Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

William Cash Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 12th February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I will give way in a moment. I am warming to a theme—let me warm!

The theme is this: in our fight against terrorism—in our determination to protect the public against those who spread hate, division, death and injury, irrespective of what might motivate them, because we know that we have a cohort of different types of terrorist—we are defending something of value. We are defending a democratic, free society. We are defending the rule of law. We are defending the values of this place and, indeed, the values of all the people we have the honour and privilege of representing. That is something worth defending. By using due process, we mark ourselves out as distinct from, better than and different from those who seek to divide us.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend in receipt of advice from the Law Officers on this question? I say that because whatever arguments he may address with regard to compatibility and his statement on the front of the Bill, the reality is that this could easily end up in the courts if they can possibly manufacture an argument. I want to be quite clear that his advice relates to action in the courts and not just to incompatibility.

[Robert Buckland]

I can assure my hon. Friend that all the usual processes were followed. I am not going to go into the weeds of what the Law Officers might have said. We know that they have a particular function when it comes to the necessary clearances for the introduction of a Bill. I can assure him that those processes have been followed and that the issues that he rightly outlines—and, indeed, presages through his amendments—are very much uppermost in our considerations.

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[Robert Buckland]

I am hugely grateful to my right hon. Friend, who, as the House will know, was a distinguished Security Minister and Northern Ireland Secretary, and had to deal with these issues daily. I will say this to him: he will know that the counter-terrorism Bill, which was announced some weeks ago, will be coming before the House soon. There will be measures in it not only on the minimum term to be served for serious terror offences, but on the way in which licence periods will be applied as part of such a sentence. That is clearly one of the most effective ways to deal with this problem—through the criminal prosecution and conviction process.

My right hon. Friend makes a wider point. He will know from having navigated through the House the TPIMs legislation, which has been subsequently strengthened and amended, that there are other circumstances in which public protection will have to play a function in the absence of a conviction. It is on that particular cohort that the Government are placing a lot of attention and concentration. It would perhaps be idle of me to speculate by outlining what precise forms those will take, but it is a dialogue that I encourage him actively to take part in over the next few months and it is something I would want to develop with support from all parts of this House.

[Sir William Cash]

At this stage in the debate, and trying to avoid our having what might otherwise turn into an argument about the law in court, may I ask my right hon. and learned Friend whether the case of del Río Prada has actually been taken into account? Does he know if that has been taken into account, because it was about policy and administration?

[Robert Buckland]

My hon. Friend will be glad to know that not only has it been taken into account, but I have read it. It is a 2013 authority from the Strasbourg Court that relates to a particular set of circumstances involving the Kingdom of Spain. There have been subsequent cases both before that court and, indeed, domestically. In summary, we are satisfied, on the basis of all the information we have, that the provisions of article 7 are not engaged in this respect.

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[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I think we sometimes see things in isolation, but cuts to many other services have also had an impact, which the Government need to take into account. Indeed, when we talk about conditions for our prison officers to work in, a third of our prisons were built in the Victoria era. There is a £900 million maintenance backlog and a desperate need for new investment.

[Sir William Cash]

On mental disturbance, does the hon. Gentleman accept that there are circumstances in which the principle of mens rea may not apply simply because the person in question, for a variety of reasons, some of which may be drug-affected or intrinsic, is incapable of making an act within the framework of mens rea? In those circumstances, should we perhaps be thinking further down the line about what kind of containment people need to restrain them from performing such murderous acts?

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

A number of issues about mens rea, which is an essential element of committing a criminal offence, have been decided before the courts. However, elements of our law can already deal with those who suffer from severe mental health problems, and they can be used and operated appropriately on a multi-agency basis.

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[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

The speeches from both Front Benchers have been very thoughtful and that matches the significance of this debate. My right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor made a very compelling case for this legislation. It is not the type of legislation that the House should undertake lightly, but protecting the public must ultimately trump all other considerations. It is always right that we should protect the public in a way that is commensurate with the rule of law. I believe that the Government and the Lord Chancellor have managed to achieve that balance and I am glad that the official Opposition recognise that, too. That is a fundamental duty for all of us, and reconciling the two is a considerable achievement, given the pressures we are under at this time.

The reason that I think it is necessary to move in this way has been well set out. I speak as somebody who represents a London constituency: many of my constituents work in and around the places where we have seen so many atrocities. That brings home to us profoundly the catastrophic risk that can come when an individual is released. Even though the index offence that caused them to go to prison may not have led to a very long sentence, the nature—I am sorry to say—of the type of terrorism that we see now, often based on perverted ideologies and the deep-seated hatred that that breeds, gives us the need to be particularly careful and cautious about all forms of release going forward. The automatic point of release will be moved to two thirds—in fact, that will no longer be automatic but will, in all cases, be considered by the Parole Board, and that is a worthwhile and important aspect of the Bill.

[Sir William Cash]

I am listening with great interest to everything that my hon. Friend says, as ever. Does he think that the question over the Bill is that it will have a limited effect, whereas the problems that we face have a much longer-term consequence? Does he believe, therefore, that we ought to have a more rigorous analysis in future—this is only emergency legislation—to make sure that human life in this country takes priority over the interpretation of law?

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[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I follow the line taken by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) on the cross-party consensus that is needed in passing this Bill.

However, as I have already indicated in a number of interventions, I am concerned about the restrictive and restricted nature of this Bill. We should get the Justice Committee to look at the longer-term issues raised by these incidents, murders and terrorist offences. I entirely understand why this Bill has been introduced, and I support it. I am glad the House, as a whole, has clearly indicated the same.

We have to take these problems seriously, as they are deeply entrenched in parts of our society, and they will continue. They will not change just because this emergency legislation has been passed. The Bill will have a limited effect, so we need a longer-term assessment of the real problems that underpin it.

In response to the intervention by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), I mentioned the state of mind of some of the people concerned and the question of whether, in certain cases, it is evidence of some degree of insanity, of a drug-affected mind or of mental disturbance on such a scale as to impinge on the question of mens rea. We do not have time to go into all of it this afternoon, but I want such longer-term assessments because some of these people, from whatever part of society, have had to be confined to Broadmoor and other similar secure places because of their mental state. I put that on the record as a suggestion that needs to be taken up by the Justice Committee and, indeed, other Committees.

I also raised in an intervention that, for me, this Bill does not answer the question of why automatic early release, with the agreement of the Parole Board, should be moved from halfway to two thirds of a sentence. In circumstances where we are dealing with public safety and human life, I do not see why two thirds should be chosen as a boundary line. There are circumstances in very severe cases where I do not believe there should be any release at all, for the reasons I have already touched on in relation to certain people’s instability of mind.

[Alicia Kearns]

Does my hon. Friend agree that terrorists are traitors? They have declared this country their enemy, and they have declared he and I, and civilians, as legitimate targets to be murdered and assaulted on our streets. I therefore agree entirely that they should serve at least their full sentence. We should be looking at far longer sentences than just 14 years.

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend touches on a point that I raised several years ago, shortly after the infamous, terrible murder of Lee Rigby. On the question of persons returning to this country from ISIS, I told the House that, as far as I was concerned, the issue of their return should be evaluated in accordance with article 8 of the convention on the reduction of statelessness, which makes it clear that a person can be made stateless if they give allegiance to another country—the caliphate could be regarded as such in this context. I accept this is controversial, but the United States, for example, already applies article 8 in that way. If the person in question gives allegiance to another country, by definition they have moved into the zone of treason and have deliberately and voluntarily abdicated their allegiance to this country. I put that on the record because we have to take these matters extremely seriously, and I attempted to make such an amendment to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. This is about not just external activities, but internal ones, within our domestic law, so we need to take this incredibly seriously. That is why I am appealing for this longer term assessment of all these questions, including the one my hon. Friend has raised, because it is so important and cannot just be put into a category of “rather extravagant thinking”. This is really serious.

As I said earlier, human life and public safety are much more important than the question of whether the courts may or may not interpret a particular provision in a more “fashionable” judicial interpretation than we ought to expect of our courts. I go further and say that human life is more important than any legal interpretation of human rights, which is why I have tabled my amendments. I imagine that the Committee stage will be pretty truncated, so I am not going to go into this in Committee in the detail that I will now. As this is a Second Reading issue and a matter of principle, let me say that we should include in the Bill, in clause 1, the exclusion of the Human Rights Act 1998. I have something of a history in that respect, but so do the Foreign Secretary and many others, such as the distinguished Martin Howe, QC. We were regarded as highly unfashionable some years ago, but issues of the kind that gravitate around the Bill have drawn attention to the fact that we have to take these matters really seriously. I understand that the Bingham Centre has made a number of representations on the matter, and there are clear indications that there are lawyers of some notoriety, if not distinction, who will seek to overturn the provisions of this Bill by going to the courts. I deplore the fact that they would seek to do so.

I am looking forward to the discussion in the House of Lords on this matter, because there are distinguished lawyers on all sides of the debate in that House, who, with the greatest respect to all of us here in the House of Commons, have been practising at the Bar, have been in the Supreme Court and so on. They will be able to bring to bear the right degree of analysis of the case law, which needs to be looked at carefully in this context.

[Sir John Hayes]

As ever, my hon. Friend is making a compelling case. I suggest to him that this requires a more fundamental review of the characteristic and extent of rights, and how they relate to citizenship, duty, responsibility and the public good. I wonder what he thinks of that.

[Sir William Cash]

That is an extremely important point. As my right hon. Friend knows, I have the greatest respect for his analysis when it moves from not just the law into the broader societal and philosophical questions, which ought to inform opinions made in this House; we should not just treat issues of this kind as if they are somehow matters of semantics. We are dealing with the kind of society that we want, and the impact of the terrorism, and murderous and dangerous behaviour, of the perpetrators of these crimes our own constituents. A most recent case involved somebody who travelled from Stafford down to London, and therefore was a matter of immediate concern to my constituents, because he had been living there for some time. The manner in which he was allowed to leave to come down to London and commit murder in Fishmongers’ Hall and in the vicinity is a lesson for us all.

I now want to deal with the retrospectivity elements of this Bill, which relate to my general concern to tie down this issue in the longer term. The Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and I had an exchange about a number of cases. I am well aware that this is not the place for us to attempt to make an assumption that we are able to treat this Chamber as though it is a court of law, although we are, of course, the High Court of Parliament, but that is to miss the point; the fact is that proper analysis of the case law has to be conducted. Some of that has already been done in blogging and in some pamphlets, and I am expecting the House of Lords to home in on it effectively when the Bill gets to that House, although it will not have much time.

We know that Ministers have been warned about the likelihood of a legal battle; despite the assertions of the Government that the Bill is compatible with article 7 of the European convention on human rights—for reasons that I will explain, I am sympathetic to their view—there are those who will argue that it is not. I can see this coming, so my amendment would remove any chance that there could be that kind of legal battle on the applicability of the Human Rights Act to this Bill. My amendment would insert the words

“notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.

That is a belt-and-braces approach, and it is what I am seeking. I am not going to move this amendment in Committee with any intention of dividing the Committee of the whole House on it; I think the matter needs further consideration outside this House, and I look to the House of Lords for some indication of views.

My argument goes like this: this Bill is compatible with article 7. No one has read it out so far, so I will do so. It states:

“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence”—

for conduct —

“which did not constitute a criminal offence…at the time when it was committed.”

This Bill does not purport to create a new criminal offence. Rather, it seeks to prevent terrorists convicted by UK courts on the basis of offences that existed prior to the Bill from having automatic early release. I have already made my point about the length of time indicated. Furthermore, the explanatory notes state:

“The Bill does not retrospectively alter a serving offender’s sentence as imposed by the court, or alter the maximum penalties for offences.”

They state that the Bill is concerned with the “administration of a sentence”. I still believe, despite the exchanges I had with the Chairman of the Justice Committee, that the del Río Prada case could well still come into play there. I fear that it might be used effectively against the Bill. So my conclusion on the question of a textual interpretation of article 7 of the ECHR indicates that is not incompatible with this Bill. However, Parliament does have the power to legislate retrospectively—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. I just want to let the hon. Gentleman know that I am sure he will have the opportunity in Committee to address his amendment. I am sure he will be aware that there are quite a few people who wish to speak on Second Reading; I just want to assure him that he will be able to address his amendment during the Committee stage.

[Sir William Cash]

I do understand that, but I also anticipate that there may be a need for brevity at that point. That is how these things go, from my experience, which goes back some time. I am talking about matters of principle. I repeat: I am talking about matters of principle.

As established by Willes J in Phillips v. Eyre, courts ascribe retrospective force to new laws that affect rights only if

“by express words or necessary implication that such was the intention of the legislature”.

Clause 1 will amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and expressly restrict eligibility for the release of prisoners who have been sentenced for a terrorist offence

“whether before or after this section comes into force”.

My conclusion on this point is simple: the courts would be expected to give retrospective effect to the Bill.

The principle I wish to address is that I am concerned that the courts have a disinclination and reluctance to give effect to retrospective legislation, particularly when it deals with criminal acts. That is well established, and I could quote Bradley and Ewing, page 56, which explains that. Although I do not think that article 7 applies to the Bill, to ensure that the courts do not find a way around the Bill or a misguided interpretation that would frustrate its real purpose, I shall move my amendment in Committee, for the purposes of legislative clarity and for the avoidance of doubt in relation to the power of Parliament to legislate retrospectively. That is the principle that I am addressing at this moment.

I have no further comment to make for the purposes of this debate, but this matter has to be taken seriously. The wording that I intend to introduce in Committee will be taken as a serious attempt to make sure that no way around the provisions is found by the courts or by some ingenious lawyers, who would avoid and frustrate the purposes and principle of the Bill, as expressed on Second Reading, which we are debating.

[Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)]

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). He referred to lawyers of some “notoriety” rather than, perhaps, remarkable lawyers; he is not the former. He has raised in the House the considerations relating to his amendment, so should this matter ever reach the courts for adjudication, the courts may, having been served with notice that the wording he proposes in his amendment should have been in the Bill, be even more inclined to accept the argument, knowing that Parliament was fully apprised of the considerations and had the opportunity so to heed the advice. That said, it was pragmatic of the hon. Member to indicate that although he may move his amendment, he may not force it to a vote, hoping instead that it is considered in the other place. I understand why he did that.

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this debate, which has been incredibly positive so far. We have been considering a serious issue, but every Member who has spoken so far has done so with a determination— in recognition of the difficulties that we have faced as a society from terrorism in responding appropriately, pragmatically, sensibly and swiftly—that this debate should add to the response that we as a Parliament should bring.

It was of benefit to hear from the hon. Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill), if I may mention him specifically. He is new to the House, but he has incredible knowledge of a parliamentary approach to early release. He did not refer to any individual cases in his remarks, but Members should know that the hon. Member has been through the political, practical, public and moral rigours of early release for those engaged in terrorist offences. We have benefited from his insight.

