European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

The current situation is a sad contrast with all that in many ways. It comes at a time when there is the utmost confusion about what our policy is, as we seek whatever destination we are eventually going to take when we reach agreement. Either new clause 3 or amendment 7 is the absolute minimum the Committee should be passing at this stage, in order to make it clear that binding commitments that affect future generations, changing our law in substantial ways, can be made only with the proper approval of both Houses of Parliament, following the full procedures that are necessary for statutory law.

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Rosie, just as it is to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), the Father of the House, who gave an informed and powerful speech that we would do well to take on board as we proceed in today’s debate.

I rise to speak to new clause 66 and amendments 30, 27 and 29, which stand in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also intend to speak to amendment 28 and to the wider question of whether clause 9 should stand part of the Bill. In its policy impact, clause 9 is arguably the most important in the Bill and, taken together, clauses 9 and 17 give rise to a very wide range of interlocking issues. For the purposes of clarity, I intend to speak first to amendments 30, 27 and 28, which relate to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 9 and whether it should stand part of the Bill. I will then turn to amendment 29, which relates to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17. I will finish by dealing with new clause 66 and the thorny issue of Parliament’s role in approving the final terms of the UK’s exit from the EU and any associated transitional arrangements that might be agreed.

I turn first to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 9. The Government have argued that the clause 9 power is necessary in order that they have sufficient flexibility to give effect to whatever is in the withdrawal agreement and to ensure that there are no holes in the statute book after exit day. The withdrawal agreement, it should be noted, is defined in clause 14 as an agreement, whether or not ratified, agreed with the EU under article 50, meaning that the powers in clause 9 could be used before a withdrawal agreement is ratified but not, as the clause makes clear, after exit day for the purposes of the Bill, because the power will expire at that point.

In the light of the Secretary of State’s announcement on 13 November that the Government intend to bring forward a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill in order to give the agreement and any agreed transitional arrangements domestic legal effect, an announcement, it should be noted, that was confirmed in writing in the joint UK-EU report published last Friday, it is entirely unclear why the Government still require the powers provided for by clause 9.

Let me set out why we believe that to be the case. In that announcement on 13 November, the Secretary of State made it clear that the major policies set out in the withdrawal agreement, including those reached last week on citizens’ rights, Northern Ireland and the financial settlement, along with any agreement on transitional arrangements, would be implemented by means of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill and not by secondary legislation provided for by the Bill before us. So barring some unforeseen delay in the concluding of a withdrawal agreement, if the Government are not to create significant legal uncertainty following our departure with regard to the major policies covered by such an agreement, the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will have to have come into force by 29 March 2019 at the latest. My hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Chuka Umunna) covered that point.

In legal terms, any transitional arrangements agreed to could not bridge a post-exit gap, because even if some elements of the withdrawal agreement come into effect at the end of any such period, an agreement on transition itself will have had to have been given legal effect in the UK by means of the very same primary legislation, namely the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. As such, unless the Government are proposing to begin the process of implementing the withdrawal agreement and any agreed transitional arrangements immediately after the final terms of such an agreement are reached, but pre-ratification, by means of secondary legislation in this Bill—a point made earlier by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Hertfordshire (Sir Oliver Heald), who is not in his place—a course of action for which there is no justification, given that the phase 1 joint report published last week sets out in black and white the intention to provide a specified period to approve the agreement and transitional arrangements in accordance with our own constitutional procedures and to prepare the statute book in accordance with that agreement, there is simply no need for the powers provided for by clause 9, including the broad power under that clause to amend the Bill itself.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but is it really that unreasonable that the Government might need to avail themselves of these powers in clause 9 while the withdrawal and implementation Bill is proceeding through the House of Commons? If the timetable is compressed, that Bill would not be on the statute book and the powers there would not be available. So clause 9 is necessary for that purpose. Of course the withdrawal and implementation Bill could circumscribe the powers in clause 9 and indeed close them off once that Bill is on the statute book.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman has pre-empted a point I was going to come to. In the scenario he gives, there is no need for the timetable necessarily to be compressed. If it were squeezed, what would that say about the role that Parliament will have on the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill? In his scenario, there would also be no need for the secondary legislation in this Bill, which could be included in a similar form in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, when we would have a better idea about what it will be needed for and can more adequately circumscribe its scope. As for this idea that we have a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill making its way through this House at the same time as secondary legislation implementing elements of that agreement hang over this place, such an approach would create serious confusion.

