European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateWilliam Cash
Main Page: William Cash (Conservative - Stone)Department Debates - View all William Cash's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberNo, I will not give way. I want other people to be able to contribute to the debate.
The second reason why I feel disappointment at the Government’s stance is that they are misreading the other side with whom we are negotiating. A British assumption is always to allow give and take, but we now have the Barnier rule of all take and no give. I will in a moment comment on how we should respond to that. Anybody who is serious, as all of us in the Committee have been, about wishing to award equal status and citizenship to EU citizens in this country know that those negotiations could have been over in half an hour. It was never ever the intention but for the other side to tick that off and say it was very good. Millions of people could have been put at their ease about their lives—both Britons living in the European Union and European citizens, as they will become, living in Britain—and we should consider that very carefully in our negotiations from now on.
The third disappointment is that the Government have produced such a Bill. When we were campaigning to leave, I thought we would have a Bill with two, three or four clauses to get us out. I know that the Government have been beguiled by its first title—the great repeal Bill—with some group of clever people thinking it can be great only if it is large, rather than aiming to be effective. I do not believe that a Bill of this size, timetabled as it will be to deliver it for the Government, actually stands much chance of getting through the House of Lords. Hence, my emphasis on the rescue launch waiting in the form of my four new clauses, including this new clause, which I have had such pleasure in moving.
Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the House of Lords, which is of course unelected and which itself decided to pass the European Union Referendum Act 2015, really has no justification whatsoever for attempting to obstruct, delay or undermine this Bill?
A very important lesson needs to be learned by some of those in the House of Lords who think they can wreck the Bill and wear us down so that Brexit never takes place. There is a very important convention—the Salisbury convention—and there is a very important difference between a referendum and a party’s manifesto. The Salisbury convention allows us to give and take on the important parts of a manifesto—the parts to which Governments rightly feel committed, and which they wish to pursue in Parliament so that when they stand for re-election they can say they have done the job they promised to do.
This is a different ball game. As I tried to say at the beginning, it is difficult for us all to come to terms with the role we have as MPs and the role we have in a post-referendum debate. I think their lordships should know that if they try to wreck the Bill, many of us will push the nuclear button. Labour wants to see the House of Lords go—I am surprised there was not a cheer at that point—but their lordships will sound their own death knell. Not one of them is elected, and none of them has any standing whatsoever in preventing the Government from inviting the House of Commons to implement the referendum decision, as we are doing today.
I am extremely grateful to you, Mr Hoyle. I very much hope that my voice makes it through these remarks.
I rise to support clause 1 stand part and to speak to Government amendments 381, 382 and 383. It may help the House and members of the public if I say that the decisions on those amendments will be taken on days seven and eight.
Clause 1 reads:
“The European Communities Act 1972 is repealed on exit day.”
It is a simple clause, but it could scarcely be more significant. In repealing the European Communities Act 1972, the clause will be a historic step in delivering our exit from the European Union, in accordance with last year’s referendum. I hope that all people on all sides of this issue can agree that the repeal of the Act is a necessary step as we leave the European Union.
Does my hon. Friend recall that the official Opposition voted against the Bill on Second Reading and therefore the repeal of the 1972 Act? They still claim that this Bill is not fit for purpose and that it usurps parliamentary sovereignty, when in fact it does exactly the opposite.
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend and I look forward to seeing whether Opposition Members support clause 1 stand part.
If we were not to repeal the European Communities Act, we would still, from the perspective of EU law, exit the European Union at the end of the article 50 process, but there would be confusion and uncertainty about the law on our own statute book. For example, it would be unclear whether UK or EU law would take precedence if there was a conflict between them. The status of new EU law would also be unclear once the UK left the EU.
I intend first to set out briefly the effect of the European Communities Act on our legal system and the implications of its repeal. The UK is a “dualist” state, meaning that a treaty, even when ratified, does not alter our laws unless it is incorporated into domestic law by legislation. Parliament must pass legislation before the rights and obligations in a treaty have effect in our law. The European Communities Act gave EU law supremacy over UK law. Without it, EU law would not apply in the UK. The 1972 Act has two main provisions. Section 2(1) ensures rights and obligations in the EU treaties and regulations are directly applicable in the UK legal system. They apply directly without the need for Parliament to pass specific domestic implementing legislation. This bears repeating in the context of the clauses to follow.
