European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Chris Leslie Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

New clause 24—Scope of delegated powers—

“Subject to sections 8 and 9 and paragraphs 13 and 21 of Schedule 2, any power to make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation conferred or modified under this Act and its Schedules must be used, and may only be used, insofar as is necessary to ensure that retained EU law continues to operate with equivalent scope, purpose and effect following the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU.”

The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the powers to create secondary legislation given to Ministers by the Bill can be used only in pursuit of the overall statutory purpose, namely to allow retained EU law to continue to operate effectively after exit day.

New clause 27—Institutional arrangements—

“(1) Before exit day a Minister of the Crown must make provision that all powers and functions relating to the environment or environmental protection that were exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement (‘relevant powers and functions’) will—

(a) continue to be carried out by an EU entity or public authority;

(b) be carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom; or

(c) be carried out by an appropriate international entity or public authority.

(2) For the purposes of this section, relevant powers and functions relating to the UK exercisable by an EU entity or public authority include, but are not limited to—

(a) monitoring and measuring compliance with legal requirements,

(b) reviewing and reporting on compliance with legal requirements,

(c) enforcement of legal requirements,

(d) setting standards or targets,

(e) co-ordinating action,

(f) publicising information including regarding compliance with environmental standards.

(3) Within 12 months of exit day, the Government shall consult on and bring forward proposals for the creation by primary legislation of—

(a) a new independent body or bodies with powers and functions at least equivalent to those of EU entities and public authorities in Member States in relation to environment; and

(b) a new domestic framework for environmental protection and improvement.

(4) Responsibility for any functions or obligations arising from retained EU law for which no specific provision has been made immediately after commencement of this Act will belong to the relevant Minister until such a time as specific provision for those functions or obligations has been made.”

This new clause requires the Government to establish new domestic governance proposals following the UK’s exit from the EU and to ensure statutory and institutional basis for future environmental protection.

New clause 35—Regulations (publication of list)—

“(1) Within 1 month of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must publish a draft list of regulations that the Government intends to make under section 7.

(2) A list under subsection (1) must include—

(a) the proposed title of the regulation,

(b) the area of retained EU law it is required to correct,

(c) the Government Department who has responsibility for the regulation, and

(d) the proposed month in which the regulation will be tabled.

(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that a list published under subsection (1) is updated within one month from the day it was published, and within one month of every subsequent update, to include any regulations that the Government has since determined it intends to make.”

This new clause would require the Government to produce a list of regulations it intends to make under the Bills correcting powers, and to update that list each month, in order to provide clarity about when, and in which areas, it believes the power will be necessary.

New clause 37—Governance and institutional arrangements—

“(1) Before exit day a Minister of the Crown must seek to make provision that all powers and functions relating to any right, freedom, or protection, that any person might reasonably expect to exercise, that were exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day, and which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement (‘relevant powers and functions’) will—

(a) continue to be carried out by an EU entity or public authority;

(b) be carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom; or

(c) be carried out by an appropriate international entity or public authority.

(2) For the purposes of this section, relevant powers and functions relating to the UK exercisable by an EU entity or public authority include, but are not limited to—

(a) monitoring and measuring compliance with legal requirements,

(b) reviewing and reporting on compliance with legal requirements,

(c) enforcement of legal requirements,

(d) setting standards or targets,

(e) co-ordinating action,

(f) publicising information.

(3) Responsibility for any functions or obligations arising from retained EU law for which no specific provision has been made immediately after commencement of this Act will belong to the relevant Minister until such a time as specific provision for those functions or obligations has been made.”

This new clause would ensure that the institutions and agencies that protect EU derived rights and protections are replaced to a sufficient standard so those rights and protections will still be enjoyed in practice.

New clause 53—Dealing with deficiencies arising from withdrawal in relation to child refugee family reunion—

“(1) In the exercise of powers under section 7 (Dealing with deficiencies arising from withdrawal) the Secretary of State must in particular make regulations amending the Immigration Rules in order to preserve the effect in the United Kingdom of Commission Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person).

(2) In particular, the regulations made under subsection (1) must provide for an unaccompanied minor who has a family member in the United Kingdom who is a refugee or has been granted humanitarian protection to have the same family reunion rights to be reunited in the United Kingdom with that family member as they would have had under Commission Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013.

(3) The regulations under subsection (1) must require an assessment of the best interests of the minor, taking into account possibilities for family reunification, the minor’s well-being and social development, safety and security considerations, and the view of the minor.

(4) Regulations under this section must be made within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.

(5) For the purpose of this section “family member” in relation to the unaccompanied minor, means—

(a) their parents;

(b) their adult siblings;

(c) their aunts and uncles;

(d) their grandparents.”

This new clause is intended to provide for refugee family reunion in the UK in place of the family reunion aspects of the Dublin III Regulation, allowing adult refugees in the UK to sponsor relatives who are unaccompanied children to come to the UK from around the world.

New clause 62—Enforcement of retained environmental law—

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations under section 7 of this Act for the purpose of ensuring that retained EU legislation relating to environmental protection continues to be monitored and enforced effectively after exit day.

(2) The regulations must, in particular—

(a) create a statutory corporation (to be called “the Environmental Protection Agency”) with operational independence from Ministers of the Crown to monitor environmental targets set by retained EU law relating to environmental protection;

(b) require the statutory corporation to report to Parliament every year on progress in meeting those targets and to make recommendations for remedial action where appropriate;

(c) allow the statutory corporation to publish additional reports identifying action or omissions on the part of Ministers of the Crown that is likely to result in targets not being met.”

This new clause would require Ministers of the Crown to make specific provision for the enforcement of EU legislation relating to environmental protection.

New clause 63—Environmental standards and protections: enforcement—

“(1) Before exit day a Minister of the Crown must make provision that all powers and functions relating to environmental standards and protections that were exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day and which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement (“relevant powers and functions”) will be carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom.

(2) For the purposes of this section, relevant powers and functions include, but are not limited to—

(a) reviewing and reporting on the implementation of environmental standards in practice,

(b) monitoring and measuring compliance with legal requirements,

(c) publicising information including regarding compliance with environmental standards,

(d) facilitating the submission of complaints from persons with regard to possible infringements of legal requirements, and

(e) enforcing legal commitments.

(3) For the purposes of this section, relevant powers and functions carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom on any day after exit day must be at least equivalent to all those exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement.

(4) Any newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom charged with exercising any relevant powers and functions on any day after exit day shall not be established other than by an Act of Parliament.

(5) Before making provision under subsection (1), a Minister of the Crown shall hold a public consultation on—

(a) the precise scope of the relevant powers and functions to be carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom, and

(b) the institutional design of any entity or public authority in the United Kingdom to be newly established in order to exercise relevant powers and functions.

(6) A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make time-limited transitional arrangements for the exercise of relevant powers and functions until such time as an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom is able to carry them out.”

This new clause would require the Government to establish new domestic governance arrangements following the UK’s exit from the EU for environmental standards and protections, following consultation.

New clause 82—Tertiary legislation—

“The powers conferred by this Act do not include power to confer any power to legislate by means of orders, rules or other subordinate instrument, other than rules of procedure for any court or tribunal.”

Amendment 65, in clause 7, page 5, line 4, leave out “appropriate” and insert “necessary”.

This Amendment would reduce the wide discretion for using delegated legislation and limit it to those aspects which are unavoidable.

Amendment 15, page 5, line 5, leave out from “effectively” to end of line 6 on page 6.

Amendment 49, page 5, line 7, at end insert—

“(1A) Regulations under subsection (1) may be made so far as necessary to adapt the body of EU law to fit the UK’s domestic legal framework.”

This amendment would place a general provision on the face of the Bill to the effect that the delegated powers granted by the Bill should be used only so far as necessary.

Amendment 131, page 5, line 7, at end insert—

“(1A) A Minister of the Crown must by regulations make provision to maintain, preserve and protect the rights of any citizen of an EU member state who was lawfully resident in the UK immediately before exit day, and in particular to continue their right to be lawfully resident in the UK.”

This Amendment is intended to preserve after exit day the rights, including residence rights, of EU citizens in the UK.

Amendment 264, page 5, line 7, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State shall make regulations to define “failure to operate efficiently” for the purposes of this section.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to define in regulations one of the criteria for the use of Clause 7 powers to deal with deficiencies arising from withdrawal from the EU.

Amendment 1, page 5, line 8, leave out “(but are not limited to)” and insert “and are limited to”.

To restrict the power of a Minister to make regulations to amend retained EU law to cases where the EU law is deficient in the way set out in the Bill.

Amendment 56, page 5, line 8, leave out “(but are not limited to)”.

This amendment would remove the ambiguity in Clause 7 which sets out a definition of ‘deficiencies in retained EU law’ but allows Ministers significant latitude. By removing the qualifying phrase ‘but are not limited to’, subsection (2) becomes a more precise prescribed set of circumstances where Ministers may and may not make regulations.

Amendment 277, page 5, line 41, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under this section may not be made unless a Minister of the Crown has laid before each House of Parliament a report setting out how any functions, regulation-making powers or instruments of a legislative character undertaken by EU entities prior to exit day and instead to be exercisable by a public authority in the United Kingdom shall also be subject to the level of legislative scrutiny by the UK Parliament equivalent to that available to the European Parliament prior to exit day.”

This amendment would ensure that any regulatory or rule-making powers transferred from EU entities to UK public bodies receive the same degree of scrutiny that would have been the case if the UK had remained in the European Union.

Amendment 359, page 5, line 41, at end insert—

“( ) Retained EU law is not deficient only because it enables rights to be exercised in the United Kingdom by persons having a connection with the EU, which other persons having a corresponding connection with the United Kingdom may not be able to exercise in the EU as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.”

The amendment would make clear that retained EU law cannot be modified under clause 7 to restrict the rights of EU nationals or businesses in the UK simply because UK nationals or businesses may lose equivalent rights in the EU as a result of the UK’s withdrawal.

Amendment 57, page 5, line 42, leave out subsection (4).

This amendment would remove the scope for regulations to make provisions that could be made by an Act of Parliament.

Amendment 32, page 5, line 43, at end insert “, apart from amending or modifying this Act”.

This amendment would remove the proposed capacity of Ministers under Clause 7 to modify and amend the Act itself via delegated powers.

Amendment 121, page 5, line 44, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) No regulations may be made under this section which provide for the establishment of public authorities in the United Kingdom.

(6) Subsection (5) applies to but is not limited to—

(a) Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),

(b) Office of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC Office),

(c) Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO),

(d) European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex),

(e) European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA),

(f) European Asylum Support Office (EASO),

(g) European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA),

(h) European Banking Authority (EBA),

(i) European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC),

(j) European Chemicals Agency (ECHA),

(k) European Environment Agency (EEA),

(l) European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA),

(m) European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA),

(n) European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA),

(o) European Medicines Agency (EMA),

(p) European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA),

(q) European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA),

(r) European Police Office (Europol),

(s) European Union Agency for Railways (ERA),

(t) European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and

(u) European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).”

This amendment ensures that the Government cannot establish new agencies using delegated legislation.

