European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

I would love to, but the truth is that the Government do not have the foggiest idea when anything is going to happen. They have suggested that something might be available in October 2018—perhaps it will, but perhaps it will not. This reminds me of the hymn we used to sing:

“God is working his purpose out, as year succeeds to year”

The Government are trying to work out what their purpose is, day by day, hour by hour. They have no idea at the moment, which is why we have to make sure we get the process right before we engage in it; otherwise there is a danger that we will be railroaded without making proper, good decisions.

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman said earlier that he was focused on getting the best possible process. Should we not be focused on getting the best possible deal in our negotiations? We know the EU does not want us to leave, so if he puts a process in place where the EU can simply knock a deal back to this Parliament, does that not give the EU the incentive to give us the worst possible deal, on the basis that we are more likely to reject it? We will simply have endless negotiations.

[Chris Bryant]

That is where we disagree. I believe that we will get the best possible deal only if we have the best possible process; the two go hand in hand. Indeed, if the Government introduced a Bill to implement an agreement and they started to lose votes on individual elements, they would probably then go back to Brussels and say, “You know what? I cannot get this through Parliament, so you’re going to have to give me a better deal.” At that point, I think that our colleagues and friends in other countries in Europe would improve the deal. I believe we would end up with a better deal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hywel Williams (Arfon) (PC)]

I rise to speak to amendment 355, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friends and sets out our position that an affirmative vote by devolved bodies prior to enactment is required.

If the process of Brexit could be summed up in one word, it would be “control”. For me, taking back control also means bringing the exercise of powers as close as possible to the people. The final deal will be subject to ratification by all EU member states, the EU Parliament and sub-state parliaments, variously numbered at 33, 37 or 38—take your pick. By the same token, I believe that the constituent parts of the UK should have the same final say as our counterparts in the EU. The final deal with the EU should be approved in statute passed by both the Westminster Parliament and the devolved Administrations, hence amendment 355.

We have repeated our arguments many times for remaining in the European single market and customs union. Wales’s goods-based, export-led economy relies on its close links with the EU single market, with 67% of all Welsh exports going to the EU and the single market sustaining 200,000 jobs. We already know that the stakes are high for Wales, so Wales must have a stake and a say in the final deal. I will not revisit the arguments I have made during previous debates on the Bill about the constitutional intricacies of the Sewel convention, but I wish to say to my Labour friends that not giving the devolved Governments a stake in the final deal risks subjecting our nation to policies, and indeed an ideology, that have so far caused our country grievous harm.

To conclude these brief remarks, the whole argument boils down to control. Following the referendum, the principle of returning control is not at issue. What is at issue is where that control lies. The minority Government party asserts that finally control rests here and here alone, but if the UK is a shared enterprise, based on mutual respect between Westminster and the devolved Governments, that party should also accept my amendment 355, which, to adapt a phrase from the Father of the House, is the fundamental minimum for a devolved parliamentary democracy.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I have listened carefully to the many esoteric legal arguments that have been advanced this evening. I am afraid that my comments will be far more prosaic and practical. I was on the remain side of the referendum debate, but, like most of my colleagues, I am now focusing on trying to secure the best possible deal, and that deal must centre on what a meaningful vote would be.

What does “a meaningful vote” mean? If it means “deal or no deal”, I think that that is a recipe for securing the best possible deal, but if it means “deal or no deal, or go back to the negotiating table”, perhaps indefinitely and with no time limit, I think that that is counterproductive. It would be detrimental, and would undermine our negotiating position. I am not suggesting for a second that that is the desire of those who promote a meaningful vote of that kind, but I think that that would be the effect.

Rather than looking only at the legal context, we need also to look at the political, economic and financial contexts. Of course the negotiations were always going to be difficult after 44 years of integration with the European Union, but they will also be difficult because of the European Union’s position. The EU clearly does not want us to leave, which is understandable for some of the reasons that I have given, but also, primarily, it does not want others to leave, and that must be its priority during the negotiations. If this were a marriage of equals and therefore a divorce of equals, that meaningful vote with those three different options would be fine, but that is not where we are. Of course, the EU also recognises that 75% of Members of Parliament were on the remain side of the argument.

We have to look at the EU’s perspective as well as that of the UK, which is why I think that the Prime Minister was not only right to offer a fair deal in her Florence speech, but right to say that we would not be afraid to walk away with no deal. That gives the EU one chance to get this right, whereas a meaningful vote-plus would give the EU many, many chances to get this right—to give the worst possible deal to get it right. Its incentive would be to put the worst deal on the table initially, knowing that Parliament would reject it and keep going back to the table. That cannot be the right negotiating position.

None of us wants to leave on the basis of no deal. WTO rules would clearly not be in the country’s interests, and it would not be in my own interests outside Parliament either. Nevertheless, I do not want to be locked into an organisation that simply will not let us leave other than on disadvantageous terms.

[Dominic Raab]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Let me say to him that—reflecting the mood of the Committee, having taken advice, and, in particular, having listened very carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin)—the Government are willing to return on Report with an amendment on the face of the Bill clarifying the undertaking and assurance that I gave in my speech that statutory instruments under clause 9 will not come into force until we have had a meaningful vote in Parliament.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I hope that the Minister’s intervention will satisfy some of my colleagues.

Let me end by saying that I will be supporting the Government this evening. In my view, it is time for us to grit our teeth and simply get on with it.

[Mary Creagh (Wakefield) (Lab)]

I rise to speak about my amendments 293, 294 and 295, which deal with the issue of who decides exit day, but rather than making the speech that I originally prepared, I will keep my remarks brief and broad.

The Prime Minister’s decision to set the exit date and to write it into law is another panic move, and it puts her into a self-tying straitjacket. It is a sop to the hard Brexiteers, and it creates a rod for the negotiators’ backs. It weakens, rather than strengthens, the UK’s position in the crucial nine months that are left for us to negotiate a good deal. Eighteen months after the referendum, we have seen the bluff and bluster on the withdrawal agreement. The Foreign Secretary has gone from telling our European partners to go whistle to being little Tommy Tucker singing for his supper to the tune of £40 billion. We have seen a tug of war take place on EU citizens’ rights, and a deal on no hard border with Ireland taking place in frantic late-night phone calls—a deal that the Brexit Secretary later undermined by calling it a mere “statement of intent”, which has caused all sorts of problems.