Lord Judd

The Climate Change Act (2008) requires the Government to set legally binding ‘carbon budgets’ to meet the objective of reducing emissions by at least 80% in 2050 from 1990 levels. The Act requires that the UK’s emissions in the third carbon budget period, which covers 2020, are at least 34% below the 1990 baseline for emissions.

The Government has not set specific targets for how much of the emissions reductions required for each carbon budget should come from different emissions sources, for example heat, electricity or transport. This is to provide sufficient flexibility to ensure carbon savings are delivered across the economy in the most cost effective way.

However, DECC does produce projections of UK emissions that account for the impact of Government policies. The last projections published in September 2014 [1] showed that the UK was on track to meet the second (2013-17) and third (2018-22) budgets having already met the first carbon budget (2008-12).

In 2020, policies [2] which drive improvements in energy efficiency (across all sectors) are projected to contribute 61% of the total reduction in emissions and policies influencing the uptake of low-carbon heat technologies are projected to contribute 5%. Other policies such as Building Regulations also support the reduction of heat emissions from buildings for example through the requirement to install a condensing boiler in most cases when a boiler needs to be replaced.

[1] Updated Energy and Emissions Projections: 2014 (DECC)

[2] Source: Annex D of the Updated Energy and Emissions Projections (EEP): 2014 (DECC). Based on all policies listed in EEP, including those introduced before as well as after the publication of the Low Carbon Transition Plan (LCTP) 2009

The Climate Change Act (2008) requires the Government to set legally binding ‘carbon budgets’ to meet the objective of reducing emissions by at least 80% in 2050 from 1990 levels. The Act requires that the UK’s emissions in the third carbon budget period, which covers 2020, are at least 34% below the 1990 baseline for emissions.

The Government has not set specific targets for how much of the emissions reductions required for each carbon budget should come from different emissions sources, for example heat, electricity or transport. This is to provide sufficient flexibility to ensure carbon savings are delivered across the economy in the most cost effective way.

However, DECC does produce projections of UK emissions that account for the impact of Government policies. The last projections published in September 2014 [1] showed that the UK was on track to meet the second (2013-17) and third (2018-22) budgets having already met the first carbon budget (2008-12).

In 2020, policies [2] which drive improvements in energy efficiency (across all sectors) are projected to contribute 61% of the total reduction in emissions and policies influencing the uptake of low-carbon heat technologies are projected to contribute 5%. Other policies such as Building Regulations also support the reduction of heat emissions from buildings for example through the requirement to install a condensing boiler in most cases when a boiler needs to be replaced.

[1] Updated Energy and Emissions Projections: 2014 (DECC)

[2] Source: Annex D of the Updated Energy and Emissions Projections (EEP): 2014 (DECC). Based on all policies listed in EEP, including those introduced before as well as after the publication of the Low Carbon Transition Plan (LCTP) 2009

Government and licensees take very seriously the need to decommission legacy facilities, including those at Sellafield. This work is underpinned by periodic safety reviews, which are assessed by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). In addition to this, nuclear operators have a legal obligation under the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) to identify, evaluate and assess their hazards and risks, which enables the ONR to determine the off-site emergency planning area in line with its assessment principles:

http://www.onr.org.uk/depz-onr-principles.htm.

It is a national priority to reduce the hazard and risk at Sellafield in a safe and timely manner and progress in addressing the hazards at Sellafield is kept under frequent review. The actual detail of the programmes and the actions to maintain safety, are matters between Sellafield Ltd. as the site licence company and ONR as the independent nuclear regulator. Sellafield is ONR’s highest regulatory priority and receives a significantly enhanced level of regulatory attention.

Security at Sellafield is specifically designed to address a wide range of credible threats, with measures including perimeter and internal physical barriers, detection and surveillance technologies and an armed response provided by the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. In line with internationally established principle of continuous improvement, the Sellafield site has seen a series of security enhancements over the last few years to ensure security remains robust.