Amendment 388, page 5, line 44, leave out subsection (5).

Amendment 61, page 6, line 3, leave out sub-paragraph (ii).

This amendment would remove the ability of Ministers to replace or abolish public service functions currently undertaken by EU entities without making an alternative provision for those equivalent public services to continue domestically after exit day. Retaining the existing functions undertaken by the EU is an important principle that the part of this sub-clause could potentially undermine.

Amendment 5, page 6, line 3, leave out “abolished”.

To prevent the abolition by SI of a function currently carried out by an EU entity in the UK, as opposed to its replacement or modification.

Amendment 108, page 6, line 4, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment seeks to prevent the establishment of new public bodies by means of secondary legislation only, as opposed to primary legislation.

Amendment 17, page 6, line 6, at end insert—

“(5A) Regulations under this section must be prefaced by a statement by the person making the regulations—

(a) specifying the nature of the failure of retained European Union law to operate effectively or other deficiency arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union in respect of which the regulations are made, and

(b) declaring that the person making the regulations—

(i) is satisfied that the conditions in section 7 are met,

(ii) is satisfied that the regulations contain only provision which is appropriate for the purpose of preventing, remedying or mitigating any failure to operate effectively or other deficiency in retained European Union law arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union in respect of which the regulations are made,

(iii) is satisfied that the effect of the regulations is in due proportion to that failure to operate effectively or other deficiency in European Union retained law arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, and

(iv) is satisfied that the regulations are compatible with the Convention rights (within the meaning of section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)).”

This amendment replicates the provisions in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which limit Ministers’ powers even in a time of declared emergency. They ensure that statutory instruments are proportionate and necessary.

Amendment 48, page 6, line 6, at end insert—

“(5A) But a Minister may not make provision under subsection (4), other than provision which merely restates an enactment, unless the Minister considers that the conditions in subsection (5B), where relevant, are satisfied in relation to that provision.

(5B) These conditions are that—

(a) the effect of the provision is proportionate to the policy objective,

(b) the provision does not remove any necessary protection, and

(c) the provision does not prevent any person from continuing to exercise any right or freedom which that person might reasonably expect to continue to exercise.”

This amendment is intended to prevent the regulation-making power from being used to remove necessary protections.

Amendment 104, page 6, line 6, at end insert—

“(5A) A public authority established under this section will be abolished after two years.”

This amendment provides for any new public authority established under secondary legislation to be temporary.

Amendment 342, page 6, line 6, at end insert—

“(5A) Regulations to which subsection (5) applies must so far as practicable ensure that all powers and functions exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement are carried out by either an EU entity, an appropriate public authority in the United Kingdom or an appropriate international entity after exit day”.

This amendment would ensure that standards, rights and protections currently maintained by EU entities or public authorities in member states will continue to be maintained in practice following the UK’s exit from the EU.

Amendment 123, page 6, line 10, at end insert—

“(ca) weaken, remove or replace any requirement of law in effect in the United Kingdom place immediately before exit day which, in the opinion of the Minister, was a requirement up to exit day of the United Kingdom’s membership of the customs union,”

This amendment is intended to prevent the regulation-making powers being used to create barriers to the UK’s continued membership of the customs union.

Amendment 124, page 6, line 10, at end insert—

“(ca) weaken, remove or replace any requirement of law in effect in the United Kingdom place immediately before exit day which, in the opinion of the Minister, was a requirement up to exit day of the United Kingdom’s membership of the single market,”.

This amendment is intended to prevent the regulation-making powers being used to create barriers to the UK’s continued membership of the single market.

Amendment 222, page 6, line 11, at end insert—

“(da) remove any protections or rights of consumers which are available in the United Kingdom under EU law immediately before exit day.”

This amendment would prevent the Government from using powers in the Act to remove any consumer protections or rights enshrined in EU law after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union.

Amendment 332, page 6, line 11, at end insert—

“(da) remove or reduce any rights available to unaccompanied child refugees or asylum seekers (including those who wish to claim asylum) concerning their admission or transfer to the UK under—

(i) Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (the “Dublin Regulation”); or

(ii) Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;

(db) remove any rights or obligations derived from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Treaty on the European Union, or the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which can be applied to the treatment of unaccompanied child refugees or asylum seekers (including those who wish to claim asylum) concerning their admission or transfer to the UK,”

This amendment would prevent a Minister from using regulations under Clause 7 of the Bill to remove or reduce rights under the Dublin Regulation, the 2004 Directive on freedom of movement, or to remove rights or obligations under TFEU, TEU or the Charter of Fundamental Rights, regarding admission or transfer to the UK of unaccompanied child refugees or asylum seekers (including those who wish to claim asylum).

Amendment 333, page 6, line 11, at end insert—

“(da) establish a new entity or public authority in the United Kingdom charged with exercising any powers and functions currently exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day in relation to the environment or environmental protection”.

This amendment would ensure that any new institutions required to enforce environmental standards and protections following the UK’s exit from the EU can be created only by primary legislation.

Amendment 52, page 6, line 12, after “revoke” insert “the Equality Act 2010 or”

This amendment would prevent regulations under the Bill being used to amend the Equality Act 2010.

Amendment 363, page 6, line 12, after “revoke”, insert “, or otherwise modify the effect of,”

This amendment would ensure that the restriction in this paragraph could not be undermined by the use of legislation which does not amend the text of the Human Rights Act but modifies its effect.

Amendment 364, page 6, line 13, after “it”, insert—

“(ea) amend, repeal or revoke, or otherwise modify the effect of, any other law relating to equality or human rights,”.

This amendment would broaden the restriction in this subsection to protect all legislation relating to equality and human rights (and not only the Human Rights Act 1998).

Amendment 2, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) make any other provision, unless the Minister considers that the conditions in subsection (6A) where relevant are satisfied in relation to that provision.

(6A) Those conditions are that—

(a) the policy objective intended to be secured by the provision could not be secured by non-legislative means;

(b) the effect of the provision is proportionate to the policy objective;

(c) the provision, taken as a whole, strikes a fair balance between the public interest and the interests of any person adversely affected by it;

(d) the provision does not remove any necessary protection;

(e) the provision does not prevent any person from continuing to exercise any right or freedom which that person might reasonably expect to continue to exercise.

(f) the provision is not of constitutional significance”.

To narrow down the circumstances in which this power can be exercised.

Amendment 25, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) remove or reduce any protections currently conferred upon individuals, groups or the natural environment,

(h) prevent any person from continuing to exercise a right that they can currently exercise,

(i) amend, repeal or revoke the Equality Act 2010 or any subordinate legislation made under that Act.”

This amendment would prevent the Government’s using delegated powers under Clause 7 to reduce rights or protections.

Amendment 73, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) make changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning the rights of workers in the UK unless the Secretary of State has secured unanimous agreement from the Joint Ministerial Committee.”

Amendment 96, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) limit the scope or weaken standards of environmental protection.”

This Amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 7 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.

Amendment 109, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) amend, repeal or revoke any legal right derived from EU law and operative in UK law immediately before 30 March 2019.”

This amendment seeks to prevent the delegated powers granted to Ministers by Clause 7 being used to weaken or abolish existing EU-derived legal rights, such as those on workers’ rights, equality, and environmental protection.

Amendment 233, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) make changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning the co-ordination of social security systems between the UK and EU member states unless the Secretary of State has consulted with the relevant Minister in each of the devolved administrations.”

This amendment would require that changes cannot be made under Clause 7 to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning the co-ordination of social security systems between the UK and EU member states unless the Secretary of State has consulted with the relevant Minister in each of the devolved administrations.

Amendment 234, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) make changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning eligibility for UK pensions unless a public consultation on these changes has taken place.”

This amendment would require that changes cannot be made under Clause 7 to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning eligibility for UK pensions unless a public consultation on these changes has taken place.

Amendment 239, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) make changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning agricultural policies in the UK unless the Secretary of State has secured unanimous agreement from the Joint Ministerial Committee to those changes.”

This amendment would ensure that the power to make regulations on agricultural policy under Clause 7 could not be exercised without agreement from the Joint Ministerial Council.

Amendment 240, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) make changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning fisheries in the UK unless the Secretary of State has secured unanimous agreement from the Joint Ministerial Committee to those changes.”

This amendment would ensure that the power to make regulations concerning fisheries under Clause 7 could not be exercised without agreement from the Joint Ministerial Council.

Amendment 266, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) amend, repeal or revoke the Equality Act 2010 or any subordinate legislation made under it.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 7 being used to amend Equality Act 2010 legislation.

Amendment 269, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 7 being used to remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.

Amendment 272, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) make provision which, in the opinion of the Minister, could pose a threat to national security.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 7 being used to make provision which could pose a threat to national security.

Amendment 389, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(g) confer a power to legislate (other than a power to make rules of procedure for a court or tribunal).”

Amendment 138, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(6A) Regulations may not be made under this section unless a Minister of the Crown has certified that the Minister is satisfied that the regulations do not remove or reduce any environmental protection provided by retained EU law.”

This amendment ensures that regulations under this section cannot interfere with environmental protection under retained EU law, by requiring a Ministerial certificate.

Amendment 360, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(6A) A Minister of the Crown must as soon as reasonably practicable—

(a) publish a statement of Her Majesty’s Government’s policy as to modifications of retained EU law under this section, so far as they appear to the Minister likely to affect industry and commerce in the United Kingdom, and

(b) consult with representatives of, or participants in, industry and commerce as to the modifications which are necessary or desirable.

(6B) In subsection (6A) “industry and commerce” includes financial and professional services.”

The amendment would require early consultation with representatives of the financial and professional services industries on relevant modifications which are to be made under clause 7.

Amendment 385, page 6, line 18, at end insert—

“(6A) A Minister of the Crown must by regulations make provision to replicate the protections in relation to ‘protected persons’ as defined in Part 3 of the Criminal Justice (European Protection Order) (England and Wales) Regulations 2014 after exit day.”

This amendment is intended to require the Government to make regulations that continue to recognise European Protection Orders issued by courts in other EU member states after exit day.

Amendment 16, page 6, line 21, leave out subsection (8).

Amendment 88, page 6, line 25, at end insert—

“(9) Regulations may only be made under subsection (5)(a)(ii) if an impact assessment on the replacement, abolition or modification of the functions of EU entities is laid before each House of Parliament prior to them being made.”

This amendment prevents Ministers of the Crown from being able to replace, abolish or modify the functions of EU Agencies without laying impact assessments on its effect before both Houses of Parliament.

Amendment 334, page 6, line 25, at end insert—

“(9) In the exercise of powers under this section the Secretary of State must guarantee the standards and protections currently required as a result of the National Emissions Ceilings Directive, the Ambient Air Quality Directive, the Industrial Emissions Directive, the Medium Combustion Plant Directive and Directive 2004/107/EC relating to arsenic, cadmium, mercury, nickel and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in ambient air.”

This amendment would ensure that the UK maintains existing air quality standards and protections following the UK’s exit from the EU.

Clause 7 stand part.

Amendment 206, in clause 9, page 6, line 43, leave out “appropriate” and insert “necessary”

To require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by Parliament.

