European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateOliver Letwin
Main Page: Oliver Letwin (Independent - West Dorset)Department Debates - View all Oliver Letwin's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThere is a sort of sadism or masochism— I do not know which it is—on the part of a small number of hon. Members who relish the idea of a no deal scenario, saying, “The WTO has a fantastic set of rules —let’s just dive straight in.” However, I think there is consensus in the House that a transition is necessary, and if that is the case, we must work together across the parties to make sure we put in place the right legislative framework to deliver and facilitate such a transition.
The Prime Minister pointed out after her Florence speech that the European Court of Justice will
“still govern the rules we are part of”
during a transition. The Prime Minister is right. The European Union has said in terms that the entirety of the acquis communautaire needs to apply during a transitional period and that it is the equivalent of the single market, the customs union and the four pillars—the freedoms—within them. That has to include the European Court of Justice, if we are going to sign up to that set of arrangements. That is also the Labour Front Benchers’ policy for the transitional period. Indeed, they will want to speak to their own amendments detailing how they envisage the transition needs to take place.
It is worth reminding ourselves why it is that, during a transition, we will still need a resolution mechanism through the European Court of Justice. The right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) mentioned in an earlier intervention that the UK took the European Central Bank to the European Court when there was a question whether the euro clearing arrangements might not be feasible in the City of London. From time to time, therefore, we have benefited from that dispute resolution arrangement.
What would happen if other circumstances arose during a transition? For instance, if UK citizens living abroad wanted to get their pension payments but there was an obstacle to them doing so, they would need to be able to seek redress, and that could be provided by the European Court. If a breach of competition rules adversely affected a UK firm, it might seek to get redress through the European Court of Justice. If the European Union started passing rules in conflict with the transition agreement, we would want the Court to resolve the situation in our favour. If UK firms were denied market access in the European Union, we would need resolution arrangements during a transition period. The application of the European Court of Justice is integral to such issues—the Prime Minister was right to accept that—but the Bill presents a problem.
The hon. Gentleman has listed a series of issues, each of which is a legal issue. How does he suppose we could delegate to the Government a prerogative power to decide how the courts could decide those issues?
My proposed new clause seeks to elicit from the Government information on how they are going to deal with the issue. The Prime Minister has said that she accepts that the European Court of Justice would need to continue to have jurisdiction during a transition. However, there are problems in the Bill.
I invite hon. Members to turn to page 3 and read clause 5(1), which states:
“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day.”
Therefore, under the Bill as framed, the ECJ arrangements will not apply beyond exit day. Further down on page 3, clause 6(1) and (2) similarly state that no regard will be made to the European Court after exit day.
I am going to make a little progress, because I think that some of these queries will be addressed in the discussions on the amendments that others have tabled.
I return to clause 6. For as long as retained EU law remains in force in the UK, it is essential that there is a common understanding of what that law means. That is critical for legal certainty and, in real terms, for the very predictability of law that businesses and individuals rely on every day as they go about their lives. We want to provide the greatest possible certainty—I suspect that, for all the thunder and lightning in this debate, that is a shared objective underpinning it all—and the question is how we achieve that. Clause 6 will ensure that UK courts must continue to interpret retained EU law using the Court of Justice of the European Union’s pre-exit case law and retained general principles of EU law. Any other starting point would be to change the law. That is certainly recognised by the Government.
I am going to make a little more progress, but I will give way to my right hon. Friend in due course.
The crucial point reflected in clause 6 is that the intention is not to fossilise past decisions of the ECJ for ever and a day. The clause provides that our Supreme Court—and, indeed, the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland—will be able to depart from pre-exit case law. In doing so, they will of course apply the same tests as they do when departing from their own case law in the ordinary way.
We have, in my view at least, the finest judiciary in the world. Our courts are fiercely independent of Government, as they have already proved during the Brexit process. The clause will provide them with clarity about how they should interpret retained EU law after exit. As we take back control over our laws, it must be right that the UK Supreme Court, not the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, has the last word on the laws of the land. It is therefore of paramount importance that the clause stands part of the Bill.
I sense that the hon. Gentleman recognises that he is putting the legislative cart before the diplomatic horse. Of course the implementing legislation relates to the agreement, and we need to have one in place to comply with the terms of any obligations, whether they are under the withdrawal arrangement, the implementation period or the future partnership deal.
I now turn to amendment 357, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), Chair of the Justice Committee.