[Anna Soubry]

Has it come to the hon. Gentleman’s attention that, were the Bill passed without either amendment 7 or amendment 4 being made, and were there then a change of Government to one who believe in a hard Brexit, we could leave the European Union on absolutely no agreement, with no deal and no recourse whatever to this Parliament to have any say in that, because the Bill is completely silent about what would happen in the event of no deal?

[Matthew Pennycook]

The right hon. Lady makes a very important point. Although I concede that amendment 7 provides for an additional check because it requires primary legislation, our new clause 66 highlights an important point: we would wish to bind the Government so that Parliament would get a say even in the event of a no-deal scenario. I shall return to that point later.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Matthew Pennycook]

I cannot resist.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman is concerned about the potential for a compressed timetable and the consequences of what may flow from that, but is that not actually following from the will and vote of Parliament? Parliament passed into law article 50, which it agreed to by bringing the Lisbon treaty into law, so this is the natural consequence of what Parliament itself has determined.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman is right that the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and the article 50 notification gave effect to their own timetable. That is why it is so important that we have transitional arrangements on current terms that allow us flexibility to negotiate the final deal. I will return to this point later, but there is no way that, before we leave in March 2019, we will have agreed the future relationship. We will have agreed heads of terms at best.

[Mr Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

[Matthew Pennycook]

If it is all right, I am going to make a bit of progress because many Members wish to speak.

As I have said, I do not think there is a need for the powers in clause 9 because secondary legislation of a similar type could be included in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Why the need for such powers? We do not think there is any justification for them. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s justification for why the clause needs to stand part of the Bill but, unless amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is passed, the Opposition will vote for the clause to be struck from the Bill.

If clause 9 remains part of the Bill at the end of the parliamentary process, its constitutional potency and scope must be highly circumscribed. I do not intend to dwell extensively on what limits should be placed on the clause 9 power because, in general, the same arguments apply as those that I set out at length in the Committee’s deliberations on clause 7 yesterday. I will say, though, that amendment 27 to clause 9, similar to our amendment 25 to clause 7, would constrain the capacity of the powers in clause 9 to reduce rights or protections.

The powers in clause 9 are different from the powers in clause 7 in a particular way: namely, the extraordinarily wide power explicitly provided for by clause 9(2) gives Ministers the power by regulation to modify—a term that clause 14 makes clear covers amendment and repeal—the Bill itself once enacted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) pointed out on Second Reading, there is no example throughout the history of the 20th century of a Bill that has ever sought to do that—not in time of war and not in time of civil emergency. In fact—this is a point that my hon. Friend continues to make, and should—every single emergency powers Act has specified that there should not be a power in such legislation for Ministers to alter primary legislation. We do not believe the power is justified, and amendment 30 would limit the potency of the delegated powers in clause 9 by preventing them from being used to amend or repeal the Act itself.

Let me turn briefly to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17, which gives powers to Ministers to make any consequential provisions that they consider appropriate in consequence of the Act and to make any transitional provisions that might be needed as a result of the Bill coming into force. In contrast to our position on clause 9, we acknowledge that there is an established precedent with regard to consequential and transitional provisions, so we will not be voting against clause 17 standing part of the Bill, but it must be circumscribed.

A clause as widely drawn as clause 17—it is arguably the most widely drawn of all—set in the context of a Bill of such constitutional and legal significance that it covers almost every element of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, it could be argued, nearly every facet of our national life, means that the power to make consequential provisions under clause 17 is not as tightly limited as it might be in other pieces of legislation. As such, it inevitably throws up the possibility that the powers in subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17 could be used to make changes to vast swathes of secondary and primary legislation, including legislation in this Session up to May 2019.

When he responds, the Minister will no doubt cite other statutes that provide for not dissimilar powers, but having looked closely at a fair number of them, I am not convinced that any are so widely drawn as this one, and none are contained in legislation as constitutionally significant as this Bill. The Hansard Society was right to refer to clause 17 as a “legislative blank cheque” for the Government, and the power must be restricted. Amendment 29 would achieve that aim by removing subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17. If the Government believe that that is the wrong way to restrict the sweeping powers in the clause, they can of course come forward with their own suggestions, but the principle of circumscribing the powers in the clause must be accepted.