In response, vicariously to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), may I point out that most decisions taken by the Council of Ministers are effectively made by consensus behind closed doors, with no record of who said what, how the decision was arrived at, or, unlike this House, with no record of any of the proceedings either?
I am surprised that such an ardent Brexiteer as the right hon. Gentleman does not understand what leaving the European Union involves. We do.
Until last Thursday, the debate on clause 1 looked fairly straightforward. The article 50 notification made our exit from the European Union in March 2019 a legal certainty, so, for the purposes of the Bill, exit day could be left in the hands of Parliament. But then the Government did something needless: they tabled amendments 381 and 382, putting a specified exit date—and, indeed, a specified exit time: 11 pm, or midnight Brussels time—into the Bill. Their consequential amendment 383 seems to contradict the other amendments in some regards, which underlines the chaotic way in which the Government have approached the Bill, but taken together, the intention of the three amendments is clear.
The rather mysterious explanation that the hon. Gentleman gave to my right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson) needs some elucidation. Would he be good enough to explain whether leaving the European Union means repealing the European Communities Act 1972, and why Labour voted against the Bill on Second Reading?
I would have thought that it would be as clear to the hon. Gentleman as it is to me that leaving the European Union does involve revoking the European Communities Act. I will go on to explain why we have concerns about the Government’s amendments and the different decisions within them.
Indeed. I wish to challenge my right hon. and learned Friend on his assertion that the manner in which the Council of Ministers has been operating has been adequately democratic and transparent. Can he please explain to us, from his own extensive experience, how it works and will he deny that, for the most part, it is done behind closed doors and that it is done by consensus, so nobody knows who decides what, how and when?
Under the Major Government, we introduced a process whereby parts of the European Council meetings were held in public. The Council of Ministers do hold public sessions, and an attempt was made to reach decisions in public sessions. It probably still goes on. [Interruption.] It does not amount to very much.
No, let me finish my answer. We did try to tackle this criticism. What happened was that each of the 28 Ministers gave little speeches entirely designed for their national newspapers and television, and negotiations and discussion did not make much practical progress. When the public sessions were over, the Ministers went into private session to negotiate and reach agreement. I used to find that the best business at the European Council was usually done over lunch. I have attended more European Council meetings than most people have had hot dinners. The dinners and the lunches tended to be where reasonable understandings were made. There were very few votes, but Governments made it clear when they opposed anything. When the council was over, everyone gave a press conference. It was a slightly distressing habit, because some of the accounts of Ministers for the assembled national press did not bear a close resemblance to what they had been saying inside the Council. I regret to say that some British Ministers fell into that trap. British Ministers and Ministers of other nationalities who had fiercely advocated regulating inside the Council would hold a press conference describing their valiant efforts to block what had now come in, which confirms some of my hon. Friend’s criticisms.
The fact is that most British Governments made it clear what they opposed and what they did not. If a regulation was passed in their presence, they had to come back here to explain why they had gone along with it. Now, that is enough on the European Communities Act.
I want to start by simply outlining that, contrary to what the hon. Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins) has just suggested about there being weak arguments for why we should leave the EU and repeal the European Communities Act 1972, it is absolutely essential that we do so if we are going to have a self-respecting, self-governing democratic country. The Bill and this whole issue are about one main question, namely democracy, which is what everything else necessarily flows from. All the economic arguments and questions relating to trade and other matters are ultimately dependent on the question of whether we have the right to govern ourselves in this sacred House of Commons. That is the basis on which the people of this country make decisions, of their own free choice, in general elections—whether it is to vote for the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats, the SNP or the Conservative party—and then a decision is made in this House as to how they will be governed.
I repeat what I have said: we have just had Remembrance Day. I simply want people to reflect for one moment on the fact that those millions of people who died in both world wars died for a reason. It was to do with sustaining the freedom and democracy of this House.
Does not democracy presume that a Government would listen to the will of the House of Commons, whose Members are individually elected by their constituencies? Would it not be slightly odd, therefore, to proceed with the Bill without taking out the Henry VIII powers?
Put simply, on the European Union Referendum Act 2015, which was a sovereign Act of this House—the point that the hon. Gentleman has just made—the House of Commons agreed, by six to one, that it would deliberately transfer to the people the decision whether to leave or remain in the European Union. Unless that Act is repealed, I do not believe that that decision should be returned to by the House.