Amendment 114,  page 7, line 1, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment seeks to restrict the delegated powers granted to Ministers by Clause 9.

Amendment 18, page 7, line 2, leave out “(including modifying this Act)” and insert

“except modifying this Act, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 and any Act granted Royal Assent in the session of Parliament in which this Act is passed”.

This removes the power of Ministers to amend this Act, the Parliament Acts and any Act granted assent in this session of Parliament. It is necessary so as to safeguard the constitutional provisions in the Parliament Acts, such as the provision that a Parliament cannot last more than five years and the relative powers of the House of Lords.

Amendment 30, page 7, line 2, leave out ‘(including modifying this Act)’ and insert

“, apart from amending or modifying this Act”.

This amendment would remove the proposed capacity of Ministers in Clause 9 to modify and amend the Act itself via delegated powers.

Amendment 59, page 7, line 2, leave out “including” and insert “but not”.

This amendment would prevent the Ministerial order making powers in Clause 9 being used to modify the European Union (Withdrawal) Act itself.

Amendment 368, page 7, line 6, leave out “or”.

This amendment is preparatory to Amendment 370.

Amendment 369, page 7, line 7, after “revoke”, insert “, or otherwise modify the effect of,”

This amendment would ensure that the restriction in this paragraph could not be undermined by the use of legislation which does not amend the text of the Human Rights Act but modifies its effect.

Amendment 13, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(e) make any provision, unless the Minister considers that the conditions in subsection (3B) where relevant are satisfied in relation to that provision.

(3A) Those conditions are that—

(a) the policy objective intended to be secured by the provision could not be secured by non-legislative means;

(b) the effect of the provision is proportionate to the policy objective;

(c) the provision, taken as a whole, strikes a fair balance between the public interest and the interests of any person adversely affected by it;

(d) the provision does not remove any necessary protection;

(e) the provision does not prevent any person from continuing to exercise any right or freedom which that person might reasonably expect to continue to exercise;

(f) the provision is not of constitutional significance”

Amendment 27, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(e) remove or reduce any protections currently conferred upon individuals, groups or the natural environment,

(f) prevent any person from continuing to exercise a right that they can currently exercise,

(g) amend, repeal or revoke the Equality Act 2010 or any subordinate legislation made under that Act.”

This amendment would prevent the Government’s using delegated powers under Clause 9 to reduce rights or protections.

Amendment 98, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(e) limit the scope or weaken standards of environmental protection.”

This Amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 8 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.

Amendment 115, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(e) amend, repeal or revoke any legal right derived from EU law and operative in UK law immediately before 30 March 2019.”

This amendment seeks to prevent the delegated powers granted to Ministers by Clause 9 being used to weaken or abolish existing EU-derived legal rights, such as those on workers’ rights, equality, and environmental protection.

Amendment 268, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(e) amend, repeal or revoke the Equality Act 2010 or any subordinate legislation made under it.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 9 being used to amend Equality Act 2010 legislation.

Amendment 271, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(e) remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 9 being used to remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.

Amendment 274, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(e) make provision which, in the opinion of the Minister, could pose a threat to national security.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 9 being used to make provision which could pose a threat to national security.

Amendment 370, page 7, line 8, at end insert “, or

(e) amend, repeal or revoke, or otherwise modify the effect of, any other law relating to equality or human rights.”.

This amendment would broaden the restriction in this subsection to protect all legislation relating to equality and human rights (and not only the Human Rights Act 1998).

New clause 1—Scrutiny Committee—

“(1) For the purposes of this Act ‘a scrutiny committee’ refers to either—

(a) the House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, or

(b) a Committee of the House of Commons which is established to perform the specific functions assigned to a scrutiny committee in this Act.

(2) The scrutiny committee referred to in subsection (1)(b) shall be chaired by a Member who is—

(a) of the same Party as the Official Opposition, and

(b) elected by the whole House.”

This new clause establishes the principle that there shall be a Commons triage committee which works alongside the Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee to determine the level of scrutiny each statutory instrument shall receive.

New clause 6—Government proposals for Parliamentary scrutiny—

“Within one month of Royal Assent of this Act the Leader of the House of Commons shall publish proposals for improved scrutiny of delegated legislation and regulations that result from this Act.”

This new clause would require the Government to bring forward early proposals for the House of Commons to consider as changes to Standing Orders to reflect the scrutiny required as a result of changes to regulation and delegated legislation made by this Act.

New clause 26—Scrutiny of statutory instruments—

“(1) A Parliamentary Committee shall determine the form and duration of parliamentary and public scrutiny for every statutory instrument proposed to be made under this Act.

(2) Where the relevant Committee decides that the statutory instrument will be subject to enhanced parliamentary scrutiny the Committee shall have the power—

(a) to require a draft of the proposed statutory instrument be laid before Parliament;

(b) to require the relevant Minister to provide further evidence or explanation as to the purpose and necessity of the proposed instrument;

(c) to make recommendations to the relevant Minister in relation to the text of the draft statutory instrument;

(d) to recommend to the House that “no further proceedings be taken” in relation to the draft statutory instrument.

(3) Where an instrument is subject to enhanced scrutiny, the relevant Minister must have regard to any recommendations made by the Parliamentary Committee pursuant to subparagraph © above before laying a revised draft instrument before each House of Parliament.

(4) Where an instrument is subject to public consultation, the relevant Minister must have regard to the results of the consultation before laying a revised draft instrument before each House of Parliament or making a Written Statement explaining why no revision is necessary.”

This new clause seeks to ensure that a Parliamentary Committee rather than ministers should decide what is the appropriate level of scrutiny for regulations made under the Act and that the Parliamentary Committee has the power to require enhanced scrutiny in relation to regulations that it considers to be particularly significant or contentious.

Amendment 68, in schedule 7, page 39, line 13, leave out sub-paragraphs (1) to (3) and insert—

“(1) If a Minister considers it appropriate to proceed with the making of regulations under section 7, the Minister shall lay before Parliament—

(a) draft regulations,

(b) an explanatory document and

(c) a declaration under sub-paragraph (3).

(2) The explanatory document must—

(a) introduce and explain the amendment made to retained EU law by each proposed regulation, and

(b) set out the reason why each such amendment is necessary (or, in the case where the Minister is unable to make a statement of necessity under sub-paragraph (3)(a), the reason why each such amendment is nevertheless considered appropriate).

(3) The declaration required in sub-paragraph (1) must either—

(a) state that, in the Minister’s view, the provisions of the draft regulations do not exceed what is necessary to prevent, remedy or mitigate any deficiency in retained EU law arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU (a “statement of necessity”); or

(b) include a statement to the effect that although the Minister is unable to make a statement of necessity the Government nevertheless proposes to exercise the power to make the regulations in the form of the draft.

(4) Subject as follows, if after the expiry of the 21-day period a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament appointed to consider draft regulations under this Schedule (“the joint committee”) has not reported to both Houses a resolution in respect of the draft regulations laid under sub-paragraph (1), the Minister may proceed to make a statutory instrument in the form of the draft regulations.

(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under sub-paragraph (4) shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(6) The procedure in sub-paragraphs (7) to (9) shall apply to the proposal for the draft regulations instead of the procedure in sub-paragraph (4) if—

(a) either House of Parliament so resolves within the 21-day period,

(b) the joint committee so recommends within the 21-day period and neither House by resolution rejects the recommendation within that period, or

(c) the draft regulations contain provision to—

(i) establish a public authority in the United Kingdom,

(ii) provide for any function of an EU entity or public authority in a member State to be exercisable instead by a public authority in the United Kingdom established by regulations under section 7, 8 or 9 or Schedule 2,

(iii) provides for any function of an EU entity or public authority in a member State of making an instrument of a legislative character to be exercisable instead by a public authority in the United Kingdom,

(iv) imposes, or otherwise relates to, a fee in respect of a function exercisable by a public authority in the United Kingdom,

(v) creates, or widens the scope of, a criminal offence, or

(vi) creates or amends a power to legislate.

(7) The Minister must have regard to—

(a) any representations,

(b) any resolution of either House of Parliament, and

(c) any recommendations of a committee of either House of Parliament charged with reporting on the proposal for the draft regulations,

made during the 60-day period with regard to the draft regulations.

(8) If after the expiry of the 60-day period the draft regulations are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Minister may make regulations in the form of the draft.

(a) revised draft regulations, and

(b) a statement giving a summary of the changes proposed.

(9) If after the expiry of the 60-day period the Minister wishes to proceed with the draft regulations but with material changes, the Minister may lay before Parliament—

(a) revised draft regulations, and

(b) a statement giving a summary of the changes proposed

(10) If the revised draft regulations are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Minister may make regulations in the terms of the revised draft.

(11) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (1) to (10) regulations are made in the terms of draft regulations or revised draft regulations if they contain no material change to their provisions.

(12) In sub-paragraphs (1) to (10), references to the “21-day” and “60-day” periods in relation to any draft regulations are to the periods of 21 and 60 days beginning with the day on which the draft regulations were laid before Parliament.

(13) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (12), no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days.”

This amendment would require the Minister to provide an explanatory statement on whether the regulations simply transpose EU law or make further changes, subject to a check by a committee of the House, and require that if the regulations involve more than simple transposition the super affirmative procedure must be used.

Amendment 129, page 39, line 13, leave out paragraphs 1 to 3 and insert—

“Scrutiny procedure: introductory

1 A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 7 may not be made by a Minister of the Crown unless it complies with the procedures in this Part.

Determination of scrutiny procedure

2 (1) The explanatory document laid with a statutory instrument or draft statutory instrument containing regulations under section 7 must contain a recommendation by the Minister as to which of the following should apply in relation to the making of an order pursuant to the draft order—

(a) the negative resolution procedure:

(b) the affirmative resolution procedure;

(c) the super-affirmative procedure.

(2) The explanatory document must give reasons for the Minister’s recommendation.

(3) Where the Minister’s recommendation is that the negative resolution procedure should apply, that procedure shall apply unless, within the 30-day period—

(a) either House of Parliament requires that the super-affirmative procedure shall apply, in which case that procedure shall apply; or

(b) in a case not falling within paragraph (a), either House of Parliament requires that the affirmative resolution procedure shall apply, in which case that procedure shall apply.

(4) Where the Minister’s recommendation is that the affirmative resolution should apply, that procedure shall apply unless, within the 30-day period, either House of Parliament requires that the super-affirmative resolution procedure shall apply, in which case the super-affirmative resolution procedure shall apply.

(5) Where the Minister’s recommendation is that the super-affirmative procedure should apply, that procedure shall apply.

(6) For the purposes of this paragraph a House of Parliament shall be taken to have required a procedure within the 30-day period if—

(a) that House resolves within that period that that procedure shall apply; or

(b) in a case not falling within paragraph (a), a committee of that House charged with reporting on the draft order has recommended within that period that that procedure shall apply and the House has not by resolution rejected that recommendation within that period.

Super-affirmative procedure

3 (1) for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule, the “super-affirmative resolution procedure” is as follows.

