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(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIn the past three years, national gigabit coverage has rocketed from 6% to 69%. Through Project Gigabit, we are investing £5 billion so that people in hard-to-reach areas can get ultra-reliable gigabit broadband speeds. We have already upgraded more than 600,000 premises and we have over half a billion pounds of contracts out for tender right now. Last week, I also announced £82 million in funding to connect up to 3,000 schools to lightning-fast gigabit broadband.
In too many parts of my constituency, access to good-quality, fast broadband is a real issue for local businesses, and our economy is being held back as a result. However, we are making progress, including an additional 25,000 houses being connected through fast gigabit broadband. Could my right hon. Friend update me and the House on what further progress we can make across my constituency to help those businesses that are struggling with access?
I am pleased that 82% of premises in Keighley can already access a gigabit-capable connection, exceeding the national average. I join my hon. Friend in welcoming the recent progress that has been made. We are making good progress to reach premises not included in the suppliers commercial plan through Project Gigabit. Preparations are under way for the procurement covering Keighley, which is due to start between February and April next year. It was never the case that we were going to be able to go from zero to 100% overnight—I am sure all hon. Members accept that—but we are making excellent progress.
In 2011, Ofcom estimated that only 3% of homes and businesses in East Sussex had access to superfast broadband, putting the county in the fourth quintile nationally. Now the figure stands at 98%. We have also seen local villages such as Westfield and Three Oaks working really hard to take advantage of the Government’s national rural gigabit voucher scheme, supported by the East Sussex rural gigabit top-up scheme. Will my right hon. Friend join me in thanking East Sussex County Council and the parish councils for their hard work and urge other rural communities to take advantage of these schemes to improve their connectivity and boost local economic growth?
I thank my hon. Friend for the work that she did on the Committee that considered the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill—vital legislation to give all parts of the country great connectivity. I join her in thanking East Sussex County Council and parish councils across the country that have supported local communities to benefit from our £210 million gigabit broadband voucher scheme. She rightly highlights the incredible growth in superfast coverage across East Sussex, which has benefited from public subsidy through voucher funding and earlier superfast contracts.
We understand that the pressures people are facing mean that some will not be able to give as much to charity as they have done in the past. However, while recent reports show a drop, average donations remain higher than pre covid, and total donations for the first quarter of 2022 look to be the highest since 2017, although this is due in large part to the incredible generosity of the British people in giving over £300 million towards the Ukrainian humanitarian appeal. I will continue to work closely with the sector on this important issue.
I thank the Minister for that response, but he just does not get it, does he? Thanks to this Government’s cruel policies, food banks are now embedded in our welfare state. As the cost of living crisis intensifies, we are running out of food donations and people are going hungry. It is an abdication of the Government’s duty to leave charities to fill gaps left by the state, so when will whoever is left in the Government start doing their job?
I gently remind the hon. Lady that the Opposition do not have a monopoly on sympathy and understanding. We completely understand the pressures that people are facing with the cost of living and have taken action to support families. That is why the Government are providing over £15 billion in further support targeted particularly at those with the greatest need. That is in addition to over £22 billion announced previously. Government support on the cost of living now totals £37 billion this year.
I associate myself with the remarks by my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mrs Lewell-Buck). That is the experience in my constituency too—food banks are suffering. Research by the Charities Aid Foundation found that 82% of charities are worried about how they are going to pay their utility bills, and many of them worry that they will not survive the crisis. What action are the Government taking to help our valuable charities to stay afloat?
During the pandemic, we showed how important charities were, with more than £750 million for the charity scheme. That showed that we needed them to survive, because they play such an important role in our society. I will continue to engage with charities and make representations to other parts of Government. We recognise the important role they play, but also we need to help families directly, which will then reduce the burden on the charities.
Charities are indeed working harder than ever to support people through this cost of living crisis. They are delivering food to older people, supporting people with the stresses of poverty and working tirelessly to advocate for vulnerable people, yet charities are suffering from a big hit to their income as their running costs spiral and demand for their services rockets. I cannot find any mention that the Secretary of State has made of charities since she was appointed last year. Will the Minister admit that charities have not been a priority for this Government, and when will they take the steps to support the sector to deal with this perfect storm of pressures?
The hon. Lady is completely wrong. The Secretary of State and I talk about and to charities all the time—constantly. What she said goes against the facts. As I just outlined, there was £750 million in charity support during the pandemic, which was a specific recognition of the key role that they play.
I know that both Members have taken an active involvement in this issue and, like all the House, are looking forward to seeing the outcomes of our Gambling Act 2005 review. It remains a priority for the Department, and we will publish a White Paper setting out conclusions and a vision for the sector in the coming weeks.
We know that the Department has considered gambling-related harm to be a public health issue and preventing harm is an essential objective of gambling regulations, so may I gently press the Minister to confirm whether key public health-based reforms, such as a smart statutory levy, the introduction of online stake limits, an effective affordability assessment and controls on gambling advertising, will be included in the forthcoming White Paper?
I know how passionately and seriously the hon. Gentleman takes this issue, as do we on this side of the Chamber. That is why the review was comprehensive and covered many, if not all, of those areas that he mentioned. I ask him to be slightly patient, because we will be responding to the review in due course.
Many countries are ahead of the UK in regulating loot boxes and video games and require games to display the odds of receiving certain loot in the box items. It is essential to ensure that we are not subjecting players to blind gambling, yet Diablo Immortal’s “rift” feature finds a loophole apparently in this, and is essentially a loot box that is contingent on skill-based gameplay. The skill-based element means it is not technically gambling and does not have to display odds, but it is a loot box. Will the Minister commit to exploring in the gambling review how to close that loophole, and will the Department meet with the game developer Blizzard to discuss how to close the loophole in Diablo Immortal?
Again, this is a topic that has consumed the attention of the whole House. The gambling review was looked at separately from the specific issue of loot boxes, where we recognise there are also issues and concerns, and we have been conducting a review. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that protecting children, both on loot boxes and in the gambling review, is front and centre of our thoughts.
It is not just children who can be impacted by loot boxes and other gambling mechanics; it is also people with other vulnerabilities. It is critical that the Government take effective steps to close loopholes, and do not just bake in the problem for ever more creative tech companies to exploit.
My right hon. Friend makes an important point about ensuring that the review we conduct and the conclusions that come out of it are comprehensive, but it is important, as technology evolves and changes, and becomes ever more sophisticated—as it does, particularly in the online gambling and gaming space—that we keep a close eye on developments, and we will be doing that going forward.
I thank the ministerial team for their continued good work. Specifically on fixed odds betting terminals, would it not be a pragmatic and sensible consideration to display the average return rate for five seconds at the beginning of play, so that users can make an informed decision to weigh up enjoyment against the likely returns?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. The White Paper will be looking at those issues, and the Gambling Commission of course looks at those kind of issues on an ongoing basis. He raises important points about targeting, in particular of the most vulnerable in society, and it is something of which we are very aware.
One could be forgiven for failing to notice a news article yesterday regarding No. 10 policy advisers who have links to gambling companies. It would be unforgiveable, however, if either of those advisers had attempted to influence the White Paper in a way that could be considered to favour the industry. Can the Minister assure the House that that is not the case?
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s passion and commitment on the subject; we have had many conversations. She will be aware that we have engaged extensively with stakeholders in the course of the gambling review.
When the Government publish the White Paper, which I very much look forward to, will they ensure that it makes it clear who will be responsible for the issue of affordability—the Government or the Gambling Commission?
Again, I cannot pre-empt the conclusions of the review, but my hon. Friend makes an important point. The Secretary of State in particular is aware of that and we will be communicating more in due course. Affordability is an important point.
I am not at all surprised to see the Secretary of State still in her place; I had no doubt that she would be the last woman standing in support of the Prime Minister while all around her collapses, including her ministerial team. I wondered whether, by this morning, she would hold not only all the ministerial offices in her Department but several other Cabinet posts as well.
For many months, we have heard that the gambling White Paper is imminent. It has still not been published, although its content has again been trailed to the news- papers. Apparently, Ministers are dropping the gambling levy, which has widespread support, and other measures that would bring the analogue gambling regulation into the digital age. Is that true?
Well, we now know from the former gambling Minister, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), that the White Paper is with No. 10 for sign-off—good luck with that. We have also been promised the media Bill, a White Paper on football regulation, a review of women’s football, a review on the future funding of the BBC, and a data Bill—all before the summer recess. How is that going? The truth is that we have chaos, paralysis and a total collapse of Government, with huge swathes of vacant ministerial posts and parliamentary business on hold. Is it not the reality that not just the Prime Minister has lost the country’s trust, but the entire Conservative party?
This is about the gambling review, and the question should be about that. The Minister should answer on the gambling review.
I hope the hon. Lady will wait to respond to the gambling review. I appreciate her giving a comprehensive list of all the policy areas and manifesto commitments on which the Government are committed to delivering. She could have gone further and mentioned safe standing, the delivery of the Commonwealth games, which start in three weeks’ time, or the Euros—well done to the Lionesses for last night. I thank her for giving a list of the Government’s achievements.
I also do not want the Minister to wander off topic. Let us go to someone who will put us back on track—John Nicolson, the SNP spokesperson.
In what could be our last exchange across the Dispatch Box, I recognise that the Secretary of State cannot bind the hands of her successor, but as we move away from post-truth politics and culture wars, perhaps she can leave doing some good. The lottery is the country’s principal gambling addiction. For most, it is innocent fun; for some, it is a problem—an affliction. The now resigned tech and digital Minister, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), confirmed to the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) at the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee this week that tickets can be charged perfectly legally to credit cards, building up huge debts. When Camelot is replaced, can that be reformed?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the final part of his comments and for drawing attention to the fact that we constantly review the lottery. We have made significant changes over time, such as to the age limit for who can play it. As he is aware, people can use a credit card if the ticket is bought with other shopping. That is the norm in many other countries, but we constantly review those exact areas.
In 2019, the last full year of gambling data unaffected by covid, the gambling industry contributed £8.3 billion to the economy, or 0.4% of gross value added. The sector employs approximately 98,000 people and pays £2 billion a year in gambling duties. According to the British Horseracing Authority, racing has direct revenues in excess of £1.47 billion and makes a total annual contribution to the UK economy of over £4 billion.
I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply. Can I urge him, in preparing the White Paper, to take a balanced view of the economic and social benefits, the considerable pleasure for millions who bet quite responsibly and the great contribution to the Exchequer, and balance that against the very vocal lobbying, particularly in some of the media, by those who basically, with gambling, are prohibitionists?
Again, I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the gambling White Paper was comprehensive, and the response will be comprehensive. We have taken evidence and information from across the entire sector, so views such as those he has represented we are absolutely taking into account during the consideration.
The hon. Lady will be aware that, just last week, we announced a review of this very area. It is vitally important, particularly in tourism-affected areas of the country, and I know that her city, which I have had the pleasure of visiting, is one of them.
Short-term holiday lets and Airbnb are blighting my city: we have nearly 2,000. That is undermining the regulated bed and breakfast and guesthouse sector. It is taking away houses from people in my city who are desperate to get homes, but it is causing antisocial behaviour and party houses on residential streets. Will the Minister ensure that the Government introduce a licensing system as opposed to a registration scheme, and also enable local authorities to create areas where there are no Airbnbs? Will the Minister meet me to discuss the crisis we are currently facing?
I am always delighted to meet the hon. Lady. She raises some important points, articulating precisely the need for the review, which we have brought in because we are very aware of some of the issues she raised. Some of the individual entities—Airbnb and so on—are already taking action on antisocial behaviour and the number of people who can be at parties. We expect, and require them actually, to continue to be responsible for and responsive to their customers and, indeed, local communities. We have not pre-empted the conclusions of the review, so I ask her to please contribute to that review.
The hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) is absolutely right to identify the issue that she has in York and in other parts of the country, but will my hon. Friend also bear in mind that these lets generate income for the area too, and many restaurants and other places would probably go out of business were it not for some of these lets?
My hon. Friend is making an important point, and that is why this is a call for evidence. It is about information; we have not come to conclusions or, indeed, decisions about potential legislation. There is a balance to be had here. Many people rent out a spare room, and in particular in these straitened times, it is very important that they can get additional revenue where they can.
With the announcement, just now, that the Prime Minister has resigned as the leader of the Conservative party, will his temporary occupation of No. 10 Downing Street over the summer qualify as a short-term holiday let?
I am sure the hon. Gentleman is enjoying himself, but that is nonsense. I think the important thing to make very clear, as people can see today, is that government continues.
Society lotteries are a vital source of funds for charities and other organisations, raising hundreds of millions of pounds every year. Sales and prize limits were last increased in 2020. A review after 12 months, published in March, concluded that the reforms were starting to benefit the sector, but more evidence was needed before making further changes. We will work with the Gambling Commission to keep this under review.
I thank the Minister for that answer. As he rightly said, charity lotteries, such as the people’s postcode lottery, are benefiting thousands of charities and communities around the country, not least in the Calder Valley itself, and implementing the next stage of charity lottery reform, as the Government have previously said they will do, is a great way to help to take forward the levelling-up agenda at no cost to the public purse. Will he agree to look further at this and implement that review sooner rather than later?
Yes, absolutely; we will keep this under review. The Government did express an ambition to look again at increasing the annual sales limit to £100 million once we were satisfied that this would result in an increase in overall returns to good causes and would not negatively impact on the national lottery. That goal of making sure the returns to good causes are optimised will be at the front of our minds.
Through Project Gigabit we are ensuring that hard-to-reach areas of the UK gain access to world-class gigabit connectivity alongside delivering gigabit broadband to the rest of the country ahead of the demand. As I said in response to an earlier answer, connectivity stood at 6% in 2019, while today the figure is 69%.
Rolling out gigabit broadband requires real leadership. The Prime Minister has brought his office into disrepute, so will the Deputy Prime Minister be his stand-by this summer?
Secretary of State, I am not quite sure that question is relevant.
Yes, I am afraid that question does not relate to gigabit broadband roll-out.
I was originally going to ask about the Commonwealth games, which is obviously a fantastic event for the west midlands, but I wish to focus on something else that is very good news in my locality. Will the Secretary of State join me in congratulating Solihull council, Solihull Community Housing and CityFibre on striking a deal to ensure that 4,000 community housing tenants are given the very latest full-fibre network? Does she agree that whatever our roll-out programme in towns, cities and villages across the country, we must make sure everyone is covered in those localities so that we leave no one behind as we strive to finally join the first rank of connected nations?
I thank my hon. Friend for the work he continually contributes to this area and as Chair of the Select Committee, and he is absolutely right. The manifesto commitment was for 100% for a reason: that is the Prime Minister’s absolute commitment that nobody would be left behind. Obviously, there are hard-to-reach areas such as hill farms and other premises in more rural parts of the country, but there are innovative ways—using 5G, satellite and other means—of getting that connectivity to those areas. That is being worked on right now, and this Government will not rest until 100% has been reached.
Only 97.5% of premises in England and 95% in West Worcestershire can access superfast broadband of at least 30 megabits per second. We are now bringing forward investment of £5 billion through Project Gigabit to provide gigabit connectivity to premises across the UK that are not covered through the commercial delivery. We have already provided gigabit coverage to 600,000 premises in areas that previously only had low speeds. We are aiming to commence procurement for gigabit coverage in Worcestershire between September and November of this year.
The figures I have got from the House of Commons Library for West Worcestershire say that 9% of my constituency is still not covered. That is because it is very cumbersome to put together the groups of people with vouchers to make a scheme viable, and they are very vulnerable to someone withdrawing their voucher at the last minute. Will the Secretary of State look at ways to improve that, so we can have someone underwriting and strengthening the delivery of this important service to rural areas?
Hundreds of premises in rural areas across my hon. Friend’s constituency, which I know well, have received gigabit-capable connections through the voucher scheme, but, as she says, there are some fragilities to that. We will be bringing forward our Project Gigabit procurement for suppliers to provide coverage to premises that are not covered by the commercial providers, or where vouchers are not the most effective approach. Alongside this, we have introduced voucher priority areas, but in some instances suppliers are able to deliver faster thanks to their participation in the voucher scheme. I reiterate what I said in response to a previous answer: we were never going to reach 100% overnight, but to have gone from 6% to 69% across the UK in three years is pretty remarkable, and that progress continues at pace.
The Prime Minister—sorry, the Secretary of State—[Laughter.] With the level of change at the moment, it is hard to keep track. The Secretary of State refers, I presume, to the current Prime Minister’s commitment that no one be left behind, but she knows well that under successive Conservative Governments, the absence of a digital inclusion strategy means that the digital divide has broadened, whether it be between rural and urban, between those who have digital skills and those who do not, or between those who can afford broadband and those who cannot. The last digital inclusion strategy was in 2014. When will a new one appear?
The progress with which we have commenced the roll-out of gigabit broadband across the UK has been exemplary. Just last week, I held a roundtable with telecommunications providers to urge them to look at social tariffs and to offer lower rates to those who are left behind and cannot afford the rates that others can. Work never stops in this area. We are very aware of those who cannot access broadband and cannot have digital access—
The Government absolutely appreciate the unique importance of heritage steam railways in this country in promoting our industrial heritage and supporting tourism. We are in regular communication with the industry.
I am lucky to have seven heritage railways in Dwyfor Meirionnydd, and steam engines were designed to be run on coal. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they face a crisis in the supply of suitable coal. The sector is working to develop alternatives to coal, as required by the net zero agenda, but it needs help. Will the Minister commit to supporting heritage steam to ensure the survival of our industrial heritage?
I have had several conversations with the right hon. Lady on this topic, as I have with colleagues from across the House, and I understand the complexities and challenges. She will be aware that some of the issues that need to be resolved may be outside DCMS’s portfolio. Ultimately, the sourcing of fuel supplies is a commercial arrangement. However, I will be happy to continue to work with her and facilitate further conversations across Government.
In the last few weeks, we have seen huge crowds at Her Majesty’s platinum jubilee, Glastonbury, Silverstone and Wimbledon. The women’s Euros kicked off last night, and the Birmingham Commonwealth games are on their way. It is set to be a great British summer of culture and sport.
Speaking of sport, last week I was lucky enough to attend an event celebrating the upcoming rugby league world cup—[Interruption.] I know that Mr Speaker is a huge fan of the sport, and while I do not share his detailed expertise, he will be delighted that rugby league’s execs have told me—and him, I believe—that rugby league has never had so much publicity and so much attention. All I can say, Mr Speaker, is, “You’re welcome.”
I think you did a great job for rugby league. We certainly got it promoted.
The Government deserve considerable credit for their recent announcement to allow safe standing in all premier league grounds. However, the rule change does not permit seat locking for safe standing, which is essential if we are to be able to increase capacity and provide cheaper ticket prices like those in Germany, as the overwhelming majority of fans want. Will the Secretary of State agree to meet me, officials from the Football Association and the English Premier League and colleagues from the all-party parliamentary group for safe standing to discuss the issue and get on—
I assure my hon. Friend that the safety of spectators at football matches was the key priority in the development of the policy. The report found that keeping seats unlocked would offer greater choice to spectators and was supported by the data from the spectator survey. Of course, I am always happy to meet and discuss the matter further.
It looks as though the Secretary of State will shortly have a lot more spare time on her hands, perhaps for more sport and physical activity, but that becomes much harder if leisure facilities and swimming pools close because of high fuel costs and reduced footfall. Operators are really worried. What more will the Government do to support local authorities and the rest of the sector as they face the Tory cost of living crisis?
The leisure centre sector was supported with £100 million throughout the pandemic. We continue to work, and discuss ongoing issues, with the sector, but I am delighted that we are seeing improvements across all leisure sectors.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his question and for his continued support to me and the Department. Last week, we published our response to the consultation on intellectual property and artificial intelligence, of which I am sure he is aware. Following that consultation, we intend to amend copyright law to make it easier to analyse material for the purposes of machine learning, research and innovation. That will promote the use of AI technology and wider data mining techniques for the public good.
This has been an objective of mine since I first arrived in the Department. Yesterday I visited the British Library, which holds many of the nation’s treasures. We want to ensure that collections in libraries, museums and art galleries reach across the country, so that everybody has access to and can see, enjoy and learn from those national treasures. At the beginning of my tenure and recently, I asked every organisation to look again at what they are doing to ensure that that happens.
I am sure Mr Speaker has a response on Westminster, but as of July 2022, London has 81% gigabit coverage. It is an urban area: it is easier to cover and easier to reach homes. Birmingham is at 93%. Those figures are up from just 14% and 21% respectively in November 2019.
We are looking at the long list of potential future bids for UNESCO world heritage sites. Many people will be surprised that York is not already on the list, for many of the reasons the hon. Lady outlines. I am happy to have a conversation with her. I do not think there is an expectation of financial support, but we should be able to provide support and advice.
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is working with the Canal & River Trust on the current review of the Government’s annual grant funding of the trust, as required by the 2012 grant agreement. The UK’s historic canals and waterways represent some of the finest examples of working industrial heritage in the world. They play an important role in the wider visitor economy and as a valuable green space for local communities. Because of their unique social, cultural and economic importance, the Canal & River Trust, an independent charity, benefited from £3.2 million.
The Government recently introduced a dual registration scheme to support touring trucks, because touring was completely forgotten during the Brexit negotiations. Although we do not have a Minister for this area, can somebody tell me how orchestras that own their own vehicles and do not benefit from the scheme for small-scale operators will be able to operate in this area, helping our creative industries?
A huge amount of work has gone into touring, as the hon. Gentleman knows. I am sure that he will be delighted with the recent announcement from Greece that it will, along with Spain and others, open up and allow our musicians and artisans to tour across the EU. Negotiations are taking place on a daily basis and problems are being resolved as we move forward.
The Hillingdon outdoor activities centre at Harefield in my constituency has given generations of children the opportunity to experience new sports. What plans does my right hon. Friend have to ensure that more children can benefit from such opportunities in future?
The Government encourage everyone, no matter their age, to be as active as they can be. We recognise that outdoor activities centres provide opportunities for all members of society to be active. Outdoor activities centres were supported through the pandemic by Government assistance, such as the furlough scheme, and there is a range of programmes, including the National Citizen Service and the £80 million green recovery challenge, with delivery partners that include outdoor activities centres.
I know the Secretary of State to be a great survivor. If she does survive, will she look again at her terrible war against public service broadcasting—Channel 4 and the BBC?
I am disappointed with the hon. Gentleman’s question. We have worked together for 18 years, and I have no war. I have two objectives: to ensure that both Channel 4 and the BBC survive and that they are fit for the ever-changing broadcasting landscape. With the greatest respect, I say to him that we need to be aware of how the landscape is changing at warp speed.
As has been mentioned, the Commonwealth games are fast approaching, allowing athletes from Wales to display their proud individualism under our great Union. Will my hon. Friend the Minister join me in congratulating Jacob Edwards from Olympus Gymnastics in Wrexham, and wishing him all the best as he represents Team Wales?
I am absolutely delighted to wish Jacob Edwards the best of luck. Of course, the nations compete separately in the Commonwealth games, so there is an England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales dynamic that we do not have in the Olympics. I wish all nations the best of luck.
The Secretary of State was very upbeat in her response to the Opposition Front Bencher, my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Withington (Jeff Smith), who asked about local authority leisure centres. They are in financial distress because of the rising costs of energy, and that is particularly true of those that run swimming pools. Is the Secretary of State saying that they are safe for the future, and if so, how is she securing that?
The cost of living challenge—in terms of energy costs, which we all face across all sectors—is a problem that the Government are addressing. We supported the leisure sector throughout the pandemic. Conversations are taking place with sectors about the problems that they face and the solutions that the Government can help to find.
Before I answer question 1, may I take the opportunity to pay tribute to my superb hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk)? He was quite simply an excellent Solicitor General, who took the difficult decision to resign from the Government this week. He was an absolute honour and pleasure to work with, a brilliant lawyer, a dedicated Member of Parliament and a shining example of the highest standards of public service.
Victims are not spectators. They have the right to be informed of their case and to be supported. That is why the Government are increasing funding for victim and witness support services to £192 million by 2024-25, which represents an uplift of 92% on core budgets in ’20-21. A large proportion of that funding has been allocated to police and crime commissioners to commission local victim support services. For ’22-23, the Ministry of Justice allocated about £5.2 million to the Greater Manchester PCC, to support services.
I am bound to welcome any extra resources to support victims. Nevertheless, victims and their families are still treated in an appalling fashion in too many cases. Cases that do not come to court, trials that are cracked and all the things that go wrong give victims the impression that they are simply an adjunct to the process. What is the Attorney General seriously going to do about it?
Well, I think that the Government have already acted in a significant way to put victims front and centre in our criminal justice system so that justice is secured for them. For 2021-22, the Ministry of Justice has provided £150 million for victims and witnesses alone, whether that is with more independent sexual violence advisers, who are game-changing in the victim experience—victims have told me personally how transformative the presence of an ISVA can be to their experience through the criminal justice system—or with the £20 million for local community-based sexual violence and domestic abuse services. I am very proud of the track record of this Government on supporting victims.
I join the Attorney General in her tribute to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), whose service was absolutely outstanding and exceptional. He departed his post with great honour and with the respect of this House, the profession and the judiciary.
I thank the Attorney General for what she says about victims. It is clear that the Government have done a great deal. However, I am sure she is aware that in the course of the Select Committee’s prelegislative scrutiny of the welcome draft Victims Bill, we have heard evidence that—as the hon. Member for Rochdale (Tony Lloyd) said—although there is good work, there is still patchiness in the provision of services for victims in many areas. The draft Victims Bill is a real opportunity to improve that and ensure a much more consistent approach. May I ask the Attorney General for an undertaking that the Government will look with care at the recommendations that we make as a result of that prelegislative scrutiny?
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the forthcoming Victims Bill. I am proud that the Government are introducing specific measures to transform victims’ experience of the criminal justice system. The Bill will pursue measures to improve victims’ experiences; we are looking at what more can be done to ensure that the victim’s voice is heard, both pre and post charge. I am particularly proud of the victims code, which came into force last year and is a real reflection of our commitment to victims.
May I say what an honour it is to be at this Dispatch Box facing the next Prime Minister as she awaits her call from the palace? It is a true honour, although colleagues will have noticed that in her list of leadership priorities last night the Attorney General had absolutely nothing to say about tackling the epidemic of crime in our country or ending the culture of lawbreaking in our Government, both of which have flourished on her watch. What she did say last night, however, was that we need to
“shrink the size of the state”.
I ask the Attorney General a very simple question: in percentage terms, what size of staffing cuts does she plan to make to the Crown Prosecution Service, and what will that mean to the record backlogs that our courts currently face?
I know that the right hon. Lady loves to degrade these question sessions to petty politics. I am not going to lower myself to her standards; I am here to talk about victims and what we are doing to secure justice for vulnerable people. I am very proud of the financial settlement that this Government have put into the CPS, increasing the number of prosecutors. Notably, in the past 12 months alone there have been 115 more RASSO-trained prosecutors in place to work specifically to support victims.
The Scottish Government are investing an extra £4 million this year to tackle violence against women and girls and offer greater support for victims’ needs. The Crown Office budget in Scotland is more than 40% higher than at the start of the last Parliament, supporting a range of improvements and modernisation processes. Does the Attorney General welcome that? Does she agree that more funding should be made available across the UK for greater access to justice for victims? Will she consider putting that in her prime ministerial manifesto?
The hon. Lady has raised some good points. Over the last two years, however, there has been a sea change in what the Government have been doing to tackle violence against women and girls. We now have more data, with localised data dashboards and scorecards shining a light on how different parts of the country are performing in relation to RASSO— rape and serious sexual offences—and indeed all crime, and how they are recovering from covid.
As I have said, I am proud of the victims code, which contains 12 rights for victims which will be enshrined in statute—for instance, a right for victims to be referred to the relevant support services, a right for victims to have access to the relevant information, and a right for victims to make a personal statement in court. Those are meaningful changes that this Government have introduced, and I am very proud of that.
I visited the CPS in Wales in February and was pleased to be able to speak to the hard-working and dedicated prosecutors about their work, which has also been praised in a recent report from the CPS inspectorate. I know that the hon. Member had a productive meeting with the Chief Crown Prosecutor for Wales recently, and I hope he will join me in commending the area for its strong performance in recovering from the backlog.
I thank the Attorney General for her answer, and it is good to see her in her place. I also pay tribute to Jenny Hopkins, the Chief Crown Prosecutor for Wales. As the Attorney General said, I met her recently, and she and her team are doing a terrific job. However, the court backlog in Mid Wales—rural Wales—is still quite spectacular. What is the Attorney General doing to deal with the problem?
The data, to which we now have unprecedented access, shows that when it comes to recovery from covid and court backlogs, the CPS in Wales and the local criminal justice board have performed exceptionally well. Huge resources have been put into court recovery, which is why the magistrates court backlog in the CPS Wales area was the first to recover from the impact of covid, with live caseload numbers falling to below pre-covid levels in December 2021.
I successfully personally presented a case at the Court of Appeal, sitting at Cardiff Crown court, which resulted in an increase from 13 years to 20 years and seven months, with an extended licence period of five years,. in the prison sentence given to Stephen Gibbs for an attempted murder. I was delighted and honoured to be in court in Wales.
We are united in our combined efforts, across Government, to improve performance for victims and increase the number of successful rape cases that go through our courts. Since we published our rape review action plan, there has been a steady increase in the number of rape charges, prosecutions and convictions quarter on quarter. We are closing the gap between complaints and convictions. Most notably, the number of convictions for rape offences is up by 27% on the number in 2019.
In Lancashire, our brilliant police and crime commissioner, Andrew Snowden, is funding a variety of projects to reduce the number of rape and serious sexual offences. They include dedicated specialist support services for victims, and Operation Night Guardian, which focuses on the night economy. How is the CPS in Lancashire working alongside our police and crime commissioner to improve the rates of conviction for these abhorrent crimes?
I am pleased to report that CPS North West is in an Operation Soteria area. Operation Soteria, which was introduced recently under this Government, is an ambitious joint police and CPS programme of work to transform the way in which rape prosecutions are handled. It will provide a renewed focus on investigating the suspect rather than the victim, and will ultimately create a new operating model for the investigation and prosecution of rape. We are pleased to be seeing the green shoots of progress nationally: the number of rape convictions has increased by 29% compared with the last quarter pre-covid.
I have a constituent whose sperm was used without his consent by his ex-partner so that she could become pregnant. The police have looked at the case and passed it to the CPS, which says that the law does not allow it to deal with the offence as any kind of sexual assault. Will my right hon. and learned Friend look at the law? This is not just “sperm theft”, but a form of sexual assault and a violation of my constituent’s rights.
My thoughts are very much with my hon. Friend’s constituent. That sounds like a very traumatic affair. I want to thank her for raising this case. I know that she has already received a reply from my Department setting out the reasons why the CPS could not proceed with this particular case. The CPS looked at all the facts of the case carefully and considered all the available offences under current legislation before determining that no offence had been committed under current law. I will raise the case with my colleagues in the Ministry of Justice so that they might look at the existing statutory framework.
Since the Supreme Court reversed the Roe v. Wade judgment, a 10-year-old girl in Ohio who is pregnant as a result of rape has been forced to travel to Indiana from her home state for an abortion, which she could not get locally. Will the Attorney General condemn the appalling cruelty that has resulted, and will result, from the Supreme Court ruling? Will she also condemn the Conservative MPs who celebrated it on social media?
I do not think it is the right of a UK Government Minister to comment on a judicial decision in another jurisdiction such as the United States. That is a matter for the United States Supreme Court and the United States Congress to resolve. What I am focused on is the experience of victims in Britain and Wales and how we can improve our criminal justice system. That is why I am very proud of the achievements that we have secured. I am very proud that, for example, the CPS prosecuted 430,000 defendants last year on a whole suite of offences, including 69 alleged terrorists, 33 of whom were convicted, and 19,000 serious violence offences, with a conviction rate of almost 75%. Those are the statistics, the facts and the policies on which I am focused.
Is the Attorney-General proud of her achievements when the delay between offence and completion in rape cases is now more than 1,000 days and there are 50 UK Crown courts with delays of more than three years and 18 with delays of more than four years? Does she agree with the Victims Commissioner that these delays are appalling? Could she take time out from her leadership campaign to look at bringing in pre-recorded evidence and cross-examination in all rape cases in all Crown courts now?
Actually, what we are seeing as a result of pioneering operations such as Soteria is a closer collaboration between police and prosecutor. What we know works is when a prosecutor has a good, clear case strategy, has a grip of the case and has properly identified the challenges, and when the police are supportive and involved in the investigation. Close collaboration, early investigative advice and support for the victim is what will cut down the timelines and ensure that victims get justice in a swifter way. That is why I am very proud of the section 28 roll-out.
The last time we debated this issue in this Chamber, the Attorney General told me that
“any allegation of domestic abuse or sexual assault on victims is horrendous. On no account does anyone in this Government condone that behaviour.”—[Official Report, 26 May 2022; Vol. 715, c. 414.]
So why did the Attorney General not call for the Prime Minister’s resignation when she found out that he had turned a blind eye to an allegation of sexual assault by one of his own Ministers, but did call for his resignation to launch her bizarre leadership campaign live on TV last night? Does that not just sum up how she has debased the office she holds and put political ambition before the rule of law?
The hon. Gentleman could have asked about domestic abuse victims; he could have asked about RASSO; he could have asked about crime prevention and keeping the British people safe. Instead, he used his opportunity to score cheap political points—[Interruption.]
Order. Front Benchers should not be shouting after asking the question. Let’s get this done and move on.
When it comes to domestic abuse, our landmark Domestic Abuse Act 2021 is strengthening protection for victims and ensuring that perpetrators feel the full force of the law. It includes the first legal definition of domestic abuse, it improves support for victims in the courts, it introduces new offences and it strengthens the legislation precisely for victims of domestic abuse. It is a pity he did not want to talk about that.
We published the review of disclosure and the amended disclosure guidelines in May to deliver improvements for police, prosecutors and victims of crime. The new guidelines feature an annex on data protection that will ease the burden on police handling of digital material and will leave the police more time to be on the street, fighting and investigating crime. I am pleased with how the guide- lines have been received by the profession throughout.
My hon. Friend raises a real priority for the Government. These guidelines will mean fewer unnecessary intrusions into a victim’s private life and more interactions with victims to help them understand the process. All of this will mean that victims are more engaged, there is less attrition and the process is swifter but just as effective. It is unfortunate that some Labour Members have promoted an incorrect understanding of what these guidelines mean.
There have been no prosecutions by either the Serious Fraud Office or the Crown Prosecution Service of frauds connected to covid-19 contracts awarded by the Department of Health and Social Care. However, I can neither confirm nor deny whether the Serious Fraud Office is investigating any frauds relating to those contracts. This Government rightly took swift action at the height of the pandemic and, thanks to the excellent work of this Government, including Government lawyers, we have successfully defended the majority of our coronavirus-related litigation.
The secrecy on VIP lane contracts is emblematic of the loss of trust and transparency in this Government. Over the last 48 hours, Conservative Members have repeatedly stated the importance of integrity and honesty. As Prime Minister, will the Attorney General finally lift the veil of secrecy, publish the full details of VIP lane contacts and refer the matter to a committee or authorities, as necessary?
A lot of covid-related litigation has gone through our courts, and there has been a lot of scrutiny of the Government’s decision making and actions during the pandemic. I am pleased to say that the Government were successful in the majority of cases, with our decision making being upheld and found to be lawful.
Before I call Barry Sheerman, I note that he wishes to raise the case of his late constituent Ms Katelyn Dawson, who is the subject of an open and adjourned inquest. I am exercising the discretion given to the Chair in relation to matters that are sub judice to allow reference to the case as part of the question and answer.
I am aware of this tragic case in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, and I take this opportunity to offer my deepest condolences to Katelyn’s family and friends. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his tireless campaigning, over many years, on all road safety issues. He has been a leader in this field.
Like the hon. Gentleman, I recognise the devastating impact that fatal road traffic accidents and collisions can have on families and victims, which is why, under the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, this Government increased the maximum penalty to life imprisonment for the offences of causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs. Last year, the CPS charged more than 650 defendants in relation to fatal road traffic accidents, bringing the total number of charges back in line with pre-pandemic levels.
I have been around long enough to be one of the people who introduced the seatbelt legislation that banned children from travelling unrestrained in cars.
I was not going to talk about specifics, Mr Speaker, although you were very kind to mention the case in my constituency. I am very worried that, across the country, an increasing number of families have had a family member killed by a driver and then, because a lot of people are able to hire very expensive lawyers who can argue things like automatism—that they were not in control of their body or faculties at the time of the accident—the CPS is increasingly frightened into not prosecuting. That is my worry. Can we do something about it?
It is tragic; there are simply no words for the situation that the hon. Gentleman sets out. Ultimately, fairness sits at the heart of our justice system. Therefore, the same threshold is used for all offences—deciding whether to prosecute in fatal road traffic cases or murder cases. That is set out in “The Code for Crown Prosecutors” and has remained the same since the CPS was formed in the 1980s. It sets out a two-stage test, with which many people here will be familiar. A case will proceed only where both stages of the test are met. It always comes down to the evidence and the public interest, and I am very happy to talk to him about what more can be done, operationally or in the state of the law, to remedy the problem he identifies.
Before we start the urgent question, I wish to make a short statement. Clearly, this is a day when there are lots of important developments happening outside the Chamber, and the situation is fast-moving. However, it is important that the House is kept informed of developments in a timely and authoritative way. There are legitimate questions requiring answers about the functioning of government over this turbulent period, which is why I have granted the UQ we are about to hear. I remind all Members that conventions and courtesies are here for a purpose: they allow us to discuss the most important issues without resorting to personal attacks. That is why I encourage all Members to remember that our constituents are watching events closely. Let us focus on the big issues, not the personality. I call the deputy leader of the Labour party, Angela Rayner, to ask the UQ.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons Chamber(Urgent Question):To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, if he will make a statement on the functioning of Government.
Mr Speaker, as the House will be aware, it is widely reported that the Prime Minister is about to make an important statement shortly. I can confirm that it is correct that the Prime Minister will speak shortly. I cannot pre-empt the Prime Minister’s statement, and the House and the nation will hear more imminently. In the meantime, the business of Government continues, supported in the usual way by our excellent civil service. There will continue to be Ministers of the Crown in place, including in all great offices of state. We must continue to serve our country, constituents and the general public first and foremost. It is our duty now to make sure the people of this country have a functioning Government. That is true now more than ever.
The civil service is the foundation on which all Governments function. The civil service continues to support across all Government Departments, and the country can be assured that that will always remain the case—I have spoken this morning to the Cabinet Secretary to that effect. Any transitional arrangements have always been made to allow for the business of Government to continue. There are constitutional mechanisms in place to make sure that that can happen. We await the Prime Minister’s statement, but the House should be reassured that the Government continue to function in the meantime. Any necessary ministerial vacancies can and will be filled; other Secretaries of State can make decisions if necessary. There is a rich reserve of people who are both dedicated and talented, and who remain dedicated to serving our country and their constituents. Calmness and professionalism are now required. Our focus now is fully on the stability and continuity of Government. Now is the time to serve in the interests of our country, as it always is, and of our constituents during the period ahead.
I hate to break it to the Minister, but we do not have a functioning Government. It would be good news for the country that the Prime Minister is to announce his resignation; he was always unfit for office. He has overseen scandal, fraud and waste on an industrial scale, but the chaos of the last three days is more than just petty Tory infighting. These actions have serious consequences for the running of our country. In the middle of the deepest cost of living crisis for a generation, with families unable to make ends meet, a dangerous war in Europe threatening our borders and a possible trade crisis in Northern Ireland, Britain has no functioning Government: no Ministers in place to pass legislation; and Bill Committees cancelled with no one to run them.
Can the Minister confirm whether the 11 Committees due to take place today will go ahead? Without Ministers, what are the arrangements to pass primary and secondary legislation, and who will answer oral questions? How will this Government continue to be democratically held to account? With the new Education Secretary resigning after 36 hours, which must be a record, there is not a single Member in the Department for Education. What does that mean for children taking their exams? What does that mean for the impending childcare cost crisis?
Our British national security is at risk, too, not least because the Prime Minister thinks that he can stay on. With the departure of the Northern Ireland Secretary, only two Ministers are left able to sign security warrants to approve secret service use of sensitive powers. What contingency plans are in place to deal with emergencies in the short term?
The Prime Minister has said that he will stay on as caretaker. How many more months of chaos does this country have to endure? With dozens of ministerial posts unfilled, who on earth will join the Prime Minister’s Government now and how will a half-empty Cabinet run the country until October? Mr Speaker, they will try desperately to change the person at the top, but it is the same old Tory party in government.
I cannot pre-empt the Prime Minister’s statement. The House and the nation will hear more very shortly, but Government and the civil service will continue to function in the meantime. The Business of the House statement will be made shortly, and Members can ask questions of the Leader of the House about the business of this place. The House will continue to function, and Government business will continue to function. Others Secretaries of State can deal with issues for other Departments, constitutionally and legally, in necessary circumstances.
Without wishing to pre-empt the Prime Minister’s statement, does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that he can be proud of a large number of achievements of his Government? May I invite my right hon. and learned Friend to pre-empt the Opposition by making it clear that Margaret Thatcher, David Cameron, Tony Blair and Theresa May all left office and were succeeded by new leaders and new Prime Ministers without a general election and that the ship of state sails on?
As I came into the Chamber, we were at 59 resignations and counting. A remarkable amount of leadership was shown by the junior ministerial ranks rather than by many of the Cabinet. I have been longing, since I was elected, for a Cabinet of remainers, but not necessarily of the kind that we have seen, clinging like limpets to a rock.
Today’s announcement from the Prime Minister of his intention to resign comes after two years and 348 days in office, which, by supreme irony, is the same number of days as Neville Chamberlain spent in office as Prime Minister. It is a Prime Minister who achieved Brexit under false pretences, purely as part of his game to achieve entry to Downing Street. In that two years and 348 days, he has left behind a trail of political chaos and economic destruction, leaving any reputation that the UK might have retained as a reliable international partner that stands up for the international rules-based order trampled into the dust. We regularly in Scotland have to put up with patronising lectures about how well our Government are performing, yet in Westminster we have a Department for Education with no Education Ministers, six police forces in England under special measures and a Government who seem utterly paralysed and unable to deal with the major issues of the day. The idea that the Prime Minister can stay on and preside over this until the autumn is utterly risible. How long can this farce be allowed to continue, and how is it right that 300 Tory MPs will get to choose the next Prime Minister over that time while denying the right of 5.5 million Scots to choose their own future?
The Government and the civil service will continue to function in the meantime, as they always have done and as they have done historically.
I thank the Prime Minister for his great service to our nation and to the people of Ukraine. I think people will rue the day he was forced to resign. Is there not a lot to be said for having a smaller Cabinet, fewer Ministers and hardly any parliamentary private secretaries? Can we have a pilot to show how successful that will be?
My hon. Friend makes a perfectly interesting point, but it is somewhat outside the range of my responsibilities.
I have a list here of all the resignations from Government. I will not read them out, but there are plenty of tasty quotes in there that will be of use later on. The Minister cannot sensibly argue that we have a functioning Government when this number of people are missing. There are no Ministers to do statutory instrument Committees and legislation even as we speak. What is the way forward? He cannot just blather at the Dispatch Box when the Government are disintegrating around him.
The business of the House of Commons will continue. There are Ministers to continue in place. I cannot pre-empt the Prime Minister’s statement, but I have spoken to the Cabinet Secretary today and the Government and civil service will continue to function in their public duty.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend and have great sympathy for the position he finds himself in. He and I have had to take some pretty rough cases in court in the past, and he has drawn a few short straws recently in that regard—and done so with dignity, if I may say so. May I ask him just to take this away? Whatever one’s views on the Prime Minister, and while I accept the importance of the continuity of the Government and the fact that there is no need for a general election at all—there is plenty of precedent for that—will my right hon. and learned Friend take away the serious question mark that many have about how long a caretaker Prime Minister can remain in place when there is real concern about whether the Government can be fully and effectively back? Might it not be in everybody’s interest to speed up the transition as much as possible?
I thank my hon. Friend for his kind remarks. He is right, of course, that a general election is not constitutionally necessary; the Prime Minister was before the Liaison Committee yesterday and said as much. We will await events, but I cannot pre-empt the Prime Minister’s statement.
I am delighted to hear the Minister speaking positively about the role of the civil service. That contrasts rather well with the way the Government in recent years have done nothing but traduce and undermine its position. I must say that the Prime Minister cannot remain as a caretaker. That is just putting the bull in charge of the china shop. This is not all about Ministers and politicians; it is about our constituents and the public services on which they depend and which, for months now, this Government have been unable to deliver properly for them. That is why they all need to go.
The substantive matter that the right hon. Gentleman mentions is not a matter for me, but I will say that Ministers on this Bench and in this House will serve the Crown and this country, as they always have.
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his statement. Without wishing to pre-empt the Prime Minister, I am glad he has finally come to his senses and will be making his statement shortly. I am very sad that in the past 48 hours so many right hon. and hon. Friends have felt the need to resign from Government. If those people will not serve this Prime Minister, may I ask my right hon. and learned Friend to convey to the Prime Minister that it will not be tenable for him to continue as caretaker if he cannot fill the ministerial appointments he needs to?
It is a great relief that we will no longer have a Prime Minister who keeps on saying things that subsequently turn out to be untrue. Will the Minister reassure us that the change will take place in hours, not months, and does he recognise that effective democracy depends on Ministers telling the truth?
I can only say that the Prime Minister will make a statement shortly.
The hollow resignations by those who enthusiastically supported decisions such as voting for Owen Paterson show how they were unfit to serve as Ministers in the beginning. But the governance of this country cannot be allowed to fail, so when are these vacancies going to be filled? They must be filled immediately and we cannot allow decisions to be made by other Secretaries of State from other Departments. The country deserves better than that.
The Government will continue to function, and I have spoken to the head of the civil service to that effect.
The Independent reports that the PM and Tory Ministers resigning are entitled to £420,000 of severance pay. At the same time we have a Government gripped by paralysis and we have a cost of living crisis. Can the Minister confirm that they will be forfeiting their right to this, because we do not reward failure?
The matter that the hon. Lady refers to is set in statute, so it is a matter for the law, and that law would have been passed by this House.
It was an enormous honour to serve as a Minister in the Home Office until yesterday, tackling violence against women and girls. I know that is a cause that all Members of this House care deeply about. While we are discussing these matters, victims of rape, sexual assault, stalking and spiking continue to deserve justice and they will continue to be victims of crime. Will my right hon. Friend give his continued support to the vital work of Operation Soteria and the rape review. Will he join me in putting on record my thanks to Detective Chief Constable Maggie Blyth, Chief Constable Sarah Crew, Assistant Commissioner Louisa Rolfe and many other serving senior police officers who I know will capably continue to drive forward this work? Will he also thank the civil servants in the Home Office who I know will continue to do this essential work?
I understand it is good to get that on the record but there are a lot of other people I have got to try and get in.
I will do as my hon. Friend says. I commend her for her championing of this very important area. The rape review and the work thereof should of course continue.
There have been times occasionally when Prime Ministers have been temporarily incapacitated. There has never been a period in British history where a Government have been incapacitated across every Department of State. We have just heard how the secret services are being undermined by the current situation, putting national security at risk. At what point are the Government going to actually start functioning again?
The Government are functioning. I have already mentioned to the House that the great offices of state are still in place. The hon. Gentleman refers to our security and intelligence services. The Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary are in place.
What provisions are being put in place for the continuing operation of the EU-UK Partnership Council and the specialised committees over the coming months?
I think my hon. Friend knows that I attended a meeting of the EU-UK Partnership Council in Brussels recently. The functions of Government, including in the international sphere, will continue apace.