I agree with what my hon. Friend is saying about new clause 14. May I take him back to clause 6(4)(a)? It says that the Supreme Court “is not bound”. Will that enable it to look at the plain words of the treaties, and not at the previous expansive teleological jurisprudence of the ECJ?
I am not quite sure that I understand my right hon. Friend’s forensic point. It is a feature of the common law that UK courts already take into account and consider principles and precedents from other jurisdictions, but they do so with full autonomy as to how they might apply it, where they have discretion under the normal canons of interpretation. We are effectively seeking to apply the same basic principles, through this Bill, to retained EU law and the interpretation of it.
I am going to make a bit of progress. Wider general definitions are set out in clause 14, and clause 15 provides an index of all the defined terms to make the Bill easier to use as a reference tool. To remove those definitions from clause 6 and only partially to reinsert them into clause 14, as the amendment would do, would undermine the certainty and clarity that we aim to provide.
Without statutory definitions of the different types of retained law, we would undermine the stability of our domestic legal regime after exit and exacerbate the burdens on the court system. Reinserting the definition of “retained domestic case law” into clause 14 would not alleviate that, because it would give rise to the question why that definition had been included, while others had not. Its placement in the body of clause 14, away from its original use in clause 4, would make the text far less easy to navigate—something that we are keen to avoid.
I turn to amendment 137, which is a joint SNP and Liberal Democrat amendment, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). Clause 6(2) will allow our domestic courts and tribunals to take into account any decisions made by the European Court, an EU entity or the EU itself on or after exit day, if they consider it appropriate to do so. That will ensure that our courts are not bound by the decisions of the European Court, while enabling them to consider its subsequent case law if they believe it is appropriate to do so. It is widespread practice in our domestic courts to carry out a similar exercise with the judgments of courts in other jurisdictions—I am thinking particularly of Commonwealth and common law jurisdictions—so, in principle, there is nothing new or particularly different here.
The UK has always been an open and outward-looking country, and our legal traditions reflect that. We pay attention to developments in other jurisdictions, including common law jurisdictions, and we embrace the best that the world has to offer, but we do so on our terms and under our control. That is decided by our courts and, ultimately, it is subject to the legislative will and sovereignty of this House. Amendment 137 is therefore unnecessary, as the Bill already provides that post-exit decisions of the European Court can be considered by the domestic courts.
Amendment 137 would go further, however, in that it would require our courts and tribunals to pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court. What does “due regard” mean? It is not defined and, indeed, it is far from clear. It is evidently intended to go further than clause 6, and tacitly urges our courts to heed, follow or shadow the Luxembourg Court, but there is no clarity about what would count as due consideration. The amendment would alter the inherent discretion the UK courts already have to consider, without fetters, the case law in other jurisdictions, and it seeks to apply to the European Court a procedural requirement that is stronger but so vague that it is liable to create more, not less, confusion. I hope that I have tackled, or at least addressed the concerns that the hon. and learned Lady has expressed in her amendment, and I urge her not to press it.
I will now turn to amendment 303 in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham. I thank her for tabling this amendment and for explaining it, as she did, in a very constructive spirit. I recognise that she is representing the interests of her constituents with her customary tenacity, but I will take a few moments to set out why we have taken our approach to the issues and my difficulties with her amendment.
Clause 6 supports the Bill’s core aim of maximising certainty. It is in no one’s interests for there to be a legal cliff edge. The Bill means that the laws and rules we have now will, as far as possible, continue to apply. It seeks to take a snapshot of EU law immediately before exit day. The Government have been clear that in leaving the EU, we will be bringing to an end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the UK. To maximise certainty, any question about the meaning of retained EU law will be determined in UK courts by reference to ECJ case law as it existed before our exit. Using any other starting point would be to change the law, which is not our objective. Our domestic courts and tribunals will no longer be bound by or required to have regard to any decisions of the European Court after that point, but they can do so if they consider it appropriate. These clear rules of interpretation are set out in clause 6.
May I try again to ask my hon. Friend the question on which both my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), the former Attorney General, and I have been pressing him? My hon. Friend has just said that courts would be bound by judgments of the European Court about retained EU law. I asked him about clause 6(4)(a), which specifically says that
“the Supreme Court is not bound by any retained EU case law”.
It seems to us that he can have it one way or the other, so which is the governing clause—the one saying that the courts are bound to judge in accordance with the previous judgments of the ECJ, or the one saying that the Supreme Court is not bound by such a rule?
