European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

90: Clause 7, page 6, line 25, at end insert—
“( ) modify the Scotland Act 1998 without the consent of the Scottish Parliament, or( ) modify the Government of Wales Act 2006 without the consent of the National Assembly for Wales.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, three amendments in this group are in my name: Amendment 90, which relates to Clause 7; Amendment 130, which relates to Clause 8; and Amendment 148, which relates to Clause 9. They all raise the same point about the extent of the delegated powers given to Ministers of the Crown by these three clauses. The context is the way in which exercise of these powers may affect the devolution settlements for Scotland, under the Scotland Act 1998, and for Wales, under the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Wales Act 2017. I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for her amendments introducing the position of Northern Ireland in exactly the same terms as my amendments.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Wales Office (Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth) (Con)]

Before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, proceeds, it may be of benefit to the House if I now confirm that the Government will bring forward amendments on Report to apply the same protection for the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act to the Clause 7 correcting power that applies to the Northern Ireland Act. I will speak about that more at the end of the debate. It may also benefit the House to note that the Government have tabled an amendment to Clause 11 —as I am sure noble Lords are aware—that reflects the significant offer we have made on that issue to ensure that the House can debate the offer when we reach that clause, just as we promised to do in the other place.

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[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has not yet moved the amendment so he needs to do that first.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his intervention and for the indication that he has given. My amendments extend to Clauses 8 and 9; what he has said is an indication of the way the Government are minded to go on Clause 7, but I must introduce my amendments in relation to Clauses 8 and 9 as well.

The provision relating to Northern Ireland, to which the Minister referred, is what we find in Clause 7(7)(f), which indicates that,

“regulations under subsection (1) may not … amend or repeal the Northern Ireland Act 1998”.

That provision is then substantially qualified in a way one can only understand by reading through the schedules. I am not clear whether the Minister is proposing that the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act should be qualified in the same way, but if he intends to qualify them, my amendments are unqualified. It is therefore appropriate for me to explain why my amendments are in the terms they are. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, will appreciate why I need to set this matter out in a little bit of detail and explain why I have brought the amendments forward.

As we have seen, these three clauses confer a very wide power on a Minister of the Crown to make provisions by regulations. That includes a provision to which attention has not been drawn until now, but which is certainly relevant to the amendments in this group: a Minister of the Crown may make a regulation of the same kind that could be made by an Act of Parliament. We find that in Clause 7(5), Clause 8(2) and Clause 9(2). I need not go over what these clauses deal with but, broadly speaking, in Clause 7 the power is to enable a Minister to deal with,

“any other deficiency in retained EU law, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”.

In Clause 8, the power is to enable a Minister to,

“prevent or remedy any breach, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, of the international obligations of the United Kingdom”.

In Clause 9, it is a wider power to enable the Minister to,

“make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement if the Minister considers that such provision should be in force on or before exit day”.

Each of these clauses is limited in some respects by saying that regulations made under them may not do certain things. The Committee has heard about that in earlier debates today, such as in relation to sentencing, the creation of criminal offences and so on. These amendments seek to add two further limitations. One is that the power under these three clauses may not be used to modify the Scotland Acts and the government of Wales Acts without the consent of the Scottish Parliament or the National Assembly for Wales, as the case may be. As I mentioned earlier, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, is seeking to make similar provision in relation to Northern Ireland. Amendment 148 goes a little further than that: it builds in an additional provision relating to the Ministers of the devolved institutions. These are the subject of the group after next, which we will come to later this evening. I will not develop that aspect until we get to that group.

The scale of the transfer of legislative competence to Ministers of the Crown, provided for by these clauses, raises concerns of a fundamental nature. This is not only about the balance of power between Parliament and the Executive, as the Constitution Committee pointed out in paragraph 158 of its report, it also raises concerns about the balance of power within the union and the future of the devolution settlements themselves, referred to in the same report at paragraph 243. Some of what I will be saying in a moment will be directed only to the Scotland Act, but it should be understood as applying equally to the Government of Wales Act and the Wales Act, which are referred to in my amendments.

