learned Gentleman, like everyone in the House, will be well aware that our legislation does not have long preambles. I think that the judges need further guidance. He has indicated from the Dispatch Box that the preambles will have force. What weight should the judiciary across the UK give to those preambles, as they are not accustomed to them in British legislation? What does “force” actually mean?
To be fair to our judges, they already have the task of interpreting and applying EU regulations and all EU legislation that has direct effect. With respect to the hon. Lady, it will not be a new task for them, and I trust Her Majesty’s judges to get it right. As I said in response to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, it is tempting for the House to try to set out a list of judicial dos and don’ts, but I do not think that that is an appropriate approach. I trust and respect the judiciary to get this right, as they almost invariably do. They answer the question that is put to them, and deal with it in a robust and independent way. As one of the Law Officers responsible for upholding the rule of law, I am happy to reiterate on the Floor of the House that I have the utmost confidence in our domestic judiciary to get it right.
Paragraph 4 is based on subsections (2) to (5) of section 3 of the 1972 Act. Those subsections distinguish between EU-related matters which are to be judicially noticed—such as EU treaties, judgments of the Court and the Official Journal of the European Union—and other matters which, in theory, fall to be proved to the Court, such as EU instruments. For the latter category, rules are provided about how such matters are to be admissible to our courts. It is worth noting that the power in paragraph 4 to make evidential rules is again subject to the affirmative procedure, as it will be used to replace rules commonly found in primary legislation. I think it is important for all Members to note the context in which these powers are to be used.
My hon. and learned Friend is giving a very helpful explanation of the powers in paragraph 4. He may agree that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) should listen to it with care. There he was, expressing his great concern about the way in which legislation and EU law was handled in this country—and is still being handled before we leave the EU—but here the Government are replicating the process for when we have left. I am not allowed to speak in French in the Chamber, but plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
My right hon. and learned Friend is not just a lawyer but an historian. He will know that a previous Solicitor General, the late Lord Howe, steered the Bill that became the 1972 Act through the House of Commons. I nod to his memory. He knew what he was about, and he helped to produce an extremely important and effective piece of legislation. I make no apology for replicating aspects of it in this Bill.
Let me reassure the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West that the fact that the provision is in a schedule is not significant. It is on the face of the Bill—in primary legislation—and it receives the same high level of scrutiny that it would if it were one of the clauses. I think it only right that clause 13 is drafted in a general way and there is particularity in the schedule. That is good, modern drafting practice, as I am sure the hon. and learned Lady will acknowledge, given her extensive study of other Bills on which we have worked together.
That was not just my concern. It was a concern expressed by the Law Society of Scotland which, as I have said, informed the SNP amendments. May I take up a point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)? These are extremely sweeping powers, but they are tucked away in a schedule.
I take the hon. and learned Lady’s point with the utmost seriousness, as I hope I always do, but, with respect to her, I think there is no real significance to be attached to the fact that the provision is in a schedule. This is hardly the longest piece of legislation that the House will have seen, but it will certainly be one of the most pored over—and rightly so. The hon. and learned Lady is doing justice to that through her interventions.
Let me now deal directly with new clause 21. Of course I recognise the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, but I do not consider it feasible to impose a statutory duty requiring summaries of all retained direct EU legislation. The scale of that task would be hard to overstate. I have used the word Sisyphean before, and I think that it applies in this case.
According to EUR-Lex, the EU’s legal database, there are currently more than 12,000 EU regulations in force. To impose a statutory duty of requiring plain English summaries of them would, I think, be disproportionate, given that many explanatory materials have already been issued by the EU about EU law—and, indeed, by UK bodies, including the Health and Safety Executive. One example is documentation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals regulations published by the European Chemicals Agency. That measure has been mentioned many times in the Committee. I believe that, at present, the law is accessible.
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for addressing new clause 21 in that way, which will be useful to the poor members of the committee that has been given the task of sifting what should and should not be negative statutory instruments. The commitment to provide explanatory memorandums that are readily understandable is very helpful. Dealing with perhaps 12,000 regulations is, of course, a massive task, but does the Solicitor General not agree that that might be one of the unforeseen consequences of Brexit?
I think that there are many consequences on which the hon. Gentleman and I could dwell on another occasion. The fact is, however, that it is my task to try to ensure, as one of the Law Officers, that the principles of the rule of law to which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield referred in his speech—accessibility, clarity and certainty—are adhered to. We will deal with the issues so that we uphold those important principles, which were set out by the late Lord Bingham.
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his generosity in giving way again. As he knows, we do not currently have a functioning Assembly in Northern Ireland, so we do not have Ministers who can abide by his direction about explanatory memorandums that will be issued when EU regulations and directives are brought back, in this context to Northern Ireland. Will he confirm that the Departments in Northern Ireland will have an obligation—a duty—to provide explanatory memorandums in that connection?
I think it must follow that when there is no Executive functioning in Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Office is carrying out functions as a substitute for the Executive, the duty will apply to that Department. I assure the hon. Lady that when we introduce statutory instruments, there will be explanatory memorandums from one source or another. Various Departments will have different responsibilities for the drafting and publication of the statutory instruments, and it will be their duty to produce the explanatory memorandums for Members to consider. I cannot envisage an exception being made. Northern Ireland will be covered in the way in which the hon. Lady wants it to be.
Paragraph 1(4) of schedule 5 enables the Queen’s printer to make arrangements to publish documents that may be considered useful in connection with anything else published under the schedule. That, I think, allows for the approach that the hon. Member for Nottingham East is requesting. We are committed to ensuring that the law remains accessible and comprehensible after exit day, and on that basis, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause, which I think he said was a probing measure. He will have noted my comment, and I understand his position.
Amendments 76 and 77 have been addressed in particular by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West. Amendment 77 seeks to place the power for a Minister to make provision about judicial notice and the admissibility in legal proceedings of specified evidence of certain matters into the Bill. Judicial notice is a term that covers matters that are to be treated as already within the knowledge of the court, and are therefore not required to be “proved”, as other evidence would be, in the usual way. Amendment 76 would remove that power from schedule 5, while not replacing the provisions that clarify the scope of that power.
The power in part 2 of the schedule covers a limited, technical area, and the affirmative procedure will apply. My worry is that, with the removals that amendment 76 would make, we will lose clarity on how those powers are to be applied. I imagine that the intention of those who support the amendments is that those clarifying provisions would be inserted underneath the power, but I think that we achieve greater clarity by putting them in this schedule in the way that we have, so I respectfully ask the hon. and learned Lady and the other Members who have tabled the amendments not to press them.
Finally, I will deal with amendment 348. It is tempting for me to plunge into the debate about impact assessments and regulatory and sectoral analyses, but this is an amendment about this Bill, of course, and I remind all Members that an impact assessment for this Bill was published when it was introduced. That is in line with the general practice of Governments of different parties in recent years of publishing impact assessments alongside legislation. We want to continue pursuing that approach, but it must be done in a proportionate and appropriate way.
Amendment 348 would impose an open-ended requirement on the Queen’s printer to publish impact assessments, and could, I fear, create a duty it could not meet. The Queen’s printer does not have a responsibility to decide what should be published alongside legislation; it merely publishes what the Government ask it to, and quite rightly so, we might think. At the same time, Ministers have a specific responsibility, endorsed by Parliament, not to release information that would expose our negotiating position. This amendment would risk doing precisely that in a way that would put the responsibility on to a non-ministerial department—the Queen’s printer—which, with respect to it, is in no place to know what analysis is being undertaken, or to make a judgment about what can be published appropriately, safely and proportionately.
In the context of those remarks, I ask the hon. Member for Nottingham East to withdraw the new clause, and I support the passage of clause 13 and schedule 5 and beg that they stand part of the Bill.
I rise to speak in support of amendment 348 and new clause 21.
Today, I took the short and wide pavements over to the Department for Exiting the European Union; what a waste of my time that was. I went because I wanted to read what was written in relation to the workforce impacts for the large numbers of my constituents from Bridgend who work in the Ford engine factory and with Tata Steel. So I went to look in particular at the automotive sector and the steel sector reports.
The Ford engine plant is the largest engine works in Europe, and Tata next door in Port Talbot employs the largest number of people in steelworks in the UK. It was interesting that when I got there—having gone through the whole palaver of not taking my phone with me and being walked up to the Department, being asked to sign myself in and being handed the two big files—I found that the document started off by telling me what it was not: the first page I had to wade through told me that 58 sectorial impact assessments do not exist. So what I had gone there to see did not exist. Instead I was told that the paperwork consisted of qualitative and quantitative analyses in a range of documents developed at different times since—that is an important word—the referendum, so this was going to be new information: it was going to be information and analysis not available before the referendum and therefore, sadly, not available to the voters in my constituency or indeed to Members.
The 38—not 58—sector documents consist of descriptions of the sector, comments on EU regulations, existing frameworks for how trade is facilitated between countries and sector views. In the end, they are sector views, and nothing the Government had collected together was worth going there to read. They did not contain commercial, market or negotiation-sensitive information, as the documents told me, so why on earth could it all not just have been emailed to all MPs? There was nothing there that would upset anybody; all it would have done was insult people, not worry them. Apart from the sector views, it told us nothing that could not be found from a good read through Wikipedia.
There is no Government impact assessment, or indeed any assessment, even in the one part of the document worth reading: the sectoral view. The sectoral view is just there: the Government do not say what they are going to do about it, or even whether they think it is relevant—they just ignore it.
Sir David, what I was greeted with at DExEU would, in all honesty, have insulted us when we were both serving on the Select Committee on Defence; if that had come to us from the Ministry of Defence, we would have sent it back and said, “Do it again.” It was insulting. Members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly would have been confused by such pathetic information being placed before them. So perhaps that is why we are not making it public.
I read the report relating to the automotive and steel industries. The report admits that automotive is central to the UK economy and a key part of our industrial strategy, so we would think that the Government would want to make sure that whatever they were going to do would protect it. The industry employs 159,000 people, with a further 238,000 in the supply chain. I did like one line, which said that the UK is a global centre of excellence for engine design, and offered the example of Ford; that is us down in Bridgend. Automotive earns us £40.1 billion in exports, and the EU is the UK’s largest export market, so we would think this is pretty important stuff.
What were the sectoral view and the concerns? Again, there was nothing new; my hon. Friend the Member for Ogmore (Chris Elmore) and I could have written this ourselves. In fact, we could probably have written a better sectoral analysis than anything the Government have produced; it was pathetic.
I am happy to tell the Committee that that is the case, as I shall confirm later.
I am delighted by that. It is important to people on both sides of the arguments that it be something that Parliament can do, not that Ministers may simply do on their own. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), my south-western neighbour at the end of the Bench, very much agrees with that proposition, as does my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield in the middle.
I rise on this eighth day of eight to propose that clauses 14 and 15, 18 and 19 and schedules 6, 8 and 9 stand part of the Bill.
Over the course of the eight days of debate, we have had almost 500 amendments tabled and more than 30 separate Divisions. I am very happy that, in this section of the debate today, the amendments under consideration run to just 39 pages.
May I make my serious point first, and then give way?
It is sometimes said of this House that it does not scrutinise legislation well and that we send Bills to the other place in a mess. On this occasion, on this historic Bill, I think that the House of Commons has shown itself equal to the task of scrutinising important constitutional legislation. With that, I will very gladly give way.
I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. What I wanted to say was that, at the start, there was some disquiet over the timetable motion, and, actually, the Government responded positively on that. The evidence suggests to me that, in fact, the timetable has matched the scope of the amendments that we have had to consider, and that is greatly to the credit of the Government that that has happened, and I am very grateful to him for it.
No, I wish to move on to my next point.
On this point about consensus, the Government have listened and responded to constructive challenge from all parts of the House. Earlier in the process, the Government tabled amendments to set a single exit day in the Bill, to which I will return. We tabled an amendment to provide extra information about equalities impacts and the changes being made to retained EU law under the powers in the Bill. We have announced the intention to bring forward separate primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period in due course. We published a right-by-right analysis of the charter of fundamental rights, and we have made it clear that we are willing to look again at some of the technical detail of how the Bill deals with general principles to ensure that we are taking an approach that can command the support of Parliament.
Finally on this point, the Government have listened to representations set out during debate on day six, and indeed on Second Reading, and have accepted the Procedure Committee’s amendments to establish a sifting committee. We fully recognise the role of Parliament in scrutinising the Bill and have been clear throughout that we are taking a pragmatic approach to this vital piece of legislation. Where MPs and peers can improve the Bill, we will work with them.
The Minister is being very generous. It would be very useful to Members on the SNP Benches if, during his speech, he set out even in principle some of the amendments that were promised by the Secretary of State for Scotland.
I thank the Minister for giving way. He is generous. As a new MP, I must say that I am very surprised about how little constructive dialogue there has been. In fact, the comment that those on the Government Benches could deal with all of this without having to deal with the Opposition was alarming. We are all here to make constructive comments, to improve the Bill and to make compromises. The comments that they could deal with it all without having to listen to the Opposition or to have constructive dialogue were both alarming and disappointing.
The hon. Lady reminds me of how much I miss the days of coalition on some occasions.
The clauses and schedules that we are debating in this final group contain a number of detailed, necessary and technical provisions. In many cases, they are standard provisions that one would expect to see in any Bill.
Clause 14 is a technical and standard provision that sets out important definitions of many key terms that appear throughout the Bill, such as “EU tertiary legislation” and “EU entity”, and clarifies how other references in the Bill are to be read. Clause 15 complements clause 14, setting out in one place where the key terms used throughout the Bill are defined and noting where amendments to the Interpretation Act 1978 are made under schedule 8. Together, clauses 14 and 15 will aid comprehension of the Bill.
Clause 18 provides that the Bill will apply to the whole UK. In addition, because the European Communities Act 1972 currently extends to the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar in a limited way, the repeal of that Act must similarly extend to those jurisdictions to the extent that it applies to them. The Bill also repeals three Acts that extend to Gibraltar, all of which relate to European parliamentary elections. The powers in clauses 7 and 17 can be used to make provision for Gibraltar as a consequence of these repeals. The approach in clause 18 has been agreed with the Governments of Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man and Gibraltar in line with usual practice.
Well, I am going return to the subject of Gibraltar at considerable length later. [Interruption.] I am grateful to my hon. Friend for allowing me to continue.
As is typical with all Bills, clause 19 sets out which parts of the Act will commence immediately at Royal Assent, and provides a power for Ministers to commence other provisions at different times by regulations. Schedule 6 is linked to clause 3, which we debated on day two in Committee. That clause converts into domestic law direct EU legislation as it operates at the moment immediately before we leave the EU. There are, however, some EU instruments that have never applied in the UK—for example, instruments in respect of the euro and measures in the area of freedom, security and justice in which the UK chose not to participate. It would obviously be nonsense to convert these measures into domestic law after we leave, so these exempt EU instruments, to which clause 3 will not apply, are described in schedule 6.
Hon. Members will know that consequential provisions are a standard part of many Acts in order to deal with the effects of the Act across the statute book. Equally, transitional provisions are a standard way in which to smooth the application of a change in the UK statute book. Schedule 8 makes detailed and technical provisions of this nature, all of which are necessary and support the smooth operation of other crucial provisions set out elsewhere in the Bill. It clarifies what will happen to ambulatory references—I will return to this topic—to EU instruments after exit day, makes consequential and necessary amendments to other Acts, and makes transitional provision in relation to the establishment of retained EU law and the exceptions to it. Finally, schedule 9 sets out additional and necessary repeals as a consequence of our exit from the EU.
During the Minister’s course through the amendments, has he perhaps noticed new clause 54, which was tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) following the Prime Minister’s Florence speech? If he has noticed it, what does he think of it?
I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments, but I am only just beginning to conclude my opening remarks—I am only eight minutes in. I will come to the new clause in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) a little later. I will not rush on this occasion.
I turn to amendments 399 to 405 in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin); I am grateful to him for tabling them. I also pay tribute to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox), my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) and, if I may say so, my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who I understand has worked hard behind the scenes to create consensus for these amendments. These amendments are closely linked to amendments 6, 43, 44 and 45, which were discussed on the first day in Committee, and Government amendments 381 to 383.
The Prime Minister has made it clear that the United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union on 29 March 2019 at the conclusion of the article 50 process. The Government have recognised the uncertainty that many people felt as to whether the exit day appointed by this Bill would correspond to the day that the UK leaves the EU at the end of the article 50 process, and that is why we brought forward our own amendments setting out when exit day will be. The purpose of our amendments is straightforward: we want to be clear when exit day is and, in the process, to provide as much certainty as we can to all. In the course of that, we want to align domestic legislation to the international position, as has been set out.
Amendments 399 to 405 build on and complement the Government amendments setting exit day. We have always said that we would listen to the concerns of the House, as we have done throughout the Bill’s passage. As part of that, the Government have had discussions with my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset, and we are grateful that he tabled his amendments. They provide the Government with the technical ability to amend the date, but only if the UK and the EU unanimously decide to change the date at which treaties cease to apply to the UK, as set out in article 50.
Only one exit day can be set for the purposes of the Bill, and any statutory instrument amending exit day will be subject to the affirmative procedure. As I said in an intervention, we will bring forward an amendment on Report to make this requirement clear on the face of the Bill.
Could the Minister set out for the whole Committee—not just the Conservative Members sitting behind him—what will happen if the legislation provided for in amendment 7, which we passed last week, is not passed? The Minister, using amendment 381—whether or not it is itself amended by amendment 400—will still have the power to set the exit date and withdraw, irrespective of what has gone on. Is that not right?
The hon. Lady is trying to pre-empt some of my remarks. If she will bear with me, I will come to that.
A crucial point is that the Bill does not determine whether the UK leaves the EU; that is a matter of international law under the article 50 process. However, it is important that we have the same position in UK law that is reflected in European Union treaty law. That is why the Government have signed these amendments, and I was glad to do so.
I can assure the Committee we would use this power only in exceptional circumstances to extend the deadline for the shortest period possible, and that we cannot envisage the date being brought forward. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said many times, we and the EU are planning on the UK leaving the European Union at 11 pm on 29 March 2019.
I apologise to the Committee for having had to be in the Liaison Committee for the last couple of hours and for missing much of the debate. I thank my hon. Friend for accepting these compromise amendments. The Government are, in fact, accepting a very significant limitation on the powers they had in the original draft of the Bill. If we are interested in the sovereignty of Parliament, we are interested in limiting the room for Government to set arbitrary dates without any controls over them whatever. That is what existed in the Bill before. There is now proper control by Parliament of the date in the Bill.
How can it be right to tell the House that the exit date is being set by the House, when the amendments give the power to the Executive to set the exit date?
It is an interesting question that the hon. Lady asks, but how does she think that exit day would be set by the House? If it is not set on the face of the Bill and immovable other than by primary legislation, it must be set in secondary legislation. I would have thought that that was plain to the hon. Lady. We have done the right and pragmatic thing, which is to align UK law with the international treaty position. That enjoys wide support across a spectrum of opinion, and I am glad to support these amendments in the way I have set out.
Let me turn to the issue of the customs union, and I particularly noted what my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset said about it. The issue has been widely aired, and I do not intend to be tempted into a broader debate on trade policy. We are confident that we will negotiate a deep and special partnership with the EU, spanning a new economic relationship and a new relationship on security. Businesses and public services should only have to plan for one set of changes in the relationship between the UK and the EU, so we are seeking a time-limited implementation period during which access to one another’s markets should continue on current terms. During this implementation period, EU nationals will continue to be able to come and live and work in the UK, but there will be a registration system. The details of the implementation period are of course a matter for negotiations, and we have been clear that we will bring forward the necessary implementing legislation in due course. However, it would not be right to sign up now to membership of the customs union and the single market pending the outcome of negotiations, as new clause 52 would have us do.
The Minister, and the Prime Minister for that matter, repeatedly say that businesses will only have to plan for one set of changes. Given that businesses currently benefit from being part of the single market and the customs union, how can it possibly be the case, as the Prime Minister has also said, that we are coming out of the customs union and the single market during the so-called implementation period?
The hon. Lady tempts me to dilate on the details of the implementation period, which are to be negotiated, but that is not my purpose today, because it is not the purpose of this Bill. The purpose of this Bill is to deliver a functioning statute book as we leave the European Union.
With that in mind, I turn to new clauses 10 and 54 on the transitional or implementation period. Both new clauses seek to impose conditions on what form the implementation period the Government are seeking will take. I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe for his new clause, which attempts to write the Prime Minister’s vision for an implementation period into statute. That would be a novel constitutional change. Nevertheless, I welcome it in the sense that it is a ringing endorsement of Government policy. New clause 10, however, differs in some key regards from our vision.
The Government cannot accept these new clauses. The Prime Minister has set out a proposal that is now subject to negotiation. We are confident of reaching that agreement, but it would not be sensible for the Government to constrain themselves domestically in any way while those negotiations continue. We are making good progress, and it is in our mutual interests to conclude a good agreement that works for everyone. We do not want to put the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse.
In referring to the transitional or the implementation period, my hon. Friend has at various times used phrases straight out of the Florence speech, and he has accepted that the new clause in my name is identical to stated Government policy on the subject. In what way does it restrain the Government’s position to put their own policy in the Bill and ask the Prime Minister, as the new clause does, to seek to attain that which she has declared to be her objective? That is not a genuine reason for rejecting it. He is rejecting it because agreeing with the Florence speech still upsets some of our more hard-line Eurosceptics both inside and outside the Government.
Of course I have read it—it is here in my hand. I have read it but I have not gone back and done his homework for him to check and mark his work.
I make two points to my right hon. and learned Friend. First, as I said, it would be a constitutional innovation to begin putting statements of policy for negotiations in legislation. That is a good reason not to accept the new clause. The second point—[Interruption.] He says that it is not a good reason. He is the Father of the House and he has occupied many of the great offices of state. I would be interested to know when, in his long and distinguished career, he accepted that principle in legislation.
I have never previously seen members of the Government debate a clear exposition of Government policy from the moment it is first announced. That gives rise to serious doubts about exactly what the Government are going to pursue in the transition deal, and these exceptional and unprecedented circumstances are doing harm to Britain’s position. I cannot see what harm would be done by giving the approval of the whole House to the Government’s stated objectives in the Bill. The fact that it has not been done before is not an argument against it; it answers a situation that has not happened before, either.
My right hon. and learned Friend has caught himself in a contradiction. In this exchange, he has rested his argument on knowing exactly what the Government’s policy is, but in his last intervention he said that he did not know what it was.
My second point concerns subsection (2) of my right hon. and learned Friend’s new clause—[Interruption.] I would just like to make this point. The subsection states:
“No Minister of the Crown shall appoint exit day if the implementation and transition period set out in subsection (1) does not feature in the withdrawal arrangements between the UK and the European Union.”
That would cause a problem if the new clause were accepted and we reached the point at which the treaties no longer applied to the United Kingdom. We would have legal chaos—my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) talked about this earlier—if we had not commenced this Bill when the treaties ceased to apply. For both those reasons, we simply could not accept the new clause.
Ah! They are like spoiled children, aren’t they?
Is not another objection, if not the real objection, to the point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that it is the sort of point that should have been made in a Second Reading debate? We have two days for Report and Third Reading. That may be a stage at which the Government wish to look at these things, and it might be a time for huge innovation. Now is not the time to take Second Reading points, which could be dealt with later in the whole proceedings.
I will not give way now, because I have been on my feet for 22 minutes, and there are, I think, 53 amendments and new clauses to deal with. I will give way to the hon. Gentleman a little later.
I turn to the long series of amendments that are designed, in one way or another, to oblige the Government to publish reports or assessments on specific areas or issues, some in advance of exit day. They are new clauses 31 to 33, 40 to 44, 46, 47, 71, 72, 82, 84 and 85, and amendments 85, 86 and 219 to 221. It is in no one’s interest for the Government to provide a running commentary on the wide range of analysis that they are doing until it is ready to support the parliamentary process in the established way. All the amendments and new clauses I have mentioned share one common flaw. Ministers have a specific responsibility, which Parliament has endorsed, not to release information that would expose our negotiating position. The amendments and new clauses risk doing precisely that. I commend the excellent speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham), who is in his place. I thought that his speech was an interesting reflection of his own experience.
The risks and difficulties are easily illustrated by looking at some of the specific reports that are called for. New clause 42 asks for a report on severance payments for employees of EU agencies, but that is not a matter for the UK Government. The right to severance pay is a matter for the EU agencies, although we hope and expect that they would honour any relevant commitments to their employees.
New clause 48 calls for a strategy for the certification of UK and EU medical devices by UK bodies so that the UK can maintain a close co-operative relationship with the EU in the field of medicines regulation. That is of course our aim: we intend such a strategy to form a key part of our deep and special future partnership with the EU.
New clause 71, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), seeks to require a Minister to report before exit day on the Government’s progress in negotiating mutual market access for financial and professional services. I understand his motivations in wanting this information to be published. We are working to reach an agreement on the final deal in good time before we leave the EU in March 2019.
I want to complete my argument, for the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who tabled this new clause.
We are seeking an economic partnership that will be both comprehensive and ambitious. It should be of greater scope and ambition than any previous agreement so that it covers sectors crucial to our linked economies, such as financial and professional services. We are confident that the UK and the EU can reach a positive deal on our future partnership as this will to be to the mutual benefit of both the UK and the EU. We will approach the negotiations in this constructive spirit.
I want to provide reassurance to my hon. Friend on his new clause 72, which seeks to ensure that any ministerial power to charge fees in respect of inspections of imported food and animal feed is exercised in a way that ensures full cost recovery for public authorities.
Before I give way to my right hon. Friend, I want to respond on the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst.
I would like to persuade my hon. Friend that his new clause 72 is not necessary. First, there is already sufficient statutory provision to ensure that the cost of mandatory veterinary checks on food and animal feed, on their importation, are fully recoverable. The arrangements for setting inspection fees for imported food and animal feed vary according to the type of inspection. All imports of products of animal origin must be inspected by a port health authority at a border inspection post. For high-risk products not of animal origin, these checks are carried out by a port health authority at a designated point of entry. Broadly speaking, these checks must be satisfactorily completed before a consignment is released for free circulation.
EC regulation No. 882/2004 on official controls, together with supporting domestic legislation—for England, it takes the form of the Official Feed and Food Controls (England) Regulations 2009—provides the legal basis for charges in respect of these inspections. The Bill will convert that EC regulation into UK legislation. The nature of the charges that the port health authority can make depends on a number of factors, including the nature of the food or animal feed being imported and its point of origin.
I am grateful to the Minister for going into such detail on the basis for charging. May I mention that the other purpose behind new clause 72, which is a probing amendment, is to remind the Government of the importance of seeking in our negotiating objectives—no more and no less than that—a continued form of mutual recognition, if at all possible, for checks on food and feed?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that clarification. He will know that, under the WTO foundations of the world trading system, there are arrangements for the mutual recognition of sanitary and phytosanitary checks and other matters.
The second point I should make about my hon. Friend’s new clause 72 is that, in relation to any new inspections that may be required after the UK leaves the EU, the Government are considering what controls or surveillance will be required on imported food once we have left the EU. Where Ministers decide to introduce statutory inspection fees, Parliament should have the opportunity to consider the approach to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Where port authorities undertake additional checks on food, on its importation into the UK, for which there is not a statutory charge, decisions will continue to be taken on the basis of the need to balance costs between general and local taxation. We consider that the Government must remain free to set fees and charges in a manner that reflects these considerations. I hope that this provides my hon. Friend with sufficient reassurance.
Finally, on a separate issue, my hon. Friend asked earlier in our debates whether courts would be able to consider all material in relation to retained EU law when deciding such legislation’s meaning and effect. I am happy to confirm that this is the position under the Bill. The Government will place a letter in the Library of the House setting this out in more detail, and I am putting that on the record now to enable us to do so.
I am grateful for that assurance. There is just one other matter on which I hope my hon. Friend will be able to give me a like reassurance, on private contract matters.
I wonder whether the Minister could be quite clear at the Dispatch Box and give an undertaking on behalf of the Government that now we have voted—as we did last week—for amendment 7, the Government will not at any stage now bring forward any measure that in any way undermines the vote of this House on amendment 7, and that Parliament will have a meaningful vote, as we voted for last Wednesday.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. I admit, I thought she was going to ask me about the matters before me. That is a matter to be considered on Report, were we to return to it. [Hon. Members: “Ah!”] Opposition Members were shouting me down there for a moment. Were we to return to it, it would be a matter for Report, not for today. The Government’s policy is as we set out in the written ministerial statement, and of course we are a Government—[Interruption.] No, certainly not. We are a Government who of course obey the law. Parliament has voted and the law would currently be set out as on the face of the Bill.
No, I really am not giving way to the hon. Gentleman; I insist.
I turn now to amendment 102, which removes provisions that enable existing powers to amend retained direct EU legislation, and amendment 103, removing provisions that enable future powers by default to amend retained EU legislation. These amendments are linked to amendments that we have already debated on day 2 of the Committee, and I do not plan to repeat all those arguments.
I will make the argument on this point. We maintain that it is absolutely right and necessary for existing domestic powers granted by Parliament in other Acts to be able to operate on retained direct EU legislation, which will become domestic law. Fettering these powers would prevent important and necessary updates being made to our law, where that is within the scope and limitations of the powers and Parliament’s will. Similarly, it is important that future delegated powers created after exit day should be able to modify retained direct EU legislation, so far as applicable. This provides important clarity on the status of retained EU law and how it will interact with these powers. Further, where it is appropriate to do so, future powers can of course still be prohibited from amending retained direct EU legislation.
It is very relevant to the amendments that the Minister is currently running through, because the Prime Minister, at the Liaison Committee, has refused to fully commit to abiding by amendment 7, agreed to by this House last week. I wonder whether the Minister would like to comment on that, because if he is rowing back on that commitment he is essentially undermining many of the amendments he is running through at the moment—the one from the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) in particular.
What I would say to the hon. Gentleman, and I try to say this as gently as possible and in the spirit of Christmas, is that when I listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield talking about certain colleagues of a Eurosceptic persuasion, I hope he will not mind me reminding the House that he gave an articulation of—I think he used the word neurosis.
I do take objection—[Interruption.] I do take objection, because what we are going to do is move forward with the Bill as it stands, with the set of concessions that we have included within it, and I would ask my right hon. Friend to accept the good faith of the Government.
I am really not going to any more on this point.
Amendments 11 and 380 relate to the treatment of direct EU law for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss this point, which, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said, is related to his other concerns. The amendments concern the status of retained EU law, in this case specifically the status of retained direct EU legislation under clause 3 for the purpose of challenges under the Human Rights Act 1998.
Let me be clear from the outset that all legislation brought across will of course be susceptible to challenge under the HRA. Hon. Members will, however, understand that the remedies available under the Act differ for primary and subordinate legislation. It is therefore important that the Bill is absolutely clear on this point. Paragraph 19 of schedule 8 is clear. It sets out that this converted EU law is to be treated as primary legislation for the purposes of the 1998 Act, with the result that it will be open to the courts, if that legislation is challenged, to consider whether the legislation is compatible with rights under the European convention on human rights, and, if they conclude otherwise, to make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA.
The amendments, by contrast, would assign the status of subordinate legislation for the purposes of HRA challenges, meaning that a successful challenge could, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield knows, result in a strike-down of the legislation. The Government considered this point very carefully before we introduced the Bill. We recognised the potential arguments that, for example, detailed and technical EU tertiary legislation is more akin to our domestic secondary legislation. We are also, of course, alive to the concerns that this law must be properly challengeable. We concluded on balance, however, that assigning primary status to converted law for these purposes was the better course for three principal reasons.
First, this law comes into our domestic statute book in a unique way, but fundamentally Parliament will have chosen to bring each and all of these pieces of legislation into our law by primary legislation, albeit indirectly through the Bill. Contrary to the position for subordinate legislation, there will have been no exercise of discretion by an individual Minister. In that sense, converted EU law is more akin to primary legislation.
Secondly, if the law could be struck down by the courts, we would risk undermining the certainty the Bill is seeking to provide. None of this legislation can be challenged in UK courts now and some of it has been on the statute book for decades. Opening it up to being struck down is an invitation to challenge law which has long been settled, and to refight the battles of the past in the hope that a different court will return a different verdict.
Of the three points the Minister has made, the latter is without doubt the one that has the greatest force. It is worth bearing in mind that it highlights the fact of the supremacy of EU law, which is being preserved for the purposes of retained EU law. That, if I may say so, is a good reason why he should listen carefully to what I said about people being able to invoke general principles of EU law in order to challenge its operation. All these matters are interconnected.
I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. I know he is going to take this matter up further with my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General. I did actually just make two points, but perhaps I structured them ambiguously.
The third point is that in the event of a strike-down there would be no existing power under which fresh regulations could be brought forward, so it would be necessary to bring forward a fresh Act of Parliament or to rely on the remedial order-making power within the HRA itself. I should say that the remedial order-making power within the HRA was not designed to be the default means by which incompatible legislation is remedied or to deal with the policy changes that could be required.
The remedial order-making power may only be used if there are compelling reasons for doing so and it is targeted at removing the identified incompatibility. If wider policy change were needed following a finding of incompatibility, a fresh Act of Parliament would be the only means of doing that and we could be left with damaging holes in the statute book unless and until such an Act was passed. That is why the Government concluded that converted EU law should have the status of primary legislation in relation to the HRA, and that is why the Government will not be able to accept the two amendments.
I wish to pick up on the important point raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). For the avoidance of doubt, will the Minister clarify that it is not the Government’s intention to set up retained EU law in UK statute in a manner that would encourage a UK court to strike down another primary statute? If that is the intention, may I suggest it might be something the Government will have to look at?
My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General has just confirmed to me that we do not want that to happen. I am sure that that will be given further consideration, along with the issue of general principles that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield has raised.
I apologise for interrupting the Minister’s stream of thought and taking him back to his response to the right hon. Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) and my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray), but can he rule out, from the Dispatch Box today, returning to amendment 7 on Report?
I refer to the answer I gave earlier. At this point, I can tell the hon. Lady that I am not expecting to return to it, but we are reflecting on the implications of the amendment. We made a strong case for the powers at the Dispatch Box and are reflecting on it. I say to her, however, and to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that we are not expecting at this point to return to it. [Interruption.] She asks what that means. We have been in close conversation with my right hon. and learned Friend, and I feel sure that those conversations will continue, but I say to the rest of the Committee that I am going to focus on the amendments before me.
It is indeed on this point. Some of the Minister’s right hon. and hon.—and courageous—Friends from last week have, in good faith, signed amendment 400 this evening. Given that he is refusing to guarantee that the Government will stick to the letter and the spirit of amendment 7, they might feel that they are being led up the garden path.
Will the Minister confirm that Parliament is going to have its way? We will have a vote on any agreement, and it will then need primary legislation—the most intense scrutiny of all—to put it through. That, surely, is a major win for those who wanted that approach. I am quite happy with that. That is what amendment 7 leaves us with. Will he confirm that there will be full parliamentary scrutiny, debate and legislation on an agreement?
Yes, I will confirm that of course there will be full parliamentary scrutiny. One of the things that is bringing me great joy, particularly at Christmas, is the extent of parliamentary unity on this point of parliamentary sovereignty. One reason so many of us campaigned to leave the EU is that we wanted our voters to have a choice over who governed the UK in as many matters as conceivable.
I do not wish to revisit the arguments around amendment 7. I wish rather to conclude my consideration of the issue before us.
I am not going to let the hon. Gentleman come in on this point, which we have dealt with.
I emphasise again that our approach does not immunise converted law from HRA challenges. If an incompatibility were to be found, it places the matter in the hands of Parliament to resolve, without creating a legal vacuum in the interim. This approach strikes the right balance and recognises that supremacy of Parliament. I know that my right hon. and learned Friend has wider concerns regarding the rights of challenge after exit, including, in particular, where these are based on the general principles of EU law. I am happy to repeat the commitment made by my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General earlier that we are willing to look again at the technical detail of how certain legal challenges based on the general principles of EU law might work after exit. We will bring forward amendments on Report to address this, and we are happy to continue to discuss these concerns with him.
That is a very sensible approach on these matters, and I am very grateful to the Minister and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General for taking it forward. As for the other matter that has floated into our discussion, and which I have studiously avoided getting drawn into, I would simply recommend that, on the whole, kicking hornets’ nests is not a very good idea.
It is ironic that my right hon. and learned Friend and I should be constituency neighbours, and, if I may say so—and as we put on the record on a previous day—friends. It is also ironic that our other Buckinghamshire neighbours have swapped one rebel commander for another. But I think I should move on: I have kicked enough hornets’ nests myself for one day.
I am grateful to the Minister for that assurance, particularly in the light of recent press reports of attempts by the Spanish Government to exclude Gibraltar from the transition and end-state process. It is important for the Government to make that clear commitment, subject, of course, to the existence of the proper regulatory equivalents and standards. If the Minister will give me an undertaking that that will happen with the full involvement of Gibraltar’s Government, I think that those of us who supported the amendment will be satisfied.
This is the one amendment that would probably have attracted support from the Democratic Unionists, but, because of the assurances the Minister has given—and, importantly, the assurances the Prime Minister gave even today at the Dispatch Box—we feel relieved for Gibraltar’s sake. Is the Minister essentially saying that the protections he is now affording to Gibraltar effectively mean it will not be treated in any way differently from any other part of the United Kingdom?
The position is as I have set out, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if, in all the circumstances, I stick to that position. I hope that he will understand the strength of our commitment from that. We will deliver on our assurances that Gibraltar businesses will enjoy continued access to the UK market, based on the Gibraltar authorities having already agreed to maintain full regulatory alignment with the UK.
I have no doubt that the people and Government of Gibraltar will be grateful for the Minister’s assurances, but the wording of this amendment intends to make sure with 100% certainty that, even inadvertently, nothing in the Bill can damage the interests of the people of Gibraltar. Can the Minister tell us with absolute certainty that if this amendment is not added to the Bill, there is nothing in the Bill that will cause that damage? Assurances, objectives and promises are good, but can he say with absolute certainty that nothing in the Bill will ever damage or prejudice the interests of the people of Gibraltar?
What I can say to the hon. Gentleman is that this Bill extends to Gibraltar only in the way I have set out: the Government’s policy is as I have indicated to him, and we remain steadfastly committed to the interests of Gibraltar.
I turn now to the REACH regulation, new clause 61. We will use the powers in this Bill to convert current EU chemicals law, including REACH, into domestic law. That will mean that the standards established by REACH will continue to apply in the UK. I believe that that renders new clause 61 unnecessary.
On custodial sentences and amendment 349, the scope to create criminal offences in the Bill is restricted so the powers cannot be used to create an offence punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for more than two years. It might, however, be necessary to create criminal offences in certain circumstances, for example offences related to functions that are to be transferred from EU bodies to UK bodies which would be lost without the ability to recreate offences relating to functions then held at a UK level. To lose the offence, and therefore the threat of a sanction, would remove what could be seen as important protections in our law, and for that reason we are not able to support the amendment.
I turn now to amendment 362 on the issue of ambulatory references. I hope the Committee will bear with me on the final, technical section of this speech. The amendment concerns paragraph 1 of schedule 8, which deals with the ambulatory references in our domestic law, as well as EU instruments and other documents in EU legislation that will be retained under clause 3. At present, the ambulatory cross-references update automatically when the EU instrument referred to is amended. After exit day, the Bill provides that such references will instead be read as references to the retained EU law version of the instrument, which, unless the contrary intention appears, will update when the retained instrument is modified by domestic law. This is necessary in order to prevent post-exit changes to EU law from flowing automatically into UK law. It would not be appropriate for the reference to continue to point to the EU version of the instrument after we have left the EU.
The approach set out in the Bill will be applied in relation to ambulatory references within any enactment, retained direct EU legislation, and any document relating to them. I understand that this last provision—the reference to documents and whether or not that includes contracts—has concerned my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst. The Government are alive to concerns that we should not unduly disturb the operation of private contracts, or prevent parties to a contract from being able to give effect to their intentions. We are happy to explore this issue further with my hon. Friend and interested parties, to ensure that we achieve the appropriate balance between clarity and flexibility.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General for their frank and helpful response in this matter. This issue was raised by the City of London Corporation and the International Regulatory Strategy Group. I thank the Minister for his assurance that he will continue to work with them, and look forward to that. I am satisfied, for these purposes, that the issue is being addressed.
May I briefly take the Minister back to amendments 381 and 400? I thank him for his kind words about amendment 400, and for his work on the Bill. He will know that I did not put my name to amendment 381, but I will support amendment 400 so long as that power will be used only in extremis and for the shortest possible time. We have had an assurance on that from the Prime Minister at the Dispatch Box today, and I know that those on the Government Front Bench have taken that on board, but if there is any dissension on this, it would be nice to know about it now.
Perhaps my hon. Friend was not in the Chamber when I gave my assurance on this earlier. I am happy to repeat it. I can assure the House that we would use this power only in exceptional circumstances to extend the deadline for the shortest period possible, and that we cannot envisage the date being brought forward. I think that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister explained that earlier.
I did say that that was the last time I would give way, and I think it is now time for me to—[Interruption.] Yes, it is Christmas, and it is in the spirit of seasonal brevity that I would like to turn to the issue of thanks.
I should first like to thank the Committee for its diligent and well-informed scrutiny of this, the first Bill that I have piloted through Parliament. I am an engineer, not a pilot, however, so perhaps I could be said to have guided it through Parliament. It has been my pleasure to do so. I should like to thank you, Sir David, for your chairmanship, and I thank Dame Rosie, Mrs Laing, the other Sir David, Mr Hanson and Mr Streeter for theirs. It has been a pleasure to serve under all your chairmanships. I should also like to thank the Bill ministerial team, whose advice, support and guidance have been absolutely indispensable.
I should like to thank the Solicitor General, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Robert Buckland), the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood (Chris Skidmore) and of course the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr Walker). It would be wrong of me to omit the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Sherwood (Mark Spencer), who unfortunately is not in his place. His occasional guidance to the entire team has been invaluable, and has always been followed.
Finally, and most importantly, I should like to thank all the officials in the Department for Exiting the European Union and beyond who have so diligently risen to the enormous task of dealing with the scrutiny of the Bill. They have guided and assisted Ministers in the preparation of their remarks and they have responded to every query, from the House and from Ministers. We could not possibly have asked for more from them, and they could not have responded more professionally or more energetically. We can be extremely proud of all of the officials who have supported the Bill, as we wish them all a merry Christmas.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Sir David, and it is also a pleasure to follow the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker). I pay tribute to his calmness and tolerance in taking a very difficult Bill through to this stage. I was around when the Maastricht Bill was going through Parliament, and the way in which he has handled this one is a real tribute to him.
I do not always agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), but I agreed with him when he said that the Bill was about process. I am afraid that, perhaps because we have had eight days in Committee, we have widened our debate into areas that should not necessarily have been discussed today. We have rehashed quite a lot of the debate on the referendum. For me, this is a simple Bill about repealing the European Communities Act 1972.
I welcome the fact that there is now general agreement across the House about the date. I am pleased that it will be set out in the Bill because unlike a lot of Members here, but like my hon. Friend the Member for Blyth Valley (Mr Campbell), I do not really trust the EU. I therefore always worry that if we are not absolutely clear about what we are doing, the EU will manage to move things, because it would like to delay the process and punish us as much as possible for taking the brave decision to leave. When we look at what we are discussing, we are simply asking to leave the EU. The British people originally voted for a formal economic agreement, but for 40 years we have seen entanglement and legal procedures getting into our country, and we are now having to go through all this to leave.
Amendment 7 is incredibly important. That is why I was disappointed that my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) did not take an intervention during her contribution. What amendment 7 did last week was to show that this Parliament can speak. It gave power to this Parliament to say that we require a piece of legislation to go through the processes in this House to make sure that this Parliament has spoken when we leave the European Union. The Minister, not unsurprisingly, sought to give assurances to many right hon. and hon. Members on amendments that they have tabled that the Government will do the right thing, but refused—absolutely refused—at the Dispatch Box, on three separate occasions, to give a commitment from the Government that they would abide by the will of this House and abide by amendment 7.
In addition to that, this afternoon the Prime Minister was asked on several occasions at the Liaison Committee to abide by amendment 7, and on all those occasions she refused to give a cast-iron guarantee that the Government will not row back on amendment 7 on Report. That is not taking back control. My hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall should reflect very carefully on the fact that, whether or not one agrees with the principles of amendment 7 or bringing a piece of legislation through this House to implement the deal, this Parliament has spoken and therefore the Government have a legal, moral and democratic responsibility to abide by that decision and do what this Parliament has asked them to do. To do anything other than that would not just be kicking a hornets’ nest—it would be contemptuous to the hon. Members who walked through the Lobby last week to put amendment 7 into the Bill. If the Government do decide to row back on amendment 7 on Report, that will show that their direction on this Bill, and on removing the UK from the European Union, has nothing to do with the future of this country but is to do with the future of their own party.
The reason that amendment 7 is so important is that it allows this Parliament to have a say. The reason this Parliament needs to have a say—this goes to new clause 54 and, indeed, new clause 13—is that we cannot trust a thing that Ministers say. Their statements contradict all the aspirations that they wish to achieve through this process. Indeed, Michel Barnier has said in the past 48 hours that the red lines that the Government have drawn for themselves contradict the objectives that they wish to achieve from this process. That is why we are tabling new clauses like new clause 13.
I represent a constituency where tens of thousands of jobs, and the entire Edinburgh economy, are reliant on financial services. The head negotiator from the European Union said yesterday that the red lines that the Government have drawn for themselves are completely contradictory to their aspiration to keep passporting and a unique deal for financial services. Tens of thousands of my constituents who rely on jobs or secondary jobs in financial services would look at these reports and say, “If the Government do have the aspiration to keep the financial services passporting arrangements and to keep the financial services sector in the UK healthy, then they should put that aspiration into the Bill.” That is what new clause 54 is seeking to do. If the Government do not do that, my constituents could draw the conclusion that the Government may have to throw some sectors under the bus.
I say that because nothing could be as good as the situation that we have at the moment. We have free and unfettered access for goods and services, free and unfettered access to the customs union, and free and unfettered access to the single market. The aspiration of this Government is to ensure that when we come out of this process, we have exactly the same, if not better, terms than we have at the moment. That is completely and utterly impossible, because the European Union will never agree to the same benefits of the customs union and the single market if we are dealing with it on a separately negotiated basis. That means—this goes to the arguments made by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe—that when doing individual bilateral trade deals with the US, Australia, India or wherever else, the Government will have to throw some sectors under the bus. Michel Barnier has said in the past 48 hours that the red lines that the Government have drawn and the aspirations they wish to achieve for the financial services sector are contradictory and therefore cannot happen. If the Government refuse to accept any of the amendments, do we draw the conclusion that financial services is a sector that they are willing to throw under the bus?
Exactly, of course they didn’t. They did not talk about the single market. They did talk about immigration, however, and they thought they pretty much did not like it, even though in Kimberley there have probably been about four immigrants over the course of about 200 years.
We have had that part of the debate, but there is a grave danger in looking at the result of the referendum and saying, “The British people have definitely said they don’t want the single market and the customs union and all the rest of it”. We are leaving the EU, so I have voted to trigger article 50—I have taken that big step against everything I have ever believed in, and I accept we are leaving the EU—but I am not going to stay silent, and I am not going to stop making the case for us to do the right thing as we leave. I gently say to those who stand up and bang on about the devilment of the single market and the customs union that that is gravely insulting to British business.
What have we seen in this peculiar debate? It has been peculiar. I endorse everything my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) and the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) have said; it must be a Nottingham thing that there is this agreement between the three of us about the merits of the customs union and the arguments made about the Florence speech and why it should be on the face of the Bill.
I also observe that the Government have not really conceded very much at all. They have accepted that there was a real problem with the Henry VIII powers and they have accepted amendments that they pretty much drafted themselves, and they now accept the amendment of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), but we must be honest about that: it was an amendment rightly put forward by him, but to solve a problem of the Government’s creation, because they lost the vote on amendment 7. It might be a very good fudge, but we must not make any mistake about it: if it had not come as an idea from the Government, it would not be before us as an amendment—I say that with no disrespect to my right hon. Friend.
The Government have not actually conceded anything at all. They have gone away and said some warm words, but I am now worried and concerned. Last week, 11 very honourable and brave people on this side of the House had to face what some of my colleagues think is just a bit of intimidation. We have seen national newspapers hurling abuse, and putting up photographs almost like “Wanted” posters. In the face of all that and of a lot of strong-arm tactics—I will not go into that here, but those responsible for them know exactly what was going on behind the scenes; let us not pretend otherwise—they voted, in some cases for the first time ever, and in others for the first time in more than 20 years of honourable and loyal service to their party, in accordance with their conscience when they voted for amendment 7.
Today, however, our Prime Minister appears to be rowing back on that, and the Minister is unable to give us an unequivocal statement at the Dispatch Box that the Government will honour amendment 7. Let me make it very clear that if there is any attempt by the Government to go back on amendment 7, the rebellion will be even greater and have even bigger consequences.
I am happy to give my right hon. Friend an early Christmas present. I can give her the following assurance on behalf of the Government. The Government have accepted amendment 7. Our written ministerial statement on procedures for the approval and implementation of the EU exit agreement stands. There will be the following meaningful votes in accordance with that statement: on the withdrawal treaty, and on the terms of the future agreement. There will also be a withdrawal and implementation Bill, which the House will consider in detail, and of course all legislation is amendable.
I think that that is the unequivocal statement I am looking for. If it is, I am extremely grateful to the Minister for clearing that up. It is indeed a great Christmas present.
It is obvious that the two main parties in this place remain deeply divided, just as the country does. The irony of the situation will not be lost on future generations as they read Hansard. We have a considerable number of hon. and right hon. Members sitting on the Opposition Benches who completely agree with a considerable number of hon. and right hon. Members sitting on these Benches, yet we are prevented from building consensus and finding agreement because of the divisions within the two parties and, it has to be said, some intransigence on our two Front Benches. It is not for me to comment on the state of the Labour party, however; I will leave others to do that.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe has already identified the fact that, 18 months on, we still do not know what the Government see as their endgame. Our own Cabinet remains totally divided on this great issue—the greatest issue that we have had to wrestle with for decades. I say to my honourable and dear colleagues that there are some on these Benches who are entrenched in their ideological view about the European Union and will not move from it. They are a small group—they are the minority—but I feel as though they are running our country, and that cannot be right. Then there is another group, a big wide group of Conservative colleagues. Some of them are reluctant remainers, some are leavers-lite, and as they hear our debates and listen to the businesses that come to speak to them in their constituency offices, they are feeling uneasy and queasy. I do not say that they have to agree with me—of course they do not—but I asked them to listen to the arguments that are being advanced by those of us who speak on behalf of our constituents, notably businesses, about a deal.
We are not going to get a bespoke deal from the European Union—well, not unless we pay shed loads of money for access to this or that market—but there is something available to us. It is EFTA. It is the customs union. It is sitting there as a package. We can take it and seize it, and British business would be delighted if we did so. And then it would be done. The British people would say, “Thank God! They’ve got on and delivered Brexit”, and all would be well. We need to get on with it, so that we can then address the great domestic issues. I beg my hon. Friends to google EFTA and the customs union over the Christmas period. I urge them to understand them and to look at what Norway gets. Norway is able to determine its own agricultural and fisheries policies, for example. My hon. Friends need to know and understand these things. Then we need to come back in the new year and make a fresh start on forming that consensus that our constituents are dying to hear about, because they are fed up to the back teeth with what is going on.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I will seek to live up to that expectation, Mr Speaker; I do not intend to speak for long.
Amendment 4 addresses one of the six key tests that we set out for the Bill before we could support it. Those tests were not set out simply on Second Reading or in Committee, but 10 months ago, when the White Paper outlining the Government’s approach was first published.
The tests drew support across the House, but sadly the Government have made no significant concessions. In Committee, a meaningful vote for Parliament on the final deal was secured, of course—but against the wishes of the Government and only by decision of the House. Our five amendments at this stage address those other tests: facilitating a transitional period; protecting the devolution settlement; protecting workers’ rights; reining in the Henry VIII powers; and, in amendment 4, retaining the EU charter of fundamental rights in UK law.
The objective of amendment 4, which would retain charter rights in UK law and afford them the same level of protection as those in the Human Rights Act, has wide support on both sides of the House. It is part of a sensible and responsible approach to Brexit that respects the referendum decision but does not sacrifice jobs and the economy or rights and protections on the altar of ideology. It is a sensible approach for which I believe there is a majority across the House—one that goes well beyond those who voted for amendment 7 in Committee. It is also a consensus that I think is reflected in the other place, from which I suspect we might see the Bill return with some improvements, as the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield indicated.
The Opposition support amendments 42 and 43, which would enable UK courts to continue to refer matters to the Court of Justice and to consider CJEU decision to be persuasive. As well as amendment 55, we also support new clause 13, amendments 40 and 41, on clarifying the status of retained law, and new clause 16 on enshrining equality rights, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous). We also support new clause 7 on animal sentience and new clause 9 on the acquired rights of Anguillans—an indication of the enormous complexity and range of the issues we face with Brexit. We accept that Government amendments 37 and 38 improve the Bill, but we fear that they do not go anywhere near far enough on legal challenges based on the general principles of EU law, which is why we prefer and support amendment 57, which was moved so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy).
Amendment 4 addresses the concerns we raised in Committee around the charter of fundamental rights and provides an opportunity for the Government to think again. Human rights should not be a dividing line between parties in this House, so even at this stage we hope that the Government, either here or in the Lords, might accept our approach in the amendment and perhaps even accept the amendment today and avoid the vote that we will otherwise be seeking. As we said in Committee, the charter has been critical in developing, strengthening and modernising human rights in the UK. To abandon it risks reducing protections for UK citizens and leaving a gaping hole in our statute book.
The Government claim that the Bill is about legal continuity and certainty in what will become the new category of EU retained law, but all of that EU law is interpreted through the charter, so excluding it would leave our legal system inconsistent and incoherent. To avoid defeat on this issue in Committee the former Justice Minister, the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), committed to publishing a memorandum that he claimed would confirm the Government’s case that the charter was unnecessary by identifying where all of these rights could be found in EU retained law or existing domestic law.
Obviously that argument overlooked the main point of the charter, which was to bring all of these rights together in one codifying document, but as an Opposition we were willing to be helpful and awaited the memorandum with interest. We wanted to see a comprehensive document that identified not only the source of each right in the charter but—crucially—how the existing level of effective recourse would be guaranteed. The memorandum was published on 5 December, and it acknowledged that the Government envisaged all these rights being scattered back to their original sources. They are removing the material source of the rights, in the form of the charter, and leaving citizens with the formal source. Now that is a legal way of describing the problem, but I am not a lawyer. It means in effect that it will become more difficult for any UK citizen to assert their rights post-Brexit.
In their defence, the Government insisted that nothing would be lost if we dropped the charter because it created no new rights.
I see the Solicitor General nodding. On this crucial issue, however, the Government’s cover has been blown. For this, I would like to thank the new Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) —I am sorry she is not in her place today—because in an article in The Daily Telegraph on 18 November last year she made our case clearly. She expressed her concern about the charter precisely because it provided new rights. She wrote that it went beyond the European convention on human rights by creating “extra layers of rights”, and she went on to bemoan the fact that these extra rights covered
“everything from biomedicine and eugenics to personal data and collective bargaining”.
I appreciate that her thinking on this will probably be in line with that of her new boss, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, because he relied of course on the extra rights provided by the charter when he brought his own court case against the now Prime Minister asserting his right to personal data.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I want to speak briefly to amendments 55 and 56 and to probe one simple issue: in short, what happens if there is a failure to correct a deficiency in EU law, so that it cannot operate effectively after exit, and how can we maximise the chances that such a thing does not happen?
We have had plenty of debate on how we can restrict Government powers to correct deficiencies so that such powers cannot be used to undermine the incorporation of EU rules and so that we do not end up with some sort of watered-down or dysfunctional version of the original. However, perhaps the more realistic possibility, and just as much of a danger, is that we end up with a watered-down or dysfunctional version of EU rules not because of the inappropriate use of those powers of correction, but because of a failure to use them at all in appropriate circumstances, either by accident or design, or if various incorporated rules and regulations are simply allowed to fester away uncorrected and unable to operate effectively. So, I asked at Committee stage, “What happens if there is a citizen before a court in this country, seeking to establish rights under retained EU law when that retained EU law is actually riddled with deficiencies? Is the court supposed to try and make that work? Does the person simply lose their ability to exercise that right?”
My amendment 55 simply requires the court to interpret retained EU law—as far as possible—in such a way as to make it function effectively, borrowing shamelessly from the language of the Human Rights Act. I fully acknowledge that that in itself would not take us very far, but it is there to prompt a response from the Government. What should the court do in those circumstances? There are alternative courses of action that this Parliament could take, not just in amending clause 6 but in other parts of the Bill. We could expressly require EU law to be interpreted so as to be given effect “as if the UK were still a member state”, with further provisions about how that should be done. We could put in place a procedure to allow courts to flag up rules that they have found cannot operate effectively. We could put Ministers under an obligation or a duty to ensure that retained EU laws operate effectively; indeed, amendment 57 and new clause 19 are of that nature. Alternatively, as amendment 56 suggests, we could simply require the Government to publish a list of all the deficiencies they found in retained EU law that they are not seeking directly to rectify.
In short, the task of ensuring that we have a functioning rule book or statute book on exit day is twofold. Parliament must protect important rights, not only by preventing inappropriate use of Henry VIII powers, but by providing a means of ensuring that deficiencies are rectified where necessary, either by the Government, or by Parliament or by our courts, and I still think we have a long way to go in that regard.
I wish to speak in support of amendments 37 and 38 in the name of my colleagues in Government.
I will try and answer the question that was put to me by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), who has been getting frustrated in these debates about the somewhat technical nature of ministerial responses. Well, this is a very technical Bill. Like its illustrious predecessor, the European Communities Act 1972, it is a Bill of constitutional importance; it is a framework Bill. It is not—I stress this, because it is most important—it is not a Bill that seeks to convey a policy or a particular aspect of policy that we have discussed today. It is a framework that is designed to ensure that the law that is applied up to exit is downloaded in as clear and proper a way as possible because, to be consistent with the rule of law, the law needs to be accessible, it needs to be clear and it needs to be well understood. That is the fundamental basis of my concern about today’s amendments—that in seeking to retain the charter of fundamental rights in domestic law after exit, not only do we sow potential confusion but we fundamentally misunderstand what that charter means in the first place.
The Government have introduced welcome amendments to clause 7. While my hon. and learned Friend is talking about clarity, I just want to ask him to confirm, at this early stage in his remarks, that the Government will bring forward the amendments that we were hoping for, and that I think my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I were, if not promised, at least led to expect, when clause 6 is discussed in the other place.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. If he had sufficient time at his disposal, he might have seen the evidence that I gave to the Constitution Committee in the other place, in which the issues in clause 6 were discussed—the interpretive provisions that he and I and others debated in Committee.
May I come back to the fundamental point about the charter? It was never intended to create new rights. It was a document that reaffirmed rights that already existed in EU law.
I will not; I am developing my argument. It was a point that was made clear, not only in the charter itself but in protocol 30, which was signed by Poland and the UK at the time of the Lisbon treaty. In addition—this is important, and this, it seems to me, having listened carefully to the debate, is not understood—the charter does not apply to member states in everything they do. Although it applies to the EU and its institutions in all areas, it binds member states only in so far as they are acting within the scope of EU law. Therefore talking about the charter in a domestic context misunderstands its purpose and point: it was not drafted in that context. I am afraid that there has, I think, been a regrettable misunderstanding about that in this debate.
I do not think I have been under any misunderstanding at all. That is why I have kept pressing the Government to leave the charter to one side but look at the general principles of EU law necessary to bring challenges to retained EU law, brought into our own domestic law, that was not enacted by this Parliament—and without which, frankly, the coherence of EU law starts to disintegrate. That is the issue. Linked to that, of course, is the other issue of protecting some of those fundamental rights, perhaps in a different way, that matter to so many on both sides of the House.
My right hon. and learned Friend and I agree about general principles, which is why the general principles that underpin the recently drafted charter remain and, of course, do apply in respect of retained EU law. His second point about the means by which individuals challenge that is, of course, a matter of ongoing debate. I shall come back to the points raised in not only his amendment, but mine as well.
My hon. and learned Friend kindly said that he would try to answer my question. The question was: what harm has the charter of fundamental rights done and what evil is he trying to avert? It is true that, unexpectedly, new rights have been created under the charter and he is right that those rights have relevance to EU law. But the whole point of the Bill is to retain large amounts of EU law and its principles. What is the point of the change? This is policy in this Bill—it is a policy change. I fear that it is a signal to some sections of my party: the only part of the acquis communautaire that will be abolished mentions the wicked words “fundamental rights”, and that is why it is being removed.
The position that my right hon. and learned Friend took on the charter back in 2007 is the right one. As I was saying, it is in the interests of maintaining the rule of law that we maintain clarity, consistency and a clear authoritative source for those rights. My genuine concern about the importation of this particular charter into our domestic law is that we will sow confusion. That is not good for the maintenance of the rule of law, for the citizens of our country, for the future development of the law or for the position of this place vis-à-vis that development.
I entirely endorse what my hon. and learned Friend is saying, not least because of the acquis itself. Secondly, there are the adjudications under the European Court itself. Thirdly, the charter is like a legal ectoplasm: it seeps into everything. There is no way in which we would ever be able to extract ourselves from the entirety of the provisions in perpetuity.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who raises a genuine concern about the impact of protocol 30. Many Opposition Members were here 10 years ago; they were anxious then to make sure that the protocol was included in the Lisbon treaty. They are now happy to resile from that position and take an entirely different view. I take great issue with that: the legal principles were the same then as now. Nothing has really changed about the potential force of the charter, so I am rather bemused to hear about that volte-face on the part of many Opposition Members.
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for giving way, particularly given that from a sedentary position earlier he described an intervention of mine as rubbish—but let us slide away from that. As he will know very well, human rights were an essential component of the Belfast agreement, and the protection of human rights was at the core of the Patten reforms of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. For the people of Northern Ireland, therefore, the protection of human rights is essential. By repealing the charter of fundamental rights—not the convention, the charter—we are sending out an extremely negative message to the people of Northern Ireland. Can he offer reassurances on that point?
I certainly can. First, we are not repealing anything. Secondly, the dog that has not barked in this debate is the European convention on human rights, which is much supported by both sides of the House, very much part of our law and a fundamental part of the underpinning of many of the human rights—
I know that the hon. and learned Lady treasures and rightly places great value on those human rights. I give way to her.
Can the Solicitor General confirm once and for all that reports that the Prime Minister wants to run the next Tory party general election campaign on a pledge to repeal the Human Rights Act and withdraw from the convention are incorrect? [Interruption.] Conservative Members roll their eyes and make a noise. I am giving him the opportunity to confirm that that is incorrect.
May I just calm the hon. and learned Lady? [Interruption.] Well, she is making a point that is frankly not the case. We have committed to supporting our membership of the European convention throughout this Parliament, and that is a position I entirely support.
The hon. and learned Lady seems to be very focused on future referendums and the desire to rerun arguments that were held some time ago. I want to do justice to her amendments as much as to anybody else’s, and I will say this about the amendments posited by her and the Labour party: they offer different visions of how challenge might be mounted by using the charter. Amendment 4, which stands in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, deals with a situation akin to that under the Human Rights Act, whereby a declaration of incompatibility can be given, but that does not guarantee full redress for individuals seeking it under the charter. I accept that the amendment in the name of the hon. and learned Lady goes further and would retain a power in effect to strike down legislation if it is incompatible with the charter. I simply say to both of them, with the greatest of respect, that their approaches work against the core aims of the Bill. We are leaving the EU, and there has to be certainty about the process; and certainty in the law lies at the heart of everything else we have to do. That is the simple reason why we cannot accept those amendments.
I was interested in the arguments of the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) about clause 4, when she moved her amendment 57 and spoke to her new clause 19. My argument about clause 4 is simply this: indeed, as the sweeper clause—the description she adopted—it has the important function of curing any loopholes that might exist in European law when we leave the EU and deals with the question of uncertainty that I know she is extremely concerned with. I will try to reassure her. She will remember that the explanatory notes contain a helpful and non-exhaustive list of the type of directly effective rights, such as equal pay—a very important right—that are designed to be covered by this important provision in clause 4. As I have said in evidence in another place, we are simply seeking to ensure the important principle of reciprocity in the enforcement of fundamental rights such as those of equality, which she referred to, and those pertaining to the environment, for which I know she also has a great passion.
In conjunction, I can deal with the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous), who succinctly and clearly made his argument on new clause 16, which deals fairly and squarely with equalities. We have already made our commitment clear that all the protections in and under the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010 and the equivalent Northern Ireland legislation will continue to apply once we have left the EU. In Committee, we tabled an amendment which would secure transparency in that regard by requiring ministerial statements to be made about any amendments made to the Equality Act through secondary legislative powers under the Bill.
What concerns me about new clause 16 is that it would go further by creating new free-standing rights, perhaps even more than have been proposed in amendments relating to the charter. That is not the purpose of the Bill. The Bill is about maintaining the same levels of protection on the day after exit as on the day before. It is not a vehicle for substantive legislative changes such as those that have been proposed, and for that reason we cannot accept the new clause.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) for his qualified welcome for the Government amendments. The reason for a three-month time limit analogous to that which exists in domestic judicial review is the important policy consideration that there must be a degree of certainty when it comes to ongoing litigation and dispute about EU law as we enter the post-exit era. I think there must be some resolution of that by way of a limitation period. Retaining an open-ended right of action would create more uncertainty for businesses and individuals about rights and obligations.
After we cease to be a member of the European Union, it would not be right to allow “general principles” challenges to Acts of Parliament to continue, because that is not in line with the purposes of Brexit. To put it simply, outside the context of EU law, the ability of courts to disapply Acts of Parliament on “general principles” grounds is not consistent with the way in which our domestic legal system functions. That must be at the heart of our policy considerations.
My hon. and learned Friend’s argument would make more sense if the Government had not decided to retain the principle of the supremacy of EU law in the Bill. Once they have done that, removing the mechanism of a challenge on the basis of general principles creates something that I think is rather odd. I would not have pressed the issue if the Government had adopted an alternative approach, but that was their own decision. This has, I think, highlighted some of the oddities of the way in which the matter has been approached. It may well be that they can be sorted out in the other place, but I think my hon. and learned Friend must acknowledge that they are odd.
I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend is allowing me to intervene on his intervention. Let us not forget that we are dealing with the pre-exit situation. The EU acquis is being frozen, in the sense that its full effect in a pre-exit sense must be maintained so that we can maintain certainty. I agree that it is a strange and rather unusual concept, but I think it preserves that all-important certainty.
Time is short, and I want to ensure that I deal with further amendments.
I must press on, I am afraid.
The amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield relating to the way in which we designate EU legislation make important contributions to the debate, but they are laden with problems. The sheer volume of what we are dealing with—well over 15,000 pieces of legislation—leads me to draw back from trying to create a convenient categorisation of retained EU law. With the greatest respect, I think it far wiser for the Government to approach each item on a case-by-case basis, not making glib assumptions and trying to downgrade EU law, but getting each particular measure right.
Amendments tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and others deal with, again, the debate on clause 6 and the interpretation of retained EU law. I entirely understand why the amendments were tabled, because the debate is intense, but I would say to those Members, with respect, that I think less is more. The more we try to enshrine in law principles such as persuasive authority—which is in one of the amendments—the more I see the potential for judicial head-scratching and litigation of a type that I do not believe the judiciary would welcome. I have said it before and I say it again: I trust our judiciary to answer the question put before them rather than to survey like lions of the constitutional savannah and to run across the landscape. They answer the question that is put to them, and I trust them to do that and to use the discretion that quite naturally they should be given.
In relation to the new clause in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), it is clear that the Government regard animals as sentient and we of course support the sentiment behind the new clause, as we did on a previous occasion, but we could not support it then and the reasons for not supporting it have not changed. Article 13 places an obligation on the EU when developing certain policies, and on EU member states when developing and implementing those policies. That obligation, because animals are sentient beings, is to have full regard to their welfare requirements, but article 13 applies only to a limited number of EU policy areas, and frankly it also allows for practices that we would consider cruel.
I would be interested to know what policy area the Solicitor General thinks the EU provision does not cover: what does he want to cover that the EU does not? Secondly, would it not be safer just to have this amendment in the Bill to make sure we have legal certainty, because he cannot guarantee that the Government Bill will get on to the statute book before we leave the EU?
May I reassure the hon. Lady by pointing out that there are many areas on which we have heard debates, such as on live importation? I want to make sure the new domestic law we introduce is comprehensive in a way that I know she would fully support. Cross-referencing to the obligations in article 13 —which apply only to EU policies, not to UK policies—would, if anything, create more confusion once we have left the EU.
Frankly, article 13 has not delivered and its effect on domestic law is minimal, and as my right hon. Friend the Environment Secretary has said, we can do better. We have made it clear that we intend to retain, and indeed enhance, our existing standards of animal welfare once we leave. This Bill will convert the existing body of EU animal welfare law into our law and will make sure the same protections are in place in the UK and that laws still function effectively after we leave.
The purpose of this Bill is not to improve EU laws; it is about providing a functioning statute book. That is why, as the hon. Lady has acknowledged, the Government have now published draft legislation—the Animal Welfare (Sentencing and Recognition of Sentience) Bill—which sets out why we can do it better. It is a significant improvement on article 13; it will impose a clear duty on the state to have regard for animal welfare when considering all policies, rather than just the six areas in article 13.
I also say to the hon. Lady that it is open to public consultation and we have to respect the views of thousands of members of the public who will be coming forward and making—[Interruption.] The hon. Lady believes in open and public consultation and democracy, and that is why we are doing what we are doing. [Interruption.] It ill behoves the hon. Lady to assume that my party somehow lies on a lower moral plain when it comes to issues of animal welfare. We share the passion and commitment to animal welfare that she professes and I know many other Members in this House do—I look to the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) as a shining example. We want to hear from the public and their view about it, and we want to get it right in domestic legislation, which is the right place for it.
There is much I could say about the wonderful, if small, British overseas territory of Anguilla. Having visited it myself in a ministerial capacity, I was very grateful to the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) for his description. We are very conscious not only of the importance of Anguilla, its people and its economy, but the need to make sure that the concerns of the Anguillan Government are considered and the rights people have in Anguilla, which are exactly the same as those of UK nationals, are preserved after we leave the EU. We will make sure that that situation will not change.
The debate on the charter has been an important one. It has been a further stage in the way in which we have looked carefully at the Bill. The Government remain open and we are listening to all views on how we can get this right. I am sure that, as the Bill makes its way into another place, the deliberations of this House will have done much to enhance the quality not only of the Bill but of our democracy itself.
I thank the Minister for praising me as a shining example on animal welfare, but that does not quite make up for my disappointment that he has failed to address the issues in my amendments. I therefore seek to press amendment 57 to a vote.
Thank you, Mr Speaker.
Let me make these points. What accountability is there on the promises that were made during the EU referendum? The Secretary of State for Scotland told us that we would have a “powers bonanza”, but there has been nothing. The Environment Secretary said that we would get powers over immigration, but there has been no accountability over that. The Foreign Secretary said that there would be £350 million for the NHS, and quite remarkably, he doubled down on that last night. No shame whatever. Is it any wonder that the latest NatCen survey shows that, rather than 59% of people in Scotland thinking that the Government are handling this badly, the figure has shot up to 67%? The hon. Member for Stirling (Stephen Kerr) mentioned this earlier.
Let us compare that to the attitude of the Scottish Government on this. The amendments that have gone down have been drafted by their working with colleagues from across this House and across the Administrations. We published our amendments in due time. Even yesterday, the Scottish Government used the economists that they have at their disposal to publish—not keep secret—their analysis of Scotland’s place in Europe. It showed an 8.5% loss in GDP, equating to £2,500 for every person in Scotland, through losing the value of EU nationals. Leaving the single market will be devastating. On this, I make a gentle point to our Labour colleagues, many of whom have stuck out their neck on the single market. This Government are on the ropes and we could have a majority that could achieve a sensible outcome. I urge my colleagues on the Labour Benches to reconsider some of their options on this. We can stay in the single market.
In conclusion, compromises can be reached but we must see the amendments. All of this is happening even though we were told that the only way to stay in the EU was to vote no. Two thousand years ago, the first Scot in recorded history, Calgacus, was said to have told his followers about the Romans:
“They are the only people on earth to covet wealth and poverty with equal craving. They plunder, they butcher, they ravish, and call it by the…name of ‘empire’.”
As we leave the European Union, we have nothing on clause 11, nothing on the rights of EU citizens, nothing about what will happen to our trade, and nothing on the opportunities for young people. That leads me to conclude that the only plan that the Brexiteers have is to create a desert and call it Brexit.
The debate has been lively and has ranged quite widely over various aspects of the impact of this country’s withdrawal from the European Union on the devolution settlements. I therefore want to make it clear from the start that the Government’s expectation and intention are that the return of competences from the European Union will result in a very significant addition to the powers exercised in future by the devolved Administrations on the bases set out in their respective devolution statutes. However, we have to go about this complex task in the right way for the sake of individuals, families and businesses in every part of the United Kingdom, because the devolution settlements were negotiated, debated and enacted on the basis of certain competences being known to be within the power of the European Union and, on the quite reasonable assumption at the time that the devolution statutes went through this House, that that would continue to be the situation.
I will give way briefly to the hon. Lady, who has not made a speech in this debate.
May I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his new job? I was absolutely delighted for him. He just mentioned that, in the absence of a Northern Ireland Assembly functioning as we would want it, he has had discussions with leaders of political parties in Northern Ireland—that is what I understood him to say—so will he list which leaders of which parties he has had discussions with?
Parties have all been briefed on the Government’s position and therefore have had the opportunity to put forward their points of view. Obviously, in the absence of a functioning Assembly and Executive in Northern Ireland, we have regular contact with the civil service authorities in Northern Ireland, which are maintaining the administration of Northern Ireland in accordance with Northern Ireland law.
I am grateful to the Minister for taking another intervention.
I am very disappointed. I sit as an independent, and I take my seat in this House. Sinn Féin Members, seven of them, are absentee MPs. I would be extremely offended if I thought for one moment that the leader of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland—she is not elected to this House—had been consulted when I had not.
The hon. Lady and I have known each other for a long time, and having now had overall responsibility for intergovernmental relations and devolution in the United Kingdom for seven days, I am happy to undertake to make it a priority to have that conversation with her to ensure that her views are properly heard.
Government amendments 26 and 27 will replace the current requirements for devolved Ministers to seek the consent of the United Kingdom Government when exercising the correcting power in specific ways with requirements instead to consult the United Kingdom Government. That achieves the same effect as Committee amendment 169, which was proposed by the Scottish and Welsh Governments and tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty). Having discussed the matter with those Administrations and having listened to the debate in Committee, we have agreed to accept that proposal, with the addition of extending the change to the power by conferring it on the Northern Ireland Executive.
The United Kingdom Government have a vital role in considering the broader consequences for other parts of the UK where devolved Ministers legislate under these powers, and we think this change is justified. It remains important that, in using the conferred power, no action is taken that inadvertently places us in breach of EU law while we are still a member state or that would prejudice or pre-empt the outcome of negotiations; but on reflection, we consider that the devolved Administrations consulting with the UK Government before legislating in these specific circumstances relating to our negotiations will provide a sufficient safeguard and will preserve the autonomy of the devolved Administrations in correcting their laws.
The hon. Gentleman will forgive me, but there are a lot of amendments in this group and I want to try to do justice to them.
Government amendments 25, 28 and 29 tackle a technical but important issue by allowing the devolved Administrations to use the powers conferred on them by schedule 2 to modify directly retained EU legislation in areas where a common framework is not needed. While we work with the devolved Administrations on where frameworks are or are not needed, we are maintaining existing common approaches to provide much welcomed certainty. To aid that, direct EU legislation that currently applies uniformly across the UK will be corrected at UK level in the first instance to avoid the risk of early, unhelpful divergence in areas where it may ultimately be determined that a common approach should apply. We have listened to the views of Opposition Members, my hon. Friends who represent constituencies in Scotland and Wales, the devolved Administrations and Committees in the devolved legislatures.
Given that the UK Government are committed to making swift progress on the frameworks, we agree that, where a matter is released from the clause 11 competence arrangement, the powers in the Bill should be fully available to the devolved Administrations to modify retained direct EU legislation, and we intend that that will be in the majority of areas. We and the devolved Administrations continue to make good progress in those framework discussions. We intend to agree as many areas as possible where frameworks are not needed in advance of exit day, so that those areas may transfer directly to the devolved Administrations without the need for an intervening period in which to operate the holding pattern described in the clauses.
Like my hon. Friends the Members for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), for Ochil and South Perthshire (Luke Graham), for Stirling (Stephen Kerr) and for Aberdeen South (Ross Thomson), I am disappointed that we have been unable to reach agreement with the Governments of Scotland and Wales to make amendments to clause 11 on an agreed basis. That remains the Government’s ambition. When I spoke to the Deputy First Minister of Scotland and the First Minister of Wales a few hours after being appointed to my new responsibilities last week, I emphasised that I was instructing our officials to work with theirs even more intensively to try to achieve that agreement.
The discussions so far have revealed a great deal of common ground between us. For example, we are all agreed that common UK frameworks will be required in some areas even after we have left the EU. That was also recognised in Committee and reflected a shared understanding about protecting the internal UK market, managing common resources and meeting international obligations. But this is a complex area and we need to get it right, and we do not believe that amendments 3, 6 and 13 would achieve that. It is our assessment that in only a minority of cases will we require a legislative framework, in whole or in part.
I can confirm today that the Government will shortly publish our analysis of the areas where frameworks will and will not be needed, so that we are transparent about this progress as our discussions on both clause 11 and frameworks move into greater detail. I also wish to acknowledge the co-operative approach of both the Scottish and Welsh Governments and their officials in working with us towards the right outcome. I have full confidence that we will deliver this Bill with the legislative consent of both the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales.
Let me turn to the Opposition amendments. Amendment 3, from the Opposition Front-Bench team, and amendments 6 and 13, standing in the names of the hon. Members for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins) and for Arfon (Hywel Williams), relate to the temporary arrangements established by clause 11, so that we might determine where and how frameworks would operate. The trouble with these amendments is that they would strip away certainty in areas where our citizens and our businesses rely on having common approaches across the UK, and they would pre-empt our framework discussions. They would risk our ending up when we leave the EU with unchecked divergence where common approaches were in place, with no guarantees of if and when they might be re-established. That is simply not good enough. I do not think it right to accept such amendments, which would inadvertently risk creating new barriers to living and doing business right across the UK, however well-intentioned they might be.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that we have heard a lot of talk about respect between both Governments and that being why we should accept the amendment, but that in not securing Joint Ministerial Committee agreement and in not securing a legislative consent motion this actually shows no respect for that process and is simply a stunt?
I agree with my hon. Friend.
Let me turn to the amendments from the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), who again raised the important debate between “necessary” and “appropriate” provisions made under the Bill. Members will not be surprised to know that “necessary” is a very strict legal test. It could be interpreted by a court as “logically essential”, and where two or more choices of law to correct EU law are available to Ministers, arguably neither one is strictly necessary because there is an alternative. So Ministers need to be able to exercise discretion to choose the most appropriate course. For example, if two agencies could arguably carry out a particular function, the UK Government—or in this case the devolved Administration—must propose that which would be the most appropriate choice. That is why we have chosen the word “appropriate” and would wish to stick to that.
The Government remain of the view that the power in clause 7(1) is crucial. We do not take delegated powers lightly, and we want them to be tailored as tightly to their purpose as possible. We have therefore listened to hon. Members’ concerns about the scope of the power in clause 7(1), and in bringing forward Government amendments 14 and 15, we have built on the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who was supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose).
We must ensure that we can correct all deficiencies that may arise from our withdrawal, but our amendments put it beyond doubt that some of the wilder speculation on how powers in the Bill would be used will not be possible, by providing an exhaustive list of the types of deficiency and taking up the constructive suggestion of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox). That is the act of a responsible Government responding to the debate we have listened to in the House. I hope that—
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My hon. Friend gives us a salutary reminder that it is important that we make all the appropriate corrections before exit day, and the Government do want to make all of those corrections and to ensure that the law is accessible for all. I can confirm to him that Government Departments and the centre of Government are listening to industry, including the City, as part of our planning. We have put in place procedures and tools to ensure that we prioritise the most important corrections and so that nothing is missed out. On top of that, as the Bill provides for, we have put in place an urgent procedure in case of last-minute developments to which he refers.
I am very grateful to the Minister for that helpful intervention. I am conscious, as I said, that the Solicitor General and other Ministers have done work on this, and that will shorten what I have to say. I hope that the Minister might meet me in due course to discuss the way in which the urgent procedure will operate so that we can get more detail. That is what I was seeking to achieve—to make sure that we have a means of dealing with something when a decision needs to be made pretty much in real time under these circumstances. That reassurance that the Government will find the means of doing that enables me to confirm that I shall not be pressing the matter. It does of course apply to situations in which, for whatever reason, something has been overlooked in the transition process, or in which something has cropped up that could not reasonably have been foreseen by means of the best endeavours. Against that background, I welcome the Minister’s clarification on that matter. I gather from his nod that he is happy to discuss the matter further with me, so I need not trouble the House any longer.
I am indeed. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who also serves on the European Scrutiny Committee. The provisions I refer to would be express provisions. Therefore, the question of principle is fundamental and will also, no doubt, be taken up in the House of Lords. Furthermore, former Law Lords and members of the Supreme Court have expressed their concerns.
The European Scrutiny Committee’s unanimous view when we met this morning was that Parliament as a whole needs a solution that confirms the principle of parliamentary sovereignty along the lines of declarations of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998, as I indicated in my correspondence with the Prime Minister, whose letter I received on 9 January. To take this forward, may I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to intervene to give me and the House an assurance that when the Bill is in the House of Lords, the Government will constructively engage with the European Scrutiny Committee, with any other Committees of both Houses and with the advice of the Attorney General and the Lord Chancellor to explore and find a proper solution to the constitutional issues I have raised in the national interest?
Order. Before the hon. Gentleman continues, I had—I will not say revelled in the expectation, but had been taking quiet satisfaction in the expectation, that the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) had in fact completed his speech.
That is a moderately eccentric way in which to proceed, but we will allow a brief intervention—and a very brief response, I hope.
That is why in the Bill we treat retained direct EU legislation as primary legislation for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, and why we have taken the approach we have to challenges based on the general principles. Bearing in mind what my hon. Friend has said—and, indeed, what my right hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones) has said—and the view of the Select Committee, which he has just set out, we will of course listen carefully to him and his Committee, and the other individuals he has mentioned, as the Bill continues its passage.
This has been a full and vibrant debate, with many excellent contributions and memorable moments, to which I shall try to refer at the end, if there proves to be time.
Two Members made particular requests. The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), who is not in her place, asked about the timing and when we would take forward our policy. I will undertake to discuss that with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs later this week.
My hon. Friend the Member for St Ives (Derek Thomas) mentioned the shared prosperity fund. I assure him that we discussed it when I visited Cornwall and that the Government are well aware of the need in Cornwall and other areas. We will drive forward the design and implementation of that fund.
It might help the House to know that I intend to speak first to the Government amendments and, in a couple of cases, the related Opposition amendments. I will then ensure that I have dealt with the Belfast agreement, as it is so important, before working through some of the other amendments, if time allows.
Government amendment 33 builds on the exit-day amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), to whom we are grateful. This further amendment to schedule 7 makes the power to set exit day subject to the affirmative procedure, thereby fulfilling a commitment that I gave at the Dispatch Box during day eight in Committee. As the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have made clear, we have always been committed to the proper parliamentary scrutiny of our exit from the EU. In line with our promise that Parliament will be given time to debate and scrutinise the legislation that implements the final agreement that we reach with the EU, it is appropriate that Parliament scrutinises any potential change to exit day. I hope the whole House will support the amendment.
Labour’s amendment 1 would allow the Government to amend the definition of “exit day” if it were not in accordance with any transitional arrangements agreed under article 50. I understand the intention behind the amendment, but I remind the House that, after the improvements to which I have referred, the Bill now provides for changes to the exit day, as set out in article 50, to ensure that the domestic situation reflects the international position. Furthermore, Government amendment 33 will ensure that Parliament has appropriate scrutiny of any change to the date of exit by making it subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 10, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), would require exit day to be specified in a separate Bill on the terms of withdrawal. It replicates an amendment that was debated in Committee in November, since when the Bill has benefited from the amendments I mentioned and, in particular, the changes suggested by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset. Exit day will be set out in law as 11 pm on 29 March 2019, but we will have the technical ability to amend it if the UK, the EU and, indeed—to address the right hon. Lady’s points—the European Council, decide unanimously to change the date. The right hon. Lady referred particularly to the European Parliament, but I have the text of article 50 with me and it is clear that any change would require the
“European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned”
to unanimously decide to extend the period, so I do not accept her argument about the European Parliament having more say than this Parliament.
We have always been committed to the proper parliamentary scrutiny of our exit from the EU, which is why, in line with our promise that Parliament will be given time to debate and agree the legislation that implements the final agreement that we strike with the EU, it is appropriate for Parliament to scrutinise any changes to exit day through the affirmative procedure. In the unlikely event that the power to change exit day is used, it will simply be a technical change to ensure that our domestic legislation reflects the reality of international law. It is certainly not necessary, and would be disproportionate, to make such a change via primary legislation.
The House agreed in Committee to Government amendments regarding explanatory statements and to the Procedure Committee’s amendments to establish a sifting committee. We have tabled two technical amendments, Government amendments 35 and 36, to ensure that these amendments best function alongside each other. Government amendments 35 and 36 will ensure that the requirement for a Minister of the Crown to make an explanatory statement applies before a draft instrument is laid before the House for the purposes of sifting, as well as in other cases. They will also ensure that, where an explanatory statement has been made before the House of Commons for the purposes of sifting, there is no need to make a further statement after sifting when an equivalent instrument is laid again before both Houses of Parliament after being made or as a draft affirmative instrument. That will ensure that the committee has all the necessary information at its disposal and will avoid confusing double statements when nothing has changed.
After the sifting committee has received an explanatory statement and before it makes a sift, will the committee also have access to Ministers to question them if it cannot understand what the affirmative or negative instrument is about?
I very much hope that the committee will be able to understand things through our meeting the requirements for explanatory memorandums that we have set out in the Bill, but I would of course expect Ministers to be helpful to the committee. We need to get statutory instruments through smoothly, and we would want to support the committee in reaching its decisions.
I will now jump ahead in my remarks to deal with new clause 3 and the Belfast agreement. New clause 3, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), is important, and I reiterate that the Government remain steadfast in their commitments to the Belfast agreement and its associated obligations under international law.
Will the hon. Lady allow me to make my points? I think I am going to be able to satisfy her, but I will gladly give way after I have reached the particular point in which I think she will be interested.
The agreement between the UK and the EU, as set out in the joint report, must be negotiated and taken forward through the article 50 negotiations, not in this Bill. The EU set out before Christmas that negotiators now need to work on translating the commitments in the joint report into the withdrawal agreement or the framework for the future relationship. That is the task we will be engaged in over the coming months, so it would be wrong to cut across the negotiations by separately seeking to codify commitments into this Bill.
We have already committed to protecting the Belfast agreement in full through the withdrawal negotiations. The joint report sets out the Government’s and the EU’s commitment to respect the provisions in the Belfast agreement and the principle of consent. More broadly, we have said that we will introduce the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill to implement what we agree with the EU as a whole. The joint report is also clear on the Government’s commitment to protecting north-south co-operation and to our guarantee of avoiding a hard border. We have been clear that we will protect the UK internal market in all circumstances and ensure the same unfettered access for Northern Ireland’s business to the entire United Kingdom internal market.
The detail of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will and must reflect the terms of the withdrawal agreement, so I reassure the House that we will include an appropriate provision in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill upholding the agreement we reach, including the protection of the Belfast agreement, to which we committed in the joint report.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I am delighted that he has confirmed that there will be no hard border and no border down the Irish sea. What I am concerned about are the pledges about the Belfast agreement. My focus has always been on the incorporation of the fundamental principles of the Belfast agreement. When I spoke to my new clause on the fifth day in Committee, I withdrew it on the understanding that the principles of non-discrimination, equality and respect before the law would be incorporated by the Government in forthcoming legislation. Will the Minister confirm that commitment?
I remember our previous conversation about the general principles, which have been widely discussed during the passage of this Bill. As I said, we are fully committed to the Belfast agreement, and the appropriate commitments will be put into the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill when it comes forward, so I hope the hon. Lady will allow me to move on at this point. Occasionally, a speech is made in this House that will never be forgotten, and one such speech was hers in Committee. I well remember the need as a young Royal Air Force officer to check under my car every time before getting in. Although I did not share in the troubles as she did, the echoes were felt where I trained in the Royal Air Force, so I assure her that I want to ensure that, by the end of the process, she is satisfied that we have upheld the Belfast agreement. [Interruption.] Did I hear a colleague ask to intervene? No.
Voices of inspiration, I trust.
My hon. Friend mentioned the withdrawal Bill several times. Am I right—to be absolutely clear—that the withdrawal Bill will come forward and be considered, and probably approved, by this House before any withdrawal agreement is ratified, that we will not be presented with a Bill to implement an agreement that is already binding on the United Kingdom, but that actually the Government will not ratify any agreements until the House of Commons has first given its support and approval?
The situation is set out in detail in the written ministerial statement that we laid. Both Houses will have meaningful votes on whether to accept the agreement. It is my expectation that we would not ratify before that primary legislation has gone through.
New clause 1 was tabled by the Labour Front-Bench team. It seeks to place limitations on the use of existing and future powers to amend and modify retained EU law. It is absolutely right and necessary for existing domestic powers granted by Parliament in other Acts and any future delegated powers created after exit day to be able to operate effectively and without inappropriate fetter within UK domestic law after our departure from the EU. This includes parts of our existing domestic law which will become retained EU law after exit day, as well as retained direct EU legislation which will be converted into our domestic statute book.
The Bill’s current approach to existing and future delegated powers aims to ensure the successful operation of retained EU law within our domestic statute book beyond the time limits for the Bill’s more limited specific powers. Adopting the new clause, on the other hand, would undermine the position of certainty and have several detrimental effects that would risk creating significant confusion in the UK statute book. First, limiting the modification of retained EU law by existing and future delegated powers only to when this is necessary
“to maintain or enhance rights and protections”
could have uncertain consequences. A test of necessity would impose a high burden that may prevent powers from being used in the most appropriate and relevant way if the regulations they create are not deemed truly necessary for the protection of rights. That could mean that existing and future delegated powers would be unable to amend or modify irrelevant or unsuitable parts of the statute book, leading to ossification of parts of retained EU law within UK domestic law and creating confusion and uncertainty.
Secondly, a restriction of that nature inevitably will increase the possibility of legal challenge against any use of these delegated powers. That would create needless uncertainty for businesses and individuals and risk holes emerging within the domestic statute book. Finally, the measure would also impose significant consultation requirements on the exercise of the delegated powers, the use of which is running against the clock. I understand and support the intention to ensure that all relevant stakeholders, as well as the general public, are aware of the situation and can engage as new legislation is developed. However, the blanket approach suggested under the new clause would be excessively and needlessly onerous. It would risk delays to the implementation of important changes.
In using both existing delegated powers and those created in the future, the Government will, of course, remain bound by the rules and procedures laid out in the parent Act, as well as the accepted statutory instrument processes. I will take this moment to say that I am proud of what we have done to clause 7 to make sure that we have contained the list of deficiencies while making sure that it is amendable through the affirmative procedure.
Turning to new clause 22, I think that I satisfied my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) earlier in the debate, but he is not in the Chamber so, if the House will allow me, I will move on to new clauses 14 and 15—
I am extremely grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend, and pay tribute to him. Although I have occasionally disagreed with him, he has, of course, made a historic contribution to the passage of the Bill. I am very grateful for the way in which he has helped us to improve the legislation.
Labour’s amendment 2 would restrict the scope of the clause 7 power. Labour appears to accept the principle that the power is essential if the UK is to exit the EU with certainty, continuity, control and a working statute book, but restricting the power in the way proposed in amendment 2 would risk compromising our ability to ensure that that statute book continues to function, thereby leaving gaps in our law, and creating uncertainty and confusion for businesses and individuals.
As we have explained previously, making the list of deficiencies in clause 7(2) exhaustive and immutable would risk omitting important deficiencies, preventing us from fully correcting the statute book. To require primary legislation in such circumstances would undermine the purpose of the Bill and the usual justifications for secondary legislation: technical detail, readability, incompleteness and, crucially, the management of time. We cannot risk undermining laws on which businesses and individuals—often unknowingly—rely every day.
As my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster set out yesterday, the word “appropriate” was chosen carefully to ensure that the Government have the discretion called for by this unique situation. The constraints that a test of necessity would impose would prevent the Government and the devolved Administrations from making the best corrections to ensure that the statute book continues to function properly. A provision of necessity would risk limiting the Government and the devolved Administrations to only the most minimal changes, regardless of whether that would leave the law deficient, create absurd outcomes, or change the outcomes that the legislation was intended to deliver. I cannot believe that any Member would want to risk leaving the statute book in such a state. I am very conscious that we are now in a position whereby either these instruments will be brought forward under the affirmative procedure or, if they are brought forward under the negative procedure, the sifting committee will have the opportunity to push us towards that affirmative procedure.
Amendment 2 and new clause 15 seek to prevent regression in the protection of rights and equalities as we leave the EU, and new clause 14 seeks to do similarly by maintaining equivalence with the EU. The UK already has strong protections for equalities and human rights as part of our domestic provisions, independent of our membership of the EU. Some of those predate or go beyond EU requirements. The Government are committed to protecting our equalities legislation as we leave the EU. As we set out in the paper that we published on equalities legislation, limited technical amendments will be needed to ensure that all relevant legislation continues to operate as intended by Parliament after exit.
Will the Minister confirm that the Government intend to keep in place the equal treatment directive, which has helped women to gain equal pay claims?
My first point is that that will be incorporated into our legislation. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that we carry EU legislation into UK law. Secondly, we can only correct deficiencies that arise as a result of our withdrawal, and the hon. Gentleman will be familiar by now with the provisions of clause 7 and associated schedule 2.
To increase transparency, the Government amendments accepted by the House on 13 December will require a Minister to make a statement relating to equalities legislation and duties before laying every SI made under the principal powers in the Bill, as sought by the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous). It is not for this Bill to require similar statements in other EU exit legislation. Indeed, this Bill would not be able to affect most of this legislation, including the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill and the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, which will have been introduced to the House before this Bill’s Royal Assent. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) promised in Committee, we will make equalities-related statements alongside other EU exit-related legislation, which I hope will satisfy the House.
Transparency will ensure that the House and the sifting committee established by the amendments tabled my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) have all the information necessary to make informed and reasonable judgments in the scrutiny of the SIs that we will be making under the Bill. I hope that Labour Front Benchers will be persuaded not to press their amendments.
I turn briefly to new clause 11, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake). His contribution and the presence of the hon. Member for Streatham (Chuka Umunna) in the Chamber reminded me of a rather fetching photograph of the hon. Member for Streatham posing with a remain campaign poster pointing out that the leave campaign had said that we would leave the single market. If any Member wishes to see that, I might tweet it later.
It would be remiss of me if I did not thank all those involved with the passage of the Bill: all right hon. and hon. Members who took time to participate; all the Clerks in the Public Bill Office who have provided invaluable support to Members of the House; and the world-class officials in DExEU and across Government who have ensured the Bill’s smooth passage.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time. Taking a leaf out of the Liberal Democrat book, I do so enthusiastically.
The Bill is essential to preparing the country for the historic milestone of withdrawing from the European Union. It ensures that on day one we will have a statute book that works, with this Government delivering the smooth and orderly exit desired by people and businesses across the United Kingdom. It is a complex piece of legislation, which is unsurprising given that it seeks to put into British law the entire acquis of European law—established over 40 years or more of membership—and to do so in a few years while active negotiations are going on.
The House has spent more than 80 hours discussing the Bill’s principles and why they are necessary. We have scrutinised each clause and schedule in detail, and we have debated the merits of more than 500 amendments and new clauses. I thank the Members who took the time to table amendments, and I thank them for the spirit in which they have engaged with the debate throughout. I pay tribute to the Clerks and officials in the Public Bill Office who have provided invaluable support for Members in all parts of the House, advising on the drafting and tabling of those hundreds of amendments.
I pay special tribute to several colleagues for their individual contributions. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) for tabling amendments that will undoubtedly enhance this legislation by providing greater certainty over the timing of exit day and how secondary legislation will be scrutinised. I also pay tribute to other Conservative colleagues for their contributions throughout the debate, notably my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox), my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey), my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) and my right hon. Friends the Members for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) and for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith). I am grateful to them all for their hard work—[Interruption.] I have not finished yet. I am grateful to them all for their hard work in effectively scrutinising this legislation and their tireless work in representing their constituents.
I also thank Opposition Members for their contributions. We heard impassioned and eloquent contributions from the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field), the hon. Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey), the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), the right hon. Members for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), and the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for North Down (Lady Hermon) among many others, who all played—[Interruption.] I will take nominations, Mr Speaker, if you really want, but I think I just picked out the highlights; many others made fantastic contributions. In the interests of brevity and to allow others to speak, I would like the House to take as read the detailed thanks to the Front Benchers of both sides.
I said on Second Reading that I would
“welcome and encourage contributions from those who approach the task in good faith and in a spirit of collaboration.”—[Official Report, 7 September 2017; Vol. 628, c. 343.]
All of us, as elected representatives, have a shared interest in making this Bill a success in the national interest. The Government have said time and again that we would listen carefully to all suggestions put forward and that, where hon. Members made a compelling case, we would respectfully consider it and act accordingly.
I hope that Members agree that in this debate we have often heard the very best of what this House is here to do. We have tabled amendments to provide extra information about equalities impacts and the changes being made to retained EU law under the powers in the Bill. We published a right-by-right analysis of the charter of fundamental rights, setting out how each substantive right found in the charter will be reflected in UK domestic law. It looks at how the right flows through retained EU law and how it is otherwise protected by existing domestic law or international law after exit.
If you forgive me, Mr Speaker, I am going to do two things I have never done before: not take interventions, which I have always taken before; and I am breaking that habit of a lifetime to allow time for the Scot Nats to put their reasoned amendment. [Interruption.] It is very much a lifetime first for me to be polite to the Scot Nats.
We have also brought forward amendments to provide greater certainty on how imminent or impending legal cases will be dealt with from the day we leave the EU. We committed to bring forward separate primary legislation in due course that would implement the withdrawal agreement, including an implementation period, and we set out the provisions for a vote on the final deal and the processes for implementing whatever is agreed. Linked to this, we respect the decision of this House to limit the power in clause 9, so that it cannot be used before primary legislation approving the terms of the withdrawal agreement has been enacted.
Perhaps most notably—and happily for me—we have listened to the concerns expressed about the scrutiny of secondary legislation. On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) shared her concerns about the process of scrutinising the 800 to 1,000 statutory instruments required under this Bill. I made it clear then that we would happily discuss the feasibility of establishing a triage process. With this in mind, the Government welcomed amendments made to the Bill proposed by the Procedure Committee to establish such a sifting Committee. I hope that all Members agree that we have approached scrutiny of this vital piece of legislation in a pragmatic way and worked collaboratively to improve the Bill.
We have also intensified our positive discussions with the devolved Administrations and legislatures to find an agreed approach to clause 11, and we intend to bring forward amendments in the other place.
Will the Secretary of State give way?
No, I will not.
We are committed to achieving legislative consent for this vital piece of legislation. We are sending an improved piece of legislation onwards to the other place and I hope that that House will acknowledge the substance and spirit of the debate and scrutiny this Bill has received thus far and that debate there will unfold in the same constructive way in which it has in our House.
The scrutiny of this vital legislation remains one of the most important tasks that we parliamentarians have had before us for some time. I believe that this House is risen to the occasion by ensuring that the Bill continues its journey throughout Parliament in a much improved form. I commend it to the House, and I believe that this is an historic occasion.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, the nature of the debate that has taken place over the past two days has shown the value of the expertise that this House brings to the legislative process. I totally agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, on this.
The legislation we have been debating is of great consequence for the country and is key to delivering a functioning statute book on 29 March 2019. It is therefore not only politically and constitutionally significant but practically essential, as many noble Lords have acknowledged. It is in recognition of the essential nature of the Bill that I want to emphasise my gratitude to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. The sheer number of noble Lords who took the time to attend and participate in the debate is a tribute to this House. Peers have excelled in their contributions, which have been—mostly—constructive and wholly befitting to the role of this House as a scrutinising Chamber.
I am sure noble Lords will understand that the late hour and time do not allow me to respond to each speaker individually—I am sure that noble Lords will be delighted to know that. However, it is clear that this debate has benefited from the extensive personal knowledge and professional experience in this place. Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, set out in her opening address, this Bill presents an opportunity for the Government to avail themselves of the genuine expertise on offer in this place.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has tabled an amendment, to which I will respond shortly. I should like to acknowledge at the outset the frustration and regret which many of your Lordships have expressed in this debate over the outcome of the referendum. But we are not here today to revisit the question of having a referendum, or to examine the reasons why people voted the way that they did. The withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, which will come before Parliament, will be the opportunity to debate and scrutinise the domestic legislation implementing the final agreement we strike with the EU. Therefore, again in the interests of time, I will not address all those points today. Before I come to the noble Lord’s Motion, I will address the contributions made by other noble Lords on the subject of this Bill over the last two days. I will attempt to cover the main points but will also place a letter in the Library answering questions about the Bill that I have not covered in my answer.
There has been much discussion of the delegated powers within this Bill. I pay tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Newby, Lord Lisvane, Lord Strathclyde, Lord Bridges and Lord Tugendhat, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, the noble Baronesses, Lady Mallalieu and Lady Taylor, and many others who have spoken eloquently on this issue. I hope that noble Lords will agree that the power to correct deficiencies in retained EU law arising in consequence of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is essential to achieving the core purposes of this Bill: to ensure that our statute book continues to function on exit, providing certainty and continuity for both businesses and individuals. The Government do not propose delegated powers lightly. We are committed to avoiding the twin spectres of permissions to do too much and permissions to do too little. The power is broad but limited and is, crucially, a time-limited solution to a unique problem. We want to strike the right balance between scrutiny and speed, and to ensure that the Government can complete this exceptional task in time for exit while tailoring the powers as tightly to their purpose as possible. It is important that there is no slack in a power of the exceptional type needed here. The Government do not ask noble Lords to accept on trust how they will be used. The correcting power was already adjusted in the other place to limit the scope and put the Government’s policy even more firmly in the heart of the power.
I have heard the concerns raised in this House. Be in no doubt that the Government are in listening mode and are willing to consider constructive suggestions for change. Many noble Lords have already made useful suggestions, including the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, my noble friend Lord Hodgson, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and many others, and I am confident that there will be further helpful suggestions to come in Committee.
I now come to the scrutiny procedures for the secondary legislation which will be made using the powers in the Bill. I of course recognise that the House has a strong record of scrutiny of secondary legislation under the auspices of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. The Government have always wanted to ensure that there is sufficient scrutiny of the secondary legislation to come. While major policy change is for other Bills, the Government introduced this Bill with triggers for the affirmative procedure on all the key powers. There will be many SIs under the Bill which contain small and technical amendments which will not substantially change how the law operates for firms or individuals in practice. The affirmative procedure would be disproportionate in those cases.
To provide greater clarity on this point, the Government have published draft SIs to show the types of legislative changes that would be made under each procedure. We have always said that we would listen to Members of both Houses in the passage of this Bill. In that vein, the Government were pleased to accept the recommendation of the Procedure Committee in the other place. Those amendments ensured that Ministers must submit SIs that they are proposing to make under the negative procedure under the three principal powers in the Bill—Clauses 7, 8 and 9—to a sifting committee, which will consider the appropriateness of the procedure.
I know that noble Lords will want to ensure that the expertise of this House is properly brought to bear on secondary legislation. I share this view. As my noble friend the Leader of the House set out yesterday, we will bring forward proposals in due course following appropriate consultations.
I will briefly address the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Wilson of Dinton, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, Lord Howell and Lord Storey, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady D’Souza, and many others regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The UK has a proud tradition of respecting human rights. Leaving the EU does not and will not change this commitment. This includes children’s rights, which will of course continue to be protected under the Children Act 1989 and through our remaining party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. I hope that this reassurance will aid the noble Lords, Lord Russell, Lord McConnell and Lord Storey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and I thank them for raising this important issue.
The Government have been unequivocal about this. Our intention has always been that, in itself, not incorporating the charter should not result in a significant loss of substantive rights. This is because the charter only reaffirmed the rights which were already protected under EU law, which will now be brought into UK law by this Bill. It is not, and never was, the source of those rights. The Government have also published a non-exhaustive memorandum setting out for each provision of the charter where the underlying rights will continue to exist as part of retained EU law or domestic law or the common law, but the simple fact is that leaving the EU will inevitably result in a change to the current arrangements. Therefore, it just does not make sense to retain the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The clue is in the title; the charter applies to EU institutions and member states, but it applies to member states only when they are acting within the scope of EU law. We will not be a member state, nor will we be acting within the scope of EU law once we leave the EU. As such, the charter itself will not be converted into UK law, and I agree with the remarks made on the subject earlier in the debate by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and the noble Baroness, Lady Deech.
We have heard several contributions concerning the interpretation of retained EU law in Clause 6. This is not surprising, given the exemplary legal minds in this House, and I will endeavour here to speak to the concerns raised by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar.
I also extend my thanks to the Constitution Committee for its report, which many noble Lords have made reference to in this debate. This is a long and detailed report, and the Government will consider it carefully. From the beginning we have been committed to working collaboratively with parliamentarians to improve the Bill wherever possible.
The Government have heard the concerns raised in relation to whether and to what extent our UK domestic courts and tribunals should have regard to post-exit decisions made by the Court of Justice of the European Union, or to anything done by the EU and its other entities, when interpreting retained EU law. The UK is leaving the EU. This will end the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU. For our courts to remain bound to the future case law of the CJEU would be to undermine the clear position and ignore the reality of our withdrawal. It would also limit the discretion and independence of our courts, whose judicial authority we had sought to return.
We have a world-renowned judiciary, many of whose former members, I am pleased to say, are now in this House, and the Bill’s position in Clause 6(2) reflects the Government’s confidence in the judiciary’s independence and expertise. With this in mind, I emphasise that Clause 6(2) is intended to reflect in statute our strong belief that the courts are best placed to determine the right approach to questions of interpretation concerning retained EU law.
Clause 6 therefore provides that our domestic courts are not bound by post-exit decisions made by that court, as well as anything done by an EU entity or the EU itself, on or after exit day. The courts, however, may take such things into account if they consider it appropriate to do so.
We believe this provides a clear and certain position for our courts following our departure from the EU. Again, however, the Government have heard the concerns raised in this House over the last two days, and from other sources previously. I know that my noble and learned friend Lord Keen is eager to engage with your Lordships on these provisions over the coming months.
He told me to say that. The wealth of expertise and experience in this House is ideally suited to the task of considering and agreeing an approach which can command the broadest possible confidence. I hope that this leaves your Lordships in no doubt as to how seriously we take these questions, and I hope that we can continue to engage constructively throughout.
I know that devolution, perhaps more than any other issue, has featured in your Lordships’ contributions over the past two days. I pay particular tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his constructive remarks, of which I have taken careful note. I also thank my noble friends Lord Dunlop and Lord McInnes, the noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, and many other noble Lords for their contributions.
Our priority is to ensure that our withdrawal from the EU is as smooth and orderly as possible for the whole of the UK. The Government remain committed to the devolution settlements. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, that this presents an opportunity—which the Government have seized—for sincere and mature co-operation to find consensus. The Scottish and Welsh Governments agree that there are areas where common frameworks are necessary. The Government agree that in areas where they are not necessary, those powers should and will be a devolved responsibility. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, that after we leave the EU they will continue to be able to do anything that is now within the competence of the devolved Administrations. There will of course be a need for common frameworks in some areas, as the noble Lord recognised, but the outcome of the UK leaving the EU means that more decision-making powers will be with the devolved Administrations.
As your Lordships are aware, we have made a commitment to bring forward changes to Clause 11, and this commitment remains absolute. We are engaging in intensive discussions with the Scottish and Welsh Governments on what those amendments will look like, and we are making good progress towards the right outcome. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster will travel to Edinburgh and Cardiff this week to further discuss our proposed amendments to Clause 11, which I hope will reassure the noble Lady, Baroness Finlay, and others, on her point about proper consultation with the devolved Administrations. Any such amendments to Clause 11 will of course need to speak to the concerns of the Scottish and Welsh Governments, while ensuring maximum certainty once we have left the EU. In the absence of a Northern Ireland Executive, we are working closely with the Northern Ireland Civil Service, and we are doing all we can to restore devolved government to Stormont.
Closely linked to these discussions is the work being carried out on future frameworks, guided by the principles agreed with the Scottish and Welsh Governments at the Joint Ministerial Committee. We will publish our analysis of where we expect there to be a need for legislative frameworks in whole or in part, for informal arrangements, and where we expect that no additional cross-UK mechanisms are required.
I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Luce, Lord Hoyle, Lord Kilclooney and the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, for their remarks concerning Gibraltar. The Government are clear that Gibraltar is covered by our exit negotiations, and we have committed to fully involve it as we exit the EU. We will negotiate as one United Kingdom and will leave as one United Kingdom.
I turn to the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, for another referendum to be held. On this point, let me be completely clear. The result of the referendum held on 23 June 2016 saw a clear majority of people vote to leave the European Union. On this subject, as on so many others, I can do no better than to advise noble Lords to look at the comments of my noble friend Lord Hague, who wisely said that it cannot be in the national interest to participate in a referendum merry-go-round. In the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act this Parliament overwhelmingly confirmed the result of the referendum by voting with clear and convincing majorities for that legislation. In the general election last year, both parties campaigned to take us out of the EU, as my noble friend Lady Pidding reminded us yesterday. Only last weekend I watched the leader of the Labour Party say that “that ship has sailed” and confirm that, “We are not asking for a second referendum”. You cannot go back to the people time and again in the vain hope that eventually they will give you the result that you wanted.
The British people can trust the Government to honour the referendum result. This does not mean that the process will be without scrutiny, and of course we will consult Parliament further. There will be a vote in both Houses on the final agreement reached with the EU. Then there will be a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that will give Parliament further time to debate and scrutinise the domestic legislation implementing the final agreement that we strike.
