European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateCheryl Gillan
Main Page: Cheryl Gillan (Conservative - Chesham and Amersham)Department Debates - View all Cheryl Gillan's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe can only speculate. There was even a suggestion at one point that Ministers had not yet broached the topic of transition with their counterparts in the EU and Michel Barnier. Thankfully the Prime Minister raised it in her Florence speech, and I hope that her Ministers are now getting it under way, but we need more certainty and clarity. There is a serious period—two years plus—during which legal arrangements must be put in place. It is not unreasonable for the House to ask Ministers to clarify the position at the earliest opportunity, and certainly by the time the Bill receives Royal Assent.
I want to talk about amendments 303 and 304, which stand in my name, and to return to a matter that I raised on Second Reading. I hasten to add that the amendments relate to a specific constituency case. However, I do not want to air the details; I want to stick to the principles, because the case in itself raises a problem that I would like the Government to have a look at.
As we know, the Bill transfers all EU law into UK law. That will become effective on the day of exit, ensuring that all the rights enjoyed by British citizens today will be available to them after Brexit. Owing to some practical difficulties, however, some rights cannot be transferred easily because they are entirely reliant on the European Court. The right of the individual to sue a member state for damages when the law has been incorrectly applied and has caused them harm is ultimately reliant on the rulings of the European Court, and on a legal precedent that I think many of the lawyers who surround me in the Chamber know as Francovich.
Although the UK courts will deal with such cases, they must refer questions about the interpretation or application of EU law or EU legal principles to the European Court, particularly when the interpretation is unclear and applies to every member state. Such a reference to the Court will occur, for example, when the interpretation of rules pertaining to the application of VAT across the EU is required. After Brexit the UK courts will determine all law, and there will be no references to the European Court.
I want to give the Government an opportunity to ensure that the principle underlying Francovich—the protection of individuals against malfeasance by the state—will develop within the British legal system. In the meantime, however, there is a transitional issue arising from changes in the law that impacts individuals who have already commenced such legal action prior to Brexit, or who might wish to commence such an action after Brexit in relation to an issue that occurred in the period prior to Brexit.
My right hon. Friend raises a very important issue, and it is not just a transitional issue; it is a rule of law issue, and is about legal certainty. My right hon. Friend is absolutely to raise it, and she may agree with me that the Government are going to have to deal with this, because ultimately it is a fundamental principle of law that people should be able to have that certainty when they commence actions.
My right hon. and learned Friend, who is also my constituency neighbour in Buckinghamshire, knows that I have been preoccupied with this for some time. Of course, there is also that principle of UK law called legitimate expectation, which is based on the principles of natural justice and fairness, and seeks to prevent authorities from abusing power, and I think that that is most important.
Essentially, this principle ensures that the rules cannot be changed halfway through the game if an individual had a reasonable expectation that they would continue. Changes to UK law can only happen prospectively—in other words, they can only apply from a point in the future onwards—and cannot be applied to the past. This means that anyone lodging court proceedings can do so knowing that the rules that applied at the time they lodged those proceedings will apply to their case. If that was not so, the law could be retrospectively changed in favour of the state.
My right hon. Friend is making a most powerful case, and I absolutely agree with her about the need to deal with the Francovich issues. She serves as a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as I did in the past; does she agree that to leave people without a remedy in these cases, and to breach that important rule of law of legitimate expectation, would hardly be consistent with our people being given their full entitlement under our commitments as part of the Council of Europe?
My hon. Friend served with great distinction on the Council of Europe and I am thrilled to have been put back on the Council of Europe today, along with several colleagues across the House. I happen to think that this is extremely important, as is our membership of the Council of Europe, and my hon. Friend is right that that situation would be looked at with some suspicion by the other 46 members of the Council of Europe. For that reason, it is important that if we change the law through this Bill, changes that result from the Bill only apply from a point in the future, so that individuals can rely on the law as it stood up to the point when the law changed.
I am sympathetic to the arguments the right hon. Lady is putting forward. Following on from the intervention of the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), does the right hon. Lady agree that if people’s legitimate expectations and right to an effective remedy are withdrawn as a result of Government action, those individuals might have cause for action against the Government under the European convention on human rights?
The hon. and learned Lady makes a valid point. I am trying to give the Government an opportunity to examine this, as I think it is very serious. I also think that no British Government would want the sort of unfairness thrown up by the anomaly that has arisen from the way the Bill is drafted.
In fact, the repeal Bill already states in paragraph 27(3) of schedule 8 that actions begun prior to Brexit, including Francovich, can continue and can rely on EU legal principles. However, I think there is an error in the Bill, in that it does not allow anyone who has commenced an action prior to the day of exit the right of a reference to the European Court, which they could have reasonably expected when lodging their claim in the court prior to Brexit.
