Lord Goldsmith
Main Page: Lord Goldsmith (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Goldsmith's debates with the Scotland Office
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to prevent Section 6 coming into force until after the expiration of any transitional arrangements agreed with the Union. Clause 6, somewhat innocently and perhaps misleadingly named “Interpretation of retained EU law”, does more than simply offer canons of interpretation for retained EU law. Its apparent purpose is to bring to an end in a number of respects the role of the European court, the CJEU. Once Section 6 is in force no court or tribunal would be bound by any principles laid down or any decision made on or after exit day by the CJEU. Moreover, it would bring to an end the ability to refer matters to the European Court. As the Committee will be well aware, one of the ways in which the uniformity of Union law is preserved is through the ability of national courts to refer questions of interpretation and so forth to the European Court for decision. That means that our courts can get authoritative rulings on European law from the top European court to help our courts make their decisions. Moreover, of course, while we are members of the Union we are bound by Union law as interpreted and laid down by the European Court.
Of course, because certain law will be retained as EU law after exit, if the Bill goes through, the shutters cannot and should not come down completely even after exit. Subsections (3) to (7) of Clause 6 provide how the courts and tribunals are to interpret retained EU law after exit. As one would expect, even after exit day retained EU law will need to be interpreted in the light of decisions of the CJEU on those very provisions, although at that time our most senior courts—the Supreme Court in England and Wales and the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland, in its appellate role—would have the power to depart from those decisions. It is not, however, that aspect of continuing arrangements that this amendment primarily concerns. This amendment is concerned to ensure that, so long as we remain bound to follow EU law under transitional arrangements, the judicial arrangements, including the role of the CJEU, will continue to apply. That makes sense because, until the transitional arrangements have come to an end, EU law will continue to apply.
I have looked, as many noble Lords will have done, at the colourful draft agreement for withdrawal published recently. I say “colourful” because we can see the green parts that show what has been agreed at negotiator level and the yellow parts showing what has been agreed as policy objectives. As for the proposals for judicial procedures, none of that is green or indeed yellow; it is white at the moment so, as I understand it—the noble and learned Lord or the noble Baroness, whoever is replying, will explain—the current position is that we simply have, in this text, the negotiating position that the European Union wants to put forward. That is dealt with in Title X and Articles 82 to 92, particularly Articles 82 and 83. As I understand them—again, this could be confirmed or otherwise—the current proposal of the European Union is as follows.
First, the European Court will continue to have jurisdiction in any proceedings brought before it by or against the United Kingdom before the end of the transition period. So in one case its jurisdiction would remain, if that proposal were ultimately accepted.
Secondly, the European court would continue to have jurisdiction to give references or preliminary rulings from our courts referred to it before the end of the transition period. In any case, if the current draft of Article 85 from the European Union is accepted, the judgments and orders of the Court of Justice handed down before the end of the transition period, as well as those handed down in proceedings by or against the United Kingdom, will have,
“binding force in their entirety on and in the United Kingdom”.
I believe, although it would be helpful to have confirmation, that the European Union intends that, if this negotiating position is ultimately accepted, rulings and preliminary references brought before the end of the transition period will also be binding.
I am not sure I agree with the term “red lines”; it is not one that I am inclined to use. I am never quite sure what they are. Our position is that during an implementation period, if and when finally agreed, we will accept that there is a role for the European Court of Justice. Indeed, it is outlined in the EU’s own proposals for the agreement at Articles 82 through to 85. As the noble and learned Lord indicated, that is not yet the subject of final confirmation between the two parties but it is what is anticipated.
On a related point, during that period, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that as we cease to be a member state we will cease to have the right to have a judge in the Court of Justice of the European Union. That must follow. However, we will have the right to make interventions in cases that pertain to the United Kingdom.
My Lords, there have been moments during the 11 Committee days that we have had so far on this Bill when I felt a little sorry for the noble and learned Lord opposite for the positions that he was being expected to argue by those behind him and in other places, but never more sorry than I am today. This is the most absurd situation. We have offered him an amendment and I am grateful for the description given by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, as delicate. It does not presume even that there are transitional arrangements. It simply says that, if there are transitional arrangements, this is what will happen. I cannot understand why it is not accepted. I had hoped on this 11th final day of Committee that we would have a breakthrough.