The hon. Gentleman has referred to the millions of people who died in two world wars. Those two world wars took place before the existence of the European Union and we in Europe, including this country, Germany and France, have lived in peace for decades. Is not it the case that France, Germany and other countries will now never, ever go to war because of the European Union?
The answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is that no two democracies have ever gone to war with one another. I declare a personal interest in this issue because my father was killed in Normandy, fighting for this country, and I am proud that he got the Military Cross for that reason. This is something that many people in this country really understand and believe. It is not easy to explain, but it is to do with the fact that people understand the real reasons that self-government is so important.
The proposal in the European Communities Act 1972, which we are now repealing, was the greatest power grab since Oliver Cromwell. It was done in 1972 with good intentions. I voted yes in 1975 and I did it for the reason the hon. Gentleman mentions: I believed it would create stability in Europe. The problem is that it has done exactly the opposite. Look, throughout the countries of the European Union, at the grassroots movements and the rise of the far right, which I deeply abhor and have opposed ever since I set about the Maastricht rebellion in 1990. I set out then why I was so opposed to the Maastricht treaty: it was creating European Government and making this country ever more subservient to the rulemaking of the European Union. As I said in response to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), that has been conducted behind closed doors. We have been shackled by European laws. He asked at one point if we could give one example. The ports regulation is a very good example. We fought that in the European Scrutiny Committee and in the House of Commons, but we were not allowed to make any difference to it. It was opposed by the Government, it was opposed by the Opposition, it was opposed by all the port employers and it was opposed by the trade unions. What could we do about it? Absolutely nothing!
Does my hon. Friend agree that once Parliament has passed the repeal of the 1972 Act, Ministers will only be able to do things that this Parliament permits them to do? Today, Ministers have to do many things that the European Union insists on, which this Parliament cannot discuss or overturn.
There are at least 12,000 regulations, every one of which would have required a whole Act of Parliament, with amendments and stages in both Houses. A transcript would have been available. People would have known who voted which way and why, and known the outcome of what was a democratic process. Instead, as I said to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe—even he conceded that I was right on this—the process is conducted, over bibulous lunches and in the Council of Ministers, in a manner completely lacking in democratic legitimacy, yet, because of consensus arrangements behind closed doors, it becomes part of our law through section 2 of the 1972 Act. It is imposed on us by our voluntary consent. It is therefore up to us and the people of this country to decide, by their voluntary consent and their freedom of choice, to get out of this, just as it was brought in by an Act of Parliament, without a referendum, in 1972.
Has the hon. Gentleman not shown a deep misunderstanding of how the European Union works through consensus and participatory democracy? Rather than one country dictating to another, that is the whole spirit of the European Union. No one country is sovereign, but decisions are taken in the round.
I am sorry to disillusion the hon. Lady. I have been in this House for 33 years and I have been on the European Scrutiny Committee for 32 of them. I can absolutely assure her that what she says is simply not reflected by the practice of the European Union: the system is essentially undemocratic.
Does my hon. Friend not feel that it is ironic that all 12,000 EU regulations will be imported into UK law under a process that will not have the detailed scrutiny of the House, because Henry VIII powers will be used to do it?
My hon. Friend might just reflect on the fact that there is no other way of transposing the legislation. I drafted the original repeal Bill, so I understand it very well. I did so before the referendum, in fact, because—I say this to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe—I believed we would win. In reality, once we have brought this into UK law, we will be able to have our own Bills—on agriculture, fisheries, customs, immigration, and various other parts of our constitutional arrangements—that can be properly discussed and amended.
Does my hon. Friend agree that every single one of the regulations coming into UK law is already abided by in this country and in this Parliament and are to its satisfaction at the moment?
Yes, the reality is that the Bill, if and when it goes through—and I believe it will—will incorporate into UK law EU legislation already consented to in the way that my hon. Friend mentions. We have agreed to them, but unfortunately they have not had the democratic legitimacy that will be conferred upon them when the Bill goes through.
I proceed now to the important question of the European Court of Justice. I made this point to the Prime Minister about 10 days ago and again to the Brexit Secretary last week. I wish to mention three pieces of case law that we inherited when the treaties that had accumulated after 1956 came upon us through section 2 of the 1972 Act. The first two are Van Gend en Loos in 1963 and Costa v. ENEL in 1964. In its judgment in the first case, the European Court asserted that
“the Community constitutes a new legal order in international law for whose benefit the states have limited their sovereign rights”.