The point is that we take a snapshot of EU law, including case law, at the point of exit, but after that the normal rules of precedent will apply both to the Supreme Court and in Scotland. That will allow a departure from any precedents that apply, which again comes back to the question of how we achieve a smooth and orderly transition from retained EU law while making sure that, when push comes to shove as such case law evolves, the UK Supreme Court will have the last word. That is balance struck in the Bill.
I suspect my hon. Friend is absolutely right. My point is that there are many more rules where it would surely be sensible for this Parliament to leave in place exactly as they are, and not only that but to seek to ensure consistency of application between the United Kingdom and the European Union so far as that is possible. Clause 6(6) allows for even modified retained law to be interpreted in accordance with retained case law and principles if that is what Parliament intends.
We need a clear expression of intention that by leaving the rules unmodified and retaining the same rules in place on exit day, we are seeking for them to be applied in the same way here as across the EU. That is a much more political decision than I think the Minister accepts, which is why it should not be left to judges; it should be expressed clearly by this Parliament that that is what we want, if that is indeed what we want to happen. That will help judges, it will be good for the six-sided widget manufacturers who will understand the rules under which they have to operate, and, most importantly, it will be good for all citizens who will benefit from clarity about their rights. It is therefore imperative that Parliament makes this happen, through amendment 137 or otherwise.
It pains me to say this, but I think that what several of us have been trying to say, put very briefly, is that clause 6 as it stands is a frightful mess. Of course I shall vote with the Government tonight, but I very much hope that after this debate—as did not happen after Second Reading—the Government will go away and think about clause 6. If they do not, what will happen is that it will, rightly, be massacred in the House of Lords, not least by former Law Lords. Once it has been, it will be very difficult for those of us who know it is a mess at the moment, in a way I am about to describe, to support an attempt to overrule the House of Lords. I beg those on the Front Bench to take seriously the problem we are trying to expose here. Let me try to describe it more clearly than perhaps I have managed so far, although I know that several of my hon. Friends have also tried.
It is clear, from clause 5(2), that the Government accept that, in relation to the retained law, the interpretative powers of the ECJ are extremely wide. It states:
“the principle of the supremacy of EU law continues to apply…so far as relevant to the interpretation, disapplication or quashing of any enactment”.
As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) rightly pointed out, the supreme power that can be given to a court in this land is being attributed in the Bill to the ECJ in respect of existing legislation—namely, the power to quash an Act of Parliament. It does not get higher than that.
I am listening with great care to my right hon. Friend. Is not the simple answer that the Supreme Court will apply the rules of precedent in accordance with its practice direction of 50 years ago, which allows it to depart from previous case authority where it appears right to do so? Principles have been set out in domestic law by the Supreme Court and its predecessor, the judicial committee of the House of Lords.
With great respect to the Solicitor General, I draw him back to clause 6(3)(a), which directs the lower court in such a case to continue to apply the retained case law on the basis of ECJ jurisprudence, not Supreme Court jurisprudence. If that is not what the Government intend, they need to redraft clause 6(3)(a). They can have it one way or the other, but we cannot in this country have a legal system that tells our courts to do two different things. That is why the former judges are causing a harouche here. They are not being told what we, as a Parliament, are expecting of them.
What we are seeking to do is, in effect, settle the status of retained EU case law so that it is equivalent to that of Supreme Court authority. That is the explanation of the hierarchy that my right hon. Friend has, very fairly, outlined.
If the Solicitor General is trying to argue that he is aiming for equality between the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, that poses an insoluble problem for the lower court. One has to trump the other, but if the Bill is trying to make out that one trumps the other, it does not do it. It is really quite important for a human being who speaks English and reads the Bill to be able to see which trumps which.
I understand exactly where my right hon. Friend is coming from. I have to say that my reading of this was that once the Supreme Court had departed from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in a particular case, thereafter the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence would be the one that the lower court would have to follow. However, that does not get us past the problem that the Supreme Court is provided with no guidance whatever about the purposive nature of EU law and how it should approach it.
Let me deal with my right hon. and learned Friend’s helpful intervention in two steps. If what he said in the first step about the supremacy of the Supreme Court’s rulings is to apply—which is not inequality, but puts the Supreme Court above the ECJ in the interpretation of these matters for retained law—that is a perfectly clear position, and one that I, as a matter of fact, would welcome; but then the Bill should bloody well say so. However, he is right, in that even if we presume that the Bill will be adjusted—as I am sure it will be, in the House of Lords—to make it clear that that is the case, we face the next problem, which is what it is that the poor old Supreme Court is meant to be doing.
