European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Callanan Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for what has been an excellent debate. I use the word “debate” but only one point of view has been expressed and I have heard the message from all sides. However, I shall address the issues under consideration.

I say, first, to my noble friend Lord Cormack that he has put an intriguing thought into my mind. I will speak to my officials first thing tomorrow morning to find out where I, as a Minister of State, come in this list of 109—I suspect more towards the bottom than the top but we will find out.

The noble Lord, Lord Wilson, asked me about the number of people who will be able to exercise this power without parliamentary scrutiny—a question that I suspect is almost impossible to answer. I think that the main issue is not the number of people but the number of limitations on the exercise of that power. The power is time limited and clearly limited in what it can be used for. It may only prevent, remedy or mitigate deficiencies in EU law, and of course secondary legislation is subject to well-established parliamentary procedures. Where legislative powers are sub-delegated to public authorities, this will always be subject to the affirmative procedure.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to revisit what is clearly a very important issue in the context of the Bill. The Government will place some additional draft examples of statutory instruments or parts thereof in the Library of the House. That is something that a number of noble Lords have asked for in meetings that I have had with them, so I will ensure that that happens—most likely tomorrow.

I have listened with interest to the many contributions today, and to the extensive contributions of the Constitution Committee, which I had the pleasure of speaking to this morning along with my colleague in the other place, the Solicitor-General. I have read the reports of that committee and of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which have very much helped to frame our thoughts on this issue.

As a number of noble Lords have said, both those reports go into great detail on the scope of the delegated powers. As many noble Lords will also be aware, they come out with quite different recommendations. As I said at Second Reading, we are approaching this matter in a spirit of collaboration. The Government are looking very closely at how the powers in the Bill are drawn and how they will be exercised, particularly in the light of the committee recommendations and developments in other pieces of legislation.

As the Constitution Committee notes, comparable arguments were made during the passage of the sanctions Bill through this House and a mutually agreeable position was found in that instance. That has clearly informed the committee’s recommendation and we are receptive to the arguments made in its report. I am confident that a mutually agreeable position will be found.

As I will explain in a moment, the Government do not see the DPRRC’s recommendation as workable. However, we would very much like to talk to noble Lords following the debate, with an eye to coming back to this issue on Report.

As noble Lords will appreciate, the situation that this Bill responds to is, quite simply, unprecedented. A vast amount of EU law is being transferred to our statute book, including thousands of EU regulations. As such, the programme of secondary legislation to ensure that this law operates effectively must match that. In the face of such a task, it has always been clear that the Government will need relatively broad delegated powers to deliver a functioning statute book. Indeed, the Constitution Committee outlined in its interim report that “relatively wide” delegated powers were inevitable.

I understand that there are noble Lords who have had concerns about delegated powers for some time, and the Government are keen to continue listening to suggestions in order to improve those areas of the Bill. That listening process started during this Bill’s passage through the other place, where a number of changes were introduced to reduce the scope and increase the parliamentary scrutiny of the delegated powers. However, we cannot significantly restrict the scope of these powers, which, it is acknowledged, need to be broad.

Let me deal directly with the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson. Much of the concern about the delegated powers focuses on the use of “appropriate” to describe the discretion afforded to Ministers when making regulations to correct deficiencies. In case there is some misunderstanding here, let me be clear: “appropriate” in Clause 7 does not give Ministers unrestricted discretion to correct anything that they may wish or like. Corrections must not be appropriate per se; they must be appropriate to correct the particular deficiency they are addressing. The threshold for ministerial decisions is set firmly within the context of those purposes.

I appreciate that there is a degree of subjectivity to these tests—but that is true of almost all tests, and it is important to acknowledge that there are limitations on the power. Parliament polices the Government’s interpretation of its vires to act through the mechanism of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, which I have no doubt will take a keen interest in instruments under this Bill; and ultimately, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out, these tests are litigable in the courts. So we cannot responsibly remove “appropriate” from the Bill.

