European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

Secondly, the Government say that we cannot have a legislative process around an internationally negotiated deal, but of course we can. This is what parliamentary sovereignty is all about, and this is about us being mature. Thirdly, they have said that this would somehow stop Brexit. Again, that is rubbish. This is about how we should do this and how we can get the legislation right. Fourthly, I know that some Conservative Members have been told that if they vote for amendment 7 and do not stick with the Government’s line, it will somehow undermine the Prime Minister’s position and be a disloyal thing to do. All I would say to them is that the Prime Minister has proved to be remarkably resilient in the face of things that are considerably worse than losing one vote on one amendment in this place. Much as I would like it to be different, the fact that she is still standing at the Dispatch Box despite the result of the election and the result of a series of other things means that she really will not be knocked over by this one amendment.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The right hon. Lady might agree with me that what causes more consternation overseas among those observing what is going on are the signs that we as a Parliament and as a Government seem from time to time to completely lose our marbles and get involved in polemical arguments that are far removed from the actual matters that we are supposed to be discussing.

[Yvette Cooper]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is exactly right, and I will defer to him to set out his amendment and describe its impact. The idea that we should make a confidence issue out of every single adjustment to the Brexit process or to the withdrawal Bill is just nonsense.

If we have a Bill before Parliament, it has to be possible for Members of Parliament to table amendments to it and to vote on them. In a hung Parliament, that is even more the case. The Prime Minister asked for a mandate to do all this her own way, but she did not get it. She got a hung Parliament. That puts even more responsibility on us all to work together to find something that will build consensus across Parliament and across the country. In a hung Parliament, the Government sometimes lose votes because Parliament has to do its job to build the right kind of consensus and to get the right kind of outcome.

In the end, this is all about Parliament and democracy. Each and every one of us has a responsibility to our constituents not to hand over, share or give up our authority and our sovereignty, but to exercise our responsibility to get the very best deal. For centuries, Members of Parliament have fought tooth and nail to defend democracy and the powers of Parliament against Executive power. We cannot be the generation that just rips that up and hands over all the power to the Executive. We have a responsibility—now more than ever, given the gravity of the decisions before us—to use that power responsibly and to try to build consensus. To be honest, if the Government cannot build a broader consensus in Parliament, there is no chance of their building a broader consensus in the country, and if they cannot do that, we will end up with everybody rowing over the Brexit deal for a generation to come. For the sake of all of us who want to get back to discussing our schools, our hospitals and all the other issues that face our Parliament, I urge Ministers to accept either amendment 7 or new clause 3, and to start trying to build a consensus that can get us a sustainable Brexit deal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matthew Pennycook]

I will make some progress, I am afraid, because a number of hon. Members wish to speak. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) will do so.

New clause 66 would ensure that there is a vote on a motion, not just in the event of a withdrawal agreement being concluded, but, crucially, when no such deal has been concluded, should that be the case. That outcome appears less likely following the agreement the Government reached last week and the clarification that the default position in the event of no deal will be regulatory alignment, but it remains a possibility, and Parliament must have a say.

As I have said, there are many, many ways of ensuring that Parliament has a meaningful vote. Amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is very well drafted. I do not think that it is deficient. We would definitely support it and we would not press new clause 66 if he pressed it to a vote.

[Mr Grieve]

May I say now that that amendment either has to be accepted by my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, or it will be put to the vote?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am very, very pleased to hear that. We will support the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the amendment in that eventuality.

I will conclude by saying that, subject to the kind of constraint that would be put in place if amendment 7 were incorporated into the Bill, we remain of the view that the power to appoint an exit day for the purposes of the Bill should be placed in the hands of Parliament, not Ministers, and also that the flexibility inherent in clause 14 with regard to exit day should be retained, because it is essential to finalising in some scenarios a withdrawal agreement and any transitional arrangements that need to be agreed to. We need only look at the mess last week to justify the need for such flexibility. As such, we believe that amendments 381 and 382 tabled by the Government with the aim of putting a specified exit date, and indeed time, in the Bill are an ill-conceived and unnecessary gimmick and on that basis we intend to oppose them if they are pushed to a vote.

This whole debate is about whether right hon. and hon. Members are content for Parliament to be a spectator, a passive observer, of one of the most important decisions that has faced our country in generations. Parliament must have a grip on the process, which is why we have tabled our amendments and new clauses.

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to have the opportunity to participate in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook). I agreed with virtually every word that he said.

In speaking to amendment 7, in the name of my hon. Friends, myself and other hon. Members, I am conscious that it has taken on a life of its own. When the Committee stage of the Bill started, it was my intention—and I hope one that I have observed and honoured throughout—to try to approach the amendments that I tabled in the spirit in which they are intended, which is to try to improve difficult legislation while entirely recognising the many challenges that the Government face. Brexit is full of risk and full of complexity—legal and otherwise—and the Government are entitled to my support, wherever possible, to carry Brexit out as smoothly as they can and with the least impact on the well-being of the citizens of our country. That has been my aim throughout.