As I understand the wording of these clauses, if they are left as they are the powers could be used to change the constitutional balance of powers between the UK Government and the devolved institutions which the relevant devolution statutes set out. An aspect worth stressing is the width given to the meaning of the word “deficiencies” in Clause 7. We see it set out at length in subsection (2), supplemented by subsection (3). It is extremely wide and can be widened still, as we can see, given the power in subsection (3). The provisions in Clause 7(6) are about the transfer of functions from EU entities or public authorities in member states to public authorities in the United Kingdom, which would, of course, include public authorities in the devolved areas of Scotland and Wales.

The Committee needs to bear in mind the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, in his speech last Wednesday morning about the width of Clause 7; the meaning to be given to the expression “Minister of the Crown”; and the numbers of people who could be embraced by that expression. The point which was of particular concern to me in the amendments in this group is that the power includes a power to make any provision that can be made by an Act of Parliament. I appreciate that the provision in Clause 7 is time limited. This is also true in the case of Clause 8. In Clause 9, the power is not exercisable after exit day. Nevertheless, as these clauses stand, and while they continue to have effect, it would be open to a Minister of the Crown to modify the Scotland Acts and government of Wales Acts in a way that, as I mentioned earlier, could shift the constitutional balance, and to do so without even consulting the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, let alone obtaining their consent.

A particular part of the Scotland Act which is quite vulnerable to an inadvertent amendment without that process of obtaining consent is the detailed wording of Schedule 5. I was involved, as was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in considering the Bill which gave rise to the Scotland Act 1998. We sat until late in the night—indeed, early in the morning—dealing with that Bill and went over Schedule 5 in some detail. It has survived very well over the years since devolution, but it contains considerable detail which could be adjusted a little. That would alter the balance between the UK Government and the Scottish Government in a way that should not be done without the consent of the Scottish Government.

I appreciate that Ministers may say that it is not their intention to modify the Acts in this way, but it is well known that there is a high degree of mistrust between the devolved institutions and the UK Government about where this legislation is going. Personally, I regret that but, from a Scottish point of view, the reason is not hard to find. As one reads through these clauses, and looks at them from the approach of a Scottish Minister, or the Scottish Parliament or, indeed, a lawyer who has dealt with the devolution system since it first came in, it is striking that—apart from Northern Ireland—there is simply no mention in these three clauses of the fact that there are devolved Governments in Wales and Scotland that need to be considered. That aspect causes one some alarm as soon as one begins to read through the Act. It would be desirable to do something about it, if one possibly can. That is why I welcome what the Minister said when I began my speech.

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[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, before we whip ourselves into a lather of outrage at the prospect of doing something without the consent of the devolved Administrations, perhaps I may remind the House that we have a short memory. The devolution settlement in Northern Ireland represented by the 1998 Act was butchered—a term I used some weeks ago—by this Parliament without a by your leave, without the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly and without the consent of the parties that negotiated the agreement. That was done in the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, where dramatic changes were made to the methods we had negotiated with the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, and others over many years. So this Parliament can do what it likes, when it likes. That is the nature of having a devolved institution versus a sovereign Parliament. There is a hierarchy.

The Good Friday agreement, for which the noble Lord, Lord Judd—who is not in his place—and others indicated strong support, which I welcome, was dramatically changed without a by your leave. It was done as a result of a back-stairs deal and this Parliament implemented it. There was no requirement for the Northern Ireland Assembly to agree—it was just done. So let us look back at the actions that have already been taken.

In these challenging circumstances, and from what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, among others, in his forensic examination of the amendments that he introduced, I understand that there is genuine reason to be concerned. But we have to keep this in proportion. When powers are repatriated to the United Kingdom, the European Union deals with the member state—that is the way in which it works—so the only place it can come to is the member state. The question then is: what happens when it gets there? That is of significant concern to Members. But I am not as concerned as some because I believe that it is perfectly possible to arrive at an appropriate accommodation.

