European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Callanan
Main Page: Lord Callanan (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Callanan's debates with the Department for Exiting the European Union
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe general principle referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, which has been very clearly enunciated by the courts, is that no public authority, including local authorities, has the power or statutory authority to exact money that exceeds the amount that the local authority—or other person making the imposition—sets. The charge the person is required to pay must be just equal to the amount that will be needed to carry out the service, or other thing. If it does exceed it, it is taxation and that covers all forms; it does not matter whether it is a payment, charge, fee or anything else. That is a general principle. Therefore, the provision in Clause 7(7), preventing the regulations imposing or increasing taxation, prevents any local authority or other power having the power to make any such imposition.
On the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, I wonder whether the first part of the clause —Clause 8(1), I think—is the subject of Amendment 126. My noble friend Lord Deben wondered why we were talking about this in a withdrawal Bill, but the clause says that we may have an international obligation that is breached by withdrawal; it therefore seems reasonable to deal with that in the withdrawal Bill because it is a consequence of withdrawal. That amendment implies that this power cannot be used to make any financial settlement that would cause a cost to the United Kingdom because, if it did, it would inevitably require taxation—presumably, whoever makes the settlement does not intend to defray the cost out of his or her own pocket. It is a fundamental restriction on the way in which these matters of international obligation may be resolved. I think I am right in that, but no doubt the noble Lord will tell us its effect on the amendment in due course.
My Lords, Amendments 86, 126, 127 and 155—in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Kramer, and the noble Lords, Lord Turnbull, Lord Lisvane and Lord Higgins—concern Clauses 7, 8 and 9 and the ability to provide for taxation or fees and charges under those powers.
Let me start by saying that the Government are aware of the concerns of many noble Lords about the raising of fees under these powers. On Report, we will look closely at how we can resolve those concerns. Let me explain the various issues, beginning with Clauses 7 and 9. I am glad to be able to reassure noble Lords that the restrictions in Clause 7(7)(a) and Clause 9(3)(a) already prevent Ministers establishing charges of a type that would involve any element of taxation or tax-like provision under these powers. Beyond that specific issue, I want to set out the Government’s intentions with regard to those fees and charges.
Will my noble friend tell the Committee what, in his view, is the essential difference between a fee, a charge and a tax? The Committee must understand the expressly defined difference.
If my noble friend will stay with me, I will come on to that. Beyond that specific issue, I will set out the Government’s intention with regard to fees and charges. We have included the powers in Schedule 4 to provide for fees and charges in order to be clear and transparent. It is, however, necessary for the powers in Clauses 7 and 9 to interact with existing regimes to correct deficiencies within them, and to properly modify them to reflect the withdrawal agreement. Without prejudice to our negotiations, an example of such a correction might be modifying a fee in relation to the authorisation of a credit rating agency so that the fee becomes payable to the UK financial regulators rather than the European Securities and Markets Authority. That might be argued to amount to the imposition of a new fee.
The requirements to pay new fees and charges established under Schedule 4, and the ability to modify existing regimes, will depend on deficiencies being properly corrected and on functions being transferred. Clauses 7 and 9 are not primarily aimed at imposing fees, and they cannot impose other kinds of charges, but sometimes that will be part and parcel of the correction. In answer to the questions about fees and charges from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the other poachers turned gamekeepers—if I may refer to them as that—on the Privy Council Bench, a fee is a payment only for a service received. By a charge, in paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 7, we mean anything which goes beyond cost recovery. Clause 7 cannot create a charge. In addition, creating either a fee or a charge is subject to the affirmative procedure.
The argument against a tax restriction—
There is a large number of fees that are paid to, for example, the Environment Agency, to carry out certain services. We have no idea whether those fees are equalled by the amount of work that is done. The Environment Agency says: “We want this amount of money because we need it”. There is no proof. If one were to prove that the agency spent less money than the fee, does it then become a charge or a tax? There is a real issue here. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay points to the fact that one may define it like this but how does one prove it, and how does the House deal with it? Is it not better to not have this distinction at all?
I am sorry for my noble friend, but he did say that both the fees and the charges were subject to the affirmative procedure. I know that the fees are, but I am not sure where in the Bill I find the provision that charges are subject to the affirmative procedure. Will he tell the Committee?