Reference has been made already to the contributions from the former reviewers of terrorism and terrorist legislation, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, the latter of whom has indicated that he believes that the Bill will be subject to legal challenge. Of course, that may be right, but I do not think that ultimately the House should fear that. It is appropriate that if people feel this legislation is incompatible with the European convention on human rights they get the opportunity to challenge it in the courts, but the Lord Chancellor expertly took the House through all the implications as to whether article 7 is engaged. It is surely engaged, but not in a fundamentally flawed way. It is fair for us to say that, yes, there are the considerations that we have discussed this afternoon and that will be discussed in another place and in the courts, but I believe that ultimately this Bill is the right approach for Parliament to take.

The right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) rightly referred to the comments of Lord Anderson QC. It was entirely appropriate for Lord Anderson to say that should this process, through this Bill, exhaust the opportunity for licence, compliance and control within the public sector and society at large, that would be a missed opportunity. We need to be alive to that in this debate. I think the Lord Chancellor nodded when he was considering TPIMs and the protective measures that have been in place and that could be put to good use. Licensing and rehabilitation are important parts of the criminal justice process, so the retention of someone in custody, without giving them the opportunity under control orders, is something that we should think about. We should recognise that if somebody spends the entirety of their sentence in custody without any control on release, that places an even bigger burden on our security services, when other aspects of the criminal justice system should be more appropriately engaged in monitoring, surveying and ensuring compliance and the rehabilitation of offenders who have been brought before the courts previously.

As a representative from Northern Ireland, I must focus on the fact that the Bill does not apply to our jurisdiction. The Lord Chancellor did proffer a view—I think this fairly reflects his comments—that the way we calculate sentences in Northern Ireland means that although the Bill does not fundamentally or injuriously engage article 7 considerations in England and Wales or Scotland, it would in Northern Ireland. I would be keen to explore that in greater detail with the Minister somewhere else. I do not think it would be appropriate to do that on the Floor of the House this afternoon, but it is worthy of further interrogation. I do not challenge what the Lord Chancellor said on the Floor of the House, believing what he said to be true, but I am not sure that what was indicated is right, nor indeed do I believe that it was the totality of the issues that may have been under consideration in connection with the Bill and its application to Northern Ireland. I say that as somebody who has contributed to many debates on terrorism and who lamented the fact that the counter-extremism strategy was introduced in this place and similarly did not apply to Northern Ireland.

The House knows the history that we in Northern Ireland have had in respect of both terrorism and extremism. I have made the point in the Chamber before that as a Member of Parliament for four and a half years I have seen a member of my own constituency murdered by the Provisional IRA, an organisation that most in the Chamber would believe does not exist any more; I have had a prison officer in my constituency murdered by dissident republicans through an under-car booby-trap bomb; and in January last year I had a father murdered by loyalist paramilitaries in my constituency. In four and a half years, we have had three individual murders by three different paramilitary terrorist organisations, at a time of peace. So it does jar, whenever we lend our weight—give our support—to counter-terrorism measures in this place, that we are not incorporated.

Members who have an interest in Northern Ireland affairs will be aware that the political process and the Good Friday agreement led to the early release of terrorist prisoners in Northern Ireland, and that there were two protections. Everyone was released on licence, and legislative provision was made for those licences to be revoked if it was the view of the Secretary of State that the person had engaged in activity that was leaning towards paramilitary or terrorist activity yet again: the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 and the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001.

In preparation for the introduction of this Bill, I tabled questions to the Northern Ireland Office to ask how many people who had been jailed in Northern Ireland as a result of terrorist activity had been released and had their licence subsequently revoked because of their activity. One answer, on the 1998 Act, was that two licences had been revoked since 1998, but I got the most obtuse answer on those who had licences revoked under the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order.

When you are trying to paint a picture, Madam Deputy Speaker, and you are trying to do research to understand where we have had parallel experiences in the past, and where people have been released for altogether different political reasons and under a different political settlement but have had licences revoked because they re-engaged in terrorist activity, it is important that this House has those figures. The answer, from 2001 to 2020, was that policing and justice was devolved in 2010.

That answer tells us nothing. I think it entirely discourteous to me, as a Member of Parliament seeking information, and to the House. It does not answer the question about 2001 to 2010 and it does not answer the question about licences revoked under national security considerations—information that would have been appropriate and important to inform us during the passage of the Bill.

[Sir William Cash]

I am very interested in what the hon. Gentleman is saying. I wonder whether steps are being taken to raise these matters, not only as he is doing in Westminster, but also now in Stormont. Is that now under consideration in the context of the Bill?

[Gavin Robinson]

That is a very fair question. When national security considerations are engaged—so that relates to terrorism—the devolved institutions at Stormont do not have a role; that remains the competence of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. But there are issues that I want to pursue, and I hope the Minister will give a commitment that we can have a discussion about article 7 and how it is engaged differently, in a way that makes the Bill incompatible with the European convention on human rights but not in England, Scotland or Wales.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I think you know our position when it comes to legislation to protect society and curtail the excesses of those who want to frustrate everything we value in the United Kingdom—the positive values and principles that we hold dear in this Parliament and in this place. We will support this Bill and I am grateful for the opportunity to make those ancillary comments about Northern Ireland, which I hope help to set this debate in context.

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[Chris Philp]

The Chair of the Justice Committee makes a good point. It is important to retain experience in the prison officer establishment. Prison staff have long expertise and long experience, and the Prisons Minister, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer), is acutely aware of the importance of retention.

Many hon. and right hon. Members, including the hon. Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) and the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), have drawn attention to the importance of a comprehensive deradicalisation programme in prisons—the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr Mahmood) also made that point in his excellent speech. We are acutely conscious of the importance of that and of the need to do more. We have the theological and ideological intervention programme, the healthy identities programme and the deradicalisation programme in place, and I am sure there is more that needs to be done in those areas. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) touched on that in his speech, and I know the Prisons Minister would like shortly to take up his offer of a meeting to discuss exactly these issues.

Of course, it is equally important to make sure these offenders are properly monitored after release, whether on licence or otherwise. The TPIM regime was strengthened in 2015, and we always have multi-agency public protection arrangements where necessary. As we saw, those arrangements were effective in the case of Sudesh Amman. After he began his behaviour, it was a matter of seconds before the police were able to intervene, which is an example of MAPPA working well in practice.

In the few minutes remaining to me, I will address the question of retrospection, touched on by a number of hon. Members, including the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper). It is our very firm belief, based on legal advice, that these measures do not contravene article 7. They do not constitute a retrospective change of the penalty, because the penalty is the total sentence. The penalty is the sentence handed down by the judge at the point of sentencing and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) elaborated, a wide body of case law says that changing the early release point does not change the penalty. In fact, early release ameliorates the penalty—it reduces the penalty—so changing the early release point does not add to it. The Uttley case makes that clear, as do other cases that have come before the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights.

I do not think the Del Río Prada case, in which the Kingdom of Spain was a respondent, is directly germane because it concerns the calculation of concurrent sentences and a change in how concurrent sentences are handled, which is obviously not the matter before the House today. The Government are clear that the Bill does not contravene article 7 and does not constitute a retrospective change to the penalty; it simply constitutes a change to how the sentence is administered.

Let me touch briefly on the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), which I suspect we may debate more fully in Committee shortly. We do not believe that a “notwithstanding” clause is necessary, because we do not believe article 7 is contravened by this legislation—we can debate this more. We are also not wholly convinced that a “notwithstanding” clause would derogate our treaty obligations under the ECHR.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Chris Philp]

I am conscious of time. I would be happy to give way in Committee to debate this at greater length. I very much look forward to hearing my hon. Friend’s further views on this and I would be happy to take an intervention in Committee, but I must wrap up in a minute or so.

The right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) asked about the MAPPA review and the Prevent review. The MAPPA review is under way and is being led by Jonathan Hall, QC. The Prevent review has a statutory deadline of August 2020, which we intend to abide by. We will make further announcements about its progress—this will include appointing a new reviewer—as soon as possible.

Streatham Incident

William Cash Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I welcome the hon. Lady’s support for the measures that we are going to introduce. She is absolutely right about the need to end automatic early release. I assure her that we use a range of engagement programmes to deal with this violent and dangerous cohort of people. These engagement programmes are of various natures, and are designed to meet the particular demands that such individuals can pose. However, the programmes do require engagement. Where there is engagement, we can achieve results, but we also need to be mindful of the dangers of superficial compliance. That is why this particular cohort is difficult, challenging and tough, and requires an unprecedented response.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Will the Minister give me an assurance that the legislation will be fully retrospective, notwithstanding article 7 of the European convention on human rights—he knows what I am saying—and, furthermore, that it will be good law, and that if Parliament clearly and expressly makes it clear that it intends such legislation to be retrospective, the courts, despite their reluctance, will give effect to it?

[Robert Buckland]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to remind us of the powers of Parliament in that respect, and, indeed, of the role of the Law Officers in giving consent to legislation that has retrospective effect. I remind the House that this is all about the administration of sentences, rather than their actual length or type. That is why I judge it appropriate in these unprecedented circumstances to introduce this legislation. I will discuss the details of the matters he raises with him when the legislation is introduced.

Children Act 1989 (Amendment) (Female Genital Mutilation) Bill [Lords]

William Cash Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 11th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Pauline Latham (Mid Derbyshire) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith) on bringing forward this addition to the Children Act. I remind him that, although he has been working with Nimco Ali, who is a fantastic campaigner, and Jaha, who has had fantastic success in Gambia, this all started with Jane Ellison, a former Member of Parliament for Battersea, when she formed the all-party group on female genital mutilation. She did some amazing work to bring this issue to people’s attention and she was devastated that there was no prosecution during her time here.

We have just had a prosecution, but it is hard for young people to testify, sometimes against family members, or, if not family members, against people who are friends of the family. It is really difficult for relatively young girls to go through with the prosecution. Although we have had only one prosecution—and it is incredibly important that we have had one—I can understand why we have not had more, but now that we have had that prosecution, I would like to see people feeling less frightened to come forward.

I also believe that teachers need more training to recognise the signs of when girls are going to be taken abroad. I know that it does not happen all the time and that a lot happens here, but some are taken abroad, just as they are for early marriage and forced marriage. Teachers need to be trained to recognise the symptoms of what is happening. Doctors and nurses also need additional training to make them report what they see. Many doctors in the past have seen this but have never done anything about it to protect people, because they believed that it was not their job to do so and that they should let sleeping dogs lie. That really should not be the case, because what is happening to young girls is brutal. There is the risk of bleeding to death. There is a huge risk of infection. Somebody earlier likened this to abortion in the 1950s. It is no better than the knitting needle and the gin, because there is no protection for these girls and absolutely no pain relief for them either. The perpetrators need to realise that we are serious about catching them and stopping FGM in this country.

I congratulate the Secretary of State for International Development, my right hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt), who is sitting on the Front Bench. She has put an enormous amount of work and funding behind trying to stop FGM in other countries around the world. I commend her for her work because it is really important that it is not just us who are doing this; we have to help other countries to stamp it out as well. As was said earlier, we have seen the success in Gambia, which is incredibly important to this campaign. It can be stamped out once we get over the barrier that it is not cultural and not religious—it is just sex abuse for these young girls. We must get that over, and I commend the Secretary of State for the work she has done and the huge amount of resources she has put into this issue.

I also commend the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion), who made a very passionate speech, a lot of which I was going to say but I cannot, because she has already said it. What has been really good about this debate is that it has united both sides of the House. We work better when we work together. There are things that divide us, but on issues such as this, we can all work together, just as we can on raising the age of marriage and forced marriage.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mrs Latham]

Yes, of course.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

William Cash Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

rose—

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

I agree entirely. My right hon. Friend eloquently underlines the point that the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford raised and that I am trying to make. We must have a meaningful vote before the final trade deal—indeed, the whole deal—is agreed by the Government.

Let me try to lower the temperature by going back, as I rarely do, to reminisce for a moment.

[Sir William Cash]

My right hon. and learned Friend and, I believe, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), both concede that amendment 7, at this crucial moment, is defective and would not work for a variety of reasons. I have indulged what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) has said about scrutiny and responsibility and the rest, but does he agree that it is not appropriate to press such an amendment to a vote when, in fact, it would make a nonsense of itself? It would be a meaningless vote about a meaningful vote.

[Mr Clarke]

No doubt my hon. Friend will catch your eye, Dame Rosie, when he will be able to explain why he thinks the amendment is technically defective, but this is the kind of argument we have had against every proposition that has been put forward throughout the passage of the Bill. I heard the Prime Minister personally promise us a meaningful vote and then go on to explain how the Bill would have to be used to make statutory instruments; so we are talking about the very wide powers in the Bill being used probably even before the end of the article 50 period—I think that is what she said. This amendment would prevent that; it would prevent those powers from being used until a statute has been passed by this House confirming its approval and also giving legal effect to whatever final agreement has been arrived at. I bow to my hon. Friend’s legal skill—he was indeed in parliamentary law when he practised—but I cannot for the life of me see why this is defective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I am extremely intrigued by the line that my right hon. and learned Friend has taken, with which I largely agree in relation not to the substance, but to the deficiencies he now seems to have accepted could, in some shape or other, be tidied up, as he put it, on Report if we were to get to that unfortunate situation. I simply ask him: is he able to elucidate how his amendment would actually work in practice?

[Mr Grieve]

I have been pleading with the Government throughout the past four weeks, pointing out to them that this is a really important amendment, and asking them please to respond to it. I have asked them what alternative they might have that could persuade me that they had a working proposal that should command the approval of the House and my own approval. I have been doing that repeatedly, and I was striving to achieve those things last week, but the blunt reality is—I am sorry to have to say this to the Committee—that I have been left in the lurch as a Back Bencher trying to improve this legislation, because silence has fallen. There has simply not been a credible explanation. The last explanation was, “Here is your written ministerial statement. That ought to be enough for you. In loyalty, you should now support the Government.” However, that does not answer the question.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

William Cash Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Leslie]

People will have many legitimate anxieties. We cannot simply erase a provision that currently has legal effect and provides legal protections without a statement from Ministers about the effect that that could have in law.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Leslie]

What a choice. I will give way to the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash).

[Sir William Cash]

One of the most fundamental questions is the notion of disapplying Acts of Parliament and the supremacy that the European Court of Justice asserts over our parliamentary Acts, which the amendments would effectively transfer to the Supreme Court. As for child protection, I was in part responsible for the Protection of Children Act 1978 and I presented the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014, which are intrinsic Westminster Acts. We do not need the charter to do such things; we can do them ourselves.

[Mr Leslie]

In no way would I wish to diminish the hon. Gentleman’s contribution to child protection and ensuring that legislation is as good as it possibly can be, but we currently have that extra level of protection that the charter of fundamental rights provides. New clause 16 simply asks for an analysis from Ministers of what would happen to child protection and to many other rights if we delete the charter from our current set of legal protections.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I place great respect on the fact that, for all the faults I can sometimes identify, when the European Union was established its founding fathers wished it to be based on principles not only of the rule of law, but of a vision of human society of which I have no difficulty approving.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Mr Grieve]

I will just make a little progress.

I do not have any problem with that vision at all. It worries me that, in the course of this debate on Brexit and our departure from the European Union, in this massive upheaval of venom about the EU that I have experienced personally in the past week, which seems to have no relation to reality at all and troubles me very much, we seem to be at risk of losing sight of these aspects of real progress within our society as a result of our EU membership. They are overlooked.