I very much regret that—as often tends to happen in these matters—while some sessions in Committee have led to sensible amendment and the Government considering matters, or going away to look again and making some helpful suggestions, in the case of amendment 7 we seem to have run out of road. What happens in those circumstances, I regret to say, is that all rational discourse starts to evaporate. The purpose of the amendment, the nature of it, is entirely lost in a confrontation in which it is suggested that the underlying purpose is the sabotage of the will of the people, which it most manifestly is not. That is then followed by a hurling of public abuse; large numbers of people telling one that one is a traitor; and, I regret to say, some of one’s hon. and right hon. Friends saying slightly startling things. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), for example, said that I am grandstanding, when I do not remember ever having suggested such a thing to him about the way that he has expressed his views on Europe at any time in his career—including, I might add, when I tried to be a loyal member of his team when he was leader of my own party.

[Mr Baron]

My right hon. and learned Friend will know that I have never participated in any of that sort of language. May I gently put it to him that amendment 7 leaves open at least the possibility that, given that the EU does not want any member to leave and that there is therefore no incentive for it to negotiate a good deal that would be acceptable to this Parliament, we could find ourselves in a permanent state of limbo, deadlocked in unproductive negotiations?

[Mr Grieve]

I note what my hon. Friend has said and I am very grateful to him for the way in which he put it, but I happen to disagree with him. If he listens to me he will understand why I think that I am right on that point.

The consequence is that we completely lose sight of what the key issues are, and if I may say so before I move on, that matters a lot, because in the course of this, we also lose sight of the fact that we are the Parliament of a deeply divided country on this issue. When I go and lecture to sixth-formers occasionally and talk to them, I point out that the parliamentary process is not just about the imposition of the will of the majority on the minority; it is the process by which we obtain consent for what the majority chooses to do.

The difficulty with this referendum is that, having invoked the public will, which, I regret to say, is not entirely tempered in its expressions of view by some of the courtesies that we extend to each other here, we run the risk of losing sight of the fact that 48% of the electorate did not wish for the policy that we are currently pursuing and have deep concerns about, not trying to reverse it, but the extent to which it will have an adverse impact on their well-being, and request us as a Parliament to pay as much attention to what they are saying as we undoubtedly have to do to those who voted in the referendum and said that they wanted to leave. The most worrying aspect of the debate, as it has progressed, is how we become polarised and so fixated on ends that we fail completely to look at means. We look at the top of the mountain, but not at where we are going to put our foot next. As a consequence, we run serious risks of badly letting them down—all of them, collectively—by enacting bad legislation and taking very foolish decisions.

Of course, when this confrontation comes along, the negotiations immediately stop, the conversation ceases, the Government’s steamroller is invoked, and the atmosphere can suddenly get really quite unpleasant; and I regret it. As a consequence—I will come back to this in a moment—I have to tell my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that I think they have lost a series of opportunities in the dialogue we have had on this to come to a sensible outcome. With that, I turn to the issue that is, in truth, under debate.

[Paul Farrelly]

Is not the advantage of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s very helpful amendment that it would give certainty? It would nail down, in black and white, what we have agreed and would place a legal responsibility on the Government. We would then avoid a situation whereby what people think has been agreed simply becomes a statement of intent within a matter of hours and days.

[Mr Grieve]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I hope that I will be able to develop some of those points in a moment.

As was rightly said by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), the Government had a notion when this debate started that it was possible to pull out of the European Union by use of the royal prerogative. Fortunately, time, common sense, debate and a small amount of judicial intervention has pointed out that that is not possible. As a consequence, my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench have correctly begun to understand that in fact there has to be a proper process. I appreciate the points that have been made about a meaningful vote and how we can actually get that in the context of Brexit; it is a real, live issue. Nevertheless, I greatly welcome the written ministerial statement, which sets out what appears to be a constitutionally tenable process for Parliament approving or considering the deal by motion, and then moving on to implement the deal by primary legislation.

Of course, the Government know that they must proceed by primary legislation because, in view of the comments during the Miller case, it is blindingly apparent that there must be a serious risk of legal uncertainty if anything other than a statute were to be used to take us out of the EU at the end. That is the last thing that my right hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench should want, because that will cause even more trouble and difficulty than they already have in the challenges they have to face.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me if I appear pedantic, but does not this Bill and the enactment of article 50 take us out of the European Union at the end, whereas the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill legislate for the consequences?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes. If, indeed, we were leaving with nothing further to do, that might be a good point. But it seems to be a pretty universal view, even on the Government Benches—although this perhaps does not apply to my hon. Friend—that simply leaving to jump off the top of the tower block is not the best thing to do. Therefore, there will need to be primary legislation to implement the undoubted new constitutional order that we will have after 29 March 2019.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

May I just make a tiny bit more progress?