The word “balance” has been used, and that is an important point. But let us look at legislative consent. I have to say to noble Lords that we have got to be extremely careful about what we are doing here. If there is a Northern Ireland Assembly, do we know what legislative consent means? It means that Sinn Fein will decide whether there is legislative consent. If we build that into an Act of this Parliament dealing with such an important matter as the consequences of the EU decision, we will be handing a veto to that single party. Under our devolution settlement, it will be about Sinn Fein’s consent as a party. Whether it has a majority or a minority in the Assembly is irrelevant; it has sufficient power to block consent. What are we doing in considering that?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord. In Clause 7(7), which deals with Northern Ireland, there is no mention of the need for consent at all. It states simply that the power to amend or repeal the Northern Ireland Act by statutory instrument is excluded. I can see the sense in that. Does the noble Lord agree that that is a sensible way of dealing with the matter, and that perhaps the same provision should be made for Scotland and Wales?

[Lord Empey]

I think that we have to be careful because this is complicated. It is obvious that the devolution settlements are not uniform; they are at different levels. My concern with the whole point of having consent is that, while it is obviously highly desirable to have it, although we are talking about the institutions, in practice we are talking about the people who at any point in time are controlling those institutions. In our particular case, there is a veto. I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, but in the Scottish case a similar situation arises because there is a political party which has a particular objective in mind. It is not simply about the institutions but about those who are controlling them at a point in time when these matters come forward. In fact the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, said in his passionate contribution—I know that he is a lifelong devolutionary —that devolution, once granted, cannot be taken away. That is a contradiction in terms, because by definition devolution is something that is given—and of course our experience is that what has been given can be taken away. That is the danger in all of this.

Obviously we are waiting to see what the Government’s proposals will be. I do not believe that what the Minister indicated at the start of this debate will be the only contribution they will be making on these clauses, because it is clear that other matters need to be dealt with in Clauses 8 and 9, and I am sure that we will hear more from the Government. But I would urge colleagues to be careful about what this may mean in practice—because it is not as straightforward as it seems.

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Amendment 91 (to Amendment 90) withdrawn.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I moved my amendment some time ago—at least I believe I did. I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate and to the Minister for his very constructive response.

To sum up briefly, it seems that a theme ran through various contributions, which I want to bring to a point. I picked up from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, the point that the Government have not really carried the people with them in the way they have responded to devolution, at least in Wales. Then, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, said that devolution had yet to be taken seriously. Then, the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, said that the atmosphere is becoming increasingly negative. These are very unfortunate phrases to be using in a situation where we seek agreement. However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said that accepting these amendments would be a step forward and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said—if I understood him correctly—that accepting the amendments would not cause the Government much trouble, given what they have been saying about their intentions for the use of the powers that will be given to Ministers of State by these three clauses.

If the Minister searches his conscience very thoroughly, it does not look as though the Government have much to lose, if anything, in accepting these amendments. At the same time, there is a lot to be gained because they would help to change the atmosphere, which is so negative at the moment. He has made a step forward in Clause 7, which I appreciate, but he has done so because he says that he does not need to bother with the Scotland Act because he will have it all there on Report. I applaud that, but surely he might take the same step with Clauses 8 and 9. He may say that there is no question of amending the Scotland Act or the Government of Wales Act under those clauses—if so, why not just say so? Why not put these measures in the Bill and get this all over with, as a background to when we come to the real difficulty of Clause 11? There is that to take away from the debate.

I want to mention one other point. If we put a provision of this kind in Clause 7, people will look at Clauses 8 and 9 and say, “Oh, it’s not there. The situation is different as far as Clauses 8 and 9 are concerned”. There is a Latin phrase for this: inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that putting one thing in excludes the other. We need to look rather carefully at the wisdom of adding a very sensible amendment to Clause 7 but not reproducing it in Clauses 8 and 9 as well.

I hope we can take these thoughts into the discussions which I would like to have with the Minister if we can find time. I look forward to Report when he will bring forward his other amendments. That is as far as we can take the matter this evening. We will come back to it on Report, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 90 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

102: Clause 7, page 6, line 25, at end insert—
“( ) The consent of the Scottish Ministers is required before any provision is made in regulations under this section so far as the provision would be within the devolved competence of the Scottish Ministers within the meaning given to those words by paragraph 18 of Schedule 2.( ) The consent of the Welsh Ministers is required before any provision is made in regulations under this section so far as the provision would be within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers within the meaning given to those words by paragraph 19 of Schedule 2.”