The government remains focused on implementing the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which was published in 2015. In July the government announced a review of national security capabilities, in support of SDSR implementation, to ensure that we have a full suite of effective and efficient national security capabilities to achieve our three national security objectives: protecting our people, projecting our global influence and promoting our prosperity. The work is being coordinated by the National Security Adviser, with individual strands taken forward by cross-departmental teams, which has involved a range of Government departments and our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

As the Prime Minister said to the UN General Assembly, the United Kingdom has always been an outward-facing, global partner at the heart of international efforts to secure peace and prosperity for all. She also pledged that the UK will be a confident, strong and dependable partner internationally – true to the UN's universal values. Both the rhetoric, but also the policy at the heart of this government's approach, make it clear that our posture must be internationalist as we build a new, deep and special partnership with our European neighbours and seek to strengthen our global role and relations. This sets a clear tone for all Government departments' approach.

The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review set out the long term direction to meet the strategic objectives of ensuring domestic security and resilience, and shaping a stable world. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, comprising members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, scrutinises the National Security Strategy and the structures for government decision-making on national security, particularly the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Adviser.

The NSC brings together departments, including DFID, to take collective decisions, balancing the mutually–reinforcing elements of national security including domestic, foreign, development, defence and economic policy. The NSC has introduced, from April 20145, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and associated governance reforms. Together these looking systematically at deployed overseas dealing with the risk of instability. links NSC strategic decision making with programmes on the ground.

The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review set out the long term direction to meet the strategic objectives of ensuring domestic security and resilience, and shaping a stable world. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, comprising members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, scrutinises the National Security Strategy and the structures for government decision-making on national security, particularly the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Adviser.

The NSC brings together departments, including DFID, to take collective decisions, balancing the mutually–reinforcing elements of national security including domestic, foreign, development, defence and economic policy. The NSC has introduced, from April 20145, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and associated governance reforms. Together these looking systematically at deployed overseas dealing with the risk of instability. links NSC strategic decision making with programmes on the ground.

The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review set out the long term direction to meet the strategic objectives of ensuring domestic security and resilience, and shaping a stable world. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, comprising members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, scrutinises the National Security Strategy and the structures for government decision-making on national security, particularly the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Adviser.

The NSC brings together departments, including DFID, to take collective decisions, balancing the mutually–reinforcing elements of national security including domestic, foreign, development, defence and economic policy. The NSC has introduced, from April 20145, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and associated governance reforms. Together these looking systematically at deployed overseas dealing with the risk of instability. links NSC strategic decision making with programmes on the ground.

The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review set out the long term direction to meet the strategic objectives of ensuring domestic security and resilience, and shaping a stable world. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, comprising members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, scrutinises the National Security Strategy and the structures for government decision-making on national security, particularly the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Adviser.

The NSC brings together departments, including DFID, to take collective decisions, balancing the mutually–reinforcing elements of national security including domestic, foreign, development, defence and economic policy. The NSC has introduced, from April 20145, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and associated governance reforms. Together these looking systematically at deployed overseas dealing with the risk of instability. links NSC strategic decision making with programmes on the ground.

The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review set out the long term direction to meet the strategic objectives of ensuring domestic security and resilience, and shaping a stable world. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, comprising members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, scrutinises the National Security Strategy and the structures for government decision-making on national security, particularly the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Adviser.

The NSC brings together departments, including DFID, to take collective decisions, balancing the mutually–reinforcing elements of national security including domestic, foreign, development, defence and economic policy. The NSC has introduced, from April 20145, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and associated governance reforms. Together these looking systematically at deployed overseas dealing with the risk of instability. links NSC strategic decision making with programmes on the ground.

The Government is working to implement a new domestic UK nuclear safeguards regime when Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the UK. The new regime will be regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and will be equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom.

Parliament has passed the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 which provides the legal framework for setting up a domestic nuclear safeguards regime; and Government is consulting on draft Nuclear Safeguards Regulations, which set out the proposed detail of the regime.

The ONR will run the UK's State System of Accountancy and Control (SSAC) of Nuclear Material as part of the new domestic regime. The ONR is working to ensure it can have in place by 29 March 2019 the IT systems and safeguards inspectors needed to deliver safeguards arrangements that meet international standards and to build, over time, to coverage and effectiveness equivalent to Euratom.

