(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for his question. I suspect that the answer is that they are both part of one of the most exclusive and enjoyable clubs in the whole of London, in this House.
There will need to be a disputes resolution body to resolve disagreements between the EU and the United Kingdom. The Government’s position, which I understand, is that it cannot be the European Court of Justice, but what body is going to perform this task?
I thank the noble Lord for the close interest he takes in dispute resolution. Perhaps he should be declaring an interest, with his long experience of both litigating for, and resolving disputes with, Her Majesty’s Government. Of course, he raises an important point. He is right that it cannot be the European Court of Justice, and we will want to discuss with our European partners a proper, independent arbitration process for any disputes that arise, although we hope that none will.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs some of your Lordships will know, I have a particular interest in the legal aspects of Brexit. Depending on the votes today in the House of Commons, important legal issues may arise under the Benn Act, the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019. If the House of Commons today approves the amendment tabled by Sir Oliver Letwin withholding approval of the Prime Minister’s deal unless and until the implementation Bill is passed in the next two weeks, or if it rejects the Prime Minister’s deal, the Prime Minister has a legal obligation to send the prescribed letter to the President of the European Council by the end of today. He must seek an extension under Article 50 until 31 January next year.
The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has repeatedly told this House that the Prime Minister would comply with the law and has repeatedly resisted the request to amplify what he understands that to mean. This legal obligation would require the Prime Minister personally to send the prescribed letter—the Act sets out the letter—by midnight. In my view, the Prime Minister has that duty irrespective of the purpose of the extension to which the Act refers—a point to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, referred a few moments ago. If the EU offers an extension, it must be accepted in accordance with Section 3 of the Benn Act. The Prime Minister would have a legal duty not to frustrate the Benn Act by adding some other phrases to the letter or sending another, conflicting letter. If the Prime Minister did not comply with this legal duty, I do not see how any reputable Attorney-General or Lord Chancellor could remain in post.
The Benn Act, however, does not, and could not, oblige the European Council to grant an extension, and nor does it prevent the Prime Minister reminding the EU member states that he does not want an extension, wants to leave on 31 October and is sending the letter only because Parliament has required him to do so. I do not see that the Benn Act can sensibly be interpreted as requiring the Prime Minister to abandon his policy objectives.
There is a very fine line between not frustrating the Benn Act and the Prime Minister making clear to other EU leaders that his policy is unchanged. What if the Prime Minister telephones another EU leader on Monday and encourages him or her to oppose or even veto an extension? That would be an interesting Supreme Court case.
Section 1(4) of the Benn Act says:
“The Prime Minister must seek to obtain from the European Council an extension”,
but it then adds how he must seek an extension—
“by sending to the President of the European Council a letter”.
I doubt that the courts would interpret the Benn Act as also requiring the Prime Minister to refrain from pursuing his policy objectives by other political means.
What if the Supreme Court in the next two weeks were to hold that the Prime Minister has acted unlawfully by breaching the Benn Act and persuading the EU not to offer an extension? As a matter of EU law, would we still be treated as leaving on 31 October because the EU has not offered an extension, or would the requirement in Article 50.1 be determinative? I quote:
“Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”.
That question would have to be decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Okay. The number of Peers who have contributed to this debate, on a Saturday—
As to the letter, does the Minister mean that, by midnight, the Prime Minister will send the letter as listed in the Benn Act in the terms set out in the Schedule?
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend is well aware that the deal was agreed jointly between the UK Government and the EU. Any solution will also need to be agreed jointly.
Can the Minister assure the House that Parliament will not be prorogued to prevent it expressing a view on the appropriate way forward before 31 October?
Parliament has expressed its view on these matters many times, both in the other place and in this House. I am sure that both Houses will continue to express their views in the future.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 4 seeks to insert a restriction on the date referred to in line 10:
“which must not be later than the end of the 2019/20 financial year”.
This may in practice be a variation on the provision proposed by my noble friend Lady Noakes in her amendment, but, as I explained at Second Reading, it is born out of frustration at not being able to table specific amendments on financial impact.
I want to draw attention to the fact that this Bill—agreed by all to be a constitutional innovation—is not the subject of a money resolution, as the Speaker decided in the other place. Equally pertinently, it has no impact assessment, and yet it could bring about a delay in Brexit without end or resolution, which could be extremely costly to this country.
