Lord Davies of Stamford
Main Page: Lord Davies of Stamford (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Davies of Stamford's debates with the Scotland Office
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I fear I must intervene at this point, having been restrained a little earlier. I did have some amendments down which I thought were rather germane to the transition period potentially, on which noble Lords could take different views, but in the interest of making progress I thought that those issues could be more intelligently addressed once we knew a bit more about the progress of negotiations.
I must point out that, prior to that, four groups of amendments had occupied your Lordships’ House for five and three-quarter hours. At that average rate of progress and with 85 groups still to consider on the Marshalled List, many of which have been tabled by noble Lords who are concerned about leaving the European Union, we will need 13 more days in Committee, sitting for nine hours until midnight every day, with no dinner break and without considering any other business. With all respect, I do not consider that that is a good way to make progress or that it is sufficient progress to make. I think that a number of your Lordships will probably agree privately with those reflections.
We have a 19-clause Bill here, to which already your Lordships’ have tabled 67 new clauses. Perhaps some of these statistics might be noted outside. The amendment to which I speak is such a new clause.
I feel that, with all respect—
The noble Lord has spoken a great deal in the past few days; I would like to continue my remarks, if I may.
The important issue that is raised here is a perfectly good issue on which to have a debate in the Moses Room or on an Unstarred Question. These are matters of great importance. I strongly disagree with the noble Baroness who said that we had not made progress in this country: we have made a great deal of progress in this country. The performance of this country on gender equality, work/life balance and carers has been transformed in my lifetime. It needs to go further, but I cannot accept—
I did not make that suggestion, and the record will show it. I was coming to make some suggestions about how we could address this as a House. We have had some outstanding debates in this House from committees of your Lordships’ House on broader policy questions that arise from this difficult exit process. This is an extremely important issue, as I acknowledged at the outset, which deserves to be considered and continually considered in your Lordships’ House. I am merely saying, with great respect, that perhaps the usual channels should give some consideration to ways in which some of the issues that have been raised on this quite narrow Bill could be discussed—but, since I have been invited to explain why, it is nothing to do with the matters concerned.
By the way, the noble Lord cannot argue that because progress has been made by one judicial process it would not have been made by other processes. After all, huge progress has been made in the United States of America, which does not accept the judicial authority of Luxembourg.
This worthy amendment seeks to raise and bring before your Lordships’ House an important subject that your Lordships should consider and hold dear. However, the amendment is absurd in what it asks the Government to do—and that would be true if it was applied to any other field of public policy. So far in Committee we have had a series of general public policy debates. We have had several today which have been cloned, as it were, on to the Bill. The amendment wants Ministers to be required by law to watch only EU law as it develops and give regular reports to your Lordships’ House whenever a proposal comes forward on what should happen. A new principle is being grafted on to the law for this one issue.
I could reverse the question: why for this worthy policy only? Will it be submitted in the rest of Committee as we proceed on different aspects of public policy on all these new clauses that we should have a process whereby Ministers are required to watch and report on this and that after we have left the European Union? That is not very sensible. Our Ministers and Government should watch the legislation brought forward in every advanced country of the world, not only among our European partners, but not have this specific process clogging up the statute book.
The remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown—I am sorry, I can never remember his full title; I know it has got something to do with living in a leafy place with a wood nearby—on the previous group were absolutely correct. He made the point that we had discussed the Charter of Fundamental Rights before.
So, with the greatest respect, I oppose this amendment for the reasons I have given. It is not a sensible process on any aspect of law to ask any future Government to specifically watch the development of debates on future policy within the European Union and bring reports to your Lordships’ House. That is simply not practical legislation.
I have the highest esteem for the noble Baroness, as she knows. I recognise that she is passionately committed to these issues, as is the noble Baroness, Lady Burt. They are trying to bring issues they care about before the House, but they do not have to do so on this Bill—and certainly not in the context of an amendment that will not work in practical terms.
We have been sent a Bill by the other place that is to provide for withdrawal from the European Union—not to provide a basis for a series of lengthy Second Reading-like debates on different aspects of public policy. That is the way we are drifting. It is why we took five and three-quarter hours to debate the first four groups and why, if we continued at that rate, we would have another 13 days to get through. The amendment is not practical and will not work. It raises an important issue, but we should move on. I will give way to the noble Lord now.
I am grateful to the noble Lord. He has been implying—rather more than implying—that noble Lords in this debate have been wasting time; that they have not been getting to the bottom of the subject or have been talking about irrelevancies. Is that what the noble Lord means to say—in other words, that we have not been doing a good job on this Bill? It seems to me that we have fairly elucidated the quite complex details in this proposed legislation so far. It is an enormously important matter and we can scarcely be accused of spending too much time on it. Our debates are being followed carefully by the country as a whole—and rightly so. If the noble Lord has any evidence of someone who has been filibustering or wasting time, I hope that he will bring it forward.
