European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord True]

The noble Lord has spoken a great deal in the past few days; I would like to continue my remarks, if I may.

The important issue that is raised here is a perfectly good issue on which to have a debate in the Moses Room or on an Unstarred Question. These are matters of great importance. I strongly disagree with the noble Baroness who said that we had not made progress in this country: we have made a great deal of progress in this country. The performance of this country on gender equality, work/life balance and carers has been transformed in my lifetime. It needs to go further, but I cannot accept—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Does the noble Lord accept that a great deal of the progress that we have made—for example, on gender equality—has been because of the judgments of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, which has imposed standards that our Parliament has not imposed?

[Lord True]

I do not necessarily accept that at all. I do not think that the progress of—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, also subscribed to by my noble friend Lady Bowles. The amendment is primarily a probing one, to seek clarification from the Government on what they are seeking to do here. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 states:

“No general principle of EU law is part of domestic law on or after exit day if it was not recognised as a general principle of EU law by the European Court in a case decided before exit day”.


So if one allows for the double negative, it rather suggests that, if it was a general principle of EU law that had been determined by the European Court in a case before exit day, it will continue to be part of domestic law. Having reached that point, the following paragraph says:

“There is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on a failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law”,


and that no,

“court or tribunal or other public authority may, on or after exit day … disapply or quash”—

and so forth.

I am intrigued about why, having apparently established that there is a general principle of EU law that becomes part of our domestic law, when what is given away with one hand is taken away with another, one is not allowed a remedy based on that general principle of EU law. It would be helpful if the Government could clarify that.

The matter was raised in the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, which at paragraph 117 of its report quotes Professor Alison Young, who wrote:

“Schedule 1 to the Bill makes it clear that ‘there is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law’ … This prevents claims of the nature found in Benkharbouche, where the Charter was used independently from other provisions of EU law. … But claimants will still be able to rely on general principles of EU law, which protect fundamental rights. They will not be able to use these general principles on their own, but they will still be used to interpret EU-derived law, which then in turn could be used to disapply legislation. For the claimants in Benkharbouche, the stronger remedy currently found under EU law for the protection of fundamental rights will disappear”.


Again, I seek clarification from the Government as to why they believe that these protections should disappear as currently found in EU law. Indeed, the committee in paragraph 120 concludes:

“The effects of excluding the Charter rights, retaining the ‘general principles’, but excluding rights of action based on them, are unclear … We recommend that the Government provides greater clarity on how the Bill deals with the general principles and how they will operate post-Brexit”.


I sincerely hope that the noble and learned Lord will take the opportunity when replying to the debate to respond to that recommendation from the Constitution Committee and give us a clarification.

There was also one specific point, on which I would ask for a view from the Government Front Bench. The provision in paragraph 3 is:

“No court or tribunal … may, on or after exit day … disapply or quash any enactment … because it is incompatible with any of the general principles of EU law”.


I assume that that would mean to any enactment pre exit, which could of course include an Act of the Scottish Parliament. Therefore, would the provision in paragraph 3 prevent any challenge being made to an Act of the Scottish Parliament passed before the exit day on the grounds that it was outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament because it was incompatible with those general principles, but not on the grounds that it was incompatible with any other pre-exit European Union law?

In other words, if other EU law had been satisfied but there was still a problem or it was still not compatible with EU principles, would an action that had been raised before exit day on the grounds that it was incompetent have to fall because no court could make a determination of it because of this paragraph? Some clarification on this point would be welcome. It would appear that a principle is established, but not the remedy that might go with it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have a similar question for the Minister. In paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1, we are told:

“There is no right in domestic law on or after exit day to challenge any retained EU law on the basis that, immediately before exit day, an EU instrument was invalid”.


I understand why that should be so, by reference to EU law principles, because at the moment you cannot challenge, in our courts, the validity of an EU instrument; you have to go to the Court of Justice. I am not sure whether the provision in paragraph 1(1) prevents, after exit day, a challenge to a provision of retained EU law brought by reference not to EU law but to common law principles. For example, are challenges on the grounds of legal certainty, the presumption against retrospectivity, or proportionality, which has already been mentioned, prevented by paragraph 1(1)?

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

Would the noble Lord agree that proportionality now seems to be part of UK law, notwithstanding what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said?

[Lord Pannick]

I do not think that the courts have accepted that proportionality can be a challenge by way of judicial review where you are not raising an issue of EU law or convention law—but we have come a very long way towards recognising proportionality as a principle of the common law. That is one reason why I am asking this very important question. I simply do not know whether you can challenge retained EU law after exit day by reference to traditional common law principles.