That must be wrong as well. In the past, when we have had references to the Privy Council, for example, and a country has terminated those references, the references have continued after the date of termination until all the cases going through the system are completed. It must follow that references to the ECJ—or CJEU, perhaps, to give it its full title—must be able to continue after the date of exit.
My right hon. and learned Friend makes the same point that I am trying to make. Likewise, the Bill does not allow anyone who has suffered harm because of an act of the state in the period prior to the day of exit the right to lodge a claim under the rules as they stood at the time they were harmed.
This is incredibly important for my constituents who could face issues relating to HS2, because a right of claim could arise between now and exit day, whenever that is set to be, and it is vital that their rights should not be changed during that period.
My hon. Friend is leading me down a path that I do not wish to go down. I was very much hoping that I could make my contribution today without mentioning HS2, but the trouble is that if I do not mention it, someone else will. In fact, I agree with her entirely. To deny people those rights would be an abuse.
A retrospective removal of rights breaches the principle of legitimate expectation, because individuals have a reasonable expectation that their grievances should be heard under the rules as they stood at the time they were affected. For this reason, I am proposing these minor amendments to the Bill. I do not believe that they would undermine the overall effect of the Bill; rather, they would give legal certainty to those who were caught in the transitionary period. Anyone who has a claim originating in the period prior to Brexit should be able to have their claim heard under the rules as they stood prior to Brexit, including a right to a reference to the European Court. That is only fair and just. The British people voted for Brexit to improve their rights and the rights of their fellow citizens. They did not vote to cause legal confusion or harm, or to frustrate the rights of those relying on the courts during the transitionary phase.
I would like to finish now.
As the Bill already states that cases occurring during the transitionary period can continue, my amendments would do nothing other than ensure that that happens fairly. I really hope that the Government will respond positively to these amendments, and remember that justice delayed is justice denied.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan), who has made some thoughtful and sensible points on her amendments, which we would support. I rise to speak to amendment 278, and to the consequential amendments 279 to 284, which would allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure, rules and regulations. I will also speak to our amendment 306, but I will return to those separate issues later.
Amendment 278 follows on from our earlier debate on clause 1. It brings into even sharper focus the issue of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisdiction during a transitional period. As I said in the previous debate, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) said earlier in this one, there can be no transitional period on current terms, as the Prime Minister wishes, without that jurisdiction. The Florence speech has been much quoted already, and I am sure that that will continue. Let me refer briefly to it one more time. The Prime Minister obviously made the speech after the Bill had been published, but perhaps its early drafting did not have the opportunity to accommodate the emphasis that she has placed on the
“two important steps, which have added a new impetus”
to the process.
She said of the second of those steps:
“I proposed a time-limited implementation period based on current terms, which is in the interest of both the UK and the EU.”
She was accepting the case made by business and trade unions for an effective transitional period and, crucially, again making the point that this should be on current terms.
As I said in the earlier debate, we were pleased that the Prime Minister had caught up with Labour on that position. However, seven weeks on from the Florence speech, the Government have failed to reflect the ambition that the Prime Minister had at that time in any of the amendments to the Bill. They came up with the bizarre amendments that we debated in relation to clause 1, but they failed to address that ambition, so we have helpfully stepped in to fill that gap with amendments 278 to 284. The amendments would mean that, in relation to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, exit day should come at the end of the transitional period. The reason is simple: without acceptance of the continuing role of the Court of Justice during the transition, the idea that the implementation period, based on current terms, could happen in the way that the Prime Minister described is frankly delusional.
I understand the point that my hon. Friend is making, although I do not accept that characterisation. It is absolutely right that cases that are procedurally before the dock of the court, if I may put it like that—that have been lodged before exit day—will continue to conclusion. However, in relation to facts that may or may not give rise to a cause of action at an indeterminate point in the future, we would end up with a long tail of uncertainty if we went down the path that she suggests. I gently say to her that it will be possible to continue those cases before the UK courts because of the way in which we will retain EU law. There would be more, not less, uncertainty for citizens and businesses alike if we allowed the kind of indeterminate access to the court that she suggests.
Surely, the Minister is ignoring the legitimate expectation that I have talked about. Frankly, if the Government do not look again at the matter, it will constitute an abuse of power, because it will remove from individuals rights that they legitimately expected to carry through to the end of a case.
My right hon. Friend makes an interesting point about legitimate expectations. I think there is an equally legitimate expectation, demand and need to have some finality to the legal and institutional arrangements that give rise to cases before the European Court.
Perhaps I can give way to my right hon. Friend when I come on to her amendments.