The 11th hour of the 11th day, as my noble friend Lady Hayter says. If we had had a breakthrough, we would have been able to say we had finished Committee with a concession—not much of a concession, it would have to be said, because it is so obvious that this ought to happen, but at least it would have been something that we could build on as we move towards Report where we hope we will have a degree of constructive engagement.
This really does not make sense at all. We all know, and the noble and learned Lord knows—indeed, he accepted it—that there will be a role for the European Court of Justice after the magic exit day, whatever day we end up with. If there is not, this amendment does not operate. It is very straightforward and simple: to suggest otherwise is cloud-cuckoo-land or Red Queen land.
The noble and learned Lord’s final recourse is to legal certainty. We all accept the importance of legal certainty, and that that is what is behind the Bill. However, there is complete legal certainty if this Bill, when it becomes an Act, says, “If something happens, this provision does not come into effect until the end of that period”. I will not quote Latin again, but we know there are principles which say that those things are certain which can be made certain, and it will be certain because we will know whether or not there is such an arrangement.
My Lords, I am glad to be associated with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in supporting this amendment to seek some clarity. I will simply add two further points, having said that this distinctly lacks clarity at the moment.
First, I draw attention to paragraph 3, which says:
“Any power to make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation which, immediately before exit day, is subject to an implied restriction that it is exercisable only compatibly with EU law is to be read on or after exit day without that restriction”.
A little gloss on that from the Minister would be helpful. The second thing that needs clarifying is the impact on the devolution aspects of the Bill. The Government’s Explanatory Notes say that,
“in relation to the devolved administrations these pre-existing powers”—
that is, the powers that can be used under the clause we are discussing—
“are subject to the devolution provisions described in paragraphs 36 to 41 of these notes, meaning powers in pre-exit legislation cannot be used to modify retained EU law in a way that would be incompatible with EU law as it existed on exit day until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”.
I imagine that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pricked up his ears at that phrase, because it goes to the heart of the argument we have been having about the impact of the Bill on devolution and the idea that powers will be released to the devolved Administrations only once the UK Government are satisfied with the way they will deal with the framework provisions. The appearance of the phrase,
“until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”,
in the Explanatory Notes is quite worrying. The provisions are of course there because some of the provisions here relate to existing devolved powers. The devolved Administrations must have the capacity to take this kind of action if the UK Government have the capacity to do so. However, it is subject to this rather extraordinary restriction: the Government hold on to the powers until they are satisfied that they can be released. For the benefit of clarity, I hope that the Minister can help us.
My Lords, I support the amendment. There is not much to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about what the amendment does and why it is necessary, nor to add to the questions he asked or to those then added by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, which in particular picked up issues with regard to the devolved Administrations.
We know that a major theme in your Lordships’ House, rightly, has been how powers are to be exercised, recognising that there may be circumstances in which they have to be exercised. Notwithstanding that, on the whole this Committee has rightly taken the view—or we hope that we will see it take the view, certainly from the interventions and contributions that have been made throughout the Committee—that this is a matter where proper parliamentary scrutiny is required. There may well be a role for certain delegated legislation, but please let us not add to it with still yet another way in which things can be done which avoid that full parliamentary scrutiny.
I hope that the Minister, when he responds, will be able to say something reassuring, both answering the questions posed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beith, and saying why we need not be concerned and that the Government will content themselves with relying on those delegated powers that will be specific to the Bill, once this Committee and the other place have determined just what those delegated powers should be.
I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by making two observations. These amendments are linked closely to the issue we have already debated in Committee of the status of retained EU law and how we deal with it in the context of its status. As has been indicated previously in Committee, the Government have been listening and considering that, and we intend to come back to the House on the matter before Report. I mention that because it is a relevant backdrop to what we are considering at this stage.
On the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, essentially, the powers in paragraph 3 of Schedule 8 are, first of all, designed to remove what I might term the shadow of European law from what will be domestic legislation. However, more particularly, the noble Lord raised a point about the devolution issues and quoted from the Explanatory Notes. I understand that the section of the Explanatory Notes that he refers to addresses Clause 11 prior to its recent amendment. I appreciate that we then withdrew that amendment, but the Explanatory Notes should be read in that context. Essentially, therefore, we have moved on because of the decision to flip Clause 11—I think that was the term used—so I ask the noble Lord to look at the proposed amendment to Clause 11 to understand the context in which we now want to deal with this point.