I do not have the specific clause in front of me, but I am sure that is the case and I will write to the noble Viscount about it. I am not an expert on Erskine May and the precise legal definitions, but I will have a look at the matter towards which the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has pointed me.
The argument against a tax restriction on Clause 8, made by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, is altogether different. The Clause 8 power is predicated on the fact that when we leave the EU, without further action we may inadvertently end up in breach of certain international obligations which have been affected by our EU membership, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out was said in the other place by my honourable friend Robin Walker. It is possible that some of these obligations may be in the field of tariffs, although it is, of course, impossible to know the full picture until our future relationship with the EU has been negotiated. If Clause 8 had a tax restriction as the other main powers do, we may not have the capability to remedy these breaches in all circumstances. As I hope noble Lords will appreciate, we are committed to international relationships and a key part of that is ensuring that we are fully compliant with our international obligations.
That is a very interesting point. Would that be remediable if we were to stay within the European Economic Area, which would classify us as part nevertheless of a regional economic arrangement? Is that one of the things that perhaps we and the Government should take into account in considering this transition?
If we were part of the European Economic Area, I assume that we would not need to do that. However, as we are not going to be part of the European Economic Area, it may perhaps be necessary. I hope that the noble Lord will listen to my next point.
In the light of our successful phase 1 agreement, we are increasingly confident that we will secure a deal with the EU and that the prospect of leaving negotiations with no deal has reduced significantly. It is in both the UK’s and the EU’s interests to secure a good deal for both sides. However, as a responsible Government, we have a duty to plan for the unlikely scenario in which no mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached. I hope noble Lords agree that that is common sense. If we do not have this power, and in exiting the EU we are unable to correct a breach of the MFN principle, another WTO member could bring a dispute against the UK in the WTO. That is a situation that we want to avoid, and which could result in a loss of trade for UK business through retaliatory measures by other WTO members or claims for compensation against the UK.
The noble Lord makes some very good points about how we might need to levy charges or fees, or whatever he wishes to call them, but he has not made any case as to why this should be done by secondary legislation as opposed to primary legislation.
Because in such circumstances we will need to react quickly in the light of the events as they happen, depending on—
It would be totally appropriate and, indeed, necessary to do so in the circumstances. We are in a difficult position in that we are trying to plan for all eventualities. It is one of those powers that we hope we will never use because, of course, we want, and seek, a good agreement with the EU.
There is a different eventuality using the same example that the noble Lord gave—namely, the eventuality of the Government’s proposal for what I think is called an implementation phase; most of us call it a transition or standstill phase—lasting about two years. Is he suggesting that we might be in breach of our WTO obligations if we reach an agreement with the European Union on that basis, because it is about to be reached, is it not?
No, I am not suggesting that we might be in breach of our international obligations. However, as the noble Lord knows, we are currently negotiating for the implementation period, and as soon as we have an agreement—I hope within the next few weeks—we will be sure to report back to the noble Lord and others.
For those reasons, which I set out earlier, the Government therefore cannot accept these amendments to Clause 8. The power can be used only for the specific purpose of ensuring continuing compliance with international obligations to which this House has already consented and which would be affected by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It is available only for a limited period of time, and any further restriction risks increasing the primary legislative burden on this House and weakening the UK’s promise to the rest of the world that we are ready and able to honour our commitments.
However, having said all that, I repeat the point I made at the start of this debate: that we are listening carefully to what noble Lords have said, that we will look closely at how we can resolve many of the concerns that have been raised by noble Lords throughout this debate, and that we will come back to the issue on Report. In the light of those assurances, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, will the Minister take the message from this House that we are very happy to have this burden imposed on us? Although we appreciate his concern at the weight of business which we might have to undertake if we had to pay attention to primary legislation in respect of fees and charges, we will be very happy to assume that heavy burden.
I take on board the sincere nature of the noble Lord’s assurances on this matter.
Might my noble friend point out to the noble Lord that, if it is about taxation, that burden would not be placed on this Chamber anyway?
My Lords, since we are discovering the enormous complexity of all this, on the previous amendment I asked the Government whether they would be willing to share with us their own calculations on the process of policy-making for directives and regulations, some of which are in force but not implemented, and others of which are about to come into force but will not be implemented until after March 2019. What view have the Government formed on those? That would be helpful to us and others in understanding how the Government are coping with this complex process.
