European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome Amendment 83C but will refer to Amendment 83D, to which the Minister devoted considerable attention. Amendment 83C goes some way to meet the concerns of the Constitution Committee, indicated by the tabling of Amendment 83D, even though the committee’s amendment is expressed in different terms. I will refer to that difference initially. The noble Baroness spoke at length about it, and it is a sore point with the Government. They do not want there to be any possibility of being accused of making big policy choices by delegated legislation, and indeed they ought not to do so. The Constitution Committee’s purpose in drafting its amendment was to ensure that delegated legislation is used to make technical changes which are necessary to ensure that retained EU law functions after exit day, and not to make policy choices.

I recognise that there are some cases where a technical change does in fact represent a policy choice—for example, the question of which body should handle this matter in the UK might be seen as a policy choice —but it would be no bad thing for Ministers’ attention to be focused on the need to police that boundary, so far as there is a boundary, between what provisions of EU law it is necessary to put on to our statute book in functioning form and what represents a policy change. That is what the House is anxious about.

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[Baroness Goldie]

I now look forward to giving that response. I thank the noble and learned Lord for his comments. On his first point, which is fairly legitimate, he will be acutely aware that Ministers have not just a personal but a political responsibility. They are, in the office of being a Minister, responsible for having made the statement. That, I think, imputes to the Minister both a political and a personal responsibility. Governments of all colours act in good faith and the Ministers involved act in good faith. I think this House will be satisfied that Ministers of whatever political hue acting under these powers will genuinely have a personal focus on what is being discussed—I think “focus” was the word used by the noble and learned Lord.

The statement must both make the original statement and give an explanation of the delay in having brought the statement forward. I have tried to make that clear in my remarks: this is not an alternative responsibility but a complementary responsibility; the two things will apply. A Minister cannot shoal off one of them and offer the other. Both responsibilities will apply.

The final point was that, when creating an offence, the noble and learned Lord thought it was appropriate to justify not just why the offence was being created but why it was being created in this way. Again, that is ex facie. Part of the impact of the responsibilities of the Minister under the Bill, if so amended, is that they can expect to be questioned closely. Indeed, given the now very robust scrutiny procedures that are in place, Ministers will expect to be questioned closely not only as to why they are creating the offence, but why they are doing so in this way. That is implicit in the structure within which Ministers are now being asked to operate. I hope that to some extent answers the noble and learned Lord’s points.

[Lord Beith]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I assume that she is going to answer the questions I put to her, not least about Third Reading but also about the importance of Ministers recognising that the inclusion of policy choices is something we would prefer not to see in delegated legislation.

[Baroness Goldie]

I am sorry. I did not have a detailed note about the point raised by the noble Lord, so may I undertake to write to him?

[Lord Beith]

I am sorry to press the noble Baroness, who is normally so helpful, but she has not clarified what she said about the Government reconsidering the wording in relation to criminal offences. It seems to me that, if the Government are reconsidering the wording, then we have to come back to that at Third Reading.

[Baroness Goldie]

We are not reconsidering. We are simply considering the appropriate text. The general point has been made clear by the Government: that they will not want to retract what is already their policy position. They will simply undertake to inform the House when a form of words has been adjusted.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I rise to move the Government’s Amendment 117. The Bill’s approach to certain EU rights of challenge and associated remedies has already been scrutinised closely. We have debated at length the substantive provisions in the Bill covering this area and this House has made clear its views. I do not intend to go over old ground again in this speech. The amendment deals with the approach to transitional cases in one important area, where Francovich damages are being sought. I will say a little about the particular substantive provisions that this relates to.

Francovich damages are a specific form of remedy that exists in EU law. They are available in certain strictly limited circumstances where member states have breached EU law, for example where a member state has failed to properly transpose a directive. The Government remain firmly of the view that, after we leave the EU, Francovich damages will no longer be relevant when we cease to be bound to follow obligations that apply to member states. This is for the simple reason that the majority of Francovich cases in the UK have been brought on the grounds of non-implementation or insufficient implementation of a directive. The UK will no longer be under an obligation to implement directives after exit and the directives will not form part of our domestic law as retained EU law, so the ability to claim Francovich damages would not be possible for a post-exit cause of action. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 therefore removes the right to Francovich damages after exit day. The Government consider this outcome to be a natural consequence of the decision to leave the EU, while ensuring Parliament is sovereign.

The impact of these provisions on transitional cases is one area that the House urged us to think again on when we debated the matter in Committee. I concede that the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Carlile, made powerful arguments, in particular on the need to look again at cases where an individual’s course of action accrued before we left the EU. The amendment responds directly to that concern.

We remain of the view that it would not be reasonable for there to be a long tail of cases based on outdated elements of EU law continuing to process through our courts, potentially for many years after we leave the EU. That would not be conducive to the legal certainty this Bill aims for. The Bill will therefore set what the Government believe to be a clear and sensible cut-off point. The amendment we have brought forward will therefore delay the prohibition in the Bill on seeking Francovich damages in domestic law for two years after exit day. This will provide individuals with a fair and sensible opportunity to seek damages for pre-exit breaches of EU law. It also ensures that we continue to have a clear and certain cut-off point after which such challenges would end. I hope that the House supports the proposals that we have put forward, which I think provide important reassurance to individuals and businesses. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord could help the House, or those of us who were not following quickly enough, as to how Amendment 117 relates to Amendment 116, which, as I understand it, the Government did not move, and what the effect would be of having Amendment 117 without Amendment 116. Would that affect the Francovich damages time limitation?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the intention with respect to Amendment 117 is that there should be a two-year period after exit, during which it will be possible for a claim to be made in respect of a right of action that accrued up to the point of Brexit. I hope that that clarifies the point.

[Lord Beith]

What was not clear to me was why the Government did not move the preceding amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is probably attributable to a note that I have here saying, “Don’t move Amendment 116”.