I will now delve into the detail of the various different permutations of amendments seeking to restrict the scope of the delegated powers. The first amendments I would like to discuss are Amendments 201, 243 and 245, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, which attempt to ensure that Ministers have considered that exercises of the main powers are made for good reasons and are reasonable courses of action. These match the Constitution Committee’s recommendation, and a smaller group were added to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill.

Amendments 74, 117 and 139, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, seek to write into the Bill that Ministers’ consideration of the appropriateness of any exercise of the delegated powers must be made on reasonable grounds. This is the right type of approach in not altering the fundamental scope of the powers.

[Lord Cormack]

Is my noble friend saying that he has made his mind up—or the Government have made their collective mind up—on retaining “appropriate”?

[Lord Callanan]

If my noble friend will forgive me, I will discuss that in a second.

Ministers make their decisions on secondary legislation based on reasonable grounds in the normal course of events. The use of these powers will be subject to the usual public law principles designed to ensure that the Executive act reasonably, in good faith and for proper purposes. I accept, however, that noble Lords have principled and legitimate concerns and we will ensure that these are addressed and that the reasonableness of a Minister’s courses of action is made clearer. Given the views expressed today, I would like to engage in further discussions with noble Lords with a view to returning to this issue on Report.

Amendments 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 116, 118, 140, 229, 253, 254, 257, 258, 264, 265, 276, 277, 290 and 291, which were tabled by noble Lords including the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane—to whom I spoke yesterday and I understand why he is not in his place today—the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seek to exchange “appropriate” for “necessary”, about which we have had a great deal of debate, in the main powers and schedules in which it can be found. I understand noble Lords’ concerns but, as I have stated, this would have a serious impact on our vital programme of secondary legislation to prepare our statute book for exit day. “Necessary” is a high bar to meet. The courts have said that the nearest paraphrase for “necessary” is “really needed”, but such a test would be too constrictive.

[Lord Newby (LD)]

Can the noble Lord give an example of where something is not really needed? Surely the whole point of this legislation is only to do things that are really needed—not to do anything that you think, when you wake up in the morning, might be a jolly good idea.

[Lord Callanan]

If the noble Lord will have a little patience I will get on to that in a second.

If regulations could only make “necessary” provisions, the powers would be heavily restricted to a much smaller set of essential changes. For example, if the Government wanted to change references in legislation from euros to sterling, we would expect such a change to be considered “appropriate” both by the courts and, I hope, by this House, but it might not be considered “necessary”.

We might manage to ensure that our statute book is in a legally operable state, but it would not be in its most coherent form, or arranged in a way that best promotes our national interest. I am sure that this Committee does not intend to restrict the Government from legislating coherently or in the national interest, but that may be the unintended consequence of amendments which swap “appropriate” for “necessary”.

I note that some of the amendments in this group contain wording suggested by the DPRRC in its report on the powers in this Bill. In particular, I was interested in the assertion that:

“The operative test in Clause 7 should be whether it is necessary to deal with the problem, not whether only one solution follows inexorably”.


I first highlight that I do not believe that these amendments break up the necessity process in the way that the committee intends. I also question the merits of breaking up the necessity test in the way that the committee suggests. In its report, the committee cites the example of a deficiency in which there is:

“A requirement to collect and send information that will no longer be accepted by the EU”.


The committee states that it,

“is clearly a deficiency that it is necessary to remove from the statute book: it cannot be right to retain a redundant legal duty that amounts to a waste of time, effort and public money”.

However, I question whether this change is strictly necessary, or whether it is merely appropriate. The committee asserts that it cannot be “right” for this arrangement to continue—and I agree with it—but is it strictly “necessary” that it be removed? What great harm, after all, would be done if the information were still sent? The statute book would continue to function, albeit illogically and not in the public interest. But is it necessary, in a strict legalistic sense, to have the statute book working logically and in the public interest, or are all our changes merely appropriate? In these sorts of instance we cannot with any certainty predict the way in which a court might rule. It is precisely to guard against such a decision that the Government cannot support the suggestion made by the committee.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Is the Minister saying that he will not accept these amendments because he might be defeated in court? If so, that is a thoroughly bad reason.