The noble Lord makes a good point. I was speaking to my noble friend Lady Goldie about the matter when he asked her the question earlier. I will have a look at this for him. I think it is fair to say that most of our negotiating positions on the existing directives and regulations are already public. We share our positions, the issues that are being discussed are transparently available on both our website and the EU’s website, and many of the issues that will come to fruition over the next year or two are already in early formative phases. I therefore genuinely do not think that there is much about this process that is secretive, but I will certainly have a look at the issue for the noble Lord.
My Lords, I think it will be obvious why I spoke so briefly at the beginning of this debate, as I have now heard far better speeches on this group than I would ever have made. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, who “salivated”—his word at Second Reading—at the thought of being able to raise money by SIs, was not here. However, he and the other “guilty men”, as they were called, who used these in the past, have made the case well that this would be quite a move from our traditional way of raising money. Whatever the name of the charge—the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said that it was basically “taking money out of your pocket”, and the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, called it an “obligation to pay”—we know what we are looking at.
The noble Lord, Lord Deben, said that this had, “not been entirely well thought through”. I hope that that, rather than anything more untoward, is why this power has crept in there. As everyone has said, it is for Parliament to decide whether to raise funds—whether to pay for some WTO obligation or for anything else. The example of the American situation is very valid: it is how, ultimately, you stop Governments doing what you do not want them to do.
Earlier in this debate the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said that we need some hard examples. I do not think that the WTO example is the hard example to justify these powers. I think that his second point was that, if we do not get those hard examples to convince the House, surely it is much better that we leave this to the withdrawal (No. 2) Bill, by which stage we will know exactly what in the withdrawal agreement had led to the need to raise a particular fee, charge, imposition or whatever. That seems more appropriate.
Speaking about the WTO, I think that the Minister said that he thought the Government might be in a difficult position. I have to advise him that I think the Government are in a difficult position now on this power in the Bill. I hope that the Government will bring forward their own amendment on Report. That would be a way of taking matters forward. I am sure that there are far more expert noble Lords in the House than me who might meet the Minister to see whether we can find some such amendment. I hope that we do not have to repeat this debate on Report and that the Minister will bring something back because, if he does not, I can assure him that we will. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I had intended to stand up before the noble and learned Lord sat down to respond to his kind invitation. Perhaps it would be to the benefit of the House if I note that, as the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, this issue has been debated previously in the debate on the sanctions Bill. As with the issue we debated last Wednesday—the appropriate test for the use of delegated powers—the solutions found in the sanctions Bill are at the forefront of our minds in this regard and we intend to meet noble Lords to discuss the issue over the coming weeks. I will set out the Government’s views at the conclusion of the debate on this group of amendments. I very much look forward to hearing what noble Lords have to say but I thought it would be helpful to say this at the start.
My Lords, in view of what my noble friend has said, I can be very brief. I support the first four amendments in this group, to which I have set my name, and have ventured to put forward a sort of default position in my Amendment 340. As the Committee will appreciate, the purpose of the first four amendments is to ensure that the regulatory power now under discussion cannot be used to create a criminal offence, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has set out very clearly the reasons for this. Amendment 340, which stands in my name, is the default position, so that if by any evil chance this Committee or your Lordships’ House decided that it was right to create a criminal offence, it should be one that does not attract a custodial sentence.
We need to be quite plain about what we are talking about. The Bill as presently drafted enables the Minister, if he deems it appropriate and subject to the affirmative resolution, to create a criminal offence that attracts a custodial sentence of up to two years. Two years is not an insignificant period, and it is very important that one reminds oneself that the test is whether the Minister thinks it is appropriate. Furthermore, we must go on reminding ourselves that the procedure—that is the affirmative resolution procedure—is simply not subject to amendment. So this is, in effect, the power to introduce a criminal offence which attracts a custodial sentence by fiat or declaration. I find that profoundly unattractive.
As a former Minister who signed an awful lot of statutory instruments, I know that the degree of ministerial oversight is extremely limited. As I said, if this Committee decides that a criminal offence should be creatable in this way, then surely it should not attract a custodial sentence of any kind.