Any commitment to a second referendum would actively undermine our ongoing negotiating position. As the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union noted:
“The consequence of putting a second referendum at the end of the negotiation is to invite every single member of the European Union who does not want us to leave to propose the worst possible deal, in the hope that we will change our mind”.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/1/17; col 176.]
This point was reinforced by many noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley. We are not going to do that. We are seeking to get the best deal for the UK and we intend to negotiate under the best possible conditions. To do otherwise would be irresponsible in the extreme.
This debate has served to highlight the weight of the matter at hand and the importance of this House’s scrutiny. I look forward to the forthcoming Committee stage where we can enter into proper scrutiny and debate on the issues that have been raised over the past two days. I echo the words of noble Lords who have spoken of our constitutional duty to scrutinise this historic legislation. This place benefits from a wealth of experience and expertise, and I am confident that your Lordships will bring this to bear over the coming months.
Amidst some of the more colourful and entertaining rhetoric, metaphor and simile, a recurring theme has emerged in this debate: the Bill is necessary, the Bill is not perfect, and the Bill should be improved and strengthened but not obstructed. There was a visible and tangible consensus around these sentiments.
The people have spoken and this Government now have a duty to deliver a smooth exit. We owe this not only to those who voted to leave but to those who voted to remain. Regardless of how people voted, it is in the collective national interest to have a functioning statute book on the day we leave. This Bill delivers that by providing certainty and stability to businesses, consumers and citizens across the United Kingdom and I commend it to the House.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, it is a great honour to contribute to the first day in Committee on this historic Bill. Let me say at the outset that I look forward to working constructively with colleagues from across the Chamber throughout the course of Committee to scrutinise and improve this vital Bill in the national interest.
Clause 1 is the shortest of all in the Bill—you would not believe it from the debate—but it could scarcely be more important. This debate has shown the House at its passionate best, but it was not really about Clause 1 at all. I think all noble Lords recognise that, when we leave the EU, we need to repeal the European Communities Act. So we have had a fascinating debate on the UK’s potential ongoing membership of or future relationship with the single market, the customs union, the EEA and EFTA. These are of course issues of profound importance and I understand that noble Lords have strong views on them, but everybody really knows that they are not matters which the Bill is designed to address.
However, I will happily rehearse the Government’s position once again. What this Government seek is a bold and ambitious economic partnership that is of greater scope and ambition than any such existing agreement. We have listened to EU leaders and we understand and respect the position that the four freedoms of the single market are indivisible, and that there can be no cherry picking. For that reason, we do not seek membership of the single market after we leave the EU, and nor do we seek membership of the customs union. By leaving the customs union and establishing a new and ambitious customs arrangement with the EU, we will be able to forge new trade relationships with our partners around the world and maintain as frictionless trade as possible in goods between the UK and the EU, providing a positive and powerful voice for free trade in the world.
Of course, I am talking about our future relationship with the EU. To answer the question which I think came from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, we also seek an implementation period which, we have been very clear, will be based on the existing structure of EU rules and regulations—but during which the UK will be outside the EU.
Let me take this early opportunity to draw the attention of noble Lords to our publication today of our proposed draft legal text for the section of the withdrawal agreement in relation to the implementation period. We have published this in part to facilitate parliamentary scrutiny. It is right, too, that the British public should be able to see our position. The details of that implementation period would be implemented in domestic law through separate primary legislation, after we have reached agreement with the EU and after these Houses of Parliament have voted on that agreement.
In the meantime, a number of amendments in this group seek to mandate our continued membership of one or both of the single market or customs union, presumably in perpetuity. But put simply, this is not something the UK Government could deliver unilaterally, even if we were so minded. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, get around that by proposing maintaining the same rights, freedoms and access within the UK that we have currently, which in practice means staying in the single market in all but name but without any reciprocal guarantees from the EU. That would be the worst of all possible worlds.
Other amendments seek to mandate the Government to take a particular negotiating position or to pursue particular objectives. Leaving aside what I have said about those not being our objectives, the amendments raise constitutional questions about the role of these Houses of Parliament and they raise practical questions too. Who is to say whether the Government have truly made these things their negotiating objectives? How would they be judged? Would we see the courts ruling on the conduct of the negotiations, and what would be the consequences if they did so? I recognise the noble intention behind these amendments, but I do not think we can contemplate making them, especially when the repeal of the ECA or the exercise of crucial delegated powers becomes contingent on them. That is a recipe for undermining the essential certainty that this Bill is designed to create.
Other amendments call merely for reports to be published on certain things. In response to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, we have confirmed that when we bring forward the vote on the final deal we will ensure that this House is presented with the appropriate analysis the Government have done to make an informed decision, and we will take such steps as we can to facilitate scrutiny in the interim. But the particular reports and timetables suggested are arbitrary and may not in fact serve Parliament well.
The Government intend to secure a new partnership with the EU. We will legislate in accordance with that and nothing in this Bill threatens that. This Bill is designed only to prepare our statute book; it is agnostic as to the outcome of the negotiations and rules nothing in or out. We will legislate for the agreement reached with the EU in due course.
Finally, let me say something about the EEA and the amendments tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, concerning the EEA. Amendment 152, for example, seeks to make continued membership of the EEA one of the UK’s negotiating objectives, while Amendments 193 and 203 require a parliamentary vote on withdrawal from the EEA before making regulations under the power in Clause 9. Amendment 225 seeks to prevent notification of the UK’s withdrawal from the EEA agreement. On that specifically, our legal position remains unchanged. Article 127 does not need to be triggered for the agreement to cease to have effect.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh also asked about the EEA. In the absence of any further action, the European Economic Area agreement will no longer operate in respect of the UK when we leave the EU. However, as the Secretary of State has said, our existing international agreements should continue to apply during the proposed time-limited implementation period.
Will the Government publish the legal advice they have had in respect of that proposed procedure on withdrawal from the EEA?
We are not going to publish confidential legal advice. That has been the position of previous Governments, and it is the position of this Government. Our aim is to ensure continuity with international partners
No, I have given way to the noble Lord once. I have answered his question. I have referred to his points. If he will forgive me, I will make some progress.
I responded to the noble Lord’s question about the legal advice and to the other points that have been raised. I will respond further in my forthcoming remarks.
My noble friend has been most gracious in replying to one part of my question, but not the other part about the status of regulations. He has now accepted that we will remain in the EEA for the duration of the implementation period. The precise content of my amendment relates to regulations passed and decisions agreed by the EEA before the end of the implementation period. What will the status of those regulations be?
I understand that the regulations of the EEA will continue during the implementation period. For the period after the implementation period we will seek to negotiate an ongoing relationship with the other three member states of the EEA. Our aim is to ensure continuity with international partners and the EU during the implementation phase and certainty for businesses and individuals. This approach will mean that we seek the continued application of the EEA agreement for the time-limited implementation period to ensure continuity in crucial elements of our trading and non-trading relationship with those three EEA states. Participation in the EEA agreement beyond the implementation period would not work for the UK. It would not deliver on the British people’s desire to have more direct control over decisions that affect their daily lives and it would mean accepting free movement of people. As I have said to my noble friend, once the implementation period ends we will no longer participate in the EEA agreement. We will instead seek to put in place new arrangements to maintain our relationships with those three countries: Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. I hope I have made the Government’s position clear, and I hope as a result the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
There were a number of other questions, such as the one I raised on regulations, that are absolutely pertinent to the Bill. We will come later to how the regulations will be brought over and put into our law, and we will have debates on that on days three, four and five, I think. The question I asked the Minister specifically is: does he know about the work being done by Conservatives, along with Americans, to change regulations to assist a different form of trade? This is relevant to this Bill because we will be coming on to how we secure those regulations and their status in our law. I think the Minister’s understanding of those discussions is relevant today.
My Lords, there is a huge amount of work being done by various economists, lobby groups, institutions and think tanks on regulation and various agreements. I am not aware of the specific work the noble Baroness talks about. Of course I know some of the individuals she mentioned—they are good friends of mine—but I am not aware of all that work. Now she has mentioned it, I will go away and have a look at it. I am sure it is very good, but I cannot comment until I have seen it.
The Minister puzzled me slightly just then by saying that once the implementation phase—that piece of Orwellian language —is complete, the object will be to negotiate with the EEA partners of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein to preserve our present relationship, but that includes free movement.
With great respect to the noble Lord, I do not think I said that we would preserve the present relationship. We will want to establish a new relationship with those states. We have always had close and friendly relationships with them. Ultimately that will be a matter for the negotiations.
I do not feel that any of my questions were addressed. I apologise to the Committee, but I have to say to the Minister that he has not addressed whether he agrees with the estimate of the Secretaries of State about progress on trade deals. This is paramount information to understand what needs to happen in terms of customs union, single market and so on. I wonder whether my questions can be addressed.
My Lords, I thought we were here to discuss the Bill. We have spent three hours and 20 minutes debating so far, and I have listened very carefully to what everyone has said. I have sought to answer a lot of the questions where they were relevant to the contents of the Bill. The clause that we are debating repeals the European Communities Act. I understand that many Members want to raise concerns about the referendum, whether they thought the campaign was right or not and whether various people said various things or not, but I really do not think they are that relevant to the clause of the Bill that we are debating.
I apologise; I will make another attempt because I do not feel that I am making my questions understood. My questions are based on Amendments 191 and 206, and the purpose of the amendments is to seek answers so that we know whether we need to press them to a vote. My question is very clear: how is progress going? Does the Minister believe that the estimates given by the two Secretaries of State in the other place can be relied upon, and how are we getting on in terms of progress on the trade deal? This is paramount to understand what needs to go in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, and those amendments are before the House.
I am sure that the statements made by the Secretaries of State in the other place are true and valid and that they will be endeavouring to fulfil them. There will be further legislation, as we have said, on the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill when we have sought and obtained agreement with the EU, and I am sure that further international trade Bills will follow in due course as well. However, that is not the subject of this legislation, as the noble Baroness well knows.
My Lords, the Minister was on his feet for just 12 minutes dealing with a debate that had taken over three hours. There are four sets of amendments here that deal with delegated powers. He has not addressed that issue at all in this debate but it is very much the focus of those amendments. That is a pretty shabby performance, actually, and this House is entitled to be extremely dissatisfied with the response that we have had. Further, we have had a big debate about the single market and the customs union but the Minister dismissed that in his opening comments. He said the Government were preparing themselves for a customs union-lite type of arrangement but failed to set out any details of what that might look like. This House deserves better explanations to its amendments than that, and I hope this does not give rise to an equally shabby performance on all the other amendments that we have to consider; there are over 300 of them.
I realise that. I apologise if the noble Lord is disappointed but I was trying to address what is actually in the Bill. As I said, further legislation will follow. We have spent three and a half hours so far debating one grouping of amendments, and we have eight further groupings to get through this evening on the timetable agreed by all the usual sources.
I am sorry to say this, but the amendments were taken by the Public Bill Office as being in scope. They are therefore relevant to the House.
My Lords, before the Minister finishes after the very short intervention that he has just made, I point out that he did not respond at all to the points made by noble Lords from around the Chamber about the Good Friday agreement. Would he give the view of the Government, since it appears to be in question at the moment, about the future of the agreement and whether he agrees with the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland who said it had now served its purpose?
I am happy to clarify for the noble Lord that we remain completely committed to the Good Friday agreement.
My noble friend has been accused of not being very experienced. I point out to those Members opposite that we are in Committee but we have had three and a half hours of Second Reading speeches, not speeches on the amendments.
I am sorry to disappoint the noble Baroness, but we will be having a number of Brexit Bills, not least of which will be the withdrawal agreement and the implementation Bill, once we have reached agreement. I shall endeavour to respond to all the questions that I have been asked.
Repealing the European Communities Act is an important step to ensure that there is maximum clarity on the law that will apply in the UK after we leave the EU. I cannot see the sense in needing a separate Act to repeal the European Communities Act. This repeal in Clause 1 is front and centre of the Bill; indeed, this Bill was originally called the great repeal Bill. To prevent this Bill from repealing the European Communities Act would undermine perhaps the most important part of it.
I suspect that I have read the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, correctly when I say that he would prefer the European Communities Act to be repealed in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that was announced by the Secretary of State in November. That Bill would then deal with the implementation period and our relationship to EU law during that period. This may be founded on the misconception that, if Parliament does not repeal the European Communities Act and appoint an exit day, that will somehow prevent the UK exiting the EU. If that is the case, I am sorry that I have to disappoint the noble Lord: our leaving the EU is a matter of international law, and we are leaving no matter what is or is not done to the European Communities Act.
I will address the noble Lord’s question about exit day and procedure. What will become Section 14(4)—currently Clause 14(4)—could be used to change the exit day in the Bill only if the Article 50 period were to be extended; it could not be used to prevent us leaving the EU. That is a matter of international rather than domestic law. The exercise of Section 14(4) to alter the exit day in domestic law in accordance with Article 50 would be subject—in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler—to the affirmative procedure in both Houses. I will give more detail on that in a minute. We do not expect to use this power and we are leaving the EU on 29 March 2019.
The noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked further questions about our exit day and the amendment. In the other place we tabled an amendment which set exit day in order to provide certainty and clarity, and we accepted further amendments on the issue, again to provide further clarity. The amendments set the exit day in the Bill as 11 pm on 29 March 2019, while retaining the technical ability to amend the date at a later stage. As I said, that can happen only if the European Council—including the UK, of course—unanimously decides to change the date on which the treaties cease to apply to the UK, as set out in the famous Article 50. We do not intend this to happen.
I will give the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, more detail on his point. Any change to exit day in domestic law under the power of what will become Section 14(4) will be by the affirmative procedure, guaranteeing a vote in both Houses. The affirmative procedure in this instance is provided for in paragraph 10 of Schedule 7.
Providing for the date of the repeal of the 1972 Act in the Bill that implements our withdrawal agreement might seem tidy in certain scenarios, but it would put the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse in what I feel would be quite a dangerous way. Both the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period are, of course, still matters for negotiation. This Bill, being agnostic on the negotiations, is designed to prepare the statute book for our withdrawal. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that there will be additional legislation to implement our withdrawal agreement. As I said a moment ago, this Bill is designed to implement the clearly expressed will of the British people to leave the EU, and therefore the date of repeal is set at the point that the UK will fall out of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
There are many demands on parliamentary time, as we know to our cost, and this is the Bill that will prepare our statute book for exit. The amendment would force the date of repeal into the agenda of another Bill. This is the right time and place for the debate on the repeal of the ECA, and the debate should incorporate all the additional context and provisions necessary for a smooth exit. Indeed, if we did not reach an agreement and the second of the noble Lord’s amendments were agreed, we would be in a state almost of paradox. To repeal the ECA, the Government would be compelled to enact a statute for the purposes of Clause 9(1) of the Bill— a clause which itself is predicated on the existence of a withdrawal agreement. So we would be forced to enact a statute enabling us to approve the final terms of the withdrawal agreement and set the date of the repeal of the European Communities Act without such a withdrawal agreement existing. That is too much of a logical conundrum to ask any Bill to bear, and not an acceptable way to go about legislating.
Clause 1 will provide certainty to businesses and individuals that the European Communities Act will be repealed on exit day. Any attempt to change this while negotiations are ongoing would lead only to a lack of clarity on the law that will apply in the UK after we leave the EU. This would run counter to the primary aim of the Bill, so I hope that the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for seeking to clarify the point about process, and I take on board what he said about paragraph 10 of Schedule 7. But will he give an absolute undertaking to the Committee that there will be no attempt to accelerate the process? I think he would accept that, if the Minister in this case were seeking to do something at speed, for expediency’s sake—surely that would be the only circumstance in which it would be necessary to change the date—it would be extremely difficult to give both Houses of Parliament advance notice and the usual time for consultation. Is the Minister giving us an absolute undertaking that the normal process and timescale will apply and that there will be no attempt to accelerate the process?
Yes, I am giving the noble Lord an assurance that the normal timescale of the affirmative procedure for statutory instruments would apply in this case.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, for his comments and I agree that this matter is totally within the scope of the Bill. I will do what I can to satisfy his requests, but I will probably not be able to satisfy all Members of the House. I understand the frustration on this, but let me take the Committee through our position and where we hope to be when the Committee gets to discuss Clause 11.
We have sought legislative consent from the Scottish and Welsh Governments, and it remains our priority to make a positive case in favour of that legislative consent for this important legislation. That is why we committed to work with the devolved Administrations to find a way forward on Clause 11, and to bring forward an amendment in this House. We will debate Clause 11 fully in Committee, and we will table government amendments before then for noble Lords to consider. Although, without an Executive, there is no way to seek legislative consent in Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is working hard to restore devolved government there as soon as possible. We are committed to working to ensure that Northern Irish interests are represented in the meantime. We have explicitly recognised the role of the Sewel convention in the Wales Act 2017 and the Scotland Act 2016. We also have a strong track record on devolution. I make it clear to noble Lords that we are committed to the devolution settlements and the conventions that have been established.
But these amendments go further than Sewel; as my noble friend Lord Forsyth pointed out, they would prevent this Parliament exercising its sovereignty. They would require this Parliament to seek consent to legislate in some cases that are not within devolved responsibility and do not affect devolved competence. We believe in the importance of this Bill, which is in the interests of the whole of the UK, and will work to deliver it together with the devolved institutions. But it is also not right that one part of the United Kingdom can hold a veto over the decision taken, in the referendum, by the whole of the United Kingdom and risk the certainty this Government are committed to providing.
Let me address directly some of the points that were raised. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, asked about progress on Clause 11 and the Joint Ministerial Committee. The Scottish and Welsh Governments asked us to work with them to amend Clause 11, and that is exactly what we have been doing. Officials have worked extensively on proposals and Ministers discussed these in their recent bilaterals in February. We have preserved the space to engage in meaningful discussion and sought to reach agreement with the devolved Administrations. We have not yet tabled an amendment precisely because those discussions still continue. Our proposed amendment will be discussed, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out, at the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations tomorrow.
In response to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, but also by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, we are fully committed to the JMC process as well as to increasing our bilateral engagement between meetings to strengthen relations. Since the referendum, we have had six JMC meetings and, as I have already mentioned, it will meet again tomorrow. In addition, officials are meeting weekly in order to try to take forward the proposals.
The Minister said there have been six meetings since the referendum. Given that at the first meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations the communiqué said that they would meet on a monthly basis and that was in November 2016, by my calculation there have been several more months than six since then. Can the Minister tell us how many official meetings took place between February and October 2017?
I do not have information about how many official meetings have taken place. I understand that officials are meeting extensively. They are in regular contact. I am told by my officials that contact with officials in the Scottish and Welsh Governments and discussions are extremely positive. That is not the same as getting political agreement, but we are endeavouring to do that. Proposals have been tabled, after extensive discussion, for the meeting tomorrow. We hope there will be agreement. I obviously cannot guarantee that, but we hope there will be. We remain committed to obtaining legislative consent Motions if possible, and we will continue that dialogue in an effort to do that. That is the responsible way to proceed, but I totally understand the frustration expressed from all parts of the Committee that we do not yet have that agreement. We want to get that agreement. We are endeavouring to get that agreement. We will do our best to get it, but we will table amendments for this Committee to consider before we get to Clause 11.
Given the difficulties, which are understood, of getting agreement to one legislative consent Motion, can the Minister give us an assurance that whatever amendments he tables will not require us to have legislative consent to even more Motions?
I am not quite sure I understand that point. I do not think we can give that assurance at the moment. I will have to have a separate discussion with my noble friend on that point.
What happens if there is no agreement tomorrow? Will the Government’s amendment, the one that they are putting to the Joint Ministerial Committee tomorrow, be published so that we can look at it and so that informed opinion throughout the country, throughout Wales, throughout Scotland, can look at it and comment on it and so that we can see where the problem is? At the moment, it is all obscure. As my noble and learned friend said, there is no transparency whatever in this process. What happens if there is no agreement tomorrow?
As I said, we will be bringing forward the amendment at the same time that Members of this House have an opportunity to view it. The public at large will be able to comment on it and discuss it, and I am sure there will be extensive comment on it in the media at that time. The reason we have not published so far is that we want to preserve space for discussion and to try to have the discussions with our colleagues in Scotland and Wales and with officials in Northern Ireland in as confidential an atmosphere as possible. The discussions are positive and are proceeding apace. I cannot guarantee that there will be agreement, but we want that agreement and are working to it. We have compromised on many aspects. As soon as we are able to, we will share it with this House. We will definitely be producing an amendment before Committee. I totally understand noble Lords’ frustrations, but we are endeavouring to produce a solution to this difficult issue as quickly as possible.
In order that the Joint Ministerial Committee should enjoy its full status, does the Minister accept that it would be desirable if minutes were kept of its meetings, if an agenda were to be published and if it were indeed to agree to meet at least monthly?
I understand the noble Lord’s question. I am not a member of the committee; it is handled not by my department but by the Cabinet Office. I will write to the noble Lord giving him details of what agendas are published and whether they are shared with other departments. I do not know the exact format, but I will contact him with it.
With those assurances in mind—limited assurances, I fully accept—I would be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, agreed to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, it is not part of the human condition to think that institutions are marvellous. They can always be improved. But I did not take the noble Viscount’s clarification to be raising the banner for abolishing Euratom because there were going to be such great advantages to the public from us—in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, to the House a few weeks ago—walking the “gangplank into thin air”.
However, I have a specific question for the Minister. Can he confirm to the Committee that Her Majesty’s Government can withdraw the notice of withdrawal from Euratom under Article 106a of the Euratom treaty and that they can do that unilaterally? As he knows, I am slightly persistent in these matters. I always thought that part of the argument from those who were in favour of Brexit was that we were going to restore the sovereignty of Parliament. It is not too much to expect that Parliament should be able to see and study the legal advice on which Ministers make decisions. I ask him yet again whether he will make available to the House before Report the legal advice which his department has on the legal basis on which the Government can act in withdrawing the notice of withdrawal under Article 106a of the Euratom treaty.
My Lords, once again I thank noble Lords for an excellent debate on this important issue. I will respond to the point raised by most people who spoke—certainly the noble Lords, Lord Hunt, Lord Warner, Lord Teverson, Lord Carlile, Lord Liddle and Lord Adonis—about the reasons for leaving Euratom.
The Euratom treaty is legally distinct from the European Union treaty but it has the same membership, which includes all 28 member states, and makes use of the same institutions. There are no precedents for a non-European Union member state being a member of Euratom.
Noble Lords will recall that the decision to leave Euratom formed part of both Houses’ consideration of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, which is now of course an Act. Noble Lords spoke at that time about the unique nature of the relationship between the separate treaties of the European Union and Euratom. As the European Union and Euratom are uniquely legally joined, when we formally notified our intention to leave the European Union we also commenced the process for leaving Euratom.
The Minister mentioned that it was a parallel European institution. Before we gave that notice, did we actually ask other members whether we could remain in Euratom as a non-EU member?
It is not a matter of getting a political opinion on this. It is the legal position, as I have set out. When we formally notified our intention to leave—
Before the Minister resumes, can I pursue this issue? The industry is very clear in its legal views, which it is prepared to put in the public arena, that we do not have to leave Euratom if we leave the EU. Have the Government discussed that issue with the industry and what the reasons are for its difference of legal view from the Government’s legal view?
My Lords, there has been extensive discussion and liaison between ourselves and industry. I will come on to discuss that shortly but we remain of the opinion, as I said, that when we formally notified our intention to leave the European Union we also commenced the process for leaving Euratom. Having said that, we are determined to continue to have a constructive, collaborative relationship with Euratom. The UK is a great supporter of Euratom and will continue to be so. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, for his efforts to help me save face—even at 2.30 am—but I regret that I will not be able to give him what he requires this evening.
Let me go on to discuss the details of Euratom and our other plans. I will go into it in some detail, if that is okay with noble Lords, despite the late hour. As the Government have made clear, the UK’s future relationship with EU agencies, including those under the Euratom treaty, is a matter for negotiations. I will come on to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, later. Requiring the Government to publish a report in advance of negotiations concluding would be neither helpful to Parliament nor in the national interest. As soon as negotiations have concluded, the Government have committed to hold a vote on the final deal in Parliament. This vote will cover both the withdrawal agreement and the terms of our future relationship, and provide Parliament with the opportunity to scrutinise the outcome of negotiations at the appropriate juncture.
In the interests of transparency and providing as much certainty as possible, we took steps during the Commons passage of this Bill and the Nuclear Safeguards Bill to set out our strategy in a Written Statement on 11 January. That Statement made it absolutely clear that the UK will seek a close and effective association with Euratom in the future, and that we are putting in place all measures to ensure that the UK can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one. This is vital to ensure continuity for industry, whatever the outcome of the negotiations. As noble Lords will be fully aware, the nature of our future relationship with Euratom is part of the next phase of negotiations that has yet to start.
The Statement set out the principles on which our strategy is based: to aim for continuity with current relevant Euratom arrangements; to ensure that the UK maintains its leading role in European nuclear research; and to ensure that the nuclear industry in the UK has the necessary skilled workforce. We will be seeking a close association with Euratom’s research and training programme, including the Joint European Torus and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor projects. We will also seek continuity of trade arrangements to ensure that the nuclear industry can continue to trade across EU borders. Finally, we will seek to maintain close and effective co-operation with Euratom on nuclear safety.
While we have made clear that we will indeed be seeking such an association, it is also essential that we have our own safeguards regime ready to come into place when Euratom arrangements no longer apply in the UK, whatever the outcome of the next phase of EU negotiations on our future relationship. It may be helpful to explain the meaning of nuclear safeguards to inform our discussion of this important but rather technical issue. Nuclear safeguards are non-proliferation reporting and verification processes which states use to demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes. The UK applies nuclear safeguards because it is a responsible nuclear power. Nuclear safeguards are different from nuclear safety and nuclear security. Civil nuclear safeguards reporting, by assuring the international community about the proper use of certain nuclear materials, underpins international civil nuclear trade.
I am grateful to the Minister for the explanation that he has given on the issue of medical isotopes. Can he give us one further piece of information? How many meetings have actually taken place so far in an attempt to negotiate with the EU the continuity of the system of importing and exporting medical isotopes from the UK and from the EU?
I am afraid I do not have those figures to hand. I cannot tell him how many meetings there have been.
I can say that there has been extensive dialogue and discussion with both our EU partners and international partners at official and ministerial level. I can write to him with the exact number, which I can discover.
Could the Minister respond to a question before he moves on to the important amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty? I stopped believing in Father Christmas and in the tooth fairy some years ago. Can he explain why he thinks there will be a warm working relationship between Euratom and a country that has abruptly and unilaterally withdrawn one-quarter of its budget?
I am sorry that the noble Lord no longer believes in Father Christmas. I think there will be a warm relationship for the same reason that we will have a good trading relationship with the EU: because it is manifestly in the interests of both sides to do that.
The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, would require the Government to publish a report on how we will engage with a number of EU and Euratom agencies before negotiations had concluded. We believe this would be neither helpful to Parliament nor in the national interest. I can tell him that as soon as negotiations have concluded, we are committed to holding a vote on the final deal in Parliament, and this vote will cover both the withdrawal agreement and the terms of our future relationship, including of course our relationship with various EU agencies.
I hope that I have addressed noble Lords’ concerns expressed through the amendments and that the noble Lord will therefore feel able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, with respect, the Minister has not answered either of the two questions I put to him. He has not answered the question whether or not the Government are of the opinion that they can withdraw the notice of withdrawal under Article 106a of the Euratom treaty, and he has not told me whether or not the Government will publish or make available to the House in some abbreviated form the legal advice they have on this matter.
I can tell him that we are not going to withdraw our notification.
My Lords, with respect, that is not the question I asked him. I asked him what is the Government’s legal advice on their power to withdraw, which is a very different question.
I have given the noble Lord the answer he is going to get on that subject.
My Lords, with respect, that is not a good enough answer. When we return to this at Report, I fear that that it will simply be grist to the mill for all those noble Lords who feel that this is a colossal error that the Government will not even tell the House what power they possess to rectify the error which they have already committed.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Let me first thank noble Lords very much indeed for bringing this important topic before the House today. I reassure them that the Department of Health and Social Care is actively supporting my department in its negotiations with the EU, including forming part of the negotiation team where the topic is of direct relevance to healthcare. It is also working closely with its arm’s-length bodies, the territorial offices and others across government in preparing for EU exit under all eventualities.
I will address this group of amendments now but I note that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, who I think is not in his place at the moment, has also tabled an amendment on health to Clause 6. This will be responded to formally when we reach that group and I note his specific interest in the subject.
Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, would delay the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 until such time as the Secretary of State has set out a strategy for ensuring the mutual recognition of medicines and devices between the EU and UK. The Government have already set out a very clear offer to the EU for the UK to continue to work in partnership in the area of medicines. It is in the interests of patients and the life sciences industry for us to find a way to continue UK-EU co-operation on medical regulation, even if our precise relationship with the EU will by necessity change. Discussions are ongoing and the outcome will form part of our future relationship with the EU. We cannot and should not delay commencement of this Act until those discussions have concluded. The UK’s medicines and medical devices regulator, the MHRA, is a strong leader that will continue to ensure that medicines and medical devices are safe and effective, regardless of the outcome of negotiations and any agreement on recognition in this area. Indeed, it is currently recognised globally as an authority in its licensing and inspections.
In response to the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Davies, I can be extremely clear that the UK’s preferred outcome is to find a way to continue to co-operate on medicines regulation with the EMA. We have made that extremely clear to the EU. Even though our relationship with the EMA will have to change as we leave the EU, it is in our mutual interests to continue to co-operate and share scientific expertise. We believe that desire is shared by the EU.
Can I ask for some clarification from the Minister about his statement about the preferred outcome? What exactly does that mean? If we do not achieve what we want to in that preferred outcome, what exactly happens and what do we do next? What is the timescale for this? That is why the amendment is framed in the way it is.
It is obviously difficult for me to speculate on what happens if we do not achieve the outcome that we want. As I said, we strongly believe that since we contribute an awful lot of work through the MHRA—something like 40% of the EMA’s work is contributed to by UK authorities—it is in our mutual interests to continue to co-operate. If that is not possible, we will set out an alternative course of action but we believe that it is and should be.
We have a window of about two years in which to get this right. I was talking to the trade bodies for over-the-counter medicine last week and they were saying that a change to make all over-the-counter medicines UK-based would need about a five-year timescale. It is just not doable, so there is an absolute imperative to get these regulations sorted out in pretty short order.
The noble Baroness makes a powerful point. It is one of our priorities. We have a number of priorities in the negotiations but it is important that we get this one right. The MHRA already licenses nationally 90% of all medicines available in the UK but there is a small percentage regulated abroad, so we need to reach a mutual agreement on that.
Amendment 101, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, would prevent the Government making changes to the licensing or regulation regimes for over-the-counter medicines, to which she just referred. The Government will need to correct deficiencies arising from withdrawal in relation to the regulation regimes for over-the-counter medicines, self-care medical devices and food supplements where the UK’s exit from the EU would result in the retained EU law which governs the regimes being deficient or not operating effectively and where manufacturers of these products would have to adapt to divergent UK requirements, potentially leading to a temporary or permanent withdrawal of their product from our market.
The noble Baroness asked a number of specific questions. The Government have already made it clear that we wish to retain a close working relationship after exit. The Government have been engaging with industry and research charities through the ministerial and industry co-chaired life sciences group, and we will continue to work with that group and industry to ensure adequate notice and sufficient time to implement any changes necessary.
Whatever the outcome of negotiations, the principles which will underpin post-Brexit regulation for this sector will be that patients should not be disadvantaged, that innovators should be able to access the UK market as quickly and simply as possible, and that we will continue to play a leading role in Europe and the world in promoting public health. Over-the-counter products will continue to have an important role in relieving pressure on health professionals and promoting consumer choice to improve public health.
In the event that it is not possible to reach a deal that secures ongoing, close collaboration between the UK and Europe, we will set up a regulatory system in the UK that protects the best interests of patients and supports industry to grow and flourish. I hope that my comments will provide the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Jolly, with the reassurance they need not to press their amendments.
Amendments 9 and 205 were tabled by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty. The Government recognise how important reciprocal healthcare is to the 190,000 UK pensioners who currently benefit from it, to UK tourists who use the European Health Insurance Card scheme and to EU nationals visiting and living in the UK. This point was powerfully made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. We want to protect reciprocal healthcare arrangements and have made important progress towards this in this first phase of negotiations. It is the intention of the UK and the EU that the final withdrawal agreement will protect reciprocal healthcare rights for UK citizens resident in the EU on exit day and vice versa on a reciprocal basis.
The Minister said that important progress has been made. Will he tell the Committee what that progress is?
The important progress was announced in the agreement reached in December in the first phase of the negotiations. Reciprocal healthcare benefits were guaranteed for existing UK residents in the EU and for existing EU residents here. The next phase is what happens in the future.
The points I raised related not to the important matter of residents, whether continental residents living here or British residents living on the continent, but to travellers—people who may want to travel for a short period for tourism, family reasons or what have you. Has any progress been made on that front? If not, are the Government proposing to make any progress and, if so, what progress?
That will be for the next phase of the negotiations. We have guaranteed the right of existing residents from the EU in the UK and for UK residents in the EU. The next phase of the negotiations is for people who will travel there in future.
Is the Minister saying that the Government intend to retain the EHIC reciprocal agreement or is he talking about something else?
We would like to retain an arrangement similar to the EHIC if possible. We cannot give any guarantee about what might happen in the next phase of the negotiations.
We welcome the progress made, but we are clear that we want a wider agreement on reciprocal healthcare. I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate that this is not something we can simply legislate for in the withdrawal Bill, but must be negotiated with the EU, which is what we have been doing. We are very clear that we want to protect reciprocal healthcare arrangements.
On 8 December, the UK and EU Commission reached an agreement which delivered on the Prime Minister’s number one priority: to safeguard the rights of people who have built their lives in the UK and EU.
I asked the Minister for information about billing across borders to date, because that information must have been available to the Government before they started negotiating over the travel arrangements.
I will need to write to the noble Baroness with the exact amount of billing, as I do not have those figures in front of me at the moment.
I turn to Amendment 353, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stephen. The Government already keep NHS performance and health outcomes constantly under review, including through the NHS outcomes framework, which measures a number of health indicators intended to form an overarching picture of the current state of health and care services in England. We are committed to positive and productive engagement with the devolved Administrations going forward as we seek a deal that works for the entire United Kingdom.
The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care also publishes an annual assessment on the performance of NHS England, including how it has met its mandate from the Government, as well as an annual report on the overall performance of the health service.
As the Minister has confirmed that there is in fact ongoing, detailed monitoring of these matters, can he confirm that we are losing National Health Service staff returning to the European Union and are having greater difficulty in recruiting from Europe to fill the vacant spaces?
I am not sure that is the case. Obviously there are people returning to the EU all the time, and different people coming to the UK to take up job offers. We can get into detailed figures, but I do not think there is any large-scale exodus of health service staff.
For the reasons I have set out, this amendment is both unnecessary and risks creating unwelcome new burdens at a time when that is least appropriate. I hope I have been able to provide noble Lords with sufficient reassurance.
My noble friend is batting on a difficult wicket. We understand that. He has my total personal sympathy for the plight in which he finds himself, but what he has said this afternoon just ain’t good enough. It is important that he takes on board what has been said during this debate, particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and that when we come to this on Report, he has some substantial and detailed specific progress to report to your Lordships’ House.
I thank my noble friend for his comments. A lot of these matters are still to be negotiated in the next phase. We made substantial progress in the first phase, and we will endeavour to ensure that we make good progress to achieve a good working relationship with the EMA and to guarantee the rights of travellers through a system similar to the European health insurance card for those travelling in future. I hope to be able to provide more information on Report.
Following on from the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, could the Minister provide us with data in writing on the numbers of EU staff who have applied for jobs in healthcare in the last 12 months and the numbers of EU staff who have left? We need to have the data rather than bald statements about what is happening based on anecdotes, because it may well be that the Minister is hearing a quite different set of anecdotes from the ones the rest of us are hearing.
Will the Minister also confirm, or not, my interpretation of his comments on the outcome if there is no agreement? Here I return in part to Amendment 11, but to others as well. If there is no agreement with these regulations, will the Government then simply adopt European regulations de facto? I cannot see any other way for our pharmaceutical and biotech industries to continue to function. We need them for our economy, quite apart from needing them to ensure that there is a supply of medical and biotech advances for our patients. It is particularly important because biotech is an emerging field in which to date, within Europe, the UK has been the leader. I should declare an interest here because my son is a senior lecturer in bioengineering and cardiology, so he is involved in some of this ground-breaking work.
It would be helpful for us to know that and whether, in the context of there being no deal, the Government are already establishing dialogue between different Ministers in the devolved Administrations. As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has pointed out, there are very real implications for Wales, particularly west Wales—I declare my interest as someone who lives and works there—because we know there are large gaps there. We have to know how the Government intend to behave in the event of there being no deal at all.
The noble Baroness has made some valuable points. On the question of data on EU staff applying to jobs in the UK, if that information is available then we will certainly share it with her.
She asked what happens if there is no agreement. As I said, the MHRA already issues national licences for some 90% of medicines on the UK market. If we are no longer co-operating with the EMA on the regulation of new novel medicines, the UK will ensure that our own procedures do not lead to any delay in patient access to new medicines and are no more burdensome to industry.
The noble Baroness’s point about working with the devolved Administrations is a good one and we will ensure that that happens.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, who as always is much more qualified than me and indeed most of the House, for her support. I respectfully suggest that the Minister needs to actually talk to some of these bodies about how complicated, difficult and costly it will be if we do not reach an agreement. That needs to be taken into account.
I thank noble Lords for their support across the House for this suite of amendments. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, is important and—like my own, I hope—very practical. This is about what medicines people buy over the counter, what health supplements they have access to and whether those will change post Brexit.
The noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, tabled Amendment 205, and I thank him for his support for my amendment. He and I want the same thing: we want this scheme, which protects people’s right to healthcare, to continue, and as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, its current form would be the easiest form for it to do so. It is often the case that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, makes the observation that you wish you had—in this case, about disease knowing no boundaries. He is absolutely right.
My noble friend Lady Blackstone made an eloquent point about cutting-edge research and the importance that that has for children and the rare diseases that they experience.
I do not deny that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, is important. It will be very important that we know what the impact of Brexit has been, not just a year later but ongoing. However, the argument that we are having on the earlier part of this suite of amendments is about what happens in the negotiations and what happens if they fail. It is about the action that we take now.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is quite correct about the uncertainty that has been created for NHS staff in terms of their retention and recruitment. In fact I asked a Question of the Health Minister about precisely that not so long ago. Those figures have been collected by organisations such as the Royal Colleges so we know that the number of nurses coming from Europe in the last year has fallen by, from memory, around 80%. That is a huge drop in the number of nurses prepared to come and work in this country from Europe.
I say to the Minister that we understand—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack—that this is a difficult time and the Government are in the middle of negotiations. However, it is a long time since the referendum and we are a short time away from falling off the edge of the Brexit cliff, and issues of licensing of medicines and access of citizens to healthcare can none of them brook a two or three-year negotiation after Brexit because of the suffering that would cause and the impact it would have. That is what the amendments concern.
I hope that, between now and the next stage of the Bill, we will make some progress on both those issues. If we do not, we shall return to them. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I agree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has just uttered. The noble Lord, Lord Patten, said that we were not expecting miracles from the Minister. I think even the Minister’s most ardent admirers do not credit him with miraculous powers, and he is not going to able to produce any rabbits out of a hat for us this evening. But it is not miracles we need here: all we need is a continuation of the status quo. This is one of those areas we come back to time and again—we had it in the long debate on Euratom last week: all we need to do is to avoid massive, self-inflicted damage.
There is no need to create whole new programmes and ways of working. We have Horizon 2020 and Erasmus; the latter has been going on for the best part of 30 years and is a highly successful programme. When you are doing something well, the usual trick is just to keep on doing it. There are so many things that do not work that the idea that Parliament and Government should be spending their time dismantling things that do is clearly crazy. What we want to hear from the Minister is simply that he is open-minded to continuing with the present arrangements. The sooner the Government are prepared to say that, the better.
The most telling contribution to this debate came from the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Cambridge. In the higher education world, there is—I shall choose my words slightly diplomatically—a pronounced air of self-congratulation on how excellent everything is in this country and how brilliantly we do it, and if only the rest of world copied us then they would be a great deal better off. In many areas that is true, but in one we have a very poor international record: the propensity of our students to study abroad. According to the Erasmus figures, twice as many European students come to Britain as Brits go abroad. The noble Baroness was right to say there is a big problem with students from poorer backgrounds studying abroad. When I was preparing figures for this debate, I found that it looks as if Singapore, a country less than one-tenth the size of the UK, has about as many students studying abroad as we have in our entirety.
The fact is that we do not have nearly enough of our students studying abroad. When I visited Singapore as Minister for Schools, they were aiming—by about now, so maybe they have achieved it—at requiring all students at the National University of Singapore, regardless of their course, to spend at least six months, one semester, studying abroad. Can your Lordships imagine if we had anything like that commitment here? It might be a good thing if in due course we did. The great irony is that one of the great slogans to emerge from this Brexit policy as it has developed is “Global Britain”—but how can there ever be a global Britain unless far more of our students go and see the rest of the globe and spend time studying there? The first requirement for that is that we should not make the situation worse than it currently is.
The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was right that what we seek from the Minister is not a miracle; we are clearly not going to get that from the present Minister. We simply expect a commitment to continue with the current programmes, and it is absolutely within the scope of the Government to say unilaterally that the negotiating position of Her Majesty’s Government now, in 2018, is that these programmes will continue with full British participation after 2020. If the Minister does not say that, he is staring at near-certain defeat on this issue on Report.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for another excellent debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Garden, for their Amendments 10 and 163, which respectively seek clarification on the Government’s future membership of the Erasmus and Horizon 2020 programmes. I am particularly grateful to my noble friends Lord Deben and Lord Patten for their helpful attempts to rewrite my notes for me before I started.
At the December European Council last year, the Prime Minister confirmed that UK students will continue to be able to participate in the Erasmus student exchange programme for at least another three years, until the end of the current budget period. She welcomed the opportunity to provide clarity to young people and the education sector, and she reaffirmed our commitment to the deep and special relationship that we want to build with the EU.
In response to my noble friend Lord Cormack, I say that the Government have made it clear many times that we value the Erasmus+ programme and international exchanges more generally. Cultural exchange helps to build important business, political and diplomatic bridges around the world, not to mention lifelong friendships.
I am grateful for that, but if that is the case then why do we not carry on beyond the three years?
If my noble friend will have some patience, I will come to that in a second. Supporting young people to study, work, volunteer, teach and train abroad, and supporting their schools, youth and sports organisations to build transnational partnerships, helps us to create a new generation of globally mobile, culturally agile people who can succeed in an increasingly global marketplace.
In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, I say that the UK has a strong offer to EU and international students, with four universities in the world’s top 10 and 16 in the top 100. In fact, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, pointed out, we received many more students under Erasmus than we sent. Erasmus is an important programme, but it represents only about half the student exchange programmes we have in the UK.
Our young people get first-hand experience of different cultures, helping them to broaden their horizons and their ambitions. Students who have spent time abroad as a part of their degree are much more likely to achieve better degree outcomes, improved starting salaries and stronger employment prospects, as noble Lords have pointed out. This is especially the case for students from disadvantaged or less represented backgrounds.
In response to the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, no decisions have yet been made about post-2020 programme participation as the scope of that programme has not been agreed. We look forward to the Commission’s proposal, which we expect to be published in May. Participation in the successor to the Erasmus+ programme, which we think is valuable, will form part of the negotiations.
The UK fully participated in the mid-term evaluation of the current programme and we reached broadly the same conclusions as the Commission: the programme works well but there is room for improvement and simplification, especially for smaller applicants. UK respondents to the mid-term evaluation made many detailed comments and criticisms, but few suggested that radical change was needed. The proposal for the next programme will be published in May, as I said, and we are currently shaping the debate and looking forward to further discussions with the Commission about that.
We see future co-operation in education programmes as an area of mutual benefit to both the EU and the UK, provided that we can agree a fair ongoing contribution.
My Lords, what reassurance can the Minister give to students who are beginning their courses in September this year or September next year? Will they be able to participate in Erasmus or does that depend on whatever decisions the Government take after May? Is that not too late for certainty?
They will be able to participate in the existing Erasmus scheme up till 2020, should they wish to do so, and, as I said, we will see what the next programme will be. We await the proposals from the Commission in May, and we will discuss our participation in that with them.
As I said, we see future co-operation in education programmes as an area of mutual benefit to both the UK and the EU, provided that we can agree a fair ongoing contribution. We are giving this matter careful consideration as we negotiate the UK’s exit and are listening to the views of the sector.
As many noble Lords are aware, we have proposed a time-limited implementation period based on the current structure of rules and regulations. Looking to the future, we recognise the value of international exchange and collaboration in education and training as part of our vision for the UK as a global nation. That is why we said in our science and innovation policy paper, published in September, that we would discuss with the EU future arrangements to facilitate the mobility of researchers, academics and students engaged in cross-border collaboration. The UK and EU agreed in December that UK entities’ right to participate in current EU programmes for their duration will be unaffected by withdrawal. This includes the Horizon 2020 framework programme for research and innovation.
A number of noble Lords—the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Wallace, the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, and my noble friend Lord Deben—have asked me about the future of the Horizon programmes. Horizon will be succeeded by the ninth framework programme, as the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, reminded us. This programme is also still being developed by the European Commission, and we are participating in discussions on that. The UK has declared that it would like to reach an ambitious science and innovation agreement with the EU that would include future framework programmes. It is too early to speculate on whether the UK will seek to associate to framework programme nine which, as I said, is still being developed.
The Government are deeply conscious of the importance of the Horizon 2020 and the future framework programmes to research in the UK, in which we have an international reputation. We are working hard to secure a research and innovation agreement with the EU that will take effect after Brexit.
The Minister says it is too early to decide whether we will co-operate. Can he tell us in what circumstances we will decide that it is not in the national interest for the UK to participate in the next Horizon programme?
I very much expect that it will be in our interest to participate in it. As I said, we are taking part in discussions. We have not yet seen the detail of how it will be financed, but, given a fair ongoing contribution, I suspect that we will want to participate. But they are a matter of negotiation. It is fine for us to say that, yes, we would like to take part; we need the EU side, the other side to the negotiation, to say that, yes, they would like us to take part as well. It is a negotiation. We can give a commitment that we would like to; we cannot give a commitment that we will be accepted.
As part of the new deep and special partnership with the EU, we will recognise our shared interest in maintaining and strengthening research collaboration. The UK will seek an ambitious agreement, one that promotes science and innovation across Europe now and in future. For the avoidance of any doubt, in response to the many questions that have been asked, let me say that we support Erasmus, we support Horizon 2020, but, contrary to what many noble Lords have suggested, these are EU programmes. The UK cannot adopt a unilateral stance; there has to be bilateral agreement on them. That agreement depends, first, on understanding the shape of the Erasmus programme in May and framework programme nine, when it is clarified by the Commission, and finding a mutually acceptable financial arrangement. Subject to those conditions, we would be very happy to be able to participate in both those programmes in future.
My Lords, I am not sure whether the Minister is drawing to an end, but he has not managed so far to say anything about the movement of researchers and students. Why can he not state categorically that we will not introduce any new impediments to students or researchers offered places in our universities? That would be entirely consistent with the introduction of a work permit scheme, because neither of those two categories come to our universities without a work offer. Why can he not say that now? Mobility is crucial in this area, but he has not said a word about it.
I totally agree with the noble Lord that mobility is crucial. I am fairly certain that we would not want to introduce restrictions on mobility in these areas—we want as many students to come as possible—but, as I am sure he is aware, this will be a matter for the Home Office to decide in the immigration policy that will be discussed shortly.
Indeed so. I was hoping that the Minister would say that there is not now, and never has been, any limit on the number of genuine students who can come to the UK. I would have thought that that is bound to continue: this is a false issue.
Yes, we have been a proud recipient of and destination for thousands of international students in the past. They are welcome in this country, they contribute greatly to our education services and I am sure that we will want that to continue in future, but I cannot speculate on what a future immigration policy may look like.
If this is a non-issue, why cannot my noble friend say very simply: “There will be no additional stops or impediments on students”? Does he not understand that constantly saying how wonderful everything is but that he cannot actually tell us anything is very difficult for anyone trying to plan their future and very unfair on young people?
As I said, I am fairly certain that we will want to continue to welcome as many students and researchers as want to visit this country in future, but, as I am sure the noble Lord will understand, I cannot speculate on what a future immigration policy might be before it has been announced by the Home Office and published by the Government.
Nevertheless, let me say for the avoidance of doubt that I have heard the message from all parts of the House and I will certainly reflect on these matters before we come back to the issue on Report. I understand that there are very strong feelings from all parts of the House about these issues and we will certainly see what we can do about that.
My Lords, first, let me say that I welcome the Minister saying that he will reflect on this debate, because I think it is the first chink of light from him on any of these important debates in Committee. It has been a remarkable debate. We have heard from many noble Lords about the importance of the Erasmus programme. I agree with my noble friend Lord Adonis: the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, speaking from huge experience as a former vice-chancellor of Aston University of the impact that Erasmus has had on the students who go to Aston and the way it has widened their horizons, is for me one of the most important illustrations of why future participation by the UK in Erasmus is so important.
On research, again, my worry is that the Government are hugely complacent about the UK’s position. Consider the consequences of uncertainty over Horizon 2020, which is having an impact on universities at this very moment in terms of collaboration on future research bids. Even where European Union universities will still collaborate with UK universities—and it is by no means certain that they will continue to do so in every case—they are reluctant for UK universities to be in the lead. Added to the uncertainties about the movement of both academics and students, we are entering a hugely uncertain position for a very important sector.
I listened with care to what the Minister said. To be fair, he has said that the Government value both Erasmus and Horizon 2020 and he repeated the Prime Minister’s comments, particularly in relation to Horizon 2020. He then said that while he values these programmes, the EU is working out the next stage of both Erasmus and Horizon 2020, that the UK is part of some discussion about that but they will form part of the negotiations and that there is nothing more he can say.
I think there is something more that the Minister can say. I think it is without question that it is in our national interest that we continue wholeheartedly to take part in those programmes. Thinking about the negotiations and the UK Government’s tactics, this niggardly, churlish approach does not seem to be getting us very far. This Government would attract a hell of a lot of good will if in relation to just these two programmes they said, “Whatever, we are going to stick with it, and we will make good any deficiency in UK university research programmes if the price of sticking with it means that we will get less than we did in the past”.
The whole Committee—almost all Members—really wants these programmes to continue. We will obviously come back at Report. The Minister has kindly said he will reflect on it. I very much hope that he will do so. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, of course I shall withdraw the amendment, but I shall make a couple of comments. It is clear that we will have to return to this at the next stage if the Government do not provide any more detail. First, on the role of the Lords in considering Bills such as this, the noble Baroness said—as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said on a couple of occasions—that this is a largely mechanical Bill. Well, it is a mechanical Bill that gives very wide discretion to the Government to design our future relationship with our most important security, political and economic partners. So a House that concerns itself not with whether the principle of the Bill is correct but with the detail is entirely in accord with its role to ask for detail on what that discretion will be used for.
It would be easier to accept that this is a mechanical Bill and not to raise these difficult questions one after another if we had some confidence that the Government actually know what they want in these areas. Part of our problem is that many of us have no such confidence. I do not think that the Foreign Secretary has a clue about what he wants by way of a future relationship with Europe: I doubt whether he has really thought about it for more than three or four minutes. He is too busy thinking about the next anecdote he is going to tell or the next joke he is going to make. His speech last week was a disgrace for a Foreign Secretary: the Prime Minister’s was of an entirely different quality. For a Conservative Party that has always prided itself on its commitment to a strong foreign policy, it must be a real embarrassment that we still have someone in place who is incapable of giving a serious speech on foreign policy. So this House is fulfilling its proper role in asking for detail on the implications of the Bill.
Secondly, I take up what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said: the engine room is important.
My Lords, I think it is against the rules and the spirit of this Chamber to criticise a Member of another place by name. I hope that the noble Lord will see fit to moderate his comments accordingly.
I apologise for being perhaps a little stronger than I should have been in this respect. On the engine room—I wanted to return to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, on this—much of the business of multilateral organisations, be it NATO or the EU, is done in working groups and committees. The common foreign and security policy structure has some 40 working groups and committees, including a military committee that has been chaired by a British officer. If we are not in any of those working groups, we will miss out on formulating policy.
There are other details that matter a great deal. I remember the noble Earl, Lord Howe, saying on one occasion, when some of us were following the noble Lord, Lord West, and asking, “Where are you going to find the frigates to make up the carrier groups that we need?” The noble Earl said, if I remember correctly, “They do not necessarily have to be British frigates”. I took him as meaning that they might be Dutch, French, Belgian or whatever. Well, that also needs a certain structure, with certain training mechanisms and certain multilateral commands.
My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments relating to reciprocal issues are key to continuing to protect and assist British citizens after Brexit, including children and protected persons, in ways that hitherto our EU membership and cross-border agreements have provided. In particular these are the European arrest warrant, the mutual recognition of family court judgments, information exchange, Europol and Eurojust.
The Government’s approach to these issues must be agreed in principle with the EU in time to be included in the framework part of the Article 50 requirements and form part of the withdrawal agreement, so a satisfactory approach to these will be key to the future vote on that deal. However, as we have heard from speakers tonight, there seems to be an extraordinary lack of urgency, especially if there is any chance—I am not sure whether this is what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, hinted at—that a standstill transition agreement could not cover these issues. That would make it even more urgent.
I ask in particular about the Government’s urgency, or lack of it, as I began asking Written Questions on this a year ago. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, will remember it very well: it was on St Valentine’s Day last year—I do not think he chose it to be that day, but never mind—that he answered some of my questions on matrimonial and maintenance proceedings. It was very reassuring: he said that the Government,
“recognises the importance of the issues”.
Wow. There was no more than that then, nor indeed on civil judicial co-operation and cross-border disputes and family law when he replied to a similar Written Question in August. I worry about the lack of progress since then.
As the Prime Minister has remarked and others have repeated, keeping our citizens safe is the first mission of any Government. Therefore, like others, I welcome that she used the Munich speech to reiterate her desire to negotiate continued, and in some cases enhanced, co-operation with EU nations and particularly with these bodies and schemes. As we have heard, the amendments cover the Schengen Information System, the European arrest warrant, the European Criminal Records Information System, Europol and Eurojust. Given what we have heard today and in earlier debates, the Minister will recognise the importance of our continued participation in all of those, but also the challenges that that will bring to them in negotiating.
While we heard from Munich the desire for this comprehensive agreement, it is time for the Minister to offer a bit more detail and clarity sooner rather than later. It is about the direction of travel or the objectives. It does not undermine any negotiations for us, not just our Parliaments, to know what the Government want to do. As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, it is time for the Government to move from intention to reality. These issues, as has been touched on just now, are partly held up by an obsession with red lines around the ECJ. They cannot be allowed to stand in the way of some logical and sensible solutions to these problems. These issues are too important to be left to a divided Cabinet. At the moment I see a pantomime horse, or Dr Dolittle’s pushmi-pullyu, being pulled in two different directions, mostly about red lines that are immaterial to the issues we have been discussing. I hope we can hear about some direction and some practical steps from the Minister, particularly on how these negotiations are taking place.
I thank all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have contributed to what has been a fascinating debate. I reiterate the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the outcome of our negotiations with our partners in the EU delivers continued close co-operation on internal security matters.
There are parallels between the effect of Amendment 13 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and that of Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, which was debated previously, in so far as they both seek to discuss the future relationship with the EU, which is, of course, subject to the negotiations. The noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to prevent the Government from bringing regulations into force until agreed procedures for continued participation in EU internal security measures have been approved by both Houses. The Government have already committed to providing Parliament with a meaningful vote on any final deal. This will give Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise the future relationship between the UK and the EU in all these areas. For this reason, it is our view that the amendment is not needed.
I must come back to the points made by my noble friends Lord Hamilton and Lord Lamont. Many noble Lords have pushed me and asked for further detail and clarification on the negotiations. This Bill is negotiation agnostic; it is not concerned with the negotiations. I understand why people want clarification in all those areas, but, of course, when we have reached an agreement, it will be the subject of future legislation that noble Lords will no doubt want to comment on in great detail. However, I will attempt to answer as many questions and go into as much detail as I can. I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, may be a little disappointed yet again, but I will do my best.
Can the Minister answer the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, as to which Minister is taking the lead in the security negotiations?
I will come to that later in my speech, but I will answer that question.
In that same paper, we made it clear that we value the operational benefits that we derive—I was struck by the comments on this from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and on how valuable many of them are. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred to many of them, too, including the passenger name record directive, the second generation Schengen Information System and the European arrest warrant. There is also ECRIS, referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and all the various acronyms that go with many of these JHA matters. They are all to do with the systematic exchange of information with our EU partners—for example, on criminal records—which helps to deliver fair and robust justice. I hope that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. He referred to Interpol. I assume that he meant Europol, but, for the avoidance of any doubt, I should say that we continue to co-operate in the same way with Interpol.
We made it clear that we want to agree future arrangements in this area that support co-operation across a range of EU measures and agencies, and to avoid operational gaps for law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in the UK and the EU. The level of co-operation that we want to sustain goes beyond the specific tools and measures highlighted by the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy and Lady Massey, and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. We have described the legal instruments here as a “toolkit” that can provide cumulative benefits. We have also indicated that we want our future partnership with the EU in this area to be dynamic, allowing us to co-operate if necessary in new ways in the face of evolving threats.
The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, highlights the respective roles of domestic courts and the CJEU. We made it clear in our future partnership paper on security, law enforcement and criminal justice that a future agreement in this area would need to provide for dispute resolution. Let me give a little more detail on that.
On leaving the EU we will bring to an end the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK. There are a number of existing precedents where EU agreements with third countries provide for close co-operative relationships without the CJEU having direct jurisdiction in those countries. The UK will engage proactively to negotiate an approach to enforcement and dispute resolution that meets the key objectives of the UK and the EU. We also published a separate future partnership paper on enforcement and dispute resolution last August, addressing many of those points and setting out the Government’s approach to these issues.
The House has of course debated this issue on a number of occasions, particularly earlier this month, on 8 February, in the debate on the EU Committee’s report on judicial oversight of the European arrest warrant. The withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will implement the withdrawal agreement in our domestic law. In addition, the Government have already committed to provide Parliament with a meaningful vote on any final deal. This will give both Houses of Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise again the future relationship between the UK and the EU. We need to be able to work with the EU to respond quickly and effectively to the changing threats we face from terrorism and serious organised crime. In negotiations, we will be seeking to agree the best possible way to continue our work alongside our European partners in support of our common goals and shared interests. We are absolutely committed to securing the close relationship that the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford, Lady Kennedy and Lady Massey, and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, want to see—and on that basis I hope that they will not press their amendments.
Amendment 99, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, would prevent regulations made under Section 7(1) of the Bill from diminishing the protections in relation to “protected persons” set out in Part 3 of the Criminal Justice (European Protection Order) (England and Wales) Regulations 2014. As I understand it, the amendment seeks to ensure that the relevant authorities in England and Wales will continue to recognise and act upon European protection orders made in remaining member states after exit day, whether or not those states act on ours.
The EPO regime, established by an EU directive of the same name and implemented in England and Wales under the cited regulations, which came into force in 2015, is essentially a reciprocal regime. It requires the relevant designated authorities in the different member states involved to act and to communicate with each other in the making of an order and in its recognition and enforcement—and also, indeed, in any modification, revocation or withdrawal of one. It is not possible for us to regulate from here to require the relevant authorities of remaining member states to act in any particular way. As such, if we are not in a reciprocal regime we will no longer issue EPOs to remaining member states, since it would be pointless to do so, and nor will the authorities in those member states issue them to the UK, for the same reasons.
In short, absent our continued participation in the EPO regime, or in some proximate reciprocal arrangements in its place, these regulations will be redundant; they do not work unilaterally. This amendment therefore pre-empts the outcome of the negotiations, potentially requiring the retention of redundant legislation. It would not be right to create a false impression by retaining redundant legislation. I am happy to be clear, however, that if the forthcoming negotiations produce an agreement to continue access to the regime established under this directive, or something like it, appropriate steps and legislation will be brought forward to implement it at that time. This will encompass the protections for protected persons. We will, of course, consider that at that stage. Meanwhile, for now, there is no practical point or purpose in having such an amendment or these provisions.
I shall answer some of the other points that were made. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked me about the O’Connor case and about extradition to the UK from Ireland. I am sure that the House will understand that I am somewhat limited in what I can say on this matter; it is a live case at the moment. Suffice it to say that we are monitoring it closely, but it would be wrong to speculate on its impact before the case is concluded. Once it is, we will be happy to do so.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I think it was, asked how we could reconcile the principles set out in the Prime Minister’s Munich speech, first on UK sovereignty and secondly on the ECJ. As the Prime Minister said:
“The Treaty must preserve our operational capabilities. But it must also fulfil three further requirements. It must be respectful of the sovereignty of both the UK and the EU’s legal orders. So, for example, when participating in EU agencies the UK will respect the remit of the European Court of Justice. And a principled but pragmatic solution to close legal co-operation will be needed to respect our unique status as a third country with our own sovereign legal order”.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked about justice and home affairs in the implementation period. We welcome the EU’s position that the UK should continue to participate in existing justice and home affairs measures where it has opted in. We also want to ensure that the UK and the EU can take new action together against unforeseen incidents and threats during that period. For those reasons, we want to be involved in new measures introduced during implementation where that is appropriate. He also asked about the Prime Minister’s speech in Munich. I confirm that she was talking about all the justice and home affairs measures he mentioned—the EAW, ECRIS, Europol and all the other appropriate acronyms.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked about the European arrest warrant and about the chance of a successful outcome compared with Norway. We value our co-operation through the EAW as it provides a faster and cost-effective way of handling extradition and helping us tackle cross-border criminality. With regard to Norway, our starting point for negotiations on future co-operation will be different from that of either Norway or Iceland, where a bilateral agreement is also in place. Of course, our starting point is different from theirs in so far as our extradition arrangements will be fully aligned with those of the EU at the point of our exit since we operate the same tool. That was not the case with Norway and Iceland when they joined.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, asked where we are in the negotiations and who is doing them—which the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, was also interested in. The Secretary of State for Exiting the EU is responsible for conducting negotiations in support of the Prime Minister. He is supported by the core negotiating team, which is made up of senior officials from a range of government departments. In response to his question about contacts, officials are engaging now and constantly with EU counterparts on a range of issues—but I come back to my earlier point that it would not be appropriate to give a running commentary on these discussions. We approach the next round of negotiations with optimism.
Can the Minister tell us if the European Union has appointed anybody to represent the 27 other countries in conducting the other side of treaty negotiations?
Michel Barnier is the EU chief negotiator. I thought that that was fairly obvious.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about no deal. Of course, we approach these negotiations not expecting failure but anticipating success. We are confident that continued practical co-operation between the UK and the EU on law enforcement and national security is very much in the interests of both sides, so we approach these negotiations anticipating success. We do not want or expect a no-deal outcome. However, a responsible Government should prepare for all potential outcomes, including the unlikely scenario in which no mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached. That is exactly what we are doing across the whole of government. The UK uses and benefits from a range of international information-sharing tools in the area of security and law enforcement, which are by no means limited to EU mechanisms but include bilateral and multilateral channels, including Interpol and the Council of Europe.
I hope I have answered all the questions—
Do I understand the Minister to be saying that the people conducting the trade negotiations will deal with the security stuff as well? Is that what he is saying? Are there no lawyers on the other side to conduct the negotiations on behalf of those 27 other countries? What is the situation?
There are lead negotiators on each side but they are supported by a whole range of officials and Ministers from various departments. David Davis is our negotiator, Michel Barnier is the EU’s negotiator, and they have different members in each of the teams—
But is the withdrawal agreement the same thing as the treaty or are they separate?
No, the treaty will be a separate piece of legislation when we negotiate it. I hope I have tackled most of noble Lords’ questions and they will be able to withdraw or not move their amendments.
May I just ask the Minister about his comments on the European Court of Justice? Is there anything in the case law of the ECJ that justifies the Government’s reluctance for it to continue to be the dispute resolution procedure for the matters we are discussing?
We have been clear that respecting the Brexit vote means delivering on having control of our own laws. Our Supreme Court will be the ultimate arbiter of our own laws and it would not be appropriate to submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of a foreign power.
The Magna Carta was imposed on King John by the Barons, as I understand it—the Barons being Members of this noble House. The House did not exist in that form, but it was imposed by the Lords and the Barons. The House of Commons passed the Bill of Rights 350 years ago and imposed it on the sovereign, guaranteeing our rights to free elections, no taxes without parliamentary approval and free speech. The Bill of Rights passed 350 years ago by this Parliament formed the basis of the United States Bill of Rights and Bills of rights of other countries around the world.
Then just 70 years ago, we used our unique experience to write the European Convention on Human Rights—largely written by British lawyers. We wrote that for countries which had no history of our fundamental freedoms and had suffered the evils and degradations of National Socialism. What I am saying is that the worst indictment I make of the EU is that it seems to have destroyed the belief among parliamentarians, noble Lords and Members of Parliament that we are capable of governing ourselves and writing our own law.
There is nothing of any value in the Charter of Fundamental Rights which is not already covered in UK law or the European convention. If we find some great new right in the future and decide that freedom of thought must become a law, are we incapable in this House, in the other place and as British parliamentarians of drafting that? Are we so enfeebled and incapable that we cannot do it? If the Barons could do it 800 years ago, Members of Parliament 350 years ago and the British Government and parliamentarians did it for Europe 70 years ago, are we so incapable that we cannot do it now?
The people of this country voted to bring back control of our laws because they believed that Parliament was capable of making better laws than the EU. They believed that we are better at deciding on our essential rights than an ECJ judge from Bulgaria who has a law degree in Marxist-Leninist law—I have checked on that, and he has got a degree from Sofia on Marxist-Leninist law.
I happen to agree with the British people. I see the incredible wealth of talent in this House, with noble and learned Lords and Law Lords, and I trust our courts. We do not need nor want this charter. Let us wear once gain the mantle of our predecessors in the Lords and Commons, who gave us every freedom that has been worth fighting and dying for for the last few hundred years. We need the courage of the electorate, who trusted us to make our own laws once again. We should not let them down.
I will make a point that has not been made before. The charter has never been scrutinised by this House. If it had been, we would not have this lack of clarity. I have more confidence in the ability of our Supreme Court to protect us than I have in the ECJ. Bearing in mind what the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, said, what a failure the charter has been across Europe. The Roma are being persecuted, migrants are not getting proper treatment, the leaders of Catalonia are being locked up and extremist, right-wing parties are on the march. Freedom House is marking down European countries; they are sliding away from human rights. I am not proud of the charter; it has not worked in Europe. We are much better off with something home-grown and administered by our Supreme Court.
My Lords, if I appear faint in my defence of the Bill it is due to a lack of food rather than a lack of enthusiasm. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to this important debate and set out the Government’s position. I will start by making it clear that we are listening carefully to the debates on this issue, and will continue to do so.
The Government agree that protecting our rights and liberties as we leave the EU is of critical importance and it is only right that every detail of our approach is scrutinised. This has been a wide-ranging debate about human rights after exit, but it is worth remembering that the amendments before us relate specifically to the charter and the question of what role, if any, it should have in domestic law when we are no longer a member of the EU.
I maintain that the approach in the Bill to the charter as a document is absolutely right, and that the Bill in this respect is in no need of improvement. However, as many noble Lords have pointed out, that approach cannot be separated from the Bill’s approach to the general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights. In response to the strength of feeling conveyed not just in this House but in the other place, the Government are looking again at these issues. These are highly technical issues in some respects but they are undoubtedly important, so we will look further at whether this part of the Bill can be improved in keeping with some of the concerns that have been expressed. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Lamont referred to an observation made by the Secretary of State himself that, if there were specific examples of rights which were not otherwise covered, we would examine them to ensure that the rights were not lost. However, that is not the case. On the specific question of whether the charter should be kept, our view remains that not incorporating the charter into UK law should not in itself affect the substantive rights from which individuals already benefit in the United Kingdom. This is because the charter was never the source of those rights.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, anticipated that he might be reminded of his previous remarks on the matter, and I see no reason to disappoint him. In 2008, when this House debated the then European Union (Amendment) Bill, he was absolutely clear that,
“the charter was never intended to be applied directly to member states in dealing with those matters that member states have the competence to deal with. It was always intended to constrain the European Union institutions … the United Kingdom’s position, like my position, has always been that the charter affirms existing rights, it does not create any new justiciable rights in any member state and does not extend the power of the courts. Moreover, in many cases the charter rights are based on national laws and practices and so they must mirror the extent and content of those national”,—[Official Report, 9/6/08; cols. 426-27.]
laws.
The noble and learned Lord observed that he had nevertheless then encountered the incorporation of the charter into the Lisbon treaty in 2009. Perhaps that was a game changer. I remind him of his evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee in 2014. At that time he referred back to his previous statements and publications with regard to the charter and went on to say that, as he had there explained, the fundamental point was to provide a clear and accessible statement of existing rights and therefore constraints on the power of the EU to legislate.
As the noble and learned Lord’s previous remarks help to make clear, the charter is only one of the elements of the UK’s existing human rights architecture. It reaffirms rights and principles that exist elsewhere in the EU acquis, irrespective of the charter, and the Bill sets out how those rights and principles will continue to be protected in UK law after exit.
The noble and learned Lord referred to a number of issues, such as the case of Benkharbouche in 2017 in the Supreme Court. In that case the court found that there was a breach of Article 6 of the convention but it also referred to Article 47 of the charter in the context not of rights but of remedies. One has to bear in mind the distinction between rights and remedies.
The noble and learned Lord posed three questions in the context of previous observations about the charter. First, he talked about there being no loss of substantial protection. It is inevitable that leaving the EU will result in changes to the current arrangements, but certainly we do not accept that this in itself will result in a loss of substantive rights.
Secondly, he referred to the procedural protections that will be excluded. When we leave the EU, a person can still rely on sources that are reaffirmed in the charter. I emphasise “reaffirmed in the charter”, as he himself observed in 2008 and 2014. Procedurally there may be differences but we do not consider that that can be a basis for incorporating the charter into domestic law. Indeed, we absolutely stand by what has been said by the Prime Minister: it is not necessary to retain the charter to ensure that rights are protected.
The noble and learned Lord also referred to the body of the charter, beginning with Article 1, and suggested that these rights were contained only in the charter. I simply observe that on 5 December last year the Government published a very detailed paper setting out, as it were, a comparison of the rights in the charter and where they can be found elsewhere—in the convention, in the principles of EU law and in our own common law. The noble and learned Lord referred to Article 1, which concerns the right to human dignity. I remind him that there is a long series of case law both from the ECJ, as it then was, and from the European Court of Human Rights going back to 1995 in which, for example, the convention court emphasised that the very essence of the convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. That has been repeated in a whole series of cases since then. These are well-established rights and they were well established when they were brought together into the charter.
I want to reassure noble Lords that substantive rights protected in the charter are, and will continue to be, protected elsewhere in UK law after we leave the EU, most notably in convention rights, in retained EU law, in the common law and via specific statutory protections such as those in our own equalities legislation. I have already mentioned that the Government published a detailed analysis providing guidance about how substantive rights found in the charter would be reflected in domestic law after exit.
Reference has been made to various legal opinions and that of Jason Coppel QC, who has had a number of name checks this evening. I can only implore noble Lords to look at the very detailed analysis the Government have produced. I also note that some of the references to Mr Coppel’s opinion involve references to his concern that Ministers might change rights, for example, or that the procedures will be affected. However, that is not to say that the fundamental rights underlying the charter are not found elsewhere.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord quite rightly draws our attention to the distinction between rights and remedies, but he will agree that rights are not helpful unless there are remedies. If we were scrutinising the charter and the source of its rights to establish whether we were satisfied that the rights and remedies could still apply, we might, for instance, have noted that the sources of Article 1 mentioned in the analysis would not confer an enforceable right on individuals after exit day. That is the JCHR’s analysis of the analysis.
I hope that the Minister can answer the question asked, in particular, by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Kerslake, about why we have combined the two debates—one about the charter, its rights and wrongs and whether it is good or bad, and the other about the mechanisms. We have heard so often from the Government Front Bench that this Bill is about mechanisms. Why are the Government not using the mechanism they have themselves designed to give them the opportunity, and to give the Committee the opportunity, to consider the substance calmly after the chimes of midnight?
Quite simply because, as I indicated earlier to the Committee, the rights underpinning the charter exist elsewhere than in the charter and it is not necessary to incorporate the charter into domestic law in order to find those fundamental rights in our domestic law after we leave the EU.
I am sorry to interrupt, but the analysis by the Joint Committee on Human Rights to which the noble Baroness referred, which is an analysis of the Government’s analysis, identified a number of rights that are not there other than in the charter. Does the noble and learned Lord reject the JCHR’s analysis?
We have considered that analysis, and that is why I indicated that we were still looking at this. As I said, if rights are identified which are not in fact going to be incorporated into our domestic law in the absence of the charter, we will look very carefully at ensuring that those are not lost.
Clause 5(5) makes it clear that, notwithstanding the non-incorporation of the charter, retained EU law will continue to be interpreted by UK courts in a way that is consistent with the underlying rights. I hope that addresses to some extent the issue raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. Interpretive provisions will retain a means by which we can look at these rights in the proper context.
With regard to those who have expressed concerns about this Bill resulting in a loss of substantive rights, I repeat—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has done, at least prior to his recent Pauline conversion—that it is not necessary to retain the charter to retain those fundamental rights. If we see that there is a potential loss of such fundamental rights, we will address that, and that is what we have indicated.
I put it to the noble and learned Lord that there is no other area of retained EU law where the Government have carried out this exercise or said that we do not need to read across a particular provision because it is already in domestic law. Why are they making an exception of the charter?
Because this is the only case in which we have identified that situation. There is no other reason for proceeding in this way except for that.
If, as the noble and learned Lord said on numerous occasions in his reply, the rights established in the charter are already there in our domestic law, what is lost by keeping the charter? If those rights are already there, the Government cannot be worried about anything if they retain the charter.
I must compliment the noble and learned Lord on his second sight. As I was about to say, the next argument put to us is that if we say that the charter is not adding anything, what is the problem with keeping it? I hope that is a fair summary of the noble and learned Lord’s intervention. With respect, this argument simply fails to take account of how the charter applies at present. The charter and the rights that it reaffirmed have a limited application. They apply to the EU institutions all of the time, but apply only to member states acting within the scope of EU law. We will no longer be a member state and so we will be no longer be acting within the scope of EU law. Simply retaining the charter would not reflect the realities of leaving the EU. It cannot be right that a document called the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could continue to be used as the justification to bring cases that would lead ultimately to the striking down of UK primary legislation after we leave the EU. Outside our membership of the EU, it is simply not appropriate to retain the charter.
There are also practical questions to consider. It would be no simple matter to say that we are keeping the charter. The amendments in this group all attempt, in various ways, to solve the riddle of how an instrument inherently linked to and constrained by our membership of the EU could apply purely domestically. They each highlight the complexity involved in such an exercise.
In Amendment 13A, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, requires the Government to lay a report on how the charter will continue to apply to retained EU law after we leave the EU. However, his other amendments are far from clear on precisely how he intends the charter to have effect domestically after exit. They would remove the exclusion of the charter provided for in Clause 5, presumably with the intention that it would now form part of retained EU law. I note that one of his amendments would excise the definition of what the charter is from the Bill, despite going on to say that this undefined, unclear thing will continue to have effect in relation to retained EU law under Clauses 2, 3 and 4. What would our courts make of that? Many articles of the charter set out principles, not rights, which can be relied on directly by individuals. How would these have effect after exit? Eight articles of the charter constitute rights intrinsically linked to EU citizenship—for example, the right to vote in an EU parliamentary election. Of course, they claw at the air—we appreciate that—but they do nothing.
Let us pause again on the fact that the charter applies to member states only when acting within the scope of EU law. Presumably, if retained under the Bill, the charter would then apply only when we were acting within the scope of retained EU law, which I believe is the elaboration that the noble and learned Lord made in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Over time, our domestic law will evolve and new laws will be made by this sovereign Parliament and the devolved legislatures that will start to replace and supersede this category of retained EU law. We would be retaining the charter, in whatever capacity the noble and learned Lord intends, only for an ever-diminishing proportion of our law. This further risks incorporating complexity and confusion into our domestic statute book.
We should not overstate the accessibility of the current rights regime, which relies on citizens knowing—
The noble and learned Lord is right in that assertion, but it does not follow that retained European law should not be read across in the form of the charter as well as its other features on exit day. Lots of things will change over time. Parliament will no doubt amend retained European law so that it ceases to be retained European law, but the Bill is about legal continuity and what the situation is on exit day. For this purpose, surely the Minister should accept what is being proposed.
I entirely agree with the noble Lord as to what this Bill is about. With regard to the charter, the point is that it does not bring anything over on its own. We already have these rights and obligations, as established by the principles of EU law, convention law and the common law.
As to a concern that something is omitted at the end of the day, as I indicated, we would address that to ensure that all rights are brought across. However, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, I do not believe that you can never have too many belts and braces. If you have too many belts and braces, eventually you cannot stand up. It is therefore important that we approach this issue with a degree of proportionality, if I may use a European term.
Following on from the point I made earlier, retaining the charter for what will become a fluid and changing category of law risks legislatively binding us to a document that would bring the illusion of clarity in the short term but serve only to undermine it in the longer term. Indeed, the other amendments in this group raise similar issues to those put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.
My noble friend Lord Hailsham has tabled amendments that seek to build on the amendments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. They seek to assign the status of primary legislation to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. For reasons that we will go into in a later group, the Government believe that the question of assigning status to retained EU law is complex and should be approached with caution. I hope that we can come back to this question when we have concluded our debate on the approach to rights protection and to status more generally. I will not seek to take up time on that issue at this stage.
I suspect that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would also add to the confusion. Seeking to afford charter rights the same level of protection as convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 is fraught with difficulty. Charter rights do not correspond exactly to ECHR rights and apply in different ways. The charter also contains non-justiciable principles as well as rights, and it is unclear what status these would have in domestic law under his amendment. Moreover, it does not deal with how explanations to the charter articles should be treated or how certain sections of the Human Rights Act would apply to charter rights. I appreciate that we are in Committee and that the noble Lord is entitled to say that he will look more carefully at the form of the amendment and perhaps elaborate upon it in due course, but there are fundamental difficulties with the approach he is attempting to take in simply trying to incorporate the charter when, as indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, himself observed, the expression of rights in the charter does not coincide precisely with the expression of rights in the convention.
I would like to emphasise again that we remain committed to listening to this House and indeed to working constructively to ensure that we have a functioning statute book which maximises legal certainty. I understand the concerns expressed by some about whether some rights would somehow be left behind, but if we can and do identify a risk of such rights being left behind, we are entirely open to the proposition that we have to address that by way of amendment to the Bill, and we will seek to do that. I wish to reassure noble Lords on that point.
My Lords, can the noble and learned Lord give us any indication of when he thinks that that exercise will be completed?
The potential answer is no, and the note says that my time is up. Nevertheless, and be that as it may, we will endeavour to address these issues as soon as we can. Clearly it will require us not only to consider the position we have adopted already in the document published in December last year but to take into consideration the concerns expressed by other lawyers and in this Committee in the course of the debate. We will look at those and we will want to address them at the next stage of the Bill; of that, I am confident.
At this stage I appreciate that there are some questions which I have not directly answered in the course of my response and it may be difficult to do so in the time remaining. Perhaps I may say that I endorse entirely the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood, with regard to the potential difficulties of simply drawing the charter over into domestic law. I am not going to elaborate on the consequences of doing that, but they can be summarised as confusion, uncertainty and difficulty, and ultimately could prove to be counterproductive. In these circumstances, I invite the noble and learned Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have taken part in the debate. It has been wide-ranging, as we anticipated it would be. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks. I shall obviously not spend long on what I say now, given the hour. As we approached midnight, I was looking around the corner to see whether a pumpkin would arrive with horses. I was not sure whether it would be for me or for the noble and learned Lord opposite.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
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My Lords, your Lordships may have noticed that I am rather short: this afternoon, I can give the House some comfort by saying that, in relation to this amendment at least, I shall also be brief.
The Constitution Committee points out that Clause 2 is not needed to ensure that most categories of domestic legislation—which in practice will remain in force—will continue to apply. It concludes that,
“clause 2 appears to be significantly broader than it needs to be”.
The Constitution Committee affirms that it is not constitutionally necessary or appropriate for primary legislation, which will continue in force in any event, to be treated as retained EU law and be subject to the powers of the amendment referred to in Clause 7.
Does the Minister accept this? If not, on what basis does he take that stance? The provision appears to be a way of allowing the Government to amend legislation by the mechanism of secondary legislation. With all the concerns around the excessive use of such procedures that have frequently been expressed by committees of the House and by Members in the Chamber, it would be reassuring if the noble and learned Lord could make it clear that that is not the Government’s intention in respect of this Bill.
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions from Members of the House with regard to this issue. We are extremely grateful for the extensive work done by the Constitution Committee with regard to the Bill, as set out in the report, and for the consideration that members of the committee have given to the provisions of the Bill and some of the difficult issues that arise in transposing EU-based legislation into domestic law, because it represents something of a challenge in a number of respects.
I shall begin by referring to a matter that does not arise out of this group, or did not until the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, raised it, because it may help if I address his point about whether retained EU law is primary or secondary legislation. It is neither in the Bill. There are provisions in paragraph 19 of Schedule 8 with regard to the Human Rights Act, which is a very particular case, where it will be treated as primary legislation. There is the Constitution Committee’s recommendation that it should all be treated as primary legislation. I shall not go into detail at this stage because we will address this later, but I want to reassure the noble Lord about where we are.
That recommendation raises enormous difficulties because there are aspects of EU-derived legislation that, for example, involve the enumeration of the contents of a particular dye or chemical, and the idea that we could amend that only by way of primary legislation raises issues of its own. Nevertheless, it seems to the Government that there is some scope for considering how we can take this forward, and we are open to considering not only the recommendations of the Constitution Committee but of others. For those who have an interest in this issue, I commend for consideration, at least, the recent observations of Professor Paul Craig of St John’s College, Oxford, in a blog on the UK Constitutional Law Association site dated 26 February—only a few days ago—in which, supplementary to an earlier note that he made, he proposes a categorisation of EU-derived legislation. I cannot say that it is one that we entirely agree with, but it is certainly one that we are looking at because there is more than one route to the resolution of this issue. We are looking at that and, for noble Lords who are interested in that point, it may be worth considering.
For those of us who are uninitiated into this blog, what would that mean?
What would the new status of legislation that the noble and learned Lord has just mentioned be?
Professor Craig addresses a potential categorisation of EU-derived legislation by reference to its origins within EU law, so there is pre-Lisbon treaty and post-Lisbon treaty analysis based on the articles of the pre-Lisbon provisions and of TFEU post Lisbon in 2009. I shall not elaborate on it at this stage as it does not arise in the context of this group. With respect to the noble Lord, I simply want to reassure him that we understand that there is a debate about how we should categorise EU-derived legislation.
The second point I shall mention at the outset is the reference to the principle of supremacy. That turns on Clause 5(2), which ensures that the principle of supremacy—it currently has effect through the ECA—will continue to apply but only for the purpose of resolving conflicts which arise between EU law which is converted by the Bill into domestic law and pre-exit domestic law.
Again, we have to be clear what the purpose of that is. I acknowledge in passing that the Constitution Committee proposed a different way of addressing Clause 5, which on one view might be considered neat, in so far as it involves applying the principle of supremacy without using the word “supremacy”. We will come on to debate that in due course, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, observed, and I will not take time up with that at this stage.
I turn to Amendment 15. Clause 2 has been drawn broadly deliberately. As has been noted, it will preserve any domestic regulations made under Section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of Schedule 2 to, the ECA 1972. But it also includes within its ambit any other domestic primary or secondary legislation which implements, or enables the implementation of, EU obligations and any related domestic legislation. In response to the inquiry from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I make the point that enactments often contain provisions derived from EU legislation—we have to remember that what we are referring to in Clause 2 is EU-derived domestic legislation. It is those parts of Acts such as the Equality Act or the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act that are EU derived which are to be brought within the ambit of retained EU law. It is necessary to read two elements: EU-derived domestic legislation—those parts of legislation that come from the EU—and retained EU law. They are linked.
I think I am following what the Minister is saying, but a moment ago he used the phrase “legislation which … enables” implementation. How much of what is “enabling” will be caught in this?
It is only that part of the legislation which is derived from the EU which is then brought in and forms part of retained EU law. As a hypothetical example, let us suppose that there are 20 clauses in some piece of health and safety at work legislation, of which 10 are derived from EU legislation. That forms part of EU-derived legislation for the purposes of this Bill, and will come into retained EU law. But the other parts are not EU-derived legislation and will not form part of EU retained law.
I accept that, but the Minister is assuming that legislation is always very neatly compartmentalised in a way which would allow that. My fear is that there will be enabling parts of legislation that could be caught up because some subsection could be EU related.
Could I just follow on from that by expressing a related concern? We know what the Government’s attitude is to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and we know that the Bill provides that there is no right of action on the basis of general principles of EU law. I am thinking aloud here, but the concern might be that even with only a strict and narrow interpretation of which bits of, say, the Equality Act are EU derived and therefore subject to all the consequences, including Clause 6, we might miss some of the context in which those narrow provisions should be interpreted if we were to remain in the EU and fully under the jurisdiction of the court.
I am not sure I agree with that proposition. But of course, at the end of the day, pursuant to Clause 7, it will be necessary to bring forward regulations which address amendments that are required in regards to retained EU law. At that point of course, those regulations will be the subject of scrutiny to ensure that they are limited to those aspects which are EU-derived law and therefore EU retained law. I do not believe that that is necessarily a problem, but I hear what the noble Baroness has said. We will of course take into consideration any difficulties that could arise in that context.
I wish to add one further point that I meant to make at the outset in response to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. He referred to me as the Advocate-General. I am not appearing here as a law officer, and nothing I say should be construed as law officer advice. I am appearing here as a Minister in respect of the Bill. I would not want there to be any misunderstanding in the light of his reference.
I am really interested in what the noble and learned Lord has just said. Could he explain what the difference is if he says something as a law officer or as a Minister? What import does that have? What difference does it make in the context of this House and in the legal context?
I am obliged to the noble Lord. I would never say anything in this House as a law officer. It is my role to give advice to the Government in my role as a law officer, but I do not speak in this Chamber in that role. I just wanted to make that clear. The other difference can be found in the list of ministerial salaries.
Clause 2 is not broadly drawn for the reason that all this legislation needs saving—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with reference to Clause 14(6). It is broadly drawn for two important reasons. First, any deficiencies that might arise within this domestic legislation upon our withdrawal can be corrected by the Bill powers under Clause 7. I appreciate that there are noble Lords who will want to address the scope of those powers under Clause 7 when we come to it, but that is the purpose of drawing Clause 2 in this way. During the period in which we have been an EU member state, we have brought into our domestic law a great deal of EU law, and not just expressed as EU-derived law in the form of the implementation of directives or the direct effect of regulations. We have already had reference to the scope of, for example, the Equalities Act; there is also the health and safety at work legislation. These are areas in which we know we find EU-derived legislation. It is therefore important that we bring all that together in order that it can be subject to the regulatory processes in Clause 7, subject of course to the debate that will take place with regard to the scope of the powers in that clause.
The second, rather more important, reason for treating all this legislation as part of retained EU law—I emphasise the connection between EU-derived legislation and what is defined as “retained EU law” for the purposes of the Bill—is that we have to ensure that retained EU law will continue to be interpreted consistently by our courts under Clause 6 of the Bill. This, I apprehend, is why the Bingham Centre, for example, said, while addressing the question of the scope of Clause 2, “If you’re going to narrow the scope, then you’re going to have to amend other parts of the Bill, in particular Clause 6”. That might be a different road to the same goal. All I would say at this stage is that the road we would take is to address this in the context of Clause 2 and the scope of that clause. In a sense, if Clause 2 were narrower, the powers under Clause 7 would be much broader. If we did not bring all of this into the definition of EU-derived legislation but wanted to be able to operate by way of regulations pursuant to Clause 7, there would be virtually no boundaries for the Clause 7 powers, whereas they are circumscribed by the definition that is brought into Clause 2 in the present form.
In my respectful submission, it would be odd if we were to take these categories out of Clause 2 and therefore find ourselves in a situation in which the construction of that law now differed from what it would have been while it remained to be interpreted by reference to the canons of construction that presently apply while we are a member of the EU. It is important that it should be part of retained EU law in order that we have consistency of interpretation. I do not take issue with the suggestion that an alternative route might be to narrow Clause 2 and then completely amend Clause 6, but that is simply not the route that the Government are taking here. I have sought to explain why we are taking this particular route at this time.
I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that Clause 2 is wide in its scope, but for a legitimate purpose. As I said, we will come in due course to address the question of whether and to what extent Clause 7 should complement those provisions with regard to retained EU law. In those circumstances, and emphasising again that we are listening to various considerations about how Clause 2 is formulated, I hope that noble Lords will see fit not to press their amendments. I am obliged.
I seek clarification from the noble and learned Lord. As I understand it, the words “so far as”, are intended to give Clause 2 limited range. Is this a useful touchstone, in so far as without the provisions we would have failed to implement our obligations under EU law? As I understand it, paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) address aspects of our domestic legislation that are designed to give effect, as they had to, to EU law, but only in so far as they are achieving that objective does Clause 2 have any application. Is that right?
That is indeed my reading. The noble Baroness alluded to this earlier in her contribution. That is why I sought to emphasise the term “EU-derived” domestic legislation. It is the derivation of that aspect of a particular Act which is to be brought within the ambit of retained EU law for these purposes.
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to what has been a valuable debate, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, in whatever capacity he was speaking to the House. The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, emphasised the need for legal certainty not just in this clause but throughout the Bill, even though that harms the interests of the legal profession. I should have declared my interest as a barrister who may benefit from legal uncertainty. A number of barristers are present in Committee: the noble Lords, Lord Faulks, Lord Carlile and Lord Thomas of Gresford. There may be others, all of us no doubt thinking that this is the reverse of Thomas Erskine’s comment when he was asked how he had the courage to stand up in the court of Lord Mansfield. He replied that he thought of his children pulling at his robe and begging him, “Now, father, is the time to get us bread”.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said that Clause 2 applies only to those sections of the Equality Act, for example, which were enacted for a specified EU purpose or have a relevant EU law connection. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, gave an explanation of that, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, agreed with that approach. That is very helpful in limiting the scope of Clause 2. However, it raises a problem, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, alluded. If Clause 2 applies only in relation to those parts of the statute which were enacted for a relevant EU purpose, there is still a problem of legal certainty, because there will be disputes as to which parts of the Equality Act—or other legislation—satisfy those criteria. I must say that the criteria in Clause 2 are far from clear. They operate by reference to the purpose of the legislation or whether the legislation relates to EU material. So there may still be a problem here.
I have two suggestions for the noble and learned Lord. First, if as he said, and I entirely accept what he said, Clause 2 is intended to apply only to those parts of the enactment—the Equality Act, or whichever Act—that are linked to EU law or have an EU purpose, the Government might wish to bring forward an amendment to Clause 2 on Report to make that clear on the face of the Bill. The second suggestion is that the noble and learned Lord might wish to consider whether any further clarity can be provided as to how the courts are supposed to apply this section-by-section approach and identify the purpose of the relevant section or whether it relates to EU law.
I noted the very helpful comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on the status of retained EU law and on the supremacy of retained EU law. As he said, we will come to those matters next week, and there are amendments addressing them. I associate myself with the comments of the noble and learned Lord on the valuable contributions by Professor Paul Craig of the University of Oxford.
This has been a helpful debate in illuminating the Government’s intention. I will reflect, and I am sure the Constitution Committee will want to reflect, on what the Minister has said and on the other contributions. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am really grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, himself a former Advocate-General, for moving this amendment. In the light of what he said, all I can say is that I agree with his every word.
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord not only for explaining the amendment but for their endorsement of it.
In responding to Amendments 16, 17 and 342, I start by reaffirming our view that Clause 2 is an essential provision for providing certainty and continuity regarding our law after exit day. I think that that is plain to all noble Lords. I shall then say a little more about why Clause 2 must stand part of the Bill. This clause, along with Clauses 3 and 4, delivers one of the core purposes of this Bill: maximising certainty for individuals and businesses when we leave the EU by ensuring that, so far as is practical, the laws that we have now will continue to apply. In that respect, Clause 2 preserves the domestic law that we have made to implement our EU obligations; we have touched on that already.
More particularly, on the point raised by the noble and learned Lord in this regard, Amendment 342 seeks to clarify that Acts of the Scottish Parliament are included within the clause only if they have received Royal Assent before exit day. I suspect that Amendment 16 also seeks to provide clarity on that same point. I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify any uncertainty that there may be here. Clause 2(2) states that,
“‘EU-derived domestic legislation’ means any enactment”
that is described in that subsection. Clause 14 defines the term “enactment” to include an enactment contained in an Act of the Scottish Parliament. An Act of the Scottish Parliament must have received Royal Assent; until that time, it is a Bill. Section 28(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides for this. So an Act of the Scottish Parliament that has only been passed and not received Royal Assent does not fall within this definition, and would not be categorised as EU-derived domestic legislation for the purposes of this Bill. I believe that the noble and learned Lord rather suspected that this might be the case; his concern seemed to be one of certainty as regards the drafting.
The same applies in relation to Acts of the UK Parliament. The reference to “passed” in Clause 2(2)(b) is therefore a reference to the purpose for which the enactment was passed, not whether it was passed. In that context, I venture to suggest that Amendments 16 and 342 are unnecessary.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. He does get my point that it is for clarity; in Section 28 of the Scotland Act, there is a distinction made between being passed and Royal Assent. It is the word “passed” that appears in Clause 14(1) and the noble and learned Lord knows as well as anyone that, when statute uses the same word, it may—not unreasonably—have the same interpretation. Yet, a Bill “passed” by the Scottish Parliament is not the same as “enacted”. Simply, does it really go to the heart of this Bill that the Government could not bring forward an amendment just to make it clear beyond doubt and, therefore, not allow unnecessary litigation at some stage in the future? Because you can bet your life that something will come up when someone finds some clever point.
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. I do not have any red lines so far as Clause 2 is concerned in this context. It appears to me that if there is concern about a lack of certainty, we can take that into consideration, and we will do so in time for Report. I do not indicate that we will bring forward any amendment in regard to this; it seems to me, as the noble and learned Lord will appreciate, that context is everything. We have to read the provision and the use of “passed” in Clause 14 in the context of what is said in Clause 2(2), but I hear what he says. I am not seeking to strike it down, as it were, at this stage; I am merely seeking to explain the approach that we have taken to this issue and why we consider that, on the face of it, Amendments 16 and 342 are unnecessary.
Amendment 17 seeks to mirror the language of Clause 3 in terms of the cut-off point for inclusion within the scope of the clause. Clause 2 of course works in conjunction with Clause 3, which converts direct EU legislation into domestic law. Both clauses take a snapshot of the law that is in place immediately before exit day. EU-derived domestic law will fall into the scope of Clause 2 if it has been enacted before exit day—that is, if it can be said to be on the statute book at that time. There is of course a different test employed for direct EU legislation to be retained under Clause 3, because direct EU legislation must be operative within UK law “immediately before exit day”, as defined in Clause 3(3). That is why there is a distinction between the two clauses; they serve distinct purposes.
As I say, we are listening and we will consider further the point made by the noble and learned Lord and by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. Having given an explanation of the Government’s position, I hope that, at this stage, they will see fit to withdraw or not move these amendments.
I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his response and his willingness to look at this and take on board the comments made. A simple amendment could be made that in no way detracts from the purpose of this Bill; if anything, it would add to that purpose in terms of legal certainty. Using the word “passed”, which, from what the noble and learned Lord said, has a different meaning in two Acts, is not helpful. I do not think the amendment in any way departs from or mitigates what the Bill seeks to achieve and I therefore strongly encourage the noble and learned Lord and his colleagues to bring forward a simple amendment to provide legal certainty. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I agree: the Committee will be pleased to know that, had the letter ended like that, I would not be on my feet today. These are important measures for our international co-operation, and if the Government would say, “Yes, this is something that we are willing to do”, that would take us forward. I hope that the noble and learned Lord may be able to give us that assurance as he responds.
My Lords, I am obliged to all sides of the Committee for their contributions to this part of the debate, which began with an amendment concerning directives. I was not initially taken with the use of the word “fuzzy” by my noble friend Lord Deben but the term has begun to gain traction as the debate has continued. Let us try to be clear about one or two issues. The Bill seeks, for very clear reasons, to take a snapshot of EU law as it applies immediately before exit day. That is the cut-off point. Regulations emerging from the EU have direct effect on the domestic law of member states, so regulations that have taken direct effect by the exit date will be part of retained EU law. There is really no difficulty about that whatever.
Nobody, I think, has questioned that. We are talking about directives.
That is what we began talking about but the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for example, has referred to regulations. I will come on to address the point she made, but regulations have direct effect and if a regulation has direct effect by exit day it will form part of retained EU law. Directives have no direct effect in the domestic law of a member state. Directives have to be the subject of implementation and in that regard a transition period is given to member states for the implementation of a directive. There may be directives that have been adopted prior to the exit date which have a transitional period that will expire by the exit date specified in the Bill. In that event, the Government have indicated that they will seek to implement those directives that require implementation by a transitional date before the exit date. Therefore, they will become part of retained EU law because they will have been implemented in our domestic law.
Perhaps I might suggest to the Minister, and ask him to confirm, that there will also be directives that have passed their implementation date and have not yet been implemented in domestic law, but are sufficiently clear and precise that they confer individual rights under EU law and, therefore, to that extent they will be part of retained EU law.
With respect, that is a slightly different point. First, the Government are committed to implementing in domestic law those directives which have a transition period that expires before the exit date. There are, however, circumstances in which a directive may have direct effect in a question between an individual and the state but has not been implemented in domestic law. That is subject to a determination by the Court of Justice of the European Union or, indeed, by our own courts. In circumstances where a directive has not been implemented by the end of the transition period and has direct effect as determined by the courts of justice, and that has been determined prior to the exit date, that will be brought into domestic law by way of Clause 4. That is the point of Clause 4 in that context.
Where a directive has been adopted before the exit date but has an implementation period which expires after the exit date, and has not been implemented in domestic law by the exit date, that will not form part of our domestic law and therefore it will not form part of EU retained law for the purposes of the Bill.
Both my noble and learned friend the Minister and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay have indicated that the Government could choose to implement directives falling into that category if they wished to do so. My question to the Government is: what is the legal basis for doing so? My understanding is that there is not a legal basis at the moment, which is why I tabled this amendment.
There is no legal basis for doing so. With great respect to my noble friend, her amendment would not actually provide one; that is perhaps an aside. The point is more central than that: directives that have been adopted but not implemented by the exit date, and which have a transition period that goes beyond the exit date, are not part of domestic law, and for the purposes of the Bill they will not become part of domestic law or EU retained law. Therefore, we will not be taking them into our domestic law by way of an implementation that takes place after the exit date.
Following this is fairly complicated, is it not? To add to that complication, what will be the position on devolved matters—such as environmental matters, which are to a very large extent devolved—where the implementation may be on different dates in different devolved regimes?
We have to be clear here about the distinction between implementation and application. Essentially, there is only one date for implementation. That is when we implement the directive into our domestic law. There may be situations—and if I misunderstand the noble Lord’s question, I am sure he will tell me—in which there is a directive, or indeed a regulation, that is adopted into domestic law but which applies only at a date after the exit date. There are examples of regulations as well, where we accept that the regulation has come into domestic law but its actual operation is deferred, perhaps until 2020. That regulation or that provision will form part of our domestic law at the exit date, even though the operative provisions come into force only after the exit date.
I do not want to overlabour this point, and perhaps it is one that the Minister could look at between now and Report in case there is any validity in what I am raising, but since it is by instruments that are passed in the National Assembly for Wales or in the Scottish Parliament that some of these will be put into force, there will quite likely be different dates for those purposes, and that could have a material effect. Some may fall one side and others the other side of 29 March 2019.
If I understand the noble Lord’s point, he is suggesting that we may have a situation in which a directive that has been adopted is implemented in England or in Wales or in Scotland but on different dates.
Yes, indeed, or it may have failed to have been implemented within the timeframe in one area and therefore does not get implemented but does get implemented in another area.
In that event, it will be by reference to the exit date that we determine whether or not it forms part of the domestic law.
I wonder if the Minister could deal with one category which I do not think he has dealt with yet; that is, a directive that is adopted before the exit date but whose implementation date is after the exit date but within the standstill period which the Government are currently negotiating in Brussels—and which, it is no secret, will involve the Government accepting that all the obligations of European law will continue to apply during that period.
The implementation period is a wholly distinct issue from what we have to address in the context of the Bill. The implementation period has yet to be negotiated. The outcome of that implementation negotiation has yet to be determined. In the event that we agree an implementation period, clearly there will have to be further statutory provision—a further Bill—addressing our rights and obligations during that implementation period, and it may be that that further Bill will amend this Bill with regard to the effect of the exit date on further EU legislation, whether in the form of regulations or directives, after 29 March 2019. But that is not an issue for this Bill. This Bill is dealing with the situation at exit, subject to the fact that, if there is a negotiation, things may change.
For those of us who have not been following the minutiae of the Government’s announcements, can the Minister say that it is an absolute commitment on the part of the Government that directives that have been adopted and for which the implementation date falls before 29 March next year will be implemented?
My Lords, my understanding is that the Government are determined, and have the present intention, to implement directives that have been adopted and which have an implementation period that expires before the exit date. I cannot give an absolute assurance to that extent but that has been and continues to be the Government’s position. Indeed, to put it another way, we will continue to perform our obligations as a member of the EU, as we are bound to do by the treaty provisions. One of our obligations is to implement directives that have been adopted in Europe within the implementation period or by the transition date that is set out.
I express my gratitude and admiration for the way that the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Keen of Elie, are bringing lustre to the Scottish Bar in the way that they are answering all these questions so brilliantly and with such trouble. My inquiry relates to a directive requiring implementation that has not been implemented, where there are certain rights that would be directly enforceable by an individual and there is no court case that says that. Can you go to court afterwards and say, “We can enforce that because there was a directive prior to the date of exit”? No court has said that it was directly enforceable; you could argue subsequently that if you win, you win—this would be in the domestic courts—and can say it is enforceable. Would that be covered?
No, that would not be covered, because in those circumstances there would have been no crystallisation of the direct right prior to the exit date. That is our position with regard to that point—but I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his acknowledgment that we are answering questions as they are posed. I was rather hoping that my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern might actually come forward to the Front Bench and allow me to retire to the second tier in order that this matter could be dealt with even more cogently than I am able to do.
I return for just a moment to the actual amendment. I have sought to emphasise—clearly, I hope—why the amendment is not appropriate in the present context. It would simply take away from one of the principal purposes of the Bill, which is to determine that there is an exit date—a cut-off point—when we will determine the scope of our own domestic law. I can quite understand the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, about emerging provisions in the EU that have been worked on for many years and that would bring about appropriate and attractive standards for various aspects of our life in the United Kingdom—but, of course, it would be perfectly open to this Parliament to decide, in light of what has already been agreed in Europe, that it would be appropriate to have these standards in our domestic law, and we will have the means to do that. It is just that they will not form part of retained EU law for the purposes of this Bill.
On the noble Baroness’s amendment, I respectfully suggest that the mechanism that she has put forward—that you somehow retain the ECA for some purpose after it has been repealed—simply would not work. I appreciate that this is Committee, and we are actually looking at the underlying purpose of the proposed amendment and therefore have to consider whether we find that attractive and then look for a way to make it work. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to notice that the actual mechanism proposed in the amendment would not work.
I hope that I have addressed most of the points raised by noble Lords, but I agree with the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with regard to what this Bill is attempting to achieve. It is attempting to achieve certainty as to the scope of our domestic law at exit date. That is its purpose, and we must keep that in mind.
Will the Minister take another look at Clause 4(2)(b), which is a double negative? It talks about rights that are,
“not of a kind recognised”,
by the European Court or any UK court. When he was talking earlier about a directive that had direct effect, I think I recall him saying that it would have had to be recognised by a court decision as having direct effect—but the wording of Clause 4(2)(b) suggests a direct effect if it is “of a kind” that has been recognised by the European Court or a UK court. He might not be able to reply immediately but perhaps, when we come to Clause 4, he could look back at what he said today on directives with direct effect and be sure that there is a logical fitting together with Clause 4(2)(b).
In my submission, it fits entirely with what is said in Clause 4(2)(b) and is consistent with that. It points to the necessity of there having been a recognition by the European Court or a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom for those purposes. It may be that the noble Baroness will want to take issue in due course with the use of the word “kind”, and no doubt we will come to that when we consider amendments to Clause 4.
This is the precise subject of Amendment 26, which arises out of a recommendation from the Constitution Committee. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is interested in this subject, we are going to debate it under Amendment 26.
I am obliged to the noble Lord, but we have ranged rather widely in the context of the present debate—or, to use my noble friend Lord Deben’s term, we have got a little bit fuzzy as regards the precise terms of the amendment. I hope that, in light of the explanations that I have sought to give, including the reference to regulations and the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, to which we will return in due course, the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw her amendment.
I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate. I had not realised that we were going to have such a full debate, but it shows the importance of the issue that has been raised in Amendment 18. With regard to fuzzy wording, I am sure that my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, like myself, remembers a key distinction. I was one of the first law students to do the compulsory six-month constitutional law course on EU law, in which we learned straight off that a regulation is directly applicable and does not require any other implementation, whereas a directive is given direct effect only through implementation.
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Liddle, who managed to put more flesh on the bones and give much greater clarification to what I was hoping to say. I am a little concerned by the Minister recognising that there is no legal basis for what we are seeking to do here—and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern as well. I suggest, mindful of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that this amendment has established that a legal basis is required, and if this is not the wording that would give that legal basis, I would request that the Government come forward by Report with the legal basis in the form of an amendment on which the House could agree. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The only reason why the noble Lord is not carrying me with him is that I do not understand the purpose of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Schedule 8. It seems to me extraordinarily broad, which is why I am seeking an explanation from the Minister as to why we need these powers, given that we also have Clause 7 in the Bill, which is time limited.
Well, noble Lords may not want to hear what I am going to say. I have had a sense developing over the last 40 minutes that we are well ahead of ourselves. We should be discussing these issues when we come to decide the very important question of whether retained EU law is to be treated as primary legislation, subordinate legislation or a bit of both. We will then have a debate on Clause 7, which entirely addresses this issue of subordinate legislation and Henry VIII powers, and we will come again to it when we debate Clause 9.
I just make two points. First, no Parliament can bind its successor. We do not know what a future Parliament will think about all these various matters raised in proposed new subsection (6) in Amendment 21; they are very important issues, but we cannot bind anybody. Secondly, in relation to the exercise of any Henry VIII powers—and there will of course have to be careful thought given to it—I am fascinated by the proposal in proposed new subsection (2) in Amendment 21 that a schedule should list,
“technical provisions in retained EU law that may be amended by subordinate legislation”.
When we come to look at Henry VIII powers, do we not have to take a rather more revolutionary look at them? Should we not be saying to ourselves that the Government of the day—whatever Government it may happen to be—should, at the very least, in the proposal for subordinate legislation, set out which terms of primary legislation are being repealed, amended or affected by the secondary legislation? That is some food for thought.
My Lords, as may have been observed during the passage of the Investigatory Powers Bill, the Government are always listening. I am most obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for his observations, because they go to the very heart of the point I want to make. We are, in a sense, having the wrong debate in the wrong place, but I am also relieved to hear from my friend the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that he does not understand paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, because I was rather concerned about his earlier interpretation of it under reference to the opinion of Pushpinder Saini, QC—I will come back to that in a moment, if I may.
The areas that these amendments seek to protect, such as employment rights and environmental standards, are issues that are important to every Government, and in particular this Government. Of course, we are anxious to ensure that rights and standards such as these are maintained—indeed, where possible, increased —after we leave the EU. It might be observed that UK protections in many of these areas—for example, parental leave—in fact go beyond the level of protection provided for in EU law, so let us keep this in context.
It is important, however, that we are able to address deficiencies to ensure that the protection of these rights and the standards that they reflect continue to function effectively and that the Government are able to amend legislation in line with our history of leading in these areas of protection. When people voted to bring back power to our Parliament and to bring back control of our laws, they did not vote to put them in the deep freeze for any number of years. We have to see this in context: we are talking about thousands of regulations—somewhere in the order of 12,000 regulations —which were of course not the subject of parliamentary scrutiny; and we are talking about thousands of SIs implementing directives, which were of course not the subject of parliamentary scrutiny, which have come into our law and will be part of our law on exit day, because they will form part of the area of retained EU law.
The noble Baroness, in her amendment, proposes a schedule of “technical provisions” in an area where we are dealing with enormous quantities of law, by way of regulation and by way of implemented directives. The first point that would arise is: where is the line to be drawn between what is a technical and a non-technical provision? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, alluded to this as one of the three criteria he had in mind. You have to be able to define these criteria, otherwise you immediately run into a further issue. That is in itself a very real challenge: how would we define or class a technical issue in the context of seeking to update retained EU law?
Perhaps the more important point, however, is that much of what has been said here anticipates the issues that we will debate in the context of Clause 5, on the classification of retained EU law, and, more particularly, Clause 7, in relation to the exercise of certain powers by government in dealing with the body of retained EU law. Again, it is important to try to put this in context. We have had references to the suggestion that the Government are taking untrammelled, unlimited powers to do virtually anything with the statute book. Let us not, even if we think we have a good case, overstate it because, in doing so, we rather spoil our argument. That is not at all what the Government seek to do. Clause 7 is concerned with how we deal with deficiencies arising from our withdrawal from the EU. It is therefore concerned, as it says, about the making of regulations which are,
“appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate—
(a) any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively”.
We are not talking about wholesale policy changes to our employment or environment laws, our standards for consumers or anything of that kind. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to—
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. Of course, we hope that we are not talking about any of those things. We hope that we are not talking about radical changes and reductions in some of the essential regulation which we have all said is so necessary. However, we need a little bit more than hope. We need some evidence of the Government’s commitment to restrain themselves when it comes to using these powers.
That is why Clause 7 is drafted in the terms in which the noble Lord will find it in the Bill.