Before the House—before both Houses—there are two major Bills affecting Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Protocol Bill is about the Prime Minister’s own decision, while the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill is very much the now-resigned Secretary of State’s province. Can we have absolute clarity, at this critical moment in the history of Northern Ireland and its relations with both the rest of the UK and Ireland, that we will get some sense from this Government about how we take these important matters forward?
I am particularly conscious of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, to which I think the hon. Gentleman is referring. The Leader of the House will be doing the usual business questions session soon in this House.
This latest Conservative party psychodrama only emphasises what many of us already know: the UK is a failed state. This Government have shown contempt for devolution. The Prime Minister’s successor will treat the electorate of Wales with the same disdain, and in this Palace the circus will roll on. Does the Paymaster General not recognise that surely now is the time for a new constitutional settlement for these islands?
The right hon. Lady frequently traduces this country. I disagree with her—I could not disagree with her more strongly. She has a separatist agenda, of course, and she wishes for the country to split, but in my view this country is the greatest country on earth.
On the anniversary of 7/7, security is of paramount importance to all in this House. With no Security Minister, a depleted Cabinet and a Home Office that was struggling prior to this chaos, what assurances can the Paymaster General give us that the intelligence agencies are receiving all the full ministerial and legal engagement and sign-off in a timely way to keep us all safe?
I cannot discuss the security arrangements of this country from the Dispatch Box, but the Secretary of State for the Home Department is in place and is responsible for the arrangements appertaining to the security services of this country.
I suggest that the Paymaster General look up the meaning of “functioning”, because his Government are not it. Will the Paymaster General confirm whether the now former Secretary of State for Education, the right hon. Member for Chippenham (Michelle Donelan) will be getting the standard severance package for Secretaries of State of three months’ salary for a job that she did for just 36 hours?
Matters such as pay and remuneration are set in statute and are not a matter for me.
The Members of Parliament who have eventually forced out the Prime Minister and who blindly stood by him during the no confidence vote have not miraculously found their principles or their voices, but are doing so out of their own naked self-interest. Does the Paymaster General agree that a damaged and failing Prime Minister should go immediately and not hang around like a bad smell until the Tory conference in the autumn?
I cannot pre-empt the Prime Minister’s statement, but the business of Government will continue functioning as normal.
It is good to see the Paymaster General here—one of the last remaining living crew on the ghost ship HMG. In an effort to assist the burden of the skeleton crew who remain, we would like to arrange for the signing of a section 30 order to begin the process of moving some of the functions of government to a fully functioning set of Ministers in Holyrood.
No matter who forms the Government of this country, the Union of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is of paramount importance, as the people of Scotland themselves decided in the referendum in 2014.
The current situation is clearly unsustainable. As we heard earlier from my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner), it is damaging crucial decision making and harming our reputation abroad. Could the Paymaster General please take this back to the Prime Minister, urge an urgent resolution and inform the House as soon as possible?
Clearly the idea of the Prime Minister continuing as a caretaker will be worrying many people, but it is interesting to hear from the BBC that MPs are privately briefing that they are worried, perhaps half-jokingly, that the PM might take us to war to avoid leaving office. What will be done to ensure that the Opposition can hold to account a caretaker Prime Minister who has lost the faith of the country and his Government?
I recommend to the hon. Lady that she does not listen to gossip and rumour. The fact of the matter is that responsible government in this country will continue.
With the resignation this morning of the Secretary of State for Education, following that of her entire Commons ministerial team, the Education Committee did not even have the chance to ask about her plans. It has become abundantly clear to almost the entire population that for months, if not a few years, the only functioning cabinet in No. 10 Downing Street has been the drinks cabinet. When will the remnants of the Government Front Bench team accept that they have been in collective denial for far too long?
I think the hon. Gentleman asked a rhetorical question, but I will say that the Government will continue to function as the country would expect.
I am looking at many Tory MPs in the Lobby and everywhere using the word “sadness”, but each and every one of them upheld the Prime Minister and let him carry on. He should have resigned when partygate happened, when Durhamgate happened, when his ethics adviser resigned—he should have resigned a long time ago. Each and every one of them kept him here and now they are trying to take the moral high ground when he is finally on his way out. I will not feel sorry for them. Mr Speaker, how can the Opposition hold Ministers to account when there is not a governing Government?
The people who put the Prime Minister in place are the 14 million people who voted for the Conservative party at the general election.
This is one of the greatest crises that any of us can remember. In the national interest, surely we should work across the Benches to sort it out, even for the short period until recess. I do not want any laughter, but I have a great deal of experience in education. There is no Education Minister, so on a short-term basis, I would be happy to help. [Laughter.] Unpaid! Our constituents would want us to work together across the Benches, to forget these petty politics and to get the Government working again.
I thank the hon. Gentleman, but his services are not required, because there are a plethora of talented and dedicated individuals on the Government Benches who will serve in the Government.
For many people in Scotland, the outgoing Prime Minister is Westminster personified: backward, unfit for purpose, delusional and in disgrace. Just like the Union that he is the Minister for, the Prime Minister is isolated, broken and bereft of ideas. His time is up. The party is over. Can the Minister tell me whether there will be a leaving do in No. 10 tonight? We will be raising a glass in Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill.
I do not think a serious answer is expected to that frivolous question.
Given that a majority of Government MPs now say that the Prime Minister lacks the integrity and honesty required for that post, can the Minister explain what the basis is for the Prime Minister to stay in post for a further three months?
I recommend that the hon. Gentleman awaits the statement that is due from the Prime Minister shortly.
The Minister will be aware that our constituents contact us about extremely important matters when they have explored every other avenue to get a resolution to their problems, and we then write to Ministers on their behalf. I am concerned on their behalf about what this situation means, not only for the casework that we have already sent to Ministers, some of which is of extreme importance for people’s health and survival, but for future casework. It is untenable that the Prime Minister should stay on until the autumn, so will the Minister please explain how we can have a situation where there is no functioning Government but the Prime Minister thinks that he can stay on?
There is a functioning Government and a functioning civil service, which will continue to do its duty in supporting the operation and functionality of the state as it always has.
The Government are telling us not to worry about whether a Government elected with a majority of 80 two years ago can carry on functioning because we have the civil service, but levelling up is a Government priority. The Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill is before the House of Commons at the moment. If the Government are functioning, can the Minister tell us whether the Committee is going ahead in 26 minutes’ time?
There is a business of the House statement in the usual way, and the hon. Member will be able to ask that question of the Leader of the House of Commons.
The Minister speaks about responsible government, yet we have had nearly three years of totally irresponsible government. My constituents are suffering massively. Surely the moral thing to do is not to look to the constitution, but to go to the country, call a general election and let the people of this country decide—not just on the Prime Minister, but on the rotten lot of bankrupt Government we have had for the past two and a half years since the last election. This is not about the constitution; it is about what the people of this country need. That is responsible government, and they are not going to get it from his side, even with a change of Prime Minister.
The business of government will continue functioning as the public would expect it to do. I reject the characterisation that the hon. Member makes, and I suspect that the vast majority of the general public in this country would also reject that characterisation.
The Prime Minister should be making the statement in this House, frankly, not anywhere else, so that we could question him about the functioning of government. I think, Mr Speaker, that you would prefer that as well. Let me just ask the Minister this. There are two major crises at the moment: one is the cost of living crisis, which is facing many millions of families; and the other is the situation in Ukraine and across NATO. There is a real possibility that a Government might have to deploy further troops in the next few months, for proper reasons. A caretaker Government cannot do that—it simply cannot: the rules forbid them from doing that. Yet I fear that this Prime Minister—the disgraced, deselected Prime Minister—will be more dangerous in these next three months, if he is allowed to have another three months, than he has been in the last three years. Can the Minister please make sure that we have a proper Government soon—in other words, before the summer recess?
We have a proper Government, and proper government continues. I have to say to the hon. Gentleman that he talks about the cost of living and Ukraine, but I have hardly heard him or his hon. Friends speak of those subjects over the past six months. They have mostly been talking about personalities. It is this Government who have been getting on with the business of representing the United Kingdom in international fora and have led the way on Ukraine and, when it comes to dealing with the global cost of living crisis, having been doing that too.
Wow! What was that response to this urgent question? Is the Minister tired of propping up this Prime Minister and defending the indefensible? Minister, where was your letter? Did it get lost with your backbone?
Today, it appears that a number of Bill Committees on issues of the utmost importance will be cancelled—from national security to levelling up, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) has raised, and tackling fraud—because there are no Ministers to attend them. The Minister says that the business of the House will continue, but it will not. It obviously is not doing so if Committees are being cancelled. In no other workplace would such crucial work go undone. Can the Minister explain why his Prime Minister and why his party think this is acceptable?
I say to the hon. Lady, as I have said before, that the legislative business of this House is a matter for the Leader of the House of Commons, who holds a Cabinet position and is in place. He is shortly to have his weekly question-and-answer session in this House, and she will be able to take advantage of that.
The Prime Minister has brought his office into disrepute. Our country should not have to put up with it any longer. Will the Prime Minister be leaving No. 10 this weekend?
The hon. Member will need to wait for the Prime Minister’s statement later today.
The Times reports this morning of Downing Street being like a bunker with gallows humour. This is no surprise really, given the Prime Minister’s track record. The Prime Minister is now set on staying in post until after the summer. If this happens, is the Minister concerned about what further damage the Prime Minister will do?
The hon. Member will need to wait for the Prime Minister’s statement later today; I cannot pre-empt what that statement will be.
Away from this place, our constituents are waiting for answers from this Government. My constituents Lisa and Mark Rutherford and Caroline Curry had their precious children taken from them in the Manchester Arena terror attack. Due to archaic legislation, they cannot register their deaths. The Ministry of Justice advised that an answer on a possible change to that legislation was imminent. Given that the Government have collapsed, who will give them an answer and when?
I am very sorry to hear of the appalling bereavement suffered by the hon. Lady’s constituents; it is an unimaginable loss. I would like her to convey my sympathies, and the sympathies of the entire Government, for that. In answer to her question, the functioning of government continues: the civil service supports Ministers in place, Ministers are in place to support the functioning of necessary government, and that will continue.
May I point out to the Minister that we do in fact have functioning government within the United Kingdom: we have a functioning Government in Edinburgh and we have a functioning Government in the Senedd in Cardiff? Where Government does not function across these islands, in Westminster and in Northern Ireland, they have one thing in common: the dead, malign hand of this Tory Government. What possible confidence can the people of these islands—the people who want to stay in this broken Union and the millions of us who do not—have in who is coming next, because they all stood by and watched what this Prime Minister did for six months or more?
It is the Westminster Government who represent this country, and the Union of the United Kingdom will continue apace despite the hon. Gentleman’s opposition to it.
The Minister praises the civil service while planning to cut 91,000 of them. I echo his praise, but they cannot be expected to cover for the lack of Ministers or, for that matter, for the British people’s lack of confidence in this dysfunctional Government. So will he say whether the missing Ministers will be replaced, and does he accept that they are all tainted by the prime Minister’s disgrace and that what is needed is a fresh start?
Ministerial appointments are not a matter for me, but the functioning of government will continue apace.
In 18 minutes I am due to sit on the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill Committee, as set out on the Order Paper. The Leader of the House will not have been before the House at that point, there are no Ministers, there is no Secretary of State, and there is a Prime Minister in office but not in government, so can the Paymaster General let me know whether that Committee is going ahead—now in 17 minutes—and when it is due to recommence if it is not going ahead then?
I am unable to answer the hon. Member’s question. The Committees of this House will continue in the normal way of business.
The majority of those who left the Government have referred to the Prime Minister’s lack of integrity, honour, honesty and competence. They surely cannot return to work for such a man, even on a temporary basis. To get a functioning Government, we need a full set of Ministers and we need a swift transition. Will the Paymaster General at least convey that message to No. 10 and to his Cabinet colleagues?
It is up to each individual to decide how best to serve in Government or not, and the functioning of Government can and will continue. Having spoken this morning to the Cabinet Secretary, I can say that there are a multitude of Ministers and a plethora of items on agendas that will continue to be dealt with, with the support of the civil service, as I have said.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
(Urgent Question): To ask the Minister to make a statement on the meeting between the Prime Minister and the former KGB agent Alexander Lebedev at the height of the Skripal crisis.
Alexander Lebedev is a well-known former KGB officer and a former owner of the London Evening Standard newspaper. Yesterday, the Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee, in response to questions from the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson), that he had met Mr Lebedev
“on a very few occasions”.
I understand that the Prime Minister also confirmed that he had met Mr Lebedev without officials present and that he had subsequently reported those meetings to officials as required. I do not have any information about the content of any discussions that may or may not have been held with Mr Lebedev.
All Government Ministers are made fully aware of their responsibilities to safeguard national security and sensitive information. It has been a long-standing policy of all Governments of all colours not to comment on intelligence or national security-sensitive matters, as to do so could jeopardise the very security that it is the first duty of Government to protect. In response to the Salisbury attack, the UK expelled 23 Russian intelligence officers and significantly strengthened our defences against Russian interference in the United Kingdom.
We sought this urgent question despite the meltdown in the Government because it goes to the heart of our national security. Yesterday, the Prime Minister admitted to the Chairs of the Home Affairs Committee and the Public Accounts Committee that in April 2018 as Foreign Secretary he met the former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev—the father of Lord Lebedev—in Italy without any officials and without any security. He went there straight from a NATO meeting, where the top item on the agenda was Russia, at the height of the Salisbury poisoning crisis after Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia had been attacked and before Charlie Rowley and Dawn Sturgess had been exposed to the remaining Novichok. That was a chemical weapon attack by Russian agents on British soil that targeted two British residents, had life-changing effects for a British police officer and killed a British citizen.
On 20 May this year, Alexander Lebedev was sanctioned by the Canadian Government—a Five Eyes partner of the UK—for being one of the 14 identified people who
“have directly enabled Vladimir Putin’s senseless war in Ukraine and bear responsibility for the pain and suffering of the people of Ukraine.”
The UK has not yet sanctioned him.
The charges against the Prime Minister are about not just a lack of integrity but a complete disregard for basic national security and the patriotic interests of the country. Those charges lie not just with him but with all those who have enabled him and covered up for him on this issue. Did the Foreign Office, the Home Office and the Security Service know about the meeting in advance? Was a detailed record made of the meeting after the event—there are rumours that the Foreign Secretary was too drunk to properly remember? Is that true? There are also rumours that Alexander Lebedev was trying to arrange a phone call from the meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov. Is that true? Did that phone call happen? The record of Ministers’ interests says that the Foreign Secretary accepted hospitality in Italy for himself and a guest, but he travelled home alone. Who was that guest? Did that put him in a compromising position?
Yesterday, the Prime Minister referred to several meetings with Alexander Lebedev without officials. When were the others? Were any of them while he was Prime Minister? The shadow Security Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), has been asking for confirmation that that meeting happened for months, so why have Home Office Ministers, Cabinet Office Ministers and Foreign Office Ministers all been covering up? It is bad enough covering up for parties and breaking the law, but covering up over national security is a total disgrace. It puts all our safety and security at risk. It is not just the Prime Minister but the whole Government who are letting the country down.
I do not expect the Minister to take everybody. This session will be short, because we have a lot of other business.
I take issues of our national security extremely seriously, which is why I am at the Dispatch Box today. Day after day, Ministers in the Government, especially Foreign Office Ministers, make decisions that affect the safety and security of UK citizens; in the case of Foreign Office Ministers, especially UK citizens overseas.
On sanctions, the UK has introduced world-leading sanctions packages since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine—that is over 12,000 individuals. I cannot comment on any further sanctions, as we never comment on sanctions in advance, but I can comment that, since 24 February, I, like other Foreign Office Ministers, have carried out my duties in signing off a number of those sanctions.
The last 48 hours of this hapless Government have been quite disgusting to any decent person who has been submitting to the spectacle of it. And the last few years have not been much cop either: somebody who is deeply inappropriate for public office, not least the highest office, aided, abetted and enabled by the venality and cowardice of people who are now falling over themselves to compete for sanctimony and hypocrisy.
We on the SNP Benches do not celebrate the departure of the Prime Minister—like getting rid of a headache, we are just glad he is going—but his toxic legacy will live on after him. We will all need to deal with the consequences of this disastrous Administration: his toxic legacy on inflicting his disastrous Brexit on us all; asleep at the wheel over climate change; allowing the cost of living crisis to accumulate, which all our citizens are dealing with; inaction on climate change; and breaking international law over Northern Ireland. We will all of us be dealing with that thereafter.
I am glad to hear the Minister takes national security seriously. I do not doubt it—
Order. First of all, the hon. Gentleman’s contribution is meant to be relevant to what we are debating. I have had nothing yet and you have just used your full minute. I will give you a couple of seconds to actually put a question.
Forgive me, Mr Speaker. I am taking this stuff really seriously and I am disgusted.
I do, Mr Speaker. I am trying to chime with the mood of the House, rather than the Government.
The Minister takes national security seriously, but it is quite obvious from the Prime Minister’s admission yesterday that he has serious questions to answer. I appreciate that the Minister is perhaps not in a position to give a proper answer, but will she at least allow the prospect of a police investigation into the Prime Minister and the influence that Russian individuals have over him? His toxic legacy over national security cannot be something he can evade responsibility for.
I would say that—I will follow up as well to the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper)—the Prime Minister did commit yesterday that he would follow up on the question from the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North at the Liaison Committee. He did commit to that. I have asked whether there is more detailed information on the discussions, but I do not have any information about the content of those discussions at this time.
Mr Speaker, I think the Minister inadvertently misled us earlier, because the Prime Minister yesterday—I was at the Liaison Committee—did not say what she said. He did not say—to the best of my memory, anyway—that he had notified other officials. If he had notified other officials, surely, as the Minister would understand, that meeting would have appeared on the transparency records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for April 2018 and it is not there. So, either she has misled us inadvertently today, or the Prime Minister did so, perhaps more deliberately, previously.
Obviously, I was not at the Liaison Committee yesterday. I was, as you may know, Mr Speaker, giving a ministerial statement on fast-tracking the ratification of Finland and Sweden joining NATO, another measure that is absolutely crucial to our safety and security here and, later in the Chamber, ensuring that we passed the funding. On the question, I repeat what I said in my opening words. It is my understanding that the Prime Minister confirmed that he had met Mr Lebedev without officials present and that he subsequently reported those meetings to officials. That is my understanding and that is what I have been told. If that is not an accurate reflection, I apologise. But this is not me misleading; that is what I was told.
According to intelligence reports that I have seen, a serving FSB officer reported in 2017, “Aleksandr Lebedev is considered by the FSB to be an important asset”. More recently, he has significantly expanded his businesses in occupied Crimea; pleaded with the Kremlin for economic help for occupied Crimea; and was revealed as the indirect owner of a company called Energomash, which supplies the Russian nuclear programme. How is it possible for the Prime Minister to stay in office if he is conspiring with an agent of the Russian state?
As the right hon. Member knows, I cannot comment on any potential future sanctions that may be introduced, because we never do that in advance. I cannot give any more comment on the particular individual that he is discussing.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) asked me to be more clear about what the Prime Minister said at the Liaison Committee. I have just been passed a note: apparently, the Prime Minister says that he thinks he mentioned this meeting to officials. [Interruption.] I am reporting what I have been told.
It is deeply unsatisfactory that the Minister has come to the House so ill-prepared, because the matter has been doggedly pursued by my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) for many months. Does the Minister agree that, in the light of the admissions that were made at the Liaison Committee yesterday, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Prime Minister—if he is about to resign—to try to stay as a caretaker Prime Minister? These very serious allegations reflect on his ability to keep this country safe.
The Prime Minister is expected to make a statement shortly to the people of this country and I obviously cannot comment on that in advance. I do hear what the right hon. Lady says.
Just for my clarification, the Minister previously said that we will be getting something in this House. Are we now saying that it will be to the people and not to the House?
I understand that the Prime Minister is intending to make a press statement to the people of this country.
“Not satisfactory”—I admire your magnificent understatement, Mr Speaker.
Surely this admission illustrates why this man cannot remain as Prime Minister, even as a caretaker. He is simply not to be trusted. I have seen four other Prime Ministers stand at the Government Dispatch Box in my time in the House, and I cannot imagine any one of them becoming involved in an enterprise such as this. The relationship with Russia goes right through this Government. We were told four months ago that we would get the report on the golden visa schemes, but we still do not have it. When will that report be published? Why has it been delayed?
What we have heard is truly horrifying. It is deeply disturbing and worrying that the Prime Minister, as Foreign Secretary, met an agent of Russia. Let me ask the Minister this, because I have not actually heard her say it: does she condemn that meeting?
I just need to repeat again that all Government Ministers are made fully aware of their responsibility to safeguard national security-sensitive information, as I am and as others are. I cannot comment any further because I do not have any further details of the meeting.
The Minister really cannot come to the House so unprepared that she cannot give us any answers, when the Prime Minister has belatedly admitted that he met an agent of the Russian state while he was Foreign Secretary without any security or anyone else to listen to what he had to say to Putin’s henchman. She has to come to the House properly prepared and tell us why this disgraced Prime Minister has any right to stay in office for a second longer, given that he is now a direct threat to our national security.
As I said earlier, I take national security and the security of our citizens extremely seriously, which is why it is absolutely vital that the Government continue to have Foreign Office Ministers in place. I have inquired as to whether or not there are further details of the meetings—these alleged meetings—and I do not have any further details at this time.
Given that the then Foreign Secretary went from the NATO meeting to these meetings, did he have any Government papers in his possession at the time? Secondly, we know that the Prime Minister has been very careless in the past—I think his mobile phone number was publicly available for 15 years. Did he have his personal electronic devices with him at the time? If he did, were they searched and examined by the security services after that meeting?
As I have said, I do not have any further details at this time. I have asked to see whether there are further details, but I do not have the details at this time. The Prime Minister, however, has announced that he is stepping down and will be making a statement shortly, as we know.
Why did it take until yesterday for the Prime Minister to admit that he had met a KGB agent in secret? Will there be a published report on this matter?
The Prime Minister was questioned yesterday, and he answered the question yesterday. Today is today.
As we know, the Prime Minister often goes into meetings, has conversations and then has a lapse of memory. He had a lapse of memory after the meeting with Alexander Lebedev. Has he now recalled it and informed the Minister of the conversation in that meeting? It is not just a national security matter; Alexander Lebedev owns businesses in illegally occupied Crimea, which is Ukrainian, not Russian territory. It is a matter not just for us, but for the country of Ukraine.
We must remember that at the time, there had been a devastating attack against a civilian on UK soil, involving chemical weapons. That led to a massive effort by the Foreign Office to co-ordinate the expulsion of Russian diplomats from embassies all across the world. At this time, the UK is also working with our allies across the world to counter Russian disinformation and help to remind people across the world about Russia’s brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine. In terms of the information that the hon. Gentleman requests, I do not have any further information at this time.
Where the Minister has said in answer to me or my colleagues that she does not have the information at this time, I do hope that we will get answers in writing in due course. My question is: what reassurance can the Minister give us that the Prime Minister has had no meetings with any other KGB agents or other people who pose a threat to our national security?
I understand that at the Liaison Committee yesterday the Prime Minister committed to following up in writing with the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, so there is a commitment to put information in writing. That is important. I cannot comment on any further meetings.
I do not think that the Minister understands quite how serious the issue is, and not only for our own national security; at a time when Ukraine is defending its own right to its own land, this is completely undermining President Zelensky. What analysis has the Minister’s office undertaken to understand the impact of the Prime Minister’s secret meetings?
May I just say that Russia is a top national security priority for this Government? We have made huge strides to counter the threat by the Russian state. The National Security Council agreed the Russia strategy back in 2017. The Government published a full and comprehensive response to the Intelligence and Security Committee report back in January 2020, implementing a majority of the Committee’s recommendations. We have closed the tier 1 investor visa route, which I believe was introduced by the Labour party. We continue to call out Russian malign activities where they occur across the globe.
Open Democracy has reported that the Conservative party has received £62,000 from Russian-linked donors since the beginning of the current escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, including a further £50,000 from Lubov Chernukhin, who is married to Putin’s former deputy Finance Minister. We know that money buys influence. What analysis has the Minister carried out of the influence that this money buys and where it goes, and of the national security implications?
Transparency of information about political donations is very important. Only individuals on the UK electoral roll, or UK-registered companies, are allowed to make such donations. It is an offence for political parties and other campaigners to receive donations from impermissible sources, and that includes donations from foreign nationals living abroad. That is the law, and that is the law that all parties, including the Conservative party, need to uphold.
Given the revelations of the last 24 hours and the suspicions that have existed for a number of months, if not years, why would any of our allies share any sensitive information with us now, while the current Prime Minister remains in office?
Because the UK has been leading the international efforts to stand up for Ukraine against Russian aggression. That is why allies across the world have been working with the UK: because we have been helping to lead the efforts to stand up for the people of Ukraine during the attack against their sovereignty, their democracy and their freedom.
That the meeting with Alexander Lebedev took place is not in question, but much controversy has surrounded that meeting, and many people feel that there is a lack of detail about what took place. May I respectfully ask the Minister, for whom I have a fondness, whether a full disclosure of all that has been discussed with Alexander Lebedev will be made available, and whether the threat to national security—given Lebedev’s close links with the KGB and the Kremlin—will be disclosed at the same time?
The hon. Gentleman will recognise that I cannot disclose any further information at this time, although I appreciate that Members want more information. He will also recognise that we would not disclose any information that might put the security of our own citizens further at risk. It is extremely important for us not to disclose information from time to time if it would put people at risk. However, in answer to questions asked yesterday by the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the Prime Minister committed himself to writing to her. She has that commitment from him, although he has of course said since then that he will be stepping down, and he is expected to give further information about that.
Before we start business questions, I wish to refer to an exchange between the Leader of the House and me about the Youth Parliament during last week’s business questions. We will have to lay a motion for that, but I should point out that the letter in question had not arrived at the office of the Leader of the House in time. I want to clarify that he was absolutely correct about that. I am sure he will now take this forward with great heart and with great speed.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberMay I ask the Leader of the House to give us the forthcoming business?
It will be a pleasure. The business for the week beginning on 11 July will include the following:
Monday 11 July—Consideration of a Business of the House motion, followed by all stages of the Energy (Oil and Gas) Profits Levy Bill, followed by debate on motions relating to the Liability of Trade Unions in Proceedings in Tort (Increase of Limits on Damages) Order 2022 and the draft Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses (Amendment) Regulations 2022.
Tuesday 12 July—Remaining stages of the Online Safety Bill (day 1), followed by a debate on a motion on restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster.
Wednesday 13 July—Consideration in Committee of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill (Day 1).
Thursday 14 July—A debate on a motion on Srebrenica, followed by a general debate on protecting and restoring nature at COP15 and beyond. The subjects for these debates were determined by the Backbench Business Committee.
Friday 15 July—Private Members’ Bills.
The provisional business for the week commencing 18 July includes the following:
Monday 18 July—Consideration in Committee of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill (Day 2).
Tuesday 19 July—Conclusion of consideration in Committee of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill (Day 3).
Wednesday 20 July—Conclusion of remaining stages of the Online Safety Bill.
Thursday 21 July—Business to be determined by the Backbench Business Committee.
The House will rise for the summer recess at the conclusion of business on Thursday 21 July and return on Monday 5 September.
I thank the Leader of the House for the forthcoming business, although his Government are clearly not in any position to deliver it. The Prime Minister is resigning—we are hearing on Twitter that Cabinet appointments may be happening—and we have had Bill Committees cancelled this morning. There is no doubt, as we have been saying for months, that this Government are simply unable to govern. Inflation has reached its highest for 40 years; 59 members of the Government—when I last printed out a copy of this speech—have resigned; economic growth is grinding to a halt; the hours-in-post Chancellor spent his first day on the job asking his boss to quit rather than planning for how we will deal with the cost of living crisis; and, as backlog Britain bulges, the Attorney General has been on television announcing her leadership bid. This is far beyond a mere distraction; this is a Tory Government paralysed by sleaze and scandal. In a shameful act of desperation, the Prime Minister is dragging the country down with him as he goes, and I am afraid his party has propped him up to do it.
Even if the Prime Minister is now Prime Minister in name only—frankly, that situation needs to change—there appears to be no one left to drive the work of the Government forward in Whitehall. The Leader of the House is constantly telling me that his Government are getting on with the job. They are clearly not. We were told that appointments would be made last night, but we are still waiting for ministerial posts in the Treasury, Education—there is no one there—Justice, Environment, Employment, Housing and Levelling Up. The flagship Levelling Up Department has been levelled to the extent that I think there is only one Minister left standing. When will these Ministers be replaced? What qualifications does someone now need to be a Minister in this Government? Who knows? Not only are the Government unable to carry out their basic functions in Whitehall, but the business of this House cannot proceed.
The Leader of the House may know that the Paymaster General has referred questions about cancelled Bill Committees to him, so I will ask him: what is happening to today’s Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill Committee, which should have been going for, I think, 12 minutes by now? When will that be rescheduled? The Northern Ireland Secretary resigned just a few hours ago. Where does that leave the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill? What is the plan for all of this?
The Leader of the House has announced business on the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill for 13, 18 and 19 July. Considering the seriousness of that legislation and the impact it has on our country’s reputation, and the fact that this Prime Minister is now a caretaker only, what mandate do the Government have to proceed? This is affecting not just primary but secondary legislation. During the passage of the Building Safety Bill, the Minister admitted that there were unresolved issues that needed statutory instruments passing to protect leaseholders. Is there anyone who can sign these SIs?
In an excruciating appearance before the Liaison Committee yesterday, the Prime Minister admitted he had met a former KGB agent who had links to Putin, without officials being present, in Italy when he was Foreign Secretary. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) was able to ask questions about that this morning with your permission, Mr Speaker, but not a single one was answered. This is about security. If my right hon. Friend is unable to get answers in the context of a chemical weapons attack on British soil in which British people died, how can this be a Government who are functioning? I ask the Leader of the House, with the greatest respect: how does any of this look like a functioning Government?
Week after week, the Leader of the House has failed to answer my very specific questions on the appointment of a new ethics adviser. Given the new revelations regarding Lebedev, surely he will agree with me today—I hope he will also answer my question—that a new ethics adviser is needed. Can he tell us when this vacancy will be filled? Can he guarantee that the investigations that were ongoing prior to Lord Geidt’s resignation will be completed? The first duty of any Government, as we all know, is to keep their people safe. When the Security Minister resigns in the morning, we cannot allow the vacancy to drift into the evening, let alone the weekend, and for this Conservative party to continue putting national security at risk.
Every single Tory MP—every single one—should take a long, hard look in the mirror and ask themselves how we got here with a Government who have collapsed before our eyes. They are putting the British people through an excruciating and dangerous act of desperation with a caretaker Prime Minister who, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford said, is even more dangerous as a caretaker than as Prime Minister. I may disagree with the Leader of the House politically, but I have huge respect for his office and for that of the Prime Minister. They propped him up, they were complicit, they have overseen 12 years of stagnation, declining public services and empty promises. We need a fresh start with a Labour Government.
There is a very clear difference between the hon. Lady and me. Now is the moment for calmness and professionalism, not for ranting and overexcitement.
The hon. Lady mentioned national security and, before we proceed, we should recognise that today is the 15th anniversary of the 7/7 bombings. The Home Secretary is the Minister responsible for national security, and she is in office—she is still Home Secretary—and in control of our national security. There is no issue on our national security at any level at this moment in time.
I have presented the business of the House, and there are Ministers in place to deliver the programme for the next two weeks. The hon. Lady asked how we will proceed with the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill. If she had been paying attention, she would know that we have concluded the Bill in this House. She is very concerned about legislation, but there were only four Labour Members in the House to consider the Bill. That is how seriously they take the troubles in Northern Ireland, and there were zero Liberal Democrats. Only four Labour Members could be bothered to turn up to debate the Bill.
The hon. Lady mentioned the chemical weapons attack in Salisbury. She supported a Leader of the Opposition who wanted to send the evidence back for Russia to consider. Just pause for a moment and think about who she supported at that moment in time.
It is all right heckling and saying we have nothing to say, but we are getting on with the business of Government in a calm way. Some Public Bill Committees will not run today, but they will be back up and running very soon.
The hon. Lady finished on Lord Geidt. I declare my interest, but I am assured that processes are in place and that these matters will continue to be reviewed. The result of those processes will come forward very soon.
As the Leader of the House continues to have confidence in the Prime Minister, my question requires a simple answer. Does he agree with the Prime Minister that, if a complaint is raised against a Member of Parliament that is so grave it triggers an investigation, that Member of Parliament or Minister should not be promoted or continue on the Front Bench? My question is simple: does he agree with the Prime Minister?
I am not sure how that question is relevant to the business of the House in any way, shape or form. If my hon. Friend wants to apply for an Adjournment debate on any matter, she is welcome to do so.
To those who were late, please do not embarrass me by standing. I call the SNP spokesperson, Pete Wishart.
And the Leader of the House is away! Has he not been curiously quiet over the past 24 hours? He was one of the few Johnson loyalists left standing last night. I thought we might find him in the bunker this morning, chained to the radiator with his beloved Prime Minister—but I can reassure him that he is a rank outsider to take over from the Prime Minister, at something like 80/1, which is a long shot even for him.
What a mess they have made of this. This Prime Minister cannot even leave the scene without almost burning down the House. He is the first Prime Minister in history who, when receiving that tap on the shoulder, told the men in grey suits to get stuffed. Surely there is no way on earth that he can remain as any sort of caretaker, particularly given all the big issues we have to consider and address as we go through the summer. He is more of an undertaker than a caretaker.
What a joke of a business statement, with a Government at half capacity! There are barely enough Ministers to respond to debates and to answers the questions, and business has been cancelled for the rest of the day. What happens to all the vacant positions? Will people all now return to their posts? Does the former Levelling Up Secretary now get his job back?
We need to debate this Prime Minister’s legacy. He will go down as one of the worst Prime Ministers in history, at one of the worst possible times. In just three years, he has managed to decimate our international reputation, our economy and our democracy. We will now have our fourth Prime Minister in six years, so perhaps the problem is not with whoever leads that shower over there. People ask the SNP why we want independence for Scotland. I am not asking that this morning. Independence would mean that we would never again get another Prime Minister whom we had not voted for, like him. Isn’t it funny that one of the last acts of the man who has trashed so much of the democracy in the UK was to write to our First Minister to try to deny democracy to our nation. He has now gone, and Scotland will soon be gone too.
Once again, there was not much in there that was relevant to the business of the House. We await the Prime Minister’s statement this afternoon. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that vacant positions will be refilled as the reshuffle progresses today and tomorrow, and the Government will continue to function in a professional way and deliver for the people of the United Kingdom.
May we have an urgent debate in Government time, because I have already had a debate in Westminster Hall, on increasing general practice capacity where we have huge increases in population? The Leader of the House faces similar issues to those I have in my constituency; they exist all over the country. Such a debate would show to our constituents that, notwithstanding what has gone on in the past few days, the Government get this and take the issue seriously, and that serious work will take place on this issue in the next few weeks and months.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend, who has done a lot of work on this matter, and to his leadership on it. He will be aware that we are investing £1.5 billion to create an extra 50 million GP appointments by 2024. We want people to feel confident that when they have a problem they can see a GP face to face. This is worthy of further debate and I know that he will continue to press. I encourage him to seek a debate in this House.
I call Ian Mearns, the Chair of the Backbench Business Committee.
I am very grateful, Mr Speaker. I thank the Leader of the House for announcing the business and the Backbench Business Committee debates for 14 July. Let me also give the House notice that on 21 July, which has been allocated to the Committee, our proposal is to have a debate in the first half of the day on United Kingdom sanctions for human rights abuses and corruption.
For quite a few years, the final Thursday before the summer recess has been allocated, when allowed, to a debate on, “Matters to be raised before the forthcoming summer Adjournment”. The Committee has agreed that, to honour his memory, it would be a fitting tribute to Sir David Amess, who was cruelly taken from us last October, if that debate was renamed the “Sir David Amess Summer Adjournment Debate”. Sir David was renowned among our colleagues for his regular appearances at our Committee and his impressive contributions to pre-recess Adjournment debates. I raised this matter briefly in the House after Sir David’s loss and had the support of the then Leader of the House. I have written to the Chair of the Procedure Committee, to you, Mr Speaker, and to the current Leader of the House to this effect.
I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman and to his Committee for the work that they do, and I thank him for announcing the debate that he mentioned. From the Dispatch Box, I offer my full support for his recommendation to call the debate the Sir David Amess debate. I hope I have the opportunity to respond to the hon. Gentleman and to other Members in that debate, and I think it is a very fitting tribute that he has introduced.
This may seem mundane given the drama that is happening around us, but it is important to my constituents because we have several fantastic sustainable businesses. I recently met Kit Change, which makes leggings and sporting tops out of recycled plastic bottles, and 3rd Rock, which makes sustainable climbing activewear out of old carpets and discarded fishing nets. Such businesses are really important and I have discussed with them the challenges and opportunities they face, particularly in relation to financing. Please could we have a debate in this House about financing for small businesses that focus on sustainability and ethical sourcing of products?
This is not a trivial matter: such businesses up and down this country are the backbone of our economy. The Government provide extensive business support for small and medium-sized enterprises, including sustainable businesses. The British Business Bank programmes support more than 1.77 million smaller businesses with £89 billion-worth of finance. My hon. Friend will have the opportunity at Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy questions next week if she wants to highlight the fantastic recyclables businesses in her constituency.
I associate myself with the comments made a few minutes ago about David Amess, my former neighbour.
One of the many consequences of rising energy prices is that hundreds of swimming pools in this country face closure in the next few months. This was raised this morning at Digital, Culture, Media and Sport questions, but technically it is not a matter for that Department; it has more to do with the Treasury and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. If we have any Ministers left in those Departments, can we have a statement on how this potential crisis will be tackled with all the implications for future generations?
The hon. Gentleman asks a very important question. I have swimming pools in my constituency that are struggling with the rising cost of global energy. It is something that the Government understand and take very seriously, which is why we have poured in billions of pounds of support. I hope the local authorities can find it within their means to help and support those swimming pools that are under pressure. There may be an opportunity to raise that next week at BEIS questions, under the energy portfolio.
The 7th July remains a very painful day for many Londoners—it is 17 years since 52 of them were murdered in London. Five of those victims were people who had direct connections with Hendon, including Anthony Fatayi-Williams, who walked past me just two hours before his death.
My constituent, nine-year-old Precious, has a neuro- generative disease resulting in complex health conditions, including scoliosis. Her medical team has advised that she needs an operation to insert MAGEC rods into her spine to correct this. Their use was suspended in 2020 due to safety concerns, but they have been cleared for procedures in the United States and other countries, as a modified version has been implemented. Precious’s family and the spinal team at Great Ormond Street Hospital have been waiting more than six months for the approval of the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency. Can a Minister come to the Dispatch Box to update us on progress on approving this desperately needed technology for my constituent?
I thank my hon. Friend and join him in paying tribute to the 7/7 victims. I may have inadvertently said that today was the 15th anniversary, but I think he is right that it is the 17th anniversary.
I am sure that the whole House sends its best wishes to Precious. I can assure my hon. Friend that the MHRA is taking this matter very seriously. I understand that he has written to the chief executive of the MHRA, which will be providing a full written response in due course.
I associate myself with the remarks of the Leader of the House on the 17th anniversary of the 7/7 bombings, and remember the 52 victims who died. It serves as a reminder that London will never be cowed by terrorism.
At a time when we need stability across the Government, we have seen that the Minister for Crime and Policing has been appointed to another role. The fact that the Met police, along with six other police forces, are in special measures does not give my constituents in Vauxhall the confidence that this Government are stable. Can the Leader of the House please outline when there will be a reappointment to that important post?
I thank the hon. Lady for her question and her comments about 7/7 and recognise the cross-party support on matters of national security. I can assure her that a reshuffle is taking place. It is my understanding that that is a very important role and will be filled very soon. I am sure that she will be able to question the new Minister in due course.
As we commemorate the terrorist attacks on London, people should remember that the day before was a day of great joy when London was awarded the Olympics, but our memory of that is tinged with sadness because of the terrorist atrocities that took place the following day. Over the course of the pandemic, the Department for Transport has continued to bail out Transport for London to cover the loss of income from fares. However, the Department has rightly refused to cover the cost of the Mayor of London’s not doing what he should have done to deal with TfL’s finances. The current deal runs out next weekend, I believe. We desperately need an announcement from the Department for Transport on what will happen after next weekend on financing for London transport, because we cannot continue in a position where the Mayor of London refuses to take the action required to reduce costs.
I recognise the challenges that Londoners will face if the transport system does not operate. My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the amount of support that the Government have offered, and to hold the Mayor of London to account. I will pass on his comments directly to the Secretary of State, but I hope the Mayor of London will take firm action, get a grip on Transport for London and not rely on the cash from the Government that he is requesting.
All the events of today sort of started with the Prime Minister throwing the kitchen sink at trying to preserve Owen Paterson in post, which of course the Leader of the House was also instrumental in. The Standards Committee has produced a new code of conduct. It is ready to go, and we have published it. Although there has been a form of appeal in the past, we have also published a new procedural protocol that would put in place a formal appeal through the Independent Expert Panel, which is chaired by a High Court judge, Sir Stephen Irwin. We cannot use that, including for new cases, unless the Government table the motions. I had hoped we would do that before the summer recess. I urge the Leader of the House to think again about the past week and whether there is a means of doing this before the summer recess. Otherwise, there is a real danger that we will be in legal jeopardy because we will not know how to deal with an individual case that might come along that might be just as serious as that of Owen Paterson.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the work he has done and for the work of the Committee. We had the final reports late last week, I think, and the Government are now considering them. I know he is keen to move forward, as are the Government, but I do not think it will be possible to have that debate before the summer recess. I am happy to sit down with him at some point over the next week to try to arrange a time when we can plan our way forward.
My right hon. Friend will know that this year alone we are spending nearly £190 billion of taxpayers’ money on the NHS. Spending on the health service is increasing every year as a percentage of overall Government spending. We are very proud in Shropshire that my right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) and I secured £312 million for major modernisation of our local A&E services, but not a penny of that money has been spent, four years after we secured it. Can we have a debate in Government time about the quality and efficacy of various levels of NHS management? Certainly, I am starting to lose confidence in my trust.
I pay tribute to the work my hon. Friend does holding local health authorities to account in Shropshire. He will be aware that the Government have introduced a £39 billion package through the health and social care levy—a huge investment in our health services—but he is right that that must also go hand in hand with reform and restructure to ensure that taxpayers’ money is invested properly and spent efficiently.
Will the Leader of the House, who of course knows more about what has been going on in No. 10 and the Government than anyone else, take seriously the fact that this is a national crisis and a national emergency? Perhaps pro tem, just for the next two weeks and through the recess, there should be some serious co-operation between those on the Opposition and Government Front Benches to serve the national purpose.
Will the Leader of the House address another matter? I do not know how we do this. When dear David was killed and when Jo was killed, I had the assurance that their families would be well looked after, but evidence has come to me that that is not the case. Could we have a proper way of finding out how we look after the families of victims killed when they are doing their job as parliamentarians, because what I have heard recently reflects very poorly on this House?
I am more than happy to pursue that away from the Dispatch Box if the hon. Gentleman wants to raise it with me privately and send me the information that he is in possession of. Clearly there is a responsibility for us to look after families of those people who sadly were brutally murdered. It is worth reaffirming that there are support mechanisms out there for security through the Speaker’s Office and through the security services within the House of Commons. If any Members are concerned about their own security or that of their family, there is support out there.
At the Treasury Committee on 6 June, the now former Chancellor promised action in weeks on what he called the extraordinary profits of electricity generators, sparking significant uncertainty about renewables investment in Scotland. Nothing in the business statement presented today deals with this proposal. Before the recess, will the Leader of the House restore confidence and help Scotland’s net zero ambitions by confirming that the current Government will not go ahead with these half-baked plans?
We have announced the Energy (Oil and Gas) Profits Levy Bill, which is coming to the House very soon, so the hon. Lady will have the opportunity in those debates to question the Minister at the Dispatch Box. But I think we can afford the new Chancellor of the Exchequer a little time to find his feet and then come to the House, and I am sure she will have the opportunity to question him when he does.
I should not actually be here at the moment—I should be in the Committee on the Genetic Technologies (Precision Breeding) Bill, but unfortunately we lost the Minister yesterday. We have a new Minister who is even now swotting up ferociously for this afternoon’s sitting, but it is an incredibly technical Bill and it is not very well drafted; it is very flawed. Does the Leader of the House really think that that Minister, with no disrespect to her, is going to be a position to take us through the remaining stages of the Committee by this afternoon?
The Bill Committee will meet at 2 o’clock this afternoon. I can assure her that the Minister of State in that Department is very informed on this matter —is right across the detail of it—and I am sure the Bill Committee will proceed with great speed at 2 o’clock this afternoon.
I welcome the fact that the Leader of the House has not listed any business on the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill for 12 July, given that celebrations about the glorious revolution will be taking place on that day and a number of Northern Ireland Members would not be available, but I also welcome the fact that he has listed it for three days—the 13th, the 18th and the 19th. Will he confirm that as personalities are changing at the top, the policy on the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill will not change and it is the Government’s intention to complete this business by the end of this Session? Could I recommend to him the evidence that the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee received from the renowned international law expert, Professor Alan Boyle of Edinburgh Law School, in which he confirmed that all his advice to the Government is that the Bill does not breach international law?
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the Bill will continue on the dates that have been announced. He will be aware that it is a Foreign Office Bill. The Foreign Secretary remains very much in her place, and I hope he will be in his place to scrutinise the Bill as it progresses.
May I associate myself with the comments of the Leader of the House and many other Members across this House on the 17th anniversary of the 7/7 terror attacks?
For the good of this country, we need a functioning Government, and at this precise moment we do not have one. Many Government Departments are without Ministers. Over the past month, I have met many Ministers and corresponded with them in writing on very important matters that matter to the people of Battersea. Can the Leader of the House give me an assurance that I will get timely responses at the earliest opportunity?
I can offer the hon. Lady that assurance. Ministers are being appointed as we speak. Those vacancies will be filled, she will get a timely response and her constituents will receive the service they deserve.
In Bath, we have soaring ambulance waiting times, NHS dentists and GPs are in crisis, and the cost of living emergency is bringing misery to scores of my constituents. There is no functioning Government left. How is it possible that the Prime Minister can continue in office even as a caretaker, amidst the chaos he has created? Will the Leader of the House bring forward a debate and a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister?
It is good to see the hon. Lady back in her place for business questions. I know she has missed a couple, and I hope she is now well. I can assure her that there is a functioning Government. There are a few vacancies that are currently being filled, and they will be filled very soon and the level of service will continue at the high level it has for some time.
In view of the comments from the Secretary of State for Defence at the Defence Committee this week on the ongoing situation in Ukraine, may we have an urgent debate in Government time to examine the need to increase defence spending and the number of defence personnel?
The hon. Gentleman will be aware of the commitment we made of extra cash for Ukraine and the security situation there. I hope he recognises that warfare is changing and the requirements of the MOD have changed over the past few decades, and that is why the MOD has been reviewing its requirements. We have a Secretary of State who is very much across his brief and very much in place and who will remain so for the near future.
Before the chaos of the past 24 hours, I had been promised a meeting with the former Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Michael Gove), over the issues affecting my constituents relating to fire and building safety defects and the lack of co-operation with the Welsh Government about commitments from developers done on an England-only rather than a UK-wide basis to remedy those defects. Will the Leader of the House be able to assist me in getting a meeting with whoever is newly appointed to that role? These are serious issues affecting thousands of people.
I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman is aware, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) has been appointed to that Secretary of State role. I shall pass on the hon. Gentleman’s comments directly to my right hon. Friend and make sure that we can arrange a meeting for him with the Department as soon as possible.