[Lord Callanan]

I think I have made my position clear on that but, nevertheless, I also said that we are listening and endeavouring to satisfy the concerns of noble Lords.

Amendments 73, 119 and 141 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and also spoken to by my noble friend Lord Lang, meanwhile used “essential” rather than “appropriate” to limit the discretion of Ministers in exercising the delegated powers. This really is very similar to the amendments which propose the use of “necessary”. I think that a court would likely interpret the meaning of “necessary” and “essential”—in this context—in much the same way and, therefore, I will not repeat the arguments that I have already made.

[Lord Cormack]

I beg my noble friend to talk to his ministerial colleagues and think again, otherwise the Government will suffer the most massive, crushing defeat when this comes up on Report.

[Lord Callanan]

I said at the start that I am setting out a position, but I have heard the messages that came to me from all sides of the Committee and I very much take on board the point that my noble friend makes. I shall state again that, despite their breadth, these are not powers designed to deliver major policy changes and they can only be read in light of their purpose. For Clause 7(1), that is to “prevent, remedy or mitigate” deficiencies arising from withdrawal.

Amendment 244A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Dunlop, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, touches on a point to which I will return to in more detail later, but I will stress now the risks of introducing additional legal uncertainty by creating new and untested definitions to the law. However, I am conscious of the need for transparency in this process and we will look to see how, in line with developments and other legislation, we can ensure that ministerial decision-making about the appropriate exercise of the powers is more transparent to the Committee.

Amendment 75, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, allows me the opportunity to expand upon the reasons why we are taking the correcting power and to build upon the arguments made in previous days of debate. Areas of our domestic law, such as those relating to EU obligations, will be redundant when we leave the EU. The Bills repealed by Schedule 9 are an example of this. Some noble Lords will consider that having provisions that do nothing on the statute book is not harmful. Indeed, the Easter Act 1928, which was never commenced, continues to sit on the statute book with no effect and causes no harm. My noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, also argued that there is no legal recourse under the use of powers under Clause 7. That is not strictly correct. If the threshold set out in the Act is overstepped the regulations can be struck down by judicial review.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem]

The noble Lord was helpful in trying to give an example for something else. Could he give an example of where something that was “appropriate” could not be covered by the principle of necessity?

[Lord Callanan]

I do not have any additional examples beyond the ones I have already given, but I will certainly write to the noble Lord with alternative information on that.

However, the Government and I believe that a majority of noble Lords in this House will agree that the statute book is not truly effective unless it is tidy. The Bill is designed to provide clarity and certainty on the law; if we cannot remove or correct these redundant provisions this goal will be undermined. However, having said all that, as I have set out, I would be very happy to engage in further discussions with noble Lords. I have very much heard the messages given from all sides of the Committee with a view to returning to this issue on Report. On the basis of those assurances, I hope that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.

[Lord Wilson of Dinton]

My Lords, I thank the 13 noble Lords who spoke on the amendment, all of whom were unanimous in their support of the need to change Clause 7(1). There was a lot of support for the substitution of “necessary” for “appropriate”. I am not going to go through what was said because, first, I agreed with everything; and secondly, it was said so eloquently that it would be otiose for me to add to it at this hour of night.

