European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is exactly right, and that is why we have a cross-party interest in these issues. Not only is there no trigger on the face of the Bill—clause 9 will still allow Ministers this huge concentrated power to go ahead and implement the withdrawal agreement without Parliament’s agreement—but there is also a second difference, certainly for me in what Ministers have set out so far, about how a meaningful vote should take place. I want to come on to that as well.

New clause 3 says that Parliament will not yet give the Government permission to use secondary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement, and that instead the Government must set out their plans for primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement. If secondary legislation is needed at that time, as part of the implementation process, those powers should be taken in the withdrawal agreement Bill—the second Bill—so that Parliament is not just handing over a blank cheque, but is deciding what powers are needed and making sure that the proper scrutiny and checks and balances are in place at that time.

I do not think this is really a controversial proposal. It is basically saying that Parliament should hand over no more power to the Executive than it needs to and should not hand over power to the Executive until it needs to and until it knows what is going on. New clause 3 also has the effect of requiring a meaningful vote in primary legislation on the withdrawal agreement before it can be implemented. That is not really a controversial proposal either. It simply says that we should have a proper vote on the most important thing to pass through Parliament in a generation—and a meaningful vote in primary legislation, as is fitting for something so important—and that we should do so before and not after we give Government the powers to start implementing it.

Amendment 7, which was tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), has broadly the same effect. Rather than removing the powers from clause 9, it simply says that they cannot be used until a statute or primary legislation has been passed supporting the withdrawal agreement. Again, that means that Parliament does not blindly hand over powers to the Executive in a trusting way without knowing what the consequences will be or what the agreement looks like.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

The whole point of this Bill is that it is taking back power to this country and this Parliament, so that we can decide for ourselves what will happen. All the significant powers in the Bill are subject to the affirmative resolution and those that are not will now be subject to a sifting committee. We are recovering from a situation where, as members of the European Union, we had handed over all these decisions, lock, stock and barrel, to the European Union, so the Bill is a massive improvement, and to dress up this attempt to reverse Brexit as an argument in favour of parliamentary sovereignty is nothing but cant.

[Yvette Cooper]

Oh my, what Stalinism is this?—that any attempt to disagree with the way in which this Bill is drawn up is somehow a betrayal of Brexit! What rubbish! How insecure are Members who object to any changes in the Bill, if they cannot see that it is Parliament’s job—a job that they argued for when they stood up and tried to defend parliamentary sovereignty—to take some responsibility by scrutinising legislation and proposing amendments to it? That is all we are doing now. We are putting forward an amendment to the way in which the Brexit process—the withdrawal process—should take place. The idea that this somehow undermines the referendum decision is just a load of rubbish and the hon. Gentleman well knows it, and if he had any better arguments, he would put them, rather than using something that is so ridiculous.

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[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend is right, and that again shows the importance of having these commitments in the Bill, so that there can be no doubt and no possibility of the Government using clause 9 to start implementing an agreement on which there has been no meaningful vote.

[Mr Jenkin]

Can the right hon. Lady explain how the timing will work? If there is to be legislation to approve a withdrawal agreement before March 2019, what happens if the agreement is reached too late to allow that legislation to go through all its stages—[Interruption]—or is this a plan to delay the Brexit date?

[Yvette Cooper]

I thought part of the way through the hon. Gentleman’s intervention that he was finally coming up with a sensible point. I have no control over the timing of the Government’s negotiations; I hope that they and the EU will get on with this quickly, because in particular we need the transitional agreement pinned down as early as possible, as businesses need certainty—and they need that as much in my constituency as in the hon. Gentleman’s. So I hugely hope there will be plenty of time for all these debates to take place. In the event that, against the Government’s will—they have said they do not want this—it ends up being a late deal, Parliament should have the opportunity to ask the Government to extend article 50 for a couple of months, to be able to implement it properly. In fact, the Government will have to do that anyway, because they will not be able to bring clause 9 powers through fast enough not to have to do so.

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[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but is it really that unreasonable that the Government might need to avail themselves of these powers in clause 9 while the withdrawal and implementation Bill is proceeding through the House of Commons? If the timetable is compressed, that Bill would not be on the statute book and the powers there would not be available. So clause 9 is necessary for that purpose. Of course the withdrawal and implementation Bill could circumscribe the powers in clause 9 and indeed close them off once that Bill is on the statute book.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman has pre-empted a point I was going to come to. In the scenario he gives, there is no need for the timetable necessarily to be compressed. If it were squeezed, what would that say about the role that Parliament will have on the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill? In his scenario, there would also be no need for the secondary legislation in this Bill, which could be included in a similar form in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, when we would have a better idea about what it will be needed for and can more adequately circumscribe its scope. As for this idea that we have a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill making its way through this House at the same time as secondary legislation implementing elements of that agreement hang over this place, such an approach would create serious confusion.