[Sir William Cash]

I have listened to my right hon. and learned Friend with great care and interest. Will he explain why the matters to which he and the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) have just referred could not be enacted? In fact, they often are enacted; I referred to the Protection of Children Act 1978, the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 and so forth. Does he not understand that it is terribly important to remember that implicit in the charter—as a distinguished lawyer, he knows this—is the power of the European Court to disapply Supreme Court enactments? The Factortame case was a good example of that in respect of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988.

[Mr Grieve]

I thought Factortame would come along at some point in this debate. My hon. Friend is of course right about that. I know that he has spent most of his career in this House agonising over the issue of the loss or diminution of parliamentary sovereignty. That is not a matter to be neglected, and if he will wait just a moment I shall come to that point.

As I said, by raising the points he has through tabling new clause 16, the hon. Member for Nottingham East has done the right thing, because we need to focus on what is going to happen after we have left the EU. Of course my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) is correct: the laws that we have enacted, as at the date of exit, as a consequence of our EU membership and the requirement for us to adhere to the charter, will remain in place, but it is interesting that they will thereafter be wholly unprotected. For example, they will not even enjoy the special protection that we crafted in the Human Rights Act for other areas deemed to be of importance.

One solution may be that, in due course, we ought to think carefully about whether there are other categories of rights additional to the European convention on human rights—heaven knows we have been here before—that ought to enjoy the sort of protection that the Human Rights Act affords other rights. That might well be the way forward. I agree with my hon. Friend that it is slightly strange that, in leaving the EU for national sovereignty reasons, we should then say that we will continue to entrench certain categories of rights protected in the charter and give them a status even higher than, for example, prohibiting torture under the ECHR. That might strike people as rather odd. On that basis, I am forced to conclude that, if we are leaving the EU, as we intend to do, the sort of entrenchment that has previously existed is not sustainable. We will have to come back to this House to consider how we move forward, but, in saying that, I think that this is a very big issue indeed.

It worries me that, when we leave in March 2019, there will be a hiatus. There will be a gap where areas of law that matter to people are not protected in any way at all. It is no surprise, therefore, that non-governmental organisations have been bombarding MPs with their anxiety. I think that that anxiety is misplaced, because I cannot believe that any Member on the Treasury Front Bench intends to diminish existing rights. However, we are in danger from two things. One is sclerosis—that the rights development will cease. Secondly, because those rights do not enjoy any form of special status—many, not necessarily all, should certainly do so—there will be occasions when we nibble away at them and then discover that they have been lost. For that reason, it is a really urgent issue for consideration by this House, preferably before or shortly after we leave.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a very good point. He highlights the difficulty faced by all Back Benchers, particularly Government Back Benchers, in presenting amendments—namely, the extent to which they should accept assurances from Front Benchers. That largely depends on how detailed the assurance is—whether it is woolly and vague or has some specificity to it. My judgment on whether I might press amendment 10 to the vote will depend on how specific Front Benchers can be in providing an assurance that they recognise that, even if there may be areas that remain to be debated, there is a core issue that must be addressed about the ability to bring a right of action in domestic law based on a failure to comply with a general principle of EU law when it concerns the operation of retained EU law.

Furthermore, because retained EU law has supremacy over domestic law, it must be possible that there might be instances in which our domestic law would have to be altered. The Government cannot then argue that that is an extraordinary thing to do, because they have themselves drafted this Bill in a way that allows for the possibility of UK domestic law being quashed. That will, I hope, be for a temporary period. Nevertheless, I am unable to understand how, during that temporary period, we can end up with a situation where the Government are perfectly happy to allow for the supremacy of EU law but remove the very principles that moderate it, ensure that it cannot be abused, and, in those areas that were within EU competence, provide a framework under which the Government are undertaking to operate unless or until they repeal the bits of retained EU legislation that they are bringing into our law.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Mr Grieve]

Before my hon. Friend intervenes, let me say this to him. The big argument against EU law is that it was either created by “this foreign body” or it was inflicted on us and we had to enact it in order to comply with our international legal obligations. In those circumstances, it is a bit odd if we start arguing that, in view of where it comes from, the possibility of, for example, knocking it on the head because it does not comply with its own general principles should be entirely abandoned.

[Sir William Cash]

I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will not go down the rabbit hole suggested by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), which is that we should accept this incongruous proposal when in fact it involves a fundamental principle of constitutional supremacy. I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) understands that. He is identifying a number of questions, and I entirely encourage him to continue to do so. I suggest, however, that it would be very unwise indeed to follow the advice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe as regards the Government accepting these amendments for the time being.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point. However, the purpose of this Bill, as I understand it, is to put together a package that enables a smooth transition from our presence within the European Union to our presence outside of it. That, of necessity, requires adjustments to the purity of his thinking about parliamentary sovereignty, which the Government have been required to acknowledge in the way that they have drafted this Bill. In those circumstances, it does not seem to be pushing the boundaries very much further, nor should it be seen as some treasonable article, for us to consider whether the general principles of EU law ought not to be capable of being invoked when they are probably the very thing that has, over the years, prevented the EU from turning into an even worse tyranny, as my hon. Friend would see it. [Interruption.] Well, I have to say, having listened to him, that that is usually the impression that has come across. He sees it as tyrannical because it is not moderated by the doctrine of our parliamentary sovereignty. I simply make that point; I do not wish to labour it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

It is a genuine pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who made his case extremely well and very convincingly—it is supported by many hon. Members on both sides of Committee.

I rise to speak to amendment 46, which is designed to ensure that we keep the charter of fundamental rights in EU retained law; amendment 335, which would maintain the principles of the Francovich ruling after exit day for pre-Brexit cases; amendments 285, 286 and 287, which make provision for existing arrangements to continue during a transitional period; and, finally, amendment 336, which makes provision for retaining existing principles of EU law within domestic law until the end of the transitional arrangements.

[Sir William Cash]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Paul Blomfield]

I think I could probably get a few more sentences into my stride before taking an intervention, but I certainly anticipate that I will take interventions from the hon. Gentleman.

The debate raises fundamental principles about the transposition of EU law and the important role of this House in holding the Government to account for their commitments. Last week, the focus of the debate was on the Government’s attempt to unravel the Prime Minister’s pledges on the transitional arrangements in her Florence speech, by the imposition of a defined exit day for all purposes. The Minister, the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), made a good attempt to defend the indefensible and not commit to the application of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union throughout the transitional period; that was not the Government’s line at the time. It would have been helpful if No. 10 had said a week ago what it said this morning, namely that the Court of Justice will have jurisdiction throughout the transitional period. If that had happened, the Minister would not have been left in such a mess.

--- Later in debate ---

We recognise that steps will be required to make the charter operable in domestic law, and there has been some debate on that already. There is no reason why this House could not direct courts in the UK to interpret retained law by taking into account Luxembourg’s interpretations, such as is the case with the Human Rights Act and the ECHR in the Strasbourg Court. That matters, and I will explain why the inclusion of the charter in retained EU law is critical to maintaining and upholding those rights.

[Sir William Cash]

Is the hon. Gentleman about to move on to explain why Tony Blair and Lord Goldsmith fought so hard to obtain protocol 36—I think it was that one—in the Lisbon treaty, which the Conservative party opposed? At the same time as advancing the charter of fundamental rights, will he explain why we cannot pass such legislation as we wish to in this place?

[Paul Blomfield]

I was not about to go on to that, but clearly I am now. The hon. Gentleman knows that the charter was not binding when it was first adopted in 2000. It was made legally binding by the Lisbon treaty of 2007, which entered into force in 2009. It has, as the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield pointed out, increased in significance, and the rights that it contains have become more visible and correspondingly more effective. Labour supported the charter then, and we support it now, because it has enhanced and improved European human rights protection, and by doing so it has significantly developed the quality of human rights protection in the UK. The wider point that the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) makes is not relevant to the issue under discussion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield]

We are talking about statute law, and about rights such as the one on which the right hon. Gentleman’s friend and colleague, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, relied. I think that that point is clear.

Returning to the comparison of the charter with the Human Rights Act, as well as the wider class of applicants for which it provides, it allows for stronger remedies. If any national court finds that any national law is incompatible with a directly effective provision of the charter, it must disapply contravening primary legislation or quash secondary legislation. We have exercised some of the arguments around that issue, but that is much stronger than a notification of incompatibility. We should be in no doubt that losing the charter means losing rights.

[Sir William Cash]

Has the hon. Gentleman considered the impact in relation to alleged and actual terrorists on the question of national security and case law? Many people who would like those individuals to be deported would find that extremely difficult under the principles of the charter because of the provisions relating to the protection of family life, which have been badly abused.

[Paul Blomfield]

In his keenness to tackle the argument, I think that the hon. Gentleman has missed the point. That has nothing to do with the charter.

Let me turn to a separate but related point on schedule 1, which states:

“There is no right of action in domestic law”

post exit

“based on a failure to comply”

with EU general principles. The schedule also prevents courts from ruling that a particular Act was “unlawful” or from quashing any action on the basis that it was not compatible with the general principles. Damages are not allowed, so general principles are rendered irrelevant, which also reduces rights. Our amendment 336 seeks to address that by retaining the existing principles of EU law regardless of whether they originated in case law, treaties, EU legislation or directives. The date on which that retention would end would be the end of a transitional period.

Let me turn to our amendment 335 to schedule 1 on the Francovich rule. I shall be brief because others have tabled similar amendments, which we support, and I want to give them a full opportunity to make their case without my anticipating what they are going to say.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I am not sure where this devilish plot has come from—I have made no such suggestion; I was simply pointing out to my right hon. and learned Friend that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex, the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, mentioned earlier, some of the amendments run the risk of creating more, not less, uncertainty, notwithstanding their perfectly laudable and genuine aims.

If my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment were passed, it would no longer be clear how common law rules would interact with a particular provision of retained EU law in the event of a conflict between the two. Across a range of issues, from animal welfare to competition law, the concern is that such an approach would create uncertainty about the legal position of citizens and businesses. I am sure that this was not his intention. I am not looking for devilish plots on either side of the House, but I do fear that that would be the practical reality.

[Sir William Cash]

On the subject of devilish plots and “The Screwtape Letters”, may I refer my hon. Friend to chapter 12 of Lord Bingham’s magisterial work, “The Rule of Law and the Sovereignty of Parliament?”? In this context, its reference to the rule of law is highly relevant, simply because it refers, indirectly or directly, to the issue of the constitutional supremacy of law making and the construction placed upon it by the courts themselves. On that issue, the rule of law does, I think, have considerable salience.

[Dominic Raab]

My hon. Friend makes a considered and thoughtful point. Given the changes we are making—for the purposes of greater certainty and clarity—I respectfully suggest to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and other hon. Members across the House that it is worth having some clarity and certainty on this point.

I turn now to amendments 285 and 286. We discussed similar amendments from the leader of the Labour party on day one of the Committee in relation to clause 6, and for the same reasons given during that debate, we cannot support them. I note again what the Prime Minister said in her Florence speech:

“The United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union on the 29th March 2019”.

I will not speculate on the contents of the withdrawal agreement. The Government will do whatever is necessary to prepare for our exit and have already made it clear that separate primary legislation will be brought forward to implement the terms of the withdrawal agreement and any implementation period. With that in mind, the amendments would pre-empt and prejudge the outcome of the negotiations and introduce a straitjacket of inflexibility for the duration of any implementation period. We are all in the House committed to securing the very best deal with our EU friends and partners, and I respectfully suggest that the amendments would undermine that objective. I urge the leader of the Labour party not to press them.

--- Later in debate ---

It was reported just last night that a distinguished British jurist who had been put up to be a judge at the International Court of Justice has had to withdraw from the race, because other countries in the UN are keener on somebody from another country. Even as a Scottish nationalist, I can see that that is a setback for the United Kingdom’s world standing. For so long as Scotland remains part of the United Kingdom, I would like it to be an outward-looking country—indeed, I would very much like the rest of the UK to continue to be outward looking even after Scotland leaves the UK —but that sort of thing does not inspire confidence in the British Government’s adherence to international human rights norms. I invite the Government to think again, and I look forward to hearing their response to several questions that I have raised this afternoon, the most important of which relates to the statement by the Prime Minister’s spokesperson, but equally as important is the situation of Northern Ireland.

[Sir William Cash]

As I have already suggested, both Tony Blair and Lord Goldsmith strongly resisted the charter of fundamental rights being made part of UK law, as made clear by my European Scrutiny Committee in its report of April 2014, which anyone can read, so it is impossible to understand why the Labour party has now taken retaining the charter as its position—although as someone said to Alice said in “Through the Looking Glass”:

“I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”

The Conservative party categorically ruled out bringing the charter into UK law in our manifesto, and we also voted against the Lisbon treaty. That included the charter, which the European Court of Justice has since ruled did apply to us, because it includes the application of EU law as applied by the European Court of Justice, including assertions of constitutional supremacy over our Acts of Parliament and the vicarious power to disapply those Acts. An example of that—I mentioned this in my exchange with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—is the striking down by the House of Lords of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 in the Factortame case. For all those reasons, it would be unconscionable to include the charter in this Bill.

With great respect to those who have tabled amendments, the European Court of Justice’s interpretation and the case law, which is so greatly liable to EU jurisprudential elasticity by the Court itself, would thereby enable the UK Supreme Court to disapply Acts of Parliament. That is absolutely fundamental, and it would also be completely undemocratic. It has already happened under the present aegis in the case of the 1988 Act, but it would happen more and more frequently, and we would simply have to accept it, because it is not a question of opinion; it is a question of law and of fact.

[Mr Jenkin]

It is for the European Court of Justice to continue to interpret what the charter of fundamental rights actually means within the European Union, so if the charter was incorporated into our law, what relationship does my hon. Friend think would exist between our Supreme Court and the interpretations that would continue to be developed in the European Union?

[Sir William Cash]

The Supreme Court would be applying the European interpretation in that context, and I simply say that it will involve disapplication of law. It is a matter not of assertion but of fact and law that that is precisely what will happen.

I urge my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and others not to press their amendments on the charter, because to do so would be totally unacceptable. I refer to what I have alluded to already: the principle set out by Lord Justice Bingham in chapter 12 of his magisterial book on “The Rule of Law and the Sovereignty of Parliament?”, in which he publicly criticised the attitude of Baroness Hale, now President of the Supreme Court, and Lord Hope of Craighead in suggesting that the courts have constitutional authority, as against an Act of Parliament. With respect to the whole question of parliamentary sovereignty and the issue of the courts, he says that various remarks had been made but:

“No authority was cited to support them, and no detailed reasons were given.

I cannot for my part accept that my colleagues’ observations are correct... To my mind, it has been convincingly shown”—

by Professor Goldsworthy, one of the greatest authorities on this subject—

“that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty has been recognised as fundamental in this country not because the judges invented it but because it has for centuries been accepted as such by judges and others officially concerned in the operation of our constitutional system. The judges did not by themselves establish the principle and they cannot by themselves change it… What is at stake”—

said Professor Goldsworthy—

“is the location of ultimate decision-making authority… If the judges were to repudiate the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, by refusing to allow Parliament to infringe on unwritten rights, they would be claiming that ultimate authority for themselves.”