As the Government’s position has shifted, they have come up with a written ministerial statement, which seems accurately to reflect the right direction of travel. But the difficulty is that clause 9 is entirely incompatible with what the Government have set out.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I happen to agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that it would be undesirable for us to leave without an agreement. Indeed, I think that the Government agree with that. But I will go back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) a moment ago. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that, in the event that it were not possible to reach a further agreement, it would then be the case that the actions of Parliament already taken—including in triggering article 50—would constitute a proper answer to the Supreme Court’s point that Parliament, and Parliament alone, can remove us from the EU?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, I think I agree with my right hon. Friend that the action of Parliament in triggering article 50 would do that. But it is not, I think, the intention of the Government to do any such thing, and never has been. Indeed, if it is the intention of the Government to do such a thing, I hope very much that they will tell me as soon as possible, because I think I might be withdrawing my support from them.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Is not the point that, everything else being equal, even if nothing else happens, article 50 has been triggered so we are leaving the European Union on a set date, unless 27 other countries decide to extend the date? Therefore, this argument is about the UK’s internal process. It is not a question of the EU or anyone else holding things up.

[Mr Grieve]

There are a series of processes. I do not wish to get too diverted from my main point. We are intending, and will require, a further statute in order to achieve what the Government have set out. I hope very much that we do not leave with a no deal on anything, because we would not be able to fly off to Rome on the day after, we would have no security co-operation and we would, indeed, be mired in complete and utter chaos.

The reality is that clause 9 is incompatible with the programme that the Government have set out. At the time that clause 9 was inserted, I think that the Government had not yet fully worked out the implications of how withdrawal had to take place.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Grieve]

In a moment. I do not wish to take up too much of the Committee’s time.

My point brings me to the specifics of clause 9, which is an extraordinary and wide power to remove us from the EU by statutory instrument, and moreover—this is the most telling point—to ask the House to give the Government effectively a blank cheque to draft statutory instruments to achieve something when at the moment we do not know what that is.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening very carefully, but clause 9 is not about implementing our leaving the European Union; it is about implementing a withdrawal agreement. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) did not vote for article 50, but my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) did. That is when he voted to leave the European Union and that is decided, so he is incorrect to say that clause 9 is deciding when or how we leave the European Union.

[Mr Grieve]

If I may say so, I think my hon. Friend has misunderstood what I said. The fact is that clause 9 provides a power, exercisable once this Bill comes into force before exit day, to implement something when we do not at present know what that is. Therefore, it is a very strange thing to ask Parliament to sign off.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

Is not the supreme irony the fact that clause 9 is actually the child of article 50 of the Lisbon treaty, which the Government are now supporting? This provision is the Lisbon treaty timetable. It is not in any way trying to give power or control back to this House to amend that in any way or to ensure that the UK leaves the European Union at the time that is fortuitous. The UK is just accepting what is in the Lisbon treaty and the Government have welded themselves to that very idea.

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point.

Ultimately, the centre of this point is that we are being asked to give the Government a power that can be exercised on something, but we do not know what that something is. Logically, the moment to make the statutory instruments to enact our withdrawal would come when we have this further statute—whatever it happens to be called—and have debated it in this House. We will then have structured the powers conferred by statutory instrument to achieve what Parliament wants and thinks is necessary to carry out withdrawal. That is the point, and pre-empting matters in this fashion is odd. Indeed, it is so odd that I heard one Minister—I will not reveal who—informally saying that they questioned whether the clause 9 power was in fact still needed, in view of how the Government were progressing this matter.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

In a moment.

On my key issue and what I was trying to tease out in tabling amendment 7, I could, I suppose, have simply said that I will not support clause 9. Indeed, if my amendment is not accepted, I am afraid I shall be voting against clause 9 this evening—I have no option—but rather than do that, the purpose of my amendment is to try to explore what it is that the Government want clause 9 to do that, in fact, we should not be doing when we enact the legislation at the end.

It is for the Government, in those circumstances, to explain themselves; it is not for Parliament simply to roll over and accept something because the Government say that that is what we should do. Indeed, if we all get told that we must support the Government out of loyalty because to do otherwise would undermine the Prime Minister—I think that is cuckoo, for the reasons given by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper)—we need to know why.

Last week, I engaged in a whole series of dialogues with the Government, trying to understand what was bothering them. At one point, I thought we might be getting to the point where we would reach an agreement that some power might be needed in the Bill before we came to the final Bill, although I will come back to that in a moment. It started to dawn on me that one possibility was that this power might be exercisable, but only provided it could not be used to bring anything into force—we might lay some statutory instruments, but they could not be brought into force in any way until the end statute had been passed.

That is where I thought we might be—and then everything closed down, and I am none the wiser why the Government need this power, except that I note that a journalist who seemed to have been speaking to a briefing was told it might be required to effect the registration of EU citizens. I thought to myself, “I thought we were going to have an immigration Act to do that.” So I am still at this moment—this afternoon—absolutely at sea about why this power is needed. If the Government cannot make a case for this power, it should not be here.