(2) The Minister must have regard to—

(a) any representations,

(b) any resolution of either House of Parliament, and

(c) any recommendations of a committee of either House of Parliament charged with reporting on the draft order,

made during the 60-day period with regard to the draft order.

(3) If, after the expiry of the 60-day period, the Minister wishes to make an order in the terms of the draft, he or she must lay before Parliament a statement—

(a) stating whether any representations were made; and

(b) if any representations were so made, giving details of them.

(4) The Minister may after the laying of such a statement make an order in the terms of the draft if it is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(5) However, a committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft order may, at any time after the laying of a statement under sub-paragraph (3) and before the draft order is approved by that House under sub-paragraph (4), recommend under this subparagraph that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order.

(6) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of either House under subparagraph (5) in relation to a draft statutory instrument, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the draft statutory instrument in that House unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.

(7) If, after the expiry of the 60-day period, the Minister wishes to make an order consisting of a version of the draft statutory instrument with material changes, he or she must lay before Parliament—

(a) a revised draft statutory instrument; and

(b) a statement giving details of—

(i) any representations made; and

(ii) the revisions proposed.

(8) The Minister may after laying a revised draft statutory instrument and statement under sub-paragraph (7) make regulations in the terms of the revised statutory instrument if it is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(9) However, a committee of either House charged with reporting on the revised draft statutory instrument may, at any time after the revised draft statutory is laid under sub-paragraph (7) and before it is approved by that House under sub-paragraph (8), recommend under this sub-paragraph that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the revised draft statutory instrument.

(10) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of either House under sub-paragraph (9) in relation to a revised draft statutory instrument, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the revised draft statutory instrument in that House under subsection (8) unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.

(11) In this Part—

(a) the “30-day period” means the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which the draft statutory instrument was laid before Parliament;

(b) the “60-day period” means the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the draft statutory instrument was laid before Parliament;

(c) the “affirmative resolution procedure” has the same meaning as in section 17 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006;

(d) the “negative resolution procedure” has the same meaning as in section 16 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.”

This amendment would ensure Parliament has the power to determine, following recommendations by the Minister, which parliamentary procedure should be used to scrutinise statutory instruments containing regulations that deal with deficiencies arising from EU withdrawal. It also provides for use of the “super-affirmative resolution procedure” whereby a committee of either House can recommend that no further proceedings be taken in relation to a draft order, which can only be over-turned by a resolution of that House.

Amendment 20, page 39, line 13, leave out

“which contain provisions falling with sub-paragraph (2).”

This amendment is linked to Amendment 21 and removes the provision that certain statutory instruments can be introduced under the negative resolution and requires all SIs made under Clause 7 to go through the affirmative route with a vote in both Houses. It means that the Government could not bypass Parliament by refusing to grant time for a debate on annulling an SI.

Amendment 216, page 39, line 14, after “unless” insert—

“(a) the Minister laying the instrument has made a declaration that the instrument does no more than necessary to prevent, remedy or mitigate—

(i) any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively, or

(ii) any other deficiency in retained EU law arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, and

(b) ”.

Amendment 21, page 39, line 17, leave out sub-paragraphs (2) and (3)

This amendment is linked to Amendment 20 and removes the provision that certain statutory instruments can be introduced under the negative resolution and requires all SIs made under Clause 7 to go through the affirmative route with a vote in both Houses. It means that the Government could not bypass Parliament by refusing to grant time for a debate on annulling an SI.

Amendment 33, page 39, line 17, after “if” insert

“a scrutiny committee determines that”.

This amendment together with Amendments 34 and 35 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 7 of this Act, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 34, page 39, line 29, at end insert—

“(g) is otherwise of sufficient policy interest to merit the application of sub-paragraph (1).”

This amendment together with Amendments 33 and 35 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 7 of this Act, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 265, page 39, line 29, at end insert—

“(g) defines “failure to operate efficiently” under section 7(1A).”

This amendment, linked to Amendment 264, would ensure that any regulations to define “failure to operate efficiently” under section 7(1A) would be subject to affirmative procedure.

Amendment 3, page 39, line 30, leave out sub-paragraphs (3) to (10) and insert—

“(3) A Minister of the Crown must not make an Order under (1) and (2) above or any other Order to which this Schedule applies, unless—

(a) a draft Order and explanatory document has been laid before Parliament in accordance with paragraph 1A; and

(b) in the case of any Order which can be made other than solely by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Order is made as determined under paragraph 1B in accordance in accordance with—

(i) the negative resolution procedure (see paragraph 1C); or

(ii) the affirmative resolution procedure (see paragraph 1D); or

(c) it is declared in the Order that it appears to the person making it that because of the urgency of the matter, it is necessary to make the Order without a draft being so approved (see paragraph 1E).

Draft Order and Explanatory document laid before Parliament

1A (1) If the minister considers it appropriate to proceed with the making of an Order under this Part, he must lay before Parliament—

(a) a draft of the Order, together with

(b) an explanatory document.

(2) The explanatory document must—

(a) explain under which power or powers in this Part the provision contained in the Order is made;

(b) introduce and give reasons for the provision;

(c) explain why the Minister considers that—

(i) in the case of an Order under section 7, include, so far as appropriate, an assessment of the extent to which the provision made by the Order would prevent, remedy or mitigate—any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively; or any other deficiency in retained EU law arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU,

(ii) in the case of an Order under section 8, include, so far as appropriate, an assessment of the extent to which the provision made by the Order would prevent or remedy any breach, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, of the international obligations of the United Kingdom,

(iii) in the case of an Order under section 9, include, so far as appropriate, an assessment of the extent to which implementation of the withdrawal agreement should be in force on or before exit day.

(d) identify and give reasons for—

(i) any functions of legislating conferred by the Order; and

(ii) the procedural requirements attaching to the exercise of those functions.

Determination of Parliamentary procedure

1B (1) The explanatory document laid with a draft Order under paragraph 1A must contain a recommendation by the Minister as to which of the following should apply in relation to the making of an Order pursuant to the draft Order—

(a) the negative resolution procedure (see paragraph 1C); or

(b) the affirmative resolution procedure (see paragraph 1D).

(2) The explanatory document must give reasons for the Minister’s recommendation.

(3) Where the Minister’s recommendation is that the negative resolution procedure should apply, that procedure shall apply unless, within the 20-day period either House of Parliament requires that the affirmative resolution procedure shall apply, in which case that procedure shall apply.

(4) For the purposes of this paragraph a House of Parliament shall be taken to have required a procedure within the 20-day period if—

(a) that House resolves within that period that that procedure shall apply; or

(b) in a case not falling within sub paragraph (4)(a), a committee of that House charged with reporting on the draft Order has recommended within that period that that procedure should apply and the House has not by resolution rejected that recommendation within that period.

(5) In this section the “20-day period” means the period of 20 days beginning with the day on which the draft Order was laid before Parliament under paragraph 1A.

Negative resolution procedure

1C (1) For the purposes of this Part, the “negative resolution procedure” in relation to the making of an Order pursuant to a draft order laid under paragraph 1A is as follows.

(2) The Minister may make an order in the terms of the draft Order subject to the following provisions of this paragraph.

(3) The Minister may not make an order in the terms of the draft Order if either House of Parliament so resolves within the 40-day period.

(4) For the purposes of this paragraph an Order is made in the terms of a draft Order if it contains no material changes to the provisions of the draft Order.

(5) In this paragraph the “40-day period” means the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the draft Order was laid before Parliament under paragraph 1A.

Affirmative resolution procedure

1D (1) For the purposes of this Part the “affirmative resolution procedure” in relation to the making of an Order pursuant to a draft Order laid under paragraph 1A is as follows.

(2) The Minister must have regard to—

(a) any representations,

(b) any resolution of either House of Parliament, and

(c) any recommendations of a committee of either House of Parliament charged with reporting on the draft Order, made during the 40-day period with regard to the draft Order.

(3) If, after the expiry of the 40-day period, the minister wishes to make an Order in the terms of the draft, he must lay before Parliament a statement—

(a) stating whether any representations were made under sub-paragraph (2)(a); and

(b) if any representations were so made, giving details of them.

(4) The Minister may after the laying of such a statement make an Order in the terms of the draft if it is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(5) If, after the expiry of the 40-day period, the Minister wishes to make an Order consisting of a version of the draft Order with material changes, he must lay before Parliament—

(a) a revised draft Order; and

(b) a statement giving details of—

(i) any representations made under sub-paragraph (2)(a); and

(ii) the revisions proposed.

(6) The Minister may after laying a revised draft Order and statement under sub-paragraph (5) make an Order in the terms of the revised draft if it is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (4) an Order is made in the terms of a draft Order if it contains no material changes to the provisions of the draft Order.

(8) In this paragraph the “40-day period” has the meaning given by paragraph 4(5)(a).

Procedure in urgent cases

1E (1) If an Order is made without being approved in draft, the person making it must lay it before Parliament, accompanied by the required information, after it is made.

(2) If, at the end of the period of one month beginning with the day on which the original Order was made, a resolution has not been passed by each House approving the original or replacement Order, the Order ceases to have effect.

(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), “required information” means—

(a) a statement of the reasons for proceeding under paragraph 1E; and

(b) an explanatory document, as set out in paragraph 1A (2).”

To set up a triage and scrutiny system under the control of Parliament for determining how Statutory Instruments under Clause 7 of the Bill will be dealt with.

Amendment 67, page 39, line 30, leave out sub-paragraph (3).

This amendment would facilitate the use of affirmative and super-affirmative procedures, other than for the transfer of functions of EU public bodies.

Amendment 35, page 39, line 33, at end insert

“, unless a scrutiny committee determines that the instrument is of such significant policy interest that it ought to be subject to approval of each House with a procedure that allows for amendment.”

This amendment together with Amendments 33 and 34 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 7 of this Act, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 392, page 39, line 33, at end insert—

“( ) See paragraph 2A for restrictions on the choice of procedure under sub-paragraph (3).”

This amendment signposts the existence, and location within the Bill, of a scrutiny process involving a committee of the House of Commons for regulations under Clause 7 for which there is a choice between negative and affirmative procedures.

Amendment 130, page 40, line 23, leave out sub-paragraphs (2) to (4) and insert—

“(2) The procedure provided for in paragraphs 1 to 3 of this Part in respect of the Houses of Parliament applies in relation to regulations to which this paragraph applies as well as any other procedure provided for by this paragraph which is applicable to the regulations concerned.”

This amendment applies the procedures set out in Amendment 129 in respect of the UK Parliament for regulations made jointly by a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority.

Amendment 4, page 40, line 32, leave out from “is” to end of line 34 and insert

“subject to the rules set out in paragraphs 1 to 1E above.”

Consequential amendment to Amendment 3.

Amendment 393, page 42, line 4, at end insert—

“Parliamentary committee to sift certain regulations involving Minister of the Crown

2A (1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies if a Minister of the Crown who is to make a statutory instrument to which paragraph 1(3) applies is of the opinion that the appropriate procedure for the instrument is for it to be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(2) The Minister may not make the instrument so that it is subject to that procedure unless—

(a) condition 1 is met, and

(b) either condition 2 or 3 is met.