Maintaining nuclear safety is and always will be a top priority for this Department. The UK has a well-established domestic civil nuclear safety regime which will continue to operate as now following the UK’s departure from the Euratom community.

Irrespective of our future relationship with Euratom, the UK will continue to be a committed and constructive member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and will continue to follow international standards on nuclear safety.

The Department regularly discusses matters of mutual interest in the nuclear field with government counterparts in the Republic of Ireland. The Department, in partnership with the Office for Nuclear Regulation and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, holds a biannual Contact Group on Radiological Matters with Irish government officials and environmental regulators. This Contact Group provides an opportunity to exchange information and to discuss approaches on a wide range of nuclear issues, including Euratom Exit. This is in addition to the regular contact between Ministers in my Department and the Government of Ireland on a range of matters including energy.

The Office for Nuclear Regulation is responsible for its own recruitment.

The ONR currently has more safeguards inspectors than its own instructed minimum and is continuing to recruit to ensure the UK can deliver a domestic safeguards regime that honours our international obligation.

The UK and EU have agreed in principle the terms of an implementation period running from 30 March 2019 until 31 December 2020. As outlined in the draft Withdrawal Agreement published on 19 March, such a period will include the provisions of the Euratom Treaty.

Alongside this, the Government has stated in its White Paper on the UK’s Future Relationship with Euratom (Cm 9593) that the UK will be seeking a close association with Euratom which will come into force when Euratom arrangements no longer apply.

The Government has also published a technical notice on civil nuclear regulation (DEP2018-0836). This notice explains to the civil nuclear industry and stakeholders how the sector will be affected in the UK in the unlikely event that the UK leaves the EU and Euratom in March 2019 with no agreement in place.

The Nuclear Sector Deal announced on 28 June 2018 will also promote new opportunities in the sector including a focus on innovation to develop the technology and skills needed to maintain the UK’s position as one of the world’s leading nuclear nations.

The UK’s objective is to seek association to the Euratom Research and Training Programme as part of an ambitious Science and Innovation Accord with the EU. This would ensure collaboration with the EU across a range of nuclear R&D activities can continue uninterrupted.

The UK is also on track to have bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements in place with key partners ahead of March 2019. This will facilitate continued, unimpeded civil nuclear trade and nuclear research cooperation with these countries.

The Government regularly engages with stakeholders in the civil nuclear sector on Euratom Exit. The Nuclear Institute has participated in Euratom Industry Fora for interested stakeholders, hosted by Richard Harrington, the Minister of State for Business and Industry. Government also frequently communicates progress towards Euratom exit with a wider range of stakeholders, including the Nuclear Institute.

We are putting in place appropriate measures to ensure uninterrupted cooperation and trade in the civil nuclear sector when Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the UK, whether at the end of March 2019 or at the end of an implementation period. These arrangements include new safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear cooperation agreements with key trading partners and a domestic nuclear safeguards regime. We will present the new international agreements relating to Euratom exit to Parliament for ratification in the Autumn.

The Government has published quarterly updates to Parliament on progress towards the UK’s exit from the Euratom Treaty in March 2018 and June 2018. These reports contain further information on the arrangements being put in place. The next such quarterly update will be published in October.

The Government has made clear that it is seeking a close association with Euratom. In the White Paper on our Future Relationship with the European Union (Cm 9593), the Government set out its vision for a relationship with Euratom that is broader and more comprehensive than any existing precedent. The Government proposed that this close association should be based on a comprehensive Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the UK and Euratom. This would help ensure the UK’s standing as a leading and responsible civil nuclear state is maintained, and would be mutually beneficial for the UK and the Euratom Community.

Nuclear safety and security in the UK are currently regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and these arrangements will continue.

When Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply to the UK, the ONR will regulate safeguards in the UK. The ONR is confident that they will have in place the IT system and safeguards inspectors needed to ensure the UK continues to meet its international obligations when Euratom arrangements no longer apply.