Moreover, Lord Bingham went on to say that they would then be transferring the rights of Parliament to judges:

“It would be a transfer of power initiated by the judges, to protect rights chosen by them, rather than one brought about democratically by parliamentary enactment or popular referendum.”

With some irony, the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has put some of the contrary arguments.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making some excellent points about parliamentary sovereignty, but I am not sure the point has yet been made that there has been a cosy consensus in this debate so far that everything about European human rights is wonderful and that we want to transfer those European human rights into our own law. Actually, many of us think that the advancement of European so-called human rights has been to the detriment of the rights of other people, particularly religious people, to find their own space, because European equality laws trump all other laws. When we regain parliamentary sovereignty, in this House and through our democracy, we can start asserting real human rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I agree with my hon. Friend’s general proposition, to which I would add that it is up to us to make our own laws. We can listen to the arguments, we can make the amendments and we can recognise human rights, as well as all the other things, as I did with the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014. I entirely agree with his sentiment for that reason.

Lord Bingham went on to say:

“We live in a society dedicated to the rule of law”—

I note the reference to that by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield—

“in which Parliament has power, subject to limited, self-imposed restraints, to legislate as it wishes; in which Parliament may therefore legislate in a way which infringes the rule of law; and in which the judges, consistently with their constitutional duty to administer justice according to the laws and usages of the realm, cannot fail to give effect to such legislation if it is clearly and unambiguously expressed.”

I ought to add that, in fact, Lady Hale revisited that territory, before she was made President of the Supreme Court, in a speech in Kuala Lumpur on 9 November 2016.

The Conservative party opposed Lisbon, which conferred treaty status on the charter. I say this to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield with all respect, because we get on pretty well and we have had several chats over the past few days, but I trust he will recall his opposition to the Lisbon treaty and, therefore, to the charter when he was shadow Attorney General—he followed me in that post. More specifically, I hope he will recall the evidence he gave to the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, which was cited in its report published on 9 May 2016—

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Sir William Cash]

I know my right hon. and learned friend knows what I am about to say, but may I finish the quotation? He said that

“the European Court of Human Rights is a very benign institution, whereas I happen to think that the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has predatory qualities to it that could be very inimical to some of our national practices”.

I would suggest that those are in respect of the question of disapplication of Acts of Parliament.

[Mr Grieve]

May I gently say to my hon. Friend that although this is fascinating, we are actually talking about retained EU law which will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union? I do have criticisms of the CJEU and the way it has operated at times, and I have had the pleasure, or misfortune, of appearing before it. Its teleological principles and its purposive interpretation of law have often been challenging in our national setting, although it is not a pariah court and by international standards it is a pretty good tribunal. So I stand by the points I made on that occasion, but they in no way diminish or undermine anything that I have said here this afternoon.

[Sir William Cash]

I simply add that I understand this with reference to the European Court in its existing situation, because not until we leave the EU are we able to avoid the jurisdiction of the European Court, so that applies at least for the next two years and probably for the two after that. God knows what they will do in the meantime. My European Scrutiny Committee has been holding meetings already on the European laws that have been proposed since the general election, but the problem is—

[Wera Hobhouse]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir William Cash]

No, I will not, because, as the Chair will appreciate, I have taken a lot of interventions, as I did last time, when I took six or eight. It is impossible to get the arguments out in reply to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, with whom I have been discussing this for an extremely long time—for the best part of 20 years—if I am constrained in this way, so I am not going to take any further interventions.

What lies behind these amendments is not only the charter itself, but the whole role of judicial interpretation and jurisprudence in its application to the UK; by virtue of the way in which the amendments would apply, the Supreme Court would inherit the power to invalidate and disapply Acts of Parliament. This is a matter of the gravest constitutional significance and it goes to the heart of the stability of this country and its rule of law. In turn, that goes to the heart of our democratic system and the right of the British people to govern themselves, whichever party they come from, in respect of how they vote in free elections, exercising their freedom of choice as to whom they decide to govern them until the next general election.

All this is intrinsically bound up with the claimed virtues of the European Court itself—it is not impartial. As I said in the previous debate, when the European Court adjudicated on the Van Gend en Loos case and Costa v. ENEL in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, it was doing so on its own initiative, without any basis in EU treaties, until the Lisbon treaty, which we on this side of the House, including my right hon. and learned Friend, opposed. That is what did this. We opposed it. He opposed it. I simply make that point to put it on the record.

This Lisbon treaty, as the European Scrutiny Committee also demonstrated, was the Giscard d’Estaing proposal for a European constitution by any other name. It is part and parcel of the other characteristic of the European Court, which is the drive towards political integration and its interpretation of law by the purposive rule, even when the wording in question is neither obscure nor ambiguous. Furthermore, many different purposes may, from time to time, be in conflict with one another, but the driving force for them is the integrationist road map from which it never deviates and never will. It is the ultimate engineer of European integration. Equally, it has adopted a method of interpretation that neutralises the principle of the conferral of powers that were meant to be limited under articles 4 and 5 of the treaty on European Union. By doing so, it has extended the range and effect of European law by leaps and bounds. With that comes the extensions of competence, which in turn are everlastingly overarching and limitless. The European Court has never once annulled a general EU legislative act, except on one occasion, and when it did so, it was re-enacted almost immediately. It is permanently on the march in favour of political integration and by any standard is therefore more a political than judicial court.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

As I said, the drafting of amendments is quite a complex matter, and I am the first to accept that an amendment may not meet the exact needs of the Government, even if the Government were to seek to accept it. None the less, the position is very simple and I can only repeat it: amendment 10 will be put to the vote unless the Government give some satisfactory assurances that they will respond to it.

[Sir William Cash]

Let me conclude. I do hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will not do what he has just suggested. I say that because those measures are defective not only in the way that he has described, but in respect of paragraph 5 of schedule 1. Amendment 10 refers to paragraphs 1 to 3, but there are also difficulties in relation to paragraph 5, which I will not go into now because I have made all my remarks.

I sincerely urge my right hon. and learned Friend to listen to the arguments and to accept the fact that, for very good reasons, it would not be appropriate to press these amendments to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cox]

The point is that these broad and general rights are ripe with value judgments. Quite often, they are not appropriately dealt with by six or seven elderly white judges in a Supreme Court; they are better resolved on the Floor of this House and by a democratic vote in this Parliament.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Cox]

If my hon. Friend will forgive me for a moment, I need to develop an argument, because I want to move on.

Let us accept for the moment that there is a second and perfectly legitimate way, which international law accepts. International law does not require subscribing nations of the United Nations to adopt a Bill of Rights, and neither does the European Court of Human Rights—it never did require us to do so. It looked at the substantive and practical effect and how those rights were substantively protected in the jurisdiction. If we accept that for a moment, why should we not proceed by means of the Government’s proposed policy of examining specific statutory remedies and specific rules of common law, and considering whether the right is satisfactorily protected?

Some of us believe that the courts are not always the right place in which to deal with these matters. For example, article 20 of the charter of fundamental rights simply contains a right to equality before the law. That right has been enshrined in the common law in this country for centuries. Why should we have it in the charter of fundamental rights? Some say that there will be a problem between the two charters—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

For the sake of the record, I would be grateful to my right hon. Friend—I nearly said “learned” because he is doing such a great job—if he also looked at paragraph 5, which, in terms of interpretation, does relate to schedule 1 as well, and so cannot be left out.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Oddly enough, I was going to say that, so I will not do so now. I agree with that. While we are at it, I hope that the Solicitor General will also tell us that paragraph 3(1) of schedule 1 will be similarly adjusted, because, clearly, we need the same principle to apply to a private right of action as applies to the quashing of an enactment.

Provided that those changes are made, I think that the basic articulation of clause 5 and schedule 1, unlike clause 6, is in reasonably good shape and therefore I hope that, as well as the very splendid offer of a full analysis of the rights, we will get a very clear statement from the Minister about the kind of amendments that will be brought forward on Report. That would certainly make me more than willing to support the Government tonight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

On amendment 10, I am sure that my hon. Friend observed what was said about the absence of reference to paragraph 5 of schedule 1, which deals specifically with the question of interpretation. Does he also agree that one of the greatest dangers is the idea that the Supreme Court, of its own volition after we have left, will be able to disapply any legislation? Does he not agree that that is a fundamental principle, too?

[Robert Neill]

I think the most important principle is legal certainty. It may well be very sensible for us to start to remove, as soon as possible, bits of retained law that we do not want to keep, but it seems to me to be equally implausible to retain something without following through on the logic from whence it comes. I recognise my hon. Friend’s point, but the issue, as my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) pointed out, is one of the Bill’s own making. I hope that the Government will table an amendment—before the Report stage—to remove these internal contradictions sooner rather than later. I think we all want to be in the same place, but justice requires not only independence of the courts but a proper framework in which it can operate. Above all, it requires certainty. The Bill as it stands runs the risk of creating uncertainty, and that cannot be in anybody’s interest.

I have been struck by the tone of the responses we have had from the Government Front Bench so far, but it is really important to stress that this is a matter of very significant principle. We wish to give the Government the best possible fair wind. I have no doubt whatever about the intentions, credit and integrity of the Solicitor General, who will reply to the debate shortly. What he says will weigh very heavily with many of us. I am sure he will do something that is constructive and helpful, and will help to improve the Bill. This is an important point that I wish to put on the record, because if there is not something of that kind, we will have to return to the issue as the Bill progresses. I hope that that will not be necessary. I believe it will not be necessary, but it is important to stress how fundamentally significant it is. These matters may seem technical, but they are vital to the underpinning of a sound piece of proposed legislation going forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

With respect to my right hon. and learned Friend, I have talked in detail about the various paragraphs of schedule 1, and I have been looking in particular at paragraph 3. In response to the clarifications sought by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), I made sure that all of paragraph 3 would be the subject of that clarification and the tabling of an amendment. Neither my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe nor I are fans of having our cake and eating it when it comes to EU withdrawal and, with respect, I am offering something substantial here that will certainly satisfy him this evening.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Lady Hermon]

rose—

[The Solicitor General]

I will give way to my hon. Friend.

[Sir William Cash]

I hope that the Solicitor General will be good enough to look at the deficiencies in amendment 10. Paragraph 5 of schedule 1 deals with interpretation and therefore also applies to paragraphs 1 to 3. As he quite rightly said before he took the intervention, the matter is being scrutinised. As Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, we have it on our agenda, and we are scrutinising all such matters and will continue to do so, because we want to be sure that this House is not overridden by disapplication.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I am always interested in looking at how one particular paragraph of a schedule applies to another, but I am particularly interested in paragraph 3.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

William Cash Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Frank Field]

No, I will not give way. I want other people to be able to contribute to the debate.

The second reason why I feel disappointment at the Government’s stance is that they are misreading the other side with whom we are negotiating. A British assumption is always to allow give and take, but we now have the Barnier rule of all take and no give. I will in a moment comment on how we should respond to that. Anybody who is serious, as all of us in the Committee have been, about wishing to award equal status and citizenship to EU citizens in this country know that those negotiations could have been over in half an hour. It was never ever the intention but for the other side to tick that off and say it was very good. Millions of people could have been put at their ease about their lives—both Britons living in the European Union and European citizens, as they will become, living in Britain—and we should consider that very carefully in our negotiations from now on.

The third disappointment is that the Government have produced such a Bill. When we were campaigning to leave, I thought we would have a Bill with two, three or four clauses to get us out. I know that the Government have been beguiled by its first title—the great repeal Bill—with some group of clever people thinking it can be great only if it is large, rather than aiming to be effective. I do not believe that a Bill of this size, timetabled as it will be to deliver it for the Government, actually stands much chance of getting through the House of Lords. Hence, my emphasis on the rescue launch waiting in the form of my four new clauses, including this new clause, which I have had such pleasure in moving.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the House of Lords, which is of course unelected and which itself decided to pass the European Union Referendum Act 2015, really has no justification whatsoever for attempting to obstruct, delay or undermine this Bill?

[Frank Field]

A very important lesson needs to be learned by some of those in the House of Lords who think they can wreck the Bill and wear us down so that Brexit never takes place. There is a very important convention—the Salisbury convention—and there is a very important difference between a referendum and a party’s manifesto. The Salisbury convention allows us to give and take on the important parts of a manifesto—the parts to which Governments rightly feel committed, and which they wish to pursue in Parliament so that when they stand for re-election they can say they have done the job they promised to do.

This is a different ball game. As I tried to say at the beginning, it is difficult for us all to come to terms with the role we have as MPs and the role we have in a post-referendum debate. I think their lordships should know that if they try to wreck the Bill, many of us will push the nuclear button. Labour wants to see the House of Lords go—I am surprised there was not a cheer at that point—but their lordships will sound their own death knell. Not one of them is elected, and none of them has any standing whatsoever in preventing the Government from inviting the House of Commons to implement the referendum decision, as we are doing today.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Mr Steve Baker)]

I am extremely grateful to you, Mr Hoyle. I very much hope that my voice makes it through these remarks.

I rise to support clause 1 stand part and to speak to Government amendments 381, 382 and 383. It may help the House and members of the public if I say that the decisions on those amendments will be taken on days seven and eight.

Clause 1 reads:

“The European Communities Act 1972 is repealed on exit day.”

It is a simple clause, but it could scarcely be more significant. In repealing the European Communities Act 1972, the clause will be a historic step in delivering our exit from the European Union, in accordance with last year’s referendum. I hope that all people on all sides of this issue can agree that the repeal of the Act is a necessary step as we leave the European Union.

[Sir William Cash]

Does my hon. Friend recall that the official Opposition voted against the Bill on Second Reading and therefore the repeal of the 1972 Act? They still claim that this Bill is not fit for purpose and that it usurps parliamentary sovereignty, when in fact it does exactly the opposite.

[Mr Baker]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend and I look forward to seeing whether Opposition Members support clause 1 stand part.

If we were not to repeal the European Communities Act, we would still, from the perspective of EU law, exit the European Union at the end of the article 50 process, but there would be confusion and uncertainty about the law on our own statute book. For example, it would be unclear whether UK or EU law would take precedence if there was a conflict between them. The status of new EU law would also be unclear once the UK left the EU.

I intend first to set out briefly the effect of the European Communities Act on our legal system and the implications of its repeal. The UK is a “dualist” state, meaning that a treaty, even when ratified, does not alter our laws unless it is incorporated into domestic law by legislation. Parliament must pass legislation before the rights and obligations in a treaty have effect in our law. The European Communities Act gave EU law supremacy over UK law. Without it, EU law would not apply in the UK. The 1972 Act has two main provisions. Section 2(1) ensures rights and obligations in the EU treaties and regulations are directly applicable in the UK legal system. They apply directly without the need for Parliament to pass specific domestic implementing legislation. This bears repeating in the context of the clauses to follow.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

Indeed. I have often thought that the scenery of our constitution had remained in place throughout my lifetime, but not the practical effect the electors of this country expected it to have.

[Sir William Cash]

In response, vicariously to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), may I point out that most decisions taken by the Council of Ministers are effectively made by consensus behind closed doors, with no record of who said what, how the decision was arrived at, or, unlike this House, with no record of any of the proceedings either?