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[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

I just want to clarify whether the hon. Gentleman means what I think he means by what he just said. Does he mean that if the House did not approve a withdrawal agreement, his view is that the Government should have to ask for an indefinite extension of article 50 until the House has approved a set-up that it finds acceptable?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I do not think that is necessarily the case, for several reasons. First, there is no reason why a withdrawal agreement cannot be reached, perhaps even sooner than October 2018—

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

You told us it would take a long time.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I think it will take a long time. The Minister can confirm this, but I assume the Government would be pleased to conclude the withdrawal agreement before October 2018, if possible. However, there are several things that might happen, one of which is that the Government go back to the negotiating table and try to improve on the deal. I cannot see what is unreasonable about filling in the gaps or asking for revisions, were that the expressed will of the House.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way yet again. I think that he has just confirmed not that it would necessarily follow that the Government would have to extend indefinitely, but that it would be possible that the Government, in his view, should have to extend indefinitely because this House had not agreed to the withdrawal agreement. In other words, he is saying, is he not, that, if this House does not approve the terms on which we leave, until and unless it approves the terms on which we leave, we should not leave. Is he saying that, or not?

[Matthew Pennycook]

What I am saying is that there is any number of options that might happen, but let us bear in mind there is a period after October 2018 for the Government to return to the negotiating table and seek to revise or improve the terms. It does not necessarily mean an extension of article 50—I know that the right hon. Gentleman is trying to draw me down that path.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Matthew Pennycook]

I wish to make a little progress.

That is why we tabled new clause 66, which would guarantee, by means of prescribing when exit day for the purposes of this Bill can be appointed, that both Houses have a meaningful vote on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, just as critically, a vote in the event that no such agreement is reached and the Government are determined to take us out of the EU without a deal—a catastrophic scenario that would result in legal chaos, significant damage to our economy, the erection of a hard border in Northern Ireland and serious harm to Britain’s standing in the world. We have consistently called for the Government to make it clear that no deal is not a viable outcome.

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

In the event of a no deal, people are concerned about falling into World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs, but will my hon. Friend confirm that, of course, the WTO does not cover services, which are the majority—in fact, 80%—of our exports and which require intricate, detailed negotiations? In the case of a car, two thirds of it are now services and often parts of the car go across borders. Therefore, does he not accept that having no deal would not be a disaster—it would be a catastrophe?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I agree with my hon. Friend’s point about services. I say to all hon. Members who are happy to contemplate a scenario in which the Government walk away from the negotiations and this House is merely a spectator in that outcome, that that is not acceptable and this House should not accept it.

[Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I will make some progress, I am afraid, because a number of hon. Members wish to speak. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) will do so.

New clause 66 would ensure that there is a vote on a motion, not just in the event of a withdrawal agreement being concluded, but, crucially, when no such deal has been concluded, should that be the case. That outcome appears less likely following the agreement the Government reached last week and the clarification that the default position in the event of no deal will be regulatory alignment, but it remains a possibility, and Parliament must have a say.

As I have said, there are many, many ways of ensuring that Parliament has a meaningful vote. Amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is very well drafted. I do not think that it is deficient. We would definitely support it and we would not press new clause 66 if he pressed it to a vote.

[Mr Grieve]

May I say now that that amendment either has to be accepted by my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, or it will be put to the vote?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am very, very pleased to hear that. We will support the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the amendment in that eventuality.

I will conclude by saying that, subject to the kind of constraint that would be put in place if amendment 7 were incorporated into the Bill, we remain of the view that the power to appoint an exit day for the purposes of the Bill should be placed in the hands of Parliament, not Ministers, and also that the flexibility inherent in clause 14 with regard to exit day should be retained, because it is essential to finalising in some scenarios a withdrawal agreement and any transitional arrangements that need to be agreed to. We need only look at the mess last week to justify the need for such flexibility. As such, we believe that amendments 381 and 382 tabled by the Government with the aim of putting a specified exit date, and indeed time, in the Bill are an ill-conceived and unnecessary gimmick and on that basis we intend to oppose them if they are pushed to a vote.