In Costa v. ENEL, the Court ruled:
“The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights”.
In 1970, in the Handelsgesellschaft case, the Court said that community law should take precedence even over the constitutional laws of member states, including basic entrenched laws relating to fundamental rights. It does not get more profound than that. Those decisions are mere assertions by the Court, yet under section 3 of the 1972 Act, we agree to abide by them.
Will my hon. Friend agree that all treaties involve a pooling of sovereignty? We gave up immense sovereignty when we joined the United Nations and NATO, membership of which we would never dream of renouncing. The European Court exists to enforce treaty rights, including obligations on members. Does he recall probably the most important case there of modern times, when the British Government took the European Central Bank there to assert our treaty rights so that the City of London and our financial services industry could have a passport to financial services in the eurozone? It was worth thousands of jobs and showed the benefit of the Court in upholding treaty rights, including the most important treaty rights of the UK.
I also remember the case of Factortame, when Lord Bridge made it clear that by Parliament’s voluntary consent, given by virtue of the 1972 Act, an Act of Parliament—namely, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988—could be struck down. I am not trying to be disingenuous. The fact is that the 1972 Act empowers the European Court to strike down UK Acts of Parliament. That is what sovereignty is all about.
The hon. Gentleman talks about sovereignty and the pooling of sovereignty. Building on the point from the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), how does the hon. Gentleman think we will achieve new trade deals without ceding sovereignty, given that all trade deals—like EU membership, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman just pointed out—require the ceding of sovereignty?
I must say to the hon. Gentleman, and to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, that there is a world of difference between that and having agreements by virtue of treaties in international law, which are actually matters on which it is possible to make decisions without being absorbed into and entangled in a legal order. That is the difference. It is the acquis communautaire and its principles that completely undermine the sovereignty of this House. I am prepared to concede that some people—
I am sure that my hon. Friend will be making this point, but I will try to anticipate it. There are circumstances in which the pooling of sovereignty by virtue of, for example, NATO is claimed to be a genuine pooling, but it is not, because it is possible to withdraw from it. The whole point about the European Communities Act is that it is not possible to withdraw from it except by repealing it in this manner. That is what we are doing now.
My hon. Friend has strongly emphasised the importance of the sovereignty of the House, and I agree with him. Is it not all the more important that, as we leave, this sovereign House should have a meaningful vote on the terms on which we leave, rather than there being a “take it or leave it” vote at the end of the process? Is that not the ultimate expression of sovereignty, and will my hon. Friend therefore support it?
The answer is that I am supporting the outcome of the referendum, which, by virtue of our sovereign Acts of Parliament, we decided that we would pass over—
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his point of order. We are also debating clause 1, which is fairly wide-ranging, so the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) is in order.
I had actually spotted that, Dame Rosie, and I am most grateful to you for confirming that I am in order.
Let me now touch on some of the issues that arise from this continuous emphasis on the virtues of the European Court of Justice. There is the constitutional principle, which I have already explained, and there is the case law, which I have also already explained. But it goes further than that. The very great Lord Justice Bingham, in chapter 12 of his book “The Rule of Law”, describes the relationship between the courts and Parliament. He comes down unequivocally in favour of Parliament. He makes it clear that when Parliament passes a Bill such as the one that we are to enact, it will override all the laws in the European system that have shackled us so far, and also all the Court judgments, save only that we have agreed, by virtue of the retained law, to transpose some aspects of the process to which we have become used, and which we can decide what to do with at a future date.
I certainly will; I should be only too delighted. I have been waiting to hear from my right hon. and learned Friend, whom I happen to know very well, and for whom I have great respect. I shall listen to him with interest.
I do not think my hon. Friend can have it both ways. A moment ago, he was talking about direct effect. There is no doubt that if we leave the European Union, direct effect will cease on the day we go; but, as I am sure he knows, we are signed up to about 800 treaties with arbitral mechanisms that can lead to judgments affecting the United Kingdom, which we then undertake to implement, sometimes by changing our own laws. I do not quite understand why my hon. Friend has such an obsession with the Court of Justice of the European Union if its direct effect will be removed, although we will have to be subject to it during the transitional period as we are leaving.