If the Prime Minister is permitted to remain in post until October following a leadership election, the Government of the UK will be in a state of paralysis until that time, with more than 25 ministerial vacancies and important Bill Committees cancelled across the House today. It seems that the Prime Minister is still only supported by political giants such as the right hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire (Ms Dorries) and for Dumfries and Galloway (Mr Jack). No wonder the people of Scotland are deciding in increasing numbers that they are better off taking their future into their own hands. Will the Leader of the House make a statement setting out the importance of a Prime Minister who has lost the support of his own MPs and is now unable to govern resigning immediately so that an interim Prime Minister can be appointed?
I understand that the Prime Minister will make a statement later, and we await that statement with anticipation to see what is said, but I can assure the hon. Lady that the Government will continue to work away. She says that a number of Committees have been cancelled. In fact, some of them have just been rearranged and will continue in the usual way.
I associate myself with the remarks about 7/7. Hounslow Council lost a wonderful social worker, Ojara Ikeagwu, on that day. One of the key tasks of Government involves the basic functions that currently seem to be collapsing, such as the issuing of visas and passports. Members are not getting answers. Can the Leader of the House explain how the basic parliamentary tools of scrutiny will be addressed, such as getting answers to questions, whether oral or written, where there are either no Ministers or the Ministers are so new that they will take time to get their feet under the table?
The hon. Lady will be aware that where there is a vacancy, Ministers will be appointed very soon. The function of those Departments will be up and running quickly, and I can assure her that there are many talented people on the Benches behind me who will be able to take up those roles. [Hon. Members: “Where are they?”] They are probably all waiting by their phones. I can assure her that once they are in place, they will be ready to give her the level of service that she requires.
We had a wholly unsatisfactory response this morning from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford), to the urgent question from the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) about the meeting on 28 April 2018 between former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev and the then Foreign Secretary, now Prime Minister. Will the Leader of the House please arrange for a fully briefed Minister to attend the House on Monday to give a statement setting out the facts of what happened and who was told, particularly in light of what appears to be a clear breach of the ministerial code and potentially a criminal offence being committed?
As the right hon. Lady said, there was an urgent question this morning. There are matters of national security pertinent to this, and not all of them can be vocalised from the Dispatch Box due to their sensitivity. I will make sure I pass on her comments to the relevant Department, and I am sure they will respond in due course.
I was pleased to learn recently that Davenport station in my constituency is to be finally awarded Access for All funding to make accessibility improvements, but Stockport station, which had almost 4.5 million passengers per annum pre-pandemic, still requires significant capital investment to ensure it is safe and accessible for all. It is the fifth-busiest station in Greater Manchester, but unfortunately we have leaky roofs, which often make platforms unsafe, and lifts are out of use. If there are any Ministers left in the Department for Transport, can the Leader of the House allow Government time for a debate on train stations across Greater Manchester to address these serious health and safety and accessibility issues?
I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for raising the matter. Disability access at our stations is important, and that is why the Department for Transport has invested millions of pounds in our rail infrastructure up and down the country. He will have the opportunity to raise that matter again in Transport questions on 15 September. I know from my own constituency that there are a number of challenges with railway stations that need improvements to allow disability access.
openDemocracy tells us that 18 Ministers have refused to publish official diaries of the meetings they held during the pandemic, including the former Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for West Suffolk (Matt Hancock) and the Prime Minister. The new Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi) tells us that we will see “evidence and transparency” from the ministerial team and the Prime Minister in the future. Can we have a statement about the importance of the Government ensuring evidence and transparency in governmental business, that Ministers’ diaries are made available to the public for scrutiny and also that distinctions between official, political and personal meetings are properly defined for the future?
The hon. Lady will be aware that there are strict rules around these sorts of declarations. I do not think it is possible to publish the diaries of all Ministers, as there are security implications about regularly publishing specific diary engagements, particularly for some Ministers who have security briefs. There are strict rules around what should be declared and the timelines around that.
As we know, it is the end of days for this Prime Minister. It is also the end of days for this parliamentary Session before summer recess. The Leader of the House might not have seen the interview on the BBC this morning, where the Leader of the Opposition said that if the Conservative party do not get rid of the Prime Minister shortly,
“Labour will, in the national interest, bring a no confidence vote—because this can’t go on”.
Will the Leader of the House guarantee that 21 July will be the last day of this session, or will he try to bring that forward to avoid a vote?
I have announced the business for the next two weeks. The House will rise on 21 July. We await the Prime Minister’s statement this afternoon; I am not about to pre-empt what he may or may not say, but I assure the hon. Gentleman that the functions of government continue and will continue to move forward.
The Public and Commercial Services Union is opposing the closure of Toxteth jobcentre in my constituency, along with other centres nationally, and challenging the proposed 91,000 job cuts across the wider civil service and the attacks on pay terms and conditions across Government Departments. Will the Leader of the House grant an urgent debate in Government time so that we can scrutinise the Government’s plans to negotiate with PCS to avoid jobcentre closures and attacks on pay and conditions?
The hon. Lady is perfectly at liberty to apply for a Westminster Hall or Adjournment debate on that matter. It is worth recognising that there is huge global inflationary pressure and we as a Government must act responsibly with fiscal responsibility to ensure that we do not add to that inflationary pressure. That will require some pay restraint across the country.
Last week, at business questions, I raised the issue of redundancies in the Royal Mail. I apologise to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, because I may have inadvertently misled the House when I said that there were 1,400 agreed redundancies and 900 in dispute. The actual figures are that 1,250 redundancies were achieved at Royal Mail and 542 are in dispute. The Leader of the House was good enough last week to say that he would raise the matter of the disruption to service with the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, who I understand is still in his post. Has he done so? If so, will we get an urgent statement from the Business Secretary about the current disruption to postal services across the country?
The direct answer is yes, I have written to the Secretary of State. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will get a copy of my letter in his inbox very soon, if he has not already. I know that Royal Mail has also written to the hon. Gentleman directly. I have not yet had a response from the Secretary of State; if I get one before he does, I will forward it to him.
Greater than the crisis in Downing Street is the crisis in the Donbas and across Ukraine, but the Prime Minister remaining in office plays into Putin’s hands and undermines President Zelensky. Will the Leader of the House convey my concern, and that of many hon. Members, to the Prime Minister that he cannot continue in office if he wants to support the people of Ukraine? Will the Leader of the House bring a statement to the House about the impact of the Prime Minister’s behaviour on our foreign policy?
I gently say to the hon. Lady that we await the Prime Minister’s statement this afternoon and I do not want to pre-empt what he may or may not say. Most people in the country will recognise that he has been the leading voice in the world in taking the fight back to Putin and supporting Ukraine. He has shown great global leadership on the matter and if it were not for him and his efforts, Russia would now be in Kyiv and, probably, across the whole of Ukraine.
Yesterday, the Yazidi Justice Committee published its report, “State Responsibility and the Genocide of the Yazidis”, on the murder and mutilation of women and families, and lives that have been destroyed forever. It is undoubtedly difficult reading. It highlights the duty of Governments to prevent genocide occurring when a high risk has been identified. Given the situation in Afghanistan and the current threats to the Hazaras, it is time to debate how the United Kingdom can help to prevent future genocides. As I do every week, because these are important issues to raise in the House, I ask whether the Leader of the House will make time for a debate on that important matter.
I have not had the opportunity to read the report, which sounds harrowing. The hon. Gentleman is a true champion of religious freedom around the world, which the Government take seriously. I will pass on his comments to the Foreign Secretary, who shares his concern about the terrible actions that some states commit around the world.
Since my election, I have been campaigning on ambulance response times in Shropshire. As a result of that campaign, local health leaders have been preparing for a visit from the Minister for Health, the hon. Member for Charnwood (Edward Argar), in the coming weeks to see how they have been doing to improve the situation. My understanding is that the Minister resigned yesterday evening, so that visit is on hold, postponed or maybe even cancelled. Can the Leader of the House bring forward a debate in Government time on the national ambulance situation? People are dying avoidable deaths not only in North Shropshire but across the country and it is time that the Government got a grip of it.
The hon. Lady will have the opportunity to question the Secretary of State directly at Health and Social Care questions on 19 July. I hope that she will recognise the huge investment that the Government have made in our health services up and down the country. We are working hard to improve ambulance waiting times and to support her constituents and those across the whole of Shropshire.
I thank the Leader of the House for his statement today, on what has clearly been a busy day for him, and for responding to questions for over three quarters of an hour.
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. We have had two urgent questions today where Ministers have come to the Dispatch Box and told us that they have no knowledge of the things that they are meant to be answering on, which completely undermines the point of having UQs. Certainly, when I was a Government Minister, I would not have thought of coming to the House of Commons and merely saying, “Oh, I don’t know. Nobody’s told me. I don’t know what the information is.” I know that the Chair does not have any say on the content of ministerial responses, but that seems to be a sinking of standards to such an extent that UQs are becoming a laughing stock. That surely cannot be right for the accountability of Government Ministers to this place.
I thank Dame Angela for her point of order. As she has stated, the Chair is not responsible for the content of responses or who gives responses. I suspect that the only thing I can say is that we have lived in interesting and exceptional times over the last 48 hours. I am sure that those on the Treasury Bench have heard exactly what she has said and will get that through to the relevant Government Departments.
Supply and Appropriation (Main Estimates) Bill
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 56), That the Bill
be now read a Second time.
Question agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Question put forthwith, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Question agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House notes that economic crime costs the UK economy at least £290 billion per year; recognises that law enforcement agencies are significantly under-resourced to deal with the scale of the problem and can be unwilling to properly enforce existing laws; is concerned at the fragmented nature of the enforcement landscape; and calls on the Government to bring forward an economic crime enforcement strategy that allows for a significant increase in resource to expand and restructure the fight against economic crime, including money laundering and fraud.
I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this important debate and the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), who has worked closely with me on this issue. Too often in this place, we talk about legislation and not implementation. As the motion says,
“economic crime costs the UK economy at least £290 billion per year”—
probably a lot more than that—and our agencies are “significantly under-resourced” and “fragmented”.
I would like to say that things will get better, but actually they will get much worse. That is not a criticism of the Government or any of our agencies, although there are criticisms to be levelled; the reality is that things are moving so quickly in this space and in the ability of organised criminals—people who deal drugs, traffic people across continents, fund terrorism, and steal assets from foreign jurisdictions and foreign nations —to move money around.
Let me set out an example of how easy this is becoming—these are all instances running through one platform. There is a hackers group called Lazarus, which is in effect a state-funded agency for North Korea that funds the North Korean weapons programme. There is also Hydra, a dark net drug dealing network, as well as Grandefex, which is run by organised criminals, and Russian Government agencies. The thing they all have in common is that they use a crypto-exchange platform called Binance, set up by a guy called Changpeng Zhao.
Reuters has investigated how those organisations used Binance to move money around totally anonymously between 2017 and 2021. Until 2021, this was regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, but still for this crypto -exchange, which moved bitcoins and lots of other currencies totally anonymously for those enterprises —for those funding terrorism and other nefarious enterprises —all people needed to do in order to register an account was to enter an email address. That was all people needed to do. There were no “know your customer” checks, no “know your client” checks and no ID requirements. People just had to enter an email address, which could easily be a fake one, and the money was moved around totally anonymously.
The owner of the organisation, Mr Zhao, said as recently as 2020, when speaking to his own staff, that he was driven by one thing and one thing only: growing his enterprise. This platform has now been banned in the UK as a regulated activity, but that does not stop UK people actually using it, because that is obviously how the internet works. He told his staff to “do everything” to increase market share, and spoke about “know your client” checks as being “unfortunately a requirement”.
The investigation by Reuters found that £2.35 billion was moved around in this way for nefarious ends, but a couple of billion pounds is just scratching the surface when we know that the amount of money washing through the UK is in the hundreds of billions of pounds. The UK plays a key role in this, and it is a role that we must acknowledge, and we must take responsibility for clamping down on this. We are getting nowhere near doing so at the moment.
We know that roughly 40% of our crime is economic crime, yet only 0.8% of our resources in man hours are dedicated to tackling economic crime, so there is a huge disparity. I think it is fair to say that the figure of £290 billion a year is a conservative estimate. It represents about 14.5% of our GDP as a cost to the UK economy, yet the application of resources to it adds up to 0.04% of GDP. There is a massive gulf in the cost to society and to this nation, as well as in many other ways. It is not just a financial cost, of course. As I say, there is drug dealing, people trafficking and all the things we are trying to tackle, yet money goes out through the backdoor to all these illegal enterprises.
Action Fraud reports on the impact on individuals, and I think that all of us, as constituency MPs, deal with individuals who have had money stolen from their accounts through things such as authorised push payment fraud. Action Fraud is not the most fit for purpose organisation on the planet. Anybody who has used it knows that the information just goes into a black hole, which is what Action Fraud is. It is going to be reformed, but just changing something’s name does not make it work. However, according to Action Fraud’s figures, £2.35 billion a year goes in that kind of small-scale fraud, which damages our constituents and small businesses directly.
I congratulate my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) on bringing this important debate to the House. Does he agree that to some extent our public debate about this is stuck in a 1980s time warp? We are all still talking about bobbies on the beat, when increasingly we need to have bobbies behind screens, patrolling digital highways rather than pavements. Without that, public trust in maintaining law and order and maintaining the credibility of the system will continue to be serious eroded.
That is absolutely right. My hon. Friend has much experience and expertise in this area as the former Government anti-corruption champion. He is absolutely right that we are tackling this in an analogue way in a digital era, and that we need to look at it completely differently. This is about enforcement and resources, and understanding the scale of the problem and meeting that with the right scale of response. However, we also need to look at legislative areas, because there are things we could do to make sure we get a better bang for our buck from our enforcement agencies, rather than just have more and more people, and I will talk about some other measures shortly.
On my hon. Friend’s point, at the moment 0.8% of our police and enforcement agencies’ time is spent tackling economic crime. Of the 20,000 new police officers who are going to be recruited, 725 are going to be dedicated to economic crime. That is better, but it is still only 3.6% of that cohort, so he is absolutely right. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary says that 90% of cases of economic crime are not even looked at, which is shocking.
The FCA is responsible for controlling money laundering in our financial organisations. Most of this runs through financial organisations—not just through the likes of Binance, which are shadowy enterprises—and I will talk about our main institutions in a moment. For money laundering purposes, the FCA regulates 22,000 organisations, which is a huge number, of which 5,000 are defined as high-risk organisations for money laundering. Last year it did 200 checks—only 200 out of those 5,000—and some of those were desktop checks, for money laundering. I would argue that we are never going to be able to tackle this just by having more and more people, although we do need more people.
This is not just about Binance. I am sure that, sooner or later, we will catch up with Binance. At some point in time, it will be banned, fined or something. In particular, the German regulators and the US enforcement agencies are on to it. Binance is based in the Cayman Islands, as Members might imagine. This is about our UK institutions as well.
If we look at our banks, we see that they have a horrendous record. HSBC was fined £1.4 billion for facilitating money laundering for Mexican drug cartels—the Escobars of this world—in 2012. That was a £1.4 billion fine, and it was fined another £64 million in 2021 for facilitating money laundering offences. In 2019, Standard Chartered was fined £840 million in the US and £102 million in the UK. In 2021, MT Global was fined £23 million by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs for money laundering offences. NatWest was fined about £260 million this year, which was the first ever corporate criminal prosecution by the FCA. I welcome the fact that this year is the first time this has ever happened for historical money laundering offences. UBS has had the biggest ever fine—£3.2 billion by the French authority in 2019.
Danske Bank has facilitated £200 billion of money laundering offences, but it has not been fined yet. This has been identified, and it will be fined for the £200 billion of Russian money coming out of Russia and being spread around the world, with it all going through small banks in Estonia via Danske Bank—horrendous. We talk about how Putin funds his invasion of Ukraine. He does so by keeping a coterie of people around him who are stealing Russian assets and making him—there is no doubt about this—the wealthiest person in the world. However, we are facilitating this, because UK companies are involved in the shell companies moving that money around.
I could cite other examples of economic crime from my involvement with the all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking. Criminal fraud at Lloyds HBOS was proven in 2017, and the cover-up associated with that is an utter disgrace. We are yet to see the Dobbs review, which later this year should identify the scale of the cover-up by Lloyds of what went on at HBOS. We have also seen the problems with Royal Bank of Scotland’s Global Restructuring Group, which devastated tens of thousands of businesses, in effect by defrauding businesses of their assets. On all those occasions, all those businesses ever got was a fine. Not a single senior executive in any of those cases has gone to jail. What we need is personal liability or this stuff will just be seen as a cost of doing business. That is the reality.
My hon. Friend speaks with knowledge and clarity about these crimes, and about the impact on constituents and the global impact—the two are very much interlinked. Many of my constituents have been impacted, to the tune of hundreds or thousands of pounds, which then filters into the global impact. How can we tackle this problem without people feeling that the answers are beyond them? We are talking about the global scale but this is affecting individuals; the two are inextricably linked and people want to see action.
That is the right question. These problems are not difficult to solve if people are willing to apply the right rules. On the money taken from my hon. Friend’s constituents, there is probably an organised criminal gang behind that, contacting the constituent, saying they should move the money, and when they do that the money is probably moved through a mule account in one of the major banks and then off somewhere else, offshore, and it then disappears into the ether. The reality, of course, is that the banks would clamp down on mule accounts if they had the right incentive or the willingness to do so. These crimes can be stopped, but people will not stop them until that is in their interests to do so, and we need to make sure that is the case. Yes, we need the enforcement and enough people, but we need the people who are currently facilitating this, who are largely UK-based in this context, to be willing to prevent it.
The UK plays a particular role in all this economic crime. It is seen as a place where money is laundered, not necessarily where it is kept, although that is different in the case of kleptocrats or Russian oligarchs. The money is usually laundered in the UK and then goes off to other jurisdictions, largely the US. That is because of the consolidation of expertise in the City of London—we should be very proud of the City—and the financial organisations and the advisers who sit around them, who are also culpable in this regard. We have strong regulation in some areas and very weak regulation in others, particularly on offshore regulation, where in the UK there is a particular relationship between its domestic regulations and what happens offshore.
Banks are very strict with local customers, and rightly so, but not with the movement of large sums of money, unfortunately, including the £200 million sent from Estonia to Northern Ireland, which I understand has been highlighted on “Panorama”. The Government seem to focus on the ordinary account holders being regulated strictly, but they do not seem to have any level of regulation for the big money movements. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we need to focus on that bigger picture?
The hon. Gentleman is right. The regulations are there but the penalties are not sufficient. The people within Danske Bank knew that they were doing wrong when they moved €200 billion out of Russia and into other parts of the world, but there was no incentive to do anything about it because they made a huge amount of money as it flew through their systems. A local manager, a mid-tier manager or even a senior executive would think, “Well, we’re making money and nobody’s going to find out, and if we are found out there will be a fine down the line and I will have gone by then anyway.” So where is the incentive to clamp down if they are going to make lots of money out of it? After all, everybody has budgets and targets to hit, and bonuses on the back of them. That is the problem: the penalties and enforcement need to be different.
Another key reason why money is washed through the UK is that we have the overseas territories, tax havens that work on the same basis of common law—Jersey, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Money launderers do not want to pay tax on their money, so they put it through a jurisdiction with low or zero taxation. That is why the UK plays a major role in facilitating this, and also why it must play a major role in clamping down on it.
We do not do clamping down very well here, however. Our enforcement agencies have success in some regards, but they are nowhere near as successful as other jurisdictions, for example the USA, which is far more focused on this. The US has similar bribery laws to the UK, introduced in 2011. In 2020 the US fined organisations in the US £1.85 billion for bribery offences, which is more than the UK has fined in 10 years. The situation for money laundering sanctions is very similar: in 2019 the UK fined our banks £260 million in the entire year for money laundering offences, while the US fined £7.5 billion, including £2.5 billion of criminal sanctions. Almost every one of our agencies is underfunded and under-resourced in tackling this problem.
What do we need to do? My colleague the right hon. Member for Barking will talk about some of the measures, but I will focus on the key things that I think we need. We must ringfence a budget for tackling economic crime right across the piece in the UK, to see exactly how much we are spending on tackling organised crime. We need fewer agencies, too; the effort must be more consolidated so the lines of reporting are less fragmented and more direct.
Action Fraud must not just be a rebadged enterprise. It needs to be meaningful, and people need to have confidence that the offences reported to it will be dealt with. I was recently nearly scammed through WhatsApp when I thought my son had contacted me, but it was another person. I wondered whether to report it to Action Fraud, but I thought, “What’s the point? It’s not going to do anything about it.” That is why people do not report such incidents. Clearly, therefore, there are many more offences than the number reported.
The No. 1 thing we need to do is something the Government have talked about. We already have a failure to prevent offence. There is corporate criminal liability in the UK if people fail to prevent bribery in their organisation—that offence was introduced some years ago, I think in 2011—and also an offence of failure to prevent tax evasion. People cannot just stop that happening; they have to put the rules in place to stop it happening. The key thing is what they can do to stop this. They therefore put systems in their organisation to alert them to certain things happening, and they train staff that they cannot get involved in bribery or facilitate tax evasion. We need to extend that to failure to prevent economic crime.
The Government have been talking about this for some time, and the Law Commission has reported on it. It said we should introduce such an offence but probably for fraud alone, not for money laundering or things like false accounting. I think that is a big mistake. It is also very mealy-mouthed on including personal liability for directors; it says it could be added if they have the mental something—what is the word?
Thank you. On that basis, only if it can be proven that the directors had a guilty mind and were actually participating in the fraud can they go to jail. That is the wrong approach, and is not what the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 said. The Act said that those who fail to prevent accidents in their workplace could go to jail, and construction deaths dropped in the following year by 90%. We need to put in place an offence such that those who fail to take reasonable steps to prevent and clamp down on fraud can go to jail, without it also being necessary to prove that they deliberately facilitated the fraud. That would make a fundamental difference.
We must support whistleblowers, too. Most of the information on these offences will come not from our enforcement agencies or investigations by regulators, but from people within the organisations. Currently, those people are not protected—
I remind the mover of the motion that the guidance says they have up to 10 minutes, and the hon. Member has now spoken for longer than that times two. Perhaps, with a bit of focus, he will now bring his remarks to a conclusion.
I have so much to say on this; I apologise, Mr Deputy Speaker.
Finally, as well as beefing up the numbers, we should consider doing what we have done on unexplained wealth orders. Welcome Government legislation that was brought forward in the last Session capped costs for UWOs, and we should consider capping costs for all prosecutions of economic crimes to stop very wealthy individuals preventing our enforcement agencies from taking them to court merely because they have huge financial firepower that is much stronger than ours.
On that, I will conclude. I am very sorry, Mr Deputy Speaker, that I have taken so long, but, as I said, I could talk for much longer on this given the chance.
I remind the hon. Member that, at the end of the debate, he will have two minutes to conclude, not four. [Laughter.]
It is a bizarre day to be debating a really important issue. I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for selecting it, and it is a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), with whom I am working closely on many of these issues. I will say something a bit general before moving on. Have I got 10 minutes, Mr Deputy Speaker, or a little bit more?
I will keep it tight.
It is shocking but true that it was the tragedy of the war in Ukraine that got our Government to start thinking about the serious threat that the country faces, in both our economy and our society, from the spiralling menace of illicit finance and all that goes with it. I have said many times in the House, and I repeat today, that we will never enjoy sustained, good economic prosperity on the back of dirty money. We earned the reputation on which our superb, successful financial sector was built by being a trusted jurisdiction, and we must maintain that. Today, we are in danger of losing that trust.
The US sees us as a high-risk jurisdiction similar to Cyprus, and Londongrad is becoming a popular term among many. We have moved off our perch as the world’s leaders in fighting economic crime. Moody’s has downgraded us, and we are slipping down the ranks of Transparency International’s corruption perception index. Everything is moving in the wrong direction. That is no surprise because, as the hon. Member said, economic crime is now massive. It costs the country £290 billion annually—more than a quarter of the Government’s total public expenditure—and all of us who are concerned with this area know that that figure is conservative. The latest figures from UK Finance that came out last week suggest that in 2020 there was an 8% increase in fraud, which of course is the biggest component of economic crime.
Much illicit finance, but not all, comes from Russia, through Russian companies and Russian individuals. As various Select Committee reports on the subject show, for too long we have turned a blind eye to the threat that Putin’s kleptocratic regime poses to our economy. Why did we do nothing after the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, or after the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in 2018? Those were two brutal attacks on British soil.
We must add to that the findings of a recent report by Buzzfeed News investigations, which established that between 2003 and 2016, there were 14 more suspicious deaths in the UK of individuals who were hostile to the Russian state. I will mention just three of them. Stephen Curtis, the British lawyer who helped the laundering of money—potentially billions of pounds—in the UK for wealthy Russian oligarchs, died in a helicopter crash in 2004. Alexander Perepilichnyy blew the whistle on a multimillion-pound Government fraud in Russia. He flew to Britain, and died of a so-called heart attack when jogging near his home in Surrey in 2012. The coroner’s inquest said that he died of natural causes, but evidence given, I gather, behind closed doors for national security reasons said that there was no natural cause determined. Some suspect that he was poisoned. Boris Berezovsky, who made his wealth during the collapse of the Soviet Union, was famous because he was key in supporting Putin and getting him into power in Russia. In 2013, he was found hanged in his home.
Those are only three of 14 cases, but in all of them the police concluded that the deaths were not suspicious. There was no investigation, or indeed any suggestion that those were Russian state-sanctioned murders, although the US intelligence services told our police that they thought the deaths were likely sanctioned by the Kremlin. Were the police just incompetent? I doubt it. Was there pressure from somewhere else—from either our security services or our Government—to turn a blind eye to the possibility that those were state-sanctioned murders? American intelligence officials told Buzzfeed journalists that Russian killers had been able to kill in Britain with impunity. They said that one of the reasons for the reticence of enforcement agencies to act was
“a desire to preserve the billions of pounds of Russian money that pour into British banks and properties each year.”
As we debate the failures of our enforcement agencies in tackling illicit wealth, we should bear in mind that the problem goes well beyond the funding, the skills and the effectiveness of the enforcement agency. If we are really to eradicate dirty money, we require action on a wide number of fronts, as the all-party parliamentary group for fair business banking and the all-party parliamentary group on anti-corruption and responsible tax have said. We have put together a good manifesto that could form the start of concerted action to rid us of this terribly bad thing. We talk in the manifesto about action on four fronts. We need smart regulation, much greater transparency, proper accountability and enforcement. We are debating enforcement today.
All those measures are interdependent, and I worry a lot that the Government’s response through the economic crime Bill, which should be with us in the autumn, will be too little and too fragmented. Reform of Companies House, for which we have argued for a long time, is necessary but not sufficient. So are reform of anti-money laundering regulations, and an open register of property owned by foreign countries. We need co-ordinated action on many fronts if we are to clean up dirty Britain.
Today, we are focusing on enforcement. Our performance is abysmal, our record in successfully bringing bad players to account is miserable and our commitment to doing the job properly is questionable. The evidence—the hon. Member already talked about some of it—is overwhelming. The Bribery Act was introduced in 2010, and in the UK we have had 99 criminal convictions and six deferred prosecution agreements. The USA, with a similar legislative framework, has had 236 convictions in the same period. As I understand it—I could not find one, but if I am wrong, I stand to be corrected—we have never pursued a criminal prosecution against a bank for money laundering or sanctions busting. We use civil measures, but never criminal ones. In 2019, we had civil fines of £260 million. In the same year, the Americans pursued criminal action against and secured £2.5 billion from just six banks, and they secured £5 billion in civil fines.
As the hon. Member said—it is worth repeating, because it is so shocking—the Financial Conduct Authority fined HSBC £64 million in 2021 for AML failures, but nearly a decade before, it was fined £1.4 billion in America for AML offences. Standard Chartered is a British bank, so we ought to be the ones who are really responsible for ensuring that it behaves itself. What do we get from it? Fines for wrongdoing under anti-money laundering regulations of £102 million. What do the Americans get? Over 800% more: £842 million. Yet we know from the FinCEN—the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network—files that too many of our banks and too many individuals who work in our banks either passively collude with economic crime, or actively promote and facilitate money launderings. The banks that are implicated are so often the biggest British-based banks: HSBC, Barclays, Standard Chartered.
What we do in Britain is pursue the little businesses, the little men and women who are trying hard to establish new businesses here. That came home to me very much when I chaired the Public Accounts Committee and we had the leaks relating to HSBC—they were called the Falciani leaks. There were more documents relating to British accounts than, I think, for any other nation. There were 3,600 British accounts. At the time, the tax authorities said to us that there was cause for concern with about a third of those. Out of that third—about 1,200—they finally found 150 cases. How many did they pursue? One individual was charged. I could not find, in my search of Google, whether that individual was ever convicted. Look at how other countries dealt with it: every other country managed to charge more people, fine more people and get some compensation. The only thing that happened with us was that Rona Fairhead, now in the House of Lords, was on the board of HSBC at the time and was responsible for the audit committee. I cannot understand how anybody with that responsibility could not have seen a red flag when looking through the accounts from the Swiss branch of HSBC and seeing the profits being secured. The only thing she said was that she declared that the whistleblower was a criminal and that the only thing that HSBC should do was pursue the whistleblower and try to get him imprisoned.
Fraud is the crime that now affects one in 11 adults in the UK, yet convictions for fraud have collapsed by two-thirds in the past three years—cases up and convictions down. The number of criminal cases the Serious Fraud Office, in which we had great confidence, has under investigation has halved over the past three years. There have been some disastrous failures in the courts through the SFO with Serco and Unaoil, where it lost cases simply because it did not share information in a proper way—it failed to disclose relevant material to the defendants. There are lawyers in the Chamber. I am not one, but I cannot believe that it actually did that.
My right hon. Friend is making an excellent analysis of the situation. At the moment, the SFO is itself being investigated by a former Director of Public Prosecutions and being sued by the people it should be investigating. It lacks the money, the personnel and the powers to do its job. It has a £53 million a year budget against hundreds of billions of dirty money. This is a peashooter against an elephant, is it not? This needs reform urgently.
I completely agree with those observations, which are so well made.
The National Crime Agency has dropped its prosecutions by 35% in the past five years. The record of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which we do not often talk about, is equally awful. It sees its purpose entirely as simply getting tax revenues in. That is important, but it also has a duty to ensure that anybody who acts unlawfully in the way that they deal with the revenue authorities—or, more seriously, evade tax—is pursued. Yet it simply does not see that as part of its functions. Compare that to the Department for Work and Pensions, where anybody who has an allegation of fraudulently claiming benefit is pursued with vigour by the authorities in that agency. A similar attitude should be taken to what I consider the serious crime of deliberately avoiding tax and not paying into the common pot for the common good.
There are some egregious cases of schemes dreamt up with no purpose other than to avoid tax. One example was Working Wheels, which hit my desk when I was Chair of the Public Accounts Committee. In that instance, the person who wanted to avoid tax pretended that they were selling second-hand cars. That created money that then whirled through the system to create a debt, which they were able to claim against the tax liability from their legitimate earnings. Chris Moyles was persuaded that he could become a second-hand car dealer. Telling people that you are a second-hand car dealer is fraudulent. It is a fraud. And why that is not pursued with the same vigour as somebody who tries to lie about their circumstances to get a better benefit settlement is beyond belief. One of our recommendations is that HMRC should have an absolute statutory duty to pursue wrongdoing with the same vigour with which it pursues getting money into our coffers.
All the agencies are grossly underfunded. The Government trumpet the £100 million they will get from the economic crime levy, but that is peanuts when set alongside what the banks themselves spend on anti-money laundering and what other countries spend. Under Biden, the Americans have increased their expenditure on enforcement by more than 30%, because they define it as a security issue. What have we done here? We have had a real cut of 4.5%.
We have lots of ideas that would not require a call on taxpayers’ money. We could enable a percentage of the fines collected from successful actions to be used to fund further activity and staffing within the enforcement agency. We could follow the American example and say that costs incurred by the defendant, were we to lose cases, should in no way be met from the public purse. Why should people against whom we allege wrongdoing in relation to Government funding be allowed such a contribution? One thing we will come back to is the sanctioning of individuals. We have frozen the assets of a lot of Russian oligarchs, but we have no mechanism to seize those assets. A move from freezing to seizing—we are doing some work next week to look at the practical changes that would have to be brought in to enable that to happen—would release more resources not just for enforcement activity but, in this instance, to help with the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war.
Staffing must grow. For example, there are only 118 employees to deal with more than half a million suspicious activity reports a year that the agencies receive. By my arithmetic, that is 4,250 reports per official. In Germany, there are 500 reports per official. In Australia, there are 1,400 reports per official. They are all better staffed than we are here. This is so much an invest-to-save activity. It is a nonsense that the Government do not distribute their resources in a way that enables that to happen.
There is also the chaos of our existing regulatory infrastructure, which is fragmented. As the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton said, lots of stuff falls through the holes. A lot of whistleblowers and people come to me with cases, and I refer a case to one agency, which tells me to refer it to another, and it then disappears and I never hear about it again.
We must take on board the failure of the professionals to self-regulate. There are too many bodies; 13 bodies supervise the accountancy sector. The hon. Member and I met representatives of one of those the other day. I think that they have suspended seven people in the past year. That is a nonsensical figure in relation to the activity that is taking place—the collusion and facilitation of wrongdoing—so we have to sort out the regulation of the enablers and the regulator. There is an overarching regulator, which regulates all the regulators. That should be sorted out and personal responsibility must be taken.
I will make two other points. The most egregious case that I have come across—this is a comment on all our regulatory systems and our failure to enforce—relates to Lebanon, where there was a tragic explosion in a warehouse that had fertiliser, which was supposed to go to Mozambique. That resulted in hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries and massive damage to property. A few weeks after that occurred, I got a phone call from a Reuters journalist with whom I regularly work. He told me that the company that owned the fertiliser was British-registered. I gave my usual comment about “hopeless, lax regulation” and did not think twice about it. About three weeks after that, I got a number of phone calls from people in Lebanon, the Lebanese Bar Association and others. It emerged that the company had been set up here as a UK-based company by a woman in Cyprus who was in fact the company service provider. She put herself down as the beneficial owner, but she obviously was not. She told HMRC that it was a dormant company, but it obviously was not because it was dealing in fertiliser. It then emerged that the real owners were Russian-Syrians and that the fertiliser was going nowhere near Mozambique, but to Assad to be used in barrel bombs to kill his people. That is a shocking story, but it demonstrates how our regulatory infrastructure and the failure of our enforcement agencies damages the lives of people not just here at home but abroad.
I have a final story, which, again, causes me great concern. After the Kazakhstan tragedy—a demonstration against the kleptocrats who run the regime where Russian soldiers were used to fire at the crowds and people were killed—two British academics came to me with their research, which demonstrated that there were 30 individuals in Kazakhstan who were involved in money laundering and human rights abuses and whom we should sanction. I used the privilege of the House to mention the 30 individuals in an Adjournment debate and then sent the list to the Foreign Office. A few days after that, I got a letter from one of the people I had named, asserting his innocence. Obviously, he wanted me to respond outside the House, so I acknowledged the letter and did nothing more. I then got a second letter with a phone call, asking whether we had received the letter. My assistant said that we had. I then got a letter from the desk at the Foreign Office asking me whether we had received the letter, whether we were responding and what we were going to do about it. I asked the Foreign Office why it was pursuing this and on whose behalf it was working. It said that it thought that it was important to facilitate relations between kleptocrats and British politicians.
That is shocking and leads me to think: are the Government really serious about bearing down on all the economic crime and corruption that week after week, year after year, we talk about in the House? If they are, they must pursue consistently and vigorously every instance of it, and not just the Russian kleptocrats—evil though they are—but kleptocrats elsewhere who are stealing from and killing their people and creating instability in the world.
I thank the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) and my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake)—the chairs of the all-party groups on anti-corruption and responsible tax and on fair business banking respectively—for securing this important debate. As chair of the all-party group for whistleblowing, I also thank them for making the APPG’s proposal to create an office for whistleblowers a policy recommendation as part of their “Economic Crime Manifesto”.
The recently published “Economic Crime Manifesto” presents the Government with good recommendations on how they can robustly tackle economic crime. Taken together, the manifesto’s four umbrellas for reform—transparency, enforcement, accountability and regulation—work to stop economic crime from all angles and at all levels. I ask the Government to give proper consideration to the detailed proposals made in the manifesto, if they are serious, as I know they are, about fighting economic crime.
The motion recognises the enormous cost of economic crime to the economy of £290 billion a year. It calls for an economic crime enforcement strategy and a restructuring of the fight against economic crime. That is much needed and part of that, in my view, is the office for whistleblowers. That office, which comes under the manifesto’s “Accountability” heading, would go a long way to supporting the detection of economic crime by supporting the individuals responsible for detecting the majority of fraud.
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, in its 2022 “A Report to the Nations”, found that 43% of fraud was detected through whistleblowers versus just 15% by internal audit and 3% by external audit. Whistleblowers are the single most cost-effective detection tool yet, as it stands, there is little to incentivise whistleblowers to come forward with information. When they do, they face, at best, being ignored, stifled and gaslit and at worst, having their careers and lives destroyed. When an employee blows the whistle, they risk retaliation, harassment, unfair dismissal and blacklisting and, as we have heard in relation to some crimes, much worse.
Meanwhile, the bosses of economic crime gangs take money from hard-working taxpayers and funding from much-needed public services. Although the knowledge of having done the right thing may be sufficient reward for many, it is the personal cost that deters so many others. With little to look forward to but possible pain and suffering ahead, is it any wonder that people choose not to speak up?
To combat economic crime, we need a shift in society, where people feel confident to come forward and are supported in doing so. Disturbingly, the National Crime Agency believes that just 20% of incidents of fraud are reported. Although the Office for National Statistics crime survey reports more than 3 million incidents of fraud a year, the true figure could be five times that.
While a whistleblowing-positive culture will uncover more economic crime that will need investigating, the office for whistleblowers would support law enforcement. The office would be responsible for setting, monitoring and enforcing standards for the management of whistleblowing cases, would provide advice services and a clear avenue for disclosures, and would direct investigations and handle redress for whistleblowers. Although the current whistleblowing legislation covers only employees, anyone who blows the whistle—witnesses, contractors and many others—would be supported by the office for whistleblowers. If we want to combat economic crime effectively, we need to know about instances of it, to understand the scale. If we want to understand the scale, we need those with the information to come forward. If we want people to come forward, we need them to be able to do so without repercussions.
Serious and organised crime funds gangs and results in public and private money co-mingling with drugs, human trafficking, arms dealing and more. At a time when the state and individuals can least afford it, billions of pounds are being funnelled into illegal activities, despite modern and sophisticated crime detection techniques. Despite Government efforts over recent years, we are continuing to lose vast sums to criminals. That suggests to me that a new approach to handling economic crime is needed. I thank the right hon. Member for Barking and my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton for securing this important debate; I am happy to support the motion.
I thank the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) for bringing this debate to the House and for all their work in bringing together the superb set of proposals in the economic crime manifesto. It is an important debate for us to have, even on a day like this, for the simple reason that at the heart of every autocracy, every dictatorship and every tyranny is corruption. Those who enable that corruption enable dictatorship, tyranny and autocracy. Our country led the industrial revolution and is a proud hub for the global financial services industry. Just as we once destroyed slave trading around the world, it is imperative that we destroy economic crime around the world in the 21st century. That is why the debate is so important.
I commend the all-party groups for the publication of their economic crime manifesto. I draw the House’s attention to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s contribution to the debate—our report published last week. The conclusion that we reached, which is set out clearly at paragraph 14, is a pretty damning indictment of where we have ended up:
“The Government’s unwillingness to bring forward legislation to stem the flow of dirty money is likely to have contributed to the belief in Russia that the UK is a safe haven for corrupt wealth.”
The ecosystem of wealth managers, lawyers, PR merchants, bankers and estate agents who enabled Putin’s kleptocrats have contributed to the strength of Putin in Russia and therefore to the prosecution of war in Ukraine—that is the conclusion that the Foreign Affairs Committee came to last week.
My right hon. Friend is speaking very well on the subject, as he always does. We have heard that the oligarchs use Londongrad as a playground, not just for leisure and lifestyle but for criminal activity, because law enforcement is too weak. What adds insult to injury is that when journalists and private investigators step up to expose what is going on, they are subject to punishment from the institutions of this country—the courts—through SLAPP, or strategic litigation against public participation. The people who are getting away with it are the people who should be in the dock.
Exactly. My hon. Friend is absolutely right.
I will quickly run through five parts of the economic manifesto that have to be at the core of the next economic crime Bill. One of the virtues of having this debate today, at this moment of great flux in our politics, is that I hope to put on the record the cross-party consensus that now exists about the provisions that need to go into economic crime Bill 2.
Many of us argued for a long time for the first Bill, which was rushed through the House in record time for obvious reasons. Many of the amendments that improved the Bill came from participants in this debate. What we are saying to the Government today, through the good offices of the Minister, is that the Bill did not go far enough—it did not begin to touch the scale of the problem. There is therefore an expectation that when the Government draw together the provisions of economic crime Bill 2, they will look at the economic crime manifesto, the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report and the text of this debate.
The right hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech. May I recommend that the Minister —or the Minister responsible, when that Minister is in place—also reads the Treasury Committee’s report “Economic Crime”, which sets out recommendations similar to those of the Foreign Affairs Committee?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The joy of the Minister’s position must surely be that Members of this House have done the heavy lifting for him. Between us, we have sketched out a pretty comprehensive catalogue of measures for the Bill: we have not quite put the clause numbers in, but I think we have set out most of the measures.
Those measures have to start with information about the crime. That is why we need the whistleblower provision, because whistleblowers are so often the source of intelligence, and it is also why we have to reform the suspicious activity reporting regime. Not only does the regime need widening so that it bites on more organisations such as estate agents but we have to find a way of pooling the intelligence that comes from suspicious activity reports and focusing on where we think the harm is greatest. Our Committee has heard that loud and clear, not least in New York last week, where our excellent consular team pulled together a wide-ranging discussion for us. Lots of banks, law firms and so on are saying, “Look, we are spending all our time running platinum-plated processes, but without sieving the information intelligently and focusing on the 0.01% of reports to which we really should pay some attention.”
My hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) has drawn attention to the way our courts are being used to shut down journalists, which is the third piece of the puzzle. We need courageous journalists to speak the truth; we cannot use English courts to shut them down, as is happening in London.
There are some changes that we need to make to ensure that we have good information and intelligence. We then need to ensure that the regulator is in place. The argument about needing a better Companies House has been well rehearsed; it is just crazy that the “know your customer” provisions that bite on so many commercial organisations do not bite on Companies House, so it is recording directors with names like Mickey Mouse, and in some cases not recording directors at all.
I fully agree that we need criminal liability for directors as a third set of provisions. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton is absolutely right to sketch out the parallel with the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, which requires people to identify the harms of which their organisation may be guilty and put provision in place to prevent those harms from happening in the first place. Prevention is always better than cure.
We obviously need to transform enforcement. We need to double, at least, the budget for the National Crime Agency. We need to match, at least, the money that the private sector puts into law enforcement. We need to take steps to reduce the costs, which is the only way to start getting unexplained wealth orders through. In America they would love the power of unexplained wealth orders, but we have had to explain that they are currently useless because we just cannot prosecute them successfully through the courts.
On top of that architecture, we need to create one further set of offences to tackle the problem that in cases of corruption, the evidence that our agencies need is not carefully organised and filed away in Britain; it is offshore in jurisdictions where it is not available to us. When we cannot onshore the evidence, we have to somehow onshore the offence. We need to think about creating tough obligations on enablers, on company directors and on politicians in this House and the other place to declare anything that is suspect or corrupt. We almost need a suspicious activity reporting regime that allows us to prosecute people for failing to disclose things that they should be disclosing. That needs to carry a sanction which leads to civil proceedings for confiscation of assets. Unless we find a way of onshoring these offences, we will continue to be bedevilled by the problem of getting hold of the evidence that we need.
Out in the world, people are asking why on earth this place has not acted on economic crime. It is understandable that people should draw a connection between the flood of dirty money into our politics and our failure to act. It is a matter of tremendous regret that more than £7 million of the £54 million that has gone to the Conservative party in high-value donations has come from individuals with very suspect links to Russia.
Ehud Sheleg, who has been discussed in The New York Times, is deeply connected commercially with his father-in-law, Mr Kopytov. The New York Times recently revealed the way in which money came from his father-in-law to Mr Sheleg as a result of business activity in Russia—that was in the suspicious activity report—but when a number of us reported it to the National Crime Agency, the NCA just said, “Well, it has come from the bank account of a UK citizen; nothing to see here.” That is nuts, not least because there is now further evidence that Mr Kopytov is closely linked to business in occupied Crimea, and that money from that Crimean business went into Mr Sheleg’s account in 2018. Worse than that, Mr Sheleg’s father-in-law is now closely connected commercially to Alexander Babakov, who has been sanctioned by countries all over the world.
It is not a good situation for any of us when we have to raise concerns of this kind in the House, not least because we in the House will make mistakes. During a debate on 17 January, for instance, I said that Yuriy Lopatynskyy had questions to answer. I am glad that he has now answered those questions, and has given me reassurances that he has never had links with the Russian intelligence services. I am glad to be able to accept those assurances, and to apologise to him for any distress caused. However, it is not a good situation when we do not have regulators, intelligence agencies and police services that are able to tackle this kind of dirty money.
Dmitry Leus, I am afraid, is another example. There is clear knowledge of his recruitment by the FSB, who got him out of prison. He has a criminal record in Russia., and according to intelligence sources that I have seen, he is
“absolutely dependent on the FSB”.
However, he is also a significant donor to the constituency of Esher and Walton, the home of—I am not quite sure what position he is in at the moment, but he was Deputy Prime Minister last time I looked. The donation that went to the Prince of Wales’s charity was returned, but the Conservative party has not returned its donation.
We are not in a good situation when we are having to discuss this kind of money coming into political parties, and I therefore hope that the future economic crime Bill will ensure that the only money that can come into a political party is from profits that have been created here, in this country.
Let me end by again thanking the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton and my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking for initiating the debate.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) and the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) on securing the debate, and on the reports produced by their all-party parliamentary groups on fair business banking and on anti-corruption and responsible tax. Much of the debate so far has focused on what might be termed high-level and high-profile international and economic crime. I understand that, and I will touch on it briefly, but then I want to move on.
In relation to those very high-level matters, we definitely need to do more to tighten the rules on money laundering. I agree that the Bill that became the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 was much improved in the course of its passage, and we should certainly seek to tighten and improve the provisions of the second Bill when it comes before the House.
We also need to do more about corporate criminal responsibility and liability. The issue referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton relates to what, in law, is called the identification test. It concerns the mens rea, or guilty knowledge, of the “controlling mind and will” of a company, and the requirement to identify that controlling mind and will—a term which, in practice, has tended to mean only a very small cadre of senior managers, which makes it impossible to make the company liable for acts carried out by anyone who is other than part of that controlling mind and will, the very tight-knit group at the top who may be carrying out fraudulent acts for or on behalf of the corporate entity. The system is different in other jurisdictions, including the United States, and reform in that regard would be helpful and sensible. As the right hon. Member for Barking pointed out, it has proved easier in practice to prosecute small companies than to prosecute large ones, because the management structures of the large companies are often more diffuse, and under the current law it is therefore harder to identify those who constitute the controlling mind and will.
An extension of the duty to prevent offences would also be wise, and the Law Commission has recommended it in relation to fraud, but I think we should be open to going further. My one caveat, which I think the Law Commission flags up in its options paper which it published month, is that there is not always an exact analogy between health and safety at work offences and fraud offences. To convict for fraud, there has to be the additional element of dishonesty, either knowledge or “connivance”—a term that it often used—and, of course, dishonesty is not always a requisite element of the offences under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. A distinction may need to be drawn, and I think we have not gone as far as we could have. I am not saying that we cannot look at this, but I think it is important to bear that distinction in mind.
