European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

The power that the Executive will have in making regulations under the clause will be subject to Parliament, because secondary legislation comes to Parliament. These regulations are of a different order of magnitude from regulations made by the European Union, which can be made by qualified majority vote against the will of the British Government and are automatically British law. So this is, in fact, restoring parliamentary oversight to the making of laws.

[Yvette Cooper]

The hon. Gentleman has himself been a strong advocate of the responsibilities and powers of Parliament, but it does not take long for him to become completely lost down a sidetrack and start talking about what our relationship with the EU has been for very many years. The point is that this process is about how that relationship will change. We know that it is due to change as a result of the referendum and the article 50 negotiations, but the responsibility for all of us is to determine how it should change. The hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do, and as well as every other Member in the House, that the giving of powers in secondary legislation concentrates powers in the hands of Ministers, and does not receive the same scrutiny. Furthermore, this is not just about the concentration of power through clause 9; it is also about the process through which the Government want to make the decisions on the withdrawal agreement in order to trigger clause 9.

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[Mr David Lammy (Tottenham) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

I will give way in just a second, but let me finish this point.

That means that a meaningful vote cannot take place until a detailed agreement has been arrived at about certainly the precise nature of our trading and economic relationships with the single market of the European Union, and actually quite a lot else besides, because we still have to embark on the security discussions, the policing discussions and the discussions about which agencies we are going to remain in and which agency rules we are going to comply with. This is, we all agree, a huge and complex agreement, and it is going to determine this country’s relationships with the rest of the continent of Europe and the wider world for generations to come. Can that happen before March 2019?

We face the genuine difficulty that it is quite obvious that we will not be remotely near to reaching that agreement by March 2019, and we have to think through what that actually means. The negotiators have been very optimistic in saying that they will have first a transition deal and then a deal by 2019. I am sure that they will try, but they have not a chance. I think that what they are actually saying—certainly the continental negotiators—is that they might be able to have some heads of agreement on the eventual destination by March 2019, which we can all carefully consider. They will certainly have to agree a transition deal of at least two years within which the rest of the process will have to be completed.

I agree with the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford that everybody wants things to be speedy, because one of things that this country is suffering from most at the moment is the appalling uncertainty caused by the fact that we have taken a ridiculous length of time to reach three obvious conclusions on the three preliminary points that had to be determined as the basis of our withdrawal. At the moment, however, we do not quite know what the British Government are going to be seeking as their end goal in the negotiations that are about to start, because the British Government, within the Cabinet, have not yet been able to agree exactly what they are seeking.

If I may say this to my desperately paranoid Eurosceptic friends, it is not as if I am somehow trying in some surreptitious remainer way to put a spoke in the wheels of the fast progress of the United Kingdom towards our destination. The Government do not know what leave means. Nobody discussed what leave meant when we were having the referendum. Our overriding duty is not just to our political allegiances and so on; it is to provide this country with a good, responsible Government who face up to the problems of the real world and, accountable to Parliament, can produce the best new order that they can for the benefit of future generations.

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[Matthew Pennycook]

The right hon. Lady makes a very important point. Although I concede that amendment 7 provides for an additional check because it requires primary legislation, our new clause 66 highlights an important point: we would wish to bind the Government so that Parliament would get a say even in the event of a no-deal scenario. I shall return to that point later.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Matthew Pennycook]

I cannot resist.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman is concerned about the potential for a compressed timetable and the consequences of what may flow from that, but is that not actually following from the will and vote of Parliament? Parliament passed into law article 50, which it agreed to by bringing the Lisbon treaty into law, so this is the natural consequence of what Parliament itself has determined.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman is right that the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and the article 50 notification gave effect to their own timetable. That is why it is so important that we have transitional arrangements on current terms that allow us flexibility to negotiate the final deal. I will return to this point later, but there is no way that, before we leave in March 2019, we will have agreed the future relationship. We will have agreed heads of terms at best.