I do not think that matter has been entirely settled, by any means. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) earlier referred to a lunch she was at, where it appears that she was told we were going to be subject to the European Court of Justice, and my right hon. and learned Friend has made exactly the same point.
I have to say that there are serious questions about the nature of the European Court. The problem is that the European Court is essentially not an impartial court at all. It has never discharged the function impartially, and from the early 1960s it developed a range of principles, such as those of the uniform application and effectiveness of EU law, that it then expanded of its own volition into the general principles of the supremacy and direct effect of EU law over national law. These judge-made principles had no basis in the EU treaties until the Lisbon treaty, which my right hon. and learned Friend, who was then Attorney General, opposed. The fact is that until Lisbon—
I am afraid not, as I really must proceed.
None of these judge-made principles had any basis in the EU treaties, and the principle of the primacy of EU law is a judicial creation recently codified, and no more than that. However, because we have accepted judgments of the European Court under section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, which we are going to repeal, we are saddled with this, and that is one of the things we are going to unshackle.
Interpretation is done in the European Court by what is known as the purposive approach. In fact, as has been well said, there are many different purposes that can be in conflict with one another, and the methods of interpretation applied are anything but satisfactory. I therefore say to those who want to advocate the European Court, whether in the transitional period or in general, “Beware of what you wish for,” because the European Court can create havoc in relation to our trading arrangements.
If the hon. Gentleman is so opposed to the European Court of Justice, what is his dispute resolution mechanism going to be? Independent states need a dispute resolution mechanism where they cede sovereignty; they give some of their sovereignty and get some of somebody else’s sovereignty. What is that going to be?
Order. I been generous in allowing the hon. Gentleman to range over a number of subjects, but I gently remind him that there are a lot of speakers in this debate, so I am sure his list about the European Court of Justice is now a little shorter than it was before.
I shall conclude my remarks on this point. The European Court is seriously deficient in a whole range of matters. On the question put by the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil), the idea has been put forward by Martin Howe QC, and I have put it forward myself in the House, of a system of jurisdiction that would be more in the nature of an arbitration, where there might be, for example, retired European Court judges or whoever, who would adjudicate—but on a bilateral basis, not on the basis of a decision taken by the European Court. It is possible to come up with a solution, therefore, but I do recognise the problem.
We are now embarked upon a massive restoration of self-government in this country. This Bill is essential to achieve that, and should be passed without any of the obstacles and frustrating tactics being put in its way.
I rise to speak to amendment 386, which has cross-party support and which I tabled late last night. The Minister said that it was somehow introducing “chaos” into this process. With the greatest respect, after a fortnight in which we have seen the Foreign Secretary, the International Development Secretary, the former Defence Secretary, the current Defence Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary all subsumed in controversies, I think the Government are doing quite well on the chaos front without any help from me. Also, the idea that taking the exit date out and putting it into a different Bill would create chaos when, just five days ago, Ministers did not want it in any Bill at all, makes the Government’s argument look rather silly.
The amendment would require Parliament to vote on the terms of withdrawal through primary legislation before Brexit day. That would mean that exit day would be set in UK law not in this Bill but in a future Bill, either in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that the Government announced yesterday or, if there is no deal at all, through an alternative Bill setting out the terms of departure and presumably whatever implementation plan would be needed in those circumstances.
The purpose of the amendment is not to dispute the Government’s intentions about the timing of exit day; it is simply to ensure that there is a proper parliamentary and democratic process before we get to that date. The central focus is not the date itself but a requirement on the Government to do as they have promised and set out a meaningful vote for Parliament in advance of that date. The amendment would also ensure that Parliament could properly respond, whatever the outcome of the Government’s negotiations, rather than being inadvertently timed out if things were to go badly wrong.
Yesterday, we learned from the Government that there would be a second Bill to implement the withdrawal agreement, and that is welcome. That was the subject of other amendments that the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I had tabled because we were concerned that Parliament should not give the Executive a blank cheque through this Bill on the implementation of a withdrawal Bill that had not yet happened. Rather less welcome was the Government’s admission that the legislation might not actually happen before Brexit day. Even less welcome was the Brexit Secretary’s admission that the vote on the withdrawal agreement would simply be a take-it-or-leave-it vote, and that therefore if the Government negotiate a bad deal, if they have no implementation plan in place or if other things go wrong along the way, Parliament would simply have to accept that or choose to have no deal at all.