Would my hon. Friend care to venture an opinion on the Law Commission’s recommendations concerning the potential for fixing the “controlling mind” legislation and legal approach? Could that be improved sufficiently to provide a decent alternative to the “failure to prevent”, or is it fundamentally unfixable, and would such a path therefore not lead to success?
The Law Commission often offers a sensible way forward, and I urge the Government to adopt those recommendations and try to implement them swiftly. This involved considerable work and a great deal of expertise and advice, and I see no reason for us not to move on the “controlling mind” test quite quickly, even if we needed to look a little further at the “duty to prevent” test. Neither of those is unfixable. They offer a sensible way forward in relation to the “controlling mind” test”, and I hope the Government will act.
The other matter I want to raise in respect of larger-scale frauds is the work of the Serious Fraud Office. It certainly involves controversy, and there are some issues to which the SFO needs to respond in relation to the conduct of certain cases. I hope very much that we will see the full publication of Sir David Calvert-Smith’s report on one of those cases. On the other hand, to its credit, with a staff of 250-odd, the SFO has secured for the Consolidated Fund, through payments under deferred prosecution agreements—of which there are now 12—the recovery of some £1.6 billion. If a modest percentage of that were ringfenced, and, rather than going back to the Treasury, were held and reinvested in the budget of the SFO and allied crime-fighting agencies, that would be a massive step forward in providing it with the resources with which to deal with serious international and corporate crime.
In one of the cases that we spoke about recently when the Justice Committee visited the SFO, the disclosure material involved some 1.9 million documents. Dealing with those is a massive task. The SFO could invest in more artificial intelligence for searching documents. There are some legal complexities surrounding that, but it is doable, and is already done in commercial civil litigation. However, it is necessary to invest in it. If some of that money from the deferred prosecution agreements were ringfenced and reinvested, it would be money very well spent.
Having spoken about those large-scale matters, I hope that we will not forget that there is a great deal of “small-scale” fraud—small-scale in the global picture, that is, but very big and important to the victims of fraud. The Justice Committee recently conducted a number of hearings on fraud in the justice system. The message of the evidence we heard from Victim Support was “Do not think that fraud is a victimless crime, which is all too easy to do”. That view was supported by the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, which reported that some 74% of fraud victims were emotionally impacted by the crime. At the very least, someone will feel that they have been made an idiot of; more often, they will have lost what may be a small sum of money for a bank, but is a lot of money to them. They will feel vulnerable thereafter, almost betrayed. So this is not a victimless crime, and we should never allow it to be thought to be so. This is coming from the people who have been talked to because they have reported the offence of fraud. There are estimated to be 3.7 million incidents of fraud but according to Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services, the majority of them are not reported. We need to do a lot more on that everyday fraud.
The hon. Gentleman talks about this subject as well as about the major frauds. I was shocked to find out that in 2020-21 fraud accounted for 39% of all crime and that the average investment fraud deprived the victim of £14,000, which is a significant sum of money to an individual. Is it part of the problem that we are not taking this seriously enough? If we were, we would no longer be relying on Action Fraud, which I thought the Government had agreed to wind up and replace with something effective.
It is extraordinary that fraud accounts for nearly 40% of all crime but only about 20% of police resources go into it, which is disproportionately low. The hon. Gentleman is right about the failures of Action Fraud. Every one of us will have seen that in our own constituency caseloads. It is clear from the evidence that we heard that Action Fraud is not working effectively. The stats told us that 876,000 frauds were reported through Action Fraud, CIFAS and UK Finance in 2021. On average, about seven frauds per minute are being committed. Of those 876,000, only about 58,200 were then disseminated for further investigation, and about 28,700 were passed on to the police National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, which sits behind Action Fraud. So even if someone gets through and gets anything done, only a small percentage of the cases are acted on. Ironically, for people who can get their case to court, the conviction rate is about 85%, but only a tiny percentage get to court. We have to do an awful lot more to get these cases to court in the first place, and that means much better treatment of victims and witnesses in those fraud cases.
The chair of the Bar Council, Mark Fenhalls QC, has said that
“this country has to decide whether or not it is interested in taking on the issue of fraud.”
The chief executive officer of CIFAS, Mike Haley, said it was surprising that
“there is no national strategy for fraud. There is an action plan, but it is a plan without a strategy.”
It would not be a bad thing for Ministers to upgrade the action plan into a proper full strategy and to have a Minister with overall responsibility for that action plan.
We need to look at the role of the financial institutions in high street fraud and credit card fraud. Often they are running very profitable retail credit card operations. Perhaps they could make a small investment and show willingness as responsible business people to contribute more towards anti-fraud measures. That might be regarded as a sensible and responsible type of business activity to assist with the significant costs that people have to meet.
We have to recognise that it is not just the big frauds that are international. The CPS, giving evidence to our Committee, stated that 75% of the fraud crimes that it prosecutes have an international element. That does not mean that they are Russian oligarchs or kleptocrats. It might mean that they are coming from foreign servers, for example, or they might be foreign-based scammers hitting not businesses but individuals through insurance fraud, scamming bogus products and so on, while based overseas. We need to find ways of improving our international co-operation around tracking down those matters. This all indicates that although good work is being done, it is not being done at the scale that is necessary or commensurate with the level of the problem and the harm that is done. There is the economic harm, but I stress that there is also social and personal harm, as the Committee heard. I hope we can use the upcoming opportunities to redouble these efforts, and this debate is very timely in that regard. I commend the reports from the all-party parliamentary groups, and I hope the Government will take on board the responses that we will be sending to the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office from the evidence we drew up only recently, as a spur to further and co-ordinated action. That is the most important thing.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill). He always brings a wealth and breadth of knowledge to these debates and we thank him for that; it certainly adds to the focus and the direction in which we wish to go. I also give my sincere thanks to the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) and the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) for their contributions. They have been terribly helpful to the debate today and we thank them for that. Others have contributed as well, and they have all added their experience and knowledge to the debate.
The Government stated in July 2020 that economic crime represents
“a significant threat to the security and the prosperity of the UK … This has a significant impact on the UK’s economy, competitiveness, citizens and institutions”.
It is therefore imperative for our own economic progress that we have an efficient strategy and proper guidelines to enforce punishment for economic crime. All right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken have indicated the direction in which we want to go and what needs to be done.
I would like to start with some figures, to give a real insight into the depth of economic crime in the UK. A total of 14.5% of the UK’s annual £2 trillion GDP is taken in economic crime. That gives us an idea of the magnitude of the issue. Some £190 billion of our losses come from fraud and a further £100 billion from money laundering. London has been described as a laundromat for corrupt money, and in 2019 the Treasury found many failings in relation to legislative guidance on tackling economic crime. We must do more to ensure that the resources are there to tackle economic crime properly. They are clearly not up to scratch at the moment, hence the billions of pounds that have been lost to theft over the last period of time. I very much look forward to the contributions from the shadow Minister and, in particular, from the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who will endeavour to answer our questions, as he always does.
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Government fast-tracked the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 to crack down on the elites and the dirty money in the UK. As a result of today’s debate, I hope that the Minister will give us an update on where we are, how the situation has improved and whether we can take any other steps here in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to do better. The Government must make tackling economic crime a much higher priority, especially as it is a threat to our national security. We had some discussions on that in the urgent question this morning, and we have had other discussions in this Chamber and in Westminster Hall on the same issue.
We have seen some of the most intensive sanctions in our history imposed on Russia to ensure that oligarchs and business owners cannot operate in an illicit manner outside their own borders. That is an important and welcome step, but given that economic crime accounts for some 40% of all crime in the UK, there is more regulatory action that we should take. We must have a strategy that encompasses all of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton referred to the “Panorama” programme and to the dirty money that came from Estonia right across Europe and ended up in one of the banks in Northern Ireland. In my intervention I referred to regulation for domestic customers, which is clearly there. I understand the reason for that regulation and I am in no way saying that it should not be there, but I have to question just how this can happen. Is it down to the bank? It happened to be the bank that I am a member of—I know some of the regulations the bank enforces on its customers because I am one of them. I understand that, but when I hear about £200 million moving across, it concerns me.
Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland has been significant in money laundering and in the criminal activity that it is involved in, whether it be money lending, protection money, drugs or, in the case of the IRA along the border, fuel laundering. The Government have made significant attempts to address all those issues, but many of those paramilitary groups have bought properties and businesses across the whole of the United Kingdom. I would love to see more attention being focused, through the legislation, on those paramilitary groups, who are criminals living off the backs of the local communities that they say they protect. They do not protect them; they take advantage of them and brutalise them. As a Northern Ireland MP, I am keen to see how this legislation can squeeze the paramilitaries, on both sides of the community in Northern Ireland, who are taking advantage of good local people.
We also need to consider the impact of cryptocurrency. I am sure that there are many cryptocurrency experts in the House, but I am not one of them. I have little or no knowledge of cryptocurrency. I am old-fashioned in preferring to use cash if at all possible, although I now use cheques and credit cards following covid-19, but cryptocurrency is becoming a more popular mode of finance among younger generations.
Not a week goes by when I do not see a story in the local or national press warning about cryptocurrency. I am not sure whether those warnings are heeded or whether there is regulation to ensure people are not caught by its sting. The Minister will give us his valuable knowledge of cryptocurrency and what is being done to regulate it, to monitor those involved and to ensure that our constituents do not find themselves in bother. There must be proper regulation of crypto-assets, with intensive efforts to ensure that people are not misled by the thousands of online scams. It is all too easy to make an onscreen decision, but people need to be aware that the decision is made once the button is pressed.
Consumers lost £754 million to online scams in the first half of 2021. I have been contacted by numerous constituents who have been victims of scams, and I suspect that others in this House will also have constituents who have been victims. Unfortunately, probably not a week passes without someone in my constituency finding themselves the victim of a scam, whether it is successful or whether it is stopped in time. The police issue a statement in the local press back home every fortnight warning of the latest scam, whether it is people knocking on doors or online scams. People are fairly trusting, by and large. More often than not, the people who are hacked or who find themselves the victim of online scams are of an elderly and vulnerable generation. A few months ago, an elderly gentleman in my constituency lost some £30,000 of his savings to a scam by being trusting. These things happen regularly, and the Police Service of Northern Ireland regularly advises people to be careful.
People should be careful with their information and when using online bank accounts. People are not aware of how much fraud there is in the UK. Our focus is often on large-scale dirty money and money laundering involving oligarchs—the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton mentioned the “Panorama” programme—and we forget about normal consumers who have their money taken every day and every week. The House must do due diligence to ensure that people are aware of the scale of the problem.
I will now conclude and give the Front Benchers the time they deserve. I welcome the numerous actions that the Home Office, the Treasury and the Minister have taken to ensure more efficient regulation and checks against economic crime. However, we have seen substantial sums of money coming to the UK through fraud and money laundering, so severe action and regulation is needed. We must ensure that the Treasury allocates the correct sustainable funds and staff to enforce proper punishment against economic crime, which is ever-evolving and becoming increasingly advanced.
I call on the Minister and the Government to take this into consideration, as I know they will. I am sure the Minister will answer some of our concerns. As we look to future policies to tackle economic crime, I praise him and the Government for all their work thus far. We need to be smarter than those who try to outsmart us.
I call the SNP spokesperson, Alison Thewliss.
It is a pleasure to come to the House this afternoon. Even with all the chaos and politics outside, we have come together to have a very good debate and to share comprehensive ideas and solutions to the ongoing issue of economic crime.
I thank the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) and the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) for coming together to secure this debate. We often all agree whenever we have such debates, and it is for the Minister to respond to our comprehensive agreement and suggestions. I have often been in discussions on economic crime in which all the experts in the room have solutions but the Government are way behind in implementing them. I urge the Minister to work with his colleagues and others to bring those experts together so that we can get to some kind of solution. It feels like we have been talking about this throughout my time in Parliament, and there has been relatively little action.
Enforcement is crucial. The Government can have the best rules in the world, but if they do not follow through with enforcement, as they have not in many cases, there is almost no point in having those rules at all. If criminals realise that they are going to get away with it, the rules do not matter. I am sure the Minister will address what has been said about the Financial Action Task Force but, again, there is a gap between the rules and the enforcement; between what the FATF has said about the UK and the UK regime and the actual reality on the ground.
A number of Members highlighted that things move fast in this area. The hon. Members for Thirsk and Malton and for Strangford (Jim Shannon) both mentioned crypto-exchanges and cryptocurrencies, which is a fast-moving and fast-developing situation that means money can move away from people very quickly. Tracing that money then becomes incredibly difficult.
It strikes me that perhaps the Government need to get further into the expertise of this sector, because the criminals who do these scams and financial crimes are always several steps ahead of the Government on the technology, skills and expertise. It takes the Government and legislation an awfully long time to catch up with the fraudsters’ expertise.
The issues with Action Fraud—or inAction Fraud—have been set out very clearly by many people. It has been a problem for years, and I understand that the Scottish Government do not pay into Action Fraud because they do not see the value. They get nothing from it, so instead they look to our police force to deal with fraud. I will talk a wee bit about that, too.
We have a crime campus at Gartcosh just outside Glasgow. When Assistant Chief Constable Patrick Campbell gave evidence to the Treasury Committee as part of its economic crime inquiry in early 2021, he talked about the value of the crime campus. There are 27 enforcement bodies in one location, so people can speak to each other as they go about their business. They are made to communicate because of the useful way in which the campus is set up.
Patrick Campbell also talked about Scotland’s economic crime and financial investigation unit, detailing that 150,000 officers are tasked with serious organised crime and high-level fraud, and 17,000 people are gathering that information on the frontline and making sure that people know where to report these crimes. That contrasts with the fragmentation across the plethora of UK agencies, as the Treasury Committee’s report highlighted. Nobody has proper responsibility and proper oversight over economic crime in the whole UK, which really shows when it comes to enforcement.
Some very good suggestions have been made, and I would welcome more executive responsibility and liability for economic crime. A duty to prevent economic crime is crucial, and a good comparison was made to the Health and Safety Executive. Because nobody is responsible or accountable for economic crime, it is difficult to see anybody doing anything about it. I would extend that to social media companies—some of the evidence we took in the Treasury Committee reflected this—because they are where an awful lot of fraud happens these days.
I went to an event in this place with TSB Bank, which sent me some more information about the levels of fraud on social media platforms. It reported that between January and March, 70% of that fraud came through Meta companies—24% on Facebook and 46% on Instagram—with 4% on Snapchat and 23% on other social media platforms. Why is Meta not being held to account for the fraud on those platforms? It is not Facebook, Instagram or Snapchat that have to pay up for such fraud, but the banks. That fraud is not the banks’ fault. They are not facilitating it; the social media companies are.
The hon. Lady makes an important point. The point about the failure to prevent offence is, of course, that it does not just apply to the banks; it could also apply to the companies she talks about, which are facilitating the scamsters who facilitate the crime. It could also apply to the senior executives in the organisations she refers to.
I absolutely agree. The hon. Gentleman made a point about the fraud coming through on his WhatsApp. There is a real problem there; such fraud is taking place on those platforms. If they did not exist, perhaps the fraud would happen in a different way, in a different place. However, social media companies ought to be taking real responsibility. TSB said that one of the highest value incidents within the period I have mentioned was a £3,000 fraud carried out against somebody on a social media platform, with the average amount of fraud being £415. That is a lot of money for people to lose. Many people on social media might not be on particularly high incomes, but they might buy and sell across marketplaces. We see fraud where someone advertises a games console, and when people pay the money over, it never arrives, because it was literally just a picture of a games console. Some people then try to pass that on to somebody else, and more people get scammed. This is a real issue. TSB ran a sample across a week and found that 67% of those purchase scams were happening on Meta. The Government need to do an awful lot more to understand the levels of such fraud, how it is happening and how we should go about chasing it down. There is an awful lot more that can be done in that regard.
I come to the issues that the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) so excellently and comprehensively set out about kleptocrats, Londongrad and the dirty money washing through the City of London and other places. The Government should be seeking out the experts on that, getting them to come in and exploring these things with them. I am referring to experts such as Oliver Bullough and other journalists who have done so much to expose this. Why is this still happening? Why is it still being allowed? What opportunities are there in the economic crime Bill to nail this down and do more than the Government have done so far? Although the first economic crime Bill was a welcome reaction, it was pretty small scale, and an awful lot more needs to be done.
As I often say, more needs to be done on Scottish limited partnerships, which have been used so well to facilitate such fraud. It has spread, as it does—if we push down the bubble in the wallpaper, it will come up somewhere else—to Irish limited partnerships. What discussions have the Government had with the Irish Government about what our failure to tackle this has done to their limited partnership system? What progress and what dates can the Minister give in respect of the register of overseas entities? We have talked about that for years, and nothing has yet happened. The Scottish equivalent has been set up and is operating, and the UK Government are behind.
Let us consider the impact on the wider economic system, on sanctions and on Russia. I understand that Bill Browder said this week that the UK is the world’s biggest destination for dirty money from Russia, and that
“there has not been a single Russian economic crimes prosecution in the UK”.
Why is that? What are the Government doing to ensure that nobody can get off scot-free?
I wish to talk briefly about Companies House, because I always do, and I will continue to do so until it gets fixed. Companies House is utter guff, and the register is full of complete nonsense. Will the Minister meet Graham Barrow, an expert in this area, to talk about the timescales and the process for reforming Companies House? Graham Barrow pointed out that on Tuesday this week, 4,063 new companies were registered at Companies House. That is not a sign of a booming legitimate economy, but a sign that something is very wrong with Companies House. For example, Wendy Siegelman, a journalist in the States, pointed out that a company was registered in Edinburgh in December 2020 under the name of President Donald John Trump. When she flagged that up with Companies House, the response was:
“The person was no longer President of the USA at that time.”
That is entirely missing the point; I do not think that Donald Trump is living and registering companies in Edinburgh—I think he is somewhere else in the world, doing other things just now. Companies House should be taking these issues a lot more seriously.
More seriously for the Government, Martin Williams of openDemocracy has mentioned that fraudsters have been exploiting Companies House to set up companies in the names of officials at the Ministry of Justice and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. This identity fraud being perpetrated through Companies House should be of great concern to the Government, not only because it is government officials being affected, but because you, I or anybody else, Madam Deputy Speaker, could be affected by a company being registered in our name. We would then become somehow liable for it, despite perhaps never knowing anything about it. Companies House reforms are well overdue. It must be an anti-money laundering supervisor in its own right, and it must ask for verification of not only our companies, but individuals.
I could talk for longer on this—I could talk until the cows come home or we lose a Prime Minister, whichever comes sooner—but I will leave it at that. There is an awful lot to be done on this, and the Government need to listen to the experts. The Government need to get them in, get them around the table and figure out how to fix this properly, once and for all—or give Scotland the powers to do so, and we will do so ourselves.
It is a pleasure to be here. I would not normally be in this debate, but what has happened with the National Security Bill Committee, statutory instruments and various other things leaves me here. I say firmly that I have learned a huge amount while sitting in this debate. First, I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), a dear friend, for securing this important debate, along with the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake). I am glad that he took on some of the technicalities about cryptocurrency. My husband sometimes talks to me about that, but I cannot say I am particularly across it. I say that to highlight a problem, which has been raised by the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose): we in this legislature, and in our law enforcement, are grossly behind, acting in an analogue form in a digital world. The writing has been on the wall in that regard for some time, and I fear that we have not kept pace at all.
I could not agree more with what the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton said about Action Fraud. I believe it was the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) who called it inAction Fraud, which is a considerably better way to describe it. What surprised me most was what the hon. Gentleman said about banks that everybody in this country trusts being fined so much money for laundering the money of Mexican drug cartels, among many other things. He spoke for the nation when he expressed disgust about there being no criminal charges laid against banks. The public would be absolutely appalled to hear that, especially given how ready our agencies are to chase up our constituents if they fall foul of something, as many Members have pointed out. His solutions were good and well thought through, and I am an absolute fan of a preventive duty, as the Minister may well know. I think we have to act to put preventive duties in place to address those who are considering turning a blind eye and taking the fines because they have big pockets. We need to firmly place this in their wheelhouse.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Barking will be so missed by this House when an election comes—that could be in the next 25 minutes—because she has been a giant in the fight against dirty money. She said that there can be no prosperity for our country based on dirty money, and that call should be taken incredibly seriously. When she tells stories such as the one about the situation in Lebanon, we cannot sit back and act as though the receipts into our nation result in some sort of prosperity that gives us a reason to turn a blind eye. I, as a British citizen, along with every British citizen in my constituency, do not want my country being used as a place to hive off the interests of people who make barrel bombs for Russia and Syria to try to kill people—people who then have to flee to my constituency. I never want to hear a story like that again. Anyone who thinks that our prosperity should rely on such activity ought to know that it harms our nation, so we must act.
My right hon. Friend reminded us about the heinous run of murders and suspicious deaths that are linked to dirty money. This is not just about receipts, especially where Russia is concerned. It is chilling that Russian killers have been able to kill at will in the United Kingdom because of a reliance on dirty Russian money, and she highlighted some of the cases. Just this morning, we had to have an urgent question in this House because, at the height of one of those murders—the poisoning in Salisbury—our then Foreign Secretary and now Prime Minister met Alexander Lebedev without officials and without putting anything on a public record. These are dangerous instances; we are lying down in the face of what is, as my right hon. Friend highlights, not just dirty money, but murder and deceit.
My right hon. Friend reminded us that enforcement is abysmal. I can assure her that she is not alone in calling it abysmal. Enforcement in relation to all crime in this country is utterly abysmal. It is no surprise to me that economic crime is falling foul of the same dreadful regime—of falling charges, falling convictions and failing cases. In the face of this, the NCA faces cuts of 20%, so my right hon. Friend’s concerns about the agency’s ability are not about to get any better. Both the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton and my right hon. Friend compelled us to take seriously the recommendations of both all-party groups, and the Opposition absolutely will.
The hon. Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) spoke about the importance of whistleblowers. I totally agree with that, especially when we hear about whistleblowers dying mysteriously. It is no small thing to step forward about crime, but when we are talking about organised crime, the highest level of protection is undoubtedly needed. My hon. Friend and neighbour, the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne), made an impassioned plea. He said that we in the UK should be leading the world on ending this corruption; instead, we have advertised ourselves to Russia as a safe haven, and much more must be done.
The Government’s economic crime Bill is long overdue. For far too long, our country, and particularly our capital, has been a hotspot for dirty money. The Bill does not need to be overdue, from what I have heard in this Chamber today. All the amendments and recommendations are out there. They have come from the Justice Committee, as highlighted by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill); from the all-party groups for whistleblowing and on fair business banking; from the Foreign Affairs Committee; and from the Treasury Committee. Good work has been done, so why is the economic crime Bill so overdue? The illegal war in Ukraine and Russia’s aggression have brought that into sharp focus, but let us be very clear that it should not have come to this.
The National Crime Agency said in 2020 that there was a “realistic possibility” that money laundering alone in the UK amounted to hundreds of billions of pounds annually. The first economic crime Bill was delayed for years, with the Government blocking Labour amendments that have reformed Companies House and left Russian oligarchs with fewer places to hide. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central highlighted very clearly what is going wrong in Companies House.
Meanwhile, economic crime continues to rage across this country. Fraud now accounts for more than 40% of all crime, as we have heard, yet less than 1% of police resources goes to tackling it. Millions of people are scammed every year, but, as with so many other crimes, nothing is done. Only one in 1,000 fraud offences is prosecuted, and the Serious Fraud Office secured only two convictions in 2020-21—just two! That is one more than the number of Government prosecutions for child trafficking, because that was just one. Enforcement across the board is down on every form of harmful crime.
Has the Minister ever tried to refer a crime of fraud? Many Members have talked about their constituents and, in fact, themselves. I can tell him that I have tried to refer such a crime. There was literally a person using my name and my details to book a hotel—I knew it was happening because, when they were checking into the hotel, it appeared on my Google calendar. I know that they checked in because I did the sleuthing. But when I tried to report it, I might as well—I will not swear Madam Deputy Speaker—not have bothered. I was able to ring that hotel, find out that somebody had checked in—they were literally in the hotel when this was happening—and yet nothing was done. I am a Member of Parliament. Imagine what it is like for somebody who is not a Member of Parliament. I got absolutely nowhere.
The hon. Members for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and for Bromley and Chislehurst both mentioned the fraud strategy. Where is it? We are waiting for it from the Home Secretary. I am afraid to say that, when it comes to fraud, the Government and the Home Office have been missing in action.
I know that it has been a stressful day for the Minister. His entire Government have collapsed around him. He is one of the few Ministers left standing and one of the few Ministers who has not had to cancel parliamentary business today, but, despite all of that, I shall not let him off the hook. I hope that he will take this opportunity today to answer a number of important questions, many of which the Opposition have been asking for many months. Will the second economic crime Bill, promised in the Queen’s Speech, be introduced before the recess, or will it meet the same fate as so many others? Will this Bill, like the Victims Bill, be promised in multiple Queen’s Speeches before we even see it in draft form? Will the Home Office finally bring forward a fraud strategy—a promise that the Minister, although possibly not this particular Minister, made months ago? Or, again, will this be another broken promise?
Will the Home Office finally axe Action Fraud, which anyone who has fallen victim to fraud, will know is a completely failing service? If it does, will the Minister update the House on what steps are being taken to replace it and whether the replacement will be something that actually functions? Given the National Crime Agency’s hugely important role in tackling fraud, will the Minister rule out the 20% staff cut that the Government have reportedly asked the NCA to make?
This is certainly an interesting day to be responding to a debate. As is the case with the shadow Minister, this is not my usual field, but I agreed to respond to this debate about a week ago. [Interruption.] It is always nice to have those comments from the Deputy Leader of the Labour party. It is always a pleasure when she joins us.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) and the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) for securing this debate, and all the other Members who have contributed. It was good to have the rare chance of hearing from my good friend, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon).
We all agree that economic crime poses a threat to the integrity of our economy, and to the security and prosperity of the UK and our allies. Let us not forget the innocent victims who suffer both emotionally and financially at the hands of unscrupulous fraudsters. Economic crime, as outlined by many who contributed, affects more UK citizens more often than any other crime type, and we have heard many examples of that today.
The UK has one of the world’s largest and most open economies, and London is one of the world’s most attractive destinations for overseas investors. Those factors make the UK attractive for legitimate business and contribute to our prosperity, but the Government accept that they also expose the UK to the risk of money laundering via some of those processes.
The public/private economic crime plan published in 2019 provided impetus and direction for our collective efforts in this area, including strengthening law enforcement and increasing domestic and international co-operation. There has been progress in tackling the threat. For example, in recent years we have built some key capabilities, including the creation of the National Economic Crime Centre and substantial reform of the suspicious activity reports regime.
As a number of hon. Members touched on during the debate, we have enacted the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, introducing reforms to enable law enforcement to take more effective action against kleptocrats who launder their funds in the UK. We have also legislated for a levy on the anti-money laundering regulated sector, which from next year will raise £100 million a year to help us to combat economic crime.
I hear some of the concerns expressed by colleagues about the potentially fragmented nature of the enforcement landscape, yet I would emphasise that that does not mean there is not joint and co-ordinated working between the law enforcement agencies concerned. The ever-evolving and clandestine nature of economic crime requires a multi-agency response, drawing together the relevant expertise, capability and resources to effectively tackle this challenge head-on.
The Government believe that the National Economic Crime Centre plays a leading role in setting strategic priorities for the enforcement response to economic crime and bringing agencies together. The NECC leads intensification campaigns to prevent, prepare for and protect against economic crime and to pursue those responsible for it. Co-ordinated by the NECC, the joint money laundering intelligence taskforce serves as a world-leading model of best practice, enabling tactical and strategic intelligence sharing between the public and private sectors to better tackle economic crime and support high-priority operations. However, we recognise the need to go further, as many hon. Members have set out.
I note the Minister’s theoretical description of what happens, but the practice, for anybody who puts any allegation that we get from whistleblowers into the system, is that it just gets passed from one agency to another and it then falls down a black hole and we never hear about it again. While theoretically co-operation and co-ordination take place, in practice they do not. The other thing I would say is that, if in practice the system is working so brilliantly, why are prosecutions and convictions down by so much when we know economic crime is going in the opposite direction?
We would accept there is a need to go further and certainly, following today’s debate, we look forward to the debates we will have on the forthcoming Bill. From what we have heard today, I think Members across the House will have thoughts, opinions and valuable contributions to make on how we can strengthen our regime, in both its legal construction and its direct impact.
We recognised in the 2021 spending review the need to invest in this area. The economic crime levy, combined with public contributions, is now an overall package of £400 million to tackle economic crime over the next three years. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the National Crime Agency established a new combating kleptocracy cell specifically to combat corrupt elites, their dirty money and those who enable them to abuse our financial system. We also recognise that we need to further empower law enforcement through the forthcoming economic crime and corporate transparency Bill, which will be designed to tackle economic crime and protect our national security while supporting enterprise. The Bill will include much-needed reforms to Companies House and limited partnerships, with additional powers to seize suspect crypto assets more quickly.
I welcome all reforms of Companies House, but will the Minister put it on a proper footing and make Companies House an anti-money laundering supervisor in its own right, so that it does not have to rely on third parties to fulfil that function?
We will set out the details in the Bill and we look forward to the debates on it, but certainly we are clear that the registrar of companies should become more of an active gatekeeper for company creation and a custodian of reliable data, including powers to check, remove or decline information submitted to it. In her contribution, the hon. Lady rightly gave the example of someone setting up a company in the name of “Donald Trump”. Clearly that was not a legitimate company being established—[Interruption.] Some hon. Members may have missed that particular example.
Some of the changes are on identity verification. In my normal role talking about immigration, we do quite a range of work on ensuring that people can validate who they are and what their status is, and we want to bring a lot of that practice into the area of company formation to remove some of the worst examples we have heard about today. I accept that many people will see that as overdue, but it needs to be done and it is something we intend to legislate on and bring forward as a key change to our enforcement structure, to ensure there are fewer opportunities to abuse the system of company registration here in the UK.
Comments have been made about the resources of the National Crime Agency. We have increased its budget year on year since 2019. Taking all NCA funding into account, its budget has increased by 32% since 2019.
In response to concerns on corporate criminal liability laws, which a number of colleagues picked up on in the debate, we have sought to establish whether there is a case for change. I think it was my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) who referred to the Law Commission and the review we asked it to undertake. As he rightly says, it sets out several options for reform; he outlined his view that he would like to see us accept them, and we are assessing them. Certainly, that is something we specifically asked the Law Commission to do because we believe it is an area that needs careful consideration.
I know the Minister wants to assess the options, but he will be aware that that debate has been ongoing for a number of years now, well in advance of its referral to the Law Commission. The matter has been debated in political circles and in legal and judicial circles for a great deal of time and there is a huge amount of information there, so I hope he can come to his assessment very quickly.
Obviously, it would be tempting for me, at the Dispatch Box in the current situation, to make a raft of pledges on behalf of the Government about all the things I might like to see happen. At this stage, I will say that I share my hon. Friend’s enthusiasm for coming to a conclusion on our assessment fairly quickly.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) in particular talked about whistleblowers. We recognise the value of whistleblowers’ being prepared to shine a light on wrongdoing and we believe they should be able to do so without fear of recrimination. I want to make it clear that workers can seek redress through the whistleblowing regime if they are dismissed or suffer detriment because they have made a protected disclosure. It is worth noting that uncapped compensation can be awarded by an employment tribunal to reflect this.
If a whistleblower does not feel they can blow the whistle to their employer, they may make a disclosure to a prescribed person. There are over 80 prescribed persons and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy regularly publishes guidance for them and updates the list of prescribed persons.
I appreciate the fact that the Minister is covering this brief. On the point he makes, if whistleblower legislation works, then why has my constituent Ian Foxley, who blew the whistle on GPT Special Project Management in 2011—a company that was found guilty last year and faced £28 million in financial sanctions—been without a single penny of compensation or a single penny of earnings for 11 years? The legislation is not broad enough or all-encompassing, and it needs urgent reform.
As always, my hon. Friend makes a powerful case for going further. He will be aware that the Government have committed to a review of the whistleblowing framework, and we are considering the scope and timing of that review. We would certainly be happy to engage with him about how that could be taken forward effectively, particularly given examples such as the one he has cited, although he will realise that I do not necessarily want to comment on individual cases from the Dispatch Box.
This has been a helpful and productive debate. I reassure colleagues that the Home Office and the Treasury, when leading the policy response for Government, ensure that we do so through a governance structure that oversees activity across the system. This is not the only area where our two Departments work together in the national interest to deliver the overall objectives we wish to see.
In closing, I again thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions to this debate. This is an immensely important subject and an area in which we will shortly see significant legislation brought before the House for colleagues to scrutinise, examine and develop, as I know they will want to. Certainly, from what we have heard in this debate, there will be many positive and constructive engagements in that debate. That is something we very much look forward to, because, as has been said, this is not just about tackling crime; it is ultimately about keeping our nation and its allies safe.
This has been an excellent debate. I thank all Members across the House for supporting the application for the debate and for their contributions, and the Backbench Business Committee for granting it. I have learned an awful lot in addition to what I know from having looked at this issue for some time. “Coalitions” is perhaps a bit of a dirty word in the Conservative party, but I am a big fan of them, actually. I invite everyone who has spoken in the debate and anybody else interested in this issue to work with our all-party groups on this agenda, because we are not going away—we will make sure that future legislation is fit for purpose.
It is fair to say that, for whatever reason, we have turned a blind eye to this issue for too long. Ukraine has been an eye-opener because we have suddenly realised what it means and facilitates. I welcome the economic crime Bill mark 1, but mark 2 is coming along, with the reforms that will come from it. I urge the Government to look at the economic crime manifesto and include what they can in there, and also make provision in other areas, particularly on failure to prevent, whistleblowers, and beefing up, co-ordinating and strategising our resources.
It is great to see so much cross-party agreement on this. With all the work of the Justice Committee, the Treasury Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and our all-party groups, it involves MPs and peers across the political spectrum. It is time we opened our eyes. We have been a world leader in facilitating economic crime; we now want to be a world leader in fighting economic crime.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
“That this House notes that economic crime costs the UK economy at least £290 billion per year; recognises that law enforcement agencies are significantly under-resourced to deal with the scale of the problem and can be unwilling to properly enforce existing laws; is concerned at the fragmented nature of the enforcement landscape; and calls on the Government to bring forward an economic crime enforcement strategy that allows for a significant increase in resource to expand and restructure the fight against economic crime, including money laundering and fraud.”
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I assure you that I have informed the Minister concerned. I hope you will be able to advise me on how to shed light on a series of confused and potentially misleading comments made by the Prime Minister and his Minister regarding Alexander Lebedev. During his appearance at the Liaison Committee yesterday, referring to a meeting in April 2018 in which he met Alexander Lebedev, the Prime Minister stated:
“I have certainly met him without officials.”
This is a significant revelation and something no Government Minister has ever commented on under questioning. But during the urgent question earlier today, the Minister appeared to contradict the Prime Minister’s claim that officials were not involved, saying that the Prime Minister did involve his officials. Later in the session, she received word from the Prime Minister that he thinks he told officials. We must get to the facts.
This is not just a question of integrity but demonstrates a complete disregard for British national security. What action can be taken from the Chair or by Members of the House to ensure that Ministers keep their promises to us, to the Crown and to the British people to allow us to get to the facts of this whole murky business?
I thank the right hon. Lady for her point of order. I note that she says that she informed the Minister, quite correctly. It is not for the Chair to determine these matters, but those on the Government Front Bench will have heard what she had to say, and I hope that they will pass back that we would expect the record to be corrected if it needs to be. In addition, the Table Office may be able to advise the right hon. Lady of other ways she might like to pursue the concerns that she has raised.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
“That this House has considered Alcohol Duty and tax on alcohol.”
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Gateshead (Ian Mearns) and the Backbench Business Committee for selecting this important topic for consideration, and to all Members across the House who supported the case that it should be considered. This debate is hugely important to a large number of businesses across the country—the hospitality sector in general, brewers, vineyards, distillers and retailers, employing hundreds of thousands of people. A disproportionate amount of them will be small businesses with younger employees, so getting this policy right really matters.
I start by paying tribute to the Government for recognising this Brexit opportunity. Taxation and alcohol duty has been needlessly complicated for too long, yet the UK was tied to EU restrictions preventing change. The Government set out their intentions to review the structures in March 2020, followed by a consultation on their proposals in October last year. The Government’s stated aims are to make the system simpler, more economically rational and less distortive, and to reduce the administrative burden. It is fair to say that these positive intentions are included in the thrust of the proposals. The consultation is welcome because it creates the opportunity for hon. and right hon. Members, and the industry, to respond and to further develop the plans. My comments are aimed at encouraging the Minister to refine the proposals further now that the industry, consumers and officials have considered how they would work in practice.
On beer duty, there has rightly been a warm welcome for the lower duty on draught beer. There has also been a recognition that the proposed 5% reduction should also apply to kegs and casks of 20 litres rather than the 40 litres set out. There has been a strong indication from the Treasury that this may happen, and I ask the Minister to confirm her intentions. I would also press for a greater reduction than 5% a pint in order to further support the industry, and pubs in particular. New research published this week highlighted that England and Wales have 7,000 fewer pubs than just 10 years ago. We all recognise the important role pubs play in our community and society at large, and also in providing a watching influence on people who enjoy having a drink rather than their being encouraged by the cost incentive to drink at home.
The plan to widen the reduced rate from 2.8% to 3.4% ABV is also a positive move, but a minor adjustment to 3.5% would resonate much better, and enable the industry to innovate further. To help to protect smaller brewers from the larger operators who may simply adjust their recipes to take advantage, it is important that the relief that they currently receive under the small brewers relief fully applies at this level. It would also make this element competitive with EU directives, and provide further support to small businesses within the industry.
I commend the right hon. Member on bringing forward this debate on an important issue. The past few years have impacted greatly on local pubs, bars and restaurants—they are the ones who have suffered. At the same time, Tesco and Asda, to take just two examples, can sell exorbitant amounts of alcohol with low tax while others are left suffering. Does he feel that with the Government’s proposed steps, which he will speak about later—lowering alcohol taxation and encouraging people to support local—pubs can pick up the business they once had and have lost? Does he agree that that is a positive way forward?
The hon. Member makes an extremely important point. As I said, some people are encouraged to drink more at home by the discounted prices offered by the large retailers. I would add that in Scotland and Wales—I am not so familiar with the position in Northern Ireland—the retailers receive the extra differential with minimum alcohol pricing, in comparison with what is available in England. That gives some room for the Treasury to react positively to support the pubs and brewers, as he and I seek to underline.
The small brewers relief has been proven to deliver major benefits. It enables small brewers to compete with larger operators and to innovate and generate new options for consumers. It will be replaced by the small producers relief to offer similar or common benefits to the wider sector and to prevent the current cliff edge. Again, the Government’s objectives are positive, but I am concerned that the proposed changes introduce significant complexity to the process. Moving from 5,000 hectolitres at a 50% discount, to a maximum of 2,500 hectolitres at a 50% discount, tapering up to a 100,000 hectolitre maximum at up to 8.5% ABV, along with a cash limit and an average ABV measure, is much more complex than it needs to be. It is hard enough to say, let alone follow the process. It also makes it much more unpredictable for the businesses we are seeking to encourage to innovate, to invest and to create wealth at the smaller end of the scale.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on securing this debate on an important issue, and he is making a powerful speech. I was particularly interested in his point about broadening the duty from brewers across to the wider sector. In particular, the cider sector is important in the west country. Thatchers Cider, based in my constituency, is complaining, both on its behalf and that of many other small producers, about the massive increase in complexity that this collective set of changes has introduced. It may be easier to understand at a high level, but Martin Thatcher has written to me saying that for individual firms the
“huge increase in red tape and bureaucracy brought in as a result of these proposals will result in a need for increased staff to manage monthly excise duty returns”,
and he goes on to talk about the increased costs of that burden. I hope my right hon. Friend will address that and persuade the Minister to respond.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his point. The significant advantage that the cider industry receives—the differential in taxation status— is testament to the campaigning that my hon. and right hon. Friends have done for the industry. Some have called for that to be addressed, but that is not proposed in the Government’s plans, and I am not suggesting that should change. He makes an extremely important point about the complexity. Even when there are potential advantages for some sectors over others, the complexity detracts from that. The simpler the process, the better that would be.
I hope that the Minister agrees that the current proposal is too complex, and a simplified approach would work much better. The principles or broad approach of this incentive are important. Why is there no similar support for UK vineyards as well, all of which in the UK are small operators? These businesses invest for many years before receiving a return on that investment. The quality of wine competes on par with traditional winemaking countries and wins.
Llanerch Vineyard and Glyndwr Vineyard in my constituency are excellent examples. They invest heavily, have long lead times, are excellent employers and are great visitor attractions. In reality, they are small operators, and extending either the principle of the small producers relief to include vineyards or simply increasing the current arrangement—albeit simplified from the 8.5% ABV limit—would make a major difference and provide significant advantage to wines made in England and Wales. Support for such vineyards in the UK would not pose risks or undermine the Treasury’s ambitions and can be met within the World Trade Organisation rules.
This issue has been specifically raised with me by Bolney Wine Estate, on which the duty particularly impacts, along with other nearby producers, such as Ridgeview, which is on the edge of my pitch in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Lewes (Maria Caulfield), and Kingscote in East Grinstead. There is a collective ask across the English and Welsh wine industry, and I hope that the Minister, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) will be able to help these businesses to grow. They are small producers and tourist attractions, but above all they are businesses.
My hon. Friend makes an important point that underlines the issues that we have highlighted.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. As a member of the Campaign for Real Ale, I welcome his comments about the brewing industry. If we get the reduction to 22%, it will be welcome. On wine, he rightly references British vineyards, which are a great success story. Is he concerned about our trading relationships with many of our strongest allies, particularly when the Government are undertaking a trade deal with Australia? Australian winemakers are seeking to diversify from their market in China and are concerned about the new complexities being introduced. Does he think that the Government ought to engage with the Governments of Australia and other similar countries where our trade and security relationships are important?
The right hon. Gentleman makes an extremely important point. That is important for businesses, as he recognises, and because of the international influence that such policies have. His wider experience, geographically and on security issues, is recognised on both sides of the House.
I warmly welcome the proposed abolition of the additional tax on sparkling wine, which is particularly helpful to producers in England and Wales. Some 70% of wines from the UK are sparkling and the current EU system works against them, particularly as smaller operators, so that is another Brexit dividend.
The wider proposals for duty changes on wine also have positive intentions, but in practical terms, as they stand, they will leave more complexity in the system. The three current rates per bottle will be replaced by a total of 27 separate amounts per bottle, assuming that it applies to the labelled ABV. We must recognise that winemakers cannot dictate the specific level of ABV. It depends on seasonal factors, and the structure of taxation should take that into account.
The administrative burden will fall particularly hard on UK retailers, particularly specialist merchants that tend to carry small supplies of a wider range of products. For example, a small retailer could have a range of 2,000 to 3,000 different products. The variation between different vintages means that they would become swamped in red tape—a policy that runs against the positive intentions of the Minister and the Treasury. There would also be a need to take into account permitted tolerances.
The good news is that minor adjustments could achieve the Government’s objectives and simplify the structure for the industry. All wines fall within a spread of 8.5% to 15% ABV. Establishing such a spread and applying a common rate would simplify the process and give the Treasury the clarity it needs. For example, the industry believes that a rate of 12%—a 4% increase on current rate—would be a win for the Treasury and for it because of the reduced red tape. That demonstrates the earlier point about the cost of red tape.
It might sound logical to compromise—for example, to have just two splits instead of the high number of splits in the range of 8.5% to 15% ABV—but that would not work either. The complexity would remain and it would leave similar tolerance challenges. Taxing at one rate would help the Treasury to achieve its objective of providing clarity, as well as significantly supporting the industry.
I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend, particularly on this point. A company in my constituency, Direct Wines, has stressed the dangers to its business if the changes go ahead. Does he agree that they should be delayed until we have had more chance to talk to people about how they will affect their business?
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the complexity of the system, particularly in relation to wines and the variation of ABV, which depends on circumstances. I am torn about delaying, because if we can get this right—the industry needs only minor changes—let us do it as quickly as possible. Clearly, however, we would not want the proposals for wine to be introduced as they stand, so if they have to remain, it would be better for them to be delayed. It is a challenge, and perhaps the Minister can indicate how long she expects it to take to see the changes.
These issues are technical and complex, but they are hugely important to industries that employ and entertain millions of people across the UK. Previous Chancellors have often made a name for themselves by working closely with the drinks industry on such technical issues and have delivered a huge boost to employment, investment and society at large. It has also gone down very well with the popular press when they got it right because of the popularity of the alcohol sector, and rightly so. This is an opportunity to do the same. The intentions are right and the structure is logical, but changes along the lines I have highlighted would ensure that this important industry can continue to develop, grow and deliver for all our constituents.
I am incredibly pleased to be able to speak in this debate. I would like to speak about beer, cider and fortified wine—sometimes known in parts of Westminster as a work event.
The former Chancellor’s relief scheme for draught beer and cider excludes far too many of the small brewers and cider producers that need the most help. The ill-thought-out proposal to impose the 40 litre minimum container size to qualify for help has obviously been dreamt up by someone who has absolutely no knowledge at all about how pubs up and down our country operate. Almost all craft and small batch beers are kegged into a 30 litre container, which is 6.6 gallons for anyone who still wants to reintroduce imperial measurements. A small 4.5 gallon cask for real ale—a pin—holds just 20 litres, and many ciders are delivered to pubs to dispense in 20 litre bag-in-box containers.
Some 34% of licensees stock products in containers smaller than 40 litres to improve beer quality and choice for customers, while 46% of venues said that some products are only available to them in containers of less than 40 litres and one in 10 venues can only stock containers of less than 40 litres as they do not have the cellar space to sell the larger ones. I hope that the Treasury can finally own up to the fact that it plucked this figure out of the air, and instead give small brewers, cider makers and our struggling hospitality industry the break they need. Will the Minister confirm today that the industry will get the much-needed assurance that the threshold will be lowered to 20 litres after all?
I also want to talk about fortified wines because the forthcoming changes to the duty regime will have a significant and arguably disproportionate effect on port producers in particular. In my constituency, I have one of the UK’s leading distributors, Fells—a major employer in my constituency and in Hertfordshire more broadly—which is braced to see a dramatic decline in its sales should this go ahead. Aside from the dramatic price increase that will follow the changes, there are very real and legitimate concerns about the implementation costs and the increased red tape. The system changes, administrative burden and ongoing compliance with such a system will have further negative effects. The Government’s objectives for the alcohol duty reform consultation were welcome. They want to simplify the regime and reduce red tape, but the proposals simply do not do that. For wine, the proposed model cannot be described as simpler. Introducing taxation by degree will be complicated, costly and impractical. Unlike other categories of alcoholic drink, there is a far greater permitted tolerance for the alcohol content of wine made from fresh grapes, meaning that without testing every wine at the point excise duty becomes payable, it is not possible to determine alcoholic strength accurately.
Introducing such a system will disproportionately hit wine-dominant or wine-exclusive small and medium-sized enterprises, importers and retailers, which are an important element of the customer base for my constituency business, Fells. It is requesting that the Government conduct a full and thorough cost-benefit analysis of the impact on the wine sector and that this analysis should be undertaken as a matter of urgency before any such system is introduced. I would be grateful for assurances from the Minister that they would indeed consider running such an analysis.
Additionally, under the current proposals the suggested model penalises warmer climates. There are limited tools available to vineyard managers to keep ABV down to an acceptable degree, and production rules forbid winemakers from removing more than 2% of ABV. I understand that the Minister has met the Wine and Spirit Trade Association; it is also seeking further meetings because it is looking for an assurance that the Government will instead consider a more workable way of taxing wine by applying a flat rate based on 12% ABV for all wine and 18% ABV for all fortified wine.