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield]

I am surprised that such an ardent Brexiteer as the right hon. Gentleman does not understand what leaving the European Union involves. We do.

Until last Thursday, the debate on clause 1 looked fairly straightforward. The article 50 notification made our exit from the European Union in March 2019 a legal certainty, so, for the purposes of the Bill, exit day could be left in the hands of Parliament. But then the Government did something needless: they tabled amendments 381 and 382, putting a specified exit date—and, indeed, a specified exit time: 11 pm, or midnight Brussels time—into the Bill. Their consequential amendment 383 seems to contradict the other amendments in some regards, which underlines the chaotic way in which the Government have approached the Bill, but taken together, the intention of the three amendments is clear.

[Sir William Cash]

The rather mysterious explanation that the hon. Gentleman gave to my right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson) needs some elucidation. Would he be good enough to explain whether leaving the European Union means repealing the European Communities Act 1972, and why Labour voted against the Bill on Second Reading?

[Paul Blomfield]

I would have thought that it would be as clear to the hon. Gentleman as it is to me that leaving the European Union does involve revoking the European Communities Act. I will go on to explain why we have concerns about the Government’s amendments and the different decisions within them.

--- Later in debate ---

During the highly successful 45 years in which we have been one of the leading influential players in the European Union, the British Government have been the advocates of more regulation and higher standards. No British Government have ever taken up the cause of deregulating in Europe. The Barroso Commission, which was very sensitive to what appeared to be public feeling, was very keen to be a deregulatory commission. It gave it up. As one of the commissioners explained to me, it could not get any European Government, including the British Government, to come forward with any deregulatory proposals. Vice-President Tindemans, who was a very keen deregulator, was extremely anxious to get proposals. We tried to get some deregulatory proposals when we were in coalition. Not one Department could produce any that it was anxious to repeal. The joy that some people feel over the repeal of the European Communities Act is splendidly symbolic.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

If there is anybody in this House who knows each of the 1,600 regulations in meticulous detail, it is my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash).

[Sir William Cash]

Indeed. I wish to challenge my right hon. and learned Friend on his assertion that the manner in which the Council of Ministers has been operating has been adequately democratic and transparent. Can he please explain to us, from his own extensive experience, how it works and will he deny that, for the most part, it is done behind closed doors and that it is done by consensus, so nobody knows who decides what, how and when?

[Mr Clarke]

Under the Major Government, we introduced a process whereby parts of the European Council meetings were held in public. The Council of Ministers do hold public sessions, and an attempt was made to reach decisions in public sessions. It probably still goes on. [Interruption.] It does not amount to very much.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

No, let me finish my answer. We did try to tackle this criticism. What happened was that each of the 28 Ministers gave little speeches entirely designed for their national newspapers and television, and negotiations and discussion did not make much practical progress. When the public sessions were over, the Ministers went into private session to negotiate and reach agreement. I used to find that the best business at the European Council was usually done over lunch. I have attended more European Council meetings than most people have had hot dinners. The dinners and the lunches tended to be where reasonable understandings were made. There were very few votes, but Governments made it clear when they opposed anything. When the council was over, everyone gave a press conference. It was a slightly distressing habit, because some of the accounts of Ministers for the assembled national press did not bear a close resemblance to what they had been saying inside the Council. I regret to say that some British Ministers fell into that trap. British Ministers and Ministers of other nationalities who had fiercely advocated regulating inside the Council would hold a press conference describing their valiant efforts to block what had now come in, which confirms some of my hon. Friend’s criticisms.

The fact is that most British Governments made it clear what they opposed and what they did not. If a regulation was passed in their presence, they had to come back here to explain why they had gone along with it. Now, that is enough on the European Communities Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I want to start by simply outlining that, contrary to what the hon. Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins) has just suggested about there being weak arguments for why we should leave the EU and repeal the European Communities Act 1972, it is absolutely essential that we do so if we are going to have a self-respecting, self-governing democratic country. The Bill and this whole issue are about one main question, namely democracy, which is what everything else necessarily flows from. All the economic arguments and questions relating to trade and other matters are ultimately dependent on the question of whether we have the right to govern ourselves in this sacred House of Commons. That is the basis on which the people of this country make decisions, of their own free choice, in general elections—whether it is to vote for the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats, the SNP or the Conservative party—and then a decision is made in this House as to how they will be governed.

I repeat what I have said: we have just had Remembrance Day. I simply want people to reflect for one moment on the fact that those millions of people who died in both world wars died for a reason. It was to do with sustaining the freedom and democracy of this House.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Does not democracy presume that a Government would listen to the will of the House of Commons, whose Members are individually elected by their constituencies? Would it not be slightly odd, therefore, to proceed with the Bill without taking out the Henry VIII powers?

[Sir William Cash]

Put simply, on the European Union Referendum Act 2015, which was a sovereign Act of this House—the point that the hon. Gentleman has just made—the House of Commons agreed, by six to one, that it would deliberately transfer to the people the decision whether to leave or remain in the European Union. Unless that Act is repealed, I do not believe that that decision should be returned to by the House.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

The hon. Gentleman has referred to the millions of people who died in two world wars. Those two world wars took place before the existence of the European Union and we in Europe, including this country, Germany and France, have lived in peace for decades. Is not it the case that France, Germany and other countries will now never, ever go to war because of the European Union?

[Sir William Cash]

The answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is that no two democracies have ever gone to war with one another. I declare a personal interest in this issue because my father was killed in Normandy, fighting for this country, and I am proud that he got the Military Cross for that reason. This is something that many people in this country really understand and believe. It is not easy to explain, but it is to do with the fact that people understand the real reasons that self-government is so important.

The proposal in the European Communities Act 1972, which we are now repealing, was the greatest power grab since Oliver Cromwell. It was done in 1972 with good intentions. I voted yes in 1975 and I did it for the reason the hon. Gentleman mentions: I believed it would create stability in Europe. The problem is that it has done exactly the opposite. Look, throughout the countries of the European Union, at the grassroots movements and the rise of the far right, which I deeply abhor and have opposed ever since I set about the Maastricht rebellion in 1990. I set out then why I was so opposed to the Maastricht treaty: it was creating European Government and making this country ever more subservient to the rulemaking of the European Union. As I said in response to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), that has been conducted behind closed doors. We have been shackled by European laws. He asked at one point if we could give one example. The ports regulation is a very good example. We fought that in the European Scrutiny Committee and in the House of Commons, but we were not allowed to make any difference to it. It was opposed by the Government, it was opposed by the Opposition, it was opposed by all the port employers and it was opposed by the trade unions. What could we do about it? Absolutely nothing!

[John Redwood]

Does my hon. Friend agree that once Parliament has passed the repeal of the 1972 Act, Ministers will only be able to do things that this Parliament permits them to do? Today, Ministers have to do many things that the European Union insists on, which this Parliament cannot discuss or overturn.

[Sir William Cash]

There are at least 12,000 regulations, every one of which would have required a whole Act of Parliament, with amendments and stages in both Houses. A transcript would have been available. People would have known who voted which way and why, and known the outcome of what was a democratic process. Instead, as I said to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe—even he conceded that I was right on this—the process is conducted, over bibulous lunches and in the Council of Ministers, in a manner completely lacking in democratic legitimacy, yet, because of consensus arrangements behind closed doors, it becomes part of our law through section 2 of the 1972 Act. It is imposed on us by our voluntary consent. It is therefore up to us and the people of this country to decide, by their voluntary consent and their freedom of choice, to get out of this, just as it was brought in by an Act of Parliament, without a referendum, in 1972.

[Wera Hobhouse]

Has the hon. Gentleman not shown a deep misunderstanding of how the European Union works through consensus and participatory democracy? Rather than one country dictating to another, that is the whole spirit of the European Union. No one country is sovereign, but decisions are taken in the round.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I am sorry to disillusion the hon. Lady. I have been in this House for 33 years and I have been on the European Scrutiny Committee for 32 of them. I can absolutely assure her that what she says is simply not reflected by the practice of the European Union: the system is essentially undemocratic.

[Antoinette Sandbach]

Does my hon. Friend not feel that it is ironic that all 12,000 EU regulations will be imported into UK law under a process that will not have the detailed scrutiny of the House, because Henry VIII powers will be used to do it?

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend might just reflect on the fact that there is no other way of transposing the legislation. I drafted the original repeal Bill, so I understand it very well. I did so before the referendum, in fact, because—I say this to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe—I believed we would win. In reality, once we have brought this into UK law, we will be able to have our own Bills—on agriculture, fisheries, customs, immigration, and various other parts of our constitutional arrangements—that can be properly discussed and amended.

[Paul Scully (Sutton and Cheam) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that every single one of the regulations coming into UK law is already abided by in this country and in this Parliament and are to its satisfaction at the moment?

[Sir William Cash]

Yes, the reality is that the Bill, if and when it goes through—and I believe it will—will incorporate into UK law EU legislation already consented to in the way that my hon. Friend mentions. We have agreed to them, but unfortunately they have not had the democratic legitimacy that will be conferred upon them when the Bill goes through.

I proceed now to the important question of the European Court of Justice. I made this point to the Prime Minister about 10 days ago and again to the Brexit Secretary last week. I wish to mention three pieces of case law that we inherited when the treaties that had accumulated after 1956 came upon us through section 2 of the 1972 Act. The first two are Van Gend en Loos in 1963 and Costa v. ENEL in 1964. In its judgment in the first case, the European Court asserted that

“the Community constitutes a new legal order in international law for whose benefit the states have limited their sovereign rights”.

In Costa v. ENEL, the Court ruled:

“The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights”.

In 1970, in the Handelsgesellschaft case, the Court said that community law should take precedence even over the constitutional laws of member states, including basic entrenched laws relating to fundamental rights. It does not get more profound than that. Those decisions are mere assertions by the Court, yet under section 3 of the 1972 Act, we agree to abide by them.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

Will my hon. Friend agree that all treaties involve a pooling of sovereignty? We gave up immense sovereignty when we joined the United Nations and NATO, membership of which we would never dream of renouncing. The European Court exists to enforce treaty rights, including obligations on members. Does he recall probably the most important case there of modern times, when the British Government took the European Central Bank there to assert our treaty rights so that the City of London and our financial services industry could have a passport to financial services in the eurozone? It was worth thousands of jobs and showed the benefit of the Court in upholding treaty rights, including the most important treaty rights of the UK.

[Sir William Cash]

I also remember the case of Factortame, when Lord Bridge made it clear that by Parliament’s voluntary consent, given by virtue of the 1972 Act, an Act of Parliament—namely, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988—could be struck down. I am not trying to be disingenuous. The fact is that the 1972 Act empowers the European Court to strike down UK Acts of Parliament. That is what sovereignty is all about.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman talks about sovereignty and the pooling of sovereignty. Building on the point from the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), how does the hon. Gentleman think we will achieve new trade deals without ceding sovereignty, given that all trade deals—like EU membership, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman just pointed out—require the ceding of sovereignty?

[Sir William Cash]

I must say to the hon. Gentleman, and to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, that there is a world of difference between that and having agreements by virtue of treaties in international law, which are actually matters on which it is possible to make decisions without being absorbed into and entangled in a legal order. That is the difference. It is the acquis communautaire and its principles that completely undermine the sovereignty of this House. I am prepared to concede that some people—

[Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

rose—

[Sir William Cash]

I am sure that my hon. Friend will be making this point, but I will try to anticipate it. There are circumstances in which the pooling of sovereignty by virtue of, for example, NATO is claimed to be a genuine pooling, but it is not, because it is possible to withdraw from it. The whole point about the European Communities Act is that it is not possible to withdraw from it except by repealing it in this manner. That is what we are doing now.

[Robert Neill]

My hon. Friend has strongly emphasised the importance of the sovereignty of the House, and I agree with him. Is it not all the more important that, as we leave, this sovereign House should have a meaningful vote on the terms on which we leave, rather than there being a “take it or leave it” vote at the end of the process? Is that not the ultimate expression of sovereignty, and will my hon. Friend therefore support it?

[Sir William Cash]

The answer is that I am supporting the outcome of the referendum, which, by virtue of our sovereign Acts of Parliament, we decided that we would pass over—

--- Later in debate ---

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his point of order. We are also debating clause 1, which is fairly wide-ranging, so the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) is in order.

[Sir William Cash]

I had actually spotted that, Dame Rosie, and I am most grateful to you for confirming that I am in order.

Let me now touch on some of the issues that arise from this continuous emphasis on the virtues of the European Court of Justice. There is the constitutional principle, which I have already explained, and there is the case law, which I have also already explained. But it goes further than that. The very great Lord Justice Bingham, in chapter 12 of his book “The Rule of Law”, describes the relationship between the courts and Parliament. He comes down unequivocally in favour of Parliament. He makes it clear that when Parliament passes a Bill such as the one that we are to enact, it will override all the laws in the European system that have shackled us so far, and also all the Court judgments, save only that we have agreed, by virtue of the retained law, to transpose some aspects of the process to which we have become used, and which we can decide what to do with at a future date.

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Sir William Cash]

I certainly will; I should be only too delighted. I have been waiting to hear from my right hon. and learned Friend, whom I happen to know very well, and for whom I have great respect. I shall listen to him with interest.

[Mr Grieve]

I do not think my hon. Friend can have it both ways. A moment ago, he was talking about direct effect. There is no doubt that if we leave the European Union, direct effect will cease on the day we go; but, as I am sure he knows, we are signed up to about 800 treaties with arbitral mechanisms that can lead to judgments affecting the United Kingdom, which we then undertake to implement, sometimes by changing our own laws. I do not quite understand why my hon. Friend has such an obsession with the Court of Justice of the European Union if its direct effect will be removed, although we will have to be subject to it during the transitional period as we are leaving.

[Sir William Cash]

I do not think that matter has been entirely settled, by any means. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) earlier referred to a lunch she was at, where it appears that she was told we were going to be subject to the European Court of Justice, and my right hon. and learned Friend has made exactly the same point.

I have to say that there are serious questions about the nature of the European Court. The problem is that the European Court is essentially not an impartial court at all. It has never discharged the function impartially, and from the early 1960s it developed a range of principles, such as those of the uniform application and effectiveness of EU law, that it then expanded of its own volition into the general principles of the supremacy and direct effect of EU law over national law. These judge-made principles had no basis in the EU treaties until the Lisbon treaty, which my right hon. and learned Friend, who was then Attorney General, opposed. The fact is that until Lisbon—

[Wera Hobhouse]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir William Cash]

I am afraid not, as I really must proceed.

None of these judge-made principles had any basis in the EU treaties, and the principle of the primacy of EU law is a judicial creation recently codified, and no more than that. However, because we have accepted judgments of the European Court under section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, which we are going to repeal, we are saddled with this, and that is one of the things we are going to unshackle.

Interpretation is done in the European Court by what is known as the purposive approach. In fact, as has been well said, there are many different purposes that can be in conflict with one another, and the methods of interpretation applied are anything but satisfactory. I therefore say to those who want to advocate the European Court, whether in the transitional period or in general, “Beware of what you wish for,” because the European Court can create havoc in relation to our trading arrangements.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

If the hon. Gentleman is so opposed to the European Court of Justice, what is his dispute resolution mechanism going to be? Independent states need a dispute resolution mechanism where they cede sovereignty; they give some of their sovereignty and get some of somebody else’s sovereignty. What is that going to be?

