European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wigley Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

I suggest that the noble Lord reads the amendment.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I am glad to support Amendment 50, to which I have added my name, which was moved so effectively by the noble Lord, Lord Newby. I will add a few comments of my own to explain why it is essential that a provision along these lines is incorporated into the Bill we send back for further consideration to the elected Chamber.

I make it clear that I have a great dislike of referenda as a tool for sanctioning complex legislation. A referendum may be all right for approving a simple, transparent, binary issue which cuts across traditional party divides, such as opening the pubs on Sundays in Wales, as was mentioned in Committee. The more complex the issue, the more inappropriate a referendum is. However, the genie is already out of the bottle. There is a valid question as to whether a decision taken by referendum can—or perhaps I should say should—be overturned by a vote by Members of Parliament or by a general election, and certainly not by Members of an unelected House. None the less, those MPs who at last year’s election gave their constituents a pledge that they would do everything in their power to ensure that the UK remained in the European Union are duty-bound to redeem that pledge by the way they vote, as are MPs who committed in the opposite direction.

By this amendment we would facilitate MPs having a choice at their disposal when the Bill goes back to them—and in fact, they would have two choices. The first is the fundamental one: that MPs can return to the question of whether the Bill should be amended by them to provide a referendum in circumstances where they deem that appropriate. If we reject this amendment tonight, we would in effect prevent MPs giving further thought to that issue. When circumstances change, sensible MPs may want to change their minds. However, unless we give them the hook on which to latch any initiatives relating to a referendum, we essentially lock out the question of a referendum in any circumstances whatever.

The second area of choice we would facilitate by this amendment relates to the circumstances in which a referendum may be required. I believe that if the Government were able to negotiate a deal which enabled the UK, while leaving the EU, to continue to have a customs union relationship with the EU, and which enabled our industry and agriculture to participate in the single market, as outlined in the Welsh White Paper put forward by the Welsh Government and opposition parties last year, that should be endorsed by MPs without a further referendum. Not least, such an option would resolve both the Ireland and Gibraltar issues, which would be as good a compromise as we are likely to achieve. If, however, the Government fail to reach a satisfactory agreement which protects the interests of exporters and those who depend on the availability of EU workers to meet their needs, and if they secure no agreement at all and we face the utter disaster of a cliff edge prospect, MPs must be allowed to revert the issue back to the people. If voters then endorse a no-deal exit from the EU, with all that that means, so be it.

Some noble Lords may well argue that the decision at that stage should be taken by MPs and that they, if they are so minded, should have the option of overturning the referendum outcome. There are, of course, two basic reasons why this may not be possible. The first is that the Government have repeatedly—and again today—stated that the only option other than the negotiated settlement will be to quit the EU without agreement; essentially, on world trade terms. The Government continually refuse to give MPs or this Chamber the option of being able to reject a hard Brexit. In these circumstances, I believe that MPs should be allowed the option of considering a confirmatory referendum as one outcome. This amendment gives them that option. It allows them the maximum flexibility: it does not instruct them to hold a confirmatory referendum but it allows MPs to go down that path, if circumstances so dictate.

It is for these reasons that I implore colleagues, even if they share my dislike for referenda, to pass this amendment tonight and, by so doing, to enable MPs when this Bill returns to them shortly to keep the referendum option open and, in the fullness of time, to use it if, in their judgment, that is the only way to ratify or reject a worst-case scenario of leaving the EU without agreement. I commend the amendment to the House.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I have put my name to this amendment. Although I have always maintained that the people ought to have the opportunity of a referendum on the terms of our leaving the European Union, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley said, this amendment does not mandate such a referendum. It gives Parliament the option of a referendum if, and only if, Parliament believes that the terms secured by the Government would be more damaging to our country than staying in the EU.

I supported the amendment that the House has just passed. Of course Parliament should be allowed a wider choice than the choice which, as the Minister admitted, the Government intend, and of course we must hope that the Government secure a good agreement. But Parliament should not be limited to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, described as a Hobson’s choice between a bad agreement and no agreement at all. For that reason, I will also support Amendment 62 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Cormack, Lord Reid, Lord Deben and Lord Balfe.

Although no one relishes the idea of a further referendum—I certainly do not—I believe that Amendment 50 is the logical consequence of the one that the House has just passed, which says that, if Parliament withholds approval of the withdrawal agreement, the Government must follow any direction approved by the House of Commons and considered by the House of Lords. I have considerable sympathy with the arguments advanced by the noble Lords, Lord Howard and Lord Lamont, against Parliament giving instructions to the Government. However, I believe that there will, in effect, be no choice for anybody about the instructions that would have to be given. About this, we have to be realistic. Whatever agreement is reached will be the result of long and painful negotiations. We cannot realistically expect the EU to be willing to reopen the negotiations and give us better terms at the behest of the UK Parliament—that is simply not a possible prospect.