Under the Government’s proposals, Brexit day would be embedded in primary legislation through this Bill, and it would therefore become legally and constitutionally possible for Ministers simply to let us drift towards exit day without Parliament being able to insist on any kind of implementation preparations or any kind of plan at all. Such a concentration of power in the hands of the Executive would be unacceptable. No legislature should ever accept that: certainly not this legislature right now when we were given a hung Parliament by the electorate less than six months ago; and certainly not our Parliament, whose sovereignty has been such a key issue throughout the debates on the referendum.
The amendment would strengthen the democratic process around Brexit and ensure that Parliament could vote on the terms of withdrawal, whether there was a deal or not, before exit day. It would implement the Government’s commitment to a meaningful parliamentary vote. If everything goes according to the Government’s plans and promises, if they get the timetable they want for the transition agreements being agreed in the early part of next year and the withdrawal plans agreed by the autumn, and if we get the kind of deal that the Government have promised, with all the benefits that it will bring, all that the amendment would do would hold the Government to that by implementing their intentions and their timetable. It would hold the Government to what the Brexit Secretary said yesterday was his primary plan for the timetable. It would hold Ministers to that plan on the face of the Bill. It would also prevent the Government from delaying the withdrawal agreement legislation beyond the withdrawal date. It links the timing of exit to the terms of exit in the parliamentary process. It would prevent Parliament from being timed out because it would give Parliament the final say. If the Government’s plans go wrong—I hope they will not—it also gives Parliament a say in how the country should respond. For example, if we end up with no deal at all, if we run out of time—I hope that will not happen—or if the whole thing goes belly up, it gives Parliament a role. It allows for a debate on whether the Government should go back to the negotiating table or just walk away. It allows for a debate about the timing of Brexit day. It allows Parliament to debate and decide, rather than just throwing up our hands and leaving it to Ministers—rather than just drifting along.
My right hon. and learned Friend is very tempting, but not at this moment.
I understand the point of amendment 357, which is to provide a default mechanism for transposing EU law where regulations have not been made under clause 7. I can equally see that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst is seeking to make default provision for any gaps that may exist in the law to avoid creating not just legal uncertainty, but any legal potholes that may strew the road that lies ahead. I hope that he does not mind me saying that he is, perhaps inadvertently, reinforcing the case for clause 7 because his concern appears to be with the risk that it might not being used comprehensively enough. I certainly share his concern to avoid legal cliff edges and legal potholes, for which I think he is trying to cater.
I mentioned to the Prime Minister during her statement a few days ago the bear trap that I can see coming up during the transitional period if we are not careful because of the manner in which the European Court operates by the purposive rule; I know my hon. Friend will understand. During the transitional period, when we are faced with a court operating under that rule and not by precedent, we could end up with the European Court dictating to us the basis upon which we would be operating during that period. Does my hon. Friend agree?
The Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee eloquently makes his powerful point. We need to avoid bear traps, cliff edges and potholes, and that is what this Bill does. That is a common goal that we all ought to be trying to pursue, on both sides of the House—whether we voted to leave or remain. I am not convinced that the amendment of the Chair of the Justice Committee would achieve that aim. Despite his best intentions and his rather ingenious drafting, I fear that the amendment would, in practice, create considerably more legal uncertainty, not less.
My amendment 137 seeks to ensure that:
“When interpreting retained EU law after exit day a court or tribunal shall pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court.”
The Minister questioned the term “due regard”, but it is not unknown to international law. The Lugano Convention on the mutual recognition on enforcement of judgments, to which EU and non-EU states are signatories, talks about paying “due account”, but I have followed the recommendation of the organisation Justice that it is clearer and better English to talk about paying “due regard”. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, we have a duty to take account of decisions of the Court of Justice, so paying “due regard” to taking account of such decisions is not a phrase unknown.
This amendment is not a Trojan horse designed to continue references after Brexit, and I say that as someone who does not want Brexit to happen. It is designed to create certainty for individuals, businesses and litigants, and also for the judiciary. It would leave it open to British courts to disagree with the Court of Justice’s interpretation, even if its case law was relevant to the case. It would not—as the Government’s current draft does—give an unfettered, politically controversial discretion to consider or ignore Court of Justice decisions as our courts saw fit.