Whatever one’s views on Brexit, it must surely be common ground that altering the date of the event will have financial consequences. I accept that some of the costs will be negative and some will be positive, but the longer Brexit drags on, the more the cost of uncertainty for all economic players and the extra cost to the Treasury in payments to Brussels will weigh against the benefits of avoiding no deal.
Although we cannot persuade the Speaker of the House of Commons to change his mind on a money resolution, I believe that the promoters of the Bill should work up an impact assessment, which would cover some of the same ground. I also believe that adding a date gives the Government an incentive finally to resolve matters. Alternatively, if the promoters will not produce an assessment today, one should be required when the Government use the power to define the length of an extension in their statutory Motion.
Let us look at some of the costs of the new approach, as the costs of no deal, now threatened for 12 April, have been well articulated already and are well understood. As a businesswoman, I know that they are real worries and that they are especially acute in farming, the motor industry and industries such as food which depend on just-in-time supply chains and mutual recognition of labelling. But there is also a huge cost to uncertainty. There are literally billions of pounds which business is waiting to invest once, but only once, the Brexit uncertainty disappears. This could be a great driver of growth and productivity, because the combination of low capital investment and cheap, flexible labour from the EU is a key reason why productivity is flatlining, despite an increase in infrastructure, digital and R&D investment by this Government.
In other sectors such as financial services, which now represent a very large percentage of GDP, the critical thing is to turn the political declaration into a free trade agreement with the EU 27. Unfortunately, the Bill as drafted could allow the EU 27 to delay negotiations to the point where the resulting uncertainty has allowed it to steal more and more of our market. The beauty parade to attract investment which would have taken place in the UK to go to Paris or Milan is very energetic. We heard in the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee last week how jobs and work are moving, never to return, to Frankfurt, Dublin, Amsterdam, Brussels and elsewhere, even if we stay in the EU.
I feel that the Brexit process has lacked transparency from day one. If there was a fuller and more honest discussion of the complexities of what is planned when and of the likely implications, more dynamic analysis, objective pros and cons, both economic and political, and less of Project Fear, the country would be less divided and perhaps less critical of what we in Parliament have achieved.
There is another reason why a system of financial assessment and timetable constraints is desirable. We will have let the genie out of the bottle if this rushed, defective and uncosted Bill is passed. I fear very much that it will act as a precedent for future Private Members’ Bills even more financially damaging, such as on the regulation of utilities or whatever. This is a constitutional revolution and, as I said last week, there will be no way to hold Back-Bench sponsors to account if the mechanism in such a Bill causes damage.
As my noble friend the Leader of the House just said, it is important not to set a precedent. The Bill is about stopping a premature no deal, for which I have some sympathy, but for the reasons I have stated the Bill needs amendment. I would be glad to hear from someone among the opposition promoters—although I am not sure who; perhaps the Deputy Leader of the Opposition the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who has always supported impact assessments, or another of her colleagues—on how we might meet some of these concerns about proper assessment. My noble friend the Brexit Minister may also be able to think of a way to do so.
Given our often tedious scrutiny role—I am afraid that this is a technical point, and some may feel it is tedious—it was cheering to hear the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union express the expectation that this House would correct the flaws in the Bill. That is what we need to do today. I beg to move.
My Lords, I oppose the amendment. It would frustrate the very purpose of the Bill, which is to leave it to the House of Commons to identify what it thinks is the appropriate date.
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendment for two reasons. First, this remains a wretched Bill, taking power away from the Government and their ability to use the royal prerogative. Therefore, I would support any restriction on that measure being put into the Bill. Secondly, I support the points made by my noble friend in respect of the financial impact of different variants of a delay in leaving the EU. The fact that the Bill was not treated as a money Bill in the other place is beyond my comprehension, as is the fact that my noble friend was unable to table an amendment explicitly calling for an impact assessment or something else—but the ways of the Public Bill Office are strange on occasion. I support my noble friend.
My Lords, may I respectfully remind the noble Viscount that we are debating Amendment 4?
I am well aware, and I thank the noble Lord for his advice.
However, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Blencathra on the report from his committee and on the fact that he so quickly responded.
The amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is much needed. In her speech at Second Reading and again today, she has made the very good point that the Bill has profound financial implications. My noble friend Lord Cathcart also made this point most clearly in his powerful speech. It is reasonable to say that the terms of withdrawal should require the UK to honour its commitments during the current EU spending round, provided of course that the UK is not disadvantaged by its decision to leave the EU in terms of the amounts that UK projects and companies would otherwise have received from EU programmes.
Besides that, any extension beyond 22 May would require us to participate in the European Parliament elections, and that requirement would of course have financial implications. It is therefore strange that the Speaker has ruled that this is not a money Bill, but it is not surprising given his increasing willingness to allow his own political views and prejudices—
No, it is not for the Minister to answer them, as it is not a Government Bill. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is going to deal with these points, because we have the Opposition criticising the Bill, and seeking to amend it as we go along in Committee. To my mind—I am blessed with not being a lawyer—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, is riding two horses at once. On the one hand, he is saying that it is important that we retain the royal prerogative, because the Prime Minister has to be able to deal with the situation as it arises, and on the other hand, he says that we need this Bill in order to prevent the Prime Minister doing what she thinks is appropriate. If the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is the sponsor of this Bill, perhaps he could enlighten us and deal with the important points which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has just made.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, accepted that Amendments 5 and 7 remove the concern that she otherwise had—that is what she told the House.
I support Amendment 5 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, and I also want to speak to Amendment 7, which has, as I understand it, now been grouped with Amendment 5.
It is not on the list, but as I understand it, there have been suggestions that it would be helpful to the House if it debated Amendment 7 together with Amendment 5; that was what we were told by the Table Office. In any event, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has referred to Amendment 7, and it may be helpful if I make my remarks as the person who has tabled Amendment 7.
They are not grouped on the Marshalled List, but I was informed that the Table Office had been invited to list Amendment 7 with Amendment 5. I am entirely in your Lordships’ hands as to what is of most assistance.
My Lords, I will do whatever the Chief Whip thinks is most appropriate in these circumstances, as I always do.
I thank the noble Lord. The papers for today were prepared when, at a rather late hour, someone arrived to suggest that these two amendments be taken together. I have no comment to make on that matter—it is for the House to decide. If the House decides that they should be taken together, they can be.
As the sponsor of the Bill, I suggest that they are taken together.
My Lords, I can sense the mood of the House, and I am grateful to all noble Lords, particularly the Chief Whip.
The noble and learned Lord has already mentioned Amendment 7, which goes with Amendment 5. It addresses a practical concern that may arise at the European Council meeting on Wednesday night. The problem is that Clause 1 envisages that, if the Prime Minister is mandated by the House of Commons to seek an extension to a specified date, and the European Council then makes a counteroffer of a different date, the Prime Minister would have no power under Clause 1 to agree to that counteroffer. She would have to say to our European partners that she is required to return to the House of Commons on Thursday to seek its approval. She would have to say that notwithstanding the fact that the European Council is not going to remain in session—they are all going to go home. There is therefore a risk that, contrary to the aims of the promoters of this Bill, the restrictions on the Prime Minister’s powers contained in this Bill may cause a no-deal exit on Friday at 11pm. Therefore, Amendment 7 makes it clear that nothing in this Bill prevents the Prime Minister seeking or agreeing on Wednesday night in Brussels an extension of the Article 50 period, provided it is not to a date earlier than 22 May.
I entirely understand the point about the Prime Minister agreeing to a proposal coming from the European Union. I am a little less certain about the desirability of enabling her to seek a date without prior parliamentary approval.
This is a negotiation. It would be very odd to say that she can agree a date but she cannot seek one. There has to be give and take. I think that there is general agreement around the House that the Bill, whether noble Lords are in favour of it or not, ought not to constrain the Prime Minister’s powers when she is conducting an international negotiation.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, asked whether this was really necessary: unless an Act of Parliament expressly takes away the Prime Minister’s prerogative powers, surely they remain. My answer is that there is a danger that it might be said that the Bill, by necessary implication by reason of its contents, takes away the Prime Minister’s prerogative powers. I think we would all agree that the worst of all possible worlds would be if the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, on Thursday morning was to be instructed by a client to go to court to obtain a declaration that the Prime Minister has acted in breach of her powers, given the Bill’s contents.
If I may assist, Clause 1(4) would require the Prime Minister to seek an extension of the period required by the House of Commons. We are then dealing with what happens after that.
I entirely accept that.