The Government has made significant progress in our preparations to leave Euratom, to ensure a domestic nuclear safeguards regime can be in place from day one of exit, including passing the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 and proposing draft Nuclear Safeguards Regulations.

As outlined in the White Paper published on 12 July, the UK has proposed that we will be seeking a close association with Euratom, including regulatory cooperation on nuclear safeguards and technical cooperation on nuclear safety. We are well advanced in our work to address the issues that may affect the civil nuclear sector if an agreement is not reached with the EU.

Nuclear safety in the UK is currently regulated by the UK’s independent regulator the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and this will not change. We remain absolutely committed to maintaining high standards of radiation protection for workers, the public and the environment.

As of February 2018, the UK has transposed the majority of Euratom’s 2013 Basic Safety Standards Directive (2013/59/Euratom) into UK legislation, which sets updated standards for radiation protection. We are committed to completing the transposition of the remaining parts as soon as possible to ensure that the UK continues to be recognised internationally as a leader in radiological safety.

All nuclear sites, including nuclear waste facilities, are required to develop and maintain a site security plan in order to be licensed to operate by the Office for Nuclear Regulation. These site security plans are required to demonstrate compliance against the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003, which includes having to plan for managing all types of potential security threats. Implementation of the plans is also overseen by the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

Flooding and climate change considerations are a major element of the Safety Case that must be developed and maintained for every nuclear facility as part of the licence conditions against which sites must operate. These Safety Cases are also assessed and approved by the by the Office for Nuclear Regulation. In addition, operators of nuclear waste disposal facilities must produce Environmental Safety Cases which demonstrate the safety of disposals of nuclear waste, now and in the future, managed within assessed risk scenarios consistent with regulatory guidance. These risk scenarios include the potential consequences of climate change. It is the Environmental Safety Case that determines if disposals may continue or not and what limitations or conditions may be required to minimise any impact to the environment.

A Geological Disposal Facility will provide a permanent and safe solution for disposing of the UK’s inventory of higher activity radioactive waste. The Government recently consulted on a draft National Policy Statement (NPS) for geological disposal infrastructure. This draft National Policy Statement follows the approach of the National Planning Policy Framework and all other non-site specific National Policy Statements, by not excluding all development in designated areas such as National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, and other such protected areas. Rather, the proposed draft NPS sets out that development for a Geological Disposal Facility should only be consented in nationally designated areas in exceptional circumstances and where it would be in the public interest to do so. Even if such development were consented, the developer would be required to take a number of measures to protect and where possible improve the environment. Existing UK legislation already provides a high degree of protection for National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and other such protected areas; the proposed draft National Policy Statement reinforces this. The Government is currently analysing responses to the consultation on the draft National Policy Statement and will publish a response in due course.

The Government recently consulted on draft policy proposals for delivering a consent-based process for identifying a suitable location to site a Geological Disposal Facility, which will provide a permanent and safe solution for the disposal of higher activity radioactive waste. The proposals recognise that the relevant principal local authorities, including county councils, unitary authorities and district councils will have an integral role in this process through their role on ‘Community Partnerships’ which will be developed in all areas that wish to put themselves forward as potential sites for developing such a facility. The partnerships are proposed to be used to share information, raise awareness and make decisions on behalf of their local area. The proposals set out that as members of the Community Partnership, relevant principal local authorities will have the ability to invoke a right of withdrawal from the engagement process. Also, before making any final decision on where to locate the facility, it is proposed that there will need to have been a test of public support that demonstrates community support for the development at a particular site. A test of public support cannot be designed or enacted without the support of the relevant principal local authorities. The Government is currently analysing responses to the consultation on the draft proposals for delivering a consent based process and will publish a response in due course.

The Government has no plans for Ennerdale and the Ennerdale granite in its proposals for developing a Geological Disposal Facility to provide a permanent and safe solution for the disposal of higher activity radioactive waste. The Government recently consulted on draft policy proposals for delivering a consent-based process for identifying a suitable location to site such a facility. The Government is currently analysing responses to the consultation and will publish a response in due course. No sites have been identified and it is proposed that any interested communities will be able to begin formal discussions with the Government following the publication of the response to the consultation and the launch of the siting process.