My Lords, I could well be tempted and I suppose that it depends on how quickly you can see paint dry. I leave it to people outside your Lordships’ House to judge the progress that we have made in the first four days, despite some of the undertakings and understandings of the Opposition Front Bench. Perhaps I may say that I greatly value and respect the Bench whose behaviour has been absolutely admirable and exemplary. I do not think that we have made fast enough progress, which is not justified. There are important issues to raise and I have simply suggested that these are some things that, as with the reports of your Lordships’ committees, could be discussed in other forums—but surely not during consideration of this little 19-clause Bill with a rather narrowly defined purpose and given all the other legislation that we have coming forward.
I oppose this amendment. It suggests a new mechanism for the Government in relation to our future relations with the EU which is unnecessary. I look forward to seeing the progress that the noble Baroness wishes to see being made.
My Lords, it is not easy to generate a great deal of excitement at this time of night about an item of jurisprudence, but I rise to speak about the Francovich principle, which is extremely important both as a general principle—in fact, I do not think that there is any more important principle in our legal system—and as an instrument for driving ever-better standards of governance and of output by the public sector. Let me explain this briefly.
The Francovich case, as I think noble Lords will know, and certainly all noble and learned Lords will know very well, is a piece of jurisprudence dating originally from 1991 that has been with us for 25 years. It has become very much part of the scene, and I think that without exaggeration I can say that it is part of the political and legal culture that we have created in the European Union over that time. It has been extended by jurisprudence so that it covers states, public authorities and agencies as well as local government, and more recently it has also been extended to cover the private sector. What the principle says is that where an individual, a corporate body or a state body has been in breach of union law and corporate or private individuals have suffered thereby, they have the remedy that the courts concerned are able to impose damages proportionate to the losses incurred by those who have suffered as a result of the bad governance concerned.
When I say that it is a very important principle and a very important pragmatic instrument, let me explain that. Surely the very important principle here is that the state must be subject to the law. If I go out and break the law, I can be arrested, charged and eventually fined, or even sent to prison in certain cases—and I can certainly be sued for civil damages for negligence, breach of the law et cetera. If, however, state bodies are immune from the law, the relationship between the citizen and the state is very different from the one we like to think exists in a constitutional democracy. That principle is very important and it will cease to be enshrined in law if we do not amend the Bill as it currently stands.
The valuable, pragmatic instrument to which I referred is simply that the existence of the Francovich judgment, which—as the Library told me—has been cited by over 300 cases since and has played a major part in many decisions. If I had more time I would digress on the bad planning decisions that have been reversed and the beaches and rivers that have been cleaned up as a result of the working of this principle. The principle drives better government the whole time.
I dare say that the Government, in their contribution to the debate, will say, “It doesn’t matter because when we leave the Union we can fall back on judicial review”. Judicial review is a creation, of course, not of European jurisprudence but our own jurisprudence; it is a very valuable principle and a valuable achievement over the past 50 years. In my view, as I have already argued, it is not quite as important or valuable as the Francovich principle, but nevertheless it is a splendid thing. There is a big difference between judicial review and Francovich, because under judicial review, you cannot get any damages. You can spend £3 million or £5 million—I have no doubt that noble and learned Lords will tell me any amount of money you want—by running the case, but you will not get the damages that you would get under the Francovich case. All of us who have been involved in government know that there is nothing more terrifying for any Minister than the prospect of being exposed as responsible for the loss of money in their department. Indeed, the political life expectancy of any Minister who finds himself in that position is frankly a matter of hours rather than days. So the risk of having damages awarded against one is a very real threat to anybody in a position of responsibility—chief executive of the local council, chief executive of an agency, a Minister or whoever—and it makes everybody stop to think extremely carefully. That is what we are talking about in the amendment.
Going through the Bill, all of us face a great difficulty. We have a choice to make and I do not think that any one of us is completely clear on how we should make it. Hopefully, we will have taken a decision by the time the Bill emerges from Report, but it may take a little while yet. The choice is this: do we believe the Bill or the Government? If we believe the Bill, all these rights and remedies and protections are disappearing. That is what the wording of the Bill before us says—that Francovich has been abolished—quite unambiguously and clearly. In other parts of the Bill, as we have seen today and on other occasions in Committee, it is the same story. We were talking earlier about family rights and labour rights and so forth, and it looks as though some of those are not being protected—even animal rights are not being carried forward on the same terms, with the wording being changed and softened and so on. There are subtle ways in which rights and protections are being withdrawn. That is what you get from reading the Bill.
What is more, the Government continually tell us that all the Bill does is make sure that there is no legal uncertainty at the time of Brexit and that we will simply carry forward retained law into British law. In fact, there is an agenda in the Bill that is quite blatant to anybody who reads it. It is not a hidden agenda; it is quite obvious. It is a kind of power grab by the Executive at the expense of the citizen. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights is going, which is clearly a loss to the citizen. Again, the Executive cannot have the charter prayed in aid against them.
