European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we are dealing here with truly technical amendments to ensure that the provisions of the Bill deliver the intended policy. They achieve two things. The first is to clarify how the requirement for regulations made by devolved Ministers under Schedule 2 to be within devolved competence interacts with the principle of severance applied by the courts.

The normal practice would be that when a Minister makes regulations that include, for instance, 10 different provisions, should one of those provisions be outwith the scope of the power, the courts would not strike down the regulations as a whole, they would simply sever the offending provision and allow the remaining nine provisions to stand as law. Some concerns were raised that the requirements in the Bill might imply that this standard practice should not occur. The amendments therefore make it clear that when a provision is outside devolved competence, only that provision would be ultra vires and not the whole instrument in which the provision is included.

The second purpose of the amendments is to allow for a devolved Minister and a UK Minister acting jointly to make provision that would not be in the competence of the devolved Minister acting alone. It has always been the Government’s intention that the Schedule 2 powers can be exercised jointly to allow us to work together in areas where we may need to make the same or related changes to retained EU law and so that, where appropriate, those changes can be subject to formal scrutiny and approval in both this Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature.

We believe it is right that, for instance, where a UK Minister and a Welsh Minister jointly make regulations in relation to a matter that concerns the England/Wales border, those regulations can include both the provision for England and the provision for Wales, even though it would not be within the Welsh Minister’s competence to make the provision in relation to England if they were acting alone.

We will also be bringing forward at Third Reading a number of further drafting changes to permit combinations of instruments beyond what is normally possible, reflecting the level of joint working that will be needed in relation to these powers. I will be speaking to the Government’s Clause 11 amendments shortly, when we reach the group beginning Amendment 89DA. I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that we have a number of further groups to get through on other parts of the devolution provisions before we reach that debate. The amendments provide what I hope to be welcome legal clarity. They reflect standard practice and the mechanisms for good, collaborative joint working between the Administrations. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation of these technical amendments. Can he say whether there is agreement among the devolved Administrations and the UK Government on these amendments?

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, at last we have reached this stage, although I find it a little off-putting that we are coming to consequential, technical matters before we look at the meaty issue; but that will come, as was said.

I would like to pay the respects of those on our Benches to the serious way in which the Government have contributed through the joint ministerial group to the success of the proposals, and thank them for bringing them to us now. I would also like to thank Mark Drakeford from the Welsh Government and Mike Russell from the Scottish Government for the part they played, even if the latter has thus far been unable formally to sign up to the inter-governmental process. As the Minister said, we are going to discuss Clause 11 and neither of us can wait for that. It is coming in more detail later this evening. However, we on these Benches recognise and appreciate the progress that has been made. We have come a long way since the Bill was published and it is against that backdrop that this and subsequent groups of amendments should be considered.

The Labour Party has always been the party of devolution. While we will be watching the Government’s treatment of the devolved Administrations very closely throughout the Brexit process—that is our job—we recognise the genuine progress that has been made and welcome the amendments in this group. They allow United Kingdom and devolved Ministers jointly to exercise powers in Schedule 2 in order to make provisions that could not be made by a devolved Minister acting alone. This clarifies the use of so-called composite instruments, as the Minister said, and we hope paves the way for collaborative working between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government.

Other amendments in the group improve the position regarding ultra vires provision within instruments made under Schedule 2. I believe that the devolved Administrations previously raised concerns with the Government as to whether the courts would permit those parts of an instrument that were within competence to remain law. We are glad that Ministers and officials have responded positively to the appeals from the devolved bodies and that the amendments provide greater clarity for all involved. The group amounts to just one piece in the jigsaw puzzle. I usually start my jigsaws with the edge pieces. This looks like putting a piece in the middle and working around it in due course. It is a piece that these Benches are happy to support.

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Tabled by

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

89: Schedule 2, page 17, line 35, at end insert—
“( ) No regulations may be made under this Part after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.”

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, since submitting this amendment, I note that Clause 7(8) covers the point and therefore I do not wish to move it.

A89 not moved.