The Minister has clearly heard the voices of so many noble Lords in favour of some change to Clause 7(1). I say respectfully that he seemed to be speaking with two voices. One was a clear, fierce defence of “appropriate”. I have to confess that I found some of it surprising. I would have thought, faced with EU retained law expressed in the euro, that that would be a deficiency that one needed to correct and that it would be necessary to correct it. However, I will study what the Minister said with interest. On the one hand he spoke with a fierce voice defending the present drafting. On the other, he referred three or four times to the need to discuss before Report. At one point, he said that he was sure that a mutually agreeable position would be found. We need to study exactly what he said. Against that background, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, when we discussed Clause 2 and the Constitution Committee’s amendments, I said I did not wish to exclude the three paragraphs that the Constitution Committee wanted to exclude; I wish to exclude them instead from amendment under this paragraph. With the discussion we just had about what is necessary rather than just appropriate, to put as much as possible beyond the temptation of amendment by the Government seems to be a good idea. That was the approach I outlined previously. As far as this clause is concerned, it is in line with the Constitution Committee and with the Bingham Centre report, and in view of the state of my voice, I think it is best if I just say that I beg to move.

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, I am tempted to send some cough sweets to the noble Baroness to help her: she certainly has my sympathy, and I suspect the Prime Minister’s sympathy, for the difficult position she is in. I am grateful to her for the amendment and this debate.

The noble Baroness has proposed to limit the Clause 7(1) power so that it is only possible to correct deficiencies in domestic legislation in two circumstances. The first is where the deficiency is of any type provided for in this Bill and that the legislation was a statutory instrument made under Section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of Schedule 2 to, the European Communities Act. The second, for all other EU derived domestic legislation, is that inappropriate EU references are the only type of deficiency which may be corrected.

I understand the noble Baroness’s well-intentioned desire to, where possible, protect from amendment legislation which has already been considered in detail by this House. However, while Section 2(2) of the ECA has been a crucial tool in the Government’s implementation of our EU obligations, it is far from the only way the Government have implemented EU obligations in the 45 years of our EU membership. Indeed, many noble Lords have been vociferous in encouraging Governments past and present to do more under primary legislation and specific powers and less under Section 2(2). Furthermore, whether a deficiency is in primary or secondary legislation is not, I believe, a meaningful indication of the type of deficiencies which might arise in it, or the significance of the correction that needs to be made.

To be ready for exit day a large number of fairly straight-forward changes will need to be made to primary legislation in exactly the same way as in secondary legislation made under the ECA. For example, Section 42(5) of the Employment Relations Act 2004, concerning information and consultation, will require amendment as outlined in the draft regulations the Government have already published. This power relates to the implementation of a directive. This directive has already been implemented in our domestic law and the relevant implementing legislation will be converted to retained EU law by the Bill. Once the UK has withdrawn from the EU, this power will have no practical application. I hope noble Lords will accept that we need to be able to make appropriate corrections to such deficiencies. The power therefore needs to be broad enough to allow for corrections to be made to both primary and secondary legislation for the full range of deficiencies. Textual and technical changes must be made in primary legislation if we are to have a functioning statute book on exit day.

The Government’s contention is that what matters is not the status of the law that is being amended but the purpose of the amendment. Indeed, some provisions of secondary legislation made under Section 2(2) are extremely important, which is why the Government have provided for the sifting committee and affirmative procedure to ensure that all regulations are subject to the appropriate level of scrutiny. For example, much of the vital statutory protections of the rights of workers in this country lies in regulations made under Section 2(2) of the ECA. We have already published details of some of the corrections that will be required here, and I hope they have laid concerns to rest. They are also representative of the type of corrections that will arise throughout the statute book and will need to be corrected to ensure that important areas of law continue to function.

I hope I have persuaded the noble Baroness of the Government’s position that it is the substance of the change, not where it is being made, that matters, and that she therefore feels able—if she can do so—to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

In the absence of my noble friend Lord Bassam, I just want to encourage the Minister—though I am sure it is already in his notes—to comment on Amendment 244, which appears in this group. It requires that:

“The statement under sub-paragraph (2) must include a certification that the regulation does no more than make technical changes to retained EU law in order for it to work following exit, and that no policy decisions are being made”.


I appreciate that the Minister and other Ministers have said all the way along that this is not about making policy, so it should be an easy certification on this occasion for a Minister to sign. I hope that that might be accepted.