Of course, our constitutional position has altered over the last few years—say, the last 500—and, at the end of the day, we see ourselves as, essentially, an amending House. I understand the noble Lord’s point but, in that context, we also understand the precedence of the other place with regard to the final passage of legislation. Therefore, our primary tasks in this context are scrutiny and comment.
The Government have always said that this Bill is not the place for radical policy change. Essentially, what we want to do at this stage is preserve the existing domestic powers to amend legislation pursuant to paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, in order that we can address issues with regard to retained EU law. But the manner in which those powers will ultimately be deployed will depend on the outcome of our consideration of the question of what status we confer on retained EU law. Given that that is an ongoing issue, I invite the noble Lord at this stage to withdraw his amendment. He may, of course, choose to return to it once he has seen our proposals with regard to retained EU law, but it appears to me that the two issues are inextricably linked.
Before the noble Lord announces the fate of his amendment, I have a question for the Minister. He said several times that there is a connection here with what will happen to EU retained law and what status it will have. We have had full debates on that, as he rightly says. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles; we have heard from the Constitution Committee; we have heard a rather different proposal from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who is not in his place at the moment. My question is simply: when will we know what the Government’s decision is? I hope that they will not stick—because they cannot stick—to the idea that it will be simply for Ministers to decide as we go along the status of a particular piece of retained law. When will we know the Government’s position? That might enable us to advance not only on that point but on points such as the one being debated at the moment. Can the Minister give us an answer as to dates?
I cannot give the noble and learned Lord an answer as to dates, but clearly we are concerned to ensure that any proposals we have to make are in place in time for consideration by the whole House before Report.
My Lords, I can hear the strains of the “Farewell” Symphony as we prepare to tackle the penultimate amendment to be debated in Committee, and how appropriate it is that the very final amendment should be in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.
Amendment 365 is in my name and the names of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and it is very sharply focused. The Committee has already considered the issue of tertiary legislation, with Amendments 110 and 135 as vehicles. Those amendments combined the issue of the principle of tertiary legislation with that of sunsetting. Amendment 365 is about only sunsetting, so I need not trouble the Minister to revisit the general defence of tertiary legislation, which he made at cols. 1473 and 1474 at an unearthly hour on Monday 12 March, although it was then what the rest of the world knew as Tuesday 13 March.
On that occasion, the Minister also made a defence of the exemption of tertiary legislation from sunsetting. He said:
“Where sub-delegated or transferred legislative powers are crucial to the functioning of a regime, it would not be appropriate”—
how often that word “appropriate” recurs—
“for those powers to be subject to a sunset”.—[Official Report, 12/3/18; col. 1475.]
If one accepts the principle of bodies such as the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority exercising tertiary powers in their role as continuing guardians of a regime—and the Minister made a very good case for that in his speech on that occasion—it also makes sense for them to continue to do so after two years have elapsed from exit day. Indeed, I feel that I am now starting to make the Minister’s speech for him. However, there remains a serious point, because if bodies responsible for the functioning of a regime are to continue to exercise their powers without a sunset, it is crucial that those powers are tightly drawn in the first instance, as there will be no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of the subsequent exercise of the powers that have been delegated to those bodies.
Therefore, perhaps the most helpful thing the Minister could do in replying to this debate would be to give your Lordships a clear assurance that the tertiary powers will be carefully circumscribed, and that when affirmative instruments delegating those powers come before Parliament—because the actual delegation will be subject to the affirmative process—they do not simply prescribe some general subject area in which the body is to operate and which is to be its responsibility, but are rather more specific and indeed constraining. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support this amendment and am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for bringing it forward. I am also grateful to him for reminding the Committee that, when we sit past midnight, it remains the same day. I wonder what the noble Lord’s nervous maiden aunts would have made of this never-ending night. The amendment raises an important point and is yet another example of how we have to be careful and circumspect in the use of delegated powers. It is now really for the Minister to answer that question and to see whether he is prepared to give us the reassurance that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, asked for.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for introducing this amendment, which stands also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I am glad to have the opportunity to address it.
