Lord Adonis
Main Page: Lord Adonis (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Adonis's debates with the Scotland Office
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I should notify the Committee that if Amendment 15 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 16 by reason of pre-emption.
My Lords, the noble Lord Pannick, is a great expert in these matters. Could he give the Committee the benefit of his advice on whether he believes that converted law under Clause 2 has the status of primary or secondary legislation?
That is a very important question that we are coming to in later amendments. The Constitution Committee addressed that question. It has advised the House that one of the defects of the Bill, it respectfully suggests, is that it does not address that vital question and that legal uncertainty will be caused without it being addressed. The Constitution Committee suggested that retained EU law should be given the status of primary legislation, but there is a variety of views on this. The committee advised—I do not speak for the committee, but I am reporting what its report said—that this issue has to be addressed in the Bill. We are coming to it in later amendments.
My Lords, there is no more terrifying ordeal in your Lordships’ House than intervening in a debate between lawyers, particularly following the noble and learned Lord. It appears to me, however, as a layman reading the Bill for the first time and reading the reports of our Constitution Committee, that a critical issue relating to all the debates we shall have on Clause 2 and the following clauses is whether converted law is primary or secondary legislation. Will the Advocate-General for Scotland give us his view, so that that can colour our discussion of the later groups?
When I was wrestling with this issue and reading debates in the other place, I noticed that the Solicitor-General said on 15 November last year:
“Converted law … will not automatically have the status of either primary or secondary legislation”.
He did not then go on to say what will determine whether it is primary or secondary legislation. Somewhat confusingly, he then said:
“Indeed … paragraph 19 of schedule 8 sets this out: ‘For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, any retained direct EU legislation is to be treated as primary legislation’”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/11/17; col. 416.]
Again, as a layman reading this, I wonder whether that means only in respect of the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 or with general applicability. I know that the Advocate-General for Scotland is good at speaking plain English as well as legalese, so will he set out for us in plain English his view of whether the generality of law converted into UK law under the Bill will be primary or secondary legislation?
My Lords, I repeat the worries about coming in on a debate populated primarily by lawyers, but if my noble friend Lord Adonis can do it, I can have a go. I very much welcomed the intent of the Constitution Committee and the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I subsequently received a briefing that raised a question about it. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for alluding to the issue of the amendment meaning that UK courts could not be required to consider existing European court decisions when interpreting and applying provisions that have been implemented through UK law by Acts of Parliament or regulations introduced under Acts of Parliament other than the ECA 1972. I am grateful that he referred to the Bingham Centre proposal that there needed to be consequent amendments later in the Bill to cover that. I want to highlight the importance of that because the reality is that about 80% of environment law stems from the European Union and much of it would be caught by this provision. We just need to be sure that if this provision were recognised as needing to be addressed by the Government, we will see that subsequent amendment to allow ECJ decisions to be taken into account.
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions from Members of the House with regard to this issue. We are extremely grateful for the extensive work done by the Constitution Committee with regard to the Bill, as set out in the report, and for the consideration that members of the committee have given to the provisions of the Bill and some of the difficult issues that arise in transposing EU-based legislation into domestic law, because it represents something of a challenge in a number of respects.
I shall begin by referring to a matter that does not arise out of this group, or did not until the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, raised it, because it may help if I address his point about whether retained EU law is primary or secondary legislation. It is neither in the Bill. There are provisions in paragraph 19 of Schedule 8 with regard to the Human Rights Act, which is a very particular case, where it will be treated as primary legislation. There is the Constitution Committee’s recommendation that it should all be treated as primary legislation. I shall not go into detail at this stage because we will address this later, but I want to reassure the noble Lord about where we are.
That recommendation raises enormous difficulties because there are aspects of EU-derived legislation that, for example, involve the enumeration of the contents of a particular dye or chemical, and the idea that we could amend that only by way of primary legislation raises issues of its own. Nevertheless, it seems to the Government that there is some scope for considering how we can take this forward, and we are open to considering not only the recommendations of the Constitution Committee but of others. For those who have an interest in this issue, I commend for consideration, at least, the recent observations of Professor Paul Craig of St John’s College, Oxford, in a blog on the UK Constitutional Law Association site dated 26 February—only a few days ago—in which, supplementary to an earlier note that he made, he proposes a categorisation of EU-derived legislation. I cannot say that it is one that we entirely agree with, but it is certainly one that we are looking at because there is more than one route to the resolution of this issue. We are looking at that and, for noble Lords who are interested in that point, it may be worth considering.