Even at this stage, I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, if they accept this amendment, which is absolutely central and necessary to ensuring that a power of this scope cannot be abused in a way that the House should not tolerate, and if they want to come back on Report and tidy it up because there is some adjustment or some caveat they want to put in, I will of course listen to what they want to say—my job is not to make their lives more difficult—but I am not prepared to sign away such an extensive power, when it appears to be contrary to the Government’s stated policy on how Brexit will be carried out and, in fact, surrenders without any good reason the control of this House over how the Government conduct Brexit.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

If my right hon. and learned Friend’s version of what our vote would be were to prevail, rather than the Government’s version, what would happen if, close to our leaving date, Parliament voted against any agreement there might have been and against no deal?

[Mr Grieve]

Ultimately, as my right hon. Friend knows, this Parliament is sovereign, although its sovereignty does not extend to concluding agreements with other parties in international relations that the Government do not wish to adhere to or sign up to. I have no idea what the circumstances are going to be in 12 months’ time. I agree entirely with the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich: we are dealing with a whole series of hypothetical questions. I get a bit fed up when I keep on being asked, “What is it? Surely, it is a choice between the deal on offer and no deal.” I do not know. There is no way that any of us can know, and that is why the process matters so much. If we get the process right, we will answer correctly each question as and when it arises. Far from that hurting or damaging the Government, it will enhance their power. To come back to the point I made in an intervention, it will convey an impression of purpose and method to our EU partners in negotiation, whereas, at the moment, the major thing that has been undermining our negotiations is the impression of chaos in our procedure and our aims.

[Sir William Cash]

I am extremely intrigued by the line that my right hon. and learned Friend has taken, with which I largely agree in relation not to the substance, but to the deficiencies he now seems to have accepted could, in some shape or other, be tidied up, as he put it, on Report if we were to get to that unfortunate situation. I simply ask him: is he able to elucidate how his amendment would actually work in practice?

[Mr Grieve]

I have been pleading with the Government throughout the past four weeks, pointing out to them that this is a really important amendment, and asking them please to respond to it. I have asked them what alternative they might have that could persuade me that they had a working proposal that should command the approval of the House and my own approval. I have been doing that repeatedly, and I was striving to achieve those things last week, but the blunt reality is—I am sorry to have to say this to the Committee—that I have been left in the lurch as a Back Bencher trying to improve this legislation, because silence has fallen. There has simply not been a credible explanation. The last explanation was, “Here is your written ministerial statement. That ought to be enough for you. In loyalty, you should now support the Government.” However, that does not answer the question.

[Anna Soubry]

Has my right hon. and learned Friend also looked at this issue: does he think that, should the Government decide that the best deal is the European Free Trade Association—we would effectively be Norway—some right hon. and hon. Government Members have worked out that, without his amendment or the new clause moved by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), this country would become like Norway and go straight into EFTA, without this Parliament having a say on whether that is what leave meant?

[Mr Grieve]

It would indeed be a remarkable outcome. Certainly, I think that Parliament ought to have a say. Those reasons highlight the difficulty of clause 9. There are other difficulties with the Bill, but clause 9 really has it.

I want to bring my remarks to an end, and I simply say that I do want the Government to listen. The opportunity is here for them to accept the amendment and then to come back on Report and explain themselves further or to tidy the amendment up, and I will listen and try constructively to help them if, indeed, any of this power is needed, but I am not prepared to sign off clause 9 in its present form.

The one merit of amendment 7—I tailored it very carefully and I tried quite deliberately to avoid the no-deal scenario, which is a very legitimate issue, but it is not what I went for—is that I wanted to make sure that these powers could not be used to pre-empt a statute that we should probably be considering this time next year. It is plainly wrong, and if it is to be departed from, the Government have to provide a credible reason for it.

[Alex Chalk]

May I ask my right hon. and learned Friend about a point I am struggling with and that others may be struggling with, too? On the one hand, given that the Government have conceded that there will need to be a statute to implement any agreement, it is difficult, for me at any rate, to see what the point is of clause 9, and Parliament should not legislate in vain. That is point one. On the other hand is the key point not that we will get a vote on that statute, so does this really matter? That is the part I am struggling with, and I would very much welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s views.

[Mr Grieve]

I think that this does matter. If I understand the reason why the Government want this power, it is that, at the time when we may be considering the next statute, they will also be pushing through this House statutory instruments setting up structures for our departure from the EU that may be, or that we might consider to be, at variance with what we need in the fresh statute that we are considering. I think that that is a form of constitutional chaos, actually. I cannot see how it produces any clarity at all. For that reason—a reason of good process—this is a mistaken course of action, particularly because it is not necessary.

We have heard the argument, “We’re going to run out of time in leaving the EU.” I simply repeat what I have said previously. I realise that this is hugely objected to by some of my right hon. and hon. Friends because they are so fixated on getting us out. The article 50 mechanism provides for a sensible structure to enable us to leave smoothly, yet for reasons that I do not understand, the aim of some of my right hon. and hon. Friends seems to be to mess it up as much as possible. There is the famous amendment 381, for example, which we are going to come back to next week and which I have already indicated I will not support under any circumstances whatsoever. If we actually stick to a sensible process, I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), then we will get the right answers. As I say, if the Government are to justify keeping clause 9, they have to provide us with chapter and verse—and they simply have not done so. I have asked, and I have not had it.