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[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman is right that the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and the article 50 notification gave effect to their own timetable. That is why it is so important that we have transitional arrangements on current terms that allow us flexibility to negotiate the final deal. I will return to this point later, but there is no way that, before we leave in March 2019, we will have agreed the future relationship. We will have agreed heads of terms at best.

[Mr Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

[Matthew Pennycook]

If it is all right, I am going to make a bit of progress because many Members wish to speak.

As I have said, I do not think there is a need for the powers in clause 9 because secondary legislation of a similar type could be included in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Why the need for such powers? We do not think there is any justification for them. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s justification for why the clause needs to stand part of the Bill but, unless amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is passed, the Opposition will vote for the clause to be struck from the Bill.

If clause 9 remains part of the Bill at the end of the parliamentary process, its constitutional potency and scope must be highly circumscribed. I do not intend to dwell extensively on what limits should be placed on the clause 9 power because, in general, the same arguments apply as those that I set out at length in the Committee’s deliberations on clause 7 yesterday. I will say, though, that amendment 27 to clause 9, similar to our amendment 25 to clause 7, would constrain the capacity of the powers in clause 9 to reduce rights or protections.

The powers in clause 9 are different from the powers in clause 7 in a particular way: namely, the extraordinarily wide power explicitly provided for by clause 9(2) gives Ministers the power by regulation to modify—a term that clause 14 makes clear covers amendment and repeal—the Bill itself once enacted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) pointed out on Second Reading, there is no example throughout the history of the 20th century of a Bill that has ever sought to do that—not in time of war and not in time of civil emergency. In fact—this is a point that my hon. Friend continues to make, and should—every single emergency powers Act has specified that there should not be a power in such legislation for Ministers to alter primary legislation. We do not believe the power is justified, and amendment 30 would limit the potency of the delegated powers in clause 9 by preventing them from being used to amend or repeal the Act itself.

Let me turn briefly to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17, which gives powers to Ministers to make any consequential provisions that they consider appropriate in consequence of the Act and to make any transitional provisions that might be needed as a result of the Bill coming into force. In contrast to our position on clause 9, we acknowledge that there is an established precedent with regard to consequential and transitional provisions, so we will not be voting against clause 17 standing part of the Bill, but it must be circumscribed.

A clause as widely drawn as clause 17—it is arguably the most widely drawn of all—set in the context of a Bill of such constitutional and legal significance that it covers almost every element of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, it could be argued, nearly every facet of our national life, means that the power to make consequential provisions under clause 17 is not as tightly limited as it might be in other pieces of legislation. As such, it inevitably throws up the possibility that the powers in subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17 could be used to make changes to vast swathes of secondary and primary legislation, including legislation in this Session up to May 2019.

When he responds, the Minister will no doubt cite other statutes that provide for not dissimilar powers, but having looked closely at a fair number of them, I am not convinced that any are so widely drawn as this one, and none are contained in legislation as constitutionally significant as this Bill. The Hansard Society was right to refer to clause 17 as a “legislative blank cheque” for the Government, and the power must be restricted. Amendment 29 would achieve that aim by removing subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17. If the Government believe that that is the wrong way to restrict the sweeping powers in the clause, they can of course come forward with their own suggestions, but the principle of circumscribing the powers in the clause must be accepted.

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[Mr Grieve]

In a moment. I do not wish to take up too much of the Committee’s time.

My point brings me to the specifics of clause 9, which is an extraordinary and wide power to remove us from the EU by statutory instrument, and moreover—this is the most telling point—to ask the House to give the Government effectively a blank cheque to draft statutory instruments to achieve something when at the moment we do not know what that is.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening very carefully, but clause 9 is not about implementing our leaving the European Union; it is about implementing a withdrawal agreement. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) did not vote for article 50, but my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) did. That is when he voted to leave the European Union and that is decided, so he is incorrect to say that clause 9 is deciding when or how we leave the European Union.

[Mr Grieve]

If I may say so, I think my hon. Friend has misunderstood what I said. The fact is that clause 9 provides a power, exercisable once this Bill comes into force before exit day, to implement something when we do not at present know what that is. Therefore, it is a very strange thing to ask Parliament to sign off.

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[Mr Jenkin]

I have listened to this entire debate with close interest. I think that we are all agreed that we want an orderly process for leaving the EU, which means a sensible withdrawal agreement along with a clear and detailed commitment to an EU-UK trade agreement and a period of implementation, but I also think we all agree that if no satisfactory agreement arrives, we still all voted to leave the EU. Well, we nearly all voted to leave the EU: I respect my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), but he voted against the triggering of article 50, as did some others. Those of us who voted to trigger article 50 voted to leave on 29 March 2019.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Article 50 clearly states that an extension can be requested, so when we voted to trigger it, we voted to trigger a clause that included the possibility of requesting an extension.