The Government’s proposals would have a particularly negative impact on the fortified wine business. The total UK market for fortified wine is £311 million. Port accounts for £82 million of that, and Fells in my constituency is the leading UK importer and distributor. The Government proposals would add £1.09 duty to a bottle of port, resulting in an 11 % increase on the average price per bottle. Fells estimates that in such a highly price-sensitive market this increase could lead to an 11% decline in sales, or approximately 1 million bottles per annum. Fortified wines such as port and sherry are generally not consumed irresponsibly; they are bought and consumed at festive occasions, to mark exams and graduations, weddings and anniversaries, and at Christmas—they are an occasional treat. But we are in a cost of living emergency when treats are often the first things to go, and therefore this regime could have a huge impact on this market. So I ask the Government to think again, to consult more and not rush this through, and to do that cost-benefit analysis.
Overall, the alcohol duty reforms proposed by the Government just tinker around the edges in dealing with the pressures facing hospitality. We have a broken business rate system that penalises pubs, restaurants and high street shops. We have spiralling energy costs which remain uncapped for small businesses. We have food inflation and labour shortages. I ask the Government to seriously consider bringing forward a proper plan to protect British brewers, distillers, winemakers and their distributors.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) on securing this important debate.
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate on the taxation of alcohol and the Government review, and I should first declare that I am the chair of the all-party group on wine of Great Britain. I am also fortunate to have some fantastic producers in my Meon Valley constituency, who will have an interest in these policies, including brewers of beer, cider makers and, most importantly, vineyards. I have kept in close touch with them throughout the process of the consultations and review, and the points I make here are heavily influenced by their comments to me over many months.
In Britain we are increasingly a maker and exporter of wine. Our tastes as consumers, technological advances, and—we must face it—climate change have driven change and growth in the industry. I very much welcome the removal of the supertax on English sparkling wine. We have some brilliant vineyards around the UK. Hambledon Vineyard in my constituency is at the forefront with its award-winning wines. This will help it develop the market at home alongside its continuing success in the export market.
Vineyards face high start-up costs, and in the case of sparkling winemakers up to a decade of careful work before they have a wine they can market. I was pleased that the vineyards of Sussex recently achieved protected designation of origin status and hope that their counterparts in Hampshire and other counties will be able to achieve a similar designation. I will do whatever I can to help them get that recognition of their excellence.
In view of the challenges that winemakers and merchants face, we must look again at the proposals on wine duty. I appreciate the desire to simplify what has become a complex regime that dates from a time when we neither consumed as wide a variety of wines nor had so many made in Britain. However, the current proposals would increase the price of around 70% of wines, which would affect many small and medium-sized enterprises in the wine trade. It would also create a regime of 27 different bands, as we have heard, and the burden that that would impose on independent wine importers and merchants is a mountain of red tape, which we are generally trying to reduce.
The Wine and Spirit Trade Association has put a range of proposals on wine and spirits to the Treasury, including bringing small producers of wine and spirits into the small producers scheme that is available to brewers and cider makers. I favour a solution with duty based on 12% as the midpoint of the 8.5% to 15% range, which would cover three quarters of all wine. Fortified wines have a midpoint of 18%, which would provide a logical basis for another band. That would also tie in with the global market, which regulates all wines between 8% and 15% as just one product.
Turning to brewers, I ask the Treasury to look again at the Make it 20 campaign, led by the Society of Independent Brewers. The introduction of the draught duty rate has been welcomed across the industry and by CAMRA. Supporting smaller brewers has been a long-term aim of the Government but, in order to get the best out of the draught duty rate, we need to reduce the container size to which it applies to 20 litres. The 20-litre and 30-litre containers are the mainstay of supply for small brewers and, with the limit at 40 litres, there is a good chance that many would miss out.
When we look at the health of the pub sector, consumers want to see smaller brewers represented. YouGov recently surveyed pub drinkers and found that more than three quarters of respondents cited that as an important factor.
I will turn to cider, mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), which is the area of business that has benefited most from Government support in recent years. I urge the Government to act at that same level for our winemakers and brewers. Cider is a great British success story. Having talked to cider makers such as Meon Valley Cider, I look forward to them going from strength to strength.
Pubs faced a tough time during the pandemic. I argued strongly for restrictions on them to be lifted as quickly as possible and I wanted them to be able to continue off-sales while they were closed for on-sales. The sector initially recovered strongly during the pandemic, thanks to the Chancellor’s eat out to help out scheme. However, even with the good weather that we are having this summer, it is clear that pubs and restaurants are still operating below pre-pandemic levels—a figure of minus 20% is often mentioned—and that leaves a potential black hole in their margins, which are tight at the best of times, with some fairly rapacious major businesses in the supply chain. Macro brewers and pubcos have not been good friends to the pub trade, and that is why it is vital that we support our smaller producers. The Treasury has generally been constructive throughout the process, and I am confident that my colleagues will continue to ensure that we get the right policies in place to help our small brewers, cider makers and, in particular, vineyards.
It is a real pleasure to speak in the debate. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) on securing it at such a vital time for so much in the sector. It is a particular pleasure to speak as chair of the all-party parliamentary beer group, which is the largest APPG in Parliament.
A lot of public focus is given to the very real harm that can be caused by alcohol and overconsumption, but not enough attention is given to the real contributions that British beer and our community pubs make to almost every element of life. On balance, they genuinely are forces for good. They are a force for good economically, with beer and pubs nationally contributing about £23 billion to GDP and, as I am sure the new Chancellor will become very aware, about £13 billion to the Exchequer. They are present in every single one of our constituencies in every part of the country. We have about 1,800 brewers —possibly more—across the UK, including about 150 in the west midlands. My own constituency is home to at least five breweries.
They make huge contributions to our local economies. They are a force for good for employment, with beer and pubs employing around 900,000 people, with an almost identical gender balance. Around half the people employed across the sectors are aged under 25 and there is a fantastic variety of career progression across the industry. They are good for tourism. British pubs are named consistently as one of the top three things that visitors to the UK want to do here. They are good for exports. They are the third-highest food and drink export sector, worth about £550 million for the UK economy. Before the pandemic, the sector was growing more quickly than almost any other export sector. They are good for our society and culture. At a time when loneliness and isolation are often the biggest challenges facing some of the most vulnerable people in our communities, in many areas the community pub really is the last of the services in towns and villages.
I thank my hon. Friend for raising the long-term and managerial career opportunities in the sector, and for raising the charitable good will and fundraising that happens in many of our pubs. I recently went to a “Brave the Shave” in the Burrell Arms in Haywards Heath, which raised masses of money for Macmillan Cancer. That sort of thing goes on up and down the land, bringing people together and bringing good causes and good will together—as well as a good time.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. PubAid estimates that pubs up and down the country contribute more than £100 million every year to charitable activities and community causes, and a further £40 million for grassroots sports in our constituencies, so they really are forces for good in our communities.
As my hon. Friends have said, our pubs, brewers and many other parts of the sector have long been over-taxed. UK pubs and brewers are taxed around 20 times more than US tech companies, as compared by their turnover. They are taxed around five times more than UK gambling. The UK has one of the highest levels of beer duty in Europe—behind, I think, only Finland and Ireland—which is 10 times that of Germany. Taken together, our pubs and brewers contributed over £10 billion in tax last year, even in reduced market conditions—£1 in every £3 spent in a UK pub goes straight to the Treasury. I am sure the Minister is very grateful for that, but I am also sure that Members recognise the disadvantage and burden that places on responsible places for people to drink responsibly and in moderation, compared with the opportunities that supermarkets in particular and other off-trade retailers have to sell their products far more cheaply, with far fewer employment costs and far fewer responsibilities to regulate who they are selling to.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is an absolute travesty that about 10,000 pubs and restaurants could be lost if there are not more fundamental reforms to the tax system that affects UK hospitality? Many say that the pressures they face now are even worse than those they faced during the pandemic. Does he agree that we need to go much further than just having the alcohol duty reforms?
There has been a long-term trend away from drinking in pubs and on-trade, and towards supermarket sales making up a greater share of the market. Some of that will be due to natural changes in consumer preferences and people’s lifestyles, but we should not allow the tax system to aggravate such trends, which have real social and economic consequences. Where we can tweak the tax system to make sure that our pubs, brewers and other producers get a fairer deal and where we can reduce some of the disincentives to people consuming drinks in well-regulated public houses, we should do so.
I welcome the alcohol duty review, which is a massive step forward. The level of duty, which is much higher than in most comparable countries, is compounded not only by VAT, but by extremely high business rates. I hope that we can look at how our system of local business taxation can be further modified. The Treasury has clearly been piloting attempts to charge digital and online companies. That is an important starting point, but we need to make sure that our taxes on clicks are comparable with our taxes on bricks, to help sectors that have to operate in the real world. Nobody has yet established a viable virtual pub. A few people tried during the pandemic, but I do not think that any of those experiences quite worked out. It is noticeable that in April and May last year, most people were quick to get back to the real thing rather than using the online equivalent.
On the duty review, the proposed reforms are hugely welcome, particularly the banding that recognises the progression through alcohol strengths, so that higher-strength drinks have, if not quite exponentially more, progressively higher levels of duty compared with low-strength drinks. The changes to the low-alcohol band for beer for 2.8% to 3.4% will make a big difference to the availability of good-quality, lower-alcohol beer. Brewers find it relatively simple to change recipes to bring a 3.6% or 3.7% real ale down to 3.4%. It is much easier than getting a recipe down to under a 2.8% threshold without changing the character of such drinks, although I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan that 3.5% would clearly be preferable, if we are looking at those details.
Similarly, the proposals for small brewers relief are hugely preferable both to the system that we have and to the Treasury’s initial proposals, which would have caused a lot of difficulties for relatively small breweries. I accept that the changes will take a while to get our heads around—that is probably putting it lightly—but the current system has a distorting effect, with sharp edges that act as a very strong disincentive for growth and that impose an unnatural plateau at about 5,000 hectolitres. That means that unless businesses are confident that they will grow significantly beyond 5,000 hectolitres, they have very little incentive to invest in the extra staff and the extra capital to do so. The system that has been proposed is far better. It is very noticeable that what for a long time was probably the most contentious issue in the beer sector has now brought people together: although there are some details that each person might like to change, the overwhelming majority in the sector now feel that they can live with it.
I suggest that the Treasury look at whether it might be possible to extend some form of small producers relief beyond beer and cider, to include small wine producers. That would have particular benefits for English wine producers, and of course for Welsh wine producers; I must say to the SNP Front Bencher, the hon. Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson), that I do not know the scale on which Scottish wine producers are operating at the moment, but I imagine that they mostly fall within the smaller category.
The differential draught beer duty rate that the then Chancellor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Rishi Sunak), announced in his Budget last autumn is a fantastic proposal. It has the potential to make a big difference to supporting responsible beer drinking in our pubs, cafés and bars, instead of our supermarkets and—let us be honest—our park benches, town centres and street corners.
The difference will depend on the scale of the differential. The 5p differential is a good start in establishing the principle, but getting a new system up and running is likely to mean that almost all of it will be retained by pubs and breweries. That will typically mean an additional investment of about £2,000 being available to pubs, but if we want our consumers and beer drinkers to benefit from the draught beer duty rate, the differential will need to be widened. Only once it gets to 10p or 15p will we start to see a real difference in what customers pay for a pint at the bar, which will also make a difference by encouraging people to drink on regulated premises instead of buying from the off-trade.
We would like to see the differential not only increased but introduced at the first available opportunity. I know that the Treasury was looking at introducing something in probably the spring of next year, but given the difficulties that we all know the hospitality sector has had over the past two years or so, if a suitable fiscal event or financial instrument could be found that would allow the measure to come into force before this year’s Christmas season, that would make a massive difference. It would help the pubs that the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) referred to, which may be struggling, on the edge of going under or just about managing to stay afloat through the winter. Bringing the differential in early would make a big difference.
There has clearly been a very lively debate about container size; 20 litres is very obviously the correct answer. Having had discussions with the last Chancellor and the last Economic Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen), I think they recognised that 20 litres was where we needed to end up. I very much hope that incoming Ministers will reach the same conclusion. I think that the last Chancellor broadly accepted the argument that 40 litres was probably not the right container size for the threshold: he was pictured with the Prime Minister holding 30-litre containers to launch the policy. The 20-litre level will make a big difference to the range and types of beer that can be made available, particularly for our smaller brewers. However, I also think we should look at the provisions on distribution mechanisms, and ensure that containers do not necessarily have to be connectable to either a gravity-pulled or an electrically pulled draught system. When it comes to the pins of the kind typically seen at beer festivals in all our constituencies, where there is just a tap in the side of a barrel, I think that applying the discount to a container of over 20 litres makes a good deal of sense. Brewers I have talked to estimate that less than 0.1% of their beer is sold through those taps. We are not risking a massive distortion in the market from people buying huge numbers of these containers for parties at lower rates of duty, and applying this to all containers of over 20 litres would constitute a minimal cost to the Treasury.
The system introduced a few years ago in Australia does have a requirement involving connectors, partly because the Australian market is very different and partly because there is a much lower threshold—from memory, I think it is as low as 8 litres—but I think that a provision for 20 litres would capture virtually all the beer that almost all the small brewers that we are trying to support supply through our pubs and our licensed premises, and that they would benefit. I therefore hope that the Treasury will settle on that, as the obvious figure, in its final decision.
Once again, I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan for securing the debate. I also thank the Treasury for all the discussions that we have had over the past couple of years, particularly since the publication of the duty review. We look forward to the speedy introduction of these measures so that our brewers, our publicans and UK hospitality as a whole can benefit, succeed and thrive.
We now come to the Front Bench winding-up speeches. First, I call Richard Thomson.
Let me first say what a pleasure it is to speak in the debate, and congratulate the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) on securing it. Let me also declare my membership of the Scotch whisky all-party parliamentary group, and say how pleased I am to see that, after a day of turmoil, the Minister is still in her place. I am going to have to get to grips with two other Ministers whom I shadow, so it is nice to see some continuity in at least one area of my responsibilities on the APPG.
Alcohol duty has been ripe for review for a considerable time, on the grounds of complexity and economic impacts, but also on the grounds of the social and health impacts that it may have in influencing behaviour. I think—indeed, I know—that this could have been done at any time. Contrasting levels of duty are applied across the European Union, and the UK was towards the higher end of that, but many other countries had considerably lower rates, so it is certainly not a Brexit benefit that the UK Government are now able to turn their attention to this matter.
The former Chancellor clearly had an agenda to simplify the duty regime. It is perhaps understandable that the current Chancellor has not had a chance to share his thoughts with us. Of course, he may not even be Chancellor past the autumn; it will depend on how the cards fall. In any event, I think that this is the right moment for us to have this debate and reopen some of these issues.
Ideally, to my mind, what any Government ought to be looking for is a regime that supports domestic innovation—product innovation and technological innovation, of which there is a great deal in the alcohol-producing sector—along with investment and production, while also keeping the social and health impacts of alcohol consumption in mind. On that measure, in terms of the review of the parameters that have been set out so far, I have always taken a dim view of the apparent bias against stronger alcohols such as whisky, vodka and gin, and I will go on to explain why.
As I have said, I am a member of the all-party parliamentary group on Scotch whisky, and in my constituency in the north-east of Scotland there are three significant distilleries. The Glendronach distillery is near the village of Forgue, and the Ardmore distillery is near the railway at Kennethmont. The third is Glen Garioch and, unusually for a Scottish distillery, it sits not in the middle of an iconic natural landscape but slap bang in the middle of the town of Oldmeldrum. If you drive through Oldmeldrum, you drive through the different buildings of the distillery, depending on the route you take, and it really is quite remarkable. If you are in the north-east of Scotland, I would encourage you to visit it. Give me a shout and I’ll come along with you—it would be great to be able to show off such a distillery.
As well as producing excellent products, those distilleries are right at the heart of our visitor economy. Together with the rest of the whisky sector, they make an enormous contribution to Treasury revenues and to the UK balance of payments. It is not just the whisky that is important; many distillery sites in Scotland also produce the spirits needed to make vodka or gin. In Aberdeenshire there is a burgeoning sector of craft gin manufacturers and those who produce the botanicals to go along with that. There is real innovation there, and while I would not wish to overstate this, it seems iniquitous that we are taxing that domestic product at such a high rate and as a consequence perhaps influencing consumer behaviour to prefer other forms of drink that are not produced domestically.
Those levels of duty are disproportionate, and that is harmful on a number of levels. For one thing—I know from my discussions with the industry how significant this is—it becomes very hard when trying to strike trade deals, which the Government are obviously trying their best to do at the moment, to encourage other jurisdictions to bring down the sometimes punitive rates of duty that they apply to these products. There is also the inhibition that that, as well as some tariffs, puts on the bourbon sector. People might think that bourbon is a competitor product, but in many ways it is a complementary product due to the nature of the ownership of the distilling industry. Quite often the multinational companies trying to sell bourbon in these markets are also investing heavily in new production and new practices in the Scotch whisky industry, so it is all interlinked. The high level of taxation that we put on that product on the shelf is not very helpful.
Finally, let me say something about minimum unit pricing. This policy was introduced in Scotland, and I think it is fair to say that it was quite controversial at the time. It was attacked for a number of reasons, some good and some not so good. We have now experienced the policy in action for some time, and I can happily report that there have not been the predicted traffic jams at the border on the A1 at Berwick or on the M74 at Carlisle due to people doing booze runs. That did not happen. The most valid criticism of that policy approach was not so much about the increase in price as about the fact that the benefit of the increase did not go to the Government to invest in health measures but instead rested with the retailer. That was a fair criticism. I think it is fair to say that if any Scottish Government had had control over the range of duties applied to various drinks, they might have had a minimum price in mind, but they would have used duty as a mechanism rather than imposing that on the retailers.
Minimum unit pricing has also been introduced in Wales, and the feedback there has also been very positive.
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. It has indeed been introduced in Wales, and the evidence is that it has been a very positive thing in both jurisdictions.
We also need to look at promotions. Minimum pricing and other associated policies ended the practice of supermarkets using cheap, below-cost-price alcohol as a loss leader to draw people through the doors. Today’s evaluation of minimum unit pricing in Scotland—I am sure there will be similar evaluations in Wales—shows that, in the 12 months following its introduction before the pandemic, there was a 2% reduction in off-trade alcohol sales and, more significantly, a 10% decline in alcohol-specific deaths in 2019. With more alcohol being drunk at home and with the changes in behaviour we saw throughout the pandemic, it is still reasonable to conclude that minimum unit pricing is contributing to a lower level of harm and adverse health, crime and social outcomes than might otherwise be the case.
All of this has been part of an initial suite of measures to try to change the relationship we sadly have with alcohol in Scotland. We can have an incredibly positive relationship with alcohol, but we cannot be blind to the impacts it can have. I am pleased that the Scottish Government are reviewing the effectiveness of the current system of alcohol brief interventions where people have exhibited problem behaviours, and are reviewing how the product is marketed and presented to consumers, as part of delivering those improved public health outcomes. I believe a review of where we are on duties is a ripe opportunity to do that, and I would be failing in my duty as an SNP spokesperson if I did not say that this would all be better if it were devolved.
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I should have drawn the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests relating to the hospitality I have received from, appropriately, the hospitality sector. Can you advise on how I may put that on the record?
Thank you for giving me notice of your point of order. You have just done that, and I thank you for correcting the record at the earliest opportunity.
I congratulate the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) on securing this Backbench Business debate. He covered all the points very well.
Despite the strange situation in which we find ourselves, I welcome this opportunity to debate the principles behind the taxation of alcohol and the details of the Government’s alcohol duty review. I am glad the Government have managed to find a Minister to respond to this debate, and I welcome her to her place. We will see whether the review survives the change of Government.
Over recent months, I have engaged with representatives across the alcohol sector on these significant changes. The alcohol duty review represents the biggest change to alcohol duty in decades, so it is welcome that the House has had the opportunity to consider the changes in advance of legislation, for which I thank the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan.
I also thank all the other hon. Members who have contributed. Many of them spoke on behalf of alcohol producers and retailers in their constituency. It is clear that our great many breweries, cider makers, distilleries, wine shops and other alcohol-related businesses play an important role in supporting local jobs and economies, and we all know the importance of pubs to our local communities. It is good that hon. Members have been able to champion these businesses today.
Before addressing the specific issues, I will set out the principles that Labour believes should guide the changes. We agree that the alcohol duty system should be simplified and should be more consistent. For this reason, we welcome the principles behind the alcohol duty review, but we believe careful consideration should be given to individual changes. We recognise that there is a balance to be struck between supporting businesses and consumers, protecting public health and maintaining an important source of revenue for the Exchequer. Importantly, the Treasury must make sure there are no unintended consequences as it seeks to make these changes—we have heard about some of those unintended consequences in this debate. We also believe that special attention should be given to ensuring that small domestic producers are able to compete with global players across the industry.
I will now turn to some of the specific proposals for each category of product. The Government are proposing significant changes to wine duty. Currently, wine is taxed by volume, rather than by strength, and the Treasury states that there are a number of anomalies and distortions in the current system. The alcohol duty review therefore proposes that all wine products will be taxed in reference to their ABV. It also proposes abolishing the different rates for still and sparkling wine, which will benefit English sparkling wine producers. Some hon. Members have raised some of the issues of complexity in relation to wine duty, and I have also heard these concerns directly from the industry. The Wine and Spirit Trade Association says that the proposed system will replace one band with 27 bands, resulting in a significant increase in red tape for businesses throughout the supply chain. That is likely to cause particular problems for small and medium-sized enterprises, including SME importers and retailers. I hope the Minister is aware of these concerns, and I am sure all hon. Members would be interested to hear from her about any changes the Treasury is considering to mitigate the impact on the wine industry. We believe that the Government should set out a comprehensive assessment of the impact that these proposals will have on the regulatory burden faced by businesses in the wine sector and the steps the Government intend to take to mitigate them.
The Government’s overall proposals for beer duty are relatively minor, as the current system is already based on the ABV of the product. The reduced rate for products below 2.8% is being widened and will now include products of up to 3.5%. I note this has been welcomed by the Campaign for Real Ale, which says that it will incentivise the production of lower-strength beers. However, the Society of Independent Brewers has raised concerns that this change may allow large brewers to undercut small brewers, so will the Minister look into this? The alcohol duty review also announced the Government’s intention to introduce a new draught duty discount of 5% for draught products sold in large containers. Labour welcomes that proposal as an important way to support pubs as they recover from several very difficult years during the pandemic. However, there are concerns that the proposal to set 40 litres as the minimum container size risks excluding small brewers and small community pubs, which often use 20-litre or 30-litre containers. We believe the Government should set out how many small brewers would benefit at different minimum sizes of containers. Will the Minister address that in her wind-up?
The alcohol duty review states that cider duty is not a well-structured tax, as high-strength ciders currently pay proportionately less duty than those at lower ABV. The review also directly links that to high rates of problem drinking associated with very strong white ciders. However, the review continues to treat cider favourably, with a rate less than half that of beer. We do recognise cider making’s importance to many rural communities, but is the Minister concerned that the proposed changes will not go far enough in tackling the problem drinking associated with very strong ciders? Will she set out what assessment the Treasury has made of the public health impact of different rates of duty on high-alcohol cider, given it makes up a disproportionate amount of alcohol-related harm?
Spirit distillers, particularly the Scotch whisky industry, make a very important contribution to the UK economy and are an important export for the UK. I urge the Government to work with this industry to ensure it remains competitive. The Government are not making significant changes to the structure of spirits duty, but we welcome their reducing the duty on spirits below 22% to encourage the development of lower-strength spirit-based drinks.
Finally, I wish to say a few words about the proposal for a new small producers relief. Labour introduced a small brewers relief in 2002 and is proud of the effect that it has in supporting small brewers and creating the vibrant UK beer scene that we know exists. We therefore support proposals to extend the scheme to other producers, but believe that the Treasury should work closely with representatives of small brewers and cider makers to ensure that it continues to work effectively, because, as Members will know, the devil is always in the detail.
I have also had concerns from the wine and spirits industry that the proposed small producers relief will not apply to products above 8.5% ABV. The Government need to explain why they are excluding small distillers and small English and Welsh wine makers from this relief and what assessment they have made of the merits of including them.
To end my remarks, I look forward to hearing from the Minister on all the important points that I have raised. These are major changes that will affect businesses and consumers, and they deserve careful consideration. We will be scrutinising the forthcoming legislation closely, and I look forward to debating the issues again in the future.
It is a pleasure to respond to this debate and I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) on securing it. It has been good to hear from hon. Members across the House and from the chairs and members of very important all-party groups on this subject.
It is very clear that my right hon. Friend is an ardent advocate for producers and traders in his constituency. Indeed, Wales has an historic association with alcohol production going back 4,000 years and today produces many ciders, beers and wine. My hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley (Mrs Drummond) also talked about the producers in her constituency.
As many Members have mentioned today, we are making changes to outdated, arbitrary and inconsistent alcohol tax laws. These reforms will make the system fairer, simpler and more aligned to public health goals than the system that we inherited from the EU. As the hon. Member for Erith and Thamesmead (Abena Oppong-Asare) said, these are significant reforms that we are making.
Before addressing the excellent points that have been raised today, I want to remind Members of the major changes that we are making to improve the duty system. Reform of our alcohol tax laws is long overdue. These laws have barely changed since the 1990s. That is largely because incoherent and prohibitive EU rules have, in the past, hindered much-needed change. In the current system, a high-strength white cider will pay less duty per unit than a low-strength beer. Sparkling wine—a product of which the UK has world- leading examples—pays much more duty than still wine, even when it is substantially less strong. Fortified wines are made with the addition of spirits, and yet they pay less duty than a liqueur made with spirits, even if they are the same strength. We have inherited 15 rates from the EU across five different products, and with three different methods of taxation.
The current system is complex and archaic. The Institute of Economic Affairs said that it “defies common sense”. Producers, importers and exporters in this country have called it “distorted”,
“perversely incentivised to produce stronger drinks”
and welcomed “the opportunity for reform”. We agree. Now that we have left the EU, we have an opportunity to create alcohol laws that are more rational and that support the many and varied producers and traders in this country that we have heard about today.
I wish to take this opportunity to remind everyone of the significant benefits that have been introduced with our reforms: a radically simplified system, slashing the number of bands from 15 to six and taxing all products in proportion to their alcohol content; taxing all products in the same rational way, a policy banned by EU law; and ending the premium rates on sparkling wine and equalising them with still wine, and substantially reducing duty on rosé. We have introduced new rates for low-strength drinks below 3.5%, encouraging innovation and reflecting consumer preferences for the low or no-alcohol market, and we are cutting duty on 3.4% beer by 25p a pint. We have modernised the taxation of cider, targeting unhealthy and problematic white ciders while cutting the duty for lower ABV craft and sparkling ciders. We have introduced small producers’ relief to support the many small, artisan alcohol producers who continue to create world-leading products in this country. Those are benefits that would not have been available to us before we left the EU.
Can the Minister clarify which specific EU regulation was preventing us from enacting duty reform?
There are many laws in the EU, as the hon. Lady will know, that have dictated our laws for many years. Those are the regulations and directives that we are changing, not only in this area, but in many others.
Coming back to the system we are producing, we ran a consultation from after the autumn Budget until January this year and Treasury officials have met many stakeholders from across industries and public health groups. The hon. Lady said that we need to consult more, but I can assure her that Treasury Ministers, largely the former Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately), who was responsible for this area, have met colleagues from across the parties. We have spoken to and visited businesses, from the smallest to the largest, welcomed representations from many of the most important trade bodies and sat down with the Australian high commissioner, all to ensure that at the Treasury we have heard all points of view on the reforms. I can assure the hon. Lady and others that we are listening.
I will come on to the points that hon. Members have made. We have heard from industries, businesses and colleagues about their concerns, and we will continue to listen to the feedback. The comments made in this debate will form part of that listening. We are actively thinking about how we can reduce burdens on businesses while still preserving the many benefits of the system, not least the clear and obvious public health benefits of taxing products by their alcohol strength.
Many hon. Members have talked about issues with keg size, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan, my hon. Friends the Members for Meon Valley and for Dudley South (Mike Wood), and the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper). I want to assure them that, while I cannot make any announcements today, we are listening to that point. My right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan, my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley South and others talked about how small producers’ relief is too complicated. I reassure them that we are determined to get rid of the cliff edge to support the growth of small brewers.
Other hon. Members talked about the duty charges on wine. I have spoken to the former Exchequer Secretary, who told me how she has been engaging with the sector on this very issue. The hon. Member for St Albans mentioned that she had visited the Wine Society and heard its views, and I know the Treasury is looking at ways to reduce the administrative burdens.
The hon. Lady also talked about fortified wines; she will know that we are reforming the duty on fortified wines to ensure that those products pay a consistent rate of duty per unit with still and sparkling wines and high-strength beers. We are increasing the duty on fortified wines to equal the duty on spirit-based liqueurs such as Baileys, because both drinks are made using spirits and we think it is right in those circumstances that they pay the same rates.
My hon. Friends the Members for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) and for Meon Valley talked about cider, as did others, and I hear what they are saying. They will know that ciders will benefit from new reduced rates for lower ABV ciders below 3.5% ABV, and as part of our new draught relief we will cut duty rates on draught fruit ciders by 20% to equalise them with beer, cutting 13p off a pint. Nobody has mentioned this today, but I would like to reiterate that we announced in the 2021 autumn Budget that we were freezing cider duty for the fourth consecutive year.
The hon. Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson) talked about Scotch and other spirits. I remind him that at the Budget the Government froze spirits duty, saving 52p off a bottle of Scotch compared with what it would have been if duty had risen with inflation. Because of the decisions that we have made, spirits duty rates are at their lowest level since at least 1918. It is a really important industry for us and we have an exceptionally competitive environment for Scotch to succeed. Domestic whisky volumes have expanded year on year, including throughout the pandemic, to reach their highest levels since 2013, growing by 11% over the past two years.
I am looking at a graphic that shows that when duty on a shot of whisky in the UK was 46p, duty on the same measure of whisky in Spain would have been the equivalent of only 12p. I wonder what Brexit benefit it might be that has resulted in that differential staying there even with whisky duties being frozen.
The hon. Member will know that the benefit of Brexit is that we can now make these decisions ourselves, reflecting our own industries and what we want to do as a Government going forward.
We have heard many positive responses to the changes we have made, welcoming the substantial benefits that they will bring to businesses. Respondents to the consultation said that they
“wholeheartedly welcome the direction of the proposals.”
Many hon. Members have mentioned positive features of the proposals, which have been called a “genuinely significant achievement”. Crucially to a country that puts its people first, a public health group described the reforms as
“the largest and most positive shift from the perspective of public health in contemporary alcohol policy.”
I thank all colleagues who have contributed to this important and insightful debate. We will soon confirm details of the reforms and publish the draft legislation for consultation, alongside the Government’s response. We have before us a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reform and improve an outdated system, with new incentives for producers to diversify and innovate, while introducing a direct boost for pubs. The reforms are more rational, they are fair, and they are better aligned to public health goals and consumer preferences. They support the great British pub and small producers producing fantastic, world-leading products. Our reforms spell exciting times for alcohol businesses in this country and will protect our brilliant heritage in alcohol production and trade.
It has been a privilege to hold this debate and I am grateful to all Members who have contributed. I think it is obvious that right across the House there is strong support for the need for change and for the direction of travel that the Government have introduced, but also a recognition of the need for further change.
The hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) highlighted the challenges to fortified wines, among other things. My hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley (Mrs Drummond) talked about a range of issues, including the importance of the wine sector, particularly to her constituency, and the need to consider, as a key issue, one broad range of 8.5% to 15% ABV. The Minister said that 15 rates across five products would come down to just six rates. That is a positive step, but it does not recognise the 27 measures per bottle that would need to be on wine alone, the different rates that would apply, and the difficulty of predicting them.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley South (Mike Wood), who is clearly a champion of the beer industry, drew attention to the importance of the sector, as well as welcome nature of the changes and some adjustments that are needed in order to secure them. The hon. Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson) rightly highlighted the importance of duty on Scotch whisky and the impact that that has. He also, I would suggest, recognises the Brexit opportunity given to the Scotch whisky industry.
The fact that the hon. Member for Erith and Thamesmead (Abena Oppong-Asare) highlighted some of the same issues as many Conservative Members draws attention to the consensus that exists across the House for change in this area. That needs to be along the lines that the Government are pursuing, but also in a way that really supports the industry, supports the Treasury in raising the revenue it needs, reduces red tape, and allows for innovation to take place. I am grateful to all hon. and right hon. Members for their contributions.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered Alcohol Duty and tax on alcohol.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberLast November a 10-year-old boy, Jack Lis from Pen y Bryn, Penyrheol, in my Caerphilly constituency was killed by a vicious dog. The dog attacked and killed Jack in a neighbour’s home. The dog was an American XL Bully. In the trial, which concluded last month, one of the defendants, in whose home Jack died, was sentenced to three years. The other defendant, the owner of the dog, received a sentence of four and a half years in a youth offender institution. The dog, called Beast, had been bought on the internet only a few days earlier.
There can be no doubt that the dog had huge behavioural problems and was not going to be kept as a normal pet. Indeed, the previous owner of the dog stated that he was selling the dog because he could not cope with it anymore, and the dog was described as “aggressive” in its “For sale” advert. Moreover, CCTV recordings showed how the dog threatened and tried to attack people on the street. It is worth noting that during the course of the trial, the man who owned the dog breached his bail conditions in a blatant way.
It is the view of Jack’s mother, Emma, who has been incredibly brave, that the sentences given to the two defendants were far too lenient. That is also the view of the local community in Caerphilly, and it is my view, too. An e-petition has been launched by Jack’s mother, and it clearly expresses the view of so many people about the leniency of the sentences that have been handed down. In response to the representations that Emma has made to the Attorney General’s Office, she has been told that it is not possible to refer these sentences to the Court of Appeal. Although the Law Officers have the power to ask the Court of Appeal to review certain sentences that appear to be unduly lenient, the power does not apply to sentences under the piece of legislation applicable here. I understand, however, that the Secretary of State for Justice has the power to add legislation to the scheme where a review can take place. Will the Minister therefore speak to her colleagues in the Ministry of Justice so that they can give active consideration to the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 being included in the scheme?
It has to be said that even if the sentences in this case were referred to the Court of Appeal, the sentences of the two defendants could not be changed, as there could not be a retrospective change. It is nevertheless important that we learn the lessons from what has happened in this terrible situation when we look to the future. It follows from what I have said that the sentencing guidelines should be rewritten and strengthened in the light of this case.
Another important lesson from this terrible case is that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 is woefully inadequate and inappropriate to deal with the issue of dangerous dogs. The attack on 10-year-old Jack Lis is truly tragic, but attacks by dangerous dogs are not a rare occurrence. In the past 10 years alone, more than 20 people have died after being attacked by a dog. Each year, some 200,000 people are attacked by dogs in England alone. In Wales there have been more than 200 incidents involving dangerous dogs during the last six months or so. In Gwent, which includes Caerphilly, between September 2021 and February 2022, 69 dog attacks were reported to Gwent police, three of which were on children aged 17 or under.
The main piece of relevant legislation is the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which applies to England, Scotland and Wales. It was under that law that the two defendants I referred to earlier were convicted and sentenced. They were found guilty of keeping or allowing a dog dangerously out of control where death is caused. As I said, the operation of that part of the Act could be significantly improved by strengthening the sentencing guidelines, but there also needs to be a fundamental rethink of the law as it applies to dangerous dogs.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for bringing forward this debate. He rightly says that the law is specific to England, Scotland and Wales; it is a devolved issue in Northern Ireland, but the situation is similar. For example, about six or seven weeks ago, a constituent of mine was out walking with their young dog, which was attacked by three or four other dogs. The dog had to be put down. That is another example of legislation that does not work. To address that issue, my constituent had to bring a private court case against the person, which added to the trauma.
I understand that the hon. Gentleman is trying to bring forward a change in the legislation, which hopefully the Minister can review and consider. When that is done, will he share the information with the Northern Ireland Assembly and the devolved Administrations, so that we can all have better legislation, not just for his constituents—I am sorry to hear their tragic story—but for all of us across this great United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland?
I thank the hon. Member for his support. Although the Act does not apply to Northern Ireland, there are arrangements in place. It is a serious issue in Northern Ireland, as it is in the rest of the United Kingdom. I will certainly liaise with him when I pursue the matter further.
Only four specific breeds of dogs are banned in the Act: the pit bull terrier, the Japanese Tosa, the Dogo Argentino and the Fila Brasileiro. Incredible though it may seem to many, the dog that attacked Jack Lis, an American XL Bully, is not listed as a dangerous dog—but I am not calling for that particular breed simply to be added to the list. There are many types of dogs, including cross breeds, that people could argue ought to be on the list, but there are two fundamental problems with that approach. First, because there is more and more cross-breeding, it is virtually impossible to maintain any kind of legislation that contains an up-to-date list. Secondly, proscribing certain breeds of dogs gives the erroneous impression that only listed dogs are dangerous, and it does not take into account how a dog is kept and trained. It has been said that most dogs have the potential to be dangerous if they are not trained properly.
We need to fundamentally change our whole approach to so-called dangerous dogs. Rather than relying on breed-specific legislation, which is clearly inappropriate, the Government ought to bring forward legislation based on a totally different approach to the issue. I know that the Government have done a lot of work on it, and I contributed to a Westminster Hall debate on it only a few weeks ago. The response of the former Minister, the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill), to that debate was encouraging, and I hope that the Minister will take us a bit further forward today.
The Government’s starting point has to be an acceptance that there is a lack of any real evidence to support a breed-specific approach to protecting the public. I believe that there is a large amount of independent research, funded by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which lays the basis for a quite different approach. It shows that simply looking at a dog’s breed is not an appropriate criterion for assessing that dog’s risk to people. I know that the Government are fully aware of the conclusions of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee inquiry, which states that the current dangerous dogs legislation fails to protect public safety and also harms animal welfare. This is also the view of a whole range of organisations that have come together under the dog control coalition. These organisations include the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Dogs Trust and the Kennel Club.
It is now over 30 years since the Dangerous Dogs Act was passed, and going beyond this Act, it has to be said that the legal framework for dealing with dog bite incidents is very complex, with a number of different laws applicable depending on the circumstances surrounding the incident. However, the breed-specific legislation has another fundamental weakness, which is the fact that it is to a large extent reactive in character. I believe that it is better to approach this issue of public safety before harm is caused, rather than responding to the consequences. Prevention has to be the watchword. That is why I want a comprehensive and fundamentally different approach to the issue.
A number of years ago, there were dog licences. The Government really ought to examine the possibility of reintroducing dog licences, but this time we should not simply see them as an easy way for Government to have an additional source of revenue. The money received should be used for a whole range of initiatives, including tackling the behavioural problems of certain kinds of dogs that lead to dog bite incidents. Resources could also be provided for dealing with stray dogs and for helping to fund dog training. Let us not forget that, at the moment, dogs have to have microchips by the time they are eight weeks old. Licensing could be an extension of this and a significant elaboration of it.
I am pleased that the RSPCA Cymru agrees with the approach I have outlined. As animal welfare in Wales is devolved to the Welsh Senedd, I look forward to having a constructive dialogue on this issue with Hefin David, the Member of the Senedd for Caerphilly, and the Welsh Government. Crucially, however, I also believe that an effective assessment needs to be made of potential and actual owners of dogs. At the moment, anyone in any circumstances can purchase virtually any kind of dog. I believe that local authorities should have a key role to play here. Local authorities also ought to have the statutory responsibility for ensuring that dogs are kept and housed properly, and that their owners are ensuring that their dogs are correctly and appropriately trained.
In addition, there needs to be firm control on the buying and selling of dogs. To return to the tragic case of Jack Lis, the dog that killed him was purchased on Facebook not long before the attack. Such purchases cannot be allowed to continue. That is why I would urge the Government to prevent the sale and purchase of dogs in this way.
Today, many of my remarks have focused on the tragedy of Jack Lis, and I want to pay tribute to his family, especially his mother, Emma. She has been enormously brave during this whole difficult time. Nothing can bring Jack back, but all of us need to do our utmost to prevent similar tragedies in the future. I look forward to the Minister’s reply and I encourage her to be as positive as possible.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) on securing this debate on such an important issue, and our usual Adjournment friend, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), on joining in. I have listened carefully and appreciate that this subject is of keen interest to the hon. Member for Caerphilly and his constituents. As he stated, he recently contributed to a Westminster Hall debate on breed-specific legislation and has spoken publicly about dangerous dogs on a number of occasions. I appreciate his strength of feeling on this topic and commend him for his diligent campaigning.
Sadly, there have been a number of fatalities from dog attacks in recent months, many involving children. This of course includes the tragic death of the hon. Gentleman’s constituent Jack Lis last November. I note that the owner and keeper of the dog were both sentenced last month, under the Dangerous Dogs Act, to four and a half years and three years in prison respectively, and they have been banned from owning dogs indefinitely. Sadly, individual sentences are for the courts to decide, based on all the evidence presented at trial, so I cannot comment further on that specific point. Again, I pass on my condolences to the Lis family—to Emma, who is bearing up so well.
The Government are determined to crack down on irresponsible dog ownership and to promote safe interactions with dogs. We are already taking action on this, and I want to take the opportunity today to set this out in more detail. As colleagues may know, Middlesex University was commissioned by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to examine measures to reduce dog attacks and promote responsible dog ownership across all breeds. We published that report and its recommendations in December last year.
In response to that report, we have established the responsible dog ownership project, working with the police, local authorities and animal welfare stakeholders to consider the recommendations in detail and provide advice to Government. The project’s steering group is overseeing a series of specialist sub-groups that are considering the recommendations and gathering further evidence and expertise from relevant stakeholders, academics and experts. This will inform the project’s final advice regarding the report’s recommendations. Please be assured that I will make sure the hon. Gentleman’s speech today forms part of those consultations.
The responsible dog ownership project’s data sub-group will be considering the recommendation to improve the recording of dog attack data and incident characteristics. The group will be giving specific consideration to current data collection practices across enforcement, healthcare and animal-based sectors, and will identify how these could be improved to strengthen the evidence base relating to dog control incidents and dog attacks, including breed-related trends. In addition, the Middlesex University report recommended the introduction of new legal requirements on dog ownership. We will be considering this recommendation and any relevant evidence in more detail, including the merits of dog licensing, which I hope the hon. Gentleman will be pleased about.
The responsible dog ownership steering group will also be looking at the possibility of strengthening enforcement, improving the quality and accessibility of dog training and awareness courses, and developing and supporting education initiatives—again, it is as though the hon. Gentleman read my script, but I am pleased about that. All these areas will be looked at in detail and the steering group will then provide advice to Government as to how to take these forward. We expect the work of the project to be concluded next year, at which point the Government will consider the advice and decide on next steps.
In response to the recent tragedies involving children, we have also undertaken a rapid response, in collaboration with stakeholders, police, local authorities and the devolved Administrations, to develop simple messages to promote safer interactions between children and dogs. The dog safety code was launched in June and highlights three key messages that all dog owners and families with children need to be aware of. First, be alert—always keep an eye on your dog around children and never leave them alone together. Secondly, be aware—get to know your dog; dogs use signals to tell us how they feel. Thirdly, be safe—any dog can bite; accidents happen far too fast. During the summer holidays, the Department of Health and Social Care and the Department for Education will be sharing this messaging for use by health visitors and child safeguarding professionals. This was also promoted during Child Safety Week in June. We want the dog safety code to become embedded in future communications.
I will change tack slightly. I recognise the strength of feeling on breed-specific legislation. Simply repealing the breed-specific provisions in the Dangerous Dogs Act with no other changes would increase the risks to public safety. We must therefore balance the views of those who want to repeal the legislation with our responsibility to protect public safety. Any changes to breed-specific legislation that we may propose will need to ensure that public safety remains at the heart of the regime.
Section 3 of the Dangerous Dogs Act makes it an offence to allow a dog of any breed or type to be “dangerously out of control” in any place. As well as that, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 includes specific measures to enable the police and local authorities to tackle irresponsible dog ownership before a dog attack occurs, including through the use of community protection notices. To put the hon. Member’s mind at rest, we will explore the effectiveness of the current legislation and areas for improvement as part of the ongoing work of the responsible dog ownership project.
I hope that colleagues are reassured that we take these issues seriously and are committed to protecting public safety. I look forward to discussing the conclusions of the responsible dog ownership project with colleagues when they are available, and when the new Minister is appointed.
The whole House sends its condolences to the bereaved family. That was a very sad story. Our hearts go out to them.
Question put and agreed to.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
General CommitteesIn what will probably be my final act as Policing Minister, I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Police Act 1996 (Amendment and Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2022.
The draft regulations were laid before the House on 9 June and will change the name of the Hampshire police area, in my own fair county, to Hampshire and Isle of Wight. That will better reflect the make-up of the police area and the communities it serves across the counties of Hampshire and Isle of Wight.
I thank in particular Donna Jones, our brilliant police and crime commissioner in the two counties, for her campaign and representations on this important local matter. There is significant local support for the change, with 82% of local residents indicating their support in a consultation carried out by the commissioner. The standout reason cited was the simple fact that Hampshire constabulary serves two counties: Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. Respondents also noted that those on the Island sometimes feel forgotten, and it was felt that a more inclusive name would help to address that. Key local leaders are also united in their support for the name change, including the leader of Isle of Wight Council, my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) , the force’s chief constable and the district commander based on the Island.
Parliament’s approval of the draft regulations will therefore respond to the specific requests of the people of the Isle of Wight, recognising their strong sense of identity. It will also better reflect Hampshire constabulary’s full geographical coverage and bring the force into line with the corresponding fire service, which rebranded as the Hampshire and Isle of Wight Fire and Rescue Service following the recent merger of the Island and mainland fire services.
Police area names and the power to amend them are set out in the Police Act 1996, section 31A of which allows for the Secretary of State to amend those names by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure. This draft instrument will amend schedule 1 to the Act, which sets out the names of all police areas in England and Wales, with the exception of the Metropolitan police district and the City of London police area. Furthermore, articles 34 and 35 of the Police and Crime Commissioner Elections Order 2012 makes provision in relation to election expenses in police areas. Those articles include references to “Hampshire”, which these regulations will substitute with “Hampshire and Isle of Wight”.
Should the amendment be approved, the Government intend to make a further statutory instrument, subject to the negative resolution procedure, to come into force at the same time as the draft regulations, to reflect the name change in other secondary legislation. Together with the strong local support, I trust that I have made a clear case for enacting this important local change.
I had wanted to ask the Minister to clarify that there would be no cost implications, but he mentioned it earlier.
Question put and agreed to.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Ministerial Corrections(2 years, 5 months ago)
Ministerial CorrectionsIn terms of the timescale that the shadow Minister asked for, we expect the instrument to come into force once the Privy Council has approved it in August, 28 days after it has been signed.
[Official Report, Third Delegated Legislation Committee, 14 June 2022, Vol. 716, c. 6.]
Letter of correction from the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison).
An error has been identified in my response to the debate.
The correct response should have been:
In terms of the timescale that the shadow Minister asked for, we expect the instrument to come into force the day after the Privy Council has approved it. The Privy Council is meeting on 19 July, so we expect the instrument to come into force on 20 July 2022.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill Committees(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesToday we will first consider the amendment to the programme order on the amendment paper, which will cancel this afternoon’s sitting. I understand that we will then consider a motion to adjourn the Committee. As I see no one who wishes to debate this matter, and as there will be a change at the crease—to continue to cricketing analogy, rain is not stopping play—I will put the Question.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of 21 June 2022 be varied by the omission from paragraph 1(f) of the words “and 2.00 pm”.— (Miss Dines.)
The Committee will next meet at 9.25 am on Tuesday 12 July.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Miss Dines.)