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[Mr Grieve]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I hope that I will be able to develop some of those points in a moment.

As was rightly said by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), the Government had a notion when this debate started that it was possible to pull out of the European Union by use of the royal prerogative. Fortunately, time, common sense, debate and a small amount of judicial intervention has pointed out that that is not possible. As a consequence, my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench have correctly begun to understand that in fact there has to be a proper process. I appreciate the points that have been made about a meaningful vote and how we can actually get that in the context of Brexit; it is a real, live issue. Nevertheless, I greatly welcome the written ministerial statement, which sets out what appears to be a constitutionally tenable process for Parliament approving or considering the deal by motion, and then moving on to implement the deal by primary legislation.

Of course, the Government know that they must proceed by primary legislation because, in view of the comments during the Miller case, it is blindingly apparent that there must be a serious risk of legal uncertainty if anything other than a statute were to be used to take us out of the EU at the end. That is the last thing that my right hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench should want, because that will cause even more trouble and difficulty than they already have in the challenges they have to face.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me if I appear pedantic, but does not this Bill and the enactment of article 50 take us out of the European Union at the end, whereas the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill legislate for the consequences?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes. If, indeed, we were leaving with nothing further to do, that might be a good point. But it seems to be a pretty universal view, even on the Government Benches—although this perhaps does not apply to my hon. Friend—that simply leaving to jump off the top of the tower block is not the best thing to do. Therefore, there will need to be primary legislation to implement the undoubted new constitutional order that we will have after 29 March 2019.

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[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point.

Ultimately, the centre of this point is that we are being asked to give the Government a power that can be exercised on something, but we do not know what that something is. Logically, the moment to make the statutory instruments to enact our withdrawal would come when we have this further statute—whatever it happens to be called—and have debated it in this House. We will then have structured the powers conferred by statutory instrument to achieve what Parliament wants and thinks is necessary to carry out withdrawal. That is the point, and pre-empting matters in this fashion is odd. Indeed, it is so odd that I heard one Minister—I will not reveal who—informally saying that they questioned whether the clause 9 power was in fact still needed, in view of how the Government were progressing this matter.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

In a moment.

On my key issue and what I was trying to tease out in tabling amendment 7, I could, I suppose, have simply said that I will not support clause 9. Indeed, if my amendment is not accepted, I am afraid I shall be voting against clause 9 this evening—I have no option—but rather than do that, the purpose of my amendment is to try to explore what it is that the Government want clause 9 to do that, in fact, we should not be doing when we enact the legislation at the end.

It is for the Government, in those circumstances, to explain themselves; it is not for Parliament simply to roll over and accept something because the Government say that that is what we should do. Indeed, if we all get told that we must support the Government out of loyalty because to do otherwise would undermine the Prime Minister—I think that is cuckoo, for the reasons given by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper)—we need to know why.

Last week, I engaged in a whole series of dialogues with the Government, trying to understand what was bothering them. At one point, I thought we might be getting to the point where we would reach an agreement that some power might be needed in the Bill before we came to the final Bill, although I will come back to that in a moment. It started to dawn on me that one possibility was that this power might be exercisable, but only provided it could not be used to bring anything into force—we might lay some statutory instruments, but they could not be brought into force in any way until the end statute had been passed.

That is where I thought we might be—and then everything closed down, and I am none the wiser why the Government need this power, except that I note that a journalist who seemed to have been speaking to a briefing was told it might be required to effect the registration of EU citizens. I thought to myself, “I thought we were going to have an immigration Act to do that.” So I am still at this moment—this afternoon—absolutely at sea about why this power is needed. If the Government cannot make a case for this power, it should not be here.

Even at this stage, I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, if they accept this amendment, which is absolutely central and necessary to ensuring that a power of this scope cannot be abused in a way that the House should not tolerate, and if they want to come back on Report and tidy it up because there is some adjustment or some caveat they want to put in, I will of course listen to what they want to say—my job is not to make their lives more difficult—but I am not prepared to sign away such an extensive power, when it appears to be contrary to the Government’s stated policy on how Brexit will be carried out and, in fact, surrenders without any good reason the control of this House over how the Government conduct Brexit.