Reference was also made to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Schedule 8. I am not sure how the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, interpreted that paragraph but let us be clear: it refers to existing powers, not to powers created under this Bill. Those powers already exist in respect of existing legislation. They are not being extended. If the Government truly intended to bring about wholesale change to these policy areas, and could do so on the basis of their existing powers, perhaps they might have done so already. The provision does not extend to these powers. Therefore, again, with respect, it appears to me that the matter is being taken out of context. However, I would be happy to look at the opinion on this from Pushpinder Saini referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
My Lords, we must make progress at this stage, if the noble Lord does not mind. We have to keep moving.
I come to the nub of the point. If there is a concern about the powers being conferred on Ministers to ensure that the retained EU law works after exit, that arises in the context of Clauses 7 and 5, which will be the subject of future debate in this House. As I say, it is not appropriate to try to represent the powers already set out in the Bill as extending beyond the boundaries set out precisely there about correction, regulation and making retained EU law work. I respectfully suggest that the route proposed by the noble Baroness is not one that we should go down as we would simply run into the sand. If we were to list technicalities and technical changes in all these areas of legislation, we would be here in 10 years’ time trying to produce such a schedule; let us be frank about it. Of course, many people may wish that we will be here in 10 years’ time attempting to achieve that. In that context, I invite the noble Baroness to consider withdrawing her amendment and invite the noble Lord, Lord Judd, not to move his.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I know the Committee will not believe this but the three noble Lords I most want to thank are the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Faulks, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. I thank the noble Lord, Lord True, for raising my spirits. I love the words “Labour Government”; I will use them again and again. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, because sometimes when you know what you are talking about, you assume that everyone else does. I had got something wrong and it was not clear. I was not talking about how, under this Bill, the current EU rules will be put into legislation by statutory instruments. We are content with that. We will in due course argue about whether the relevant word should be “necessary” or “appropriate”, but that is not the purpose of this amendment. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for giving me the opportunity to say that.
The purpose of the amendment is about looking way into the future and future-proofing what we are putting into UK legislation and to make sure that it cannot then be tampered with by means of statutory instruments. It is not about the current work that many of our colleagues on the statutory instruments committee are about to undertake. We are talking about the future. I again thank the noble Viscount for giving me the opportunity to discuss that.
I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that I said at the beginning of this discussion that we would come on to how we deal with the bigger issues involved in this matter. However, today, I want to discuss the human, environmental and consumer rights that we sometimes risk losing sight of when we get into the technicalities of law and how we are going to hold on to those. As I said, I absolutely accept that we may deal with the technicalities later.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that certain bits of retained EU law could possibly be dealt with by statutory instruments and others by primary legislation. Elsewhere in the Bill judges are allowed to deal with measures on a case-by-case basis. But in the case of retained EU law, we have a difficulty as I think he said that he was happy for the Government to decide which measures could be dealt with by secondary legislation. Perhaps that is the nub of the problem.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is our money.
That is the constant refrain from the leavers. We heard it all through the referendum campaign: “It’s our money”. It is money from all the European countries that comes in according to their ability to pay and goes out to different parts of the European Union according to their needs, and rural areas, transition areas and less developed areas are those which get it. But that is not the argument here; we have had that argument. It has been made and we can have it in another place.
Wherever it comes from, that money is within the European Union budget at the moment and is then allocated to these projects in different parts of the United Kingdom. We are asking for an assurance—we need a guarantee—that, if we leave the European Union, this money will go to the same projects and be funded by the United Kingdom Government. I hope that the Minister will be able to give us that guarantee; such projects will otherwise have an uncertain future. People’s livelihoods depend on them; people who have put their lives into developing them are now faced with uncertainty. The only way in which they can be given some certainty is if the Government accept my amendment or something like it, and make sure that the money that they currently get from those European Union funds will come in future from Her Majesty’s Government.
I can tell the noble Lord and, indeed, the Minister that there will be a probing amendment on paragraphs 3 and 5 of Schedule 8. It has been tabled today and will be on the next Marshalled List.
The group that we are dealing with is not actually mine but, with the leave of the Committee, I will respond to the inquiry. In light of the reference to the probing amendment, the appropriate step would be for us to consider that amendment and determine what response we shall make to it. If I am in a position, in light of that amendment, to write to the noble Lord ahead of Report and elaborate on our position, rather than responding by way of a government amendment or something of that kind, I will do so.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
May I ask the Minister a few questions, because I suspect that his response is going to proceed on the basis that the Hague conventions are sufficient? It is true that the biggest number of abductions that come to our courts relate to Pakistan, the USA, Australia and then Poland. It would also be very sad if either we or the rest of the EU put ideology ahead of the welfare of children. Therefore, I want to know what the Minister’s prediction is as to the arrangements that might be made.
Overall, I feel that the amendment is perhaps too narrow. We have units in this country that study the effect of abduction: we have a permanent bureau, the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children and the International Child Abduction and Contact Unit, which can look not just at the European Community countries but at the others. We need a global view of the welfare of children and cross-border abduction, not just an EU view. How does the Minister think we can cope, given that the EU takes apparently 164 days to deal with returned children, whereas we manage to do it in 90 days? For a small child, a matter of a few months is extremely important.
Is the Minister satisfied that we can swiftly and properly sign up to the 2007 Hague convention, which at the moment we are a party to only through the EU? We need to, and we should be able to, join it in our own right. Those are the questions that I put to the Minister.
My Lords, I am obliged. “Reciprocity” was the term used and emphasised by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. They both recognised the significance and the relevance of that term in the context of the issue we are discussing and of this Bill. They may have approached it from different directions, but there is a common recognition there. I will come back to that point in a moment, particularly in the context of this Bill and not the other Bills that may follow it in due course.
I acknowledge the commitment of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, to family law and the rights that it provides to many of the most vulnerable in our society. I also extend my appreciation to the report on this subject produced last year by this House’s EU Justice Sub-Committee, under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. In addition, I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, met my noble friend Lord Callanan and officials to discuss this matter a week or so ago. I observe also that officials have engaged in discussions with a variety of groups, including Resolution and the Family Law Bar Association, and others at an EU level, to discuss this critical issue.
To the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, I say that I would be perfectly willing to meet—or at least to arrange a meeting with other Ministers who might be more directly involved in this issue—at some stage in order to discuss with all relevant and interested parties the issues that arise here.
I emphasise that the Government are committed to maintaining an effective system for the resolution of cross-border family law disputes once the UK leaves the EU in 2019—of course we are. Any system which requires cross-border dialogue and co-operation needs a common language to be effective. To that end, as part of our future partnership we want to agree a clear set of coherent common rules about: which country’s courts will hear a case in the event of a dispute—that is choice of jurisdiction; which country’s law will apply—that is choice of law; and a mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments across borders. That can be achieved within the EU and beyond the EU as well.
We are only beginning to embark on the negotiations of our future partnership with the EU 27 but we set out our position on this in a future partnership paper in August last year. That paper makes clear that an effective framework of civil judicial co-operation, which includes family law, is an important part of any deep partnership we want to establish with the remaining members of the EU. We believe that the optimum outcome for both sides will be a new agreement negotiated between the UK and EU as part of a future partnership which reflects our close existing relationship.
My noble and learned Friend, Lord Mackay of Clashfern made the point that the object of this Bill is to bring into our domestic law existing EU law so that we start out in the same place as the other members of the EU. We have to bear in mind the means of ensuring that litigation in a cross-border case involving UK and EU parties, wherever it takes place, can be as easy, efficient and cheap as possible. Such an agreement is necessary to provide confidence and certainty to families and individuals.
As the noble Baroness reminded us in backing up a point well made last year by the EU Justice Sub-Committee in its valuable report, reciprocity is key. This Bill can bring EU rules and regulations across into UK law, but it cannot place requirements on the remaining EU states. That is precisely why we want to negotiate a new deal with the EU and, as of this month, we are set to embark upon that negotiating process.
The current reciprocal rules on which we hope to model a new agreement provide a legal route to resolving what are often difficult and intractable problems. As noble Lords may know, and the noble Baroness readily appreciates, that can include determining in which member state a divorce takes place, child arrangements are made, maintenance issues are determined and, on the fraught issue of child abduction, the return of an abducted child is facilitated.
As I have mentioned, this area goes far beyond the EU. The EU, of course, is important, but we have the Hague conventions with respect to children, one in 1980 and one in 1996. The Hague convention in 2007 has the EU as a signatory, not the individual members of the EU. We will be taking steps to engage with the council on the Hague conventions in order that we can become individual signatories of that convention. I acknowledge the well-made point of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, about the three-month time lapse that could potentially occur. We are mindful of that in setting about the process of negotiation because no one wants to see a gap in the process.
We also have the Lugano convention which engages with not only the EU, as a signatory, but also the other parties to it—Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. Returning to the point raised by the noble Lord about having regard to cases of another court, as between the Lugano convention and the EU it is agreed that each will have regard to the decisions of the other’s court. They are not bound by them or subject to the jurisdiction of the other, but they will have regard to them and take them into consideration when construing the rights and obligations that arise under these various conventions. So it is not making yourself subject to the CJEU but, in general terms, it is saying that you will respect its decisions and look at them for consideration.
Perhaps I may elaborate on that a little. The role of the CJEU is often either misunderstood or exaggerated in this context. What we are concerned about, generally speaking, is the ability of a court in one jurisdiction to recognise the pre-eminent jurisdiction of another country, the willingness of the courts in one country to recognise the orders made by the courts of another country, and the willingness of the courts in one country to enforce the judgments of another country in respect of these matters. Of course, if you are within the EU, the construction of a particular provision such as the Brussels convention—Brussels Ia, IIa and so on—would ultimately be a matter for the CJEU. However, in negotiating with our other partners, we recognise where we start from and the wide ambit of these conventions, and we understand how critical they are to family life going forward. No one is going to ignore them or turn their back on them, so I can assure noble Lords that we are intent on negotiating this. The precise way in which it will be done will have to be the subject of negotiation with our EU partners.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked me, as it were, to enumerate the negotiations that are ongoing, but so far we have been dealing with the separation agreement. From March we have set upon the negotiation of our future partnership; that is what the Prime Minister set out in her recent speech.
With regard to the other jurisdictions within the United Kingdom, officials within the Ministry of Justice are in regular contact with officials in Scotland and in Northern Ireland in regard to these matters. Of course we take account of those, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, will recognise that I am conscious that there are different laws in the different jurisdictions of the United Kingdom.
I thank the Minister for giving way. Of course discussions are taking place between officials in the different departments, but are Ministers talking to each other and are agreements being reached that will ensure that the right decisions are made to serve the different jurisdictions of the UK?
I cannot say that agreements are being reached at this time because we are only setting out on the process of negotiation with regard to the future partnership; I cannot take that any further at this stage. However, our position is that family law co-operation is critically important, and it is no different from our general position with regard to civil co-operation.
I would acknowledge that the development of Brussels IIa is an improvement on the Hague conventions, and indeed I believe that some would acknowledge that it is an improvement on the terms of the Lugano convention in this regard as well. The terms have been refined and developed, and it may be that there will be a further negotiation and conclusion over Brussels IIa—what might be termed as Brussels IIb, I suppose—which may well occur after Brexit. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that we have reasonable alignment and therefore the basis for reciprocity, we will want to take into consideration such developments in the law.
Let us be clear: generally speaking, these developments take place for all the best reasons. They are developments that reflect improvements, so why would we turn our face away from improvements in the law on the reciprocal enforcement of family law matters related to maintenance, divorce and child abduction? We have no cause or reason to do so and of course we are going to embrace these matters.
I appreciate that the amendments in this group are probing in nature, but I shall try to address some of the specific details. The report called for in the first amendment tabled by the noble Baroness would require the Government to publish details of how rights in EU family law operate in domestic law as well as key details of the negotiations within six months of this Bill receiving Royal Assent. With great respect, that is an arbitrary deadline which makes no reference to the position of the negotiations at that stage or the other documents that the Government will be publishing on the subject. These documents include not only any final agreement reached in the negotiations regarding continuing judicial co-operation on family law, but also the explanatory material that Ministers will publish when they exercise their key Bill powers to amend retained EU law. That will include retained EU family law. So, as I am sure the noble Baroness is aware, any agreement between the UK and the EU will be detailed clearly within the withdrawal agreement and domestically legislated for in the upcoming withdrawal agreement and implementation period Bill, which Parliament will have a full opportunity to scrutinise. However, I have to say that it does not arise in the context of this Bill.
The next amendment concerns the jurisdiction of the CJEU. We will discuss that in more detail when we come to debate Clause 6, so I will not take up a great deal of time although I want to make a couple of points. First, it is not necessary for the UK to be subject, unilaterally, to CJEU jurisdiction to secure a reciprocal agreement in this field any more than it is a requirement of the signatories to the Lugano convention to secure agreement with Brussels regarding family law matters. There are a number of existing precedents: not just Lugano, but the Hague convention as well. As I have indicated, the jurisdiction of the CJEU is sometimes either exaggerated or misunderstood in this context. In the EU, it is of course the final arbiter of the construction and application of EU instruments, but that does not mean that we have to embrace the CJEU’s jurisdiction to have a suitable partnership agreement with the 27 members of the EU.
In his lengthy reply, the Minister appears to perpetuate some of the misunderstanding that underlay the Prime Minister’s speech on Friday, which is that somehow if you mirror the laws of the EU 27 and start from the same position, you do not need the rest of what Commission jargon calls the ecosystem—in other words, the common rules and the enforcement of institutional and supervisory mechanisms. Surely that is the difference between the EU context and the Hague and Lugano conventions, and accounts for the difference between having regard to and mutually recognising and enforcing judgments. It is part of a complex of arrangements. There is a qualitative difference between the international arrangements and the EU arrangements, which does not seem to come through in the Minister’s response.
With respect, neither I nor the Prime Minister misunderstood any of that. With great respect, I want to correct the noble Baroness on one point: that ecosystem is simply not required for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments by two separate jurisdictions. That happens between the countries of the Lugano convention and countries in the EU in any event. I am talking about starting from the same point, with common rules regarding judicial recognition and enforcement, and moving from there to the negotiation of a new partnership. We do not foresee the sort of difficulty that the noble Baroness alludes to in that context.
At this stage, I want to come back to the point I was seeking to make. First, it is not necessary for the UK to subject itself unilaterally to the CJEU’s jurisdiction to secure a reciprocal agreement. Many other countries do that. Secondly, in any event, the Government have been clear throughout debate on the Bill that it is in no way designed to legislate for any future agreement between the UK and the EU. That is not the purpose of the Bill. We cannot unilaterally legislate for our future relationship with the EU simply by including in our domestic legislation certain provisions about recognition of family law, maintenance and other agreements—a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, readily acknowledged at the outset of her opening remarks some considerable time ago.
I understand that the intention behind Amendment 120 is to make sure that there can be continued application of international agreements, such as the Hague 2007 maintenance convention, which the UK currently operates by virtue of its membership of the EU. Of course, we are intent on doing that; as I noted earlier, we understand that there is a potential three-month gap there, which we need to address. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that we are clearly intent on securing an agreement, albeit not as an EU member and not subject to the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU, which ensures that we can maintain the highest standards of family law and mutual recognition, whether it be jurisdiction, choice of law or enforcement. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I entirely understand the response the noble and learned Lord gave to the effect that you can, of course, have a treaty to ensure reciprocity, but he does not appear to recognise the role of the CJEU in the difficult cases where there is an argument about what reciprocity means and the obligations on states that are parties to that treaty. I do not know that there has been any explanation from the Government of how we deal with the difficult cases without accepting the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Would he like to elaborate?
I am happy to repeat the observation I made earlier: these difficult cases are resolved, for example, between Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and the other members of the Lugano convention embraced within the EU. In that context, each of the courts—the Lugano court and the CJEU—respects each other’s judgments, but they are not bound by them. That happens all the time. Ultimately, it would be for the domestic courts of each jurisdiction to determine what they were and were not prepared to enforce in the context of these agreements. That does not present any insurmountable difficulty, any more than it does in the context of the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of orders made pursuant to the current Hague conventions.
Again, I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for the report. I repeat my offer of further meetings to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed and the Minister for his reply. When I tabled these amendments—I realise that they have not found favour in all corners of your Lordships’ Committee—my aim was simply to have a discussion that I thought had not happened since the Bill began. It had not happened in another place and, with all respect to the Government, it has not been happening in the kind of detail we need in the publications we have seen so far. We have at least now begun to have this conversation and I am delighted that we have.
The debate has established to so many people quite how important these family law provisions are. They are fundamental to the welfare of so many of our children, because issues of child abduction, child protection and child contact are caught up at the centre of this. Those points were made very well by my noble friends Lady Massey and Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. The importance of a single effective family law system was stressed very well by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who also expressed how well-functioning and widely admired our system is. The need for it was underscored so well. I am hugely grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. When I heard her speech I wanted, in the way children do nowadays, to say “what she said”. She expressed it so well that I should have walked away at this point, but I think convention prohibits it so I press on.
I will pick up two or three points that were in contention. I do not think I will take up all the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, but his most important contention was that the provisions in the Hague conventions and elsewhere are sufficient unto the day. I hope he will take the opportunity, when he can read Hansard, to reflect on the comments made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and to look at how the weight of opinion in family law is clearly against him on this matter.
I would be happy to discuss this further outside the Committee, but to make a couple of specific points, Brussels IIa is distinctly better than Hague because it has a stricter timetable on abduction. There is a back-up mechanism—a second bite of the cherry—so that the child’s home country has another opportunity to overrule a decision by another court not to return an abducted child. The Brussels II recast will make that far better still.
The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, mentioned the provisions on divorce, which I found harder to understand. My understanding is that the 1970 Hague convention is much more restrictive than the current arrangements and that very few EU members are signed up to it anyway. It has no direct rules about jurisdiction, so we would be back to these forum conveniens arguments deciding expensively where which court should rule. Those things take at least two days in court, probably with a circuit court judge or above. I do not think there is a practical alternative on divorce, but I would be very interested if the noble Lord wanted to intervene or to talk to me later to challenge that.
I hope that we would all widely accept that the current EU provisions are the superior offering available. The challenge would be to find out how we can best salvage what is there. I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, from whom I dissent with great trepidation, that the Bill is doing what it can to replicate the current provisions. The problem is that, by importing those provisions, it is not replicating the current situation, because, by doing so in a context of no reciprocity, it is creating asymmetry between our obligations to the EU 27 and theirs to us. That needs dealing with very early on.
That is our position: we should have this amendment now but work on it in the longer term. I am sure we could all find ways of improving it. The easiest and most honourable thing is to transpose what was in the treaty and move that wording over, then move on to something better for the longer term. I agree with my noble friend.
My Lords, this has been an excellent debate and I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to it. I start by directly addressing the question put by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Davies, my noble friend Lord Bowness and others. There is no question but that this Government regard animals as sentient beings. As we said on this issue in the other place, we certainly agree with the sentiment of the amendments, such as that of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. However, as I will set out, we cannot support them.
Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to which many noble Lords have referred, places an obligation on the European Union and EU member states when formulating and implementing certain EU policies to have regard to the welfare requirements of animals because animals are sentient beings. However, the weakness of that article—this relates directly to my noble friend Lord Deben’s point—is that it applies only to a limited number of EU policy areas and, even then, allows for certain religious and cultural traditions which many would consider to be cruel. Two examples, of course, are bull-fighting and the production of foie gras. Article 13’s effect on domestic law is minimal. As the Secretary of State for the Environment has made clear, as we leave the EU, we believe that we can do much better.
We have made it clear that we intend to retain our existing standards of animal welfare once we have left the EU, and, indeed, to enhance them. This Bill will convert the existing body of EU animal welfare law into UK law. It will make sure that the same protections are in place in the UK and that laws still function effectively after we leave the EU. However, the purpose of this Bill is to provide continuity by addressing any deficiencies in law as we leave the EU. It is not about improving EU laws that the Government think could be better. That is why, at the end of last year, the Government published draft legislation, the Animal Welfare (Sentencing and Recognition of Sentience) Bill, to which a number of noble Lords have referred. The draft Bill sets out how we can better enshrine in domestic law the recognition of animals as sentient beings.
Let me reply to the questions asked by my noble friend Lord Bowness and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. The Secretary of State for the Environment has been clear that we will legislate and that there will be no gap left in our law on sentience after we leave the EU. We believe that the draft Bill is a significant improvement on Article 13, imposing a clear duty on the state to have regard for animal welfare when considering all policies, rather than just the six areas outlined in Article 13.
My noble friend has said that the reason we are not including that part of the article which is excluded is that it does not go very far and it is not good enough, but that is not what the Government promised. The Government said that they were going to include in this Bill all the present legislation. That is all we ask. Why will he not include even so deficient a piece as this and then do the additions afterwards, which is what he has told me he is going to do on every other occasion?
Because we do not think that Article 13 works in the context of UK law; it applies only to EU law. I have set out why we think we can do better.
The public consultation on the draft Bill closed on 31 January. The Government are analysing the responses and will publish a summary and next steps in due course—I hope before we get to Report. I hope this reassures the noble Baroness, and indeed my noble friend Lord Deben, about the Government’s firm stance on animal sentience.
The Minister emphasised that he hoped this would be brought forward by Report. If it is not, would he be prepared to look at an amendment along these lines to meet the Government’s shortcomings and ensure that the Bill covers the possibilities we have outlined in the debate, rather than relying on the possibility of future legislation that may not reach the statute book?
I do not want to give the noble Lord an exact commitment but, as I have said, we hope to have it by Report stage. If that is not the case we will look at what can be done in its place.
Amendment 30 seeks to transfer the obligations contained in Article 13—to have regard to the welfare requirements of animals as sentient beings when developing and implementing certain EU policies—to domestic law. Unlike Article 13, however, the amendment applies only to the formulation rather than the formulation and implementation of law and policy. Furthermore, once the UK has left the EU we will obviously no longer be a member state and therefore no longer formulate or implement any EU laws or policies. Therefore, by referring to the obligations contained in Article 13, it is not clear what the effect of the amendment would be in practice. Although it is assumed that its intention is to require the welfare requirements of animals to be taken into account in formulating domestic law and policy, it appears that the amendment would only require it when formulating and implementing EU policy and law, which of course we would no longer be doing. As I have said, the Government have published a draft Bill which introduces a clear duty on Ministers to have regard for animal welfare when formulating and implementing all government policy and not only the six areas I mentioned earlier.
Amendment 98, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, seeks to apply the requirements of Article 13 to the use of Clause 7. It would require Ministers to pay full regard to animal welfare requirements when introducing any legislation under Clause 7. I remind noble Lords that the purpose of Clause 7 is to allow the Government to address deficiencies in retained EU law arising from our withdrawal. Clause 7 provides powers for Ministers to make secondary legislation to deal with any problem that would arise on exit—for example, to remedy any provisions that would have no practical application after the UK has left the EU.
However, the power is temporary and can only be used for up to two years after exit. After that point it will expire. Similarly, the proposed amendment to Clause 7 would only have effect for two years from the date of our withdrawal from the EU. The amendment would also only apply to those regulations introduced by Ministers before March 2021 for the purposes of addressing deficiencies arising from our withdrawal. Therefore, the limited protection provided for animals by the amendment would also expire on 30 March 2021.
The amendment would not hold Ministers to the standards required in Article 13 two years after we have left the EU and, therefore, would weaken the current obligation in Article 13. The provisions set out in our draft Bill in December go beyond the two years following our exit from the EU and will apply to more than just those regulations that deal only with any deficiencies arising from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
My Lords, when we last debated this issue, the Advocate-General for Scotland said that he was very attracted to the proposals published by Professor Paul Craig in his blog—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to that. I notice that Professor Craig published a subsequent blog on 26 February, also referred to by the noble Lord, in which he suggests that, once the process of transposing law has taken effect, we should assign,
“legal status to EU retained law in the UK based on the status it had in EU law”
Having read his blog as a non-lawyer, I felt that, if the intention is to give certainty, the proposals of Professor Craig would do that—except in one key respect which I hope the Minister might comment on: what process would be undergone between now and next February to allocate the huge body of retained law to one or other category if we were to adopt Professor Craig’s mode of proceeding? Since the Solicitor-General said in the House of Commons that about 20,000 pieces of EU law will be transferred, and if it were possible to establish, as Professor Craig sets out, a criterion based on the intention of existing EU law which would divide between primary and secondary legislation, can the Minister indicate, if he is minded to go down that route, what process would take place, so that, on 29 March next year, we know the status of law being transposed?
We need to speak from these Benches as well.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made a powerful speech in favour of his amendment, backed by the powerful arguments of the Constitution Committee. It is apparent that this gives rise not to a difference on what the end objective should be: the need for clarity; the need for a clear status for EU law; and the recognition that retained EU law will need to retain its position of priority over pre-existing UK law because that is the status it has at the moment and because, as we have been reminded in debate after debate, the Government have promised that EU law will be passed across on exit day as it is at the moment. The routes proposed by the Constitution Committee and the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law—and in the interesting proposals put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles—demonstrate that it is possible to reach those objectives by different routes.
However, the methods put forward by the Constitution Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, have the merit of simplicity and elegance. The status of the law is clear. We do not have to go through a process of trying to decide between now and next February what it is; we certainly do not have to go through a process of allowing a Minister to use powers under Clause 17 to assign a process, which would be, as the Constitution Committee says, an unacceptable approach.
It would have the additional advantage, or so it would seem to me at least, that retained EU law would then have some protection against amendability, save by the processes of this House and the other place considering the amendments which ought to be made rather than by a process of delegated legislation—I say “some” protection, because it would not be complete. Those seem reasons why the elegant solution proposed by the Constitution Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has much to commend it
I would like to read when it becomes available what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, to make sure that I fully understood all of it. I do not disagree with the intention behind it, but the proposal of the Constitution Committee may achieve it more readily and elegantly.
My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions and for the opportunity to respond to this debate. These provisions and amendments may be technical, but, in debating them, we must not lose sight of the real practical consequences that follow from how we deal with this issue. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, observed in passing, we are aiming at the same goal; it is a question of which route can most appropriately take us there. I shall come on in due course to look at some of the routes proposed.
I was referring to the different proposals by the Constitution Committee and the Bingham Centre, rather than to the Government’s proposals.
Then I reassure the noble and learned Lord that we are all intent on arriving in the same place; it is a question of how we arrive there. I shall deal with the routes that he touched on.
Perhaps I may correct one point: the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, referred to the work of Professor Craig and to some previous remarks that I had made about that. I commend to him what I said as recorded in Hansard. I referred to the publication of 26 February on the previous occasion; it did not come out after those remarks were made. I shall mention Professor Craig’s analysis in due course. The task of categorising such legislation would be challenging, but we would consider it as one route forward.
As we know, one of the core requirements of EU membership is the principle of supremacy of EU law. In the event of any conflict with domestic law, domestic law must give way. When we leave the EU, it would make no sense and would not be in keeping with our principles to leave that unchanged in our law; we all recognise that.
It is more fundamental than that. The difficulty is, why use the concept of the supremacy of EU at all? It is surely inappropriate in a Bill of this nature.
Not necessarily in the context of retained EU law, which comes over with that principle of supremacy standing behind it. I will come on to deal with that in more detail. I understand that, as the noble Lord indicated, his amendments draw on the recommendations made in the Constitution Committee report on the Bill—although I was interested to note that Amendment 33 appears to go further than the recommendations put forward by the committee, in that it extends the status of primary legislation to all retained EU law, rather than just to law being preserved by Clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill. So there is that difference between Amendment 33 and the recommendations of the Constitution Committee.
I understand entirely the concerns here and the attraction that these amendments have as a result. It is only right, however, that we should examine fully the consequences of dealing with status in a one-size-fits-all way.
Before the Minister moves on to the consequences, perhaps I might draw his attention to the status of environmental law currently drawn from the European Union. Of course, a considerable proportion of the anticipated changes that will be required are in environmental law, because so much of what we draw from Europe is environmental law. At the moment, the status of environmental law drawn from Europe has been pretty random, to be frank, and not at all reflective of the importance of the legislation. It has been random, whether it is drawn from a regulation which would be picked up by the clauses that the Minister mentioned or from a directive which would not be picked up in that way. But it did not really matter that it was rather random in its status, because the framework provided by the ECA was there, and therefore none of the legislation could be meddled with randomly by the Executive. Of course, once the safeguard provided by the ECA has gone, the status of existing environmental law becomes rather strange. It sticks out like a sore thumb, in that some of it that one would think was sufficiently important to be considered eligible, as it were, for primary legislation, has not got that current status, while other bits of law that are pretty functional and practical have a much lower status. So I urge the Minister to think about just how complicated the process would be if we did not simply adopt a single status for all that law.
First, with respect to the noble Baroness, I do not accept that the way in which environmental law has been received and enforced in our domestic legislation has been random. We differ at the outset to that extent. Of course, various propositions have been put forward, one of which is to give the status of primary legislation to all retained EU law—but that would raise difficulties that I will come on to address. The categorisation below that can be carried out: indeed, the noble Baroness tried to set out for Amendment 32A a hierarchy that could be employed in that context. But I do not consider that environmental law stands out in the way that the noble Baroness suggests.
Our concern is that, as I mentioned, a one-size-fits-all approach will not really work. Again, I quote from the Bingham Centre’s report, which stated:
“We consider that the Rule of Law objectives of legal continuity and certainty are better served by the approach taken by the Government in the Bill. The principle of supremacy is well understood and its future role is very limited, being confined to the relationship between retained EU law and pre-exit UK law. Treating all retained EU law as primary legislation enacted on exit day, on the other hand, will increase legal uncertainty because it changes the settled approach and leaves unclear whether the interpretive obligation, to interpret pre-exit UK law so as to be compatible with retained EU law, continues to apply”.
EU law that is being converted into domestic legislation under this clause covers both a vast range of different policy areas and different types of EU law, from regulations and directives applying to agriculture and farming to detailed and technical pieces of tertiary legislation, such as the list of contents for a dye or chemical. At the end of the day, treating all of that as primary legislation would present, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, indicated, a quite enormous task for Parliament if it is going to legislate to amend any of that retained EU law. How many Acts of Parliament would we have to contemplate putting through this House to wrestle with that demanding position? It really would be formidable. Because this legislation will come on to our domestic statute book in a unique way, it will not already have been scrutinised and approved by this Parliament—so we would be bringing in this enormous body of law and treating it as primary legislation when nobody in this Parliament had actually examined it.
The breadth of this body of law, in the case of EU law being converted, is unique in its nature, which is why the Government have deliberately chosen to tread rather carefully and not simply assign a single status to that retained law in domestic legislation. While assigning a single status for all purposes to all retained EU law may be theoretically possible, it would have the most difficult consequences and might lead ultimately to a situation in which we had to extend the use of Henry VIII powers beyond any reasonable limit normally contemplated in the context of provisions of this kind.
Beyond that practical consideration, there is a more fundamental concern about the constitutional appropriateness of what has been proposed. Domestic primary legislation is less vulnerable to subsequent amendment and is less vulnerable to challenge in the courts for a very good reason—because, as I said, it has undergone scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament, which means that there can be no doubt about Parliament’s intentions so far as that primary legislation is concerned. That would not apply to retained EU law.
While we are spending considerable time scrutinising this Bill, we are not able to scrutinise the law it is converting. Some of that law is itself the EU’s own subsidiary legislation, which has not been subject to comparable scrutiny anywhere. The noble Baroness observed on an earlier occasion that the European Parliament had had the opportunity to scrutinise much of this. It has had the opportunity to scrutinise some of it, but scant scrutiny—if any—of the subsidiary legislation has actually occurred in the European Parliament. By contrast, our proposed approach has been to deal with the status of converted law for certain specified purposes, such as that alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: that is, paragraph 19 of Schedule 8 in the context of the Human Rights Act and rights arising from there.
Of course I understand the concerns put forward by the Constitution Committee and noble Lords about the consequences of the case-by-case approach that we are taking. I do not dismiss them lightly and I do not say that the Bill is a perfect solution to the issue that we have to address. As I indicated on day three of Committee, there is some scope for considering how we can take this forward. Reference has already been made to the work of Professor Paul Craig and the alternative model of categorisation that he proposed in his article of 26 February. That is something that we are looking at—albeit, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, anticipated, that it might involve a considerable amount of work. But if that can be an appropriate and effective categorisation, rather like that of the noble Baroness, it is something that we are willing to look at.
Again, I ask the Committee not to dismiss lightly the potential ramifications of treating all this law as having the status of primary legislation just to exclude the concept of supremacy from the operation of Clause 5. That would raise formidable problems for us and we do not see it as an effective way forward for the Bill. But, as I indicated previously, we are looking at the mechanisms employed here, and a mechanism that avoids actually applying the doctrine of supremacy may find greater traction as a way forward if we can come up with a suitable categorisation for retained EU law, rather than a blanket categorisation of primary legislation. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Perhaps I may make an observation. Leaving general principles out of it, if you categorise all the legislation as secondary legislation and then deem that some of it can be amended only by Act of Parliament, you do not have to sort it all. You would have to sort it only when you wanted to amend it—and at that point you would look at the basis on which it was made.
I am obliged to the noble Baroness for that observation. Obviously, that is something that we would take into account. It perhaps touches on a question I did not answer from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with regard to Clause 5(3), where he queried the reference to the “intention of the modification”. Of course, what that makes clear is that this will need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Of course, “case-by-case basis” suggests lots of work for lawyers and a lot of legal uncertainty. I am grateful to the Minister and all those who spoke in the debate. There was, I think, widespread agreement in the debate—apart from the Minister—and from expert commentators that a legal status does need to be conferred in the Bill on retained EU law. How one confers the legal status is much more difficult than what legal status one confers. I would say that there is more than one way to skin a cat—but that may upset those who spoke in the previous debate.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Goldsmith, for supporting the approach recommended by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. But I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that there is also great force in the suggestion made by Professor Paul Craig that the Bill should confer a status of either primary or secondary legislation, dependent on the category of EU law from which the retained EU law derives. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who asked about this, that Professor Craig is not advocating a process of allocation on a case-by-case basis; he is advocating that legal status should depend on the article of the EU treaty from which the retained EU law derives—a much more objective approach.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
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My Lords, I am grateful that the important issue of children’s rights has been raised. I thank noble Lords for these amendments, which seek to make changes relating to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the charter of fundamental rights, specifically to incorporate them into domestic legislation via the Bill and to impose statutory duties on Ministers to consider the UNCRC when making regulations. Many of the noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments have a track record of tirelessly championing children’s rights over the years, and the issue is of utmost importance to them and to this Government. Protecting children’s rights is paramount, and I assure noble Lords that I have heard their concerns about how existing rights and protections for children, and our commitment to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, will continue as the UK exits the EU.
Amendments 37 and 38, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Massey of Darwen and Lady Greengross, seek to provide that some or part of the charter of fundamental rights would remain part of domestic law following withdrawal from the EU. As a number of noble Lords have observed, we have already debated the wider issue of the charter at length and noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will not go through the general arguments today, although I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, for rehearsing some of them. I take the opportunity again to reassure the Committee that the Government remain fully committed to children’s rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Our ability to support and safeguard children’s rights will not be affected by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
I have heard the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, about the impact of Brexit on children’s rights and the need to ensure that their welfare, safety and best interests are not compromised as we leave the EU. The rights and best interests of children are already, and will remain, protected in England primarily through the Children Act 1989, which sets out a range of duties to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, including making the child’s welfare the paramount consideration for any court—I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, referred to that. Children’s rights and best interests are further protected through the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which among other things ensures that the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration in all decisions relating to adoption. In addition, other legislative and administrative measures are in place, including the Children Act 2004, which imposes general safeguarding duties in relation to children on various bodies.
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own measures for the protection of children’s rights which fully comply with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Additionally, the European Convention on Human Rights as a whole offers the protection of children’s rights, and this is implemented domestically by the Human Rights Act 1998.
The Minister referred to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland having devolved competence. Can he give an assurance that all the powers they currently have in that context will be maintained after Brexit?
I will come on to the noble Lord’s question shortly and answer him directly. None of this extensive framework is altered or in any way diminished by our exit from the EU and the non-retention of the charter. Amendments 68, 69 and 70, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Lister, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, would incorporate the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child into domestic legislation and require all public authorities and Ministers of the Crown to have regard to it. Further, Amendments 97 and 158, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, seek to ensure that regulations made to remedy deficiencies in retained EU law are not contrary to the UNCRC. Again, I thank noble Lords for these considered amendments. Although tabled with great intention and faith, in reality they would not enhance the existing safeguards in place to preserve the rights of children in this country—measures that I have already outlined and which will remain in place after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for her comments and points on this matter.
It is also important to highlight that in addition to these measures, which are a combination of both legislation and commitments, the UK Government already have a commitment to Parliament to give due consideration to the UNCRC when making policy and legislation. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, I assure noble Lords that the Government are working closely with the Children’s Rights Alliance for England to ensure that children and young people’s views are heard and taken fully into account when developing policy and delivery in this area. We are hugely grateful to it for the great work it does to help preserve children’s rights and deliver a framework of actions on the UNCRC. These actions are designed to embed children’s rights across Whitehall and beyond, as we set out in a Written Ministerial Statement in October 2016. Those actions include developing and promoting training for civil servants to help them understand children’s rights and the UNCRC, and looking at how we can promote and embed good practice.
As I have set out, the UK already meets its commitments under the UNCRC through a mixture of legislative and policy initiatives, which effectively safeguard the rights of children in this country, negating the need directly to incorporate the UNCRC itself. That approach is in line with normal practice for implementing international treaties. By going over and above measures already in place, and which will of course remain in place after we leave the EU, the amendments would create new burdens on public bodies and individuals, when the UK’s existing laws and commitments already adequately safeguard the rights of children in this country.
Amendment 70, from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, addresses continued co-operation on various security and law enforcement tools. Those discussions will be a matter for negotiations with the EU. The continued security of Europe is unconditionally guaranteed and is of paramount interest to us. The Government have been clear that the UK remains unconditionally committed to European security, and in the exit negotiations we will work to ensure that the UK and the EU continue to co-operate closely to safeguard our shared values and combat common threats. We recognise in that regard the value provided by Europol, the European arrest warrant, Eurojust and ECRIS. I hope that that provides appropriate assurances to my noble friend Lord Dundee and reassures other noble Lords of our wholehearted commitment to children’s rights and the UNCRC, showing that our ability to support and safeguard children’s rights will not be negatively affected by UK withdrawal from the EU.
I turn to Amendment 39, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, on the rights of the elderly. I entirely sympathise with the concerns raised today and I reassure the Committee that the Government are committed to the welfare of the elderly. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for drawing my attention to his no doubt excellent report in the Council of Europe. I must profess that in my extensive reading material I omitted to go through that worthy document but, now that he has drawn my attention to it, I shall make it my priority to get hold of a copy and will reply to him in writing on it.
There are enforceable domestic safeguards for the rights of the elderly under the Human Rights Act and the Equality Act. Older people will continue to benefit from the existing strong protections against age discrimination, harassment and victimisation in the Equality Act 2010—for example, when accessing services when we leave the EU. Of course, the Government also make provision for the rights of the elderly in domestic legislation in a range of ways. To take just the most obvious example, domestic law provides for state pensions and the safety net of state pension credit, as well as disability benefits and other measures such as the provision of social care for those with eligible needs—subject of course to a financial assessment—free prescriptions where charges would otherwise apply, and travel concessions. Again, none of this is in any way diminished by our exit from the EU and the non-retention of the charter.
Article 25 of the charter is also a principle, which is different from a right. It cannot be relied upon directly by individuals in the way that rights can. Principles are a valued and important tool, and, in so far as the principles and rights underpinning the charter exist elsewhere in directly applicable EU law, or EU law which has been implemented in domestic law, that law will be preserved and converted by the Bill. Retaining Article 25 as a standalone right in this way is simply not necessary. If Article 25 was incorporated into domestic law, it would be unclear how it was supposed to apply and it would undermine the Bill’s core objective: to give certainty and continuity after we leave the EU.
I turn to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, on protecting children’s rights. The UNCRC does not impose a requirement on state parties to incorporate the UNCRC itself. It is focused on the implementation of rights without prescribing how state parties should achieve that. I reassure noble Lords that the UK meets its obligation under the UNCRC through a mix of legislative and policy initiatives, as opposed to the incorporation of the UNCRC itself.
With regard to Wales, the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011 requires Ministers to have due regard to the convention when exercising their functions. The Children’s Rights Scheme 2014 sets out the arrangement Ministers have in place to ensure compliance. None of the rights exercised by Welsh Ministers will be affected by any of the provisions in the Bill.
My favourite hereditary oik, the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, mentioned two articles. I certainly remember writing the article for “ConservativeHome” but have no recollection of writing an article for the Sun on the same day. I would be grateful if he would send me a copy of this for my delectation and interest, and I will respond to him when I have had a look at it.
I hope that my reassurances to noble Lords will enable them to withdraw or not move their amendments.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. We have had an excellent debate on children’s rights and protection, with many articulate and forceful contributions. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, stressed that children are potentially the most affected by Brexit because they are young and will be subject to the forces that Brexit might bring. I am disappointed by the Minister’s response. Many of us have said tonight that we recognise that we have made great strides in defending children’s rights and proposing things which improve those rights and the protection and welfare of children. But I would like the Minister to recognise what was also said: namely, that our domestic laws do not protect children in all circumstances. Many noble Lords have given examples of this.
As my noble friend Lady Sherlock said, our laws do not incorporate all the treaties and we should be working towards more incorporation. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, thought this might be an “oversight”—I think that was the word she used. Whatever it is, we need to sort it out. We need to recognise that children’s rights and protection are not always incorporated into what we do. An example is youth justice, where 17 year-olds can be treated as adults rather than children. Children say that this is not right or sensible, and I agree.
The Government have made it clear that they are very keen on social mobility. It is important, but it will not happen unless children are encouraged to participate in their own futures. I am talking about empowerment as well as protection. Last November, I held a seminar in Portcullis House. One or two noble Lords were there as observers. We talked about child-friendly justice and child mental health. Almost half the participants were children and young people; others included academics, European politicians and NGOs. It was acknowledged by everyone that the contribution of young people was absolutely crucial to defining the needs of children and young people and responding to them. I recognise that the Minister says that they have talked to CRAE—for which I have the highest regard—on the rights of the child, but have the Government actually listened to what children have to say on this? I would like some evidence of that.
As I said, we have made progress on involving and protecting children, but we should be big enough to take criticism when it comes—and we are criticised. We are not rated highly at international level on how we deal with children. I gave the example of youth justice. We should not be complacent.
This is an important set of amendments, spoken to most forcefully by colleagues. I hope that the Minister will call a meeting of those present today and others to discuss how we can move forward on issues relating to Brexit and children. My questions and those of others have not been sufficiently answered. I still have reservations and I would like to meet the Minister to talk about them. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, we have had a really good debate on equality and women’s rights, and I am pleased to support the amendments in this group. Amendment 40, which inserts a new clause, was moved so ably by my noble friend Lady Lister, who explained in detail why it would be very useful to have it in the Bill. It is a very good amendment, which would require the Minister to report to Parliament whenever there are new or amended EU laws in the area of family-friendly employment rights, gender equality, and work/life balance for parents and carers, which would have amended provisions in domestic legislation if the UK had remained a member of the EU, and the Minister would have to consider whether or not to incorporate these provisions into domestic law.
There could be a danger that the UK will fall behind the EU on gender equality and women’s rights when we do not automatically have to follow EU laws. The amendment means that Parliament will at least be informed of new EU laws and that consideration will be given to whether or not to incorporate them in UK law. This is not anything new, really. We do look at other countries and see what they are doing. If one thinks of the devolved nations, the UK Government have learned from the example of the Welsh Assembly, where we had a children’s commissioner—the first one in the UK—and then the UK Parliament decided that there would be one for England. There are other examples I could go into where we have learned from other countries. There is no problem in looking to see what works in one area or one country and then incorporating it into our laws. That is the importance of the proposed new clause.
Amendments 89A, 129A and 157A, spoken to by my noble friend Lady Drake, would ensure that regulations will not weaken our rights relating to maternity or paternity, or adoptive parental rights, or the rights of pregnant or breastfeeding women. We know that even today regarding our gender equality rights, which have been hard fought for, there is ample evidence that employers do not always adhere to the law. In recent weeks we have heard of employers who seem to disregard the laws around maternity and pregnancy. The Equality and Human Rights Commission, as my noble friend Lady Drake mentioned, said recently that many businesses were “decades behind the law” and,
“living in the dark ages”.
This followed a survey which showed that a third of those working for private companies thought it was reasonable to ask women during the recruitment process about their plans to have children in the future, whether they were pregnant and whether they had small children. This type of questioning is against the law and one wonders why it still goes on.
In December, the Prime Minister failed to rule out scrapping the working time directive, the agency workers directive and the pregnant workers directive, even though she was asked several times to give that assurance. The pregnant workers directive is of great value to women and gives much-needed protection in the workplace. So we need to ensure that delegated powers cannot be used to weaken maternity, paternity, adoption or parental rights. One can see why, after that long fight for equality, it has still has to go on. We want to make progress all the time but there are grave concerns about the Bill.
I hope that the Minister will be able to give guarantees tonight in relation to these amendments. Equality rights do not just stand still; they have to progress all the time. That is why it is so important that we look to see what the EU is doing and then see whether it is something that we would want to incorporate into our laws. We really need that reassurance from the Government that the equal rights we have fought for, hard and over many years, will not be watered down at all. These are sensible amendments that would continue to ensure the protection of women in the workplace, as well as ensuring that women’s equality rights do not fall behind those of future EU laws. I hope that the Minister can give assurances that he will look seriously at these amendments, because they are good and sensible ones.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister, Lady Altmann, Lady Greengross, Lady Burt, Lady Drake and Lady Gale for their contributions, and for bringing this debate alive tonight. It is right and proper that that debate should be here.
I would like to make a few points, which are necessary this evening. First, on the day after Brexit, the rights which we have worked so hard while within the EU to create will be brought back. We have been a partner in the framing of those rules and we will return them to the United Kingdom. There will be no dilution. There will be no weakening or regression. These rules will come back and they will stand here. I emphasise that as members of the EU, we have never been bound by those rules as anything more than a foundation upon which we can build greater adherence to those rights. It is important to stress that.
The EU pregnant workers directive requires 14 weeks of paid maternity leave. In the UK we offer 52 weeks, 39 of which are statutory maternity pay. Our maternity entitlements are nearly three times greater than the minimum within the EU. We have given fathers and partners statutory rights to paternity leave and pay—an entitlement which the EU is only now starting to consider in its proposed work-life balance directive. In light of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, she will be aware that the work-life balance directive is still only at the Commission proposal stage. We have not yet heard, or had a report, from the European Parliament or begun the necessary dialogue to determine what exactly will form the final elements of that directive. It is important to stress that the process of negotiation is right and proper. We have always taken part in that and will continue to do so. Exactly when it will reach the stage of clarity remains yet to be determined.
We have given the parents of all children up to the age of 18 a right to take up to 18 weeks of unpaid parental leave, while the parental leave directive requires only four months and applies only to the parents of children up to the age of eight. Again, we have sought to go further. It is important to stress that when we look at our ability to deliver against these EU expectations, we have never seen them as limiting us. We should be able to go beyond them.
Importantly again, it is not simply enough to enact these proposals; they must also be adequately enforced. That is why looking at the EU’s enforcement scoreboard is particularly important. At that point we begin to understand how successful it has been not just in transferring the law into the statute book but in making the law a reality because it is by those instruments and the reality of that law becoming functional that we adhere, advance and create functional rights.
The Minister’s reference to enforcement is very important. Is he giving an assurance that there are no government plans to cap compensation in discrimination cases when we leave the EU?
The noble Baroness will recognise that that is part of a discussion for another time. We have already touched on it on more than one occasion. If I may, I will focus primarily on the amendments before us today.
It is important that we recognise that the rights we have cannot be undone. That must be the fundamental guidance. For those who ask whether I can give a categorical assurance that there shall be no erosion of the working time directive, the answer is yes, I can give that assurance. We will not be eroding these rules as they come back or after they come back. It is critical that these rules become and remain functional as we begin to develop our own rulebook. It is right that we should be cognisant of the advances in the evolution of rights whether it be in the EU or elsewhere. We have heard this evening about a number of these rights which we have seen emanating from the UN. We should not be limited in that regard. Time and again we have found ourselves in the vanguard of particular rights. As we consider this suite of amendments, I do not think we should lose sight of the fact that in more than one area on more than one occasion we have pushed rights far further forward than had been the case of the median rights within the EU as a whole.
The Minister just made an extremely significant statement. He will appreciate that part of the problem many of us have with the Bill is how far we trust the Government to have the very extensive delegated powers which are granted by the Bill and the chatter one hears, including from Ministers, about a desire to loosen EU regulations, in particular to loosen EU labour regulations. If the statement he has just made represents the Government’s considered view, that puts a number of minds at rest, although it may upset a number of people within his own party.
I hope I can put the noble Lord’s mind at rest.
It is important that we recognise how these functional rights are developed and ongoing. The day after Brexit, our rulebook will be safe. The rights which we have will be incorporated and we will build on them as a foundation. They are not a ceiling. It is right and proper that both this Chamber and the other place are instrumental in taking forward the enhancement of these rights. We have to recognise that over the past 30 years our understanding of what is a necessary family right has entirely evolved. As the vice-chair of the LGBTI group in the European Parliament, I recognised how far we could push things within the European Parliament, but I was very clear about how far we could not push them within the European Parliament because of the inability of certain member states to move forward with us. In that regard, in terms of equalities, on not one occasion have we ranked lower than third in the whole of the EU—indeed, in the whole of the continent of Europe. We have pushed forward those rights far faster, deeper and more surely than many of the other member states, so we should not lightly shake them off. We will remain what we have been, I hope, all the way through: a deliverer of these rights, not just on paper, because that is not a functional right, but in functioning and working in the workplace and elsewhere. It is absolutely right that we do so.
In response to a number of the questions raised, I am conscious that there is unease and a certain regard that the Government today will take the first opportunity to cast these rights aside, to scrape the barnacles off the boat to allow the ship to move faster. I assure the Committee that they are integral parts of the engine of the ship and we shall not be discarding them. That is how important they shall remain.
If that is the case, and we are all very impressed by this unexpected and thorough assurance from the Minister on behalf of the Government, why can he not accept some amendments in this area and some others to put that in the Bill?
The noble Baroness makes an interesting point as to why people have not been able to hear these points, but I am iterating what the Prime Minister, and a number of other Ministers in the Government, have said as regards this, and am pleased if I have been able to cut through some of the hubbub that has surrounded it. We are and remain a Government committed to ensuring that on day one after Brexit there is no diminution whatever in the rights which are and have been enjoyed through our membership of the EU. It is important to stress that. I hope I have been able to give noble Lords some reassurances this evening and some confidence that they will be able to set aside these amendments on this occasion.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken from across the Committee in support of this amendment—with one exception of course, the noble Lord, Lord True. I cannot help but point out that there is a certain irony that the longest speech came from the noble Lord who complained that we were wasting time. He took, I think, nearly a fifth of the non-ministerial time in order to tell us we were wasting time.
I am grateful for the question, because it enables me to clarify that point. There are two sorts of principles. I was talking in answer to the noble Lord’s question last week about the principles which are contained in the charter itself. The charter says that it is a charter of rights and principles, and the principles there—it is not that easy to identify which are principles and which are not—are not actionable in themselves. They may become actionable, because as they are aspirational tools, they are then implemented into law and are actionable at that stage. The principles we are talking about here are different. These are the general principles of EU law, which are, for example, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality, and the principle of non-discrimination. These are different in that sense; they are general rather than specific principles, and they are actionable at the moment. That is why the Walker case I mentioned gives rise to a remedy, as did the other cases where the Supreme Court struck down tribunal fees as being disproportionately high for particular categories of workers.
That is why we believe it is important to keep this. It is one element of the architecture to retain rights. I remind noble Lords that the Prime Minister made it clear that the intention was that rights would continue the same the day after exit as the day before. To remove general principles in this way, and the ability to rely upon them, will fail to keep that promise. This amendment also—it has been referred to already—specifically proposes that the general principles of EU law should include those which are contained in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Those are environmental principles of huge importance: the precautionary principle, the principle of polluter pays and the principle for preventive action. Those principles and the others I referred to need to continue to operate to keep in place the rights that people enjoy at the moment.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their brevity.
Amendment 40ZA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to ensure that challenges to validity could continue on general principles of EU law grounds. I will address concerns raised on general principles in more detail later. First, Schedule 1 generally ends the ability to bring challenges on validity grounds to what will become retained EU law after we leave the EU. We recognise, however, that in some circumstances, individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument. For example, a decision of an EU institution or body may be addressed directly to an individual or business. After exit, they would continue to be able to challenge such decisions—in so far as they apply in the EU—before the CJEU, and to have them annulled. Of course, the converted form of the decision would however remain in force within the UK as retained EU law.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked whether paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 would, after exit day, prevent a challenge to a provision of retained EU law by reference to common-law principles. I understand that the answer is no, it would not, and it is not intended to do so. I hope that that meets the position that he raised with me a moment ago.
Domestic courts currently have no jurisdiction to annul an EU measure or declare it invalid, and we do not believe it would be right to hand them a new jurisdiction which asks them effectively to assume the role of the CJEU in this context. This amendment would effectively ask our courts to consider whether the EU acted incompatibly with the general principles when it made an EU instrument. Generally speaking, this is a function that we do not consider it appropriate to confer on domestic courts.
Therefore, although I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, the amendment would undermine the Government’s stated policy of a clear exclusion of both validity challenges and general principle challenges provided for within Schedule 1. However, we recognise that there might be some limited circumstances in which it would be sensible to maintain the ability to challenge retained EU law on validity grounds. The Bill therefore contains a power set out in paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule 1, to which the noble Baroness alluded, which would enable the Minister to make regulations providing for a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in specified circumstances.
Sub-paragraph (3) sets out that those regulations may provide that a challenge which would previously have proceeded against an EU institution may, after exit, proceed against a UK public authority, because of course there would be no EU institution against which it could be directed. I seek to reassure the noble Baroness that the word “may” is there as a precautionary term lest, in the context of trying to make such a regulatory power, it be perceived that there is no easily identifiable body against which the matter can be directed. However, the intent is that it should be possible to proceed against a public body in those circumstances.
Can the noble and learned Lord envisage the circumstances in which such regulations would be made? Will Ministers have to decide between now and exit day a category of matters for which such regulation is to be provided, or are we to await a case coming up which ought to have been the subject of regulations which are then made? That surely cannot be possible.
With respect, it is a precautionary power and it is intended that, where the circumstances arise, the Minister will address himself to those circumstances and contemplate the making of appropriate regulations.
Perhaps I may suggest to the Minister a circumstance in which this might arise. The day after exit day the Court of Justice gives a judgment saying that a provision of EU law is invalid. Nevertheless, that provision will be part of retained EU law—it will be part of our law even though it has been abolished in the EU. That might be a circumstance in which the Minister wishes to act.
I fully acknowledge that that is most certainly a circumstance that could arise. Of course, one might address that circumstance by Parliament legislating to reflect the outcome of that post-Brexit decision. However, I fully acknowledge that, depending on the way in which one constructs the departure on exit day, one might find that what one has retained as EU law ceases to be EU law almost immediately after one has left the EU. I believe that that has been acknowledged on a number of occasions. Indeed, it could lead to the development of two parallel jurisprudences—one for retained EU law and one for EU law. That is an inevitable outcome of our decision to leave the EU but to retain in our domestic law that which was EU law at the point of our departure. I fully acknowledge that, but it might also be a circumstance in which potentially one would seek to exercise the exceptional regulatory power that is referred to.
Reference was made to Amendments 41 and 42, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, which seek to retain indefinitely in domestic law rights of challenge based on the general principles of EU law. If agreed to, these amendments would empower domestic courts to quash administrative actions or secondary legislation or, indeed, even go as far as disapplying an Act of Parliament on the ground that it breaches one or more of the retained general principles of EU law—that could take place long after we have left the EU. That is why we have to have a point in time at which we have certainty as to the scope for such challenges, and that is reflected in the schedule.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, acknowledged, Amendment 41 would go even further. It seeks to set out an ostensibly broader definition of which general principles are to be retained under the Bill. In that context, he alluded to Article 191 of the TFEU, which deals with environmental issues. I take issue with him as to whether the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle are both now accepted as general principles of EU law. I would suggest that there is considerable doubt as to whether the former, in particular, constitutes what is recognised in EU law as a general principle, so I have some difficulty with that amendment.
I come now to Amendment 63, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is, I apprehend, intended to retain this right of challenge but solely for the principle of proportionality, as she indicated, and specifically including where retained EU law is to be treated as primary legislation. It would also appear to permit the possibility of a challenge on the basis of invalidity of EU law, as well as judicial review of such legislation. It is our position that the general principles of EU law, such as proportionality, non-retroactivity and fundamental rights, will be kept in our domestic law, but in order to assist in interpreting retained EU law and not to give rise to additional stand-alone rights. Whereas some general principles are now set out expressly in EU treaties, the general principles were those that were first recognised by the European Court of Justice. They are essentially judge-made and determined as principles on the basis of case law. It is those principles that we are dealing with.
I come back for a moment to Amendment 41, which goes beyond just the issue of proportionality. It would undermine the approach that we are seeking to take if we were to pursue it. In particular the inclusion of Article 191 in the amendment risks going further than the existing principles that are, as I say, set out in EU law and consequently in UK law today.
Leaving aside Article 191—we can argue about that and there is a decision that appears to demonstrate the point: the case of Artegodan, where the court appeared to be willing to extrapolate from the precautionary principle a general principle of EU law—does the Minister accept that, so far as the other general principles of EU law are concerned, to exclude them from the ability to found a cause of action and not just be an interpretative tool would be a diminution of the rights that people currently have and would include a diminution of many of the rights that the Government are saying are already protected under English law?
The noble Baroness is confusing two distinct issues. The Bill is about the retention in domestic law of EU retained law at the point of Brexit. The Prime Minister was addressing our future relationship with the other 27 members of the EU in the context of our seeking to align in some areas and not align in others. This will be the subject of negotiation which is about to commence and will apply in agreeing a transitional period, and then our post-transitional period relationship with the other EU 27. They are two distinct issues.
On the noble and learned Lord’s observation about the general principles, these are retained as an interpretive tool. It may impact upon the matter of remedies but not on the issue of rights. One has to bear in mind that distinction.
Reference was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, to the case of Benkharbouche, which was a classic example of where the issue of rights had to be distinguished from the issue of remedies. There were rights arising under Article 6 of the convention but there was an also an issue as to whether or not certain principles arising by reference to the charter were also in play. I believe it was Article 46 of the charter that was referred to by Lord Sumption, who delivered the opinion of the court. The point was that while the rights could be identified by reference to the convention or the charter, the particular remedy there arose by reference to the charter. I acknowledge that that is the case.
Is that not part of the point? An expectation has been built up by what has been said—that, on Brexit date plus one, people will be in the same position. The noble and learned Lord is admitting that they will not be in the same position because they may have rights but they will no longer necessarily have remedies.
They will have rights but they may not have the same remedy, but that is quite distinct. We are talking about maintaining rights at the point when we leave.
Does the noble and learned Lord accept that Mr Walker would not have the same rights? Those are rights purely based upon EU general principles and nothing else. Does he not accept that in that case, at least, the rights would not be there?
No, I do not accept that. I certainly do not accept that that is the position under reference to the Walker case. However, I am content to come back to the noble and learned Lord on that question on the Walker case but I do not accept that it falls in the way he indicates.
Perhaps I can make some progress. We remain of the view that after we cease to be a member of the EU there is a real risk of allowing general principle challenges to continue indefinitely, which is what these amendments would allow. Simply put, this would not be in keeping with our undertaking—our promise—to return sovereignty to this Parliament.
Of course we are aware of the concerns that have been raised, particularly about the impact on those whose cause of action precedes exit but who are unable, for whatever reason, to issue proceedings before some change takes effect. That is why we brought forward amendments on Report in the other place to provide reassurance that where a breach of the general principles occurred or gave rise to a potential claim before exit day—that is the important point—individuals and businesses will still have the opportunity to make certain claims based on the breach of the general principles of EU law for a period of three months after exit date. That period of three months after exit date is taken to mirror the period normally allowed in the context of applications for judicial review. That strikes a balance between ensuring that, on the one hand, individuals and businesses will still have the opportunity to bring these challenges and, on the other hand, delivering the result of the referendum and maintaining our parliamentary sovereignty.
While we believe that the compromises we have already made on the general principles of EU law have improved the Bill, the Government are looking again at these issues to see whether this part of the Bill can be improved in keeping with some of the concerns that have been expressed. That is because we understand the complexities of the issues that arise in the context of Schedule 1 and we are looking at those at present.
With that, I hope that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw her amendment.
As the noble and learned Lord rises to his feet I am reminded of his reference to whether paragraph 3 includes Acts of the Scottish Parliament passed before Brexit day and not within competence. If they are not within competence, they are not law.
Perhaps I may explore that with the noble and learned Lord. The point I was making was that if the Acts were passed before Brexit day and they were challenged on the basis that the alleged incompetence was that they were not consistent with the general principles of EU law, would that challenge fail on Brexit day plus one, because it would mean that the court could no longer determine it?
In the event that an Act of the Scottish Parliament was enacted beyond the competence of the Parliament, it would not and would never have been law. That is the position pursuant to Sections 28 and 29 of the Scotland Act 1998. I hope that that clarifies the point, but if I have misunderstood the noble and learned Lord—
I am quite prepared to discuss the point with the noble and learned Lord because it may be that we will look more closely at those provisions in the Scotland Act in the very near future.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for his response and all noble and noble and learned Lords who have spoken in this debate. I think that it has been confirmed that it is every bit as bad as I thought it was, and in fact I am not even sure that it is not worse. We now seem to have some kind of parallel jurisprudence which appears not to be actionable either under general principles or under common law, so we have created a kind of lacuna that cannot be approached. I also reject the fact that we would not be going on indefinitely applying general principles because the whole point is that we have the law as it is in the snapshot until such time as we change it. While I understand that one would not necessarily want to go in for a sudden wholesale redrafting of things, as amendments are necessary—especially if we avail ourselves of some of the mechanisms we have talked about where an Act of Parliament is going to be needed either because it is primary legislation or because we have put that on as a safeguard—these things are going to be revised and updated. I am still concerned and it is something that along with others we might want to return to on Report. However, for now, with the leave of the Committee I shall withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am obliged. Reference has been made to the Francovich principle. I am not sure there is such a principle, although there is the issue of Francovich damages, which arises from the case that was referred to in 1991. In order to put that into context, since 1991, and in the 20 years following, there have been 22—possibly up to 25—claims for Francovich damages in the UK courts. This is not some wide-ranging citizen or business right for the recovery of damages. There have been very few actual Francovich damages claims. I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, shaking his head, but I invite him to study the case law.
I have no doubt about what the noble and learned Lord says. So why are they so worried about keeping it?
I am just about to come on to that. I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his patience in that respect, and will endeavour to deal with matters as swiftly as I can, given the hour. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, very correctly, pointed out the criteria that apply in determining whether or not there is a claim for Francovich damages: first, that the relevant provision of European Union law was intended to confer rights; secondly, that there has been a serious failure to implement European Union law; and thirdly, that there is a direct causal link between that failure and the loss complained of. I would not go so far as to suggest that Francovich damages are in some sense more generous than those available otherwise under the common law in this country, particularly those available in the context of judicial review. I have to point out to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that damages are potentially available in a claim for judicial review.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, dealt with that point. In practice, damages are not usually available under judicial review. The general view of the public is that there is a very small chance of getting damages that way. That is the difference between that and Francovich, and it is very important.
With respect, it is not. I have to say to the noble Lord that Francovich damages are a rare remedy, as I have already indicated. Damages in the context of judicial review are not so uncommon as the noble Lord was suggesting. They are available as a remedy, albeit in limited circumstances.
Perhaps I can continue just for a moment. I would begin by looking at the Bill against that background. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 is perfectly clear in saying the right to Francovich damages is removed, because of course it is related to a breach of European Union law, and it would not be appropriate to continue—in accordance with Amendment 43—after we have left the European Union. The Bill is quite clear in saying that there is,
“no right in domestic law on or after exit day to damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich”.
To that extent, it does deal with the issue raised in the context of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978.
I take it from what the noble and learned Lord is saying that he accepts that there are existing rights to recover damages available in the British courts which the Government wish to remove. That is a breach of promise, is it not?
I wonder whether the noble Lord could exercise a small degree of patience while I just complete what I have to say on this topic. But we can take as long as it takes. As I was saying, in terms of paragraph 4 of Schedule 1, the right in domestic law to damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich is removed as at exit date. There is of course a proviso in paragraph 27 of Schedule 8 in respect of claims for Francovich damages which have already been raised prior to exit date—the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made. The potential lacuna is this: there may be accrued rights as at exit date where no claim has been made. We recognise that and it was noted in the other place. We are open to addressing that issue in order to ensure that those accrued rights are not removed by the application of paragraph 4 of Schedule 1. That is something that we are prepared to look at, as I have indicated, because we are aware of the criticism that has been made about the potential removal of rights that have already accrued as at the exit date.
Do I take it from that that the Minister will be bringing forward an amendment to correct this?
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. As I say, we are addressing that issue, which we recognise, and therefore in time for Report we will be determining what our position is. I cannot go further at this stage and I am not going to commit to an amendment, but I make it perfectly clear that we recognise that there is a potential lacuna arising from the fact that while, where a claim has been made before Brexit date it is continued, where the claim has accrued but no claim has actually been made it would be lost by this process. We recognise that there is room for criticism of the legislation on that basis; I am absolutely clear about that.
In these circumstances, I recognise the force of the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in order to address that issue. I would take issue with the scope of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which goes well beyond that and would maintain some sort of claim for Francovich damages in a context quite unrelated to our departure from the EU. I underline that this would not be appropriate.
I mentioned earlier the limited number of cases in which Francovich damages have arisen. That in itself suggests that it might be a proportionate response to the amendments made by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to allow for claims that have accrued because they are potentially very few indeed. I recognise that entirely. I am not committing to an amendment at this stage but I will make the position clear by the time we reach Report. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Before the Minister sits down and we all go to bed, I am very puzzled by his suggestion that there is currently a right to damages in judicial review such that Francovich damages do not add anything. In what circumstances is the Minister suggesting there is a right to damages in judicial review, other than in the very rare cases where you can prove misfeasance in public office?
That is one example of where a claim for damages would arise in the context of a judicial review. There are distinct circumstances in which Francovich damages will arise. The noble Lord will himself recognise that the circumstances in which you can actually establish a basis of claim for Francovich damages are even rarer than those instances in which you can establish one in domestic judicial review.
I do not accept that. It is quite clear, I suggest, that damages under Francovich are provided in circumstances where you would not otherwise get damages because you cannot prove misfeasance but you can prove that the breach is sufficiently serious and that the law was intended to confer a right to damages. That is why I suggest to the Minister that paragraph 4 is taking away something of value.
In response to the noble Lord’s observations, we are dealing in the context of Francovich with the court having to find that there has been a serious failure with regard to an EU obligation, and I suggest that that is not very far from the test of misfeasance in the context of judicial review.
My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who has taken part in this interesting debate. I think that anybody listening in from outside will be impressed that we are working hard on a very serious matter at quarter to one in the morning.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I am pleased to be able—I use that term advisedly—to respond to the issues raised in the context of these amendments. Given the scope of the contributions, I will perhaps begin by touching on one or two points that have been made by noble Lords in the debate.
The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to the content of the joint report and quoted, among other things, the phrase,
“the Agreement should also establish”.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, did likewise, and referred to the passage about the bestowal of rights that will come with the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, referred to Michel Barnier’s recent draft—quite accurately, if I may say so. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out that the European Parliament will have to agree to the terms of any withdrawal agreement. That is self-evident.
In other words, these matters are prospective. Why are they prospective? I do not want to be overly technical, and I do not believe that I will be, but we begin with the duality principle of our law. That means that we enter into international obligations at the level of international law and they have no direct impact on our domestic law. For example, the withdrawal agreement will be an international treaty entered into by the Executive. We then implement or bring the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by way of domestic legislation of this Parliament. That is the duality principle: you have international law and you have domestic law, and you can only have the domestic law once you have the international treaty, because it is from the international treaty rights and obligations that you allow the domestic rights and obligations to be brought into our domestic law. What we have at the present time is a joint report from December of last year. We acknowledge that.
It is not yet a treaty, if I can anticipate the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, because the position of the EU has been, quite rightly, that there is no agreement until everything is agreed. This has been a staged process. We believe that it is important that we were able to achieve the first stage and that we were able to achieve consensus. It is perhaps better to use the word “consensus” here rather than “agreement”, which can be confusing and sometimes misleading. We have achieved consensus in a number of important areas and, as we carry that forward, we proceed into the negotiation of what will be an international treaty.
As we have said before, once we have that international treaty, we can then draw down from the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by virtue of the fact that we will bring forward a withdrawal agreement Bill for scrutiny by this Parliament.
Can the noble and learned Lord explain to the House the difference between consensus and agreement?
One has to be careful in the matter of language. We are at one with regard to the first part of what we want to do in the context of withdrawal, but we do not yet have an agreement that is binding in law with the other EU 27. For example, going forward, and during the subsequent negotiations, the EU may come and go as to the terms of the joint report. Indeed, we saw some indications of that when it came out with its draft recently, where issue was taken with the way in which it expressed some aspects of the joint report, particularly with regard to Northern Ireland. I appreciate that, if you want to construe the term “consensus” in that way, it involves “agreement”. The reason why I am trying to move away from “agreement” is that some see the word and infer that there is some legally binding concept. That is not yet what we have. We have a joint report and, therefore, we have consensus. We are moving on to the overall negotiations on what will ultimately be an international treaty.
We all hope that this agreement, or whatever word it is, is fixed soon, but it could be quite late. We may not have the withdrawal Bill until sometime next year and it could be that we are due to leave a month or so afterwards. This part of the Bill affects individuals more than businesses and they will not know whether they can go to court until it is fixed—we may not get Royal Assent until a month or two before we leave. Is that really a good way to treat individuals?
With respect to the noble Baroness, businesses affect individuals, so it is not appropriate to try to draw a distinction between citizens’ rights and businesses in that context. The right to work involves the right to maintain a business in various countries; you cannot simply draw them apart in that way. As regards regards timing, of course we are concerned to ensure that we achieve a withdrawal agreement sooner rather than later. That is why these negotiations are under way. If perchance no agreement is achieved—and I am not aware of anyone who wishes this, although others will perhaps assert the contrary—we will have to look at how we then deal with matters in the absence of that international agreement.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I hear what he is saying about the duality principle. Can he conceive of any circumstances in which the consensus reached between the United Kingdom and the European Union on the way in which we should treat EU citizens in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom citizens in the EU would not be taken forward or would fall apart? Can he see any circumstances where that might happen?
At the present time, no, but we are only now undertaking the detailed negotiation of the withdrawal agreement. It may be, for example, that the situation of UK citizens in Europe will alter during the course of those negotiations. It may be that the European Parliament will take a different view on how the rights and interests of those UK citizens in Europe should be approached. The noble and learned Lord will recall that, at an earlier stage, there were some suggestions that the rights of UK citizens in Europe would be limited to the member state in which they were resident at the time of exit. There are all sorts of possibilities and I am not going to indulge in an analysis of those possibilities—we are concerned with achieving certainty. We have achieved, by way of the joint report in December, an expression of joint opinion about where we are going, with regard not only to the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom but also to the rights of UK citizens in the EU. Of course we want to bring that in to the final withdrawal agreement, in order that we can then draw it down and implement it in domestic law.
My noble and learned friend is being very honest with the Committee, but in a way that gives me some cause for alarm. He has made it absolutely plain that, at the moment, there is no guarantee. Would it still be possible—I believe that it would—for this Government to give and enact in Parliament a guarantee such as this House voted for at the time of the debates on the Article 50 Bill?
With respect, no, my Lords, because we are not in a position to guarantee that which has been arrived at in terms of the joint report. For example, we cannot by ourselves guarantee the rights of UK citizens in Europe. To try to dissect the joint report and say, “We’ll take one piece out and leave another piece in”, is not a way forward in the context of an ongoing international-level negotiation. It is not the way in which this Government would proceed in that context.
My noble and learned friend is talking in the context of this being an international treaty that has to be transposed into UK law, but surely the amendment addresses the issue of the supremacy of European Union law, which citizens of the EU currently rely on when they live in this country. I thought that the purpose of the amendment was to make sure that those rights continued to exist and would be clarified. That is all that we asking in the Committee today.
With great respect to the noble Baroness, I think that I must respond to my noble friend Lady McIntosh.
Again, that argument rather misses the point, because what we have at the moment is a belief on the basis of the joint report that rights of EU citizens in the UK may be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union after Brexit, but that is not finalised; it is not yet contained in an international treaty agreement.
We have always understood that we cannot unilaterally guarantee in the context of what is now happening an agreement of two parties. What was said from the very beginning, immediately after the referendum, was, “Give a unilateral guarantee and then we can with almost 100% certainty expect full reciprocity”. That was always what was suggested.
With respect to the noble Baroness—who I think invited me to drop all the mire; I am not sure what I am supposed to do about that—the expectation of reciprocity is something that we hope to achieve during the negotiation, and that is ongoing.
Perhaps I may make a little progress.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, also raised the question of settled status. We are intent on putting in place provision for settled status, which can be done pursuant to regulations made under the immigration legislation, in particular the Immigration Act 1971. We plan to open that application process on a voluntary basis in late 2018 in order that people may begin on it. The noble Baroness suggested that it was inappropriate to have an application process and went on to suggest a light-touch process. I suggest that we have an efficient and effective process from the perspective both of the applicant and of those who have to process it.
The noble Baroness also raised the question of arrivals during the implementation period and the need during the implementation period for those arrivals to register. Again, the final outcome as to the rights and obligations of those who arrive during the implementation period will be the subject of negotiation. We hope to take that forward in due course.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I am following what he is saying. Is he in fact confirming that there will be two classes of citizen in Northern Ireland: those who hold Irish citizenship as well and will be able, if there is a border, to cross it totally freely and thus into the rest of Europe, and a second class of UK citizens in Northern Ireland who will not be able to do so?
No, my Lords, there will not be two classes of citizens. Let us take a simple example. If I hold USA citizenship and UK citizenship, I can pass between the UK and the USA because I am a citizen of both countries. If I am a citizen of the UK and a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, I can pass between the two countries because I am a citizen of each state. It is not a case of classification; it is simply a matter of status.
Will the noble and learned Lord clarify a point raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley? What is the position of citizens in Gibraltar?
Gibraltar is an overseas territory whose people hold UK citizenship. However, if they do not retain citizenship of another EU country after Brexit, they will not be EU citizens.
As I understand it, they can get a Spanish passport if they so wish, although I do not think that many of them do. Will they continue to be citizens of the United Kingdom and will they be eligible also to get EU citizenship?
This seems to confuse a number of different issues because the parallels are the same as those in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. If you are a UK citizen in Gibraltar and you are also entitled to apply for and be granted citizenship of Spain, you will then hold dual nationality or dual citizenship, and as a citizen of Spain, for as long as it remains a member state of the EU, you will enjoy the right to EU citizenship. It is no different from the position in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In the same way, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—perhaps referring to something she may have read in the Daily Mail—talked about people applying for citizenship of Malta in order to ensure they can maintain EU citizenship. This is how it happens, but the fundamental point is that you cannot be a citizen of the EU unless you are a citizen of a member state. That is written into the treaties.
It may appear—and it will almost certainly appear to the Chief Whip—that I have digressed slightly from some of the amendments; he will be watching. I just seek to touch on some of them. I hope I covered in my opening remarks some of the points made. Amendments 160 and 170 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and Amendment 202 by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. Unfortunately, she was not here to speak to it, but it was referred to. As I have indicated, at the end of the day, we will have to conclude the negotiations in respect of the withdrawal agreement treaty and then draw it down into our domestic law. Tying Clause 9 to a particular outcome is not going to assist that.
The noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, moved Amendment 210. Again, I hope I have set out the Government’s position on this. We appreciate what we have achieved by way of the joint report, and we go on to the detailed negotiations in the hope it will effectively mean that we can confirm in domestic law not only the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom, but the right of UK citizens in the EU.
The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, moved Amendment 211, which details a requirement to keep equivalence with the EU on rights and protections. Again, this is prospective. We are addressing it in the course of negotiations and we hope to achieve it in many respects. In my view and in the view of the Government, it would not be appropriate to bring this into our domestic law.
Finally, we have Amendments 49 and 52, which I hope I have gone some way to addressing so far. The Bill aims to provide a stable and certain domestic statute book on exit day. That is its point, irrespective of the result of the negotiations and of any final agreement with the EU. Of course, once we achieve a final agreement, we fully appreciate that we are going to have to draw it down into our domestic law. Parliament will have an opportunity to scrutinise it.
If, as I am sure we both do not want, the withdrawal agreement is not reached, what then happens to EU citizens’ rights? Do we not have the opportunity now to guarantee them, whatever the case?
With respect, if there were no agreement, then it would be for this sovereign Parliament to decide what it was going to do about that in domestic law. We have already made clear expressions of intent as regards their status. There is an issue here of time and place. While I understand the expressions of concern that we have heard from across the House, this is not the time and this Bill is not the place for these amendments. In these circumstances, I invite noble Lords not to press them.
I wonder if I could put one point to the noble and learned Lord before he sits down. As ever, what he said was intellectually lucid and stimulating. I just want to jog back to what he said about consensus and agreement. It is a very important distinction and I am sure it will be interesting to all his ministerial colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and to diplomats around the world. How does this distinction translate into other languages? Does he think that our interlocutors in Brussels regard what we appeared to accept in December as a consensus or as an agreement? Does he think that they will now be quite relaxed if we walk away from some of what was a consensus because it was not an agreement? I should like to be a little clearer on this. It is going to be very important as we go through this debate when we are told that things are part of a consensus and not part of an agreement. If, with his usual intellectual authority, he could explain that to naive, one-time make-believe diplomats like me, I should be grateful.
I am most obliged to the noble Lord, if only for the compliment. As I sought to explain, we have the joint report and we have embraced it. We go on now to the next stage of negotiation. I used the term “consensus”, perhaps ill advisedly, to underline the point that we have not yet signed a binding agreement in international law—we have not yet achieved a treaty. We strive to achieve a treaty, and in striving to achieve that treaty we have in mind what we have already achieved in the joint report. But we acknowledge, as the EU itself has noted, that we have not yet placed that in the form of a treaty that is binding in international law. Until we do that, we do not draw it down into domestic law.
Does the noble and learned Lord envisage that Her Majesty’s Government might resile from any of the commitments they gave in the consensus they reached at the end of last year?
I do not even imagine that Her Majesty’s Government would wish to do anything of the sort.
Before my noble friend concludes, does he share my concern about what the Minister said about the difference between “consensus” and “agreement”? Does he agree that that is quite a significant statement on the part of the Government in the course of this debate? The only point in making the distinction, as I understand it, is that the Government do not regard themselves as fully committed to the terms of the “agreement” of last December.
It is unusual for me to intervene, but I feel that if the noble Lord is going to make statements, he should make them accurately. If he is going to represent what a Minister has said, he should do so accurately. The distinction I drew was between an agreement that was now binding in international law and an agreement that was not now binding in international law. I hope the noble Lord’s recollection coincides with mine. If it does not, could he perhaps consult Hansard?
It is a very interesting point, and the noble Lord, Lord Patten, highlighted it in his intervention. I wish that while he was speaking I had been able to translate “consensus” and “agreement” into Spanish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Welsh and so on to see whether there is a coincidence between one and the other. No doubt that is something that we can return to.
The Minister finished by saying that there is a time and a place, and that this is not the right time and not the right place for these amendments. There will be many more times and this will be the right place, and I look forward to speaking to the rights of European—
My Lords, I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for making that point. I would add only that I spoke as a Minister of this Government in expressing that view, because I spoke from the Dispatch Box when I made it clear. I can refer the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, to Hansard in regard to that point. Of course, the origins of the remark may not have had quite the impact that it could otherwise have had if coming from another source—I do not seek to elaborate on that point.
Sometimes it comes ill to counsel to listen rather than to speak, but this is an occasion when it is entirely appropriate for me and for the Government to listen to what has been said. I am extremely grateful for the contributions of all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords with regard to the formulation of Clause 6(2). I refer to the formulation of the clause because I believe we have a common desire to ensure that we give appropriate, effective and clear guidance, in so far as it is required, to the judiciary regarding what is a relatively complex issue. Of course the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out that in the normal way one might delete Clause 6(2) and allow the courts to deal with this as they deal with other matters of comparative law, but he went on to point out—quite correctly, I submit—that here we are dealing with a very particular situation where guidance may be needed. I am conscious of the way in which the various amendments have evolved.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, also referred to Clause 6(4) and the issue of whether and when the Supreme Court might decide whether to adhere to precedents in this context. I bow to the far greater experience of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Neuberger and Lord Hope, who sat in the UK Supreme Court. My limited experience is that, where I attempted to persuade them to adhere or not to adhere to a particular precedent, they had no difficulty in making their own minds up.
Be that as it may, I recognise the force of the points that have been made. They have come from beyond this House as well because, as noble Lords will be aware, the Constitution Committee also made some recommendations about this. Indeed, its early recommendation in March 2017 was,
“the Government may wish to consider whether the Bill should provide that, as a general rule, UK courts ‘may have regard to’ the case law of the Court of Justice (and we stress that it should be optional)”.
Indeed, we were having regard to that as we looked at Clause 6(2).
A point was made about the distinction between “may” and “must” in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It occurs to me that, where he uses “must”, he goes on in his amendment at (2C) to qualify the context in which that word is used, and there may not be a vast gulf between “may” and “must” in the context of the two amendments that have been tabled. Of course, that which was recommended by the Law Society of Scotland has the merit of some simplicity and embraces the same point.
At this stage I would add only that the Bingham Centre looked at the current recommendations of the Constitution Committee that lie behind the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and raised concerns about a number of aspects of the formulation put forward by the committee. However, I make it clear that we greatly appreciate the contributions that have been made to this part of the Committee’s debate. We will go away and consider the various formulations, and I believe it would be sensible for the Government to engage with various interested parties once we have come to a view about how we can properly express what we all understand is necessary policy guidance in the context of this exceptional step. Against that background, I invite noble Lords to consider not pressing their amendments at this stage.
I know I will not be popular by holding things up, but the Minister was specifically asked if he could explain the reference to,
“another EU entity or the EU”,
in Clause 6(2). I do not know whether he feels he could do that. Does it have any reference to the European Commission? The Prime Minister said we would have a binding commitment to follow EU state aid and competition law, and I wondered if it had any relevance in that context.
I am not going to elaborate at this stage because, as I say, the Government are going to go away and consider the proposals for an amendment to Clause 6(2).
I am very grateful to the Minister for that encouraging response, and I am grateful to the noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have spoken in this debate.
On a matter of detail, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about new subsection (2B) in Amendment 56, giving guidance to the judges to look to the relevance of an EU agreement. The noble Lord asked how that would work. I shall give him an example. If the judge is seeking to interpret a provision of retained EU law, relating to, say, medicinal products; if the Court of Justice after exit day pronounces on a regulation which has become part of retained EU law, and if the withdrawal agreement has said that there will be close regulatory alignment between the EU and the United Kingdom in that particular area, then the judge would be encouraged to pay close regard to what the Court of Justice had said about the meaning of the regulation. Our court would still be in control but it would pay particular regard—that is the whole point of new subsection (2B).
There is widespread agreement around the House that the wording of Clause 6(2) is unsatisfactory and that Parliament needs to give as much guidance as possible to judges in this context to protect them from being seen to be required to take policy decisions, which would undermine confidence in the rule of law. The Government and Parliament would be very unwise to reject, in particular, the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. It is much more difficult to identify precisely what should be put in place of Clause 6(2). I am encouraged by what the Minister said—that the Government are listening and considering this matter. I am sure that all noble Lords who have spoken would be happy to contribute to the discussions that will take place before Report. I hope that, on Report, the Government will bring forward amendments to Clause 6(2).
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for what has been an excellent debate. I use the word “debate” but only one point of view has been expressed and I have heard the message from all sides. However, I shall address the issues under consideration.
I say, first, to my noble friend Lord Cormack that he has put an intriguing thought into my mind. I will speak to my officials first thing tomorrow morning to find out where I, as a Minister of State, come in this list of 109—I suspect more towards the bottom than the top but we will find out.
The noble Lord, Lord Wilson, asked me about the number of people who will be able to exercise this power without parliamentary scrutiny—a question that I suspect is almost impossible to answer. I think that the main issue is not the number of people but the number of limitations on the exercise of that power. The power is time limited and clearly limited in what it can be used for. It may only prevent, remedy or mitigate deficiencies in EU law, and of course secondary legislation is subject to well-established parliamentary procedures. Where legislative powers are sub-delegated to public authorities, this will always be subject to the affirmative procedure.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to revisit what is clearly a very important issue in the context of the Bill. The Government will place some additional draft examples of statutory instruments or parts thereof in the Library of the House. That is something that a number of noble Lords have asked for in meetings that I have had with them, so I will ensure that that happens—most likely tomorrow.
I have listened with interest to the many contributions today, and to the extensive contributions of the Constitution Committee, which I had the pleasure of speaking to this morning along with my colleague in the other place, the Solicitor-General. I have read the reports of that committee and of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which have very much helped to frame our thoughts on this issue.
As a number of noble Lords have said, both those reports go into great detail on the scope of the delegated powers. As many noble Lords will also be aware, they come out with quite different recommendations. As I said at Second Reading, we are approaching this matter in a spirit of collaboration. The Government are looking very closely at how the powers in the Bill are drawn and how they will be exercised, particularly in the light of the committee recommendations and developments in other pieces of legislation.
As the Constitution Committee notes, comparable arguments were made during the passage of the sanctions Bill through this House and a mutually agreeable position was found in that instance. That has clearly informed the committee’s recommendation and we are receptive to the arguments made in its report. I am confident that a mutually agreeable position will be found.
As I will explain in a moment, the Government do not see the DPRRC’s recommendation as workable. However, we would very much like to talk to noble Lords following the debate, with an eye to coming back to this issue on Report.
As noble Lords will appreciate, the situation that this Bill responds to is, quite simply, unprecedented. A vast amount of EU law is being transferred to our statute book, including thousands of EU regulations. As such, the programme of secondary legislation to ensure that this law operates effectively must match that. In the face of such a task, it has always been clear that the Government will need relatively broad delegated powers to deliver a functioning statute book. Indeed, the Constitution Committee outlined in its interim report that “relatively wide” delegated powers were inevitable.
I understand that there are noble Lords who have had concerns about delegated powers for some time, and the Government are keen to continue listening to suggestions in order to improve those areas of the Bill. That listening process started during this Bill’s passage through the other place, where a number of changes were introduced to reduce the scope and increase the parliamentary scrutiny of the delegated powers. However, we cannot significantly restrict the scope of these powers, which, it is acknowledged, need to be broad.
Let me deal directly with the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson. Much of the concern about the delegated powers focuses on the use of “appropriate” to describe the discretion afforded to Ministers when making regulations to correct deficiencies. In case there is some misunderstanding here, let me be clear: “appropriate” in Clause 7 does not give Ministers unrestricted discretion to correct anything that they may wish or like. Corrections must not be appropriate per se; they must be appropriate to correct the particular deficiency they are addressing. The threshold for ministerial decisions is set firmly within the context of those purposes.
I appreciate that there is a degree of subjectivity to these tests—but that is true of almost all tests, and it is important to acknowledge that there are limitations on the power. Parliament polices the Government’s interpretation of its vires to act through the mechanism of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, which I have no doubt will take a keen interest in instruments under this Bill; and ultimately, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out, these tests are litigable in the courts. So we cannot responsibly remove “appropriate” from the Bill.
I will now delve into the detail of the various different permutations of amendments seeking to restrict the scope of the delegated powers. The first amendments I would like to discuss are Amendments 201, 243 and 245, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, which attempt to ensure that Ministers have considered that exercises of the main powers are made for good reasons and are reasonable courses of action. These match the Constitution Committee’s recommendation, and a smaller group were added to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill.
Amendments 74, 117 and 139, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, seek to write into the Bill that Ministers’ consideration of the appropriateness of any exercise of the delegated powers must be made on reasonable grounds. This is the right type of approach in not altering the fundamental scope of the powers.
Is my noble friend saying that he has made his mind up—or the Government have made their collective mind up—on retaining “appropriate”?
If my noble friend will forgive me, I will discuss that in a second.
Ministers make their decisions on secondary legislation based on reasonable grounds in the normal course of events. The use of these powers will be subject to the usual public law principles designed to ensure that the Executive act reasonably, in good faith and for proper purposes. I accept, however, that noble Lords have principled and legitimate concerns and we will ensure that these are addressed and that the reasonableness of a Minister’s courses of action is made clearer. Given the views expressed today, I would like to engage in further discussions with noble Lords with a view to returning to this issue on Report.
Amendments 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 116, 118, 140, 229, 253, 254, 257, 258, 264, 265, 276, 277, 290 and 291, which were tabled by noble Lords including the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane—to whom I spoke yesterday and I understand why he is not in his place today—the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seek to exchange “appropriate” for “necessary”, about which we have had a great deal of debate, in the main powers and schedules in which it can be found. I understand noble Lords’ concerns but, as I have stated, this would have a serious impact on our vital programme of secondary legislation to prepare our statute book for exit day. “Necessary” is a high bar to meet. The courts have said that the nearest paraphrase for “necessary” is “really needed”, but such a test would be too constrictive.
Can the noble Lord give an example of where something is not really needed? Surely the whole point of this legislation is only to do things that are really needed—not to do anything that you think, when you wake up in the morning, might be a jolly good idea.
If the noble Lord will have a little patience I will get on to that in a second.
If regulations could only make “necessary” provisions, the powers would be heavily restricted to a much smaller set of essential changes. For example, if the Government wanted to change references in legislation from euros to sterling, we would expect such a change to be considered “appropriate” both by the courts and, I hope, by this House, but it might not be considered “necessary”.
We might manage to ensure that our statute book is in a legally operable state, but it would not be in its most coherent form, or arranged in a way that best promotes our national interest. I am sure that this Committee does not intend to restrict the Government from legislating coherently or in the national interest, but that may be the unintended consequence of amendments which swap “appropriate” for “necessary”.
I note that some of the amendments in this group contain wording suggested by the DPRRC in its report on the powers in this Bill. In particular, I was interested in the assertion that:
“The operative test in Clause 7 should be whether it is necessary to deal with the problem, not whether only one solution follows inexorably”.
I first highlight that I do not believe that these amendments break up the necessity process in the way that the committee intends. I also question the merits of breaking up the necessity test in the way that the committee suggests. In its report, the committee cites the example of a deficiency in which there is:
“A requirement to collect and send information that will no longer be accepted by the EU”.
The committee states that it,
“is clearly a deficiency that it is necessary to remove from the statute book: it cannot be right to retain a redundant legal duty that amounts to a waste of time, effort and public money”.
However, I question whether this change is strictly necessary, or whether it is merely appropriate. The committee asserts that it cannot be “right” for this arrangement to continue—and I agree with it—but is it strictly “necessary” that it be removed? What great harm, after all, would be done if the information were still sent? The statute book would continue to function, albeit illogically and not in the public interest. But is it necessary, in a strict legalistic sense, to have the statute book working logically and in the public interest, or are all our changes merely appropriate? In these sorts of instance we cannot with any certainty predict the way in which a court might rule. It is precisely to guard against such a decision that the Government cannot support the suggestion made by the committee.
Is the Minister saying that he will not accept these amendments because he might be defeated in court? If so, that is a thoroughly bad reason.
I think I have made my position clear on that but, nevertheless, I also said that we are listening and endeavouring to satisfy the concerns of noble Lords.
Amendments 73, 119 and 141 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and also spoken to by my noble friend Lord Lang, meanwhile used “essential” rather than “appropriate” to limit the discretion of Ministers in exercising the delegated powers. This really is very similar to the amendments which propose the use of “necessary”. I think that a court would likely interpret the meaning of “necessary” and “essential”—in this context—in much the same way and, therefore, I will not repeat the arguments that I have already made.
I beg my noble friend to talk to his ministerial colleagues and think again, otherwise the Government will suffer the most massive, crushing defeat when this comes up on Report.
I said at the start that I am setting out a position, but I have heard the messages that came to me from all sides of the Committee and I very much take on board the point that my noble friend makes. I shall state again that, despite their breadth, these are not powers designed to deliver major policy changes and they can only be read in light of their purpose. For Clause 7(1), that is to “prevent, remedy or mitigate” deficiencies arising from withdrawal.
Amendment 244A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Dunlop, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, touches on a point to which I will return to in more detail later, but I will stress now the risks of introducing additional legal uncertainty by creating new and untested definitions to the law. However, I am conscious of the need for transparency in this process and we will look to see how, in line with developments and other legislation, we can ensure that ministerial decision-making about the appropriate exercise of the powers is more transparent to the Committee.
Amendment 75, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, allows me the opportunity to expand upon the reasons why we are taking the correcting power and to build upon the arguments made in previous days of debate. Areas of our domestic law, such as those relating to EU obligations, will be redundant when we leave the EU. The Bills repealed by Schedule 9 are an example of this. Some noble Lords will consider that having provisions that do nothing on the statute book is not harmful. Indeed, the Easter Act 1928, which was never commenced, continues to sit on the statute book with no effect and causes no harm. My noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, also argued that there is no legal recourse under the use of powers under Clause 7. That is not strictly correct. If the threshold set out in the Act is overstepped the regulations can be struck down by judicial review.
The noble Lord was helpful in trying to give an example for something else. Could he give an example of where something that was “appropriate” could not be covered by the principle of necessity?
I do not have any additional examples beyond the ones I have already given, but I will certainly write to the noble Lord with alternative information on that.
However, the Government and I believe that a majority of noble Lords in this House will agree that the statute book is not truly effective unless it is tidy. The Bill is designed to provide clarity and certainty on the law; if we cannot remove or correct these redundant provisions this goal will be undermined. However, having said all that, as I have set out, I would be very happy to engage in further discussions with noble Lords. I have very much heard the messages given from all sides of the Committee with a view to returning to this issue on Report. On the basis of those assurances, I hope that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I thank the 13 noble Lords who spoke on the amendment, all of whom were unanimous in their support of the need to change Clause 7(1). There was a lot of support for the substitution of “necessary” for “appropriate”. I am not going to go through what was said because, first, I agreed with everything; and secondly, it was said so eloquently that it would be otiose for me to add to it at this hour of night.
The Minister has clearly heard the voices of so many noble Lords in favour of some change to Clause 7(1). I say respectfully that he seemed to be speaking with two voices. One was a clear, fierce defence of “appropriate”. I have to confess that I found some of it surprising. I would have thought, faced with EU retained law expressed in the euro, that that would be a deficiency that one needed to correct and that it would be necessary to correct it. However, I will study what the Minister said with interest. On the one hand he spoke with a fierce voice defending the present drafting. On the other, he referred three or four times to the need to discuss before Report. At one point, he said that he was sure that a mutually agreeable position would be found. We need to study exactly what he said. Against that background, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, when we discussed Clause 2 and the Constitution Committee’s amendments, I said I did not wish to exclude the three paragraphs that the Constitution Committee wanted to exclude; I wish to exclude them instead from amendment under this paragraph. With the discussion we just had about what is necessary rather than just appropriate, to put as much as possible beyond the temptation of amendment by the Government seems to be a good idea. That was the approach I outlined previously. As far as this clause is concerned, it is in line with the Constitution Committee and with the Bingham Centre report, and in view of the state of my voice, I think it is best if I just say that I beg to move.
My Lords, I am tempted to send some cough sweets to the noble Baroness to help her: she certainly has my sympathy, and I suspect the Prime Minister’s sympathy, for the difficult position she is in. I am grateful to her for the amendment and this debate.
The noble Baroness has proposed to limit the Clause 7(1) power so that it is only possible to correct deficiencies in domestic legislation in two circumstances. The first is where the deficiency is of any type provided for in this Bill and that the legislation was a statutory instrument made under Section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of Schedule 2 to, the European Communities Act. The second, for all other EU derived domestic legislation, is that inappropriate EU references are the only type of deficiency which may be corrected.
I understand the noble Baroness’s well-intentioned desire to, where possible, protect from amendment legislation which has already been considered in detail by this House. However, while Section 2(2) of the ECA has been a crucial tool in the Government’s implementation of our EU obligations, it is far from the only way the Government have implemented EU obligations in the 45 years of our EU membership. Indeed, many noble Lords have been vociferous in encouraging Governments past and present to do more under primary legislation and specific powers and less under Section 2(2). Furthermore, whether a deficiency is in primary or secondary legislation is not, I believe, a meaningful indication of the type of deficiencies which might arise in it, or the significance of the correction that needs to be made.
To be ready for exit day a large number of fairly straight-forward changes will need to be made to primary legislation in exactly the same way as in secondary legislation made under the ECA. For example, Section 42(5) of the Employment Relations Act 2004, concerning information and consultation, will require amendment as outlined in the draft regulations the Government have already published. This power relates to the implementation of a directive. This directive has already been implemented in our domestic law and the relevant implementing legislation will be converted to retained EU law by the Bill. Once the UK has withdrawn from the EU, this power will have no practical application. I hope noble Lords will accept that we need to be able to make appropriate corrections to such deficiencies. The power therefore needs to be broad enough to allow for corrections to be made to both primary and secondary legislation for the full range of deficiencies. Textual and technical changes must be made in primary legislation if we are to have a functioning statute book on exit day.
The Government’s contention is that what matters is not the status of the law that is being amended but the purpose of the amendment. Indeed, some provisions of secondary legislation made under Section 2(2) are extremely important, which is why the Government have provided for the sifting committee and affirmative procedure to ensure that all regulations are subject to the appropriate level of scrutiny. For example, much of the vital statutory protections of the rights of workers in this country lies in regulations made under Section 2(2) of the ECA. We have already published details of some of the corrections that will be required here, and I hope they have laid concerns to rest. They are also representative of the type of corrections that will arise throughout the statute book and will need to be corrected to ensure that important areas of law continue to function.
I hope I have persuaded the noble Baroness of the Government’s position that it is the substance of the change, not where it is being made, that matters, and that she therefore feels able—if she can do so—to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
In the absence of my noble friend Lord Bassam, I just want to encourage the Minister—though I am sure it is already in his notes—to comment on Amendment 244, which appears in this group. It requires that:
“The statement under sub-paragraph (2) must include a certification that the regulation does no more than make technical changes to retained EU law in order for it to work following exit, and that no policy decisions are being made”.
I appreciate that the Minister and other Ministers have said all the way along that this is not about making policy, so it should be an easy certification on this occasion for a Minister to sign. I hope that that might be accepted.
My Lords, Amendment 81 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, concerns the core concept of this Bill, namely that it preserves and makes functional the law at the moment of the UK’s exit from the EU. As the long and learned debates in this House and the other place demonstrate, this is of course something much simpler said than done. We can all agree that the law in the UK should not be considered deficient simply because the EU adopts a new law once the UK has left. The Bill reflects that with the provision in Clause 7(4) and, therefore, this would not constitute a valid trigger for the use of the power in Clause 7(1).
It is also the case that the law is not deficient simply because EU law, as is often the case in some areas, contains provisions that are adopted before our withdrawal but only come into force or apply after exit day. This reflects the approach taken in Clause 3, which provides for the conversion of direct EU legislation that is operative in the UK immediately before exit day. As the Government set out when we debated Clause 3, we believe that it is right that we incorporate only that law which is operative at the time of our exit. It is surely not taking back control to this Parliament and the devolved legislatures if we simultaneously preserve the automaticity of new provisions of what was EU law becoming operative in our law, months or perhaps years later. It would be unacceptable for EU law provisions to flow automatically into the UK many years after we have left and would undermine the clarity and certainty this Bill is designed to provide. That is why Clause 3 preserves only the law as individuals and businesses were bound by it immediately before exit day, and why that decision is reflected in Clause 7(4), which makes it clear that the law is not deficient simply because it does not contain planned future changes to EU law. In preserving EU law, the Government have drawn a line in the legal sand on exit day. Wherever the line was drawn, the outcomes would, of course, please some and not others. I note that the controversial ports regulation, although already in force, will enter into application only days before exit day. Clause 7(4) merely reflects this line in the legal sand.
Although Amendment 244, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam, asks for,
“a certification that the regulation does no more than make technical changes … and that no policy decisions are being made”,
I take the point that policy choices may be being made. Although it is not in this group, Amendment 244A says that there would be a certificate saying that either the change was just technical or a policy choice has been made. That amendment may not be in this group, but I am interested whether the Minister is closing his mind to the idea that there should be a certificate from the relevant Minister. That is what this amendment aims to do.
No. As I have made clear throughout the Bill, our minds are not closed on many of these matters. I think I gave the noble Baroness an example. It is a difficult distinction to draw about what is making policy or what is a policy choice. As I said, the choice between two regulators can be said to be a policy choice, but it is certainly not our intention to use any of the power in the Bill to massively expand on different levels of policy. It is our intention to impose a snapshot on exit day and ensure that the law is compliant and tidy, as we have said.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister and to all who have contributed to this little group. While I am grateful to my noble friend for his reply, I am not sure that he addressed the question of timings, and I am slightly concerned about the scope for judicial reviews. I end with the comment that the wording I seek to delete refers to the earlier Amendment 18, on which we had a lengthier debate, and to which I will return on Report. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I think the good news is that we heard a hint earlier that this might be one of the areas where we are going to hear a bit of movement tonight. If the Chief Whip will allow us to go home after this group, we will be sent home in a very happy mood.
My name is also on these two amendments and I will not make the case again, because the noble Lord, Lord Newby, made the clearest of cases against the use of secondary powers to create new quangos, with others adding similar reasons for why this is not just a power too far but is in breach of government guidelines.
I will add only two points. First—this is a slight gripe, I am afraid—in answer to my Written Question as to whether there were other examples of NGOs established by secondary legislation, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, said that it was not possible to answer other than “at disproportionate cost”. But the Government must have known why I was asking this Question—they have a brain—and I would have thought that if there were some public bodies set up by secondary legislation they could have found a few examples. This was some time ago. Unfortunately it is an undated letter—like many I get from the Government —but it is HL1651, so I think it was probably last year that I asked it.
My second point—and in a sense it is really the point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Beith—arises from my experience both as a consumer representative and as a former member of various regulatory bodies set up always by statute. It is simply to say that the very way we establish those bodies—whether it is the Charity Commission, the Competition Commission, the Legal Services Board or the National Consumer Council of which my noble friend Lord Whitty was such an eminent chair until the Public Bodies Act abolished it—affects how they do their job. The founding statute will spell out their task and set out the “have regards to” that influence how they set about their work. It will also define who sits on their boards, how they are appointed, to whom they report and whether, for example, they have a duty to heed consumers in the relevant industry, the regulated industry itself, the employees, the wider social considerations such as the environment or things like that—and indeed their degree of independence from the Government. It is a crucial part of the function of many public bodies.
Such limitations on the powers of those public bodies, and the requirements for how they operate, are written in primary legislation. They can be discussed carefully, they can be amended—as we did before with others, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said—they can be debated in this Chamber or in the other place, and they could have pre-legislative scrutiny. For example, setting up a new public ombudsman—as the Member in the other place Mr Jenkins has been recommending—could come by a Bill and could be amended after consultation with the relevant interested parties. That is the way that we should set up public bodies. Instead, this Bill says to a Minister, “Well, you decide. You decide how to set it up; you decide how its board will be established; you decide who to appoint it—probably you could decide to appoint your friends to it”—and Parliament will nod it through. That is not good enough and this power must be dispensed with.
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to respond to the debate, if only to confound all the prejudices of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that I am some inflexible hardliner who never gives him anything he might want and that only my noble friend Lady Goldie can—I was going to say “satisfy him”, but perhaps I should not use that word. He could not put a cigarette paper between us, by the way. She might do so with more charm than me, but we are saying essentially the same thing.
I understand that a number of noble Lords are concerned about the scope of this power and I reassure your Lordships that the Government are listening to those concerns. When Clause 7 was drafted, we thought it would be only sensible for the sake of contingency to include in its scope the ability to establish new public authorities to ensure, as many amendments in the other place sought to ensure, against losing any important functions as they are transferred over from the EU, as no such public authority may currently exist in the UK. Certainty and continuity are, after all, the watchwords of the Bill.
We have been clear that our preference will always be, where possible, to transfer any functions returning from the EU to existing bodies in the UK, but it has proven necessary to legislate in parallel with negotiations because of the strict Article 50 timeline. Therefore, we do not know at this stage exactly which functions are returning. We must make this legislation without prejudice to those negotiations, where, as the Prime Minister said in her Mansion House speech last week, we are looking to continue a productive relationship with various EU bodies as part of our deep and special partnership.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked about our strategy towards the agencies. Where there is a demonstrable national interest in pursuing a continued relationship with any EU body or agency, the Government will consider carefully whether we should do so. However, as he knows, it is ultimately a matter for negotiations. We remain committed to keep Parliament as fully informed as possible without prejudice to our negotiating position.
However, we already know of one function that we expect to return to the UK and which it is agreed does not sit happily with any existing public body: our environmental protections. This prompted the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to announce our intention to consult on a new, independent and statutory body to advise and challenge the Government and potentially other public bodies on the environment—we discussed this extensively earlier—stepping in when needed to hold these bodies to account and enforce standards. As such, we need to retain the power until we can be confident of delivering all necessary legislative changes without it.
It is for this reason that I am sorry to say that we will not be accepting Amendments 83 and 94 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, which seek to remove this ability from the scope of the power. The Government have a responsibility to safeguard against the potential disruption and confusion caused to businesses and individuals as we exit the EU, and we believe that the ability to create new public authorities plays a big part in ensuring this. However, the Government also recognise their responsibility to Parliament in listening to Members’ concerns regarding the legislation it seeks to pass. Therefore, I can assure noble Lords that the Government are working hard on finding a resolution to this matter that will satisfy the concerns of noble Lords—maybe even the noble Lord, Lord Adonis—and we will revisit it on Report. In the meantime, with those assurances, I hope the noble Lord will be able to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The general principle referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, which has been very clearly enunciated by the courts, is that no public authority, including local authorities, has the power or statutory authority to exact money that exceeds the amount that the local authority—or other person making the imposition—sets. The charge the person is required to pay must be just equal to the amount that will be needed to carry out the service, or other thing. If it does exceed it, it is taxation and that covers all forms; it does not matter whether it is a payment, charge, fee or anything else. That is a general principle. Therefore, the provision in Clause 7(7), preventing the regulations imposing or increasing taxation, prevents any local authority or other power having the power to make any such imposition.
On the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, I wonder whether the first part of the clause —Clause 8(1), I think—is the subject of Amendment 126. My noble friend Lord Deben wondered why we were talking about this in a withdrawal Bill, but the clause says that we may have an international obligation that is breached by withdrawal; it therefore seems reasonable to deal with that in the withdrawal Bill because it is a consequence of withdrawal. That amendment implies that this power cannot be used to make any financial settlement that would cause a cost to the United Kingdom because, if it did, it would inevitably require taxation—presumably, whoever makes the settlement does not intend to defray the cost out of his or her own pocket. It is a fundamental restriction on the way in which these matters of international obligation may be resolved. I think I am right in that, but no doubt the noble Lord will tell us its effect on the amendment in due course.
My Lords, Amendments 86, 126, 127 and 155—in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Kramer, and the noble Lords, Lord Turnbull, Lord Lisvane and Lord Higgins—concern Clauses 7, 8 and 9 and the ability to provide for taxation or fees and charges under those powers.
Let me start by saying that the Government are aware of the concerns of many noble Lords about the raising of fees under these powers. On Report, we will look closely at how we can resolve those concerns. Let me explain the various issues, beginning with Clauses 7 and 9. I am glad to be able to reassure noble Lords that the restrictions in Clause 7(7)(a) and Clause 9(3)(a) already prevent Ministers establishing charges of a type that would involve any element of taxation or tax-like provision under these powers. Beyond that specific issue, I want to set out the Government’s intentions with regard to those fees and charges.
Will my noble friend tell the Committee what, in his view, is the essential difference between a fee, a charge and a tax? The Committee must understand the expressly defined difference.
If my noble friend will stay with me, I will come on to that. Beyond that specific issue, I will set out the Government’s intention with regard to fees and charges. We have included the powers in Schedule 4 to provide for fees and charges in order to be clear and transparent. It is, however, necessary for the powers in Clauses 7 and 9 to interact with existing regimes to correct deficiencies within them, and to properly modify them to reflect the withdrawal agreement. Without prejudice to our negotiations, an example of such a correction might be modifying a fee in relation to the authorisation of a credit rating agency so that the fee becomes payable to the UK financial regulators rather than the European Securities and Markets Authority. That might be argued to amount to the imposition of a new fee.
The requirements to pay new fees and charges established under Schedule 4, and the ability to modify existing regimes, will depend on deficiencies being properly corrected and on functions being transferred. Clauses 7 and 9 are not primarily aimed at imposing fees, and they cannot impose other kinds of charges, but sometimes that will be part and parcel of the correction. In answer to the questions about fees and charges from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the other poachers turned gamekeepers—if I may refer to them as that—on the Privy Council Bench, a fee is a payment only for a service received. By a charge, in paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 7, we mean anything which goes beyond cost recovery. Clause 7 cannot create a charge. In addition, creating either a fee or a charge is subject to the affirmative procedure.
The argument against a tax restriction—
There is a large number of fees that are paid to, for example, the Environment Agency, to carry out certain services. We have no idea whether those fees are equalled by the amount of work that is done. The Environment Agency says: “We want this amount of money because we need it”. There is no proof. If one were to prove that the agency spent less money than the fee, does it then become a charge or a tax? There is a real issue here. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay points to the fact that one may define it like this but how does one prove it, and how does the House deal with it? Is it not better to not have this distinction at all?
I am sorry for my noble friend, but he did say that both the fees and the charges were subject to the affirmative procedure. I know that the fees are, but I am not sure where in the Bill I find the provision that charges are subject to the affirmative procedure. Will he tell the Committee?
I do not have the specific clause in front of me, but I am sure that is the case and I will write to the noble Viscount about it. I am not an expert on Erskine May and the precise legal definitions, but I will have a look at the matter towards which the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has pointed me.