In those circumstances, the only proper course of action—I say this with the greatest reluctance—is that I am going to have to vote for my amendment, and, if necessary, if it is not passed, I will vote against clause 9, because without my amendment, clause 9 becomes a really very worrying tool of Executive power that does not appear to have any reasonable presence in this legislation. Apart from on HS2, I do not think that I have ever rebelled against the Government in my 20 and a half years in this House. I do find it quite entertaining that some who criticise me for speaking my mind on this matter are individuals who appear to have exercised the luxury of rebellion on many, many occasions. But that said, there is a time for everybody to stand up and be counted. As Churchill said, “He is good party man—he puts the party before himself and the country before his party.” And that is what I intend to do.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

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[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I think that is a very possible eventuality, which takes us back to our earlier discussion. I certainly agree that if, upon a resolution, the House refused to accept the withdrawal agreement suggested by the Government and agreed by the EU, it is very likely that the Government would go back and try to renegotiate it, and it is very possible that they would succeed in doing so. I do not deny any of that. My point is that amendment 7 would not force that result, because all it would do is, under certain circumstances, stop certain kinds of orders being issued under this Bill.

[Mr Grieve]

I picked this amendment with some care, precisely because I wanted to avoid the suggestion that by tabling it I was trying to sabotage Brexit. I was trying to prevent the potentially abusive use of a power in clause 9 when the Government were saying that they were going to do something different. That was the purpose behind the amendment. It was also, if I might say so, to prod the Government into responding, which I very much regret they have failed to do.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am delighted by my right hon. and learned Friend’s intervention, because I agree that he has succeeded in doing that. He has not created the so-called meaningful vote that the right hon. Member for Leeds Central and the Opposition want. He has instead pointed out an issue with the use of the order-making power in this Bill. The question is: is it a good amendment in those terms? We have accepted that it is not a question of creating or not creating a meaningful vote, to use the term used by the right hon. Member for Leeds Central, but just a question of trying to get the Bill into good order—a pursuit in which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and I have joined on many occasions during Committee proceedings. However, I think that on this particular occasion, this particular amendment is not a particularly good way of doing that. I will explain why I think that is the case, and I hope that the Government will instead come forward with another way of achieving the same effect.

It is a very odd situation indeed to have an amendment to what will become a section of an Act that refers to another piece of primary legislation as the basis for an order-making power in the first piece of legislation. In fact I think it is virtually unprecedented.

[Mr Grieve]

The Bill is unprecedented, because it is asking us, in the light of what the Government themselves say they are going to do, to sanction a power that undermines a further statute that the Government intend to pass, which should be the source of power for removing us from the EU.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Now I am beginning rather to agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. Therefore, my suggestion is that if that is the purpose of his amendment, it would be far better that it come back as a Government amendment on Report that achieves that effect in a different way and directly, without the gross inelegance of referring to another piece of legislation. It should mainly limit the power in clause 9 to things that are urgent and immediate, and perhaps even specify what sorts of things they might be.

As a matter of fact, I rather share my right hon. and learned Friend’s inclination to believe that clause 9 in its present form came forward before the Government were clear about the need for the implementation and withdrawal Bill, and that Ministers and officials have so far been quite hard pressed to identify exactly which powers are required in clause 9 under the new dispensation of that forthcoming Bill. The Government therefore have a good opportunity to promise from the Dispatch Box today that they will come back on Report with an amendment that is correctly phrased in such a way as to limit the order-making power in clause 9. That would avoid the possibility—this is the point that I want to make to my right hon. and learned Friend and other hon. Friends—of suggesting that we are in any way creating a launch pad for the efforts of the right hon. Member for Leeds Central and Opposition Front Benchers to create what they call a meaningful vote, which is in fact an ability to trigger us not leaving.

[Mr Grieve]

There will undoubtedly be an opportunity at the end of this process, if this House were so minded, to reject a deal. I have to say—my right hon. Friend may agree with me—that ultimately the House could bring this Government down, if it had to or wanted to do so. That is our constitutional ability.

My right hon. Friend’s main point does not find favour with me, because the only way we will get something sensible on Report is by getting amendment 7 on the statute book and on the face of the Bill. I asked repeatedly for an engagement along precisely the lines that my right hon. Friend has identified, and it was consistently rejected. That is why I will vote for amendment 7, and if I may say so, I would encourage him to do likewise.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am surprised by that, because my right hon. and learned Friend has a long and distinguished record of voting for good law. I do not think that this is good law, for the reasons I have identified. I think it really would be better if we had a correct amendment at a later stage of proceedings.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way again. In a sense, he unmasks my strategy. I have spent the whole time trying to be sotto voce about this, trying to get some common sense into the Government, which I have been unable to do. It is for that reason that, I very much regret, there really is no alternative to amendment 7. It may be inelegant—although I do not think it is—but it does the business. It would stop the Government doing something that they should not be doing. I could not agree with him more that clause 9 could be removed entirely. It would very sensible if the Government were to do that, but if I had suggested that they would have been upset with me, and it would have made the relationship and the negotiation even harder. In the spirit of conciliation I avoided that brutality and came up with something different.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Speaking personally, I do not think there would be anything very brutal about the Government deciding on Report that it would be sensible to not have clause 9 in the Bill, given that there will now be a separate piece of legislation to achieve the same effect.