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore we begin, I have a couple of preliminary announcements. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if hon. Members emailed their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please will you all switch your electronic devices to silent mode? I can see that you have not got teas and coffees, so that is good. Date Time Witness Thursday 7 July Until no later than 12.00 noon Jonathan Hall QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Thursday 7 July Until no later than 12.40 pm Sir Alex Younger, former Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service; Professor Sir David Omand, King’s College London Thursday 7 July Until no later than 1.00 pm Paddy McGuinness, former Deputy National Security Adviser Thursday 7 July Until no later than 2.40 pm Demos; Henry Jackson Society Thursday 7 July Until no later than 3.00 pm Electoral Commission Thursday 7 July Until no later than 3.20 pm Professor Ciaran Martin, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford Thursday 7 July Until no later than 4.00 pm The Law Commission; the Law Society Thursday 7 July Until no later than 4.20 pm Reset Thursday 7 July Until no later than 4.40 pm Reprieve
We will consider the programme motion on the amendment paper, followed by a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication, and then a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence session. In view of the time available, I hope that we can deal with those matters formally, without debate. The programme motion was discussed on Tuesday by the Programming Sub-Committee for this Bill.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 7 July) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 7 July;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 12 July;
(c) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 14 July;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 19 July;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 6 September;
(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 8 September;
(g) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 13 September;
2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table;
3. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 14; Schedule 1; Clauses 15 to 20; Schedule 2; Clause 21; Schedule 3; Clauses 22 to 32; Schedule 4; Clauses 33 to 36; Schedule 5; Clauses 37 to 44; Schedule 6; Clauses 45 to 47; Schedule 7; Clauses 48 to 51; Schedule 8; Clause 52; Schedule 9; Clauses 53 to 61; Schedule 10; Clauses 62 to 65; Schedule 11; Clauses 66 to 73; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 13 September.—(Scott Mann.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Scott Mann.)
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Scott Mann.)
Copies of the written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room and circulated to Members by email. We will now go into private session to discuss lines of questioning.
We are now sitting in public again and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start hearing from witnesses, do any Members want to make any declarations of interest in connection with the Bill? I take it that there are no declarations of interest.
Examination of Witness
Jonathan Hall QC gave evidence.
We will now hear oral evidence from Jonathan Hall QC, independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Before calling the first Member to ask questions, I should like to remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill, and that we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this panel we have until 12 noon. Could you please introduce yourself for the record?
Jonathan Hall: My name is Jonathan Hall and I am the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, a position that I have held since 2019.
Q
Do you agree that utilising the tools made available in the Bill will enhance our ability to deal with the current threats, and give us the flexibility to respond to the changing threat landscape?
Jonathan Hall: Yes, the measures in part 1 and part 2—I will talk about part 3 at some later stage—contain tools that are necessary. I am not a state threats specialist—I am terrorism specialist—but I have had a chance to interrogate officials, and it is clear that there are determined and well-resourced adversaries who will not be put off by a knock on the door to say, “We know what you are up to.” The agencies and the police need measures to prosecute and PIMs—prevention and investigation measures—which are special measures.
Q
Jonathan Hall: There are two things. First, the official who chairs the review group meetings, which are to decide whether to submit to the Secretary of State that a measure ought to be imposed, or the group which reviews whether they remain necessary and proportionate, needs to be really strong. This is what I have witnessed, I am glad to say, with terrorism prevention and investigation measures. That official has to be able to really hold the agencies in particular to account, and really test and probe what they are saying, both about the intelligence that is being given to the review group and about whether the measures remain appropriate. The first message from the TPIMs is that you need to have a strong chair of the TPIM review group, or the equivalent, the PIMs review group.
The second thing is that one of the experiences from TPIMs is that it is really difficult with connectedness. People who are under those measures can become very isolated, and I think that officials have struggled with whether to allow those people to have smartphones or access to the internet. These days it is very difficult to function as a normal member of society unless you have access to those. One of the lessons that will be learned from TPIMs is how to try to square the circle to ensure that people cannot do bad communications but while also allowing them to function normally in the world with access to normal communications technology.
Q
Jonathan Hall: First, it is being able to go to the room where it happens—the meetings where these decisions are taken. When I review TPIMs, I have a completely free hand. I am able to interrogate officials and able to see whatever I want. That is really important. I am not just looking at judgments in courts, or just reading documents; I am actually there able to interrogate, test and challenge. That is what I do. Also, I think it is important that Parliament and the public have a sense of what is going on. Regrettably, because legal aid has not been made available in all cases for TPIMs, there are now fewer court cases, so general information about how this important but serious power is being exercised is relatively cut off. The independent reviewer can provide a lot of transparency about how it is operating.
Q
Jonathan Hall: It has been tentatively mentioned. Obviously, because the legislation has not been passed, I have not been formally asked whether I would do it, but it has been tentatively asked. My answer is that I think it actually is quite a good fit for the reviewer’s job, and I think it probably is right that the person who does the independent review of terrorism legislation should also do the state threats legislation. The reason is that this new legislation is really modelled on terrorism legislation. In crude terms, the concept of the foreign power condition sits in place of the purposes or acts of terrorism, and then there is the same framework in terms of very strong arrest power, detention up to 14 days, strong powers of cordons and search and investigations, and, of course, the PIMs. There are so many learning points between the two regimes that it does make sense.
Q
Jonathan Hall: Having thought about this, I do. I do not think that decisions on prosecution are going to be made other than in really strong and good cases. Where I think one needs particular care is with all the strong powers that come before prosecution, for example with arrest and detention, as well as the PIMs, which are based not on beyond reasonable doubt but on the balance of probabilities.
We have to acknowledge that we live in quite a polarised world at the moment and that citizens of individual countries, such as Russia and China, and those who associate with them, are bound to fall under suspicion. There is a parallel here, in the sense that people used to argue—I think wrongly, but they did argue —that counter-terrorism laws in England and Wales were anti-Muslim, and I think having a reviewer is one way of offering reassurance that that is not the case.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I expect that they will be effective because the agencies and the Home Secretary will only think about imposing one when they think it is going to work. There are many more subjects of interest who have terrorist intents than are currently on TPIMs, and I expect that the same will be true in relation to people who are foreign threats. There will be many more people who are identified as foreign threats who will actually go under PIMs. At the moment I think only two people are under TPIMs, so it is very few. I would have thought that the agencies and the Home Secretary will think very carefully before imposing them.
Q
Jonathan Hall: What I have been told is that polygraphs have not been used for TPIMs, as far as I am aware, but they have been used for released terrorist offenders and some disclosures have been made. Everyone always thought that the real utility of polygraphs and the clear reason for their use is the disclosures that people make when undergoing the process. I gather that some admissions have been made that have been valuable and have led to a recall. I do not have a huge amount of data, but they seem to have had some success in the context of terrorism offences.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I cannot remember the total number of TPIMs. I think it is around 30, but I may be misremembering and that may also include—
That is over a number of years, of course.
Jonathan Hall: Yes. The maximum I remember in any year is up to six; at the moment it is down to about two. The authorities ran quite a successful campaign, using TPIMs against members or former members of al-Muhajiroun. Those have tended to drop off, and we are now looking at a very small clutch—I think it is only two now.
Q
Jonathan Hall: First of all, where there is good intelligence that an individual is up to no good but it is impossible to prosecute them. There may be secret sources of intelligence—information coming from allies or from electronic means that could not be disclosed—that mean that the agencies know perfectly well that someone is a real risk. Having had the opportunity to read the intelligence, I know that there certainly are cases where people are very dangerous and are engaging in attack planning but could not be prosecuted. These measures allow a huge amount of control.
One of the key measures for the really serious people is moving them from their home location. They find it much harder to operate if they are outside their home location: they do not have the people around that they know, and they find it a more hostile operating environment. There will also be some people whose threat really comes from the propagation of terrorist propaganda, so the measure might be directed towards their use of electronic devices and the internet.
Q
Jonathan Hall: Up to a point. I have expressed my disappointment that because legal aid is not now available as of right for all TPIM subjects, there is a cohort of TPIM subjects who are not getting court reviews. In the absence of the court having the opportunity to test the proportionality, it is particularly important that the Home Office official who chairs the TPIM review group’s meetings is really testing, and I also feel that I have to play that sort of role myself. I have certainly seen cases in which it has been debatable whether the measures have been too strong, particularly in relation to electronic devices, and whether enough attention is being given to allowing people to live a useful life without presenting a threat to the wider public.
I am going to move on to our next question now, from shadow Minister Jess Phillips.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I have one thing to say about part 1, but we will come back to it. Part 3 is different from parts 1 and 2, because I believe that part 3 is not there to meet an operational need. Generally speaking, I think the reason why the public support terrorism legislation is that they believe that laws are being passed to improve their security—obviously, today is the anniversary of 7/7. Here, the changes are intended to be entirely symbolic. The first thing to do is to recognise that it is quite unusual in the context of terrorism legislation to enact a measure that is really symbolic, and therefore it needs to be justified with care.
My concern about the legal aid, beyond the symbolism aspect, is that the class of individuals who are going to be affected by this is very wide indeed. The justification for removing legal aid from convicted terrorists is that they have broken their links with society. Of course, we all understand that in the context of an Islamic State would-be suicide bomber or someone of that nature, but the same effect will be felt by children who are arrested for document offences—in other words, having a copy of “The Anarchist Cookbook” on their computer.
As you know, there are now many children who have been arrested and prosecuted for terrorism offences. It also catches people who do not get custodial sentences at all, so the cohort of people captured is very wide indeed, and I do not myself understand why the decision has been taken to include not just the most egregious examples of terrorism-convicted people, but also people who may never have gone to prison and may have very quickly—one hopes—gone back into normal life. That is my general point about aid. I have expressed further points about how it is possible that this measure could be counterproductive. Should I pause there?
Q
Jonathan Hall: I do not think so, because legal aid is termed individually. In the example you are giving, the woman in question would not be a terrorist convict, so she would be able to apply for legal aid.
Q
Jonathan Hall: Then, yes. A woman who has previously been convicted of a terrorism offence would be forced to resort to what is known as exceptional case funding. As I think the Justice Committee has reported, it is very difficult to get solicitors to even apply for exceptional case funding and there are great difficulties in getting hold of it urgently. I suspect it will be said that, for the worst cases of domestic violence, it would be granted. I do not know if that is the case.
I am going to have to move on to the next questioner. I would appreciate it if colleagues could be succinct with their questions. I will allow a couple if you are succinct—otherwise it is just one question.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I think what you mean is, am I comfortable with the fact that legislation has now been passed that is dealing with state threats, when previously the focus had been on terrorism? If that is what you are saying, then I think I am comfortable, because I accept and recognise that we live in a contested and uncertain world. Focusing on state threats is now a very sound necessity.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I think the two regimes—the terrorism regime and the state-threats regime—should be sufficient. There are obviously people operating in the grey zone at the moment who might be able to say, “We fall outside the remit of terrorism legislation,” for example, the Wagner Group. If they are acting on the battlefield in support of Russia, we would have difficulty seeing them as terrorists. I think this legislation probably fills some gaps.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I do not think so, if the regime operates as it is intended to, because the Bill replicates the obligation for the Secretary of State to consider whether it is possible to prosecute in the first place. I do not think in practice that they will become a measure of first resort, just because they are so resource-intensive and complicated. I suppose it is possible that, unlike some of the terrorist TPIM subjects who are individuals without a huge amount of access to resources, some of the individuals who may be under an SPIM could be backed by a huge amount of resources, which means that there will be perhaps more significant litigation than there has been with TPIMs; I do not know.
The point is that you are dealing with people at a lower level than beyond reasonable doubt. Intelligence is fragmentary and it is possible to make a mistake. It is always important to bear that in mind, with a degree of modesty and humility, when these really strong measures are being imposed.
Q
Jonathan Hall: My view is that it is the same thing.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I am slightly uncertain and concerned about the scope of clause 3(2), the foreign intelligence services offence. On the face of it, an offence could be committed inadvertently, and it does appear to cover quite a lot of lawful conduct. The example that I have been debating with officials is the example of someone who sells miniature cameras, which is undoubtedly conduct of a kind that could assist a foreign intelligence service. My concern with clause 3(2) is that it does not seem to have a sufficient mental element, either that the individual who commits the offence is deliberately acting prejudicially to the UK interest, or knows or ought to suspect that there is some foreign intelligence service involvement, so I have a concern about that particular clause.
Q
Jonathan Hall: Not all terrorists are cold, calculating, ruthless killers who will go and commit terrorist acts whatever their circumstances. They may exist, but there are also quite chaotic terrorist-risk offenders. I have certainly come across cases where the terrorist risk from the individual—the chance of their stabbing someone, for example—goes up if they are not taking their medication or if they are homeless.
My concern about the legal aid is that it will make it harder, for example, for a terrorist offender, maybe 10 years after they have been released and who is facing eviction, to get legal aid. That means that you might have less good decisions made and a sense of injustice or grievance on behalf of the terrorist offender, who will perhaps say to themselves, “Why can’t I get legal aid when everyone else in my situation can?” My real concern is people becoming homeless or falling into debt when they might otherwise be able to get legal assistance.
I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allocated to the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank Mr Jonathan Hall QC for giving evidence in this session.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: Hello, my name is Alex Younger and I was chief of SIS from 2014 to 2020.
Professor Sir David Omand: I am David Omand. I am currently at the King’s College London war studies department as a professor. My previous career in the civil service involved being director of GCHQ, permanent secretary of the Home Office and UK security and intelligence co-ordinator.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: Yes. That is a huge question. To keep it brief, though, I think the predominant fact that developed during my career was the erosion of boundaries. When I started, the difference between peace and war, domestic and international, covert and overt, and virtual and real was reasonably clear, and we were organised along those boundaries. The threats that eventuated most powerfully were the ones that recognised that those boundaries had eroded and crossed them. What I would call grey threats eventuated and often presented us with real challenges, particularly when actors or states felt themselves at war with us and we did not feel ourselves at war with them, for good reason.
My career saw less emphasis on conventional threats and more on grey space. Most of my career was devoted to counter-terrorism, which was the dominant example, but subsequently we saw state actors working in sub-threshold space—operations short of conventional war—to harm us. That is broadly the situation we are in now, even if we have a very 20th-century example of conflict happening on our continent.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: It has risen. During my career, we were broadly in a situation where we had to focus on state threats or terrorist threats. I think that all of us, societally, were hubristically convinced of the end of history and the fact that liberal democracy had triumphed. Perhaps another answer to your earlier question is that that was demonstrated to be false. In fact, we are in a geopolitically contested world, just as we always were. That led to the increasing dominance of the state threat over time as the world diverged ideologically. Of course, with Russia and the UK specifically, we had some really acute examples of that, in terms of services demonstrating complete contempt for us and our democracy by attempting to murder people on our soil. In a sense, that got us, particularly in the national security community, to the hard truth quicker than many.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: I think it is pressing, not least because, as I have said, many of the threats are ambiguous. This legislation, in seeking to dispel ambiguity—daylight is the best disinfectant—has my support. The reality is that the act of using deception on behalf of a foreign power to undermine our democracy, cause our citizens harm, sap our strategic advantage and undermine our economic advantage is essentially not criminalised at the moment, and that is odd. As you would expect, our adversaries have tonnes of legislation outlawing spying. That is what they do; it is part of how they engineer unity. There is a sense of an external and pernicious threat.
I am more struck by the fact that many of our allies, particularly in the Five Eyes, have seen fit, for many years in some cases, to have such measures in place. To that extent, I regard them as basically uncontentious and overdue. If I may be permitted a professional observation as someone who has worked in this area for 30 years, they will definitely make it harder for people who mean us harm to operate, in a way that they would not like and the public would like.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: Yes.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: First of all, I think it is a good idea, fundamentally, to require people to say if they are acting on behalf of a foreign power. I am supportive of that because I know how difficult it makes it for people intent on conducting operations against us to operate, and makes it much easier to prove. I am therefore instinctively supportive of that, and of a register, and I think that we should get on with that. I have talked to the Government about that; they are understandably cautious, given all the unintended consequences attached to it, and the fact that our adversaries use those techniques in a way that lacks good faith and is malicious. However, fundamentally, I am supportive of it.
I have to be honest; I am more ambivalent about the idea of distinguishing between nations. My view of legislation generally, but particularly when it comes to technology, is that it is a mistake to write things to the current circumstances. It is much better to write things to the principles that you are seeking to employ. I am not a lawyer or a member of the Government, but my recommendation would be that we go for a principles-based approach in so far as we can.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: You are referring to the amendment to the Serious Crime Act?
That is right, yes.
Sir Alex Younger: I strongly believe that that is necessary. I am conscious of the concerns that you will have, and even the contentious nature of the assertion, so if you will forgive me, I briefly have to tell you why.
First, alongside our ability to uphold our values and not be terrorists, the other reason why we have been successful in stopping bombs going off has been international partnership. That is because no one state or intelligence service really ever has the full facts. They have to work together and combine their information to get the intelligence that is required, proactively, to disrupt terrorist events. That was true in the analogue world; it is really true in the digital world. It is the thing that works and keeps us safe.
That involves an unavoidable risk. That risk, through all the safeguards that you will be familiar with—but which I am happy to talk about—is managed down to the very lowest level possible. However, ultimately, we are dealing with sovereign actors—other states who we do not control—and ultimately, when we are exchanging large bulk datasets, notwithstanding all the scrutiny and risk management, there is a possibility that there will be data in that dataset whose significance we do not understand until it is compared with another dataset that we do not have. That is an unavoidable risk.
An issue that I think you have to consider is, who should be carrying that risk? My view is that there must be accountability, but where an SIS officer or any other UK intelligence community officer is acting in good faith, within their instructions, as authorised by Ministers, on behalf of you and the public, it should not be them carrying the risk. It is more appropriately carried by the Government more broadly. I feel that, as you can tell from my body language, very strongly, as a leader.
It was unavoidable that we sent our young men and women into harm’s way when it came to physical risk. For instance, I served in Afghanistan. Our people were asked to go out on to the streets day in, day out. It involved physical risk that we mitigated down to the lowest level we could possibly manage, but it was part of the deal.
These risks are avoidable. Through this legislation and other measures, we can make sure that these risks are attached to the appropriate person or people or entity. I am much less comfortable as a leader about the idea that we therefore ask individual men and women in the UK intelligence community to suck it up. I do not think that is right.
Professor Sir David Omand: I very strongly agree with what Alex Younger has just said. I know from my own experience of GCHQ that information-sharing with our close allies and indeed more broadly is essential, and I think it is morally wrong to place that burden on the individual member of staff, who may be quite junior, who is simply following the policies and the instructions that they have had. In the end, the Government Ministers must account if something unexpectedly does go awry.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: My counter-argument would be that this is actually a question of principle—how Government works, particularly in relation to people whom we as a nation are asking to take some significant risks on our behalf. This is an additional risk. You may say that it is theoretical; they may not feel it that way, and I think that we owe it to them to protect them.
Sir Alex Younger: It does not feel theoretical. You know, you have to examine the motives of the staff of the UK IC, who are ordinary members of the public, just like you and me. They are not doing this for personal gain.
There is a very practical point that I think the Committee must consider, which is the incentive. Over time, what is going to motivate admittedly a very mission-orientated community if they see personal legal jeopardy in an area where there is an unavoidable level of ambiguity? I think that will inhibit people from the exercise of sharing. I hope I have been really clear that it is the exercise of sharing that allows us, as a team, to deal with the threats that we face. The risk may be theoretical, but it does not feel like that when you are stood in front of the person or the computer.
Q
Just before we get the answer, I will just flag up that this may be outside of the scope of this Bill, but we will allow the discussion to proceed, because we have not made a precise ruling on it as the co-Chairs of this Committee. So please proceed, but there the potential for it not to be within the scope.
Sir Alex Younger: My answer is a less eloquent version of that, which is that I have talked about the Government about this. Essentially, they say that they think it is too complicated to work this issue through in the timescale that this Bill is operating in. I am not a lawyer; I apologise. I do not have a detailed answer to your question.
Professor Sir David Omand: I believe that the powers in the Bill are not only necessary, but urgent. In addition to everything that Alex was saying, we are living through a digital revolution. The digital harms are there. I would hate to see the powers in this Bill held up, and possibly even miss their legislative slot, while quite difficult work is done on the 1989 Act.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: It is sincere.
It is novel for me—I speak as a lawyer.
I would like to come back to clause 23 and the changes proposed to the Serious Crime Act 2007. I could tell you are very strongly in favour of the changes, but I wonder whether this kind of complete carve-out from liability for the agencies is something you have come across before anywhere else. Is this totally novel, or have you seen it operate somewhere else, and you think it would work well in these instances? There are already defences in that legislation to protect the people you were expressing concern about. What is so wrong with the defences that are already there?
Sir Alex Younger: There are other examples. Australia is the clearest, but it goes much broader than this, actually. In our case, you are right, and it is really important to recognise that a large part of what is already there works. The SCA is, by the way, an Act that I absolutely support—I hate to see fat cats here helping people launder money overseas; it is really irritating. We need this stuff, but I am fairly sure that this aspect, the potential criminalisation of intelligence exchange, was unintentional. The reality is that the way the SCA is drawn, with its extraterritorial nature and its very broad conditions, captures things that would not be adequately addressed through the safeguards that were in place before.
Of course, as you allude to, there are defences in place, but to go back to the conversation we have just had, I do not think I as a counter-terrorist operator, which I was, would be particularly happy—even though I have faith in the justice system and the wisdom of juries—to know that what I did could be tested in a court of law with all the uncertainty that entails, when I am obeying a lawfully authorised instruction with all of the oversight that exists. I want to be really clear: when a UK intelligence community individual acts not in good faith or outside those instructions, they should absolutely be subject to all the considerations, including of secondary liability, that exist, but I think any ambiguity in the circumstances I just described is wrong and will have a chilling effect on our intelligence exchange.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: Again, I am not a lawyer, but I do not believe that it does, no, not entirely. In fact, that is the predicate for what I am saying.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: Yes, I would agree with that.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: From my experience, I would point to the consequences of the digitisation of every conceivable kind of information. That is proceeding apace. We have digital cities. Our infrastructure is now wholly dependent on IT.
In my recent book, I coined an acronym, CESSPIT—crime, espionage, sabotage and subversion perverting internet technology—and that perversion is going on as we speak. I will add one thought: I put “crime” in my acronym deliberately. If you take the activities of something like the North Korean Lazarus group, which was responsible for the WannaCry ransomware attack on our national health service, it is operating in order to obtain foreign exchange to pay for the North Korean nuclear programme and North Korean intelligence activity. In March, the group took more than $0.5 billion-worth of Ethereum currency from an exchange. This is large-scale larceny on behalf of a state.
My hope is that the powers in the Bill will help the police and agencies to deal with state-based criminal activity. I know that there are aggravated offences powers as well, which will help the police.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: If you recall the statement made almost exactly two years ago in the House by Dominic Raab, he said that the Government had concluded that it was “almost certain” that “Russian actors” had “sought to interfere” in our election in 2019; and we had the evidence from the American elections and the French presidential election in 2017. All the techniques were deployed. I do not know whether any members of the Committee have been watching the TV series showing on Channel 4, which is as good a primer as any on how such techniques can be used to pervert our political discourse as well as actually harm individuals. This is the world we are in, these are the harms we face and I think that this Bill is a good start in helping the agencies to address some of those harms.
Sir Alex Younger: On this issue, you are right to focus on the possibility of interference in our democratic process and the potential unintended consequences of what we are talking about here. Of course, one person’s interference is another person’s legitimate intervention. Perish the thought that it should be the Government’s responsibility to say what is true and what is not. That is the difference between us and our opponents.
I can understand the scale of the problem; I have seen it. I had a long chat with the Government about this, and the thing that convinced me that this was an appropriate response was, first, the foreign powers condition—to be clear, that is about people acting on behalf of a foreign power—and, secondly, essentially the use of deception to achieve your aim. It seems to me that if someone is working on behalf of a foreign power, using deception, to distort our political process, we have a pretty clear basis for taking action. That, I think, is as it should be.
Q
“A person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct…will have”
a negative “effect” on the UK for or on behalf of the foreign power in question. In other areas of law, in particular the criminal law, we have intent and recklessness. Do you think that clause 13 should be expanded to include recklessness?
Professor Sir David Omand: I looked at clause 24, “The foreign power condition”, and there is quite a lot of scope in it for a successful prosecution to demonstrate that the individual who as, as you say, acted recklessly, could reasonably have been expected to know that their act would benefit a foreign power, for example, so I was not so concerned about that particular question.
So you do not think that it should be included in clause 13?
Professor Sir David Omand: No, I had not concluded that.
Sir Alex?
Sir Alex Younger: I do not have anything to add to that.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: First of all, “carve-out” means different things to different people, but there is a wild idea that this is a granting of immunity that means we can behave willy-nilly. You will know from your Committee experience that this is not true. I want to make that really clear. The reality at the end of all this—we have had the theoretical versus practical conversation already—is that there exists a risk that individual UK IC officers will face criminal sanction for doing their job. I do not think that risk should exist. That is fundamentally where I am. You can decide as politicians that it is better than what is being proposed by the Government, but I am saying that I do not think it is compatible with a healthy sharing regime of the sort that produces the security benefits I have outlined.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: I cannot. I am sorry, but it happened just at the end of my time. I know from conversations with my Australian colleagues that they are very satisfied with the legislation that exists, in so far as that it deals with this issue. I would recommend looking into that yourself or speaking to the Australians. I do know that it is broader than what we are proposing here today. I am sorry I cannot be more helpful.
Q
Sir Alex Younger: Yes. It is not something I have thought hard about, but the fundamental principle of operating as a team is probably our most powerful riposte, alongside our values, to the threat of authoritarianism. It is something I am completely signed up for, but alliances are a thing we have that our opponents generally speaking do not. I was very proud to operate in one of those—Five Eyes—which is a particularly effective version. If we, as a matter of principle, aimed for interoperability through legal alignment, that is something I would absolutely support. It is never going to be complete. The United States particularly has a very different legal process to us. Certainly as regards counter-terrorism, the extent that we manage to align legally massively boosts operational co-operation. I am wholly confident that the same would be true when it comes to state threats.
I think everybody here would agree that a team has to play by the same rules.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: I was pleased to see the power in the Bill because, particularly in the digital age, you can take the offensive and you can prepare, but you may not have got to the stage of actually pressing the button. If you can demonstrate that a foreign state was engaged with help from inside the country in some serious espionage or sabotage activity, it seems to me that the very preparation is something that the prosecutors ought to be able to bring forward. In the terrorism example, the cases would be slightly different, but the offence of acts preparatory to terrorism has been extremely helpful to the prosecution authorities for good reason.
Sir Alex Younger: The bottom line is that we have to get in front of this stuff. Just speaking as a counter-terrorist practitioner, that is the additional discipline. It is not like solving the crime. We need to solve it before it has happened, and that raises a set of ethical and legal dilemmas where it is important to be striking the right balance, so I really welcome the proper treatment that we see of that in the Bill.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: Probably not, but on the other hand you have to balance that against the risk that legislation would inadvertently catch, for example, academic activity in think-tanks. Alex Younger has referred to transparency and covertness. Where a foreign power is taking covert acts and dirty tricks in order to access our institutions, think-tanks and universities, that would be criminalised by the Bill.
Where a member of the embassy of any foreign state represented here attends, quite openly, think-tank meetings and so on—everybody knows who they are and they know they are on the guest list—that does not pose a direct harm. It would be a mistake to start to try to confuse those categories too much. However, what it comes down to is that this is a probabilistic business; this is doing things that increase the chances that we all protect the citizens and the interests of the state. This Bill alone is not going to prevent states from attempting harm against us, and it probably will not catch all those harms either, but it is a good start.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: Well, there is a lot in the Bill. The move away from having to identify states as enemies, for example. States have interests of their own and they will promote those interests. If they are doing so openly through diplomatic and academic means, that is one thing, but if they are doing it, as some are, covertly, then although you might not categorise them as enemies, they are none the less conducting themselves in a way that causes harm. That is one of the examples where I think the Bill takes a more up-to-date view. It is not just nations with which we are at war or potentially could be at war.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: My reading of the Bill is that trade secrets and theft of intellectual property are well covered. You probably also have to have in mind the Online Safety Bill, which has a whole different set of considerations but which is, again, intended to reduce the amount of harmful content that citizens are exposed to. It is quite easy to envisage cases where a foreign state is putting material online covertly and pretending to be someone else.
In the 2016 US presidential election, there were a number of egregious examples of that—for example, in order to stir up conflict within society by exaggerating an existing split in society, be it over race, inequality or any other issue. That is the nature of the threat that we currently face in all democracies. You cannot solve it all by creating criminal offences where a link cannot be established back to the foreign powers condition, but you may be able—by working with the companies, which will exercise their own terms and conditions—to get more of this stuff removed. You need that as well as the powers in the Bill.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: Yes, and another important consideration is public education. I have argued before that we should start teaching critical thinking in schools and teaching kids how to be safe online when they come across deliberate and malicious misrepresentation.
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: I recommend the use of the OECD’s triplet of “misinformation”, which is wrong, but innocently so, and should be corrected; “disinformation”, which is deliberately and maliciously wrong; and “malinformation”, which is information that is true but was never intended to enter the public domain, such as the personal emails of Members of Parliament.
Sir Alex Younger: Please hold that thought, because I spent years trying to work out whose side Vladimir Putin was on, as he was propagating all sorts of contradictory causes, and then I just realised that he wants an argument—he wants distrust and discord. I have not been to the OECD on the subject, but I entirely support that.
That brings us to the end of the time allocated for this session. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our very distinguished witnesses for your time today.
Examination of Witness
Paddy McGuiness gave evidence.
Q
Paddy McGuinness: My name is Paddy McGuiness, and I am currently an adviser with a critical issues firm called Brunswick Group. I was previously a national security official, latterly as the deputy national security adviser for intelligence, security and resilience in the Cabinet Office from 2014 to 2018. In that role, I oversaw hazards and threats affecting the UK homeland, including some aspects of counter-terrorism, alongside Sir Alex, and cyber-security programmes, offensive and defensive. I began the work on hostile states, and I also dealt with questions of broader resilience to natural hazard. For much of that time, I was also the Government’s chief security officer, overseeing matters of vetting, classification, investigation, and disciplinary and criminal proceedings to protect classified information.
Q
Paddy McGuinness: I really welcome the way you framed that question, because when I thought to myself, “What am I going to say in front of this Committee?” that was absolutely at the centre of it. As the representative, in a policy sense, of the intelligence agency—Sir Alex and the others—and as a person trying to practise Government security and see through disciplinary and sometimes criminal investigations around compromise of classified material, my lived experience was that our legislation and regulations were, frankly, a Potemkin front, and that behind them there was not very much.
I would move in public or speak to Members of Parliament and Ministers, and they would say, “Ah, we have got the Official Secrets Act. We have got this and that,” and they would look at the terrorism powers, which Jonathan Hall described so fully, and the way they interplay with the powers proposed in the Bill, and they would assume we have similar powers, but as you see we had almost nothing. Where there were powers, very few of them crossed the serious crime threshold to engage the full range of intrusive investigative techniques and police time to pursue them. That was very disturbing at a time, certainly when I was deputy National Security Adviser and previously, when the impact on the digital age, as described by Sir David and Sir Alex, came to the fore, and when many states were messing, within the United Kingdom, with our institutions, corporate life and communities, over which they thought they had some share because those people came from that country of origin.
The answer is that I was left very disturbed. That is why under the coalition Government, the Cameron Administration and the May Administration—I left during that—I was, if you like, an apolitical advocate of new powers to shore up what was a weakness or shortfall in our national security capability.
Q
Paddy McGuinness: Yes, and this is illustrative. In the other areas, as Sir Alex described and did fantastic service in countering terrorism, we have not had as much terrorist pressure on our societies and values as there might have been, because of the suppressive effect we have been able to have with our partners. That is because we had capabilities and powers. In the case of hostile state threats, we have some capabilities but perhaps not enough powers, and that is true in cyber. So we have left in front of people who wish to have purchase over our decision making, or to be able to influence us or possibly attack us, free space.
Inevitably, we concentrate on those that are most egregious. Sir David referred to the Lazarus Group in North Korea, and we might look at Iranian behaviours. Indeed, we might look at Russian or Chinese behaviours, particularly around intellectual property and technology, which are all very serious, but I refer you to the number of advanced persistent threats that are now listed because that gives you a description of the number of states that, unconstrained, are beginning to use these techniques for their policy purposes, whatever they are.
For me, almost the best example of this was in the covid pandemic, when there were intrusions and potentially damaging activity in the networks of international healthcare organisations that we needed to help us deal with the pandemic, such as the World Health Organisation. The APT—advanced persistent threat—identified was Vietnamese. I refer you to that list. We do not need to ask any former official to breach the confidentiality of high classification material to know that many states act in this space, and they have clear space in front of them in the cyber domain and in some of the techniques that are countered by the Bill.
Q
Paddy McGuinness: It was quite extraordinary that we had a range of different possible offences that relate to the kinds of things that a hostile state would commit in order to sabotage, for instance, critical national infrastructure—a target entity in the UK—and that it was not coherent. What I would put in front of the Committee when you are thinking about this is: the most common thing that I find now in corporate life, but also in Government or in policy space—and in Parliament where I do a bit of advisory work—is stovepiping.
You say “cyber” or “cyber-security” and people immediately think of cyber-security issues, or you say “insider issues” and they say they will deal with that, or they think of physical attacks or physical disruption and they deal with that. They do not understand that this is a playbook, which, if you are a Russian commander, you put together, and you have a choice of what you do.
So you go in an escalation route from, “Can we access this remotely through the internet? Is there another way of accessing it electronically? Do we have a spy within it? Can I send someone from the embassy to go and get close to it and do something to it? Shall I send in Spetsnaz covertly—you know, go to Salisbury and poison some people? Or shall I go to war?” You have that whole range of things and they all relate to each other. And all of them relate to sabotage. We need to approach this by understanding what the adversary is doing and not having little bits of powers in some criminal damage legislation, or in the Computer Misuse Act. That will not do because that is not the purpose of the opponent.
I have described it for disruption and destruction in a sense of warfare, and I have used a kind of Gerasimov Russian example. It is very interesting when one looks at the way in which intellectual property has been stolen. There are a few cases where we see the end-to-end Chinese state effort, where you begin with remote cyber-attacks in close proximity—the case I am thinking of was in the United States—and an inability to get in by those means. Eventually, the subversion and recruitment of a member of staff operating in Switzerland provided them with the intellectual property, which they were not able to access using the cyber techniques. All the way through they were intervening in the networks and activities of that company.
One final thought on this: one of the difficulties with this grey space activity, as Sir Alex described it, is that if you have a presence for an intelligence purpose, you can flick it over and turn it into a disruptive or destructive attack. That is where that preparatory bit is quite important, too: understanding that the simple fact of engaging and being present quickly takes you towards sabotage. I think these are absolutely vital powers.
Q
Paddy McGuinness: The Clerks may have told you, or it may be in my bio, I do not know, but after I left Government I was asked by the Oxford Internet Institute to join them in a thing called the Oxford Technology and Elections Committee, prior to the 2019 elections—with an urgency because of what had happened in the United States in 2016—to come up with some practical suggestions for what we might do to protect our elections. I refer you to it: it is a great bit of work, and the Oxford Internet Institute has gone on doing that work. I am no longer as involved, but there is good work there.
The way I would frame it is this: it is a bit like what I said about the powers that we have. Because we do not occupy the space, others step into it, so because there are not strong controls and real clarity about what is happening around our electoral processes, people mess about in that space. It is really important—this rather echoes something Sir Alex said—that we do not take messing about in the electoral space as being the same thing as delegitimising an election. We have a strong tradition in the United Kingdom of being able to make judgments about whether the way in which candidates have behaved or the way in which money has been spent in a given constituency makes an election void, and you possibly have to run it again. We are used to making that judgment.
One of the risks that I note in this space—again, this is a point Sir Alex made very nicely about Vladimir Putin’s intent, which is to have us off balance—is that if the Russians do hack into a political party’s servers and mess about within them, and maybe mess with the data or interfere, or if they play games with a technology platform that people rely on for information and put out information, and we decide as a result that we cannot trust a referendum or an election, they succeed. That is success for them, so I think what really matters in this space is the ability to measure the impact that state activity has on the democratic process we are looking at, and—as Sir Alex said—that there is bright transparency so we know who is doing what.
Q
Paddy McGuinness: I would expect it to be a dynamic process. I think you will be looking at further legislation; let us hope you have a long life as an MP, but in your time as an MP I would expect you to have to look at this again.
To Sir David’s point, I do not think we should delay for a moment fixing the things that the Bill fixes because of the fact that technologies develop dynamically. There is a lag. I can remember—I think I was actually working at GCHQ at the time—us thinking about what was happening with Facebook as it emerged as a widely used platform. Here we are with the Online Safety Bill, about 13 years later. There is a natural and quite proper lag between rapid technology innovation and slow and considered regulation and legislation, and we are going to have to live with that. I think this is good. It provides a basis, and I think the extraterritoriality is particularly important, as is the way in which sabotage is broadly defined to allow you to deal with the kind of range of things that I have been talking about, given that the opponent will move through those spaces.
Q
Paddy McGuinness: I think it does a very significant thing in the way in which it criminalises specifically the trade secrets aspect, which covers a very broad range. Again, we may have to return to this. This kind of legislation and the type of work that Sir Alex and his successors in MI5, MI6 and GCHQ are doing has Darwinian effect, so I have no doubt that as companies have got better at certain kinds of protection advised by the interaction with the CPNI and the National Cyber Security Centre, so the opponents have got better at it. And we will have to go on doing it.
It does not feel as though we have quite the same volume of opencast mining of our intellectual property and economic value that we had, as was described previously by General Keith Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency in the US. He described the enormous volume—trillions of value—taken out of our economies. There still is a very high level, though, so there is more work to do on this, and it is a significant challenge to the corporate sector to do the right thing in this space, because of the difficulty that it represents. The Bill provides a really solid basis for that discussion, because of the criminalisation of the trades secrets aspect.
Q
Paddy McGuinness: One must constantly avoid complacency, but one of the strengths of the British state is the way in which institutions and agencies work together pragmatically and practically—within the bounds of law, obviously. That is how we have managed to get this far, with a lack of powers, without something going catastrophically wrong. It has felt really nerve-wracking doing it. As the person who had to represent it to Prime Ministers and the National Security Council, my word I was nervous about this. I was much more confident in other areas of my responsibilities, because there was a real shortfall. The Bill closes out quite a lot of that.
I would note something that I think reads across several of the points that have been made by the previous witnesses that I have heard today that it is important for the Committee to understand and for me to represent. When you are dealing with state threats, and in particular against really capable actors, that is a different task from dealing with terrorism or serious and organised crime, because we must work on the assumption that some of our communications, some of our computers and some of our people are under their control.
When I look at, for instance, the STPIM powers, I reflect that it is much more difficult still to bring prosecutions in this area than it is for terrorism and for serious and organised crime, where sometimes people have been suborned by the crime group. This is all together more serious, and it would be naive to think that no one spies for a foreign country, no communications are intercepted and no one is in any of our computers. That just raises the level of difficulty that we have got in this space.
Thank you very much. That brings us to the end of the morning sitting and the time allocated. On behalf of the Committee, I thank Mr McGuinness for giving evidence today.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWe will now hear from Carl Miller, research director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at Demos, and Sam Armstrong, director of communications at the Henry Jackson Society. We have until 2.40 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?
Carl Miller: Hi everyone. My name is Carl Miller. I am the research director for the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at Demos. That means that my day job is trying both to build and then use technology to research the internet in different ways. I have been doing that for about 13 or 14 years now. I suppose most pertinent to the issues being discussed now would be the work that we have been doing for quite a long time trying to pull apart and understand illicit influence operations online and how they affect various aspects of British public life.
Sam Armstrong: I am Sam Armstrong. I am the director of communications at the Henry Jackson Society. I look after our work on China and I also serve as the director of strategy and communications at the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which I know a couple of members of the Committee are members of as well.
Q
Sam Armstrong: My fundamental answer is yes. There are a number of good powers in the Bill. It does not address every issue that some of our allies have wrestled with, but in so far as there are powers in it, all of them are in my view good and helpful powers, which will greatly aid the security services in their important work keeping us all safe.
Carl Miller: I will restrict myself from any broad observations and will keep to the one area that I actually know something about, which is to do with information warfare and influence operations, especially over the internet and social media, and how that might impact things. In so far as that is the case—I am sure we will dig into this more in a second—I do not see the Bill as doing any harm. In fact, strangely, as a centre-left think-tank, we have long been calling for more direct state activity in this area. We have deferred far too much and far too often to the tech giants to try to sort these kinds of problems out for us. My fear, though, is about how the Bill will be enforced and deployed. I do not think that in and of itself, as it stands, it alone will be enough to secure—digitally secure—elections and quite a lot of other important moments, themes and aspects of life against the kinds of online influence that we have seen.
Q
Carl Miller: If there is one thing to take away from any of my evidence it is probably this: we have completely misconceived—the Bill slightly, but generally in Government at the moment—the problem as one of disinformation. The problem is not overwhelmingly or primarily one of disinformation. When we pull apart these campaigns, ones that we know or highly suspect of being in one way or another sponsored or driven by, or of having interacted with, a foreign, usually autocratic state, we notice that disinformation is only one of a whole array of different methods that can be used to influence people. You can paint an extremely distorted picture of the world simply by amplifying some truths over others.
If we look at what is happening in Ukraine at the moment, it is as much about “Putin riding bear” memes as it is about explicit disinformation. Much of this interacts at the level of identity, belonging, kinship, friendship, reasons for getting up in the morning and the problems that people see in the world—hugely subtle. Even at the level of lying, it is less to do with the overt falsehood circulating on the internet and much more to do with the harnessing of false identities and false reasons for being involved in debates. I tend to view this as the emergence of a kind of shadowy tradecraft. It is one that can wrap together, yes, some disinformation, but also some black-hat search engine manipulation, the harnessing of outrage, things to do with identity, as I have been saying, and humour and comedy—all that is influential in different ways.
The way we often set up this problem is through a hyper-rationalist idea that there is this thing called disinformation that propagates online, people lacking digital literacy believe it, and that influences their behaviour and attitudes. I will shut up in a second. I rarely interview people, but I have interviewed some of the perpetrators that actually do these operations and they tell me one thing, time and time again. They say, “Carl, we don’t lie about the world to get people to change their minds. We tell people things they already think are true about the world and then guide that in a particular direction.”
The current influence operation in Ukraine is a brilliant example of that. What we are seeing is Russia or pro-invasion-linked influence operations targeting the global south, trying to portray the invasion as essentially being an anti-colonial gesture and tapping into deep-seated anti-western and anti-colonial attitudes within the audiences they are addressing.
Q
Sam Armstrong: Yes. In a sense, the threat is changing less so than our recognition of the change. Increasingly, we are waking up to the threat of the more all-encompassing nature of interference launched or directed by branches of the Chinese Communist party. Unlike traditional Russian or Soviet Union espionage, this is not 100 or 200 individuals in the UK at any time running a network of agents in a very organised way. This is something more full-throated and all-encompassing—they call it the united front—in which people who would not ordinarily be, or who would not see themselves as being, operatives of a foreign intelligence state are being brought into it or are acting in it.
In addition, the nature of the way that we have woken up to this threat means that there are individuals acting on behalf of the Chinese state quite explicitly and openly who are also employed concurrently, and declaredly so, by public authorities in the United Kingdom, most particularly at British universities, where we have Confucius centres. That is one well known example. They are a branch of the Chinese state and they often take money directly from the Chinese state for their operations. People are double-hatting in roles in the academy there and in the university. That means there is the bizarre case of the British Government—not the British Government as in Her Majesty’s Government, but public authorities at their largest—employing Chinese spies. The British state is certainly knowingly employing agents of the Chinese state.
Q
Sam Armstrong: This Bill will do an awful lot to deal with it. There are some offences in the Bill that are drawn extremely broadly and will allow the security services to take a knife to whichever problems they would like.
The Bill does not do certain things that other countries have done. For example, Australia introduced the Foreign Relations Act, which allowed the central Government to terminate relationships that public authorities had entered into with foreign states where they were undermining Australia’s foreign policy position. That is a power that I know Australian officials have been keen to encourage the British Government to replicate.
In terms of assisting foreign intelligence services, which I think is by far and away the most broadly applicable offence in the Bill, and the trade secrets offence, there are broad powers there and the Government deserve commendation for bringing those powers before Parliament, although not before time. The security services have been keenly pushing for them and they will appreciate them in doing their work.
Q
Carl Miller: That is a great question. We can start by cleaning up the grubby world of spam. Often, when talking about online influence operations and disinformation, we descend into this kind of rarefied world of grand geopolitics, but it has as much to do with a very wide array of services and companies. If anyone googles “buy retweets now”, you will be able to see what I am talking about.
There are a tonne of companies that operate in plain sight, selling social media manipulation as “social media services”. You can buy fake followers; you can buy fake engagement. I looked it up on the way here; as of about 10 minutes ago, there was a company selling positive comments in Ukrainian on Instagram—mostly, they claim, by users from Ukraine—for $78 per 1,000. That is on the light net; we are not even talking about the services that are cryptographically secured or anonymised.
There is an array of these kinds of operations. An almost shadowy grey-area marketplace has emerged, which radically lowers the barriers to entry into doing those kinds of activities. That has always been there, but the consensus has emerged among researchers like me that, over the last year or two, the actual number, sophistication and variety of those services has increased quite dramatically. To be honest, if we were to really try to genuinely start increasing the cost and penalties for the actors that do that kind of thing, we would have to target that entire industry as participants in it.
Lastly, in pulling apart some of the operations regarding Ukraine, our hunch is that state-backed activities have likely made use of those exact same services. We will see states maybe rolling out capability outside of state, setting up as private companies, and selling those capabilities back into state.
Q
Carl Miller: I have spent 10 years saying the social media companies have not been doing enough on just about every matter of importance that I can possibly think of. They are doing a tremendous amount more now than before, but that has a couple of implications.
First, we have dramatically overfocused on Facebook and Twitter. There are reasons for that, and a lot of them are the fault of researchers like me. We research Facebook because it is big, and Twitter because it is easy to research. If you have a look at the journalistic stories that drive the awareness and debate, they are very often furnished by exposés and revelations about those two platforms.
If I were to point to one part of the internet that I am genuinely afraid about, it would be Wikipedia. If I were an information operation officer, I would have no idea why I was mucking around with Twitter. In Wikipedia, we have an open platform that is protected and serviced by an open community of people who can freely join. If I were a state, I would employ a phalanx of people to contribute completely legitimate edits to Wikipedia and build up their standing in the community, and then they could run for office within Wikipedia and start using the powers they would gain to change what is on Wikipedia and the policies that govern it.
There are lots of other such open-source communities, many of which, including Wikipedia, inform and drive the decisions that the tech giants make. They have not managed to build the kind of internal defensive teams that a Facebook or a Twitter can to try—often in the shadows and in secret; we do not know enough about what happens—to clear that kind of stuff off at scale.
Q
Sam Armstrong: The problem is that it is so broad, in that there are problems even in this building. The security services will tell you privately that—far beyond Christine Lee, who obviously was named—there are agents of the Chinese state here who are known to the security services and in whom they have taken an active interest.
There are huge problems in academia; China has made no secret of its interest in academia. When the Zhenhua database leak happened a couple of years ago—this was a database that China was using to identify potential targets of intelligence activity—it was no surprise that they had targeted think-tanks and academics very carefully.
The third and final area that China is very, very interested in is anything related to technology, and to the areas that it would like to obtain and that it set out in its “Made in China 2025” programme. Those areas are twofold. The first is universities and open research. There are researchers in the UK right now who are, frankly, working with branches of the Chinese navy to come up with devices to track nuclear submarines around the world. That is as dangerous as it comes to our national security, and that work is going on in the open. I am also aware of British companies that are making engines—or casings for engines in this case—that they have admitted are good for nothing other than for engines in tanks. There are grievous concerns about the whole level.