The argument against a tax restriction on Clause 8, made by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, is altogether different. The Clause 8 power is predicated on the fact that when we leave the EU, without further action we may inadvertently end up in breach of certain international obligations which have been affected by our EU membership, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out was said in the other place by my honourable friend Robin Walker. It is possible that some of these obligations may be in the field of tariffs, although it is, of course, impossible to know the full picture until our future relationship with the EU has been negotiated. If Clause 8 had a tax restriction as the other main powers do, we may not have the capability to remedy these breaches in all circumstances. As I hope noble Lords will appreciate, we are committed to international relationships and a key part of that is ensuring that we are fully compliant with our international obligations.
That is a very interesting point. Would that be remediable if we were to stay within the European Economic Area, which would classify us as part nevertheless of a regional economic arrangement? Is that one of the things that perhaps we and the Government should take into account in considering this transition?
If we were part of the European Economic Area, I assume that we would not need to do that. However, as we are not going to be part of the European Economic Area, it may perhaps be necessary. I hope that the noble Lord will listen to my next point.
In the light of our successful phase 1 agreement, we are increasingly confident that we will secure a deal with the EU and that the prospect of leaving negotiations with no deal has reduced significantly. It is in both the UK’s and the EU’s interests to secure a good deal for both sides. However, as a responsible Government, we have a duty to plan for the unlikely scenario in which no mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached. I hope noble Lords agree that that is common sense. If we do not have this power, and in exiting the EU we are unable to correct a breach of the MFN principle, another WTO member could bring a dispute against the UK in the WTO. That is a situation that we want to avoid, and which could result in a loss of trade for UK business through retaliatory measures by other WTO members or claims for compensation against the UK.
The noble Lord makes some very good points about how we might need to levy charges or fees, or whatever he wishes to call them, but he has not made any case as to why this should be done by secondary legislation as opposed to primary legislation.
Because in such circumstances we will need to react quickly in the light of the events as they happen, depending on—
I did not want to use the word “expedient”, as it had been referred to.
It would be totally appropriate and, indeed, necessary to do so in the circumstances. We are in a difficult position in that we are trying to plan for all eventualities. It is one of those powers that we hope we will never use because, of course, we want, and seek, a good agreement with the EU.
There is a different eventuality using the same example that the noble Lord gave—namely, the eventuality of the Government’s proposal for what I think is called an implementation phase; most of us call it a transition or standstill phase—lasting about two years. Is he suggesting that we might be in breach of our WTO obligations if we reach an agreement with the European Union on that basis, because it is about to be reached, is it not?
No, I am not suggesting that we might be in breach of our international obligations. However, as the noble Lord knows, we are currently negotiating for the implementation period, and as soon as we have an agreement—I hope within the next few weeks—we will be sure to report back to the noble Lord and others.
For those reasons, which I set out earlier, the Government therefore cannot accept these amendments to Clause 8. The power can be used only for the specific purpose of ensuring continuing compliance with international obligations to which this House has already consented and which would be affected by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It is available only for a limited period of time, and any further restriction risks increasing the primary legislative burden on this House and weakening the UK’s promise to the rest of the world that we are ready and able to honour our commitments.
However, having said all that, I repeat the point I made at the start of this debate: that we are listening carefully to what noble Lords have said, that we will look closely at how we can resolve many of the concerns that have been raised by noble Lords throughout this debate, and that we will come back to the issue on Report. In the light of those assurances, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, will the Minister take the message from this House that we are very happy to have this burden imposed on us? Although we appreciate his concern at the weight of business which we might have to undertake if we had to pay attention to primary legislation in respect of fees and charges, we will be very happy to assume that heavy burden.
I take on board the sincere nature of the noble Lord’s assurances on this matter.
Might my noble friend point out to the noble Lord that, if it is about taxation, that burden would not be placed on this Chamber anyway?
My Lords, since we are discovering the enormous complexity of all this, on the previous amendment I asked the Government whether they would be willing to share with us their own calculations on the process of policy-making for directives and regulations, some of which are in force but not implemented, and others of which are about to come into force but will not be implemented until after March 2019. What view have the Government formed on those? That would be helpful to us and others in understanding how the Government are coping with this complex process.
The noble Lord makes a good point. I was speaking to my noble friend Lady Goldie about the matter when he asked her the question earlier. I will have a look at this for him. I think it is fair to say that most of our negotiating positions on the existing directives and regulations are already public. We share our positions, the issues that are being discussed are transparently available on both our website and the EU’s website, and many of the issues that will come to fruition over the next year or two are already in early formative phases. I therefore genuinely do not think that there is much about this process that is secretive, but I will certainly have a look at the issue for the noble Lord.
My Lords, I think it will be obvious why I spoke so briefly at the beginning of this debate, as I have now heard far better speeches on this group than I would ever have made. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, who “salivated”—his word at Second Reading—at the thought of being able to raise money by SIs, was not here. However, he and the other “guilty men”, as they were called, who used these in the past, have made the case well that this would be quite a move from our traditional way of raising money. Whatever the name of the charge—the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said that it was basically “taking money out of your pocket”, and the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, called it an “obligation to pay”—we know what we are looking at.
The noble Lord, Lord Deben, said that this had, “not been entirely well thought through”. I hope that that, rather than anything more untoward, is why this power has crept in there. As everyone has said, it is for Parliament to decide whether to raise funds—whether to pay for some WTO obligation or for anything else. The example of the American situation is very valid: it is how, ultimately, you stop Governments doing what you do not want them to do.
Earlier in this debate the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said that we need some hard examples. I do not think that the WTO example is the hard example to justify these powers. I think that his second point was that, if we do not get those hard examples to convince the House, surely it is much better that we leave this to the withdrawal (No. 2) Bill, by which stage we will know exactly what in the withdrawal agreement had led to the need to raise a particular fee, charge, imposition or whatever. That seems more appropriate.
Speaking about the WTO, I think that the Minister said that he thought the Government might be in a difficult position. I have to advise him that I think the Government are in a difficult position now on this power in the Bill. I hope that the Government will bring forward their own amendment on Report. That would be a way of taking matters forward. I am sure that there are far more expert noble Lords in the House than me who might meet the Minister to see whether we can find some such amendment. I hope that we do not have to repeat this debate on Report and that the Minister will bring something back because, if he does not, I can assure him that we will. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I had intended to stand up before the noble and learned Lord sat down to respond to his kind invitation. Perhaps it would be to the benefit of the House if I note that, as the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, this issue has been debated previously in the debate on the sanctions Bill. As with the issue we debated last Wednesday—the appropriate test for the use of delegated powers—the solutions found in the sanctions Bill are at the forefront of our minds in this regard and we intend to meet noble Lords to discuss the issue over the coming weeks. I will set out the Government’s views at the conclusion of the debate on this group of amendments. I very much look forward to hearing what noble Lords have to say but I thought it would be helpful to say this at the start.
My Lords, in view of what my noble friend has said, I can be very brief. I support the first four amendments in this group, to which I have set my name, and have ventured to put forward a sort of default position in my Amendment 340. As the Committee will appreciate, the purpose of the first four amendments is to ensure that the regulatory power now under discussion cannot be used to create a criminal offence, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has set out very clearly the reasons for this. Amendment 340, which stands in my name, is the default position, so that if by any evil chance this Committee or your Lordships’ House decided that it was right to create a criminal offence, it should be one that does not attract a custodial sentence.
We need to be quite plain about what we are talking about. The Bill as presently drafted enables the Minister, if he deems it appropriate and subject to the affirmative resolution, to create a criminal offence that attracts a custodial sentence of up to two years. Two years is not an insignificant period, and it is very important that one reminds oneself that the test is whether the Minister thinks it is appropriate. Furthermore, we must go on reminding ourselves that the procedure—that is the affirmative resolution procedure—is simply not subject to amendment. So this is, in effect, the power to introduce a criminal offence which attracts a custodial sentence by fiat or declaration. I find that profoundly unattractive.
As a former Minister who signed an awful lot of statutory instruments, I know that the degree of ministerial oversight is extremely limited. As I said, if this Committee decides that a criminal offence should be creatable in this way, then surely it should not attract a custodial sentence of any kind.
My Lords, because the case was made so clearly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, with the added detail provided by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I shall not try to add anything to the substance of the argument. I just want to express my regret at the lack of preparation and forethought that went into the drafting of this power. Indeed, I was alarmed by it on the very day I first read the Bill and started blogging about it back in the summer. I then tabled Questions for Written Answer in October asking the Government what other instances there were of new criminal offences being created by secondary legislation. In the replies I received on 2 and 23 October, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, was unable to list any.
I went on to ask the then Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, the same question. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, had by then taken over and replied in her stead on 14 November—but again gave no examples. The letter merely noted that “existing” criminal offences “in our law”—those are his words—which relate to the EU might need to be transferred to another body: for example, an offence not to notify an EU institution of something important relating to health. The letter ended by saying that the offence might have to be changed to a failure to notify the equivalent UK body. I understand that, but that is an existing offence, not a new one, and alters only to whom the report should be made. No case was made for, and no example given of, where new offences might be needed as we leave the European Union—much less one with the threat of up to two years in prison on first offence.
Noble Lords will not be surprised that I did not let this drop. I raised the issue again with the lucky noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who had another meeting with me in January—he has all the fun. On Wednesday last, when we anticipated dealing with this group, just before we broke for lunch I received an email from his department in response to my request in January. But again the email failed to answer why any new offences might be needed. It commented only that,
“existing criminal offences may require widening or amending, or new offences may need to be created to fix deficiencies in retained EU law”—
but provided absolutely no examples. The only example given in the email was of an existing offence where a business fails,
“to provide an EU authority with certain information”,
and therefore such an offence may,
“need amending to ensure they continue to operate effectively post exit day, for example by changing references from an EU authority to a UK one”,
and to ensure that businesses are complying with the law. Again, that is a change rather than a new offence. It is true that the email goes on to state:
“Previous case law”—
here I shall look to others to look into the detail of this—
“has created some uncertainty as to whether actions such as these would amount to creating a new offence rather than amending an existing one, and there could be differing legal views on this point”.
As I read the email, it seems that on that basis alone—that there is possibly a legal issue as to whether an amendment to an offence is a new offence—the Government have written themselves powers to create brand new offences that are punishable by up to two years in prison. So I think we are agreed that that will not do and that these powers have to go. Moreover, they have to go more completely than the Government allowed for in the sanctions Bill because, as was said in the debate at the time, anything there would follow an international agreement to which we would be a party as a Government—so there would have been that earlier stage. But these powers will not be part of that, and therefore I hope that, when the Minister responds, he will say that these powers are going to be taken out of the Bill.
First, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham for bringing the matter of creating criminal offences under the powers in Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 to the attention of the Committee through their Amendments 87, 128, 156, 339 and 340, which seek to amend the relevant provisions in the Bill. As I said, I understand that similar concerns were raised during the debates on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, but that a mutually agreeable outcome has since been reached, with the Government bringing forward a requirement on Ministers to make additional statements alongside their statutory instruments. Of course, the offences envisaged under that Bill were different and carried considerably greater sentences. I hope that I can satisfy the concerns that noble Lords have expressed during this debate. However, the Government are still looking very closely at how the powers in the Bill are drawn and how they will be exercised—and, as I say, we are open to discussion on finding similar solutions in this Bill.
I shall start with the reassurance that the three main powers in the Bill are explicitly restricted from creating a “relevant criminal offence”, which is defined in the Bill as an offence for which an individual who has reached the age of 18, or in relation to Scotland or Northern Ireland the age of 21, is capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than two years. A vital part in achieving continuity and consistency for businesses and individuals as we leave the EU is to ensure that criminal offences continue to operate effectively after exit. As such, the Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 powers can create criminal offences punishable by imprisonment for two years or less. In applying this two-year limit, the Government have sought a balance between appropriately limiting the three main powers and providing a functioning statute book on exit day.
The amendments would see that no criminal offences—or no criminal offences punishable by any term of imprisonment at all—could be created under the three main powers in the Bill. However, it is important that these powers are able to create certain criminal offences, as I shall come on to explain. For example, criminal offences provide an essential function of ensuring compliance with regulatory regimes which provide crucial protections for businesses and individuals. Some of the regimes criminalise particular conduct relating to the EU and some offences may no longer operate as intended after exit day if they are not corrected, particularly where functions transfer to a UK authority. For example, it could be an offence for a business to fail to provide an EU authority with certain information, but after exit day the authority collecting that information might be a UK one instead. Continuity would seem to demand penalties remaining in place—
I wonder if the Minister could help us. He seems to be arguing what might be a coherent case for some offences needing to be redefined to have the same effect as they would have had before exit day. Surely it cannot be part of what he is describing to create offences that did not exist simply to ensure that the statute book after exit day has the same effect, in terms of the criminality that people would face, as it had beforehand. Does that not need him to approach this differently and try to find a way of defining the process so that it is not about the creation of new criminal offences?
I understand the noble Lord’s concern, which comes on to the same point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I will come on to deal with what constitutes a new offence and what does not in a second.
Continuity would seem to demand penalties remaining in place for what would substantively be the same misconduct. Currently, certain types of financial services firms are regulated at an EU level. Depending on negotiation outcomes, we may need to bring such firms into the UK regulatory regime. Under these circumstances, we would want the UK regulators to be able to regulate such firms in a way consistent with their current regulatory framework, in line with their statutory objectives. Where appropriate, this may include bringing firms within the scope of existing criminal offences to which UK financial services firms are already subject.
To give another example, Her Majesty’s Treasury is considering amending the existing offence in Section 398 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 of “knowingly or recklessly” giving a regulator,
“information which is false or misleading”.
This would make it an offence, as a consequence of transferring functions from the European Securities and Markets Authority, for third country central counterparties to mislead the Bank of England in connection with recognition applications. In direct response to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, a view could be taken that this creates a new offence as it will be a new function for the Bank of England and extends this offence to central counterparties established in third countries to whom it did not apply before. Her Majesty’s Treasury is also considering making similar provision for the FCA—as a consequence of transferring functions from the European Securities and Markets Authority relating to trade repositories—and similar considerations apply. We therefore need the power in its current shape to provide certainty that we can make such statutory instruments.
As an alternative example, marketing authorisations for medicinal products are currently granted at both EU and UK level. Post exit—again, depending on negotiation outcomes—it is possible that the best way to provide continuity for businesses marketing medicines in the UK will be to convert EU marketing authorisations into UK ones. Under Regulation 95 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012, it is currently an offence to provide false or misleading information in connection with applications for marketing authorisations as this information is key to assessing the safety, quality and efficacy of medicines. The offence is punishable with a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. It is vital that, if we need to, we are able to amend the existing offence or create a comparable one. I think we can all agree that it remains important that false or misleading information is not supplied in connection with the process of converting EU marketing authorisations into new ones, and that the public’s health is protected.
Noble Lords will see from the examples that the intent here is largely to ensure that the same types of conduct carry criminal penalties as before, or that we can create criminal offences to deal with the post-exit world. Previous case law has, though, created some uncertainty as to whether widening an existing offence would amount to creating a new offence, and there could be differing legal views on this point.
The noble Lord just used a different word—“widening”—but I think his earlier example was making a notification to a different organisation. “Widening” suggests that the scope of what might be a crime would be extended. Is that what he meant?
No, that is not what I meant.
It is therefore vital that the Bill can provide for “creating” criminal offences to ensure that no offences that are needed fall away as we leave the EU, and that businesses and individuals continue to comply with the law.
Any statutory instruments made under Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 which create or widen the scope of a criminal offence will automatically be subject to the affirmative procedure so that they will be subject to a debate and vote in this House and in the other place. The Government accept that this level of scrutiny is important here and, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, I hope we can consider further safeguards. Therefore, I hope that with those assurances I have demonstrated why we think this element of the power must remain part of the Bill and that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I am troubled by just one observation made by the Minister. I think someone has been advising him incorrectly. Speaking for myself, I have never come to a mutually agreeable arrangement relating to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill. I have certainly welcomed an advance by the Government relating to these issues, but, as I said at the beginning, I leave open the argument that “good reasons”, which are proposed, should give way to “necessary” and I have added that there is an advance.
Beyond that, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. We really must not return—can we make up our minds now not to?—to the constitutional aberration of unexplained, and effectively unscrutinised, regulations creating criminal offences. That is the constitutional principle. In view of the observations made by the Minister, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
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My Lords, three amendments in this group are in my name: Amendment 90, which relates to Clause 7; Amendment 130, which relates to Clause 8; and Amendment 148, which relates to Clause 9. They all raise the same point about the extent of the delegated powers given to Ministers of the Crown by these three clauses. The context is the way in which exercise of these powers may affect the devolution settlements for Scotland, under the Scotland Act 1998, and for Wales, under the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Wales Act 2017. I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for her amendments introducing the position of Northern Ireland in exactly the same terms as my amendments.
Before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, proceeds, it may be of benefit to the House if I now confirm that the Government will bring forward amendments on Report to apply the same protection for the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act to the Clause 7 correcting power that applies to the Northern Ireland Act. I will speak about that more at the end of the debate. It may also benefit the House to note that the Government have tabled an amendment to Clause 11 —as I am sure noble Lords are aware—that reflects the significant offer we have made on that issue to ensure that the House can debate the offer when we reach that clause, just as we promised to do in the other place.
Since he has started speaking, would it not be better for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, to speak fully now and tell us what he was going to say? That would give us much more to respond to and might indeed shorten the debate.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has not yet moved the amendment so he needs to do that first.
I am very grateful to the Minister for his intervention and for the indication that he has given. My amendments extend to Clauses 8 and 9; what he has said is an indication of the way the Government are minded to go on Clause 7, but I must introduce my amendments in relation to Clauses 8 and 9 as well.
The provision relating to Northern Ireland, to which the Minister referred, is what we find in Clause 7(7)(f), which indicates that,
“regulations under subsection (1) may not … amend or repeal the Northern Ireland Act 1998”.
That provision is then substantially qualified in a way one can only understand by reading through the schedules. I am not clear whether the Minister is proposing that the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act should be qualified in the same way, but if he intends to qualify them, my amendments are unqualified. It is therefore appropriate for me to explain why my amendments are in the terms they are. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, will appreciate why I need to set this matter out in a little bit of detail and explain why I have brought the amendments forward.
As we have seen, these three clauses confer a very wide power on a Minister of the Crown to make provisions by regulations. That includes a provision to which attention has not been drawn until now, but which is certainly relevant to the amendments in this group: a Minister of the Crown may make a regulation of the same kind that could be made by an Act of Parliament. We find that in Clause 7(5), Clause 8(2) and Clause 9(2). I need not go over what these clauses deal with but, broadly speaking, in Clause 7 the power is to enable a Minister to deal with,
“any other deficiency in retained EU law, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”.
In Clause 8, the power is to enable a Minister to,
“prevent or remedy any breach, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, of the international obligations of the United Kingdom”.
In Clause 9, it is a wider power to enable the Minister to,
“make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement if the Minister considers that such provision should be in force on or before exit day”.
Each of these clauses is limited in some respects by saying that regulations made under them may not do certain things. The Committee has heard about that in earlier debates today, such as in relation to sentencing, the creation of criminal offences and so on. These amendments seek to add two further limitations. One is that the power under these three clauses may not be used to modify the Scotland Acts and the government of Wales Acts without the consent of the Scottish Parliament or the National Assembly for Wales, as the case may be. As I mentioned earlier, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, is seeking to make similar provision in relation to Northern Ireland. Amendment 148 goes a little further than that: it builds in an additional provision relating to the Ministers of the devolved institutions. These are the subject of the group after next, which we will come to later this evening. I will not develop that aspect until we get to that group.
The scale of the transfer of legislative competence to Ministers of the Crown, provided for by these clauses, raises concerns of a fundamental nature. This is not only about the balance of power between Parliament and the Executive, as the Constitution Committee pointed out in paragraph 158 of its report, it also raises concerns about the balance of power within the union and the future of the devolution settlements themselves, referred to in the same report at paragraph 243. Some of what I will be saying in a moment will be directed only to the Scotland Act, but it should be understood as applying equally to the Government of Wales Act and the Wales Act, which are referred to in my amendments.
As I understand the wording of these clauses, if they are left as they are the powers could be used to change the constitutional balance of powers between the UK Government and the devolved institutions which the relevant devolution statutes set out. An aspect worth stressing is the width given to the meaning of the word “deficiencies” in Clause 7. We see it set out at length in subsection (2), supplemented by subsection (3). It is extremely wide and can be widened still, as we can see, given the power in subsection (3). The provisions in Clause 7(6) are about the transfer of functions from EU entities or public authorities in member states to public authorities in the United Kingdom, which would, of course, include public authorities in the devolved areas of Scotland and Wales.
The Committee needs to bear in mind the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, in his speech last Wednesday morning about the width of Clause 7; the meaning to be given to the expression “Minister of the Crown”; and the numbers of people who could be embraced by that expression. The point which was of particular concern to me in the amendments in this group is that the power includes a power to make any provision that can be made by an Act of Parliament. I appreciate that the provision in Clause 7 is time limited. This is also true in the case of Clause 8. In Clause 9, the power is not exercisable after exit day. Nevertheless, as these clauses stand, and while they continue to have effect, it would be open to a Minister of the Crown to modify the Scotland Acts and government of Wales Acts in a way that, as I mentioned earlier, could shift the constitutional balance, and to do so without even consulting the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, let alone obtaining their consent.
A particular part of the Scotland Act which is quite vulnerable to an inadvertent amendment without that process of obtaining consent is the detailed wording of Schedule 5. I was involved, as was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in considering the Bill which gave rise to the Scotland Act 1998. We sat until late in the night—indeed, early in the morning—dealing with that Bill and went over Schedule 5 in some detail. It has survived very well over the years since devolution, but it contains considerable detail which could be adjusted a little. That would alter the balance between the UK Government and the Scottish Government in a way that should not be done without the consent of the Scottish Government.
I appreciate that Ministers may say that it is not their intention to modify the Acts in this way, but it is well known that there is a high degree of mistrust between the devolved institutions and the UK Government about where this legislation is going. Personally, I regret that but, from a Scottish point of view, the reason is not hard to find. As one reads through these clauses, and looks at them from the approach of a Scottish Minister, or the Scottish Parliament or, indeed, a lawyer who has dealt with the devolution system since it first came in, it is striking that—apart from Northern Ireland—there is simply no mention in these three clauses of the fact that there are devolved Governments in Wales and Scotland that need to be considered. That aspect causes one some alarm as soon as one begins to read through the Act. It would be desirable to do something about it, if one possibly can. That is why I welcome what the Minister said when I began my speech.
My Lords, the Minister unusually intervened at the beginning of the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, to say that he had some significant announcements to make in respect of Scotland and Wales and Clause 7. I assume he also meant Clause 8, but it was not clear. Given that this debate will be precisely on what the terms of Clauses 7 and 8 should be in respect of the devolution settlements, may I suggest that it would be fitting if the Minister made his announcements on the Government’s intentions now, and then noble Lords can respond afterwards? He has already told us that he intends to make such announcements and it would be ridiculous to have a big debate only for us to learn of the Government’s intentions after we have spoken.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I thought I was explicit that my remarks concerned only Clause 7, but I thought that was still significant because, clearly, that is a large part of the debate. I wanted to make it clear at this stage that we have moved significantly on Clause 7, but there is still an issue to be addressed in relation to Clause 8, and, I believe, Clause 9.
My Lords, what does the noble Lord mean by “moved significantly”? For those of us not initiated into the intricacies of this, what does he intend to do?
I seek to indicate that I can confirm that the Government will bring forward amendments on Report to apply the same protection to the Northern Ireland Act as to the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act. This means that all the changes we are proposing—bar one, I think, in relation to technical standards, but even that we will be able to spell out in relation to the Bill—and all the powers in relation to corrections will be in the legislation when we get to Report. We will table amendments on Report so that the correction power in Clause 7 will not be necessary. It will be in relation only to international obligations in Clause 8 and complying with the exit in relation to Clause 9.
On that point, could the noble Lord confirm that the amendments to be brought forward by the Government will make absolutely sacrosanct the principle of the preservation of the Good Friday agreement?
My Lords, I certainly can confirm that but I was going to confirm it, as it were, right at the end of the debate. Clearly, this is fundamental. We are very much wedded to it, as was indicated in December, when there was a meeting with the EU on this issue and as we have stated again and again. I appreciate the point the noble Lord makes. It is important and I can confirm that we will do that.
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 92 and 93 standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and myself. I am sorry that he cannot be here to speak to these amendments, but I understand that it is in order for me to do so.
These amendments would restrict Ministers of the Crown from being able to amend or repeal the Wales Act 2017 and the corresponding Scotland Act using regulatory powers. The fact that these amendments are necessary underlines a perceived disregard the UK Government have for the sovereignty of the two devolved parliaments. If the Northern Ireland parliament were in existence, I am sure there would be feelings along similar lines.
The Bill gives sweeping powers to Ministers of the Crown, with which they can do what they like, including amending and/or repealing the devolution settlements. This was exemplified last Friday 9 March, when, despite no agreement being reached at the JMC (EN) meeting on the status of powers being repatriated from Brussels, the UK Government pushed ahead and published their framework analysis. This was essentially a list of devolved areas of policy that the UK Government will take over themselves—I will not list them or go into that, because they will mainly come under Clause 8, as the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, mentioned a moment ago.
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords who have participated in this very wide-ranging debate, particularly to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for moving his amendment and the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for moving her amendment to the amendment. I shall first try to deal with a couple of very basic points before turning to the substance of the debate and I shall then try to pick up some of the points made by noble Lords. I gently say to the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, that if my aim was to cut short this debate, I failed fairly spectacularly. I regret that. I had sought to clarify where we were—but I will go through the basic principles again.
I shall deal with a couple of very basic points. First, I do not know where the idea came from that there is some possibility of the Government fundamentally amending or repealing the Government of Wales Act without consent. That is not remotely on our agenda. It is certainly not something that I would tolerate. I suppose it is just about within the scope of Austinian sovereignty, but I do not know where the idea came from that that is a possibility—so let me put that to bed absolutely right away. We are totally committed to devolution—the Government of Wales Act, the Scotland Act and the Northern Ireland Act—and I think that noble Lords will appreciate that point.
Secondly, I think that there has been some confusion. We are not principally dealing with Clause 11 today. There might be some confusion because we have just published the amendments in relation to Clause 11, following an undertaking we gave in another place—but that will be the subject of much broader discussion later. No doubt we will go through that in some substance, so I do not intend to deal with it and pre-empt what is going to happen later in our consideration of the Bill.
I thank noble Lords for this valuable debate. We will consider the main clauses relating to devolution in coming days, but the question of how the powers conferred by the Bill interact with our devolution settlements and the responsibilities of our devolved institutions is no less important and deserves no less robust scrutiny. I shall first speak to the protection for the devolution statutes in relation to the Clause 7(1) correcting power and by extension its Schedule 2 counterpart. There are many amendments in Schedule 3 for those who want some idea of what will be brought forward on Report. It is not a question of them coming forward now. My noble friend Lady McIntosh raised this, but we are not in a position to come up with all the amendments that may be necessary. They will be debated on Report. We are talking about every correction that is necessary being brought forward on Report for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. It is as simple as that. I hope that clarifies what I hoped to clarify right at the start.
I must start by emphasising that the Government recognise the importance of our devolution settlements and the Acts through which they have effect. I think noble Lords who know my history will know that that is my starting point. That is why we have sought to make as many corrections to the Acts as possible in the Bill already. Those, as I say, can be found in Part 2 of Schedule 3. We want to be open and transparent in demonstrating that these are, as noble Lords will discover when they look at them, simply technical fixes to remedy deficiencies created by leaving the EU. For instance, much like in other pieces of legislation, we must remove or replace redundant references to member states or EU institutions.
The noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, is absolutely right to raise the unique importance of the Northern Ireland Act as the statutory manifestation of the Belfast agreement. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis—I hope the record will show this—I do not think I said that we were bringing forward amendments in relation to the Good Friday agreement on Report. What we are doing is bringing forward some amendments in relation to Northern Ireland to make sure that all the amendments that relate to Northern Ireland are in the Bill. I cannot stress often enough or strongly enough our total, steadfast commitment to the Belfast agreement. That is precisely why we have, in this Bill, already generally restricted the correcting power from making corrections to the Northern Ireland Act. As I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, is aware, references to Northern Ireland amendments are minimal, and we will seek to make sure that all of those are on the face of the Bill when it comes back on Report.
Noble Lords must recognise that there remain outstanding corrections to the Acts that must be made in order to ensure that they function properly on exit day. Corrections to the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act are being discussed with the Scottish and Welsh Governments, and progress is being made. It is a mistake to think that people are at daggers drawn. This is not how things are operating, as many noble Lords are well aware. Day to day, negotiations go on very constructively and effectively—that is what is happening. We have not made all of the corrections on the face of the Bill so far, as we must rightly agree the forms of the corrections to those Acts with the Scottish and Welsh Governments. Indeed, some fall within devolved competence to address. In some cases, alternative mechanisms may exist to deal with them.
I can provide further reassurance, because these are not matters of substantive policy. This is about correcting provisions that will not function correctly once we have left the EU. For example, there is provision in the Government of Wales Act requiring the Auditor-General for Wales to make certain arrangements for bodies established by the European Union. This will need to be updated so that the provision continues to work in a post-exit world. There is one correction that must be made to the Northern Ireland Act, as I have referred to, which relates to technical standards—the quality of goods and safety marks. This, again, is fairly routine and will be brought forward on Report.
It would be irresponsible for us to place these limits on the correcting power if we could not also provide the answers to the questions—which I am now providing —and the assurance that we will deal with these issues on Report. I can confirm that we will bring forward amendments on Report to apply the same protection for the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act as for the Northern Ireland Act, so that all the necessary amendments will appear on the face of the Bill on Report. Contrary to what some noble Lords seem to think, we have made substantial progress in discussions, but we were not in a position to remedy the remaining deficiencies for consideration in Committee. I regret that, but I am very pleased that we have made the progress we have.
I do not know whether my noble friend reads the Scottish papers. If he does, he will have seen that there has been headline after headline about the Scottish Government claiming that this is a great power grab by Westminster—attacking the Government and attacking the whole concept of leaving the European Union with scare stories about the impact of it. I am a little puzzled that he can say that there is a gentlemanly discussion going on when that is the perception north of the border.
My Lords, I do not recognise the power-grab allegation as being anywhere near reality. We are making progress. Of course there are differences, but I think in fairness all parties concerned have indicated, as the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, did, that progress is being made. These are complex issues and it is a great mistake to see this, in some Animal Farm way as all black and white. It is not like that. Progress is being made. There is still territory to cover and progress to be made, but we are making that progress.
Before the Minister moves on, we are aware of his good intentions in this, his experience and his wish to get a coming together of minds. However, if the Government’s intention is always to get agreement for the changes—and, from the tone of what he has said, that is their objective—why should they be building provisions into the clause now under discussion to have a veto for Westminster that overrules either Cardiff or Edinburgh?
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. It certainly is my view that we want to get agreement—I have no doubt about that—but I shy away from his idea that one party should have a veto on things where there is no substantive reason why it should do so. I shall come to this, but if something relates to a devolved area, of course we will need the relevant consent of the devolved Administration. However, we are not seeking to add powers in this legislation that do not already exist to give bodies vetoes over Westminster legislation.
It is my understanding that the concept behind the phrase “Westminster will not normally legislate without the consent of the devolved Administrations” depends on what you mean by “normally”. It was explained to me that it meant there was a recognition that very occasionally one would need emergency legislation, perhaps in a situation of terrorism, where it was impossible, possibly because the other body was in recess, to get agreement in a reasonable timescale—that sort of exceptional situation. That is how the meaning of “normally” was explained to me from a legal perspective. Is that accurate? Is that the Government’s understanding of what that word means? If so, would it be possible to reach an agreement with the devolved Administrations on that definition?
My Lords, the noble Baroness, with her normal quicksilver mind, has darted ahead to the bit of the speech that I have not yet got to, relating to where we are on Clauses 8 and 9. She makes a fair point and I intend to deal with it. I hope I have reassured noble Lords over the correction power, and I thank noble Lords who contributed to that part of the debate.
Amendments 130, 131, 132, 148, 149 and 159, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, seek to extend such a restriction to the international obligations and withdrawal agreement powers. I have listened carefully to what has been said. To avoid any shadow of a doubt, I am very happy to sit down with the noble Lord on what he says about the points raised on international agreements to look at the point on international obligations; I think it related to Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act. I am happy to look at that point with officials. However, I think he must accept, as noble Lords would, that the overriding ability in relation to international agreements must rest with the UK Government as the member state and the body able to conclude international treaties. I do not think there can be any question about that. However, I am happy to look at the valid issue he has raised on that point.
The position on international obligations and the withdrawal agreement powers must necessarily be more nuanced because we do not yet know what changes may be required, as we are not yet sure what the precise shape of the withdrawal agreement will be. However, I can confirm that this power will not be used to unpick the devolution settlements, nor to undermine or amend the Belfast agreement. As I have indicated, we are adhered to both the devolution settlements that we have and to the Belfast agreement that was reached in April 1998 and must be protected in all its parts.
The Minister speaks as though the Clause 8 and Clause 9 powers are basically the same. They are not, of course. The Clause 9 powers can be exercised only if a further piece of legislation, a withdrawal Bill, is passed. It is not clear to me why the Minister is letting himself be cornered over this when the powers do not need to be in the Bill at all.
My Lords, I accept that they are not the same thing. Perhaps by definition, Clause 9 relates to the withdrawal agreement, but that will be made by the United Kingdom Government. As the member state, it will be the United Kingdom Government who will sign the withdrawal agreement. There may—indeed, I am sure there will—be issues about ensuring that our law is compliant with the withdrawal agreement in all parts of the United Kingdom, in both the Westminster Parliament and the devolved Administrations. That is why we need it.
Noble Lords will be aware that it is quite normal to use delegated powers in such ways, including Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972, which amends the devolution statutes to ensure that our legislation reflects the most accurate position in law and ultimately to ensure that we fulfil our international obligations. To give an example, the Treaty of Lisbon (Changes in Terminology) Order 2011 was made under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act. It amended the Scotland Act, the Northern Ireland Act and the Government of Wales Act to give effect to new terminology relating to the EU. This is not the stuff of power grabs, believe me; it is the stuff of ensuring that day-to-day business can continue. Leaving the EU requires changes of a similar technical nature across the settlements, and we will need the flexibility to ensure that these important Acts operate effectively once we have left the EU. That is precisely what these powers enable.
Amendments 148 and 149 also speak to the concurrent powers for United Kingdom Ministers and would apply a requirement for devolved Ministers to consent to their use. We will consider this matter fully in the next group, but I am very willing to engage with noble Lords on the subject that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, raised when she talked about the use of the word “normally”. “Normally” is not subject to definition by government, it is subject to definition in law, but of course we would normally expect the consent of devolved Administrations in conducting discussions on these matters. A lot of this, believe me, is down to ensuring good housekeeping and common sense. If we have the prospect, by agreement, of dealing with this just once in one United Kingdom Parliament rather than repeating it in all the different legislatures of the country, that makes sense.
I shall try to deal quickly with the points raised by noble Lords, I hope in more or less the order in which they were raised. Forgive me if I miss points; I will try to pick them up by letter and will place a copy in the Library for those who did not participate in the debate.
First, I restate my thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for tabling the amendment and ably and cogently setting out what it was about. I followed precisely what he said and sympathise with a lot of it. I suspect we may disagree on some of the detail and emphasis, but I am certainly willing to engage with the issues he has raised. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for bringing forward the Northern Ireland dimension. She asked who we will engage with. Sadly, we cannot engage with an Executive at the moment, but we continue to put all our energies into ensuring that we have an Executive in place to engage with. Whatever our differences with them will be, that is far a more desirable form of government and governance of Northern Ireland.
I think the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, spoke next, and spoke also on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. As I said, we will look at Clause 11 later. If I am not mistaken, we sought and obtained agreement from both Scotland and Wales to publish that. There are deep dives, as the parlance has it, going on in all framework areas—I think we are now down to 24 from 27. Full and active engagement on that is the way forward, and significant work is being done.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, spoke next. He has massive experience and knowledge of this area, so I listened very carefully to what he was saying. I appreciated our earlier chat. I can confirm that these framework areas are frozen, as it were, until we can get down to the substance in the deep dives of the things that need to be devolved and the things that need to be held in the centre. I think there is common agreement, including in Scotland, on the principle that some things will have to be retained in the centre. If we are seeking to pull something back—I do not see that that will happen, but if we were, through some of these other Acts—of course we would need LCMs just as we are seeking an LCM on this legislation. That is, again, a reassurance that I am able to give.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for the engagement that we have had on this. I can confirm that we are seeking an LCM, as I believe she knows, on this legislation in both Scotland and Wales, and on the other legislation—on agriculture and so on—insofar as this involves potentially encroaching on devolved areas. Of course, once again we would seek to have long and deep discussions, as we are doing. If it were to impinge on devolved areas, we would fairly clearly need that LCM.
I hope I have answered on deficiencies; all of those will be covered in the Bill. An example of an international obligation would be something perhaps not mundane, but, for example, complying with a new law of the sea if there was a new law of the sea convention. That may be something we would seek to amend. It would be that sort of issue.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked for full details of the amendments. She will see that we have published the Clause 11 amendments. The amendments to Clause 7 will be tabled on Report. I have given that undertaking. They are not yet ready for reasons I have sought to explain but they will be there for Report stage. I hope she will take some comfort from that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, spoke with great experience of the devolved areas, and I thank her for her contribution about how things have moved and how there are still rough edges. I share some of the frustration of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, because we tried to solve some of this together on asbestos. This is not a power grab. Nobody knows where that power lies. Indeed, there is perhaps a little bit of, “You do it”, “No, you do it”. It is just lack of clarity rather than a power grab, but I hope we will be able to solve and settle it before too long.
I think I have dealt with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who is not in his place at the moment, on the Good Friday agreement. It will not involve any amendments in relation to that agreement, to which we are totally wedded, but there will be some amendments on Report in relation to Northern Ireland and some of the deficiencies that need correcting, in just the same way as in relation to Scotland and Wales. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, once again for the clarity of what he said. I agree that we should look, perhaps through conversation and discussion, to move this forward. Like my noble friend Lord Forsyth, I have grave doubts. We will not be moving to a position of consent but I would certainly like to see us talking and consulting, and I am very happy to engage with that. To move to a position of consent in non-devolved areas would be dangerous to the union.
I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern once again for what he said. I totally agree: if we think this is difficult, just wait until we get to Clause 11. I think this is relatively straightforward and I can see a way through this where we would have broad agreement. As the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, indicated, Clause 11 will be a much more difficult area.
The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, knows so much about this area, through both his political and legal experience. I agree with him that it is important to move to a position where, for things related to devolved areas, there is a convention that has grown up and is widely accepted about consent. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, for his clarity. I agree with him about the importance of transparency and coming up with some common sense; I think that is essentially what he was saying and I do not disagree at all.
We have probably reached agreement on Clause 7. In relation to Clauses 8 and 9, I am very happy to look at the points that were made and discuss them further ahead of Report stage. In the meantime, I ask the noble and learned Lord and the noble Baroness to withdraw their amendments.
I believe the amendment under debate is that of the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie.
I thank noble Lords who have participated in the debate on this group of amendments, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for tabling their amendments. I will seek to deal with the substance and then very briefly pick up some of the points that were made in debate. Amendments 102, 124, 103 and 125 seek to place a requirement on UK Ministers to have the consent of devolved Ministers when using Clause 7(1)—I think that issue will not arise now but I am happy to discuss it further; however, I think we will have exhausted that by bringing proposals forward on Report—Clause 8 and Clause 9, where it is appropriate, in areas of devolved competence.
I stress that the concurrent powers in this Bill do not in any way undermine the devolution settlements. Rather, they give the UK Government and the devolved Administrations the tools required to respond to what is a shared challenge of ensuring the functioning of our statute book in a pragmatic and collaborative manner which reflects current practice, and I stress has been the norm for some time. I made this point on the last group of amendments and an example can be found in new Schedule 3A to the Government of Wales Act 2006, which lists no fewer than 34 laws containing concurrent functions for United Kingdom and Welsh Ministers, including powers to make subordinate legislation.
I also highlight Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 itself, which is concurrent and has routinely been used to make a single set of regulations to implement directives relating to devolved matters. Take, for example, the Marine Works (Environmental Impact Assessments) Regulations 2007—enacted, therefore, under the last Labour Government. If a deficiency arises within that statutory instrument and we all agree on the best way to correct it, it makes little sense for four Administrations to make four sets of regulations to make the same amendment. This is of course compounded by the volume of legislation that will be needed in this House and in the devolved legislatures to ensure the proper functioning of our laws after exit day.
Our approach in this Bill is to mirror that effect: to continue working collaboratively with devolved Administrations, which is certainly the norm, to ensure that our statute book is fully functioning on exit. This has not been a cause of conflict in the past—there have certainly been differences but they have been few and far between—and we do not believe that it should be a cause of conflict in the future. We cannot compromise the flexibility provided for by the concurrent power that allows us and the devolved Administrations to benefit from shared working. This is crucial for us to meet the considerable task that lies ahead in order to have a complete, functioning statute book on exit day. I remind noble Lords of the clear commitment the Government have made that we will not normally use the powers in this way without the agreement of the devolved Administrations. I am happy to restate that: it is there in black and white in the delegated powers memorandum and in written evidence to the Constitution Committee. It was stated in the other place and I have repeated it here today.
However, I take very serious note of what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay suggested about the possibility of a memorandum of understanding. I shall take that away and look at it. Noble Lords have asked why such a commitment is not included in the Bill and I would be happy to look at this with them and to hear their views, taking seriously what my noble and learned friend has said. There can be no doubt about the commitment this Government have made to “normally” seek the agreement of the devolved Administrations on these matters. I hope that that offers some reassurance.
Let me pick up some points made by noble Lords during the debate, first thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for the constructive way he has introduced this set of amendments: I am very happy to talk about this further, ahead of research, as I have suggested. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and quite understand her seeking the best interests of Northern Ireland, which must be treated in precisely the same way. As I have indicated, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern for his suggestion about a memorandum of understanding, which I would like to take away and look at further.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, made far-reaching points on Barnett. We certainly made some headway on that when I was in the Assembly—not because I was in the Assembly, but I remember some headway being made on it. That issue is of course still there but it is far beyond the Bill, let alone this amendment. He made a point, as did others, about the importance of trust, which I take very seriously. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, very much; trust is important and we need to build it.
My noble friend Lord Deben is at his most deadly when he seeks to praise me. He was being so constructive that I am bound to agree with him, and I thank him very much for his kind comments. I know that he speaks with authority and understanding, particularly on Wales, and once again on the importance of trust. Again, I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on the importance of that in our discussions. We can of course discuss this further. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for clarifying the point and I am sorry if I misrepresented him. It was certainly unintended so I take that point, too.
My noble friend Lord Forsyth made some serious points about the dangers of the unintended consequences of legislation. We have to be careful of that and I take his point but that said, there is the serious and important issue of building up trust, as my noble friend Lady McIntosh reminded us. She also reminded us of how we all have interests in different parts of the country; it is not as if we are talking about a union that does not mean something. When we all have relations, friends and interests in different parts of our country, we have a shared interest in getting this right.
On the suggestion about engaging made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, I am very happy between now and Report to meet with officials to see whether we might move in the direction of a memorandum of understanding. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, who has vast experience not just of Scottish issues but of legal issues, made a very valid point as to how we might achieve that. In the meantime, I ask the noble and learned Lord and the noble Baroness if they could perhaps withdraw their amendments.
My Lords, I join in the general compliments to the Minister and thank him very much for his courteous and detailed replies this evening, and for his commitment to engage further with noble Lords before Report. We will no doubt return to many of these issues on Clause 11 in Committee, and again during Report. But in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Before the Minister responds, I want to spend a couple of minutes on a highly relevant issue that has not been raised on this Bill at all.
Following the BSE crisis, which was very damaging to the economy, an all-island animal feed arrangement was created in Ireland. It is not generally appreciated that there are a disproportionate number of animals for food production on the island of Ireland, hence its exports to the rest of the world: 15% of the world’s infant formula market is controlled by the dairy industry on the island of Ireland. The animal feed situation, which is crucial, is controlled by the ports around the island of Ireland. After Brexit, the EU will be ultra-sensitive—do not forget that we are the country that gave the world BSE—about the imports of animal feed. Given that there already exists an all-Ireland animal feed arrangement, and all-Ireland control mechanisms at the ports and the mills, how will this work after Brexit for the transport between the north and the south from the feed mills and ports? It simply will not be possible to drive a lorry full of feed across the border into Europe without it being checked. I cannot understand why this issue never gets raised. A third of what we grow feeds animals—it is a huge amount of business. We are what we eat, of course, and the animals are produced that way. What will happen in the island of Ireland to the existing animal feed arrangements? It is highly relevant to this debate.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for this debate on Amendments 104 and 231, which raise the important matter of frontier control procedures and freight transport in relation to the Clause 7(1) power. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord for his helpful technical and operational suggestions. I would have passed them on to my colleagues in the Department for Transport but my noble friend Lady Sugg has already taken careful note of them and I am sure she would like to take them forward with him personally.
I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that discussions in this field continue with all those involved in the running of our roads and railways and the freight services that use them. How these services and the procedures involved continue to operate after our exit is, however, a matter to be negotiated with the EU. In the event that there is no negotiated outcome, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs will treat EU trade as it currently treats third country trade, which means that businesses trading with the EU will need to comply with additional customs requirements. The Government recognise that this represents a change to how UK businesses currently trade with EU firms and so we will model new customs processes and procedures on the existing Union customs code.
The noble Lord’s amendment would prevent the making of regulations in certain scenarios but it does not, and cannot, do anything to prevent those scenarios arising. This will be determined purely by what happens in the negotiations. All it would do in the unhappy situation that we did not secure a satisfactory agreement with the EU is to leave us unable to reflect that situation in domestic law, which of course would only make the position worse. Furthermore, any report that was carried out before the outcome of the negotiations would necessarily be speculative and so would lack a certain utility.
Happily, I can tell the noble Lord that the transport of goods is incredibly important to both the UK and the EU, as many noble Lords have pointed out, and there is a strong mutual interest in reaching an ambitious agreement which maximises the benefits for all businesses and individuals. As such, the Government aim to negotiate for the most tariff and barrier-free trade with our European neighbours, as the Prime Minister said in her speech last week. The Government will ensure that appropriate measures are taken when implementing whatever may be agreed. It will be done in a phased process, thereby providing businesses with enough time to plan and prepare for the new arrangements, minimising disruption.
Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, the Government believe that it is in the interests of both the UK and the EU to have efficient and effective frontier control procedures to achieve one of the strategic objectives of ensuring that UK-EU trade is as frictionless as possible. We will continue to meet our commitment to keeping Parliament fully informed on these negotiations and allow for proper scrutiny, including through regular statements and in our support for the work of committees in this House and the other place. I hope I have reassured the noble Lord that the Government will work hard on securing an agreement with the EU that works well for all in the road and rail freight sectors and I therefore ask that he will withdraw his amendment.
I asked four questions on trusted trader status. When will I get my answers?
I will read Hansard and respond to the noble Lord in writing.
The Minister did not answer any of the points that I made about what level of contact the Government have had in Brussels discussing these issues, and why in the interval between the September agreement and March, when the Commission produced its own proposals, Britain appears to have done nothing. Will he please tell us what is going on?
We are having extensive discussions with our partners in Europe. We are also having extensive discussions with representatives of the rail freight industry and other players in the sector, but as the noble Lord well knows, the arrangements are a matter for negotiation.
If Brussels can produce a proposal, why cannot the British Government produce an alternative proposal?
As the noble Lord pointed out, we did produce a customs paper last year. In her speech last week, the Prime Minister referred to two alternative customs arrangements and those matters are being taken forward in the discussions. If the noble Lord reads the Prime Minister’s speech of last Friday, he will see that she referred to them specifically.
Of course I have read the Prime Minister’s speech. What do you take me for? I follow these things very closely, but the Minister still has not explained how it is that the Prime Minister simply referred to the principles that were put out last summer. This is a situation of real urgency for the economic actors, so why are the Government not producing proposals? Would the Minister be willing to write to me on this point?
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this interesting debate. It has been really well informed and I am amazed that the Government have nothing better to respond with other than answers that I think I heard six months ago. As my noble friend has said, time is running out. This is a probing amendment and I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for suggesting that we should have gone harder, and indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said the same thing. We have time to have discussions before Report, but it is a sad reflection for all of industry, not only the transport sector. The noble Baroness referred to the manufacturing sector and said that we are no further on. The Commission has produced papers but we just get motherhood and apple pie. I do not think I can take this any further tonight, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for bringing this important matter before the Committee. The Government are considering carefully all the potential implications arising from the UK’s exit from the EU, including the implications for the UK’s future relationship with the European Union Agency for Railways. The UK’s continued participation in the agency as a third country and its continued co-operation in the fields of rail safety and standards, as well as the implications for the UK’s technical standards regime, is, of course, a matter for the negotiations.
Our domestic railway and the cross-border services that link us with the EU serve an incredibly important function in the transport of goods and people across the UK and between the UK and the EU. In 2016, there were some 1.7 billion passenger journeys facilitated by rail in the UK, while the rail freight industry transports goods that would otherwise require 7.6 million more lorry journeys each year. Equally, the Channel Tunnel was responsible for 25% by value of all trade in goods between the UK and continental Europe in 2014, facilitating an estimated £91.4 billion of trade in total. Passenger services through the tunnel, including Eurostar and Le Shuttle, and international rail freight services, transported an estimated 20.8 million passengers and 22.5 million tonnes of goods in 2016.
As the Prime Minister made clear in her Mansion House speech last week, we want to maintain the continuity of rail services that link us with the EU, which provide important economic benefits to both the UK and the EU. However, our participation in the European Union Agency for Railways is not something that the Bill can legislate for. For decades, we have worked closely with our European partners to develop a regime in the field of rail safety and standards that reflects UK practice. We strongly believe it is in both our and the EU’s interests to ensure continued productive co-operation on safety and standards in the future, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. As I have said, this will be a matter for negotiations. In considering all relevant factors relating to the future rail safety and standards framework, the Government remain committed to our railways continuing to have the highest standards and remaining steadfastly amongst the safest in the EU.
We will continue to take on board the views of industry. The Government have a number of established mechanisms for engaging regularly with the rail sector. These include, for example, the Rail Delivery Group and the Rail Supply Group, whose members include the supply chain, passenger and freight operators, and Network Rail. As we prepare for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the Government will continue this engagement with a wide range of stakeholders from across the UK’s rail industry to seek views, which the UK has taken, and will continue to take, into consideration.
In the light of that, I hope I have satisfied the noble Lord that we understand the importance of maintaining the continuity of our important EU rail links, as well as maintaining a safe and effective railway. This will continue to be an important factor as we approach the negotiations. I therefore hope he feels able to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. It is not news to me, because, obviously, I am aware of what is going on. Could he possibly write to me quite soon about some information that I have which states that the Department for Transport is looking at which regulations from Europe could be torn up as soon as we leave? It is apparently highly confidential, which probably means that we will end up retaining a mishmash of half European and half British regulations, with a divergence which will be incredibly bad for both our manufacturing industry and operators.
My noble friend Lady Sugg will be happy to discuss that with the noble Lord.
I am grateful to the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I rise briefly to explain why I have added my name to these important amendments. One thing that has not been mentioned in Committee so far is the idea that the arrangements we have with Europe also protect the safety, maintenance and repair facilities around our country for our aviation and aerospace industries. We must maintain alignment of regulation. We have 100 airports and 172 maintenance and repair facilities, and if we jeopardise the standards of safety, if we are not in the open skies agreement and not in EASA, then the US apparently is already planning to send its own inspectors to make sure that our standards are up to scratch. If we cannot reassure people that we will maintain those standards, we will not have a functioning aerospace and aviation industry.
Another important element that must not be forgotten is that if we do not maintain our membership of the open skies agreement and EASA, the flights taken by ordinary citizens will increase in price. One estimate from the consultancy Oxera is that if all flights operated by third country airlines were removed, air fares for UK passengers would rise by between 15% and 30%—a Brexit surcharge which people were never told to expect to pay when they voted to leave the EU. These restrictions cannot be overcome simply by airlines setting up subsidiaries in Europe, because ownership restrictions do not allow non-EU investors to own a controlling interest in EU airlines.
I urge my noble friend the Minister to make a commitment to the Committee that we intend to maintain membership of EASA and the open skies agreement, notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.
My Lords, to start with, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, as we are more than happy engage in discussions with interested parties. Before I had this job, I was Aviation Minister and had regular meetings with all the concerned parties in the industry, and my noble friend Lady Sugg has told me she is very happy to continue those discussions. I am sorry if I did not make that clear to him earlier. We are of course carefully considering all the potential implications arising from the UK’s exit from the EU, including the implications for the UK’s future relationship with the European Aviation Safety Agency and the Single European Sky agreement. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Adonis—surprisingly, I see that the latter is not in his place—for their amendment.
I will repeat the words that I used, for the noble Lord’s benefit:
“The Prime Minister … acknowledged that an appropriate financial contribution would be necessary and that there will be a role for the Court of Justice of the European Union”.
As I was saying, the precise form and nature of the UK’s future relationship with EASA, as well as continued co-operation with the EU in the field of aviation safety more generally, will of course be a matter for the negotiations. The UK’s geographical position means that, with Ireland, the UK services over 80% of traffic entering or leaving EU airspace from the North Atlantic. Given that, the level of interaction between the UK and the EU demands close co-operation. The Government recognise the need for UK air traffic management arrangements to remain interoperable with the rest of Europe once the UK has left the EU. Safe and efficient air traffic management is a priority for us. The UK’s air traffic management system will remain closely bound to that of our European partners. We seek a close and collaborative relationship in this area, just as in many others. However, NATS will continue to provide the same high-quality service to airspace users that it does today.
The Government also want to avoid disadvantaging industry by imposing additional regulatory burdens. The Bill is part of that: it allows the Government to be clear that we are committed to maintaining a harmonised safety system that benefits both the UK and EU aviation networks and maintains the high safety standards that we all wish to see. I hope what I have said has been reassuring for noble Lords and that they feel able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, what about the point about the affirmative procedure?
I took on board the noble Lord’s question but I am unable to give him those reassurances at the moment.
I am grateful to the Minister for his reply and to all noble Lords who have spoken in this excellent debate. The Prime Minister has made more progress here than in the logistics, customs and railway sectors. My final question to the Minister is: has the European Union agreed this? Until it is agreed, it is not a lot of good. We need to revisit this and, we hope, have regular updates. I hope the Government will push very hard for it to be a priority—as my noble friend Lord Whitty said, to have this signed, sealed and delivered at as early a stage as possible. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have little to add but I have tabled Amendments 350 and 351 in this group. I should like to mention the importance of ensuring parliamentary scrutiny, in particular of tertiary legislation which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. We will deal with that issue later in a different group. The issue he raises is covered in paragraph 15 of the report of the Delegated Powers Committee. There is to be no time limit on the ability to pass tertiary legislation.
As has been made clear both last Wednesday and today, in seeking to bring into UK law the provisions that are currently effected in the UK by virtue of the 1972 Act and our EU membership, the Government have simply slipped into a belief that they should take control of all of this and have drafted for themselves powers and possibilities that rightly belong in Parliament, not with the Executive. As has been said, these amendments are to ensure that use of the powers will be properly scrutinised, and that they will be used by Parliament, rather than Ministers. I hope that the Minister has heard this often and strongly enough to be able to indicate, even at this late hour of the night, that it should be the Government who bring forward amendments on this on Report, because the arguments have been so well made. We should expect them to take the next step.
My Lords, I know that concerns regarding the delegation of legislative power, particularly where that delegation permits sub-delegation or allows for tertiary legislation, are shared by many in the Committee. I know that this debate has been brief because the hour is late, but I am aware of the concerns. I say up front in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Government understand these concerns. We have listened carefully to this debate and to other representations that we have received, so for Report we will look to see how we can provide additional reassurances and transparency around sub-delegation and additional scrutiny of any fees and charges made under Schedule 4.
I will go into this in a little more detail, if noble Lords will forgive me. I know that it is late, but these are serious amendments on an aspect of the Bill that is of legitimate concern, unlike some of the amendments we discussed earlier. I hope I can do something to put some concerns to rest. I shall first take a moment to clarify that, where a legislative function is being sub-delegated under Clause 7 or any of the other powers in the Bill, that power will also be constrained by the policy restrictions that apply to the delegating power. In the case of Clause 7(1), that includes all the restrictions in Clause 7(7).
Although, beyond Ministers, there are indeed a great number of public authorities in the UK, there are only a very small number to which it would be appropriate for Ministers to sub-delegate legislative functions as an appropriate correction for a deficiency in retained EU law. Again, these will all be subject to the affirmative procedure.
I also restate that any SI providing for legislative sub-delegation will be subject to the affirmative scrutiny procedure and will have to set out what conditions apply to the exercise of that power. Whether scrutinising the sub-delegation of any of the powers in this Bill, the creation of a new, specific and targeted legislative function, or the transfer of any legislative power from the EU, I would expect this House in particular to take a keen interest in these instruments and to have vigorous debates on the appropriateness of the conditions proposed for the exercise of the power before voting on the instrument.
While the Government are listening to the Committee’s concerns about the form that this sub-delegation will take, they believe that conferring powers on public authorities, including Ministers, to allow them to make provisions of a legislative character or other legislation can be an appropriate course of action, either to make corrections to retained EU law or to maintain a regime in the future. This is particularly true where there is a need for specialised, technical rules to be developed, introduced and maintained by a body that has the necessary dedicated resource and expertise.
I will give noble Lords an example. The EU binding technical standards—the detailed technical rules developed by EU regulators for financial services—demonstrate where it might be appropriate to sub-delegate the responsibility for correcting. These standards, which run to almost 10,000 pages, fill out the detail of how firms need to comply with requirements of policy set in higher legislation. The PRA and FCA have already been given the responsibility by Parliament of developing and making the domestic detailed rules needed to ensure that financial services firms are stable, well managed and meet the needs of consumers. These UK public bodies have played a leading role in the EU to develop these standards, so they already have the necessary resources and expertise to review and correct them to operate effectively in the UK from day one of exit.
Perhaps the Minister could help me with a clarification. As I understand it, the FCA and others have the powers he just described as a consequence of a cascade that comes, as he said, from higher levels of legislation that originated in a democratic process. They therefore have safeguards, frameworks, constraints, mitigations and appeals processes—all kinds of characteristics sitting around them. How do the powers of sub-delegation which the Minister described relate to any of those structures of cascade or framework, since we are supposedly leaving the EU?
I am not sure that the powers originated in a democratic framework; a lot of them came from EU legislation introduced by regulation which takes automatic effect through the European Communities Act. We could have an argument about whether that is a democratic framework, but perhaps now is not the time.
Let me make some further progress and see whether it responds to the noble Baroness’s questions.
Some of the powers to make legislation that will be transferred under the powers in the Bill are integral parts of regimes currently managed at the EU level; for example, where the European Commission currently legislates to add to or remove active compounds from lists of biocidal products. Where sub-delegated or transferred legislative powers are crucial to the functioning of a regime, it would not be appropriate for those powers to be subject to a sunset. That would only postpone rather than remove the requirement in the limited time available before exit for either a regular flow of primary legislation to keep regimes up to date or a suite of primary legislation to design equivalent powers to those which the Government intend to transfer under this Bill.
Perhaps I may address the three elements of Amendments 350 and 351 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. First, I turn to the scrutiny of the exercise of the powers by Ministers of the Crown in Schedule 4. We have laid out in Schedule 7, which I know we will debate at length another day, provisions for the scrutiny of those powers. Our position is that the powers should indeed be subject to the affirmative procedure where Ministers are creating new fees and charges regimes, or where we seek to grant an authority the power to set its own fees and charges. It is the sort of framework being established in which this House rightly takes a great interest. All this is of course possible under Schedule 4 only in relation to new functions that we are transferring from the EU or setting up on exit under the powers in the Bill. We have not provided for the adjustment of these, or for existing fees or charges, to be subject to the affirmative procedure. In years to come, there will be many such adjustments as technology cuts costs and inflation raises them. This ebb and flow can make a real difference to businesses, but does not normally represent a matter requiring debate and division within this House.
Nevertheless, I accept the point made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the raising of a fee not by 1% or 2% but by, let us say, 13,000% would be a substantial matter. I trust, however, in the expertise of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments to draw this House’s attention to such matters. I remind noble Lords that the negative procedure for statutory instruments does not mean no scrutiny at all, nor does it prevent debate. Nevertheless, if I have not addressed sufficiently the noble Baroness’s concerns on this point, I would be more than happy to discuss further how we might do so. As I said at the start, we are looking closely at this issue and expect to come back to it on Report.
Secondly, these powers are vested also in the devolved Ministers—we do not have the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, with us to make his regular point about devolved matters. While the scrutiny of the powers is important and, as I have just set out, the Government have tried to ensure that the most important of the regulations made under them will be affirmative, it is not for this House to dictate scrutiny to the devolved legislatures. The Bill contains a starting base of procedures for the devolved exercise of powers. While the devolved Administrations are competent to change these following Royal Assent, discussions continue with them about any alterations they may think it appropriate to make in the Bill. It would also not be appropriate for us to require the devolved Ministers to seek our approval for their statutory instruments—I am sure the noble Baroness did not intend this to happen.
My third point regards the sub-delegation of the power to provide for fees and charges. It bears repeating that any instrument providing for this will have to be affirmative, can delegate this power only to a body being given a new function under this Bill, and will have to set out the conditions for the exercise of that power.
It sounds as though what the Minster is reading out dates from before today’s debate on fees and charges. I had hoped that, in light of that, this continued idea of setting these by secondary legislation had gone from his mind.
We said that we would return to this matter on Report, but we are now talking about the sub-delegation of those fees and charges.
Moving on to Amendment 352 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham, I am in total agreement with the principle that the Government should not raise fees or charges from the public, whether businesses or individuals, without considering the impact on those who will pay or the impact on both the payers and the wider economy. I may be wrong but I doubt that many in this Committee, other than the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, who is sadly not in his place and is of course intimately familiar with it, will have read Managing Public Money. This weighty tome is easily available online and serves as the sacred text of Her Majesty’s Treasury regarding many things, including the setting of new fees and charges. It sets out that charges on the public must be subject to the general practices on consultation and economic and financial analysis. Without this, the consent of Her Majesty’s Treasury to establishing a new fee or charge, required by paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 for all new fees or charges under the Bill, cannot be obtained.
I hope that this long explanation, for which I apologise at this late hour, and my other points have gone some way to reassuring noble Lords. I am happy to continue discussing these important issues, but in the meantime I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments today.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the Minister for the detail he went into in his reply, particularly at this late hour. I also pay tribute to him for his customary generosity in being prepared to discuss these matters outside the Chamber. He recommended one weighty tome with which, as a former accounting officer, I am moderately familiar. Perhaps I may recommend to him another weighty tome, Craies On Legislation, edited in masterly fashion by Daniel Greenberg, former parliamentary counsel. I think it is at chapter 3.5.1 that he will find a very good treatment of the dos and don’ts of sub-delegation. That might be something we discuss before we come back to these matters on Report.
Of course, he is absolutely right to say that the consigning of these powers to a body or a person will require the affirmative procedure, and that is fine up to a point, but the exercise of the powers, once sub-delegated, will be free of the trammels of the accepted processes, so it becomes even more important that, in the consigning of the powers, the constraints on how they can be used by the consignee, if I can use that rather unlegislative term, are made absolutely clear. That is something, perhaps, on which we can have further conversations between now and Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 110.
My Lords, I do not think that anyone who has read the excellent December 2016 report Brexit: Financial Services from our EU Committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, will be under any illusion about the challenge that Brexit poses to this economically crucial sector of our economy. This evening we have heard of the needs both of those in the financial sector and of those who depend on it, and we have heard of one possible way forward, but the most important point is that something is needed urgently.
The British Insurance Brokers’ Association, to which we have just heard reference, the Alternative Investment Management Association, the ABI and TheCityUK have all come to me, and I am sure to other Members of this House, to raise their concerns about Brexit and particularly the wider implications for the legal sector and the insolvency sector and what that means for investors as well as for the more traditional City firms. Along the lines outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, TheCityUK has called for a bespoke market access agreement based on mutual recognition, regulatory supervision and co-operation, with, as we have heard, particular emphasis on mutual recognition and the enforcement of judgments.
In long-term contracts, legal continuity and certainty are vital for business, as we have heard, but also for consumers, as the ABI has stressed. Retired British citizens in nice warm areas such as the south of Spain need to know whether their annuities and pensions from London-based providers will continue after March next year, and indeed after December 2020.
The AIMA wants to see regulatory frameworks that enable managers to deal with any type of fund vehicle or account, as they now do, as they manage the savings and investments of pension funds and insurance companies. The British Insurance Brokers’ Association—100,000 people are employed in that industry, and they arrange 70% of all general insurance—says that it is “critical” to reach a transition agreement quickly and, following that, a mutual free-trade agreement.
The one word that I want to leave the Minister with is “urgency”, because insurance renewals are already being issued for annual policies renewable on 30 March next year, a date that I know is uppermost in his mind. Any policies running after 30 March next year would result in uncertainty over the legitimacy of that part of the policy that is effective after we leave. So we need these brokers to be able to ensure that there are no interruptions in customers’ cover, and that extends to whether we can be insured when we travel and when we drive our cars abroad, and to travel insurance if the EHIC ends—these are real things that people rely on day by day.
As we know, the UK is the world’s largest exporter of financial services to the EU, which is where I have to disagree with the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. He thinks that there is great hope somewhere else, but actually, for us to earn money in the EU and maintain all the customers we serve there, we must first prioritise establishing that we can continue with what we do so well there. Shoring up that business certainty through a formal agreement on regulatory equivalence or something similar is becoming ever more urgent.
We first started debating this report in the House in December 2016. We are now in March 2018, and I fear we are no clearer in knowing what the Government are doing. I hope that at this late hour, not just of the clock but of the calendar in moving towards when we leave, the Government will be able to provide a little more assurance than they have done thus far.
My Lords, I first thank my noble friend Lord Carrington for his amendment, which has enabled us to have this excellent short discussion. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, for her contribution. Of course, I know the report of her committee extremely well, as I was a member of the committee when it was produced and I participated in many of the discussions to which she referred, and which she very ably chaired. I thank my noble friend Lord Trenchard for his comments. He made some excellent points and pointed out the global nature of many of the financial services regulations that we are talking about.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made some good points about the insurance industry. I can assure him that we will continue the work that we are doing in consultation and discussions with the industry as we take the negotiations forward.
However, although I thanked the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, for his amendment, I am afraid that we cannot accept it for reasons that I will explain. It would not be practical given that the negotiations on the UK’s future relationship and the eventual arrangements for market access in financial services post Brexit have yet to begin. It will be important that in entering negotiations the UK retains a degree of flexibility as to what the precise arrangements for market access for financial services firms may be. It is imperative that both sides come to the negotiating table with a constructive mind set. That was the essence of the Chancellor’s contribution last week. Agreeing now to set out a report according to the specific and detailed criteria set out in the proposed new clause would prejudge a great deal of the substance that has yet to be discussed by both ourselves and the EU.
I emphasise that the Government share the aims of the noble Lord’s amendment. We are seeking an ambitious relationship that takes account of the fact that the UK and the EU start from a position of total alignment, with unprecedented experience in working with one another’s regulators and institutions. As the Chancellor outlined last week, the UK is a global financial services hub—an engine that powers the real economy and the UK—and it is a real asset for Europe too.
In his speech—this refers to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer—the Chancellor set out three key elements for a possible approach to a future partnership: a binding dialogue for establishing regulatory requirements for cross-border trade; supervisory co-operation arrangements that are reciprocal, reliable and prioritise financial stability; and an independent arbitration mechanism that has the confidence of both parties to provide durable dispute resolution. We hope that we would agree that the UK cannot be a rule taker in financial services but, by working together as the Government have proposed, the UK and the EU can preserve market access and strengthen stability and prosperity in the UK as well as the rest of Europe.
Underpinning this is our commitment to upholding the robust standards which are, as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, pointed out, often based on international standards that we have developed since the financial crisis. These aims have consistently been emphasised in government messaging—more recently by the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and by the Chancellor. These align with what we have been hearing from the financial services sector in terms of a desirable end state deal. However, the details have to be worked through via the negotiations and the process will require imagination on both sides. This proposed new clause would set out a prescriptive template for the Government to follow. Negotiations are by their nature fluid and we cannot agree to provide a report based on a set of potential end state arrangements, which are predefined and outlined specifically here, that prejudges the outcome of negotiations before those talks have even started.
These issues are extremely important and I hope that the Government’s conduct in negotiations, as well as the clear public stance of Ministers on the significance of financial services to our future relationship, will help to provide reassurance over our commitment to securing agreement on these issues. Once the negotiations conclude, the Government will need to make clear the substance of what has been agreed. This is particularly so in order to enable the industry to understand the provisions for market access and how they sit within the UK’s agreed relationship with the EU on financial services going forward. We will of course, as always, be happy to update Parliament when the appropriate time comes. However, in light of the need to preserve UK flexibility in the negotiations, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Before we dispense with the amendment I have a brief question for the Minister. If I have understood him correctly, he has just said that when the negotiations are complete, the Government would set out and clarify their position. Can he tell me what he means by “when the negotiations are complete”? Is he talking about the negotiations on the withdrawal agreement—in other words, by the end of this year—or the agreement on the FTA, in which case we will not know the parameters of the Government’s thinking until very much later when we are into the transition agreement itself? There I would have to agree with my noble friend Lady Kramer that essentially, businesses will have made up their mind and taken the necessary actions, not least because the regulators require them to carry out their contingency planning.
I think I mean both. We will update the House on the position at the end of the negotiations on the withdrawal agreement, on the agreement on the future FTA, and if I can add a third criterion to that, of course on the negotiations for the implementation period, for which we hope to be able to provide an update in the very near future. All those factors are important in the provision of financial services. If we get the implementation period agreed in the near future, which we hope and expect, that will provide a slightly longer period for businesses to establish the appropriate stability, but it is hoped that as we get to the end of the year we will have the withdrawal agreement. We expect that to provide the details of the framework for future co-operation. I will be very happy to update noble Lords at all of these stages.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
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My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 147A, to which I have added my name. The world of sport, as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, mentioned, is a complicated one that fits into all the other strands here. He spoke about Cheltenham most passionately. I live in the village of Lambourn, which has a mass exodus to Cheltenham. However, round it are other things that are not, say, France and Ireland. When you come to the show-jumping world, there are other countries coming there, with other workers, and you have travel from other nations such as Germany and Holland. It gets more complicated the more you look at it. The employment rights of professional sportsmen get more and more complicated and tap into the other things we have spoken about. It comes into the creative industries. All of these come across.
Are you going to stop the expertise of Parliament getting into this? Government departments and Ministers tend to be very bad at picking up on these concerns—and that is effectively the function of Parliament. How many of us here spend our entire lives saying, “You hadn’t thought of that. You haven’t spoken about that”? It is virtually all we do. Civil servants do not have a limitless supply of crystal balls, and neither do party hacks backing up the machine of government. Unless Parliament gets in and we have comprehensive agreements, when we do something this complicated we are going to make mistakes. Sport is just one example. The creative industries is another. It was not that the list was long for this group; it was not long enough. There must be a way of getting this information in. The way to do that is to aim to get Members of both Houses of Parliament to get through, because there is nothing else that can start to do it.
The main amendment here—and those supporting it—point us this way, and unless the Minister can make some response that tells us how that is going to happen, we are going to have major problems. I hope this will be the first and last time I have to speak on this Bill—but if the Minister does not give a proper answer I will be back.
My Lords, there is a theme that recurs in many of our debates on the Bill; and perhaps in this debate most of all. I think the noble Lord, Lord Addington, expressed the view that this Government somehow do not respect Parliament, do not understand its place in the constitution and are somehow seeking to work around it or sideline it. With respect, I hope to demonstrate that this suggestion is unfounded. Let me be clear and emphatic. Given Parliament’s pre-eminent position in our constitution, it is not possible for the Government to disregard it or work around it—and nor, of course, would it be desirable for them to seek to do so.
Why, therefore, did Gina Miller have to take the Government to the High Court?
That is a separate issue—but we respected the outcome and the Article 50 Bill was, of course, approved by Parliament.
The need for parliamentary assent to executive action is woven into our constitution at every juncture, and rightly so. Of course, on occasion Parliament puts a question to the electorate directly for their views. The debate we are having today—and had on previous days—is of course the result of one of those occasions. In the course of the debates on this Bill, it has been asserted that it has profound constitutional implications, and so it does. However, I am wary of endorsing some of the language that has been used with regard to the delegated powers in this Bill.
If noble Lords have some time to take a look at the draft statutory instruments that we published last week, they will perhaps see what I mean when I say that there is a profound disconnect between the picture painted at times in this House of the types of powers we are taking and the actual uses to which we propose to put those powers. I urge noble Lords to look at these draft instruments on the GOV.UK website.
The group of amendments we have been debating so far today and the group to which we will turn next do of course raise some profound constitutional questions. They require us to ask ourselves who can act on the international plane on behalf of the UK, and how the mechanisms of control and accountability operate for the conduct of such action. They pose the question of if and how there should be a role for the courts in examining the conduct of those negotiations. They also pose questions about the circumstances—if any—in which it would be appropriate for Parliament to consider action that goes against a decision made in a referendum.
Our debate here today has, understandably, touched on a number of different areas. However, I now wish to address the core theme of the amendments in this group: that it is for the legislature to set the mandate for the negotiations that the Government are currently undertaking with the EU. It was right that the electorate had the opportunity to make its voice heard at the last election, and the result of that democratic exercise was the return of the Government in their current form, to pursue their stated objective of a deep and special partnership with the EU.
Most of the amendments in this group are attached to Amendment 142, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Monks, and they raise important and valid issues in the context of our future relationship with the EU. I reassure noble Lords that I will revisit these issues later in my response. However, as a point of principle, it is not beneficial to enter into a negotiation with a number of domestic constraints on exactly what we can negotiate. Flexibility is necessary for a successful negotiated outcome.
The challenge now is to make a success of our exit and get the best deal possible for the UK, so that this House, the other place, and our national conversation more broadly can turn to discussing and taking decisions on what kind of country we wish to be after we have concluded our negotiations with the EU. After exit, and once we have negotiated the new deep and special partnership, great opportunities for new decisions will open up in this Parliament and in the devolved legislatures.
In case it appears that I am trying to exclude the role of Parliament in shaping our negotiating objectives, I once again reassure the Committee that I am doing nothing of the sort. Parliament does not need to go beyond our settled constitutional boundaries and set mandates in order to exert profound influence over the conduct of the negotiations. We take incredibly seriously our need to keep Parliament apprised of the Government’s negotiating intentions. That is for the purpose not just of transmitting information but of inviting scrutiny and allowing Parliament and its committees to take informed views. Government positions are created, tested and refined in the light of continual challenge from this Parliament. We are mindful always of the Government’s ultimate accountability to Parliament, and in this particular circumstance we are mindful, too, that we will be seeking Parliament’s approval of the agreements that are currently under negotiation.
My Lords, does the Minister not see a profound contradiction in his remarks? He has praised the role and significance of Parliament—until it actually chooses to express a view. Is it not the whole purpose of Parliament to express views? My noble friend is seeking to codify those views into a remit. The Minister’s response is that that is inappropriate because Parliament would then be taking on the responsibility that he wants to arrogate entirely to himself as a Minister.
Of course Parliament should express its view—but there are a number of ways in which it can do so.
Given that the next grouping on the Order Paper covers approval of the withdrawal agreement, I shall not prejudge that discussion by going into further detail here. That is part of the reason why we have sought to be as transparent as we can while protecting our negotiating position. Noble Lords will, I hope, acknowledge that this is a difficult balance to strike. But they will also note the information contained in speeches by the Prime Minister and other Ministers, in the large number of papers the Government have now published, ranging from White Papers to the raft of position papers on various areas, and in the papers for the negotiations themselves. Most recently, of course, we have also just published our draft text for the implementation period.
Access to information does not constitute the proper exercise of sovereignty.
Having access to that information helps to inform the views of parliamentarians for their many speeches and committee appearances. On top of these publications, and the legislation we have introduced, the Government have further sought to facilitate scrutiny through the frequent making of oral Statements, the timetabling of debates in both Houses in various forms, and through appearing frequently at a range of Select Committees. Of course, we have not covered every subject or satisfied every member of every committee with our answers to every question, but noble Lords should be in no doubt that there has been more parliamentary scrutiny of EU exit than there can have been of anything else in the history of our modern committee system. That is right and proper, and we support it as well as we can. In order to pay tribute to the wide-ranging debate, I hope noble Lords will be patient as I seek to set out, relatively briefly, the Government’s position on these various issues, many of which will be key parts of the wider negotiations on the future economic partnership.
First, on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, raised in Amendment 144, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, the Government have already stated that they will seek to agree a continued system of mutual recognition as part of the future economic partnership. This system will form part of the wider negotiations underpinning trade in services. The joint report from the first phase already includes provisions on the recognition of professional qualifications which apply to UK nationals already resident in the EU at the specified date and, of course, EU nationals in the UK on that date. Those provisions will be included in the withdrawal agreement to provide clarity and security to the individuals affected.
Will the Minister answer the crucial point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan: will there be free movement of horses around the European Union after Brexit?
I am sure that it will be at the forefront of our negotiation priorities, given the close interest that many noble Lords have taken in this vital national issue.
In response to Amendment 145, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, I reiterate that this Government have committed to maintaining high standards of consumer protection, delivering the stability that consumers need to continue to make purchases and a level playing field in trade with the EU—at the very seminar to which she referred, I believe that my ministerial colleague, Robin Walker, was present to set out the Government’s position. I myself have met Which? in Bristol on a number of occasions, and we will continue to engage with consumer organisations. We start from a strong position of long-standing co-operation on the effective enforcement of consumer protection laws, and it is essential that the UK through this Bill is able to ensure that UK consumer protections continue uninterrupted at the point we exit the European Union.
Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, is rightly concerned with food standards. The UK has world-leading standards of food safety and quality backed up by a rigorous legislative framework. The Bill will ensure that we are able to maintain those high standards once the UK leaves the European Union. The Government are proud of our high standards of food safety, and these will not be watered down when we leave the EU. Maintaining safety and public confidence in the food we all eat is a high priority for the Government, and any future trade deal must work for UK farmers, businesses and consumers.
A number of EU agencies, such as the European Food Safety Authority referred to in Amendment 184 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, have been established to support EU member states and their citizens. May I say how pleased I am to see the noble Lord in his place today? We missed him very much in our debates on Monday evening, with his great insights on our issues.
Touché, as they say.
We are committed to exploring with the EU the terms on which the UK could remain part of EU agencies. However, our future relationship with the EU and arrangements with regards to agencies such as the food safety authority are still to be determined and are the subject of ongoing negotiations. I would give the noble Lord the same response to his comments on the RASFF system.
Is it possible to have an answer to the only question that I asked? Are we going to stay a member of the rapid alert food and feed system? If we do not, we are in real trouble. I cannot see the arrangements for that—nobody ever talks about it—but it is pretty crucial. Are we going to stay in that system?
I cannot give an absolute guarantee that we will; it is a matter for the negotiations. However, I can certainly tell the noble Lord that we see the value of it, and it is one of the many EU agencies and systems that we will seek to continue to collaborate with.
In response to Amendment 146, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, whose illness I was sorry to hear about, and Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, I can say that the Government want to seek the best possible outcome for the UK’s creative industries following the negotiations with the EU. In response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, we are considering all our options for participation in future EU funding programmes, including the Creative Europe programme.
As the Prime Minister has already made clear, the UK will not be part of the EU’s digital single market, which will continue to develop after our withdrawal from the EU. This is a fast-evolving, innovative sector in which the UK is a world leader.
In response to Amendment 147C, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, who has yet again spoken very effectively on this topic, as she did on Monday evening, the Government fully recognise the central role that transport will play in supporting our new trading relationships as we leave the EU. As I set out in my response on Monday, our ambition for transport is to maintain and develop the current levels of transport connectivity between the UK and the EU to underpin our future trading relationship.
The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, asked me about aviation agreements. She is of course correct to say that all worldwide aviation agreements are concluded on a bilateral basis, as are most of our existing aviation agreements. We benefit from a number of these as part of the single sky policy through our membership of the EU and we are currently discussing replacing those agreements with the countries concerned.
Listening to the Minister, it occurs to me that this group of amendments endorses almost precisely what he is saying, so are the Government going to accept them?
I think I have made clear that we are not going to accept them because we do not want our negotiating position to be constrained by them. We want to be as flexible as possible in the negotiations.
As I was saying, the UK will also seek to continue to collaborate with EU and international agencies to maintain critical safety and regulatory arrangements.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 227BF, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley. Ministers and officials recognise that vehicle type approval can be a key enabler in such international trade and that the automotive industry in the UK and across the EU wants to be able to plan for future production and development with certainty at the earliest possible stage.
I thank the Minister for his comprehensive reply, but could he comment on a point made by my noble friend Lord Moynihan on competition policy and state aid? Will he remind the House what the Prime Minister said in the Mansion House speech about the Government’s attitude to competition policy and state aid? As I recall it, she said that we want to stay in that domain of policy. Can the Minister confirm that from the Dispatch Box today?
The Prime Minister did indeed refer to these important level playing field issues and said that we do not want to see a significant diminution of standards in these areas.
If I recall, the Prime Minister promised binding commitments in the area of state aid and competition, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Patten, for reminding me of that element of the speech. The Minister tells us that he does not want to be constrained in the negotiations, but has not the Prime Minister already constrained the negotiations by accepting binding commitments in the area of competition law and by using the phrase “strong commitments”—apparently she was banned from saying “binding commitments”—with regard to regulatory alignment?
I will allow the Prime Minister’s words to speak for themselves.
It is in the interests of consumers and industry in both the UK and the EU to maintain the freest and most frictionless trade possible in vehicles and automotive products after exit.
I apologise that have I spoken at length about issues of constitutional significance, but—
My Lords, the Minister seems to be reaching the end of his remarks. In replying to matters raised on the individual areas of transport, sport and so on, he has simply ignored the fact that most of those who spoke to these areas talked about the need for rapid movement of people, rapid access and no impediment to such movements. Could he perhaps say something about that? At the moment, the Government seem to have a blank sheet in front of them on that. We have not been told a single thing about the immigration rules that will apply after 29 March 2019—not one word has been said other than that it is going to take a lot longer for the Government to consult everyone before they can tell us what they are doing. All the areas that have been referred to in the debate this morning involve the movement of people. Will the Minister please try to fill that out a little?
I fear that I will disappoint the noble Lord yet again. It is of course a vital subject. We are currently formulating our proposals. It will of course be a matter for negotiation, but the Home Office will, I believe, set out in a White Paper later this year how a future immigration system might work.
I am most grateful to my noble friend. I have heard every word of this debate and have refrained from taking part because the case was being made so splendidly by everybody who was. Quite honestly, I say with due respect to my noble friend, appreciating the difficulty of his task, that all he has presented to the House is a stone wall. Frankly, this is not good enough.
I can only apologise for disappointing my noble friend. Of course, we take very different views on the issue of our EU withdrawal, so perhaps he will forgive me on this occasion for not agreeing with him.
I thank my noble friend for giving way. Can he confirm that he said that the Government want to remain flexible about belonging to the rapid response and alert system which governs public health, public food safety and feed standards? It would seem to me that that is not something that the country or Parliament would think was an issue one could be flexible about. We need to be in that arrangement, as the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, so vividly explained.
I apologise to the noble Baroness, but I do not think I used the word “flexible” in respect of that agency. I said that the agency does some valuable work, as do a number of other EU agencies, and that is one matter that we need to discuss.
Will the Minister accept that it is not an agency? Get briefed. Have a look at the annual report of RASFF. It is a 24/7 system that is incredibly simple. That is why it works. We are either in it to give notifications or to receive notifications. You cannot be half in and half out. I should have thought this was non-negotiable, to be honest.
The noble Lord is right: it is not an agency. I was referring to the food safety agency. As I have said, the system, or whatever we want to call it, does good work, we value our participation in it and it is one of the things that we will want to raise as an urgent priority in the negotiation, as will be our participation in a number of agencies mentioned by the Prime Minister.
I am sure that noble Lords will return to this debate at Report, and I am more than willing to engage closely with any noble Lords who wish to talk about these issues in the interim. I hope—I suspect that I have not—that I have helped to allay some of noble Lords’ concerns in this debate and that the noble Lords will feel able to withdraw their amendments.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, we are now well into the 11th hour of consideration of the Bill. There has been no break of any kind since lunchtime. I do not believe that noble Lords have been guilty in any way of prolonging the debate unnecessarily; I think the discussions have been perfectly reasonable, and the contributions have been precisely what we would expect of this House. To expect us to carry on with no break whatever is treating the House with contempt. I will oppose this Motion, and subsequent motions, unless the Chief Whip is, very graciously, prepared to allow us to behave in a reasonable manner in respect of the Bill.
My Lords, this group of amendments—frankly, I have lost track of who moved what and which ones are in the group, but I will be generous and address all the issues that were part of the original grouping under the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, although the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has moved Amendment 183—addresses two quite distinct institutions, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank, including its subsidiary, the European Investment Fund. If the Committee will permit, I will address each of them in turn.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is an international financial institution that is based in London and is subject to its own establishing agreement through a multilateral treaty that was laid before Parliament in 1990. The EBRD is led by a British president, Sir Suma Chakrabarti, who in 2016 was re-elected to serve a second four-year term. The bank is not an EU institution and therefore the UK’s membership is fully independent of EU membership. As such, the European Council does not have dominion over the membership or operation of the EBRD. The UK’s exit from the EU will not have any bearing on the location of the bank’s headquarters in London, which is enshrined in its articles of agreement. The EBRD has also publicly reiterated that Brexit will have no impact on the UK’s membership and the London headquarters. Amendment 167 is therefore unnecessary and would have no effect on UK membership, which will continue unaffected after the UK leaves the EU. The Government have made it clear in recent Answers to Parliamentary Questions that the UK remains firmly committed to the EBRD and that exit from the EU will have no impact on our continuing membership. With that reassurance, although I am not sure whether the noble Lord moved the amendment, I hope that he will feel able not to press it.
Amendment 227BC would create a negotiating objective for the UK to remain a full member of the European Investment Bank. The EU treaty defines members of the EIB as EU member states. It also sets out that only members can hold capital in the bank and participate on its board. That means that in March 2019 the UK will no longer be a full member of the EIB, as it will no longer be a member state of the European Union. However, let me reply directly to the questions put by the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson. The Chancellor has made it clear that the UK considers that it may prove to be in the mutual interest of all sides for the UK to maintain some form of ongoing relationship with the EIB group after leaving the EU. The UK will explore these options—
Why did the Minister say “may” when surely he means “will”? Will he think again about that?
If the noble Lord will forgive me, I will use the words as I have said them. These issues are matters for negotiation, so we will use the word “may” instead of “will”. Obviously, we cannot impose our will on our negotiating partners. The UK will explore the options with the EU as part of the negotiations on the future relationship.
Perhaps I may use this opportunity to respond to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, on agencies. I think that I indicated to him during the debate that the list issued by the Prime Minister was not necessarily an exclusive one and that we are considering carefully a range of options. Where there is a demonstrable national interest in pursuing a continued relationship with an agency or other EU body, the Government will carefully consider whether we should pursue it, at which point of course it will be a matter for the negotiations. We will continue to update noble Lords on our negotiations, subject to the usual caveat of not undermining our negotiating position.
Amendment 227BC seeks to make it an objective of the Government to achieve a particular outcome in the negotiations on our future relationship with the EIB. It is important that the Government should maintain negotiating flexibility in this and all other areas in order to achieve the best deal for the UK. However, as I said, we have not discounted maintaining some form of ongoing relationship, if that supports an overall deal. I hope that that will be sufficient for the noble Lord not to press his amendment.
Amendments 183 and 187 would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to publish a strategy for retaining access to the EIB and the EIF. As Parliament has agreed, we will not publish anything that would undermine our ability to negotiate the best deal for the United Kingdom. Any information on potential economic considerations and negotiating strategy is important to the negotiating capital of all parties. Publishing a statement from the Chancellor setting out the strategy for retaining access to the EIB and its subsidiary, the EIF, will ultimately harm our negotiating position. However, as I said in response to Amendment 227BC, I can assure the Committee that we have not discounted maintaining some form of ongoing relationship with the EIB group if that proves to be part of the best overall deal for the UK.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked about the British Business Bank.
Can the Minister explain, distinctly and clearly, to the Committee the distinction between demonstrable national interests and the national interest adjudicated by Jacob Rees-Mogg, Bill Cash and others?
We are having a serious debate about the EIB. The noble Lord is demeaning the subject before the House.
The British Business Bank has already raised the limit on the amount that it can invest in venture capital funds from 33% to 50%. It has also brought forward the £400 million of additional investment that was announced in the Autumn Statement. As a result, we expect it to have doubled its investment in venture capital this financial year. We have also broadened the range of the UK guarantee scheme by offering construction guarantees for the first time. I hope that that addresses the noble Baroness’s question.
Perhaps I could just press the Minister on that, although I appreciate that he may not have an answer. In terms of volume, what he has discussed does not meet the need. Businesses are concerned that we may not end up with an appropriate relationship with the EIB and the EIF. Are the Government looking at similar programmes but on a relatively minor scale?
I do not have an answer to that question. I will come back to the noble Baroness on that. I have only the figures that I outlined to her.
I hope that I have reassured the noble Lord enough not to press whichever amendment he wished to move.
The Minister’s response was helpful and I completely accept his reassurances on the EBRD. That issue is clear. My amendment was just a probing one to elicit the response that he has given, which is that there is no relationship with the EU and therefore our position is not affected at all.
The Minister made tantalising remarks suggesting flexibility on a wide range of agencies and the Government’s position on them. He said that this would be a matter for the ongoing negotiations. This will be a big issue for us when we come to Report because, as he knows, a lot of the amendments that we have been going through have sought to elicit from the Government their intentions toward individual agencies. Is he in a position to let us know before Report which agencies the Government will seek either full or associate membership of? Otherwise, I am not quite sure how the House will proceed on Report. We will be presenting amendments that seek continued British engagement with agencies when we do not know whether it is the Government’s policy to share that objective.
I understand the noble Lord’s point. As we have gone through the various categories of debate, I think that we have been reasonably clear on where we see the values in certain agencies in the individual sectors that have been talked about. The difficulty with putting any of these requirements to achieve something in statute is that this is a negotiation. We can seek to achieve anything, but if our negotiating partners are not interested in discussing it, it would be very difficult to do. We have gone as far as we can and I do not want to go any further this evening than the statement that I have already given. In her Mansion House speech, the Prime Minister gave some examples of agencies that we would be willing to participate in, subject to the negotiations. That applies to a lot of other agencies that have been mentioned at various stages, so I do not want to go any further at the moment. As soon as we have any information that we can share with the House, we will do so.
I do not think that the Minister quite grasped the point that I was making, which was not about whether it is appropriate to have requirements of this kind in legislation. The question was simply about knowing whether the Government seek to negotiate continued engagement in particular agencies so that we know whether it is appropriate for noble Lords to move amendments on Report calling for an objective that, unbeknown to us, the Government may be seeking to achieve anyway.
I will take the noble Lord’s statement as an invitation to give some thought to the matter, to consult ministerial colleagues and to see what further information we can share before Report.
My Lords, that was even shorter than my speech. The Government have to accept that they have to come to some sort of accommodation on statutory instruments. We all know that a lot of them will be required, and we have got to have a good system that satisfies everybody, both in this and the other House. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, sensibly makes that task simpler by making it uniform across the Bill. I am very persuaded by his argument and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and I hope that the Government are as well.
My Lords, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for tabling this amendment so that we can have a discussion about this and for the extremely courteous discussion that he had on this matter with me and my officials.
Many of us here today are opposed, in general, to making sweeping fixes to the whole statute book through one Act. Indeed, that is the cause of many of the concerns about the powers in this Bill, and an issue that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, addresses with his amendment. I am therefore wary of inadvertently undermining the delicate and proportionate balances struck within other Acts between haste and scrutiny. The need to deal with the detail of how the Acts differ from one another is, however, what makes these Henry VIII powers necessary.
Nothing in this Bill directly changes the scope or functioning of other delegated powers. The exceptions that this Bill provides are that, within the context of and with the scrutiny attached to the original powers, they can be used to amend retained direct EU law. The Bill also clarifies that it lifts any implied EU-related restrictions from exit day, a necessary consequential step to our leaving the EU’s legal architecture. It is right and proper that, within their context and limits, other powers can be used for the same purposes as Clauses 7, 8 and 9. This amendment, if it is broadly constructed by the courts, could render moot any debate that this House has had or is having on scrutiny provisions in other Bills. This also extends to exit-related Bills and, in this field alone, this could catch the trade, sanctions and customs Bill.
It is I think best to let the sleeping dogs of my noble friend Lord Strathclyde lie, so I shall skate over the very concerning question of how financial privilege would apply under this amendment to the powers to correct deficiencies in the customs Bill.
I call noble Lords’ attention back to the crucial importance of the ability to exercise the powers in the sanctions Bill at speed and the additional information requirements added to that Bill. Even if parallel changes were to be made to this Bill, these would be tailored to the specifics of this Bill.
I stress the Government’s commitment to proper scrutiny of the powers under this Bill; they are a unique, time-limited solution to a unique problem. None of this, however, should be a reason to render irrelevant any specificities of scrutiny that this House has insisted on in other Acts. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
As I listened to the noble Lord, I could not help thinking that we were talking entirely at cross purposes. The House has yet to decide on exactly what method of scrutiny we shall use and how we will amend existing methods—if we do at all—when we consider this Bill. That is not the issue for this evening; that is for Monday’s discussions.
This amendment simply says that whatever we decide is the appropriate method of scrutiny, all other SIs, no matter where they come from, should be subject to the same level and procedure of scrutiny. That is all it does. It does not interfere with anything else, or any workings of the parent Act, apart from the scrutiny procedure itself. It leaves the parent Act entirely untouched in every possible sense. The Minister is greatly overcomplicating what the situation will be. I accept that there may be cases with other Acts where the Government prefer not to have more rigorous scrutiny applied to the SIs generated by those Acts, but that is part of the point of tabling the amendment in the first place. I will withdraw it now, especially at this time of night, but I suspect we will return to this subject on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in addressing Amendment 204 moved by the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, at the risk of repeating myself I remind the Committee yet again that the purpose of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is to provide a functioning statute book on the day we leave the EU, whatever the outcome of the negotiations. It is our intention that the planned withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will implement the major elements of the withdrawal agreement, including giving effect to the agreement on citizens’ rights.
The amendment appears to seek to make it an objective of the Government to achieve a particular outcome in the negotiations on our future relationship with the EU and so to tie the Government’s hands on these issues. The amendment is focused on the withdrawal agreement, but these matters are for the future relationship with the EU, which this Bill does not seek to address.
After we leave the European Union, there will continue to be migration and mobility between the EU and the UK. We have proposed a time-limited implementation period based on the current structure of rules and regulations. This means that UK nationals may continue to have the same rights as EU nationals, such as the right to move and reside freely.
Looking to the future, UK citizens will still want to work and study in EU countries, just as EU citizens will want to do here, helping to shape and drive growth, innovation and enterprise. Indeed, businesses across the EU and the UK must be able to attract and employ the people they need. That is why, in our science and innovation policy paper published in September, we said that we will discuss with the EU future arrangements to facilitate the mobility of researchers, academics and students engaged in cross-border collaboration. We are open to discussing how to facilitate these valuable links.
Of course, we recognise the value of international exchange and collaboration, through both study and work placements abroad, in increasing people’s language skills and cultural awareness as part of our vision for the UK as a global nation. We will continue to take part in those specific policies and programmes which are greatly to the joint advantage of the UK and the EU, such as those that promote science, education and culture.
I repeat for the benefit of the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, what I said in the debate on Erasmus, although I forget exactly when it was—sometime in the past. No decisions on UK participation in the successor Erasmus+ programme after 2020 have yet been taken for the simple reason that the scope of the future programme has not yet been agreed. The noble Lord is asking me to give him an assurance that we will take part in a programme about whose composition we have no idea. No Government could agree to do that. We will take a decision when we see what the successor programme is. UK participation will form part of the negotiations about our future relationship with the EU. There may be some specific European programmes that we want to continue to participate in as we leave the EU, and that will be considered as part of the negotiations.
Whatever the outcome of those negotiations, including the increasingly unlikely scenario in which we leave the EU without a deal—
If the noble Lord will forgive me, will the Government continue to take into account the importance of young people’s desire to be able to work freely and move freely through Europe?
Of course we will take into account the wishes of young people to move freely, just as we will take into account the wishes of older people to move freely.
We will underwrite successful bids for Erasmus+ submitted while the UK is still a member state, even if payments continue beyond the point of exit. Therefore, applications for funding from UK institutions should continue, and are continuing, as normal.
The noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, asked me again, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has done in the past, about the issue of associate EU citizenships. Let me make the point to the Liberal Democrats once again—it seems to have difficulty permeating through to them—that the EU treaty provisions state that only citizens of EU member states are able to hold EU citizenship. Therefore, when the UK ceases to be a member of the European Union, British nationals will no longer hold EU citizenship unless they hold dual nationality with another EU member state.
For those reasons, I hope the noble Earl will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, it is a great shame that there is not more of a consensus between the two—or three—parties on the issue of refugees. We have debated it much over the years. Recently, we have got to what I would loosely call an uneasy peace, which is essentially based on my noble friend Lord Dubs’s Section 67 and Dublin III. That has produced modest numbers, but there are very real numbers of people meeting very real problems.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, put her finger on it. The rights individuals have as a result of Dublin III must be maintained. I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that the Government will either accept these amendments or make a very firm commitment to assure us that, one way or another, the effect of Dublin III will be maintained after Brexit.
I thank noble Lords who have contributed to this evening’s debate, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. I think the word “noble” is appropriate in so many different ways in the manner that we have been discussing this matter this evening.
It is a number of years since I worked for the Scottish Refugee Council. At that time, I was struck by a number of challenges experienced by those fleeing and seeking refuge across the globe. I was very much aware of the challenges experienced by refugees and asylum seekers; I draw a distinction between the two, as does the law. My frustrations were also manifest as a Member of the European Parliament at how the Dublin regulations were discussed, ultimately moved towards law and, frankly, not enforced in the manner in which I believe they should have been across the EU. While we often look towards Brussels for leadership in these areas, quite often we are disappointed by what happens when we move from the high words which can be found in certain of the discussions towards the realities of delivery, which can be quite different.
I particularly thank my noble friend Lady Stroud, who has again helped us realise some of the realities which we face. She is right to point out one of the greater challenges, which is finding unaccompanied minors in a difficult situation which they have not chosen to be in.
I turn specifically to the amendment. Noble Lords will be pleased that my noble friend Lady Williams is in her place beside me. I believe that on a number of occasions she has affirmed the Government’s commitment to ongoing support for those who are seeking asylum or who fall under the refugee convention. However, we must remember that the Dublin regulation is not, and never has been, a route for family reunification. It is a mechanism to determine the member state responsible for consideration of an asylum claim. Dublin confers no long-term right to remain in an EU state, whether on the grounds of family relationship or on any other basis. If someone is transferred under Dublin to the UK to join an asylum-seeking family member, should that asylum claim fail, they can be removed to their home country. In the UK, around 60% of those who claim asylum are found not to need protection.
The Dublin regulation rules are fundamentally different from the family reunion procedure in the Immigration Rules, which allows refugees under the Geneva convention, or recipients of humanitarian protection, to bring their close family members to the UK, where they are entitled to leave to remain. Furthermore, the Dublin regulation does not create refugee family reunion rights because it deals with asylum seekers, not refugees. Once a person is recognised as a refugee in the EU, they are no longer in scope of the Dublin system and the family unity provisions in the regulation do not apply.
More broadly—this is perhaps worth stressing as we consider movement outside the EU—the system has reciprocal effect in all participating states. It is a two-way process which governs the movement of asylum seekers into and out of the UK. Unilateral rules that place an obligation on only one state do not work. They need to be reciprocal.
Going forward, we seek a relationship with the EU that will address the entire spectrum, not just asylum seekers but refugees and the wider question of illegal migration, not solely on the basis of family reunion. A relationship with the EU on this matter above all will be how we are judged, and I note the noble Lord, Lord Judd, noting that point. We will be judged on this, and we need to get this right. However, I stress that the EU also needs to get this right and, if I may be so bold and so frank, I do not believe that the EU has got this right either. It is seeking to find that solution and, for as long as we are a member, we will be part of that struggle. At the moment, there is no easy way forward, as the EU is finding and as I do not doubt we will find.
However, as long as we are guided by the noble intentions of individuals such as the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I believe we will be moving in the right direction. On that basis, I ask him to withdraw the amendments.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords who participated in what has been a very interesting and wide-ranging debate on the Committee of the Regions aspect of this legislation. I will respond to the thrust of what the amendment seeks, then I will briefly go through the contributions and pick up the points that have been made.
In thanking the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, I say that I have considerable sympathy with the underlying aim of Amendment 227, which he tabled, although I do not believe that the proposed provisions are strictly necessary. Addressing the first limb of the amendment, the Government have been very clear that we are consulting with local government and will continue to do so throughout the withdrawal process. Local government has a clear and vital role to play as we depart from the EU and the Government are committed to facilitating it. We have held meetings with leading members of the local government associations of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and their officials, as was indicated by my noble friend Lord Porter. We have met with the Mayor of London and attended a number of “sounding board” round tables, facilitated by the Local Government Association, in Newcastle, Essex, Bristol, Cornwall, London and Staffordshire. These crucial conversations will continue, with local government remaining engaged throughout the Brexit process.
The second limb of the noble Lord’s amendment concerns domestically replicating consultative rights that local government currently has at European level through the mechanism of the Committee of the Regions. The United Kingdom delegation to the Committee of the Regions currently makes an invaluable, important contribution to the decision-making process of the European Union on issues including transport, and economic, social and territorial cohesion. I pay tribute to noble Lords in the Chamber who have been part of that process. I readily agree that it performs a very useful and important function. We do not consider it necessary to provide a statutory basis to a domestic replication of the existing consultative rights provided to local authorities through the mechanism of the Committee of the Regions, but I will explain how we propose to proceed.
We believe the statutory basis risks introducing unduly rigid bureaucracy, which many find so unattractive in some of the current structures. That said, the Government have been having constructive discussions with local government about how the consultative rights and responsibilities it currently has at European level can be replicated domestically, in a non-statutory way, when the United Kingdom has left the European Union. These discussions involve the Local Government Association, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, the Northern Ireland Local Government Association and the Welsh Local Government Association, and they are continuing, including at ministerial level.
However, I can now say that we envisage the following approach. Through a ministerial Statement to Parliament, the Government will give local government a clear assurance about how it can expect to be consulted on certain matters which, following their repatriation from Europe, will now be handled at the United Kingdom level. These matters will be those which local government would have been consulted on through the mechanism of the Committee of the Regions. In this way, we could have a flexible, non-statutory mechanism that, in essence, replicates for local government the rights and responsibilities it had through the Committee of the Regions, but in a lighter-touch, non-bureaucratic way. Any such new consultative arrangements will need to complement the wide range of domestic processes and procedures the Government already have for consulting local government.
My Lords, will those consultative arrangements include a consultative body? If they do not, people will regard what the noble Lord just said as rather hollow.
I am coming to that point, but I anticipate that they would. I will just deal with this point, because there is a complication here. In devolved areas, many of these issues will be matters for the devolved Administration dealing with the relevant bodies. That has to be catered for too. Clearly some non-devolved matters would be part of the arrangement relating to this legislation, but we have to recognise that there are some that are rightly the prerogative of devolved Administrations.
This is the important point, which I hope goes some way to answer the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. My colleague in the other place, the Minister for Local Government, Rishi Sunak, will carry this forward with the local government associations’ representatives, and we will update the House on the progress made by the next stage of the Bill. I anticipate that in seeking to replicate the arrangements it will take that forward. We need to allow those discussions to take place with the Minister in charge of local government. I will report back on this on Report.
I will deal with the relevant points raised. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, talked about the importance of the European Social Fund, the European structural funds, steel, community energy and so on. I anticipate that all these points will come within the ambit of the new arrangements.
My noble friend Lord Porter of, I think, South Holland made it clear that he had consultation and discussion with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the DExEU teams. That is very much on the record.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, talked about the regions of England being left out of the devolution arrangements. I readily recognise that point. It came up in a wide-ranging discussion that, apart from the city mayors—I take the noble Lord’s point about Yorkshire not quite being there at the moment, but it will eventually be there with the might of the whole of the county, so I hope that will progress—there is, I readily recognise, a dimension in England that is not answered by the devolution arrangements that exist for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The noble Lord, Lord Tope, spoke with feeling and passion about the importance of the Committee of the Regions. He was clearly very much part of it. In this House we have the collective wisdom of many noble Lords as to how that operated very effectively.
The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, talked about the paradox of devolution. I recognise some of the points he made, although I do not necessarily agree with all of them. He talked about the regions of England having some of the highest Brexit votes. That is true, but we should not ignore the fact that some very high Brexit votes were in the valleys of Wales. That happened not just where there was an absence of some substructure of government. I think that the highest yes vote in Wales was in Conservative Monmouthshire, so these things are perhaps not quite as simple as they may seem.
My colleagues in Wales would not forgive me if I missed the opportunity to put it on record that that was probably due largely to the fact that devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland seems to have bypassed local government in all those provinces as it seems to have done in this country. If the vote there was due to people not being consulted, it might be because the Welsh devolution system does not recognise Welsh local government.
I am not going to be tempted too far down that path, but I shall be tempted a little way. The area that has historically been most resistant to devolution is Monmouthshire, the only local authority that voted against extended powers in 2011.
Let me finish the point if the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will allow. If what I said is true, the area with the lowest yes vote on devolution had the highest yes vote in relation to Europe, so I am not sure that the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Porter, would be borne out totally.
I support what the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said. Is it not ironic that the valleys of south Wales, where there was a large Brexit vote, had received more money from the EU almost than anywhere else?
Certainly, it is, but before we cause great confusion on the part of anybody tuning in now and thinking that they have tuned into Cardiff Bay, I think all noble Lords will realise the dangers of us going down that path. Suffice it to say that it is wise in the light of that not to be led down the path of discussing a federal second Chamber, although there are certainly issues worthy of broader consideration on another occasion. However, I appreciate some of the points being made.
I am pleased to note that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is recovering from his injury and that it is not more serious than it looks.
I am grateful to the Minister for that. I should make it quite clear that it is not damage inflicted by Brexiteers.
I am not sure that the noble Lord is absolutely certain of that, because it seemed to be a Tube driver who caused the accident. Anyway, I am pleased that it is not a serious injury.
The noble Lord talked about the particular issues in the north-east in relation to government offices and so on. Again, I think it wise to leave the matter for the new arrangements, but I take the point about the great regional interest of the north-east. It is worth mentioning in passing that there was an opportunity under the previous Labour Government which was turned down pretty heartily, but circumstances change and it does not mean that there are not regional interests that need looking after.
We have had a fascinating and wide-ranging discussion. As I have indicated, I am very sympathetic to the aim of what is being sought, but it should not be on a statutory basis. We will follow up with a ministerial Statement. The Minister for Local Government will proceed shortly to discuss this matter with Local Government Association representatives cognisant of the fact that interests in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will need protecting. I understand the concerns. In light of these assurances, and with the undertaking that I will update the House on Report, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, this has been an excellent debate. Here we have a successful and innovative industry with lots of SMEs involved, but their very future is at risk because of the approach that the Government are taking to Brexit. We need to be clear about this. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, talked about CE marking and the notified body. What is crucial is that the CE marking is a logo placed on medical devices to show that they conform to the requirements of the various EU directives. The notified body is an organisation that has been designated by an EU member state to assess whether manufacturers and their medical devices meet the requirements set out in legislation. As part of our being within the EU, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency is the designated competent authority in the UK. That sets out the legal position and why it is so important in terms of both patient safety and the ability of UK companies to do business in the rest of the EU and market some of the most extraordinary machines, devices and developments that have been seen in the world.
Here we come to the point where there is such a risky position for our companies. To take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, we should look at Mrs May’s Mansion House speech, where she referred to the fact that the Government,
“want to explore with the EU, the terms on which the UK could remain part of EU agencies such as those that are critical for the chemicals, medicines and aerospace industries”—
and she mentioned the European Medicines Agency by name, although, extraordinarily, not Euratom, which we will come to debate later this evening and tomorrow. She went on to explain why we should be seeking associate membership of the European Medicines Agency and the other agencies named. She said:
“First, associate membership of these agencies is the only way to meet our objective of ensuring that these products only need to undergo one series of approvals, in one country. Second, these agencies have a critical role in setting and enforcing relevant rules … Third, associate membership could permit UK firms to resolve certain challenges related to the agencies through UK courts … Fourth it would bring other benefits too. For example, membership of the European Medicines Agency would mean investment in new innovative medicines continuing in the UK, and it would mean these medicines getting to patients faster as firms prioritise larger markets when they start the lengthy process of seeking authorisations”.
If ever I have heard a convincing case for remaining a member of the EU, the Prime Minister set it out in her Mansion House speech. The point is the one that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, made. We are going to beg for associate membership. As the Prime Minister said, we will follow the rules and pay the cost, but we will have no say in the rules that are being set. At the moment, the MHRA is one of the most effective negotiators in the EU, so when it comes to medicines safety or devices, the UK has a huge influence. That means a big advantage for UK companies, because it has in mind the interests of the UK as a whole.
We are to throw all this away and be supplicants at the altar of those agencies, because the Government have woken up to the fact that they cannot let those industries go down, so they will have to negotiate associate membership. It will be on EU terms, because they are a lot bigger than we are. We will have to abide by their rules but no longer will we have any say in how those rules are developed. As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, we are trying to negotiate the least worst option, but it is a worst option.
It is a wholly depressing picture: this Government seeking to destroy so many of our innovative industries through their obdurate and ignorant approach to the way industry, the UK and the EU work. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, has done us a great service tonight by letting us debate this important issue. It would be nice, would it not, to hear a proper response from the Government to show that they recognise the problems that they are now causing for British industry?
My Lords, this medical device amendment has been deemed a probing amendment, and I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that I feel well and truly probed by the comments made across the Chamber this evening.