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[Mr Edward Vaizey (Wantage) (Con)]

I am very grateful, Mr Amess—[Hon. Members: “Sir David Amess.”] I am so sorry. I should remember that nearly everyone who is speaking in this debate has a knighthood.

I am very grateful, Sir David, for the chance to speak in this important debate. It has been extraordinarily interesting and, actually, enjoyable. I want to make a brief detour on amendment 7, because the dialogue between my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) was absolutely terrific. Listening to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset took me back—to a certain extent—to meetings that I had with him when I was a Minister. You could not go in and order a cup of coffee without engaging in a two-hour debate about exactly what was meant.

In the end, however, the answer emerged, and it emerged in this exchange. Notwithstanding all the technical debate, it is extremely simple. Clause 9 was written before the Government realised that they would have to put the withdrawal agreement into a statute, and now that they have to put it into a statute, both clause 9 and, potentially, amendment 7 have reached their sell-by date. The offer from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset is serious and real: to come back, effectively, with a rewritten clause 9 which tells Parliament exactly what the Government need to do as we implement the withdrawal agreement in legislation. Do they need some powers—I could understand that—to do some things that are essential preparatory work? I thought my point was good enough to stimulate—

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Mr Vaizey]

Yes, it has stimulated my hon. Friend.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

What my right hon. Friend is saying is spot-on: clause 9 gives some powers that trouble even Eurosceptics. I have never felt comfortable with the self-amending part of the Bill, and the solution advocated by my right hon. Friend, and proposed by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), is very attractive.

[Mr Vaizey]

I can barely stand up again, because I am slightly overwhelmed by the outbreak of consensus.

I shall end this section of the speech with some unashamed flattery, as I look at the triumvirate of titans on the Treasury Front Bench: three Ministers for whom I have the utmost admiration, including my constituency neighbour, the Solicitor General, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Robert Buckland). They have heard this debate, and they are thoughtful and effective Ministers and I am sure they will have taken the mood at least from a certain part of this House about the brilliant opportunity for a solution to this Gordian knot.

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[Chris Bryant]

Sir David—for you are indeed beknighted—it is good to take part in this debate immediately after the right hon. Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey). However, I am slightly saddened that he was so disparaging of all the Opposition Members who have signed his amendment. If we are just cast aside with such casual, reckless, gay abandon, we are never going to do that again, are we?

The British way in parliamentary matters has always been that we govern by consent, not by Government fiat, so Parliament should never be conceived of by a Government as an inconvenience that has to be avoided if possible. Parliament should be seen as an essential part of how we carry the whole nation with us. The Government should have more strength in Parliament than they do if they try to circumvent Parliament.

Getting the process right, as several hon. Members have already said, is absolutely essential. We are going to be deciding what many assume will be a long-term settlement for this country for generations to come. We cannot simply try to go ahead with a railroaded version of that settlement that only carries 52% of the country, or perhaps even less by then—who knows?—because we will in the end undermine the very institutions that people have been trying to say should be sovereign. I say to the Government that no amount of jiggery-pokery will sort things out. At the end of the day, parliamentary shenanigans will do far more harm to this country’s political institutions than we should countenance.

The Government already have phenomenal power and—I have used this figure before, but it is true—this is the first time in our history that more than half of Government Members are now either Ministers, trade envoys or Parliamentary Private Secretaries and are beholden unto the Government in some way or other. We have more Ministers than Italy, France and Germany put together, so the Government’s hold on Parliament in our system is already phenomenal, yet they have introduced clause 9, which is truly exceptional. I have tabled several amendments, which I will not address because I do not think there is any great point. The honest truth is that I would prefer to see the whole clause out of the Bill.