(3) Condition 1 is that a Minister of the Crown—

(a) has made a statement in writing to the effect that in the Minister’s opinion the instrument should be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament, and

(b) has laid before the House of Commons—

(i) a draft of the instrument, and

(ii) a memorandum setting out the statement and the reasons for the Minister’s opinion.

(4) Condition 2 is that a committee of the House of Commons charged with doing so has made a recommendation as to the appropriate procedure for the instrument.

(5) Condition 3 is that the period of 10 sitting days beginning with the first sitting day after the day on which the draft instrument was laid before the House of Commons as mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) has ended without any recommendation being made as mentioned in sub-paragraph (4).

(6) In sub-paragraph (5) “sitting day” means a day on which the House of Commons sits.

(7) Nothing in this paragraph prevents a Minister of the Crown from deciding at any time before a statutory instrument to which paragraph 1(3) applies is made that another procedure should apply in relation to the instrument (whether under paragraph 1(3) or 3).

(8) Section 6(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (alternative procedure for certain instruments laid in draft before Parliament) does not apply in relation to any statutory instrument to which this paragraph applies.”

This amendment ensures that regulations under Clause 7 for which there is a choice between negative and affirmative procedures cannot be subject to the negative procedure without first having been subject to a scrutiny process involving a committee of the House of Commons. The scrutiny process envisages that the committee will make a recommendation as to the appropriate procedure in the light of draft regulations and other information provided by the Government.

Amendment 394, page 42, line 31, at end insert—

“(7) Sub-paragraph (8) applies to a statutory instrument to which paragraph 1(3) applies where the Minister of the Crown who is to make the instrument is of the opinion that the appropriate procedure for the instrument is for it to be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(8) Paragraph 2A does not apply in relation to the instrument if the instrument contains a declaration that the Minister is of the opinion that, by reason of urgency, it is necessary to make the regulations without meeting the requirements of that paragraph.”

This amendment permits the scrutiny process for deciding whether certain regulations under Clause 7 should be subject to the negative or affirmative procedure to be disapplied in urgent cases.

Amendment 36, page 43, line 3, after “if” insert

“a scrutiny committee determines that”.

This amendment together with Amendments 37 and 38 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 8 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 37, page 43, line 15, at end insert—

“(g) is otherwise of sufficient policy interest to merit the application of sub-paragraph (1)”.

This amendment together with Amendments 36 and 38 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 8 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 22, page 43, line 19, at end insert

“or if the Government has not provided time on the floor of the House for a debate and vote on a prayer against the statutory instrument signed by the Leader of the Opposition or 80 Members of the House of Commons.”

This would mean that if the Leader of the Opposition or 80 members of the House of Commons were to sign a prayer against an SI that was subject under Schedule 7 to the negative procedure, the Government would have to provide time for a debate and a vote on the floor of the House or lose the SI. At present there is no such provision in the House of Commons.

Amendment 38, page 43, line 19, at end insert

“,unless a scrutiny committee determines that the instrument is of such significant policy interest that it ought to be subject to approval of each House with a procedure that allows for amendment.”

This amendment together with Amendments 36 and 37 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 8 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 395, page 43, line 19, at end insert—

“( ) See paragraph 10A for restrictions on the choice of procedure under sub-paragraph (3).”

This amendment signposts the existence, and location within the Bill, of a scrutiny process involving a committee of the House of Commons for regulations under Clause 8 for which there is a choice between negative and affirmative procedures.

Amendment 23, page 43, line 26, leave out

“which contain provisions falling within sub-paragraph (2).”

This amendment is linked to Amendment 24 and removes the provision that certain statutory instruments can be introduced under the negative resolution and requires all SIs under Clause 9 to go through the affirmative route with a vote in both Houses. It means that the Government could not bypass Parliament by refusing to grant time for a debate on annulling an SI.

Amendment 24, page 43, line 30, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

This amendment is linked to Amendment 23 and removes the provision that certain statutory instruments can be introduced under the negative resolution and requires all SIs under Clause 9 to go through the affirmative route with a vote in both Houses. It means that the Government could not bypass Parliament by refusing to grant time for a debate on annulling an SI.

Amendment 39, page 43, line 30, after “if” insert

“a scrutiny committee determines that”.

This amendment together with Amendments 40 and 41 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 9 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 40, page 43, line 43, at end insert—

“(h) is otherwise of sufficient policy interest to merit the application of sub-paragraph (1).”

This amendment together with Amendments 39 and 41 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 9 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 41, page 43, line 47, at end insert

“, unless a scrutiny committee determines that the instrument if of such significant policy interest that it ought to be subject to approval of each House with a procedure that allows for amendment.”

This amendment together with Amendments 39 and 40 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 9 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.

Amendment 396, page 43, line 47, at end insert—

“( ) See paragraph 10A for restrictions on the choice of procedure under sub-paragraph (3).”

This amendment signposts the existence, and location within the Bill, of a scrutiny process involving a committee of the House of Commons for regulations under Clause 9 for which there is a choice between negative and affirmative procedures.

Amendment 374, page 44, line 5, at end insert—

“Amendment of definition of “law relating to equality or human rights”

6A A statutory instrument containing regulations of a Minister of the Crown under section 14(7) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

This amendment provides for draft affirmative resolution scrutiny for the power to the definition of “law relating to equality or human rights”, inserted by Amendment 371.

Amendment 397, page 45, line 11, at end insert—

“Parliamentary committee to sift certain regulations involving Minister of the Crown

10A (1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies if a Minister of the Crown who is to make a statutory instrument to which paragraph 5(3) or 6(3) applies is of the opinion that the appropriate procedure for the instrument is for it to be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(2) The Minister may not make the instrument so that it is subject to that procedure unless—

(a) condition 1 is met, and

(b) either condition 2 or 3 is met.

(3) Condition 1 is that a Minister of the Crown—

(a) has made a statement in writing to the effect that in the Minister’s opinion the instrument should be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament, and

(b) has laid before the House of Commons—

(i) a draft of the instrument, and

(ii) a memorandum setting out the statement and the reasons for the Minister’s opinion.

(4) Condition 2 is that a committee of the House of Commons charged with doing so has made a recommendation as to the appropriate procedure for the instrument.

(5) Condition 3 is that the period of 10 sitting days beginning with the first sitting day after the day on which the draft instrument was laid before the House of Commons as mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) has ended without any recommendation being made as mentioned in sub-paragraph (4).

(6) In sub-paragraph (5) “sitting day” means a day on which the House of Commons sits.

(7) Nothing in this paragraph prevents a Minister of the Crown from deciding at any time before a statutory instrument to which paragraph 5(3) or 6(3) applies is made that another procedure should apply in relation to the instrument (whether under that paragraph or paragraph 11).

(8) Section 6(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (alternative procedure for certain instruments laid in draft before Parliament) does not apply in relation to any statutory instrument to which this paragraph applies.”

This amendment ensures that regulations under Clause 8 or 9 for which there is a choice between negative and affirmative procedures cannot be subject to the negative procedure without first having been subject to a scrutiny process involving a committee of the House of Commons. The scrutiny process envisages that the committee will make a recommendation as to the appropriate procedure in the light of draft regulations and other information provided by the Government.

Amendment 398, page 45, line 40, at end insert—

“(7) Sub-paragraph (8) applies to a statutory instrument to which paragraph 5(3) or 6(3) applies where the Minister of the Crown who is to make the instrument is of the opinion that the appropriate procedure for the instrument is for it to be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(8) Paragraph 10A does not apply in relation to the instrument if the instrument contains a declaration that the Minister is of the opinion that, by reason of urgency, it is necessary to make the regulations without meeting the requirements of that paragraph.”

This amendment permits the scrutiny process for deciding whether certain regulations under Clause 8 or 9 should be subject to the negative or affirmative procedure to be disapplied in urgent cases.

Government amendment 391.

Amendment 207, in clause 17, page 13, line 35, leave out “appropriate” and insert “necessary”.

Amendment 208, page 14, line 7, leave out “appropriate” and insert “necessary”.

Amendment 373, page 14, line 13, at end insert—

“(8) Regulations under subsection (1) or (5) may not amend, repeal or revoke, or otherwise modify the effect of, any law relating to equality or human rights.”

This amendment would replicate, for the powers in clause 17, the equality and human rights restrictions on other powers in this Bill (as modified by other amendments).

Amendment 205, in clause 8, page 6, line 28, leave out “appropriate” and insert “necessary”.

Amendment 110, page 6, line 31, leave out subsection (2)

This amendment seeks to restrict the delegated powers granted to Ministers by Clause 8.

Amendment 31, page 6, line 32, at end insert “, apart from amending or modifying this Act”.

This amendment would remove the proposed capacity of Ministers in Clause 8 to modify and amend the Act itself via delegated powers.

Amendment 365, page 6, line 36, leave out “or”

This amendment is preparatory to Amendment 367.

Amendment 366, page 6, line 37, after “revoke”, insert “, or otherwise modify the effect of,”

This amendment would ensure that the restriction in this paragraph could not be undermined by the use of legislation which does not amend the text of the Human Rights Act but modifies its effect.

Amendment 367, page 6, line 38, at end insert “, or

(e) amend, repeal or revoke, or otherwise modify the effect of, any other law relating to equality or human rights.”.

This amendment would broaden the restriction in this subsection to protect all legislation relating to equality and human rights (and not only the Human Rights Act 1998).

Amendment 12, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) make any provision, unless the Minister considers that the conditions in subsection (3A) where relevant are satisfied in relation to that provision.

(3A) Those conditions are that—

(a) the policy objective intended to be secured by the provision could not be secured by non-legislative means;

(b) the effect of the provision is proportionate to the policy objective;

(c) the provision, taken as a whole, strikes a fair balance between the public interest and the interests of any person adversely affected by it;

(d) the provision does not remove any necessary protection;

(e) the provision does not prevent any person from exercising any right or freedom which that person might reasonably expect top continue to exercise;

(f) the provision is not of constitutional significance”

Amendment 26, in clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) remove or reduce any protections currently conferred upon individuals, groups or the natural environment,

(f) prevent any person from continuing to exercise a right that they can currently exercise,

(g) amend, repeal or revoke the Equality Act 2010 or any subordinate legislation made under that Act.”

This amendment would prevent the Government’s using delegated powers under Clause 8 to reduce rights or protections.

Amendment 97, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) limit the scope or weaken standards of environmental protection.”

This Amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 8 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.

Amendment 111, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) amend, repeal or revoke any legal right derived from EU law and operative in UK law immediately before 30 March 2019.”

This amendment seeks to prevent the delegated powers granted to Ministers by clause 8 being used to weaken or abolish existing EU-derived legal rights, such as those on workers’ rights, equality, and environmental protection.

Amendment 267, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) amend, repeal or revoke the Equality Act 2010 or any subordinate legislation made under it.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 8 being used to amend Equality Act 2010 legislation.

Amendment 270, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 8 being used to remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.

Amendment 273, page 6, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) make provision which, in the opinion of the Minister, could pose a threat to national security.”

This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 8 being used to make provision which could pose a threat to national security.