The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a number of sweeping statements, which of course are accurate, about the response that I must give at this point. He will not be surprised to know that. We have agreed today the beginning of a journey with regard to the transition. I sought confirmation again that medical devices and the CE framework are included in that transition, and indeed they are, so I can give that assurance just now. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, will also be aware that the matters that we have discussed this evening must necessarily be a matter for negotiation. I am sure he will understand why that is so, also.
Were I to stop there, the Committee would rightly be disappointed. This has been a wide-ranging debate touching on a number of points. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in summation, raised the Mansion House speech delivered by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. That speech is a recognition of the importance of mutual recognition, what it means and why it will be important after we leave the European Union.
As a Member of the European Parliament, I sat on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee when the medical devices and in vitro question was being debated, and I was aware how important that forum was for determining particular standards. I am also aware of the importance of the United Kingdom’s innovation in medical devices. It is global in its reach and import and is extraordinary in what it can achieve. I am aware that, as we exit the European Union, we must secure mutual benefit to both sides. I do not accept the assertion that this is a moment when big means right. We are seeking an outcome that is right for those who would seek the comfort and necessity of what those medical devices must be and can achieve for them.
Will the Minister explain to noble Lords what effect mutual recognition would have? Can he explain how the UK will have as much influence on those rules in the future, outside the EU, as it does now, as a key member of it? Or does it mean that, in effect, we will simply have to follow the rules set by the EU?
I thank the noble Lord for his question. I am again reminded of the importance of the United Kingdom’s academic sector and the academic excellence which it creates, not just in the wider area of science but specifically in medical science. I am aware of how important that innovation is and believe that, right now, it should be able to speak for itself in the negotiations and discussions in terms of the wider recognition and import of what they represent.
I am conscious that, as we embrace the challenges which lie ahead—
Will the Minister answer the point made by my noble friend Lord Hunt? It sounds to me that he is unable to do so. If that is the case, he should tell the House so. It is clear to me that he has not answered the question, which is highly pertinent and relevant to the direction of the debate.
I am sorry if I have misled noble Lords. I am unable to answer the question. That will be a matter for the negotiations and I cannot comment upon them. This is the point made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I wish I could, but I cannot. I am sorry if my response misled the noble Lord as well. Determining exactly how that mutual recognition will work in practice will be a matter for the ongoing negotiations. I hope that it will work on both sides in a common-sense way which recognises that, at the heart, we are talking about the health and well-being of individuals. We are not talking about constitutional matters or anything other than ensuring the best health for the people of the continent of Europe that we can achieve.
My Lords, the Government have talked about completing the negotiations by October 2018. Is this one element that they hope to have completed negotiations on by then, or will it have to be put off into the transitional period?
It is the Government’s intention to complete all negotiations by that point.
I think that all noble Lords agree that UK notified bodies have a strong reputation in the EU. We have heard it more than once this evening. The notified bodies assess a disproportionate number of medical devices. According to a recent independent assessment of the market, UK notified bodies make up the first, third and fourth largest share of assessors. Furthermore, we estimate that UK notified bodies oversee between 50% and 60% of all the highest-risk devices on the EU market.
As I stated earlier, the UK has played a leading role in the negotiations of new regulations for medical devices in general and, specifically, for in vitro diagnostic medical devices. I believe that these innovations will make a significant difference. As the Government have made clear, whatever the outcome of negotiations, the principles which underpin our approach remain: that patients should not be disadvantaged; innovators should be able to access the UK market as quickly and simply as possible; and the UK will continue to play a leading role in both Europe and the world in promoting public health.
At the heart of much of this is the notion stressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Inside the EU, there are a number of means by which research is supported, not least of which is the Horizon 2020 fund. We have been blessed by punching above our weight in securing funds from this resource. I believe that in future it will be an asset for the entire EU and this will be negotiated in the next few years. It has yet to be made clear exactly how it will be determined. I remind noble Lords that the last time this was negotiated the EU top-sliced a substantial amount of money away from the fund, to the detriment of the overall Horizon 2020 reach.
My Lords, under this amendment, if by the end of January 2019 negotiations have not concluded in an agreement endorsed by Parliament, then a Motion would be put to revoke Article 50 and authorise a second referendum with the Government having already opened talks and informally secured an agreement on three issues. These are: a non-rebated own-resources contribution maintaining our existing contribution under subsection (1)(b); amendments to regulatory arrangements of most concern to Parliament—and I suggest animal welfare as one—under subsection (1)(c), and stronger border controls under subsection (1)(a), on which I intend to concentrate my remarks.
My amendment, which is not Labour policy, would signal to our European partners an alternative to Brexit and end the delay which is on course to undermine our economy and, in my view, our industrial base. Negotiators would need to negotiate on the core issues that concern the British people and influenced the referendum. I am arguing today a direct linkage between loose border controls, insensitivity to public concerns over immigration and developing political extremism in both the United Kingdom and Europe.
My amendment finds its origins in February 2016, after David Cameron’s return from Brussels, having failed to secure a meaningful deal. I am not blaming Cameron: I blame inflexibility in Europe. As I set out in the February 2017 debate, I have always been a supporter of European union, having canvassed in its favour in 1975 and loyally supported union throughout the period of Labour difficulties on Europe in the 1980s. I have never wavered until the Cameron failure in 2016.
For me, the Commission is the problem: its insensitivity to public opinion, its almost breathtaking administrative arrogance and its inability to address the problem of developing political extremism in the European Union. The result of that was that the people gave the system a good kicking—as indeed I did. I voted leave, along with another 17.5 million people. Neither I nor they voted to leave the customs union. People in the industrial heartlands of south Wales, the Midlands and the north—the core leave vote—are not stupid; they were alert to the risks of economic and industrial upheaval, and they were not rejecting the whole single market. For most, these were obscure terms. Millions travel abroad every year; they like what they see and recognise the benefits. They are not bought off with billion-pound promises on healthcare—they know instinctively when politicians are telling porkies.
Those issues were not at the heart of the leave vote. Millions voted leave due to a feeling of national insecurity, stemming from what they believe to be permeable borders throughout Europe. They believe that we have lost control over immigration and fear migratory flows across Europe from other continents that will destabilise populations. Be all that a true or false, valid or invalid reason, all was not helped by inadequate official statistics hiding inertia in government. They believe that inertia threatens their jobs, their personal security, the national well-being, and, for some, their cultural heritage. That is at the heart of the leave vote, not antipathy towards Europe.
The Merkel initiative, Sangatte, the crisis in the Mediterranean, imported criminal activity and the bombings in Europe have all served to aggravate the condition. Our leadership in this country is in denial, and most frightening of all is that the pursuit of integration in areas such as education and the tearing down of indefensible cultural boundaries, which are desperately needed, have fallen victim to political correctness. The public know it, and all over Europe the public are kicking the system and challenging permeable borders. Even those of us who argue for managed migration and its benefits are deemed out of touch. Even we are told that we are in denial, that we do not understand, and that we live in silos of privilege—which, to some extent, is probably true. When we argue that migration is not the cause of all the insecurity they point to threats to their jobs and unscrupulous employers who insist on passive cheap migrant labour sheltering behind government indifference.
It is all an invitation to political extremism and anti-migrant prejudice. That is what happens when states do not listen. For those of us who believe in the vision of a new Europe, our dream is being shattered by the politics of that institutional indifference. Denial at home is only surpassed by denial overseas. France is divided and the Visegrad states are riddled with division; there was Italy last week, and the AFD in Germany. All over Europe people are in revolt; in some EU states, even freedom of movement is being questioned.
I spent Christmas researching anti-immigration and wider extremist movements generally in 32 inner and outer European states. The findings were breathtaking. The migration crisis has given not only birth but real lift to reactionary movements throughout the continent of Europe. One is reminded of the 1930s. It is about time the powers that be consider whether their failure to act collectively on migration and its resultant insecurity is undermining their historic role in the development of Europe. They should be talking about aiding development, increasing resources on aid and creating safe areas in parts of the world where people live in fear, at the same time as acting to hold back the forces of political extremism. I used my leave vote to promote that debate, on Schengen and wider European border control issues. Without a leave vote in the United Kingdom there would be no debate in Europe on these matters, just drift. This amendment is a modest attempt to forward that debate.
I recognise that tougher border controls may be limited in effect, but that would depend on border management policies, whether we introduce work permits, ID requirements and the profile of social support. The Government’s Brexit-inspired immigration advisory committee recommendations due later this year might point to a way forward. At least we can be sure that taking back control of borders would help in planning our public services. That is what the public expect of their Parliament.
For me personally this has always been a high-wire, high-risk strategy. I saw my own credibility slip away among colleagues in both Houses as I set out in 2016, two years ago, why I, as a remainer, was voting leave. Those of us who wanted a real debate on those issues which are of most concern to the public had to stand up and be counted. I repeat: without a leave vote there would be no debate. We cannot rely on the Commission, as it is smothering any debate that questions its direction of travel. It says that the pillars are immutable, all while some nation states are chomping at the bit for reform. We need tough negotiations and brinkmanship with a clear message. Commission inflexibility should be met by preparedness to go direct to nation states. If we leave the Commission to run amok and run rings round nation states, there will be no single market left in the end to defend. We should be leading the charge, not only for ourselves but for Europe as a whole.
For those in the Chamber who say that challenging a single market core principle is a pipe dream, I say that they underestimate attitudes in Europe towards Britain, our Parliament, our institutions, our history, our stability, our commitment to democracy, our response in history when they were all in trouble, and our financial contribution to Europe. They have an eye on our money and, in particular, the topslicing of budgets post Brexit, which worries many of them.
I believe that one day we will have real freedom of movement throughout Europe. There will be no borders, just regional differences and cultural traditions, but not now. At this time in our history, the developing crisis demands a rethink. Too much is at stake and the threat of extremism has to be tackled head on now. If we win a new deal on the basis of the agenda in this amendment, we could win a second referendum with a resounding vote and our nightmare would be over.
This has not been an easy contribution for me to make, particularly as I personally embrace immigration in its most positive form and in warmth. My great, great, great grandmother on my mother’s side was born in slavery in the colonies in the early 1800s. Even now, after 200 years, one is conscious of that legacy and the agony of those before me who suffered racism through extremism—political extremism—in those times. We want to love our fellow man, but sometimes love has to be tough to survive. My amendment is about being tough and stamping out the evil of intolerance before it is too late and sweeps across Europe. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thought that we would have a longer debate on this matter. I understand the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, with this amendment. He is concerned, as are many other noble Lords, with the timeframe in which a deal with the EU is reached, and the consequences should Parliament choose to reject it. I also understand that the Government’s position on future referenda on extending the Article 50 period and what will occur if Parliament does not support our negotiated agreement is, to be fair, not one which satisfies the whole House. Therefore, I reassure the House once again that we are confident that we will reach a positive deal with the EU, as that is indisputably in the mutual interests of both the UK and the EU. Parliament will be given the opportunity of a vote on the final terms of the agreement, alongside the terms of our future partnership. There will be a clear choice—whether to accept the deal we have negotiated or move forward without a deal. Ultimately, if Parliament chooses to reject the deal, we will leave the EU with no deal once the Article 50 window closes.
The noble Lord proposes that, in the event of Parliament rejecting the deal, there should be another referendum on whether the UK should revoke its notification under Article 50 and renegotiate its membership of the EU. We had a very long and strong debate about a second referendum earlier this evening. As has been said, rather than second-guess the British people’s decision to leave the EU with a second referendum, the challenge as the Government see it is to make a success of it. That is how we are approaching the negotiations—anticipating success, not failure. It is vital that we try to reach an agreement that builds a deep and special partnership between the UK and the EU, not just for those who voted to leave but for every citizen of our country.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a recreational boater and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for proposing the amendment of my noble friend Lord Berkeley. Everything that he said seemed entirely reasonable and I am sure that the whole House awaits the Minister’s concession on this point.
My Lords, in moving this amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said that it may not be at the front of everyone’s minds. But as often happens in these circumstances, this particular issue is almost the nexus of all the key issues affecting withdrawal from the EU, whether it be our mutual recognition of certain types of goods for the purposes of customs duty, the precise arrangements and procedures for ensuring cross-border security or the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. So in truth, one might argue that this is a key amendment in many respects. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, is right to remind us of the significance of this sector. It is a substantial contributor to the Exchequer and a major employer. It is also, as a number of noble Lords have noted, a source of much pleasure, and we should not lose sight of that.
In responding to this debate it is important that I am very clear, so perhaps I may turn directly to the specific question raised by my noble friend Lady McIntosh. She asked whether we will continue to align with future legislation within the EU. I am afraid that that is a commitment I cannot give at this moment because it will be determined by the ongoing negotiations and our future relationship at that point. However, it is important to stress that we are in very regular contact with the British marine sector and are attentive to the issues that it is raising. I hope that in saying that, my noble friend will recognise that it is our intention to be very careful as we take this matter forward.
The noble Lord started by saying that this is the nexus of the issues virtually across the piece. He is painting a very dull picture of the future if he cannot assure us that in this area we are able to achieve the objectives of the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord for his probe in this regard. This is, if you like, the epitome of the challenges we are facing, but unfortunately it is larger than the individual amendment can recognise and what it seeks to do, which is to have Ministers place before us a single report setting out both the current arrangements and thereafter the arrangements that we secure through negotiation. The arrangements we secure through negotiation will be detailed for this House and will be iterated so that we understand what they are, and they will emerge from that negotiation. It is not our intention to downplay the significance of these issues, but we must recognise that they play a part in a wider question, in particular when it comes to the customs issues. On that basis, I still hope that the noble Lord will be able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for demonstrating his sensitivity to this issue, which will be reassuring to some extent for boat owners and boating businesses around the UK, so there may be some solace in that. The amendment is not seeking a running commentary on the negotiations. The Minister is correct to say that this goes to the nub of the customs and free movement issues as they unfold, but providing a promise of some kind to keep the industry informed about what is going on is very important. Obviously we will look at the Minister’s response in detail in Hansard, and with that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate, and we have identified some of the challenges that we face in public health: air quality, environmental standards, food standards, accidents, infectious diseases and, indeed, huge health inequalities. I listened with interest to the noble Baroness, Lady Oppenheim-Barnes. Overall, I disagreed with her. Of course, you can pick out some regulations from the EU with which one might disagree or think that they do not go far enough, and she identified an issue around labelling. Overall, however, the EU has been generally helpful and a force for improvement in public health. I mention in particular air quality, because that is one clear example where it has pressed this country hard on our very poor performance. Governments have started to do something about it only because of the fines we face. There are other examples as well.
The fear expressed so well by noble Lords—I too pay tribute to the Faculty of Public Health for its briefings on this—is that without EU law, and in the context of already significant reductions in public health budgets, we will see a gradual erosion over time of our important public health legislation. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and others mentioned food safety as an example. The Minister will no doubt tell us that he cannot say anything substantive because of the process of negotiations; he has said that a few times before. However, one of the fears clearly is that in the Government’s haste to negotiate a deal with the US—they are desperate to do so, for obvious reasons—when it comes to it, things like some of the food standards we have at the moment will go by the board. We know that that will happen because they have to produce a US trade deal; they have no option but to do it. They are so weak compared to the US in terms of the negotiation that it is quite likely that some of those standards will have to be thrown away.
That is why this amendment has been brought forward tonight. Ministers have helpfully discussed this amendment in meetings with some stakeholders. I know Ministers may say that the Secretary of State already has the powers set out in the amendment. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said, the amendment would place a duty on the whole of the Government to do no harm. That is a very important distinction. Importantly, it would also place a duty on other public authorities, including the devolved nations, so I believe that it goes further than current legislation. It is relevant to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, not just to a theoretical health and social care Bill which may be introduced at some point.
Other noble Lords have talked about the Lisbon treaty and the impact upon it. The amendment essentially seeks to ensure that there is a legal precedent and interpretive guidance on which to draw when determining the meaning of the proposed new clause, but, as I understand it, it does not seek to preserve EU law and regulation. Therefore, it would be for the British courts, on the basis of our doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty, to decide the future interpretation of the law.
This has been a very important debate. The Minister has to recognise that there is real concern that the Government’s desire to negotiate agreements with other countries will lead to them having to agree to reduce some of our essential public health standards. This amendment seeks to provide a guarantee and assurance that this will not happen. We should very much welcome it.
I thank the noble Lord for his comments. I will start where he finished: no, we are not going to do that. I am afraid that is not the Government’s purpose. There will be no rollback of these standards because they are at the heart of what we believe to be right and proper. A number of noble Lords have implied that what has been proposed will be the case. I assure them that is not the case.
My noble friend Lady Chalker is right to stress the leadership role that the United Kingdom has long had in the area of public health. Indeed, that leadership role has been a beacon to not only the EU but its member states. As someone who currently lives in Edinburgh, I recognise the role that Scotland has had in pushing forward boundaries which are only now being adopted in certain parts of the world. It is important to stress that we are not in any way diminishing our regard for public health. Indeed, in bringing across the corpus of European law, those matters will rest in our statute book and will therefore be removable only by the other place and by this place.
Before I address some of the more substantive points, it is important once again to look at the EU itself, mostly in the area of public health. The noble Lord should be aware that public health has not been a core competence of the EU. Indeed, many of the aspects of public health have rested elsewhere within the statute books. Noble Lords will be aware that we have known about the pernicious and deadly impact of tobacco for many years, yet it is only in the last five years that the EU has phased out subsidies for tobacco growers.
I was a member of the European Parliament and sat on the environment committee. I also sat on the committee that investigated a scandal that came to be known as “dieselgate”. Noble Lords will be aware of exactly what that represented. At the heart of the EU, a major organisation installed cheap devices in vehicles that were specifically intended to undermine the core air quality standards. We should again remember that that was uncovered by an American public body, not by the EU’s body, which is in itself a borderline scandal. Further, we must also recognise that Volkswagen has compensated car owners in the US but has not in any way compensated car owners in the EU.
I am reminded also of the traceability of food and the horsemeat scandal, which riddled the EU. High standards are important only if they are met, and they must be met in each and every instance. Far too often we have found across the EU some of the most rigorous standards on paper that there could ever be, yet their enforcement is dreadful and woeful. Indeed, I am nearly certain that when we leave the EU the mean standard of public health will fall in the remaining states, so important is the contribution that we make to the wider question of public health.
When we look at the role of global standards and something like the recent Ebola outbreak, it was not the EU that pushed at that standard but France and the UK. They recognised an obligation to deliver against that pernicious pandemic. I believe we also need to recognise that the UK has been at the cutting edge of driving forward public health.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, said that I might suggest that his amendment was vague. It is not vague; it simply duplicates exactly what the Government—indeed, not just this Government but every Government—have long said and long held to be dear. At the heart of good government must be the preservation of public health. It must be a cornerstone not just in the UK Government but in the Governments of the devolved Administrations, which in some respects have been brought into the ambit of the report. We need to recognise that.
Perhaps I may touch upon some of the other issues that have been brought into this wide-ranging debate. I reiterate that many of the aspects that we are touching on here will necessarily be part of ongoing negotiations, but I assure noble Lords that it is this Government’s intention to secure the highest possible engagement on matters of wider public health. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Patel, for bringing up a number of the areas that I believe the Government need to look at carefully—how we continue our collaboration, how we ensure that we can co-operate and how we can maintain that high standard. We can do so by sharing practice on both sides, because we both have a great deal to contribute and each will be the poorer for the absence of that collaboration.
It important for me to stress that the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care has a statutory duty under the National Health Service Act 2012 to protect the health of the public. A number of noble Lords have raised that, as indeed has the briefing from a number of sources, not least the Royal College of Physicians of the United Kingdom. Of course we are going to argue that the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care already has these powers, and it is his intention to hold them to the highest possible standard. I stress that, although there is an equivalent duty under the NHS—
Can I make it clear that the Minister is saying that the powers and duties of the Secretary of State are as wide as the powers and duties in this amendment?
I am stressing once again that the powers and duties that rest upon a Secretary of State for Health and the health department are high enough and wide enough to capture the intent of this amendment, and that is why the Government will not support the amendment on this occasion.
That was not my question. Can the Minister say whether the current powers extend to the devolved Administrations, the other public bodies and the whole of government, as covered by the amendment?
No, for one very simple reason. As the noble Lord knows, we cannot impose on the devolved Administrations by this mechanism. I am afraid that that is a simple statement of where the law and the devolution settlement rest.
My Lords, there is another way of approaching this, and that is to ask whether the provision in the treaty on which my noble friend Lord Warner has based his amendment is part of retained EU law. If it is, then it has a place in the statute and will be applied by the courts if necessary. Is the noble Lord able to answer that? Is it part of retained EU law?
In this instance, it is not part of EU retained law, but that is not the point. We are saying that the powers that already rest in the Secretary of State’s hands are equal to the powers that would come through this amendment.
If it is not part of this Bill, why not? The Government said that they were going to take this into the legislation. Why is it excluded? That is why people are frightened—because the Government have not put it in the Bill.
Because it is superseded by the power that rests in the hands of all good Governments to deliver at that particular level. That is the purpose, and that is the point that I raised just now. If I may, I will make some progress.
It is important that I stress that we are committed to continuing co-operation not just within the EU but more broadly. That is why we are an active participant in the World Health Organization and in various other elements of global public health. My noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, who is sitting beside me this evening, has committed to continuing the UK’s leading role in promoting and ensuring public health, in Europe and beyond. This commitment builds upon the principles set out by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care last July on a post-Brexit regulatory system where patients are not disadvantaged and patient safety remains at the heart of our endeavours. It is the Government’s intention, as stated in the future partnership papers, to continue collaboration with the EU to safeguard resilience. This of course will be determined as we move through the engagement on this matter.
I stress that the values and principles which have underpinned our National Health Service for the past 70 years—and which are not to be traded away with the US or any other trade partner we might have—will continue to guide us, just as they have contributed to the development of health and social care services across the EU. That is why, in this instance, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to everybody for their contributions in this debate. My score-card shows 14 in favour of the amendment and two against, including the Minister, and that was across the Benches. I am glad that he has moved on from saying that the amendment is vague—that is a bit of progress from what Ministers said before to the Faculty of Public Health.
The Minister seems to be setting up the EU as a straw-man villain to criticise. I never claimed in the past that everything that the EU did in this area was perfect and for all time. What I was trying to do in this amendment was take a principle in the Lisbon treaty, which this country has signed, and apply it to the jurisprudence of the future. If I may, I remind him of the quotation from the High Court judgment, which he needs to read carefully. It makes it very clear that the courts found it useful to apply this principle and put it at the “epicentre”—the word of the judgment, not mine—of public health. It was used in coming to a judgment that actually helped the Government’s position on tobacco policy.
I have heard nothing from the Minister which suggests that the Government have got the same breadth and width of coverage as this amendment provides in this legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, I cannot see why on this issue the Government cannot put in the Bill what they claim to be their policy. It would reassure a very large number of people and help with the exit from the EU. I can guarantee the Minister that I shall return to this issue on Report.
I would be very happy to have a meeting with him, if he feels some flexibility coming upon him, as would many of my colleagues. However, if he does not, I think he can expect a rerun of this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
I understand the point the noble Lord makes, but if we remember the reasons it was brought forward, this is not the process we have at present.
The other point about stating the reasons, as set out in Amendment 239B, for why an SI is urgent is very helpful in this regard. All of these amendments are trying to bring some order to the process which at the moment seems to be complicated and difficult and raises concerns about accuracy.
I hope that the noble Baroness can respond positively to these amendments. I will not go into further detail because that has been provided by the noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments, but this is a serious issue and I suspect that if we do not receive an appropriate response from the Minister, we will return to it as the Bill proceeds.
My Lords, before responding to these amendments in turn, I should like to take this opportunity to expand on the remarks I made at Second Reading. As I said then, I wanted to find a way to build any new sifting procedure into the existing scrutiny structures which this House has developed so successfully over the years. On 5 March, as the noble Baroness has said, the Procedure Committee agreed to my proposal to incorporate the same powers as those of the new Commons sifting committee into the terms of reference of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee as well as conferring the power to appoint sub-committees. This will allow the sub-committees to recommend within 10 sitting days that the House’s consideration of specific negative instruments related to this Bill should follow the affirmative procedure.
As the House will expect, the SLSC’s existing role in scrutinising the merits of all instruments will continue as before, with the sub-committees fulfilling this function alongside their new sifting role in relation to the SIs flowing from this Bill. The main committee will have responsibility for determining the allocation of policy areas between the two sub-committees as well as maintaining oversight of the scrutiny process in general terms. If it wishes to do so, this will allow it to meet as a whole to conduct its own inquiries into the overall management of secondary legislation, as it has done in the past. The 10-day period for allowing the sifting committee to make a recommendation was originally suggested by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of this House and was endorsed by the Procedure Committee in the Commons. The Government are content to agree to this timeframe, and that is why the sub-committee will have the power to report directly to the House, to award it greater agility in conducting its sifting role without unrealistic constraints on the time to report.
The agreement reached regarding the SLSC’s new role is, I believe, an example of the House coming together on a constructive basis to strengthen our important scrutiny role, and I am grateful to other members of the Procedure Committee, including the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for their support in reaching this decision. I am also grateful to the chairman of the SLSC, my noble friend Lord Trefgarne, his clerk and advisers for their constructive engagement in the development of this proposal. I am pleased to confirm that the SLSC will receive additional resources both in terms of expert advice and additional members, including the ability to form two sub-committees, in order to fulfil its new sifting role. I know that noble Lords on all sides will want to ensure that the new arrangements are a success. The House will be invited to agree the proposed arrangement when the Procedure Committee presents its report. That is expected to be when the passage of this Bill is nearing completion, as of course the report may have to reflect any relevant changes to the Bill that are agreed by both Houses.
In the meantime, and as the Bill progresses, I am clear that both Houses must be treated equally regarding the proposed sifting arrangements under the Bill. In this respect, the Bill, as introduced to this House, only makes reference to the House of Commons in the relevant paragraphs of Schedule 7. The Government will therefore introduce amendments to incorporate equivalent references to the House of Lords where appropriate.
I hope I have explained to noble Lords the new proposed arrangement, so I will now turn to Amendment 237, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Lisvane. Noble Lords will know that the sifting committees, as currently provided for in the Bill, cover only the main powers in the Bill, rather than any consequential and transitional provisions made under Clause 17 where the negative procedure is stipulated. Making such consequential provisions through SIs is already a standard approach in legislation—even in significant constitutional legislation, such as the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the Scotland and Northern Ireland Acts and the Government of Wales Acts. We have already published a draft example of consequential provision that we will need to make under the Bill—the European Communities (Designation Orders) (Revocation) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018—but we intend to publish further such examples before Report. I hope these will reassure noble Lords that the negative procedure is being used appropriately. In relation to the comments of the noble Baroness about draft SIs, we intend to publish them where possible and appropriate. As I have mentioned—I will mention a few more—we have already published some illustrative drafts and will continue to do so to support the debate in this House.
The proposed powers of the SLSC, as the Bill stands, will not allow it to make the sort of binding decision proposed by noble Lords. We believe that this is consistent with how this House’s committees conduct their scrutiny work in other areas. Ultimately, it is up to both Houses to decide whether a Government are using appropriately the delegated powers Parliament has given them when they come to consider an SI. It is right for this House to consider these instruments in the light of the expert advice of its committees, but we do not believe that it would be right for those committees to make binding decisions about the use of delegated powers independent of the whole House. The amendment, as proposed, would also see the Government bound by a decision of the sifting committee of one House, even when the other disagrees, and only the recommending House would be able to reject the recommendation. Currently, no mechanism for the resolution of such disagreement is provided in the amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, mentioned the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act, the Public Bodies Act and the Localism Act. All of those Acts combine a sifting mechanism with the form of the super-affirmative procedure. We do not believe that the super-affirmative procedures are suitable for the instruments to come, particularly given that they can take up to six months, but as I hope I have set out, we have taken steps to create a sifting process in the Bill.
I understand noble Lords’ concerns that, as Ministers are not bound to accept the committee’s recommendations, they may choose to exercise discretion; however, if both sifting committees were to reach the same—well-considered, no doubt—and persuasive recommendation, I assure your Lordships that the Government’s expectation is that such recommendations are likely to be accepted. Where the two committees disagree, the situation would of course need to be carefully considered on its merits. On the occasions—hopefully, very rare—when the Government did not agree to a recommendation to use the affirmative procedure, we would expect to justify fully our reasons to the committee concerned.
Furthermore, when the House chooses to delegate a scrutiny role to its committees—as is the case in other important policy areas—it is important for it to have confidence in the committee’s expertise and judgment to make a persuasive recommendation for the House to consider. I fear that making the committee’s recommendation binding, then building in an explicit provision to allow the House to reject such a decision, as the amendment seeks to do, could undermine the well-established confidence that the House has in its committee structure.
The amendment would also—unnecessarily, in my view—increase the sifting period from 10 to 15 days. As noble Lords have already said, we expect time to be in short supply as we prepare to exit the EU. As I have already stated, the changes to the SLSC’s powers, agreed to by the Procedure Committee, will seek to maximise the sub-committee’s ability to conduct its important scrutiny work within that 10-day period.
I did say that it would indeed be for the Government to justify their position in that situation, although I also hope that I have made it clear that where both committees agree and both Houses put forward—I have no doubt—strongly argued reasons for a change in the procedure to be used, our expectation is that the Government would accept such a recommendation. The noble Lord is absolutely right: it would be for the Government to have to justify their position if that is not the case.
Moving on to Amendment 237A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I believe that, despite its well-intentioned deference to this House, it is unnecessary. If either House were to feel especially strongly that a particular instrument should use the affirmative procedure, they could choose to table a Motion to that effect and make a recommendation to the Minister regardless. As with the sifting committees’ recommendations, I am sure that the Government would respond to such a resolution with the weight it deserved.
For similar reasons, I believe that Amendment 239A in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Lisvane, is also unnecessary. The Bill adheres to the House’s established procedures for the scrutiny of statutory instruments and the proposed change would mark a significant departure from the standard SI procedure. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, pointed out the similarity of the system proposed in the amendment to that proposed for all SIs by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde. We believe that making such a change would represent a significant change to the balance of the relationship on SIs between the two Houses.
We also feel this would be insufficiently sensitive about the time constraints that I have already articulated. As noble Lords know, the task at hand of correcting the statute book must largely be completed before exit day. The majority of SIs that will be made to address deficiencies and make corrections, barring potentially some relating to provisions which have no practical application and can be addressed in the period after exit day, must be passed and ready to come into force on exit day to ensure the continuity of the UK’s legal system.
The Government therefore expect to be laying and ensuring a steady flow of statutory instruments before Parliament for scrutiny by this House from when the Bill receives Royal Assent until shortly before exit day. As noble Lords have rightly alluded to, we estimate that between 800 and 1,000 SIs will be introduced during that period relating to our exit from the EU. As I explained in my evidence to the Constitution Committee in December, and, indeed, as my noble friend Lady Goldie outlined in the last debate, the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee is now overseeing secondary legislation in much the same way as it manages primary legislation. This is partly because we want to improve the quality of SIs—indeed, the noble Baronesses highlighted the importance of that—but we also want to ensure that the flow of SIs is steady, rather than in peaks and troughs, to allow Parliament to do its job more effectively by allowing adequate time for scrutiny.
I can reassure noble Lords that we absolutely understand what is coming before us. We as a Government are making every effort to ensure we are working effectively to try to make sure this House and the other place have the time to deal with the SIs that will come before us effectively. I will continue to work with my parliamentary colleagues to make sure we do our very best on this.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 239B from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, which seeks to require the Minister to make a statement of the grounds for urgency in the case of urgent SIs made under the “made affirmative” procedure. “Urgent” is a term without definition in the Bill, but I hope that the requirement for each “urgent” SI to contain a declaration of urgency in the body of the instrument will reassure noble Lords on that point. The Government have already promised that Explanatory Memoranda will contain an explanation by the Minister as to why they considered the SI to merit the urgent procedure. Nevertheless, I promise that the Government will consider this issue further before Report to see whether we can provide further assurances to your Lordships on it.
I hope my response to these amendments demonstrates that the Government continue to take this House’s scrutiny role seriously and that we do not consider it—
On the urgent procedures, why in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill is there a 60-day period, whereas for SIs generated urgently by this Bill there is a 28-day period? The Minister has talked about the necessity for speed. I do not understand why one Bill has 60 days and the other has 28.
The procedure, including in EU exit-related legislation such as the customs Bill, must reflect the specificities of the Act. Where certainty and the nature of tax legislation require provisions to come into force rapidly, it is important that there is time to arrange for debate and scrutiny, so there will be different timings relating to different legislation. I am happy to seek further information and write to the noble Lord if that would be helpful.
I hope that I have managed to allay some of your Lordships’ concerns and that I have explained the process that we are setting out. I hope, too, that noble Lords will understand that we are taking this matter seriously. We will obviously reflect on the debate; there are a couple of issues in particular that I have said we will take back, but I hope that, at this point, noble Lords will feel able to withdraw their amendments.
Yes, I feel able to withdraw my amendment, but want to make one comment before I do so. The Minister has pointed out that the proposal for a reconsideration period marks a major change. She is quite right about that, because the circumstances seem to require exactly that change. I think that we will come to discuss this matter again, but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
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No, I have it absolutely right. I know that that is precisely what it is. I have said that on previous occasions. But, with respect, it was the couple of speeches that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, made earlier on that moved me in the Government’s direction.
My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions at this stage of the debate. I appreciate, as do other Members of the House, that when I move the government amendment to Clause 11, we will embrace a debate about the consequences of that amended clause and the significant change it makes to the way in which we are going to deal with, among other things, devolved competences. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, his amendments are consequential in a sense on what is going to happen with regard to Clause 11. In that context, I point out that we had already indicated our intention to move the amendment to Clause 11 and then withdraw it, in order that the consequences for the schedules to the Bill can be addressed more properly when we reach Report. However, there is a more fundamental issue underlying this, which has been highlighted by the use of the terms “consult” and “consent”. It is really rather fundamental. Because these are probing amendments, I will just outline the Government’s thinking with regard to this area of the Bill and how it will work. I am sorry if I am going to appear somewhat repetitive about some matters of history that have been touched upon already, but perhaps your Lordships could bear with me, if but for a moment.
In 1972, the UK Parliament of course transferred certain competences to the EU. Having done so, it limited its competence to legislate for the United Kingdom. When it came to the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, that Brussels competence, as I will term it, had already gone. When it came to considering the scope of the divorce settlement, the matter of the powers held by the European Union in Brussels was not in scope for consideration as part of devolution. They had gone, by virtue of an international treaty implemented in domestic law pursuant to the ECA 1972. The devolved settlement was determined by reference to the competence that remained in Westminster in 1998 and in 2006.
I am going to elaborate on what happens to the competences in Europe. I wonder whether the noble Baroness will bear with me just for a moment.
But I wanted to challenge what the Minister just said. The competences were not actually removed from us. We agreed to operate within the framework, but the idea that we actually gave up those competences in the way described would perhaps not be accepted, as such. We agreed that the EU had rights to make laws in certain areas, but that is not the same as saying, “This is no longer our responsibility”.
With respect, pursuant to our international treaty obligations, we bound ourselves at the level of international law to allow the EU to exercise competence in areas where previously the UK Parliament would have exercised it. That was then implemented in domestic law by virtue of the 1972 Act. Of course a sovereign Parliament is always able to repeal the 1972 Act, as it is now doing, but so long as it remained in place, and so long as we remained party to the relevant treaty—which became treaties—we were bound in that context. I do not entirely agree with the analysis, but I do not believe it is material for the present purposes, if I may respectfully say so.
Once Brussels had certain competences, it then exercised them. It was important that Brussels should exercise them in one area in particular, which was the development of the EU single market, as no one else could have exercised jurisdiction over a single market in the EU. The idea that 12—now 28—individual jurisdictions could have maintained the single market is self-evidently untenable, so Brussels exercised that jurisdiction, for very good reason. When we leave the EU, we will find ourselves in the position where we want to maintain an internal single market in the United Kingdom; the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to that, while the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said we are looking forward to the internal market in the United Kingdom. We have to bear that in mind. What Parliament is in a position to legislate for a UK single market? The answer to that is the Parliament that has jurisdiction for the whole United Kingdom. I will come on to the issue of devolved competence in a moment, but generally speaking if you are going to maintain a single market you need a legislative power that is able to do that for the single market.
Lest anyone interrupt just yet, I add that of course by their very nature the devolved Administrations, parliaments and assemblies have responsibility for devolved powers in their respective nations. We respect that, of course, but there is an issue here that has not yet been mentioned. We identified, on the basis of analysis that was carried out with the devolved Administrations, that there were some 153 areas of competence where—
Before the Minister moves on to the detail of those competences, I want to challenge the analysis that he has given about the comparison between the UK single market and the EU single market. No one would have suggested at any time in the last 26 years that the relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU single market, and the decision-making around the EU single market, would have been such that the decision-making on the EU single market would have been left solely to the European Parliament and the European Commission. It was not. The decision-making around the EU single market was done primarily by the Council of Ministers, and in the Council of Ministers some aspects of that single market were determined by absolute consent, where the UK had a veto, while some areas were determined by qualified majority voting. We cannot replicate that arrangement with one that leaves the sole decision-making power after consultation, without consent, with the UK Parliament and the UK Government in relation to areas where currently the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or the Northern Ireland Assembly would have legislative competence.
I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord’s analysis but for the present purposes I am not sure that it is particularly relevant. What is relevant is this, if I can continue: we have identified about 153 areas in which, upon our leaving the EU, competences will return and touch upon areas of devolved competence. These are areas that the devolved parliaments and assemblies previously had no engagement with because they lay in Brussels, but they are coming back and touching upon these areas of devolved competence and we recognise that.
However, some of these areas of competence are critical to the maintenance of a single market in the United Kingdom, as I will illustrate in a moment. Those therefore had to be addressed. We did that by engaging with the devolved Administrations and assemblies in the context of the Joint Ministerial Committee negotiations. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter: there may be criticisms of that process but I respectfully suggest that that is not for this Bill. It is important to notice the achievements made by that committee in this context. In particular, noble Lords may have received a copy of the communiqué of 16 October 2017 from the Joint Ministerial Committee, which was attended by Mark Drakeford, a Cabinet Secretary in Wales, and Mr Russell, a Minister from the Scottish Government, among others, including senior civil servants from Northern Ireland in the absence of their Executive. I shall quote briefly from it, although some aspects are referred to in some of the proposed amendments:
“Ministers noted the positive progress being made on consideration of common frameworks and agreed the principles that will underpin that work”.
The definition of those principles includes the line:
“A framework will set out a common UK, or GB, approach and how it will be operated and governed”.
Then there is a list of principles:
“Common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to … enable the functioning of the UK internal market”—
for example, to,
“ensure compliance with international obligations; ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties; enable the management of common resources; administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element; safeguard the security of the”,
United Kingdom.
No, perhaps I can finish this point. I am just trying to explain why in these 24 areas it has been identified as very material that we should retain and then develop frameworks.
I just wanted to intervene on this very point about pesticides. The Minister will be aware that the Welsh Government did in fact legislate on the question of genetically modified crops, and it was forecast that the roof would fall in. It did not; it was quite possible to have a different regime in Wales from that in England. As he addresses the rest of the points that have been raised, will he tell us how the regime will be allowed or not allowed to work in the context of agricultural support? Sheep farmers may well want and be entitled to get support from the Welsh Government. The Welsh Government may want to give them that support but, if it is argued that that distorts the UK market, they would not be able to do so. That is the sort of issue that causes concern.
As regards agricultural support, that is another subspecies of agriculture. I am dealing with those matters that fall within the 24 identified areas where we find it necessary to retain and operate the single internal market. Not all areas within those 24 competencies are going to have to be retained for the purposes of that market. There are areas which we will devolve.
The Minister is making a very strong case for how a single market can operate effectively. Does he not believe that the United Kingdom could operate under a frictionless trading or regulatory arrangement with managed divergence across the four nations?
That is not what is in contemplation, and that is why I am trying to explain the Government’s thinking with regard to maintaining effectively a single market, not frictionless borders between nations within the United Kingdom, which is a different issue altogether and one that does arise in a different context.
I will not take this opportunity to contest some of the points that have been made about, for example, fertilisers, although I think there is a debate to be had about the way in which the Government describe that issue. It is not helpful to the heat generated around this debate when the examples the Government give for the need to retain the power imply that decisions that would be made in Scotland or Wales would be stupid. The Government need to think hard about the fact that when they describe the need for these single market frameworks in the UK, they should do so in a positive way in terms of the UK having regulations that work together.
On the substantive point about the frameworks, the issue is not the list of 24, but how they will be agreed and who will have the ultimate decision-making power. It is not about what is or is not on the list. That is a matter for negotiation and determination within the existing settlements. The issue here is who agrees the frameworks, how they are agreed and who ultimately has the power to veto them or otherwise. That is the substantive issue I would ask the Minister to address.
I wholly reject the implication that we are suggesting that any of the devolved Administrations are going to proceed to legislate, with any of the competencies returned to them, in a way that would be regarded as stupid or unacceptable. That is a most unfortunate gloss to put on the matter. It is, however, very helpful that the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, has raised the question of how we are going to deal with the issue in this context. The framework agreements have been the subject of ongoing negotiation among all of the Administrations, but in order to achieve that it is necessary to retain competencies in those areas so that there is not the prospect of legislation within the devolved areas which impacts upon areas outwith their competence. To give a simple example in that context, the Scottish Government are entitled to exercise devolved competence and powers within Scotland for the Scottish people, but if we allow all of the additional competencies to go back to the Scottish Government and they legislate in an area such as food labelling, that impacts on the people not only of Scotland but of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. There is therefore, in a sense, a veto over proposals for the internal market, with one devolved Administration saying, “No, we don’t like your proposals on food labelling. We know everybody else likes them but we’ve decided we don’t like them, we’re not going to consent to them, so you can’t have them.” That is the problem that we want to ensure does not arise.
Coming more particularly to the point that was made about how this is decided, we do ring-fence, as it were, the 24 competencies—or elements of them—that have been identified following the consultation process with the devolved Administrations and which are reflected in the principles that I quoted from the Joint Ministerial Committee on 16 October last year. Then, we have to formulate framework agreements, essentially, in each of these areas for the United Kingdom.
Taking up the noble Lord’s point on how we are going to implement those, we will do so by way of primary legislation. And where do we find ourselves? Back in the relevant devolved legislation, which says that we will not normally legislate in respect of these devolved areas except with the agreement of the relevant devolved Government. So the relevant safeguard is exactly the same as the one that exists at the present time. What we propose will not intrude on the devolved competence in Scotland, Wales or indeed Northern Ireland. It retains 24 areas that are coming back from the European Union in order that we can work out what is required for the purposes of maintaining a single UK market. However, what would alter the devolved competencies quite fundamentally would be a provision that said that we could retain those areas of competence only with the consent of each of the devolved Administrations. That would give them a veto over matters that went beyond their present devolved competence and a veto over matters that impacted on England, Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland, depending upon who was doing it. That is why we have set out matters in the way that we have. When we come on to the amendment to Clause 11 in due course, I hope that, having essentially flipped Clause 11, we can reflect on the great progress that we have made to date in these areas. It is in that context that I simply invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
We will return to these matters under reference to the government amendments but I wanted to set out, I hope with a reasonable degree of clarity, the Government’s thinking in this area. This is not, with respect, a power grab—on the contrary: if we consult, if we agree and if we achieve this, there is no question of a power grab. It is certainly not a derogation from devolved competence. A great deal of competence will be laid on the devolved Administrations, because so many of these competencies coming back from the EU, and under the amended Clause 11, are going straight to the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies.
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I just tempt him? He has given a very clear exposition of the Government’s position and why it is in the interests of the devolved Administrations and the United Kingdom as a whole to proceed in the manner that the Government describe. He has also talked about the great efforts that have been made by the officials and the work that has been done. Why, then, do we have such opposition, in particular from the Scottish Administration?
I am not going to rehearse the rhetoric that has been used by some members of the Scottish Government to feed populism. Terms such as “power grab” may have their place, but they do not have a place in the context of our looking at this legislation. Of course, it has been asserted that consultation is not enough—even though it may lead to agreement—and that there has to be consent and only consent. But if it is consent, that is, let us remember, a very material change to the devolved settlements. That will result in the devolved Parliaments and Governments being able effectively to veto matters that impact upon those outwith their area of devolved competence.
The Minister used a phrase—which is used also either in the Explanatory Note or in a letter, I cannot remember which—about the retention of this for the purpose of the internal market. It might be helpful if that wording appeared on the face of the Bill.
I note that comment. The noble Baroness will appreciate that the amendment to Clause 11, which I will move in due course, seeks to ring-fence these powers to ensure that they are limited. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has also tabled an amendment regarding a sunset clause in that context. It is perfectly clear from the proposed amendment to Clause 11 that they are meant to have a very limited function—but I note what the noble Baroness said and I will take it forward.
Does the Minister not realise that the Labour Government in Cardiff feel as strongly as the SNP Government in Scotland about this matter? This is not a matter of party politics; it is a question of where power lies. That is why the term “power grab” has arisen. When he says how outrageous it would be if Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland had a veto, does he not realise that the structure that he is advocating gives England a veto? It gives Westminster a veto; that is what is causing so much trouble.
One moment. I am terribly sorry, Archbishop, but I must reply to that. This does not give England a veto. Essentially, England has no voice. This is the United Kingdom Parliament: it legislates for the United Kingdom.
The point I was going to make is exactly the same. As I have listened to the debate, it seems to me that the issue is probably what the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, tried to address. When we leave the EU, the state of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland will still be the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. Therefore, there are areas that are for all four nations and others that are just for one nation. Devolution was a good thing, but it does not mean that powers that affect other nations can simply be devolved. I have listened again and again, and I think the point is that, of all the powers that are coming back, 23 have been identified which, if they were simply handed over without clear legislation, would leave us in a real mess. There would be no coherence, no sense that this would be the United Kingdom; it would be something else. So may I plead with those who come from nations with devolved Governments to realise that, for the benefit of the whole of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, there are some areas that affect all of us together, not separately, and that those need to be retained? Of course there could be negotiations and conversations—but I get a little concerned that the message is not getting through. This is not grabbing power: some areas are returning to the United Kingdom and we must sort out which bits really need to go straight to the devolved Administrations. The 23 areas that we have heard about require very careful consideration; otherwise some might think that leaving the EU equals independence for them.
I am not going to indulge in party politics at this stage; I do not think that that is necessary. We all know the ultimate objective of the Scottish National Party. It is not to have a United Kingdom; it is to break up the United Kingdom and have an independent Scotland. Although Scottish nationalists talk about all these powers coming back from the EU, let us remember that they do not want them. If they get them, they want to give them back to Brussels, because they want Scotland, as an independent country, to remain in the EU—and, if it leaves, they want it to join EFTA and the single market. Therefore they will return all the powers they are talking about if they get their ultimate aim.
The noble and learned Lord has distinguished between “consult” and “consent”, and has described consent as a veto. Does he not accept that over the years the normal use of “consent” by both the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly has been exercised responsibly, and that there is no basis for that fear? How would he define the word “consult”? What does it mean?
Consultation has been going on in the Joint Ministerial Committees on a regular basis since October of last year. As regards respecting the constitutional settlement on devolution, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord—with one qualification. A convention has arisen out of the memorandum of understanding between the Scottish Government and the UK Government about how we ensure that legislation put before the Scottish Parliament is competent. That convention has operated since 1999 and involves an exchange of a note of competence. Prior to a Bill being introduced to the Scottish Parliament, a copy is passed to my office—the Office of the Advocate-General for Scotland. That is always done.
I then confer with the Lord Advocate and his officials—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, will be familiar with this—and we iron out any differences and come to a view on what is competent and what is not, and consequently these matters are resolved. For the first time in nearly 20 years, that convention was departed from by the Scottish Government in respect of their EU Continuity Bill, which I first heard about after it was introduced to the Scottish Parliament. They did, however, give it to the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament in time for him to take legal advice. Therefore, while I accept the generality of the point the noble and learned Lord made, particular exceptions have arisen very recently.
I was the Minister who negotiated the memorandum of understanding. I think I am the only Minister involved in the negotiation at the time who serves in your Lordships’ House. I agree that the Sewel convention and the arrangements for considering the competence of legislation have worked very well. That concerns the point I made earlier—two debates ago, I think—about the clarity of the legislation and of the memorandum of understanding, which have worked well over many years. I am encouraged by the Minister’s comment that these frameworks would all be subject to the Sewel convention. It would certainly be very helpful for the debate that we are about to have on Clause 11 for the Minister to say that, if these 24 areas are indeed the final 24 areas that are agreed for common frameworks, in each of the 24 areas the establishment of the common frameworks would be subject to the Sewel convention, as I think he hinted at a few minutes ago.
In so far as they are carried forward by primary legislation—and I rather anticipate that that will be the case—they would engage not only the Sewel convention but the provisions of DGN 10, the devolved guidance note, because there may be areas where these matters impact on the competence of Scottish Ministers. That is what is anticipated and I have no difficulty with that.
I keep trying to answer a question raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, about what happens with regard to the transition period. Clearly, that will have to be addressed in the context of the withdrawal agreement Bill—and that, as has been indicated before, may result in some amendment to the existing provisions of this exit Bill.
As I understand what the Minister is saying, ultimately everything has to be settled by primary legislation, so there will be a single market in the United Kingdom that is settled by primary legislation—for which legislative consent will be sought and no doubt given. What we are talking about is an interim period when Ministers take powers to themselves. Over a temporary period they will in effect dictate what the framework agreement will be until there is a final agreement in a number of years—that is what I understand the Minister to say.
With great respect, I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has understood what I said. It is not a case of us dictating anything to the devolved Administrations; it is a case of ring-fencing these limited competences until we have reached agreement with the devolved Administrations as to what the framework agreements will be. They will then be put forward for the purpose of legislative consideration in the usual way. But it is not suggested that we are going to start regulating agriculture in Scotland in the meantime—that is not what is comprehended by this at all. I do not know whether I asked this earlier, but will the noble and learned Lord withdraw his amendment so that I can sit down again?
Before the Minister does, how long will this ring-fence last? I believe the Barnett formula was temporary; how long does the Minister envisage the ring-fence will last before there is a proper legislative framework?
It will last until we have managed to implement all of the framework agreement. That will be a finite period—there is no question about that. Indeed, if the noble Lord looks at the proposed amendment to Clause 11, he will see that there are various checks and balances, including the requirement that Ministers report to Parliament if they retain the powers for any longer. So that is already addressed.
My Lords, this debate has ranged a good deal wider than was necessary for the Minister to deal with my points on this group of amendments. With respect to him, he has not given me the kind of reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave me on earlier groups. My point is that this very disparate group contains a number of points that I raised with regard to Schedules 2 and 8, which need to be reconsidered in the light of the reformed Clause 11. A simple example is on page 56, where there is a reference to a fetter on the power to,
“make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation”,
which extends to the wording of Section 57(4) of the Scotland Act as in the Bill. However, that section is reworded by the proposed new Clause 11.
I just remind the noble and learned Lord that I said that when we come to Clause 11, we will move and withdraw the amendment. We appreciate that although we want Clause 11 in its present form, to put it forward in a form that covers all these matters we will have to address the impact it has on Schedule 2 in these contexts.
I am grateful for that. Not every one of my amendments is a Clause 11 point—there are other points of detail which need to be looked at. If the Minister would be kind enough just to say that these will be looked at, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment. Can he give me that assurance?
I am content to indicate that we will look at these points.
On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 274.
My Lords, I will respond briefly, without repeating what I said on the immediately preceding group, but this raises essentially the same issue. On these provisions, the circumstances in which consent applies to the powers—which are the obverse of some of the others—are those where the devolved Ministers could use powers in ways that have implications outside of their devolved jurisdiction, for example when making provision regarding the World Trade Organization obligations. That is why we have framed it in this way, but it raises the wider point made by the noble and learned Lord and I appreciate that that might be addressed in more detail when we come to Clause 11 and the government amendments. I wonder if, in these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord will, at this stage, withdraw his amendments.
I am glad we have not provoked a longer debate on this group of amendments. There is a reason for being concerned about this; the provision I am concerned about deals specifically with something within competence—in other words, it deals with regulations made for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO agreement. It does not deal with the WTO agreement itself; it simply exercises the power given under paragraph 7(2)(b) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 to deal with these matters domestically. Since it is within competence under the Scotland Act, it is hard to see why the position should be regulated in the way proposed. However, I have listened to what the Minister has said and—on the understanding that we can look at all this again when we get to the revised formula for Clause 11—I am happy to withdraw this amendment.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I shall speak also to the other government amendments in this group. We have put forward these amendments to facilitate scrutiny of the Government’s current position on Clause 11. They reflect the status of our discussions with the devolved Administrations, and noble Lords will be aware that our discussions with the Scottish and Welsh Governments are continuing. We remain convinced that this Bill is the right vehicle for providing legal certainty across the UK and that we should reach agreement with the Scottish and Welsh Governments. As such, the Government do not seek a vote on these amendments today and we will withdraw or not move them at the conclusion of the debate, but we will reflect seriously on the points made and incorporate them into our discussions.
The Government have been clear that the Bill is about continuity, certainty and control. That applies equally and without exception to people and businesses across all parts of the United Kingdom. Our approach has always been guided by two principal aims; namely, that we have a fully functioning statute book on exit, and that there are no new barriers to people living and doing business across the United Kingdom. These amendments have been tabled, in line with our commitment made in the other place, to address the concerns raised regarding the current Clause 11. They represent a substantial movement from our original position and reflect the sincerity of our commitment to finding a mutually agreeable position.
We have had lengthy discussions on this issue at official and ministerial level, including at the Joint Ministerial Committee. Noble Lords will well know that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have not yet agreed these amendments, but we will continue to work with them to try to find a way through. I am confident that all parties to this discussion are invested in trying to reach that agreement, as was demonstrated by the constructive tone set at the JMC by the Prime Minister and the First Ministers. This is a crucial piece of legislation in the national interest. It must work for all parts of the United Kingdom and we are sincere in our hope that we will find a way for us all to come together in support of it.
Noble Lords spoke at length at Second Reading and in previous debates of the importance of the “presumption of devolution” and have debated the principle that if there is not a good reason for a matter to be held in common, it should be devolved. That is what these amendments aim to deliver. They would take the existing Clause 11 and effectively turn it on its head. Their effect is that by default on exit day any decision-making powers currently held by the EU in areas that are otherwise devolved would pass directly to our devolved institutions without first being diverted through Westminster. The amendments then give UK Ministers powers to apply targeted and temporary limitations on competence to modify retained EU law, which would in essence have the effect of maintaining existing UK frameworks. We envisage that they will be used in those specific areas where we have identified that a future framework for the United Kingdom may be needed. That would ensure that in those areas the current common approaches established by EU law will continue to apply until we—the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations—can together determine the form that the new bespoke UK framework will take, if one is ultimately required for the benefit of both our communities and our businesses.
I should be clear that the limits that would be applied by these powers are not new limits or constraints. They would merely preserve existing competence in relation to EU law after exit as it stood in relation to EU law immediately prior to exit. Therefore any decision that the devolved institutions could take before exit day will continue to be a decision that they can take after exit day in areas where they have exercised their powers. There is no encroachment into existing devolved areas, and of course in areas where we have not exercised these powers there will be an immediate and significant increase in the decision-making powers of the devolved institutions upon exit. I should also be clear that these limits apply to an area only to the extent it is covered by EU law and not to the entire subject matter. They will not limit competence to make any provision in relation to a subject matter where this does not involve the modification of retained EU law. I urge noble Lords to refer to the Government’s frameworks analysis, published on 9 March, to see the kind of areas where we envisage that the temporary powers may need to be exercised.
Noble Lords will also want to be aware of the additional limits placed on the exercise of these powers. Not only would the powers be subject to the affirmative procedure but the amendments also apply a reporting duty, a duty to consult the devolved Administrations and a duty to produce explanatory statements.
Ministers will be under a duty to report at regular intervals on the steps taken to implement future frameworks; the way in which the framework principles that underpin that work are applied; steps taken to apply or remove restrictions on devolved competence under the powers; the progress towards removing restrictions and repealing those powers altogether once they have served their purpose; and any other information they deem relevant. All this serves to demonstrate that this mechanism is a temporary means to achieve our end state on frameworks.
Before laying an instrument under these powers, UK Ministers will also be required to consult the relevant devolved Administrations and make a statement on the effect of the instrument and any representations made by the devolved Administrations in response to consultation. Further, since these limits are but a temporary means to preserve existing EU frameworks until they are replaced by a UK framework, the amendments also provide a power to repeal the constraining powers so that they will not be retained for longer than is necessary. Ministers would be under a duty to consider periodically whether it is appropriate to repeal the powers. In doing so, they would be required to have regard to the intended temporary nature of these arrangements and to any progress in putting lasting arrangements in place.
Through this, we have sought to emphasise that these powers and restrictions are not to exist in perpetuity or as a permanent feature of the devolution arrangements. Rather, they provide a short-term fix for our longer, more detailed work on the development of long-term future common arrangements. I note in relation to this the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, which would subject the current Clause 11 and any regulations made under the new Clause 11 power relating to Scottish legislative competence to a sunset limit. I understand why that suggestion has been put forward; we have of course been clear that these are temporary arrangements and I am interested to hear the debate on this point.
I must be clear that the temporary nature of the constraints is not the same as proceeding to a fixed timetable. We need to ensure that these complex matters are given due consideration, and there is a risk that the creation of a sunset merely prolongs the cliff edge.
Might noble Lords be referring to the mixed metaphor they have just heard?
May I proceed to split an infinitive?
The new arrangements must be achieved in partnership with the devolved Administrations. Crucially, that takes time to work through.
We must proceed with caution in considering any form of sunset which would change the purpose of our discussions from designing and implementing frameworks that are fit for purpose to ones that can be achieved in the time allowed. Our priority must be to continue to provide legal certainty on how these laws will work in that interim, but this could risk uncertainty where the provisions may lift before their replacement is known.
This is a substantial and significant amendment to Clause 11. It reflects the progress that we and the devolved Administrations have made on frameworks and in our discussions on Clause 11. It strikes the right balance, delivering for the devolved Administrations and for businesses and people across the United Kingdom. I am grateful for the consideration that this House will provide on this offer as we continue to refine and consider the policy in coming weeks.
The amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson, Lord Griffiths and Lord Thomas, would amend elements of the amendments that we have put forward. We have heard much on the question of the consent of the devolved institutions for the use of the proposed new Clause 11 powers that would “freeze” existing UK frameworks. As I indicated earlier, I wish to be clear on two fundamental points. The first is that this will be a collaborative process. There is no suggestion or intention that we want to cut our devolved institutions out of these decisions. We have put in place a set of shared principles that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have agreed and which guide our work on frameworks—I referred earlier to the statement following the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year that sets out those principles in detail. Departments across Administrations are now working together to consider frameworks. Devolved and UK Ministers continue to discuss these matters regularly at Joint Ministerial Committee meetings. The limits on the powers make it clear that the views of the devolved Ministers must be heard and the United Kingdom Government in exercising the power must set out what those views are for Parliament’s consideration. That is not a power grab. As we have heard today, this Parliament will rightly hold us to account on how the Government act on devolution policy. The second point is that we must be clear about the implications and outcomes of this work. These decisions affect every part of the United Kingdom. It is the United Kingdom Government and the United Kingdom Parliament that are responsible for matters that affect the whole of the United Kingdom.
We must therefore be very careful about the impact of a hard-edged legal requirement, not because we do not want the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government and, once restored, the Northern Ireland Executive to be part of these decisions but because it cannot be for an Administration in one devolved nation to exercise what amounts to a veto over something that would be in the interest of the other nations of the United Kingdom as a whole. That is not and never was the purpose of the devolution settlement.
I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Wigley, for their proposals to bring the United Kingdom Government and devolved Administrations together. These are constructive suggestions for a middle way that deserve serious thought. I am encouraged by the effort being made to reach agreement.
At present, we believe that the JMC will be the right forum for engagement, working under the principles agreed for the work on frameworks in October last year, but I would like to take away the ideas that have been brought to the table here today by way of the further proposed amendments and consider how these matters might be incorporated into our policy thinking, while continuing to meet our two stated objectives on legal certainty and respect for the devolved settlements.
I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern for his amendment, which seeks to find a way forward in the context of Clause 11 and the frameworks. Again, it is an attempt to ensure engagement between all the interested Administrations to achieve consensus at the end of the day. My noble and learned friend’s amendment highlights the importance of clarity as we develop frameworks. As we have discussed during earlier debates, the work on frameworks will have to be a collaborative effort designed to ensure maintenance of a single internal market for the United Kingdom after we leave the EU. Our intention remains to reach agreement with the devolved Administrations. However we approach it, we have that as a goal.
The approach that we have put forward for Clause 11 in these amendments is, I venture, an entirely reasonable proposition. By default, and unless further action is taken, the returning EU powers in the 153 areas identified will become devolved matters. We should perhaps take pause to remind ourselves that these are entirely new powers for the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales, expanding devolved competence into areas previously held and exercised by the EU and, prior to that, by the United Kingdom Parliament.
We believe that what we propose addresses the points raised by the Scottish and Welsh Governments in their legislative consent memorandums. I hope that noble Lords will recognise that we have moved a considerable way on this, but that we continue to see the importance of providing as much certainty as early as possible for businesses across the UK in order that we can avoid, or indeed manage, divergence between the individual nations of the United Kingdom. While we have not yet reached agreement with the devolved Administrations, discussions will continue and we are extremely keen to maintain our engagement with them. But we consider that it is right that noble Lords have the chance to consider these amendments—the Government committed to that on Report and we brought them forward for consideration by this Committee. I hope noble Lords whose amendments are in this group will feel able to withdraw them at this stage; we, as I indicated earlier, will do similarly with the government amendments at the end of this debate. I beg to move.
Amendment 302B (to Amendment 302A)
My Lords, are you sure? I do not think there is any need to rush this. We have covered a lot of ground and we have a lot more ground to cover now.
This amendment was put forward as a catalyst, and there has been a reaction. I leave others to judge whether it was contained or uncontained. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, just observed, this is not the vehicle for major constitutional change in the United Kingdom. If we attempt to bolt that on to this Bill, it will sink without trace. Some may prefer that that should happen; nevertheless, that is not a sensible way forward. I am obliged to all those who have contributed to this debate, because it was our intention in putting forward this amendment to judge the mood of the Committee with regard to the quite radical change and approach that we have taken with this proposed amendment. It may be that I approach the matter with an open mind; it may be that I approach it with an empty mind; but at the end of the day we will have to make a decision that works for the whole of the United Kingdom.
I will take up one or two points. There is an appreciation—it may not be universal, but it is almost universal—of recognising the benefits of maintaining a single market in the United Kingdom. We already enjoy that single market by virtue of our membership of the EU, and it is something we want to retain after we leave the EU. In order to do that, there has to be agreement in principle as to the areas that underpin such a single market. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, alluded to the principles set out in the Joint Ministerial Committee minute of 16 October 2017. That is essentially what underpins our seeking agreement; there was consensus. That is what we need to do.
Ultimately, if we are to have a single market for the United Kingdom, we require a body to have jurisdiction over that single market. Again, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and others have acknowledged, that ultimately has to be the Parliament of the United Kingdom. There is no other way of addressing that issue. If we look to the issue of consent, rather than consultation, let us be clear that it is not a question of trust but of constitutional propriety. If we have a black and white, sharp-edged consent mechanism for the devolved Administrations, then we have the basis for what has been termed the veto problem. We have the situation in which, beyond the existing devolved competence, any one of these Assemblies could—it is at that level that it must be judged; not would, but could—proceed to legislate within its devolved competence in a manner that impacted upon those in another country within the United Kingdom, whether it be England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. We cannot go down that road. That would be a fundamental change in the devolved competence that we created in, and have indeed developed since, 1998.
It appears that we have, at times, merged two issues. The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, apart from criticising Ministers for not getting on and doing any work on this, pointed out that there had to be a breathing space. Indeed, that point was developed by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, when he quoted the letter from my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Wales. Just to put that into context—and if I may briefly go back to a point I made in an earlier part of the debate—the first stage of this process is to identify those competences coming back from the EU that will be required to operate a single market in the United Kingdom and to effectively ring-fence them on a temporary basis; thus the breathing space that the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, referred to.
That is all that is involved in the first stage. That process has carried on in great detail since the principles were established last October. It has been the work of officials not only in Whitehall but in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. They have all come together to do what is termed in Civil Service-speak as “deep dives” into these matters. The product has now been published. It is the table that identifies 24 areas where it is considered there will have to be some temporary ring-fencing so that we can establish the next stage of the process for the single market—the framework agreements that will then form the basis for that single market.
Let us be clear: that is a separate stage. The ring-fencing is merely to hold those competences for the time required to put the framework agreements in place. We have agreed the principles on which the competences can be identified, and we have now carried out a process that identifies those competences. There is an element of disagreement about that, but only in two or three areas, so far as the Scottish Government are concerned. State aid is one of them. We regard it, for reasons I find fairly obvious, as a reserved competence, but they say it touches on a devolved competence. We will therefore have to address that, and potentially have a framework agreement in those areas as well. That is why there are a further 12 areas of competence that we are confident are in reserved areas, but which may be open to debate. None the less, there is a very substantial element of agreement on the ring- fencing.
Now let me go to the next stage. We then require the framework agreements. To the extent that those agreements will be implemented by primary legislation—it is anticipated that in many of the areas that will be the case—the primary legislation will be carried on in accordance with the constitutional conventions that we already have, and with the respect for the devolved settlement that we have always shown in the past. That includes the Sewel convention as now expressed in the Scotland Act 2016, which amended the Scotland Act 1998. It also includes those areas where, pursuant to DGN 10, such matters will touch upon the competence of Scottish Ministers.
That is where we seek the true element of consent—but ultimately, of course, if we cannot get agreement, we have the Sewel convention. Normally we proceed with the consent of the devolved assemblies, and that remains the position. That is the political understanding that underpins the devolved settlement, and has done for a very long time.
Can we just remove that dichotomy of consultation or consent? I know that within some Administrations, for reasons we do not have to explore, there is a determination to push for consent. Consent, as such, is constitutionally very difficult; I indulge in understatement when I say that. But there is still room for agreement, and the process overall should result in what somebody termed consensus—that is, a belief that we are all doing the same thing for the same reasons, with an expectation of the same result. That involves an understanding of what these frameworks are.
It has been suggested that the 24 areas of competence that require to be ring-fenced on a temporary basis should be expressed in a schedule to the Bill. I hear what is said about that, but whether it can practically be done in the context of the Bill may be another matter. As was observed, I believe by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that may have to be expressed elsewhere. We can look at that, but in the first instance we have to understand what needs to be ring-fenced for the purposes of the framework agreements.
A sunset clause has been suggested, and I have already expressed a view about that. Clearly, we are listening to the idea that a sunset clause might run for five years. But the more we have gone on about this, the more we realise that what it all comes down to is two questions. One: can we have an appropriate forum in which to negotiate agreement with the devolved legislatures? Yes; that has been carried on in the joint ministerial committees. They have been criticised, but they have been successful, as can be seen by the agreement in principle in respect of these matters. Can we achieve that? The answer is yes.
Secondly, can we then express, in a manner that will satisfy the devolved Administrations, what the framework agreements will be? The answer to that is again yes because we will follow the normal and usual constitutional principles that involve embracing the Sewel convention in cases where primary legislation is required.
I hope that goes some way to reassure noble Lords that we are making progress here because underneath the concern about consent versus consultation there has been considerable movement. We not only have the principles that we will apply to the ring-fencing of competences but we will also have the means to bring forward framework agreements in a manner that will satisfy the devolved competence, as I say. It may be that it will go beyond the 24 areas already identified but work can continue on that matter. What is ultimately of importance is that we retain the means for uniformity of regulation in those critical areas that touch on the principles enunciated in October 2017. That is what has to be achieved. There may be more than one road but ultimately they all lead to Rome, and that is where we want to be at the end of the day, so with that—
I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that the roads do not go to Brussels any more. However, he is welcome to go and hack a path there, if he wishes. With that, I seek to withdraw the government amendment.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I rise only to make it clear that the unanimity comes also from the Front Bench. My noble friend Lord Morgan may not be on the Front Bench but on this occasion we are absolutely as one with him.
It would perhaps be helpful if the Minister feeds back what he has heard from the devolved Administrations in his discussions with them on these amendments.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who participated in the discussion on these amendments. In opening, let me say that I fully understand the absence of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. I am very grateful for his careful consideration of the Bill and that of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which he chairs.
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. I knew that my noble friend Lord Blencathra was not going to be here and I tried in vain to find out who would be his substitute so that I could have had a word with them earlier. However, I am very happy to meet the noble Lord afterwards at any convenient juncture to discuss this. In fact, I had heard at a previous stage that the substitute would be the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, so I encourage him to ignore the several messages he has received from me.
I will respond first to the general points made and then pick up some of the specifics. I want to make it clear that the amendment that the Government have tabled to change how the Bill deals with devolved competence would, as part of that change, remove the Order in Council procedure from Clause 11 and Schedule 3. In the light of this, my noble friend’s amendments would no longer be necessary on that specific point. However, I will address the substantive point that my noble friend Lord Blencathra sought to make, and which has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, in his stead, on the modification of the devolution statutes—namely, the Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006—by secondary legislation.
I understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler: that the Order in Council powers contained in Clause 11 and Schedule 3 are unsatisfactory substitutes of those contained in Section 30 of the Scotland Act and Section 109 of the Government of Wales Act. I accept that there is merit in my noble friend’s argument that there may be a difference in the function of these powers and that we may wish to consider the need for a different procedure. As I said, I am very happy to discuss that point with my noble friend Lord Blencathra, the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and others.
I do not agree that it necessarily follows that secondary legislation can never be used to modify devolved competence or the devolution statutes more widely, and that this should only ever be achieved through primary legislation. For example, we used the procedure in 2013 to amend the Scotland Act 1998, and we used an order in 2007 to amend the Government of Wales Act 2006. There are previous examples and, more recently, we saw the Treaty of Lisbon (Changes in Terminology) Order made under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act. It has sometimes been a convenient way to proceed, by consent of the devolved Administrations.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for raising the point that she did. We have been discussing these issues with the devolved Administrations and continue to do so in a perfectly constructive way. I have to say that there is no agreement yet, but we are looking at how this should be used going forward.
I will pick up some of the particular points made. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, was making general points, but, as I say, the specific issue mentioned will not arise in the light of the amendments we have put down. However, I appreciate that it was, as he said, the unanimous view of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I thank the committee for its third report and constructive and dispassionate work on these issues. I served on that committee for a time and I know it looks at these issues constructively.
My Lords, I wish to add a couple of points. First, are discussions progressing on the possible inclusion in the Bill of a schedule detailing these areas of concern? Secondly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said that a solution should be agreed, not imposed. We should heed those words. I again ask the Minister: as regards reaching agreement on these issues, to what extent does he have in mind involving the legislatures rather than just the devolved Governments?
The Minister has had notice of my next point. I would like to correct something that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said in the House last week. He said that there were,
“about 153 areas in which, upon our leaving the EU, competences will return and touch upon areas of devolved competence. These are areas that the devolved parliaments and assemblies previously had no engagement with because they lay in Brussels”.—[Official Report, 21/3/18; col. 334.]
I have since written to him because that it not completely the case. As it works, the memorandum of understanding provides that, in matters of devolved competence, the UK Government consult the devolved Administrations to agree a common UK position on matters before the Council of Ministers, and then defend that position in the Council. Indeed, as we just heard, occasionally devolved Ministers will do that and represent the UK. However, whether it is a UK Minister or a devolved Minister there, they speak in this case for an agreed UK position, not just a UK government position. It may therefore be helpful if the Minister confirms that understanding, which is undoubtedly how the devolved Governments see it. What has been said is right: the spirit to reach accord is there. However, perhaps for clarity, it would be good if that could be confirmed.
Perhaps noble Lords will forgive me for a moment or two while I stretch my back, which is just a little bit tight. Now I am fighting fit. I point out to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that it is because I am carrying the heavy weight of Brexit on my shoulders.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for bringing forward this amendment, and all noble Lords who have introduced some interesting debate into the discussions today. It will be useful for us to begin by looking at the deep-dive process itself, whereby the devolved Administrations together with the UK Government have pored over the various 150 or so areas to which my noble and learned friend Lord Keen referred. They have been guided, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, noted, by a suite of agreed principles, which indeed from time to time make reference to such concepts as the UK market itself, trade and various other obligations. I understand that each of your Lordships should have had in their postbox or email in-tray a series of emails from my noble friend Lord Bourne which set out the principles themselves and the areas in which they intersect with the policy matters.
It may be useful if I give a flavour of that. It struck me, as I was discussing with various officials in my department and others, that we have perhaps not done that before to give your Lordships a sense of the sheer scale and magnitude of the engagement thus far undertaken. There is a certain sense sometimes that we are quite dismissive of the devolved Administrations, when nothing could be further from the truth. To give your Lordships just a flavour of that, in the area of fisheries there have been six full days of discussions between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government—17, 18, 23 and 24 January, and 6 and 7 February. On environmental quality, to take another example, there was a whole-day discussion on ozone-depleting substances and fluorine gases on 31 January, and two full days at the end of January were spent examining chemicals and pesticides. It is useful to recognise that this approach is unprecedented. Its purpose is, again, one of respect. I can see that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, is ready to jump up. He is welcome to do so—it will give me a chance to sit down.
What the Minister is saying is encouraging. For the sake of argument, let us take fishing. Have any of these meetings between UK officials and officials from the devolved Administrations involved members of the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation? Stakeholders obviously have a practical view on where some common arrangements are useful and where they are not.
I wish I could answer that question in the affirmative, but the answer is no. Before each meeting the devolved Administrations, with the UK Government, have engaged in direct consultation with stakeholders. However, the stakeholders have not been inside the room. None the less, what they bring to the table is very much understood. I develop upon these parts because, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, pointed out, it is important that when we consider the question of agriculture there is no suggestion that, although agriculture itself is one of the headings, everything in agriculture will remain part of that. To some degree, what noble Lords had in their in-boxes, which was simply entitled “Agricultural funding”, was a little unhelpful. Underneath that rests each of the areas where there is expected to be a necessary common framework, and indeed a whole range of areas where there would not need to be a common framework because it would be fully devolved from the get-go. To some degree, there can be a result of some misunderstanding contained in that approach. Again, that is why it is imperative that we examine every single aspect when we have these deep dives, which are ongoing; they have not finished yet.
Can my noble friend confirm that it is the Government’s intention that this should happen by primary legislation?
Yes, that is the intention. We will move forward with this through primary legislation in each of the common framework areas. On that basis, I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate and to the Minister for his few words in his response. Of course, legislation may contain enabling powers but we do not know yet what the legislation he is promising will look like. If it is simply a Bill with a lot of Henry VIII powers in the area concerned, it will not advance the argument at all.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for enlarging on the points he made last week. I am glad that my amendment has given him the opportunity to emphasise again the points he has made and his valuable contribution to our debate. He said that if his approach is correct then my amendment ceases to have any purpose. Of course, he is right, because my amendment does not look at primary legislation; it looks at the procedure that would be followed if the mechanism to be used is to be by delegated legislation, in which case we are talking about the consent not of the legislatures but of the Administrations—that is, of Ministers. At the moment, we have in the amendment that was before us last week—the amended form of Clause 11—a promise of consultation. Many noble Lords who have spoken in support of my amendment have emphasised the importance of consent, which is the crucial matter. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said after his careful analysis of what we are really talking about: consent is fundamental. That is the background to what I am submitting.
There are one or two scattered points which I might mention. On the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, was absolutely right. Proposed subsection (2) of my amendment is based on an agreement reached in October last year at the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations. The wording is exactly as it was framed in the agreements, and that is the point from which we are moving forward. One could debate the language, but I think that the time for doing so has passed.
I thought that the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, about the attitude of the sheep farmers was very helpful, and we have heard similar remarks about the position as regards fishing. I do not think that the position of the hill farmer in Scotland is very different from that which was described by the noble Lord. However, there could well be differences in the way that sheep are managed in England and the way that they are bred and moved south in Scotland and east in Wales—they are moved across the United Kingdom before being exported somewhere else. I can see, therefore, that there could be detailed disputes about what the Welsh, Scots and English would want in framing a UK-wide market for the handling of sheep stock. To attempt to create uniformity in areas as sensitive as this may be a mistake, and it may be that that is where the sticking points are in the discussions. I hope very much that one can get to the point where these matters can be agreed without resorting to dispute resolution.
As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, also pointed out, in a few years’ time, when we move beyond the Clause 11 procedure and the time limit has disappeared, we do not want to have to start these arguments all over again. We want to resolve this at the beginning in the creation of the market.
It is difficult to take the point further because we do not really know the detail of the disagreements before us. However, I suggest to the Minister that it would be a great help if, before Report, a letter could be passed to those who have taken part in the debate explaining the procedure that the Government intend to use in the creation of these frameworks. I would be very pleased if they were to adopt what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has suggested, and it would be very helpful to know that that is what they propose before we start looking at this again on Report. If they do not propose to do that, we need to know what the alternative is and how consent is to be built into it. In the light of the very helpful response from the Minister, and of what I have said so far, I will leave the matter there for the time being. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
To be clear, the Opposition believe—as do I personally, as someone who has worked in Gibraltar over the years—that the position of Gibraltar should be a matter for the Gibraltarians. There should be no doubt about that, and we are committed to it. They have had a referendum and we will completely stick to that.
I was about to come on to my comments relating to what the noble Lord, Lord Luce, said. At the end of the day, we want to ensure that we make economic relationships and economic development a high priority. I do not think we should restrict this to comments about the viability of Gibraltar; we should be focused on how we can support a friendly country in developing an economy in the south that has been so difficult to establish over many years. British tourism has been very important to that, but it is also in terms of new industries and finance sectors that could be expanded and developed. I like the proposal by the noble Lord, Lord Luce, that we should be talking positively about economic development in relation to Gibraltar and to how important that is.
To be frank, we cannot rely on Madrid. We should understand the nature of the Spanish psyche here: no matter what the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht were, there is a claim by the Spanish nation over sovereignty and, whichever political party is in power in Spain, socialist or conservative, this issue unites them across the political spectrum. I do not think we are going to resolve that—we cannot tell the Spanish what their views should be—but we can give very clear commitments to Gibraltar and its people, and we should maintain those commitments. What we need to hear from the Minister today is that it is not simply about commitments regarding Gibraltar’s relationships with the UK but that the Government are committed to ensuring that Gibraltar can have a positive economic relationship with the rest of the EU, and that in any final appendix or agreement to the transitional period Gibraltar’s needs are properly considered and there is a positive case. Not only would closing the border be a disaster for Gibraltar but, as people have said in this debate, it would be an incredible cost to this country as well.
In the 1960s we had a very big MoD base in Gibraltar and there was employment. That is not the case any more. It is a different sort of industry and employment that we have to address.
Will the Minister answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, about what is next under the transitional agreement? What will Gibraltar’s relationship economically be with the rest of the EU? To take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Luce, what commitments will we give for a positive relationship with Spain to ensure the economic future of Gibraltar and its people, and the people of Andalusia?
Let me first agree with the noble Lord, Lord Collins: it has indeed been an excellent debate on an extremely important topic. I also thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for raising the issues, but we do not believe that the new clause is necessary. It posits the need to protect the rights of persons and businesses either from or established in Gibraltar operating in the UK, but none is directly affected by the Bill.
As I begin, I say that we are steadfast in our support for Gibraltar, its people and its economy. Let me directly address the issue put to me by the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Luce, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, about the implementation period.
The territorial scope of the draft withdrawal agreement, including for the implementation period, explicitly includes Gibraltar. That is right, and consistent with our view that we are negotiating on behalf of the whole UK family. We want to get a deal that works for all, including for Gibraltarians. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked me to be specific, and it is in Article 3, section 1, paragraph (b) of the draft agreement.
In legislating for the United Kingdom, the Bill seeks to maintain, wherever practicable, the rights and responsibilities that exist in our law at the moment of leaving the EU, and the rights in the UK of those established in Gibraltar are no exception to that. We respect Gibraltar’s own legislative competence and the fact that Gibraltar has its own degree of autonomy and responsibilities. For example, Gibraltar has its own repeal Bill.
We are committed to fully involving Gibraltar as we prepare for negotiations to leave to ensure that its priorities are taken properly into account. As has been mentioned, we are working closely with Gibraltar, including through the dedicated Joint Ministerial Council on Gibraltar EU Negotiations.
The Bill, however, is not the place for legislation about Gibraltar. The Bill does not extend to Gibraltar, except in two very minor ways: that, by virtue of Clause 18(3), the powers in Clauses 7 and 17 can be used to amend the European parliamentary elections legislation, which of course covers Gibraltar; and the Bill repeals some UK legislation that extends to Gibraltar.
However, we understand the concerns being expressed through the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. In response to those concerns, I hope that I can reassure the Committee that access to the UK market for Gibraltar is already protected by law, and my ministerial colleague at the Department for Exiting the EU, Robin Walker, agreed a package of measures at the last Gibraltar JMC on 8 March that will maintain, strengthen and indeed deepen UK-Gibraltar ties.
In financial services, where UK-Gibraltar trade is deepest, this is granted by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Gibraltar) Order 2001 on the basis of Gibraltar’s participation in EU structures. We have agreed that the UK will guarantee Gibraltar financial services firms’ access to UK markets as now until 2020, even in the unlikely event of no deal being reached. We will design a replacement framework to endure beyond 2020 based on shared high standards of regulation and enforcement and underpinned by modern arrangements for information-sharing, transparency and regulatory co-operation.
Obviously, I always hate to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, but when it comes to online gambling, the UK has provided assurance that gambling operators based in Gibraltar will continue to access the UK market after we leave the EU in the same way as they do now, and we are working towards agreement of a memorandum of understanding which will enable closer working and collaboration between gambling regulators in Gibraltar and the UK. This work is already under way, so we consider that the amendment is unnecessary.
In this way, we will deliver on our assurances that Gibraltar will enjoy continued access to the UK market for Gibraltar business, based on the Gibraltar authorities having already agreed to maintain full regulatory alignment with the UK.
We will of course keep Parliament informed of progress. Gibraltar is regularly discussed in Questions and in debate: for example, in Oral Questions on 30 January and on Second Reading of this Bill on 31 January.
I hope that I have addressed the noble and learned Baroness’s concerns, and I urge her to withdraw the amendment.
Before my noble friend ends, could he assure the Committee that it will be an absolute aim of negotiations to ensure that Gibraltar continues to enjoy commercial intercourse with the rest of the European Union?
I am very happy to assure the Committee of that. As I said, we are working closely with the Government and people of Gibraltar. They are at the forefront of our consideration; they are our fellow citizens and our allies. We are working with them, we are co-operating with them and of course, alongside the rest of the negotiations, that will be one of our priorities.
Perhaps the Minister will give way. He mentioned online gambling and financial markets, perhaps looking after the interests of people who are already quite well off. What about the workers who travel across from Spain to Gibraltar and vice versa? What about the tourists? What about ordinary people? There seem to be no guarantees. It all seems to have been done to look after the financial interests of the gamblers and the financial markets.
I am sorry that the noble Lord has a retrograde opinion on these matters. It may shock him to know that many ordinary people take part in online gambling and indulge in financial services. In fact, many of the workers that he refers to work in those areas, so perhaps he should not apply to everyone else the same prejudices that he has. They are successful industries that employ a lot of people. They are perfectly legal and people have a right to engage in them.
I do not know whether the noble Lord sits in on any of our debates other than those on the Bill. I have been sitting in at Question Time and other debates—it is good to see three Bishops here today—where concerns have been expressed about online gambling and the effect that it has on ordinary people who get caught up in and become addicted to it. If the noble Lord does not understand concerns about that, he is missing an awful lot of the debates that go on in this House.
Of course I understand those concerns and why the industry needs to be properly regulated. That is being done and we are working with Gibraltar to ensure consistent regulation across the two territories. But of course that is not a matter for the Bill, I am pleased to say.
I hope that, with those reassurances, I have addressed the noble and learned Baroness’s concerns—
I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but he has left us—and, through us, the Gibraltarians—in a degree of uncertainty. I imagine he will have difficulty replying to this, but presumably he does not think we can negotiate better terms for Gibraltar’s access to the EU 27 than we negotiate for ourselves. That would be a pretty startling victory for the Government, which might just be beyond their powers. If that is so, and as the Prime Minister admits that our access to the European Union 27’s market will be less good after the end of the transitional period than it has been while we are a member, presumably Gibraltar will have to take a hit too.
The second question, which the Minister has not addressed at all, concerns the movement of people across the border between Gibraltar and Andalusia. What does he envisage for that? Presumably, the immigration Bill, which may one day cease to be a mirage floating out there, always several months away from us but never quite attained, will one day be sitting on our Order Paper and will have to regulate how Gibraltar treats migrants or other people crossing that border who currently and during the transitional period are covered by free movement. What are the Government’s plans for that?
I will give the noble Lord the answer that I have given when he has asked similar questions previously. This is a matter for the immigration Bill. Of course, we will need to discuss the matter of the frontier between Gibraltar and Spain with the Spanish authorities, which we will do in full consultation with the people of Gibraltar. We will be sure to let the noble Lord know when we have an outcome to those negotiations. I hope that the noble Baroness will feel free to withdraw her amendment.
Have Her Majesty’s Government given any consideration to a matter that I understand was raised about 15 years ago—granting dominion status to Gibraltar? Dominion status is so supple, varied and wide that it could legitimately and properly encompass the constitutional aspirations of Spain, the United Kingdom and the Gibraltarians themselves.
I am not an expert on the legal ramifications of dominion status, so if the noble Lord will forgive me, perhaps I may write to him on that.
My Lords, I thank all those who have taken part in this debate and the Minister for his partial reply. I recognise that nothing is decided until everything is decided. I concentrated on the business arrangements between the UK and Gibraltar because they are one of the major concerns. Of course, there are many other major concerns for Gibraltar, which is stuck in a very difficult position, but the one thing it has is good trade relations with the United Kingdom and a lot of business. That needed to be in at least the first stage of what would be done. It is not just gambling; it is also education, tourism and the other things that the noble Lord, Lord Luce, set out in his speech today.
It is good that, at least as between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, there are clear guidelines and Gibraltar has protection. We know—I am very grateful to other speakers for having raised these issues—that the position of Gibraltar is extremely precarious vis-à-vis the EU. In relation to migrants, I understand that Gibraltar wants as many as come across the border daily, mainly from La Línea, to work. It is up to Spain whether it lets them come through. It is not up to the Gibraltar Government, who welcome them. As has been said, I think by the noble Lord, Lord Luce, 13,000 people a day go through, 10,000 of whom are from Andalusia and are Spanish workers. It is very much to the detriment of Spain if it does not allow them through. It was, of course, La Línea and the southern part of Andalusia that really suffered when Spain closed the border for some 15 years.
So, there are reasons why Spain might be sensible. One hopes that the positive discussions that go on may have a good effect. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Luce, and I have said, there are dangers of the threat to Spain. All of us enjoy Spanish holidays and many of us have Spanish relationships, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, has, so we want to be fair to Gibraltar. Gibraltar is part of us but we want to continue to have good relations with Spain. I very much hope that, having got to the first stage—business relations, education and other relationships between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom—we will continue to battle on behalf of the whole of the United Kingdom, including Gibraltar, in whatever arrangements happen during Brexit. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I absolutely recognise that. There are a number of issues which we hope will be part of the agreement. In business, there are what are called goods already on the market, which I believe the transition agreement will cover. There is the arrest warrant. A number of countries forbid any of their nationals being extradited to a non-EU member state, so we could find that if someone who commits murder here hops off to a member state, unless we have this all agreed in the transition deal, they would be free. I understand that the negotiations will say that where a case has started on its track towards the ECJ, let it finish.
There is a raft of things where, if we come out with a bump in the night, and wake up on 30 March with no deal, it will not just be a fall from the bed, it will be a substantial disadvantage. That is why I am confident that we will have a deal, but therefore I am confident that the Minister will accept the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her contribution.
I have presumed for the purposes of this response that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jay, are intended to ensure that a statute, specifically that provided for in Clause 9(1), is required to approve a situation in which the UK fails to negotiate a deal with the EU.
With the greatest respect, the amendments do not achieve the desired outcome. The statute specified in Clause 9(1) is intrinsically linked to the exercise of the Clause 9 power, which is itself dependent on the existence of a withdrawal agreement. Therefore, in a no-deal scenario, the Clause 9 power and all provisions within it would be unavailable, because there would be no withdrawal agreement.
The amendments would also leave other areas of the Bill inoperable. For example, Clause 7(7)(d) sets out that the power cannot be used to implement the withdrawal agreement. Changing the definition of withdrawal agreement to include the absence of an agreement would therefore leave us unable to use Clause 7 in a no-deal scenario. Vital corrections could not be made in that case and we would be left with many inoperabilities on our statute book.
Of course, I remind the House that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and others have said, we are confident that the UK and EU can reach a positive deal on our future partnership—
If the Minister is saying that the amendment does not technically achieve what they want, if we can word it in a way that they want, will the Government then accept it?
I cannot give the noble Baroness that commitment. I am explaining the amendment and will come to the other implications in a second.
Perhaps the Minister can give an easier commitment, which is that the Government will use the period between now and Report to draft a provision which has that effect and catches a no-deal situation. I am sure we should be delighted. He has a whole team of draftsmen at his beck and call, so perhaps he could make good use of their Easter recess.
I am delighted to hear that I have all these people at my beck and call; it seems to have escaped my notice.
I remind the Committee that we are confident that the UK and the EU can reach a positive deal on our future partnership, as we believe that this is in our mutual interest. However, a responsible Government must be prepared for all possible outcomes. To invalidate the Clause 7 power in the absence of an agreement would eradicate a crucial part of our preparations. Putting the issue to one side, I respectfully disagree with the intention of the amendment—that parliamentary approval should be required to leave the EU without a deal. There should be one fundamental fact sitting behind all these debates: the UK is leaving the EU. As noble Lords have heard me say before in Committee, and on which I have been questioned at length, the decision to hold a referendum was put to the electorate in the 2015 general election. That decision was then put into statute in the European Union (Referendum) Act. The referendum was held and delivered a majority in favour of leaving the EU. Parliament then consented to act on that verdict through the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act.
I do not normally read the Observer, but as Keir Starmer had given an interview I thought it would be appropriate for me to read what he had to say on behalf of the Labour Party. It had some interesting quotes. He said:
“Article 50 was triggered a year ago. It expires in 52 weeks and a few days, and I don’t think there is any realistic prospect of it being revoked”.
Article 50 also says that there will be a withdrawal deal which will include the framework for our future arrangements. Article 50, which we triggered, does not say that we are giving notice that we are leaving and that we are leaving without a deal.
We are giving notice of our withdrawal. The title was in the Bill that we passed to trigger it. Keir Starmer also said:
“Having asked the electorate for a view by way of the referendum, we have to respect the result”.
I agree with him.
I say again only to remind noble Lords so that they can understand my point of view that there has been a legitimate process, marked at intervals by the consent of both Parliament and the electorate. As I said in an earlier debate, amendments that could be perceived as a means to delay or disregard the referendum result carry with them their own risks—people’s faith in their democracy and its institutions. With that in mind, I do not think that it would be right to add an express mechanism within this Bill which might prevent the referendum result being acted upon.
The Prime Minister has been very clear: we are leaving the EU at the end of March 2019. That is not a question of domestic legislation; it is now a question of the EU treaties. While the detail of our future relationship with the EU has yet to be negotiated, I believe that remaining in the EU is the only outcome which cannot be reconciled with the decision taken in the referendum. I do not think that it would be in the interests of either the EU or the UK to open the door to an ever-continuing negotiation process with no certainty that the UK will ever reach a new, settled relationship with the EU. I was going to finish there but I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is itching to ask a question.
I thank the noble Lord for anticipating my question. He referred to there being a problem with Clause 7(1), which says:
“A Minister … may by regulations make such provision as … appropriate … arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”.
If it is “may”, it could also mean “may not”. If there are no regulations to be made because there is no deal, and therefore there are no deficiencies in retained EU law to remedy, and that is the Government’s position, that subsection does not need to be invoked.
That is surely different from Clause 9. I do not see the parallel. Clause 9(1) refers to the parliamentary enactment of whatever the final terms are. We are talking about a scenario where there is no deal. As was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, if you are maintaining that it is unworkable in this situation, the Government need to come up with something that they consider a workable formula. The Minister must surely understand that the point is to make sure there is not wriggle room over where parliamentary responsibility and rights reside, and not to be able to dodge Clause 9(1) by saying, “Well, it’s not really final terms of withdrawal because we are crashing out without a deal”.
We hope not to crash out without a deal, as I have said. If we do not have a withdrawal agreement, there is nothing to implement in Clause 9—therefore, Clause 9 would not be necessary. As I have said many times before, our position is that we are leaving the European Union on 29 March 2019, because that was what was authorised by Parliament when it authorised the Prime Minister to submit the notification under Article 50.
Does my noble friend truly believe that the British people voted to leave the EU with no deal, with all the implications that that has for the livelihoods and business prospects of this country? That was not on the ballot paper. We have respected the British people’s vote by triggering Article 50 and negotiating with the EU but, if it comes down to the point where we cannot get a deal, surely Parliament must be in control of what happens to the interests of our country in that scenario.
I believe that the British people voted to leave the EU and we are trying to negotiate the best possible deal to ensure that we leave the EU. To go back to our original argument for all the reasons against the amendment, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, will consent to withdraw it.
My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken in this short debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his reply and for reciting the history, but I simply disagree on the substance of the issue. There is no question of these amendments seeking to countermand the result of the referendum; they are simply to reaffirm the role of Parliament and what I and others believe would unquestionably be the desire of the British people in the event of no deal—that Parliament should take its responsibility and consider these issues before the final decision is made.
There is perhaps a difference of nuance between some of us who have spoken on the likelihood of no deal. I think that David Davis spoke of no deal as a sort of an insurance policy, in case there was a no deal. But I do not think that there is any disagreement among those who have spoken tonight on the consequence of no deal, with the exception of the Minister, or of the need for Parliament to be consulted. I have no doubt that we shall return to this issue at Report, but meanwhile I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this commendably brief debate at this not so late hour, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, for his commendably brief opening statements. I was delighted to see that he made his way up to Newcastle yesterday but, unsurprisingly, he forgot to ask me to meet him for a drink while he was there to speak to his 200 or so Brexit-disliking supporters.
The noble Lord is right—I am sorry.
I will try to give a relatively detailed explanation. For any policy to be complete, it must have a practical answer to the question of how it will be funded. Clause 12 and Schedule 4 are that answer here. I hasten to add that they are not the answer to all money matters in relation to Brexit. The withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will provide the statutory underpinning for paying our negotiated financial settlement with the EU and any other financial matters related to the withdrawal agreement. Before I proceed, I make it completely clear that I have heard the principled and eloquently expressed concerns about the powers in Schedule 4 and their scrutiny, and we will look closely at this ahead of Report. I regret to say that I am unable to provide too much detail on that at the moment, but we will carefully consider this issue.
Clause 12 and Schedule 4 provide that all the money which might flow into and out of the Exchequer as a consequence of the Bill is made “proper”, in line with the rules governing public expenditure and as laid down between the Commons and the Treasury in the PAC concordat of 1932—which I assume even the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, was not around to take part in. Maybe his maiden aunts were around at the time to take part—who knows? These are obviously provisions relating to spending and charges on the public and were closely examined by the other place, which has privilege in financial matters, before the Bill reached us.
It is evident that the process of taking on new functions from the EU, and in the future running them, will cost money. Some of this will be public measures funded from general taxation—and, I hope, more efficiently than they were funded at the EU level. Some will be paid for by users of services to ensure that taxpayers, both corporate and individual, do not end up unfairly subsidising specialist provision. Where the line will fall is clearly a matter for debate in some cases, and I expect that as SIs come before Parliament for scrutiny, that question will, in a handful of cases, be relevant to the discussion. These provisions of the Bill, however, are key to ensuring that the rest of the Bill can be given real-world effect. I hope noble Lords will agree that without funding, the essential EU exit preparations enabled by the Bill could not be put into practice.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Tyler, for Amendment 348. The Government, as has been said at other times and in other places, are aware of the risks and concerns posed by any legislative sub-delegation to public authorities, but we remain convinced that conferring powers on public authorities other than Ministers to allow them to make provisions of a legislative character can be an appropriate course of action. I stress that, like any other form of sub-delegation under this Bill, any transfer of legislative power must be approved by both this House and the other place following a debate. It will not be possible for an SI to pass through this place, under the eyes of noble Lords, without a thorough and reasonable explanation of how any sub-delegation will be exercised in practice.
In this exceptional Bill, it is right that, although we must address all the issues that we discussed at Second Reading and which will arise under the Bill, Parliament also keeps a close and strict eye on all matters where any financial burden can be imposed on individuals and businesses. However, I remind noble Lords that this power is only available if the public authority is taking on a new function under the Bill and that the fees and charges must be in connection to that function. This is not a general power for the Government or any other public authority to raise moneys as they please.
The Government envisage sub-delegating this power in limited circumstances—for example, where Parliament has already granted to a public authority the power to set up its own rules for fees and charges of the type envisaged by this power, and, for good reasons, made it independent of the Government.
Will the Minister clarify one point? As I understand it, the affirmative procedure would apply to secondary legislation under Schedule 4 where there is a new fee or charge, but only the negative procedure would apply in subsequent regulations modifying those fees. That is an important qualification of the assurances he was giving to the Committee just now.
The noble Lord makes a good point. I will answer his question later. In line with the Bill’s aim to provide continuity, Parliament should have the option of approving the ability of authorities such as the Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England to independently make fees and charges for firms that will, after exit and under this Bill, fall under their regulatory remit.
Amendment 349 comes to the heart of the purpose of these powers and I thank the same noble and learned Lords for tabling it. This power is designed to ensure that those using specialist services transferred from the EU to the UK pay for them. This involves providing for fees and charges which, though not taxes in the common sense of the term, are at least tax-like. For the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, let me clarify what we mean by tax and tax-like charges in this context. Under the guidance laid down by the Treasury, although fees and charges for services that are set on a strict cost-recovery basis are not taxes, any fee or charge that goes further than direct cost recovery is likely to count as taxation or to be tax-like. This would be the case if it cross-subsidises to construct a progressive regime between large multinationals and small enterprises, if it is a compulsory levy in a regulated and surveilled sector, such as banking, or if it funds the broader functions of an organisation not directly part of the cost of providing a service, such as enforcement.
I hope we can all agree that, as part of providing continuity, this Bill should enable the Government to continue to fund public services in an appropriate manner. Because the Government have directly prohibited the increase or imposition of taxation, including tax-like charges of the type I have just described under other relevant powers in the Bill—particularly Clause 7(1)—we require the ability to do so under this power. To give an example, without this the Bank of England would not be able to bring trade repositories—a vital piece of financial market infrastructure currently supervised at the European level—within the scope of its levy-based funding regimes. This House approved the creation of those delegated regimes through the relevant legislation and I hope that, with the proper information before it, it will approve the relevant power in this Bill, subject to the use of the affirmative scrutiny procedure.
Having said all that, let me repeat what I said at the start. We are looking closely at this matter ahead of Report. We will try to see how we might provide appropriate reassurance to a number of the fairly reasonable concerns that have been raised by noble Lords. Even with that caveat, I recognise that noble Lords may still have concerns but I hope that I have given some insight into the Government’s position and satisfied the House of the honourability of the Government’s intentions. I hope that noble Lords will agree, therefore, to not press their amendments or object to Clause 12 standing part.
I congratulate the Minister on what was, I thought, an excellent response to the debate. After 10 days in Committee, he has learned from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, how to charm the House and we have seen a new side to him that we were not aware of before: his conciliatory and emollient side. He may even, in due course, convert to the anti-Brexit cause at this rate of progress—maybe with another 10 days in Committee we would get there.
However, the Minister did the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, a great disservice. It is a well-known fact that the noble Lord drafted Magna Carta.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I was hoping that that was an intervention—I am better prepared for interventions than I was last time.
I simply hope that, when all is said and done, the fact that this is about money—even if the guarantees and figures cannot be given in a debate such as this—will indicate the desperate need felt in Wales for some support and encouragement. There must be a promissory note for adequate support that will be met once we are no longer in Europe for the activities that up to now Europe has helped us with so generously.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for tabling these amendments and all who have participated in what has been a free-wheeling, free-ranging debate covering an awful lot of important areas, some which I perhaps in all fairness could not have anticipated when I read the amendments.
The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, is absolutely right that in debating something geared specifically to Wales we should recognise the enormous contributions made by Lord Richard and Lord Crickhowell, both of whom sadly died recently. Sometimes in similar ways but in differing ways in other respects, both made enormous contributions in Wales and to devolution. Lord Richard is certainly massively missed. He made an outstanding contribution on the Richard commission in relation to devolution but in so many other ways in public life as well.
I will first turn to the amendments and then try to do justice to the many wide-ranging points made during the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, was described as “terrier-like” and as getting the last bit of marrow out of the bone. As someone who has often broken bread with him, I thought that conjured up an extraordinary vision of him. For many years, he has certainly fought hard for many issues in public life, not least for Welsh principles and rights, both here, in the Commons and in the National Assembly for Wales. I think that is acknowledged across the political divide and by people with no politics at all. He continues to make an extraordinary contribution.
The amendments would require the United Kingdom Government to produce a report outlining how EU funding provided to Wales will be replaced once we leave the EU. They would mean that the entire Bill could not be brought into force pending the publication of such a report.
While I understand the desire for as much clarity as possible—I shall say something about cohesion funding shortly—I do not consider such a step necessary in view of the considerable funding assurances the Government have already made to all parts of the United Kingdom. I recognise that there is an issue here that goes broader than Wales. There are certainly issues relating to Cumbria, as has been mentioned during the debate, Cornwall, Merseyside, Scotland and so on—this affects many parts of the United Kingdom, although the amendments are for understandable reasons addressed to the needs of Wales, which I can strongly identify with.
The agreed implementation period to the end of 2020 will see the UK participate in 2014 to 2020 EU funding programmes until their closure. In the case of some of those projects, that will mean the end of 2023. It will not be beyond 2023, but it could mean funding for those programmes that remain open during that funding programme until the end of 2023. The projects would receive their full allocation of EU funding during that period—that is an agreed position as things stand.
This approach ensures that projects are not disrupted and no community misses out. The noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, was there at the start of the Assembly as were the noble Lord, Lord Wigley and I, and saw the benefit of such funding—I fully recognise many of the examples that she gave. In the area that I represented in west Wales, there were massive benefits. No community would miss out. British businesses and potential investors have certainty and stability up to the end of projects running to 2023.
In the longer term, the Government have further committed to maintain cash farm funding until the end of this Parliament, taking us beyond 2020, which provides the sector with more certainty than in any other part of the EU as things stand. The Government will also create a UK shared prosperity fund to reduce inequalities between communities across the United Kingdom and deliver sustainable, inclusive growth. The Government intend to consult on the design of this United Kingdom-wide fund during 2018. That will of course, quite rightly, mean engagement with the Welsh Assembly through the Welsh Government and, similarly, the Scottish Parliament through the Scottish Government and with others who would expect to be consulted in that process.
Can the Minister tell us anything about the timing of consultation papers on the shared prosperity fund? When are they likely to appear? Particularly in relation to the debate on Brexit, are we likely to see what is proposed before the final decisions that we have to make at the end of this year?
The noble Lord makes a fair point. I do not know the specific answer, but I will cover it in a letter to all Peers who have participated in the debate on these amendments, and place a copy in the Library.
Perhaps the Minister can answer this question. Is the UK prosperity fund—which I think was in the last Conservative manifesto—intended to be administered or distributed on the basis of need or a population count?
My Lords, it certainly was in our last manifesto. As I have just indicated, it talks about reducing inequalities, so the noble Lord has that comfort. Again, I will ensure that any points not dealt with in my answers will be covered in a letter to all Peers who have participated on these amendments, a copy of which will be placed in the Library.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, made some points about cohesion funding, which dates back to 2000. I remember when the noble Lord was leader of the opposition in the Assembly and I was leader of the Welsh Conservatives—I later became leader of the opposition. I too went out to Europe and fought for this with Michel Barnier. I also remember the struggles that we had with the Treasury; that was accurately reflected. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, on this point, which the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, made in the Assembly on many occasions. Such funding was not a badge of pride: it was coming to Wales because of the poverty that was experienced in west Wales and the valleys. It was not limited to Wales: Cornwall, Merseyside and so on were also involved. This was something that we did not really want to qualify for. There will be another round of funding from 2021 to 2027 and I will look at how that pans out. It is not guaranteed, even in European terms, that Wales will qualify. We were somewhat surprised in the last round of funding—it was very marginal—that Wales just managed to qualify. In one sense we were pleased, because to just qualify rather than just miss was welcome. We have to remember that there is no automatic right to it. It is based on 75% of average prosperity throughout the European Union.
There were some free-ranging points made about the referendum campaign—I remember the campaign in Wales as a campaigner for remain—but I will focus on the parts of the debate that were more central to the amendment and the legislation. First, however, I will touch on some of the funding that is coming to Wales. As a Welsh Office Minister, I know that we are participating very much in mid-Wales growth deals, north Wales growth deals and city deals. Stuff is going on which is helping projects in Wales now and engaging with the NFU, the FUW, the CLA and so on. Many things are happening in Wales that I am sure noble Lords across the Chamber would be pleased about.
Points were made about the Barnett formula. Lord Richard would have had much to say on this and we come back to it on many occasions. However, the issue exists independently of Europe and it is not made better or worse by our position in Europe. It does need addressing. In fairness, as part of the coalition in the previous Parliament, we ensured that the formula was ameliorated by the application of the Barnett floor, which benefited Wales. That said, I recognise the points about the historic position of Wales, unlike Scotland which benefits from the Barnett formula. I will leave that for another day, if I may.
The noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, was there at the start and very much engaged with ensuring that we got the benefits of Objective 1 into Wales. In parenthesis, the giving of taxation powers to Wales, which was part of the coalition Government and the Silk commission and is now in process, should help to incentivise growth in Wales and is part of the added powers that have been given to the National Assembly for Wales. We should not fail to recognise that a lot of these issues are things that the National Assembly now can, and I have no doubt will, ameliorate.
The noble Lord, Lord Roberts, made a valid point about Welsh agriculture being much dependent on agricultural funding. I hope he takes comfort from what I have said about the agricultural budget up to the end of the Parliament. He is right that we have to focus on it. In fairness, it is not just a Welsh issue but, as he rightly recognises, it is central to a lot of Welsh life and many areas and close to the hearts of people in Wales.
The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, mentioned the Cumbrian situation and touched on federal issues. I can promise that just as I would take a call from Sadiq Khan, I would take a call from the noble Lord. If he wants to ring on any issues, I would be very keen to do that. I think Wigton is extremely important.
The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, referred appositely and correctly to the weak voice of England in our structures. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, by inference touched on the incomplete part of the jigsaw in that we do not have regional voices for England, or not in the same way that exist in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.
I perhaps take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, about the unknown mayor of Birmingham. I think that would be a surprise to many people. Many people know that it is Andy Street, just as we all know Andy Burnham. I do not think it would be quite right to refer to them as colonial governors, either.
My Lords, I was referring to the then Leader of Birmingham City Council who is now also a Member of your Lordships’ House.
And a very able one. I take that qualification and thank the noble Lord for it.
It is also worth saying that there were attempts to extend regional government to England. I am sure we all remember the referendum in the north-east, which was pretty decisive. I accept that there are issues to address there. This Government have done more for city mayors than has been done for a long time in terms of devolved power and not just in the big cities of the UK. We have looked at other areas—Cambridgeshire, for example. However, there is incomplete work—including in Yorkshire, it is fair to say.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, that the Falkirk Wheel is well worth visiting. I also agreed with him on other issues that he mentioned in relation to the unaddressed issues about government in our country—some points well made.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for his contribution and agree that we fought for money for Wales. It was not a matter of pride, it was a matter of getting money that was needed. I agree that in many ways the money is still needed because of the relative poverty in Wales—sometimes a poverty that is not obvious. The grinding poverty that exists in the Valleys is obvious, but the poverty in the rural communities of north-west and south-west Wales is not necessarily as obvious.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, for his contribution and for re-focusing us on some of the issues that matter. He referred to the history of some of the devolution process in Wales—the 1997 referendum, the 2011 referendum and much work that was done in-between. He is right that there is a money issue. I do not think it is just a money issue; it is also an attitude issue that has existed prior to this Government and probably the previous Government. In short, I think it is ameliorated. There is an attitude of: “Let’s not forget Wales, let’s not forget Scotland”. It has become lot better; it is plugged in. That is not to say that we are there yet. It is not just a money issue, though money is important too.
The noble Lord mentioned the Barnett formula. A lot of good work has been done in the past by Gerry Holtham and the Holtham commission, but there are issues which remain to be addressed—that is no doubt true. He went on to talk about the consenting process, and I take it that he means the process referred to in Clause 11. I agree that this is a partnership and, in fairness, the Prime Minister is very much aware of that. She met the First Ministers of Wales and Scotland very recently, and I think progress was made. More work needs to be done and is being done. We are not there yet. I think that anyone who is fair minded would acknowledge that we have made considerable progress on this but, as I say, we are not there yet.
I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, may regard this as half a loaf—it is not everything he wants—but I am happy to talk to him between now and Report and to find answers to some of the questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, about the timing of this process. I hope that helps the noble Lord: I thank him for bringing this important issue to the House. I thank other noble Lords for their part in this. While the present team and I remain at the Wales Office, we are determined to ensure that Wales gets a fair deal. I am sure that applies to the Scottish and Northern Ireland teams in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. We have to ensure that all parts of the United Kingdom are taken care of in this. We do not want this to be x versus y: everybody has to be fairly dealt with. On the basis that I am happy to try to find more information for the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and others, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which was rather longer than I expected. Perhaps I set the wrong precedent in my own speech. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Liddle, Lord Roberts of Llandudno, Lord Adonis, the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, of course, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, and the Minister, for their comments. I am grateful for the acknowledgment of the importance of the issue. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Cavendish, whose interventions I followed with interest, I recognise, as we all do, that other parts of the UK have specific needs which should be addressed as well. We need a mechanism to do that. In the context of the current round of European funding, on top of the CAP, there is a particular impact on Wales, which was what I wanted to highlight.
I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, that, in the fullness of time and having thought a bit more about this and discussed it with his colleagues, the Government might be minded to bring forward a White Paper, or a publication of some sort, laying out how funding coming from Europe will be replaced. This would not be just for Wales but for other areas as well, and not just for the period from now until 2019 or 2021—whichever is the end of the transition period—but their ongoing intention after that. As the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said, the timing is important. I identify with the comments made about the late Lord Richard and the late Lord Crickhowell who, in their different ways, both made considerable contributions to Wales. I am sure that, if they were here today, they would be taking an active interest in these issues.