The safety and integrity of installations currently containing nuclear waste are kept under constant review by the Office for Nuclear Regulation, as the regulatory body responsible for the safety of nuclear installations in the UK. In 2009, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority carried out a national review of nuclear waste stores it is responsible for on behalf of the Government. This work has informed the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s current strategy for the safe and secure management of radioactive waste installations, which was last updated in 2016 and includes an ongoing programme of radioactive waste retrieval, treatment and storage.

Modern radioactive waste stores are designed to store waste for at least 100 years and operated to provide an environment necessary to ensure the longevity of the waste packaging. Packages for radioactive waste in the UK need to meet the appropriate regulatory standards and expectations to ensure their suitability for long-term storage and compatibility with the requirements for permanent disposal in the future.

Ahead of the launch of a siting process for a Geological Disposal Facility, the Government will publish the findings from a National Geological Screening (NGS) exercise that brings together existing information about England, Wales and Northern Ireland’s geology relevant to the long term safety of a geological disposal facility. These findings will be presented in the format of a series of brief narratives describing the key characteristics of the geological environment and their relevance to safety for siting a Geological Disposal Facility for the whole of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, subdivided in to 13 regions and out to 20 kilometres from the shore. The narratives will be illustrated with maps, where appropriate. For some attributes, information will be presented at a national level only, because data are very sparse or vary little across all regions, and so there will also be a short national output presenting this information, which is applicable to all regions. The findings will be made available in an accessible form, providing authoritative information that can be used in early discussions with communities about their geological potential to host a disposal facility.

The Government has undertaken generic design work on the construction requirements for a Geological Disposal Facility, which demonstrate that the depth of the underground facilities are expected to be between 200m and 1000m. This work demonstrates that while the surface structures and access points of a Geological Disposal Facility will be located on land, the design could allow the underground facilities to extend offshore if accessed from onshore surface sites. Therefore the National Geological Screening (NGS) exercise will bring together existing information about England, Wales and Northern Ireland’s geology relevant to the long term safety of a geological disposal facility examines geological attributes out to 20 kilometres from the shore which is the extent of UK territorial waters.

Ahead of the launch of a siting process for a Geological Disposal Facility, the Government will publish the findings from a National Geological Screening (NGS) exercise that brings together existing information about England, Wales and Northern Ireland’s geology relevant to the long term safety of a geological disposal facility. The findings from this exercise will not assess areas as either ‘suitable’ or ‘unsuitable’, but will provide an initial indication of the likely geological suitability of an area where the local community is interested in participating in the consent-based siting process for the disposal facility. There are a large range of potentially suitable geological settings in the UK, and the findings will inform early discussions with communities and provide the basis of subsequent detailed, site-specific geological investigations, which will be necessary to assess the degree to which a location is suitable or unsuitable.

Ahead of the launch of a siting process for a Geological Disposal Facility, the Government will publish the findings from a National Geological Screening (NGS) exercise that brings together existing information about England, Wales and Northern Ireland’s geology relevant to the long term safety of a geological disposal facility. The findings from this exercise will not assess areas as either ‘suitable’ or ‘unsuitable’, but will provide an initial indication of the likely geological suitability of an area where the local community is interested in participating in the consent-based siting process for the disposal facility. There are a large range of potentially suitable geological settings in the UK, and the findings will inform early discussions with communities and provide the basis of subsequent detailed, site-specific geological investigations, which will be necessary to determine, whether a location is suitable or unsuitable.

The Government is committed to a consent based approach for siting a geological disposal facility, which will involve working with communities that are willing to participate in the siting process. In the 2014 Geological Disposal White Paper Government recognised that local representative bodies – including all levels of local government – will need to have a voice in this process.

In addition, a Geological Disposal Facility and associated boreholes have been brought within the definition of Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects under the Planning Act 2008. The development consent process for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects places specific requirements on the developer to consult local communities, local authorities, statutory bodies, and other interested parties before any application for development consent is made.