The moment I saw clause 9, I thought, “If there is a real reason for this, surely by now the Government would have argued why they have to have these powers.” Now the Government say a Bill will be introduced on the agreement and its implementation. If there really is a need for those powers, clause 9 should be in that Bill and not in this Bill at all.

I love all four of the Ministers sitting on the Government Front Bench to death, and obviously the safest thing to do today is for one of them to stand up—they could stand up one after another, as in “Spartacus”—and say, “We will not support this. We will not urge the Committee to consider taking on this clause as part of the Bill, because we know we do not really need it.”

People might ask, “If the Government do not really need clause 9, why does it matter if the clause is in the Bill at all?” The problem is that every single Government in the history of the world have always used every power they have to the umpteenth degree. It is a temptation, and we should take temptation out of the Government’s hands if they are not prepared to take it out of their own hands. Let us bear in mind that the Bill will allow the Government to change the Parliament Acts and the Representation of the People Acts. [Interruption.] The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice is standing up! Oh, he’s not.

Admittedly, changes to the Parliament Acts and the Representation of the People Acts by secondary legislation would have to be made via the affirmative process and there would be a vote in both Houses.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Bryant]

I will give way to the 16th century, but I cannot imagine for an instant how the hon. Gentleman could support such a change.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

As I have said, I have my doubts about parts of clause 9, but it says that a Minister of the Crown may, “by regulations,” do things

“for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement”.

It is hard to see how that could change the Representation of the People Acts. The hon. Gentleman slightly overstates his case.

[Chris Bryant]

The hon. Gentleman entices me down the road of one of my amendments. Previous legislation allowing Governments such extensive powers, such as the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, has made it clear that, when tabling statutory instruments, Governments have to argue the case for why those statutory instruments are necessary. In this case, the Government have not even added that provision to the Bill, which is what makes me suspicious.

A doubting Thomas is a good man, but he should follow through on his doubts. I hope that means the hon. Gentleman will be joining us in the Lobby tonight, although I have a sneaking suspicion the smile that just crept across his face indicates that he has no intention of doing so.

There has been much talk about what is a meaningful vote. I read theology at university. My theology professor, John Macquarrie, was a wonderful man who had a rather strange half-American, half-Scottish accent. He was asked by a student, “What is the meaning of God?” And he answered, “You should not ask me, ‘What is the meaning of God?’ You should ask me, ‘What is the meaning of meaning?’” That is the kind of existential debate we are having today.

What does it mean to have a meaningful vote? First, I would say that the vote cannot simply be on a fait accompli. It is not meaningful to vote on something after it has already happened and it has already been decided. It cannot just be a vote on a treaty because, as I have already tried to explain, the provisions on treaties in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 state that the Government do not have to provide for a vote on treaties, because it is not an affirmative process. They merely state that, if the House says within 21 sitting days that the treaty should not be agreed, the Government have to have another go, if they want to. That is a problematic process for us.

In addition, a treaty is unamendable. One thing everybody has been arguing in this debate is that we need to be able to send the Government back to negotiate again if we think the deal is not good enough. This cannot be simply be on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. That is what Hobson, the 17th century stable owner said: “You can either take the horse closest to the door or you will not take a horse at all.” It is like Henry Ford’s saying:

“Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is black.”

My fear is that the Prime Minister will want to be a stable owner trying to persuade everybody to take the horse closest to the door, and I do not believe that will be a meaningful vote.

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[Tom Brake]

Perhaps I could suggest a handicap system for Members who observe the advisory time limit on speeches.

If the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) thinks that the European Union is keen to drag things out, he has clearly not spoken to many EU diplomats. They want this to be over; they are not as obsessed with Brexit as he might be.