My Lords, because the case was made so clearly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, with the added detail provided by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I shall not try to add anything to the substance of the argument. I just want to express my regret at the lack of preparation and forethought that went into the drafting of this power. Indeed, I was alarmed by it on the very day I first read the Bill and started blogging about it back in the summer. I then tabled Questions for Written Answer in October asking the Government what other instances there were of new criminal offences being created by secondary legislation. In the replies I received on 2 and 23 October, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, was unable to list any.
I went on to ask the then Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, the same question. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, had by then taken over and replied in her stead on 14 November—but again gave no examples. The letter merely noted that “existing” criminal offences “in our law”—those are his words—which relate to the EU might need to be transferred to another body: for example, an offence not to notify an EU institution of something important relating to health. The letter ended by saying that the offence might have to be changed to a failure to notify the equivalent UK body. I understand that, but that is an existing offence, not a new one, and alters only to whom the report should be made. No case was made for, and no example given of, where new offences might be needed as we leave the European Union—much less one with the threat of up to two years in prison on first offence.
Noble Lords will not be surprised that I did not let this drop. I raised the issue again with the lucky noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who had another meeting with me in January—he has all the fun. On Wednesday last, when we anticipated dealing with this group, just before we broke for lunch I received an email from his department in response to my request in January. But again the email failed to answer why any new offences might be needed. It commented only that,
“existing criminal offences may require widening or amending, or new offences may need to be created to fix deficiencies in retained EU law”—
but provided absolutely no examples. The only example given in the email was of an existing offence where a business fails,
“to provide an EU authority with certain information”,
and therefore such an offence may,
“need amending to ensure they continue to operate effectively post exit day, for example by changing references from an EU authority to a UK one”,
and to ensure that businesses are complying with the law. Again, that is a change rather than a new offence. It is true that the email goes on to state:
“Previous case law”—
here I shall look to others to look into the detail of this—
“has created some uncertainty as to whether actions such as these would amount to creating a new offence rather than amending an existing one, and there could be differing legal views on this point”.
As I read the email, it seems that on that basis alone—that there is possibly a legal issue as to whether an amendment to an offence is a new offence—the Government have written themselves powers to create brand new offences that are punishable by up to two years in prison. So I think we are agreed that that will not do and that these powers have to go. Moreover, they have to go more completely than the Government allowed for in the sanctions Bill because, as was said in the debate at the time, anything there would follow an international agreement to which we would be a party as a Government—so there would have been that earlier stage. But these powers will not be part of that, and therefore I hope that, when the Minister responds, he will say that these powers are going to be taken out of the Bill.
First, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham for bringing the matter of creating criminal offences under the powers in Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 to the attention of the Committee through their Amendments 87, 128, 156, 339 and 340, which seek to amend the relevant provisions in the Bill. As I said, I understand that similar concerns were raised during the debates on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, but that a mutually agreeable outcome has since been reached, with the Government bringing forward a requirement on Ministers to make additional statements alongside their statutory instruments. Of course, the offences envisaged under that Bill were different and carried considerably greater sentences. I hope that I can satisfy the concerns that noble Lords have expressed during this debate. However, the Government are still looking very closely at how the powers in the Bill are drawn and how they will be exercised—and, as I say, we are open to discussion on finding similar solutions in this Bill.
I shall start with the reassurance that the three main powers in the Bill are explicitly restricted from creating a “relevant criminal offence”, which is defined in the Bill as an offence for which an individual who has reached the age of 18, or in relation to Scotland or Northern Ireland the age of 21, is capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than two years. A vital part in achieving continuity and consistency for businesses and individuals as we leave the EU is to ensure that criminal offences continue to operate effectively after exit. As such, the Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 powers can create criminal offences punishable by imprisonment for two years or less. In applying this two-year limit, the Government have sought a balance between appropriately limiting the three main powers and providing a functioning statute book on exit day.