It is necessary to have legal certainty on the retention of the Prime Minister’s powers on such an important matter. That is why the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Goldsmith, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I have all put our names to Amendment 7.
My Lords, I have listened with care to the speeches of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the intervention from my noble friend Lord Hailsham. I do not have my noble friend Lord Forsyth’s advantage because I have the misfortune of having trained and practised as a lawyer, so I am in that difficult circumstance. I am confused by the exchanges that have taken place. I draw only one inference from them: this appalling piece of legislation is totally misconceived. It seeks on the one hand indubitably to constrain the exercise of the royal prerogative by the Prime Minister. That is its main purpose. Now we have amendment after amendment that seek to persuade us that it is only in some circumstances that the royal prerogative should be constrained and that in others it is absolutely necessary because, as the noble Lord just said, the Prime Minister must be able to make use of the royal prerogative when she is involved in negotiations of this kind. It is negotiations of this kind that the Bill is all about.
The fact is that the Prime Minister will be involved in negotiations about the date on which we exit the European Union, the conditions in which we do so and any terms that might be sought by the European Council to limit the extent to which we might be able to act in accordance with the result of the referendum. The Prime Minister will be engaged in negotiations of that kind. She ought to be able to exercise the royal prerogative when she engages in those negotiations, as the noble Lord said a moment ago. This ludicrous Bill, which seeks in part to restrain the royal prerogative and then to subtract from the extent to which it constrains it, is wholly misconceived and should never reach the statute book.
The noble Lord should know that on any amendment or Bill in this House, the Government and the official Opposition will have a view, and we seek to help noble Lords by providing that view. That is exactly what is happening here.
I am not responsible for the Bill, but I offer a further argument in favour of retaining Clause 2. The practical reality is that, on Wednesday night, the Prime Minister will be offered a deal by the European Council. She will either accept it or not. The overwhelming probability is that she will come to some agreement with the European Council.
If the matter comes back on an affirmative resolution before the House of Commons and this House on Thursday or Friday, there will be only two choices: either we accept the date that has been agreed or we leave on Friday at 11 pm. The House of Commons has overwhelmingly voted that it does not wish to leave with no deal, and the view of this House is perfectly clear that it does not want to leave with no deal. Therefore, it seems to me that, in the extraordinary circumstances in which we now find ourselves, Clause 2 is entirely acceptable.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Noakes on this amendment. As she explained so clearly on Thursday and in her speech today, the curtailment of prerogative powers envisaged in this Bill is significant. I agree with her that the powers available to the Government to negotiate international treaties are important and should not be curtailed.
My noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, who is acknowledged across your Lordships’ House as the most knowledgeable constitutional expert, explained that the changes sought by the Bill, and the practices by which it was passed in another place, are not small but highly significant. I consider it unfortunate that your Lordships’ House is likely to pass this Bill, but at least it would be better if its destructive elements could be made temporary. Surely even noble Lords who support the Bill would agree that, against the background of the views of the noble Lord, Lord Norton, on the matter, the restrictions on prerogative powers should be temporary. It would be unfortunate for the House to agree to a precedent created by such a rushed and controversial piece of legislation.
My Lords, this amendment is not needed to ensure that the provisions in the Bill are temporary. They are temporary in any event because the Bill is concerned with only the period for negotiations for withdrawing. Once we withdraw, the Bill has no effect whatever.
My Lords, if that is the case, there is no reason at all why we should not accept this amendment. The Prime Minister sent her letter asking for an extension on Friday, so I have spent most of the weekend trying to work out what the point of this Bill was in the first place. Given that we have amended it in respect of the prerogative powers, it is just a very bad piece of legislation. My noble friend Lady Noakes is offering the House the opportunity to get rid of a very embarrassing relative. The Bill and its genesis are not something of which this House or the other place can be particularly proud. It is a very bad Bill, conceived for all the wrong reasons. It has ridden roughshod over our procedures. Having a sunset clause, which is what this amendment offers, would be a very good thing indeed. I very much support my noble friend.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I had planned to be at the National Theatre tonight, on date night with my wife. We had tickets to see “Follies”. The follies that we have all witnessed in this House today sadly lacked the lyrics and the music of Stephen Sondheim that I will be humming to myself throughout the debate.