One reason why this matters is that the Supreme Court, in the HS2 case, suggested that this might be possible under existing law. As was raised in the debate last Monday, we should also bear in mind that, under Clause 2, retained EU law includes statutory instruments that do not owe their legal basis to the European Communities Act. They include statutory instruments enacted through other mechanisms, albeit that they are linked to EU law. At present, one can challenge those instruments by reference to traditional common law principles. Therefore, if Clause 1(1) were intended to prevent such a challenge after exit day, it would be a significant change in the law.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

Are these questions affected by the proposal to make this particular branch of law statutory? In that case, certain principles of our constitution might cause some difficulty.

[Lord Pannick]

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right. If retained EU law were to be categorised as primary legislation, such challenges could not be brought. But the Minister resisted that suggestion in our earlier debate. I am concerned with the Bill as it is at the moment. What is the Government’s intention in this respect?

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, that short exchange has demonstrated how complicated this area is and how important the general principles of EU law are in it. It is, perhaps, late at night to be discussing this but it is extremely important because of both the principles and the way they operate. If one looks at it in this way, and takes the Government’s intention not to take away rights as a part of this process, one has to recognise that the architecture which provides rights at the moment is quite complicated. As a commentator has said, there is no single, simple answer to restoring the position in the light of what the Government propose to do.

Amendment 41, which stands in my name, follows the principle the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, initiated by saying that the general principles of EU law should continue to be capable of giving rise to rights which can be enforced by our courts. The point has already been made that there is a difference between these general rights existing as a way of interpreting other rights—as an interpretive technique—and giving rise to freestanding rights themselves. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 prevents any action being founded in contravention of one of the general principles or rendering any Executive act unlawful or disapplying any legislation, including secondary legislation, on the grounds that it offends these general principles.

The general principles of EU law have been critical to a number of legal decisions relating to people’s rights. One of those often cited is the case of John Walker, who brought a case for equal protection in pension rights for his same-sex partner, a claim upheld by the Supreme Court which recognised that prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was a key principle of EU law. As I apprehend it, without that the case would not have succeeded.

The principle of effectiveness of remedies has also been relied upon. When the Supreme Court struck down employment tribunal fees that disproportionately affected disadvantaged women and low-paid workers, the principle of effectiveness of remedies was relied upon. Cases concerning caps on compensation and equal pay cases have depended upon the general principle that we find in the EU principles. The amendment standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to enable those general principles to continue to have that effect in our law. It is important that they do for a couple of other reasons. Take, for example, something that was raised in the other place. What if there is a principle of EU retained law which is deficient, defective, does not operate properly or is disproportionate? Without being able to rely upon the general principles of EU law, it may be that all the court could do if faced with that would be to say that either that principle or that particular Act or that particular piece of law, though deficient or defective, has to continue to operate because there is no principle by which it can be struck down, and that would be a loss.

The other reason goes back, I am afraid, to the debate that we had last week on the charter and the Government’s assertion that the charter is not necessary because all the rights are otherwise protected under our law. Of course, at the time the charter was drawn up we were still a member and, in many people’s minds at least, were expected to continue to remain a member of the European Union with all that that implied, including the continued application of general principles. But if one looks—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it is a precautionary power and it is intended that, where the circumstances arise, the Minister will address himself to those circumstances and contemplate the making of appropriate regulations.

[Lord Pannick]

Perhaps I may suggest to the Minister a circumstance in which this might arise. The day after exit day the Court of Justice gives a judgment saying that a provision of EU law is invalid. Nevertheless, that provision will be part of retained EU law—it will be part of our law even though it has been abolished in the EU. That might be a circumstance in which the Minister wishes to act.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I fully acknowledge that that is most certainly a circumstance that could arise. Of course, one might address that circumstance by Parliament legislating to reflect the outcome of that post-Brexit decision. However, I fully acknowledge that, depending on the way in which one constructs the departure on exit day, one might find that what one has retained as EU law ceases to be EU law almost immediately after one has left the EU. I believe that that has been acknowledged on a number of occasions. Indeed, it could lead to the development of two parallel jurisprudences—one for retained EU law and one for EU law. That is an inevitable outcome of our decision to leave the EU but to retain in our domestic law that which was EU law at the point of our departure. I fully acknowledge that, but it might also be a circumstance in which potentially one would seek to exercise the exceptional regulatory power that is referred to.