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It would be a great help if the Minister could say, if he is able, that we are dealing with a one-off, special situation that lies outside the structure of those sections, and that for that reason he is taking the line that it is a type A and not a type C case. Perhaps he could give an assurance that if we are dealing with something that is precisely covered by Section 30 and the other sections I have mentioned, the system laid down by the Scotland Act 1998 will be adhered to. An assurance of that kind will, I hope, give some comfort to those on the other side of the discussion and reassure them that they are talking about a special situation, which need not in any way cast doubt on the future relationship between the devolved system and the Westminster Government when we come to other debates on how the systems that were set up by the 1998 Act might be modified. Against that background, which I hope has set the scene sufficiently, I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I will return to the points on the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, but first I endorse what has been said by everyone who has contributed to this debate so far—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—in expressing gratitude, if that is the right word, to those who have laboured hard to try to move forward and get an agreement on the kind of structure we need for when EU law is, as it were, repatriated. I think there is common ground that the original Clause 11 proposals were not fit for purpose; that has been said on many occasions, and I will not rehearse all the arguments for that now. It is to the credit of the Government that they recognise that and have sought to address it —unfortunately, some valuable time was lost, but nevertheless they have done that in a constructive way. Indeed, I am grateful to both Mark Drakeford of the Welsh Government and Mike Russell of the Scottish Government for their efforts. What has been brought before us represents a considerable advance with much better arrangements for dealing with retained EU law after exit day. It is regrettable that the Scottish Government did not feel able to sign up, notwithstanding the considerable advances that had been made. One or two people have speculated that, if one is not satisfied with what the Government are doing, there may be an argument for voting it down. I pointed out that if you did that, we would be left with Clause 11, which no one seems to think we should give any house room to any longer. However, the progress made is welcome.

I listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said when he moved his amendment. I have been trying to work through it, because something about it was not quite right. It may be just my approach. He quite rightly drew attention to the fact that the “type A” Order in Council procedure is deployed when changes are to be made in the competence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Ministers, and specifically where there is a change to Schedule 5, which defines what is reserved, and to the restrictions which are currently set out in Schedule 4. Where I possibly have a difficulty is that of course these are not the only two restrictions; the noble and learned Lord himself pointed out that EU law, and for that matter the European Convention on Human Rights, is another restriction, as indeed is territoriality. As he acknowledged, we are dealing with a situation that was never foreseen when the Scotland Act was being drafted and taken through both Houses back in 1998, and that is a situation where, potentially, the restriction on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament —namely, that it must abide by European Union law —will fly off, and we will be in what might be described as a sui generis situation. The question is whether the procedure which is for modification of Schedule 4 or 5 is appropriate for this one-off situation.

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[The Duke of Montrose (Con)]

My Lords, there is a provision in Section 29 of the Scotland Act that covers the thing that worries the noble and learned Lord. Section 29(2)(a) provides that it is outside the competence of the Scottish Government to apply,

“part of the law of a country or territory other than Scotland, or confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as regards Scotland”.

So this raises a great problem in the area he is talking about.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, if an Act of Parliament gives the Scottish Parliament power to say no and refuse its consent, what I am asking is whether that affects what might happen in other parts of the United Kingdom, so that you would not be able to get the common UK framework which people might otherwise think is necessary and desirable to be able to sustain a single market within these islands. At the moment, we have to some extent a form of competence at a different level—the European level—which is being brought back down to the United Kingdom. I ask these questions because it possibly means that there is a difference between the procedure which has been used if you wish to modify Schedule 5 or change Schedule 4 and one where we are returning the laws which hitherto have been subject to the European Union.

The amendments in my name, which I know are supported by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, are Amendment 89DAF in respect of Scotland, Amendment 89DAJ in respect of Wales and Amendment 89 DAK in respect of Northern Ireland. These amendments would, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, indicated, change the sunset—although it is not really a sunset in this respect—overall from seven years to five years, and they do that by changing the period during which the frameworks must be established from five years to three years. I did not seek to change the two-year period during which these orders have to be made, because that is consistent with other provisions in the Bill.