Where do you start first? Well, that is a choice between those that are dangerously undermining our national security and tech, and those that are dangerously undermining our democracy in accessing this building and in terms of the influence and space in which they are influencing our democratic process.
Q
Carl Miller: One suggestion that I was going to make today was that we have nothing like a comprehensive picture. This is often extremely sporadic project-based research, and it is usually platform-specific, even though we know that, in all likelihood, that is not how the campaigns work—they will work across tonnes of platforms all at once. We will see only certain kinds of campaigns. We are broadly better at seeing broad-based campaigns addressing quite large slices of a population, but again, if we were to put ourselves in the mind of an influence operator, there would be much more targeted campaigns directed towards—if you will—higher-value targets as well.
What we know about scale is that many more countries than those we talk about are doing it. I understand that in the last Indian election, accounts attributable to every single mainstream political party were taken down by Facebook during that campaign. It has emerged as an almost mainstream campaigning tactic.
Q
Carl Miller: Yes. One of the reasons that I am hesitating is that, for researchers like me, clear and guaranteed attribution—outside the platforms—is unbelievably difficult, and I do not want to overstate. I can tell you that there are dozens upon dozens upon dozens of incidences, scenarios and narratives that we regard—reading the tea leaves of machine-learning patterns as we do—as suspicious. With the open data that is available to me, I cannot definitively link that back to a state. However, Twitter and Facebook, for example, have both disclosed dozens of campaigns that were—at least in part—likely targeting the UK, and linked them back to what they believe to be state actors.
Q
Carl Miller: No, there is not. In fact, I am sure it does, and that is one of the big trends we are seeing. We ran an effort over COP26, and we saw that there were certainly various kinds of organised attempts to manipulate big global thematic conversations about climate action, for instance. Given the barriers of entry into this world, I also do not think that it will be national elections; it might be quite small and local events that see some level of manipulation happening, too.
I will also point out one reality about how these work. One of the difficulties in seeing how the Bill—I am sorry if I have misunderstood this—might apply is its requirement that the actors involved have to be conscious that they are working on behalf of a foreign power.
Quite often, my suspicion is that you would have a state agency with various kinds of links with online actors, and there might be a whole chain, from a PR company to another more specialist digital consultant to a much spammier consultant, and that person might be the person reaching in and actually gathering together various kinds of functionalities, capabilities or services to do overtly illegitimate and malign forms of manipulation online. It might be very difficult; they might never know that a state is at the other end of the trail. With the companies that I mention—the ones selling large amounts of digital manipulation—I cannot believe that they do any kind of “know your customer” activity. I do not think that they have any idea who is employing them.
Q
Carl Miller: I cannot create a profile for how each state would approach information operations, to be honest. I do think that there is quite a high degree of heterogeneity among the actors involved. You have all kinds of different intelligence agencies, and military-based and political PR comms-based actors. One of the truisms is that it is a bit of a scattergun approach at the moment, where lots of things have been tried and they are attempting to evaluate them, and they do not really know which ones are succeeding and which are not. I am not quite sure if that is true or not.
The actual nitty-gritty of the techniques and technologies involved is probably the shadowiest part of this whole area. If the Bill were to be effective, something we need in parallel to it would be almost a digital influence version of the national risk register, where we have state support to pull apart and lay out where we think the genuine threats are and the genuine bodies of capability and technology that have been built to do this kind of stuff. It is very difficult for researchers in the open to do this by ourselves.
Q
Sam Armstrong: Yes. China initially began—there is some really interesting stuff that has only happened in the UK in this space. We had a university that for a very long time rather openly advertised itself as providing services and specialist media training to officers of the Chinese propaganda Ministry, among others—various branches of the Chinese state—right here in London, metres away from the BBC. You also have the Confucius centre picture, which is important.
Where China has actually done very poorly is in its direct Government-to-Government disinformation. Some of the stuff that you saw around “Wolf Warrior” or that the Global Times—its state international newspaper—puts out is very ineffective. What China is incredibly effective at is not really that disinformation or misinformation public communications picture, but identifying individuals of influence within academia, business or wherever, and building up close relations with them. They are invariably people of influence, who in turn use their own networks to say, “Well, look, I’d be careful of all this talk about China. They are the biggest-growing economy on Earth, we really need to trade with them and we shouldn’t do anything to upset them at any point.” In so far as I have seen, that is where the Chinese influence picture has been focused.
Q
Sam Armstrong: Yes, there are two things. The first is the foreign influence transparency register system. I note that there has been a promise that it is to come, but the devil will be in the detail on that because there is a series of policy judgments that have to be made—whether it is expansive, where the teeth bite and so on. It is incredibly important that it is seen quickly.
Secondly, there should be an ability for the Secretary of State, either of the Home Office or the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, to intervene in known problematic institutional relations. There are excellent powers here, such as the individual prevention and investigation measures, but there is very little capacity when that is done more corporately—to go in and say not just to universities but to companies, which would be an expansion of the Australian power, “This arrangement is not in the UK’s interest, and we are ordering you to terminate it.” To say that is a glaring omission is perhaps overstating it, but those are the two powers I would really like to see.
Mr Miller?
Carl Miller: There is nothing I dislike in the Bill. It makes a lot of sense to criminalise conscious influence activities linked to foreign states, but we should not think that it will have an appreciable impact on the kind of illicit influence operations that we know are happening.
Q
Mr Armstrong, you obviously think the foreign influence registration scheme would help a very great deal. Mr Miller, would it make any difference to some of the issues that you have been discussing if it were clearer that some of the actors that work in social media that you have been talking about had to register?
Carl Miller: No, it will not. Identity is being hijacked and used at a very great scale, so we do not know who these actors are. To be honest with you, the way to start to reduce this activity is to try to create some cost and penalties for the people who do it. They are not doing it from the UK. The nature of the internet is that crime on the internet, like anything, passes unbelievably easily across borders, almost without being noticed. The way forward will be for us to create ways of reaching beyond our own borders and increase the costs. This might sound strange for a think-tanker to say, but we need to increase cyber-offensive activity against the criminal architectures that allow this kind of work to happen.
Q
Carl Miller: It is difficult, because the web of powers that the intelligence agencies have to use cyber-offensive activity—various kinds of online action, such as device interference—is spread out across a number of different pieces of legislation.
One of the difficulties is that online influence operations are so widespread and common that most of them would probably not pass the thresholds for the intelligence agencies to become interested and engaged in them. That is one of the difficulties that we have with cyber-crime in general. A tremendous amount of it happens, but so much of the capability to do something about it is concentrated within GCHQ, and not in the police services that have to handle most of it. Sorry, that was a slightly amorphous and broad answer.
Q
Sam Armstrong: The Australian scheme is by far and away the best example—in my view, the US FARA system is not a good comparator—and it is a shame that we have not taken the opportunity to bring it in sooner. The Australian high commissioner in London was George Brandis, who was the Attorney General who wrote that very Bill, and I know he was keen wherever possible to impress on the Government that he was there and ready to help. I am sure that offer has not dissipated.
Q
“a person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct”
and
“the foreign power condition is met…if… the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that”
it is a foreign power. Do you think that should be widened to include an element of recklessness or recklessness?
Carl Miller: I think doing anything that might compel any of the services involved to do any kind of due diligence on the people who are employing them can only be a good thing, although the general point I am making is that I don’t think criminalising activity within domestic legislation has been a particularly effective way of changing what people do on the internet, especially when those people are largely concentrated in jurisdictions that do not have any co-operative relationship with British law enforcement.
I remember I spent time with a number of cyber-crime teams across the UK and, in the words of one cyber-crime police officer, “If you are in Russia, the cost or penalty of doing cyber-crimes against British citizens is basically nil.” This is not going to be an effective way of reaching beyond our borders and addressing where we believe a large number of actors doing this kind of thing are; they are not doing this from the UK.
Q
Carl Miller: Sure. First, we need to change the intelligence picture slightly. We should integrate SOCMINT—social media intelligence—within the national strategic intelligence picture. We overlooked open-source intelligence—
But that is not to do with this Bill, is it?
Carl Miller: Sorry, I thought you asked me— Would you like to hear what I think?
Yes, carry on.
Carl Miller: Partly it is to do with changing our national knowledge of where these threats are and who is doing them, so the integration of intelligence. Then, as I said, there should be a national risk register and possibly the creation of powers for parts of the intelligence establishment to undertake direct activity against some of the technical architectures that allow this to happen.
Sorry to delve into the technicalities for a second, but for instance residential proxy IP addresses are a very important way in which this stuff happens. Residential proxy IPs are toasters and fridges and stuff. Basically, they each have an IP address and many of them are hijacked. They are the kind of things you that you use if you want to fool a social media platform into thinking that you are 10,000 people from around the planet when you are not—you are one operator sitting in a particular country. These are criminal architectures that have been amassed and rented out and sold to people, and I am sure they are rented out by some of the actors who seek to do influence operations. These are the kinds of things that we need to target. Putting pressure on that kind of asset is the kind of thing that will probably not get rid of them, but will meaningfully increase the costs of this kind of activity.
Q
Sam Armstrong: Yes, I think so. Imposing a duty on the social media companies is one of the only immediate tools and levers we can pull. I take Carl’s point; I do not think it is going to be sufficient to deal with the hordes of people overseas who are, frankly, conducting quasi-military-type activities against the UK through cyber means here, because criminal law is not the tool for that. Should they exist and are they necessary? Yes. Are they sufficient? Probably not.
Carl Miller: It is just massively insufficient. The reason why is that the platforms, however rich, clever or large they are, cannot reach beyond the platforms themselves. That is the problem. The way we have tried to respond to this problem so far is to have Facebook take down accounts, but take-down is a very weak response. That is essentially being priced in to those kinds of activities. They have developed methodologies for setting up or acquiring new accounts as they go. In principle, I am not hostile to platform regulation across a range of online threats, but for those problems where we are dealing with a set number of actors who have specific capabilities and tap into a specific and constantly evolving tradecraft, I do not think it is going to be the tool to make much difference.
Q
Carl Miller: The main thing I would say that the state can step in to help with is around attribution. That is something that we cannot do without state powers. It is something that, at the moment, only the tech giants do, and that is only linked to take-down. If we were to have any prospect of either taking direct cyber-action, or actually bringing criminal prosecution, it would be something that we need. One big thing here is around data access—I am sure you have had other panellists talk to you about that before. To foreground that, I have come here as a researcher whose job it is to do that kind of research, and one of my main things is that we know so little. We know nothing about TikTok—it makes none of its data available. Facebook makes some of its data available, and that is why we have some picture of it. Twitter makes a lot of its data available, and that is why we have a bigger picture.
TikTok is enormous, likely very influential, anecdotally there is tonnes of Ukraine-invasion activity happening on it now, and it has absolutely no application programming interface available for researchers in any way, whatsoever. By the way, there are also rumours that Facebook is withdrawing some of the data access that it currently gives researchers. I am sorry; I know this is ranging far beyond the scope of the Bill. However, to put this on your radars, I think that legislators may have to step in sooner or later to compel platforms to maintain data availability. Otherwise, even the very small window we currently get is going to continually shrink.
Q
Sam Armstrong: Yes, I would say that we should actually open this up. One of the best things about the Ukrainian war—there is not much to take solace in—is that defence intelligence has been publishing daily information that has been countering many of those problems. That is a really good thing; we have seen it work and it is wonderful.
We saw a foreign intelligence asset, Christine Lee, regularly making use of this place and having worrying relations with Members of this House. That continued right up until MI5 published a foreign interference alert about her. She is not alone; a number of countries have foreign intelligence and influence assets operating in and around here. There are a number more from the country that sent Christine Lee.
It has been a few months now. If you want to deal with this problem, the fastest way is some sunlight and disinfectant. Let us see a routine publication of those individuals that lengthy, hugely expensive but necessary investigations launched by MI5 have established—beyond MI5’s doubt, at least—are engaged in foreign interference.
Order. That brings us to the end of the allocated time. I thank our witnesses for coming in today.
Examination of Witness
Louise Edwards gave evidence.
We will now hear, via Zoom, from Louise Edwards, director of regulation at the Electoral Commission. We have until 3 o’clock for this session. I would be grateful, Louise, if you could introduce yourself for the record.
Louise Edwards: Thank you. My name is Louise Edwards. I am the director of regulation at the Electoral Commission.
Q
Louise Edwards: Of course. We are, fundamentally, an organisation that oversees the running of elections in the UK. We also have a role as the civil enforcement and regulator body for political finance in the UK. For foreign interference, that means that we are the experts on electoral law, electoral finance and the running of elections, and we offer that advice to law enforcement and indeed to the security services, on request. We are not a national security body per se. We do not have an intelligence function per se. It is really a question of working with the intelligence services or law enforcement where we can to offer them that advice.
Q
Louise Edwards: As I said, we are not a national security body, so our knowledge of the threat of foreign interference in the UK is very much based on what law enforcement and the police tell us, essentially. If you think about elections in the UK, we have not been notified by the security services of any successful attempts at foreign interference in UK elections, and I think we take some confidence from that.
On the political finance side—the money that is going in and out of political parties, campaigners and others involved in our democracy—I caught the end of the previous session and there was reference to one notification from MI5 in that area. That is the only one that we are aware of. However, I would say that it is not a matter to be complacent about. There are things that could be done, particularly on the political finance side, to really modernise and improve the safeguards in the system, not just for foreign interference but for any kind of abuse or interference in the political finance regime.
Q
Louise Edwards: There is a key principle here, which is that you could hope there is a link between increasing the penalty that can be imposed for an offence and therefore disincentivising or deterring people from committing that offence. That seems like an in-principle link that you would want to see made. That is what perhaps the Bill is aimed at creating.
The measures in the Bill—the offences relevant to elections that are in it—are offences that the police will have to investigate and that will then go through the courts for prosecutions, so really key to making the provisions work effectively is to ensure that the police have the capability and capacity to take them forward, investigating them and passing them on to prosecutors when appropriate.
Q
Louise Edwards: Do you mean a potential problem in the sense of a foreign state interference issue?
Yes, foreign interference.
Louise Edwards: Okay. If we were made aware of that, it is likely that it would be from the intelligence community or the police, because they are likely to be the ones that would have that information.
If we think about the sorts of offences that are being considered in the Bill, they are broadly around, if we look at the political finance ones, for example, the people who put money into the political system. In political finance, you have the people who are making donations and the people who are receiving the donations, that being the political parties, campaigners and candidates. For donors—the people putting the money into the system—the regime as it currently stands has a set of criminal offences that broadly sit with law enforcement rather than with the commission.
We, as a civil regulatory body, have a set of sanctioning powers for political parties and campaigners, so if we were to be notified of an instance of foreign interference—money coming into the political system from a foreign state power, say—our first response would be to discuss the matter with law enforcement, which would then decide whether to pursue it.
Q
Louise Edwards: That is how the process would work. It is very common for civil regulators to have a route into law enforcement for anything that is a criminal matter. In fact, a number of offences in electoral law are both civil and criminal, so even now, before the Bill goes through, we would hand anything involving a foreign state power over to law enforcement to take forward. If the Bill goes through, we will have to hand that over to law enforcement anyway, because the offences listed in it will be investigated only by law enforcement, not by us.
We have a good, established process to notify police forces around the UK if we think that a matter is for them to look at and decide whether to investigate. We have very strong links with police around the UK through which we can do that.
Q
Louise Edwards: The answer to your first question is quite simple: we are not looking at any instances of foreign interference at the moment.
The second question is a very good one. If I may be so bold, I do have an ask. One of the challenges when working with law enforcement is that we do not have effective information-sharing powers. One of the things that the Bill would achieve is to bring the police in particular further into the political finance enforcement regime by making the listed offences matters for them only, rather than for us at all. We need a more effective information-sharing power under which we can just hand evidence straight over to the police, unlike at the moment. Currently, it is like we have to say to the police, “Can you please ask us for the evidence information that we want to give you?” If we could cut through that with some decent information-sharing powers, it would make the process an awful lot more straightforward.
Thank you. There is an awful lot for us to look at closely there.
Q
Louise Edwards: The intelligence community have not notified us of any successful attempts to interfere in UK elections. As I mentioned, the Electoral Commission is not a national security body—we do not have intelligence functions—so when it comes those matters, we receive the information rather than creating it or analysing exactly what it means.
Q
Louise Edwards: That is my understanding of what the intelligence community mean when they tell us that, yes.
Q
We talk in other contexts about regulating political advertising—meaning adverts placed by political parties that are registered under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000—but in reality, political parties’ advertising is a very small fraction of the total online influencing that goes on in the run-up to elections. What is your expert assessment of how the whole political arena is changing? How do our institutions and our legislative approach need to change to keep up?
Louise Edwards: That is a very interesting question—how long do I have? The political finance side of the regime—I will unpack what I mean by that in a moment—is very much focused on the concept of regular and routine transparency that is enhanced significantly around an electoral event—an election, essentially.
When we talk about the political finance regime, we are talking about a defined set of actors: registered political parties, third-party campaigners, candidates or other members of political parties, and those who have specific responsibilities under law, including regular donation-reporting obligations. For example, political parties have to tell us about their substantial donations on a quarterly basis, and we then publish all that information.
When it comes to elections, as I am sure you know, there is a period in the run-up to elections called the regulated period. Any spending on campaigning that happens during that period—obviously, it gets more intense the closer you get to polling day—also has to be reported to us and gets published so that people can see it.
However, you are right that that is only one side of the nature of influencing or of the wider concept of political campaigning in the UK. There are some really interesting questions there around whether it is sustainable to look only at detailed spending in the run-up to an election, when you might well argue that political campaigning these days is year-round rather than in the run-up to particular polls.
There is also another side to it: how do you define regulated political campaigning and the spending that has to be reported? Back in 2018, we did some work with voters looking at what they thought about online campaigning specifically. One thing we found was that quite often voters did not realise that something they saw online was actually trying to influence their vote, because it was not immediately obvious on the face of the piece of literature that that was what was happening.
In terms of how things might change or develop in the future, there was a bit of thinking done about this in the Elections Act 2022, which introduced what we call “digital imprints”. They are a little bit of text that goes on a message online and says, “This was produced by this person, on behalf of this person, paid for by this person,” so you can see that it is a political advertisement. It is that level of detail and transparency that now needs to be applied.
Q
Louise Edwards: It applies to anybody who is putting out regulated political material, so it would be political parties, third-party campaigners and candidates. The regime is fairly comprehensive, although not entirely comprehensive. I realise I am going slightly outside the scope of this Bill, but there is opportunity to make it more comprehensive and to really make it clear to voters every time they see a little bit of campaign material online who is paying for it. So it is those established actors who are—
Q
Louise Edwards: Yes.
Q
Louise Edwards: You have hit upon one of the hardest issues here. Broadly speaking, people who are within the regime already—the established actors we have been talking about—comply with the law. Many of them, in fact, already put digital imprints on their online material, even though it is not yet a legal requirement to do so. The challenge is those who are perhaps based overseas or who do not want to play by the rules, basically. There are real enforcement challenges there, particularly when you are thinking about organisations or individuals based overseas.
If I go back to the recent Elections Act, one of the provisions that the Government brought in at that point was to lower the spending threshold in elections for people who are based overseas to £700: if you are an overseas entity, you can spend up to £700 campaigning in our elections, then that is it—that is your spending threshold. The problem is that, from our point of view, that can only really be symbolic, because it is virtually impossible to enforce spending at that low level. Even if we were to identify an overseas organisation spending in UK elections, they are overseas, so we have no enforcement powers that we can use to try to stop them.
I am painting a fairly awful picture, but there are some ways to tackle it from a slightly different perspective. For example, we have recently started launching a campaign before elections that is helping voters to look at online material with perhaps a more critical eye, to try to assess whether they should let it affect their vote and to give them a place to find out how to express concerns about that material, with the hope then being that we can perhaps raise confidence in legitimate digital campaigning while at the same time giving people an outlet if they see something they think is illegitimate. There is also a fair amount of work that you could do around political literacy at a very young age with voters, to help them to have that kind of critical perspective.
You mentioned the registration schemes. As a civil political finance regulator, our remit does not extend to matters of lobbying and influence, but one thing I would say, if I may, is that when it comes to the integrity of our democracy and voter confidence in it, transparency is key. Any registration scheme that brings more transparency around who is seeking to influence those involved in our democracy can only be to the benefit of the confidence of voters.
Are there any other questions? Okay. I thank our witness for joining this Zoom call and for giving evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
We will now start our next session and hear from Professor Ciaran Martin, professor of practice in the management of public organisations at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. We have until 3.20 pm, so if colleagues could keep the questions succinct, I would be very grateful—then we can get in as many of you as possible. Could you introduce yourself for our records, Professor?
Professor Ciaran Martin: Thanks very much, Chair. My name is Ciaran Martin. As you say, I work at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. From 2014 to 2020, I served on the board of GCHQ, and I was the first chief executive of its National Cyber Security Centre.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: Thank you for your kind words. I broadly welcome this Bill. There are a serious of fairly antiquated pieces of legislation that—sometimes at the margin, sometimes a little more profoundly—inhibit the pursuit of hostile-state threats, because they are, in effect, pre-digital legislative frameworks, very simply. With some of the language, you are replacing words like “maps” with words like “data”, or at least adding words like “data” to words like “maps”. You are dealing with things such as the flying of unmanned drones over sensitive sites. Despite my previous experience on the inside of the national security side of Government, when I read the explanatory notes, it was a bit of a double-take to be reminded that we had to explicitly criminalise assisting a foreign intelligence service in this country.
I think it is a very sensible piece of legislation, with the modernisation and some of the tidying up. From listening to your exchanges with the Electoral Commission, I think the provisions around disinformation and interference in political and democratic processes are really difficult to get right, so I welcome this sort of process. I think the intent is obviously cross-party and commands widespread support. The intent and basic provisions should be uncontentious, but I think some of the detail is going to be quite tricky.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: When I say scale, I actually mean scale in its very precise meaning about volume. Digital espionage involves the extraction of information on a scale that was hitherto inconceivable, and that has, therefore, extended the scope of that. For example, there are specific references in the legislation to commercial and trade; we have seen that.
One of the changes that digitisation has brought, in terms of hostile foreign intelligence, is that it is possible to inflict large-scale strategic damage on the UK remotely, but it is not always done remotely. There are hybrid elements—there can be activity on the ground in the UK that assists digital espionage and digital penetration of the UK. Our existing legislative framework does not allow for that to be prosecuted. Even when it is done entirely remotely—for example, the People’s Republic of China has done some of its operations entirely remotely—we have seen from the United States that, although it is not transformative, it is a useful policy lever to have a framework of criminal law that criminalises activity even in eventualities where you will not realistically be able to apprehend a named human being.
To be a bit more succinct, the large-scale extraction of and interference with data is essentially the risk. The willingness of nation states—principally Russia and China, to a lesser extent Iran, previously but not so much recently North Korea, and a bunch of up-and-coming potentially hostile states—to do that has been a very significant feature of the national security landscape over the past decade, as the head of MI5 and so forth emphasised.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: One sees only the tip of the iceberg when there are major breaches. I will use a well-known example from the United States—a close ally that is perhaps easier to talk about because it does not involve disclosing sensitive things about the UK.
The hybrid operation against the United States in 2015, which the US Government at the time acknowledged formally was undertaken by the People’s Republic of China, involved the extraction of more than 20 million security clearance records from the United States Office of Personnel Management—effectively the civil service department of the US Federal Government. It was the security clearance application forms of everyone who had applied for security clearance from the US Federal Government in the first 14 years of the century. As a dataset, it is incredibly rich. For example, if you are part of a commercial data breach, it is likely to be just your name and email address—possibly a password, although perhaps not even that, and possibly the last four digits of a credit card. If you go through a Government security clearance process, it is everything.
Think of the current politics of the US and China, and think about the established fact that the Chinese Government have this dataset of US Government personnel, with lots of information about them. You can see the strategic impact that that can have. To the best of my knowledge, based on public scholarship and disclosures relating to that incident, it was a largely remote operation, but it did include some activity on the ground. You can see how the sort of legislation we are talking about here might be useful in at least deterring or being able to deal with that.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: I would say this, wouldn’t I, but there has been a reasonably decent trajectory of controlling it.
There is a challenge for defenders. If you are attacking—if you are Russia and you have a programme of destabilisation of the UK through these sorts of means—it is all the same programme to you. But if you are defending against it, the defence of the networks of a privately owned critical infrastructure company, such as the energy grid, is one problem, and the protection of sensitive Government networks—diplomatic cables and intelligence services—requires you to do something slightly different.
Disinformation is a different problem again, because historically under our laws, quite rightly, it has not been an offence to make up a lie and put it on the internet. That is different from a cyber-attack. Putting it under a single organisation is really quite hard.
Things were starting to get better around the time of the end of my Government service in 2020, although there is probably some way to go, on the synthesis of operational cohesion—the sharing of information—across these different parts. It is better than it is in quite a lot of other countries—it is less siloed—but I am sure, Ms Lynch, that there is plenty more that could be done to improve it.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: A lot of countries have struggled with it, and it goes beyond just legislation, if I am honest. In terms of things like disinformation, quite interesting were some of the things that the French did in 2017, when there was the Russian attempt to do something and they deliberately sort of cast doubt on the integrity of it. They knew the information was being, in effect, data dumped, but they are believed to have done some alterations so as to cast doubt on the authenticity of the whole thing.
In terms of civic society and discourse, in advance of the 2020 election the Washington Post editorial board did something really interesting. Although it did not come to pass in the way that it did in 2016, they issued a proactive statement to say that if they received very sensitive political information but from a suspect source that was likely to be a foreign intelligence service, they would treat it differently from, say, a leak from within the United States—they might sort of print it differently. There is a discussion about how we handle the outcomes of disinformation, on the assumption that it might happen. That is one idea.
On the other hand, on the duties to protect within Government, for example, we are not always very good at gradations of harm. When I started in the civil service at the end of the last century there was still this approach that any leak of any data was potentially quite serious. These days, there is far too much information to take that approach—things are going to leak all the time. We need to focus on an understanding of harm caused and the duty to protect the most sensitive information.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: It is for your detailed scrutiny to work out whether you think that activity that is clearly on behalf of a hostile state is adequately deterrable and punishable by this Bill. It is quite clear, from both my previous job and discussions and concerns in academia, that it is a target sector—of course it is—for hostile foreign powers, particularly China.
I have to say that even before I went to work for a university I thought it was a very, very hard thing to leave to universities to police. I am not a legal expert, so I do not know how this is going to work on the ground, but the question is: does this Bill provide a sufficient legislative framework to deter some of the actions? There is plenty in the Bill that says that damaging foreign intelligence activity in this country is unlawful, and that would obviously include the academic sector. Whether that sufficiently captures activity is an interesting question.
I think it does help, but it is probably quite tricky to specify, if you like, academic institutions as distinct from general malevolent activity in whatever the sector may be. It is a question worth asking, though, because the sector that I work in now is clearly of significant interest to hostile intelligence services in all sorts of different ways, including in respect of people and individual areas of research. That is one of the key threats that legislation like this is designed to counter.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: I do not mean to be flippant, but obviously there could be as many different opinions as there are academics. I think that Government providing clear frameworks, laws and guidance to universities without infringing on academic freedom is where I would want to be. I do not think that it is fair to rely on universities to police this activity. It is extremely difficult in open and collaborative research environments like universities to be able to identify what is malevolent activity. If they do, it is extremely difficult to know where to go, what the relevant laws are, and so forth. The combination of a clear legal framework and clear guidance to universities is something that I personally would welcome. I imagine quite a few people, particularly in sensitive areas like technological research, would absolutely welcome that.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: They are not mutually exclusive. The thing about offensive capabilities is that they are sometimes seen as almost symmetrical—cyber is a sort of enclosed boxing ring, where you have offence versus defence—but offensive cyber can be used for anything. Our own British Government’s one declared offensive cyber-operation was against so-called Islamic State, not against the cyber-capabilities of another state.
I need to be reasonably careful about what I say here, but if you think that the US’s offensive cyber-capabilities are largely in the Cyber Command and the UK’s in the National Cyber Force, the GCHQ-MI6-Ministry of Defence partnership, one would expect that the operational security of those capabilities to be pretty good and therefore make quite hard targets for other actors. Similarly, some of China and Russia’s offensive cyber-capabilities against us will have quite good operational security, which will make them hard targets. We cannot rely on offensive cyber-capabilities to stop other people, particularly at the top end of the spectrum, at the elite nation- state level.
There is no magic panacea in the Bill, because no magic panacea is available. Even in the areas we were talking about, such as completely remote activity, one of the things that we saw anecdotally—there is some emerging research to support this—was that when the US in particular had a legal framework, where it can prosecute and indict people in absentia, in China and to some extent Iran, that did have some impact for some time. It did not solve everything, but it did affect the behaviour of some actors—they could not travel to the west, most practically, because they were under indictment by the US and therefore all the US’s allies. It meant that the associates of these people, because digital infrastructure is global, could get arrested.
Some people working with Russian groups have been arrested in eastern European countries with which we can co-operate in law enforcement terms. Strengthening that sort of legal framework gives you something. It is probably more incremental than transformative, but it is still something.
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: Why is so-called data sovereignty such an issue? There are all sorts of reasons in economics, but one of them is that the location of the storage of data is really important. Data centres are massive strategic assets and a vulnerability for any sort of country, and you can see that combined effort. Why did we have such a big debate about the role of Chinese technology in UK infrastructure? It is because of the potential—never mind 5G and so on, but rather in things like smart cities—for data to be siphoned off covertly and so forth. It is possible.
There are stats to show, if you had compromised the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and you went in there, how much you could photocopy versus how much you could steal electronically. There is now the possibility and, in some cases, the practice of comprehensive strategic compromise of huge, important datasets and sensitive strategic knowledge across all sorts of sectors by a combination of mostly digital but sometimes human-enhanced means. Until now, as you say, Mr Hinds, we have not really had a legislative framework for it. This Bill does provide a no doubt improvable such foundation.
That brings us to the end of this section of questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness, Professor Ciaran Martin. Thank you very much.
Examination of Witnesses
Dr Nicholas Hoggard, Professor Penney Lewis and Rich Owen gave evidence.
We will now hear from Dr Nicholas Hoggard, Professor Penney Lewis and Mr Rich Owen. We have until 4 o’clock for this session. I would be very grateful if the witnesses introduced themselves for the record.
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: Hello, I am Dr Nick Hoggard. I was the lead lawyer for the Protection of Official Data project at the Law Commission, which was the project referred to us by the Cabinet Office. It informs a number of the offences in part 1 of the National Security Bill.
Professor Penney Lewis: I am Professor Penney Lewis. I am the criminal law commissioner at the Law Commission, so I led that project in its latter stages.
Rich Owen: I am Rich Owen. I am here today in my capacity as the chair of the access to justice committee for the Law Society. I am also director of a pro bono law clinic, the Swansea Law Clinic, which is part of Swansea University, and the chair of a regional advice network for Swansea, Neath and Port Talbot, which was set up by the Welsh Government.
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: That is a great question. This Bill implements the first part of our report, which was concerned with the espionage offences. I think it is worth saying that we did not envisage that any one statute would implement all the recommendations that we made in that report, even were the Government minded to accept them all.
The second and third parts of the report concern unauthorised disclosure and the role of the public interest in relation to unauthorised disclosures. We understand that the Government are still considering those recommendations. But in relation to the espionage recommendations, yes, this Bill implements our recommendations. There are minor differences, which is to be expected as part of the parliamentary drafting process, but we are very pleased that the Government have accepted those recommendations.
We had several concerns about the existing offences; as the previous witness mentioned, they were not fit for the current threat. The focus, for example, on enemies was unhelpful. It did not—does not—fully reflect the nature of the threat against the UK. It also risks causing offence to states with which we are not at war. We had concerns about the territorial ambit of the offences, which are addressed by this Bill—the offences in part 1. We were also concerned that there were not sufficient culpability thresholds, such that individuals might be prosecuted for the existing offences without being sufficiently culpable. We are pleased to see that those thresholds have been raised in the offences in the Bill.
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: As a matter of generality, I think Penney has it absolutely right: the offences reflect well the recommendations that we made. As Penney said, there are some differences that will arise naturally in the course of drafting and negotiating with parliamentary counsel, but our view is that the spirit of our recommendations has very much been carried through. There is probably not much more I need to add at this point.
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: I am afraid that I will be less happy about that question. The Law Commission was asked to look at the Official Secrets Act. The project’s terms of reference focused on official Government data, so we have not looked at those matters. There are a number of matters contained in the Bill that were well outside the scope of our project, and I am afraid that we just cannot comment on them.
Q
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: Yes, I think we are. One of our concerns about the existing offences in the 1911 Act was that the existing prohibited places—though extensive; it is an extensive and complicated piece of drafting—have a strong military focus, and they do not necessarily reflect the way that critical national infrastructure, for example, or sensitive information is held by the Government.
There are some powers for the Secretary of State that exist under the 1911 Official Secrets Act, but they are quite restricted. What is good to see about the powers under this Bill is they are quite principled powers. The basis on which the Secretary of State can define something as a protected place is much more transparent. There are just three limbs that are easy to understand. That basis for affording the Secretary of the State the power is much more useful. It is more transparent, but it also enables us to capture within the offence places where there is actually a real risk of harm arising from hostile state activity.
On that front, I would say the power is good in so much as it aligns with the spirit of our recommendation. The fact that there will be parliamentary oversight of this process is important. It was a fundamental feature of our recommendations, and the negative resolution procedure is an important part of that process. The Secretary of State’s powers are more effective than is permitted under the current law, but also there is sufficient oversight.
Q
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: I do not think so. We gave some consideration to the differences throughout the project in many different parts of legislation between, say, national security and safety, and interests of the state. There is a risk that one ends up swimming in a sea of semantic exercises and trying to work out what the differences and permutations might be. The requirement to consider what might be necessary to designate a prohibited place in the context of the safety or interests of the state is an important power. I do not think it affords unlimited sweeping power to designate anything.
I think safety or interests of the state still make up a relatively confined subset of consideration. It does not enable somebody to start thinking about, in very broad terms, what might be necessary. I suppose the concern, which was raised by Government at the time and some of the stakeholders, was that if you frame these considerations in the context of national security alone, that might unnecessarily narrow the inquiry. Our position is that safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act, it is consistent with the wording in some of the Bill and it avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security.
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: The espionage offences here really do not fall into that category. The kinds of offences that you are talking about are the ones currently in the Official Secrets Act 1989 that are about unauthorised disclosure, where there is legitimate concern about information that is embarrassing. Indeed, we recommended a mechanism for authorised disclosures to an independent statutory commissioner, which would have appropriate investigatory powers to look into, for example, disclosures that might be embarrassing to the Government.
However, in relation to these offences, they have with them conditions that relate to the purpose of the person committing the offence that take them outside of someone who is leaking information, whether to embarrass the Government or not, and focus them squarely on someone who is acting to help a foreign power. I think we are in a slightly different realm here: the realm of espionage and not the realm of leaks.
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: Sadly, no. That was not within the scope of our project. It really exceeds the focus of our project on official Government data, so we did not make any recommendations in relation to those kinds of powers and we do not have a view.
Q
Rich Owen: We think the solicitors’ profession should be subjected to the scheme in just the same way as any other, although we would like an exception on grounds of legal professional privilege. This is an ancient common-law right going back 400 years or more. It is also regarded as a human right and as a corollary of everyone’s right to receive legal advice and assistance and we feel it plays a crucial role in the proper administration of justice.
To be clear on what we mean by legal professional privilege, it is communication between a client and lawyer whose dominant purpose is to seek legal advice, or a communication between a client and lawyer in anticipation of pending or actual litigation. We therefore think that if there is a foreign influence registration scheme without legal professional privilege, then solicitors acting for foreign states or foreign state-related actors, such as companies controlled by or influenced by foreign states, would have to disclose documents. We think that profoundly compromises the rule of law and the fairness of trials, and will affect the relationship between client and lawyer.
I think it is easy to forget that legal professional privilege is not a privilege for solicitors or lawyers; it is for the client. Of course, clients want to be open with their lawyers when they are seeking advice, and we think this scheme would inhibit that openness. Of course, very often, the reason why they want to be open with their lawyers is that they want to know how to comply with the law, rather than breach it. That is why an exemption is needed in any such scheme.
Q
Rich Owen: It is important to know the limits to legal professional privilege. It cannot be used to further a crime—because of the so-called “crime-fraud exception” or the “iniquity exception”—so if a solicitor advances an assertion of legal professional privilege in bad faith, then they are not in a privileged situation and could potentially be charged with conspiring to pervert the course of justice.
Legal professional privilege would complement any scheme. The Home Office consultation on a possible scheme said it would respect the human rights framework. That privilege is an ancient common-law right. It is has also been recognised as a human right. The consultation also said that a scheme would not interfere with legitimate activities. It would be a legitimate activity to seek advice from your lawyer and not have that advice disclosed. If anyone was furthering that for espionage purposes, then that would not be a privileged situation; they would be acting outwith legal professional privilege.
Q
Rich Owen: Yes. Well, we are looking for something similar to the Australian scheme. The Australian legislation specifically exempts legal professional privilege, as well as seeking legal advice and assistance. That sort of model, which expressly exempts legal professional privilege, would be a suitable way forward for the scheme.
Q
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: You can, although I am afraid I will have to be very boring. Speaking with my Law Commission hat on, we are limited in what we can say with respect to those things that did not form part of the scope, regarding the protection of Government data. I am very sorry; I do not mean to be deliberately unhelpful, but we do not really—
Q
Rich Owen: Well, those provisions are modelled on terrorism legislation, when they concern a serious risk to the public, and there are suitable safeguards attached to them as well, so the position of the Law Society is to regard that provision as proportionate.
Q
Rich Owen: I was saying that an exemption on grounds of legal professional privilege, or seeking legal advice and assistance, could not be used for espionage, because you are outwith legal professional privilege. You are seeking to advance a crime, so that does not come within the ambit of legal professional privilege.
Q
Rich Owen: Yes. There has to be access to justice for everyone, including rich people. They can communicate with their lawyer, and if they need advice on the law, that should be privileged. However, if they are seeking, through their communication with lawyers, to advance a criminal offence, then that is outwith legal professional privilege.
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: I am sorry but I am going to be very boring again. The offence in clause 3 is not the implementation of one of our recommendations. It is one of the offences that was outside the scope of our project. The main espionage offences that are in the existing Official Secrets Act, which implement our recommendations, are in clauses 1 and 4 of the Bill.
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: I will add to that without going outside our own remit, but thinking more broadly about the distinction between UK interests and Government interests. To re-emphasise a point that Penney made earlier, the essence of espionage offences lies in that purpose prejudicial. That is why we see in those offences that have the purpose prejudicial element—where your purpose is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom—that the sentence is so much greater.
The mens rea—the fault element—of those criminal offences lies in that purpose prejudicial. You need not only your purpose but to have known, or ought to have known, that your purpose was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. Also, you must have known, or ought to have known, that you were acting to benefit a foreign power on behalf of a foreign power. Taken together, it is that essence that makes those offences substantively different from the sort of behaviours that might embarrass a Government—or a Government Minister. That sort of thing often falls for consideration within unauthorised disclosure offences, but it is not really the meat of an offence focused on the active interference with the proper safety or interests of a state.
Regularly throughout the project we met with a number of the UK intelligence community in Cobra with the Government security group. The evidence we heard of the nature of hostile state activity does not really have a bearing on the sort of material that sometimes gets disclosed that might embarrass Government Ministers. They are two quite different creatures.
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: Maybe I will start with the high level and then Nick can come in with a bit more detail. I should preface my answer with a slight caveat. This project started in 2015. Nick joined the Law Commission in February 2019 and I joined in January 2020, so while we were heavily involved in the final report, neither of us were involved in drafting the consultation paper or in the consultation period, which happened in 2017. None the less, we have read the consultation responses, and I can also talk slightly more generally about how we go about doing a consultation.
We were asked to take on this project. The way we work is that we undertake a pre-consultation investigative phase where we talk to stakeholders. That involved Government stakeholders, including Government security stakeholders. We talked to a lot of academics who work in this field. We talked to the media, because obviously they were particularly interested in the 1989 Act, and various organisations that are interested in freedom of expression and open government. We then drafted a consultation paper, which contained provisional proposals for reform. We put those out to public consultation. We had a three-month consultation period, and we had a number of consultation events during that. At the same time, we are continuing to talk to Government security colleagues, as Nick mentioned.
We eventually came to an agreement with Government security colleagues about how they would brief us about the details of the threat facing us without us then being in a position where we would have to say in our report, “Well, we have heard all this secret evidence. We can’t tell you what it is, but trust us that these are the recommendations we think will safeguard the security and interests of the UK”, and without also putting the security and interests of the UK at risk. We agreed a confidential briefing process that involved Nick and me. We then also agreed the disclosure by Government of hypothetical examples that they had drafted to represent the real threats that they told us about confidentially and securely.
Throughout the report, there are hypothetical vignettes that illustrate particular risks. Those are the Government and intelligence services’ creatures, but they were the way in which we were able to reflect the reality of the threat. We then considered the consultation responses and the information we had had from the Government security group. We actually changed a number of things we had said in our consultation paper, so in between the provisional proposals and the recommendations there are a number of significant differences, particularly in relation to the 1989 Act. We then published a report in 2020, which contained our final recommendations for reform.
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: I will go into some specifics of what we learned, which is generously open-ended. What Penney says is correct; there were a number of changes that followed the consultation paper, come the final report. One of the major reasons for that was our engagement more substantively with confidential material and representatives from the UK intelligence community—UKIC—and across a number of Departments. It became increasingly clear to us that the scale of the threat was of an order of magnitude that, even in relatively recent integrated reviews, had not really been reflected. That scale really comes from the cyber-threat. I do not want to repeat what far more sophisticated witnesses said earlier in respect of that, but it also became increasingly clear to us that the way in which very capable state actors were wielding that cyber-threat meant that certain of the original provisions we had made needed to be reconsidered.
One example of that would be the extraterritoriality provisions, both in relation to the espionage offences and the unauthorised disclosure offences. The nature of the way in which cyber-information is held—of course, cyber-information now basically means all information—has changed. The existing offences under the 1911 Act and its ancillary Acts are now almost quaint in the way that they perceive espionage as something that happens on our territory. Of course, that is simply not the case anymore. These extraterritoriality provisions, though relatively unusual for criminal offences, are none the less vital if we are to capture the sort of behaviour that we see now. I think the process we went through in engaging with UKIC was actually vital for the understanding of, and background to, some of the recommendations that we made.
If there are no further questions, can I thank our witnesses? We will now move to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Poppy Wood gave evidence.
Q
Poppy Wood: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Poppy Wood, and I lead on UK public policy for an organisation called Reset. We are a philanthropic organisation that focuses on digital threats to democracy. We have a particular interest in disinformation. I was a civil servant about 10 years ago, and have worked in tech and, at times, in cyber-security over the past decade. I am pleased to be here today to talk about some of our work as it relates to the Bill, particularly our research on disinformation and state actors.
Q
Poppy Wood: That is a good question, and one I hope is being asked every time that we are looking at new versions and new clauses of the Bill. When the consultation came out last year, those of us who had worked in state-backed disinformation for a while were delighted to see some of the questions being asked, at least in the first instance, about the role of state actors and about foreign interference.
When Ken McCallum said last year in his annual threat report that our adversaries are really good at using co-ordinated behaviour to probe UK vulnerabilities, and that we in return really need a holistic response to that—that was about a year ago—a lot of us thought, “But we’re not. It’s great that they are, but we certainly aren’t. No one is really gripping this.” That echoed language from the ISC report in 2020—the Russia report, which said that co-ordinated disinformation and state-backed interference is a really hot potato. No one wants to grip it—not GCHQ, not DCMS, not the other security services. It is too difficult, so we were really relieved to see the Bill come forward, and the consultation late last year.
We were even more relieved earlier this week to see that there will be a link between this Bill and the Online Safety Bill. I have not yet seen that amendment brought forward by the Government; I am hoping that is happening now, because we expected to see it yesterday—I hear the Government have been quite busy this week. That is really about saying that the Home Office and DCMS recognise the role of social media in pushing these co-ordinated campaigns, that electoral interference and foreign state interference is a priority, and that we are seeing platforms being weaponised in order to push the sort of disinformation you mentioned in your question.
We have seen that time and again. In the Scottish referendum in 2014, the Free Scotland 2014 campaign turned out to be backed by Russian and Iranian actors. They were massively weaponising social media by putting up inauthentic accounts and Facebook pages, with mocked-up pictures of the royal family, saying they wanted to take all the money from Scotland and buy new houses. It was complete nonsense, the aim of which was to destabilise the Union.
The Free Scotland 2014 campaign was called out by Twitter and Facebook in 2018. So four years later they said, “Hey, we’ve just found all these accounts that were trying to destabilise the Union four years ago”, and we were going, “But what did you do about that four years ago?” I think we are going to see that again in Northern Ireland, we saw it in the US elections in 2016 and 2020, when the US Senate said that Russia was targeting African- American electors as a priority, to drive division in the States, and we will see that in any election we have in the UK.
I am really pleased to see that the Government are trying to link the two Bills. I think there are three words missing from both the Bills, and they are “co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour”. This Bill and the Online Safety Bill might be getting towards those words, but one of them has to say them, because we are talking about individuals and organisations in this Bill and social media in the Online Safety Bill, but the examples I have just given are absolutely about co-ordination.
It will be hard to find one person. The extra-territoriality provisions in this Bill are good, but we should not be measuring the success of this Bill as people in prison. This is all about troll armies abroad, so the link is important, but I think it needs to go further on specifically calling out co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour in either or both of these pieces of legislation.
There are some questions about case law linked to the Online Safety Bill and the National Security Bill. In the amendments, we are expecting, hopefully today, for foreign interference to be listed as a priority harm in the Online Safety Bill. The question arises of how social media platforms, which will now effectively be given the power to police these kinds of things, will catch foreign interference when, as the Online Safety Bill says, the
“content amounts to an offence”.
How can a social media platform judge how content would amount to a criminal offence?
We need to think about some of the language around how people identify that criminal offence. I think Carnegie UK, or another group, has suggested something along the lines of illegal content meaning content that the provider has “reasonable grounds to believe” amounts to a relevant offence. I do not think that “amounts to” has the precedent, and it is going to be hard, particularly in content law, to catch that.
The other thing about the Online Safety Bill and the National Security Bill is that we may end up seeing the case law being made in the civil courts, because we will see Ofcom taking a case against a platform, that platform appealing and the case being handled in the civil court, even if it involves foreign interference and a criminal offence. That needs to be thought about. I certainly do not have a solution, but I just want to flag it as a risk of linking these two Bills but not thinking about how they are fully linked.
However, going back to my first point, we were delighted to see that the Government are taking this really seriously.
Q
Poppy Wood: Obviously, you have heard from much greater experts than me about hack-and-leak operations et cetera, and I refer you to their remarks about that. In terms of co-ordinated disinformation campaigns, as I said we have seen that in the US election, with really targeted approaches to particular groups that people wanted to divide. When I mentioned that the US Senate said that African-American electors were being targeted, it was clear that the Russians wanted to stir up tensions within that group and between that group and white police. They would really push Ku Klux Klan narratives, false images and all sorts to make sure that those groups were infighting. I would absolutely expect to see that here as well.
Political ads are also a really big issue. I cannot work out whether they are dealt with in the Bill, but they are certainly not dealt with in the Online Safety Bill. The Cabinet Office seems to own the political ads regime, but we are seeing shell companies buying these ads purely to stoke division and tension, and we would expect to see that again. One of the problems with not having a grip of the issue, particularly as we could go into an election period in the UK at any point, is that we need someone to comprehensively pull this all together.
The Russians and the Iranians often leave quite a lot of fingerprints on their work, sometimes intentionally. I know that Ken McCallum, who is director general of MI5, and the FBI discussed the threat from China yesterday. They did not mention disinformation, which I thought was interesting, but the Chinese have historically been much better at not leaving their fingerprints on things, so I cannot really speak to some of their activity. However, we have seen it time and time again.