Reference was made to Amendments 41 and 42, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, which seek to retain indefinitely in domestic law rights of challenge based on the general principles of EU law. If agreed to, these amendments would empower domestic courts to quash administrative actions or secondary legislation or, indeed, even go as far as disapplying an Act of Parliament on the ground that it breaches one or more of the retained general principles of EU law—that could take place long after we have left the EU. That is why we have to have a point in time at which we have certainty as to the scope for such challenges, and that is reflected in the schedule.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, acknowledged, Amendment 41 would go even further. It seeks to set out an ostensibly broader definition of which general principles are to be retained under the Bill. In that context, he alluded to Article 191 of the TFEU, which deals with environmental issues. I take issue with him as to whether the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle are both now accepted as general principles of EU law. I would suggest that there is considerable doubt as to whether the former, in particular, constitutes what is recognised in EU law as a general principle, so I have some difficulty with that amendment.

I come now to Amendment 63, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is, I apprehend, intended to retain this right of challenge but solely for the principle of proportionality, as she indicated, and specifically including where retained EU law is to be treated as primary legislation. It would also appear to permit the possibility of a challenge on the basis of invalidity of EU law, as well as judicial review of such legislation. It is our position that the general principles of EU law, such as proportionality, non-retroactivity and fundamental rights, will be kept in our domestic law, but in order to assist in interpreting retained EU law and not to give rise to additional stand-alone rights. Whereas some general principles are now set out expressly in EU treaties, the general principles were those that were first recognised by the European Court of Justice. They are essentially judge-made and determined as principles on the basis of case law. It is those principles that we are dealing with.

I come back for a moment to Amendment 41, which goes beyond just the issue of proportionality. It would undermine the approach that we are seeking to take if we were to pursue it. In particular the inclusion of Article 191 in the amendment risks going further than the existing principles that are, as I say, set out in EU law and consequently in UK law today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foster of Bath (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 43, and I support Amendments 44 and 45. I begin by disagreeing slightly with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I suspect that I am in a minority: those of us who are not lawyers.

However, I am very conscious that during our deliberations so far we have heard many times that the Bill is intended to ensure that,

“as a general rule, the same rules and laws will apply after we leave the EU as they did before”.

About an hour ago we heard a very powerful reiteration of that from the noble Lord, Lord Duncan, who made it very clear that he believes what the Government seek to achieve. Yet that has to be put alongside the continuing concern in the other place and in many parts of your Lordships’ House that somehow or other Schedule 1 provides the Government with a get out of jail free card—an opportunity to have a series of measures which appear at least to curtail some of the legal rights and remedies we have enjoyed as a result of our membership of the European Union. A glaring example of that was well illustrated by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Carlile, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and is contained in paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 in relation to Francovich.

As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, rightly pointed out, Francovich is not just some right whereby anybody who feels slightly aggrieved by their Government not properly implementing some piece of EU legislation can immediately start action. Three clear criteria have to be met and have already been laid out: that there are rights conferred on an individual, that the breach was sufficiently serious, and that there is a clear causal connection between the breach and the damage sustained by the individual.

It seems clear, at least to me as a non-lawyer, that if paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 remains in the Bill, no retrospective claims under Francovich will be permitted, and certainly not if the proceedings have not been started before exit. In those cases, individuals will lose their ability to claim damages against the state for failure to implement EU laws and directives issued pre-exit. This would mean that the victim of a government failure to correctly implement an EU law must have started action before exit day, but that will not always have been possible and would seem contrary to natural justice. Access to justice, including the ability to challenge the actions of the state before a court of law, is central to the rule of law. If paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 remains as it stands, it seems that access to justice for some people will be denied.

I was in your Lordships’ House some 10 days ago when we heard during exchanges on the Statement on air quality that the High Court had ruled that the Government’s air quality plan, designed to tackle nitrogen dioxide in the air, was unlawful. The Court ruling said:

“It is now eight years since compliance with the 2008 Directive should have been achieved. This is the third, unsuccessful, attempt the Government has made at devising”,


an air quality plan,

“which complies with the Directive and the domestic Regulations."

The judge, Mr Justice Garnham, added,

“In the meanwhile, UK citizens have been exposed to significant health risks”.


It may be that some individuals will wish to argue, under the rule of Francovich, that they have suffered damage and deserve compensation because of the Government’s failure to implement the 2008 directive. Without Amendment 43, or some similar measure, such individuals will be prevented from seeking justice unless they submit their claim and have their case under way before exit day.

In the other place, many other examples of potential loss of access to justice under Francovich were raised. Initially the Minister there, Dominic Raab, offered assurances that:

“Individuals will not lose their ability to vindicate their rights in court after exit”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/11/17; col. 290.]