If my understanding of the situation is correct, if an order is not made that would identify the area for a framework and freeze, the power would automatically flow back to, let us say in this case, Edinburgh. Is it therefore to be expected that all these orders will be made, identifying the areas for freezing to establish common frameworks by the time we leave the European Union? Otherwise, it might appear that, within a period of days, weeks or months between our leaving the European Union and the order being made, there could be divergence between the different parts of the United Kingdom. After the order is made, I suggest that there should be a three-year period for the frameworks to be established rather than a five-year period.

I welcome the fact that time limits have been put in at all—that was a step forward, and the Government have obviously been listening on that. But I have not heard why it should be five years rather than three. That figure may have been plucked out of the air. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is not in his place, but he did have an amendment in Committee in which five was suggested. It may be that that commended itself to the Government because it came from the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. I would like to hear a rationale as to why five years is to be preferred to three. The noble and learned Lord said that they had agreement from the Welsh Government on this. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s views on whether the Welsh Government thought that a shorter period of time would be ideal but they were prepared to accept this.

No one disputes the amount of work to be done but we are potentially in a Parkinson’s law situation, where work expands to fill the time available for its completion. If we say five years, it could take up to five years; if we say three years, it would focus the mind and we could possibly do it in three. That is not least because we are dealing with dynamic issues, and if we are to freeze retained EU law in areas where there might be need to update the law—I assume that in these circumstances we would seek to do so by agreement—three years would allow progress to be made faster.

Also in this group is Amendment 90, which again provides a sunset. However, I think it is superseded by what we are debating and so I will not seek to press it. But it is important that the Government give us a rationale as to why they have chosen this period of time.

On a very specific point, Amendment 92AD—on page 19 of the Marshalled List—talks about the reporting that is to be made by Ministers to Parliament:

“After the end of each reporting period, a Minister of the Crown must lay before each House of Parliament a report which … (b) explains how principles … (i) agreed between Her Majesty’s Government and any of the appropriate authorities, and (ii) relating to implementing any arrangements which are to replace any relevant powers or retained EU law restrictions, have been taken into account”.

I rather suspect that these are the principles that were agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee back in October or November, which have certainly been discussed before. However, it is slightly odd to have reference to “principles” which, as far as I can see, will not actually appear in the Bill. Because we have debated this often enough, we perhaps know what the principles are, or at least know where they can be found, but to anyone coming to this fresh it would not necessarily indicate where these principles are. Will the Minister confirm that these are the principles that are being referred to—the ones agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee—and explain whether there is any reason that they should not be added as an annexe to the Bill?

In conclusion, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, quoted a letter from the First Minister, which was very measured in its terms—slightly more measured than her writings in last week’s Sunday Herald, in which she said that the Tories would “completely demolish” Scottish devolution. I immediately thought of the many debates we had during the passage of the Scotland Act 2016, in which the Conservative Government extended devolution to cover almost all of income tax and a substantial amount of social security. This could be a very cunning plan, if they assume that the Scottish Government will—I was going to say “screw it up”, but I am not sure whether that is parliamentary—act in such a way that it would end devolution, but I do not think that that was the plan. This Government have shown a very strong commitment—and I say this from the opposition Benches—through the number of things that they have devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Take one example from the 24:

“EU regulations on the classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (CLP); the placing on the market and use of biocidal products (e.g. rodenticides); the export and import of hazardous chemicals; the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH); and plant protection products (e.g. pesticides)”.


I cannot honestly believe that trying to establish a common framework on that somehow undermines devolution, given that the Government transferred, almost entirely, income tax to the Scottish Parliament. It is a degree of hype that does not serve the debate well.

I rather hope that, as we go forward, we can recognise that what we are trying to do is seek a position so that, when we are no longer part of the European Union, we can in many important areas where it is thought necessary—indeed, the Scottish Government have accepted that in some areas it is necessary—establish a common framework throughout the United Kingdom. There will be further arguments as to the content of these frameworks, but for the moment we need to identify what they are. I would welcome a response to the points that I have made.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, in addressing Amendment 89DA, I will, as did the Minister, cover the broader ground contained in the amendments in the group. Some of my misgivings with the new proposed settlement dealt with in this group will arise in later amendments, 91 and 92, which for some reason have not been coupled with these.