This whole debate is about whether right hon. and hon. Members are content for Parliament to be a spectator, a passive observer, of one of the most important decisions that has faced our country in generations. Parliament must have a grip on the process, which is why we have tabled our amendments and new clauses.

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to have the opportunity to participate in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook). I agreed with virtually every word that he said.

In speaking to amendment 7, in the name of my hon. Friends, myself and other hon. Members, I am conscious that it has taken on a life of its own. When the Committee stage of the Bill started, it was my intention—and I hope one that I have observed and honoured throughout—to try to approach the amendments that I tabled in the spirit in which they are intended, which is to try to improve difficult legislation while entirely recognising the many challenges that the Government face. Brexit is full of risk and full of complexity—legal and otherwise—and the Government are entitled to my support, wherever possible, to carry Brexit out as smoothly as they can and with the least impact on the well-being of the citizens of our country. That has been my aim throughout.

I very much regret that—as often tends to happen in these matters—while some sessions in Committee have led to sensible amendment and the Government considering matters, or going away to look again and making some helpful suggestions, in the case of amendment 7 we seem to have run out of road. What happens in those circumstances, I regret to say, is that all rational discourse starts to evaporate. The purpose of the amendment, the nature of it, is entirely lost in a confrontation in which it is suggested that the underlying purpose is the sabotage of the will of the people, which it most manifestly is not. That is then followed by a hurling of public abuse; large numbers of people telling one that one is a traitor; and, I regret to say, some of one’s hon. and right hon. Friends saying slightly startling things. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), for example, said that I am grandstanding, when I do not remember ever having suggested such a thing to him about the way that he has expressed his views on Europe at any time in his career—including, I might add, when I tried to be a loyal member of his team when he was leader of my own party.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I will not give way.

[Matthew Pennycook]

rose—

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I will give way to the Opposition spokesman in a moment.

There therefore can arise circumstances in which the choice, in the end, is between accepting leaving with no deal and not accepting leaving. I continue to believe—it is important that there is honesty on this point—that Opposition Members are essentially arguing that this House should have the ability to derail the process.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I do not think that that is a fair characterisation of my argument. The right hon. Gentleman has said that there is a possibility, in certain circumstances, of sending the Government back to ask for the deal to be changed. It is possible that that might be turned down, so it is not certain, but it is possible. Does he think that that should be an option, and if so, if he votes against amendment 7, what other mechanism might we use to send the Government back to at least try to improve a deal that this House felt was sub-optimal?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am very happy to answer that question, and it will bring me neatly on to the point I want to make about the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. The answer, of course, lies in the combination of the proceedings on the resolution that will have to be agreed by this House, during which it will be perfectly possible for this House, both in debate and in the way it votes, to tell the Government, if there is time, to go back and try again; and of the proceedings on the withdrawal and implementation Bill, during which again, if there is time, the House could reject the proposition and ask the Government to go back.

We then come to the nub of what happens if there is no time anymore because the Government cannot get a renegotiation and cannot get an agreement—a further prolongation—of the kind that my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford describes. The question arises of whether Opposition Front Benchers are recommending, in those circumstances, that leaving without a deal is the possibility it needs to be for article 50 and the referendum to be respected. That is a crunch question that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich cannot avoid.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I will be brief, and then leave it there, but I want to pick up on two of the right hon. Gentleman’s points. First, I think there will be time. Last week’s joint agreement makes it clear that there must be time, in accordance with our own procedures, to look at the withdrawal agreement and then ratify it.

The right hon. Gentleman said that there is a possibility, on the basis of the Government’s commitment to a motion, to send them back to renegotiate, but that is not what his Secretary of State says. The Secretary of State says of the motion it is an up/down deal, and that a no vote would be the end of it—leaving without an agreement; not going back to the negotiating table.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

There is no possibility of precluding Parliament from making such a resolution one way or the other. That is up to Parliament, and it is up to the Government of the day at that point to respond as they choose. No Government would sensibly respond in the way the hon. Gentleman describes, so I do not think that that is a realistic possibility.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. I should just say to my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury that I will come on to talk about the restraints on the exercise of clause 9 later. However, in relation to my right hon. and learned Friend’s point, if we waited for the withdrawal agreement Bill not just to be introduced after the withdrawal agreement has been signed but to be fully enacted—if we waited for it to complete its full passage—we would not have time to deal with the volume of technical secondary legislation that we need to put through.