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[Mr Vaizey]

I bow to my right hon. and learned Friend’s wisdom and experience on that point. I am a consensus merchant and simply thought there might be a way forward, but I totally understand that votes might have to be exercised tonight in order to stiffen the Government’s backbone to provide a solution. But nevertheless it has always been the case proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that the Government will have an opportunity on Report potentially to alter his amendment.

[Mr Grieve]

If they can justify it.

[Mr Vaizey]

If they can justify it, of course.

The second part of my remarks, which will be as brief as possible because so much time has been taken up, is about amendment 300, standing in my name, which has the largest number of signatories of any amendment to this Bill. I am astonished that only four of them are Conservatives, but I think that reflects the standing in which I am held in my own party; I could not even persuade the leader of the rebel alliance, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, to sign my Euratom amendment, and I really do not want my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset to talk about bad law when he comes to look at it.

The point of the amendment is simply to put the issue of Euratom under parliamentary scrutiny, and I note the comments made by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford) in her excellent speech about the importance of Euratom in our medical life, and her own real experience at the chalkface in her extraordinary work. So Euratom is not an esoteric issue; it affects us all. It has been debated in the House before and I shall not spend a lot of time talking about how extraordinarily successful our nuclear industry is. My own personal interest comes from the fact that although Culham is not in my constituency, many of my constituents work there, and it depends on Euratom. I thank the Government for last week’s announcement of £86 million of investment in Culham for two new centres of excellence for the testing of components and for fuel storage; that is a real vote of confidence in Culham.

The point, of course, about Euratom is that nobody voted to leave it. Euratom was not in the European Union Referendum Act 2015, and was not on the ballot; it falls under a separate treaty. So the British people did not have a chance to have a referendum on our membership of Euratom.

The reason we are leaving Euratom is technical. Legal advice, which we have not seen, deems Euratom to be inextricably linked to the European Union and therefore an article 50 notice would be defective if it did not include Euratom. However, the mood of the Government and, I think, the House is that we are leaving Euratom on a technicality, not because we object to being governed by Euratom. There is no mood among the general population to leave Euratom as far as I am aware, and I think that only one hon. Member has managed to stand up and say that there is a plausible reason to leave it.

[Mr Grieve]

I am entirely supportive of the intention behind this amendment, but being too much of a lawyer, I probably did not sign it because I realised the potential implications—

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

indicated assent.

[Mr Grieve]

I see the Solicitor General nodding. However, the fact that it might have legal implications does not mean that it is not a very desirable objective.

[Mr Vaizey]

The implications of leaving Euratom, some of which have already been identified by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire, also extend to our nuclear industry, which provides 20% of this country’s energy. At the moment, we simply cannot move nuclear material around unless we are members of Euratom. So when we leave Euratom, we will have to have, in effect, a Euratom-style arrangement to allow us to move goods around. “Goods” can mean a variety of things. We imagine highly radioactive canisters being moved in special trains at the dead of night, but the movement of goods also involves mundane things such as heat pumps, motors, spares and other components, all of which, because they are part of the civil nuclear ecosystem, have to be moved under the terms of these treaties.

Euratom covers not only objects but the freedom of movement of people. We depend on our membership of Euratom for a nuclear power industry, for our medical industry—isotopes have been mentioned—and for the Joint European Torus at Culham, where Britain has done extraordinarily well. Huge advantages have been made in robotics and other sciences, and there are £500 million-worth of contracts already in ITER, the successor to Culham, thanks to the expertise we have built up here.

Let me make it clear that, throughout this process of our technical move to leave Euratom, Ministers have been absolutely brilliant in engaging with me and other hon. Members who share my concerns and have similar interests. They have bent over backwards to do what they can to accommodate our concerns. Looking forward, we need Ministers to give us clarity on a number of issues. We need nuclear co-operation agreements with other countries—the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and possibly the European Union as well—and they need to be in place by March 2019. These agreements can be complex, and they can depend on the legislation in other legislatures. For example, the US Congress would have to pass a new nuclear co-operation agreement with us. We will also need a new safeguards regime, and this will come in through the Nuclear Safeguards Bill as a contingency, although I understand that the Government might want Euratom to continue to cover the safeguarding role.

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[Dominic Raab]

I thank my hon. Friend for the constructive way she makes her point. Of course, until we have the withdrawal agreement, we will not know precisely the nature of the technical—

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Dominic Raab]

May I at least give the answer before my right hon. and learned Friend jumps in?