While I welcome the progress that was made in the joint discussions on resolving some of the difficulties between Westminster and the devolved Governments—a welcome that has been expressed by both Mike Russell of the Scottish Government and Mark Drakeford, Wales’ Brexit Minister—I am acutely aware that not all the difficulties were resolved, and I beg the indulgence of the House for a few minutes in setting these issues in their context. I realise that some of my points may seem to be Second Reading ones, but in these amendments—there are 21 in this group alone—we have matters before us which were not in the Bill at Second Reading. I noted in particular the Minister’s invitation in his speech for us to contribute positive ideas in this context.

The adjustments before us tonight are in the context of what many people in Cardiff and Edinburgh, across party lines, regarded as a power grab—to use the term that was used then—by Westminster, in taking unto themselves powers returning from Brussels, including powers in what had previously been regarded as devolved functions such as agriculture. The fact that the Labour Government in Cardiff held out so long before agreeing reflected that fear; as did the fact that members of all parties in the Assembly—including initially Tory and UKIP AMs—supported having a continuity Bill to withstand that perceived power grab. The recent debate in Edinburgh reflected similar cross-party support for its continuity Bill. Rather than just scream “power grab” and hurl abuse at those we see as the authors of our difficulties, I will try to put forward what I see as a considered case and implore, even at this late stage in the Bill’s passage, that noble Lords appreciate the complexity of these issues—some of which have already emerged tonight—and rise to the challenge of finding a positive way forward, if not in this Bill then in some parallel or future legislation.

There have been calls from all sides for greater mutual respect in this process—for a mutuality that is not reflected by one side having a veto but other partners being denied that facility. The difficulty, repeated time after time by those involved in the recent negotiations over several months, is that there seems to be a basic lack of trust between Westminster and the devolved regimes. That is not so much a personal lack of trust but rather a lack of trust in the respective institutions.

Part of the lack of trust felt in Wales arises, perhaps, from different social values and from historic experience. There has been a growing lack of trust in Wales during my lifetime, emanating from difficult issues such as the Tryweryn Valley flooding in the 1960s, the S4C debacle of 1980 and, more recently, the Barnett formula. Devolution was meant to help avoid at least some such difficulties, but power devolved is power retained—a truism of which we have become acutely aware in these recent experiences. The underlying issues, which recent difficulties in the context of Brexit have highlighted, are not going to go away. They will continue to plague us until a proper constitutional settlement is reached. I suggest that the sunset clauses define a timescale within which this has to be sorted out.

In the wake of Brexit, the sorts of issues that will arise, and which will strain our constitutional settlement, perhaps to breaking point, include for Wales state aid for threatened industries like steel, the establishment in place of the CAP of a viable sheep-meat regime, and an acceptance that procurement rules can be used to ensure maximum community benefit from public expenditure. Sheep meat is an excellent example of the different perspectives of Westminster and Cardiff. Westminster tends to see it in terms of consumer needs; the Assembly sees it as the cornerstone of our rural economy and of local communities and their attendant culture. Quite frankly, I do not begin to see such considerations being addressed, and if Westminster insists on having a veto over such policies as agriculture, it will be seen as a constraint on devolved ambitions. There has to be give and take or the whole edifice will crumble under the strain of its own self-inflicted tensions. We are in fact trying to constrain the needs of a quasi-federal system within the straitjacket of a unitary state, and it just will not work; four into one will not go.

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Of course, there may be a situation in which, after exit, regulations have not been made, in which case powers will then—

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It seems that we have an explanation. Were officials of the Scottish Government involved in that and, if in-depth work has been done, would the Minister help the House by publishing it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to say that such work would be published, because of course it has been on the basis of engagement between officials dealing with this. I do not believe that there is any official report to that effect; it is just a matter of the product of engagement between officials negotiating these matters. Therefore I cannot indicate that we will publish anything in that regard. That is to try to explain the position with regard to the sunset clauses in the regulations. I turn to the question—