I understand the words
“in accordance with any retained case law”
in clause 6(3)(a), but I do not understand the words
“any retained general principles of EU law”.
That suggests that the court must adopt a methodology which has been retained. What we want our courts to do is revert to what they used to do, which was interpreting statute without reference to the jurisprudential and teleological techniques adopted by the European Court.
Notwithstanding the chuntering of my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry)—and she is a friend of mine, but she is quite wrong about these issues—I happen to agree with my hon. Friend. My point is, however, that it does not matter nearly so much which side of the argument we are on as that we should be clearly on one side or the other.
I feel sure that the reason clause 6(3)(a) says that the court should judge
“in accordance with…any retained general principles”
is exactly the reason that was cited by the former Attorney General, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). As we see in clause 5(2), the purposive and teleological nature of the judgments, and the ability of those judgments to be used to quash even Acts of Parliament, should apply to the way in which our courts continue to interpret retained law. That, I think, is the intent of clause 6(3)(a).
This leaves us with the wide-open, yawning question of whether the Supreme Court should be making judgments when it is, we are told in clause 6(4)(a),
“not bound by any retained EU case law”,
but should nevertheless apply the general principles, and try to use the same purpose and teleological reasoning that the ECJ uses. We are not told, and the judges are not told. Far from creating legal certainty, clause 6 seems to me to create the largest possible degree of legal uncertainty. That is not a tolerable position. It is not one that the Government wish to achieve, and not one that the Opposition wish to achieve. I do not believe that anyone in the House of Commons wishes to achieve it. However, it is what the clause, as currently drafted, achieves.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to point out issues that need to be clarified as soon as possible, which is why new clause 14 says, in a very polite way, that it would help everybody if the Government, within one month of Royal Assent to the Act, could publish a report explaining in proper detail how EU retained law applies in that transition period.
The hon. Gentleman did not allow me to intervene on him, but let me say now that, unfortunately, his point is wholly irrelevant to clause 6; it relates to the transition which will be covered in another Bill. My concern is about the continuing state of UK law following exit. This is not going to be resolved by the Government producing a White Paper. It has to be resolved by clause 6 being drafted in a way that creates the very legal certainty that the Government so admirably wish to create, and which they at present so abundantly fail to do.
My right hon. Friend is asking some very interesting questions, but that does not necessarily mean—he, or indeed any of us in this Chamber, not being a judge—that he is drawing the right conclusions. He is pointing to several questions that need to be raised, however, although he has not mentioned that clause 5(1) states:
“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day,”
and that must include this Bill.
Furthermore, my right hon. Friend has not quite taken on board what the Solicitor General said with respect to our application of the stare decisis method of interpretation, which the Supreme Court will be obliged to apply after exit day. So he is asking some interesting questions, but I do not think we can necessarily draw conclusions from them.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments, and I am very happy to leave it to the Government to draw the conclusions and answer the questions in due course. I do not think clause 5(1) helps at all, however, because my hon. Friend is right that it excludes the possibility of subsequent enactments being subject to the principle of supremacy, but in clause 5(2) it is equally clear that, so far as the retained law is concerned, the principle of supremacy remains, and therefore there may be judgments in the future that already existing law, where there is judged to be a conflict between an Act of Parliament and an ECJ ruling, should have the result that the ECJ ruling triumphs over the Act of Parliament. That is a perfectly possible and sensible position to adopt. It is not one my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) and I would like to see, and I doubt that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) would like to see it, but it is nevertheless a perfectly tolerable position—and it then needs to be carried over for the Supreme Court just as much.
My point remains, however, and it is a simple one: that if the Bill is trying to achieve a hierarchy here, it needs to state what the hierarchy is, and in stating that hierarchy, it needs to make it clear who governs whom. At the moment, the Bill does not do that.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), who, in uncharacteristic fashion, had to knock several lumps out of his own Front Bench to get it to see sense around some obvious problems with clause 6. I have chosen to rise at this point in the evening to pick up on some of the inconsistencies and flaws, revealed during this debate, in the insufficient—in some cases, absent—replies from the Government Front Bench.
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) asked the Minister very clearly whether the jurisdiction of the ECJ will apply during the transition period. I do not believe the Minister has addressed that, but I am happy to give way if he would like to do so now.