I support the Bill, but I am concerned about aspects of its drafting. In particular, your Lordships will have seen that the Bill envisages that, if the Prime Minister is mandated to seek an extension to the Article 50 period and given a specified date, as Clause 1 provides, and if the European Council then says no, that it does not agree to that but makes a counter offer of a different date for the extension, under this Bill the Prime Minister would have no power to agree. She would have to return to the House of Commons—presumably the next day, given the urgency of the matter—and meanwhile the European Council will not be sitting in Brussels waiting for the deliberations of the House of Commons; its members will all have gone home because the European Council meeting ends on Wednesday night.
This is all very unfortunate, because the laudable aim of the proposers of this Bill is to reduce the risk of a no-deal exit. However, there is a risk that, by reason of the drafting, that laudable objective may be damaged by the contents of the Bill, and I am concerned about that. Your Lordships will recollect that Aneurin Bevan told the Labour Party conference in 1957 that it should not send a British Foreign Secretary naked into the conference chamber. My concern is that this Bill will send the Prime Minister into the Brussels meeting overdressed with legal requirements.
For that reason, I shall be tabling, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, an amendment to the Bill for consideration in Committee on Monday which will address this problem. It will seek to make clear that this legislation does not affect the Prime Minister’s prerogative powers to seek or agree an extension to the Article 50 period to a date not earlier than 22 May of this year. A statutory instrument would still be required to extend exit day under the 2018 Act, as amended by Clause 2 of the Bill.
I very much hope that, over the weekend and when we debate this matter on Monday, the Government, Opposition and Liberal Democrat Front Benches will give careful consideration to the amendment.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Members of this and the other House have spoken of their shame or embarrassment about how the Prime Minister and the negotiators she appointed, Messieurs Davis, Raab and Barclay, have handled our dealings with the EU. Today’s statutory instrument is a manifestation of their failure. The Prime Minister has failed to unite her Cabinet, her Government, her party or the Commons, let alone the country. It starts with red lines and a failure to reach out to the 48%. It ends with a lonely, tax-funded, failed plea to the public and the humiliation of eating hundreds of her words. Those words, “We are leaving on 28 March”, have been repeated endlessly by Mrs May and here by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for whom some of us —almost—feel sorry, for having to digest the words he parroted so many times.
The noble Lord’s embarrassment, which he carries with a good grace, is as nothing to the uncertainty now facing our ports, businesses, holidaymakers, citizens living across the EU, farmers, importers, manufacturers, traders and hospitals, and EU citizens here. Today, they see us changing our law, not simply to remove Friday’s date from the statute book but to insert two new dates. It still is not clear when we are due to leave the EU. It is almost beyond parody. I now wonder what phrase the Minister will use to replace the old mantra. Will it be, “We will leave on a date yet to be confirmed,” or “We will leave, don’t know when, don’t know how”? Perhaps we will meet again some sunny day.
Today’s change via this SI is, of course, necessary, but it would have been unnecessary had the Government heeded the advice of your Lordships’ House. In May last year, the amendment proposed and so convincingly argued by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, replaced 29 March with the words,
“such day as a Minister of the Crown may by regulations appoint”.
My colleagues behind me have begged me not to use the words “I told you so” today, but I cannot resist. In May, I warned the Minister that,
“the negotiations … will be affected by the timetable”,
and that, given that,
“the negotiations could go on a bit later than everyone wants”,
having a particular date fixed in an Act of Parliament, passed in mid-2018, would be,
“a very unhelpful position for our negotiators to be in”.
I predicted—I promise these are my words in Hansard—that,
“the withdrawal agreement could contain a leaving date of a week or two … after the two-year period, which would allow the last-minute arrangements to be made”,
and continued,
“if that suits all the parties and if our Government would like to sign up to it, it would seem silly not to be able to do that”,—[Official Report, 8/5/18; cols. 37-38.]
without amending the Act.
Of course, it was not just me. Our own EU Committee said:
“The rigidity of the … deadline of 29 March 2019 … makes a no deal outcome more likely … enshrining the same deadline in domestic law would not … be in the national interest”.
Your Lordships agreed. By 311 votes to 233, we passed the amendment tabled by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, by a tidy majority of 78. We are here today because the Government did not listen.