I commend the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) for his rational discourse in relation to amendment 7. Unlike me, he cannot be described as wanting to stop Brexit. He does not want to, but I do—democratically, with a vote on the deal. That is covered by amendment 120, which we will vote on next Wednesday. But he and I are certainly in the same place when it comes to the importance of parliamentary sovereignty, and legislative rigour and accuracy. He set out cogent arguments in favour of amendment 7, and he described the extent to which he has bent over backwards in the last few weeks to try to secure agreement from the Government on a way forward, but failed to do so.

The Minister’s main argument against amendment 7 was time pressure. The Government have, to a great extent, inflicted that problem on themselves, whether through the general election that they called, by triggering article 50 when they did, or by refusing to entertain the option of extending the article 50 process. The hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) said that EU had not offered such an extension but, as I understand it, the UK has at no point ever asked for one. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield set out a very neat solution to the problem that the Government outlined, and the Minister did not manage to convince the very experienced senior Members who were sitting behind him. He might not have seen it, but the body language and facial expressions of those behind him reinforced the point that, frankly, the Government have not deployed very cogent arguments in favour of opposing amendment 7. I look forward to voting on that amendment, and to Parliament taking back control.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I will not be voting for article 7, because I think it is a mistake—[Interruption.] I am extremely grateful; I mean amendment 7. The amendment calls for legislation to be put in afterwards, which is a very unusual thing for a Bill to do—I believe it is unprecedented. If people do not like clause 9, they should vote against it, rather than voting for this unusual amendment.

I want to make it clear, however, that I very much accept the good faith of those who argue for amendment 7. Those of us who opposed the Government when they were very pro-European should not criticise Members such as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—Disraeli pronounced the constituency name slightly differently—when they decide to take the reverse position of the one we took in previous years. What they are doing is completely reasonable.

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[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a quite natural solution, which is to put the assurance given at the Dispatch Box into the clause when the Bill comes back on Report?

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

My right hon. Friend’s speech was absolutely brilliant. He got to the heart of all these matters, and indeed he provided a solution, which is that there should be such a good-spirited compromise that places some faith in the Government, as it is reasonable for Members of Parliament to do. We should recognise that it is better to have a clear response on Report that covers the whole problem than to agree an amendment that is constitutionally abnormal, because we should not agree to such amendments.

I follow the Minister’s argument that there are circumstances in which clause 9 could be useful. If an agreement comes relatively late on, I understand that there will be an urgency in getting statutory instruments presented. There also will be a Prorogation before May 2019, so there might be a delay in the proceedings on the withdrawal and implementation Bill and therefore a need for urgent action. If we pass a motion, as may be legislatively required, to accept the proposed statutory instruments, that will both maintain parliamentary control and give the Government the flexibility that they are likely to need.

This issue becomes very significant because, as we leave, we will want legislative continuity and clarity. The date has been set, and that has been debated, but the key is that the date has been set by previous decisions of Parliament. It is in no sense an erosion of parliamentary sovereignty, because the date is set out in the Act triggering article 50 and in the Act incorporating the Lisbon treaty into UK law. The timeframe was set under voluntary Acts of Parliament requiring things to be done by 29 March 2019. It therefore follows that there is some pressure on time, so it is perfectly reasonable for the Government to ask for such flexibility.

I conclude on the vote at the end—the final meaningful vote. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), as he so often does, made an elegant point when he said that this is a metaphysical decision for us about the meaning of meaning. The issue is that Her Majesty’s Government have already promised that we will have a vote on the deal before the European Parliament does, but there is no deal until the European Parliament has voted. The European Parliament has to agree to the deal—as part of the article 50 package, this is decided by an enhanced qualified majority vote, subject to the approval of the European Parliament—but we have already been promised a vote before the matter is voted on by the European Parliament.

[Anna Soubry]

My hon. Friend is probably right, but my understanding is that the definition of withdrawal agreement clearly says “whether ratified or not”, so we do not have to follow the European Parliament. However, unless we get a meaningful vote, it may well end up being able to vote on something that, frankly, we will not be able to vote on.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, but the Government have already said that we will have a chance to vote on the withdrawal agreement before the European Parliament.