Amendment 371, in clause 14, page 10, line 26, at end insert—

““law relating to equality or human rights” means—

(a) the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010;

(b) the Human Rights Act 1998; and

(c) other enactments relating to equality or human rights.”

This amendment defines “law relating to equality or human rights” for the purposes of other amendments which would broaden protection provided by the Bill from interference with the Human Rights Act to include other provisions about human rights and equality.

Amendment 372, page 11, line 48, at end insert—

“(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend or modify the definition of “law relating to equality or human rights” in subsection (1).”

This amendment would allow Ministers to amend the definition of “law relating to equality or human rights” inserted by Amendment 371.

New clause 76—Non-regression of equality law—

“(1) Any EU withdrawal related legislation must be accompanied by a statement made by a Minister of the Crown certifying that in the Minister‘s opinion the legislation does not remove or reduce protection under or by virtue of the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010.

(2) In subsection (1) “EU withdrawal related legislation” means—

(a) any statutory instrument under this Act;

(b) any statutory instrument made by a Minister of the Crown wholly or partly in connection with the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU; and

(c) any Bill presented to Parliament by a Minister of the Crown which is wholly or partly connected to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.”

This new clause would ensure that legislation in connection with withdrawal from the EU does not reduce protections provided by equality law.

New clause 77—Co-operation with the European Union on violence against women and girls—

“(1) Within one month of Royal Assent to this Act, and then once in every subsequent calendar year, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament a report on continued co-operation with the European Union on matters relating to violence against women and girls.

(2) That report must include, in particular, an assessment of how, following exit day, co-operation with the European Union will replicate mechanisms which exist within the European Union before exit day to—

(a) maintain common rights for victims of domestic and sexual abuse when moving across borders,

(b) reduce female genital mutilation (FGM),

(c) reduce human trafficking,

(d) reduce child sexual exploitation, and

(e) enable data sharing relating to any of (a) to (d).

(3) The first report made under subsection (1) following Royal Assent must—

(a) include an assessment of the amount and nature of funding provided by European Union institutions to organisations based in the United Kingdom for the purposes of research, service provision, and other activity relating to ending violence against women and girls, and;

(b) outline plans to provide comparable resources for research, service provision, and other activity relating to ending violence against women and girls in the United Kingdom.”

This new clause calls for the Government to lay a report before Parliament laying out how cross-border action to end violence against women and girls will continue after exit day, assessing the extent of current European Union funding for work to end violence against women and girls, and setting out the Government’s plans to provide comparable resources.

[Mr Leslie]

I thought for a minute, Mrs Laing, that you were going to read out all the amendments grouped today, which might have taken up some considerable time.

Today’s debate is about taking back control—about Parliament and the powers of the House of Commons to hold the Executive to account and to overrule it if we wish to do so. New clause 18 essentially says that it is time for the Government to be honest about the extensive and wide-ranging powers they want to take away from Parliament, which essentially is what the Bill proposes to do. Some might say that my new clause does not go far enough, that it is a little tepid: it simply says that the Government ought to commission a proper independent report into the constitutional ramifications and implications of their proposal. In my view, they have not thought the process through properly. They denied the House a pre-legislative scrutiny process for the Bill and, importantly, ignored an extremely detailed and thoughtful report and set of recommendations from the House of Lords Constitution Committee, which went into painstaking detail to review Ministers’ proposals, particularly those in clause 7. It also did so with respect to clause 9—we will not be voting on aspects of clause 9 today, but certain amendments to it have been grouped for discussion.

I accept that if we leave the EU, the acquis—the body of existing EU law—will need to be converted into UK law. We were told, of course, that the Bill was supposed to be a simple “copy and paste” exercise that merely transposed those EU rules under which we have lived for the past 30 or 40 years into UK law. Despite the early recommendations from the House of Lords Constitution Committee, made long before publication of the Bill, back in March, Ministers have made a real error in failing to distinguish between the technical and necessary task of transposing existing laws from EU to UK statute and the wider powers that Ministers are taking potentially to make substantive policy changes, by order, in areas that currently fall within EU competence. In other words, they have not sought to curtail the order-making powers simply to focus on that transposition exercise. The order-making powers go far wider into a whole array of policy making areas.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

We were told that we were bringing powers back to this Parliament so that this Parliament could take decisions. Why, then, are the Government trying to introduce something similar to the Henry VIII clause? Does it not make a mockery of their promises?

[Mr Leslie]

Exactly. People voting in the referendum might have been moved by that slogan “take back control”, but I do not honestly think many voters thought that that meant taking back control from a European Executive and handing it to Ministers of the Crown, outwith the powers and scope of Parliament to do much about it, yet that is effectively the proposal in clause 7.

I want to emphasise that this is not simply an exercise in transposing technical and necessary measures. The Government have extended the scope of the Bill into policy-making capability, which brings in the question of divergence. We have heard a lot recently about concepts of full alignment and this notion of diverging from rules and policies. The way clauses 7 and 9 have been drafted would allow Ministers, by order, through negative statutory instruments that we rarely get the chance even to vote on in this place, to make policy changes that could affect policy functions and the rights of our constituents—perhaps as part of a deregulating agenda—if that is indeed what the Government of the day sought to achieve.

[Mary Creagh (Wakefield) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend, like me, will have read in the newspapers about the Cabinet split opening up on divergence, with various Cabinet Ministers backing divergence and others not. How does he think this squares with the Prime Minister’s promise to our European partners and the Government of the Republic of Ireland that we will stay in full regulatory alignment after we leave?

[Mr Leslie]

I suspect that the European Commission and the Republic of Ireland Government saw the phrase “full alignment” and thought that full alignment meant full alignment. It turns out from the Prime Minister’s statement yesterday that full alignment does not quite mean full alignment. She said it only meant aligning the areas in the Good Friday agreement protocol, but of course that predates the notion of our leaving the single market and the customs union, so the Good Friday agreement did not cover such narrow issues—I say that sarcastically—as goods and manufacture trade. The list of issues that she thinks full alignment covers does not include trade in goods, which is a staggering thing, because of course if we do not cover trade in goods, we end up with that hard border, which is absolutely the point we have got to.

[Mary Creagh]

rose—

[Mr Leslie]

I do not want to digress at this stage. I want to focus particularly on the powers that Ministers are taking in clause 7, if my hon. Friend will allow me to do so.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Leslie]

I cannot resist.

[John Redwood]

Ministers have assured us that if they want to change policy—if, for instance, they see a need for a new fishing policy, or a new customs and trade policy—there will be primary legislation and full parliamentary debates in both Houses. Does the hon. Gentleman not understand that? We are dealing with a very narrow set of provisions, relating only to statutory instruments to deal with technical matters which, of course, the House can ultimately determine in any event.

[Mr Leslie]

It is touching that the right hon. Gentleman takes those assurances from Ministers at face value, but the Ministers may not be here for very much longer. Who knows? If we are going to make policy changes, that should be done in a Bill that comes before Parliament, or in a statutory instrument subject to affirmative resolution.

I now invite Members to pick up their copies of the Bill, because I want to deal with a couple of provisions in clause 7 which I think contradict the understanding of the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) of the scope of the order-making powers that are being taken. It is, in fact, fairly wide. Clause 7(4) states:

“Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament.”

In other words, a provision in a statutory instrument could have the same effect as one in primary legislation.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

When statutes are being considered and Bills are being drafted, there does on occasion come a point at which we must accept that assurances given, for example, at the Dispatch Box will have to complement the inevitable small grey areas. However, that should not prevent us as a Parliament from scrutinising legislation and insisting that, so far as possible, it is drafted in conformity with the purpose for which the Government say that they intend to use it.

[Mr Leslie]

That is why Members often say in the House, “Let us place it on the face of the Bill”, which means “Let us put in writing, in black and white, something that can then be held up in a court of law”, rather than a mere verbal promise from a Minister who, as I have said, could be here today and gone tomorrow. These things matter, and if we are to do our job properly we need to get our statute right.

It is not an exaggeration that clause 7(4) represents a massive potential transfer of legislative competence from Parliament to Government. It is a sweeping power that would make Henry VIII blush if he were to see it today. My amendment 57 would delete the sweeping nature of clause 7(4), because Ministers have not ensured that their powers are as limited as possible; on the contrary, they have ensured that they are as exceptionally wide as possible.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

The right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) referred to Bills relating to, for instance, trade and customs. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that those Bills are very likely to contain the very same Henry VIII powers?

[Mr Leslie]

Indeed. There are, I think, eight pieces of subsequent legislation which are also opening up this precedent. Effectively, Members of Parliament are being patted on the head and told, “Do not trouble yourselves. We will sort out all these areas of policy. We will just go away and if you really object, you can petition us about it.” That is not good enough.

Let me now turn to clause 9. We are not voting on it today, but the grouping of the amendments allows us to discuss issues relating to it. Subsection (2) states:

“Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (including modifying this Act).”

If, having gone through all the rigmarole of debating the proposals that are before us today and made all sorts of promises, Ministers then say, after Royal Assent, “Actually, we did not like that bit of the Act”, they will be taking order-making powers to amend this very provision.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

It is not just a question of assurances given from the Dispatch Box. In clause 9, Ministers are proposing to take a power that would enable them, after the event, to get rid of what they have described as safeguards in the Bill if they feel like it, by means of the mechanisms provided in that clause. Does that not undermine the confidence that the House can have in those safeguards, given that they may no longer be in the text of the Bill when it becomes an Act?

[Mr Leslie]

It is almost an Alice in Wonderland “down the rabbit hole” concept: the notion that we are passing an Act that hands powers to Ministers to amend not just any other Act of Parliament, but the Act itself. It is completely ridiculous. I know that Conservative Members will say I am making the point because I am sceptical about Brexit or something, but this is a constitutional issue. It is about ensuring that Parliament is sovereign, and that Members of Parliament can override the executive and curtail excessive behaviour. I shall be astonished if clause 9(2) is still there after Royal Assent, because if the House of Commons does not deal with it, the other place will certainly have to do so.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I have some sympathy with the points that the hon. Gentleman is making, but why did he not raise these objections when his own party was passing legislation that could be self-amending in exactly the same way, without a sunset clause—for example, the Scotland Act 1998?

[Mr Leslie]

I am not sure whether there is anything comparable to the sweeping nature of the policy scope of a Bill that says that order-making powers can include powers to modify the Act itself.

[Mr Jenkin]

There is the Scotland Act!

[Mr Leslie]

If that is indeed the case, two wrongs do not make a right, but I do not think that any other provision is quite as extensive as this. The hon. Gentleman’s loyalty to the Government knows no bounds—he has to come to their defence, because it is important for someone to do so—but I think that, in this particular instance, even he may be slightly embarrassed by quite how far Ministers have gone.

Clause 7(1) states:

“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate”.

The term “appropriate” is entirely undefined, and it is the only condition imposed on the Minister’s desire to address “deficiencies” in the law. The House of Lords Constitution Committee has said:

“This application of a subjective test to a broad term like ‘deficiency’ makes the reach of the provision potentially open-ended.”