What would the new status of legislation that the noble and learned Lord has just mentioned be?
Professor Craig addresses a potential categorisation of EU-derived legislation by reference to its origins within EU law, so there is pre-Lisbon treaty and post-Lisbon treaty analysis based on the articles of the pre-Lisbon provisions and of TFEU post Lisbon in 2009. I shall not elaborate on it at this stage as it does not arise in the context of this group. With respect to the noble Lord, I simply want to reassure him that we understand that there is a debate about how we should categorise EU-derived legislation.
The second point I shall mention at the outset is the reference to the principle of supremacy. That turns on Clause 5(2), which ensures that the principle of supremacy—it currently has effect through the ECA—will continue to apply but only for the purpose of resolving conflicts which arise between EU law which is converted by the Bill into domestic law and pre-exit domestic law.
Again, we have to be clear what the purpose of that is. I acknowledge in passing that the Constitution Committee proposed a different way of addressing Clause 5, which on one view might be considered neat, in so far as it involves applying the principle of supremacy without using the word “supremacy”. We will come on to debate that in due course, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, observed, and I will not take time up with that at this stage.
I turn to Amendment 15. Clause 2 has been drawn broadly deliberately. As has been noted, it will preserve any domestic regulations made under Section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of Schedule 2 to, the ECA 1972. But it also includes within its ambit any other domestic primary or secondary legislation which implements, or enables the implementation of, EU obligations and any related domestic legislation. In response to the inquiry from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I make the point that enactments often contain provisions derived from EU legislation—we have to remember that what we are referring to in Clause 2 is EU-derived domestic legislation. It is those parts of Acts such as the Equality Act or the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act that are EU derived which are to be brought within the ambit of retained EU law. It is necessary to read two elements: EU-derived domestic legislation—those parts of legislation that come from the EU—and retained EU law. They are linked.
My Lords, I do not intend to speak to whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. For those of us who are not lawyers and are uninitiated in the complexities of this law, what does “implemented” mean? As I understand it, once the Council of Ministers adopts a directive, it is then the responsibility, under the European Communities Act 1972, of member states to implement it. Presumably the question is: what duties lie on Her Majesty’s Government and Parliament to implement directives which have been adopted by the Council but which would, in the normal course of events, be implemented over a period that might or might not span beyond 29 March next year? I assume that that becomes a very important issue in the scenario that my noble friend Lord Liddle has just referred to, where, in the “implementation period”, the United Kingdom is undertaking to abide by the evolution of European law in the making of new directives over that period. I am not sure whether I should call him the non-Advocate-General for Scotland, but could the noble and learned Lord, in whichever capacity he is speaking to us this afternoon, give us a view on this matter?
My Lords, further to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, as I have said before, this Bill deals with a crash-out situation in which there is no transitional period. If there is a transitional period, a good deal of this will have to change or will require some alteration—the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle. As far as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is concerned, once the directive is adopted, the member states are then given a particular period—generally two years—in which to implement it, and sometimes they are late in doing it. This Bill surely ought to deal with the two situations, including the one where the implementation date has passed, in which case we would perhaps be in a rather different situation from that which assumes that the implementation date has not yet arrived when we leave, and so a different answer might be given as to how you deal with this position.
The legal obligation would cease on Brexit day. That is the situation. Unless something has been implemented by that time it is not strictly part of our law. On deciding what is to happen in the future, as far as I am concerned, there is enough to decide at the moment, but nothing will harm the Government if they give some indication of what they would do with instruments that have been adopted but not yet implemented, although, at the date of Brexit, we were obliged to adopt them on some future date.
Does the noble and learned Lord think that there is a distinction between those directives that we have agreed to where the implementation date is before or after 29 March 2019?
If it is implemented before the 29th it is part of our law.
What if the obligation to implement them is before that date, but we have not fulfilled that obligation?
The question does not arise if they have not been adopted before. The amendment deals only with directives that have been adopted before Brexit day and, even if they are not part of our law, whether they should be admitted, which the Bill could do. The problem is that that might delay the finalisation of this as an Act in force for some considerable time.