The amendments would see that no criminal offences—or no criminal offences punishable by any term of imprisonment at all—could be created under the three main powers in the Bill. However, it is important that these powers are able to create certain criminal offences, as I shall come on to explain. For example, criminal offences provide an essential function of ensuring compliance with regulatory regimes which provide crucial protections for businesses and individuals. Some of the regimes criminalise particular conduct relating to the EU and some offences may no longer operate as intended after exit day if they are not corrected, particularly where functions transfer to a UK authority. For example, it could be an offence for a business to fail to provide an EU authority with certain information, but after exit day the authority collecting that information might be a UK one instead. Continuity would seem to demand penalties remaining in place—
I wonder if the Minister could help us. He seems to be arguing what might be a coherent case for some offences needing to be redefined to have the same effect as they would have had before exit day. Surely it cannot be part of what he is describing to create offences that did not exist simply to ensure that the statute book after exit day has the same effect, in terms of the criminality that people would face, as it had beforehand. Does that not need him to approach this differently and try to find a way of defining the process so that it is not about the creation of new criminal offences?
I understand the noble Lord’s concern, which comes on to the same point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I will come on to deal with what constitutes a new offence and what does not in a second.
Continuity would seem to demand penalties remaining in place for what would substantively be the same misconduct. Currently, certain types of financial services firms are regulated at an EU level. Depending on negotiation outcomes, we may need to bring such firms into the UK regulatory regime. Under these circumstances, we would want the UK regulators to be able to regulate such firms in a way consistent with their current regulatory framework, in line with their statutory objectives. Where appropriate, this may include bringing firms within the scope of existing criminal offences to which UK financial services firms are already subject.
To give another example, Her Majesty’s Treasury is considering amending the existing offence in Section 398 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 of “knowingly or recklessly” giving a regulator,
“information which is false or misleading”.
This would make it an offence, as a consequence of transferring functions from the European Securities and Markets Authority, for third country central counterparties to mislead the Bank of England in connection with recognition applications. In direct response to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, a view could be taken that this creates a new offence as it will be a new function for the Bank of England and extends this offence to central counterparties established in third countries to whom it did not apply before. Her Majesty’s Treasury is also considering making similar provision for the FCA—as a consequence of transferring functions from the European Securities and Markets Authority relating to trade repositories—and similar considerations apply. We therefore need the power in its current shape to provide certainty that we can make such statutory instruments.
As an alternative example, marketing authorisations for medicinal products are currently granted at both EU and UK level. Post exit—again, depending on negotiation outcomes—it is possible that the best way to provide continuity for businesses marketing medicines in the UK will be to convert EU marketing authorisations into UK ones. Under Regulation 95 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012, it is currently an offence to provide false or misleading information in connection with applications for marketing authorisations as this information is key to assessing the safety, quality and efficacy of medicines. The offence is punishable with a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. It is vital that, if we need to, we are able to amend the existing offence or create a comparable one. I think we can all agree that it remains important that false or misleading information is not supplied in connection with the process of converting EU marketing authorisations into new ones, and that the public’s health is protected.
Noble Lords will see from the examples that the intent here is largely to ensure that the same types of conduct carry criminal penalties as before, or that we can create criminal offences to deal with the post-exit world. Previous case law has, though, created some uncertainty as to whether widening an existing offence would amount to creating a new offence, and there could be differing legal views on this point.
The noble Lord just used a different word—“widening”—but I think his earlier example was making a notification to a different organisation. “Widening” suggests that the scope of what might be a crime would be extended. Is that what he meant?
No, that is not what I meant.
It is therefore vital that the Bill can provide for “creating” criminal offences to ensure that no offences that are needed fall away as we leave the EU, and that businesses and individuals continue to comply with the law.
Any statutory instruments made under Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 which create or widen the scope of a criminal offence will automatically be subject to the affirmative procedure so that they will be subject to a debate and vote in this House and in the other place. The Government accept that this level of scrutiny is important here and, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, I hope we can consider further safeguards. Therefore, I hope that with those assurances I have demonstrated why we think this element of the power must remain part of the Bill and that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I am troubled by just one observation made by the Minister. I think someone has been advising him incorrectly. Speaking for myself, I have never come to a mutually agreeable arrangement relating to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill. I have certainly welcomed an advance by the Government relating to these issues, but, as I said at the beginning, I leave open the argument that “good reasons”, which are proposed, should give way to “necessary” and I have added that there is an advance.
Beyond that, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. We really must not return—can we make up our minds now not to?—to the constitutional aberration of unexplained, and effectively unscrutinised, regulations creating criminal offences. That is the constitutional principle. In view of the observations made by the Minister, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.