The Government tabled amendment 391 to try to ameliorate some of the concern about that, but it barely constitutes a concession. It merely requires Ministers to make explanatory statements that provisions are “appropriate” in order to justify the order-making power. It is because it is so broad that I tabled amendment 65, which would at least shift the subjective threshold from “appropriate” to “necessary”. I believe that requiring Ministers to feel that a regulation is necessary would present them with a stronger test and a higher threshold. It would allow them to retain fairly broad powers, but I think that it would provide an extra safeguard. A Minister may think that something is appropriate without having to justify it, and I feel that we should expect more in a Bill such as this. The Constitution Committee has also said:

“We proposed that ‘a general restriction on the use of delegated powers’ could be achieved using ‘a general provision … placed on the face of the Bill to the effect that the delegated powers granted by the Bill should be used only so far as necessary to adapt the body of EU law to fit the UK’s domestic legal framework’”.

I followed that advice by tabling amendment 65.

Clause 7(2) implies that the scope of the Henry VIII powers are not exhaustive at all.

That subsection begins with the phrase:

“Deficiencies in retained EU law include (but are not limited to) where the Minister considers that retained EU law”

does x, y and z, and it goes on to set out a series of particular conditions.

The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) has also spotted this issue in his amendment 1, and this caveat does not have to be limited to the exceptions set out in clause 7. Again, that provision is too broad and gives too much power to Ministers. Ministers might well say, “Well, it’s not our intention to go beyond the list of prescribed areas in clause 7”, but the Bill as drafted does not constrain their successors; as I have said, there will, of course, always be further Ministers after the current ones have moved on.

[Mr Grieve]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that those who draft legislation go off to Government Departments, show the draft and ask whether that covers all the things that need to be covered, and are then inevitably told that the Department is worried that something has not been covered? Perhaps this should be an encouragement to those on the Treasury Bench to go away and think again about whether the list they have produced is not in reality exhaustive. If it is not, perhaps they would like to identify during today’s debate where they think there might be these extra powers that take them beyond the limits they have listed.

[Mr Leslie]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman and any other Member who has had the privilege of serving as a Minister will know exactly what civil servants will advise, which is, “Well, you don’t know the exact circumstances, so seek as wide a power as you can possibly get away with through Parliament, if it will turn a blind eye to it. We can deal with the consequences thereafter.”

Unfortunately for them, Ministers will not be able to get away with that on this occasion, because we have spotted this land grab attempt. It is not appropriate; if they feel that there should be exceptions or that certain circumstances should be accounted for, those must be set out in the Bill, not just left in these current loose terms.

Current Ministers might feel that they are responsible stewards of Government, but I invite hon. Members to imagine circumstances in which we end up with a malign Government of some sort, shape or variety, such as some sort of extreme Administration—who knows what might happen in years to come? These Henry VIII powers are extremely sweeping. They will be available to Ministers in years to come and could leave the door open to some quite arbitrary near-autocratic actions of a future Government.

For example, if a future Government sought to lift the 48-hour working week provisions that EU law currently gives to employees in this country, Ministers would by order potentially have the scope to do that under the powers in clauses 7 and 9. If Ministers wanted to require the banking sector to have more capital requirements under these provisions, they would be able to simply make those orders. If Ministers wanted some sort of aggressive or inappropriate state intervention to distort competition, favouring one producer over others, they would be able to do that through the provisions on these order-making powers.

[Chris Stephens (Glasgow South West) (SNP)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is a real concern across the UK in relation to workers’ rights, particularly as many in government at present were saying during the EU referendum campaign that the roll-back of workers’ rights was one of the reasons why they advocated a leave vote in the first place?

[Mr Leslie]

The Bill’s provisions are so wide-ranging that the protections that our constituents have enjoyed to this day as a result of European regulations and rights could be at risk—not from Parliament, but from a ministerial sweep of the pen, through the making of an order: a negative statutory instrument.

[Mr Jim Cunningham]

We had a good test of that some time ago in relation to trade union rights, through what the Government did to the Trade Union Bill during its passage through Parliament. Does my hon. Friend agree that the big test will be something the Government are being evasive about: will this Parliament get the final vote? We were told during the referendum campaign that Parliament would have its say and everything would be brought back here, yet the Government are doing everything in their power to avoid giving Parliament the final vote on this.

[Mr Leslie]

The offer from the Government has been a binary yes or no motion at some point when we see the withdrawal agreement, and then—potentially after the fact, post-signature by Ministers—a Bill later on down the line. That is obviously not good enough, but we will come to many of those issues in tomorrow’s debates. For now, there are further deficiencies in the way clause 7 has been drafted to be addressed.

Clause 7(5) talks about the functions and public services that the regulations can amend. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield has spotted in amendment 5, as I have in amendment 61, that these powers could allow Ministers to sweep away a public service function currently undertaken by an EU agency without making alternative provisions; Ministers have talked about a function being not only “replaced” or “modified”, but “abolished”. Ridiculously, Ministers have snuck in this phrase, under which by order they can abolish a whole area of public service activity through the powers they are granting themselves in subsection (5). That could affect lots of obscure and small areas of public policy that do not matter to all our constituents but will certainly matter to some, including chemical safety certification, medicine risk assessment activities, aircraft airworthiness, preparedness for disease prevention and control, aeronautic research, energy market trading, and maritime pollution.

There are lots of functions that EU agencies currently fulfil. Some Members might say that they should be fulfilled within the UK, which is a perfectly good argument, but clause 7 would allow Ministers to abolish those functions entirely by order. I do not believe that is appropriate, and that is why I think amendment 61 and certainly amendment 5 are necessary.

[Mary Creagh]

My hon. Friend has talked about the many agencies that we currently rely on to regulate all manner and aspects of our national life, but he has neglected to mention the regulatory and enforcement functions carried out by the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. Does he share my concern that, particularly in the environmental sphere—which I will talk about in my speech—removing the Commission as an enforcement body could be very detrimental to standards in all areas of regulation?

[Mr Leslie]

My hon. Friend has done important work as Chair of the Environmental Audit Committee on some of these questions. These are not small matters; they are important functions that over the years we have developed and grown to expect. Some of them are provided by EU agencies, but they should not be able to be abolished simply by order—by the sweep of a ministerial pen—without reference to this place and without the House of Commons having some ability to decide.

[Angela Smith (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government might well find other ways of delivering these functions, but the key point is independence? We need the authorities that deliver these safeguards and regulatory activities to be independent of Government and to be accountable to the people.

[Mr Leslie]

Indeed, and there are good arguments for having independent provision of many of these assessments. We might feel that many regulatory activities currently undertaken by EU agencies need to be undertaken by our regulators here in the UK, rather than being brought into a Government departmental function, to give them that further arm’s-length independent status. I want to talk about some aspects of that shortly.

I want to make reference, too, to the Procedure Committee’s set of amendments that the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) and others have tabled to try to deal with what could be thousands of negative statutory instruments—orders by Ministers that do not automatically come up for a vote in the House of Commons. I totally respect the work of the Procedure Committee, and it is important that it has gone through this process, but I do not believe that the proposed committee would be an adequate safeguard. I do not believe that it would fulfil the concept of what a sifting committee ought to be.

We need a Committee of the House that can look through the hundreds of statutory instruments that are currently not for debate and be able to pick them out and bring them forward for an affirmative decision. The Procedure Committee’s amendments would not quite do that; they would simply create a committee able to voice its opinion about the designation of an order as a negative statutory instrument. That could be overruled or ignored by Ministers. Indeed, if a Minister were to designate such a negative statutory instrument as urgent, it would not even need to be referred to that committee. That is a pretty low threshold, and a pretty weak concession.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Is it my hon. Friend’s understanding that the committee would have an automatic Conservative party majority, because of the changes to Standing Orders?

[Mr Leslie]

I am not sure whether such a provision exists. Perhaps members of the Procedure Committee will have a view on that. I certainly think that that would be unfortunate.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

We will look at the composition when we look at the Standing Orders. It is not covered in the contents of the amendments today, but people will have an opportunity to debate that issue on another occasion.

[Mr Leslie]

That is true, but it deserves to be debated today as well. If we are creating a committee, it is perfectly legitimate to argue that we need to know whether it will have teeth and exercise bite, or whether it will be reluctant to do so. The question that my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) asked about its composition is perfectly reasonable.

[Chris Bryant]

For that matter, the Procedure Committee has regularly suggested changes to Standing Orders that the Government have refused to move forward. I have seen the right hon. Member for Broxbourne more furious than anyone else in the Chamber because the Government have refused to act on that, so it is inadequate to suggest that Standing Orders might make arrangements in this regard.

[Mr Leslie]

My hon. Friend’s point is well made. Again, it goes to show that if we are to assert ourselves as the House of Commons and create a committee to deal with this flood of negative statutory instruments, that needs to be done in a way that has teeth. We will debate the Bill and kick it around and it will go to the House of Lords, but we need to ensure that it has teeth when it comes back.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Leslie]

I am conscious that a lot of Members want to speak, and I want to get to the end of my remarks.

There are other issues relating to the standard of scrutiny, and perhaps the Procedure Committee will want to think about them as well. Currently, when regulatory policy issues are decided in Europe by EU directive or regulation, the European Parliament—to which our constituents have been able to elect people—has a quite large set of scrutiny and decision-making powers over those laws. If we are moving the law-making power from the EU to the UK, surely we should also replicate the level of scrutiny that those laws received from the European Parliament and have that same arrangement in the UK Parliament. That is not happening in the Bill, however, which is why amendment 277 has been tabled.

I was partly inspired by conversations with the Association of British Insurers, which is concerned about the potential to lose a level of scrutiny as the policy-making powers are transferred across. The UK Parliament’s ability to scrutinise some of these things is not as tough as that of the EU Parliament. The ABI has said that it supports amendment 277, which states that any additional powers transferred to the UK regulators must be matched by equivalent scrutiny mechanisms and democratic accountability. That is not a small point, because a massive array of issues is coming at us thick and fast in clauses 7 and 9, and they have to be mentioned.

Finally, I want to touch on amendment 124, which has been tabled in the name of the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake). It would prevent regulations from undermining the operation of the single market. The Government have conceded that we are, de facto, going to remain in the single market and the customs union, certainly during the transition phase. It is important that protections should be in place to ensure that orders made by Ministers cannot erode those single market freedoms that we enjoy during the transition period.

Also, if we end up—as I suspect we should—staying in the single market and the customs union, we do not want anything in the Bill that will erode the operation of those important frictionless tariff-free trade arrangements in goods and services that we currently enjoy. Amendment 124 has great merit, and I certainly hope that all Members will consider giving it their support.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend mentions the single market; I wonder whether he noted the research published today by the Rand Corporation in the United States that made it clear that any kind of fantasy deal with the United States while President Trump is in charge would do nothing for us compared with remaining in the single market and the customs union.

[Mr Leslie]

Yes; I think many hon. Members are under the illusion that free-trade agreements are an okay substitute for the single market arrangements that we now have. Our economy is 80% service sector. We take for granted the frictionless movement of goods, parts and components, and amendment 124 would—

[Hon. Members]

Order!