First, I reassure noble Lords that the strength of feeling around the exercise of delegated powers by those not immediately accountable to Parliament has been heard, as I said the other evening. The Government are looking very closely at the issue of transparency before Parliament, and we will of course hold that at the forefront of our minds as we consider our position ahead of Report.
At the heart of this Bill is the repeal of the European Communities Act, including Section 2(2) of that Act. As noble Lords on all sides of the Committee know, that provision has been the vires used for many statutory instruments made by many Governments in recent years. This Bill does not replace that power. Although there are several broad powers in the Bill, with some approaching the breadth of Section 2(2) of the ECA, they are, unlike that power, time limited. The Bill is not an assault on Parliament but, rather, the means by which this Parliament will take back control to itself.
My Lords, this is a piece of political opportunism. The context of the 2011 Act, as those who were in the House well remember, was that there was very strong opposition in your Lordships’ House to there being referendums as the result of relatively minor transfers of powers and competences. That was rejected as being unnecessary and being a sop to the Eurosceptic wing. However, there were, incidentally, quite a few occasions on which it was conceded that all was far from perfect in the European Union, which is not something we have heard much about in the debates during the course of this Committee stage. To say that we should rely on a Bill that was most unpopular with many Liberal Democrats and a good number in the Labour Party in order to hold another referendum is really not what this is about.
My Lords, it must be unprecedented to have such a long and well-attended debate on what is almost the final repeal in the last schedule to a Bill. Given that this is the last debate that we will have in the Committee stage, perhaps I may, as the person who happens to be responding from these Benches, pay tribute to the quality of the contributions that have been made by all sides of the Chamber, including from my noble friend Lord Adonis. I have to say that anyone outside who says that we have been spoiling or somehow wrecking the Bill would not be able to maintain that charge in the light of the clarity and detail of the scrutiny that we have given the Bill.
As to the amendment, I admire the ingenuity which brings it forward. It is clear that the purpose behind it ultimately would be to trigger the referendum-requiring provisions set out in the 2011 Act. There are two ways of looking at that. One is to consider the political nature of the 2011 Act and compare that with what is happening at this stage, where one might well say, if I dare, that it was simply a staging post to the position we find ourselves in now. Many of us find the position of exit an unhappy one, but it would be a staging post to that and it has now passed. There is a legal question which is quite different: whether in fact the conditions in the 2011 Act are triggered. From what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has said, there are legal proceedings which may challenge that, and I do not think it is right for me to venture an opinion from this Dispatch Box as to whether those are right or not.
However, I will venture a political opinion from my position, which is this. We are well aware that there are some in this House, in particular on the Liberal Democrat Benches—we fully respect their views, even if we may not share them—who would like to see a further referendum, and many in the country would like to see that. If that is going to happen, one might say that the way for it to come about is through a direct vote on whether a referendum should be taking place rather than what might seem to be a side wind. And that is my problem with the proposed amendment, even though it is ingenious. I have reason to believe—indeed, I suspect, from what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said—that this House will have an opportunity on Report to express its view directly, full-throatedly and openly about a further referendum. The House will give its view, but I am not convinced about doing it through this route.
Can my noble and learned friend give his view on whether it is appropriate that the 2011 Act should be repealed in advance of the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972?
It is perfectly appropriate, although I do not like the word “appropriate”, as we all know. Perhaps the answer is that it is not necessary, but it may be appropriate.
I fully respect what the noble Lord is doing. It is not easy to say this but, politically, the 2011 Act was a staging post on the route—as it turns out—to full Brexit, even though some people still hope that we will not go that far, and it has therefore served its purpose. I am not making a legal analysis of whether the conditions in the Act apply because I can see arguments why they may and why they may not; I am explaining why, if there is a suggestion that this House will vote for a referendum, it would be better to do it on an amendment or a Motion that directly raises that question. It can then be fully debated and we can all have our say. For those reasons, I very much regret to tell my noble friend that I cannot support his amendment.
My Lords, after 115 hours of Committee debate, as observed by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, it is somehow appropriate—that word again—that the last and 372nd amendment should be tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. He referred to our deep and special partnership; I think that is probably going a bit far, but to mark the occasion, I thought I would get him a gift to celebrate his perseverance. The Adonis nut bar is available in all good health shops. He is welcome to collect it later.