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, Amendment 81 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, concerns the core concept of this Bill, namely that it preserves and makes functional the law at the moment of the UK’s exit from the EU. As the long and learned debates in this House and the other place demonstrate, this is of course something much simpler said than done. We can all agree that the law in the UK should not be considered deficient simply because the EU adopts a new law once the UK has left. The Bill reflects that with the provision in Clause 7(4) and, therefore, this would not constitute a valid trigger for the use of the power in Clause 7(1).

It is also the case that the law is not deficient simply because EU law, as is often the case in some areas, contains provisions that are adopted before our withdrawal but only come into force or apply after exit day. This reflects the approach taken in Clause 3, which provides for the conversion of direct EU legislation that is operative in the UK immediately before exit day. As the Government set out when we debated Clause 3, we believe that it is right that we incorporate only that law which is operative at the time of our exit. It is surely not taking back control to this Parliament and the devolved legislatures if we simultaneously preserve the automaticity of new provisions of what was EU law becoming operative in our law, months or perhaps years later. It would be unacceptable for EU law provisions to flow automatically into the UK many years after we have left and would undermine the clarity and certainty this Bill is designed to provide. That is why Clause 3 preserves only the law as individuals and businesses were bound by it immediately before exit day, and why that decision is reflected in Clause 7(4), which makes it clear that the law is not deficient simply because it does not contain planned future changes to EU law. In preserving EU law, the Government have drawn a line in the legal sand on exit day. Wherever the line was drawn, the outcomes would, of course, please some and not others. I note that the controversial ports regulation, although already in force, will enter into application only days before exit day. Clause 7(4) merely reflects this line in the legal sand.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Although Amendment 244, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam, asks for,

“a certification that the regulation does no more than make technical changes … and that no policy decisions are being made”,

I take the point that policy choices may be being made. Although it is not in this group, Amendment 244A says that there would be a certificate saying that either the change was just technical or a policy choice has been made. That amendment may not be in this group, but I am interested whether the Minister is closing his mind to the idea that there should be a certificate from the relevant Minister. That is what this amendment aims to do.

[Lord Callanan]

No. As I have made clear throughout the Bill, our minds are not closed on many of these matters. I think I gave the noble Baroness an example. It is a difficult distinction to draw about what is making policy or what is a policy choice. As I said, the choice between two regulators can be said to be a policy choice, but it is certainly not our intention to use any of the power in the Bill to massively expand on different levels of policy. It is our intention to impose a snapshot on exit day and ensure that the law is compliant and tidy, as we have said.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister and to all who have contributed to this little group. While I am grateful to my noble friend for his reply, I am not sure that he addressed the question of timings, and I am slightly concerned about the scope for judicial reviews. I end with the comment that the wording I seek to delete refers to the earlier Amendment 18, on which we had a lengthier debate, and to which I will return on Report. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I think the good news is that we heard a hint earlier that this might be one of the areas where we are going to hear a bit of movement tonight. If the Chief Whip will allow us to go home after this group, we will be sent home in a very happy mood.

My name is also on these two amendments and I will not make the case again, because the noble Lord, Lord Newby, made the clearest of cases against the use of secondary powers to create new quangos, with others adding similar reasons for why this is not just a power too far but is in breach of government guidelines.

I will add only two points. First—this is a slight gripe, I am afraid—in answer to my Written Question as to whether there were other examples of NGOs established by secondary legislation, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, said that it was not possible to answer other than “at disproportionate cost”. But the Government must have known why I was asking this Question—they have a brain—and I would have thought that if there were some public bodies set up by secondary legislation they could have found a few examples. This was some time ago. Unfortunately it is an undated letter—like many I get from the Government —but it is HL1651, so I think it was probably last year that I asked it.