It may be—I have no way of knowing—that he believes that to be the case because of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978, which provides that,

“where an Act repeals an enactment, the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears ... affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability … accrued or incurred under that enactment”.

So the right to claim under the rule of Francovich post-exit would seem to depend on whether the Bill before us provides an effective and clear contrary intention. Can the Minister tell us clearly whether the Government believe that paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 provides a clear contrary intention, within the meaning of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978?

Certainly, there are some other lawyers who appear very uncertain about that point. For example, the very helpful briefing from James Segan of Blackstone Chambers leads me to conclude that seeking justice by arguing that there was no contrary intention or that it had been introduced ineffectively would lead litigants into a legal quagmire, so I was slightly heartened when in the other place a little later in the deliberations the Minister changed his tune when pressed by, among others, Conservative MPs Robert Neill, Dame Cheryl Gillan and Sir Oliver Letwin. He told them that he acknowledged the importance of legitimate expectations and agreed to see whether these concerns could be addressed, at least transitorily, by regulation rather than in the Bill. I hope that the Minister can update us on progress on that thinking. He has already said in relation to other aspects of Schedule 1 that the Government are willing to do that.

I would have thought that by far the better route to securing the continuation of the rights under Francovich would be to accept Amendment 43 or something like it, and ensure that the Bill makes it clear that when the Government say that the same rules and laws will apply after we leave the EU, they really mean it.

[Lord Pannick]

I have two questions for the Minister. First, will he accept that the right to damages under the Francovich principle is more generous to claimants than the common law principle of judicial review under which you very rarely have a right to claim damages as you need to prove misfeasance in public office or something similar? Does he accept that Francovich is more generous? Secondly, does he accept that it therefore follows that paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Bill conflicts with the Government’s purpose in bringing forward this Bill, which is to read across all existing rights that are enjoyed under EU law? If he accepts that, what is the justification for making an exception for Francovich damages?

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, it seems to me that if the Government break the law, they should be judged on the basis of the law at the time that they break it and that this is not a Bill in which the Government should seek to advantage themselves by averting that principle.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it is not. I have to say to the noble Lord that Francovich damages are a rare remedy, as I have already indicated. Damages in the context of judicial review are not so uncommon as the noble Lord was suggesting. They are available as a remedy, albeit in limited circumstances.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Perhaps I can continue just for a moment. I would begin by looking at the Bill against that background. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 is perfectly clear in saying the right to Francovich damages is removed, because of course it is related to a breach of European Union law, and it would not be appropriate to continue—in accordance with Amendment 43—after we have left the European Union. The Bill is quite clear in saying that there is,

“no right in domestic law on or after exit day to damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich”.

To that extent, it does deal with the issue raised in the context of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. As I say, we are addressing that issue, which we recognise, and therefore in time for Report we will be determining what our position is. I cannot go further at this stage and I am not going to commit to an amendment, but I make it perfectly clear that we recognise that there is a potential lacuna arising from the fact that while, where a claim has been made before Brexit date it is continued, where the claim has accrued but no claim has actually been made it would be lost by this process. We recognise that there is room for criticism of the legislation on that basis; I am absolutely clear about that.

In these circumstances, I recognise the force of the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in order to address that issue. I would take issue with the scope of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which goes well beyond that and would maintain some sort of claim for Francovich damages in a context quite unrelated to our departure from the EU. I underline that this would not be appropriate.

I mentioned earlier the limited number of cases in which Francovich damages have arisen. That in itself suggests that it might be a proportionate response to the amendments made by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to allow for claims that have accrued because they are potentially very few indeed. I recognise that entirely. I am not committing to an amendment at this stage but I will make the position clear by the time we reach Report. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

Before the Minister sits down and we all go to bed, I am very puzzled by his suggestion that there is currently a right to damages in judicial review such that Francovich damages do not add anything. In what circumstances is the Minister suggesting there is a right to damages in judicial review, other than in the very rare cases where you can prove misfeasance in public office?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is one example of where a claim for damages would arise in the context of a judicial review. There are distinct circumstances in which Francovich damages will arise. The noble Lord will himself recognise that the circumstances in which you can actually establish a basis of claim for Francovich damages are even rarer than those instances in which you can establish one in domestic judicial review.

[Lord Pannick]

I do not accept that. It is quite clear, I suggest, that damages under Francovich are provided in circumstances where you would not otherwise get damages because you cannot prove misfeasance but you can prove that the breach is sufficiently serious and that the law was intended to confer a right to damages. That is why I suggest to the Minister that paragraph 4 is taking away something of value.