[Mr Jenkin]

I will come back to the way Parliament interacts with the process, but it would be really rather foolish for this House and the Government to premise all their plans on the basis that that request would be acceded to, because it would require unanimity. I have not heard a single public statement from the EU or a European diplomat that suggested for a moment that they would countenance extending the deadline. Of course, why would they? The deadline written into article 50 is to their advantage. I expect that the hon. Gentleman would have voted for the Lisbon treaty, which contains article 50, but I did not vote for it. I have always thought that article 50 was a snare and a trap. It sets a deadline, against which we are now negotiating, and that is the only prudent way to negotiate.

I loathe secondary legislation that amends primary legislation expressed in Acts of Parliament. It is an odious practice that has entered the legislative process in this House—this is by no means the first Bill that contains so-called Henry VIII clauses—but I can justify such powers as a basis for reversing the effects of our membership of the EU. It may seem to be an irony, but it is by the process of secondary legislation that we have been gradually integrated into the EU.

We have seen order after order coming under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. More often than not, it was a “take it or take it” option: we did not even have a “take it or leave it” option once it was expressed in EU law. The advantages of allowing secondary legislation under this Bill are that, first, the legislation will ultimately be answerable to the House; secondly, the powers are temporary; thirdly, they can be subject to revision or annulment at any future time; and finally, they are underpinned by the democratic authority of a referendum.

On a “take it or leave it” vote, I do not remember debating a single new treaty that was offered to the House on the basis that we could amend the treaty by passing an Act of Parliament. Whether to accept the Lisbon treaty was a “take it or leave it” decision. We were told that if we did not accept the treaty, it would create such chaos that it would force us to leave the EU.

I do not doubt the bona fides of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and others on the Government Benches, but my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) exposed very ably the fact that there are people in the House who want to use amendment 7 as a means to extend the negotiation. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe was absolutely explicit on that point. I appreciate that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), did his best to avoid answering the question, but he made it clear that he thinks the deadline will have to be extended.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

I thought for a moment that my hon. Friend meant all that stuff about my challenging the result of the referendum.

[Mr Jenkin]

No, no, no.

[Mr Clarke]

I am sorry; I misheard my hon. Friend. I do not think for one moment that we will have completed any of these negotiations by March 2019, but I will wait to see. There are perfectly clear arrangements in article 50 for the time to be extended. I have met several other European politicians, including some of those involved in the negotiations, who rather expect that to happen.

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[Mr Jenkin]

As I say, it is not something that we can bank on.

May I just deal with this question of what is a meaningful vote? I cannot find anything clearer than the ministerial statement that was issued this morning. It says that

“the Government has committed to hold a vote on the final deal in Parliament as soon as possible after the negotiations have concluded.”

It continues:

“This vote will take the form of a resolution in both Houses of Parliament and will cover both the withdrawal agreement and the terms for our future relationship. The Government will not implement any parts of the withdrawal agreement—for example by using clause 9 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill—until after this vote has taken place.”

That seems to provide the assurances that my right hon. and learned Friend is looking for and that the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice has repeated already from the Dispatch Box.

[Anna Soubry]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, to be meaningful, there has to be some time between that vote and such time as we leave the European Union? That is the whole point. A meaningful vote comes before something that is basically to be rubber-stamped. That is the whole point of “meaningful”. When does he anticipate that we will have that vote?

[Mr Jenkin]

The right hon. Lady knows as well as I do that the intention is to try to conclude an agreement by October 2018, but, again, there is no guarantee of that fact, in which case the resolution will be tabled soon after 2018. May I just point out that amendment 7, proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, is trying to create a meaningful vote by turning this resolution of both Houses into a statute?

[Mr Grieve]

Well, we have been promised a statute.

[Mr Jenkin]

Yes, a statute has been promised, but not as a means of second-guessing the negotiations. At what stage in the passage of the statute does my right hon. and learned Friend expect the Government to use that moment and say, “Oh, well, they haven’t agreed with this bit of the agreement; we’ll have to go back.” Is it during the passage of the statute that the negotiations would have to continue? Making this decision a statute does not alter the discussion about a meaningful vote.

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. I think that he may misunderstand the position. The House will have an opportunity, at the time that it is asked to move a motion approving the deal, to express its view, but it will also have an opportunity to express its view during the passage of the statute. Both those are necessary pre-conditions constitutionally for our leaving the European Union. I cannot help that; that is just how it is. Let me reiterate: the purpose of my amendment is to prevent the powers in clause 9 being used until this key statute has been enacted. That is the purpose.