My second point—and in a sense it is really the point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Beith—arises from my experience both as a consumer representative and as a former member of various regulatory bodies set up always by statute. It is simply to say that the very way we establish those bodies—whether it is the Charity Commission, the Competition Commission, the Legal Services Board or the National Consumer Council of which my noble friend Lord Whitty was such an eminent chair until the Public Bodies Act abolished it—affects how they do their job. The founding statute will spell out their task and set out the “have regards to” that influence how they set about their work. It will also define who sits on their boards, how they are appointed, to whom they report and whether, for example, they have a duty to heed consumers in the relevant industry, the regulated industry itself, the employees, the wider social considerations such as the environment or things like that—and indeed their degree of independence from the Government. It is a crucial part of the function of many public bodies.

Such limitations on the powers of those public bodies, and the requirements for how they operate, are written in primary legislation. They can be discussed carefully, they can be amended—as we did before with others, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said—they can be debated in this Chamber or in the other place, and they could have pre-legislative scrutiny. For example, setting up a new public ombudsman—as the Member in the other place Mr Jenkins has been recommending—could come by a Bill and could be amended after consultation with the relevant interested parties. That is the way that we should set up public bodies. Instead, this Bill says to a Minister, “Well, you decide. You decide how to set it up; you decide how its board will be established; you decide who to appoint it—probably you could decide to appoint your friends to it”—and Parliament will nod it through. That is not good enough and this power must be dispensed with.

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to respond to the debate, if only to confound all the prejudices of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that I am some inflexible hardliner who never gives him anything he might want and that only my noble friend Lady Goldie can—I was going to say “satisfy him”, but perhaps I should not use that word. He could not put a cigarette paper between us, by the way. She might do so with more charm than me, but we are saying essentially the same thing.

I understand that a number of noble Lords are concerned about the scope of this power and I reassure your Lordships that the Government are listening to those concerns. When Clause 7 was drafted, we thought it would be only sensible for the sake of contingency to include in its scope the ability to establish new public authorities to ensure, as many amendments in the other place sought to ensure, against losing any important functions as they are transferred over from the EU, as no such public authority may currently exist in the UK. Certainty and continuity are, after all, the watchwords of the Bill.

We have been clear that our preference will always be, where possible, to transfer any functions returning from the EU to existing bodies in the UK, but it has proven necessary to legislate in parallel with negotiations because of the strict Article 50 timeline. Therefore, we do not know at this stage exactly which functions are returning. We must make this legislation without prejudice to those negotiations, where, as the Prime Minister said in her Mansion House speech last week, we are looking to continue a productive relationship with various EU bodies as part of our deep and special partnership.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked about our strategy towards the agencies. Where there is a demonstrable national interest in pursuing a continued relationship with any EU body or agency, the Government will consider carefully whether we should do so. However, as he knows, it is ultimately a matter for negotiations. We remain committed to keep Parliament as fully informed as possible without prejudice to our negotiating position.

However, we already know of one function that we expect to return to the UK and which it is agreed does not sit happily with any existing public body: our environmental protections. This prompted the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to announce our intention to consult on a new, independent and statutory body to advise and challenge the Government and potentially other public bodies on the environment—we discussed this extensively earlier—stepping in when needed to hold these bodies to account and enforce standards. As such, we need to retain the power until we can be confident of delivering all necessary legislative changes without it.

It is for this reason that I am sorry to say that we will not be accepting Amendments 83 and 94 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, which seek to remove this ability from the scope of the power. The Government have a responsibility to safeguard against the potential disruption and confusion caused to businesses and individuals as we exit the EU, and we believe that the ability to create new public authorities plays a big part in ensuring this. However, the Government also recognise their responsibility to Parliament in listening to Members’ concerns regarding the legislation it seeks to pass. Therefore, I can assure noble Lords that the Government are working hard on finding a resolution to this matter that will satisfy the concerns of noble Lords—maybe even the noble Lord, Lord Adonis—and we will revisit it on Report. In the meantime, with those assurances, I hope the noble Lord will be able to withdraw the amendment.