[Anna Soubry]

A meaningful vote.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Well, that vote must by its nature be meaningful. As we know, it is very easy to have a meaningful vote: we just table an Humble Address, and then it is binding on Her Majesty’s Government, as is quite clear from all previous parliamentary and constitutional procedure. We can engineer a meaningful vote even if the Government are trying to be a bit slippery, which I happen to doubt very much, because I think Her Majesty’s Government would never dream of being slippery—they would not know how to be slippery. It is hard to think of a Government in the whole of history being slippery.

In the whole schedule leading to the ratification and approval of the withdrawal agreement, there is a requirement for a vote in this House. There is also a requirement, now agreed with the European Union, that there will be a withdrawal and implementation Bill—[Interruption.] I am sorry that the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil) is getting impatient, but this is a very important matter. The rights of Parliament will absolutely and clearly be preserved, and I hope that Her Majesty’s Government will listen to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset, because his is a solution with which I think everybody can be happy.

[Liz Kendall (Leicester West) (Lab)]

The votes we will have at 7 o’clock will be the most important since this House voted to trigger article 50. Those of us who want to have any real influence over how we leave the EU must vote for a meaningful vote in Parliament. That is not being guaranteed. We will not have a meaningful vote on either the initial withdrawal agreement and the very broad terms—which is all they will be—of our future relationship with the EU, or the full agreement governing our future relationship with the EU, which the Government have finally admitted can be legally concluded only once the UK has left the EU.

On the first issue, all that is being offered is a take-it-or-leave-it vote on whatever the Government agree, with no guarantee that the actual vote will take place before exit day. The written ministerial statement is clear that the legislation—not the vote—

“will be introduced before the UK exits the EU”.

In reality, it will be a choice between giving the Government a blank cheque and in effect turning this Parliament into a rubber stamp, or taking a leap into the abyss.

What meaningful say will this House have if the alternative to rubber-stamping the Government’s deal is no transition agreement, meaning that our businesses will face a cliff edge; no deal for EU citizens living here or for UK citizens abroad; and no deal on the Irish border, which is so vital for protecting the Good Friday agreement? The sword of Damocles is over our heads, and we should say no.

A meaningful vote would give this House sufficient time and mean that it would not face a last-minute threat. It would give this House the power to send the Government back to the negotiating table, and the power to request that the remaining EU27 extend the article 50 deadline if we needed to get a better deal. That is also why it is so important not to have a fixed time and date in the Bill—because we may well need all the flexibility we can get.

The final overall trade deal with the EU will govern the UK’s future relationship with the EU for decades to come, but what is on offer is even worse. The written ministerial statement says that

“the agreement governing our future relationship…may take the form of a single agreement or a number of agreements covering different aspects of the relationship.”

It is pretty clear what will happen in the EU27 countries. The statement says that

“agreements on the future relationship are likely to require the consent of the European Parliament and conclusion by the Council. If both the EU and Member States are exercising their competences in an agreement, Member States will also need to ratify it.”

What do we get here? The statement says that the Government will introduce further legislation only

“where it is needed to implement the terms of the future relationship”.

There is no guarantee of any legislation, apart from when the Government deem it necessary, and there is no ability to disagree to or amend those deals, only to implement them.

That is unacceptable. MPs must have a meaningful vote on the initial withdrawal agreement and on the future trade agreement or agreements—and that must be on the face of the Bill. Nothing that the Prime Minister or the Brexit Minister have said today, or in the Brexit Secretary’s written ministerial statement, have addressed those concerns at all. Even if they had, words and assurances are not enough. The Prime Minister is not in a position to give us those assurances—indeed, no one on the Government Front Bench is, because they may not be there when our future trade and other deals with the EU are agreed. It will be many years before that happens. They have not addressed any of those points, and I say to hon. Members on both the Opposition and Government Benches that this is the time to put country before party. If we want an influence and a say over the future of this country, I urge them to vote for amendment 7.