European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, we are still formally on Clause 3, and I had the benefit over the short dinner break of speaking to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, about the issue we were debating before the break in relation to Schedule 8. May I put a specific request to the Minister, to which I hope the noble and learned Lord will be able to respond? It will be crucial to our discussing this matter further on Report. Will he write to us to clarify a specific point that arises from what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said earlier? Does Schedule 8 give the Government the power to use subordinate legislation to modify primary legislation whose primary purpose is to implement EU directives? I wonder whether the Minister might write to Members of the Committee on that specific point.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I can tell the noble Lord and, indeed, the Minister that there will be a probing amendment on paragraphs 3 and 5 of Schedule 8. It has been tabled today and will be on the next Marshalled List.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

The group that we are dealing with is not actually mine but, with the leave of the Committee, I will respond to the inquiry. In light of the reference to the probing amendment, the appropriate step would be for us to consider that amendment and determine what response we shall make to it. If I am in a position, in light of that amendment, to write to the noble Lord ahead of Report and elaborate on our position, rather than responding by way of a government amendment or something of that kind, I will do so.

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Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

26: Clause 4, page 3, line 4, leave out paragraph (b)

[Lord Pannick]

Amendment 26 is another amendment arising from the report of the Constitution Committee and stands in my name and those of three other members of that committee: our chairman, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith.

This amendment focuses on Clause 4(2)(b), which excludes from Clause 4, and therefore excludes from the scope of retained EU law, as defined in Clause 6(7), rights and obligations which arise under an EU directive but which,

“are not of a kind recognised by the European Court or any court or tribunal in the United Kingdom in a case decided before exit day (whether or not as an essential part of the decision in the case)”.

The problem with that was summarised in paragraph 38 of the Constitution Committee’s report. We said that this involves,

“ambiguities in the interpretation and effect of clause 4”,

which,

“will inevitably cause legal uncertainty about a fundamental provision of the Bill”.

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[Baroness Goldie]

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, we must go back to the fundamental principle of this Bill, which is that we have to have a cut-off point and beyond that point, law-making will revert to the United Kingdom. If there are corrections or incompletions or other matters that we are required to address, we can do that through domestic legislation. That is what any Government of any complexion would want to do. The matters referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, might take years to emerge. Therefore, it would be essential for Governments to pay attention to whatever was emerging, some of which might be de minimis. We do not know, but my argument is that this would confuse and cause difficulty about understanding what our law is and certainly where it is coming from.

I was going on to say in relation to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, that there is a lack of clarity regarding when exactly Ministers would have the duty to make such regulations under this amendment. Is it intended that all the instruments that currently give effect to EU directives should be reviewed so that such regulations could be repaired? Such a review would have considerable resource implications for both the Government and Parliament, and that should not be underestimated. Furthermore, it would be unnecessary: as I have already mentioned, while the UK has been a member of the EU, we have sought fully to meet our obligations and give effect to EU law in accordance with them. In the case of implementing directives, we have conscientiously discharged our obligations. To require potentially a proactive review exercise, as the noble Lord’s amendment could require, is, in my submission, pointless.

I have tried to address the concerns and issues raised; I believe the effect of these amendments would be profound, undermining the Government’s clear and coherent position on retained EU law. I hope I have explained in sufficient detail why the current design of Clause 4 is right and appropriate, and I would therefore ask both noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Pannick]

I thank all those who have spoken in this debate, and in particular the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, whose amendment I support. I said in opening this debate that I, and the Constitution Committee, found Clause 4(2)(b) very difficult to understand. I am reassured that even the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, with his experience dating back to 1361, with the Justices of the Peace Act, finds it puzzling.

The position is this: there is no dispute—it is well established in the case law of the Court of Justice—that an unimplemented directive does have direct effect and confers individual rights in national courts where it is clear and precise and unconditional. I understood the Minister to say that Clause 4(2)(b) is intended to exclude reliance on such a directive after exit day unless there has been a court case before exit day, either in Luxembourg or in this country on that specific directive. I find that a very odd approach—it certainly is not consistent with the language of Clause 4(2)(b) of a kind. It does not suggest that you are concerned with a court case on that specific directive.

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Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

27: Clause 4, page 3, line 7, at end insert—
“( ) are the subject of an enactment.”

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this is another amendment that comes from the Constitution Committee. It suggests that we should exclude from the scope of Clause 4 any EU law rights derived from the 1972 Act which are already the subject of an enactment—in other words, where Parliament has already dealt with the subject. The Constitution Committee explained its concern at paragraph 35 of its report.

The concern is this. Clause 4 as drafted would include, within retained EU law, rights and obligations under EU law irrespective of whether they have already been implemented in domestic law by primary or secondary legislation. The problem to which this gives rise is that, as a result of Clause 4, there may be, as part of our law after exit day, two conflicting sets of legal rights on the same subject: the ones already implemented by Parliament and the greater rights which a litigant will say are derived from retained EU law. The question is: how is the court supposed to deal with that conflict? It has two retained EU law rights on the same subject. The Constitution Committee heard evidence from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, the former President of the Supreme Court. As set out in the report, he told the committee that this problem needs to be addressed by the Bill.

Paragraph 36 of the report mentions that the committee heard evidence from the Department for Exiting the European Union that suggested that the problem that I have sought to explain is no different from the situation under the current law where there may be a statute which has sought to implement an EU law obligation that is found by a court judgment not fully to have implemented the EU law obligation, so the EU law obligation takes priority over the inadequate domestic implementation. The problem is that under the Bill, both the domestic enactment and the EU law obligation —see Clauses 2 and 4 respectively—are treated as retained EU law, so the supremacy principle under Clause 5, to which we will come, applies to both of them, and the question remains: which of them takes priority? I look forward to hearing the answer from the Minister to this difficulty. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, at this late hour, I am more than content to rely on the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the questions he has raised.

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[Baroness Goldie]

I thank the noble Lord very much indeed. I am sure my noble and learned friend Lord Keen does not even need the note. He will know that I have had a very difficult time.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. The problem is, as I sought to explain, that under existing law we know which takes priority: it is EU law. The problem under the Bill is that the EU obligation, which is retained EU law, and the existing domestic implementation, which is also retained EU law, because Clause 2 says so, are in conflict, and the Bill does not provide any order of priority between them. I had assumed that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, had gone off because he wants to sit in the Library and think about the answer to this problem. I very much hope that before Report he will come up with the answer and that this can be resolved. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 27 withdrawn.