The implementation period is a wholly distinct issue from what we have to address in the context of the Bill. The implementation period has yet to be negotiated. The outcome of that implementation negotiation has yet to be determined. In the event that we agree an implementation period, clearly there will have to be further statutory provision—a further Bill—addressing our rights and obligations during that implementation period, and it may be that that further Bill will amend this Bill with regard to the effect of the exit date on further EU legislation, whether in the form of regulations or directives, after 29 March 2019. But that is not an issue for this Bill. This Bill is dealing with the situation at exit, subject to the fact that, if there is a negotiation, things may change.
For those of us who have not been following the minutiae of the Government’s announcements, can the Minister say that it is an absolute commitment on the part of the Government that directives that have been adopted and for which the implementation date falls before 29 March next year will be implemented?
My Lords, my understanding is that the Government are determined, and have the present intention, to implement directives that have been adopted and which have an implementation period that expires before the exit date. I cannot give an absolute assurance to that extent but that has been and continues to be the Government’s position. Indeed, to put it another way, we will continue to perform our obligations as a member of the EU, as we are bound to do by the treaty provisions. One of our obligations is to implement directives that have been adopted in Europe within the implementation period or by the transition date that is set out.
I am coming to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth—will he please have some patience? Specifically, Section 2(2) of that Act deals with the type of EU legislation and rulings that need to be transposed into UK law. Typically, these involve EU directives where the intended outcome of the law is made clear, but it is up to the individual member states how to implement them. After Brexit, if Brexit happens, the Government want to use a Henry VIII clause in reverse—to adapt EU laws to make them British. For example, disputes that are currently referred to EU regulators or courts will be amended to refer to their British equivalents. The logic of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, is that, if you are going to have a swathe of amendments to undo primary legislation that has already been made using secondary legislation, you should make those replacements in the same way. It is not as simple as that; because of the “deficiencies arising from withdrawal”, the references to the EU regulators, the European Court of Justice and other entities will no longer have any sway if there is Brexit. It is not as simple as saying, “Because they are simple things, we just can’t do this”, and the Government saying, “We will just use these Henry VIII powers to tidy up things”. The problem is that it might alter not just technical details but also the substantive effect of the law. These amendments are trying to protect really important issues.
The Supreme Court has also said that it is well established that, unlike statutes, the lawfulness of statutory instruments can be challenged in court. Even if a statutory instrument gives Ministers broad powers, the courts have established that they will apply limitations. The broader the power, the more likely the courts are to intervene to ensure that the intention of the law in question is not being altered or undermined. Does the Minister accept that?
I conclude that the power to amend all EU-derived primary and secondary legislation by the Government without sufficient scrutiny, checks and control, bypassing Parliament, goes against the ultimate supremacy of Parliament itself.
My Lords, may I elaborate on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick and invite the Minister to respond further? A key point in this debate is surely that powers conferred by Parliament should be exercised only as Parliament intended. A key point on paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, which the noble Lord referred us to, is that the power to make and approve subordinate legislation—which is conferred in primary legislation—was, in the case of retained direct EU legislation, originally conferred in the context of directives and legislation which derived from the European Union itself. So the context in which Parliament gave the power to make subordinate legislation was that it should achieve the purposes of the directive.
That being the case, allowing these powers to be used completely independently of those directives significantly enlarges the scope within which those powers can be exercised, which was not intended by Parliament when the powers to grant that subordinate legislation were first conferred. I am not sure that I am carrying the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with me, but that seems to me to be a crucial aspect of Schedule 8, and it would be good to get the Government’s comments on that.
The only reason why the noble Lord is not carrying me with him is that I do not understand the purpose of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Schedule 8. It seems to me extraordinarily broad, which is why I am seeking an explanation from the Minister as to why we need these powers, given that we also have Clause 7 in the Bill, which is time limited.
That is why Clause 7 is drafted in the terms in which the noble Lord will find it in the Bill.
Reference was also made to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Schedule 8. I am not sure how the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, interpreted that paragraph but let us be clear: it refers to existing powers, not to powers created under this Bill. Those powers already exist in respect of existing legislation. They are not being extended. If the Government truly intended to bring about wholesale change to these policy areas, and could do so on the basis of their existing powers, perhaps they might have done so already. The provision does not extend to these powers. Therefore, again, with respect, it appears to me that the matter is being taken out of context. However, I would be happy to look at the opinion on this from Pushpinder Saini referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.