[Mr Jenkin]

Actually, that option is not available, because article 50 has a deadline, and when that deadline runs out, we leave. There is no requirement for a withdrawal agreement or a statute for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union.

[John Redwood]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this is a process completely driven by Parliament? We have an Act of Parliament to send the letter, an Act of Parliament proposed now to withdraw and then another Act of Parliament to implement any agreement. The whole thing is completely under parliamentary sovereignty. Will he also confirm that we must have the date in the Bill to ensure legal continuity, as, under international law, we are leaving at the end of March because of the treaty?

[Mr Jenkin]

It is wishful thinking that the deadline will be extended. Where I disagree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is over the fact that, somehow, he thinks that the withdrawal agreement is necessary for us to leave the European Union and that the statute for the agreement is therefore necessary. Unfortunately, it is not. He voted for article 50, which triggered the process of leaving. Everything else is for our domestic legislation. Let us hope that there is a withdrawal agreement, but, actually, this Bill is what is necessary to provide legal continuity. Unfortunately, requiring another Act of Parliament before provisions of this Bill come into effect is just muddying the waters.

As the Minister has already demonstrated very forcefully, this is not an effective amendment. If my right hon. and learned Friend wants to table a different amendment, as colleagues almost seem to be suggesting, that might be a way to resolve this. I beg my right hon. and hon. Friends on this point. There is a summit tomorrow. This is not the moment to try to defeat the Government—[Interruption.]

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order.

[Mr Jenkin]

This is not the moment to try to defeat the Government, when there is another opportunity to amend the Bill at a later date.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

On a point of order, Mrs Laing. Are summits now to be sovereign over Parliament?

[The First Deputy Chairman]

That is not a point of order.

[Mr Jenkin]

This is not the moment to try to defeat the Government, when there is another opportunity to amend the Bill at a later date, if a satisfactory discussion cannot be held. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield has been very conciliatory.

[Anna Soubry]

We have been speaking for months.

[Mr Jenkin]

Well, continue the discussions.

[Anna Soubry]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Jenkin]

No, I will not give way. I keep hearing my right hon. Friend saying, “It’s too late.”

[Anna Soubry]

I did not say that; I have never said that.

[Mr Jenkin]

I have heard my right hon. Friend saying that.

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[The First Deputy Chairman]

The right hon. Lady knows that that is not a point of order. It is a point of debate. The hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) is about to conclude his speech, and the more that other hon. Members shout at him and interrupt him, the less chance other Members will have to speak.

[Mr Jenkin]

I will give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey).

[Mr Vaizey]

My hon. Friend’s remarks fill me with hope. He seems to accept that this debate is about a point of principle, rather than—as some might think—delaying Brexit, which is absolutely not what it is about. Does he agree?

[Mr Jenkin]

I think that some people in this House might be trying to delay Brexit, some of whom may be supporting the amendment of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, but I perfectly accept his bona fides and those of my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage. I simply conclude that there is an opportunity for the discussions to continue. It is not necessary to bring this matter to a vote this evening.

[Chuka Umunna]

I will try to do this in three minutes, and I have three principal points. I do not want to speak for long because the points I will make in support of amendment 7 and new clause 3 have already been made very well by the right hon. and learned Members for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) and for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), my right hon. Friends the Members for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), and others.

My first point is that if taking back control does not mean passing amendment 7, I do not know what does. We were told that we were leaving the European Union to reassert parliamentary sovereignty, and it seems to me that that is exactly what amendment 7 would do. Clearly, the Government are refusing to accept it. We have heard nothing from the Dispatch Box that suggests that they are prepared to concede on this, forcing the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield to press the amendment to a vote. That brings me to my second point.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman and others who are supporting his amendment have been attacked, as he mentioned earlier, not just in this place, but beyond. They have been called mutineers and saboteurs, and have faced all the rest of the abuse. Ministers and other Tory Members of Parliament in particular who have been attacking them have absolutely no right whatever to do so because the reason that the right hon. and learned Gentleman tabled his amendment was that he felt that it was in the national interest.

Now, the Brexit Secretary has voted against his party over 90 times. The International Trade Secretary has done so 19 times; the International Development Secretary, five times; and the Leader of the House, who was here earlier, seven times. Actually, look around the Government Benches. The right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) has voted against his party 73 times; the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), 64 times; the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), 95 times; and we cannot, of course, forget the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), who has voted against his party more than 100 times. So none of these people can now lecture people who are seeking to do the right thing in the national interest on this amendment. None of them can lecture people about rebelling on this or any other matter.