Unfortunately, we now face the same again, which is why the last part of our amendment calls on the Government to pursue any course of action in those negotiations sanctioned by a resolution of the Commons. We stress this because Ministers and Mrs May keep telling us that they will not be bound by today’s votes in the elected House, which might be a bit of a problem for them anyway, if Robert Peston is correct. He reports that the Cabinet Secretary and the Attorney-General informed Cabinet that if, at the end of the Letwin process, MPs passed a Motion mandating the Prime Minister to pursue a new route through the Brexit mess, whether a referendum, a customs union or another option, then the Prime Minister and the Government would be in breach of the Ministerial Code and the law if they failed to follow MPs’ instructions. The impression created by the Prime Minister that she could ignore the results of the indicative vote process is not true if those Ministers who briefed out of the Cabinet are to be believed. Perhaps it is because those briefings are right that the Government down the other end have just tried, shamefully, to end the indicative vote process, although they lost that vote. It is that reluctance to heed the views of MPs that makes the last part of our amendment so important, even if, as I said, it might be unnecessary should the law indeed require the Government to follow the outcome.
Could the noble Baroness say what law is applicable here? I understand the political argument, but what law would compel the Prime Minister to comply with the House of Commons’ view?
Indeed, I am as questioning on that. That apparently, from very good leaks, was what the Attorney-General said to the Cabinet. Unfortunately, I do not have access to it. It may not be the case, but that is what was being briefed—I do not think that the Attorney-General will be speaking utter nonsense, which is what I think I heard from the other side of the House. It is what Robert Peston says.
It is that, rather than with anything I have said.
I noted that while on Monday there was an insistence from the government Benches that this decision by the European Council represented international law, at least by yesterday things had moved on somewhat when the noble Baroness the Leader of the House referred to EU and international law. I am, however, puzzled by her insistence that the European Council decision and the UK’s agreement to it constitutes a binding agreement in EU and international law. It seems to me that that decision is simply a binding legal act under EU law, to which the UK is now and at least until 12 April subject. It just seems to be difficult for the Government to straightforwardly acknowledge this, presumably for political reasons.
I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will speak to the issue that he raised yesterday about the legality of the two alternative exit dates and I will leave that to him. From these Benches, we can accept the convenience of needing only one statutory instrument, and not potentially two, to cover both the scenarios envisaged in the European Council decision.
Finally, I want to ask about the position on the European Communities Act. I cannot remember whether I asked this yesterday or the day before. The Explanatory Memorandum to the present regulations says:
‘“Exit day’ is the day by reference to which provisions of the 2018 Act, including the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 … take effect or come into force”,
but that is not my understanding. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act says that the repeal of the European Communities Act takes effect on exit day. My understanding is that an SI is needed to bring that into force; indeed, the briefing from the Library says:
“This provision of the EUWA”—
namely, the repeal of the European Communities Act—
“has not yet been brought into force”.
So even beyond exit day, unless there is an SI to bring into force the repeal of the ECA, the ECA will continue. Can someone explain how that interacts with these regulations? Even if you change exit day, do you still need an SI to bring in the repeal of the European Communities Act? I look forward to the clarification which I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, who is looking impatient, will be able to give me.
My Lords, I support the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and I thank him for addressing the legal question I raised yesterday. I am satisfied that these regulations are valid; the legal issue is whether exit day is specified in the statutory instrument when it refers to two possible dates. I agree that that is so: it is specified, and for this reason. It seems to me that the purpose of the power to amend the date of our exit, as expressly stated in Section 20(4)(a) of the 2018 Act, is to ensure that domestic law on exit day is consistent with our treaty obligations. This SI accurately implements in domestic law the current treaty obligations in the light of the extension of the Article 50 period. Unhappily, that still involves more than one possibility as to the future, and the SI accurately reflects the reality under EU law.
There is a risk that a court might take a different view on the validity of the SI; I would not expect it to do so. I am, however, surprised that Ministers did not adopt the simpler, risk-free option of specifying 12 April as exit day, since they have ample powers further to amend exit day if appropriate. That is especially so when there is a third possibility recognised under the EU decision to which the SI refers. The EU decision says that if the withdrawal agreement is not approved by the House of Commons by this Friday, the Article 50 period is extended until 12 April. It adds:
“In that event, the United Kingdom will indicate a way forward before 12 April 2019 for consideration by the European Council”.
If that occurs, and if agreement is then reached on the way forward, it may involve an exit day different from either 12 April or 22 May: that, of course, would require another SI.