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[The Second Deputy Chairman]

Order. I been generous in allowing the hon. Gentleman to range over a number of subjects, but I gently remind him that there are a lot of speakers in this debate, so I am sure his list about the European Court of Justice is now a little shorter than it was before.

[Sir William Cash]

I shall conclude my remarks on this point. The European Court is seriously deficient in a whole range of matters. On the question put by the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil), the idea has been put forward by Martin Howe QC, and I have put it forward myself in the House, of a system of jurisdiction that would be more in the nature of an arbitration, where there might be, for example, retired European Court judges or whoever, who would adjudicate—but on a bilateral basis, not on the basis of a decision taken by the European Court. It is possible to come up with a solution, therefore, but I do recognise the problem.

We are now embarked upon a massive restoration of self-government in this country. This Bill is essential to achieve that, and should be passed without any of the obstacles and frustrating tactics being put in its way.

[Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to amendment 386, which has cross-party support and which I tabled late last night. The Minister said that it was somehow introducing “chaos” into this process. With the greatest respect, after a fortnight in which we have seen the Foreign Secretary, the International Development Secretary, the former Defence Secretary, the current Defence Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary all subsumed in controversies, I think the Government are doing quite well on the chaos front without any help from me. Also, the idea that taking the exit date out and putting it into a different Bill would create chaos when, just five days ago, Ministers did not want it in any Bill at all, makes the Government’s argument look rather silly.

The amendment would require Parliament to vote on the terms of withdrawal through primary legislation before Brexit day. That would mean that exit day would be set in UK law not in this Bill but in a future Bill, either in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that the Government announced yesterday or, if there is no deal at all, through an alternative Bill setting out the terms of departure and presumably whatever implementation plan would be needed in those circumstances.

The purpose of the amendment is not to dispute the Government’s intentions about the timing of exit day; it is simply to ensure that there is a proper parliamentary and democratic process before we get to that date. The central focus is not the date itself but a requirement on the Government to do as they have promised and set out a meaningful vote for Parliament in advance of that date. The amendment would also ensure that Parliament could properly respond, whatever the outcome of the Government’s negotiations, rather than being inadvertently timed out if things were to go badly wrong.

Yesterday, we learned from the Government that there would be a second Bill to implement the withdrawal agreement, and that is welcome. That was the subject of other amendments that the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I had tabled because we were concerned that Parliament should not give the Executive a blank cheque through this Bill on the implementation of a withdrawal Bill that had not yet happened. Rather less welcome was the Government’s admission that the legislation might not actually happen before Brexit day. Even less welcome was the Brexit Secretary’s admission that the vote on the withdrawal agreement would simply be a take-it-or-leave-it vote, and that therefore if the Government negotiate a bad deal, if they have no implementation plan in place or if other things go wrong along the way, Parliament would simply have to accept that or choose to have no deal at all.

Under the Government’s proposals, Brexit day would be embedded in primary legislation through this Bill, and it would therefore become legally and constitutionally possible for Ministers simply to let us drift towards exit day without Parliament being able to insist on any kind of implementation preparations or any kind of plan at all. Such a concentration of power in the hands of the Executive would be unacceptable. No legislature should ever accept that: certainly not this legislature right now when we were given a hung Parliament by the electorate less than six months ago; and certainly not our Parliament, whose sovereignty has been such a key issue throughout the debates on the referendum.

The amendment would strengthen the democratic process around Brexit and ensure that Parliament could vote on the terms of withdrawal, whether there was a deal or not, before exit day. It would implement the Government’s commitment to a meaningful parliamentary vote. If everything goes according to the Government’s plans and promises, if they get the timetable they want for the transition agreements being agreed in the early part of next year and the withdrawal plans agreed by the autumn, and if we get the kind of deal that the Government have promised, with all the benefits that it will bring, all that the amendment would do would hold the Government to that by implementing their intentions and their timetable. It would hold the Government to what the Brexit Secretary said yesterday was his primary plan for the timetable. It would hold Ministers to that plan on the face of the Bill. It would also prevent the Government from delaying the withdrawal agreement legislation beyond the withdrawal date. It links the timing of exit to the terms of exit in the parliamentary process. It would prevent Parliament from being timed out because it would give Parliament the final say. If the Government’s plans go wrong—I hope they will not—it also gives Parliament a say in how the country should respond. For example, if we end up with no deal at all, if we run out of time—I hope that will not happen—or if the whole thing goes belly up, it gives Parliament a role. It allows for a debate on whether the Government should go back to the negotiating table or just walk away. It allows for a debate about the timing of Brexit day. It allows Parliament to debate and decide, rather than just throwing up our hands and leaving it to Ministers—rather than just drifting along.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

My right hon. and learned Friend is very tempting, but not at this moment.

I understand the point of amendment 357, which is to provide a default mechanism for transposing EU law where regulations have not been made under clause 7. I can equally see that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst is seeking to make default provision for any gaps that may exist in the law to avoid creating not just legal uncertainty, but any legal potholes that may strew the road that lies ahead. I hope that he does not mind me saying that he is, perhaps inadvertently, reinforcing the case for clause 7 because his concern appears to be with the risk that it might not being used comprehensively enough. I certainly share his concern to avoid legal cliff edges and legal potholes, for which I think he is trying to cater.

[Sir William Cash]

On the issue of potholes, will the Minister give way?

[Dominic Raab]

On the issue of potholes, I give way to my hon. Friend.

[Sir William Cash]

I mentioned to the Prime Minister during her statement a few days ago the bear trap that I can see coming up during the transitional period if we are not careful because of the manner in which the European Court operates by the purposive rule; I know my hon. Friend will understand. During the transitional period, when we are faced with a court operating under that rule and not by precedent, we could end up with the European Court dictating to us the basis upon which we would be operating during that period. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[Dominic Raab]

The Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee eloquently makes his powerful point. We need to avoid bear traps, cliff edges and potholes, and that is what this Bill does. That is a common goal that we all ought to be trying to pursue, on both sides of the House—whether we voted to leave or remain. I am not convinced that the amendment of the Chair of the Justice Committee would achieve that aim. Despite his best intentions and his rather ingenious drafting, I fear that the amendment would, in practice, create considerably more legal uncertainty, not less.

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[Joanna Cherry]

My amendment 137 seeks to ensure that:

“When interpreting retained EU law after exit day a court or tribunal shall pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court.”

The Minister questioned the term “due regard”, but it is not unknown to international law. The Lugano Convention on the mutual recognition on enforcement of judgments, to which EU and non-EU states are signatories, talks about paying “due account”, but I have followed the recommendation of the organisation Justice that it is clearer and better English to talk about paying “due regard”. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, we have a duty to take account of decisions of the Court of Justice, so paying “due regard” to taking account of such decisions is not a phrase unknown.

This amendment is not a Trojan horse designed to continue references after Brexit, and I say that as someone who does not want Brexit to happen. It is designed to create certainty for individuals, businesses and litigants, and also for the judiciary. It would leave it open to British courts to disagree with the Court of Justice’s interpretation, even if its case law was relevant to the case. It would not—as the Government’s current draft does—give an unfettered, politically controversial discretion to consider or ignore Court of Justice decisions as our courts saw fit.

The test set out in my amendment has three advantages. First, it would create legal certainty for individuals and businesses. Secondly, it would provide political cover for the courts. Thirdly, it seems to fit with the preference of the judiciary, who want a clear instruction. In recent evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Lady Hale, the new President of the Supreme Court, said:

“It should be made plain in statute what authority or lack of authority, or weight or lack of weight, is to be given to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union after we have left, in relation both to matters that arose before we left and, more importantly, to matters after we leave. That is not something we”—

she means “we, the judges”—

“would like to have to make up for ourselves, obviously, because it is very much a political question, and we would like statute to tell us the answer.”

In my submission, under my amendment, statute would tell the judges the answer.

That is not just my view. The Institute for Government looked at the various options and concluded that the wording that I now propose would license courts in the UK to refer to the Court of Justice’s reasoning in future judgments without making those Court of Justice judgments binding on the UK courts—

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Joanna Cherry]

I will just finish my point, then I will give way to the hon. Gentleman.

The Institute for Government took the view that that approach was compatible with the objectives set out in the Government’s White Paper on Brexit and in the repeal Bill.

[Sir William Cash]

I just wanted to refer to chapter 12 of the book by Lord Bingham, entitled “The Rule of Law”, which I am sure the hon. and learned Lady is aware of, in which he criticises Lady Hale for her view on the relationship between Parliament and the judges. Is she aware of that?

[Joanna Cherry]

I am familiar with that book, but I do not think that it has any relevance to what I am saying at the moment. I remind the hon. Gentleman the Lady Hale is the President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, and she has made the point that what she and her fellow judges require from the Government and the House is clarity in the directions as to how they are to treat the future jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, because if the guidance is not clear, they will come under the sort of political attack that I am sure the hon. Gentleman, who is a great supporter of the British constitution, would abhor, as I do—although I might actually prefer a Scottish constitution.

As I said earlier, this amendment is not a Trojan horse. It is the result of careful consideration by the organisation Justice and by the Institute for Government. It also has the support of the TUC and, I am delighted to say, the Labour party, as well as the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the Fawcett Society. One reason the Equality and Human Rights Commission is so keen on this amendment is because it is also important for rights protections. It is important to remember that EU law is largely about the rights of individuals. The Government’s position paper, published in the summer, seemed to imagine that EU law was all about disputes between the United Kingdom and the EU, but it is not. Most people who make references to the Court of Justice do so in the determination of their individual rights or their rights as a business.

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[Sir Oliver Letwin]

The hon. Gentleman did not allow me to intervene on him, but let me say now that, unfortunately, his point is wholly irrelevant to clause 6; it relates to the transition which will be covered in another Bill. My concern is about the continuing state of UK law following exit. This is not going to be resolved by the Government producing a White Paper. It has to be resolved by clause 6 being drafted in a way that creates the very legal certainty that the Government so admirably wish to create, and which they at present so abundantly fail to do.

[Sir William Cash]

My right hon. Friend is asking some very interesting questions, but that does not necessarily mean—he, or indeed any of us in this Chamber, not being a judge—that he is drawing the right conclusions. He is pointing to several questions that need to be raised, however, although he has not mentioned that clause 5(1) states:

“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day,”

and that must include this Bill.

Furthermore, my right hon. Friend has not quite taken on board what the Solicitor General said with respect to our application of the stare decisis method of interpretation, which the Supreme Court will be obliged to apply after exit day. So he is asking some interesting questions, but I do not think we can necessarily draw conclusions from them.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments, and I am very happy to leave it to the Government to draw the conclusions and answer the questions in due course. I do not think clause 5(1) helps at all, however, because my hon. Friend is right that it excludes the possibility of subsequent enactments being subject to the principle of supremacy, but in clause 5(2) it is equally clear that, so far as the retained law is concerned, the principle of supremacy remains, and therefore there may be judgments in the future that already existing law, where there is judged to be a conflict between an Act of Parliament and an ECJ ruling, should have the result that the ECJ ruling triumphs over the Act of Parliament. That is a perfectly possible and sensible position to adopt. It is not one my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) and I would like to see, and I doubt that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) would like to see it, but it is nevertheless a perfectly tolerable position—and it then needs to be carried over for the Supreme Court just as much.

My point remains, however, and it is a simple one: that if the Bill is trying to achieve a hierarchy here, it needs to state what the hierarchy is, and in stating that hierarchy, it needs to make it clear who governs whom. At the moment, the Bill does not do that.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

William Cash Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 11th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr McFadden]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is, of course, correct that we have had some of these debates before.

The criticism does not stop with the House of Lords Committee. The Hansard Society says that

“the Bill will strengthen the…executive, not Parliament”.

Its report on the Bill says:

“the broad scope of its…powers, the inadequate constraints…on them, and shortcomings in the proposed parliamentary control…will be…a toxic mix”.

We have had regulatory Bills before, and many years ago, when I was first elected, I was involved in taking the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 through the House. There was huge controversy about the powers contained in that legislation, and many Conservative Members who most vociferously defend the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill attacked that Act as a huge power grab.

The response to the 2006 Act led to the setting up of a special scrutiny process for deregulatory measures, and the Hansard Society says:

“Previous legislation, such as the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, provides examples of ways in which”

the Government

“could introduce safeguards into the EU (Withdrawal) Bill to tighten the scope and application of the powers.”

But there are no special scrutiny measures proposed in the Bill, even though its scope is far, far broader than the 2006 Act.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr McFadden]

With consideration for other speakers, I will press on.

In fact, most of the orders made under the proposed powers, far from being elevated into some kind of special sifting and debate procedure, will go through on the negative resolution procedure, with little or no debate.

On one level, I sympathise with Ministers. The outcome of the Brexit negotiations is so uncertain—in fact, getting an agreement at all is not certain—that they want to confer on themselves the maximum possible leeway in legislating, but Parliament cannot take that view. It has been argued that the best way to raise the issue of executive authority is in Committee and not now, but we already know that the Government propose to give themselves a majority on all Committees even though they did not win a majority at the general election. There is no indication—in fact, the very opposite—that the Government are more likely to listen in Committee than they are now. Parliament’s maximum moment of leverage to call on the Government to think again is not in Committee but now.

We have been told that a vote against the Bill is a vote for a chaotic Brexit, which is a bit rich. There only has to be more than two Cabinet Ministers in a room to produce versions of a chaotic Brexit. When Ministers are pushing against one another, and when letters supported by junior Ministers are being circulated attacking the policy of the Government in which they serve, the Tory party is well capable of producing chaos on its own. We have a legitimate job to do in scrutinising the Government. To further that end, I will vote against the Bill tonight.

Criminal Procedural Rights (Opt-in Decision)

William Cash Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Chris Grayling]

That is a very valid point, and my right hon. Friend is right to raise it. As he knows, we have different perspectives on the European Court of Human Rights, but he has highlighted one of the incongruities that will exist if we simply hand over jurisdiction in such crucial areas to the European Court of Justice, because there are some clear contradictions between European measures and those set out in the convention. Whatever our different perspectives in the coalition, we share that view of the problems that may arise from such Europeanisation of law.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s concluding remarks to the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice, the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith). The difference between the ECHR and the European Court is that according to section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, when a decision has been taken under that section, it is binding on us. Our Supreme Court cannot change that law, and there is no opportunity to appeal. That raises the whole question of who governs the United Kingdom in that area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Grayling]

I will do my best.

Let me touch briefly on the three measures. The first relates to the presumption of innocence. The proposal does not flow directly from the road map; it stems from the invitation in the Stockholm work programme for the Commission to consider whether issues not explicitly included in the road map—such as the presumption of innocence—might have a bearing on the mutual trust between member states.

It is very much a matter of regret to me that, in response to an invitation to consider that matter, the Commission concluded that legislative action was necessary. Even if it had concluded that something had to be done—that is a matter for debate—there are alternatives to new legislation or common EU rules. I say this as there seems to be very little evidence of need for the proposal or for common EU rules in this area. That point seems to be acknowledged in the Commission’s own impact assessment, which notes that quantifiable evidence of any problem is scant. In the light of that, I wonder why it has still proposed common rules.