That is why the agility that clause 9 gives us is important. I do not mean to correct my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) in a lawyerly way, but it is not quite right to say that clause 9 can legislate for anything in the context of departing the EU. It relates only to the withdrawal agreement, and I think she said it related to withdrawing from the EU.

Another illustration of what clause 9 could be used for is the spelling out of the technical detail of how ongoing UK cases at the European Court of Justice should be handled, and how the UK courts should treat resulting judgments. Some of that might be done under this Bill, and some under the withdrawal agreement, but we will need to clarify things such as the types of cases that would be in scope and the precise procedural points in terms of whether a case could be considered to be pending, among others. Without that clarification, how such cases should be treated might not be clear. We would run the risk of legal uncertainty, as well as uncertainty for the individuals involved in those cases.

I do not want to make too much of that before my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield jumps in. He is quite right—he has made this point before, and he may want to hear me out before I take his intervention—that, in 2016, there were 23 preliminary references from UK courts and just one infraction case against the UK. So we do not expect this issue to affect large numbers. None the less, for those affected, it is still important to get this right.

[Mr Grieve]

I want to understand this, because it is rather important. We are going to enact a withdrawal agreement Bill—I think that is what it is called. I would expect that to have statutory instrument powers—the very statutory instrument powers we can consider in relation to the scope of the withdrawal agreement when deciding what we then enact by secondary legislation to take us out. I begin to wonder whether, in fact, it is the Government’s intention not to have any statutory instruments made under that agreement at all, but to seek to make them entirely through the mechanism of clause 9 before we have had the opportunity of considering what we actually want. That is why clause 9 is, I have to say to my hon. Friend, so mischievous. While I would be prepared to listen to some great exception, abandoning the normal legislative process in this way seems to be utterly undesirable, so I would press my hon. Friend on what is going to happen with this withdrawal agreement Bill. Are we going to have secondary legislation under it?

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. I should just say to my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury that I will come on to talk about the restraints on the exercise of clause 9 later. However, in relation to my right hon. and learned Friend’s point, if we waited for the withdrawal agreement Bill not just to be introduced after the withdrawal agreement has been signed but to be fully enacted—if we waited for it to complete its full passage—we would not have time to deal with the volume of technical secondary legislation that we need to put through.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

From my experience, I must say that I think that is a rather rose-tinted perspective on EU negotiations. I should also say that the same arguments were made about my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister going into the phase 1 negotiations, yet we are on the cusp of formal ratification of the joint report dealing with the first phase issues. The Prime Minister has made some difficult compromises and shown flexibility precisely to get the deal that I think my right hon. and learned Friend welcomes—I also welcome it—even though we were on different sides during the referendum campaign.

I turn to new clauses 3 and 75, which attempt to remove clause 9 wholesale from the Bill. They would undermine one of the important strategic objectives of the Bill, which is to provide the legal means to implement the withdrawal agreement thoroughly in domestic law. I hope I have explained the important, albeit residual, role that clause 9 stands to play in light of the separate primary legislation covering the withdrawal agreement. To remove clause 9 would increase the legal uncertainty, and I hope that the new clauses will not be pressed.

I want to spend a little bit of time focusing on amendments 7, 47 and 355 and new clause 68, but particularly on amendment 7 in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. May I say at the outset that I do not think he has any ulterior motive in tabling the amendment? I have had a number of constructive conversations with him, and I look forward to more in the future. By dint of that, I hope he accepts that I have followed through on every assurance I have given him, and that I have not failed to live up to the undertakings I have given him. It is in that spirit that we on both sides of the debate need to proceed as the Bill goes through the House.

Amendments 7 and 355 call for a separate statute to be enacted approving the withdrawal agreement before the powers in clause 9 can be used. There are a number of problems with doing so. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) mentioned the constitutional issue, and I agree with him about that. From a practical point of view, however, the crucial problem is the effect that amendment 7 would have in significantly curtailing the timely advantage that we will gain from clause 9. One of the key benefits of the clause is the ability to start to use it reasonably swiftly after the withdrawal agreement has been reached.

To add an unnecessary Bill to the parliamentary agenda—in addition to Parliament’s meaningful vote, as set out in today’s written ministerial statement, and on top of the new withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill—would be restrictive enough. However, to make the first use of the powers in clause 9 wait until the additional legislation has fully passed through Parliament would unduly compress the time we will have to prepare the legislative groundwork, and would risk greater uncertainty. With the greatest respect in the world, I am afraid that is why the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is defective.

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Dominic Raab]

If I may, I will finish my comments on this amendment, and I will then let my right hon. and learned Friend critique them in the round. I suspect such a critique is coming.

In rare and exceptional cases, we may need to exercise the powers in clause 9 to pass statutory instruments before the final enactment of the primary legislation, which will be on the date of exit. Let me give an illustration of why it may be necessary for operational changes to be in put in place before that point. An example is where specific statutory authority is needed for a monitoring body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement on citizens’ rights, if that cannot be done in advance under other primary legislation. Such a body would need to be set up beforehand so that it was ready to operate on day one, but we may not know its precise content and contours until relatively late on in the negotiations.