The most concerning aspect is of course the Henry VIII clauses that we have not yet come to, which constitute an extraordinary power grab by the Executive at the expense of Parliament. We have it here again with the Francovich issue. Again, it is a power grab by the Executive, who want to abolish this because it is a trial and a problem for them and the state. They have to perform or else they have to pay up and get humiliated. That is what we see.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, dealt with that point. In practice, damages are not usually available under judicial review. The general view of the public is that there is a very small chance of getting damages that way. That is the difference between that and Francovich, and it is very important.
With respect, it is not. I have to say to the noble Lord that Francovich damages are a rare remedy, as I have already indicated. Damages in the context of judicial review are not so uncommon as the noble Lord was suggesting. They are available as a remedy, albeit in limited circumstances.
In response to the noble Lord’s observations, we are dealing in the context of Francovich with the court having to find that there has been a serious failure with regard to an EU obligation, and I suggest that that is not very far from the test of misfeasance in the context of judicial review.
My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who has taken part in this interesting debate. I think that anybody listening in from outside will be impressed that we are working hard on a very serious matter at quarter to one in the morning.
Yes, not drinking cocoa, indeed—absolutely right.
First of all, I must say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has misunderstood a number of things. One is that I think he has got it wrong on the issue of damages. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is representative in what he said of the great majority of legal opinion on this subject and of the experience that any of us have had—via our constituents or otherwise—in this area of the law.
The second thing is that I think the noble and learned Lord has misunderstood that the major part of the importance of the Francovich system or jurisprudence is that it is a potential deterrent to those who might be inclined to misgovern us. People know that they are subject to this particular sanction if they do, and that has enormous effect. The fact that the power is used 25 times is not negligible—28 times I think it is in this country and 300 and something times over the Union as a whole. That does not mean to say that it is without effect, or that its effect is limited to those occasions. It would be very naive to say that; its effect is created by the presence of that particular sanction and means of redress for those who have been wronged in this way.
I also do not think that the noble and learned Lord is right in saying that the whole matter of Francovich is not very important because it applies only when there are serious issues. The principle of—to put it in language that I think he will understand—de minimis non curat lex—applies to everything really, in the Roman law tradition anyway. So it is not at all surprising that it applies in this case.
I want to leave the Committee with complete clarity about this, and there are three separate issues here. One is what we do about people who have a claim, or think they have a claim, under the Francovich principle—and I continue to call it that—and it is overtaken by events because they have not litigated before Brexit or they are half way through or they have not expressed their claim or put it in at all. What happens about them? That is important, because it may only be three or four people, and we should always be concerned about justice for anybody. I do not in any way denigrate people who have taken up a lot of time to talk about their particular subject; it is a perfectly respectable concern to have. But my concern is not really with that—mine is to my mind much more significant. Going forward, do we have the Francovich principle or something like it in our own legal system, both to enshrine that principle that the state is subject to the law like everybody else, which as I say is so important, and to make sure that we have that instrument of good government, which has a real deterrent effect on the behaviour of central and local government, public corporations and, indeed, the private sector? That is very important to me.
I disagree very strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, when he says that the Francovich system does not make any sense when we have left the European Union, because there will not be such a thing as European law here. He is quite wrong about that; there will be retained law for decades, no doubt, until it is changed by statute—if it is changed by statute over that time. It is called retained law; it is exactly the same law. The difference may be that, whereas you could litigate under it before Brexit, after Brexit you will not be able to litigate under it at all, which seems completely unreasonable. That means the loss of remedies and rights that we currently have in respect of exactly the same laws, because they are exactly the same provisions with exactly the same wording having exactly the same effect, whether they are today on 5 March, or on 1 April next year after we have left. That is what the whole principle of retained law is, as I understand it—and I think that the noble and learned Lord knows that.
It is my concern in this amendment to make sure that, when the citizens of this country have current rights and protections, they should enjoy all those after Brexit. I thought that the Government were in favour of that principle. We heard earlier from another Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Duncan, that he believes that that is the case and favours that principle—and I think that that principle is enormously important.
Then there is the third issue, which I raised—and it is probably not the last time that I shall raise it in this House. The experience of Francovich is such that I believe that it should be carried forward into the whole corpus of law in this country, Scots law and English law. We continue to have these rights and these remedies. I believe their jurisprudence in this case to be a considerable advance of civilisation in the European Union over the last 25 years; there have been many such advances and, if we are going to carry forward the assets that we take over rather than throwing them away on Brexit, we should make sure that we carry forward this one. That is not a matter for this Bill; what is a matter for this Bill is the second point that I make, which is to make sure that in respect of retained law the rights that currently exist will be carried through and not abolished.
I hope that the Government will think about that between now and Report. I would certainly welcome the opportunity to discuss the matter with them before we decide how we can take this matter further. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.