This has been a matter of particular interest to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, in the context of the proposal’s compliance with the subsidiarity principle. I note that the Committee issued a reasoned opinion on the matter, and it is a shame that it did not manage to secure support from other Parliaments in doing so. I want to see the Commission paying a little more attention to the yellow card system than it has been doing recently.

[Mr Cash]

My right hon. Friend will recall that, on the question of the public prosecutor, the threshold was crossed but, even then, the European Commission decided that it would go ahead. Does he not regard that as an extraordinary situation? Does he agree that the yellow card system has been severely vitiated as a result?

[Chris Grayling]

I attended the Justice and Home Affairs Council at which this issue was discussed, and I have to say that there was extensive disquiet among member states. If the Commission wishes to be credible, it cannot simply ignore the system that was put in place by the Lisbon treaty in the way that it did in that particular case.

Let me turn to the second item on the list, which is the proposal on child defendants. By any assessment, I consider the UK arrangements for dealing with and helping children who become engaged with the law enforcement agencies and with criminal proceedings to be very good. There is a raft of specific provisions in place in the UK to assist children in those situations, and we wholeheartedly support the principle that children in those circumstances need to be treated differently from adults in some respects, given their particular vulnerabilities.

Beyond the general principle behind the proposal, however, and given that the UK’s current arrangements provide a significant degree of protection as good as that available anywhere else, the proposal presents significant difficulties. First, the definition of a child in the proposal is set at those under 18 years of age. In England and Wales, the procedural protections provided to suspects and defendants based on their age are varied to reflect the specific circumstances of their case. Article 1 of the United Nations convention on the rights of the child—to which the UK is a signatory, and to which the coalition Government undertook to give due consideration when making new policies and legislation—contains the same definition. In the context of the courts, prisons and the probation service, those under 18 years of age are treated as children and young people. However, there is a different approach for when the police deal with 17-year-olds under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, when, for practical reasons, 17-year-olds suspected of committing an offence are for some purposes treated as adults. Clearly, that would be an issue in regard to these proposals as well. The position in Scotland stands in even clearer contrast to the proposal, as it tends to treat younger people—that is, those aged 16 and above—as adults for these and other purposes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

As the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) said, the handling of this set of proposals has not been ideal, to put it mildly. The criticisms made by the European Scrutiny Committee have considerable weight. They also suggest that because of time constraints the Committee did not come to the Justice Committee for an opinion on proposals that fall pretty squarely within its remit. That would have been a much more desirable process to follow, and lessons ought to be learned from this.

[Mr Cash]

That process is exactly what we recommend in our report, which is currently awaiting the Government’s response. The right hon. Gentleman and I are in complete agreement about this. The more often it is possible, as in this case it was not, to go to one of the departmental Select Committees for its considered opinion, the better.

[Sir Alan Beith]

Perhaps unusually, my hon. Friend and I are indeed at one on this issue. As Chairman of the Liaison Committee, I give every encouragement to Select Committees to be ready to respond when the European Scrutiny Committee draws attention to matters and seeks opinions on them. That is how the process should work, so that we make the maximum uses of the resources of expertise among Members and, indeed, House staff, that we have built up over recent years.

Let me turn to some of the specific measures. On the presumption of innocence, the basis of the directive is that there might be significant difficulties in cross-border matters when identical standards have not been observed. However, no measurable evidence has been produced showing that cases under the European arrest warrant, for example, have frequently been obstructed over a lack of compliance with identical standards. Therefore, the whole basis on which the Commission is proceeding appears to be weak. The suggested measures would certainly adversely affect the UK provision that in certain circumstances inferences can be drawn from silence. The House has debated this at great length and with some care, and the courts have developed the operation of the system with some care. The caution administered to suspects reflects the fact that adverse inferences can be drawn from silence. These provisions would completely disrupt all those processes.

The biggest danger is one that I mentioned earlier in an intervention—that processes that have satisfied tests under the European convention on human rights would not necessarily pass the test of this directive. We would therefore end up with two alternative sources of challenge to English criminal law, leaving open the possibility of passing one and failing the other. That would be an undesirable state of affairs. It would cause confusion and, indeed, forum shopping, whereby someone could obtain their preferred outcome.

On the recommendation regarding legal aid and access to a lawyer, the jurisdiction both in England and Wales and in Scotland already satisfies the provision. My colleague and friend Sarah Ludford MEP has raised issues about the fact that, without the provision, there is no requirement for access to a lawyer in the state that issues the European arrest warrant. Problems can arise from that. Indeed, we have seen them in practice, whereby, had appropriate legal advice been available in the issuing state, an ill-founded arrest warrant might never have been issued in the first place. That factor needs to be considered in the future as the situation develops.

On procedural safeguards for children, a number of problems would arise if we were to adopt the Commission’s provisions, including with regard to the difference between ages, which has already been referred to, and the mandatory representation issue. As the Lord Chancellor has himself indicated, the United Nations convention on human rights is the most accepted international baseline for the protection of children in legal proceedings. It would be better if we proceeded with these matters through advocacy of that convention and used all the resources available to the European Commission to advocate and support adherence to it, rather than create complications between member states over issues that are not central to the protection of children’s rights.

I feel most strongly about an issue I addressed earlier. I do not want to see the role of the European convention on human rights as the primary European benchmark for human rights undermined by the creation of rival or alternative procedures. That is the danger we would run if we opted into the directives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I am extremely glad to be able to commend the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice for his good decision on the directives. Inevitably, I am pleased that he has agreed with the European Scrutiny Committee. We spent a lot of time on the subject and gave our opinions, and I am glad that he has taken a similar view to ours. That has a consequence, of course, because although we hoped for a three-hour debate, there is no need for one when there is such a healthy degree of agreement between the parties, subject only to a few comments that we have just heard from the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies).

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Is my hon. Friend struck by the fact that when the Conservative party is Eurosceptic, it is united?

[Mr Cash]

I am indeed. I must be careful in what I say, but I simply note that when the Lisbon treaty was going through the House, I tabled 150 or so amendments, and there was complete unanimity among me and my close friends of the Euro-realist type, who supported those amendments, and the Opposition as a whole. The Conservative party was completely united right the way through the proceedings, for the first time since 1972. My hon. Friend is completely right, and there is a strong lesson there.

Moving on to the substance of the matters in question, Lidington debates form part of a package of measures that were intended to

“significantly strengthen Parliament’s oversight of EU Justice and Home Affairs matters and make the Government more accountable for the decisions it makes in the EU.”—[Official Report, 20 January 2011; Vol. 521, c. 52WS.]

That was what the Minister for Europe said in his written statement in January 2011, and it is important that we put it on the record. It is therefore disappointing—this is the only caveat to my otherwise considerable appreciation of what the Justice Secretary has done today—that, yet again, the Government were unable to give the Committee adequate notice of their recommended approach to the opt-in decision. That is a great pity, because we would not have needed to request a three-hour debate. There would not have been any need for it, subject to the agreement of the Opposition Front Benchers. I suggest that it would be helpful to understand what steps the Government intend to take to improve the process for holding Lidington debates and how they will ensure that their internal decision-making procedures do not continue to hamper the timely provision of information to Members of Parliament.

I also wish to make a point about explanatory memorandums. In the Committee’s initial report, we stated that we were not satisfied with the quality of the memorandums relating to all three proposals that we are discussing today. We have said that before, but I wished to put it on record again. That is a matter of concern to us in relation to not just the Ministry of Justice but Departments in general. The explanatory memorandum is the most important information that can be made available—I do not mean when compared with everything else, but it is important in its own right. It is therefore extremely important, as we say in our European Scrutiny Committee report—for which we are awaiting the Government’s response—that explanatory memorandums are of sufficiently high quality, because that is the basis on which we hold the Government to account. When they explain in a memorandum the policy that underlies their decision, that should be the basis on which we are able to address the House, and be sure that the Government are answering the questions that we have put and are coming up with a policy that is coherent and makes sense.

The first of the three draft directives under consideration is that on the presumption of innocence. Its scope, which sets out certain rights that could be interpreted more widely than similar rights in the European Court of Human Rights by the Strasbourg Court, is a matter of great concern, and I am extremely grateful for the remarks of the Chair of the Justice Committee on that issue. I am also glad that the Lord Chancellor has made it clear that at no stage will that measure be opted back into, and I will give one or two reasons by way of amplification.

To take up the point made by the Chair of the Justice Committee, there would otherwise be different European Union and European Court of Human Rights procedural standards, which could cause legal uncertainty and confusion. That has now become an extremely topical question when applied to the judiciary. Members may have noted that, in their varying ways and without going into the detail, Lord Judge, Lord Sumption, Lord Mance and Lord Neuberger, the President of the Supreme Court, have all made incredibly important statements, in the most measured terms, about their concerns over the manner in which the Strasbourg Court approaches some of its judgments. This is not the time to go into all the detail, but I strongly recommend that their respective speeches are read by those who read these proceedings.

It is very important that people understand our concerns as members of the Conservative party—and indeed of other parties. Furthermore, some of the arguments that are presented as if we are just Eurosceptics who are out to be critical for the sake of it, are now increasingly supported—however discreetly—by some of the most eminent members of the judiciary in our analysis, which has taken a great deal of time and expertise to develop. It is important to remember that our arguments about the directive on the presumption of innocence are illustrative of the broader question of the methods of interpretation, for example, and the procedural standards in the two different Courts I have mentioned.

On procedural standards, in a nutshell, those based on European Union law override national law. As I said in an intervention, that means that the ability to draw adverse inferences from the silence of the accused, although compliant with the European Court of Human Rights, would become unlawful under European law if the United Kingdom participated in the proposal. That is dangerous, given that we have spent the best part of 600 years in the development of a common law on such matters, some of which—for those who watched it—were well illustrated in last night’s programme on the Plantagenets and Henry II. It was an interesting programme, much of which dealt with how we developed our common law.

The fact is that our courts have a system of appeal. The trouble with EU law in matters as important as the presumption of innocence, which is absolutely at the heart of Magna Carta and absolutely at the heart of our common law system, is that they would be eviscerated if the European Court of Justice were to apply the principles set out in this directive. The consequences would be for section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, passed all those years ago, to be binding on our judicial system, with no right of appeal once the European Court of Justice has adjudicated. That is different from the European Court of Human Rights, which we can override much more easily. I contend that we can put in a provision in an Act of Parliament to rectify that, by saying that, notwithstanding the European Communities Act, we will not accept this particular piece of legislation and thereby preserve our sovereignty. It is this kind of matter that is under discussion on the basis of the European Scrutiny Committee report, to which I referred earlier and on which we await the Government’s response. It is that important: there is no appeal from the European Court of Justice.

I spent two days in Rome last week discussing the question of fundamental rights with some extremely eminent lawyers from throughout the European Union. The Prime Minister of Italy was there, as were a range of other people: Mr Prodi, who used to be the President of the European Commission, people from the Council of Europe and from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and so on. I have to say that there was a great deal of disquiet at the manner in which the European Court of Justice operates in all cases. There are questions about the qualifications of the judges, the methods of interpretation and the issue of process. I will not go into those in detail, other than to put it on the record that the reason why the Government are right, why the European Scrutiny Committee is right and why it is right for this House to agree not to opt into these arrangements, is not just related to the question of the presumption of innocence in its own right, as important as that is. There is a much broader lesson to be learned on the manner in which the European Court functions and the whole question of the supremacy of Parliament. That lies at the heart of the Committee’s report and its recommendations that, if necessary, we should regain the right to veto legislation that we do not think is in the national interest, and to repeal unilaterally at Westminster legislation that is manifestly not in our national interest.

I will now move on to the directive on procedural safeguards for children. Members may want to note that the Committee’s report said that it would be disadvantageous for the Government to opt into this proposal, because the protection of a certain category of vulnerable defendant is best left to national policy and discretion. The differing approaches to the definition of the word “child” for the purposes of criminal procedural protection in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland demonstrate this point. There is a caveat to what the Lord Chancellor said in response to an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). We want to be sure that this would never be opted into. I heard what he said: he clearly would not want it to be. I suspect there may be a bit of coalition politics behind this, so I will not go down that route now. I hope that that will be resolved and that we will effectively find that this directive does not apply at any time. The Government’s estimates of the costs of an opt-in decision to the police and criminal justice system, and the costs of changes in domestic legislation in the context of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, are also relevant considerations.

Finally, Members should be aware that the Committee has expressed the view that the Government should not opt into the proposal in the directive on legal aid for two reasons. First, article 5(2) is premised on the directive on access to a lawyer, into which the United Kingdom has not yet opted. Secondly, the proposal would impose both a financial and a regulatory burden on the United Kingdom.

My function in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee is to set out the parameters and, in some detail, the Committee’s reasons for reaching its conclusions. I cannot say how delighted we are that the Government agree with us. I think that everyone’s concerns have been dealt with, and I therefore have no more to say on the subject—at any rate, for the time being.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Grayling]

We have told our European partners—and will do so again if the House approves the motion tonight—that we will not take part in negotiations on the first and third directives, on the presumption of innocence and on legal aid. We will say up front that we do not intend to opt in, either now or in the future. That is a decision that has been agreed across Government, and one that we do not intend to reverse. We will provide observers for the negotiations, but they will not participate in detailed negotiations. As I said, on the second directive involving children we do not intend to opt in; we will indicate that up front. We will participate in the negotiations in case, although it is unlikely, something emerges that this House may want to consider again, but it remains the Government’s position that we do not expect, nor want, to have to opt into the directive, but we will sit around the table while it is negotiated.

There is clearly a broader issue here about minimum standards measures. As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) pointed out very articulately, what we must understand is that we have a different legal system from the rest of the European Union. The hon. Member for Hammersmith made the same point. If we accept minimum standards measures, step by step they take away the ability of this Parliament and of our courts to shape our justice system. If we decide on any occasion to opt into such a measure, it is of paramount importance that we understand the implications of doing so.

[Mr Cash]

To add to that point, the other member states by and large have written constitutions, while we operate by a process of precedent through the common law. In many respects that would change were we to move to a system that enveloped us within a framework of European Union law, which would change the nature of the decision-making process. As my right hon. Friend so accurately says, this is a huge change because it is about jurisdiction, interpretation and the rights of the individuals who are affected.

Presumption of Innocence and EU Law

William Cash Excerpts

Monday 10th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Vara]

As always, my right hon. Friend makes a relevant point. For the purposes of today’s debate, however, I shall confine myself to the presumption of innocence. I am mindful that we have only 90 minutes for our debate, and many hon. Members wish to speak, including the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), who I am sure will want to have a decent say in the matter, in his own way.

Mutual trust and recognition are of course important in ensuring that European justice systems can operate together when crimes span borders, but without solid evidence, that mutual trust is in practice being adversely affected by these national differences. The Commission’s case for action has not been made. There is also a much broader issue at stake. As I said, this matter lies at the very heart of our justice systems as sovereign countries.