I understand that the noble and learned Lord, the Advocate-General for Scotland, will be replying to this debate for the Government. I have a question for him which builds on the question put at the end of her speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. As a matter of domestic law, exit day is highly significant under the 2018 Act for various purposes, but one of the central functions of exit day is given accurately in paragraph 6.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum:
“Section 1 of the 2018 Act repeals the European Communities Act 1972 on ‘exit day’, whilst the saving and incorporation of EU law into domestic law (known as “retained EU law”) … take effect on and after ‘exit day’”.
Various provisions of the 2018 Act were brought into force under Section 25 of that Act when it was passed. Those provisions include Section 20, which defines exit day and confers the power exercised in this statutory instrument to amend exit day. Also commenced and brought into force when the 2018 Act was passed were Sections 8 to 11 and other provisions which confer powers on Ministers to make regulations such as those we have been scrutinising in recent weeks. There have also been more recent commencement regulations, such as SI 808/2018, which provide for the bringing into force of other provisions of the 2018 Act.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe no-deal scenario has not been ruled out by the other place. Parliament as a whole has legislated for leaving the European Union on 29 March this year. We hope to do so with a deal. If not, we will leave without one.
My Lords, do the Government have no concerns about the quality of the primary and secondary legislation that will need to be enacted by 29 March? One understands the political reasons for not seeking an extension of the Article 50 process, but the national interest surely requires it.
Of course we have concerns about quality. We are endeavouring to keep all the relevant committees informed of when SIs will be tabled. We wrote to them before Christmas to give details. We are publishing full explanatory statements with every SI as required under the legislation; we are endeavouring to work with Parliament as much as possible in this process.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe terms of the implementation period are already agreed and both sides agreed with the proposal to end the implementation period co-terminous with the end of the current multiannual financial framework. There is no possibility of extending that built into the agreement.
My Lords, can I ask the Minister whether the Government will be participating in the forthcoming Court of Justice of the European Union proceedings on whether there is power unilaterally to revoke the Article 50 notification? If the Government are participating, will they be submitting that there is such power or there is not?
This is the subject of legal proceedings, as the noble Lord is well aware. I am not going to answer his question because I am not sure we have made a decision about how we are going to proceed on that yet, but as soon as I know more I will come back to him on it.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble and learned Lord the Minister and the Solicitor-General for the care and attention they have taken, not only on this issue but on all the legal issues that have been raised by this Bill. I was particularly pleased that the noble and learned Lord confirmed that the general principles of EU law—that is, outside the charter—can be relied upon in court proceedings, not to challenge legislation or decisions but as an interpretive device, and his confirmation that equality is one of those general principles of law. In the light of that, and given the eagerness of the House to move on to the important discussion on the Motion of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I shall not move Motion D1.
I would like to make a little progress, if I may. How would the will of Parliament be determined? It would be determined through political parties in the normal way, put down in the form of Motions in the House of Commons. I put it to the House that, really, this long and convoluted procedure would have little difference from the way Parliament would behave without this amendment being put in place at all.
Subject to the clarification from the Leader of the House about the Motion being justiciable and the reasons why we want it to be unamendable, I strongly support the amendment tabled by the Government and urge the House to reject that put forward by my noble friend Lord Hailsham.
My Lords, the noble Lord asks about justiciability. It is one of the most fundamental principles of our constitution that the courts do not and will not regulate proceedings in Parliament. Therefore, a court would presume, in the absence of the clearest statement to the contrary, that none of these amendments—in particular Amendment F3—is intended to depart from this fundamental principle. That is especially so when the mover of the amendment makes it clear that he does not intend to depart from that fundamental principle. In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, it seems to me that the sanctions for any breach would be political, but they certainly would not be legal.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 7 is in my name and in the names of three other members of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: our chairman, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, and the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith.
The amendment addresses a difficult issue. In its report HL69, dated 29 January of this year, the Constitution Committee drew attention in paragraph 51 to what we saw as a defect in the Bill: it does not specify the legal status that would be enjoyed in our law by retained EU law—that is, the body of EU material that the Bill incorporates into domestic law as at exit day. The question is: is it going to be primary legislation, secondary legislation or something else? And if something else, what?