The noble Lord, Lord Bourne, knows enough about the feelings in the National Assembly about European funding to realise that this is a real issue that can make a difference, not just a political football. We can certainly argue about how the money is used and how it is used in Merseyside, south Yorkshire or Cornwall, where it is used in different ways, sometimes with better results. We need the resources because we are not going to get them elsewhere. They have to be replicated somehow. The question of trust has arisen in a number of contributions. Before the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, entered the Chamber there was another issue regarding money from the Treasury—the aggregated capital funding that Wales was accumulating in the National Assembly to avoid the wastage of year-end expenditure and put it into capital projects. That money was taken back by the Treasury on the basis that we had no right to aggregate money from other headings to fund capital projects. That is the sort of breakdown of trust that we are talking about, and we have to make sure that those attitudes are not exemplified in the ongoing period.
I hope that over the coming two or three weeks it will be possible to see whether a different formulation of this amendment can be tabled on Report, bringing in other parts of the United Kingdom and perhaps other parties. I invite the Front Benches of the various parties and individuals on the Cross Benches to consider whether that may be possible, and to do so with the positive intention of achieving a meaningful step forward as a result of the debates here that will help Wales and all other parts of the United Kingdom to find a way through the consequences of leaving the European Union. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
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My Lords, at one stage I thought that, for the first time in many days, I was going to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, but then he went and spoiled it.
Many people—today, yesterday, a year ago—wanted to remain EU citizens, but more people decided that they did not. That is where we find ourselves today. I do not seek to elaborate on that. I understand the strength of feeling from many people who did not want to see us leave the EU, but the reality is that we will. The consequence of that is clear and has been made clear by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Kerr: pursuant to Article 20, EU citizenship is an addition to the citizenship of a member state.
I apologise for interrupting at this juncture because the Minister has only just begun his interesting speech. He asserted that people voted decisively in favour of Brexit and therefore also against being European citizens. As far as I recall, that did not really come up in the campaign, so how many of those people would have known about EU citizenship arising from the Maastricht treaty a long time ago?
It is so utterly basic to the issue that it is difficult to conceive of many, if any, people who did not understand the nature and consequences of Brexit, so I will not elaborate on that.
I want to come back to remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, in an earlier debate. We have debated this already in Committee in the context of another amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, mentioned Northern Ireland. Clearly, where one meets certain residency tests in Northern Ireland, one is eligible to apply for a passport from the Republic of Ireland Government. By that means, membership of an EU state can be retained and one can remain an EU citizen. As I indicated in an earlier debate, there are two areas of opinion in Northern Ireland: there are people who are perfectly happy—indeed, anxious—to secure a passport from Dublin and people who have no desire to do so.
I am afraid I must disappoint the noble and learned Lord because I think we are continuing to agree. However, I asked him why he will not extend the right to apply for an Irish passport to those of us on the mainland.
It is not in my gift. It would be a matter for international treaty negotiation between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It is for Ireland to decide who it will admit as citizens of the Republic; it is not for us to demand. That is the answer to the noble Lord’s point.
As a point of interest, perhaps one should recommend to all pregnant mothers in Great Britain that they might consider going over to Northern Ireland to have their babies.
I am not going to indulge in an issue regarding maternity at this stage. Let us try to keep focus on the amendment, shall we?
We are all aware of the issue and we are also aware of the agreement that has been entered into to protect the rights of EU citizens and their family members living in the UK and of UK nationals living in the EU until the end of the implementation period, set at 31 December 2020. During the implementation period, individuals will still be fully covered by the EU acquis. UK nationals will be able to continue to move around the EU 27 member states and will have the freedom to move to another member state to live and work, as long as they do so before the end of the implementation period.
That reminds me of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, about Article 32 of the withdrawal agreement. The position is this: what was proposed in Article 32 was removed as there was no actual agreement on that point. Therefore, there was no reason to have a legal text covering a point that was not the subject of agreement. The United Kingdom pushed strongly for the inclusion of ongoing movement rights during the first phase of the negotiations, but the European Union was not yet ready to include them. Of course, it remains an issue that we wish to pursue. We have already made that clear.
To come back to the amendment itself, it is simply not feasible for us to set upon a course of negotiation that is doomed to failure. We cannot secure EU citizenship for citizens of the United Kingdom after we leave the EU. That is the short point to be made. Therefore, the amendment would set the Government on a course of negotiation that would effectively prevent the present Bill—
I shall just finish the sentence, so will the noble Lord please sit down? It would effectively prevent the present Bill getting on to the statute book and achieving its intended purpose: to ensure legal certainty at the point at which we leave the European Union.
I am very sorry to hear that this would prevent the Bill reaching the statute book. Notwithstanding those feelings, I ask the noble and learned Lord to address the point I raised in my earlier comment about the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that that convention,
“will be binding on all remaining Member States, the UK, and the EU itself post Brexit”.
Does he accept that the convention,
“ensures that the status and rights of those EU citizens resident in the territory of the Union and those resident in the UK will continue”,
after Brexit?
I hope the noble Lord did not pay good money for that opinion. He will perhaps elaborate on the position in due course, but I do not accept that proposition.
I will not come back after this intervention, but has he read the document to which I referred, or have experts in his department done so?
I have not read the opinion in question, but I am not unfamiliar with the terms of the Vienna convention on treaties.
If between now and Report he or his advisers have an opportunity to read that opinion and, having done so, feel that what has been said in a Chamber does not fully reflect the situation, will he be prepared to come back at a later stage?
I will take up a point that the noble and learned Lord was making before he took the very sensible and helpful intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. We all accept—I explicitly accepted it in my remarks—that EU citizenship is not within the Government’s gift. I accept, too, that there is no practical possibility of the Government negotiating it in foreseeable circumstances with the EU. What I am asking for and what I hope the noble and learned Lord can offer on behalf of the Government is that they will place no obstacle in the way and will do anything that appears possible to facilitate and support any move by any of us to try to achieve from the European Union some recognition of the fact that we are European citizens and we will continue to feel that way even after Brexit, if Brexit, unfortunately, takes place.
The reality is that if Brexit takes place we will not continue to be EU citizens.
My Lords, I am very grateful to everyone who has participated in this short debate, particularly to the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, who I am sorry I relegated in my earlier reference. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, with whom I usually fully agree on these matters, although it was encouraging to hear that there may be alternatives by not pursuing this Bill. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith, Lady McIntosh and Lady Hayter, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Kerr and Lord Roberts of Llandudno, for their comments. I think I have got as far as I am likely to get on this. I was grateful to the Minister for saying that he is prepared to look at the opinion to which I have been referring. I can ask no more than that, and on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for raising the issue of Clause 6 in the context of the implementation period that is referred to in his amendment. Reference is made repeatedly to the transition period; yes, we recognise that there is to be an implementation period, as it is termed, if that and everything else is agreed. But nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, so we do not yet have that implementation period. We desire it and recognise that the EU also sees its significance. That is why we were able to express matters as we have in the March text—the multi-coloured text to which the noble and learned Lord referred. I agree with his reference to Articles 82 to 85 in that context and the point that they are on white, because they express a proposal and not a concluded agreement on those points. That is what I want to underline at this stage.
As I have said during Committee on a number of occasions, this Bill is to ensure that there is a functioning UK statute book on day one, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. In his speech on the implementation period, the Secretary of State was clear that it will allow—if it is finally agreed—a strictly time-limited role for the European Court of Justice, in keeping with the EU’s existing structures.
I am sensitive to the fact that unlike some other amendments, the provisions of this amendment are conditional upon the implementation period being part of the withdrawal agreement. Accordingly, they do not fully prejudge the outcome of negotiations and I acknowledge the delicacy of the drafting of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in that respect. However, that does not change what we have asserted consistently: that the details of the implementation period will be legislated for in the withdrawal agreement and the implementation Bill. We have always been clear that the major elements of the withdrawal agreement will be implemented in that Bill and not in this Bill.
Presumably that means, too, that because there are so many gigantic individual subjects to be agreed in the implementation period, it would be perfectly feasible for the Union and the United Kingdom in further negotiations to agree on a longer period in order to get through all the complicated material, which the Government still say will be easy to do but will be extremely difficult.
The Government’s objective is to conclude a withdrawal agreement by October of this year. That has been stated on a number of occasions and it is in that context that we intend that the present Bill should deal with the situation, whether or not there is a withdrawal agreement or an implementation period. As and when a withdrawal agreement is concluded, it will be dealt with in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Clearly, if we enter into an international treaty with the EU 27 in respect of these matters, we will respect that international treaty and our obligations inherent in it and, in accordance with the duality principle, draw down those obligations into our domestic law, using the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. I suggest that it is inconceivable that we would not seek to do that.
The noble and learned Lord has been quite clear that it will be the withdrawal Bill that is the mechanism. Is he saying that it will be that Bill and not the use of the statutory instrument powers to be found elsewhere in this Bill which will enable him to modify or repeal its sections when it is an Act?
We have been clear that the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will legislate for the withdrawal agreement. That may involve us amending the terms of the present Bill, but we should remember that the present Bill is intended to accommodate the situations where there is a withdrawal agreement and where there is no withdrawal agreement and therefore no implementation period. It is to bring certainty to the statute book in that context. Clearly, there may be a situation in which we have to bring forward amendments to the present Bill in the second withdrawal agreement Bill. I recognise that.
The Minister has just been paying tribute to the delicacy of the drafting of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, whose language in this amendment copes with both eventualities. It sets out the contingency that there is a transitional agreement. I do not see the difficulty.
It is not a question of difficulty; it is a question of how we have decided to approach dealing with this in a legislative manner. The intention is that the present Bill will legislate for legal certainty whether there is or is not a withdrawal agreement. In the event of a withdrawal agreement, we will legislate to ensure that in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill the terms of the present Bill will be brought into line with the terms of the withdrawal agreement in order that we can discharge our international legal obligations. We have consistently pointed out that that is the approach being taken to legislation in this context. It is really quite inconceivable to suppose that the Government are going to enter into a withdrawal agreement and then not implement that international legal obligation in our domestic law. That is the intention. It is simply a question of the order in which these things are being done, and it has always been maintained, and will be maintained, that it is not for this Bill to deal with the eventuality or the prospect of the implementation period.
Does the Minister not appreciate the absurdity some of us feel? As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, pointed out, we are being marched to the top of a hill that the Government have already abandoned. We are being asked to legislate in terms that are contrary to government policy and strategy in the Brexit negotiations, which leaves one feeling in a somewhat surreal position.
I sympathise with the idea of being left in a somewhat surreal position. As I said at the outset of my remarks, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, so while we have the anticipation and desire to secure an implementation period, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.
Does my noble friend not think of Sir Thomas More:
“I trust I make myself obscure”?
I often think of Sir Thomas More, but not on this occasion.
I find it rather hard from the Cross Benches and as a non-politician to make this point, but I wonder whether the Minister has considered what the Government are proposing to do. They are proposing to offer in an Act of Parliament signed into law by the Queen something which they know is not going to happen. They have offered that up; their supporters will, no doubt, rise cheering to their feet; and then, three or six months later, they will repeal that part of the Act, at which point there will be cries of betrayal and perfidy—and those are probably rather mild words compared with the ones that will be used by the Daily Mail and others. Have the Minister and his colleagues not given any thought to that? Is not the simple thing to do to accept the amendment, and then there will be no betrayal and no perfidy, or if there is it will have been done already?
There is no betrayal and no perfidy, but I feel misrepresented by the noble Lord because he said “knowing that there will be an agreement”. We do not know for certain that there will be an agreement. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Of course, we have an aspiration; we seek to secure the implementation period, and when we do we will then legislate for that in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Meanwhile, this Bill is designed and intended to accommodate the situation in which there may not be such an agreement.
I hate to add to the surreal nature of this, but the formula “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” seems incompatible with negotiating a transitional agreement during which we recognise we will agree only a small number of things and carry on negotiating. It seems to me that the Government should now drop the mantra that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, because we are actively pursuing, if I understand the Government’s case, a transitional partial agreement, during which a number of commitments will be made but a number of the fundamental issues of our future relationship with the European Union will remain entirely unclear and will be negotiated in the two or perhaps three or more years afterwards.
My Lords, we are engaged in a bilateral negotiation; it has not yet concluded. This Bill is designed to accommodate the situation in which there may not be a conclusion to that negotiation, as well as a situation in which there may be. In the event of the latter case, the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will bring the legislation into line with the statute book.
Will my noble and learned friend clarify for the Committee, if nothing is agreed until everything is agreed and we may not go into a transition period, how it can possibly make sense to have 29 March written into the Bill?
Because that addresses a distinct issue, which is the exit date from the EU. It is quite distinct from the question whether we are able to finally conclude an implementation period, which it is our intention to do. Let us be clear about that. The EU has also indicated its intention to do it as well. But we are engaged in a bilateral negotiation.
It is plain and obvious that nothing is agreed, but can the noble and learned Lord be clear with the Committee about the Government’s position in relation to negotiating this transitional implementation period? Do they now accept that they are no longer seeking to impose any red line relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice during that implementation period?
I am not sure I agree with the term “red lines”; it is not one that I am inclined to use. I am never quite sure what they are. Our position is that during an implementation period, if and when finally agreed, we will accept that there is a role for the European Court of Justice. Indeed, it is outlined in the EU’s own proposals for the agreement at Articles 82 through to 85. As the noble and learned Lord indicated, that is not yet the subject of final confirmation between the two parties but it is what is anticipated.
On a related point, during that period, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that as we cease to be a member state we will cease to have the right to have a judge in the Court of Justice of the European Union. That must follow. However, we will have the right to make interventions in cases that pertain to the United Kingdom.
My Lords, there have been moments during the 11 Committee days that we have had so far on this Bill when I felt a little sorry for the noble and learned Lord opposite for the positions that he was being expected to argue by those behind him and in other places, but never more sorry than I am today. This is the most absurd situation. We have offered him an amendment and I am grateful for the description given by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, as delicate. It does not presume even that there are transitional arrangements. It simply says that, if there are transitional arrangements, this is what will happen. I cannot understand why it is not accepted. I had hoped on this 11th final day of Committee that we would have a breakthrough.
My Lords, I support the amendment. There is not much to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about what the amendment does and why it is necessary, nor to add to the questions he asked or to those then added by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, which in particular picked up issues with regard to the devolved Administrations.
We know that a major theme in your Lordships’ House, rightly, has been how powers are to be exercised, recognising that there may be circumstances in which they have to be exercised. Notwithstanding that, on the whole this Committee has rightly taken the view—or we hope that we will see it take the view, certainly from the interventions and contributions that have been made throughout the Committee—that this is a matter where proper parliamentary scrutiny is required. There may well be a role for certain delegated legislation, but please let us not add to it with still yet another way in which things can be done which avoid that full parliamentary scrutiny.
I hope that the Minister, when he responds, will be able to say something reassuring, both answering the questions posed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beith, and saying why we need not be concerned and that the Government will content themselves with relying on those delegated powers that will be specific to the Bill, once this Committee and the other place have determined just what those delegated powers should be.
I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by making two observations. These amendments are linked closely to the issue we have already debated in Committee of the status of retained EU law and how we deal with it in the context of its status. As has been indicated previously in Committee, the Government have been listening and considering that, and we intend to come back to the House on the matter before Report. I mention that because it is a relevant backdrop to what we are considering at this stage.
On the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, essentially, the powers in paragraph 3 of Schedule 8 are, first of all, designed to remove what I might term the shadow of European law from what will be domestic legislation. However, more particularly, the noble Lord raised a point about the devolution issues and quoted from the Explanatory Notes. I understand that the section of the Explanatory Notes that he refers to addresses Clause 11 prior to its recent amendment. I appreciate that we then withdrew that amendment, but the Explanatory Notes should be read in that context. Essentially, therefore, we have moved on because of the decision to flip Clause 11—I think that was the term used—so I ask the noble Lord to look at the proposed amendment to Clause 11 to understand the context in which we now want to deal with this point.
The noble and learned Lord is being reasonable, but he is inviting us to presume that we have moved on when we have not yet done so. The Government have indicated a willingness to look further at the Clause 11 issues and come back with something new. However, when we compare that discussion to the one we just had, it is a bit odd now to be invited to behave as if something has happened which has not happened yet.
I understand the noble Lord’s point. He appreciates the statements of intent that we have made with regard to Clause 11. Although we withdrew the amendment to Clause 11, it was tendered and withdrawn for a particular purpose, in order to ensure that it could be finalised before Report. I hope that that addresses the noble Lord’s concern about the terms of the Explanatory Note that he quoted.
We have discussed on previous occasions in Committee the risk of ossifying the statute book and how that has to be balanced against checking the ability of the Government to propose changes to retained EU law. Clearly, as I indicated, the Government have heard the debates on the question of how we should treat the status of retained EU law, and we intend to come back on that. However, we must make provision for how delegated powers outside the Bill will interact with retained direct EU legislation. To do nothing would create uncertainty and potentially—by putting it beyond the reach even of Henry VIII powers that can modify Acts of Parliament—risk placing retained EU law on a pedestal of protection beyond even the elevated position of primary legislation. That is why I say that the two issues are linked: how we deal with the status of retained EU law but also carry on with our domestic powers to deal with the entire scope of our domestic legislation, including that which is going to be defined as retained EU law.
My Lords, since we have returned to the subject of Henry VIII powers, I would like to inform the Minister that, after this morning’s discussion on the Statute of Proclamations, I looked up the Wikipedia entry—my historical memory of this being relatively limited—and discovered that Thomas Cromwell’s original proposals for the Statute of Proclamations passed through the House of Commons unamended, but they were amended in the House of Lords. Does the Minister think that is a relevant precedent?
Of course, our constitutional position has altered over the last few years—say, the last 500—and, at the end of the day, we see ourselves as, essentially, an amending House. I understand the noble Lord’s point but, in that context, we also understand the precedence of the other place with regard to the final passage of legislation. Therefore, our primary tasks in this context are scrutiny and comment.
The Government have always said that this Bill is not the place for radical policy change. Essentially, what we want to do at this stage is preserve the existing domestic powers to amend legislation pursuant to paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, in order that we can address issues with regard to retained EU law. But the manner in which those powers will ultimately be deployed will depend on the outcome of our consideration of the question of what status we confer on retained EU law. Given that that is an ongoing issue, I invite the noble Lord at this stage to withdraw his amendment. He may, of course, choose to return to it once he has seen our proposals with regard to retained EU law, but it appears to me that the two issues are inextricably linked.
Before the noble Lord announces the fate of his amendment, I have a question for the Minister. He said several times that there is a connection here with what will happen to EU retained law and what status it will have. We have had full debates on that, as he rightly says. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles; we have heard from the Constitution Committee; we have heard a rather different proposal from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who is not in his place at the moment. My question is simply: when will we know what the Government’s decision is? I hope that they will not stick—because they cannot stick—to the idea that it will be simply for Ministers to decide as we go along the status of a particular piece of retained law. When will we know the Government’s position? That might enable us to advance not only on that point but on points such as the one being debated at the moment. Can the Minister give us an answer as to dates?
I cannot give the noble and learned Lord an answer as to dates, but clearly we are concerned to ensure that any proposals we have to make are in place in time for consideration by the whole House before Report.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, who I have always regarded as a true Renaissance Minister in all respects. I am very pleased to hear him confirm that the Government are seriously considering the issue of the legal status of retained EU law. The Committee of the House will look forward to seeing amendments from the Government in that respect. I am far less persuaded of the need to include in this Bill paragraphs 3(1) and 5(1) of Schedule 8, in addition to all the other extensive powers which the Government—and Ministers—will be giving themselves to amend retained EU law, under Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17. The question is: why is it necessary also to include these powers in Schedule 8?
The concern, as the Minister will understand, is that future Ministers may decide that it is much more convenient to use the extensive, unrestricted powers in Schedule 8 than to comply with whatever restrictions are imposed by this House, by the other place—by Parliament—on the powers to modify under Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17. So we might need to come back to this matter on Report.
I was also interested to hear the Minister say in his reply that the Bill is not the place for “radical policy change”. I will remind him of that when we debate the amendments—which no doubt will be put forward on Report—to take out the provisions in the Bill that remove from retained EU law the European Union charter of rights. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support this amendment and am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for bringing it forward. I am also grateful to him for reminding the Committee that, when we sit past midnight, it remains the same day. I wonder what the noble Lord’s nervous maiden aunts would have made of this never-ending night. The amendment raises an important point and is yet another example of how we have to be careful and circumspect in the use of delegated powers. It is now really for the Minister to answer that question and to see whether he is prepared to give us the reassurance that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, asked for.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for introducing this amendment, which stands also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I am glad to have the opportunity to address it.
First, I reassure noble Lords that the strength of feeling around the exercise of delegated powers by those not immediately accountable to Parliament has been heard, as I said the other evening. The Government are looking very closely at the issue of transparency before Parliament, and we will of course hold that at the forefront of our minds as we consider our position ahead of Report.
At the heart of this Bill is the repeal of the European Communities Act, including Section 2(2) of that Act. As noble Lords on all sides of the Committee know, that provision has been the vires used for many statutory instruments made by many Governments in recent years. This Bill does not replace that power. Although there are several broad powers in the Bill, with some approaching the breadth of Section 2(2) of the ECA, they are, unlike that power, time limited. The Bill is not an assault on Parliament but, rather, the means by which this Parliament will take back control to itself.
It is perfectly appropriate, although I do not like the word “appropriate”, as we all know. Perhaps the answer is that it is not necessary, but it may be appropriate.
I fully respect what the noble Lord is doing. It is not easy to say this but, politically, the 2011 Act was a staging post on the route—as it turns out—to full Brexit, even though some people still hope that we will not go that far, and it has therefore served its purpose. I am not making a legal analysis of whether the conditions in the Act apply because I can see arguments why they may and why they may not; I am explaining why, if there is a suggestion that this House will vote for a referendum, it would be better to do it on an amendment or a Motion that directly raises that question. It can then be fully debated and we can all have our say. For those reasons, I very much regret to tell my noble friend that I cannot support his amendment.
My Lords, after 115 hours of Committee debate, as observed by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, it is somehow appropriate—that word again—that the last and 372nd amendment should be tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. He referred to our deep and special partnership; I think that is probably going a bit far, but to mark the occasion, I thought I would get him a gift to celebrate his perseverance. The Adonis nut bar is available in all good health shops. He is welcome to collect it later.
In responding to Amendment 372, I want to be very clear about what the European Union Act 2011 does. The Act contains a recent mechanism for two principal goals—first, to provide that where Ministers participate in certain types of decisions, those decisions are specifically approved in the UK. This normally happens via an Act of Parliament. The Act passed last year to approve the decisions—which allowed the participation of Albania and Serbia in the work of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights and the conclusion of an agreement on competition law between the EU and Canada—is an example of this. Secondly, the Act also provides that where there is a revision to the fundamental treaties of the EU, akin to the treaties of Lisbon or Maastricht, there should be an Act of Parliament—and, in certain circumstances, a referendum in the UK—before the UK Government could approve those changes.
I invite noble Lords to cast their minds back, as some Members have done, to 2011 and the context in which this Act was passed. Sadly, I was not a Member of your Lordships’ House then; I was with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—not directly; we were Members—in the European Parliament. The Act was drafted in the context of its time in response to new EU methods of approving treaty changes and calls for more public and parliamentary involvement in such decisions. Its purpose was to regulate decision-making on the UK’s relationship to the EU treaties in the context of the UK as a member state. At that point, the idea of holding a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU was far from the Government’s mind, let alone undertaking the most complex negotiation in history to recast that relationship with the UK outside the EU treaties.
Of course, everything has changed since then. We are leaving the EU. The 2011 Act is redundant. It is appropriate to repeal redundant legislation. It may even be necessary to repeal the 2011 Act. Amendment 372 would prevent the Bill from repealing the 2011 Act. From previous statements made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, I understand that he intends to use the Act in an attempt to secure a second referendum—no surprise there. I will not revisit the positions that we have already covered extensively in debate about the merits or otherwise of holding a further referendum as part of the process of our exit from the EU; no doubt the Liberal Democrats will enable us to return to this matter on Report. We have covered that at length in this Committee; suffice it to say that the Government think, first, that a second referendum is not appropriate and, secondly, that it is most certainly not for this Bill to provide for one.
If I could have a last celebratory intervention on the Minister in Committee, can he indicate to the House when the Government intend to use the powers they would get under this Act to repeal the 2011 Act?
I do not want to give the noble Lord a precise date at this time. We will wait until the legislation is on the statute book before deciding such things.
Crucially, a second referendum is not provided for by the 2011 Act. As I hope I have set out, that Act could never have been intended to achieve that goal.
Is the Minister indicating that the Government may repeal the 2011 Act in advance of the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972?
I will not comment any further on the repeal date, I am afraid, no matter how many times the noble Lord asks me.
I refer noble Lords to the first sentence of the first part of the Explanatory Notes to that Act. Acts of Parliament or referenda are required by the 2011 Act,
“if these would transfer power or competence from the UK to the EU”.
We are leaving the EU. That process is neither governed by the types of decision referred to in the 2011 Act, nor involves a change to the treaties on European Union or the functioning of the European Union. Those treaties will go on without us, governing the EU and its institutions, for which we wish only the greatest of success. Moreover, I hope it is unquestionable for the Government to pursue a withdrawal agreement that will transfer power to the EU; it is the nature of leaving the EU that it must involve a transfer of power back to the UK. Therefore, I say with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that it is disingenuous of him to mislead others outside this House that the 2011 Act is an instrument to deliver a second referendum on our membership of the EU.
We are progressing towards establishing a future relationship with the EU as an independent third country. As part of this, we will require new processes for approving our new relationship with the EU. The Government are committed to giving Parliament a vote on the final deal of our withdrawal agreement negotiations.
The Minister is saying things that directly contradict what the Prime Minister has said: that we will have an implementation period in which we will follow the laws set by the EU without having any say over them. In her Mansion House speech, she said that we wish to maintain regulatory alignment with the EU in a large number of areas. That means following EU laws without having any say in them. Will the Minister accept that point?
I will not accept that point. We have not agreed anything yet. We are still to have those negotiations.
Is the Minister saying that he rejects what the Prime Minister said in her Mansion House speech?
Of course I am not saying that. I am saying that we are in the process of conducting a negotiation. We have said that when have concluded that withdrawal agreement, we will return to this House with the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. The noble Lord will be able to make all his points—at great length, no doubt—over and again during that process. He has made those points many times in the course of this Committee, so if he will forgive me I will make a bit more progress and then we can all go out and have an enjoyable evening at the end of this stage.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My Lords, it is a great pleasure for me to resume our debate after the Easter Recess. I hope that all noble Lords enjoyed a good break. I spent most of it studying amendments to this Bill. I hope that some doubts about how seriously the Government take these debates have now been dispelled, as noble Lords will have seen that the Government have already tabled many amendments on key aspects of the Bill. Further amendments will follow, relating to the provisions on delegated powers and on devolution. It is our firm and consistent desire to find consensus in this House on the contents of the Bill wherever possible, and I hope that our debates can proceed on a reasonably collaborative basis.
Unfortunately, as in Committee, we start our proceedings with some amendments to the Bill that the Government cannot envisage accepting—or indeed any variant on them. That is not, of course, to impugn the motivation of those supporting the amendments or to deny the importance of the subject matter. Put simply—this will probably surprise nobody in the House—the Government simply do not agree with the proposed approach.
I am, of course, grateful to all those who have taken part in this debate on the vital issue of our future economic relationship with the EU. As the Prime Minister stated in her Mansion House speech, we are seeking the broadest and deepest possible partnership, covering more sectors and co-operating more fully than under any free trade agreement anywhere in the world today. The Government have been clear that the UK, in its entirety, is leaving the customs union. For the sake of clarity, a customs union—as has been pointed out by many noble Lords—has a single external border and sets identical tariffs for trade with the rest of the world. International trade policy is consequently an exclusive competence of the EU, to avoid the creation of different customs rates in different parts of the EU customs union.
The nub of the issue is this. If the UK were to remain in the customs union and be bound by the EU's common external tariff, it would mean providing preferential access to the UK market for countries that the EU agrees trade deals with, without necessarily gaining preferential access for UK exports to such countries. Alternatively, we would need the EU to negotiate with third countries on the UK’s behalf. This would leave us with less influence over our international trade policy than we have now, and would not, in our humble assertion, be in the best interests of UK businesses.
By leaving the customs union and establishing a new and ambitious customs arrangement with the EU, we will be able to forge new trade relationships with our partners around the world and maintain as frictionless trade as possible in goods between the UK and EU, providing a powerful and positive voice for free trade across the globe. There are real opportunities for the UK from increasing our trade with fast-growing economies around the world. The EU itself predicts that 90% of future world GDP growth is expected to be generated outside Europe—a trend expected to continue over the next five to 10 years.
In assessing the options for the UK’s future customs relationship with the EU, the Government will be guided by what delivers the greatest economic advantage to the UK, and by three key strategic objectives. First, we want to ensure that UK-EU trade is as frictionless as possible. Secondly, we want to avoid a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland—a commitment that was solidified by December’s joint report. Thirdly, we want to establish an independent international trade policy.
Last year, in its future partnership paper, the Government set out two potential options for our customs arrangements with the EU. These were reiterated by the Prime Minister in her speech at the Mansion House earlier this year. I will give a few more details of those options.
Option 1 is a new customs partnership between the UK and the EU. At the border, the UK would mirror the EU’s requirements for imports from the rest of the world whose final destination is the EU—including by applying the same tariffs and the same rules of origin as the EU for those goods. By following this approach, we would know that all goods entering the EU via the UK would pay the correct EU duties, removing the need for customs processes at the UK-EU border. But, importantly, we would also put in place a mechanism so that the UK would be able to apply its own tariff and trade policy for goods intended only for the UK market.
The second option would be a highly streamlined customs arrangement under which, while introducing customs processes between the UK and the EU, we would jointly agree to implement a range of measures to minimise frictions to trade, together of course with specific provisions for Northern Ireland. This option would include measures to simplify the requirements for moving goods across borders; it would reduce the risk of delays at ports and airports; and it would see the continuation of existing levels of UK-EU customs co-operation, with mutual assistance and data sharing.
Of course, the precise form of any new customs arrangements will be the subject of negotiation, and this will form a key part of our future economic partnership with the European Union. The Government have formed this policy not arbitrarily but because we do not believe that a customs union is in the best interests of the UK and of UK businesses.
I understand that many noble Lords disagree with our analysis, or believe that our goals are unreachable. However, we cannot support Amendments 1 and 4, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and Amendments 2 and 5, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, which would have the effect of requiring the Government to make a Statement to Parliament on the steps taken towards the delivery of an objective the Government have clearly ruled out.
We in the Government are trying to seek the best possible future arrangements for the UK. I am confident we will succeed, and the progress we have made already in areas that many thought impossible demonstrates how all sides have been willing to break new ground in order to move forwards. We have set out our two potential options for a future customs relationship with the EU, but these amendments would send a signal that the Government will not seek to negotiate them, and instead pursue an outcome that the Government have ruled out.
I hope that noble Lords will accept our sincerity in our negotiating goals. I will also add, before noble Lords make a final decision, that I do not seek to give false hope that the Government will reflect further between now and Third Reading. I therefore hope that the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Wigley, will not press their amendments.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this fascinating debate. Some made speeches that were more predictable than others, and the Minister’s was a classic restatement of the position that the Government have explained all along; I am grateful to him for repeating so clearly what he has said so many times before.
I ought to pay tribute to my past—my various masters from the past—who are marking my homework so harshly. I owe the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, an apology. I am sure that he explained to the country at large the truth about the customs union and that he did it every day, morning, noon and night, but I am not sure that the country was listening. What I remember is the man who is now the Foreign Secretary telling the country, “Nobody is even talking about leaving the single market”. He published that the day after the referendum, having said it throughout the referendum campaign. So I exonerate the noble Lord—I have to; he was my boss.
As for the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, and a number of others, including the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, I ask them to please read what the amendment says. We are not asking for Britain to stay in the EU customs union—we cannot. As a non-member of the EU, we cannot be a member of the customs union. We are asking for an arrangement that enables us to participate in “a” customs union, and I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, that it does not follow that we can only get the deal that the Turks got. At the time, Turkey’s main concern was the export to the EU of its walnuts. I do not believe that that would be the principal concern if the Government were to act on this and start negotiating for a customs union. I cannot answer the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, but he is much better informed about Labour Party policy than I am.
In the course of my speech I was very worried to see the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, nod enthusiastically. I hesitated, but I realised that it was only because I had cited Professor Patrick Minford. I will know not to do it again.
Although the Minister’s response was a beautiful restatement of government policy, it did not deal with any of the arguments advanced by those of us who tabled the amendment. The best argument made in the debate was that of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. The customs union was not fully debated in the House of Commons as it dealt with this Bill. It is the job of the House of Lords to give the House of Commons the opportunity to debate whether we should seek a customs union. There are plenty of customs unions of various kinds between various countries around the world, and they are all sui generis. I do not know what terms we could get but we will never know unless we find out. I should like to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, as has been said, this is an issue for which the Government simply have to produce a solution. For once I am quite glad that I am at the Dispatch Box on this side of the Chamber so it is not my problem—but I do know that it is a problem that the Government absolutely must solve. Let us consider some of the subjects covered by the list in the amendment: safeguards for child suspects in criminal proceedings; the recognition of professional qualifications, which will be extraordinarily important for business; health and safety; and the trademarks directive. We cannot afford to have gaps, particularly with something such as trademarks. This list covers issues that are already our policy and have been adopted with our consent, so we need to find a way of getting them into our legislation. How that can be done, I hope the Minister will now tell us.
My Lords, I begin by apologising to the House, and to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for not having been in my seat when she moved the amendment. I can attribute that only to my oversight, and to a disappearing group of amendments.
We addressed this matter in Committee. As has often been said during the passage of the Bill, it is intended to create a snapshot of EU law as it applies in the United Kingdom immediately before exit day, and then to retain it in our domestic law following our departure. That has always been the necessary mechanism. It is crucial that this snapshot is taken accurately and with certainty, to ensure that, as far as possible, the law we have before exit will be the same as the law after exit. This is not merely a dry technical or legal point. It is fundamentally important to people, businesses and other organisations throughout the country that we should have that degree of certainty.
Keeping that in mind, I turn first to Amendment 8 and the questions that have been raised in that context. Unlike other EU law such as regulations, decisions, and tertiary legislation, EU directives are not intended to form a part of a member state’s domestic law. Instead they require member states to bring forward their own national measures within a certain period of time, in order to implement their intended effect domestically. It is these domestic measures which are part of our law, and will be saved under Clause 2.
Questions have been raised about a series of directives that have been adopted, which have been helpfully listed by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, suggested that there was an anomaly in the situation when directives had been adopted at EU level but not implemented. However, with respect, where they have been adopted, so be it. Where they have been implemented we have a different scenario: they form part of our domestic law.
There are two developments that I wish to mention, because they impact on the amendment and the questions that have been raised in this context. First, the Government have reached agreement with the EU—subject to everything having to be agreed before anything is agreed—regarding an implementation period that will begin on 30 March 2019 and last until 31 December 2020. It is proposed and agreed that for the implementation period the United Kingdom will continue to follow and implement EU law, and that the existing EU mechanisms for supervision and enforcement will continue to apply. The proposed final agreement with the European Union will include the implementation period and its domestic effect. As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, anticipated, that will be provided for by the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. That has an impact on the series of directives to which the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, refers in her Amendment 8. Before I turn to those directives, I should observe that at least two of them are directives in respect of which we have opted out; in other words, as member states can do, they can secure an opt-out from a directive and it is never implemented in their national law, nor is it intended that it should be so implemented. Those directives in the noble Baroness’s amendment are: at paragraph (d), the legal aid (suspects, accused persons and those under European arrest warrant proceedings) directive; and, at paragraph (g), the safeguards for child suspects in criminal proceedings directive. In respect of those, there is already an opt-out in place; it was never intended that we would opt in and implement those directives—that is simply the position at the present time.
On the remaining directives listed in the amendment, there is a confusing reference to the websites and mobile applications directive, which I believe should be a reference to a 2016 directive. However, putting that to one side, I can say that all but two, or possibly three, of these directives will be implemented during the implementation period running up to 31 December 2020. That will be provided for by the withdrawal and implementation Bill, which is the instrument that will be employed for that purpose. Those directives will be addressed. There are exceptions. There are instances, for example, in which a directive can have a divided implementation period, where it may be only partially implemented before the final implementation period date of 31 December 2020. Essentially, we must come back to the fundamental requirement for an identifiable point at which we have ring-fenced and identified retained EU law. That is subject to what will go into a withdrawal and implementation Bill in the event of the implementation period agreement being implemented. That will cover all such legislation.
Amendment 32, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, would amend Clause 7 so that it would extend the correcting power of Ministers to include legislation arising after the snapshot had been taken. As set out before, Clause 3 seeks to convert direct EU legislation—regulations, decisions and tertiary legislation—as it applies in the UK immediately before our exit from the EU into our domestic statute book. This provision is a reflection of the snapshot approach taken by the Bill and is to ensure that our law stays as similar as possible following our departure to what it was immediately before our exit.
While most direct EU legislation will apply shortly after it is adopted, certain provisions within the legislation may be stated to apply in a staggered way on different dates. If the date falls after our exit from the EU, these provisions will not be retained by the Bill in our domestic law. That cut-off provides the necessary clarity for individuals and businesses to understand what the law is both pre and post the exit date.
Instead of seeking to change this clear cut-off point, the noble Baroness’s amendment would amend how such staggered implementation within direct EU legislation may be treated for the purposes of the correcting power within Clause 7. As will be discussed in much greater detail on later days, the power contained in Clause 7 is designed to correct the “deficiencies” arising within retained EU law as a result of our withdrawal from the EU, thereby helping us to provide a functioning statute book from day one. As I understand it, the noble Baroness’s intention in tabling Amendment 32 was to widen the definition of “deficiency” to include the provisions within direct EU legislation which are stated to apply after our exit from the EU, thereby giving Ministers the ability to use Clause 7 to bring them into our domestic law. That is currently prohibited by Clause 7(4).
My Lords, I did not move my Amendment 11A because the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, had already referred to it in such approving terms. I did not want to take up the time of the House unnecessarily but perhaps your Lordships might permit me a small indulgence to say something about the substance of the amendment. I am also grateful for the endorsement of my amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham.
If delegated powers are used to make changes, I underline the importance of construing the list of areas requiring the enhanced scrutiny procedure as including changes to human rights. As the Bill currently stands, such changes can be made without that added assurance. Many areas of human rights are currently protected by EU law, such as rights to privacy under the Data Protection Act 1998 and regulations made under it which give effect to EU law; children’s rights; and protection from trafficking. It is therefore essential that the list of areas requiring the protection of the enhanced scrutiny procedure is understood as including human rights protection in EU retained law.
My Lords, we now reach a point that has been of considerable interest throughout the Bill’s passage in Parliament: how retained EU law, once it forms part of our domestic law, will be amended and how those amendments can be scrutinised to ensure that rights remain protected. There is no doubt that retained EU law, including EU-derived domestic legislation, retained direct EU legislation and anything saved by virtue of Clause 4 will contain within it important rights and protections that are currently relied upon daily by individuals and businesses. As such, for the Bill to achieve its aim of continuity within UK law following exit day, it is crucial that these rights and protections are not diluted or weakened as we withdraw from the EU.
I believe that that is what the noble Lady, Baroness Hayter, aims to achieve with her Amendment 11, which seeks to put in place an enhanced scrutiny procedure for regulations made under powers that amend retained EU law in certain defined policy areas—both powers in the Bill and those that exist or will exist elsewhere. As we have heard, the policy areas covered are employment, equality, consumer standards, health and safety standards and environmental standards.
As I have said, I understand and support the noble Baroness’s intention to protect this law, and I and my ministerial colleagues have all repeated the Government’s commitment to effective parliamentary scrutiny and to maintaining the UK’s long-standing tradition of upholding the rights and protections in these vital areas. However, I believe the Government have already taken steps to address those concerns, potentially in ways that are even stronger than the noble Baroness’s amendment. Through the package of amendments that we tabled for Report, which will be discussed in more detail on a later day, the Government have actively and constructively responded to the concerns that have been raised in this House and have proposed putting in place suitable protections against the erosion of rights within retained EU law.
For example, by the powers contained in Clauses 7, 8 and 9, modifications to all retained EU law, not just in the specific policy areas listed in Amendment 11, will be subject to numerous scrutiny procedures, including where relevant the new sifting committees within both Houses. Ministers will also have to comply with a number of important statement requirements for each piece of secondary legislation, which will be published in the Explanatory Memorandum when the SI is laid, to explain fully why the instrument has been made for the consideration of Parliament and the public.
The Government, recognising and responding to the concerns on how retained direct EU legislation will be amended beyond the life of the Bill powers, have also tabled further amendments that address the use of existing and future delegated powers to modify this law. These amendments alter the circumstances and procedures concerning how it is or is not possible to amend retained direct EU legislation by other domestic powers, reflecting the hierarchy of EU law. EU regulations and rights that are saved by Clause 4, which are higher up this hierarchy and are likely to contain more fundamental rights, rules and provisions, will therefore be amendable in a way akin to primary legislation. EU tertiary legislation and decisions, on the other hand, which contain more technical and detailed provisions, will be amendable in a way akin to subordinate legislation.
I believe that in many ways those amendments can be seen to go a step beyond the noble Baroness’s amendment, in that they seek to protect all the rights and protections contained in EU regulations and those that are retained by virtue of Clause 4, not just rights within a particular policy area. I also believe the Government’s amendments represent a more effective approach. Referring to broad but undefined policy areas could produce unclear or differing views about which provisions of retained EU law would actually be covered. This would not only lead to uncertainty within our domestic statute book but risk creating significant litigation as individuals and businesses sought clarity about how retained EU law should be treated.
I look forward to discussing in detail the Government’s amendments on this subject during later days. I believe they strike the right balance between protecting retained EU law from erosion and allowing us sufficient flexibility to ensure that we can deliver an operative and stable domestic statute book. Having said that, beyond the Government’s amendment I cannot give false hope that I will reflect further on this issue between now and Third Reading, so if the noble Baroness wishes to test the opinion of the House, as I suspect she does, she should do so now.
If this amendment is accepted, will it prevent the passage of the Minister’s amendment that covers the same ground?
No, I do not think they are mutually exclusive. I think the amendments can both stand.
I thank the Minister for his clear answer today. I wish the amendments he drafted were equally clear—I have had three very good lawyers sit and explain them to me. I have to say that they do not do what he says. There is not a hierarchy in status between EU regulations and EU directives, and the extra protection he has put in will not affect the directives. There are particular directives, such as the ambient air quality directive, the habitats directive and the working time directive, that are not covered by the government amendments. There is enhanced scrutiny for stuff coming over now, but for the future it does not cover those really important directives. I have had three different lawyers look carefully at his wording and, believe me, all three tell me that it does not meet the promise of the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister said that we will bring over everything, but after that it will be for Parliament—not a statutory instrument but Parliament or the devolved Assemblies—to decide whether there is any change to working time law. The same is true for the environment. It is, I am afraid, not good enough to leave this to secondary legislation. We need to make sure that these really important provisions are safeguarded and that only primary legislation can amend them. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws for a characteristically impressive summary of the challenges facing us in relation to family law post Brexit. I should also like to place on record my appreciation of the work done by the EU Justice Sub-Committee, which she chaired so ably, and the very helpful report it produced last year entitled Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses?. These issues are of huge importance to a significant minority of our citizens, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, for underscoring just how much personal pain can be at stake in individual cases and how important it is that we get this sorted as soon as possible.
In Committee, we had a wide-ranging discussion on a number of amendments related to the post-Brexit family law landscape, so I will not go over that ground again. I am grateful to the Minister for subsequently meeting a number of us who spoke in Committee, along with some family lawyers. I hope very much that that dialogue can continue as we discuss these matters further.
In replying to me in Committee on 5 March, the Minister confirmed that the Government wanted to,
“agree a clear set of coherent common rules about: which country’s courts will hear a case in the event of a dispute—that is choice of jurisdiction; which country’s law will apply—that is choice of law; and a mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments across borders”.
That is what is at stake. The Minister continued:
“We believe that the optimum outcome for both sides will be a new agreement negotiated between the UK and EU as part of a future partnership which reflects our close existing relationship”.—[Official Report, 5/3/18; col. 854.]
That is what we all want. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is that almost nobody disputes that what we have at the moment is the Rolls-Royce of family law provision. But time is very tight indeed. I understand that Ministers would like to negotiate a deal for the implementation period but that does not leave much time, even if it is forthcoming, to get a deal in place by the time we leave the European Union. If we crash out without a deal, things get very serious indeed. My noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws is asking for reassurance that the Government are determined to do this: to get a full, properly reciprocal deal in place; to make a priority of it; and to find a way for Parliament to be kept informed about how those negotiations are going.
I understand that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern has two different objections. I think he suspects that we are trying to press the Government to do something that they cannot do, which is to deliver reciprocity on their own. We would contend that we know that and that is the problem. One of the difficulties about this very situation is that the way the Bill has been framed means that, in the case of family law, because it is English and Welsh family law or Scottish family law that we retain, simply bringing that in does not mean that things stay the same. It means that things change in precisely the way my noble friend Lady Kennedy explained. With that family of a British man and an Italian woman, if the Italian woman were to take the couple’s son away to Rome and he pursued a British court for an order to have the child returned, whereas at the moment the court in Rome would have to recognise that, in future it would not. Under this arrangement, however, this country would have to recognise an Italian order for a child to be returned if the situation were reversed. That is the reciprocity that we cannot get around.
I fully accept that the Minister and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, may not like the wording of this amendment about the report. I honestly do not mind very much. All I would like to see is some means by which the House can be reassured that the Government are making progress, that they will keep us informed and that we will find out in good time how the problems for families described very movingly by the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, will be solved. Will the Minister please give my noble friend and the House the reassurance that we seek this evening?
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for raising this important issue. We discussed it at some length in Committee and I will not repeat the points I made at that stage. But, as the Government outlined in their position paper published in August last year, we are committed to continuing civil judicial co-operation with the EU once we leave. That of course includes the area of family law as covered by Brussels II and Brussels IIa, as it is clearly in the interests of all individuals and families both in the UK and throughout the rest of the EU that there should be an effective area of civil judicial co-operation for these purposes. Of course, that will be the subject of negotiation.
Amendment 14, while clearly well intentioned, is potentially burdensome and I venture to suggest is not necessary. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern pointed to what is potentially a deficiency in the drafting of subsection (1) of the proposed new clause, but I do not take issue with that. I understand the point that is being made about the underlying principles of reciprocity and its importance in this context.
To suggest a six-month period for a report is of course an arbitrary deadline, which makes no reference to the position of the negotiations between the EU and the UK at that stage, or to any other steps that have been taken by the Government in regard to these issues. The Government are concerned not only with the final agreement reached in negotiations but in addressing what will be done with regard to retained EU law, including retained family law. Ultimately, any agreement that takes place between the United Kingdom and the EU to reflect not only our domestic position but the need for reciprocal enforcement will be the subject of the upcoming withdrawal agreement and will be legislated for in what is proposed to be the Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Period Bill—so it is not something that will be the subject of the present Bill.
But I stress that the Government share the view expressed by the noble Baroness and others in the House on the importance of maintaining an effective system for resolution of cross-border family law disputes once we leave the EU. It will be an important part of the partnership that we seek to maintain with the other EU 27 countries. The Government certainly believe that intergovernmental co-operation and mutual recognition is of benefit to all parties. This is not an instance in which the EU has one particular interest and we have another. We all understand that the individuals and families concerned are affected right across the EU. We have made it clear that civil judicial co-operation in respect of family matters will be part of our future relationship with the EU.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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I will listen attentively to what the Minister says, of course, but I do not anticipate that we will hear anything new. In those circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will ask the House to state its opinion. I will be glad to go in the Lobby with him then, as I hope will many Members of the House.
My Lords, I thank all your Lordships for an interesting debate which has addressed some of the issues in considerable depth. In a short but telling address, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, noted that he was not a lawyer, but he exhibited a depth of understanding and a delicacy of touch in respect of our constitutional settlement that is absent from many lawyers, including, I fear, one or two who have spoken in this Chamber.
Why should I say that? Let us be clear: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union applies only to a member state where it is directly implementing European Union law. As my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern observed, that point was reinforced in a judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court just a few months ago, when it said that it is not enough to address something within the scope of EU law. The charter has applicability only where a nation member state is directly implementing EU law. That has to be borne in mind.
When we leave the EU, whether you wish it or not, we will not be a member state and we will not be directly implementing European Union law. We will have a body of law brought into our domestic law under the heading “retained EU law”. It is a body of law which will diminish over time and diverge from European Union law over time as the latter develops.
What do we find in a document, the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, that will assist us after exit, and on what constitutional basis are we to maintain it? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, helpfully referred to the explanatory notes to the charter. It is worth bearing those in mind, because the preamble to the charter, which I appreciate the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would exclude from his amendment, tells us that,
“the Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States with due regard to the explanations prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter”.
So the charter is a living document because it is subject to explanations, which, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out, may assist in our approach to the charter itself. But it goes further than that. We may decide, as is suggested by the amendment, to ring-fence the charter within that body of law referred to as retained EU law. But, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed in Committee, if that was to be attempted, the charter,
“will have to be largely rewritten if we introduce it into our law, but it is not designed for the kind of situation we are facing after Brexit. It is designed for use within the Union and to be interpreted by the CJEU”.—[Official Report, 26/2/18; col. 544.]
In that respect he was entirely correct.
However, just saying that the charter is going to be ring-fenced into domestic law is not even half the story. One has to have regard to the content of the charter itself—something that will apply only to a member state implementing EU law. If I am a little tedious on this point, I apologise in advance, but it is worth noticing some of the terms of the articles within the charter itself; one or two were referred to by my noble friend Lord Faulks. In the context of non-discrimination, it is to be looked at,
“within the scope of application of”,
the treaties. In the context of workers’ rights to information and consultation, it is to proceed not only under the conditions of “national laws and practices” but,
“under the conditions provided for by Union law”.
We will come back to that. In respect of the protection in the event of unjustified dismissal, it is to be considered not only in the context of national law but,
“in accordance with Union law”.
Article 34, with regard to social security and social assistance, is to be addressed,
“in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law”,
not just national law; that also applies in the context of social and housing assistance. With regard to economic interest, under Article 36, the objective is,
“to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union”.
Environmental protection is to be,
“integrated into the policies of the Union”.
Consumer protection is concerned with “Union policies”. The right to an effective remedy and a fair trial refers to everyone,
“whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated”,
so again we have to have regard to the law of the Union. Within the field of application itself, we have already noted that the charter applies only when a member state is directly implementing Union law.
What do we mean by “Union law”? Well, it is not international law and it is not national law. The Government, exercising the royal prerogative, can enter into international treaties at the level of international law. That is precisely what they did in 1972. That has no impact on domestic law. It is only when this Parliament decides to draw down those international treaty obligations into national law that those laws become binding upon us. That is where Parliament has to decide. So what is union law? Since at least the decision of the European Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos in the 1970s, it has been stated repeatedly by the courts of justice in Europe that EU law is not a species of international law. It represents a new legal order for the members of the Union. That is Union law. In a sense it is a form of federal law: a law that applies to all the member states of the Union.
There we go.
The next stage is to say that we as a Parliament do not trust our ability to hold the Executive to account. Then we go on to the next stage to say, of course, that we do not trust the electorate to return a Parliament that is capable of protecting their fundamental rights. What happened to the mother of Parliaments? What happened to the concept of the sovereignty of this Parliament? We are apparently prepared to abandon it in favour of a body of foreign law because we no longer trust ourselves to protect our own fundamental human rights. Is that what we have really come to? It is a shocking dénouement: whether you wish to leave the European Union or you do not wish to leave the European Union, the idea that we are going to have to cling on to a body of foreign law in order to maintain fundamental human rights in this country is simply astonishing. As I indicated before, it would reflect not only a constitutional outrage but a total abdication of our responsibilities.
Looking to Amendment 15, what is it actually going to do? It is going to bring into our domestic law a charter that relies upon union law—a developing body of foreign law going forward. Are we going to monitor this, because we are not ring-fencing the terms of the charter if we bring it into retained EU law? It will be subject, going forward, to the Explanatory Notes; it will be subject, going forward, to the development of Union law; and on the back of that, where we are supposed to be directly implementing EU law—and I can only infer that the intention of the amendment, although it is not stated and cannot be found there, is that this applies to retained EU law rather than EU law itself—the intention is that we should therefore be bound to watch while primary legislation of this Parliament is struck down on the application of a foreign body of law. We need to wake up to why the charter in its present form does not sit with our future constitutional settlement after we leave the EU and why it does not fit with the body of retained EU law that is referred to in the Bill.
If the charter is incorporated, does it not become retained EU law? Therefore, it would be subject to the mechanisms that are set out in Clause 7 of the Bill, which would enable Parliament, or Ministers—however we decide—to change it afterwards, with proper debate. What is going to happen to the rights contained in the charter which are above the rights that we have at the moment, as he has conceded and as has been conceded by other people? What is going to happen to those rights? They will fall away; they will not become part of retained EU law and therefore will not be part of the law of this country.
With great respect to the noble Lord, just because the charter is made part of retained EU law in terms of the Bill does not mean that Union law, which is the linchpin and anchor of the entirety of the charter, is then retained EU law. Union law remains Union law. Therefore the charter will continue to develop. Even though it is ring-fenced within retained law, the body of the charter will be subject to Union law. You cannot have it both ways.
The noble Lord also mentioned the loss of rights. As we indicated, we have done an analysis of rights, which has been published. We have indicated that if, once this Bill is passed, it is apparent that any substantive rights are lost, we will address that. With great respect, it appears to me that the noble Lord misses the fundamental point, which is that we are effectively going to be submitting to a body of foreign law after we exit the EU if we proceed in this way. I am afraid that is the case. We cannot say we are going to be directly implementing European Union law when we are no longer a member. We will not be. It amounts to that.
I accept that various views have been expressed by various parties about the scope of the rights that will be retained after we leave the EU without the charter, and there is a lively debate about that, but let us remind ourselves again that the charter has application only when we are directly applying EU law. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern made the point. What happens to the right to dignity in circumstances where we are not directly applying EU law? Of course it still exists. We recognise that. We would have no difficulty in recognising that, and we do not require Article 1 of the charter for that purpose. In these circumstances, noble Lords have indicated, quite rightly, that to incorporate, or even to attempt to incorporate, the charter, particularly in the form of this amendment, is to do serious damage to our entire constitutional settlement, particularly post Brexit. I hear someone say, “Outrage”, and I agree with them.
I now come to Amendment 18, which was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. He suggested that his amendment would be a necessary consequence if Amendment 15 is carried, but I do not accept that it is a necessary consequence in those circumstances. His amendment, which seeks to remove the power in paragraph 2(2)(b) of Schedule 1 and the related provisions in sub-paragraph (3), is not appropriate. Schedule 1 generally ends the ability to bring challenges on EU law validity grounds to what will become retained EU law after we leave. After exit, individuals would continue to be able to challenge EU decisions before the CJEU and to have them annulled, in so far as they apply in the EU. The converted form of the decision would, however, remain in force within the United Kingdom. Domestic courts currently have no jurisdiction to annul an EU measure or declare it invalid, and we do not think it would be right to hand them a wide-ranging new jurisdiction which asks them effectively to assume the role of the CJEU. The noble Lord’s amendment does not alter that general exclusion.
Where we differ is that the Government recognise that, in some circumstances, individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument which has been converted and should have a right to challenge it. For example, it would be strange if after exit a UK business were able to challenge and have struck down an EU decision which prevents it carrying out certain trading activities within the EU but would not have any equivalent right of redress in relation to the form of that decision which has been retained as part of UK law. It is for that reason that provision is made for this power. I note the noble Lord’s observation that it may be exceptional and may never be used. I accept that, but it is felt that it should be there as a safety measure. I urge the noble Lord not to insist on that amendment.
With regard to the position of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I ask him to think again about Amendment 15. I ask him to think very carefully about the form of it and what he is actually attempting to bring into domestic law, because it simply does not fit. It is in those circumstances that I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, this has been a powerful and passionate debate and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, whether they have supported Amendment 15 or opposed it. In particular I thank the Minister, even though he thinks I lack—what was it?—the delicacy of touch that is appropriate in these circumstances. I am going to go away and work on it.
I shall attempt—briefly, because we have had a long debate—to answer the main points that have been made against the amendment. The noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, expressed concern that the charter of rights will enable courts to strike down legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, expressed a similar concern: “What about parliamentary democracy?” was his theme. The Minister put his case very high: he said it was “shocking” and a constitutional outrage that we should be bound after exit by a body of foreign law. I have to ask him to read his own Bill because under the Bill, if a statute enacted before exit day is inconsistent with any part of retained EU law, the statute gives way. It is the supremacy of retained EU law—see Clause 5(2). So a concern about parliamentary sovereignty is no basis for excluding the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights from retained EU law. Legislation that is enacted after exit day will take priority over all retained EU law, which, if the amendment is passed, will include the charter. That is how the Bill asserts the sovereignty of Parliament, together with Clause 7, so this is a complete red herring. Amendment 15 has nothing whatever to do with the sovereignty of Parliament. The Bill deals with the sovereignty of Parliament in a perfectly acceptable way. It maintains the sovereignty of Parliament. We can do what we like after exit day, whether or not Amendment 15 is approved.
The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, criticised the drafting of the charter. However, in the context of a Bill that is designed to secure legal continuity on exit day, it cannot be right for noble Lords to point to individual provisions in the charter that they do not like or which are poorly drafted. The reason is that noble Lords could carry out the same exercise on every regulation or directive that is to be part of retained EU law and is being read across. Again, that is no basis for singling out the charter.
Then there were complaints from the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, expressing concerns about judgments by the European Court of Justice. Under Clause 6 of the Government’s own Bill, though, it is only judgments handed down before exit day that are binding, and only up to the level of the Supreme Court. Judgments that are given by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg after exit day are simply not binding on our judges; it is up to our judges whether they follow what the Luxembourg court may say in future. I emphasise a point I made in opening this debate: neither the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, the Minister nor anyone else has given any examples of judgments given by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg on the charter to which they take exception.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Cavendish of Furness, told the House in a striking intervention—I hope I quote him correctly—that the good Samaritan did not need a bunch of lawyers to tell him what do. I say to him and to the House that, unfortunately, government and other public bodies often need to be told by judges what to do. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, that Parliament has often failed to protect fundamental rights. Without enforceable human rights, the victims of injustice and discrimination can and do go unremedied in the context of employment, equality or property rights. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cavendish, and others on his Benches that if a Labour Government under Mr Corbyn were to be elected, they would be glad of the ability of courts to listen to human rights cases to secure remedies against arbitrary state action. They should think about that point, which I put forward as a Cross-Bencher.
As I said in opening this debate, to exclude the charter from retained EU law is unprincipled and unjustified. The House has heard no coherent defence of the Government’s position. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
I thank the noble Baronesses for their contributions. I believe, and am comfortable saying, that when we exit the EU the corpus of EU law on which we will build our foundations will be a strong one. At our last gathering, I was able to give assurances on the working time directive, which I hope were welcomed on all sides of the House. The key aspect here is simple: we should not solely be looking towards the EU as we consider what is happening on the wider question of family-friendly employment.
I had a pleasant discussion earlier today with the noble Baroness on the key elements of the amendment. She knows that I am not able to give the words of comfort that she is looking for, but I am able to give different ones. They are not specific to the Bill but are, more broadly, about what the Government intend to do and how we will do it. I will iterate those in due course. For example, the work-life balance directive is at present in its very early stages in the European Union. Because of where it is in the process, there is every prospect that it will not have secured enough progress before the European Parliament rises for the elections. Thereafter it will have to be retabled and greater time spent bringing it back to its current state. I would much prefer that the elements contained in that directive were taken forward by the Government in good time and good order. Post Brexit, it must be our ambition not to await what others are achieving but to see the direction in which they are facing and move as quickly as we can. Your Lordships’ House, and the lower House, must be at the forefront of these endeavours.
I spoke in Committee about these policies not being barnacles on the boat. It is absolutely clear to me that they do not drag us back; they are integral to the engine that drives us forward. Equally, it is important that the committees of both Houses recognise their roles both in holding the Government to account and in casting their eyes as widely as they can to initiatives, policies and case studies that make a difference across the globe. There is much that we can learn, not just from the EU but from its member states. For example, it is not the EU itself but some member states inside it that are driving forward wider LGBT issues. Malta and the Netherlands are pushing far beyond where the EU stands, as are we ourselves. Looking at some of the wider gender equality issues, I would never paint where we are as rosy. Until we have reached absolute parity and certainty, there are not enough roses in the garden to say that. It is always a journey and we need to be moving toward that. We can learn lessons from examples across the globe. I hope that committees of this House and the other place are able to act as the antennae, seeing and hearing what is out there; to develop invaluable reports; and to hold the Government to account for recognising what those reports can achieve as we cast our eyes more broadly.
I cannot give the words of comfort on the amendment that the noble Baroness would like. In some respects, I am disappointed that I cannot. However, I commit, on behalf of the Government, to meet the noble Baroness, and to write to her and other noble Lords, setting out clearly and exactly what the UK Government intend to do in this area, where we are, what the rights are that we need to move forward on and how we intend to do that. I suggest that that happens regularly, not just once. The regularity and frequency has yet to be determined but I suggest that we have a dialogue about it. The noble Baroness will be aware that I am not the lead Minister on this, just the lead Bill Minister in this area, but I am committing, on behalf of my colleagues in the Government, to fulfil that obligation. I hope that will give some comfort. This is a journey and we are not yet far enough along. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Baroness on this occasion, but I cannot give her the words of comfort she would prefer to hear on the specifics of her amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have spoken in support of the amendment, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, from the Benches opposite. They all used the word “reassurance” and, as he said, the Minister does not feel able to give me the reassurance I was seeking. I understand that, but welcome the fact that he has tried to go as far as he can. In a sense, he has implicitly acknowledged the case, even if he is not giving me reassurance. At the outset, I made it clear that this in no way stops us looking to other countries as well as to the EU, but we are—and will still be—a member of the European family. I will always be a European, as we all will, and that is where we should look first.
I welcome the Minister’s commitment on behalf of the Government. It is not just about meeting with me. I suggest a formal or informal all-party grouping of Peers who have supported the amendment, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and organisations such as Working Families, to take this forward. Once the Bill is out of the way, perhaps we could have a meeting to discuss the appropriate mechanisms to do that. None of us can speak on behalf of committees and so forth, but if we are able to map out a possible way it would give us something.
I am disappointed, but I did not expect that much. I take a few crumbs of comfort from what the Minister has said and I am grateful to him. I hope that, once the Bill is out of the way, we can use those crumbs to build something of a loaf. With that dreadful metaphor, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I will move Amendment 17A in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly and Lady Finlay. The purpose of the amendment is to improve the legal protections of public health post Brexit. It does that by ensuring that those parts of Article 168 of the Lisbon treaty that are concerned with public health are part of retained EU law after exit day. I will try to explain briefly why this is an important matter of such concern to so many people involved with public health who have briefed your Lordships throughout proceedings on the Bill.
Clause 4 of the Bill includes within retained EU law directly enforceable provisions of the EU treaties. The legal advice that I have been given by three professors of European law at the Universities of Sheffield, Essex and Cambridge is that it is not clear whether it includes other provisions of the EU treaties, such as Article 168 of the Lisbon treaty. As far as I can see, the Government have been unwilling to say that it does cover those other provisions. So far on the Bill, Ministers have simply asserted that the amendment is unnecessary because our public health policies are excellent and often better than many in the EU. That, of course, fails to answer the exam question: is Article 168 part of retained EU law under the Bill? The latest letter to Peers from the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy—whom I am glad to see in his place—which incorporated Jeremy Hunt’s article, still fails to tackle the exam question.
Why am I making so much fuss over Article 168? I will not repeat all I said in Committee. However, I will remind the House of Mr Justice Green’s High Court judgment on 16 May 2016, on plain packaging of tobacco products, in which, at paragraph 441, he emphasised that Article 168 places public health,
“at the epicentre of policy making … and how ‘all’ EU policies must ensure a ‘high level of human health protection’”.
This was a significant element in his finding in favour of the Government, and Mr Justice Green’s findings were further endorsed by the Court of Appeal, rejecting the tobacco industry’s appeal in its judgment dated 30 November 2016. At paragraph 201 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment it says:
“The judge was entitled to place the weight he did on the public health objectives of the Regulations: his approach was in line with the high level of human health protection provided for in EU law”.
It is one of life’s little ironies that this Government have benefited from these EU protections. Two clear and reasonable inferences can be drawn from the Court of Appeal judgment. First, the public health protections in Article 168 should be regarded as part of retained EU law after Brexit, and secondly, the EU legal public health protections may well be more robust than those in UK law.
I turn briefly to the level of public health support for this amendment. The uncertainty caused by the Government’s approach has united the Medical Royal Colleges and wider health community, all of whom have given consistent support to this amendment. To date, 52 organisations, including the Royal College of Physicians, the Faculty of Public Health and many major charities such as Cancer UK, Diabetes UK and the Alzheimer’s Society are backing the amendment. They do so, in my judgment, because they fear that after Brexit, hard-won legal protections for public health will be sacrificed in a rush to do trade deals. Given the speeches of some Ministers, who can blame them?
The simplest way to satisfy all these concerns is to put matters beyond legal doubt. We are well past the time for further warm words from the Minister. Matters need to be made clear in the Bill by an amendment along the lines of Amendment 17A. I provided the Minister with a little more time to think about this at our meeting last week by deferring consideration of the amendment until today. I hope that he has used the time wisely and that he can now agree to accept it. I beg to move.
I have some points which may be helpful to make at this moment, before the full discussion gets under way, and I may seek to clarify our position. However, I will of course respond to the wider debate in due course—I am not trying to cut off any of the points which might be made. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, was indeed kind to me last week; we sat down and he agreed to allow me a greater amount of time. I will therefore say words which may bring him some comfort with this point in mind.
Public health is a vital issue—there is no doubt about that. I accept that we have not thus far provided sufficient assurance to the noble Lord or to his noble backers on the issue of public health. I am therefore grateful that we have had this extra time to look at the issues that underpin the matters before us today. I have used that time wisely in meeting with both the noble Lord, Lord Warner, and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I thank them both sincerely for their time.
This has been a short debate but an instructive one. I am somewhat sorry that we have not had longer to share with noble Lords the remarks that I made this afternoon. The key thing about the statement I made earlier, and I suppose it was one of the aspects at the heart of the concluding statements from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was about the notion of trust. I am tempted to say, as I used to say many years ago, “You can trust me. I’m a doctor”. but my doctorate is in palaeontology so I am afraid that that is perhaps not quite as useful in this regard. The important thing is not that noble Lords trust the Government or, indeed, any Government, but rather that the case law itself can be used to hold that Government to account.
In the case cited, the UK Government were the principal beneficiary across the entire EU when it came to the packaging of tobacco products. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, confirmed, we did not explain well enough that these particular rules and aspects of Article 168 are and will be available post Brexit. They will allow for the Government—if need be—or others, to be challenged, drawing on the elements of Article 168 as they stand today and as they will stand after Brexit.
In truth, the Government are broadly neutral on the concept of the amendment, primarily because we recognise that the functionality of Article 168 will not be undermined by what happens as we go forward. For that reason, I am afraid that I am not able to give greater comfort on this occasion. Indeed, should the noble Lord wish to test the House, I shall in due course suggest that he does so.
However, before I get there, it is important to stress that the UK Government were a principal beneficiary of the Article 168 approach and the concept of public health being at the epicentre of law-making. Due to the broadly established case law and, ultimately, the interpretation that will rest in the hands of the domestic courts, I believe that we are in a strong position. I know that matters of wider trade were raised, and there will be opportunities to discuss those as we look at these questions at another time, but as far as the amendment is concerned, I believe that as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay affirmed, we are now in a good position to offer certainty, which is worthy.
I very much agree with the point that the noble and learned Lord has made. It may not be within the normal rules of a Report stage debate to have the kind of circular arguments that we have had but, without having the Companion in front of me, I am pretty certain that I am accurate in saying that this is precisely the kind of occasion when it is appropriate to consider a matter again at Third Reading. The rules on when you can bring forward amendments at Third Reading are quite restrictive but, where the Government effectively announce a change of policy or, at the very least, give a further clarification which this side of the House has no opportunity to consider in detail, I cannot see that anyone loses any face whatever. It is entirely consistent with the way in which Third Reading operates for the Government to say, “We may or may not be able to accommodate it but we’ll look at it again at Third Reading”.
For the good of my own health, we will reflect on this matter and we will be able to come back to it in due course. In the meantime, we will ensure that the intervention is circulated widely so that noble Lords can see exactly where we stand on this matter. I hope that that is helpful.
Well, my Lords, if you just sit here, things work themselves out. I am grateful to the Minister for his intervention and I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for all the help that he has given behind the scenes and to me personally on this matter.
What I have to say to the Minister is aimed not so much at him as at a few of his colleagues. They have been a bit slow in coming to the party. These legal judgments have been around for quite a long time and one would have expected DExEU to have mastered these things at an earlier stage. However, in the circumstances, and with my thanks to the Minister for showing flexibility while he was on the Bench, as well as in his interventions, we will come back to this at Third Reading. I will make sure that all the backers of the amendment have time to read everything, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I wonder whether, with the permission of the House, I might respond to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I appreciate that there may be other contributions, which I will seek to answer, but it may help the House if I indicate the Government’s position on the four propositions put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, so that we can be clear on the way forward. I shall seek to move government Amendments 23, 24 and 25, which directly address and respond to the concerns raised by many noble Lords when your Lordships last debated the matter in Committee. I hope that noble Lords will support those amendments; I note in passing that they bear a striking resemblance to Amendment 21, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and Amendment 22, tabled by my noble friend Lord Faulks, whom I cut across a moment ago.
For the avoidance of doubt, I want to make clear that the provision in Clause 6(2) does not seek to legislate to give effect to the content of a withdrawal agreement or implementation period. If there is a role for the Court of Justice as part of that agreement, as has been set out in the joint report on citizens’ rights, it would be legislated for under the separate withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. I reiterate that Clause 6(2) has always intended to make clear that, after exit, UK courts will no longer be bound by future judgments of the Court of Justice. Instead, our courts will be free to take them into account when making their decisions, just as they would also be able to consider anything done by another EU entity or the EU itself. This approach reflects the Government’s core belief that our domestic courts are best placed to consider whether, and to what extent, to have regard to post-exit Court of Justice case law.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Spicer, has made a very interesting observation, but it seems to go wider than the amendments which the House is being asked to approve, so I shall not say anything about the issues that he has raised. He referred to the “remain tactics”. I am not aware that there are any remain tactics in relation to this amendment. On the basis that we are leaving, all the amendment is about is making sure that it works properly. That has certainly been the guiding principle as far as I am concerned.
On the formulation of the amendment, I do not want to use the word “helpful”, because that is the one word that I do not like—the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, knows that. The problem with “helpful” is that it is a little subjective. A noble Lord, who is not in his place so I shall not identify him, told me in the previous debate that he was going to say something. I said, “Okay. Is it going to be helpful?” He said, “You might think so”. Let me tell you that it was not helpful at all. He might have thought it was, which is the problem with “helpful”. In any event, I do not imagine that the courts will have regard to something that they do not think is helpful for the purpose of the issue before them, so I am happy with “relevant”. The important point is that it will not be perceived as a political decision being made by a court in wanting to follow a decision from the European court. That is the point that we were making in earlier stages on this part of the Bill, and I thank the Minister and his department for dealing with it.
That leads to the fourth question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which was about the protection, safeguarding and upholding of the independence of the judiciary. We raised that on the previous occasion; it is hugely important. I join the noble Lord in congratulating the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on coming out and supporting the judiciary at a time when others in government sadly were not. The assurance on that sought by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is important, and I am grateful that the noble and learned Lord has succeeded in answering it already—it was slightly out of turn, but it was good. I shall ask him to go a little further, because the obligation to uphold the independence of the judiciary does not rest just on the Lord Chancellor. I believe that the Constitutional Reform Act which set that out imposes that obligation on the whole of the Government, and it is important that it should. We cannot have a situation in which one Minister, in perhaps one of the more political jobs, is able to say unhappy and unhelpful things about the judiciary and think it okay because the Lord Chancellor will stand up and say, “We shouldn’t really be doing that; we should be protecting them”. It is important to recognise that it is the whole Government. I would single out as well the Attorney-General as one who should uphold the independence of the judiciary. When I was in that office, I certainly regarded it as part of my job, although the Lord Chancellor was in that primary position. I would be grateful if the Minister when he replies for the second time could touch on that point and see what assurance he can give.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, raised an important point about ossification, as he put it, which is the one worry I have. As this structure works, so far as the Government are concerned, I think that the effect is that, in the areas to which the subsection would apply, the lower courts will be bound to follow decisions within that scope and it is only the Supreme Court that will be able to depart from them. That leads to the risk that the law will ossify and that cases will have to go to the Supreme Court which really do not need to because they are not that important—although it is important to clarify the law. The noble and learned Lord’s suggestion that the Government should look at the possibility of widening this so that the courts of appeal in different parts of the United Kingdom would be able to depart from what would otherwise be binding law is a good one.
I think that this suggestion would also be welcomed by some others—although I have not specifically raised this with them—who are worried about this provision. They are aware that there are rights—for example, in the field of workers’ rights—where there is some movement in EU law and are concerned that, as it stands, the retained EU law that we will have will lag behind what happens in other jurisdictions, which we all hope will still be partners, although not partners in the same Union. They are concerned that if this has to go to the Supreme Court it may create an unhappy difference between them. There may be circumstances where we all know that a particular piece of law is right for consideration by the top court, but it takes time to get there and it may not always get there.
I was going to ask the Minister whether he could give any assurances about how the Government would assist, at least where they are the other party, in getting cases to the Supreme Court where there is good reason to think that a relevant decision will be departed from. But it seems to me that opening this up to the courts of appeal would actually be a neater and more traditional way of doing that. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about that. I should have mentioned at the outset that my name stands on the original amendments as well.
My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for the contributions that have been made. With respect to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, about the position of the Lord Chancellor and the rest of the Government, perhaps I might repeat what I said earlier: I assure the House that the whole Government, the Lord Chancellor especially, steadfastly defend the independence of the judiciary. I believed I had said that before but I am happy to repeat it.
On this question of the ossification of the law, which has been raised, particularly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas—indeed, it is a matter that we have discussed—we have to remember that until exit only the Court of Justice of the European Union is in a position to see us depart from a previous decision of that court. The timeline for taking a case through the CJEU does not bear scrutiny in comparison with the timeline for taking a case to the United Kingdom Supreme Court. The feeling of the Government is that if we are removing the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is appropriate to put in its place the United Kingdom Supreme Court in that context, and that is what we have sought to do and what we intend to do.
That is a policy decision, I appreciate, and there is a suggestion that perhaps it can be brought down to the Inner House of the Court of Session, and the Court of Appeal. That has been considered, but we do not feel at this time that that is the right way forward, so I cannot give any reassurance that we intend to revisit that point. I feel that the decision we have made is the appropriate one in the circumstances but clearly we will have to consider in due course whether that gives rise to any difficulties with respect to the reference of cases to the Supreme Court.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, is aware, it is open to the Supreme Court to, in effect, accelerate cases that it considers to be of particular materiality of importance. Therefore, that facility is already available. But I have discussed this matter with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and it is not our intention to revisit it before Third Reading. I hope that noble Lords will be able to support the government amendments.
My Lords, the way in which retained EU law will be treated in our domestic statute book—what has been termed the “status” of EU law—is undeniably an important issue. It has been one of the key themes of our debates on the Bill, and the Government’s attempts to deal with it are woven throughout the Bill. The Government have always recognised the importance of getting this right—above all, in the context of the question of amendability.
These amendments, which deal with the amendability of retained EU law by secondary legislation, are to a large extent about ensuring its enhanced protection. As noble Lords will know, the House debated one way of giving enhanced protection to some parts of retained EU law last Wednesday, when it agreed to add a new clause to the Bill. Before setting out the government amendments, I will take a moment to explain to the House why the Government consider that the approach adopted last Wednesday is not the answer.
Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, carried last Wednesday, prevents crucial corrections being made in time for exit day. By failing to define key terms, and by introducing into the Bill arguably undefinable concepts such as “technical changes”, it introduces a high level of risk to attempting to take forward even the most uncontentious of corrections by secondary legislation. We have always been clear that most corrections, however innocuous and benign, require some limited policy choices.
Those corrections are how we ensure that current protections continue to operate. Our analysis is not complete but we believe that a very significant proportion of the planned secondary legislation programme, if made, would be at real risk of legal challenge, so the result of that amendment could be an enormous increase in the volume of needless primary legislation, which this House would then have to consider before exit day. In the end, we might be unable to achieve our core objective of ensuring a functioning statute book on exit day.
The volume of legislation required to keep pace with developments is already too great for it all to be done through primary legislation and this is likely to increase when we take on the legislative responsibilities of the EU. It is incumbent upon all of us to ensure that we put in place a balanced system. That system must enable the House to fully scrutinise the most significant changes to legislation and maintain the existing protections that we all value, while allowing for flexibility to keep pace with a fast-evolving world. It would be a dereliction of our duty to put in place a system which leaves Parliament unable to make important changes or updates which would enhance existing protections, such as the regulating of new hazardous chemicals or extending standards to new marine contaminants.
Parliament has debated at great length the speed at which our legislation should diverge from that of the EU but, whatever that pace, we must not leave Parliament hamstrung. The Government’s approach is to respect the balance between maintaining protections and the flexibility to reflect developments.
I know some noble Lords were in favour of deeming elements of retained EU law converted under Clauses 3 and 4 that are not already part of our domestic legislation to be one or another type of domestic legislation. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. For example, to deem an EU regulation primary legislation has all sorts of impacts, ranging from the problematic to the bizarre, such as requiring it to be printed on vellum and stored in the Queen Elizabeth Tower. Some noble Lords also wish to treat all retained EU law that is not already domestic legislation as if it were primary legislation. I recognise that noble Lords who have advocated this have the best of motivations, but it would leave the law so rigid and inflexible as to be virtually inoperable. The EU adopted just under 500 amending pieces of tertiary legislation in 2017. If this Parliament takes on the role of doing the same when those powers are returned to this Parliament by primary legislation only, we face a serious risk of these regimes ceasing to function.
I know the House loves examples, so let me provide one. Say that the Commission adopts delegated Acts under the biocidal products regulation to restrict active substance entry to the market. This is clearly an important public health matter which should continue to be adjusted rapidly and without primary legislation. Incidentally, that is also something that Amendment 11 would prevent. There are many similar examples in EU legislation and they vary as much as our domestic delegated powers. Therefore, instead of treating all direct EU legislation as domestic primary legislation for all purposes, the Bill sets out how retained EU law is to be treated in a number of specific situations, such as for the purpose of the Human Rights Act. Our amendments to the Bill for several of those purposes draw a similar distinction to that which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has drawn in her Amendment 39. That is that EU measures adopted under co-decision or ordinary legislative procedure are to be treated as primary legislation.
We have proposed, broadly, that EU regulations and Clause 4 rights should be treated as primary legislation for the purpose of amendability and that tertiary legislation should be treated as subordinate legislation. Regulations and Clause 4 rights will therefore be amendable only by primary legislation and the very limited stock of powers to amend primary legislation on the statute book. Even then, those powers will operate only where the context will permit. This will ensure that the frameworks of retained EU legislation are maintained and can be adjusted only in the same way Acts of Parliament can, but that the technical matters underneath them can be adjusted by subordinate legislation to react quickly to the changing circumstances of the day, as now.
Our amendments provide that, in the future, Parliament will need to agree any new delegated powers to amend a specific regulation, or regulations. This House will be the gatekeeper that ensures there is no bonfire of EU regulations. This will include all the powers that we are transferring under the Bill from the Commission to UK Ministers and authorities. These are generally very tightly drafted and it will have to be clear to the House where and how they can amend regulations. If Ministers cannot justify this to noble Lords, they will not be granted these powers. However, I hope your Lordships will agree, for example, that the Secretary of State should be able to adopt measures such as the wine oenology implementing regulation to ensure that our wine producers are not left behind the rest of the world as technology advances. I know that would be a subject close to many noble Lords’ hearts.
Beyond amendability, there are a limited number of other places where matters turn on whether a law is found in primary or secondary legislation. This is the case in relation to the Human Rights Act, where the remedies available in response to challenges are different in different cases. We have therefore also reflected the distinction that EU regulations are to be treated as primary and EU tertiary legislation as subordinate for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. This will mean that, as with primary legislation, claimants will be able to receive a declaration of incompatibility in the event of a successful challenge to an EU regulation. I should point out that this is a very rare measure, which I am not aware that Parliament has ever ignored. For challenges against amendments to EU tertiary legislation, our courts may, if appropriate, strike down the legislation.
We have addressed in the Bill the areas of importance where matters turn on the distinction between primary and subordinate legislation. Our discussions outside this Chamber, including with academics and others, have not identified any other such matters. I am happy to return to the issue at Third Reading if other areas are raised in debate.
I have not yet addressed directives, which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is very interested in. Directives, of course, do not form part of our domestic legislation. They have already, over the years of our EU membership, been implemented in primary legislation and under a range of delegated powers but principally in regulations made under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act. The status of these regulations is clear. They are and should remain statutory instruments. I know that these regulations contain important protections which some noble Lords wish to ensure cannot be easily eroded, but it would be constitutionally deeply questionable and practically unnecessary to attempt simply to declare these instruments to be anything different.
All regulations made under Section 2(2) of the ECA will be preserved following the repeal of that Act by the Bill. There will then be almost no powers on the statute book; I cannot be absolutely definitive, but my officials have found only a handful which, within the scope of the policy area, might be able to amend regulations made under Section 2(2). Therefore, almost all of these regulations will need to be modified by primary legislation or new powers, which this House would of course have to approve. Nevertheless, the Government have heard the concerns raised in the House about the level of scrutiny of modification of these regulations. We are committed to ensuring that the protections provided in regulations made under the ECA are maintained throughout the process of exit, and that any future modifications as the Government continue to build on these protections are properly scrutinised.
The Bill already provides for statements in relation to the SIs under it, so government Amendment 112A therefore requires Ministers and other authorities making statutory instruments under powers outside this Bill after exit day to make statements explaining the “good reasons” for any changes to regulations made under Section 2(2) of the ECA and the effect of the amendment or revocation on retained EU law. There will be no escaping the scrutiny of this House.
I am sorry for the detailed explanation, but I hope I have provided an appropriate explanation of why these amendments both give clarity to the status of retained EU law and are the right way to protect it as we transfer it on to our statute book. I recognise that the status this legislation should hold is a particularly complex issue, on which legal and academic minds have differed. I pay tribute to all noble Lords who have applied themselves to the task. We have listened and I appreciate all the contributions that have been made. Our amendments reflect a sensible approach, one that recognises and reflects the existing hierarchy within EU laws, balances the need for effective parliamentary scrutiny while giving Parliament the flexibility it needs to amend an extremely large body of legislation, and allows this place to truly take back control of our laws. I beg to move.
My Lords, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee recommended at paragraph 51 of our report—HL 69—that the Bill should address the legal status of retained EU law; that is, whether it has the status of primary legislation, secondary legislation or something distinct. I am pleased that the Government have considered this matter—I am grateful to the Minister—and have produced the amendments in this group. My understanding is that they address the problem by ensuring that any domestic law which becomes retained EU law under Clause 2 continues to have the same legal status that it has at the moment: it is either primary legislation or secondary legislation.
In relation to retained EU law under Clauses 3 and 4, the amendments do not so much confer a legal status as address the problem by reference to the circumstances in which the retained EU law can be modified. The provisions are complex, and, I fear, necessarily so, given the inherent difficulty of the exercise.
My Lords, I think three things emerge from that. First, there is a recognition, with thanks, that the Minister and the department have accepted that their previous approach to how you identify the status of retained EU law is not acceptable. That was the primary point made in the reports that we discussed at earlier stages of the Bill, and that is the first point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. I entirely agree that that is undoubtedly a step in the right direction.
The second point that emerges is the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that this touches on the amendment passed by the House and moved by my noble friend Lady Hayter, and the Government therefore have to take account of what this House has said. That leads to the third point, which is that this is very complicated, which was apparent from what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and it is perhaps difficult for us all to completely grasp the implications. Under normal circumstances it would have been enormously helpful if the Government had tabled something like this at an earlier stage so that it could have been considered by our very expert committees, the Constitution Committee and perhaps the Delegated Powers Committee. It makes it more difficult for us. However, the Minister has recognised that more needs to be said about this and more needs to be discussed, which is why he proposes that—as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, says, perhaps alone of the matters that we have discussed—this issue can come back at Third Reading.
I am not quite sure at the moment exactly what the Minister has in mind. Does he want to press these amendments today and then discuss them—or just leave them until Third Reading, which would be very welcome? I am glad that he is giving a nod that that is what he has in mind, which is what I would hope. In those circumstances, meetings with noble Lords, and indeed noble and learned Lords, can be organised to consider the matter further. Obviously we will read what he said very carefully in Hansard, and if there is any further information that the Minister can give before the meetings then that would be helpful as well. On that basis, we express qualified support for the principle of the movement that the Minister has indicated.
My Lords, I can be very brief in the light of the debate. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed. I express particular thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for tabling her amendment, which has resulted in this helpful debate.
As I said in opening, I recognise that the state of this legislation is a complex and vexed issue. As a non-lawyer, I have been struggling to get my head around it all as well. The approach that we have taken is one of pragmatism, recognising the existing hierarchy within EU law and seeking to balance effective scrutiny with the need to ensure that the law continues to function. This has not been an easy task but obviously I believe that the solution that we have arrived at is the right one. I accept that the remarks I made earlier were long and detailed and Members will want to reflect on them, so I shall repeat what I said: we think we have addressed the areas of importance where matters turn on the distinction between primary and subordinate legislation. Our discussions so far with many both inside and outside this Chamber have not identified any other such matters, but I repeat that I am happy to return to the issue at Third Reading if other areas are identified.
I thank my noble friend Lord Cormack for his contribution. I hope my remarks were not seen as dismissive of the House’s amendment the other day; of course we accept the decision that was made, but I thought it helpful for us to outline our initial thinking on the possible effects of that amendment at the earliest possible occasion. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his remarks. I am happy to confirm that either I or officials are happy to meet any other noble Lords who have concerns once they have had a chance to read the remarks that I made earlier today. With that, I hope I have convinced the House that our approach is the right one, and I beg to move.
I wanted to move the amendments now. I am happy to reflect further if any points are identified in the meantime that can be brought forward at Third Reading, but I still want to move the amendments.
I was asking the Minister whether he was prepared to leave these amendments to be moved at Third Reading or whether he wanted to proceed with them and then allow amendments to them. I had understood from the body language that was exchanged between us that he would move them at Third Reading, which would allow time for discussions and possible tweaking or perhaps something more radical. If he is going to move them now, though, it is important that he confirms he would not have a problem if amendments to his amendments were put forward at Third Reading, because that at least would mean that whatever was required could be dealt with then, rather than him moving his amendments now and for us to be told at Third Reading, “Sorry, too late, that amendment has been passed. You can’t bring it back”. Could he confirm that? Again he is nodding but I am reluctant to interpret the nod without an element of verbal assurance. Perhaps he can help with that.
Yes, I am happy to provide that assurance. As I said, it was a long and detailed speech on this area, and Members will want the opportunity to read it in detail and reflect further on it. I think I want to move my amendments now while indicating that, if there are still concerns, we would be prepared to return to the issue at Third Reading.
Forgive me; would he accept that amendments could be made even to these amendments? I am not suggesting that he will accept our amendments, but does he accept that they can be made?
My Lords, I support Amendment 27 and will speak to Amendment 41. I will explain, as my noble friend Lord Judd knows, our slight concerns about his amendment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brown, along with a number of other noble Lords from around the House, spoke very eloquently on this issue. In their own way, they have all reinforced the point that this amendment is necessary to ensure that the current environmental protections exist after exit day with the same certainties and enforcement which have helped us shape our world-class environmental standards up to now. We have rehearsed before the importance that the EU has played in setting those standards. To deliver this certainty, we need the same core principles that apply to EU law to be transposed in full, and, more importantly, we need a new organisation to replace the enforcement powers operated by the EU Commission and the Court of Justice, which guarantee the standards that we currently enjoy.
When we debated similar amendments in Committee, they received widespread support from around the Chamber. That has been echoed this evening, and I very much hope that the Minister has heard those calls. In his response to that debate in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, tried to reassure us and told us not to worry too much. He said that a number of environmental principles were also included in international treaties, such as the Rio principles, to which the UK will continue to be a signatory. Of course, it is true that some of those environmental principles do exist in other forms, but they are not all covered in the same range and depth as exists in the EU, and we do not have the same recourse to challenge breaches of these principles and demand compliance as we do within current EU structures. If we did, we would have been more successful, for example, in stopping the decimation of the Amazon rainforest, which sadly is causing enormous climate change problems across the globe. The existence of other international treaties is not sufficient grounds for the Government to back-track on this issue.
This brings us to another argument that the Minister used in Committee—that our amendments were not necessary as Michael Gove had already accepted the need for a new comprehensive policy statement setting out the Government’s environmental principles. So far, so good, but in a follow-up letter to a meeting we had with the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Gardiner, the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner, wrote to us to say:
“The withdrawal Bill will preserve environmental principles where they are included in existing EU directly applicable environmental regulations and case law”.
Our argument is that this definition does not cover the full scope of environmental principles as they currently exist. If we just use that definition—the definition that is currently in the Bill—we will lose out. That is why a promised new set of environmental principles is so important. But, as we have heard, time goes on and there is no sign of the Government’s statement or a timeline for implementation which would ensure that the new principles were in operation by March next year. Our amendment fills that time gap by setting out the key environmental principles currently in operation in the EU which should apply until we are able to agree a more comprehensive package of the kind that we have consistently been promised but which has not yet materialised.
Even more worrying is the governance gap, to which a number of noble Lords have referred. If we do not have an independent body to hold the Government to account after exit day, we will lose out. Michael Gove has acknowledged the need for such a body and has said that he intends to consult upon it but, again, no details have been published and the clock is ticking. It has also become clear that Michael Gove’s ambitions for such a body are not necessarily shared by Ministers in other departments—for example, Transport and Treasury Ministers are on record as saying they have a much narrower view of the remit of the watchdog.
The noble Baroness, Lady Miller, referred to the report on the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act, which not only looked backwards but, helpfully, forward. It mentioned post-EU structures and the great advantages we have had from being in the EU, which we have all rehearsed. It went on to refer to the UK watchdog and said that it needed to be independent and accountable to government, with diffuse sources of funding and the ability to deal with issues raised by individuals and NGOs, including taking government and other public bodies to court. That is the kind of package we are looking for.
However, as noble Lords and my noble friend Lady Young have said, these things take time to set up and, again, the clock is ticking. It is hard to see how this body is going to be up and running by Brexit day. If it is not, our protections will be diminished. We hope the Minister has heard the strong arguments that have been put forward on this.
On Amendment 28, my noble friend Lord Judd knows that I agree with everything he said. The reason we did not put it forward as one of the amendments we wanted to have at this stage as an environmental principle is because it is not currently seen as an EU environmental principle. Therefore, while I agree with everything he said, it might be a battle that we have to fight another day.
We wholly support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Whitty. It had considerable support from around the House when it was debated the first time round and we have heard the same comments echoed this evening. When we debated it before, for example, my noble friend Lord Rooker made a compelling case for our continued involvement in the EU’s rapid alert system for food and feed, which provides a 24-hour alert to all EU countries on serious health risks from contaminated products. On that issue, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, was only able to say that this would be subject to ongoing negotiation.
Similarly, when my noble friend Lord Whitty probed on the issue of REACH—which he again referred to today—the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, was only able to say that our involvement was the subject of live negotiations but that we could not remain a member of REACH. She sought to reassure us and told us not to worry because work was starting on a new IT system to oversee registrations and regulation. That prospect should strike fear into all Ministers if they expect that new IT system to be up and running on time.
The amendment of my noble friend Lord Whitty is crucial. Food and chemicals are global industries which need shared standards, shared safety levels and shared risk procedures. If we do not use those shared methodologies we are in danger of a massive duplication. Apart from the unnecessary costs, this would also have implications for animal-testing data because we would be in danger of having to duplicate research on animals, with the resulting unjustified impact on animal welfare. This is an important issue.
I hope the Minister has heard the strength of feeling on this—we have been made promises which have not materialised—and that he is in the mood to reach out to us today and provide reassurance. Otherwise, I hope noble Lords who have proposed amendments will be prepared to press them to a vote when the time comes.
My Lords, we welcome the sentiments behind Amendment 27, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Cambridge, Amendment 28, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, and Amendment 41, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. While the Government welcome the amendments as being well intentioned, as I have said before, we believe them to be ultimately unnecessary and in some elements they go beyond the existing environmental regulation that is in force today.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, reminded us, when the Prime Minister launched the 25-year environment plan on 11 January this year, she said:
“Let me be clear, Brexit will not mean a lowering of environmental standards”.
We have already taken firm steps towards that goal, as my noble friend Lord Deben remarked. Our recent announcements include an increase in recycling rates in order to slash the amount of waste polluting our land and seas, a consultation on a deposit return scheme later this year and a ban on the sale of plastic straws, drinks stirrers and plastic-stemmed cotton buds. In line with this commitment, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced on 12 November our intention to create a new comprehensive policy statement setting out our environmental principles, recognising that the principles on which we currently depend in UK law are not held in one place. It is intended that the new policy statement will draw on current EU and international principles and will underpin future policymaking, underlining our commitment that environmental protection will be enhanced and not diluted as we leave the European Union.
At that time, the Secretary of State also announced our intention to consult on a new, independent and statutory body to advise and challenge government and potentially other public bodies on environmental legislation, stepping in where needed to hold these bodies to account and being a champion for the environment. I can confirm for noble Lords that it is our intention to publish the consultation in time for the Third Reading of this Bill. The consultation will explore, first, the precise functions, remit and powers of the new statutory and independent environmental body and the nature, scope and content of the new statutory policy statement on environmental principles. It is of course important to gather the views of many stakeholders in this area before coming to any conclusions. Amendments 27 and 28 would prejudge the outcome of the forthcoming consultation by setting requirements in legislation now.
As my noble friend Lord Inglewood remarked, the purpose of the EU withdrawal Bill is to convert and preserve the law so that, after exit, the laws which we have immediately before exit day will, as far as possible, be the same as those we have now. This includes the wild birds and habitats directives, transposed through to domestic legislation, as well as the protection and enhancement of biodiversity as requested by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, in Amendment 28. I am sure that the noble Lord will be reassured to know that the UK is already a signatory to many of the multilateral environmental agreements that underpin such regulations, and that will continue to be the case after we have left the European Union.
The environmental principles are framed in the EU treaties as general objectives for the EU rather than having a direct, binding effect on the delivery of EU measures by member states. Amendment 27 goes further than that, in particular by placing a duty on all public authorities to apply the environmental principles listed in the amendment. This duty does not currently exist either in EU or UK law, and it is not appropriate for this Bill to introduce new powers of that kind.
In addition, a significant proportion of environmental policy and legislation is of course devolved. We need to take account of the different government and legal systems in the home nations as well as the different circumstances of the different parts of the United Kingdom. Amendments 27 and 28 risk compromising consideration of these important issues, as well as the wider devolution settlement, by requiring the UK Government to take UK-wide action. This includes requiring the UK Government to publish UK-wide proposals for governance and principles. Our starting point is that the new statement of principles and environmental body should cover England and environmental matters that are not currently devolved. If the devolved Administrations would also like to take action on these issues, then of course we are open to co-designing the proposals to ensure that they work more widely across the United Kingdom.
Finally, Amendment 27 would require the creation of both a list of statutory functions that can contribute to the protection and improvement of the environment and a list of functions currently exercised by EU bodies that must be retained or replicated in UK law to protect and improve the environment. SIs made under the correcting power in the Bill will be presented to Parliament for scrutiny. They will set out which UK body will perform functions, such as regulatory ones, currently performed by EU bodies. It therefore seems unnecessarily bureaucratic to require by law the creation of lists of functions.
Before the Minister moves on from the issue of future relations with the agency, can he address one point? The EU’s position is that we will cease to be a member of those agencies less than a year from today. Would the Government at least indicate that they are looking to an arrangement during a transition period where we continue to participate in those organisations, because we will be following their rules and procedures, but, according to the EU’s negotiating position, we will not be party to that? Would he please address the transition period as such?
That is not part of the amendment we are discussing, but I am happy to provide the noble Lord with that reassurance. Yes, we are discussing the exact nature of our participation in the various agencies during the implementation period.
I hope the commitments that I have made, in particular on the fact that the consultation on environmental principles will be published ahead of Third Reading, are sufficient for your Lordships to feel able not to press the amendment.
I am very pleased with what my noble friend said about the environmental principles and the like, but will he confirm that, if the House feels, when those principles are published, that they are not sufficient and that we need to bring at least part of what we tabled here into the law of the land in the Bill, it will be possible for an amendment of that kind to be brought forward on Third Reading?
Yes, we are saying that we will be able to address this issue again after noble Lords have had a chance to look at the consultation on the statement of principles and the consultation on the new environmental body.
I hope my reassurances are enough to enable noble Lords not to press the amendment and that they will take the opportunity to consider the contents of the consultation before we get to Third Reading.
I thank the very many noble Lords who have spoken and contributed to the debate, all supporting the amendments, which again emphasises that this is an issue of deep concern across the House—one where everybody agrees that urgent action is necessary. As the Minister has now highlighted, it is one where the House is asking very strongly for assurance. I thank the Minister for his detailed response, in particular, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, has highlighted, the commitment that we will have a policy statement and the consultation on a statutory body in time for Third Reading. I hope that they are in good time for Third Reading, so that we will have plenty of time to discuss them and consider their implications.
Indeed, we would hope to see commitments not only to the policy statement and the consultation but to a legislative timetable, so that there is no governance gap when we leave the EU. It will be good to have a further clear statement from the Prime Minister on the Government’s commitment to deliver the independent watchdog with teeth. We will look to see what is in the policy statement and the consultation on the statutory body with great interest. I am pleased that the Minister has been able to reassure us. We do not yet know what will be in these—we will get them before Third Reading—but the implication of that, he has confirmed, is that if the House still does not feel adequately assured, we can bring this issue back. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 27.
My Lords, it is really hard to overstate the importance of the issues raised this evening or, indeed, to understate the lack of government progress on them. It was in February of last year that the Government recognised the importance of the issues. Just so, but what action have they taken and what thought has been given to them since then? There was the welcome commitment to negotiate continued or enhanced co-operation in Munich, but what does that mean? We have heard little or nothing.
This evening we have heard from the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about Europol, about Eurojust from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, about the European arrest warrant from everyone who has spoken, about European criminal records and about the Schengen Information System. These are networks that help to keep our people safe. It clearly cannot undermine any negotiations that the Government are having for us to know what they want to achieve, because we assume that they have already shared this with the EU 27. I wonder whether what they worry will undermine the negotiations is their obsession with the red line around the ECJ or their relationship with their own Back Benches. If not, why are we not hearing more?
I want to concentrate on the issue that is perhaps easiest to understand, which is the European arrest warrant, and not simply from the point of view of where the countries named by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, might have a difficulty with it. Are we going to recognise any arrest warrant from the other countries? We do not even know that yet. What access will our law enforcers have to the checks, records and intelligence sharing that they use not simply day by day but hour by hour? As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, says, time is running out. We need some answers to that.
The amendment would ensure that the Government prioritised these issues over their concern with hard Brexiteers, who seem willing for the country to pay any price, even dropping out of the EAW, simply so that they can say, “Yeah, we’re shot of them”. That is a price that is too high to pay. It would put our security and justice outside an organised, functioning European system—one that has given us great confidence that we are being properly protected. This is an area where the Government need to give some leadership and come up with real proposals that can be implemented to keep all our people safe.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for raising the important issues dealt with in her new clause proposed in Amendment 30, as it provides me with an opportunity to set out the Government’s position on internal security, law enforcement and criminal justice.
I want to begin by reiterating the Government’s commitment to securing the best possible outcomes for the UK in our negotiations with our European partners. As the Prime Minister made clear in her Munich speech, the UK is unconditionally committed to maintaining Europe’s security, now and after our withdrawal from the EU. The UK has been instrumental in developing many of the tools which the EU has at its disposal, and is a significant contributor. For example, the UK is in the top three of member states that contribute intelligence each day to the different databases within Europol. We want this to continue in a way that works for both the UK and for Europe so that we can respond quickly and effectively to the changing threats that we face, including from terrorism and serious and organised crime. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for raising this important issue in Amendment 30.
The intention of this Bill is to create a snapshot of EU law as it applies in the UK immediately before exit day and then retain it within our domestic law following our departure. The UK has a long-standing tradition of ensuring that our rights and liberties are protected domestically and of fulfilling our international human rights obligations, which will continue irrespective of exit. The decision to leave the European Union does not change this. However, noble Lords will forgive me for repeating it, but the exact nature of our future relationship is a matter for negotiation. I assure noble Lords that the Government are already taking extensive action to prepare the ground for these negotiations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, is not in her place, but she has tabled Amendment 66 in this group. I do not think that any noble Lords referred to this amendment, but it covers some areas that have been mentioned and so I will say a few words about that and about our objectives. Our Security, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice partnership paper published in September last year outlined how we are seeking a relationship that provides for practical operational co-operation, including the European arrest warrant, facilitates data-driven law enforcement and allows for multilateral co-operation through EU agencies, including Europol and Eurojust. We believe that the UK and the EU should work together to design new, dynamic arrangements as part of our future partnership to continue and strengthen our close collaboration.
The Prime Minister has been clear that we are proposing a new treaty to underpin our future internal security relationships. With reference to paragraph (c) in the new clause proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, such a treaty will require an effective and independent means of resolving disputes that is respectful of the sovereignty of both the UK and the EU’s legal orders. The appropriate dispute resolution mechanism and the relationship between our courts will depend on the substance and context of the agreement, and so is a matter for negotiations and not for this Bill.
Let me address briefly some of the questions that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked me, about extradition from the EU using the European arrest warrant and, in particular, the implementation period. We certainly want to continue to be able to use the EAW to extradite people from the EU during the implementation period. The relevant provisions on this in the withdrawal agreement were not agreed and are hence marked as yellow, and discussions are continuing on this as we speak. However, we believe that it is in the interests of both the UK and EU member states that current capabilities are preserved during the implementation period, and we continue to make that case.
The Minister has answered only one part of the question—whether it would be possible that we would be able to extradite from other countries. I asked whether we were willing also to respect an arrest warrant from another country and to exercise that here.
It is certainly our intention but, as I have said, these are bilateral relationships and the discussions are continuing. That is one part of the withdrawal agreement that was not quite finalised and so, literally, discussions are continuing on it.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, also asked me about databases and the use of EU data on UK databases and vice versa. This is also a matter for negotiations. Our aim is to ensure that we and our EU partners continue to share and use personal data where there are clear benefits to public safety, subject of course to the appropriate safeguards.
For all of those reasons, and given the Government’s clear intentions to continue and strengthen our close collaboration on security, law enforcement and criminal justice after we leave, and given that the new clauses exceed the purpose of this Bill, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. For the sake of clarity, I should say that the Government will not reflect further on this amendment and so, if the noble Baroness wishes, she should take the opportunity to test the opinion of the House this evening.
I am quite cross, really. With all respect to the Minister, that is a disrespectful response. Twenty-one months after the referendum, there was not even as much detail in the Minister’s reply as there was in the Prime Minister’s Munich speech. For instance, the Minister said that a new treaty will require respect for legal sovereignty. As I mentioned to him, the Prime Minister said:
“when participating in EU agencies the UK will respect the remit of the European Court of Justice”.
What does that mean? The Minister has enlightened me not a jot on that, nor on the follow-up phrase about,
“our unique status as a third country with our own sovereign legal order”,
which was the only one he talked about.
It is farcical that the Prime Minister can make a speech containing more detail than the Minister is prepared to give in response to an amendment in this House. We are being treated as of no account whatever. The way in which Ministers are responding on this is disrespectful. It is obvious that there are major challenges in getting a UK-EU security treaty. Many commentators are writing about it, with various opinions and insights, but the Government are not among them, at least when it comes to telling us in Parliament. Even though we are the unelected House—I am not aware that they are telling the elected House in any more detail either—it seems poor that this is what we have become and have been reduced to when we seek knowledge about how Parliament will take back control of our future relationship with the EU post Brexit.
We will have to reflect on another way in which to take this issue forward. I hope the Minister will understand that his reply was not worth the paper it was written on. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank noble Lords for their time and consideration on the important issue of how we maintain our equality protections as and after we leave the EU. There really is no difference between us in our commitments to these important issues. Amendment 30A, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, follows on from the debate we had in Committee in that it seeks to reflect in statute the political commitment that the Government have already made in this area—that is, that we will maintain the existing protections in and under the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 after our exit from the EU.
I must, however, be clear with the noble and learned Lord that we have three concerns about his suggested approach. First, there is the issue of language, context and potential for conflicting rights. Put simply, the language of a political commitment does not translate to the statute book. Therefore, let me say to my good noble friend Lord Cashman that while our commitment to existing equality protections works perfectly well politically—we are committed to them here and in the wider world outside this place—it must be noted that terms such as “protection” and “diminish” do not have a sufficiently clear and precise meaning for the purposes of statute. As a consequence, the amendment runs a very real risk of creating tensions for real people, with real interests that may be difficult to resolve between existing and potential future rights that we may wish to legislate for.
To give an example, noble Lords may be familiar with the experiences on buses of some passengers who use wheelchairs, and the difficulty that they have sometimes had in accessing the space theoretically available to them when it has been taken by people, often parents with young children in pushchairs. The question arises as to whose rights take priority, especially as, arguably, both parties are covered by “protected characteristics” provided for in the Equality Act 2010. This particular example of potentially conflicting rights is being resolved, following a court judgment that passengers who use wheelchairs have priority. However, I trust this helps illustrate the risk of future developments in equality law being, in effect, struck down in the courts because, while they might benefit certain groups, these benefits might come at the expense of rights in retained EU law secured under this Bill. As has been noted, the Equality Act 2010 is lengthy, detailed and specific in order to avoid questions of competing or conflicting rights. Setting it in stone against any future equality issues we or future Governments may wish to provide for runs fundamentally against the grain of the Act and our developing and dynamic approach to equality rights in this country.
Our second concern is closely related in that we fear this new clause would create considerable legal uncertainty. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord has recognised this by including proposed subsections (4) and (7) which describe what a court may do when faced with an issue of the compatibility or otherwise of new provisions and existing equality rights. I hope he will understand when I say that, especially in the context of our exit from the EU, we think it is vital to keep to an absolute minimum any legal uncertainties that may arise for the good of businesses and individuals, so a new clause that seems positively to embrace such uncertainty is not an attractive prospect. It is not at all clear what businesses or individuals are supposed to make of any rights and obligations that might apply to them pending the emergence of the case law that the new clause anticipates.
Finally, there is the relationship between the proposed new clause and the Human Rights Act 1998, the architecture of which reflects the existence of the European convention. The noble and learned Lord’s text uses key concepts from the HRA, notably declarations of incompatibility and their consequences, and proposed subsections (8) and (9) directly cross-refer to sections of the HRA. This simply is not appropriate. Indeed, at the risk of echoing my earlier point, we believe these linkages would lead to uncertainty and confusion. There is, for example, no explanation of what the effect of declaration of incompatibility would be in this context. Would the primary legislation continue to have effect or not? There is clearly potential for gaps and contradictions to develop between challenges and actions based on the new clause as opposed to the HRA and its existing reference to the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
I have already alluded to our clear public commitment to maintaining existing equality protections, and I am very happy to repeat that commitment now. While I understand the noble and learned Lord’s best intentions in this area, I must gently suggest to him that the interests of equality rights on our statute book are not well served by his proposed new clause and I hope that he will feel able to withdraw it. For the avoidance of any doubt, the Government will not be reflecting further on this matter, so if he wishes to do so, he should test the opinion of the House this evening.
The Minister should not tempt me. I am grateful to him for his reply, which was probably a bit more substantive than ministerial replies to the previous two debates, although it was, equally predictably, negative.
I do not think that the Minister’s arguments bear too much scrutiny. He complained about the language used in my amendment and said that it is difficult to put a political commitment on to a statutory basis. He was challenged by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. If the wording here is not right, what are the Government proposing to do to give underpinning? I do not think that at any point in reply to this debate did the Minister indicate that there is no need for a proper underpinning of the equality rights we have. Indeed, given the Government’s commitment to maintaining them, one assumes that the Government believe that they should continue and be underpinned. If the wording proposed is not right, there is a deafening silence from the Government’s side about what words they would use. The Minister raised the declaration of incompatibility and whether that meant striking down. I think I made it clear, as did the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, that we do not mean striking down. What we seek in this amendment is to make it consistent with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty after we leave the European Union.
It is said that the clause conflicts with the Human Rights Act. I confess that my party and I have argued many times for a written constitution for the United Kingdom, but we are always told that one of the benefits of the unwritten constitution is its flexibility. So we introduced into our constitution a Human Rights Act with some very good provisions; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, indicated some of the focus of attention and consideration that that Act places upon Ministers when they consider compatibility. If we have that, what is wrong? What is the constitutional fault in using that good practice to extend into another area where we are talking about something fundamental?
That is the concluding point because this is a fundamental question. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, reflected on what kind of country we want to be. The Government set out in their White Paper last March that they want to respect and cherish equality rights. There is common ground on that. What we have not seen from the Government is a way in which they can ensure that that is underpinned as we go forward, so that we can ensure that that characteristic of what kind of country we want to be can be maintained without threat. I find it very regrettable but the night is a bit too late to test the opinion of the House, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
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I am delighted to be described as a Minister in that question—not a role that I am eager to take on—but it may be that the question was intended for the Minister himself when he comes to respond.
The important point, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made clear, as did other speakers, is that, as the Bill stands it is subjective and imposes a vague, low test. It is subjective because it is what the Minister considers, and it is a low test because it is what he considers appropriate.