I turn to amendment 203, tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber, and to the related amendments 353 and 354. They would remove clause 6(7) and partially reinsert it into clause 14. Clause 6(7) provides key definitions of terms in the Bill that are crucial for the proper interpretation and full understanding of its content. Subsection (7) aims to alleviate any potential confusion and ensure that there is no vagueness or ambiguity about the different types of retained law mentioned in the Bill. That is vital for those who read, implement and interpret the Bill, because of the different effects of each type of retained law. The placement of the definitions in clause 6 is specifically designed to make the Bill easier to navigate and more user-friendly, by placing the definitions close to where they are used and deployed in the text.
That is kind, but I will make some progress; otherwise I will lose the thread in relation to amendment 303.
The amendment is at odds with the clear and certain position set out in the Bill, because it would continue to bind UK courts to some post-exit ECJ decisions and case law where the matters giving rise to the case have occurred before our exit. Those judgments would continue to be binding even after an implementation period. Strictly interpreted, the amendment would go further still. It would apply to anything happening before exit day and so would also include ECJ judgments on cases referred from outside the UK. For example, a preliminary reference made by another EU member state in relation to the interpretation of EU law might also fall within the scope of the amendment, if the facts of the case arose before exit day. The consequences would be far-reaching and risk creating considerable uncertainty and practical difficulties for the administration of justice.
UK courts and tribunals would continue to be bound by some new ECJ judgments for an indeterminate period. Those binding judgments could continue to be issued long after we have left the EU as cases continue to progress to the European Court from across the EU. Yet those judgments would not have formed part of the snapshot of retained EU case law that, under clause 6(3), will be binding on our courts, so far as is relevant, and subject to the rule in clause 6(4). By contrast, such post-exit judgments would bind our courts in all circumstances, including where the retained version of an EU regulation had since been modified by this Parliament or a devolved Administration. That would create foreseeable and entirely avoidable uncertainty, and it would not be necessary, because individuals whose cause of action predates our exit would, of course, continue to be able to take their case to the domestic courts, even if after exit they cannot reach the European Court. That is the fundamental point in relation to the procedural framework.
I now turn to amendment 304, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham, in relation to retaining ECJ referrals and jurisdiction for anything that happened before exit day. In leaving the EU, we will bring an end to the jurisdiction of the ECJ—we have made that clear. The proposed amendment would frustrate that objective, because our courts could continue to make references to the ECJ in relation to cases where relevant matters have occurred before our withdrawal from the EU. As a result, different rules and processes would apply for those cases, compared with those where the relevant circumstances arose after exit day. That would, I fear, give rise to more not less uncertainty, because it would be impossible to predict for how long UK courts would continue to be subject to binding judgments from Luxembourg.
When we exit the EU, we will know exactly how many pending UK cases are registered with the European Court, awaiting a preliminary reference and thus covered by any proposed agreement we have with the EU on the treatment of pending cases. That is important to deliver certainty about how and when the Court’s jurisdiction in the UK will be brought to an end. The amendment would remove that certainty. Like amendment 303, it is not necessary. Individuals will not lose their ability to vindicate their rights in court after exit. They will be able to take such cases to our domestic courts.
Forgive me, Sir David, but I thought it necessary to address my right hon. Friend’s amendments in detail. Equally, I want to say that I recognise the eloquence and the force with which she champions her constituents. Ministers will take away the underlying issue that she has brought and powerfully moved for consideration. I hope that on that basis she will not feel she needs to press the amendment.
I am following the Minister’s arguments very carefully, with helpful interventions from some of my colleagues. I appreciate that this is a very tricky matter, but it does relate to my constituent. I am therefore grateful that the Minister has undertaken to take the proposal away and look at the principle in relation to this case, because I feel that it would be most unjust not to do so. I have no love for the European Court of Justice and I want the Bill to go through, but not at the cost of justice for my constituent. This case has thrown the matter into stark relief. I am grateful to the Minister for that undertaking and I look forward to talking to him further on the matter.
I thank my right hon. Friend for her constructive approach. We will take that consideration forward after these proceedings.
I will now rattle through the final amendments, so I have done them all justice and given them due consideration. I will turn next to amendment 306, tabled by the Opposition. Clause 6(2) states that our courts are no longer bound by decisions of the European Court after our departure or required to consider in future cases, although they may do so if they believe it to be appropriate. Clause 6 is a vote of confidence in our judiciary: its independence and its expertise. Using similar exercises currently undertaken with court judgments in other jurisdictions, our courts are best placed to decide to what extent, if any, they pay regard to EU law in any case before them.
The intention of amendment 306 is to remove that discretion from clause 6 and replace it with a duty that sets fetters on which aspects of EU case law our judges must consider, although only in certain areas. In practice, that would create a presumption that EU decisions should be followed in those areas. That is the clear intention, but it is inappropriate. It would undermine the purpose of clause 6 in both its fundamental objectives. It would frustrate the return of control to this House and the UK Supreme Court and expose the UK to substantial additional and unnecessary legal uncertainty.