The test set out in my amendment has three advantages. First, it would create legal certainty for individuals and businesses. Secondly, it would provide political cover for the courts. Thirdly, it seems to fit with the preference of the judiciary, who want a clear instruction. In recent evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Lady Hale, the new President of the Supreme Court, said:
“It should be made plain in statute what authority or lack of authority, or weight or lack of weight, is to be given to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union after we have left, in relation both to matters that arose before we left and, more importantly, to matters after we leave. That is not something we”—
she means “we, the judges”—
“would like to have to make up for ourselves, obviously, because it is very much a political question, and we would like statute to tell us the answer.”
In my submission, under my amendment, statute would tell the judges the answer.
That is not just my view. The Institute for Government looked at the various options and concluded that the wording that I now propose would license courts in the UK to refer to the Court of Justice’s reasoning in future judgments without making those Court of Justice judgments binding on the UK courts—
I will just finish my point, then I will give way to the hon. Gentleman.
The Institute for Government took the view that that approach was compatible with the objectives set out in the Government’s White Paper on Brexit and in the repeal Bill.
I just wanted to refer to chapter 12 of the book by Lord Bingham, entitled “The Rule of Law”, which I am sure the hon. and learned Lady is aware of, in which he criticises Lady Hale for her view on the relationship between Parliament and the judges. Is she aware of that?
I am familiar with that book, but I do not think that it has any relevance to what I am saying at the moment. I remind the hon. Gentleman the Lady Hale is the President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, and she has made the point that what she and her fellow judges require from the Government and the House is clarity in the directions as to how they are to treat the future jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, because if the guidance is not clear, they will come under the sort of political attack that I am sure the hon. Gentleman, who is a great supporter of the British constitution, would abhor, as I do—although I might actually prefer a Scottish constitution.
As I said earlier, this amendment is not a Trojan horse. It is the result of careful consideration by the organisation Justice and by the Institute for Government. It also has the support of the TUC and, I am delighted to say, the Labour party, as well as the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the Fawcett Society. One reason the Equality and Human Rights Commission is so keen on this amendment is because it is also important for rights protections. It is important to remember that EU law is largely about the rights of individuals. The Government’s position paper, published in the summer, seemed to imagine that EU law was all about disputes between the United Kingdom and the EU, but it is not. Most people who make references to the Court of Justice do so in the determination of their individual rights or their rights as a business.
The hon. Gentleman did not allow me to intervene on him, but let me say now that, unfortunately, his point is wholly irrelevant to clause 6; it relates to the transition which will be covered in another Bill. My concern is about the continuing state of UK law following exit. This is not going to be resolved by the Government producing a White Paper. It has to be resolved by clause 6 being drafted in a way that creates the very legal certainty that the Government so admirably wish to create, and which they at present so abundantly fail to do.
My right hon. Friend is asking some very interesting questions, but that does not necessarily mean—he, or indeed any of us in this Chamber, not being a judge—that he is drawing the right conclusions. He is pointing to several questions that need to be raised, however, although he has not mentioned that clause 5(1) states:
“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day,”
and that must include this Bill.
Furthermore, my right hon. Friend has not quite taken on board what the Solicitor General said with respect to our application of the stare decisis method of interpretation, which the Supreme Court will be obliged to apply after exit day. So he is asking some interesting questions, but I do not think we can necessarily draw conclusions from them.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments, and I am very happy to leave it to the Government to draw the conclusions and answer the questions in due course. I do not think clause 5(1) helps at all, however, because my hon. Friend is right that it excludes the possibility of subsequent enactments being subject to the principle of supremacy, but in clause 5(2) it is equally clear that, so far as the retained law is concerned, the principle of supremacy remains, and therefore there may be judgments in the future that already existing law, where there is judged to be a conflict between an Act of Parliament and an ECJ ruling, should have the result that the ECJ ruling triumphs over the Act of Parliament. That is a perfectly possible and sensible position to adopt. It is not one my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) and I would like to see, and I doubt that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) would like to see it, but it is nevertheless a perfectly tolerable position—and it then needs to be carried over for the Supreme Court just as much.
My point remains, however, and it is a simple one: that if the Bill is trying to achieve a hierarchy here, it needs to state what the hierarchy is, and in stating that hierarchy, it needs to make it clear who governs whom. At the moment, the Bill does not do that.