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am afraid that I have to introduce this group, and I hope to be able to do so fairly concisely. There are two amendments in this group in my name. Amendment 102 relates to Clause 7 and Amendment 124 to Clause 8. They seek to qualify the extent of the power given to Ministers of the Crown to make provision by regulations to deal with the matters to which these clauses refer, asking that these powers be not exercised without the consent of the Scottish or Welsh Ministers, so far as the provision that is sought to be made would be within “devolved competence” within the meaning given to that expression in paragraph 18 of Schedule 2.

Once again, at the heart of these amendments is the need to respect the constitutional importance and integrity of the devolution settlements. How the areas of government within devolved competence should be administered is seen—certainly in Cardiff and Edinburgh—as the responsibility of the devolved authorities. They have that responsibility by virtue of the democratic vote under which Members of these legislatures were elected. Their quite correct position is that it should not be for UK Ministers to enter into the area that is devolved to them without their consent, especially in the exercise of the power, to which I referred in the previous group, to make any provision under these two clauses that could be made by an Act of Parliament. I mention the Sewel convention in that connection. In practice, the Sewel principle has been operated for a considerable time in the way that the devolution system has been working since the two fundamental statutes were passed in 1998. The problem is that these clauses fail to give effect to that practice, and that needs to be corrected.

To set this point in its statutory context, so far as Ministers are concerned, Section 53(1) of the Scotland Act 1998 sets out the basic rule that, in so far as they are exercisable within devolved competence, they are to be exercisable by the Scottish Ministers instead of by a Minister of the Crown. That section expresses the devolutionary principle, but the rule is qualified by Section 57(1) in the case of functions in relation to observing and implementing obligations under EU law. A member of the Scottish Government has no power to make any subordinate legislation, or to do any other act, which is incompatible with EU law. Section 57(1) provides that any function of a Minister of the Crown in relation to such matters shall continue to be exercisable by him in relation to Scotland for the purposes set out in Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. No mention is made in the statute of any need to consult with, or obtain consent from, the Scottish Ministers before that power is exercised in relation to EU law.

Coming on to the way that the matter is worked out in practice, these provisions are operated in practice under successive memoranda of understanding on devolution between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations. I think they have operated almost since the start of devolution. One must recall that, to begin with, the Government in Edinburgh and the Government in Westminster were of the same persuasion: Labour Government here, Labour Government there. That, of course, assisted very much in the setting up of memoranda and a common understanding of how these matters were to be operated. The latest of these memoranda was published in October 2013. In a concordat on the co-ordination of EU policy issues, the memorandum states that the UK Government wishes to involve the devolved Administrations,

“as directly and fully as possible in decision making on EU matters which touch on devolved areas”.

It then sets out a series of underlying principles with which I think all those who are responsible for implementing EU obligations in devolved areas will be familiar. Among other things, they state that,

“it is for the devolved administrations to consider, in … consultation with the lead Whitehall Department”,

how the EU obligations should be implemented and enforced, including whether they should be implemented by the devolved Administrations themselves separately or by the UK in UK legislation. As I understand it from those I have spoken to, ever since devolution, this has been a matter of routine intergovernmental working between Scotland and Whitehall ever since the institutions were set up. This is important as it enables the Scottish Government to fulfil the responsibilities that have been devolved to them without their being cut across by measures taken in Whitehall without their agreement. That is where we are now. It is important to say that this system has worked remarkably well, with co-operation particularly between the civil servants on both sides of the border and, initially at least, with political agreement, as I indicated, on both sides of the border too.

The context in which the powers are given to a Minister of the Crown by Clauses 7 and 8 are, of course, different because we are leaving the EU behind, and this Bill is all about the withdrawal process. In the Bill as it stands, Section 57(1) of the Scotland Act is to be omitted: that is the provision that deals with UK Ministers dealing with EU obligations. Section 57(2) is to be amended by removing the reference to EU law and putting in provisions which are to be found in paragraph 1 of Schedule 3. Their effect is that the power of the Scottish Ministers will be under a restriction in relation to retained EU law which is similar to that in relation to EU law at present. However, when we look at Clauses 7, 8 and 9, we see that the Ministers of the Crown will have power under those provisions to modify retained EU law in areas of policy which are within devolved competence without any prior notice to the devolved Governments, let alone their consent. Therefore, the amendments I am putting forward in this group seek to deal with a problem which runs right through the Bill.