Yes, the potential scope for reliance on clause 9 has been reduced by the Government’s commitment to primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period, but it is still important to retain it. The fetter imposed by amendment 7 would risk materially damaging responsible preparations for exit, including in sensitive areas such as citizens’ rights. I know that that is not the intention of my right hon. and learned Friend, to whom I am very happy to give way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I am again most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. He will know—I touched on this in my comments—that when this issue was first raised, I suggested that one possibility might be to allow statutory instruments to be laid and voted on by this House prior to the enactment of the further statute, but not allow them to be brought into force until that further statute had been enacted. That would allow the House to stop the statutory process if it was not happy with it. As I understand it, the further statute has to be enacted before the date we leave, because without it we do not have the powers to pull out. In those circumstances, I find it impossible to understand why my suggestion might not solve his problem. I think he will agree that that is where our dialogue stopped. If he actually wants to do something even before that, I have to say to him that, as a matter of principle, I object.

[Dominic Raab]

My right hon. and learned Friend is right about almost everything; the only point he is not right about is that I think he will find that my suggestion to him was the appropriate way to deal with that. I will come on to give him precisely the assurance he is asking for, although we have not had a chance to get it on to the face of the Bill. I would argue that a political assurance, which I will give him on top of the others that have been given, ought adequately to address his concerns.

With the genuine and material risk of my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment in mind, I hope I can go further, bridge the gap and reassure hon. Members, and assuage any residual concerns they may have about the operation of clause 9 in practice. I want to provide three very clear assurances to the House.

First, secondary legislation passed under clause 9 will either be affirmative or considered by the Committee established under the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne. Secondly, the Government are committed to publishing such statutory instruments in draft as far as possible, as early as possible, to facilitate maximum scrutiny, which is another point we have discussed.

Thirdly, we expect that the vast majority of statutory instruments enacted under clause 9 will not come into force until exit day, when the withdrawal agreement comes into force. But I can give my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and the Committee, the concrete assurance that, following the timeframe set out in today’s written ministerial statement, none of the SIs introduced under clause 9 will come into effect until Parliament has voted on the final deal. I hope that that provides important reassurance and is sufficient for hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.

That approach has two advantages. First, it retains our ability to use clause 9 in time to fully implement the withdrawal agreement. It also squarely addresses the concern, fairly and honestly reflected in amendment 7, that there should be a meaningful vote—the critical point made by my right hon. and learned Friend—and that we should not bring new law implementing the withdrawal agreement into effect if Parliament votes that agreement down.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jenkin]

The right hon. Lady knows as well as I do that the intention is to try to conclude an agreement by October 2018, but, again, there is no guarantee of that fact, in which case the resolution will be tabled soon after 2018. May I just point out that amendment 7, proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, is trying to create a meaningful vote by turning this resolution of both Houses into a statute?

[Mr Grieve]

Well, we have been promised a statute.

[Mr Jenkin]

Yes, a statute has been promised, but not as a means of second-guessing the negotiations. At what stage in the passage of the statute does my right hon. and learned Friend expect the Government to use that moment and say, “Oh, well, they haven’t agreed with this bit of the agreement; we’ll have to go back.” Is it during the passage of the statute that the negotiations would have to continue? Making this decision a statute does not alter the discussion about a meaningful vote.

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. I think that he may misunderstand the position. The House will have an opportunity, at the time that it is asked to move a motion approving the deal, to express its view, but it will also have an opportunity to express its view during the passage of the statute. Both those are necessary pre-conditions constitutionally for our leaving the European Union. I cannot help that; that is just how it is. Let me reiterate: the purpose of my amendment is to prevent the powers in clause 9 being used until this key statute has been enacted. That is the purpose.

[Mr Jenkin]

Actually, that option is not available, because article 50 has a deadline, and when that deadline runs out, we leave. There is no requirement for a withdrawal agreement or a statute for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I rise to support the—

[Mr Grieve]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Yes, of course.

[Mr Grieve]

While I was briefly out of the Chamber, an announcement was made of a Government concession, but I have to say, it is too late. I am sorry, but you cannot treat the House in this fashion. My hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) may agree with me that the best way of getting progress in this area is by moving amendment 7 and thereafter we can co-operate with the Government in trying to achieve its aim.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I rise to support amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I have listened with great interest to all the excellent speeches and interventions by right hon. and hon. Members this afternoon and, for me, three key themes have emerged. First, there is real disagreement about the meaning of “meaningful”. Secondly, there is confusion about the terms of article 50. Thirdly, there is an issue of trust.

On the first point, it is crystal clear that this vote cannot be meaningful if it is binary. It has to be taken on the basis of us having an opportunity to instruct the Government to extend article 50 if necessary. On the second point, article 50 clearly gives the Government the opportunity to seek an extension of the period, and there is no reason whatever why the EU27 would reject that request. It is enshrined in the treaties, and for that to have meaning, they would clearly have to listen to our request. Why on earth would they not accept that request if it was in our mutual interest to do so?