It is in this respect that Amendment 50 goes further than Amendment 49. It recognises, in keeping with my view, that the only alternative to an unacceptable agreement is no agreement at all. That is not acceptable. The only other option is to withdraw our notice under Article 50. We must be honest that that is what a rejection of the agreement would entail. At the same time—

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Moved by

[Lord Wigley]

57: After Clause 9, insert the following new Clause—
“Failure to approve or agree to terms of withdrawal
It is an objective of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that—(a) in the event of Parliament not approving the terms of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal, or(b) in the event of there being no agreement with the EU,notification of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union be revoked.”

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, the first objective of the proposed new clause is to test whether the Article 50 notice is revocable. If so, its second objective is to suggest that in certain circumstances the Government might avail themselves of that option. Clearly, that could be an issue if we find ourselves with a no deal Brexit or a breakdown in negotiations at the very last moment. We touched on aspects of this in an earlier debate.

There have been no rulings on the revocability of Article 50. It is widely assumed that the interpretation of the treaty could ultimately be a matter for the Court of Justice of the European Union, although I noted the qualifications outlined earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, in that context. The parties to the Gina Miller case assumed that notice of withdrawal is irrevocable. However, a preponderance of academic opinion maintains that it is revocable. One attempt to refer to the CJEU for a ruling was dropped—the Dublin case—on the basis of costs, as I understand it. Another—the Edinburgh case—is in the process of being appealed.

There is considerable opinion that an Article 50 notice could be revoked. Professor Closa has raised a number of formal and substantive objections to the assumption of Article 50’s irrevocability; the most compelling one draws on a comparative assessment of international law and practice under which a withdrawing state is bestowed a cooling-off period, allowing it to change its decision. Furthermore, Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, has asserted in his political capacity that on conclusion of the Article 50 negotiation process, the status quo could be maintained, meaning that if the UK was not happy with the agreed terms of Brexit, it could opt to continue to be a member of the EU.

The interpretation of Article 50, if one were needed, would be a matter of EU, not UK, law. The EU treaty is silent on the matter of revocability, but under Article 267 of the TFEU, there could be a role for the CJEU in determining whether an Article 50(2) notice can be withdrawn if a member state that has served notice of an intention to withdraw changes its mind. There is a general principle of international law, set out in Article 68 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that a notification of intention to withdraw from a treaty,

“may be revoked at any time before it takes effect”.

This provision does not override any specific arrangements in a treaty, but are questions about the decision to trigger Article 50 under national constitutional arrangements relevant to the CJEU? If a court of last instance has some uncertainty as to the correct interpretation of EU law, it must refer a question on the interpretation of EU law or the EU treaties to the CJEU, but not, I stress, if the national court decides that something is clear “beyond reasonable doubt”. This is known as the “acte clair doctrine” and has been established in the case law of the CJEU. The courts have not ruled on revocability. I therefore contend that the amendment is both valid and necessary and I beg to move.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, for the reasons I have given before, the amendment restricts what we did on Amendment 49 so I have some queries about its wording. However, on the question of revocability, if we came to a point in Parliament where we were looking at the next steps, should the deal not be accepted, it would be important for Parliament to know as far as the Government do the advice on this.

There are examples of legal advice given to the Government being disclosed to Parliament where it has been relevant to an Act before it. Clearly, the Government will have got legal advice on the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley; can the Minister indicate whether that could be shared with Parliament?

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[Lord Callanan]

I am not in a position to share confidential government legal advice on this matter.

[Lord Wigley]

Well, no doubt the House has taken good note of that comment and at some time in the future perhaps that information will become available. I am struck by the Minister’s supreme confidence that this course will be followed to an inevitable conclusion, as I am sure many noble Lords are.

As we heard in earlier debates, that may not be the inevitable conclusion. It may well be that the House of Commons in its wisdom not only rejects the deal that the Government have negotiated but in the process rejects the Government themselves. At that point, whether by a general election or some other process, the question may well arise as to the irrevocability of Article 50. Noble Lords have a right to know the advice that has been given because it would be very pertinent indeed in those circumstances.

However, having said that, I believe the question may well be tested in the courts and therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 57 withdrawn.