European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJohn Redwood
Main Page: John Redwood (Conservative - Wokingham)Department Debates - View all John Redwood's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberYes, and there we are in agreement. It is inevitable and regrettable that we face this situation, but that is why simply to convert the charter, which, in any case, has lots in it that is unconvertible, and to say that it should maintain entrenched rights, seems to me, in the light of what we are debating in the context of Brexit, to be an impossibility. That is not something that commends itself to me.
Let me now move to a slightly narrower issue. We have to accept that, in the course of what we are doing, we are going through a complex period of transition. Forget about the transitional arrangements we may be negotiating with our EU partners—the truth is that we are creating a whole category of transitional law. By the concept of retained EU law, we are doing some very strange things indeed with our ordinary legal principles.
Clause 5(2) allows EU law to have priority over domestic law in certain circumstances. In fact, it allows for the possibility of UK law enacted prior to exit day being quashed for incompatibility with EU law that is retained on exit day. I simply make the point that, leaving aside our EU membership, which of course will have ceased, this is an utterly unique development in our legal system—it has never happened before. We are about to create a species of domestic or semi-domestic law—I would not quite describe it as feral law—which will have the unique quality of being able to override our own laws. Clause 6(3) will also allow CJEU judgments given before exit day to be binding, but not on our Supreme Court—a matter that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and I have been worrying about quite a lot in the course of the passage of this legislation.
So although the CJEU will rightly lose jurisdiction, it and EU law will keep a special status. However, that is intended to be only temporary, although how temporary is speculative, and I of course note clause 5(3), which says that this law can be modified and still retain this special status, as long as the modification, I assume, is not so dramatic or drastic that it is made explicit that it should lose it. That is different from replacement. That, I suspect, is because the Government know very well that this situation may continue for decades to come.
Yet, in the middle of that, the charter is removed. Leaving aside the other issues concerning the charter, which I have touched on, and which I do not want to go back over, that creates an unusual circumstance. EU law was always intended to be purposive, and one of the purposes is to give effect to the fundamental principles under which the EU is supposed to operate. Yet we are removing the benchmark under which this law is supposed to operate, because the charter will no longer be there, although, interestingly—I think this is an acknowledgment by the Government of the problem they have—they have then, in the next clauses, essentially allowed the charter and general principles of EU law to continue to be used for the purposes of interpretation.
It is very unclear how all this, in practice, is going to work out. That is why I tabled my two principal amendments. Amendment 8 would allow the retention of the charter. It provides an easy route to ensuring that this legal framework is retained, but for the reasons we have just been debating, there are serious issues surrounding it, which is why I think it is probably wrong to pursue it.
However, there is then the question in schedule 1 of what we do with general principles of EU law. What they are is totally undefined, but I assume—I have to assume—that if the Government are content to articulate the existence of general principles, they have done enough research to establish to their own satisfaction that general principles do exist—they are the result of court judgments interpreting the law and, indeed, the fundamental principles in the charter, but not the ones that are going to disappear on the day we leave.
Is not the important point about clause 5 that any future Act of this Parliament takes supremacy, so if there is a muddle or a problem, this Parliament can sort it out definitively? I should have thought that that would deal with the interests of all parties concerned.
My right hon. Friend almost makes my case for me. He is absolutely right that, in so far as we want to depart from anything, this House, once we have left the EU, can do what it likes, and as regards anything we enact thereafter, the supremacy of EU law is entirely removed. We can do exactly what we please, except, I am afraid, in so far as we may find ourselves still locked into trying to maintain comity with the EU when the penny drops about the economic consequences of not having it. However, I will refrain from straying too far into that area.
So the question is: is there some merit in keeping the right to bring a challenge using general principles of EU law? I would have thought that there is. I tried to work through in my mind the importance of this. First, we may have retained EU law that is deficient, defective or does not operate properly, or a court might be forced to conclude that it operates in a capricious or even unfair manner, or is disproportionate. At the moment, the only remedy for the court, unless it can bring in the Human Rights Act, will be to apply the law and somebody points out to a Minister that that law is working very badly.
Our rights always used to be guaranteed, and will be guaranteed once we have left, through a combination of common law and statute law. I do not understand what threat the hon. Gentleman has in mind regarding these rights, because if any threat emerged it would be struck down either by the Supreme Court or by Parliament.
I am puzzled by that point, because EU-retained law will effectively become statute law, and that will be carried forward by the application of the charter. It is not quite clear what the right hon. Gentleman is getting at.
The hon. Gentleman said that he did not understand the point I was making. Our rights will be guaranteed once we have left by our Supreme Court, and by common law or the application of our statute law. I cannot think of a right that he and I value that will be destroyed because we have not incorporated the charter. I think that they will be guaranteed by those ancient and tested methods.
We are talking about statute law, and about rights such as the one on which the right hon. Gentleman’s friend and colleague, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, relied. I think that that point is clear.
Returning to the comparison of the charter with the Human Rights Act, as well as the wider class of applicants for which it provides, it allows for stronger remedies. If any national court finds that any national law is incompatible with a directly effective provision of the charter, it must disapply contravening primary legislation or quash secondary legislation. We have exercised some of the arguments around that issue, but that is much stronger than a notification of incompatibility. We should be in no doubt that losing the charter means losing rights.
My right hon. and learned Friend’s intervention was not in quite the spirit in which we have conducted our proceedings so far, but I shall try to address his underlying concern, and I shall be happy to take another intervention from him shortly if he thinks that I have still not addressed it. He is a demanding customer, but I shall keep on trying.
I am going to make a bit of progress, but I will give way shortly.
Let me, again, be clear about what the Bill does. It takes a snapshot of substantive EU law, including the underlying fundamental rights and principles at the point of exit. It converts those into UK law, where they will sit alongside the Human Rights Act and other UK legislation on human rights. That is a crucial point. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield rather perceptively asked during debates on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008,
“Will the Lord Chancellor confirm that every country that is a member of the European Union is also a signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights? Indeed, I believe that every single one has incorporated it. In view of that, what is the purpose of the charter of fundamental rights?”—[Official Report, 5 February 2008; Vol. 471, c. 804.]
During the same debate, my right hon. and learned Friend made the point, far better than I can—and I say this with all due deference—that the risk of adopting the charter was that it would, at least potentially, run into conflict with domestic human rights law, thereby creating at least the potential for legal confusion. This is the point that I want to make to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe. If we incorporated or implemented the charter, we would in effect be triplicating human rights standards in UK law, opening up wide scope for uncertainty. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield was right about that then, and I think he is right about it now.
As we leave the European Union, it will make no sense to retain the institutional framework of membership. What we will do is retain, in the way that I have described very carefully, the substantive rights that were codified in the charter. If, when we publish the memorandum, the hon. and learned Lady, or any Member on either side of the House, thinks that there is a gaping gap, we will be able to address that.
Will the Minister confirm that the evolution of our rights through history shows that the best way in which they are created and defended is through the democratic instincts of the British people, and that they then trust this Parliament to make sure that those rights are fully entrenched? As the Minister has assured those rights, I really do not see what the problem is. What is the threat to those rights? We have a free Parliament representing a free people.
I suppose the theory is that a majoritarian dominance—a Government with a huge majority—would trample on rights and rattle legislation through the House of Commons, as the last Labour Government did with identity cards and proposals for 90 days’ detention without charge. We saw most of that off.