[Matthew Pennycook]

Six months.

[Dominic Raab]

No, that is not right. We would be required to wait for the withdrawal agreement Bill to be enacted, so that is not right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Desmond Swayne]

Swansea West. The hon. Member for Nottingham East said that he did not believe that people should not have an opportunity to revisit their decision, and that they have a perfect right to change their mind—I accept that. I am not in favour of some sort of African democracy of one man, one vote, once. People perfectly rightly have an opportunity to do that, but if there was one thing on which both sides in the referendum campaign were agreed it was on the importance of the vote that took place on 23 June 2016. He has every right to campaign for a second referendum, and I am glad that he has made it explicit this evening in advocating for his amendment that that is the real agenda. The purpose is to delay for long enough for something to turn up. An essential ingredient of giving time for something to turn up so that people will change their minds is delay, and that is what the process of all today’s amendments has, in essence, been about.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am not sure how to follow both of those contributions, but hon. Members may be relieved to know that I am going to make a brief one as I rise to speak to amendment 26, which seeks to change clause 8. I will focus on two specific points, the first being the purpose of clause 8 and the second being its scope.

The purpose of the clause, as set out in the Bill’s explanatory notes, is to give

“ministers of the Crown the power to make secondary legislation to enable continued compliance with the UK’s international obligations by preventing or remedying any breaches that might otherwise arise as a result of withdrawal.”

I say to the Minister gently that it is not entirely clear what breaches might require the clause 8 power. It is not clear to us that where breaches occur they could not, in most cases, be remedied by clause 7 or by powers contained in other legislation, for example the Trade Bill, which has already been published, or domestic legislation. I do not intend to discuss what my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) said in his comprehensive speech, in which he gave a set of examples about the types of international treaties and obligations the Government will have to deal with. However, it would be useful to hear some further examples from the Minister. To date, we have heard about only one international obligation, or perhaps a couple, where the Government believe the clause 8 power must be used. As the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee noted, the Government have not been explicit about the sort of obligations they have in mind for this clause.

On the scope of clause 8, we have many of the same concerns that we have about the scope of the powers in clauses 7, 9 and 17. Clause 8(3) contains some, although not all, of the explicit restrictions that apply in clause 7. In any case, we believe, just as we do with those clauses—that is why we tabled amendment 27 to clause 9 and amendment 25 to clause 7—that the scope of the delegated powers in clause 8 should be circumscribed so that they cannot be used to reduce rights or freedoms.

I know that many Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), wish to make speeches, so with that I draw my remarks to a close.

[Hannah Bardell]

The House has heard many technical and legalistic arguments focused on the economic, trade and legal impacts of our leaving the EU, but so far in the Brexit process and debate, the interests of children and their rights have been barely mentioned. That said, I was pleased to hear the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) about baby milk and the related regulations.

It is important to focus on children, their rights and the effect of Brexit on their future. In all of this, our children have had very little voice or decision-making opportunities for the future of the UK. All our children depend on UK, EU, international and UN provisions and treaties to protect them and to secure their future rights. It is sad and ironic that it was this Conservative Government who refused to let 16 and 17-year-olds participate in the EU referendum.

No one said it better than my former colleague and my dear friend, the previous Member for Gordon—I know all Members miss him as much as I do—who summed up the hokey-cokey politics of this Conservative Government by saying:

“The case for votes for 16 and 17-year-olds has been demonstrated by the Scottish referendum—not as some academic exercise but on the joyful and practical experience of a generation of Scotland’s young people…Claims that teenagers are disengaged with politics or incapable of understanding constitutional issues was blown apart by the great contribution by young people in Scotland during the campaign…It is a ludicrous situation and nothing better illustrates the total lack of imagination which typifies the Conservative Party at its worst and their headlong pursuit of self-interest…It encapsulates Tory arrogance and the insult to young people will neither be forgotten nor forgiven.”

That is an extremely good point.

I remember studying, not that long ago, politics at the University of Stirling, where I learned about further EU integration. It seems very sad that the students of the future will be studying this process, our performance and the decisions that were made. I wonder what the textbooks and political history books will say and how they will read. I think they will say that this has been a political catastrophe—a series of unfortunate events.