In responding to Amendment 372, I want to be very clear about what the European Union Act 2011 does. The Act contains a recent mechanism for two principal goals—first, to provide that where Ministers participate in certain types of decisions, those decisions are specifically approved in the UK. This normally happens via an Act of Parliament. The Act passed last year to approve the decisions—which allowed the participation of Albania and Serbia in the work of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights and the conclusion of an agreement on competition law between the EU and Canada—is an example of this. Secondly, the Act also provides that where there is a revision to the fundamental treaties of the EU, akin to the treaties of Lisbon or Maastricht, there should be an Act of Parliament—and, in certain circumstances, a referendum in the UK—before the UK Government could approve those changes.
I invite noble Lords to cast their minds back, as some Members have done, to 2011 and the context in which this Act was passed. Sadly, I was not a Member of your Lordships’ House then; I was with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—not directly; we were Members—in the European Parliament. The Act was drafted in the context of its time in response to new EU methods of approving treaty changes and calls for more public and parliamentary involvement in such decisions. Its purpose was to regulate decision-making on the UK’s relationship to the EU treaties in the context of the UK as a member state. At that point, the idea of holding a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU was far from the Government’s mind, let alone undertaking the most complex negotiation in history to recast that relationship with the UK outside the EU treaties.
Of course, everything has changed since then. We are leaving the EU. The 2011 Act is redundant. It is appropriate to repeal redundant legislation. It may even be necessary to repeal the 2011 Act. Amendment 372 would prevent the Bill from repealing the 2011 Act. From previous statements made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, I understand that he intends to use the Act in an attempt to secure a second referendum—no surprise there. I will not revisit the positions that we have already covered extensively in debate about the merits or otherwise of holding a further referendum as part of the process of our exit from the EU; no doubt the Liberal Democrats will enable us to return to this matter on Report. We have covered that at length in this Committee; suffice it to say that the Government think, first, that a second referendum is not appropriate and, secondly, that it is most certainly not for this Bill to provide for one.
To clarify, I did not say that. I deliberately did not express a view as to whether that argument would legally succeed precisely because I understand it is the subject of legal proceedings. I would not want for a moment to pre-empt them.
My Lords, those legal proceedings will by definition cease if the 2011 Act is repealed soon after the enactment of the Bill.
The second point that was not addressed, which is a matter of some substance, is that, on an issue of this gravity, surely it is not too much for the people to expect of Parliament that the House of Commons itself should expressly vote on the repeal of the 2011 Act. Because of the guillotine Motion in the House of Commons and the limited opportunities there were for debate in the Commons the matter was never debated, let alone voted on. That is one of our responsibilities.
My final point on the final day and the final amendment on the Bill, with such a magnificent attendance by noble Lords on the Conservative Benches, is to address the final point made by my noble and learned friend about taking a decision expressly on the issue of a referendum. I agree that it is a matter we should expressly take a decision on. The point of the 2011 Act is that it is existing statute law and should be repealed expressly only by the House of Commons.
It is clear that the dominating issue that will preoccupy us over the next six to nine months is whether the people themselves should have a say on the terms of the withdrawal treaty. What is already lurking behind the debate—it is, I am afraid, an issue of intense debate in my own party, but I suspect it will spread to other parties—is whether the people should be allowed that final say. It is clear that many people, I suspect including my noble and learned friend and maybe my right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition, at the moment do not think that a referendum is the right course. What is happening is we are having a charade of big debates about what are essentially second-order issues in the House while the consensus is rolling on that, maybe to avoid too big a division of public opinion, we should allow Brexit simply to roll on next year.
That will be the dominating issue of British politics in the next nine months: whether Brexit is a done deal, whether Parliament will debate, with the option of rejection, the Prime Minister’s withdrawal treaty and whether—in considering what is the biggest and most significant issue that has faced Parliament in this generation—before we take the final plunge into the unknown and engage in Brexit, we will give the people a say on the terms of withdrawal. That is a very big and weighty issue to raise at the very last moment of the debate in Committee, but in two weeks’ time we will regroup and start Report. We can rehearse all these arguments again. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.