Provisions in Schedules 2, 3 and 8 to the Bill provide that retained EU law is to be treated in the same way as EU law as regards devolved competence, and I have later amendments which seek to deal with that. However, the problem is that they fail to recognise that much of what will become retained EU law will relate to matters within the devolved competence of the Scottish and Welsh Governments. To deprive them of their primacy, which is established under the memoranda of understanding to which I referred, would be very unfortunate and would create a situation which in both Cardiff and Holyrood is regarded as quite unacceptable. It would mean that while policy areas within devolved competence which raise no issues of retained EU law at all would be for the devolved Administrations to deal with themselves under the ordinary rule, you have policy areas within the same devolved areas which are subject to the provisions in the Bill without the need to obtain the consent of the devolved Governments.

The point I am really trying to make, as briefly as I can, is that there is here a recipe for confusion and mismanagement which would be in nobody’s best interests, and which we should, if possible, try to avoid. The remarks I have been making are directed largely to the Clause 7 situation, about which the Minister may wish to say something more, but they apply also to Clause 8, without elaborating further on the point I drew out of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act and paragraph 7. My point is therefore common to these two clauses, and seeks to try to avoid the risk of confusion and mismanagement, which at present is avoided by the common understanding in the memoranda, which works so well.

I hope that the Minister might be willing to accept these amendments. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is seeking to intervene. So that we can get into discussion, I beg to move.

Amendment 103 (to Amendment 102)

Moved by

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, think that it would be possible to deal with his point by amending the memorandum of understanding so that it meets a new situation?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I can see the force of that, but I do not know whether that option is available in the present climate. As regards reassuring the parties in Cardiff and Edinburgh, something in the Bill is looked for. Again, it is a matter of trying to find a way to soften the atmosphere, which is highly unfortunate at the moment. I deliberately have not discussed Clause 11, because that is quite a different debate. However, the more we can do to clear the air by getting these points out of the way before we get into Clause 11, the better, and that is the basis on which I have moved this amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, late at night on 21 July 1998, I was sitting where the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, is sitting at the moment, when Lord Sewel responded to an amendment moved by Lord Mackay of Drumadoon to this effect during the passage of the Scotland Act:

“This Act does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland, which may not be amended or repealed by the Scottish parliament”.


In resisting that amendment, Lord Sewel said:

“Clause 27 makes it clear that the devolution of legislative competence to the Scottish parliament does not affect the ability of Westminster to legislate for Scotland even in relation to devolved matters. Indeed, as paragraph 4.4 of the White Paper explained, we envisage that there could be instances where it would be more convenient for legislation on devolved matters to be passed by the United Kingdom Parliament. However, as happened in Northern Ireland earlier in the century, we would expect a convention to be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish parliament.


If problems do arise the solution is for the Scottish executive and the United Kingdom Government to resolve the matter through political dialogue. That is what differences between mature parliaments and executives will be concerned with. That is what happens in other political systems. I cannot believe that it is beyond our wit to develop such a convention”.—[Official Report, 21/9/98; cols. 790-91.]


So the use of the word “normally” was off the cuff, and I imagine that Lord Sewel would be as surprised as I am to find that it has become subject to such intense examination in subsequent years.

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Amendment 103 (to Amendment 102) withdrawn.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, since that amendment has been withdrawn I am now in a position to withdraw Amendment 102 but I wish to make a few remarks. First, I must thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this rather briefer debate, and particularly the Minister for his helpful response to it.

I have to apologise to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, for my lapse of memory as to the nature of the Government at the beginning of devolution. He was of course absolutely right on that. I reject the criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that I am being naïve. I believe that my amendment had cross-party support in Edinburgh and, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, it is really all about a question of trust.

If I understood the Minister correctly, we are really in the same position on Clause 7 as we were on the previous group. In effect, he will say that the Clause 7 problem is going to be exhausted. There is therefore nothing to be lost by putting in the same thing that he is prepared to put in about the Parliament; he might as well put in something about the Ministers, too. There is a serious issue with Clause 8, which would benefit from further discussion, but perhaps that is for another day. On the basis that we can still talk about it, the proper thing for me to do is to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 102 withdrawn.