As I told your Lordships previously—I will repeat it just this one last time—as someone who has spent a life as a practising lawyer, a court advocate, advising Ministers and being a Minister, I know that there is all the difference in the world between saying, “You can do this if you consider it appropriate”—nobody can second-guess that—and saying, “You can do this if it’s necessary”. It introduces an objective test, and that is what matters. This is what we invite the House to say to the Government is necessary in these circumstances. That is the only power they should take, and I hope that when the noble Lord presses the amendment to a vote, it will be supported by many Members of this House.
My Lords, I first thank all those who have contributed to today’s relatively brief debate, and the many noble Lords I have either spoken to or exchanged letters with between Committee and Report. The scope of the delegated powers in the Bill has, rightly, been one of the most intensively scrutinised areas, and I do not for one moment doubt the best intentions of many of those who have spoken against the Government’s position today. However, I hope noble Lords will listen to my remarks with an open mind, as I hope to offer some new content that we did not cover in Committee.
Let me start by addressing the specific proposition of the amendments on the Marshalled List—Amendments 31, 42, 86 and 87, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. As has been said, they would remove from the main powers in the Bill the discretion of ministerial judgment on appropriateness, and permit action only where it “is necessary” in the context of the specific power. This has been touted as a change from a subjective test to an objective one. But I hope to demonstrate that this is not the case, as I would question what exactly “necessary” means.
For example, in the context of Clause 7, would the course of action a Minister takes have to be no more than necessary to correct the deficiency? Or must it be necessary to correct a deficiency for the power to be engaged in the first place—and if so, necessary for what purpose? Let me address these different scenarios in turn. First let us say, hypothetically, that a court interprets the amendments to mean that a course of action taken by Ministers must be necessary to correct an identified deficiency. It might follow that Ministers could follow only the course of action that does no more than is strictly necessary to correct that deficiency, rather than the course of action that is most sensible.
I know the House likes concrete examples, so let me give an example of how I think this would lead to worse policy outcomes. Take, for example, Section 105B of the Communications Act 2003—with which I am sure all noble Lords are completely familiar. This includes an obligation for Ofcom to notify its regulatory counterparts in other member states, as well as the European network and information security agency, when Ofcom is made aware of a security breach that affects a public electronic communications network or service, and Ofcom thinks it appropriate to make such a notification. It could be argued that it is not strictly necessary to delete the obligation at all. Let us assume, however, that a court accepts that some action is needed in this scenario. A test of necessity could then be taken to mean that the Government should take the minimum action possible to address the deficiency. That might be simply to remove the requirement to share information.
However, the Government's preferred policy, which this House would surely support, is to change it into a discretion that makes it explicit that Ofcom may make notifications of this kind if it wishes. This is intended to support proportionate information-sharing about security matters after EU exit. That amendment is appropriate but arguably not strictly necessary, and might fall foul of the increased restriction offered by the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. I understand the notional appeal of permitting Ministers to act only where it is necessary. But here I agree with my distinguished predecessor, my noble friend Lord Bridges, the midwife, as he put it, to the Bill. It should not be the role of a Minister to be a statutory firefighter, dousing deficiencies in the statute book only where it is absolutely necessary. Instead, I would argue that a more proactive role is the only way that we can ensure the best possible outcome for the statute book.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. How can what he is arguing be reconciled with the White Paper, which stated that,
“legal and policy changes would be made under the Bill only when it was necessary to ensure that the law continues to function properly after exit day”?
I think I have addressed that in my remarks, but I have some more comments to make which I think will address the noble Lord’s concerns.
However, as we have said throughout the passage of this legislation, we will give due consideration to all amendments that do not undermine the fundamental operation of the Bill. That is why we have accepted the recommendation of the Constitution Committee and tabled government amendments to ensure that, where the powers in Clauses 7(1), 9 or 17(1) are used, a statement must be made as to why there are good reasons for the instrument and the provision made is a reasonable course of action. Of course, we are going further with Clause 8 and propose to remove it from the Bill in its entirety. These amendments will be dealt with in a later grouping on Schedule 7, but they are key to set the context of this debate. They demonstrate the Government’s willingness to accept additional scrutiny if that scrutiny is appropriate.
I wonder whether the Minister would kindly consider this question: is he saying that he would want Ministers—and indeed, civil servants—to have the discretion to make policy changes from EU retained law without reference to Parliament?
The powers in this Bill cannot be exercised by civil servants; it has to be Ministers who make the decisions. We have said on a number of occasions that defining a policy change is quite hard. A pure correction can involve a slight policy choice—for instance, whether to designate one agency or another. It can still be a technical correction but it is a policy choice about what to do. But we are clear that we are not trying to make substantive policy choices through this secondary legislation power.
I will refrain from making the full case for the government amendments as they are not on the Marshalled List today, but I will quote the Constitution Committee in justifying our position. It said that such amendments,
“will require explanations to be given for the use of the power which can be scrutinised by Parliament. It will also provide a meaningful benchmark against which use of the power may be tested judicially. In this way, the Government can secure the flexible delegated powers it requires while Parliament will have a proper explanation and justification of their use that it can scrutinise”.
That, to me, sounds like a sensible solution.
Before I finish, let me add the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who I am sorry to see is not in his place.
I do apologise; he is behind the Bar, so he is not quite in his place. I hope he will not mind if I quote him. When comparable amendments were added by the Government to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, and when speaking in support of government Amendment 9, to which he signed his name, he stated:
“I am satisfied that this will impose a real discipline on the Minister, backed up of course by the prospect of judicial review”.—[Official Report, 15/1/18; col. 439.]
That amendment passed without a Division—and I am sure the noble Lord will be supporting us in the Division tonight.
I know that I have offered new information in my speech today. In doing so, I hope that I have demonstrated that this is not simply a case of risk-averse Ministers erring on the side of caution. I can say with complete sincerity that the amendments on the Marshalled List today would necessitate a significant review of our secondary legislation programme and would surely lead to worse outcomes. In this, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner. To avoid such a situation, I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment. If, however, as I suspect, he wishes to test the will of the House, I suggest that he do so now, as this is not an issue the Government intend to return to at Third Reading.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate—especially for their concision and brevity. I am in a position to help the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, as I apprehended that his concern was that if the amendment were agreed, Clause 7(1) would be without a subject. But that subsection begins with the words:
“A Minister of the Crown”—
so it is quite clear who will be exercising the powers.
I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and I hope that the difference of opinion which still remains between us is a demonstration that two reasonable people can disagree without either one being unreasonable.
I also listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, who had the great courtesy to mention her concerns to me earlier. It seemed to me that her particular concern was the matter of discretion and the amount of time that would be required to make orders. I respectfully suggest that neither “appropriate” nor “necessary” will have an impact on time. There will be a great deal of pressure to produce the delegated legislation in the time required, but I do not believe that whether the word is “appropriate” or “necessary” will impact on that. In terms of ministerial discretion, there is still of course a substantial amount of discretion to be given to Ministers. The debate we are having is about the degree of constraint that there should be on that discretion.
The suggestion I made in moving the amendment, which the Minister was kind enough to recall, was reflected in the Delegated Powers Committee’s 20th report: namely, that some form of sensible definition, or at least the parameters of what could be done without going beyond the bounds of “necessary”, would be of great help to Ministers. If we are talking about avoiding legal uncertainty—and here I was most grateful for the intervention of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, from his extensive professional experience—I do not think that adopting “necessary” would be necessarily an obstacle.
The Minister played the bowling in a very determined way, but the wicket has worsened substantially since Committee. He actually used the phrase about a course of action being “most sensible”—which seems to me to be at the heart of this. If one has some sort of expanded indication of what “necessary” can encompass, that seems to me to be exactly what is required. Nobody wants to stop Ministers doing things that are sensible—certainly I do not—but let us at least have them doing them on a canvas whose bounds are reasonably clear.
When he got on to “torturing” the English language, I felt that that really was a little hyperbolic. You do not torture a concept simply by telling people how you would like it interpreted. That seems again to me to be at the heart of the amendment.
The Minister’s Ofcom example was new material and very helpful, but it started to get into the area of whether there could be more than one solution to “necessary”—and, of course, there can, because, if there is a deficiency, there is not a single solution that is going to assuage that deficiency. There may be several of equal merit, and when they assuage that deficiency they demonstrate their necessity. So I did not really think that that was a particularly compelling example.
Of course, if we are to expect that significant policy changes will be made, the right route for making those changes is primary legislation, and there will be—as with a certain sense of foreboding we are well aware—a number of vehicles for such provision.
So I think that the Minister will not be surprised to hear me say that, despite a dogged defence of his wicket, I shall ask noble Lords to indicate their views, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I shall speak also to the other amendments standing in my name on the Marshalled List relating to the creation of public authorities.
I am pleased to say that the Government have listened to the discussions on this issue and have consequently tabled these amendments, which remove the ability to create public authorities from the Clause 7 power and also from the power in Clause 9. As noble Lords will have seen, the Government intend to remove Clause 8 in its entirety from the Bill.
We explained during Committee that, when Clause 7 was originally drafted, we thought it would be only sensible for the sake of contingency to include within its scope the ability to establish new public authorities to insure—as many amendments in the other place sought to do—against losing any important functions as they are transferred over from the EU, as no such public authority may currently exist in the UK.
Since then, the Government’s analysis of the transfer of functions with exit has progressed to a stage where we now consider that the establishment of a new public authority will be necessary only in a very limited number of cases. In the event that no appropriate public authority currently exists in the UK to take on functions transferred from the EU, the Government will instead bring forward the appropriate provisions under primary legislation.
As noble Lords will be aware, at the end of last year the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced plans to create a new environmental body to advise and challenge government and potentially other public bodies on the environment. It is still the Government’s clear intention to create this new environmental body but, instead, it will now need to be delivered through a separate legislative vehicle. As I informed the House on Monday evening, the consultation on the environmental body will be published ahead of Third Reading on 16 May.
In order to maintain consistency between the powers given to the UK Government and the devolved Administrations, the restrictions preventing the establishment of public authorities in the UK after exit will also apply to the devolved Administrations. We discussed this with the devolved Administrations in advance of tabling these amendments and gave them the opportunity to consider what impact this might have on their preparations for exit day. We are not aware of any circumstances where they were anticipating using the power in this way, and they have not raised any concerns about the restrictions applying to the equivalent Schedule 2 powers.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, for pursuing this issue and I am pleased to say that his Amendments 33 and 35, seeking to remove this ability from the Clause 7 power, are now not necessary, as the Government’s amendments cover this and more. I hope the noble Lord feels satisfied by these amendments and will accept them. I also hope that this demonstrates the Government’s commitment to narrowing the scope of the powers wherever practical without threatening the Bill’s core purpose to deliver a functioning statute book on exit.
I turn to the noble Lord’s Amendment 103, which seeks to restrict subdelegating fees powers under Schedule 4 to public authorities taking on new functions. This matter will be discussed further, later on during Report stage, when we will address similar amendments. Therefore, for now, I will remain brief in my response. I hope the noble Lord feels reassured by the amendments on subdelegation tabled by the Government that will ensure that, where a power is exercisable by a public authority without further direct reference to Parliament, that authority must continue to inform Parliament about the exercise of the power. This will allow Parliament to maintain oversight of the use of delegated legislation-making powers. In anticipation of the later discussion, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.
I beg to move the government amendments. In doing so, I want to inform the House that this is not an issue to which we intend to return at Third Reading.
My Lords, I have to inform the House that if Amendment 32B is agreed to I cannot call Amendment 33 by reasons of pre-emption.
My Lords, I commend the Government for these amendments, which respond to and accept the arguments made in Committee. As I argued then, and there is a reason for me repeating this, the very way that we set up quangos—how they are appointed, funded and run, and particularly their reporting structures and independence from both government and any other organisation they happen to be regulating—is key to how they work, hence the need for primary legislation so that we can interrogate all these things. That is why I very much welcome what has been said.
I am afraid, however, that I am led to make one comment, which is aimed not at the Minister but at friends of his in another place. After the vote last week on the customs union, we read in the Sun that the Government were going to remove those Conservative Peers who had voted for a customs union from their various positions on public bodies. I am absolutely certain that those threats, although mere briefings, did not emanate from anyone in this House. That is simply not the way that I have seen those on the Government Benches here work. They recognise the role of the Lords and that it is our job, on occasion, to ask the Commons to think again, even if sometimes that is a bit inconvenient when it comes from their own side. However, it was rather disturbing to learn that there are certain people around No. 10 who could, even for a moment, think that it would be right to undermine the independence and arm’s-length nature of such bodies, as is often written into their statutes, simply because Members of the House of Lords voted in a certain way. Everything I know about Ministers in this House means I know that not only were they not involved in this but they were probably as shocked as I was. Perhaps the Minister would like to take the opportunity to distance himself from such threats and reaffirm what I know to be government policy: that any appointment to such bodies is done without fear or favour and nobody would be taken off them for a choice that they made in this House.
On the essence of the amendment, and particularly given the role of the Minister and his officials, we are happy to support the government amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. There were relatively few but I thank them and I hope these amendments satisfy the concerns that have been previously raised in the many discussions I have had with noble Lords about this matter. It is proof that, despite the accusations that have been made, we are listening and will respond appropriately if we deem something to be necessary and it improves the legislation, which on this occasion we do.
I am not going to comment on every press article. Precise recruitment criteria are set down for these posts. I am sure that those criteria will be followed and that all appointments will be made on merit.
I hope noble Lords welcome the reassurance that these amendments provide and recognise that this reflects the sincerity of the Government’s commitment to narrowing the scope of the powers wherever practicable without compromising the purpose of the Bill.
My Lords, it is my pleasure to lead on this group of amendments. They are simple, short and, I hope, demonstrate again that the Government are listening to debate in the House.
The Government’s clear intention has been to make bespoke provision in relation to all financial matters in the Bill. It was introduced with a specific power to make provision in relation to fees and charges in Schedule 4. I know that that power is not without controversy and we shall debate it in full later on Report.
The powers in clause 7(1) and (9) could never, even if it were appropriate to remedying a deficiency or implementing the withdrawal agreement, make provision for a charge, as such measures contain an element of taxation prohibited in the exercise of these powers. That distinction is the distinguishing feature of a charge and why, at the time of our accession to the EU, specific provision for charges was included in the Finance Act 1973. The Government are tabling these amendments to prohibit the powers in Clause 7(1) and (9) from imposing or increasing fees, so as to provide clarity on the distinct purposes of these powers and those in Schedule 4.
The powers in Clause 7(1) and (9) will still be able to repeal fees regimes that are no longer needed, reduce fees and make amendments to pre-exit powers to provide for fees and charges. An example would be correcting a deficiency in an existing fee-setting power, such as a reference to a directive which is no longer appropriate. They will not, however, be able to impose or increase a fee or charge themselves.
These amendments respond to amendments and questions which were raised in debate in Committee. As I have said, we have reflected on this and taken steps to ensure that the stringent scrutiny provisions we are applying to Schedule 4 cannot be circumvented. This was never our plan but I can feel the mood of the House and I know that the word of a Minister only goes so far. I hope that these amendments demonstrate that we are keen to put questions beyond doubt where we can. I beg to move.
This is another opportunity to thank the Minister because some peace of mind will now be provided about the structure of Clause 7. We understand now that the Government have stepped away from any capability to introduce new or increased fees.
I also thank the Minister for clarifying what a charge is. Many in this House have been trying to understand exactly how it could be framed. I hope the fact that he has now described it in the House will, in effect, put that definition on the record so that no future Government will attempt to use the word “charge” in order to circumvent these various constraints. Again, on this occasion, I thank the Minister.
Again, I thank noble Lords for their brief contributions. As I said in moving the amendment, this group comprises simple amendments and I hope that I have convinced the House to accept them in the spirit in which they have been tabled.
My Lords, the Government recognise the vital importance of our devolution settlements and the Acts that give effect to them: the Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006. We have considered the concerns raised during Committee about the potential for the Government to use the Clause 7(1) power to amend those Acts. The Government have consequently brought forward amendments that mean this power cannot be used to substantively alter those Acts.
As noble Lords will agree, we must ensure that any deficiencies that would arise within those Acts by virtue of our leaving the EU can be addressed, so that these crucial pieces of legislation continue to work appropriately on and after exit day. We have sought to make the majority of corrections to deficiencies that arise from EU exit to those Acts in the Bill, so that we can be transparent about what corrections need to be made and the extent of those changes. Noble Lords will see from those corrections already included in Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Bill that they are essentially technical corrections to ensure the proper functioning of these Acts.
At the time of the Bill’s introduction, outstanding corrections to the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act were still being discussed with the Scottish and Welsh Governments, and in the case of the technical standards reservation with the Northern Ireland Civil Service as well. As a result of our discussion with the devolved Administrations, we have now agreed the means through which the remaining deficiencies in these Acts will be dealt with and can confirm that the correcting power will not be needed to make any of those changes.
In the light of our commitment to Parliament that we will not take powers in the Bill that are broader than they need to be and to provide reassurance to the devolved institutions, we can therefore remove the ability of the correcting power in Clause 7(1) and in Schedule 2 Part 1 to amend the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act. We can also remove the exemption from the protection for the Northern Ireland Act that would allow the power to amend paragraph 38 of Schedule 3 to that Act, the so-called technical standards reservation. These protections are applied by our Amendments 34B, 34C, and 34D.
Given the further protection for the Northern Ireland Act, the correction of the deficiency in the reservation of technical standards can now be achieved only through primary legislation. Amendment 92F therefore adds that correcting provision to the Bill. Since the reservation is consistent across the three devolution settlements, Amendments 92B and 92E make the corresponding corrections to the Scotland Act and to the Government of Wales Act.
Although this is a technical correction, I wish to take a moment to talk through this in detail, as I hope noble Lords will appreciate, given the complexities of this matter and the fact that it relates to a reservation. I can also confirm to noble Lords that the drafting of the amendments has been shared with, and agreed by, the devolved Administrations, and I would like to express my gratitude to officials in the devolved Administrations for their input and constructive approach in helping us to develop these amendments.
The current reservation applies to:
“Technical standards and requirements in relation to products in pursuance of an obligation under EU law”,
except in areas that are specified as exempt. The provision can be found in paragraph 38 of Schedule 3 to the Northern Ireland Act, Section C8 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act, and Section C7 of Schedule 7A to the Government of Wales Act as amended by the Wales Act 2017. It is our express intention that, in ensuring the reservation continues to operate as intended once we leave the EU, we should preserve the current boundary between devolved and reserved competence.
The effect of the amendments before noble Lords today is, therefore, that those standards subject to the current reservation will continue to be a reserved matter, including as they may be modified from time to time. It is the Government’s view—shared by the devolved Administrations—that a standard should not cease to be reserved simply because it has been updated. I would also like to assure noble Lords that the revised reservation will not apply in those areas where the devolved institutions currently have competence.
Let us take, for example, the case as it currently stands in relation to cigarette packaging. The obligations under EU law apply certain standards—for instance, in relation to the inclusion of health warnings on the packaging. The current reservation requires that the devolved institutions cannot legislate in relation to those standards, but it does not preclude them legislating to provide additional standards to cigarette packaging where they would be compatible and within an area of devolved competence. That will continue to be the case under the amended reservation. Indeed, when the UK Government brought legislation before Parliament to introduce plain packaging for tobacco products across the whole of the UK, we sought and received LCMs from the devolved legislatures because it would have been within their competence to make those provisions themselves.
Similarly, the devolved institutions could choose to extend those standards to products within their competence that are not specified by the relevant EU law. The reservation will also not apply to brand new standards that arise post-exit—for instance, to a new product that has been brought to market but is not currently subject to EU standards. Those would not have arisen in the UK in pursuance of EU law, even if the EU chooses to legislate on those matters after we have left, so would not be covered by the current reservation or the revised reservation. The exemptions that apply to the current reservation—for instance, in relation to food, agricultural and horticultural produce—will also continue to apply so standards in those areas, as now, will not be reserved.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Griffiths, for their contributions to this short debate. These are important amendments and they reflect important progress. It has never been the Government’s intention to use the correcting power to change our devolution settlements, and I hope noble Lords will agree that the amendments put the matter beyond doubt. I hope they welcome the reassurance that the amendments provide and recognise that this reflects the sincerity of the Government’s commitment to the devolution statutes.
My Lords, there is little I can add that is new to this debate. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws for raising these issues and I hope the Minister will make use of his customary courtesy to the House. When he responded at Second Reading and in Committee on these issues, there was a sense that he understands the concerns that were raised then, and indeed the issues raised today. When he spoke on 14 March, he was clear that there will be no impediment at the land border to the movement of people—no checks and no profiling, full stop. That was the first time that the Government had given that degree of clarity—I think my noble friend Lady Kennedy would recognise that—or sought to emphasise that. This is important, and the Minister will understand the great concerns being raised. We still have no clarity on the border issue. This House has already expressed a view on the customs union and I am sure that, as we debate Northern Ireland issues later on Report, we will deal with those further.
I hope that the Minister is able to address the concerns that have been raised about the common travel area and movement of people. He has a sense of deftness and understands these issues, so if he can address them today we would be grateful.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for introducing this topic and other noble Lords for their contributions. I had a very pleasant cup of tea with the noble Baroness yesterday and I was pleased to learn that she hails from the Kennedys of Fermanagh, which was an interesting discovery. But it was not just a pleasant cup of tea; it was more important than that. We touched on what I believe are some of the key elements that have motivated these amendments, and they are, at heart, necessary to confront. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, somewhat surprisingly, reminded me that I was indeed apparently the first person to give clarity on this issue, but I am very happy to reinforce the clear statement that there can be no racial profiling at a border, whether it be routine, quixotic or even accidental. That cannot be the policy or the direction; there cannot be even a hint of that going on at the border. I am hopeful that those further words might again give some contentment in that regard.
If I may turn to the amendment itself, the December joint report, at paragraph 54, confirms that the UK and Ireland can continue, as now, to work together on the movement of people. Building on this, the relevant chapter of the Commission’s draft withdrawal treaty text is green, confirming the policy is agreed. The key thing here is that the common travel area with Ireland is protected after the UK has left the EU. It is important to emphasise that this agreement is not just what we would like to see happen but actually what we have agreed so far. As a number of noble Lords will have noticed thus far, getting agreement is not always as straightforward as we would like. The Government are committed to turning the relevant chapter of the withdrawal treaty into legally binding text, so we will be doing that. This means that in the future, as now, the UK will not operate routine immigration controls on journeys within the common travel area. There will be no checks whatever for journeys across the land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, nor between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. As I said earlier, this includes any aspect of what those checks might look like or be interpreted to look like. That is not what will be happening.
To touch on some of the elements raised, I think it is important again—and I will commit to writing to the noble Baroness—to set out the elements of the withdrawal agreement treaty and how they protect the common travel area. I will place a copy of that letter in the Library of the House so that all can read it and see exactly what we are stating.
Forgive me, this is not facetious, but the words that the Minister is using are so much clearer than those that have been used by his colleagues in government that I just wonder if there might be an internal seminar, so that we can get some of this clarity on the record more often.
I will await that promotion when it comes. I hope that I am being as clear as I possibly can be. To be equally clear, these words do indeed represent the view of the Government. I am not an outlier in this regard; I am indeed speaking on behalf of the Government.
If I may, I will draw on some of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, about the historic element of the common travel area. It is an extraordinary outcome when you think about what had just taken place on the island of Ireland. To then create a common travel area, with all that that represents—a common travel area that survives to this day, albeit within the wider freedom of movement of the EU—is an extraordinary achievement, both for its time and for its longevity. It is a long-standing agreement; it protects unhindered the movement across the land border. I am also aware that it is also an integral element—not a symbolic but an integral element—of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. That should not be underestimated.
My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made it very clear, from the original Article 50 letter right through our position paper in August on Northern Ireland to her speech in Florence, that preserving these arrangements and a unique relationship between the UK and Ireland is a priority for future negotiations as well. The common travel area has proven to be resilient over the years, withstanding legal challenges, to which the noble Baroness referred, and new policy and political developments. It is a well-crafted arrangement—and in some respects, if only all legislation that we created could be as well crafted, we would be doing some service to the nation. It has been staunchly protected by all its members, not just the United Kingdom but Ireland—and it has been welcomed by the Crown dependencies as well. I have no doubt that it will continue to be so.
The high level of collaboration with Ireland and the Crown dependencies on border security, on strengthening the external border of the common travel area and on promoting legitimate travel within this special travel area will continue. The UK’s future approach to immigration controls for EEA nationals will be compatible with the common travel area, just as our approach to non-EEA nationals is now. Our approach to the common travel area is, of course, not reliant on our membership of the EU itself. These arrangements can be maintained after the UK has left the EU without express provision in the Bill. The common travel area was formed long before our membership of the EU and, I suspect, will exist long after.
The Government made clear during the Bill’s passage in the other place that the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will uphold the agreement we reach, including the protection of all the Northern Ireland and Ireland commitments in the joint report. That is, of course, a matter for the future Bill rather than the one we have before us today. However, I nonetheless hope that some of the elements that I have stated today will be clearly reflected in that future Bill.
Individuals travelling to the UK through Ireland will always be required to meet the UK’s immigration requirements. However, our excellent co-operation with Ireland helps to ensure that those who seek to abuse arrangements are not able to gain entry at any point in the common travel area, no matter which element we might be discussing.
I have just been handed a very helpful note, and I turn to the point raised by the noble Baroness. The word “routine” does not have a special meaning in the paper that was cited. It was not seeking to add any additional burden. It is simply saying that these are the methods that we have been using thus far and will continue to use. It is not seeking to add or put in place any additional elements. To the second question raised by the noble Baroness—the question of the obligations that fall upon Ireland itself—arrangements that we have within the common travel area will not interfere with those obligations which the Republic of Ireland has to its own citizens or to the citizens of the EU, but the nature of our future immigration status will depend on that second Bill, to which I referred a short while ago.
I appreciate that this has been a short debate, but it was an important one nonetheless. We recognise that the common travel area is not just a useful asset; it is a vital one. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, reminded us, the family commitments that stretch across those borders of long standing are very important. There is nothing that we will do that will interfere with that: that would be wrong and we will not be doing that. On that basis, and with the promise that we will send a letter and lodge a copy in the Library, I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to withdraw her amendment.
As ever, I thank my noble friend for his helpful advice. He must be right.
We of course support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. It is another option but, on the basis of the debate we have had so far, I hope noble Lords will support Amendment 40 as it stands.
My Lords, let me start by being crystal clear about the Government’s commitment to animal welfare as we leave the EU. As the Prime Minister said in another place on 22 November,
“we already have some of the highest animal welfare standards in the world, and as we leave the EU, we should not only maintain, but enhance them. We have already set out our proposals to introduce mandatory CCTV in slaughterhouses; to increase sentences for animal cruelty to five years; to ban microbeads, which damage marine life; and to ban the ivory trade to help bring an end to elephant poaching”.
The Prime Minister went on to explicitly confirm:
“We also recognise and respect the fact that animals are sentient beings and should be treated accordingly. The Animal Welfare Act 2006 provides protection for all animals capable of experiencing pain or suffering which are under the control of man”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/11/17; col. 1038.]
The following day my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs set out in a Written Ministerial Statement in the other place that:
“This Government will ensure that any necessary changes required to UK law are made in a rigorous and comprehensive way to ensure animal sentience is recognised after we leave the EU”.
But, as he further noted,
“The withdrawal Bill is not the right place to address this”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/11/17; cols. 35WS-36WS.]
In this respect I agree with my noble friend Lord Hodgson. The Government’s commitment to legislating in this area is in no doubt. I can confirm to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bakewell, and to my noble friend Lady Byford, that not only have we made that commitment but we have begun work on drafting and developing that legislation.
In December, the Government published draft legislation to address the recognition of animal sentience through the Animal Welfare (Sentencing and Recognition of Sentience) Draft Bill. The public consultation on the draft Bill closed on 31 January. We have received over 9,000 responses, which the Government are analysing. The magnitude of the response highlights not only the importance and complexity of animal sentience in and of itself, but also the manner in which it is recognised in legislation.
On 1 February, the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee in the other place published its pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, and the Government’s response to that was published earlier this week on 23 April. I do not know whether that is the consultation which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said she had not seen yet, but if that is the case, I will be happy to get my officials to send her a copy. However, we have responded to that consultation. In its report, the committee highlighted a number of concerns about the draft Bill, which once again serves to underscore further the complexities of the issue and why it is so important that we get this area of the law right, a point that was well made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay. That is what we all want, but I am afraid that the amendments before us will not achieve that, as I will outline shortly.
As previously stated, there is no question but that the Government regard animals as sentient beings. As we said in relation to this issue during the Committee stage of this Bill, we certainly agree with the underlying sentiments of amendments such as that tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and of course the noble Lord, Lord Trees. However, as we also said in Committee, we cannot support them.
In order that there can be no ambiguity regarding the Government’s resolve on this matter, let me be clear again that the Government intend to retain our existing standards of animal welfare once we have left the EU and, where possible and practical, to enhance them. My noble friend Lady Oppenheim-Barnes set out some important areas that we would want to consider in this respect. Perhaps I may also be clear that the Government fully recognise the level of support for our commitment to maintaining and enhancing our high standards of animal welfare as expressed not only in this Chamber and the other place but also among the general public. The groundswell of feeling on this matter is surely a testament to the UK as a nation of animal lovers who share a proud and long history of legislating to protect animals from cruelty and suffering, much of which of course predates our accession to the EU. As we move towards a new relationship with Europe and the rest of the world, we are absolutely determined to maintain our high animal welfare standards, to improve on them where appropriate, and to legislate to do so where necessary.
However, as has been said, the purpose of this Bill is to provide continuity by ensuring that we have a functioning statute book upon our exit from the EU. As I am sure noble Lords appreciate, in relation to the European Union and EU member states, Article 13 creates an obligation to have full regard to the welfare requirements of animals when formulating and implementing EU policies on the basis that animals are sentient beings. However, the underlying requirement to consider the needs of animals contained in Article 13 is limited to a small number of EU policy areas. The resulting impact of Article 13 on domestic law is therefore minimal. At its conception, Article 13 was considered by many to be a symbolic step change in our relationship with animals that would drive radical improvement in animal welfare across Europe. In reality, its impact has failed to materialise. Simply transferring Article 13 as it stands into domestic law would be a disservice to the cause of animal welfare and is not in keeping with the Government’s aim for the UK to be a world leader in this area.
The draft Bill that I mentioned earlier sets out a possible method to better enshrine the principles of animal sentience in domestic law. Notably, and unlike Article 13, the draft Bill does not seek to restrict the recognition of animals as sentient beings to specific policy areas, a change that we hope noble Lords will agree is a significant improvement. The draft Bill also imposes a clear duty on Ministers of the Crown to have regard to animal welfare.
Given the complexities that I touched on earlier, it is crucial that this issue is given the consideration and effective legislation that it deserves to avoid replicating the issues contained in Article 13. For this reason, I regret to say that we cannot support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The amendment appears to seek to transfer the obligations contained in Article 13 to domestic law. However, this clause applies only to the formulation, rather than to the formulation and implementation, of law and policy. It is the Government’s view that this clause would further reduce the already limited scope of Article 13.
I would like to reassure noble Lords—and I know that the noble Lord, Lord Trees, is particularly interested in this fact—that the Government and the EU have reached agreement on an implementation period following our exit from the EU until the end of December 2020, and Article 13 would continue to apply during that period.
Turning to Amendment 40, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Trees, the proposed new clause seeks to place a duty on Ministers of the Crown and the devolved Administrations to pay due regard to the welfare requirements of animals when formulating and implementing public policy. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his contribution, and as other noble Lords have indicated, he does of course have much experience in this area. I am also grateful for the constructive engagement that he has had with the Government, and I was pleased to meet with him earlier this afternoon.
The clause also seeks to prevent judicial review for failure to comply with that duty, instead requiring the Secretary of State to account to Parliament and requiring the devolved Administrations to account to their respective legislatures. This appears designed to address concerns raised by the Commons EFRA Committee about the need to avoid an unnecessary and costly burden being imposed on the courts in the pursuit of replacing Article 13. However—and this reflects on the points made by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Judge—due to the constitutional significance of legislation to this effect, very clear wording is required to remove the availability of judicial review. The current drafting of the amendment is not sufficiently clear, meaning that it is likely that policy decisions could still be subject to judicial review for failure to comply with the duty to pay due regard. Here I bow to the superior wisdom of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay on this subject.
In addition, the Secretary of State and the devolved Administrations would be accountable to their respective Parliaments for their compliance with the duty and need to report on an annual basis on the formulation, implementation and effectiveness of policy related to animal welfare. Subsection (3) states that it is for Parliament to decide how the duty has been properly discharged. However, it is likely to be argued by some that subsection (1) creates a distinct duty that can in fact be used to judicially review policy decisions.
We are carefully considering how to take forward the recommendations made by the EFRA Committee and others during the consultation. We are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Trees, for his proposed formulation and will consider it carefully as we decide how to take forward the measures that we have set out in the draft Bill.
I again reiterate that the aim of this Bill is to provide a framework which ensures that our impending exit from the EU occurs in an efficient and timely manner. It will urgently provide the reassurances needed in order to plan for day one as we leave the EU. As part of that function, this Bill will retain the existing body of EU animal welfare law in UK law, ensuring that the same protections are in place in the UK following our EU exit.
I hope that what I have had to say provides reassurance to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness on the Government’s firm stance on animal sentience and that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment. However, I cannot give any false hope that I will reflect further on this issue between now and Third Reading, so if the noble Lord wishes to test the opinion of the House, he should do so now.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this stimulating and interesting debate, and I hope that it has provided food for thought. Above all, I hope that it gives the Government an impetus to solve this problem. Perhaps I may address some of the points that have been raised.
The point about adding specific issues to a general Bill of this type was made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and others. I have huge respect for the noble Lord, who is a great fighter for animal welfare. I will answer in two ways. Normally I would totally agree with the point, but these are not normal times; rather, we are living through extremely extraordinary times, and I think that extraordinary times need some special and novel remedies. The second point is that we are seeking to enable a very specific and defined issue through making a modification to the EU withdrawal Bill.
With regard to the technical objections raised on proposed new subsection (3), I absolutely defer to the expertise of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope, Lord Judge and Lord Brown. We sought to give Parliament authority to have oversight of how proposed new subsection (1) would operate. Parliament could define the mechanisms and the definitions, getting over some of the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, it does not absolutely exclude the possibility of judicial review. It certainly reduces the possibility, which was a recommendation of the EFRA Committee report, but it does not exclude it, as the Minister acknowledged as well. We seem to have been criticised for excluding judicial review; on the other hand, perhaps we are not, so although that is an important issue it clearly needs further clarification.
No one would be more pleased than me to see the text of the amendment improved further. It could be done by the Government and tabled as an amendment on Third Reading. I had written that down before the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, made his helpful intervention, for which I thank him. No one would rather see this improved than me. I am very happy to take criticism; I am an academic of long experience and used to lots of criticism. Let us get it better but let us get it done.
Finally, turning to the main issue, I do not doubt one bit the sincerity of the Government and the Minister in wishing to see this sorted but, as has been pointed out by several noble Lords, it has already taken a long time to get this rectified. A vast tsunami of legislation is coming along the tracks, which will demand a slice of a finite amount of parliamentary time. In particular, Defra has a huge burden of legislation and adjustment to make around Brexit. While I am in no way questioning the sincerity of the Government’s desire, stuff happens. Ministers come and go. Other priorities emerge. It is particularly disappointing that the Minister has made no commitment to when we might see an improved animal welfare Bill.
Our negotiators will shortly go into battle to negotiate the trade of livestock and livestock products. They need assurance behind them so that they can argue that our welfare legislative standards are absolutely the equal of those of the rest of the EU, and so on. If we wait, I fear that we will be waiting for Godot. Noble Lords need no reminding that Godot never came, so it is with a heavy heart that I feel I must test the opinion of the House.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My Lords, first, I thank all the contributors to this debate. It is right that we have taken the time to discuss it at length, because this amendment has potentially serious implications for delivering a successful Brexit. Of course, I understand why this amendment might look notionally appealing, at least—it triggers a greater role for Parliament should any of the deadlines set by the amendment pass without their terms being met—but let me be very clear; this is not an innocuous, measured amendment. It contains a number of constitutional, practical, legal and political difficulties, all of which we should seek to avoid if we are to leave the EU with the best deal possible, which is what the Government want to achieve. Indeed, this amendment would create a profound constitutional shift in terms of which branch of the state holds the prerogative to act in the international sphere, a point so well made by my noble friends Lord Lamont and Lord Howard and by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, from the Labour Benches.
I do not suppose that those who are proposing this amendment are making this suggestion lightly, but I cannot support such a move, as I do not believe that it is in the best interests of the country to redefine the nature of our democracy in this way. It is a well-established feature of our constitution that the Executive represent the country in international diplomacy, and this constitutional arrangement exists for very good practical reasons. In any negotiation, there are judgments to be made as to what can reasonably be achieved. Those judgments can be made only by those engaged on the detail. It would be impossible for negotiators to demonstrate the flexibility necessary for an effective negotiation if they are stripped of their authority to make decisions. That will do nothing but guarantee a bad deal for the UK, which is something I hope we all wish to avoid. If the UK is to be a trusted and effective negotiator, with the EU or anybody else, the Executive branch must be competent to negotiate, just as they are competent to act on their own judgment in other areas of international relations. I speak in strong terms, because I want to demonstrate the seriousness with which the Government take this amendment, its implications and the precedent it will set.
The drafting of the amendment itself is of further concern. It states that a draft of the withdrawal agreement must be approved by the Commons before it can be concluded, but it is not clear what “conclude” means in this context. This may seem a lesser point but noble Lords will understand that we need legal certainty to ensure that the vote occurs at the right time in relation to the process of withdrawing from the EU. We would not want to end up in a perverse situation in which a vote must be offered while negotiations are ongoing, for instance. The vote must happen once the final text has been agreed. Until that point, there would be nothing for Parliament to vote upon, given that ultimately, of course, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.
My Lords, I ask the noble Lord to be careful. He is a Member of the European Parliament and knows perfectly well what “conclude” means: it is the moment at which the two parties to an international agreement, having fulfilled all their constitutional requirements, notify one another that the thing can be brought into effect. There is no doubt about that.
I was a Member of the European Parliament, but I also know that the vote of the European Parliament is in effect a take-it-or-leave-it vote. They do not seek to bind the hands of the Commission negotiators either.
I also question the implications of this amendment on the public’s confidence in our democratic institutions. The scope of proposed new subsection (5) is extremely broad, giving Parliament the power to direct the Government on anything in relation to negotiations: casting back to last week’s debate, it does not even add an “appropriate” or “necessary” restriction. That means directions do not have to be just about negotiating tactics or objectives but could feasibly encompass delaying or thwarting our exit completely, which I believe is the motivation of many of the supporters of this amendment. We should think very carefully about how that could be perceived by the electorate. Such a situation would not be compatible with either the result of the referendum nor the commitments given by many parliamentarians to respect the result. I agree with my noble friend Lord Lamont that this amendment would set a range of arbitrary deadlines and milestones after which Parliament may give binding directions to the Government, up to and including an attempt to overturn the referendum result itself.
Does this give the Government the strongest possible hand in negotiating a good deal? I am afraid that it does not—in fact, the opposite: it would create a perverse negotiating incentive for the EU to string out the negotiations for as long as possible. It is not in the UK’s interest to hand the EU negotiators a ticking clock and the hope that the more they delay, the more they can undermine the position of the UK Government and create damaging uncertainty and confusion. I agree with my noble friends Lord Blackwell and Lord King, who made precisely this point. The amendment would bolster those who wish not to secure the best deal with the EU but rather to frustrate Brexit altogether—a point that was well made by my noble friend Lord Howard.
However, I do not wish my response to be misinterpreted. I do not make these arguments because I think that the Government are somehow not accountable to Parliament. Of course we are. We have made a number of assurances on this matter. For example, there are some who have argued that this amendment is necessary to ensure that there is a vote on the final deal after the negotiations have concluded. I disagree. As my noble friend Lord Dobbs observed, our commitment to that is very clear and is in the best traditions of Parliament. It was made at the Dispatch Box and confirmed in a Written Ministerial Statement and has been repeated many times since.
I will make that commitment once again: the Government will bring forward a Motion in both Houses of Parliament on the withdrawal agreement and the terms of our future relationship as soon as possible after the negotiations have concluded. In reply to the noble Viscount, Lord Waverley, this vote will cover both the withdrawal agreement and the terms of our future relationship, but we have not settled on the precise wording.
Will the Government confirm also that that Motion will be amendable in both Houses?
I am not going to dictate what Parliament might want to do with that Motion or any other. Members will be free to table amendments to the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill.
Will the Minister answer the other question: will it be binding on the Government?
Of course it will be binding on the Government. If Parliament rejects the deal we have negotiated, of course it cannot be implemented.
I ask the Minister to clarify one other point, which we did clarify in Committee: if Parliament rejects this agreement, is the only alternative that the Government are offering leaving with no agreement at all?
If Parliament rejects the agreement, there is nothing for us to legislate further on. It has been rejected. The Article 50 process that Parliament voted for will then kick in: we will leave on 29 March 2019. I repeat that we expect and intend this vote to occur before the European Parliament votes on the deal. If Parliament supports that Motion, we will bring forward the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill—a piece of primary legislation to give the withdrawal agreement domestic legal effect. Of course, that will be amendable. This is in addition to the ratification process that is a requirement under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
Additionally, the Government will introduce further legislation where it is needed to implement the terms of the future relationship into UK law, providing yet more opportunities for further and proper parliamentary scrutiny.
Returning to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, I thought I heard David Davis suggest in a Select Committee the other day with regard to the meaningful vote in the House of Commons that the resolution might be amendable. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments.
I have not seen David Davis’s comments but I am sure what he said was true and appropriate.
This is in line with our belief that primary legislation is the appropriate vehicle for major policy changes, as is evidenced by the fact that we have already introduced Bills on sanctions, customs, trade, nuclear safeguards and road haulage.
These are serious commitments. As recently as last week, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union took detailed questions on the vote on the final deal at the Exiting the European Union Select Committee. He said:
“The Government is unlikely to put a vote to the House that it does not intend to take properly seriously”.
Perhaps that answers the noble Baroness’s question. To discount these assurances is to go against the convention that assurances to Parliament can be relied upon.
Finally, in addition to the problems and complexities I have outlined, the amendment is unnecessary because it is a simple legal fact that, following the amendment made to Clause 9 in the other place, there is no mechanism by which the Government can give the full final withdrawal agreement domestic legal effect without introducing primary legislation.
To summarise, whether intended or not, the drafting of this amendment is problematic. Some of the policy choices in it need to be rethought. Ultimately, large parts of it are simply not fit for purpose. While I suspect that I may not be successful, I strongly urge noble Lords to think again about this amendment.
It may or may not be, but that will be an issue for then. The issue for now, surely, is the negotiations that are taking place and the maximum input and effect that we can have on them.
We need to use every bit of our persuasive powers to change the objectives that the Government seem to have set their red lines on. Not everyone will agree with me on that, but that is where the public debate should be at the moment. I have heard the arguments for a referendum. This is not the time to get the public debate back on to that rather than on the subject of the negotiations. I urge that we abstain on this amendment.
My Lords, I do not know if the noble Countess, Lady Mar, is in her place but I note that the Companion to the Standing Orders makes it clear that:
“Arguments fully deployed … in Committee of the whole House … should not be repeated at length on report”.
I therefore face a challenge today, as did my noble friend Lord Bridges during the passage of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, because we seem to have heard it all before. As he said then and I have said and the Prime Minister has said, our position remains unchanged from the time of the referendum that we will respect that result.
When voters walked into the polling booth on 23 June 2016, they were asked:
“Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”.
This question was put to the public as a result of an Act of Parliament passed by both Houses. The question was not, “Should the United Kingdom negotiate to leave the EU and put the terms of that departure to a further referendum?”—a point that was well made in the excellent speeches of my noble friend Lord Faulks and the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on the Labour Benches.
Some noble Lords—possibly the Liberal Democrats—may wish that that had been the case, but it was not. The public, in the largest democratic exercise ever conducted in the United Kingdom, voted on that simple question and that simple question alone—a point made well by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin. Both sides in the referendum campaign pledged to respect the result; once the outcome of the vote was clear, that meant to leave the European Union. The public voted to leave and they expect the Government to deliver on that, not try to judge what they may have wished the question was. This promise was repeated in last year’s general election in the manifestos of parties commanding more than 80% of the vote and to which more than half the noble Lords in this House are affiliated. It is on the basis of that commitment that we are here today: the Bill is a necessary component of delivering a successful Brexit. Fundamentally, it is about providing legal certainty, for businesses here and abroad, and for citizens in both the UK and EU—which was also a point well made by my noble friend Lord Faulks.
How would the amendment fit in with that purpose? Inserting a requirement for a second referendum would have exactly the opposite effect. This House will be all too aware that a second referendum would require a further Act of Parliament. What would that process look like? What would the question be? What conditions would be attached? Would there be provision for a further referendum if the Liberal Democrats still did not like the answer? How long would it take to get the referendum legislation through the House and what would happen to business, industry and citizens in the meantime?
Furthermore, while we in this House, and in the other place, debate these issues, businesses and individuals will suffer from the uncertainty that it will bring, when what they really want is a continuation of the certainty provided by our successes in the negotiations so far. There would be legal challenges, I am sure, and perhaps clamour for a third referendum, maybe even a fourth—points well made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and my noble friend Lord Dobbs. If we commit to continually looking over our shoulder, to holding a second referendum, we cannot be a strong or reliable partner in the negotiations.
The Minister is making his case by asking for clarification on what the question would be for ratifying the agreement. I ask the Government, however, for the same clarity: what will the question be in the Government’s Motion on a meaningful vote in the House of Commons?
I outlined what the Motion would be last time: it would be to accept the deal or not to accept the deal. No simpler question can be asked.
I am grateful to noble Lords for allowing me to present the clear government position again. I ask the noble Lord, possibly without much hint of success, to withdraw his amendment. He will not be surprised to know that this is not a subject on which we will be reflecting further before Third Reading.
My Lords, in one way, it is difficult to imagine a more pertinent week for this amendment to arrive in this House. It is true that perhaps it would have been better if we had included it in the Article 50 Bill: if when, as we authorised the Government to fire the starting gun on our departure from the EU, we had laid down at that stage the requirement for the negotiating mandate which would have set out our future relationship with the EU and asked for it to be approved by Parliament.
As it turns out, that would have been good for the Government as well as for the country, as it would have forced the Prime Minister at that stage to fashion a mandate to find favour with Parliament: avoiding a further year of disputes, lobbying and, dare I say, manoeuvring within her Cabinet. Indeed, the Government’s dithering and internal party arguments have held up parliamentary work on, for example, the Trade Bill, with 12 wasted weeks’ delay on a crucial Commons vote—the equivalent of a 10th of the time allocated for the Article 50 negotiations. Such uncertainty has left the EU scratching its head as to what exactly the UK wants.
It must also drain the Prime Minister’s time and energy as she seeks to reconcile the irreconcilable within her party rather than putting the country’s interests first. The prime, perhaps the central, job of any Prime Minister is to defend and promote her country’s interests. That is what she should be doing, rather than acting as a nursery teacher controlling unruly youngsters.
That behaviour rolls on. On the one side, she is under huge pressure from within her Cabinet to abandon even consideration of a customs partnership, with, we read, senior Brexiteers “preparing for a showdown” at this week’s Brexit sub-committee. Incidentally, the showdown is in part led by Liam Fox who, in 2012, called for a new relationship with the EU based on,
“an economic partnership involving a customs union and a single market in goods and services”.
At the same time, David Davis was saying that his preference was to remain in the customs union. So their former selves were looking towards that, and your Lordships’ House, by its view on the customs union, has expressed a fear about a physical and regulatory break from our largest trading partner.
We also hear that from businesses, trade unions, environmentalists, those speaking about Northern Ireland and, possibly, from a majority in the House of Commons, where, in due course, there will have to be a crunch vote on the shape of the customs union relationship, in particular. The Prime Minister will not be able to postpone that indefinitely. As the saying goes, “You can run, but you can’t hide”. Part of the reason that that is happening now is because we did not have parliamentary approval for the negotiating mandate at the start of the process.
The amendment demands that the articulation of our future relationship—what the Government want to achieve from the negotiations—should be spelled out and put to Parliament. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, is right in what he says about what that will spell out and what the mandate would include, but why not have it endorsed by Parliament?
We support the amendment, which would ensure that that negotiating mandate, which would cover trade and our future relationship with the EU, is approved not just by what is a rather divided Cabinet at the moment, but by Parliament, which is where the decision should lie.
My Lords, I begin by making it clear that Parliament has a critical role in scrutinising the Government’s negotiating position. It is our responsibility as a Government to provide both Houses with ample opportunities for scrutinising both the approach we are taking to exiting the EU and any implementing legislation—and we are doing so.
The Secretary of State for Exiting the EU has provided an Oral Statement to the House after every negotiation round. He has provided evidence to the Select Committee on Exiting the EU five times, and has appeared before the Lords EU Committee four times. On 29 occasions to date, DExEU Ministers have given evidence to a wide range of committees, from Environmental Audit to Science and Technology. As my noble friend Lord Hamilton observed, the Prime Minister has laid out her intentions for the future economic and security relationship between the UK and the EU in several speeches, most recently in those made in Munich and in London’s Mansion House. Her intentions were also made clear in the seven future partnership papers, where the Government set out their negotiating objectives across a number of areas, including customs, science and innovation. Government Ministers have made a series of speeches laying out their intent for various aspects of the future relationship between the EU and the UK.
The scrutiny received during these parliamentary appearances, and in the multitude of reports from the committees of this House and the other place, have been of great value, and have done much to help inform the Government’s work so far. There has also been a wide range of engagement activity by government with key stakeholders across business, civil society and other interested groups. While there are some who think that Parliament should have a greater role in setting the terms of our negotiations, we simply cannot hold up the already tight negotiating timeline by providing for a further approval process prior to negotiations ending. It must be for the Government, not Parliament, to set our goals for the negotiations on the UK’s exit from the EU, and to conduct them.
As I said in my response to the first amendment that we considered today, the Government have been clear from the start that Parliament will get a vote on the final deal, when Parliament will have the final say on the withdrawal agreement and terms for our future relationship, as soon as possible after the negotiations have concluded. Only if Parliament supports that Motion will the Government bring forward the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill to give the withdrawal agreement domestic legal effect. The Government will then introduce further legislation where it is needed to implement the terms of the future relationship in UK law, providing yet further opportunities for proper parliamentary scrutiny.
Debates in this place and the work of the committees of both Houses represent valuable forums and opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny, and we have used Parliament’s input to shape our approach to negotiations so far. Indeed, I conclude by quoting some wise words from our own House’s EU Committee’s fourth report of 2016-17, titled Brexit: Parliamentary Scrutiny:
“Parliament should not seek to micromanage the negotiations. The Government will conduct the negotiations on behalf of the United Kingdom, and, like any negotiator, it will need room to manoeuvre if it is to secure a good outcome”.
My noble friend Lord Boswell will no doubt not let me ignore the fact that the report goes on to call for the avoidance of “accountability after the fact”, but I hope that the House will agree that the right response is not to go to the extremes of micromanagement by Parliament. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment tonight.
My Lords, I thank all those who took part in this debate, which has continued the theme of this afternoon and early evening about the relationship of the Executive to the legislature. This amendment goes to the heart of that relationship. The fact is that we are in a position where we know what the Government are ruling out very clearly; what we do not know is what they are ruling in. In fact, the debates taking place in the Cabinet, as I understand, this coming Wednesday, show that the Government are all over the show about the objectives that they have in the negotiations about the future relationship.
This amendment seeks to provide the means for Parliament to put pressure on the Government to come up with some clarity. There has been activity, yes—and the Minister laid out the wide range of things that have been going on in Parliament about Brexit—but the crucial issue of the future relationship of the UK to the EU is still vague or wishful thinking or a combination of the two. I think that the Government can do better than that and owe it to Parliament to do better, and this amendment is a way of putting pressure on our Executive and the Prime Minister to do something about that.
I will make a quick reference to the punishment scenario painted by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton. There is a range of things on offer from the European Commission, including membership of the single market and the customs union—many things that would make it business as usual, such as in the EEA and so on. It is our Government who are ruling out those kinds of things, which would provide as much continuity as we possibly can, which seems to be the objective of what the noble Lord was saying.
With all those points in mind, and bearing in mind the hour, I would like to test the opinion of the House on this amendment.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I remain as confident as I was debating the first group that we will reach a positive deal with the EU and that Parliament will want to support it. However, the noble Lord proposes that, in the event of Parliament rejecting the deal, we should seek an extension of Article 50 and stay in the EU. An extension to Article 50 is not for the UK to decide alone. It would require the unanimous agreement of the European Council. This should not come as a revelation to any noble Lords, as this point was made clear before and during the passage of the notification of withdrawal Act.
I do not think it is by any means certain that in the event of having agreed everything, only to find that nothing is subsequently agreed, it would be in the UK’s or the EU’s interest to reopen, for an undefined and potentially endless period, our withdrawal negotiations. I know that many noble Lords take a great and affectionate interest in the European project. It is not right to seek to extend our negotiations and act as a block to the EU’s ability to address its priorities.
Here at home, this amendment touches on the points we discussed in the previous groups today. Again, it is not the role of the legislative branch to instruct the Executive on how to act on the international stage. I realise that EU exit might have changed some noble Lords’ minds on this position, but this would be a constitutional shift potentially larger than our departure from the EU and is not something to be entered into via an amendment at this stage of the Bill.
We are, however, absolutely committed to giving Parliament the final say and, in line with the request in the noble Lord’s Amendment 52, we will make every endeavour for this vote to be held before the vote in the European Parliament. Of course, this House and the other place will also want sufficient time to consider the deal and to debate it. The noble Lord’s statutory commitment to our political goal could place these in tension. As we cannot control the timetable of the European Parliament, if it chooses to rush to a vote faster than would allow this Parliament to properly debate the deal, we would not want to try to force this House to a vote before it is ready.
In reply to my noble friend Lord Balfe, we are engaging extensively with the European Parliament. Indeed, I have met with Richard Corbett, as well as many other MEPs. We have been engaging at a ministerial level, from the Prime Minister downwards. I myself have visited Brussels and Strasbourg and attended many meetings and discussions with numerous MEPs from all of the political groups. I am pleased to tell my noble friend that there is a lot of support for a good and constructive deal with the United Kingdom in the European Parliament. His point is well made. We are engaging extensively with it; I myself am doing so.
As noble Lords will know, the UK and the EU have the shared objective of reaching an agreement by October 2018. That ensures sufficient time for the vote to take place, in both this House and the other place, before the vote in the European Parliament and substantially before our exit day. This vote will have to be prompt to leave the requisite time for the passage of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, to which we are also committed.
I hope that I have reassured the noble Lord of the Government’s commitment to delivering a timely vote and that a statutory direction to an extension to Article 50 is not appropriate. I therefore ask that he withdraws his amendment. Let me make it crystal clear that I cannot give him any false hope that I will reflect further on this issue between now and Third Reading, so if he wishes to test the opinion of the House he should do so now.
My Lords, I have no intention of seeking to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 52 because we have already passed Amendment 49.
I do not know whether I am grateful for that or not, but I made it plain at the very beginning that I would not ask the House to vote on Amendment 52. The House has passed an amendment with similar intentions by a large majority. I trust that the Government will reflect on the implications of your Lordships’ views as expressed in the Lobbies earlier.
Before I seek leave to withdraw Amendment 52, I say to my noble friend that although we share his hopes that the deal will be a good one and we would love to be able to share his expectations, various things have happened that make us concerned. We wish him and his colleagues well in the negotiations. We hope that the House of Commons, in particular, and your Lordships’ House will feel able to commend them, but we do not yet know, and it is important that we have safeguards in the Bill. Although now is not the right moment to press Amendment 62—my noble friend does not give much hope for us on that—I repeat what I said and what the noble Lord, Lord Reid, said in his admirable speech, underlined as well by my noble friend Lord Deben and the noble Lord, Lord Balfe: this is a common-sense amendment which is a logical follow-up to Amendment 49. I am sorry that the Official Opposition do not feel able to commend a vote and therefore I do not think there is any point or purpose in having one tonight, but we shall seek methods by which we can keep this issue on the agenda and have occasion to return to it later on Report, because there are amendments where we can refer to these things again and perhaps at Third Reading, too. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 52.
My Lords, I understand the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. He is concerned, as are many other noble Lords, with the consequences of failing to reach an agreement with the EU or the equally unpropitious scenario of Parliament rejecting the terms of a deal that has been reached. The noble Lord’s amendment goes even further than that tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in that it dictates, rather than leaves open, what should happen next in the event that the UK and the EU do not reach an agreement on the terms of our withdrawal; or if Parliament does not approve the terms of the withdrawal agreement, our notification under Article 50 should be revoked.
As I have explained already today, it is not constitutionally acceptable for Parliament to dictate the conduct of diplomacy in that way. Moreover, we are confident that we will reach a positive deal with the EU which Parliament will support. This is indisputably in the mutual interests of both the UK and the EU. Parliament will have a clear choice: to accept the deal we have negotiated or move forward without a deal. Ultimately, if Parliament chooses to reject the deal then we will leave the EU with no deal in March 2019.
The Government have always been clear what the outcome of failing to reach a withdrawal agreement would be. We are leaving the EU and will leave with a deal or without one. It is not a scenario that anybody relishes, least of all me, but it is also not one that should come as a surprise. The UK voted to leave the EU, Parliament voted to trigger the notification of withdrawal Act and the Government are honour bound to deliver on that instruction. We have been clear throughout that as a matter of firm policy we will not seek to revoke our notice under Article 50.
I therefore hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment. I cannot give any false hope that I will reflect further on this issue between now and Third Reading, so if the noble Lord—
Do I take it from that that the Minister is not going to answer my question?
You can take it from that, yes.
I cannot give any false hope that I will reflect further on this issue between now and Third Reading, so if the noble Lord wishes to test the opinion of the House he should do so now.
Will the Minister please give an answer to the question posed by the noble Baroness?
I am not in a position to share confidential government legal advice on this matter.
Well, no doubt the House has taken good note of that comment and at some time in the future perhaps that information will become available. I am struck by the Minister’s supreme confidence that this course will be followed to an inevitable conclusion, as I am sure many noble Lords are.
As we heard in earlier debates, that may not be the inevitable conclusion. It may well be that the House of Commons in its wisdom not only rejects the deal that the Government have negotiated but in the process rejects the Government themselves. At that point, whether by a general election or some other process, the question may well arise as to the irrevocability of Article 50. Noble Lords have a right to know the advice that has been given because it would be very pertinent indeed in those circumstances.
However, having said that, I believe the question may well be tested in the courts and therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for moving his amendment and giving us an opportunity to speak about this further. We sometimes attach additional epithets to noble Lords in this House, such as “gallant” and “learned”. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, should be the “noble and compassionate” Lord. I appreciate what he is doing. It is for that reason that my noble friend Lady Williams and I have met the noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on a number of occasions. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said that we must be clear about what we are trying to achieve. That has been the purpose of those meetings.
I will state very clearly what we are trying to achieve in the negotiations. The Government have been clear that when we leave the EU we will seek to maintain a close and effective arrangement, including practical co-operation with the EU and the member states on illegal migration and asylum. Combating illegal migration and having efficient and effective asylum systems will continue to be a priority on which we will work closely with our EU partners. As part of that arrangement, and subject to the negotiations, the UK will seek to agree with the EU a series of measures to enable unaccompanied children in the EU to join close family members in the UK or another EU member state, whichever is in their best interests. However, it is important to remember that any such agreement will require agreement and implementation by individual member states.
After the outcome of the negotiations is known, we will bring forward the appropriate legislation as necessary. At that stage this House and the other place will have an opportunity to be clear in their engagement with, and any desire to amend, that piece of legislation. The Government are very clear about what they are trying to achieve in the negotiations. We share the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that family reunification rights for the purposes of considering claims for asylum and the systems to deliver them should remain in place once we have left the EU. There can be no dropped ball, diminution or loss—there needs to be continuity, seamless in its effect. It can be nothing other than that.
In my discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, we spoke about the Dublin III approach. The sad fact is that in many cases Dublin III is simply not fit for purpose. That is perhaps the greatest tragedy of all. Across the EU we look to that as though it sets a benchmark when in truth it is doing nothing of the sort—indeed, quite the reverse. In some instances there is opposition within member states to the functioning of Dublin III. Of course, Dublin III will evolve into Dublin IV, but Dublin IV will not come before the next European elections. That is unlikely simply because of the timetable. It is not for me to draw your Lordships’ attention to what we might expect in those elections but we must be cognisant of them. We have seen in election after election a growth in parties whose views about the wider issues of migration are perhaps not to be applauded and which are quite the reverse of the welcoming approach that we in this Chamber might believe needs to be stressed.
The danger is that we are recognising a benchmark inside the EU that even the EU itself does not believe is fit for purpose. We need to go beyond that. That is why I like to think that we are not seeking to measure ourselves against Dublin III but rather setting in place very clear measures which are safe and sure and address the very matters that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has raised. If we seek to use the EU as a benchmark, we will do a disservice to the very people who would need to draw on these elements. That might seem an odd thing to say, but noble Lords who have spent any time attending to how the Dublin III measure are evolving will recognise that that is one of the central problems.
I am aware that there are challenges ahead as we enter into the negotiations. A number of noble Lords have asked why this is not therefore placed in the Bill. What we are saying is that at the appropriate point these elements will be front and centre of a Bill before the other place and this House, offering exactly the opportunities that your Lordships would wish to have—at the right time. To bring them forward and try to put them into the Bill now—into what is, in effect, a pre-negotiation settlement—will cause us difficulties. That is why we have sought to be as forthright as we can about our intention, our ambition and our method. We do not wish to see these rights undermined or lost; we wish them to be sure and safe. It is for that reason that we have moved in this way. I appreciate that there is a desire to return this to the House of Commons, perhaps with the idea that we can again emphasise how exactly we will take these matters forward. That is your Lordships’ prerogative. I would argue that in the other place the same discussions may lead to a very different result, and that might send a message that this House might prefer not to be sent.
It is a difficult issue, because we are sending, I hope, a very clear message: the UK remains committed to the very elements that the noble and compassionate Lord has brought before us on this and a number of other occasions. We remain committed to them. They will be front and centre in our negotiations, and we have engaged directly with the noble Lord on this matter.
We have also recognised that when that point comes—when legislation or appropriate vehicles are required—there will be an opportunity, in both this House and the other place, to address the very matters that the noble Lord has raised today. On that note, I hope and wish the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment, recognising that there will be further opportunities for the noble Lord to fight with the same passion on this matter, as I do not doubt he will continue to do in the future. I hope, therefore, that he will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the support of Members of the House for this amendment. In a curious way I also thank the Minister for his support for the principle that I am trying to establish.
It seems to me that the clearest message of support for the amendment would be to pass it tonight. Anything else would look as if we were hesitating and not totally certain. I am sure the Minister and his noble friend Lady Williams are quite sincere in wishing to support the principle of the amendment. The signal we send, however, will be a different one. I do not see putting this in the Bill causing any difficulty. We ask only that the Government should have a basis for negotiating to achieve the end that we are talking about. If Dublin III gives way to Dublin IV, the Government will have the flexibility to negotiate on that basis. The proposition is clear, and I ask for the support of the House. I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, the noble Earl has done a great service in bringing this amendment back after a very good debate in Committee. Although much of the focus tonight has been on Erasmus, his amendment actually goes wider. However young people voted in the referendum, and whatever the outcome of the Brexit negotiations, the Government have said that post Brexit they want a closer partnership with the EU. Given that, there is a mutual interest in ensuring that young people enhance the opportunities that they have to work, enjoy, travel and get experience between ourselves and countries of the EU. The Erasmus programme is, of course, vitally important in that regard. The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, can speak with great experience, and he will know that since its start 600,000 young people, mainly, from the UK have taken advantage of it.
The Minister was sympathetic in Committee; he made it clear that the Government would expect that opportunities that arise for mainly young people will continue in future. But I want to bring him back to the point that the noble Earl raised, which was that he said that the Government would need to see what the successor programme was to Erasmus before committing on whether to support it or not. Tonight’s debate is really about encouraging the Minister to say that, of course, first of all, we should be talking to the EU about the successor programme. Secondly, whatever the technical details, it would be inconceivable that this country, one way or another, would not wish fully to embrace the successor to the Erasmus programme. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to signify that because he took a constructive approach in Committee, he will go just that little bit further and give us that kind of commitment.
I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, for the opportunity to discuss these important issues yet again. However, the purpose of the Bill is to provide a functioning statute book on exit day, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. It is our intention that the planned withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will implement the major elements of the withdrawal agreement, which will include the agreement on citizens’ rights. This amendment seeks to make it an objective of the Government to achieve a particular outcome in the negotiations on our future relationship with the EU, effectively tying the Government’s hands. It is focused on the withdrawal agreement, but these matters are for our future relationship with the EU, which this Bill does not seek to address.
We have been clear that, after our exit from the European Union, there will continue to be migration and mobility between the EU and the UK. We have agreed an implementation period based on the current structure of rules and regulations. This will mean that UK nationals will be able to live and work in the EU as they do now until 31 December 2020. Looking to the future, the Prime Minister has set out her vision for our deep and special future partnership with the EU. She acknowledged that UK nationals will still want to work and study in EU countries, just as EU citizens will want to do the same here, helping to shape and drive growth, innovation and enterprise. She made it clear that businesses across the EU and the UK must still be able to attract and employ the people they need, and that the Government are open to discussing how to facilitate these valuable links.
Our science and innovation policy paper, published in September, said that we will discuss with the EU future arrangements to facilitate the mobility of researchers, academics and students engaged in cross-border collaboration. It remains in our best interest to ensure that businesses across the EU and the UK continue to be able to attract and employ the people they need. As has been said many times in this Chamber, and in the other place, we recognise the value of international exchange and collaboration through both work and study placements abroad. That applies to students from the EU and from many other parts of the world as well. Increasing language skills and cultural awareness aligns with our vision for the UK as a global nation. We will continue to take part in the specific policies and programmes which are to the UK’s and the EU’s joint advantage, such as those that promote science, education and culture.
As the House will now be well aware, no decisions have yet been taken on UK participation in the successor Erasmus+ programme after 2020. As I said in Committee, this is simply because the scope of the future programme has not yet been agreed. In response to the specific questions from the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, we have made clear to Parliament our commitment to 2020 and this is detailed on the Erasmus website. I will write to the noble Earl with more detail on his other question. Future UK participation in such programmes will form part of the negotiations on our future relationship with the EU. The Government have been clear that there are some specific European programmes that we may want to continue to participate in as we leave the EU. This will be considered as part of the negotiations. Once again, I also reassure noble Lords that, whatever the outcome of those negotiations, we will underwrite successful bids for Erasmus+ submitted while the UK is still a member state, even if payments continue beyond the point of exit. Therefore, applications for funding from UK institutions should continue as normal—and they are.
For these reasons, I ask the noble Earl to withdraw his amendment, as I think he indicated he would do. However, I am unable to give him any hope that I will reflect further on this issue between now and Third Reading so, although he said he is not going to, if he really wishes to test the opinion of the House he should do so now.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this brief debate and the Minister for his reply. He gave the same reply on Erasmus as he has given previously and it is not good enough. We need to be in discussions now about shaping the new Erasmus programme; otherwise, I am worried that it is going to drift. I am sure that universities up and down the country are extremely worried about this. One thing the Government need to understand is that if opportunities for young people are diminished, we diminish the country as a whole. That is a major reason why we need to maintain these opportunities. These experiences, then, are not only for the sake of young people, important as that is, but society as a whole, because those experiences are brought back and reinvigorate us. We need to keep this going, and indeed expand it, not risk the possibility that we will shut these opportunities down. Young people need to have every opportunity in Europe to develop their future, and we need to allow them to do that. The Government cannot give that assurance. However, with regret, because of the late hour I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Baroness for her comments. Amendment 61, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, but moved by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, seeks to maintain the UK’s participation in the single market if agreement is not reached in the areas of frontier controls, taxes and charges, free movement of goods and services, the digital single market, standardisation and UK involvement in European agencies. As a result of the significant progress made in negotiations, we are increasingly confident that we will secure a deal with the EU and that the prospect of leaving negotiations without a positive agreement has receded significantly.
I will say a little more about our objectives in the areas mentioned in the noble Lord’s amendment. First, on frontier controls, we have thought seriously about how our commitment to a frictionless border can best be delivered. Noble Lords will recall the Government’s clear position on this, which I touched on in my earlier remarks. On taxes and payments, the Government are committed to making cross-border trade as frictionless as possible after the UK leaves the EU and will take the necessary steps to ensure the UK economy remains strong in the future. On goods, a fundamental negotiation objective is to ensure that trade at the UK-EU border is as frictionless as possible. That means we do not want to see the introduction of any tariffs or quotas. To achieve this, we will need a comprehensive system of mutual recognition and the UK will need to make a strong commitment that its regulatory standards will remain as high as the EU’s. That commitment, in practice, will mean that UK and EU regulatory standards relating to industrial goods will remain substantially similar in the future.
As a number of noble Lords have mentioned, the UK’s services sector is a global success story. The Prime Minister has set out the Government’s objective of breaking new ground with a broader services agreement than ever before, with new barriers to trade permitted only if absolutely necessary. We want to agree an appropriate labour mobility framework that enables UK and EU businesses and self-employed professionals to travel to provide services to clients in person. We are open to discussing how to facilitate these valuable links. Given that UK qualifications are already recognised across the EU, and vice versa, it would make sense to continue to recognise each other’s qualifications in the future. An agreement that delivered these objectives would be consistent with the mutually expressed interest in an ambitious services agreement.
We have also been clear that, by virtue of leaving the single market, the UK will not be part of the EU’s digital single market strategy, which will continue to develop after our withdrawal from the EU. This is a fast-evolving, innovative sector, in which the UK is a world leader so it will be particularly important to have domestic flexibility to ensure the regulatory environment can always respond nimbly and ambitiously to new developments.
We will want to explore with the EU the terms on which the UK could remain part of EU agencies, such as those that are critical for the chemicals, medicines and aerospace industries—the European Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency and the European Aviation Safety Agency. We are confident that a deep and special partnership is in the interests of both sides, so we approach these negotiations anticipating success.
In response to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about Dover, Ministers have met representatives from the Port of Dover on a number of occasions, most recently on Monday 23 April. Furthermore, DExEU civil servants have an ongoing dialogue with the Port of Dover and Eurotunnel.
With that information, I hope I have provided a clear picture of the Government’s objectives for negotiating a deal with the EU in these areas and that the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw his amendment. I reiterate that I cannot give any false hope that I will reflect further on this issue between now and Third Reading, so if the noble Lord wishes to test the opinion of the House, he should do so now.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. Apart from the Minister they all expressed concern about the state of the negotiations and where they are going. The Minister gave us a very positive view on how the negotiations were going, to such an extent that one is tempted to believe that by the time the Bill receives Royal Assent they will all be agreed. There is the slight problem that it takes two to agree. As we have heard on many occasions, it is not just the European Commission but the many other European agencies there. If the Minister is that positive and hopeful about all these agreements, it is tempting to argue that he should accept my amendment because it will not be necessary.
However, he did not say anything about the rules of origin, which the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, also spoke to at length—we both read the same paper at the weekend. It is a very serious issue, as he said. Without agreement on the rules of origin I do not think there will be much free movement of goods across the frontier. I do not think we will be able to agree rules of origin in a couple of months. It is a very long drawn-out issue.
I was also concerned when the Minister said that we are having nothing to do with the single market and the digital agenda. If we are outside the digital agenda, we shall have very serious problems in many sectors of trade with the European Union. I rather hope the Government will look at this again. The Minister mentioned the agencies. He did not mention the railways agency this time, but I am sure he mentioned it in previous debates.
I shall read carefully what the Minister said. I will not divide the House at this late hour because we will all fall asleep before we finish, but I know we shall come back to this. Talking to the people of Dover, the harbour board, Eurotunnel and everyone else is one thing; it is probably almost too late to make it work with the massive changes that could happen. I leave noble Lords with a thought: if you live in Kent, near Ashford, and you have continuous traffic jams of trucks on the motorway during Operation Stack, usually caused by either a strike in France or the weather, I cannot see that there will be many people voting for Brexit in Kent by the time this is all over. With that aside, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in Committee many noble Lords raised valuable concerns regarding the use of the consequential power, or, I should say, the misuse of this power. In response to these concerns, and being conscious of restricting the scope of the powers wherever practical, the Government have tabled an amendment to sunset the power to make consequential amendments from 10 years after exit.
I would like to point out that it is unusual for such powers to be sunset. However, given the unique nature of this Bill and the concerns about future Governments abusing the power to make consequential amendments, the Government have taken the decision that it is right in this exceptional case to apply a sunset to the power. The Government arrived at the figure of 10 years as the consequences of the Bill may only come to light long after our exit from the EU. The fact that this period is longer than that afforded to the other powers in the Bill reflects this fact. While 10 years should ensure that the majority of consequential amendments can be made, there is still a risk that some amendments that it may prove appropriate to make could not be made if they were only discovered after this time. The Government believe, however, that the value of sunsetting the power outweighs those risks.
I know that there are other concerns about Clause 17, and the Government have tabled amendments to address those, in particular arranging for negative SIs proposed under it to be sifted. I look forward to debating these on a later day.
I hope that this amendment demonstrates yet again the Government’s commitment to satisfying the concerns of this House, and I hope that noble Lords will welcome this amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I recognise that the Government have moved on this issue, even though 10 years is the longest sunset that I think I have ever heard of in any Bill—it has the quality of a north Norwegian, Arctic sunset, which pleasantly never comes. However, in this case, some date by which to end these rather wide powers is welcome. Of course, the Bill also has the limitation in Clause 17(2). It was the breadth of the powers that led us to table Amendment 85, which was not moved, and it was the Government’s willingness to move on this and some other amendments that made us feel that we ought not to press it. I hope the Minister recognises that any use of these consequential powers that appeared to go beyond what is genuinely consequential would raise the spectre that we had let through excessive powers. He will be well aware by now that this House has become increasingly vigilant about the breadth of powers granted to Ministers. In recognising that the Government have moved on this issue, we have not pursued other amendments.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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No, no; I do not think for one second that this amendment refers to or is about joint authority. What it is about is the recognition that both the British Government and the Irish Government are joint guarantors in international law of the Good Friday agreement. That is what it is about. Also, the agreement itself set up the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which meets from time to time in order to deal with matters of common concern.
To return to the amendment, it rejects a hard border. The word “hard” has been debated by a number of speakers. The Government themselves have attached the description to what they do not want. The Government do not want a hard border, the Opposition do not want a hard border, the European Union does not want one, the Government of Ireland do not and nor do any of the parties in Northern Ireland. None of them wants a hard border, and all this is doing is putting into the Bill what everybody actually wants.
The amendment protects the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which as it happens I steered through the Commons 20 years ago. That set up the Assembly and the Executive and dealt with rights and equality. The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, asked: should we not have the Good Friday agreement in the amendment rather than the 1998 Act? Of course, the 1998 Act incorporated a great deal of the agreement and was based on the principle of the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.
The other issue is that of the north/south arrangements. There is no question, in my view, that those are extremely important and need to be protected as a vital part of the agreement, and they actually deal with millions of pounds of European funding for cross-border projects. All the amendment is about is a guarantee that the integrity of the Good Friday agreement is enshrined in law and put into the Bill.
The actual, real threat to the agreement in Northern Ireland is the fact that there is no Assembly or Executive there. The institutions should be restored. Their absence is the real threat to the Good Friday agreement and one that I hope the Government will work intensely over the next weeks and months to resolve. As parliamentarians in both Houses, we need to protect one of the most successful peace processes of modern times, and I believe that the amendment goes a long way towards doing that.
My Lords, I had a five-page speaking note when I arrived here. I have now written more than 10 pages myself. I am not sure my speaking note will do the debate justice so I will set it aside.
I will try to capture the key elements of this discussion. I will turn, as I often do in matters concerning Ireland and Northern Ireland, to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, who reminded us that we have heard the same words used many times about the Good Friday agreement, to the extent that earlier today we almost had to use a thesaurus to find a replacement for “steadfast” because we have said it so many times. As it happens, the word in the note is “unwavering”, if you are looking for a description of our support for the Good Friday agreement. But the noble and right reverend Lord is correct: we must give comfort and certainty to the people of Northern Ireland that they will not be abandoned, sacrificed, left behind, have their rights trimmed to suit a separate agenda or find themselves in a situation where what they thought they had they do not have at all. I had the pleasure of having a cup of tea yesterday with the noble and right reverend Lord and he spoke about what he called the Ballymena spade—where they call a spade a spade. We need to be clear that there can be no border down the middle of the Irish Sea. We simply cannot create a division between one part of our country and another.
Michel Barnier, the chief negotiator for the EU, has said that there needs to be some adjustment to particular rights and proprieties, that there needs to be some acceptance that we cannot have these things, and that some of the red lines themselves, as the Foreign Minister of Ireland has said, may need to be adjusted in the light of peace and prosperity. But they cannot be, that is the point. So if I was to give a message to Michel Barnier, it would be: “Ecoutez les deux communautés”—you must listen to the two communities in Northern Ireland. You cannot listen to only one of them. Both are integral to what we will be able to achieve on the island of Ireland, and any suggestion otherwise is fallacious and unhelpful. In truth, it risks creating greater uncertainty for this particular negotiation. I would advocate great caution on behalf of Michel Barnier in this regard.
The Minister knows the respect in which I hold him and the job he is doing. I have no wish to have a border which differentiates Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom. But will he accept that the problem was not created by Michel Barnier? The promise to have complete alignment between Northern Ireland and southern Ireland was not made by Michel Barnier, it was made by the British Government. Michel Barnier is doing no more than holding the Government to the promise they made to Europe in the initial agreement, and it is not his responsibility that outside that the Government also promised the DUP—correctly, in my view—that there would be complete alignment between Britain and Northern Ireland. That is the essential problem, because if you have alignment between Britain and Northern Ireland, between Northern Ireland and southern Ireland, and between southern Ireland and Europe, you automatically have alignment between Britain and the European Union; in other words, staying inside the customs union.
I hear the noble Lord, Lord Reid. With the greatest respect, I recognise what he is saying, but the joint report did not have just one element in this regard, it had three elements. The important thing about the three elements is that each must be afforded the ultimate engagement to try to deliver a solution. If Michel Barnier has decided that the first and second are sacrificial elements and he must now focus only on the third, frankly, he is becoming part of a bigger problem.
Michel Barnier is negotiating for the other 27 member Governments. It is not a question of listening to the Northern Irish Catholic community but it is part of his job as negotiator to listen to the Irish Government, who are, after all, one of the 27 member Governments with whom we are negotiating. It is the Irish Government who—perhaps to the Minister—present the problem. We have to deal with the Irish Government, not just the two communities.
If the negotiator Michel Barnier does not hear the people of Northern Ireland, he will be derelict in his responsibilities. He must hear both communities. He cannot listen only to one. It is for that reason that I say again to Michel Barnier: listen to both communities.
It is important to recognise where this journey began. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Patten, will forgive me for not beginning by thanking him for bringing this issue before us today. This is what the Government intend to do, as I am sure he will agree. Many of the elements of the amendment are exact statements of government policy, but the issue is very unusual and it needs to be iterated here. When we look at the lower elements of the amendment, the language is that of political statements, not legislative statements; they are not in the language of legislation. It is on those points that a number of noble Lords have been very clear that they leave a conspicuous ambiguity. It is important to recognise that it is the intention of the Government to return not with ambiguous statements which may or may not be subject to misinterpretation but to return in the appropriate Bill with the exact, detailed language which will give the absolute confidence that we must have in this law. That is why we are unable to support the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Patten, moved so eloquently and passionately. Indeed, all the speakers today have spoken with that passion. Of that I have no doubt.
I was drawn in particular to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice. He was very clear in his assessment of those parts of the amendment I have spoken of. I know that a number of noble Lords have sought to correct him, but I do not believe that he needs correcting. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Bew, said simply that it has a flavour of a joint approach. However you want to look at it, if individuals who live in Northern Ireland are looking at the amendment and expressing their deep unease with it, I would hope that noble Lords would recognise what message that is sending. That is why we must be cautious in the messaging that we send.
In truth, there are two elements to the Bill: the optics and the mechanics. The mechanics of the Bill mean that the Bill must function and give absolute legal certainty. That is its job. The optics of the amendment are wholly commendable in many respects. They are an affirmation and a recitation of the Government’s intention, proposals and policy. But, again, this is not the place for them to sit sensibly and with legal certainty. That is one reason why we have a great problem with the amendment. As a number of noble Lords have asserted, as they begin to look in detail at those elements they are uneasy.
Talking once again of the optics, if the noble Lords in here who have looked at those self-same provisions feel uneasy, imagine then what the message will be on the front page of the Belfast Telegraph when these particular elements are looked at if they are presented in such a fashion that they could be misunderstood or misinterpreted. That is why we are seeking, as we have always sought, absolute and utter legal certainty. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has been clear in all her utterances that we will deliver a borderless aspect on the island of Ireland but the point about this, and the reason why I emphasise it, is that this Bill is not where that will or can be delivered. I am almost channelling my inner Callanan when I say this but, in truth, this is not the right place to be doing that. There will be an opportunity to pick that up.
I shall return to some of the specific points raised. Once again the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has raised a point which I will be happy to respond to in writing. I will make sure that that is absolutely delivered. I hope that I have been able to give words of respect and comfort to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, so that he can take them away and be able to say to people that this is not a place where we can trim—where we can simply take out, manoeuvre or dispense with it.
I listened again to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, whose wisdom is welcome in this debate. He rightly described the fragility of the peace process, echoing the words of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames. It is in its infancy and we need to make sure that nothing whatever can interfere with that. However, I do not wish to see the two aspects here become entangled. That is why many noble Lords have spoken today about the impact these words can have when they are misunderstood—indeed, when they become weaponised in one fashion or another, so that where they land they cause destruction upon receipt. We cannot have that, for that in itself is ultimately destructive.
As I listen to the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, I am aware that there speaks an individual who helped to craft the Belfast agreement itself, as did a number of noble Lords who have spoken this afternoon. Each of them who spoke has echoed the same sentiment. That is worthy of pause and reflection because there is an element, in truth, in what all the Peers from Northern Ireland who have spoken today said: they are uneasy with this amendment. Whatever its optics or its intention, they are uneasy with its component parts.
Can my noble friend reassure the House, then, that “no deal” is now off the table? In a no-deal scenario, WTO rules require a hard border. It is impossible to fulfil the Good Friday agreement if we crash out with no deal.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for her intervention. The clear thing here is, as I believe all sides in this discussion recognise, that if there is no resolution of the joint report’s component parts—A, B and C—then all will be the poorer and the weaker. All will suffer because of that, which is why the important thing here is to ensure that agreement is reached on those elements in the negotiation. It is absolutely essential that those parts are then returned to the other place and to this House for clear discussion and debate at that time. That will ultimately be the key to it.
As I listened to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, I was aware of him iterating the same issues once again. He brings his own experience to them, saying that particular elements of this amendment cause him unease. They cause him to see difficulties which might emerge. The last thing we need right now is for that to percolate through the situation in Northern Ireland, with all its incumbent troubles and all the difficulties which will be in play.
As I speak today, I am very conscious that we need to find the outcome that delivers for Northern Ireland and one that delivers for the Republic of Ireland. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, expressing clearly the danger we have, however, in taking these important elements of where we need to seek agreement and somehow or other turning them into a threat—a method whereby we can seemingly upend or turn over the very things that we are all trying to achieve.
I think it is true to say that anyone who seeks to prognosticate on or forecast Irish politics will almost certainly always be disappointed. There are, no doubt, many greater minds in this Chamber than elsewhere who could do that but the point remains that irrespective of which Government are in power in Dublin, they have to be able to work to deliver an outcome which is good for the Republic of Ireland, just as we are able to deliver that self-same outcome for Northern Ireland, and indeed for ourselves. Listening to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, it was imperative that, as he put it forward, there are elements that need to be addressed now.
I also note the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, who asked whether I can explain how the technology will work on the borders. The truth is that I am a geologist, I am afraid, and I really cannot explain that. I am not knocking geologists; I am fully aware that they know many things. What I am clear about is that this must be returned to the other place, and to this House, to deliver the very things which noble Lords seek. If they are not delivered, I do not doubt that the House will vote it down. That is a clear thing which your Lordships do and it is a prerogative which you will have in this House. That is how it will ultimately work.
It will be important to ensure that the methods which we put forward are understood by all. I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, touch upon the issue of passports and I would like to write to her on those elements, because I believe that they are appropriate to be discussed. There are costs inherent in biometric passports and so forth. If noble Lords will forgive me, I will have an offline discussion to take through some of those elements. In some respects I am conscious, as the noble Lord, Lord Hay of Ballyore, said at the beginning, that this is indeed no laughing matter. I understand that but, in truth, we need to recognise that in each of these elements we must be able to deliver for the people of Northern Ireland and for the rest of the island of Ireland.
I also listened to the noble Lord, Lord Patten, when he spoke of Louis MacNeice’s father, Bishop MacNeice. I am a passionate supporter of Louis MacNeice and a great lover of his poetry. I am aware of the line where he said:
“My father made the walls resound,
He wore his collar the wrong way round”.
He was an extraordinary poet but if your Lordships will forgive me, I will bring to you the words which I believe in this instance might be slightly appropriate, although very cryptic. They are from the poem by Louis MacNeice called “Snow”, in which he was confronting two seemingly difficult and different things coming together: broadly, large flowers in a window and snow outside. He simply said:
“The room was suddenly rich and the great bay-window was
Spawning snow and pink roses against it
Soundlessly collateral and incompatible:
World is suddener than we fancy it.
World is crazier and more of it than we think,
Incorrigibly plural”.
In many respects, as we look at the island of Ireland we need to recognise its plurality. We need to recognise how that island will continue but also, none the less, that this Bill is not the place for that amendment. We remain passionate and unwavering in our support of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. It is enshrined in more than nine pieces of primary legislation and there it will remain.
There will be a negotiation on the joint report—on those three elements—and, in that, I hope that Michel Barnier will be able to respect the views not just of the Irish Government but of the communities of Northern Ireland, whose voices must be and need to be heard. In many respects, I hope that it will be appreciated—
The Minister keeps talking about Monsieur Barnier. Surely his job is to represent the views of the 27; it is the job of Her Majesty’s Government to represent the views of all communities across the United Kingdom, including the communities of Northern Ireland.
The noble Baroness raises her point but I will be clear in my statement in response: it would be daft if he did not speak to both communities. Irrespective of whether he felt that he must speak to only one Government, the resolution in Northern Ireland will depend upon the two communities, not upon the will of two Governments ignoring those self-same communities. It cannot be done on that basis.
I return briefly to the point that we wholeheartedly agree on the sentiments underpinning my noble friend Lord Patten’s amendment. We recognise, however, that those elements towards its latter half are not workable in that form. They are political statements, which are not legally binding texts, but I must say one final thing. If the noble Lord decides to divide the House, I hope he will recognise that it must not and cannot be interpreted in any way such that either side is not willing to give its wholehearted support to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, but rather only to this amendment as it has been defined. Let there be no doubt whatever that the Good Friday/Belfast agreement has our unwavering and steadfast support.
My Lords, we are dealing here with truly technical amendments to ensure that the provisions of the Bill deliver the intended policy. They achieve two things. The first is to clarify how the requirement for regulations made by devolved Ministers under Schedule 2 to be within devolved competence interacts with the principle of severance applied by the courts.
The normal practice would be that when a Minister makes regulations that include, for instance, 10 different provisions, should one of those provisions be outwith the scope of the power, the courts would not strike down the regulations as a whole, they would simply sever the offending provision and allow the remaining nine provisions to stand as law. Some concerns were raised that the requirements in the Bill might imply that this standard practice should not occur. The amendments therefore make it clear that when a provision is outside devolved competence, only that provision would be ultra vires and not the whole instrument in which the provision is included.
The second purpose of the amendments is to allow for a devolved Minister and a UK Minister acting jointly to make provision that would not be in the competence of the devolved Minister acting alone. It has always been the Government’s intention that the Schedule 2 powers can be exercised jointly to allow us to work together in areas where we may need to make the same or related changes to retained EU law and so that, where appropriate, those changes can be subject to formal scrutiny and approval in both this Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature.
We believe it is right that, for instance, where a UK Minister and a Welsh Minister jointly make regulations in relation to a matter that concerns the England/Wales border, those regulations can include both the provision for England and the provision for Wales, even though it would not be within the Welsh Minister’s competence to make the provision in relation to England if they were acting alone.
We will also be bringing forward at Third Reading a number of further drafting changes to permit combinations of instruments beyond what is normally possible, reflecting the level of joint working that will be needed in relation to these powers. I will be speaking to the Government’s Clause 11 amendments shortly, when we reach the group beginning Amendment 89DA. I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that we have a number of further groups to get through on other parts of the devolution provisions before we reach that debate. The amendments provide what I hope to be welcome legal clarity. They reflect standard practice and the mechanisms for good, collaborative joint working between the Administrations. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation of these technical amendments. Can he say whether there is agreement among the devolved Administrations and the UK Government on these amendments?
My Lords, at last we have reached this stage, although I find it a little off-putting that we are coming to consequential, technical matters before we look at the meaty issue; but that will come, as was said.
I would like to pay the respects of those on our Benches to the serious way in which the Government have contributed through the joint ministerial group to the success of the proposals, and thank them for bringing them to us now. I would also like to thank Mark Drakeford from the Welsh Government and Mike Russell from the Scottish Government for the part they played, even if the latter has thus far been unable formally to sign up to the inter-governmental process. As the Minister said, we are going to discuss Clause 11 and neither of us can wait for that. It is coming in more detail later this evening. However, we on these Benches recognise and appreciate the progress that has been made. We have come a long way since the Bill was published and it is against that backdrop that this and subsequent groups of amendments should be considered.
The Labour Party has always been the party of devolution. While we will be watching the Government’s treatment of the devolved Administrations very closely throughout the Brexit process—that is our job—we recognise the genuine progress that has been made and welcome the amendments in this group. They allow United Kingdom and devolved Ministers jointly to exercise powers in Schedule 2 in order to make provisions that could not be made by a devolved Minister acting alone. This clarifies the use of so-called composite instruments, as the Minister said, and we hope paves the way for collaborative working between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government.
Other amendments in the group improve the position regarding ultra vires provision within instruments made under Schedule 2. I believe that the devolved Administrations previously raised concerns with the Government as to whether the courts would permit those parts of an instrument that were within competence to remain law. We are glad that Ministers and officials have responded positively to the appeals from the devolved bodies and that the amendments provide greater clarity for all involved. The group amounts to just one piece in the jigsaw puzzle. I usually start my jigsaws with the edge pieces. This looks like putting a piece in the middle and working around it in due course. It is a piece that these Benches are happy to support.
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, and note his comments. The amendments will provide not only clarity but a much needed flexibility when it comes to the application of the schedules.
With respect to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, my understanding is that both devolved Administrations were content with the proposals. Indeed, much of the force for the first group of amendments came from them. I hope that satisfies noble Lords.
My Lords, to be clear, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, indicated that he was not going to move Amendment 89, but government amendment 89AA was to follow from that amendment so I would just like to address our amendment in order to avoid confusion. I am afraid that this is like one of those smart restaurants where you get a series of amuse-bouches before you get to the main course.
Amendment 89AA replicates the restriction that we have already applied to Clause 9 on the withdrawal agreement power in relation to imposing fees and charges for the corresponding power for devolved Ministers. This follows exactly the same rationale as the Clause 9 power. It has never been our intention for these powers to be used to impose fees; that is the preserve of the bespoke Schedule 4 powers, which are exercisable by devolved Ministers and should be subject to the limits that apply to those powers. This same restriction has already been applied to both the correcting power in Clause 7 and its Schedule 2 equivalent. The devolved Administrations were informed in advance of our intention to apply this restriction to that power and have agreed to its effect, so I hope noble Lords will support the amendment.
I turn to Amendment 89DA and the group that follows it. I thank noble Lords for their constructive engagement on this important issue during the passage of the Bill. The Government have now tabled a comprehensive set of amendments to Clause 11. We have worked with the Scottish and Welsh Governments to develop them, and noble Lords will recognise that we have drawn heavily on their consideration of our initial amendments in Committee. I put on record our thanks to this House, and to the Scottish and Welsh Governments for their endeavours in crafting these amendments. We are immensely pleased that the Welsh Government have agreed this approach and I am of course disappointed that the Scottish Government have not. I hope they will sign up in due course.
The intention behind Clause 11 as originally drafted was to provide maximum legal certainty across the UK to our communities and businesses after EU exit in areas that are subject to a common EU framework. As the Welsh Government aptly put it,
“it is essential to provide legislative continuity at the point at which the UK leaves the EU”.
We know, of course, that the EU has common legislative arrangements across a vast range of areas, but we must now decide in which policy areas we may need to continue those common arrangements legislatively, informally or not at all. To provide the time to do that work and provide assurances that there would not be immediate divergence across the UK, the original Clause 11 sought to freeze the law in all those areas.
We are all familiar with the views of the devolved institutions on this clause, and of course the Government have accepted the case for a more targeted and proportionate approach. This has been supported by the work that we have been doing with the devolved Administrations on assessing these current frameworks. Since we agreed the framework principles, which set out why common approaches may be needed across more than one part of the UK, our Governments have worked closely to analyse those policy areas that sit across devolved competence and EU law.
Noble Lords will recall that in March we published our initial analysis. It demonstrated that our work with the devolved Administrations indicated that legislative frameworks may be needed, in whole or in part, in only 24 of the 153 areas that had been identified, and 82 areas could be managed through more informal, non-legislative arrangements. The remaining 49 areas would likely require no further arrangements at all. We also agree that where common approaches are needed, they cannot all be designed and implemented by exit day. So it continues to make sense to maintain existing frameworks and provide certainty over which areas may be subject to change in the future, but we can and should do this in a more measured way.
Our amendments in Committee set out targeted mechanisms for doing so, following discussions with the Scottish and Welsh Governments. We have carried forward the basic proposition from Committee and have built on that in the amendments that we have put forward today. Our amendments would see powers returning from the EU in otherwise devolved areas pass directly to the devolved institutions. Where a common legislative framework may be required, we propose to freeze the current arrangements to provide the time to establish our own framework for the UK. This would apply only to those policy areas that have been explicitly frozen through regulations, rather than across all policy areas where EU law currently creates common frameworks. That was the proposal that we put forward in Committee and that we had been discussing with the Welsh and Scottish Governments. We withdrew our amendments because discussions with those Governments were ongoing and we were committed to continuing them. Our Committee proposal was a substantial, but not a final, offer. It meant that noble Lords were able to debate the very latest proposition and inform those discussions.
One theme raised here and by the devolved Administrations was consent. The devolved Administrations thought it right that there was a role for the devolved legislatures in deciding whether specific areas should be the subject of a freeze. We also heard that in the debate in this House. This House agreed that a role for the devolved legislatures was important in this process, but that it must be balanced against preserving the right—indeed, I would say, the responsibility —of the United Kingdom Parliament to act, where there may be a cross-United Kingdom impact. Only the UK Parliament can do that.
The Government listened carefully to the submissions on this matter and reflected them in discussion with the devolved Administrations over Easter. We have amended the Committee proposal. We shall seek to agree which areas should be subject to a freeze. This is part of the bigger frameworks question that we continue to progress.
We should also have the view of the devolved legislatures, not just the Administrations. Our amendments ensure that, before the UK Government may lay regulations in draft in this House, they must have sent them to the devolved Administrations and sought the consent of the legislatures. The devolved legislatures will have 40 days in which to decide whether to give or withhold consent for the regulations. Only after that decision is given or the 40 days have passed can the United Kingdom Government lay the regulations before Parliament. This process is built on collaborative working. It favours agreement for freezing areas, but also recognises that if agreement cannot be reached, it must be for the UK Parliament to decide what is in the interests of the UK as a whole.
We believe that this approach should minimise areas of disagreement, as we have also developed a comprehensive intergovernmental agreement that supports and complements the legislative amendments we are considering today. It emphasises that we will work on these regulations together and in advance of sending them to the devolved Administrations formally.
Where there is unavoidable disagreement and the United Kingdom Government consider that they must proceed in the absence of consent from a devolved legislature, UK Ministers would be under an express legal duty to provide this Parliament with a Statement, and, if provided, a statement from the devolved Administration on why consent was not being granted. The UK Minister will be under a duty to explain to Parliament why the Government consider that they must proceed without that consent. Parliament will decide on the case presented: whether it is indeed in the best interests of the United Kingdom to freeze a specific policy while we implement new arrangements.
I should also remind noble Lords of the additional reporting duties on UK Ministers. I do not wish to repeat the detail that I provided to the House on them in Committee. Needless to say, they ensure heightened accountability by providing transparency to the process of developing frameworks, the use of the regulation-making powers and where frameworks are maintained in the short term. They will also require us to report on those principles that underpin this work, the principles agreed between the United Kingdom, Scottish and Welsh Governments at the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year. Through this, our work on future frameworks is open to the scrutiny of this Parliament and of the devolved legislatures.
The other key change to the amendments that I should mention, as compared to the proposals that noble Lords considered in Committee, is the addition of sunset provisions for both the new powers and the regulations made under them. This was raised explicitly by noble Lords in Committee. We have always said that any freeze under Clause 11 would be temporary. The amendments place that beyond doubt by making it explicit in law.
I am grateful to noble Lords for the constructive manner in which they have engaged with the question of sunsets. In particular, I must give due credit to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for the tenacity with which he has pursued this, including by tabling his amendments. I hope that he will be satisfied that his concerns in this respect have been addressed and will feel able not to press those amendments.
The powers last for only two years from exit day. This aligns them with the other powers in the Bill and makes certain that they will not be an ongoing mechanism for limiting competence. The regulations will also be time-limited. We have had in-depth discussions with the devolved Administrations on how long is needed to determine and implement our future frameworks. We have settled on a period of five years from when regulations come into force.
I am most obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I am essentially moving a series of very complex and extensive amendments to the Bill, from Amendment 89DA through to Amendment 92AD, with consequential amendments from Amendment 89DB through to Amendment 117C. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has moved his own amendments on sunsetting constraints, which I shall address; and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has moved extensive amendments from Amendment 89DAA through to Amendment 92BBA—and, indeed, could have extended his Motion for amendment further than that, I suspect.
At the heart of this lies a simple principle. The EU has developed and maintained a single market for the benefit of the members of the Union. As we exit the EU, we are anxious to maintain a single market for the benefit of the union of the United Kingdom. That is what it comes to. In doing that, we must of course respect the devolution settlement and the position of the devolved entities and parliaments, whether in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland—even though at present it is not sitting as an Executive, which we acknowledge.
I am not going to address the original Clause 11. Noble Lords have expressed their views on that and I do not need to either add to them or necessarily rebut them; we are anxious to move on, and to move this amendment. What are we intent on doing? Well, I would counter the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, that this is a power grab. Such rhetoric has been thrown about before, of course, and I do not feel that it would advance matters to engage with that sort of rhetoric. I just remind noble Lords of the terms of the amendment itself. If your Lordships have the Marshalled List of amendments, at page 7—or, for the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, page 8, where it refers to Wales—I simply read out proposed new Clause 30A(1):
“An Act of the Scottish Parliament cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law so far as the modification is of a description specified in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown”.
We know that there is then an elaborate process for the making of those regulations; the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, referred to the stages that would be gone through in the making of those regulations. Let us then look at subsection (2):
“But subsection (1) does not apply to any modification so far as it would, immediately before exit day, have been within the legislative competence of the Parliament”.
There is no intention here to intrude upon the existing legislative competence of the parliaments. But of course, as powers come back, it is necessary to consider which of those powers have to be maintained in order that we can have a functioning internal market in the United Kingdom. That is the objective and what we seek to do. All powers pass to the devolved Administrations on exit day where no regulations have been made under the proposed amendment. That is the right policy outcome that we have agreed with the Welsh Government and which we still seek to agree— I emphasise still—with the Scottish Government.
That takes us on to the question of how the frameworks have been arrived at. Noble Lords will recollect that, at the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year, the principles to be applied were agreed by all those attending: the Welsh Government, the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government. I just add in response to a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, that where he finds reference in the amendments to “principles”, that refers to the principles that were agreed at that stage and are carried over in the agreements. At the present time, we have identified 24 areas of retained EU law—or what will be retained EU law—where we require frameworks to maintain an internal United Kingdom market. There is debate about some additional areas, which will have to be addressed in due course. We have focused our attention now on 24; it may be fewer at the end of the day, as we talk our way through them, because they apply only to particular areas of policy, not to one general area. We are not talking about agriculture or fisheries, we are talking about discrete aspects of these policy areas that are perceived to be necessary in order to maintain the UK internal market.
Perhaps before I move on, because a number of noble Lords have raised the point, I should address the question of how the regulations will operate. That can be seen from the proposed amendment, and there are two elements to it. Proposed subsection (7) says:
“No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day”.
That is the first period of two years. If no regulations have been made in respect of what is perceived to be a necessary framework, no regulations will be made. Proposed subsection (9) says:
“Any regulations under this section which are in force at the end of the period of five years beginning with the time at which they came into force are revoked in their application to any Act of the Scottish Parliament which receives Royal Assent after the end of that period”.
Therefore, in so far as we have not taken that forward, these powers will then revert to the appropriate authority.
It seems that we have an explanation. Were officials of the Scottish Government involved in that and, if in-depth work has been done, would the Minister help the House by publishing it?
I am not in a position to say that such work would be published, because of course it has been on the basis of engagement between officials dealing with this. I do not believe that there is any official report to that effect; it is just a matter of the product of engagement between officials negotiating these matters. Therefore I cannot indicate that we will publish anything in that regard. That is to try to explain the position with regard to the sunset clauses in the regulations. I turn to the question—
The Minister was about to tell us about the gap my noble friend introduced between exit day and the making of the regulations.
I am obliged to the noble Lord. There may be a situation in which powers go to the devolved Administrations and yet they do not deal with those powers, and it may be considered that upon further consideration there are additional areas where frameworks ought to be based on a UK-wide determination and where regulations would be made. But as the noble Lord himself observed, that regulation-making process would involve us consulting the Scottish and Welsh Governments—and, I hope at that stage, a Northern Ireland Executive—so that we could secure their consent. Only if there was a failure to secure the consent would the matter go forward to this Parliament, with two clear safeguards. First, the Minister of the Crown would have to explain to Parliament why he was seeking to make those regulations without the consent of a devolved Administration, and secondly, there would be an opportunity for the devolved Administration to make their representations to this Parliament as to why they felt it appropriate to withhold their consent. But, as I said, there may be a period after exit when it occurs to parties that it might be appropriate to proceed in that way.
Turning to the question of where we are with the Scottish Government, I begin by saying that the door—
Before the noble and learned Lord moves on, did I miss it or has he answered the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, on when the sun will rise before it spins across the sky for five years? When does it start? Is it with the particular regulation?
I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. My understanding is that the five-year period will commence from the point at which the regulation is made.
So in practice we could be looking quite a long way ahead—it is five plus X.
I am tempted to mention here the noble Countess, Lady Mar.
But I will not. If the noble Lord wishes me to elaborate on the operation of the sunset clauses, I would be quite content to write to him. At this stage, perhaps I can continue—with the encouragement of the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths—to address the question of the Scottish Government.
We are extremely grateful that we have achieved consensus with the Welsh Government and will be able to take this forward with their wholehearted agreement. I will come on to one or two points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, in a moment. As far as we are concerned, the door is still open for the Scottish Government, and we would be anxious to see them come through it so that we can take this forward with the agreement of all the Administrations in the United Kingdom. However, we are where we are at the present time. As regards their proposed amendments, they would, by different routes, result in a situation in which one of the devolved Administrations would effectively hold a veto over the implementation of UK-wide legislation for the maintenance of the UK internal market. That, I respectfully suggest, could not and would not be appropriate.
The exit from the EU raises complex questions with regard to the construction and application of the Scotland Act 1998 because, in 1998, such an exit was never contemplated. Reference has been made to Schedules 4 and 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 and the mechanisms for their amendment, but, as we were reminded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, those are not the only mechanisms that impact upon the competence of the Scottish Parliament. We have to look at the terms of Section 29 of the 1998 Act, which as the noble and learned Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Mackay, observed raises issues with regard to territoriality in respect of the competence of the Scottish Parliament. I do not want to go into the detail of that at present, but one notices that its competence is limited in that respect, and by reference to EU law as well. Therefore, we do not consider that, at the end of the day, we can appropriately accept a situation in which the devolved Administration can exercise a veto over the exercise of power by the United Kingdom Parliament in situations where it is being exercised for the benefit of the UK as a whole. I hope that that goes some way to explaining, without looking at the complexities of the 1998 Act, why we do not feel we are in a position to accept the position expressed by the Scottish Government on this point.
We simply regret the fact that, despite the very significant efforts—I underline “significant”—of the representatives of the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government in producing an outline agreement, it has not been possible to persuade the Scottish Government to join us on that point.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, suggested that this might reflect a lack of trust. As I have observed on previous occasions, this is not an issue of trust. This is an issue of constitutional propriety. Whatever view one takes of the devolved settlement and of where we are with regard to the legislation on that, at the end of the day it is not appropriate to accept that one of the devolved Administrations could effectively exercise a veto over legislation for the benefit of the other members of the Union—namely England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
I thank the Minister for the detail in which he is responding to this debate and the work that he has undertaken. None the less, there may be issues such as the sheep meat regime, which we have used in a number of circumstances as an example where the differential impact of policies in one area such as Wales may be much greater than the impact in other areas. To that extent, the wishes of the Welsh Government in that context should have a greater weight, in the same way as when Welsh Ministers represent the UK in the Council of Ministers to discuss the sheep meat regime. Is it not possible to fine-tune the Government’s proposals to enable that happen?
With respect, I must say that it is our clear intention, which is reflected in the memorandum of understanding in the agreement, that we will engage with the devolved Administrations in the consideration of these framework agreements and their application. Of course, these matters will be taken into account at that stage. But I do not consider it appropriate to bring that sort of granular detail into this Bill, which is designed for a very specific purpose. I hear what the noble Lord says and, clearly, we wish to proceed on the basis of mutual respect and understanding with the other devolved Administrations.
In that context, I underline the point in response to a query raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, speaking, I understand, on behalf of the Scottish Government who are not otherwise represented in this House. There is no question of this process under Clause 11 being somehow the thin end of the wedge so far as the devolution settlement is concerned. The devolution settlement is a reality of our constitutional situation and one that we extended under the 2016 Act, really quite recently, in light of the Smith review. We continue to respect, understand and wish to apply the devolution settlement. But it is a devolution settlement that has to work for everyone in the United Kingdom. I return to the point that it cannot work for everyone in the United Kingdom if one devolved Assembly or Government assume that they have the ability to exercise what amounts to a veto over legislation that is relevant, pertinent and important to the entirety of the United Kingdom.
I move on to address one or two additional points raised by noble Lords in respect of these matters. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, referred to finance and whether the Welsh Government had missed a trick. I do not believe that they did for a moment. Indeed, they put themselves one step ahead by embracing this agreement and the amendment. But the noble and learned Lord raised a point about funding. He is right to point out that our agreement for the Welsh Government does not speak to funding but that is not to say that funding has been forgotten or put to one side. Clearly, it is a matter that will be addressed. We recognise the importance, for example, of the Barnett formula. We understand why there is concern, particularly about agricultural funding under CAP Pillar 1 under the current EU budget that runs to 2020. We have provided a degree of certainty by promising to continue to commit the same total cash funds for farm support across the UK until 2022. At present, the Secretary of State for the Environment is in close discussion with his counterparts in the Welsh and Scottish Governments on exactly how our agricultural systems should work outside of the EU. I stress that that is not a matter for this Bill. This is the Bill that provides for our exit and our exit alone, so I hope that the noble and learned Lord will accept that. He raised the question of public procurement—again, these issues are not for this Bill but we are clearly conscious of them and they will have to be addressed.
The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, also raised the question of whether further areas might be the subject of reservation under the freezing provisions of the amendment. We have identified 24 areas for frameworks but a number of other areas that could be the subject of regulations going forward are still subject to discussion. I acknowledge that. Noble Lords may recollect that we published the list of frameworks and included not only the 24 areas I have referred to, but a further 12 where there is ongoing discussion about how they will be addressed and resolved.
I am conscious that I have not answered every question that has been posed. If noble Lords are concerned that I have not addressed a point that still concerns them about Clause 11, as amended, I would be content to receive their queries and write to them. In the event that I write to any noble Lords on this issue or any issue relating to this clause, I will place a copy in the Library. I seek to reassure noble Lords on that point. With that, I will formally move each amendment. I am sorry—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has to reply.
My Lords, it is for me to say what will happen to my Amendment 89DAA, which is an amendment to Amendment 89DA, moved by the noble and learned Lord the Minister.
I want to make a few short points. First, I want to pick up on a remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that he will not accept the opprobrium that was visited on the Scottish Ministers for the way they conducted themselves in these negotiations. Having had discussions with Michael Russell and the Lord Advocate—like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—the points I put forward in my introduction to my amendment were sincerely held. Those points were not made to cause trouble. The Lord Advocate in particular gave advice on his reading of the Scotland Act; Michael Russell, for his part, was entirely genuine in his points about principle as well. That should be clearly understood.
When I was in practice at the Scottish Bar, I was junior to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As he pointed out, if I appeared with him, I would speak first; it would then be his function, as my senior, to speak second. Quite frequently, I found that when he spoke, he refined the kind of argument that I was attempting to put forward. It took on a slightly different—rather more attractive, perhaps—appearance after he had refined it. As he pointed out in his speech, the points that I made about the construction of Section 30 and the other sections do not really apply in the situation with which we are dealing here. I was grateful for his remark that the situation is unique and not seeking in any way to undermine the devolution settlement. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for making the same point that there is no question of this being the thin end of the wedge or in any way seeking to undermine the devolution settlement, to which he wishes to adhere. These remarks should help a lot in reassuring those in Scotland on how they should approach the continuing discussions. I was glad to hear from the Minister that the door is still open; I think that the Scottish point of view still regards the door as open too.