The presumption of innocence is at the core of the rights and protections we afford in our laws and traditions, and in our constitutions, to those accused of committing a crime. That instinctively feels like a matter on which member states themselves should be making decisions. In so far as we can conclude that minimum standards are a legitimate aim—as it seems the Commission has done here—action needs to be taken at EU level, but under the terms of the treaties that permit the setting of minimum standards across the EU, we need to be wary of the Commission bringing forward totally unnecessary proposals under the umbrella of securing mutual trust and recognition. It will always claim to have passed the subsidiarity test, even when others have their doubts.

The process from here is that the reasoned opinion, if approved by the House, will be presented to the Presidents of the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. If sufficient numbers of other Parliaments do likewise, the Commission will be presented with its yellow card and must rethink the proposal.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Given the great significance that my hon. Friend has rightly given to the contents of our report and to the substance of this issue, is he concerned that, as far as we know, the only other Parliament in the whole of the European Union to have tabled a reasoned opinion at this time is the Scottish Parliament?

[Mr Vara]

As always, my hon. Friend shows his great knowledge of this area, right up to the minute. He will appreciate that I can speak only for this Parliament, but I hear what he says. I am aware that my officials have been speaking to other Parliaments, but I do not know the position as regards those other member states at this time. He is quite right to suggest that, as far as justice and home affairs issues are concerned, a quarter of all member states need to have tabled a reasoned opinion in order for a yellow card to apply. In other matters, it is a third of all member states. On that note, it is worth noting that the Government wholeheartedly support the role of national Parliaments in supporting this reasoned opinion.

The Commission’s track record in this respect is not a good one. When presented with its first yellow card on the Monti II proposal, relating to the posting of workers and the right to take collective action, the Commission withdrew the proposal. However, it claimed that that had nothing to do with subsidiarity and that there was not the political will to pass the measure. More worrying was the occasion on which this House, the other place and 10 other Parliaments of EU member states issued a yellow card in respect of the proposal for a European public prosecutor’s office. The Commission barely flinched before continuing with its plans.

[Mr Vara]

We need to consider a lot of things in terms of our future relationship and, as my hon. Friend will be aware, the Prime Minister has promised a major undertaking on reforming the way forward. It will be for the public to decide, in due course, whether there is a Conservative Government, with a referendum to follow on from that.

[Mr Cash]

On the red card, does my hon. Friend accept that, in line with the fourth principle of the Bloomberg speech, which is that national Parliaments are the root of our democracy, there are circumstances in the national interest where a mere collection—an aggregation; a small number—of countries coming together on a red card would not be enough and that, in line with precedents, it would be advisable for the United Kingdom Government to accept the idea of the disapplication of laws altogether?

[Mr Vara]

My hon. Friend, as always, makes a relevant and pertinent point, but he will appreciate that I am not going to give a definitive answer either way at the Dispatch Box.

Notwithstanding the difficulties, we must try to make our position known to the Commission. The Government will support this House and the other place in presenting reasoned opinions on subsidiarity, as and when they choose to do so. On the basis of what the Government have considered so far, we do not believe that the case for action has been made. However, as I said, this is a matter for the House to decide on, and I very much look forward to hearing what colleagues have to say.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I am glad to say that the two Front-Bench speeches have combined to encapsulate all the arguments. While I have some comments to make about the Government’s position, I commend the speech of the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), because he drew out several of the European Scrutiny Committee’s concerns. I am sure that the Minister, having somewhat belatedly reached the conclusion that improvements were required, will acknowledge that, and that everyone will be satisfied, given that we are now considering a motion on forwarding a reasoned opinion.

As I pointed out in an intervention, for all the brickbats, congratulations and backslapping that might be coming from either side of the House, as things stand there is a more worrying matter to consider. If the Minister has received late information that more member states are prepared to deal with the matter properly, that would be useful for me, as Chairman of the Committee, to know. The hon. Member for Hammersmith rightly quoted the Committee as saying:

“It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Commission’s proposal.”

Against that background, and knowing the number of member states required for the yellow card procedure—we currently have the United Kingdom Parliament and the Scottish Parliament, unless some others have come into the framework and I am not yet aware of that—there is clearly no prospect of this reasoned opinion receiving the kind of attention from other member states that it should receive. I say that because we still have a window in which to sort the matter out, but it is not a very long one, and I must say that it does not bode well given the significance of the issues at stake.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

On that point, surely the Commission will not regard the Scottish Parliament’s submission as relevant to this matter. Surely only a submission from this Parliament will be regarded as relevant.

[Mr Cash]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, because I rather agree with him. Whatever the aspirations of the Scottish nationalists and those campaigning for independence, I am afraid that at this juncture what they have to say, however worthy it may be, will not be within the criteria set out for reasoned opinions under the yellow card system.

I ought to say that I have had grave reservations about the yellow card system from the very beginning. I have never thought that it is a matter that should be decided by an aggregation of member states—if they choose number X, why not choose number Y? The fact is that if a member state wishes to act, in its own national interests—the Minister, judging by what he said, regards this as a matter of critical national interest—I suggest that the reason for disapplying or vetoing laws should rest with one member state, as my Committee’s report made clear, because it becomes invidious to choose a particular number rather than another.

The real question is whether the matter is sufficiently important in the interests of the democracies, the legislatures and the constitutional arrangements of a given country for there to be a veto. Indeed, I must commend my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who vetoed a treaty only a few months ago, and what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. For this purpose, I think that there is a very strong case, where it is sufficiently important in the national interest, to go beyond the yellow card system.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

While my hon. Friend is talking about the yellow card system, is it not worth pointing out that the judge of whether the threshold is well enough argued once it has been met is the European Commission itself, so it ends up judging its own decision?

[Mr Cash]

My hon. Friend, as ever, is completely correct. In the case of the European public prosecutor, the threshold was actually exceeded, and what did the Commission do? It just said that it would go ahead anyway, with complete contempt for our Parliament and the others. That is really what is at stake in these circumstances. It is extremely disturbing. There is no need to enlarge that argument, so I will leave it at that.

We have had a fair description of what the measure is about from those on the Front Benches, so I will simply draw the House’s attention to the fact that, with regard to process, it is unreasonable to expect Parliament to come to an informed view on compliance with subsidiarity within the eight-week time frame allotted for issuing a reasoned opinion without the benefit of an analysis by the Government. The Minister, who may have been drawn into this somewhat at the last moment, would perhaps agree with that; I hope so.

Why was it only at the second time of asking, in a letter sent four days before this debate, that the Government gave a clearer indication of their view on subsidiarity? To put it bluntly, the Government have been prevaricating; they were not clear about their position until very recently. On the substance, however, I welcome the fact that in that letter the Government have belatedly accepted that

“a lack of evidence of necessity renders a proposal in breach of the subsidiarity principle”.

I would have thought that that was an unexceptional circumstance, but I nevertheless welcome it. I also welcome the fact that, given that the Government have accepted that the Commission has not complied with the procedural requirements placed on it to provide a detailed statement appraising compliance with subsidiarity, the Commission has agreed with the European Scrutiny Committee. We relied on both those arguments in our reasoned opinion, and we are therefore grateful and glad that the Minister has decided to support our proposal.

We note—I would be grateful if the Minister responded to this point—that the Government’s view is still conditional. There is a little bit of fudging going on. They use the phrase,

“if in principle the need were to be established”.

From what source—other than the impact assessment, which lacks the necessary evidence—do the Government think the Commission will be able to establish evidence of need? We also note that the Commission recognises that there is—believe it or not, in relation to a matter of this importance—

“limited statistical quantifiable evidence on insufficient mutual trust between the Member States”.

How, therefore, can there be the slightest justification for action at EU level? These are not mere words; they are about the application of the presumption of innocence in relation to EU law.

On a technical point, the legal base of article 82(2) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union specifically requires evidence of necessity to facilitate mutual recognition. On the difference between the approach to the European convention on human rights taken by the EU and by the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, I ask the Government to what extent they agree with the paragraph in the Commission’s impact assessment cited in the draft reasoned opinion, as follows:

“The ECtHR’s reluctance to lay down prescriptive requirements in these areas, which can be seen as a rationale for an EU measure. The approach of the ECtHR has not been especially activist in developing detailed and prescriptive rules in the area of Article 6(2) of the ECHR. It has left a margin of flexibility for presumption of innocence and related rights in light of the requirement to balance the fair trial rights of suspects”—

I know that the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), who is Chairman of the Justice Committee, will appreciate that—

“or accused persons with the general public interest, as well as the diverse legal traditions of Member States.”

The Committee concluded that not being “especially activist” was a trait that we strongly welcomed and should inform the decisions of any supra-national court.

We have produced our report and we are grateful that the Government have somewhat belatedly come to the right conclusions on this. We regret that it is only in the past few days that we have got fully engaged with this subject, but we are now glad that the reasoned opinion will go from this Parliament to the European Commission with the support of the sole Member on the Opposition Benches as personified by the hon. Member for Hammersmith. It is important that we do it, but what worries me is that it looks as though it will be doomed unless other member states come forward. If they are not as interested as we are in the matters raised by our Committee, that will be very sad for the European Union as a whole.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Nuttall]

Absolutely. I for one certainly hope that the Government will not feel that it is necessary to bow to the will of Brussels on this measure. Although I am at one and in accord with the Government on their proposal this evening, I would have to depart from that course if they tried in future to suggest that we should adopt it given that the European Commission seems likely to pursue it. Bearing in mind this country’s proud history of establishing our own system of common law and the rights of an individual to be regarded as innocent until proven guilty, I see no reason why we need lecturing from the EU on this matter.

[Mr Cash]

Has my hon. Friend noticed that this matter has received almost no coverage in the media, particularly the BBC? Perhaps they will rectify that as a result of this debate. This is a serious matter and the British public must know what is going on, but there are limited opportunities for them to find out about it. If this proposal were in a Bill that dealt with the abolition of trial by jury, it would have to go through at least three stages in each House and would be subject to amendments in both Houses. Because it is in a directive, all we are left with is putting up a reasoned amendment that will be doomed if other member states disagree.

[Mr Nuttall]

The Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, as ever on these matters, is right. This proposal has not received adequate scrutiny in the media. There may be many reasons for that.

This is another example of the EU interfering in matters that are a million miles away from the areas that the vast majority of the British people want us and our European neighbours to deal with. The British people want us have free trade with our European neighbours; they do not want the European Union to interfere in matters of criminal justice. This is just one example of why, when it comes to a referendum, I believe that millions of my fellow citizens will agree with me that we would be better off out of the European Union and that we should simply trade with our European neighbours on a free trade basis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

I am bound to point out that the 1972 Act was passed in pursuance of the 1971 White Paper. The 1972 Act itself has not changed materially, but the number of functions and the invasion of the United Kingdom legislature has continued inexorably since then. That 1971 White Paper specifically guaranteed—and therefore that guarantee would seem still to be valid—that we would never give up the veto because it was in our vital national interest. To do otherwise would endanger the fabric of the European Union, which appears to be doing a very good job of destroying itself.

[Mr Vara]

My hon. Friend makes a good point, but I repeat that there is not long to go. If there is a Conservative victory, we will renegotiate, and the issues that he raises, as well as a whole series of other issues, will be put to the country.

My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills talked about the European Union trespassing into matters that have been so important to our judicial system over centuries, and I could not agree with him more. As always, he was passionate about what he said, and almost—no, not almost, I think everyone in this Chamber is in agreement about the presumption of innocence, which has existed since Roman times. The case for the directive simply has not been made by the Commission.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bury North also mentioned the tight deadline of 12 March. I am reliably informed that the date that is important is the date when the reasoned opinion is actually sent, so if it is approved today and sent immediately, it will be valid and we will have met the deadline. He also mentioned the opt-in. He said that he was not present at the start of my speech and it may be that he missed my comments, but the Government have promised a debate on that specific issue in due course.

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

William Cash Excerpts

Tuesday 19th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice to make a statement on the status in the United Kingdom of the EU charter of fundamental rights following the ruling by Mr Justice Mostyn in the High Court on 7 November.

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Grayling)]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving the House an opportunity to consider the AB case, which we all noted last week, and which gained considerable publicity. I think it would be helpful for me to set out the position.

The claimant in that case raised the EU’s charter of fundamental rights when arguing that UK officials should not have allowed information about him to pass to the authorities of the country to which he was being removed. The case was dismissed on its facts but the judge in passing made some comments on the charter and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg. The judge’s view was that the Luxembourg court had, in the case of NS, held that the charter could create new rights that apply in the UK. It is important to be very clear to the House: we do not agree with that analysis of the NS case. We intend to find another case—we cannot do it with this one as the Home Office was successful and we cannot appeal a case we have won—at the earliest opportunity to clarify beyond doubt the legal effects of the charter and to put the record straight.

It is no secret in this House that I would not personally have chosen to sign up to the Lisbon treaty or to the charter of fundamental rights. However, it is also important to say that the charter’s effects are limited to EU law within the UK, and I have not seen any evidence that it goes beyond that. I would be very concerned if there was any suggestion that the charter did in fact create new rights.

This is an important area, which is why this Government have included the extent of the EU’s competence on fundamental rights in our balance of competences review.

[Mr Cash]

Does my right hon. Friend acknowledge the scale of the problem with which he is now faced, both constitutionally and practically, which would lead to the bypassing of the Government’s proposals for a British Bill of Rights and the repeal of the Human Rights Act, a policy that I established when I was shadow Attorney-General and which lasted until the coalition Government came to office? Does he appreciate that the import of Mr Justice Mostyn’s ruling opens the floodgates to a tidal wave of charter-based legal action, at enormous cost to the British taxpayer and businesses, and raises a fundamental clash between Westminster supremacy and the claims of the EU and the ECJ in respect of sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 that goes beyond mere renegotiation? Does he on behalf of the Government recognise that the amendments I tabled to the Lisbon Act—the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008—which the then Government voted against and the then official Opposition and the Lib Dems would not support, although 48 Conservative colleagues did vote for them, would have put our exclusion from the charter beyond any doubt? Will he therefore agree to support my proposal for urgent legislation as follows: “Notwithstanding any provision of the European Communities Act 1972, nothing in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union shall be binding in any legal proceedings of the United Kingdom and shall not form part of the law applicable in any part of the United Kingdom and that this Act reaffirms the supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament”?

[Chris Grayling]

May I start by paying tribute to my hon. Friend for the work he has done in this House over the years in highlighting the complexities and challenges of EU law? He is a valuable contributor to these debates and we listen to him carefully. I have both listened to what he has said and I have taken extensive legal advice about the case last week. I think it is of fundamental importance that the impact of the charter in the United Kingdom is limited. We were made various promises about even that degree of involvement over the years, but we were not in power at that time. It is absolutely essential that it is limited in scope in the UK. I would treat it as a matter of the utmost seriousness if it were to emerge in law that that was no longer the case and that the charter was more broadly applicable than that.

I have to say that there are those in the European institutions who argue that it should have a broader impact than that, but I can provide some reassurance to my hon. Friend by saying that I was involved in such a discussion recently at a meeting in Brussels where the overwhelming view of member states present was that they did not wish it to have a broader remit than it does at the moment, and I say to him that we would treat any such situation with great seriousness. We do intend to make sure this issue is laid to rest in law at the earliest opportunity and, as always, I will be delighted to talk to him about his suggestions and about his concerns in this area.