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Leslie]

I absolutely do, Madam Deputy Speaker. Amendment 124 talks about protecting the single market provisions, and that is why, in today’s debate, as well as getting into constitutional areas such as protecting Parliament’s rights, we also have a duty to talk about the single market. The right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington’s amendment addresses this point. This is something that many of us feel very strongly about, and we are not going to give up without a bit of a fight.

[Tom Brake]

The point also enables us to remember that this was in the Conservative party manifesto in 2015.

[Mr Leslie]

Who could possibly forget that support for the single market was once a key aspect of Margaret Thatcher’s policy making, as well as the policy of subsequent Governments?

[Anna Soubry (Broxtowe) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is right when he says that Margaret Thatcher was pretty much the authoress of the single market. Does he agree that, as trade develops, the best places to do business will be those nearest to us—not those far away, which mean that goods have to be conveyed over huge distances?

[Mr Leslie]

We are putting a lot of effort into trying to get free trade deals with New Zealand, Australia and other countries, and much as I would love free trade deals with all of them, the fact is that our biggest markets are our nearest neighbours. Having that single market and that customs union is incredibly important, which is why amendment 124 should not be dismissed and I believe Members should support it. We also need to pay attention to the powers and rights that Parliament must now assert if we are to ensure that the Executive do not take back the control that many of our constituents thought was coming to their representatives after the referendum.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

As always, I am lost in admiration for the extraordinary eloquence of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie). It is unfortunate that he has a tendency, as he exhibited on this occasion, to be so carried away by his eloquence as to take arguments that many Government Members also consider important and extend them to the point where they become definitely untrue. This diminishes the force of those arguments. I believe that the Bill is over-drafted—for some of the reasons that he adduced, to give the Government greater scope for dealing with a whole series of problems, in a way that the civil service often recommends to Ministers—but it is not the case that it offers the unconstrained powers that he was suggesting. His world is a world without a Supreme Court, and without judgments of the meaning of deficiency. He alleged that the meaning of “appropriate” was entirely obscure and then used it, by my count, five times himself. We all knew what he meant and so would a court. One does not need to go to the extents to which he was going to point out that the Bill requires some amelioration in respect of the secondary legislation powers, a point which many Members on both sides of the Committee made during an earlier debate. He could have rested with that, which would have taken rather fewer minutes.

I look forward to hearing from my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), the Chairman of the Procedure Committee, because unlike the hon. Member for Nottingham East I think that amendment 393—if I remember the number correctly—is carefully judged. I think it probably will provide—[Interruption.] I apologise for getting the number wrong; I was referring to amendment 397. In any case, the Procedure Committee’s amendment seems to be the right way to tackle the question of triage, and it is well judged and well drafted. I hope that Ministers will tell us in their responses from the Dispatch Box that recommendations from the Procedure Committee will in this instance always be respected in the House. I do not think that we need to worry about a completely separate set of Ministers dealing with the recommendations, because the recommendations will be made in the coming months. We need a combination of that amendment plus an assurance from the Dispatch Box that the Procedure Committee’s recommendations will be observed, and I think we could rest on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend. I will come on to the specific differences between clause 7 and clause 9 in relation to the power to amend the Act, but I will say now that the Act itself cannot be amended under clause 7. I will come on to develop that point later.

Clause 7(5) lists some possible uses of the power. These could range from fairly mechanistic changes to correct inaccurate references, to more substantial changes to transfer important functions and services from EU institutions to UK equivalents. Both types of change are important to keep the law functioning appropriately. At this stage, we do not know for certain what corrections might need to be made. The negotiations continue and there is a large volume of law to correct in a short space of time.

[Mr Leslie]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Baker]

If I may, I will explain my approach to interventions, which I should have mentioned at the beginning of my speech. My speech has about 24 sections to address the 130 amendments that have been tabled. With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I would like to finish speaking on clause 7 stand part before I come on to his amendment. If he will allow me, I will give way to him then.

Secondary legislation made under this power is subject to entirely normal parliamentary procedures. I will come on to talk more about how we ensure sufficient scrutiny of secondary legislation when I speak to the amendments. The Government have always been clear that we will listen to the concerns of Parliament during the passage of the Bill and reflect on its concerns. We are committed to ensuring that Parliament has the right opportunities to scrutinise the Bill and its powers, so I am glad to have the opportunity to address concerns that have motivated many Members to table amendments to the scrutiny provisions in the Bill, alongside the debate on the powers themselves.

We should, however, all be in no doubt that without this power vital functions could not be carried out because they would not be provided for in our law. The UK could have obligations to the EU still existing in statute that would not reflect the reality of our new relationship. There would be confusing errors and gaps in our law. I say again that we do not take lightly the creation of delegated powers, but neither do we take lightly the imperative to deliver a stable, orderly exit that maximises certainty for the UK. Clause 7 is essential to achieving that task.

New clause 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), calls for an independent report into the constitutional implication of the powers in clause 7. There have already been a number of such reports and this is likely to continue. For example, the report he suggests sounds similar to the excellent and thoughtful report published recently by the Exiting the European Union Committee. A requirement for one more report after Royal Assent would, it seems to me, add little to the Bill and the definition of its powers. I reassure the House that the Government have listened to Members and to the Committees that have reported on the Bill.

I will turn a little later to amendments 392 to 398, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, but I am glad to report that the Government said yesterday that we would accept the amendments to enhance scrutiny of the powers through a sifting committee. Taken together with Government amendment 391 on the content of explanatory memorandums, we believe the amendments deliver more than the sum of their parts, so the House can be assured of the effective scrutiny of the powers in the Bill. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Nottingham East, but I will give way if he still wishes to intervene.

[Mr Leslie]

The Minister mentioned clause 7(5) in relation to the regulatory powers to replace, modify or abolish public service functions. He will know that one of my amendments would delete the Government’s ability to abolish functions by those orders. I wonder whether he could give us examples of public service functions or regulatory activities currently undertaken that the Government may wish to abolish.

[Mr Baker]

I will come back to that later, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman for a start that the translation functions of the European Union and various institutions will no longer be required.

I come now to amendment 1, from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). It has support from all sides of the Committee including, I do not mind telling him, from me, in spirit. The Secretary of State has asked me to put on record that he, too, is sympathetic to the idea of narrowing the Ministers’ discretion. My right hon. and learned Friend seeks to restrict the power of Ministers to make regulations to amend retained EU law to cases where the EU law is deficient only in the way set out in the Bill.

We have listened carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) and others, and the specific proposal in amendment 1 and amendment 56, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, is to convert the illustrative list of potential deficiencies in the law in clause 7(2) to an exhaustive list. As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, we do not think that it is possible to do that at this stage.

We know that there will be thousands of deficiencies across our statute book and it is impossible at this stage definitively to list all the different kinds of deficiencies that might arise on exit day. To attempt to do so risks requiring significant volumes of further primary legislation on issues that will not warrant taking up parliamentary time. The specifics of the deficiencies will inevitably vary between cases and it will therefore not be possible to provide a definition that accompanies them all, as amendments 264 and 265, tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford), also seek to do. An exhaustive list would risk omitting important deficiencies, so rendering the powers in clause 7 unable to rectify the statute book. To require primary legislation in such circumstances would undermine the purpose of the Bill and the usual justifications for secondary legislation, such as technical detail, readability and, crucially, the management of time.

We cannot risk undermining the laws on which businesses and individuals rely every day. Our goals are to exit the EU with certainty, continuity and control. However, I listened extremely carefully to the speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, my constituency neighbour, and to his appeal for us properly to consider this issue. I hope that he will not mind my saying that I think that we have already properly considered the issue, but we are perfectly willing to work with him and others to continue to reflect on this point with an eye on Report. We heard a very informative intervention on this point from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox). My right hon. and learned Friend will know that we are wrestling with the susceptibility of what we do to judicial review, which might undermine the certainty that we are trying to deliver.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Stephens]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for making that point for me. He is absolutely correct that that is what the Government are trying to do. Statements have been made in the House of Lords, including by the former chair of the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament, who has previously called for the scrapping of

“the working time directive, the agency workers’ directive, the pregnant workers’ directive and all the other barriers to actually employing people.”

That was said by Lord Callanan, now a Minister of State at the Department for Exiting the European Union—and the Conservatives ask us to trust them on workers’ rights! I would not trust them enough to send them out for the rolls in the morning. The Tories cannot be trusted on workers’ rights; if they were truly interested in workers’ rights, they would accept the amendment.

[Mr Leslie]

This has been a very important debate. Some may feel that this is a dry issue of constitutional process and ask how it relates to the question of Britain’s role in the rest of the world. However, it is fundamentally important to recognise Ministers’ land grab in attempting to take very sweeping powers, by order—not simply to transpose technical and necessary EU laws into UK law, but potentially to take whole areas of public policy and make changes by regulation with the sweep of a pen.

Anyone who looks at clause 7, the subject of this debate, will see a number of gaping holes that allow Ministers to drive a coach and horses through a whole series of policy areas. They can say that an order is “appropriate”, and that is all they have to prove—they are not “limited” to the areas that are set out.

By the way, the Minister was not even able to describe what the word “appropriate” meant. He was asked to do so in an intervention, and he could not. Ministers have also taken powers, by order, to abolish public services currently undertaken by EU agencies. This is a serious breach of the constitutional principle that Parliament should normally dictate what can be done by the Executive, who are trying to take very many powers.

A lot of amendments have been considered today. I hope that we can vote on amendment 124, because it would make sure that nothing undermines the UK staying aligned with the single market after exit day, which is a very important principle. In her amendment 49, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) deals with some of the Henry VIII powers. Given that there are so many other amendments and I know hon. Members want to prioritise theirs, I beg to ask leave to withdraw my new clause 18.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 63

Environmental standards and protections: enforcement

‘(1) Before exit day a Minister of the Crown must make provision that all powers and functions relating to environmental standards and protections that were exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day and which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement (“relevant powers and functions”) will be carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom.

(2) For the purposes of this section, relevant powers and functions include, but are not limited to—

(a) reviewing and reporting on the implementation of environmental standards in practice,

(b) monitoring and measuring compliance with legal requirements,

(c) publicising information including regarding compliance with environmental standards,

(d) facilitating the submission of complaints from persons with regard to possible infringements of legal requirements, and

(e) enforcing legal commitments.

(3) For the purposes of this section, relevant powers and functions carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom on any day after exit day must be at least equivalent to all those exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement.

(4) Any newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom charged with exercising any relevant powers and functions on any day after exit day shall not be established other than by an Act of Parliament.

(5) Before making provision under subsection (1), a Minister of the Crown shall hold a public consultation on—

(a) the precise scope of the relevant powers and functions to be carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom, and

(b) the institutional design of any entity or public authority in the United Kingdom to be newly established in order to exercise relevant powers and functions.

(6) A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make time-limited transitional arrangements for the exercise of relevant powers and functions until such time as an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom is able to carry them out.’—(Matthew Pennycook.)

This new clause would require the Government to establish new domestic governance arrangements following the UK’s exit from the EU for environmental standards and protections, following consultation.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.