Perhaps this debate has refined things and shown that the purist argument—that of principle—does not really apply here. This is not about trying to construct the market that we were trying to construct in 1998, which was done by separating out the bits that mattered for that market into Schedule 5 so that they were clearly identified. We are dealing with a different, rather more subtle, situation in trying, as the Minister said, to create a functioning internal market with what has come back to us from Europe. That requires a rather more subtle approach that is not really dealt with in the Scotland Act, for understandable reasons. That being so, I hope very much that the way forward will be pointed by our discussion this evening. Without any further ado, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I intervene to raise a point that I have spoken to the clerk about. Noble Lords might recollect that earlier in the evening I gave a passing imitation of a rabbit in headlights. The reason for that was that it appeared to me that the amendments in group three had been moved and agreed without me speaking to them—which is absolutely ideal, as far as I am concerned. They are highly technical amendments, but I felt I should mention that to the House, lest any noble Lord wishes me to speak to them. As I said, they have been agreed, but noble Lords did not have an opportunity to hear my dulcet tones on the subject.
My Lords, I have put my name down in support of the amendment. The arguments which led me to do that are those which I set out when I was moving my amendment earlier this evening, so I need not take up the time of the House in repeating them. What I said earlier is the full explanation as to why I put my name down.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his amendments, which are pertinent given the different positions of the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the imminent timing of votes in their legislatures that will address consent.
The Government have been clear that they wish to make the positive case for consent for this Bill. We have not just talked about our commitment to making that case but have shown it. We have engaged in extensive discussions with the devolved Administrations and have now introduced the amendment to Clause 11 that we have just discussed at some length to try to meet the expectations of the devolved legislatures. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will accept that our commitment to the legislative consent process is reflected in the agreement that we struck with the Welsh Government last week.
This is the legislative consent process in action. We have put forward policy objectives; we have worked through the differences, and we have found an appropriate compromise. As a result, the Welsh Government have recommended that the National Assembly for Wales grant legislative consent to the Bill when it votes on this matter, I believe, on 15 May. The Welsh Government agree that our amendments now strike the right balance between providing legal certainty and maximising assurances to the devolved legislatures on how we will jointly manage the process of powers returning from the EU in otherwise devolved areas. Of course we are disappointed that we have not been able to reach the same agreement with the Scottish Government, but this, I suggest, is not for want of trying. I stress again that time remains for the Scottish Government to join this agreement, so that we can all demonstrate that we have done what we consider to be the responsible thing in this context.
I ask for one point of clarification from the Minister. Does he not accept that there is a real danger of confusion in the public mind between allowing a consent order and actually getting consent? In other words, the process can be one where consent is given, is not given or is refused, but whichever of those three outcomes it is, the process can still go on for a parliamentary resolution here by order; and we know that orders, in the House of Commons and here, go through on the nod most of the time. Is that not a deception, giving the impression that there is a consent mechanism when, in fact, it is a pretty meaningless one?
I simply do not accept the noble Lord’s characterisation of the matter. It is clearly the case that where consent, for example, was sought and not obtained, it would be necessary for the Minister of the Crown to address that, very clearly and specifically. There would be the opportunity, as there always is, for the devolved Administration to make their own views clear as to why they had declined consent. I do not believe that this is in any sense deceptive, misleading or a mirage. These are constitutional requirements that are adhered to and that will be adhered to. It would not be appropriate to introduce the sort of amendment moved by the noble Lord that would, in effect, tie the hands of this sovereign Parliament, so far as this exit process is concerned. Whatever view one might take about the merits of exit, that is neither here nor there. This is a constitutional principle with regard to the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom when it comes to legislate for the benefit of the entirety of the United Kingdom. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, and indicate that I would not expect to return to this matter at Third Reading.
I am very grateful to the Minister. I have heard that form of words from his colleagues in the past. Clearly, this is a matter on which there may be a difference of opinion. I realise the need for there to be coherence on a UK scale but there are matters which have a specific effect in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland where their interests need to be taken into account. Clearly, we are not going to make progress on this tonight. Therefore, on the basis of the discussion we have had, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank noble Lords who have participated in the debate; we all agree it is very late in the evening for such an important issue. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for bringing this to the attention of the House and putting his case very crisply. We have already debated possible structures for the UK Government and devolved Administrations to come together in consideration of common frameworks. I do not want to simply repeat those arguments, particularly at this time of the evening, so I will not.
It is important to note that the Government are currently reviewing the existing intergovernmental structures with the devolved Administrations, as agreed by the Prime Minister and First Ministers at the meeting of the JMC plenary on 14 March. It is important that the review closely aligns with our work on future common frameworks. That undertaking was given then, and it is something that we are looking at.
I note a certain irony in the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, that, had this been on the statute book, I presume he would have been championing our agreement with the Welsh Government and saying that it was effective because two Administrations out of the three had agreed to it. Nevertheless, despite that very handy point, I must say that I cannot accept what he is arguing for—not for that reason, obviously, but for others.
We have shown that we are flexible in responding to the devolved Administrations’ requests or concerns regarding the operation of the current structures, including on the management of meetings and the content of discussions. We have all benefited from that process. Why would we not want that to be the case? I believe the pragmatism and flexible approach that we have seen, particularly from the Welsh Government—but, yes, extending certainly to Mike Russell’s approach—is something that has benefited us all. However, we do not agree that the solution would be for intergovernmental relations to be placed on a statutory footing, as suggested by the noble Lord, particularly in this amendment. In all fairness, I think he anticipated this point in saying that he realised that it would not perhaps find total favour with the Government, a point on which he is correct.
That said, we hear much of the failures of our intergovernmental structure and no doubt it could be improved, but we do ourselves a disservice if we do not also recognise its successes. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, very much for her kind comments about the Government’s approach and about me particularly; I am very grateful for that. She noted that the JMC (EN) has been very effective. It now meets frequently under the chairmanship of my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who has also continued to meet his counterparts frequently between meetings. Indeed, the committee has met today and has made some progress.
We should note that it is through the effective working of the committee that we have been able to make the progress that we have on Clause 11, and it is through this that we have reached agreement with the Welsh Government on the proposals before noble Lords today. Like other noble Lords, I place on record our thanks and our respect for Mark Drakeford, a competent Minister in the Welsh Assembly—not someone with whom I would agree politically on many occasions but he has shown a flexible, pragmatic and collaborative approach. This is grown-up politics in devolution days, and that is the way to move things forward. There was evidence of some of that approach in Scotland as well, to be fair, but ultimately, as we have noted, the JMC is not a decision-making forum. Its role is just to make an agreement that then goes elsewhere—for understandable reasons. That is something else on which I disagree with the noble Lord; I do not think it can be a decision-making body. I can see the use of bringing people together, which we are doing. It is flexible, and that is the way our constitution operates.
I note the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. Some I would agree with, but I cannot really think of anything more chilling than putting it on an inflexible statutory basis, other than the earlier prospect when the noble Lord talked about his appearance in Aberdeenshire in a kilt. That was probably somewhere along the same lines—somewhat chilling. On a serious note, though, I have to say that although I agree it is good to have bodies where we can discuss these issues, flexibility, as this has demonstrated, is of great use.
We must, as we are doing, foster a culture of collaboration, close working and, yes, compromise, which we have seen in the discussions. That is the way to move things forward in the sort of structure we have in our country, in the make-up of the four nations.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that England is the dog that does not bark—or has not so far. I agree with him on the absence of the word “England” in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. Obviously, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who, as we know with Gordon Brown, does not need to represent an English constituency, is Prime Minister of the whole of the United Kingdom. That perhaps exhibits the difference between me and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for whom I have the greatest respect. He perhaps let the cat out of the bag on that point: he or she is not Prime Minister of England but of the whole state.
That said, some important points that we will want to consider have been made this evening. I noted with seriousness the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and have sympathy with the need for some structure that underpins the union. As unionists, we would applaud that. I have always said that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is at the acceptable end of Plaid Cymru—he sees the sense of the workings of the union—and I thank him for his input, which I know is well made.
I turn to some points made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis—off piste but I will happily pick them up—about the Committee of the Regions. Perhaps other noble Lords will confirm this, but I believe that I have written to noble Lords about a meeting that not I but my honourable friend in the other place, Rishi Sunak, had with leaders of local government. That meeting has taken place. If noble Lords have not received the letter yet, it means that it has not yet gone out, but it is certainly in the system. It indicates that it was a positive meeting and that there would be more.
Here we go into the devolved structures that are now very much part of our system. The noble Lord will appreciate that on devolved matters, the Welsh, Scottish and—when that part of the country is up and running with power-sharing—Northern Ireland local government leaders will be in discussion with the devolved Administrations. That is of course a matter for them to take forward. We are taking it forward with all local government leaders, but, in relation to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, only on those matters that are reserved to us. It was a positive meeting—the letter will outline the progress made—but there are to be more meetings. I cannot remember saying anything other than that, and that is all I am able to convey at this stage.
With that, at this very late hour, I thank noble Lords for their contributions on serious issues. I will ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who made some very technical but, I am sure, valid points, gets a full response. I respectfully ask the noble Lord, who is my noble friend in personal terms, to withdraw the amendment.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bourne. I take the opportunity to thank him for—
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for giving way. One thing I forgot to say, which I know he will be anticipating, is that we will not be coming back to this issue. I know that he was probably coming on to the fact that I had not said that, so let me say now that we will not be coming back to this at Third Reading, so if he wishes to press the issue, he should do so now.
My Lords, seeing the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, sitting next to the noble Lord, I took that as read at this stage of the debate.
I wanted to put on record my appreciation and thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, for the consultation and the opportunity to discuss various aspects of the Bill. I hope that we can take advantage of that in future. I also thank everyone who has taken part in the debate—the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who has stood up so effectively for England, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—for their contributions.
I have just a couple of quick points. Of course, there needs to be thought about how England comes into any such structure, but the same argument exists now as it probably did 100 years ago: whether it is England as a whole or England on a regional basis, and how that interplays when you have national units elsewhere. That needs to be thought through.
I will obviously withdraw the amendment in a moment, but I hope that out of this debate, two avenues of thought can proceed on the post-Brexit situation. One is, what will become the equivalent of the Council of Ministers when we have a multinational United Kingdom as a single market? Thought needs to be given to that, and it may be something that can be pursued outside.
Secondly, if we cannot put the JMC on a legislative basis, how can we at least make it much more formal and therefore more effective, so that it plays the role it has the potential to play? As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, outlined, it has not always done so as effectively as it should. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, might be able to sow the seeds of thinking on that in other parts of government, and that we do not allow the water just to run into the sand from this short debate tonight. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
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(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I am delighted to speak in support of the key Amendment 93, to which my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith added his name and which was moved so biblically and effectively by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds. Of course, at that time, I had not only a brilliant legal adviser on my right, but a theological one—my noble friend Lord Griffiths—who has now left the Chamber. I said, “I have to have a biblical quote”, but I am afraid he has a sense of humour and said, “The people who were wandering aimlessly in the pre-Brexit wilderness were soon squabbling among themselves, ignoring the advice of their leader”, and so on. But I will leave my noble friend’s helpful comments for another time.
I say this particularly in answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and my noble friend Lord Adonis. This is an important and meaningful amendment because it would restrict the pretty wide powers given to Ministers in the Bill. That is why we need to pass it. We have on a number of occasions, on this Bill and the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, expressed our surprise that nowhere in the referendum process—in the immediate aftermath, nor in this legislation or any other—did the Government ever spell out that the Article 50 process automatically triggered our exit from Euratom. I will not repeat the costs and dangers of that eventuality given earlier debates on it, particularly the input at that point of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson.
However, equally unremarked on and unmentioned by the Government, or by the Brexiteers during the campaign, was the similar removal of the UK from a swathe of agencies, many of which, as we have heard, we helped to construct and all of which have served this country well. Colleagues will already know, from medical researchers who have been in touch, patient groups, health professionals and the pharmaceutical industry, of the risks of being outside the European Medicines Agency, quite apart from the loss of jobs and specialisms that are now moving to Holland. But the same could be said about the European Food Safety Agency, often referred to, but not today, by my noble friend Lord Rooker; the environment agency, emphasised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and my noble friend Lord Whitty; the railways and aviation agencies, often referred to by my noble friend Lord Berkeley; the European Chemicals Agency, which has been mentioned; and, of course, Eurojust, suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and Europol, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack.
The commonality is that any mention of those agencies in this House and beyond has included a plea for us to remain members, associates or partners with whichever such agency is in the frame. Sometimes this means following the same rules—as the Government have now accepted for clinical trials—to assist in monitoring; for safety; for easy and rapid transport, as for medical isotopes; to facilitate trade and exchange; to enable skilled persons to undertake checks or repairs; or, as my noble friend Lord Haskel said, to guarantee safe products for users and consumers.
For some of the agencies it might mean paying money in, as the Prime Minister acknowledged. For some it might mean harmonising assurance, governance or penalties for rule-breaking. But for all it will mean a willingness to adapt and respond to requirements, usually simply to maintain our existing rules and practice. What is clear is that, given the wide powers in the Bill for Ministers, we must ensure that none of those powers is used to frustrate our continued involvement with such agencies, whether because, for example, we set different sanctions for breaches, raise fees or charges in a different way that makes it difficult to move along in their way of working, or apply variant rules or any other similar change. That is why it is critical to circumscribe the powers in the Bill so that they cannot be used to prevent us having necessary EU rules or ways of working that would frustrate our participation in any of these agencies. We do not want the powers to be used for that reason, hence the very simple amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, had it right: the Bill should not be used to frustrate the intention, should that be the Government’s wish, to stay in these agencies for the good of the whole country. It is, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds said in his introduction, entirely in line with what the Prime Minister said in Mansion House and it would allow this country to continue such relationships where that continuation is in the national interest.
My Lords, I understand the sentiment behind Amendment 93 tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds— I assure him that I am not one of those who regard him as a hypocritical remoaner. However, I must make it clear that the Government consider its inclusion in the Bill to be both completely unnecessary and totally inappropriate.
Once we leave the EU, this Parliament—and the devolved Administrations, where appropriate—will be free to change the law where they decide it is right to do so. As such, nothing done by this Bill, or any other Act of Parliament, can bind the actions of future Parliaments. A provision which essentially provides that future Parliaments can mirror EU law, which this Bill neither requires nor prevents, is therefore completely unnecessary. Nor does the Bill prevent Parliament approving any future relationship between the UK and the EU, including its agencies and institutions.
If the intended effect of the amendment is to preserve the sovereignty of Parliament, it is also completely unnecessary. The amendment may have been tabled with one eye on the withdrawal agreement, but my ministerial colleagues and I have been clear throughout the Bill’s passage, both within this House and in the other place, that its aim is just to create a functioning statute book as we depart from the EU—a point well made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. For the avoidance of any doubt, the Bill does not seek pre-emptively to legislate for or against any final withdrawal agreement or future relationship with the EU. On this point, I am surprised to find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, probably for the first time in the Bill’s passage. On this narrow point, he is right. Incidentally, we have accepted many amendments put forward in this House and by its committees. We have tabled more than 100 amendments responding to concerns raised by various Members of your Lordships’ House, so it is not quite true that we always reject everything that is said.
My Lords, there will be further opportunities for the noble Lord to accept amendments in due course, particularly on membership of the single market.
We will come to that debate later.
Let me make it clear: if there is a role for any EU agency as part of the withdrawal agreement, it will be legislated for under the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill which we are planning to introduce later in the year. The same principle applies to the future relationship which will, as necessary, be legislated for in due course.
The inclusion of this amendment would make this position less clear than it is at the moment. It may also create an odd presumption that, since the Bill does not prevent the amendment’s intended effect being achieved, the specific inclusion of the new clause would mean that the UK will seek to mirror the laws of the EU after our departure or to continue its current participation in EU agencies. That may not be the right reverend Prelate’s intention, but the amendment could be read as going even further and attempting to save, or partially save, the European Communities Act for the purposes of mirroring changes in EU law after exit. If that is the case, it could be seen as allowing a wide discretionary power to keep pace with EU law. This would also be a wholly inappropriate approach when we do not yet know the outcome of the negotiations.
As I have highlighted during our previous debates on the Bill, the UK has a long-standing tradition of ensuring that our rights and traditional liberties are protected domestically. The UK leads the world in many areas in setting and upholding high standards across our statute book; for example, in areas such as consumer protection, environmental standards and workers’ rights—a point well made by my noble friend Lord Baker. I believe that all Members of Parliament, in this House and in the other place, are invested in the continuation of this legacy. It is in Parliament that we are better able to address and legislate for the specific needs and ideas of the UK.
In our negotiations, we are seeking a deep and special partnership with the EU, and our relationship with its agencies and bodies is being evaluated on this basis. I assure the House that where there is a demonstrable national interest in pursuing a continued relationship with an agency or other EU body, the Government will carefully examine whether we should pursue this. In response to the questions raised by my noble friend Lady McIntosh, participation in the European Environment Agency is of course a matter for the negotiations, but if we do negotiate participation we will, of course, make the appropriate financial contribution.
Will my noble friend help the House in one respect? I am trying to understand whether the amendment in any way obliges the Government to do anything or in any way prevents them doing anything. It seems to me entirely neutral in its effect. Can he help us?
I think I covered that in what I said earlier: we believe it to be unnecessary and pointless.
Going back to my noble friend Lady McIntosh’s questions, the second question she asked me was about contracts of employment of staff employed in those agencies. Of course, these are a matter for those agencies, but the rights of those UK citizens, as UK citizens in other EU countries, are guaranteed in the agreement we reached with the EU in December. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked me about the membership of agencies ending in March 2019. As set out in the agreement reached in March, during the implementation period common rules will remain in place and the UK may continue to participate in EU agencies where the presence of the UK is necessary and in the interests of the Union or where the discussion concerns acts addressed to the UK and its citizens.
In conclusion therefore, while I fully understand the intentions behind the amendment, I do not believe that anything would be gained from its acceptance in the Bill, apart from confusion.
Before the Minister sits down, can he help me on one matter? I am sure there is an easy answer to it. The Bill is exceptional in its regulatory power. Whereas I see the strong force of what is being submitted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, I wonder if it has the effect of curtailing these very wide Henry VIII clauses.
I do not believe that it does curtail our powers under the SI provisions of the Bill, on which we have had separate, long discussions.
In conclusion, I do not believe that anything would be gained from its acceptance in the Bill apart from confusion and uncertainty. I therefore hope that the right reverend Prelate will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and all those who have spoken in the debate. I often find myself changing my mind when I hear good argument but I cannot assure the House that I have done that in this case. The Minister referred to the sentiment behind the amendment, but it is not sentiment: what I offered was a rationale, not a sentiment. The intention behind it is as I stated in my speech. I take the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Baker, about “common sense”, but every time I hear the phrase I begin to worry. Usually, common sense is so common and so thinly spread that it does not always apply in the specific, and as they say, the devil lies in the detail. So I am not sure that it is enough just to be sure that things will continue, or that we can continue to hope.
The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said that it is not good for businesses and so on to be in the wilderness. I totally agree, but my point in using that metaphor is that we are, whether we like it or not, going to find ourselves in some sort of wilderness, because it will take a long time to work this through. It will not be that suddenly on day one, whether we stay or leave, everything in the garden is rosy. I am just being realistic about that. Finally, I find the repeated charge that this House is trying to impose on the Government, or tell the Government what to do, tiresome. It seems to me—I may be simple—that the remit and responsibility of this House is to send back to the Government and to the other House arguments that may make them think again. Otherwise, we have no purpose. So, while I take the comments seriously, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, we have just debated an important issue, and later I shall turn to some other very substantive matters. Nevertheless, I ask for a moment of the House’s time while I make the case for the five government amendments in this group, especially for the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who apparently does not believe that we are tabling any amendments to the Bill.
These are all consequential amendments on the status provisions that we debated on day two of Report, and which I am pleased to say that the House accepted without a Division. I know the House will look again at these complex provisions at Third Reading but, as I said on day two, I hope there will be no further amendments beyond anything that relates to additional matters where the distinction between primary and subordinate legislation is important, and therefore we should insert that distinction between retained principal direct EU legislation and retained minor direct EU legislation.
Amendments 93A, 93B and 93C clarify types of legislation that are included in the definition of “enactments” in the Bill. This definition includes a non-exhaustive list of enactments. The new status clause provides that enactments are to retain the same status as they had before exit day. The intention behind the provision was to address the concerns of some noble Lords about the effect that the Bill has on domestic legislation via Clause 2 and whether it changed the status of that legislation. As part of the Government’s commitment to ensuring clarity and certainty, we have tabled the amendments to make it clear that these additional types of legislation all continue to have exactly the same status that they had before our exit from the EU. The amendments clarify that Church Measures, Orders in Council made in exercise of Her Majesty’s prerogative and devolved enactments made in exercise of the prerogative are within the definition of “enactments” and therefore will retain the same status that they held prior to exit day. The Government have of course consulted with the Church of England, the Palace and devolved authorities before tabling the amendments. The amendments also make it clear that in the highly unlikely case that any of these instruments are related to the EU and contain deficiencies, the Government could correct those deficiencies if appropriate, although in these cases it is likely that others would use their own existing mechanisms to so do.
Amendments 112BA and 112BB simply insert the new definitions of “retained principal direct EU legislation” and “retained minor direct EU legislation” into the Interpretation Act so that the terms do not need to be defined in future legislation. I hope noble Lords will find nothing to object to in this group, and I beg to move.
My Lords, I understand and am grateful for what the Minister has said about the purpose behind the amendments. He is quite right that, for example, the first three amendments identify as enactments things, including Church Measures, that would normally be regarded as such but were not included. My question for him is simply this: he said in moving the amendment that one of the advantages of the amendments would be to enable deficiencies, if there were connections with EU law, to be corrected through secondary legislation. Could he explain how these amendments will enable that to be done? I did not quite follow that.
As I said, we think it is highly unlikely that any of these instruments that are related to the EU will contain deficiencies. If appropriate, we could use secondary legislation powers to correct those deficiencies but, as I said, in virtually every case it is likely that others—the devolved Administrations, the Church and so on—would want to use their own existing measures to do so.
My Lords, I will restrain myself from entering into a longer debate on this issue. I agree with my noble friend Lord Grocott that this is an important Bill, but it will also affect the negotiations, and part of that will be affected by the timetable.
It is interesting that at various times when we have discussed the promised vote on the final deal—it is not just a matter of leaving but of our future relationship with the EU after we have left—the Minister has said that he hoped that the vote, in both Houses, would take place before the European Parliament has had its say, but that he could not definitely promise that it would, because our parliamentary timetable might not be flexible enough to fit in with that of the European Parliament. I cannot say that I accept that argument, because after all, we control our business and when we have votes—not necessarily how late at night they happen, but effectively we control our timetable. However, if the Minister was correct in the assumption that the European Parliament’s vote might not be at a predictable time—it may be delayed because talks are still going on—it may suddenly be brought forward.
Here, I will answer the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Butler. It seems essential that the deal has to be agreed before April, when the European Parliament will go into recess, because under Article 50 the deal has to be agreed and have the consent of the European Parliament. If the European Parliament is to recess, adjourn or prorogue before its elections, the deal has to get consent before then. Therefore, there is a timetable, and it has to go before the European Parliament. I have had various legal advice about what happens if the European Parliament does not give its consent—it seems quite complicated—but certainly Article 50 says that it has to give consent. Therefore, the negotiations could go on a bit later than everyone wants, and the European Parliament will have to prorogue for its own elections and will have no authority thereafter. The date on which we leave could be fixed by the words in an Act of Parliament which will be passed in August or whenever, some months after those events, and that seems a very unhelpful position for our negotiators to be in.
I am sure that there will be late-night sessions and lots of consultations, with people ringing back for instructions as the negotiations go on—there are people who have been through all this. I hope that we have trained the Minister well in coping with late nights here, because he may well have more of those, but there could be very long nights as the negotiations go on. If one side—our negotiators—were curtailed by a strict date in the Act, that would put us at a disadvantage. The other side is not so constrained. The European Parliament can meet at very short notice when a decision has been taken.
However, I interpret Article 50 slightly differently. It says:
“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after … notification”.
So, without having to go to the Council for a unanimous decision, the withdrawal agreement could contain a leaving date of a week or two weeks after the two-year period, which would allow the last-minute arrangements to be made. If that is what the withdrawal agreement specifies, if that suits all the parties and if our Government would like to sign up to it, it would seem silly not to be able to do that.
It is important that we enable the negotiators to get the best possible deal, setting out exactly how we leave and exactly what our future terms of trade will be. If the amendment is passed, it will remove the straitjacket that the Government inserted at the behest not of the negotiators but of certain ardent Brexiteers. Let us remove that straitjacket, make the task easier for the negotiators and reflect what our own EU Committee said:
“The rigidity of the Article 50 deadline of 29 March 2019 … makes a no deal outcome more likely … enshrining the same deadline in domestic law would not be … in the national interest”.
I am sure that the Government want to put the national interest first and I certainly believe that this House will want to do so. Therefore, we strongly support the amendment moved by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and we urge everyone to go into the Lobby behind him.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. Exit day has been discussed at length throughout the passage of this Bill. Set dates such as this are often crucial to the functioning of any legislation, but I would like to take this opportunity to remind noble Lords of the particular importance of exit day in this Bill.
Exit day is the moment in time when the European Communities Act is repealed. It is the point at which EU laws are converted into UK law, when the deficiencies in retained EU law emerge and when a range of other effects are triggered under the Bill. However, I reiterate that exit day within the Bill does not affect our departure from the EU, which is a matter of international law under the Article 50 process, as my noble friend the Duke of Wellington and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, made clear. What it does affect, however, is whether we leave the EU in a smooth and orderly fashion.
The definition of exit day, and how it is to be set out, has been amended significantly since the Bill was introduced to the other place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on 13 July last year. My noble friend Lady Goldie has previously described the sequence of events which led us to the current drafting and I will not test the patience of your Lordships by repeating the arguments she made in Committee. What I will say, however, is that, crucially, the Bill left the other place reflecting the reality of international law under the Treaty on European Union. I see no reason, therefore, to change the Bill any further. The final drafting also reflected the concerns of Members of the other place who had been on both sides of the referendum campaign. That fact sits at the core of my opposition to Amendments 74, 95 and 99 in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington.
As has been stated on many occasions during Report, this House reviews the legislation sent to it by the other place and highlights—often very well—areas where it does not think due consideration has been given. This point was well made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, as a leaver from the West Midlands. As a leaver from the north-east, also an area underrepresented in this House, I have considerable sympathy with his arguments. I therefore cannot why these amendments are seeking to restore something like the original drafting of the Bill when that drafting was considered at great length, on many occasions, and was rejected by the other place.
I also do not agree with Amendment 96 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. The Bill is designed to provide continuity and certainty in domestic law as we leave the EU. This must be true in a scenario where we have a deal with the EU, but it must also be true in the unlikely event that there is no agreement between the EU and ourselves. While this is not what anybody on either side is hoping for, it would be irresponsible and out of keeping with the remainder of the Bill not to prepare for that unlikely event. In that circumstance, it would be vital that the Bill did not make reference to concepts which are contingent upon a successful negotiated outcome, such as an implementation period. That would prevent the Bill achieving its objective as agreed at Second Reading, because in that scenario further primary legislation would be required to alter exit day and provide for an operable statute book. Even in the Government’s preferred scenario of a successfully negotiated withdrawal agreement, including of course an implementation period, the noble Lord’s amendment presumes that no substantive provisions of this Bill will be required until the end of that implementation period.
While I do not want to be drawn into a discussion about the legal construction of the implementation period, which will be a matter for the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill—I have no doubt we will have great fun in our opportunity to consider that—I do not think that the noble Lord can be certain in his assumption. This is the real issue with the noble Lord’s amendment: it attempts to use this Bill to legislate for the implementation period. But the Government have been quite clear that the implementation period will be a matter for the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill once we have agreement. This Bill is deliberately and carefully agnostic about whatever deal we strike with the EU, prejudging neither success nor failure in negotiations.
Of course, we hope and expect to be successful in these negotiations, and our continuing progress demonstrates good movement towards that goal. I hope that noble Lords will reflect the compromise reached by the elected House, and therefore I respectfully ask the noble Duke to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I will respond first to the pertinent question from the noble Lord, Lord Butler. I did not mean to imply that, under the Article 50 process, there could not be a longer extension. I just feel that, as a practical matter, it is unlikely to be practical to extend for more than a few weeks, because the European Parliament will indeed be dissolved in late April prior to the European elections in May 2019.
“Anything which is retained EU law by virtue of section 4 | Section 14(6A)” |
My Lords, this amendment deals with a point that we raised and discussed in Committee. It may be that this group will not take too long, although that will depend upon what the Minister has to say. The important point about this is that the Bill as drafted would mean that at the moment Royal Assent was given, certain things would happen, including that the jurisdiction of the CJEU would come to an end. We raised the point that, given that it appeared likely that during an implementation period the Court of Justice of the European Union would continue, by agreement, to have certain jurisdiction, it would be important not to see the CJEU’s jurisdiction fall off a cliff edge, as it were. It may be that the noble and learned Lord the Minister will be able to reassure us that they will deal with this so as to ensure that if the CJEU continues to have jurisdiction in certain circumstances—which, as I say, I believe is a likely outcome of the continuation of the discussions—the Bill will not have taken away the ability to do that.
Amendment 109 would not allow Clause 6—which, among other things, brings the CJEU’s jurisdiction to an end—to come into effect until,
“the expiration of transitional arrangements agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union”.
The amendment focuses on transitional arrangements that are in fact agreed, not hypothetical arrangements. It would achieve no mischief because transitional arrangements would in fact be agreed and we would be saying simply that the jurisdiction of the CJEU should not come to an end until the end of that period.
The Minister may put forward some alternative way of achieving the same effect. I will listen very carefully, as will other noble Lords, to what he has to say about that. For the time being, I beg to move.
My Lords, in light of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord in moving this amendment, I will make one observation at this stage in response to his invitation to me.
Part Four of the withdrawal agreement so far agreed between the United Kingdom and the EU sets out:
“During the transition period, the Union law applicable pursuant to paragraph 1 shall produce in respect of and in the United Kingdom the same legal effects as those which it produces within the Union and its Member States and shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the same methods and general principles as those applicable within the Union”.
That would mean that during the implementation period—assuming that that is actually agreed—the CJEU will continue to fulfil the role it currently does with regard to the UK’s legal structure. This effect will be provided for under the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. I do not know whether that assists the noble and learned Lord but that is the position as set out.
I add only that given the terms of the noble and learned Lord’s amendment—and I appreciate that it has been deliberately framed in this way:
“A Minister of the Crown may not appoint a day on which section 6 is to come in force unless this day follows the expiration of transitional arrangements agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union”,
if that amendment was passed, it would throw into doubt what would happen if there were no transitional arrangements. That is not an outcome that we seek but it is a distinct possibility and would mean either that Section 6 did not come into force at all or that potentially we would be thrown back into the billowing mists of uncertain inference. So I have that objection but I thought it might assist noble Lords if I made clear our position with regard to the implementation period. I hope that that responds to the noble and learned Lord’s observation.
My Lords, I cannot agree with the point raised by the Minister about the wording of the amendment. The amendment says that a day may not be appointed,
“unless this day follows the expiration of transitional arrangements agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union”.
If in fact no arrangements have been agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union, it would seem that effect could be given to the amendment.
Be that as it may, the important point is that, as I understand it, the Minister has said two things. He has said, first, that if an implementation agreement is agreed, it will include continuing jurisdiction of some sort for the Court of Justice of the European Union and, secondly, that the Government will make sure that that jurisdiction is provided under the terms of legislation to be brought forward; I think the implementation Bill is what the Minister has in mind. If that is right and the Government are telling us that they intend that legislation will incorporate a continuing jurisdiction if that is agreed, that would deal with the mischief that this amendment was designed to deal with.
If that is the position—it would be very helpful if the noble and learned Lord could confirm whether it is—I would then be able to beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I am watching his body language but I have been fooled by that before, so I would be grateful if he clarified whether what I have said is right.
It is of course the position that there is no certainty that there will be an implementation agreement. In that event, I would seek to differ with the noble and learned Lord about the interpretation of his amendment but that is a matter of little moment, I agree. However, in the event of there being an implementation agreement that follows the terms of the withdrawal agreement in outline, which noble Lords have seen, then during the transition period the Union law applicable pursuant to paragraph 1 will produce the same effect in the United Kingdom as in the remainder of the EU. That would extend to the jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect of the matter of the interpretation and effect of such law. The noble and learned Lord is quite right that it would be the intention of Her Majesty’s Government, in those circumstances, to ensure that such a provision was expressed in the withdrawal agreement Bill.
My Lords, in those circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the House has heard the pleas of the heart if not of the head. I think I have said before that, although I was born in Germany, I sadly do not qualify for a German passport or else I would be doing the same as many others. So many people are doing it because they fear and regret losing their EU citizenship. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quite rightly said, in the treaties EU citizenship is an add-on. Only people who are citizens of a member state have EU citizenship, with all the rights, protections and consular protections that brings. They have to be a citizen of a member state. Sadly, that change will come and we will not be EU citizens.
I would like to leave a thought with the Minister. We have not treated the whole of this aspect sufficiently seriously. We have not reached out to EU nationals living here and to people who are losing their rights as EU citizens. We have still not told EU citizens living here—unless I missed it—whether they will be able to continue to vote in our local government elections. We know they will not be allowed to vote in the European Parliament elections—that is fairly obvious—but there are other changes that the Government have been very lax and slow in spelling out.
The plea behind some of the feelings that we are having is to listen to the current EU citizens. If there is one plea that I would leave with our negotiators, it is that we need a withdrawal deal that puts citizens at its heart, not as an add-on, and that we should do everything that can be done to keep the links that we already have with agencies, education and so on. That would help to make a withdrawal deal that would enable British citizens, even if they will not have that lovely treasured purple passport, still feel as if they are continentals—full associates, if you like—with the rest of the EU.
My Lords, this is of course an important issue that has already been covered in depth, both in this Chamber and in the other place. I welcome the opportunity to discuss it further with the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, when we exchange views on the interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, particularly Article 70 thereof. I acknowledge fully his interest in this area, the depth with which he has examined it and the importance that he underlines with regard to this matter.
Nevertheless the position remains, as summarised eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, that there is no provision in EU law for the concept of associate EU citizenship. It is clear that EU citizenship is tied to citizenship of a member state. The European Commission itself has referred to the additional rights and responsibilities attributed to the nationals of EU member states by virtue of EU citizenship, which they automatically attain under the provisions of the EU treaties. I emphasise the EU treaties because to take such a matter forward it would be necessary to contemplate the amendment of the EU treaties in a quite radical way, in order to attempt to confer on citizens of non-EU members the status of EU citizenship or something connected to it. However, we are willing to listen. Noble Lords may recollect that the European Parliament mentioned the idea of some associate citizenship; it has never elaborated upon that but if it wishes to, we are listening, and we would listen to that. I wish to make that clear.
The position of the Republic of Ireland emerges as the consequence of bilateral treaties that predate our entry into what was then the EEC and Ireland’s entry into the same, and that is not directly affected by our exit from what is now the EU. My understanding is that those arrangements continue in force.
With regard to the wider issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—the matter of voting rights, for example—during the course of the earlier negotiations we attempted to negotiate with regard to the exchange of voting rights, but at that stage the Commission declined to do so. That is something that we would wish to carry forward but the Commission was not prepared to engage in that discussion at that stage of the negotiation. Again, we remain open on these matters.
The citizens’ rights agreement reached in December, which is now set out in the draft withdrawal agreement, provides certainty for UK nationals in the EU regarding their rights following our exit. The agreement with the EU protects the rights of EU citizens and their family members living in the UK on exit day and indeed vice versa. To that extent, it will give citizens certainty about a wide range of rights including residence rights, healthcare rights and pension and other benefit rights. That will mean that UK nationals who are legally resident in the EU by the end of the implementation period will continue to benefit from most of the rights that stem from their EU citizenship today. As I say, associate EU citizenship does not make up part of the citizens’ rights agreement, and indeed by attempting to make it a negotiating objective we would be setting ourselves what is, frankly, an impossible target. The consequence would be that, should the amendment pass and the Government fail to adopt such an impossible negotiating position, our entire post-exit statute book would be put at severe risk. There would appear to be no sensible point in attempting to do that.
I stress that with regard to this matter we are in listening mode. Reference was made to the suggestion of further litigation in this area. A case is going on in Holland at present. It was referred by the Dutch Government to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has heard the appeal and is due to deliver its judgment later in June. We do not believe that is going to affect the matter at all but we await the judgment of that court. At present, though, we must proceed with the ultimate goal: to deal with Brexit in the easiest manner possible so far as citizenship is concerned.
My Lords, could the Minister tell us what the case at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal is?
My Lords, it was an application about the rights of certain UK citizens resident in Holland having rights post Brexit in Holland. The objective of the case was clearly to secure a reference to the CJEU for the interpretation of certain treaty matters. When that proceeded, it is my understanding that the Dutch Government then intervened in the proceedings and they were the subject of a hearing before the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. That matter is not yet advised, so that is where it stands. I am afraid I cannot give further details of the case but I understand that it was partly funded by lawyers in the UK. I hope that assists the noble Lord.
As I say, at present we, the EU and the Commission are quite clear on what the concept of EU citizenship means, that the source is the EU treaties, and that there is no provision at present for associate citizenship. If during the course of negotiation the Commission or other bodies in the EU come forward with such proposals, we will of course listen to them. At this stage, though, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has taken part in this debate: the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, Lord Dykes and Lord Green, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Ludford, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. It has been a short but worthwhile debate. Some of those participating in it have seen weaknesses in the amendment, and I accept that there is room for criticism in that direction and that it is a challenge with regard to the status quo within which we are operating.
None the less, I feel that some benefit has come out of the debate, in that the Minister has indicated that the Government would be in listening mode, both in terms of the negotiations that are going on and in terms of what may or may not come forward from the European Parliament itself on this matter, bearing in mind that Mr Verhofstadt has indicated fairly strong feelings in that direction. If it were possible for some form of associate citizenship to develop out of this—if indeed we leave the EU, which I would regret but is likely to happen—that could retain our links for the period while we are outside the EU directly, I am sure that would be of interest to a large number of people, particularly to young people, as has been mentioned in this debate, because they identify with the European dream. The European dimension is part of their identity and they would like to have some access to it in a more formal way. On the basis of the comments made by the Minister, which I welcome as far as he was able to go, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
It is not a shame. What were the words? “Kindness, care and consideration”. It is because we share the objectives of that best possible deal that we should make sure that our mandate and agreement serve the whole country, the economy and the regions. At this stage, we should not support one particular approach to that. I urge the House to abstain on the amendment.
My Lords, before I address the amendment I will say a brief word, if the House will permit me, about the previous group, which we did not get a chance to speak on. I did not have the opportunity earlier to announce that the Government intend to consult further on ambulatory references—about which I am sure noble Lords are concerned—particularly in relation to contracts. Subject to the outcome of that consultation, further legislation might be brought forward under the consequential powers in the Bill.
We intended to cover this under the previous group of amendments, as my noble friend said. This is a very important although highly technical area, transposing European law into English law for the sake of contract agreements. Under the way this is currently phrased in the Bill, there is a danger that the UK version of the EU law would be transposed into EU versions of EU law. The amendments are concerned with consulting on how this can be avoided, so that international contracts made under UK law can continue to be made under UK law for the benefit of the City of London, financial services and the accountancy and legal professions in London. With that, I congratulate my noble friend on this consultation and greatly welcome it.
I thank my noble friend for his support. [Laughter.] Noble Lords laugh, but this is an important issue that actually is something to do with the contents of the Bill, unlike some of the other amendments we are considering. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for her somewhat grudging support of our position. Since the Foreign Secretary was mentioned so much, I think it only fair we should mention the sterling performance of the shadow foreign secretary, Emily Thornberry, this morning on the radio, who, in rejecting the so-called EEA/Norway model, set out for us with great clarity what the Labour Party’s position is. She said that they “kind of want to stay in the same kind of place”, effectively.
Amendments 110A and 112BC seek to make continued participation in the EEA a negotiating objective for the Government. The UK is a party to the EEA agreement by virtue of its membership of the EU. At the March European Council we agreed with the EU that the UK is to be treated as an EU member state for the purposes of international agreements for the duration of the time-limited implementation period. This means that international agreements to which the UK is a party by virtue of our EU membership will continue to apply to the UK as they do now. This includes the EEA agreement. The agreement reached at the March European Council on the application of international agreements throughout the implementation period is a positive and significant step and will enable us to secure continuity in our relationships with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein for that period.
Once the implementation period ends, we will no longer be participants in the EU’s international agreements, including the EEA agreement. We will instead seek to put in place new arrangements to secure our future relationship with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein outside the EU. Seeking to negotiate to remain in the EEA agreement would not pass the first test that the Prime Minister set out for our future economic partnership with the EU. It would not deliver control of our borders or our laws. On borders, it would mean we would have to continue to accept all four freedoms of the single market, including freedom of movement. On laws, it would mean the UK having to implement new EU legislation on which, in future, we will have little influence and, of course, no vote. This would not deliver on the British people’s desire as expressed in the referendum to have more direct control over decisions that affect their daily lives.
Some noble Lords think that the EEA would be the right relationship for the UK to have with the EU. I and the Government simply do not agree. As I set out, it is not right for the UK, nor, necessarily, would it be right for Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, whose institutions were not designed to accommodate a member like the UK. Other noble Lords view the EEA as the right course because they believe the Government should seek any port in a storm. The Government are entering negotiations convinced of success and we will secure the right deal for the UK. I cannot support an amendment that rejects before even starting our objective of seeking the broadest and deepest possible partnership with the EU, covering more sectors and co-operating more fully than any free trade agreement anywhere in the world today. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank everyone who participated in the debate. We have had a full debate and it was encouraging to hear the voice of business come through, particularly as it is often stifled by rhetoric and dogma. I thank the Minister for what he said. Clearly, I disagree with him. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and my noble friend Lord Mandelson, best set out the kind of negotiation one would expect to have with the EEA, which would be different. In the absence of anything else, this is where we are left. I also thank my own Front Benchers for their courtesy and the way they handled this difficult situation, with many of us on this side of the House wanting to vote for this amendment. It has been a privilege to work with them. I want to say that on the record.
I will highlight a couple of other people from the debate. It will be my only opportunity, and that of many in this House, to say thank you to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, who has done an extraordinary job managing to herd the cats that are non-aligned on this Bill with regular updates and emails. I am sure that noble Lords who have had those will join me in thanking her for the work she has done. I highlight two speeches above anything else. It is very brave to speak against your own party when you do not normally do so. The contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Verma and Lady McGregor-Smith, were exemplary. To take something you believe in and to say and make those arguments against the wishes of your own party shows real bravery and independence. It has been a real privilege to be on the same amendment as them.
I am sure it will be of no surprise to the Minister that I reject his thesis entirely. I also reject the notion that if those of us in business and services wait long enough, the Government will come up with something to tell us about their trade negotiations. It simply does not wash. I ask my side to take the examples of the noble Baronesses, Lady Verma and Lady McGregor-Smith. Be brave and vote—as they say in Ireland, vote often if you can. I beg to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 70. There is not really much left to say as noble Lords have addressed so many of the points. I do not wish to delay the House, and I would like to hear what the Leader of the House has to say.
Having served in both Houses, the difference in how statutory instruments are treated is very familiar to us, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Davies. I always said in the House of Commons that when a statutory instrument committee came along and you were asked to take part, you would ask, “Why me, and how long will it take?” In this House, we have had more speakers on this debate than we had on the previous one on the EEA. That shows the level of interest and excitement generated by statutory instruments in your Lordships’ House. Someone may have said, “So many SIs and so little time”.
As we progress on the road to Brexit, as the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, said, this House and the other place will clearly have to address a huge number of SIs. The concern is that we have to get this right. The consequences of making mistakes against the Government’s intention of ensuring that EU law can be transposed into UK law are very serious. Those SIs have to be accurate and they have to be properly considered.
In Committee, the noble Baroness confirmed that the Government intend to publish draft SIs “where possible and appropriate”. If you look at the website, there are a few drafts—not many, but a few. There are illustrative examples, and I am grateful for those. They are helpful, but there is no way of knowing whether those examples are representative of the statutory instruments that are to come, particularly given the drive to reduce the overall number by packaging up multiple issues in one statutory instrument. I have raised this issue with the Government over some time. I gave evidence on it to the Select Committee in the other place and I gave evidence to our Constitution Committee, and it is really important that we have those draft SIs for, if nothing else, the appearance of accuracy, so that we know we are getting it right.
As I said, the noble Baroness made helpful comments on this about publishing draft SIs. However, I have to say that I am not convinced that “where possible and appropriate” is good enough. Can she go one step further and guarantee that SIs will always be published in draft form prior to being introduced into either House, unless of course they are made under urgent procedure? That is another discussion and there would obviously have to be very good reasons why they were urgent. Having those draft SIs is absolutely essential—not for delaying but for giving them proper consideration. It is much harder to rectify mistakes at later opportunities than if we deal with them straightaway.
The noble Baroness argued previously that the Committee stage amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, were unnecessary, and she said then that if both committees were to reach the same recommendation,
“the Government’s expectation is that such recommendations are likely to be accepted”.—[Official Report, 19/3/18; col. 154.]
I understand that that is the intention, but “expectation” and “likely to be accepted” are a bit woolly for legislation. I do not think that is adequate. We hope that would be the case but, as the noble Baroness told us at the time, there would be a problem if the two committees disagreed or if the Government decided not to accept the proposed upgrade to the affirmative procedure. It is a limited upgrade; I would not get too excited about the affirmative procedure being too intrusive. We recognise that it is a step in the right direction. The noble Baroness told the House that she hoped the latter scenario—that the Government would not accept a proposed upgrade from one House—would be very rare. Again, it is very speculative. How rare does she think that occurrence will be? Could she outline the steps she would expect Ministers to take in the event of it becoming a reality?
All of us want to see EU law on the UK statute book as accurately and as quickly as possible, but to do that we must have confidence in the process and procedures that we have in place. We cannot do it on a wing and a prayer. If we do not get this right, there will be serious consequences, which will be far harder to rectify or amend later. I hope the Minister can give some reassurances on that issue in the course of her comments.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. The Government take parliamentary scrutiny of the powers afforded them very seriously, which is why, from the outset, I have made clear our view that both Houses should be treated equally when it comes to the sifting process proposed by the Commons Procedure Committee. The Government have already accepted amendments, although they only included a committee in the other place, and the government amendments that we have just discussed would extend that process to your Lordships’ House. We have listened carefully to the views of the House and numerous committees on ways in which to improve this Bill. Among other amendments, we have removed the Clause 8 power altogether and sunset the consequential power and the power to make new fees or charges. The correcting power has been prohibited from creating public authorities or amending the devolution statutes, and we have provided that regulations should be amendable only in the same way as primary legislation.
Having heard the views of the House in Committee, I am pleased to confirm that the Government have tabled amendments that we will debate shortly to extend the sifting committee’s remit to instruments made under the power contained in Clause 17(1). I hope that noble Lords will see this as further evidence of the Government’s willingness to listen to the case put by this House and, in particular, by the DPRRC. I believe that we have made clear our commitment to ensuring that this House can rigorously scrutinise the secondary legislation that will flow from this Bill.
The government amendments allow the changes to the SLSC’s order of reference, agreed by the Procedure Committee, to be put into practice following Royal Assent. I am sure that noble Lords on all sides will want to consider the committee’s report in good time. As I have said before, the agreement reached regarding the SLSC taking on the new and vital role as the sifting committee demonstrates the constructive collaboration of the House. I remain grateful to other members of the Procedure Committee and the SLSC for their support in this decision.
A number of noble Lords have made it clear that they would like further reassurance that the recommendations of the sifting committees will be taken seriously by the Government. I am happy to repeat what I said in Committee—that if both sifting committees were to make the same well considered and no doubt persuasive recommendation that an SI should move from the negative to the affirmative procedure, I assure the House that the Government’s expectation is that such recommendations are likely to be accepted. Where the two committees disagree, the situation would, of course, need to be carefully considered on its merits. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, tempted me to speculate on how often the Government would disagree with a recommendation coming from both committees. Clearly, I cannot usefully do that, but I can say that the Government are not placing shackles on their ability to make a recommendation to upgrade the procedure if they so wish. It is right that this is the case, but I repeat my view—I expect that to be a rare occurrence. I can confirm that on the very rare occurrence, one hopes, when that happened, and the Government did not agree with a recommendation to use the affirmative procedure, we would fully expect to publicly set out our reasons to the committee concerned.
Amendments 70 and 77 in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane, Lord Norton and Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, propose an alternative sifting process. There are two significant differences between the process proposed in Amendment 70 and that proposed by the Commons Procedure Committee, the consequences of which would put at risk our ability to achieve this Bill’s fundamental aim: a functional statute book on exit day and, indeed, for this House to exercise timely and effective scrutiny. The first would make the sifting committee’s determinations binding on the Government unless the House decided to disagree with its committee. The second is that the amendment would build into the sifting committee process a mechanism for the House as a whole to make a binding determination, irrespective of the decision of the committee to which it has delegated the responsibility for making recommendations. Such determinations raise several serious problems. The first is the potential for disagreement between the Houses, and I note that Amendment 71 involves the same problem, to which I shall come in a moment.
The second risk, which is potentially more serious in practical terms, is the delays which this process could create. Given that this House and the other place do not often sit on Fridays, 10 sitting days is already likely to stretch across three weeks. The addition of an extra five-day period, during which each House could overrule its own sifting committee, potentially extends this process into a fourth week. Of course, if any of this were to occur around either House’s normal recesses, the period would be longer still. Then, after that, any negative instrument would still have a praying period of 40 days during which, as now, a debate could be sought. In addition, any affirmative instrument would be subject to the usual scrutiny procedures and laid before Parliament until it could be accommodated in the parliamentary schedule.
My Lords, the amendment is self-explanatory. If urgent regulations have to be laid, having an explanation and clarity from the Minister as to why it is urgent is always helpful. It is fairly simple and straightforward. I hope the noble Baroness will say that she is prepared to accept the amendment.
I thank noble Lords for this very brief debate. As I indicated in Committee, the Government have reflected on this point further and decided to table their own amendments to achieve the same aims as the noble Lord’s amendments. The Government have always said that we expect Ministers to use the Bill’s urgent procedure rarely. This might be where, for example, corrections to the statute book are required very close to exit day and where the impact of not making these corrections would be significant.
The Government have always been committed to ensuring an appropriate level of scrutiny is afforded to the Bill’s provisions. I remind noble Lords that the made affirmative procedure still requires debates and potentially votes in both Houses. We have always wanted to be transparent about how this unusual process will work and it is for that reason that we have clarified the time period in which a made affirmative SI must be debated. In response to the persuasive case made by noble Lords in Committee, where the Government choose to use the urgent procedure we are happy to commit in statute to supplementing any declaration of urgency with a commitment to making a statement explaining why this was considered to be appropriate. In response to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, Ministers will write as soon as is practicable. This is in addition to the obligation to make a statement.
While the Government cannot accept the noble Lord’s amendment for technical reasons, I hope noble Lords will be content to accept those tabled by the Government in its place and that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, will feel able to withdraw his amendment accordingly.
I thank the noble Baroness the Leader of the House for Amendment 83N and for agreeing with us that it is in fact necessary. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the amendments have been moved so powerfully and comprehensively by the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and my noble friends Lady Lister of Burtersett and Lord Cashman that I do not want to spend much of the House’s time commenting on them. I just want to make a few points. First, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, on the new advisory role that he mentioned—or, perhaps even more, the Equality and Human Rights Commission for taking him in that advisory role. That will be very valuable for the commission.
Secondly, I very much support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said about the benefit of statements that Ministers have to make; that focuses their minds on what they are doing. I know from my own experience that that is a valuable example from the Human Rights Act, and I have no doubt that it will be very useful here.
Thirdly, on the point made by my noble friend Lord Cashman, we are talking not about preventing amendments being made to the level of protection, but preventing them being made through delegated legislation without considerably more care and scrutiny. That takes me to my final point. Amendment 11, which has already been referred to, moved by my noble friend Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, will be doing exactly that. It is a very important amendment that was accepted in your Lordships’ House. It will be one of the ways in which the very important continuing protection for equality may be maintained.
I support the amendment and look forward to hearing what the Minister says in opposition.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Low, for his time and consideration on the important issue of how we maintain our equality protections as and after we leave the EU. I appreciate the discussions on this topic that he has had with the Bill officials and my ministerial colleagues. Before addressing the noble Lord’s Amendments 83A and 83E, the Government have reflected on our conversations with him, and today tabled amendments that will extend the statements regarding the Equality Act under Schedule 7 to SIs made under the consequential power in Clause 17(1).
This and other amendments we debated in Committee have sought to reflect in statute the political commitment that the Government have already made in this area—we will maintain the existing protections in and under the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 after our exit from the EU. Following requests for assurances on this point in the debate in the other place, we tabled an amendment that will secure transparency in this area by requiring ministerial Statements about the amendment made to the Equality Acts by every piece of secondary legislation made under key delegated powers in this Bill.
The statements will, in effect, flag up any amendments made to the Equality Acts, and secondary legislation made under those Acts, while ensuring that Ministers confirm in developing their draft legislation that they have had due regard for the need to eliminate discrimination and other conduct prohibited under the 2010 Act.
As previously stated, the language of a political commitment does not translate to the statute book. So while our commitment to existing equality protections works perfectly well politically, and indeed in the wider world outside this place, these terms do not and could not have a sufficiently clear and precise meaning for the purposes of statute. These statements as tabled in the other place—
The Minister is repeating what he said in response to my Amendment 30. It was pointed out by me and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that the word “protection” has a statutory basis in the 2006 legislation.
I heard the point that the noble and learned Lord makes, but we are talking about the statements generally.
These statements, as tabled in the other place, applied only to Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9. The Government did not include other powers in this Bill because they are much more tightly constrained than those powers, and their exercise should not give rise to any amendments to the Equality Acts or any harassment, discrimination or other conduct prohibited under the Equality Act 2010. However, we have, as I said, reflected on this, and held discussions with the noble Lord, and we are happy to extend these statements to the consequential power in Clause 17(1). I hope that this will satisfy the noble Lord and that it will enable him to withdraw his amendment. However, this is not a matter on which we will be reflecting further before Third Reading. If he wishes to test the opinion of the House, he should do so now.
My Lords, throughout debates on this Bill we have been discussing the role of this Parliament in approving legislation. This arose in relation to the scrutiny of the powers in this Bill, and the Government have moved significantly to ensure greater transparency and scrutiny of the powers in the Bill—even if our efforts are not always appreciated by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.
It also arose in relation to any sub-delegated legislative or quasi-legislative powers that might be exercised by Ministers, or devolved Ministers not directly accountable to this Parliament or the devolved legislatures. The Government are therefore tabling these amendments, which provide that Ministers must make written statements explaining the appropriateness of any relevant sub-delegation. These statements will be published alongside any SI creating a legislative power that is not to be exercised by Ministers by statutory instrument or devolved equivalent. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this will ensure that the House is provided with all the information required to forensically scrutinise any SIs providing for such sub-delegation.
To ensure that, once delegated, the exercise of such powers remains transparent, we have also required that a report on the exercise of each power should be laid before Parliament each year. I expect that relevant departmental Select Committees and committees of this House will take a close interest in these reports and use them as a basis to scrutinise and challenge both the bodies exercising these powers and sponsoring Ministers if Members of the other place or noble Lords are displeased by the way these powers are being used in practice.
I have stressed before why the Government think such sub-delegation can be appropriate. I shall try not to repeat myself too much, but Parliament has already granted legislative or quasi-legislative powers to a number of public authorities where this has previously been thought to be appropriate. In line with the Bill’s aim to provide continuity, Parliament should have the option of approving authorities such as the financial regulators or the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets to make binding rules and codes in their respective areas. I mention these examples because I hope they demonstrate the very technical areas where this has been done previously.
I also draw noble Lords’ attention to the draft SI published by DExEU and Her Majesty’s Treasury, which demonstrates how the Treasury might sub-delegate legislative functions to the financial regulators. My ministerial colleagues have discussed this with a number of noble Lords and, I hope, demonstrated that the Government’s approach here is an appropriate allocation of responsibilities that respects the existing framework set by Parliament, ensures democratic accountability for framework legislation that sets the direction of policy, and fits with the existing responsibilities of the regulators. In this case we will also be placing on top of this the provisions of these amendments.
The Government feel that this proposal balances the informed scrutiny by Parliament and Parliament’s ongoing monitoring of the exercise of legislative powers against the appropriate sub-delegation of some responsibilities. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to move the Government’s Amendment 117. The Bill’s approach to certain EU rights of challenge and associated remedies has already been scrutinised closely. We have debated at length the substantive provisions in the Bill covering this area and this House has made clear its views. I do not intend to go over old ground again in this speech. The amendment deals with the approach to transitional cases in one important area, where Francovich damages are being sought. I will say a little about the particular substantive provisions that this relates to.
Francovich damages are a specific form of remedy that exists in EU law. They are available in certain strictly limited circumstances where member states have breached EU law, for example where a member state has failed to properly transpose a directive. The Government remain firmly of the view that, after we leave the EU, Francovich damages will no longer be relevant when we cease to be bound to follow obligations that apply to member states. This is for the simple reason that the majority of Francovich cases in the UK have been brought on the grounds of non-implementation or insufficient implementation of a directive. The UK will no longer be under an obligation to implement directives after exit and the directives will not form part of our domestic law as retained EU law, so the ability to claim Francovich damages would not be possible for a post-exit cause of action. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 therefore removes the right to Francovich damages after exit day. The Government consider this outcome to be a natural consequence of the decision to leave the EU, while ensuring Parliament is sovereign.
The impact of these provisions on transitional cases is one area that the House urged us to think again on when we debated the matter in Committee. I concede that the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Carlile, made powerful arguments, in particular on the need to look again at cases where an individual’s course of action accrued before we left the EU. The amendment responds directly to that concern.
We remain of the view that it would not be reasonable for there to be a long tail of cases based on outdated elements of EU law continuing to process through our courts, potentially for many years after we leave the EU. That would not be conducive to the legal certainty this Bill aims for. The Bill will therefore set what the Government believe to be a clear and sensible cut-off point. The amendment we have brought forward will therefore delay the prohibition in the Bill on seeking Francovich damages in domestic law for two years after exit day. This will provide individuals with a fair and sensible opportunity to seek damages for pre-exit breaches of EU law. It also ensures that we continue to have a clear and certain cut-off point after which such challenges would end. I hope that the House supports the proposals that we have put forward, which I think provide important reassurance to individuals and businesses. I therefore beg to move.
My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord could help the House, or those of us who were not following quickly enough, as to how Amendment 117 relates to Amendment 116, which, as I understand it, the Government did not move, and what the effect would be of having Amendment 117 without Amendment 116. Would that affect the Francovich damages time limitation?
My Lords, the intention with respect to Amendment 117 is that there should be a two-year period after exit, during which it will be possible for a claim to be made in respect of a right of action that accrued up to the point of Brexit. I hope that that clarifies the point.
What was not clear to me was why the Government did not move the preceding amendment.
That is probably attributable to a note that I have here saying, “Don’t move Amendment 116”.
I will try to help the noble and learned Lord. It might be because it is pre-empted by Amendment 19 on general principles of EU law, which the House passed at an earlier stage.
It was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Because it was passed, Amendment 116 does not arise.
My Lords, there is nothing more I want to say about that, but it would be inappropriate to finish immediately without from these Benches thanking everybody for the part that they have played in this Report stage as we move towards the conclusion of this Bill at Third Reading—and towards 10.40, which I notice it now is.
The House will be pleased to know that I shall not repeat all the arguments against the amendment, but, following on from the questions that the noble Lord asked me in Committee, it would perhaps be helpful for him to know that the Government intend to commence this provision of the Bill shortly after Royal Assent. That was a question that the noble Lord asked me in Committee and I wanted to be up front with the House about it.
I had prepared an enormous speech on this amendment which your Lordships will be glad to hear I will not give, but after all that we have gone through so far on this Bill it is appropriate that some of us put on record our admiration for the endurance, patience, diligence and good manners of my noble friend Lord Callanan.
It is very kind of my noble friend to say so; I am very grateful for his comments. I look at the vast expanses of empty Benches on the other side; perhaps they do not share that sentiment, but it is nevertheless nice that we have finally reached the end of Report. I am sure that we will return to some of the issues in the future.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of the climate change committee. That is why I strongly support the amendment. We see here exactly what played out during the debates on the climate change committee.
I want first to thank the Government for a serious attempt to move in the direction we wanted. My noble friend and I have not always agreed, but what he promised in the sense of a real contribution has been made. What we have to say now is only in sadness rather than out of any antagonism. My noble friend Lord Framlingham, who followed me in part of my former constituency, really cannot say that this is an irrelevant amendment, because we are talking about what the Government have placed before us. This is part of the withdrawal Bill; it has nothing to do with our pro or anti-Brexit position.
If my noble friend is going to say that, I shall find it rather difficult to move towards him, because it is not; I speak as chairman of the climate committee because it is not. The reason I speak is simply this: we were promised that we would pass into UK law all the protections that we have as members of the European Union, so that, on the day after our leaving, we would be in the same position in respect of those protections. Under the present arrangements, we will not be.
As I say, this repeats what happened with the climate change legislation. The then Government were in favour of it in general, but when it came to the detailed powers, the Treasury opposed it. The Minister in Defra, or at least its equivalent in those times—it was then the Minister at the Department of Energy and Climate Change—was in favour of those powers. That battle was fought in the then Government, and they decided that they would not give the powers until we were able to show that there were enough Labour Members to give a majority in the House of Commons so that they would have to give way. Happily, it therefore became an all-party Bill that we can all claim credit for, passed by the Labour Government and ultimately supported by every party in Parliament.
I thought that I had addressed that. If after Brexit day we are to have the same powers and enforcement as we had prior to it, we need to have a green watchdog with those enhanced powers that Europe has given us in the past—as we heard from the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Smith, and other noble Lords. That is the need. If we do not replace that in some way with an independent body that can achieve that, we will have no way of enforcing the regulations to which the noble Baroness referred.
The key thing in our amendment is that we have an independent body with the powers to ensure compliance by public bodies with environmental law. There will be a governance gap, a power gap, if that does not occur. I say to all those people—including, again, the noble Baroness, Lady Byford—who say that the consultation is the right way to deal with this, that the idea that a consultation will deliver a new watchdog with some teeth when it is not included in the consultation is magical thinking. We all know that the reality is that the opposite is the case with government consultations and, inevitably, further compromises tend to occur before legislation is finalised. I do not think that to hold that out as a hope and an offer is going to give us much reassurance.
Finally—and this is also a really important point—Michael Gove has already acknowledged that there will be a governance time gap. This consultation proposes a Bill in the next Queen’s Speech. That would not be enacted until, say, the end of next year at the earliest. A lot can go wrong before then. As we have discussed before, a rather large number of Defra Bills have been promised and are already in the queue for enactment. Timescales are already slipping. Even with the most optimistic projections, the current plans mean a time lag where environmental protections will not be—as promised in the Bill—the same as we had before exit day.
Our amendment addresses that gap. It addresses those omissions and requires that the legislation would be produced within six months of the date on which this Act is passed and therefore fill that gap. This is the only way to maintain both the spirit and the substance of continuity with EU rights which the Bill promised and the only way to protect the environment for future generations. I hope that noble Lords will see fit to support it.
My Lords, it is, frankly, disappointing that this amendment has been tabled today. We have debated the important topic of environmental protections on numerous occasions in your Lordships’ House, and the Government have taken clear action in response to many of the points raised. There was support across the House for the Government’s amendments removing the powers in this Bill to create new public authorities and our commitment to do so only in primary legislation.
Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said on Report:
“the very way that we set up quangos—how they are appointed, funded and run, and particularly their reporting structures and independence from both government and any other organisation they happen to be regulating—is key to how they work, hence the need for primary legislation so that we can interrogate all these things”.—[Official Report, 25/4/18; cols. 1585-86].
I agree with her. The Government have committed to do precisely that—to bring forward primary legislation so that Parliament can fully scrutinise, indeed interrogate, the powers of a new environmental watchdog. Yet here we have an amendment designed to use this Bill to set the parameters of such a body without the benefit of the consultation that we are now undertaking and without the scrutiny that would come from considering a Bill that is specifically introduced for that purpose.
We have endeavoured to provide as much transparency as possible to our plan for ensuring environmental protections are enhanced and strengthened, not weakened, as we leave the European Union. In November, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs gave a commitment on the Floor of the other place to create a new comprehensive policy statement setting out environmental principles, recognising that the principles currently recognised in UK law are not held in one place. At that time, the Secretary of State also announced our intention to consult on a new, independent and statutory body to advise and challenge the Government and potentially other public bodies on environmental legislation, stepping in when needed to hold these bodies to account and being a champion for the environment.
In direct response to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, we welcome all consultees’ views on how this is best achieved, and that includes on the range of enforcement measures that might be required. On Report, I gave a firm undertaking that this consultation would be published ahead of Third Reading, and we did just that on 10 May. The consultation includes proposals on a new, independent statutory body to hold government to account on environmental standards once we have left the European Union and a new policy statement on environmental principles to apply post EU exit. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that this is a consultation: we want to hear all views and we have, as yet, made no decisions on how these bodies might operate.
On the subject of timing, I am afraid that the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bakewell, are simply wrong. The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced that we will bring forward a new, ambitious environmental principles and governance Bill in draft in the autumn of this year, with introduction early in the second Session of this Parliament, to deliver these proposals in advance of the end of the agreed implementation period.
Put simply, Amendment 1 risks compromising the timely and full consideration of many important issues. It requires consultation with stakeholders—a point well made by my noble friend Lord Ridley—and yet mandates a set way forward in primary legislation. This is neither helpful nor necessary, as the issues it seeks to bind the Government to commit to are those we will explore in the consultation. In short, the amendment is premature and it prejudges the views of important stakeholders.
There are good reasons for gathering and properly reflecting on views ahead of taking action. Indeed, if we did not do so, I suspect that we would be criticised by the very people moving this amendment. For example, a significant proportion of environmental policy and legislation is devolved. We need to take account of the different government and legal systems in the home nations, as well as the different circumstances in the different parts of the United Kingdom. Amendment 1 risks compromising consideration of these important issues, as well as the wider devolution settlement, by requiring the UK Government to take UK-wide action, including to publish proposals for UK-wide primary legislation on governance and principles.
The government consultation is concerned with England and reserved matters throughout the United Kingdom, for which responsibility sits in Westminster. However, we are exploring with the devolved Administrations whether they wish to take a similar approach, and would welcome the opportunity to co-design proposals to ensure that they work well across the whole of the United Kingdom. We would also welcome views from a wide range of stakeholders, including environmental groups, farmers, businesses, local authorities and the legal profession. I welcome the comments of my noble friend Lady Byford, who made some excellent points worthy of our consideration.
Turning to the issue of environmental principles, the published consultation outlines our proposal to require Ministers to enshrine these principles in a comprehensive statutory public policy statement setting out their interpretation and application. As we have said many times before, the core purpose of this Bill is to provide for continuity in our framework of laws and rules before and after exit: no more and no less. The Bill takes a comprehensive—
My Lords, will the noble Lord clarify one thing? He suggested, I think, that we are going to continue with the European regime until the end of the implementation period, which would give time for consultation. Or will we move away from the European Union arrangements in March 2019? That is important. If we are to continue to maintain all European environmental regulations, as now, up to the end of 2020, then we are in a slightly different position.
Yes, I am absolutely confirming that: the principles will continue until the end of the implementation period.
Changes to the law should be taken forward by proper processes allowing for them to receive full consideration by those affected. The Government have acted—
This is a very important point. Will the means of enforcement continue until the end of the implementation period?
Yes. All current processes will continue until the end of the implementation period.
The Government have acted as a responsible Government should. They have done what this House invariably asks them to do by setting out a range of options and inviting views to inform policy through the consultation process.
Does my noble friend mean that, until the end of 2020, we would be able to take an enforcement action to the European Court? If he does not mean that, the system does not continue and the Government do have to put into the Bill an alternative. But if he does mean that, it is a revelation.
My Lords, as we have announced on numerous occasions, there will be further legislation to consider this matter when we have completed—
I ask noble Lords to wait a moment. There will be a further withdrawal agreement and implementation period Bill to consider the details of the implementation period, which have already been agreed with the European Union. This has already been announced and we have already set it out. But there will be further opportunities to consider this, as there will be further opportunities to consider the primary legislation that we are announcing in response to this amendment.
I do not know which way to vote, so what the Minister is saying to the House is enormously important to me. Are we actually going to be able to have enforcement by the European Court of Justice until the moment of the completion of the implementation?
That is what has been agreed in the implementation period that we have agreed with the EU so far—but it will be the subject of legislation that we will be able to consider.
Will the Minister therefore explain why our amendment to allow the ECJ to continue until the end of the transition—the implementation period—was not accepted by the Government?
Because there will be separate legislation to consider the implications of the implementation period as part of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that we have already announced. We are trying to confine the purposes of this Bill to the originally announced process. I realise that lots of noble Lords want to use this legislation as a way to both influence the legislation and in some cases to prevent the process of Brexit. But we are trying to put forward revisions to the statute that will ensure that European regulations will continue to have effect in British law after the end of the period.
Can I point out to the Minister that we have no agreement that there will be an implementation period? Indeed, many government departments are preparing, rightly, for there not to be one—because nothing is agreed until all is agreed. That is why this amendment is even more important in terms of that potential gap.
I am afraid that the noble Lord is simply wrong: we do have agreement on an implementation period. It was announced at the March European Council, agreed by the Government and the European Union.
My Lords, surely, in the event that there is no deal, we leave on 29 March 2019 and there is no implementation period.
Obviously if there is no deal, we do not have an implementation period—but we are working towards getting a deal. Each of the stages so far has been announced and agreed. We agreed the issues over the financial settlement and citizens’ rights before Christmas. We agreed the implementation period in March. I realise that that the noble Baroness and many of her colleagues do not want the process of Brexit to proceed, but we are acting as a responsible Government and endeavouring to agree these things in a timely and proportionate manner. We have agreed the details of an implementation period. Each time they declare their scepticism, but we are confident that we will reach a deal at the end of the day.
As I have set out, this is neither helpful nor necessary as the text of the amendment mirrors all of the issues that we are consulting on before introducing legislation that this House and other places will be able to scrutinise. I hope that noble Lords will acknowledge that voting for this amendment would prejudge a significant period of consultation that would go against the principles of good policy-making and be ultimately detrimental to the future protection of environmental law. I hope, therefore—without much optimism—that the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw the amendment.
I hate to interrupt the Minister again, but I am genuinely confused by his answers to the Cross Benches. Do I understand that there will be an untrammelled means of enforcement until the end of the implementation period, and during that time there will be negotiation about future legislation; or is it suspended while the negotiation goes on?
As the implementation period has already been agreed, it will be the subject of further legislation in this House. Irrespective of that, we are giving a commitment to bring forward the environmental legislation already announced by the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, on which I have already updated this House.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate this afternoon. We have heard some very passionate and powerful arguments, many in favour of this amendment. I also thank the Minister for his response, although I found it as disappointing as he found my amendment. In fact, I was reminded of the words of Francis Cornford, written over 100 years ago. In his chapter on argument, he said that there are many reasons for not doing something but only one reason for doing it, which is that it is the right thing to do. I strongly believe that in this case, the right thing to do is to support the amendment.
In his speech, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, reminded me of something I heard him say over 20 years ago when he was Secretary of State. He defined sustainability as “not cheating on our grandchildren”. One of the advantages that many noble Lords will share with me is that, as you get older, you have grandchildren. I am fortunate to have three wonderful grandchildren. But with that pleasure comes the responsibility to care about their future. This amendment is about caring for the future of our grandchildren. It is not just about birds, bees, butterflies and wild flowers, because the health of our grandchildren is intimately related to the health of the environment that we leave for them to live in. This is about a healthy environment for the future and about the health of future generations. So, in spite of the arguments for not doing so, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Hunt, who is unable to be here today, I fully support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. It was helpful to be reminded of the strong concerns expressed on Report; I also endorse the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. It is important to have clarification that the need to preserve Article 168 of the Lisbon treaty as part of retained EU law is recognised, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments.
I commend the Minister’s willingness to work with noble Lords across the House on this important matter and his helpful role in facilitating this and working through the issues referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. Article 168 places public health protection and health improvement at the epicentre of policy-making, and the Government’s assurances that our domestic law implementing EU public health requirements will continue to be interpreted by reference to relevant EU law, including Article 168, will be welcome.
The Minister’s assurance of the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the UK remains a world leader in public health following Brexit would also be welcome. I hope he will provide the House with this, to be noted for the record.
Finally, it is important once again to pay tribute to and place on record the work of the wide coalition of major public health bodies, medical colleges, charities and the wider health community in helping us, one hopes, reach a consensus on the way forward.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for bringing back this important amendment before your Lordships’ House. I do not think I have ever drunk as much tea as I have in the past week or so as I have met various noble Lords and noble Baronesses, but it has been worth it.
I shall be a little more specific in the words I read out because we need on this occasion to give noble Lords the exact words that I hope they require. Before doing that, I should pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Warner—to say that he has been spirited would perhaps be an understatement—and to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, who is right about there being legal advices and legal advices, but I would much rather have his advice than that of others.
Let me tell your Lordships a little more about the effect Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU will have after we leave. It is right that we pay tribute to the Faculty of Public Health and the 62 organisations that have contributed to keeping this issue at the forefront of your Lordships’ House’s discussion. An important coalition has been assembled. I would like to think that there is now genuine recognition on all sides of the Brexit argument that public health must be at the epicentre of our engagement. There should be no back-rolling in any of the health standards. The Faculty of Public Health has been at the forefront of public health, and will continue to be so. That is important to put on the record today.
Many noble Lords have spoken eloquently of the importance of Article 168, notably its role in a successful defence to the legal challenge brought by tobacco manufacturers against the introduction of plain packaging. We therefore recognise why noble Lords are keen to confirm the Bill’s effect in that area. The Government should have been clearer on this matter in previous debates and I welcome the opportunity provided by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, to provide that further clarity.
The Government fully expect that, after exit, Article 168 will continue to be influential to the interpretation and application of retained EU law. This may include the determination of legal challenges to which Article 168 is relevant, including the consideration of public health legislation before exit day. As was noted on Report in this House, although Article 168 is not a directly enforceable provision of the TFEU, it has nevertheless been influential on EU and domestic law in the area of public health. I reassure the noble Baroness that when retained EU law is interpreted and applied, any such influence will be preserved by this Bill.
The Bill is intended to capture EU law as it stands at exit day and, as we have previously discussed, incorporate it into domestic law. Clause 2 preserves domestic legislation that implements or relates to EU law, including that in the area of public health. It is preserved,
“as it has effect in domestic law immediately before exit day”.
This will include, for example, the effect given to the Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations 2015 by the tobacco packaging case, which, in a sense, echoes the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Similarly, Clause 3 incorporates direct EU legislation, such as EU regulations relating to nutrition and food safety into domestic law,
“as it has effect in EU law immediately before exit day”,
and Clause 5 provides that any rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures that were recognised and available in domestic law immediately before exit by virtue of Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act,
“continue on and after exit day to be recognised and available in domestic law (and to be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly)”.
I had to get that exactly right; I hope it is. Therefore, any rights or obligations that have been drawn from Article 168 will be preserved as part of retained EU law.
Clause 7 is also important because it ensures that retained EU law is interpreted in accordance with relevant pre-exit case law. This means, for example, that domestic law implementing EU public health requirements will be interpreted by reference to relevant EU law, including Article 168. As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Health wrote on PoliticsHome on 18 April:
“Our guarantee of equivalent or higher standards of health protection and health improvement when we have left the EU is unequivocal”.
The influence of Article 168 of the TFEU on retained EU law, and existing duties such as those in the NHS Act 2006 and Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will enable us to do this.
I am sorry that on this occasion I cannot therefore accept the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness.
Circumstances have not enabled me to participate in previous debates on this subject but I want to put one point to my noble friend. He has instanced the debate on standardised packaging; I was responsible for the initial consultation. That policy did not stem from a European Union initiative but from one in this country or, one might say, from my conversations with Nicola Roxon, the Australian Health Minister. We do not therefore depend on the treaty for the function of the European Union to lead on public health. We have done so inside Europe, as we have across the world, on issues such as the tobacco control regime, and I hope we will continue to do so. The practical, rather than legal, issue is how effective our continuing co-operation with other European Administrations, national and EU, will be in combating public health threats—for example, the spread of infections. That kind of activity is much more practical than it is legal.
I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for that helpful intervention. He is, of course, absolutely right that the judgment did draw upon an aspect of Article 168, but of course the principal driver was not the EU component; that was rather a contributing component and as such it will be available as a contributing component going forward. The second point my noble friend raises is an important one and I hope it will permeate much of the discussion we have had and will continue to have. There needs to be ongoing collaboration with our colleagues and friends in the EU; that must continue. We must learn lessons where we can, not just from the EU but more broadly. I would like to think, again, that where good ideas emerge in the wider world of public health we grab hold of them, take them to heart and move forward on that basis.
Bearing in mind that Clause 4 as amended has clear definitions of the protections that were required in the amendment, would it not therefore be possible for the Government kindly to consider reinforcing the certainty and security of the assertions by including the text, or perhaps a revised, shortened version of the text, in the new Clause 5? It would go in the Bill as subsection (1), paragraph (c) to the amended Clause 4. Would that not be a very convenient way of combining two certainties to reassure the public?
I always welcome interventions of this nature. On this occasion I think that the Government position is clear—I hope so as I look to the noble Baroness—and provides the necessary and useful support and words of comfort. I think that on that basis it should be understood by all who read today’s remarks and engage directly with the Government on this matter that what they are seeking is provided for and will be available: as it is today, so shall it be after Brexit day. I hope that those words are of comfort to the noble Baroness on this occasion.
My Lords, I am most grateful to everyone who has intervened. As someone who has felt passionately about tobacco control I am glad to be able to tell noble Lords that I am now involved in working with Hong Kong on its tobacco control measures. UK public health has indeed led the world in many ways and nobody wanted to see that jeopardised. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Warner for generously sharing some of the background to all this with me, and of course the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who gave me a tutorial on some of the issues around EU law shortly before we came into the Chamber.
I am confident that the Government’s reassurances today will offer the legal certainty that the sector is seeking; I am sure they will be warmly welcomed by the whole health community and all those organisations which signed up to the coalition. They are 62 major health and welfare organisations and it sends a very strong signal that this Government are committed to the health and well-being and individuals, of communities and of the country during the Brexit negotiations and after we leave the EU. It signals that future Governments must retain this as a highest priority. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is an important question. It is just possible that Clause 8 could be used by the courts in a situation arising under this particular amendment to extend the provisions of Clause 8 by analogy, where that seemed suitable. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned, fitting this to everything is quite difficult. On the other hand, for a court faced with a single problem, this way of solving it might be possible. Anyway, I am entirely in support of what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about Ministers determining this sort of matter; I do not believe that that can be right. However, I do not think the court would fail, if faced with this problem, in deciding something about it.
My Lords, the noble Lord’s amendment endeavours to provide a global answer to the question of whether retained direct EU legislation should have the status of primary or subordinate legislation—if and to the extent that is relevant. I am grateful to him for the engagement he has had with the Government throughout the passage of this Bill, especially in recent days. Let me say to the House that the Government understand that there is a desire that these new forms of law should be assigned a particular status. We are sympathetic to that view, which stems from a desire for clarity in the law. Of course, clarity is indeed highly desirable. The Government have gone to great lengths to try to make provision in the Bill for how retained direct EU law should be treated. The Bill addresses treatment of retained EU law by the Human Rights Act, the Interpretation Act and rules of evidence, among other things. That is an important part of this Bill. Our provisions on the principle of supremacy deal with the situation where pre-exit domestic law conflicts with retained direct EU law; our amendments on Report deal with amendability; and other provisions with validity challenges where the aim of the Bill is continuity.
On this specific issue of challenges to retained direct EU law, paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1 states that:
“There is no right in domestic law on or after exit day to challenge … on the basis that, immediately before exit day, an EU instrument was invalid”.
As retained direct EU law under the Bill will owe its incorporation into domestic law to primary legislation, it will not be possible to challenge its validity using domestic public law principles. However, as is currently the case, any post-exit Act by a public authority under direct EU law will be susceptible to judicial review, and the Bill does not restrict the use of other routes of challenges, such as breach of statutory duty or challenges under the Human Rights Act. But the crux of our approach and our concerns with the noble Lord’s amendment is that there is no such thing in domestic law as the “status of primary legislation” or the “status of subordinate legislation”. There are many different types of both primary and subordinate legislation. For each of those types of law, there are many different rules about how they are to be treated for different purposes. Whatever we took as our model for how we wished to deal with retained EU law and how it should be treated, we would need to consider each of those different purposes and ask whether that model truly worked in each context.
My submission today is that while the pursuit of a simple rule is laudable, in practice the clarity it would purport to give would be illusory. It would raise more questions than it answered and, ultimately, it would be bad for legal certainty. I will, if I may, seek to illustrate what I mean—the noble Lord himself touched upon this. If we take the status of, for example, primary legislation, we are aware of at least five different types of primary legislation: Acts of this Parliament, Acts of the Scottish Parliament, Acts of the Welsh Assembly, Acts of the Northern Ireland Assembly and, indeed, Northern Ireland Orders in Council. Each is treated differently for different purposes; that is to say, it has a different “status”. Furthermore, to the extent that provision is made that provides that retained direct EU legislation is to be treated in the same way as an Act of, for example, the Scottish Parliament, as a matter of course the Government would want to engage with the devolved Administrations before making such a provision.
The so-called status of a particular type of legislation is not encapsulated in a single line or by reference to any simple rule. To take just one example, when this Parliament created the concept of an Act of the Scottish Parliament, it set out in the Scotland Act a number of rules, including how such Acts are made and in what circumstances and with what consequences they can be challenged. Nowhere did it try to define those rules by simply saying that Acts of the Scottish Parliament should have the status of any other existing form of legislation. What was right then is, I submit, right now. Once again, we are creating a new category of law. It needs its own rules, rather than being forced into an existing and ill-fitting set of rules made for another type of legislation.
My Lords, the wonderful thing about devolution is that it happens within our political parties, just as it happens across the UK.
There is still time for some finessing. Perhaps we can, in the coming months, find an alternative way forward to the approach now proposed, particularly before any draft regulations are laid before this House— maybe from some of the ideas going around today. If we can find a way forward that commands the support of all the devolved Administrations and thus preserve the spirit of the Sewel convention—which those of us who care about devolution rightly believe is of huge importance—we on these Benches would welcome it. For now, we judge that the package in front of us is a positive way forward, and is thus no barrier to our agreement to a Third Reading.
I should add a word about the clauses on devolution and Northern Ireland, given that, very regrettably, it was not possible to have the same level of political engagement from there as was available to the Scottish and Welsh Governments and their legislatures. Cross-UK frameworks have particular relevance to Northern Ireland, given the Government’s welcome commitment,
“to uphold the Belfast Agreement in its entirety, to maintain a frictionless border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, with no physical infrastructure”,
while ensuring that any regulatory continuity in Northern Ireland to maintain a frictionless border would not threaten Northern Ireland’s place in the internal market of the UK. The future developments of the frameworks envisaged in this package have to respect the wider demands of upholding the Good Friday agreement. We trust that will remain uppermost in the Government’s mind.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions in this debate. We may be repeating some of the ground that we covered at Report, but these are important matters and they deserve full attention. I appreciate that noble Lords want to consider the points made during the debates on the Motions in the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales yesterday.
I understand the intention behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, but I do not accept that the amendment adds anything that is not already achieved by the Bill and by the intergovernmental agreement. This amendment pertains only to Wales, although I appreciate the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, as to the position in Scotland. It seeks to remedy what is essentially already a firm political commitment that we have made, in line with the intergovernmental agreement, that we will not normally put Clause 15 regulations before this Parliament without the consent of the National Assembly for Wales.
I would put it to the noble and learned Lord that the sincerity of this commitment—and the process and agreement that underpin it—is, it would appear, sufficient for the Welsh Government to agree to these provisions, and it is sufficient for the National Assembly for Wales to agree to these provisions, as it did yesterday. There must be a genuine cause for action in the interests of the whole of the United Kingdom if the UK Government ask the UK Parliament to approve regulations without consent from the devolved legislatures. I note what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern said as to the legal position, but of course it goes beyond that. We are concerned to ensure that moves that have a UK-wide impact have the consent of the devolved Administrations.
The intergovernmental agreement that we have made with the Welsh Government makes this clear. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to paragraph 6 of that agreement which states that we, the UK Government, will not normally ask Parliament to approve draft regulations in the absence of a devolved legislature’s consent. It is also why we will be under a duty to fully explain any such decision to Parliament and to provide the reasons given by the devolved Administrations for why consent has not been given, so that in considering this matter Parliament will be able to take an informed decision on what is right for the United Kingdom as a whole, based on full information. Ultimately, as we have debated fully in this House, it is for the UK Parliament to decide whether to proceed in putting a temporary freeze on the common approaches we have now under EU law. This amendment, while well intentioned, would undermine that. It risks making it a decision for the courts as to whether that question can be put to Parliament. Moreover, the noble Lord himself observed that where you have the issue of what is normal or not normal in the actions of a Minister, it may be amenable to judicial review if he proceeds without the appropriate consent. It would introduce uncertainty because in that context there are no clear grounds on which the courts can consider whether the requirement set out in the intergovernmental agreement has been met.
I am happy to repeat the commitment set out in the noble Lord’s amendment and in paragraph 6 of the intergovernmental agreement. The implementation of that agreement will result in the UK Parliament not normally being asked to approve Clause 15 regulations without the consent of the devolved legislatures. The UK Government have committed to making regulations through a collaborative process. That puts a similar commitment on the Welsh Government that they will not unreasonably withhold recommendations of consent. These are political commitments which apply to both of our Governments so that the intergovernmental agreement carries greater weight. For the reasons that I have given, I would suggest that there is nothing to be gained, and indeed something to be lost, by putting those words on the face of the Bill. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. Perhaps I may come on to the legislative consent Motion process of yesterday in a moment because he raised questions directly pertinent to that point.
In relation to the amendment spoken to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, I recognise that he raised this point during Report and that he is doing so again through his amendment today. I am grateful for this opportunity to clarify these provisions on the record. The noble and learned Lord has made an important case for why we should seek to provide the utmost legal clarity. Given the extent of the Clause 15 changes, this sort of fine detail can easily be lost, but it is no less important that these provisions should deliver the right outcomes. As I confirmed in response to the noble Lord at Report, the reference to principles in sub-paragraph (b) of the reporting requirement is indeed intended to cover those principles that are the subject of his amendment; that is, those principles which were agreed between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations at the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations meeting on 16 October 2017 and published in the communiqué of that committee, to which the noble Lord referred. But I ought to be clear that while this reference covers the same ground as the amendment, the current wording also includes any revisions agreed to those principles and to new principles on the same subject that are put in place to supplement them over time.
I am sure that noble Lords will agree that it is right that as the work on the frameworks progresses—and it continues to progress—and as circumstances may change, we, the UK Government, and the devolved Administrations should continue to review the principles to ensure that they remain fit for purpose. I do not believe that it is the noble and learned Lord’s intention that the duty to report on any agreed revisions to the principles should be lifted from the Government or that we should be under a duty to report on the principles as drafted only in October 2017, even where these may have subsequently been revised or updated; but that, on one view, would be the effect of his amendment. In these circumstances, I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify what is covered by the reference to the principles, but again for the reasons given, I invite the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendment.
My Lords, I move the Motion with a tremendous sigh of relief. This is a good time to reflect—briefly, noble Lords will be pleased to know—on the passage of the Bill through the House. As I have said on numerous occasions, the Bill has a simple purpose: to prepare our statute book for leaving the European Union. This Bill is vital to ensuring that, as we leave, we do so in an orderly way.
When the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union opened the Second Reading debate in the House of Commons, he said:
“I stand ready to listen to those who offer improvements to the Bill”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/11/17; col. 343.]
No one can be in any doubt that we have listened. We have brought forward significant amendments to all the key aspects of the Bill, in partnership with many noble Lords in this House, with almost 200 amendments having been made to the Bill in total. The Bill now ensures that our courts are clearer on the interpretation of the CJEU’s case law. It ensures that Parliament is better informed about, and better able to scrutinise, the powers in the Bill. And it ensures that, as we leave the EU, more new powers are passed by default to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast than ever before.
We have had 11 extended days—over 100 hours—of Committee debate on the Floor of this House. We have had six days on Report, and we have discussed almost 800 amendments. More noble Lords spoke at the Second Reading of this Bill than any other Bill in the history of your Lordships’ House.
The Government have of course suffered defeat on 15 issues. Although I regret the number of defeats, I am grateful to the many noble Lords who have worked constructively to improve the Bill. This House has done its duty as a revising Chamber. The Bill has been scrutinised. It is now right that the Bill be sent back to the elected House of Commons so that Parliament can, as a responsible legislature, complete the job of ensuring a functioning statute book for the whole of the UK. I beg to move.
Amendment to the Motion
My Lords, all of us have travelled a long way—in my case, it seems like an awful long way—over a long time on this Bill since its introduction what seems like years ago but apparently is only a few months.
First, I thank the Opposition Front Benches for their work and for their kind words. I pay particular tribute to my colleagues, particularly the Leader, the Chief Whip, my noble friend Lady Goldie and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen—of wet trousers fame—for all their help and support throughout. If noble Lords do not understand that remark, I think it is on YouTube.
I also offer my considerable thanks to the team in my private office and to all the dedicated civil servants—Marianne and her team—in the Bill team, who have worked tremendously hard. Do not forget that they also took the Bill through the House of Commons: they have worked all hours of the day and night and are a credit to the Civil Service. I am very grateful for all the support and help they have given me and the rest of the Front Bench.
Let me briefly reply to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. The House will be pleased to know that I am not going to engage in any disagreements or arguments with him at this stage—well, I am slightly—but, to reply to his question, I am sure that the other place will consider this House’s amendments in due course but it is not for me to determine its timetable. For my part, I am pleased that in his amendment to the Motion he seems finally to have recognised the need to get the Bill on the statute book in good time to ensure that we successfully deliver on the instruction given by the electorate on 23 June 2016 to leave the European Union.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
That the Commons amendments be now considered forthwith.
That this House do agree with the Commons in their amendments 19R to 19T.
My Lords, on Monday evening this House voted to send Amendment 19P back to the other place because, as noble Lords supporting it made clear during the debate, they wanted to guarantee that the other place had the chance to consider that amendment. The other place has now had that chance and has voted to reject Amendment 19P, by a majority of 16, and to offer in its place the Government’s amendment. As noble Lords will be aware, this issue is the only outstanding point of difference on the Bill after many months of intensive scrutiny by both Houses. We and the House of Commons have debated this issue on multiple occasions. Where we stand today demonstrates the movement that has happened as a result.
As I outlined to the House on Monday, the amendment before us again today provides that, if Parliament rejects the final deal we make with the EU, the Government must bring forward not just a Statement but also a Motion. This will guarantee an opportunity for both Houses to express their views on the Government’s proposed next steps. The amendment also covers three sets of circumstances in which that opportunity would arise: should Parliament reject the Government’s deal with the EU, should no agreement be reached, or should no deal be agreed by 21 January 2019. As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State said earlier today, the amendment sets out in law a formal structure for Parliament to express its views in each of three possible scenarios set out. Importantly, the amendment also passes the Government’s three tests: it does not undermine the negotiations; it does not change the constitutional role of Parliament and Government in negotiating international treaties; and it respects the result of the referendum.
Respectfully, I submit that your Lordships’ House has done its job. We asked the House of Commons to consider this issue again. They have done that. They have rejected our suggestion and supported the Government’s amendment. I believe that our role is now to accept their view as expressed in the vote only a few hours ago. I hope that noble Lords, whatever their personal views on the issue at hand, will agree. In conclusion, I think we should reflect for a moment, as a House, on the milestone that the passage of the Bill will represent. This House and the other place have spent 11 months considering the Bill line by line. It is better for that work. The Bill’s passage will mean that the UK has the tools it needs to preserve the statute book after exit day, but it is not the end of the process of legislating for Brexit: this House will continue to play a critical role in the months and years ahead and I, for my part, know that it will be more than up to performing this task and complementing the work of the other place. I beg to move.
My Lords, the House of Commons has done what we had hoped: they have considered and debated our meaningful vote amendment. They have not done what some of us hoped and agreed with it, but I think we should celebrate how far we have come on this issue since the Bill arrived in this House. At that stage, there was absolutely nothing in the Bill about a vote, meaningful or otherwise, on the withdrawal deal and there was no mention of no deal. All the Prime Minister had said was that there would be a vote in both Houses on a deal. There was no commitment to that in law and the result of such a vote would have had no legislative consequence. The vote would have simply been on a Motion, which could be ignored—I will not go into whether it would have been amendable. Any such vote in this Chamber would have been particularly meaningless, as either we would have felt obliged to vote the same way as the Commons, whatever our view, or we would have voted differently and then been ignored, both of those, of course, being meaningless for this House, because as my noble friend Lord Grocott rightly feared, if there were two votes, one in each House, it would raise the question of the primacy of the House of Commons.
So that was all we had: the promise of a Motion but untied to any legislation. What we now have in the Bill is that the withdrawal agreement, including the framework for the future relationship, can be ratified only if it has been approved by the Commons and debated here. That is a legislative requirement akin to the Article 50 requirement for a vote in the European Parliament. That is a major concession. It would not have been there without the hard work of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, without your Lordships’ commitment to ensuring that this matter was in the Bill, and without us sending the amendment back on Monday.
However, I have a query about what would happen if there was no deal, as to my mind the rather extraordinary last-minute Written Ministerial Statement, as a result of which Dominic Grieve seems to have felt that he could support the Government this afternoon, does not really clarify things. I am not sure what it means. Will the Motion be amendable? Liam Fox is already out and about, briefing that actually there is no change as a result of that. To me, it reads that it still leaves it to the Speaker to decide whether or not it is sufficiently neutral to be amendable. So it is not actually an undertaking that such a Motion will be amendable. Perhaps the Leader could shed a bit of light on the significance of what made such a difference to the right honourable Dominic Grieve.
In the meantime, with the catalogue of changes to the Bill outlined by my noble friend Lady Smith on Monday and the insertion of parliamentary approval of the withdrawal deal agreed today, I hope even the Government will recognise the vital role played by your Lordships’ House, and that our detractors, particularly in parts of the press, will realise that it is our role to ask the Government, and the Commons, to think again. We have done that, and to quite a large extent we have been heard.
My Lords, as I hope I draw this debate to a close, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all noble Lords who have engaged constructively with the Government throughout our consideration of this Bill. I am sure that noble Lords on all Benches will join me in paying tribute to the staff of the House who have worked tirelessly and professionally to support that consideration.
I would also like to pay tribute to the work of my Front Bench colleagues and those of the Opposition and Liberal Democrat parties who have worked on this Bill. Their stamina alone, as has been seen on the Back Benches across the House, has been incredibly impressive, as has the quality of debate and scrutiny that they have engaged in.
Finally, I am sure that all noble Lords will join me in thanking the members of the Bill team for their hard work. I hope that at some point they will be able to look back over the past 11 months with some kind of pleasure, but I expect that that may take quite a while. On behalf of the House, we are extremely grateful to them.
Despite the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, I think that the scrutiny of your Lordships’ House has seen improvements made to this Bill. More than 230 amendments have been made by both Houses, and while there are a number of issues on which the Government did not agree, I am pleased that we have been able to find solutions and compromises to most of the concerns raised.
The subject before us today—the way in which Parliament can have a meaningful say about our exit from the EU—is a vitally important matter. We have debated it at length, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, the proposition in the Bill is very different as a result of that debate. But the elected Chamber has now made its decision, a decision that your Lordships said on Monday that they wanted to give it the opportunity to take. The elected Chamber has decided how it wishes to proceed: with considering the Motions offered by the Government’s amendment. I now ask this House to respect that decision. I beg to move.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move,
That this House agrees with Lords amendments 19C to 19E, 19G to 19L and 19P, and proposes Government amendments to Lords amendment 19P.
With this, it will be convenient to consider the following:
Manuscript amendment (b) and amendment (a) to the motion.
Lords amendments 4B to 4E.
Lords amendment 24C
Lords amendments 110B to 110J.
I inform the House that I have selected manuscript amendment (b), in the name of Mr Dominic Grieve, and amendment (a), in the name of Mr Tom Brake. I add, for the convenience of the House, that copies of manuscript amendment (b) are available in the Vote Office.
I will turn in a moment to the issue at the forefront of many hon. Members’ minds—Parliament’s role at the conclusion of the negotiations with the European Union—but first I want to set out the other issues before the House for approval today. These are all issues where the Lords agreed with the Government on Monday: enhanced protection for certain areas of EU law, family reunification for refugee children and extending sifting arrangements for statutory instruments to the Lords. The Government set out common-sense approaches to those three issues in the Lords, who backed the Government, and the issues now return to this House for final approval.
The fourth issue is, as I have said, Parliament’s role at the conclusion of our negotiations with the EU. Before we turn to the detail, let us take a step back for a moment and consider the long democratic process we have been on to get here. It began with the EU Referendum Act 2015, passed by a majority of 263 in this House, at which point the Government were clear they would respect the outcome of the referendum. This was followed by the referendum itself, which saw a turnout of over 33 million people and 17.4 million people vote in favour of leaving the EU.
We then had the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, which empowered the Government to trigger article 50. Despite the attempts of some in the other place to impugn the validity of this notification, the Act passed through both Houses, with a majority of 372 in this place on Third Reading. This was followed by a general election where both major parties, attracting over 80% of the vote, stood on manifestos that committed to respecting the result of the referendum: 27.5 million votes for parties that said they would respect the referendum—no ifs, no buts. We are now in the process of passing this essential Bill to get our statute book ready for the day we leave. It will ensure that we respect the referendum result but exit the European Union in as smooth and orderly a manner as possible.
We have already set out in law that this process will be followed by a motion to approve the final deal we agree with the EU in negotiations. If this is supported by Parliament, as I hope and expect it will be, the Government will introduce the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, which Parliament will have time to debate, vote on and amend if they so wish. Finally, as with any international treaty, the withdrawal agreement will be subject to the approval and ratification procedures under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. And this is all before we even consider the other pieces of legislation we have passed and will pass as part of this process.
Anyone who questions the democratic credentials of this Government or this process should consider the steps we have taken to get to this stage and those which we have already laid out in front of us. I believe they are greater than any steps taken for any international negotiations ever in the history of this country. Furthermore, contrary to what was said in the other place on Monday, the Bill gives Parliament significantly more rights than we see on the EU side. The European Parliament simply has to consent to the withdrawal agreement—a yes or no vote—and the EU member states will simply have a vote in the Council on the withdrawal agreement. We have considerably more powers than them, too.
I turn now to the detail of the amendment at hand. We start with a simple purpose: how do we guarantee Parliament’s role in scrutinising the Government in the unlikely event that the preferred scenario does not come to pass? Our intention is straightforward: to conclude negotiations in October and put before both Houses a deal that is worthy of support. In approaching our discussions on this matter, the Government set out three reasonable tests: that we do not undermine the negotiations, that we do not alter the constitutional role of Parliament in relation to international negotiations, and that we respect the result of the referendum.
It is on that basis that we have tabled our amendments. This is a fair and serious proposal that demonstrates the significant flexibility that the Government have already shown in addressing the concerns of the House. Our original amendment provided that, if Parliament rejected the final deal, the Government must make a statement setting out their next steps in relation to negotiations within 28 days of that rejection. Our new amendments provide for a statement and a motion, ensuring that there is a guaranteed opportunity for both Houses to express their views on the Government’s proposed next steps. Not only that, but we have expanded the set of circumstances in which that opportunity would arise, to cover the three situations conceived of in the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) last week. First, if Parliament rejects the deal, a statement must now be made within 21 days and a motion must be tabled in both Houses within seven sitting days of that statement. Alternatively, if the Prime Minister announces before 21 January 2019 that no deal can be agreed with the European Union, a statement must be made within 14 days, and a motion must be tabled in both Houses within seven days of that statement. Finally, if no agreement has been reached by the end of 21 January 2019, a statement must be made within five days, and a motion must be tabled in both Houses within five sitting days. That would happen whatever the state of the negotiations at that stage.
When the right hon. Gentleman appeared before the Committee recently, he confirmed that the motion asking the House to approve the withdrawal agreement would be amendable. Can he therefore explain to the House why the Government are now proposing amendments to Lords amendment 19P to include the reference to “neutral terms”? He will be well aware that Standing Order 24B says that, if a motion is considered by Mr Speaker to be in neutral terms, it cannot be amended. Why are the Government prepared to allow an amendable motion in one case, but not in the dire circumstances that the right hon. Gentleman is now describing?
The right hon. Gentleman has prefaced perfectly the rest of my speech, because that is precisely what I shall spend the next 10 minutes explaining to him.
I think that the additional provisions speak for themselves. Our proposed amendment creates a formal structure, set out in law, for Parliament to express its views in all the various scenarios that might come to pass in our exit from the European Union, but it also passes the three tests that were set out by me and by the Prime Minister.
I am glad to see that the amendment sent back to us by the other place accepts the vast majority of these provisions. The core of the disagreement now focuses on the exact nature of the motion offered to the House if any of the unfortunate circumstances that I have previously mentioned come to pass. Our amendment offers those motions in neutral terms. Questions have focused, understandably, on whether that means that they would not be amendable. Members will, of course, be aware that it is not within the competence of Governments to judge whether amendments can be tabled to motions, but for the sake of clarity, let me quote from Standing Order No. 24B:
“Where, in the opinion of the Speaker or the Chair, a motion, That this House… has considered the matter, is expressed in neutral terms, no amendments to it may be tabled.”
I have written to the Chairman of the Procedure Committee setting out how the Government understand that this process will operate in practice and have laid a copy of that letter in the Libraries of both Houses.
I am enormously grateful to the Secretary of State for allowing me to intervene so early in his important speech.
I am most unhappy about the repetition by the Prime Minister, and by others in the Government, of the mantra “no deal is better than a bad deal”. I should like the Secretary of State to give a guarantee to the people of Northern Ireland that the Government whom he represents here today will not be gambling with the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. No deal would lead to a hard border, which would inevitably be exploited by Sinn Féin and by new IRA dissenters. I need that guarantee.
Is not the importance of the position that the Government are taking that, if a “no deal” option is ruled out, that will guarantee a worse deal in any negotiation? Anyone who has been party to a negotiation will understand that.
The satisfactory amendment that left the House of Lords would oblige the Government to table a substantive motion if their agreement were being rejected. No doubt they would draft that with a view to commanding the majority of the House, but other people could table a substantive amendment with alternative proposals for how to proceed. My right hon. Friend rejects that, and is trying to replace it with a situation in which the Government do not have to put anything in their second amendment, except that they take note. Then, if anyone tries to table a substantive motion as an amendment, I will give you a pound to a penny, Mr Speaker, that the argument will be “If you pass this, it will mean no deal, because the Government are not going to negotiate this, and it will bring the thing to an end.”
I cannot for the life of me see why the Government are hesitating about the Lords amendment, except, of course, that they have come under tremendous pressure from hard-line Brexiteers in the Government, who caused them to reject the perfectly satisfactory understanding that had been reached with Conservative Members who had doubts last week.
I am afraid that I do not agree with my right hon. and learned Friend, as he will be unsurprised to hear. I will not try to follow him down the path of what might happen and in what circumstances. I shall explain in a moment the reasoning behind the restriction of amendment, which is precisely accurate in this area.
Let me say this to my right hon. and learned Friend. He has been in the House even longer than I have, and he knows full well that very often, when matters are particularly important, the procedural mechanism of a motion does not actually determine its power or its effect. That goes all the way back to the Norway debate, which arose from an Adjournment motion tabled by the Chief Whip of the day, and which changed the course of the war. So I do not take my right hon. and learned Friend’s point at all.
The amendment sent to us by the other place does not offer those motions in neutral terms. It is therefore possible—indeed, I would predict, likely—that wide-ranging amendments will be tabled which would seek to instruct the Government how to proceed in relation to our European Union withdrawal. This may seem to be a minor point of procedure, but it is integral to the nature of the motions, and to whether they pass the three tests that I set out last week.
The debates and amendments of the last week have revolved around what would happen in the event of no deal. Let me explain to the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) the distinction between the amendments and the motion that we promised the House—indeed, I think that I first promised it to him as long ago as the article 50 debate. The provisions of the motion will come about if the House rejects the circumstances of a deal, but the amendments apply principally to the issue of no deal, which is really rather different. Let me also make it clear to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) that I have never argued in favour of no deal. I do not favour no deal, and I will do what I can to avoid no deal. It is not an outcome that we are seeking, and, as things stand, I am confident that we will achieve a deal that Parliament can support. However, you cannot enter a negotiation without the right to walk away; if you do, it rapidly ceases to be a negotiation.
The Lords amendment undermines the strength of the United Kingdom in negotiations. There are plenty of voices on the European side of the negotiations who seek to punish us and do us harm—who wish to present us with an unambiguously bad deal. Some would do so to dissuade others from following us, and others would do so with the intention of reversing the referendum, and making us lose our nerve and rejoin the European Union. If it undermines the UK’s ability to walk away, the amendment makes that outcome more likely. That is the paradox. Trying to head off no deal—and this, too, is important to the hon. Lady—is actually making no deal more likely, and that is what we are trying to avoid.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that we must ensure that Opposition Members whose constituents, like mine, voted strongly to leave vote with us, and vote to stop these amendments?
I take my hon. Friend’s point, but, at the Dispatch Box and elsewhere, I have always insisted that people vote with their consciences, and their consciences should encompass how they represent the wishes of their constituents.
If the European Union expects Parliament to direct the Government to reconsider its policies, to extend article 50 or even to revoke it, it will have an incentive to delay and give us the worst possible deal just to try to bring about such an outcome.
On a point of order, Mr Speaker.
I am very grateful.
Will my right hon. Friend commend our hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Dr Lee), who on the radio today, with his characteristic openness, said that he hoped that, if the amendment of our right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) were passed today, the House would use that in order to suspend the triggering of article 50, which let the cat out of the bag as to what the motive is, which is to delay, frustrate or even stop entirely the UK leaving the European Union?
As I have said throughout, it is for people to go with their consciences on this matter and I do not attack anybody for doing that.
May I pick up on the point of order raised with you, Mr Speaker? I would not want the House to think that in any way it had not been told about this. In my earlier speech, I outlined the issue of “Erskine May” on this matter and Standing Order 24B and your rights in this, and made it plain that that is what we are relying upon. So I would not want the House to be misled in any way, or to believe it has been misled.
The debates on this issue have been in the finest traditions of this House. Hon. Members have stood on issues of principle and argued their cases with the utmost integrity. That has shifted the Government’s approach to a position where our Parliament will rightly and unquestionably have its say and express its view. For in this, the greatest democracy of all, we debate, we argue, we make our cases with passion, but we do it to a purpose and that is to deliver for our people, not just to please ourselves. They decided that we will leave the European Union and, whatever the EU thinks about that, we will do it, and we will do it in the best way we can. And in that spirit I commend this motion to the House.
I rise to speak in favour of the amendment tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) to preserve Lords amendment 19P, which would ensure that Parliament has a meaningful vote in the Brexit process.
We need to be clear about what this amendment is and what it is not. It is not about frustrating or blocking Brexit, it is not about tying the hands of the UK negotiators, and it would not empower Parliament to direct the Government in the ongoing negotiations. It is simply about this House playing a meaningful role in the terms of the final Brexit deal. It is about making sure that on the most important peacetime issue this House has faced for a generation, this House is not silenced.
This amendment addresses two issues: what happens if Parliament rejects the Prime Minister’s proposed article 50 deal in the autumn; and what happens if by 21 January next year there is no article 50 deal or no prospect of an article 50 deal. The Prime Minister has consistently said, “Tough luck; if you don’t like my proposed deal you can have something much worse.” That is not meaningful. The Brexit Secretary, once a great guardian of the role of this House, now wants to sideline Parliament when its voice is most needed. He says that in the event that the Prime Minister’s proposed article 50 deal is rejected by Parliament or there is no article 50 deal, a Minister will make a statement. Well, I should think so—after two years of negotiation, the Government bring back a deal which is rejected and a Minister will make a statement. And he says that will happen not in 28 days, but in 21 days—that is democracy; that is giving Parliament a real voice. And then a further safeguard: there will be a neutral motion. There is an example of a neutral motion on today’s Order Paper. There is to be a debate about NATO and what will be decided is this:
“That this House has considered NATO.”
That is the additional safeguard—“That this House has considered the article 50 deal.” And that is it; that will be the role of this House on the most important decision that we will make in this Parliament.
No one who values parliamentary sovereignty should accept either approach, and that is why the amendment is crucial. It would require the Government to back up any statement made by a Minister with a motion that can be voted on. It would permit Parliament to have a meaningful say, but only after negotiations are complete.
Of course the very idea of Parliament actually having a say prompts the usual cries, and I have no doubt that many of the interventions will be along these lines, so let me deal with them. The usual cries are these: “It’s an attempt to frustrate Brexit,” “It will weaken the Prime Minister’s negotiating hand,” “Parliament cannot micromanage negotiations.” So let me meet those objections.
First, we have heard it all before. In August 2016 we challenged the Government to produce a plan. What did they say? It would frustrate Brexit, it would tie our hands and it would play into the hands of the EU. Then they had to accept a motion to produce a plan, and the sky did not fall in. In the autumn of 2016 we challenged the Government to give Members of this House a vote on the proposed article 50 deal, and got the same response from the same people in this House—it would frustrate the process, it would tie the Prime Minister’s hands and it would play into the hands of the EU. Then we had the Lancaster House speech in January 2017; the Prime Minister agreed to give MPs a vote, and the sky did not fall in.
In December 2017, we challenged the Government to put the article 50 vote into legislation. That was contested through amendment 7, for the usual reasons. We received the usual response: it would frustrate Brexit, it would play into the hands of the EU and it would tie the Prime Minister’s hands. Amendment 7 was voted on, and the vote went against the Government. The sky did not fall in. In February this year, we challenged the Government to publish the impact assessments. We got the usual response: it would frustrate Brexit, it would tie the Prime Minister’s hands and it would play into the hands of the EU. Then the impact assessments were published, and the sky did not fall in. This amendment is not about frustrating the process; it is about making sure that there is a process.
Secondly, we have to confront the fact that the biggest threat to an orderly Brexit, and the biggest threat of having no deal, is and always has been division at the heart of the Government. They cannot agree the fundamentals. The customs arrangements were hardly an unexpected issue. No one should be under any illusion that the EU cannot see the fundamental weakness of the Government’s position.