The Bill deals with this question in part, for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, in what is now paragraph 28 of Schedule 8. But that exception simply begs the question as to what status retained EU law enjoys for other legal purposes. The recommendation made by the Constitution Committee that the issue needs to be addressed in the Bill was widely approved by expert legal opinion, in particular the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and Professor Paul Craig of Oxford University, although they disagreed with the suggestion by the committee that the status of all retained EU law should be that of primary legislation.
Ministers agreed to consider this issue and tabled an amendment on Report to introduce what is now Clause 8 of the Bill. Clause 8 is an improvement because it makes two points clear. It states that the part of retained EU law which derives from earlier statutes and earlier statutory instruments, enacted to implement EU law obligations, will retain the legal status it previously had—either primary legislation or secondary legislation. Clause 8 also addresses the circumstances in which different types of retained EU law can be amended.
However, what Clause 8 does not do is address the legal status of other retained EU law for purposes other than amendment. This may matter, as the Bingham Centre has suggested, for example, in deciding which rule takes priority if there is a conflict between different elements of retained EU law, or if the question arises of when courts may allow a challenge to retained EU law and what remedies they may give. Some distinguished legal scholars have expressed such concerns about Clause 8, particularly Professor Alison Young of Cambridge University.
The Minister made it clear on Report that because of the complexity of the issue, the Government were willing to consider the matter further at Third Reading. This amendment suggests addressing the issue of legal status by using the distinction that is in Clause 8 itself —between retained direct principal EU legislation and retained direct minor EU legislation.
I am grateful to the Minister for arranging a meeting for me yesterday with members of the Bill team and parliamentary draftsmen. They explained their concerns about the amendment. They have persuaded me that the contents of the Bill will minimise the occasions on which the legal status of retained EU law will matter. They have also pointed out that the amendment would need to specify more clearly what is meant by “primary legislation”, which covers not just Acts of Parliament but Acts of the three devolved legislatures. They also tell me that they are concerned about the generality of a deeming provision of this sort, which might cause difficulties in other contexts.
I have found these arguments compelling and I would be grateful, and I hope the House would be grateful, if the Minister would say a little more about these points when he replies to the debate. I am, however, concerned that it still appears to be the Government’s position that if any of these problems about legal status do arise in the future, they can be addressed by Ministers exercising delegated powers under the Bill. I remind the House that the Constitution Committee said in our report at paragraph 69:
“It is constitutionally unacceptable for ministers to have the power to determine something as fundamental as whether a part of our law should be treated as primary or secondary legislation”.
I ask the Minister to tell the House whether or not the Government agree with that proposition.
I will add one further point—as a promise, not as a threat—which is that the Constitution Committee intends to keep a very close eye on this issue once the Bill becomes law. If it does become necessary to give particular retained EU laws a legal status, and if this is then done by Ministers exercising delegated powers, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee will certainly wish to return to the issue. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will not add to the exposition of the amendment and the reasons for tabling it, which have been so clearly set out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The committee felt that we ought to see whether we could get a more secure place for retained European law in the hierarchy of law as it would be viewed by the courts in this country. There will probably be difficulties in this area and we are probably persuaded that they cannot be resolved by the kind of declaratory amendment that we have tabled on this occasion.
There are further difficulties which the Minister might refer to, which have been pointed out by Professor Alison Young, who was referred to earlier. For example, constitutional statutes are not subject to the doctrine of implied repeal in the same way as other legislation. What will be the position if an item of retained European law is considered to be constitutional in character and appears to be in conflict with subsequent legislation passed post exit day, when the supremacy principle has fallen away and this has to be resolved?
In passing an earlier amendment which removed a discretionary power from Ministers to, in effect, decide whether matters could be put before the courts, we wanted to assert that, wherever possible, we should protect the courts and the legal system from having to be the subject of individual ad hoc ministerial decisions in particular cases. That was part of the motivation for what the committee sought to do in this case. But clearly it cannot be solved in the way that we first suggested.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for explaining so simply just how complex this issue is. I am certainly not confident to answer his question about how what he kindly referred to as my elegant simplicity would improve the Bill on this occasion. I also thank him and other Ministers for the care and attention with which they have addressed the many points raised by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee on the Bill. I hope it is appropriate for me to say that the committee believes that its report has led to a number of amendments that have improved the Bill—happily, in most of those cases, without the need to divide the House. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.