It is probably best not to talk about the Brexit referendum, but we all know what happened there with the engagement from foreign actors. We should not be surprised to see disinformation. We are vulnerable in the UK because of our role in supporting Ukraine, and we have to pull it all together. If the Online Safety Bill, combined with the National Security Bill, does not do so, I do not know what will.
Q
Poppy Wood: We have to be careful not to try to define disinformation. There is some language in the Bill about misrepresentation, and the idea of intentionally misrepresenting is important. We will never get a grip on exactly what disinformation is, because it is a shapeshifter.
On the first part of your question, it is about the system of amplifying and the ease with which people with malicious intent can manipulate systems by creating fake accounts, not verifying IDs and exploiting the recommender algorithms so that they hook you with one piece of content. We see this time and time again. One piece of bad content is not the problem, but they hook you on it, which then leads you down a rabbit hole to something much darker and more radical. It does not even have to be radical; it can be the sort of stuff that we were talking about with the Scotland referendum. It can be innocuous, such as stories about what the royal family are doing. It is about sowing seeds and exploiting cognitive dissonance, which bad actors are very good at and which social media is absolutely weaponised to make the most of, because of the pace and amplification of the content.
The Online Safety Bill goes part of the way there; it is imperfect, partly because it is so hard to define disinformation. There is very little in the Online Safety Bill on disinformation. There is an advisory committee that is years down the road. It is ironic that the National Security Bill is about trying to rein in certain types of transparency. Transparency is a really big part of all this, so it is about trying to find out who is behind things and what the data patterns really look like, and building in researchers. I think that was something Ken McCallum said last year. A holistic approach is a cross-Government approach, but it also involves industry, civil society, journalists and researchers. Everyone has to focus on this. Both Bills could go further on systems and, as I say, the co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour language just is not there either.
Q
Poppy Wood: That is a brilliant idea. It goes back to the point about grip. We are seeing really good work being done by the Home Department and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. I think the DCMS counter-disinformation unit is an important tool, but it is very small, as is DCMS, and it is lacking the transparency that such interventions require. It should probably be a body like the Intelligence and Security Committee—some kind of cross-party body, quasi-independent of Government, thinking about the issues, with input from expertise in the relevant services and relevant Departments. I know that the Home Department and DCMS work together closely on this, and I think the Cabinet Office also has a role to play. Instinctively, I feel that something like the ISC would be the best place for it, but I am sure that is to be worked out.
One of the issues with a lot of this stuff is the role of the Executive, and making sure that the body is that far removed from political interference.
Q
Poppy Wood: Absolutely. If you are suggesting that they respond to PR crises, I would agree with you on that one. Of course, this about brands. We have seen with revelations from Frances Haugen that Facebook is not understaffed but just not focusing them in the right direction on this stuff. There are only handfuls of people focusing on co-ordinated disinformation for the whole world within these big technology companies. It should be dozens, especially if they are hiring 10,000 engineers for the metaverse in Europe. They can put some of them on elections and tracking. They say that they go far, but they could go much further. When there is pressure on them, they respond, and so far that pressure has been PR because there has not been regulation.
Q
Poppy Wood: We do not know, because we have not got the transparency. They may seem to have got better, but as a percentage of what, we cannot know. They will say that it has got better and that they have caught this many thousand as opposed to that many thousand last time, and those accounts have been taken down, but we have no idea if it is a percentage of what. That is why people, such as Frances Haugen, who have come forward as whistleblowers to say, “They are telling you this, but the data says that,” show that we should not be relying on those people. I am sure we will come on to the whistleblowers, but there have to touchpoints much earlier on, from civil society, from Government, from researchers, to say “Hey, actually, the scale is much larger,” or, “You’re not even looking at this stuff.”
London is one of the most linguistically diverse cities in the world, and when we are talking about counter-terrorism speech, one of Frances’s revelations was that 75% of counter-terrorism speech was identified as AI—it is terrorism speech, so it is taken down. We are thinking about the UK as an English monolith, but there is plenty of linguistic diversity that puts us at risk when those platforms are weaponised in elections, focusing on diaspora and so on.
I would hope that the platforms have got better, and I would like to give them the benefit of the doubt, but the truth is that we just do not know.
Q
Poppy Wood: I would challenge the first assumption that you can see what you can see on Facebook. They still view that as private information. Researchers cannot get access to that unless they kind of beg, borrow and steal. I understand the question—
But you can see public postings on Facebook. That is my point.
Poppy Wood: On your page, you can, but researchers cannot.
But that is still more than you can see on WhatsApp, where you cannot see a post at all.
Poppy Wood: That’s true. I suppose I would say they could do much more about transparency just about the public posts—that is my first point. Secondly, on encryption, there are concerns about some of the amendments in the Online Safety Bill and what that really means for encryption. I know we are not here to talk about that Bill, but encryption is an important tool. We know that those spaces are misused, but we need to be really clear about some of the benefits that encryption offers to lots of people, particularly the security services, for sharing information safely. We need to be careful.
Q
Poppy Wood: Let me give you a good example on Russia Today. We do a lot of work and analysis around Russia and Ukraine. Obviously, Russia Today was taken down from most national broadcast networks. It has been resurrected multiple times on social media. This week, we saw it resurrected with another name, like “Discovery Dig” or something, on YouTube, where lots of the comments, imagery and language were directing people to Telegram channels where they are actively mobilising.
What we see in the active mobilisation on Telegram channels is the outing of national security agents, the putting up of email addresses of politicians and saying, “Target them and say they are on the wrong side of the debate,” or, “Write to this national newspaper.” In all three of those examples, it is predominantly in the UK. They are telling them it is all fabricated. They are absolutely weaponising those private spaces. As you say, it is quite hard to get into them—but actually, it is not that hard. They are pretty open channels, with thousands and millions of engagements and followers. That is the scarier bit. They are private, but you are getting tens of millions of people and engagements on them. I am not sure that is the true definition of private, but it is certainly in an encrypted space.
Q
Poppy Wood: The role of whistleblowers in society is really important. I know the Government understand that. There are some good recommendations from the ISC about whistleblowers that I do not think have been adopted in this version of the Bill. That is about at least giving some clarity to where the thresholds lie, and giving a disclosure offence and a public interest defence to whistleblowers so they can say, “These are the reasons why.” My understanding is that at the moment it sits with juries and it is on a case-by-case basis. I would certainly commend to you the recommendations from the ISC.
I would also say—this was a recommendation from the Law Commission and also, I think, from the ISC—that lots of people have to blow the whistle because they feel that they do not have anywhere else to go. There could be formal procedures—an independent person or body or office to go to when you are in intelligence agencies, or government in general or anywhere. One of the reasons why Frances Haugen came forward—she has been public about this—is that she did not really know where else to go. There were no placards saying, “Call the Information Commissioner in the UK if you have concerns about data.” People do not know where to go.
Getting touchpoints earlier down the chain so that people do not respond in desperation in the way we have seen in the past would be a good recommendation to take forward. Whistleblowers play an important part in our society and in societies all round the world. Those tests on a public interest defence would give some clarity, which would be really welcome. Building a system around them—I know the US intelligence services do that; they have a kind of whistleblower programme within the CIA and the Department of Defence that allows people to go to someone, somewhere, earlier on, to raise concerns—is the sort of thing you might be looking at. I think a whistleblower programme is an ISC recommendation, but it is certainly a Law Commission recommendation.
Q
Poppy Wood: I have certainly read and heard concerns about journalism, about the “foreign power” test on civil society and about having Government money being quite a blunt measure for whether or not you might fall foul of these offences. On journalism, I think that is why you should never try to define disinformation: because those kinds of shape-shifting forms are very hard to pin down, particularly with questions like “What is journalism?”, “What is a mistruth?”, “What is a mis-speak?” and so on. We need to be careful about that.
On your specific question, I refer you to Article 19 and others who have really thought through the impact on journalism and free speech. I am sure it would be an unintended consequence but, again, we are seeing Russia using its co-ordinated armies on Telegram and other channels to target Ukrainian journalists. They are saying, “Complain to the platforms that the journalist is not who they say they are or is saying something false, so they are breaking the terms of service. Bombard the platforms so that that journalist gets taken down and cannot post live from Ukraine for a handful of days.”
That is just another example of how these systems are weaponised. This is where you can go much further on systems through the Online Safety Bill and the National Security Bill without worrying too much about speech. But I refer the Committee to other experts, such as Article 19, that have looked really deeply at the journalism issue. I think Index on Censorship may have done some work as well.
Q
Poppy Wood: I think that where we are now is much better than where we were last year, but my concern is whether this will all be law when we have an election. If not, what are the backstops that the Government have in place to focus on this stuff? It will get tested only when we have an election, really. If that is before March next year or whenever these laws get Royal Assent, there will be a genuine question of crisis management: if this is not law, what are we doing? I would ask that question of the Government and the civil service.
As I said, the disinformation committee in the Online Safety Bill is years down the line. Bring that forward—there is no need not to bring it forward—and please make sure that it is not chaired by someone from a tech platform. I would write that into the Bill, because otherwise there is a risk that that will happen.
Q
Poppy Wood: Why should the committee on disinformation not be chaired by someone from a tech platform? They have a vested interest in this stuff, so I would get an academic or someone from civil society—someone at arm’s length who can take a holistic view. These platforms will want to protect their interests on this stuff, so I would warn against that.
I would like to see the transparency provisions in the Online Safety Bill go much further. This is a bit in the weeds of the Online Safety Bill, if you will forgive me, but there is a very good clause in that Bill, clause 136, which says that Ofcom should ask whether researchers should be given access to data. It is an important clause, but it says, “Ask the question,” and it gives Ofcom two years to do it. I do not think it needs two years; I think we know that the answer is “Yes, researchers desperately need access to data.”
Almost all the stuff that is caught about malign information operations is caught via Twitter’s API. Twitter makes 10% of all the tweets public, and researchers use that to run analysis, so if you ever want to do research on disinformation, you always use the Twitter API. In many cases, that is mapped over to Facebook to identify the same operations on Facebook, but they are always caught in the first instance because of open data. I think that the Online Safety Bill, if this Committee and this Bill want to back it up, could bring that forward and say, “Either do the report in six months or don’t even ask the question.”
By the way, the European legislation that is equivalent to the Online Safety Bill makes that happen as of Tuesday this week, so researchers should, in theory, be able to access data. I would bring the transparency provisions forward, and I would really want the Bill to call out co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour.
That brings us to the end of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for taking the time to give evidence.
Examination of Witness
Dan Dolan gave evidence.
Last but not least, we will now hear from Dr Nicholas Hoggard, lead lawyer for—I am so sorry; it is that time of day and the lack of coffee. [Laughter.] I should have confiscated my colleague’s coffee and had it for myself! Apologies; we are going to hear from Dan Dolan, the director of policy and advocacy at Reprieve. We have until 4.40 pm for the session. Could you introduce yourself for the record, Mr Dolan?
Dan Dolan: Thank you very much. My name is Dan Dolan, and I am the director of policy and advocacy at Reprieve, a legal action charity that seeks to uphold the rule of law and human rights around the word. Over the past 20 years, Reprieve has provided legal and investigative support to hundreds of prisoners on death row, the families of innocents killed in drone strikes, victims of torture and extraordinary rendition, and scores of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. Thank you for the opportunity to give evidence.
Q
Dan Dolan: Absolutely. I should start by saying that we absolutely recognise that the country’s intelligence agencies do a difficult and often dangerous job to keep us safe, and we give our evidence in recognition of that. We think clause 23 is much more likely to protect Ministers and senior officials from criminal liability than anyone in the midst of an operation overseas.
The reason why we say that is because there is already a regime, under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, under which acts that could constitute a criminal offence overseas would be authorised by a Minister if they are in the furtherance of the agencies’ duties. That is well recognised. The Minister who took that Act through described offences such as bugging, bribery and burglary, which you can imagine an officer of the intelligence agencies may need to do overseas to keep the UK safe. That regime already exists in law, and it allows for authorisation of potentially criminal acts overseas.
Clause 23 disapplies provisions of the separate Serious Crime Act 2007 relating to encouraging or assisting the commission of a crime—specifically, schedule 4, which relates to extra-territoriality, meaning crimes that would be encouraged in the UK but committed overseas. There is already a regime that protects officers of the UK who are involved in operations overseas and do things that may be criminal by giving them insulation from criminal liability.
Clause 23 insulates people from criminal liability for acts undertaken in the UK to encourage or assist offences overseas. Realistically, we are talking about conduct that might take place, for example, behind a desk in Whitehall, but would ultimately result in what would be a criminal offence overseas. There is an existing legal regime to cover offences of those who undertake them outside the country; this is about actions taken within the country, if that makes sense.
Q
Dan Dolan: Yes, it would be. Effectively, clause 23 looks a lot like an effort to protect Ministers from criminal liability for actions that they encourage or assist in the UK that could constitute a crime overseas. This is not a hypothetical idea. There have been instances that were extensively documented in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s detainee report, where UK Ministers and officials authorised intelligence sharing that led to appalling torture and mistreatment of people overseas. The ISC has documented that extensively.
A good example is the case of Abdul Hakim Belhaj and his wife Fatima Boudchar, who in 2004 were rendered to Libya where they faced appalling mistreatment, both in Libya and in the course of their rendition by the US CIA. Subsequently, it emerged that the UK Government had provided the tip-off to enable that extraordinary rendition. The couple ultimately received an apology from Theresa May’s Government, recognising that the UK had shared intelligence that had contributed to the couple’s absolutely appalling mistreatment.
That is not an isolated case. During the war on terror era, there were many instances where the UK shared intelligence that contributed to torture. That has been recognised. The then Prime Minister recognised that in her response to the ISC’s report, and pledged never to do that again. What this clause would do is effectively to insulate Ministers from criminal responsibility for those kinds of offences.
Q
Dan Dolan: That touches, importantly, on the point about whether clause 23 would protect officers acting overseas in the UK’s national interest, or whether it would protect politicians and officials taking actions in Whitehall, like sharing intelligence. In response to your question, I want to read a quote given by MI6 to the ISC’s detainee inquiry—quoted in the report—with respect to section 7 authorisations under the 1994 Act. The Secret Intelligence Service said that, in the cases they were talking about,
“we are … always going to go for a section 7 authorisation. Because, you know, why should my officers carry the risks on behalf of the Government personally? Why should they? So, you know, as we have already discussed, serious risk is…a subjective judgement. So we will go for belt and braces on this.”
I think that “belt and braces” is the important phrase to think about, because that is MI6 describing the separate 1994 section 7 authorisations as a belt-and-braces approach to protecting officers from criminal liability. That regime exists already, under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, so why do we need clause 23? It relates to actions taking place here in the UK—not people operating abroad on operations, but people acting in the UK—so what kind of actions are we talking about? The area that is not covered under existing legislation is the authorisation of acts or the sharing of intelligence that happens here in England or Wales.
We are therefore not of the opinion that the clause would offer additional protection over and above the 1994 Act. The clause covers a different category of offence, and that would be the encouragement or assistance of a crime from within the United Kingdom. We are talking about Ministers and officials approving things here, not people on operations overseas.
My final point—I know this was made on Second Reading—is that the Serious Crime Act 2015, sections of which would be disapplied by clause 23, already includes, in section 50, a reasonableness defence. Even if you imagine a case in which the Government argue that a Minister needs to order something that might be a crime overseas in the national interest—they would have to make a strong case for that—they would have a legal defence under reasonableness to say that their action was reasonable under section 50 of the Serious Crime Act. What we are talking about here is clause 23 disapplying legislation that would hold Ministers to account were they to encourage or assist a crime overseas.
Q
Dan Dolan: I am sorry to be unhelpful, but Reprieve’s evidence largely covers the provisions under clauses 23 and 57 to 61. I can pass it on to somebody.
Q
Dan Dolan: Part 3 of the Bill—clauses 57 to 61—is in some ways the other side of the coin to clause 23. Clause 23 significantly hampers criminal accountability for ministerial or official involvement in crimes overseas, but there is also a very important civil avenue by which we might get accountability were the UK to get mixed up in torture or unlawful killing.
The Britons who were detained in Guantanamo Bay unlawfully without charge for many years and Abdel Hakim Belhaj, to whom the Government apologised, got accountability for the UK’s involvement in their appalling abuse through civil cases. They fought very hard, multi-year legal battles in the civil courts to win recognition from the Government that they had been involved in their mistreatment. Clauses 57 to 60 effectively introduce a range of so-called national security factors that would allow the Government to request a reduction of damages, potentially to nil, if those factors are present.
Say you are Mr Belhaj, who sued the Government and ultimately exposed their involvement in his torture, a national security factor that could have been applied in his case, were it in the form in the Bill, is that the UK, when it undertook the action that enabled his abuse, was acting to avert a real risk of harm. That obviously sounds convincing, but it is difficult to imagine an instance where the intelligence agencies would say they were not acting to avert a risk of harm—that is their core purpose.
The Bill also has national security factors that include the involvement of a third party. Say the UK Government passed on intelligence that led to someone’s torture by Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya, historically. Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya is a third party and its involvement would mean that UK did not need to pay damages on that front. The action happening overseas is another national security factor. If there were any wrongdoing by the UK intelligence agencies that led to torture or abuse overseas, the person would not be able to seek damages because of that factor. Effectively, what we are seeing in clauses 57 to 60 is a really sweeping effort on the part of the Government to get out of paying any damages to anyone who suffers due to Government wrongdoing overseas.
Clause 61 is really interesting, because it effectively relates to all civil cases. It allows for the freezing of damages in all civil cases, not just cases in which the Government are accused of wrongdoing. We just have not seen any basis that there is an issue with global terrorist groups receiving financing from damages in personal injury or medical negligence cases. It seems an incredibly, sweepingly broad curtailment of one’s right to receive damages—one that likely duplicates existing provisions for asset freezing and terrorist financing.
Q
Dan Dolan: I would say that our evidence to the Committee covers clauses 57 to 60 and does not look in detail at the legal aid provisions, but my understanding of those provisions from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s notes on those is that these are extremely broad provisions, and I would note that—
They would not be able to access legal aid.
Dan Dolan: There are a number of people every year—teenagers—who receive non-custodial sentences under terrorism legislation. That might be someone who shares something online at the age of 16, and my understanding is that the Bill would have an incredibly sweeping impact on their ability to receive those kinds of orders, and, equally, on their rights to access the civil courts for the rest of their lives, which is a fairly dramatic constitutional action.
It does not stop them accessing the civil courts. To be fair, it stops them accessing legal aid to the civil courts.
Dan Dolan: Which, as you will be aware, may be, at times, the same thing.
Just on a point of fact, it stops them from accessing legal aid.
Q
Dan Dolan: I am afraid I might have to give the frustrating answer that our evidence does not cover clause 20. There is clearly a concern there, but I am probably best leaving that to more expert witnesses to answer.
Any other questions? Thank you all very much. That brings us to the end of this session. I thank our witness on behalf of the Committee for taking the time to give evidence today.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 21, in clause 26, page 16, line 29, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 22, in clause 26, page 16, line 31, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
Clause stand part.
It is a pleasure to continue under you in the Chair, Mr Stringer, and it is always a pleasure to see the hon. Member for Banbury, who is now the Minister for our proceedings. Obviously, these have been difficult days for Members on the Government Benches, and I extend my sympathies to the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill). I hope that Members will agree that the spirit in which we conducted our proceedings on Tuesday was constructive. We probed the Government’s intentions, and we will continue to do so and seek to improve the legislation this afternoon.
This clause represents a significant aspect of the Bill and we welcome it, although we note that a number of Government Back Benchers expressed concern on Second Reading. I will speak to our two amendments but also more broadly about the principles underlying these clauses as we see them and why we think that they are integral to the overall package.
Much has been said about the strength of the food and public health measures in the Bill and the fact that the Food Standards Agency will have a role to play in ensuring that any precision bred organisms that reach supermarket shelves are adequately regulated. Part 3 of the Bill, which we are discussing now, covers the food and feed produced from precision bred organisms, and clause 26 concerns regulation of food and feed produced from precision bred organisms—an area on which, as I have said, much has been promised.
We have already talked frequently—I am sure that the Minister has read the record of the proceedings from the other day—about the example of tomatoes fortified to contain higher levels of vitamin D, and I think we have agreed that it is important that information for consumers in such cases is managed carefully. But before getting to that point, we must ensure that any foods created with precision bred organisms are safe for human consumption.
As I said on Second Reading, I am particularly proud that a Labour Government established the Food Standards Agency; I think that it does an excellent job. I will say a little more later about its potential role, but I do think that we have high standards here in the UK and we also have trust, and that is in no small part down to the work and reputation of the Food Standards Agency.
However, I am expressing concern about the current wording of subsection (1) precisely because, although it confers on the Government the option to create provision for regulating the placing on the market of food and feed produced from precision bred organisms, it does not make that mandatory. In other words, although the Bill makes regulation of precision bred food and feed a possibility, it leaves it open to the Government not to take up that power should they not desire to do so. Our amendment 21 would change the subsection’s language from “may” to “must”, so that the Government were mandated to take up the power; that would not be optional.
I do not think this is a minor point. All the subsections conferring delegated powers do so by stating either that the Government “must” take up the power or that they “may”, so a decision clearly has been taken about which powers should be mandatory and which ones optional. In my very helpful meetings with the former Minister, she told me that close attention had been paid to the clauses conferring delegated powers and that the language around these had been chosen very specifically. I feel that this is an area where take-up of the power should be mandatory and that the language should be amended.
We heard evidence in the evidence sessions that backs up this position. Professor Robin May, chief scientific adviser at the Food Standards Agency and a professor of infectious disease at the University of Birmingham, said that
“it is important to be sure that”
precision bred
“products are safe…The entire point of this technology is to do things that could have been achieved through traditional breeding, but much faster. It is important that we have safety checks along that pathway.”––[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022; c. 19, Q27.]
This amendment is also in line with the public polling and research that the Food Standards Agency has conducted. Professor May said that there is a
“really strong view that the public want some level of regulation and safeguards in this”.––[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022; c. 19, Q28.]
Therefore I am not convinced that the public will be reassured to know that the Government might create a regulatory system for precision bred food but they also might not. The public want certainty, as do producers who will be embarking on the process of creating and then marketing precision bred products. Our amendment 21 would achieve that.
Subsection (2) lists the sorts of things a regulatory framework for precision bred food would achieve. Again, however, this is a “may” or “might”, instead of a “must’ and “will”. The subsection contains issues as important as traceability and imposing
“requirements for the purpose of securing traceability in relation to food and feed produced from precision bred organisms that is placed on the market in England”.
Without the ability to trace products, how will we be certain that we can remove any that have unexpected health consequences? How will we reassure organic producers and those who do not want to have precision bred inputs in their supply chain? It makes little sense to outline this level of detail in the Bill, which we welcome, without the commitment to take them up. That is all the more so because the Government’s language suggests that there is a firm commitment in the Bill—the Minister is nodding, so I suspect that is what she will tell us—when the actual wording does not really say that. On Second Reading, the Secretary of State said:
“The Food Standards Agency will”—
—not may—
“also conduct a very thorough and comprehensive assessment of any food safety issues. I think that will give people the reassurance they need.”—[Official Report, 15 June 2022; Vol. 716, c. 376.]
Although we have not tabled further amendments to the clause, because we are debating the clause stand part simultaneously I will also mention that subsection (6) only makes it a possibility, not a certainty, that the FSA will conduct the “thorough and comprehensive assessment” to which the Secretary of State referred. Perhaps what he should have said is that the Bill gives the Government the option to create regulations regarding food, and powers for the FSA to manage them, but that they have yet to make their mind up and that it would be perfectly compatible with the Bill for them to choose not to do it at all. If it is something that will definitely happen, why not make it an actual commitment in the Bill by changing “may” to “must”? I recall that we have had this discussion once or twice before in previous sittings of the Committee.
I suspect the Minister will be reassuring—she is very good at that—but we seek certainty. We welcome the detail that the Food Standards Agency has provided on how it might go about setting up such a system if the powers are used by the Government. It issued a helpful publication earlier this week, which I suspect members of the Committee have seen, although that too will need further discussion, because it has proposed two tiers of checks, with tier 2 checks being engaged when a precision bred organism has been created
“in which there is likely to have been a significant change in the composition of the product that is typically eaten. Such changes that may, for instance, include alterations to the type or level of nutrients or allergens within the product to a level beyond that usually seen in products based on conventionally bred organisms… Here further evidence of safety and a more detailed risk assessment would be required prior to an authorisation decision”.
Although that is reassuring, some people will question who will make the initial judgment about what constitutes “significant change”, and how such a decision will be arrived at. However, it fleshes out the thinking, which is welcome. It is a shame that, because of the “may” and “must” issue, we do not see any guarantee in the Bill that the FSA will even have the opportunity to play a role, or that there will be a regulatory system for food in the first place, so I would welcome reassurances from the Minister.
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer, and I would like to provide the hon. Gentleman with reassurances. He and I have discussed many times the “may” and “must” issue in the context of the Agriculture Act 2020, the Fisheries Act 2020 and, I believe, the Animal Welfare (Kept Animals) Bill.
It is indeed vital that the Bill gives the necessary power for regulations to be made to enable the Food Standards Agency to ensure that, as the hon. Gentleman said, the food we eat is safe for human consumption. My Department has spoken in depth, and many times, to the Food Standards Agency about this matter, and I did so myself this morning in preparation for this afternoon’s sitting. I have been fully reassured that any measures that are proposed will be taken up by the FSA and will be proportionate and appropriate. The FSA is committed to open and transparent policy making, which will be wholly evident as it continues the process of building the new framework. Work is already under way to make sure that the right stakeholders are involved, including officials in Wales and Northern Ireland, and Food Standards Scotland. They will be able to shape the frameworks and how they operate in practice.
There are already existing provisions in general food law for securing traceability of food and feed at all stages of production, processing and distribution. Businesses wishing to market precision bred food and feed will of course need to comply with the existing legal provisions. The Bill includes the option to impose specific requirements for securing traceability, if they are deemed a good idea. That will allow the FSA to consider new methods of traceability as the science develops, future proofing the Bill in the context of further innovation, about which we have not yet thought. I urge members of the Committee to consider the evidence that they heard last week and the vital work that the FSA does to protect our consumers. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw amendments 21.
On clause 26 stand part, innovation in our food and feed industry is developing at a faster pace than we have ever seen before. New technologies, as the Committee has heard many times, enable us to utilise better and more sustainable production methods. It is vital that appropriate measures are in place to ensure that consumers can trust the food that they eat. The regulatory framework has been inherited from the EU. Now that we are forging our own path, it is vital that the framework provides consumers with food they can trust and also keeps pace with new technologies.
The framework for regulating genetically modified organisms, which, as we all know, precision breeding technologies currently fall within, does not adequately reflect the lower risk profile of PBOs, where such organisms are often indistinguishable from products that could be produced using traditional breeding methods. The clause will allow the FSA to build a framework that responds to the lower risk profile of PBOs. I beg to move that the clause stand part of the Bill.
I welcome the Minister’s reassurances, although I am not sure she really addressed the “may” and “must” issue. On this particular occasion, it would have been straightforward for the Government to say what was going to happen. Although I see the opportunity through secondary legislation to take account of changing technologies, which we all recognise is likely to happen pretty quickly, it is essential that provisions and safeguards are put in place. On that basis, although I do not feel the need to push amendment 22, I would like to test the view of the Committee on amendment 21.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 27, page 18, line 16, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 24, in clause 27, page 18, line 20, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
Amendment 25, in clause 27, page 18, line 26, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
Clause stand part.
Our amendments to this clause follow a similar line of reasoning as the previous ones. They continue the discussion around whether the provisions must be introduced or simply might be.
Clause 27 is about the food and feed marketing authorisations register. Extensive reference has been made to that register throughout the passage of the Bill and during the evidence sessions. The Bill would confer a delegated power on the Government to make provision to require the Food Standards Agency to establish and maintain a public register containing information regarding information concerning food and feed marketing authorisations. I have already said many times why I think access to information is important, and will help give confidence to consumers and those farming in ways that require separation from those using gene edited organisms.
We also think the register could be helpful in tackling some of the devolution issues that were referred to in the evidence sessions. The central provisions of the Bill apply to England only, but the Welsh and Scottish Governments were consulted at very late stages. Both Governments have raised concerns that the mutual recognition principle of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 will mean that it will be possible to legally place precision bred food on the Welsh and Scottish markets even if the Welsh and Scottish Governments choose not to adopt the changes contained in the Bill, which obviously presents a challenge. It is for the Government to resolve that challenge, but I would have certainly liked to have seen them consult the devolved Administrations earlier and in a more constructive manner.
However, in the absence of a solution to that problem, while precision bred products will be able to be legally placed on the market in Scotland and Wales, I imagine that some supermarkets and shops may decide that they want to operate within the spirit of Scottish and Welsh legislation and not stock precision bred products on their shelves, as is their right. The register of foods authorised for sale may help companies address that conundrum—certainly, without it, it is hard to see how they could do so without setting up very expensive parallel production systems, which might simply not be practical in many cases. In other words, a chain of unintended consequences might follow, which I do not think anyone would wish to see.
As I said on Second Reading, in the modern world, consumers increasingly want more information about the products they are buying. We can see that reflected in the market, such as the rise of environmental information on product labels. We will discuss labelling later when we debate one of our new clauses, but as I anticipate that that new clause might not be adopted by the Government, the register will be the only source of information for consumers and businesses looking to gain information on these products. As such, it is a pretty key provision of the Bill.
In our evidence sessions, Professor May of the Food Standards Agency said:
“The idea behind the register is to have a public awareness of the products that are going through this pathway and are ultimately out on the market, in a similar way to the public registration of foods at the moment…My view as a scientist is that this should be the same for precision breeding. We should have a register that says, ‘Here is a product that has been considered. We have looked at it; it hasn’t rocked up without any kind of due diligence around it.’ It is there in the public domain for people to see what process it has gone through and be reassured that those products have had some level of scrutiny.”—[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022; c. 24, Q40.]
That is absolutely right. He continued,
“there will be some consumers who have strong views on this, and they may or may not wish to purchase something accordingly. It is important that the information is available for them, so that they can pause if they want to and find out. Even if most people do not, it is available, should they wish to do so.”—[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022; c. 24-25, Q41.]
Again, that seems absolutely right to me.
The FSA clearly thinks there is a strong basis for establishing the register, as borne out by the evidence it has seen. Despite that, clause 27 only makes the register a possibility, rather than a certainty; it is a provision that the Government may take up, but not one that they must take up. As we go around this perpetual loop again—I have forgotten how many Bills have given rise to this discussion—perhaps the Minister can explain exactly why she thinks the wording should only be “may”, rather than “must”. With the number of key provisions that are being put not only into secondary legislation, but into secondary legislation that the Government are not even bound to introduce, there is a risk that some people looking at the Bill could say that there is a gap between the safeguards that are being promised and the reality that is being delivered.
I am sure the Minister will be affronted by such a suggestion, but as ever, salvation is at hand. Amendments 23, 24 and 25 would amend each subsection of clause 27 so that the Government must engage the provisions contained therein, rather than may. We think the register is a key element of the Bill, especially considering the Government’s stance on labelling, and so there must be a strong commitment within the Bill itself.
This will be a short contribution. The hon. Gentleman referred to the Scottish and Welsh Governments’ views on the situation. He will be aware that clause 27 just talks about the Food Standards Agency and the Secretary of State, and does not cover Food Standards Scotland, Scottish Ministers or indeed Welsh Ministers. With that in mind, I hope he will look carefully at new clause 9 and my amendment 37, which is coming up, because they will neatly address the problems he referred to.
I completely agree that it is vital that this Bill should grant the necessary power that will enable regulations to be made to allow the FSA to ensure trust in food, as I said earlier. In addition to a proportionate framework for the regulation of PBOs, it is important that consumer confidence is assured. We feel that a transparent public register for precision bred food and feed will do just that.
On the “may” and “must” point, I apologise; I thought we had been through this so many times that the hon. Member for Cambridge would not want me to say it again. It is rather like the conversations we can have with members of our families, when they say, “Please be quiet. You’ve told us that 3,000 times already!” Perhaps that is only me.
I am very happy to explain the role, as I am many other things—not fighting with one’s younger sister, for example.
The role of the FSA is enshrined in law. Its purpose is to provide food safety and consumer confidence. In our view, “must” is therefore not necessary. We are working with the FSA on this, and it has a role and a duty to provide consumer confidence, which is why we are completely assured that it will maintain this register, as it maintains other registers and keeps them regularly updated. To that end, members of the Committee may be reassured by the evidence of Professor Robin May, which the hon. Gentleman referred to. The professor spoke at length about the need for transparency within the register and how it will provide consumers with the information they need. We feel that is very important.
The FSA is committed to food safety. It is equally committed, as was explained in evidence, to using these powers in a proportionate way that both supports innovation and protects consumers. We are convinced it will deliver a food and feed register that gives consumers the information they need. We therefore do not feel that the amendments are necessary.
On clause 27, we feel that genetic technologies such as precision breeding present opportunities for innovation. Setting out a clear framework for the regulation of precision bred organisms will help ensure that we maintain that really important public trust. The clause will introduce powers that will provide transparency for consumers, the industry and enforcement bodies through the establishment of the public register. In addition to the register, which will be established under clause 18, the food and feed register will give extra clarity about PBOs are being used in food production.
The international market for PBOs is growing quickly, and countries recognise the need to align their regulatory frameworks. Establishing a register will be seen as a positive step by our international trade partners, who are keen to see that we are open for business and ready to accept imports of precision bred crops in this market. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we rely on a certain amount of agricultural food and feed imports, and we hope the Bill will facilitate trade with large exporters such as Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the US and Australia, which already have established regulatory frameworks.
We will come to the point made by the hon. Member for Edinburgh North and Leith later when we discuss new clause 9. The register will make clear the nation in which the authorisations apply. Authorisations, including on the register, will be indicated as enforced in England only. However, the UKIM Act 2020 means that market access principles will apply for PBO goods produced in or imported into England that can be lawfully sold here. That will allow those goods to be sold on the Scottish and Welsh markets. This clause will grant the power required to allow the FSA to establish a register that will give the required transparency.
Normally I find myself generally reassured by the Minister, but on this occasion, as a consequence of her comments, I am less so.
Indeed. I am afraid that however many times she tells me about “may” and “must”, I am still not convinced. On a day when trust in politics is pretty central to a public conversation, she will be unsurprised to find that the Opposition are not entirely convinced.
On a separate point about growing trade with some of the countries that the Minister noted, I am not sure I am reassured about the standards of some of those countries or that we want to import more from them—particularly precision bred food or that subject to standards that may be different from our own. That opens up a whole series of issues. The Opposition are clear that we want to grow and produce more here, and we do not want to be moving towards importing more from other countries that are producing to standards different from our own. Far from being reassured, I will go away and look very closely at what has been said, because it rather confirms a direction of travel that the Opposition are not comfortable with.
On that basis and in the spirit of not wanting to take too much time from the Committee, I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendments 24 and 25, but I will press amendment 23 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clause 29 stand part.
Clause 30 stand part.
Briefly, the Bill has so far introduced provision to ensure that PBOs will be subject to pre-market assessments that are proportionate to the level of risk posed. However, the role of the regulator does not stop with authorisation, and measures must be put in place to ensure compliance with any conditions that are imposed on the marketing of these products. It is essential that enforcement bodies have the appropriate powers to monitor compliance and investigate suspected failures to comply.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 29 and 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Meaning of “relevant breach” etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clause 32 stand part.
Clause 33 stand part.
Clause 34 stand part.
Clause 35 stand part.
Clause 36 stand part.
Clause 37 stand part.
Clause 38 stand part.
Very briefly, these clauses cover the enforcement measures in the Bill. They provide powers for “relevant breach” and “relevant obligation” and they define those terms. They provide powers to make regulations on enforcement, set out the powers for regulations to provide compliance notices and set out provisions that must be included in regulations and stop notices. They also set out provisions that must be included in regulations that provide for monetary penalty notices and in respect of enforcement notices, and they enable enforcement notices to be issued to provide for reviews and appeals. They address how the new regulatory regime might recover the costs incurred of dealing with non-compliance. I commend all eight clauses to the Committee.
I want to ask the Minister about something that the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill) said the other day on the meaning of a relevant breach. I do not expect the Minister to be able to provide me with an answer straight away, but I would be grateful if she could write to the Committee or give us further information on that matter. The previous Minister reassured us that precision bred organisms may not contain exogenous DNA, so the question was: would the release of an organism that still contains exogenous DNA, or any kind of DNA, constitute a relevant breach? If we could get an understanding of that at some stage, I would appreciate it.
As I am not absolutely certain about that conversation the other day, with your leave, Mr Stringer, we will write to the hon. Lady on this occasion.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 32 to 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Fees
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 40 stand part.
Clause 41 stand part.
Clause 42 stand part.
This group covers administrative clauses regarding fees and notices, provisions to allow PBOs not to be treated as GMOs under the Environmental Protection Act 1990, and subsequent necessary powers. I reassure the Committee that we do not intend to charge fees initially in order to incentivise innovation and investment in PBOs, but we will keep that under review. If fees are introduced later, they will be set at a cost recovery level. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
I would like to speak briefly on clause 42, as it contains one of those notorious Henry VIII clauses, which need to be considered carefully. The clause concerns powers to make consequential provisions. Subsection (2) says,
“Regulations under this section may modify legislation.”
We have had this debate many times before about the procedural and technical elements of the Bill, which are thin and constitute poor legislative practice in general, because many of the key provisions are not properly spelled out in the Bill. As we have said, many of the secondary powers are merely optional.
Clause 42 is problematic because it gives Ministers the power to change and amend primary legislation without having to go through the normal scrutiny processes. This is a familiar argument, but it bears repeating—not least because the Minister today will be well aware of the issue and would, no doubt, berate me if I made such a proposal. These clauses shift power away from Parliament towards the Executive, so they clearly need to be strongly justified.
I understand that some elements of the Bill would amend primary legislation in an administrative way, but I still think it is right that the Minister should justify her use of this subsection, given that it would give her Government wide, sweeping powers, which could also be applied in a non-administrative way. It is a question worth addressing.
It is also a question the Government will have to answer when the Bill comes to the Lords. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee will consider whether any of the Bill’s provisions inappropriately delegate legislative power, and the Government will have to provide the Committee a memorandum identifying the purpose of each delegation, providing the justification for leaving the matter to delegated legislation and explaining why the proposed level of parliamentary control is thought to be appropriate.
I am sure the Minister will be pleased to know that I have looked at the memo from the Department to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which I suspect the Minister may read out in a moment. I was not entirely convinced by the previous Minister’s arguments on these points. Given that the Lords Committee pays particular attention to any proposal in the Bill that uses a Henry VIII clause, because of the way it shifts power, I hope she will be able to provide me with further justification while we in the Commons have the opportunity to scrutinise the Bill.
I completely understand the hon. Gentleman’s feelings about Henry VIII clauses. I think it is right that they are used judiciously and carefully.
To turn to clause 42 specifically, precision bred organisms are currently regulated by many GM legislative instruments that will need amending to reflect the changes made by the Bill. They will in the main be very technical amendments that will merely reflect the changes that we make if the Bill is passed. There are also references to GM organisms in numerous legislative instruments that will need adjusting, for the same reason. Other parts of law are passed, and GM references feature in many different forms of our legislative framework. The power in clause 42 enables the Government to make reasonable, proportionate and technical amendments. In that light, I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 40 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Regulations
I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 43, page 28, line 6, at end insert—
“(7) Regulations under this Act must be made in accordance with—
(a) the environmental principles set out in section 17(5) of the Environment Act 2021, and
(b) Article 391 (Non-regression from levels of protection) of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the one part, and the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the other part, done at Brussels and London on 30 December 2020.”
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 27, in clause 43, page 28, line 6, at end insert—
“(7) No regulations may be made under this Act unless—
(a) a policy statement on environmental principles has been laid before Parliament under section 18(6) of the Environment Act 2021, and
(b) section 19 of the Environment Act 2021 is in force.”
This amendment would prevent the exercise of any powers granted by the Bill until the Government’s policy statement on environmental principles has been finalised and Ministers are under a statutory duty to have due regard to it.
Some Members may have found the previous conversations slightly dry.
However, now we are getting to some really interesting points. We have tabled two amendments that would insert additional subsections into clause 43 with regard to the environmental principles of the Environment Act 2021 and the non-regression principle laid out in the 2020 trade and co-operation agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Union. Veterans of the Environment Act proceedings will recall extensive discussion of those issues, and I suspect that one or two Government Members will rise to the defence of the trade and co-operation agreement, particularly the non-regression clauses.
This is quite technical, but it is important because it is about upholding the standards that we have committed to in both domestic legislation and international agreements. It is about upholding the promises that we have made. Arguably, it is one of the reasons why the previous Minister is not here today. These are serious issues and, as she put it, a
“jocular self-serving approach is bound to have its limitations.”
How right she was. Our amendments highlight some of those limitations.
The first of these relates to the Environment Act 2021 and specifically the Government’s obligations under sections 17 to 19. Section 17 states:
“The Secretary of State must prepare a policy statement on environmental principles”
to be interpreted and applied in the making of Government policy. Section 17(5) lays out a definition of “environmental principles”, which include
“the principle that environmental protection should be integrated into the making of policies…the principle of preventative action to avert environmental damage…the precautionary principle, so far as relating to the environment…the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and…the polluter pays principle.”
Some Members will recall extensive discussion in the Environment Act proceedings as to exactly what that meant.
Section 18 details the timeframe for the policy statement, and section 19 details the obligations that Ministers are under once the statement is finalised. Section 19(1) states:
“A Minister of the Crown must, when making policy, have due regard to the policy statement on environmental principles currently in effect.”
The problem is that the Government have yet to finalise the statement. A draft was published in May 2022, but we are yet to have a response from the Secretary of State, or the final version of the policy statement. Sadly, the Minister who issued the press release about the statement, the hon. Member for Taunton Deane (Rebecca Pow), is no longer in her place, either.
The Environment Act was heralded by the Government as “World-leading”—remember that? The Prime Minister hailed it as the most ambitious environmental programme of any country on earth, neatly timing Royal Assent to the Bill with the COP26 summit hosted in Glasgow. However, a raft of policies in this sphere and specifically in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs have been brought forward that will have significant impacts on the environment, before the Government have fulfilled their obligations under the Environment Act.
The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot hail the success of their environmental legislation, while failing to follow through on it or deliver on its aims and failing to hold themselves accountable in their creation of policy to the obligations that were set out. Great claims have been made, but they are not being followed through.
Amendment 26 would help the Government out. It would ensure that regulations under the Bill are made in accordance with the environmental principles set out in section 17(5) of the Environment Act. Amendment 27 would ensure that no regulations may be made under the Bill unless the policy statement has been finalised and laid before Parliament, and Ministers are under an obligation to pay due regard to it. I look forward to enthusiastic support from those on the Government Benches to furthering the aims of their own legislation.
Amendment 26 concerns article 391 of the trade and co-operation agreement between the UK and the EU, which was agreed in December 2020—I am sure the Minister remembers it well. Chapter 7 of the TCA covers environment and climate, and defines environmental levels of protection as
“the levels of protection provided overall in a Party’s law”—
that refers to the parties to the agreement, before anyone gets any ideas—
“which have the purpose of protecting the environment including the prevention of a danger to human life or health from environmental impacts”.
The TCA then lists some specific examples, some of which would concern this Bill. Those include:
“the protection and preservation of the aquatic environment”
and
“the management of impacts on the environment from agricultural or food production”.
Each party in the agreement—the EU and the UK— committed to
“the principle that environmental protection should be integrated into the making of policies”,
as well as to “the precautionary approach” and
“the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source”.
Article 391 of the TCA sets out the rules on non-regression from these levels of environmental protection. It allows
“each Party…to determine the environmental levels of protection and climate level of protection it deems appropriate and to adopt or modify its law and policies in a manner consistent with each Party’s international commitments”.
However, the TCA also aims to prevent either party from weakening environmental legislation below the levels in place at the end of the transition period:
“A Party shall not weaken or reduce, in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties, its environmental levels of protection or its climate level of protection below the levels that are in place at the end of the transition period, including by failing to effectively enforce its environmental law or climate level of protection.”
I am not a lawyer, although the Minister is, as I have often pointed out, but it seems to me that the non-regression rules allow the UK to argue that it is allowed to change its regulation on precision breeding to create the new category we are discussing, that it can do so safely and that there is an environmental case for doing so. However, while we may argue that, some may equally argue—we heard this in the evidence sessions—that doing so poses environmental risks. Although the Bill attempts to manage those, and we broadly agree they could be managed, the safeguards should be strengthened. My point is that there are potential grounds for disagreement.
It also seems that the EU could make a determination on how the UK has moved, carry out an assessment itself on the balance of risks and benefits, and make a judgment on whether we have adhered to the non-regression rule. Given that we trade with the EU extensively, and this element of the TCA explicitly references impacts on trade, I hope the Minister will be able to explain the Government’s assessment of how the Bill will interact with the TCA, whether parity is maintained and whether there will be any trade repercussions as a result.
The other day, I quoted the impact assessment on the economic consequences of the EU taking a different view, and I want to go back to that. Although the text was printed in Hansard, I am not sure that I presented those details with quite the force I should have done. Paragraphs 144 to 146 of the impact assessment, on page 48, in the section “Assessment of likely EU response”, are frankly staggering. The Government appear to be prepared to concede that, if there were a disagreement, our markets—our exports to the EU—would in effect be closed. Paragraph 146 states:
“Approximately 55% of all crop-related food exports from the UK are to the EU…And so, it would be difficult to replace EU demand”—
you’re telling me it would be difficult! It goes on:
“Therefore, there is a possibility for a portion of the £8.56 billion worth of crop-related exports to the EU to decrease”.
But most staggeringly of all, that is followed by an attitude of, “Well, never mind,” as the impact assessment continues:
“Nonetheless, this represents only 2.5% of our annual total value of exported goods and 5.4% of our annual value of exported goods to the EU. And so, even if UK crop-related food exports are maximally impacted, the overall impact on the UK balance of trade is minimal.”
I find that absolutely staggering and, on behalf of the food and agriculture sector, I invite the Minister to dissociate herself from that aspect of the impact assessment. The impact assessment has a lot of interesting stuff in it, but I suspect a lot of it was not read as closely as it should have been.
I have listened with interest to the points made by the hon. Gentleman. It is not necessary to put either amendment in the Bill, and I will do my best to reassure him as to why that is the case.
The scientific advice is clear that precision breeding poses no greater risk to the environment than traditional breeding. Section 19 of the Environment Act 2021 provides that Ministers must have due regard to the policy statement on environmental principles. DEFRA has already published and laid that statement before Parliament for debate. I understand that that is the draft version, but we have made it clear that our intention is to publish the final version in autumn this year. Therefore, by the time regulations are made under this Bill, the final version of the policy statement will have been laid before Parliament, and section 19 will be in force. It is therefore unnecessary to make a provision that will be meaningless by the time the Bill comes into force.
However, to provide more assurances, let me add that one of the five principles—the precautionary principle—was touched on in the evidence sessions, including by the hon. Gentleman, and I believe that many of the experts are satisfied that it is being met. They include Professor Jim Dunwell, the chair of the Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment; Dr Alan Tinch; and Professor Gideon Henderson. To quote Gideon,
“the Bill we are putting forward now is precautionary—it follows the guidelines of the precautionary principle. We are not leaping in with both feet, but we are moving in stepwise motion.”––[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2022; c. 89, Q145.]
In line with the requirements of section 20 of the Environment Act, we have reviewed whether the Bill reduces existing environmental protections. Based on the scientific advice from the independent scientific committee ACRE, our assessment is that the provisions do not have the effect of weakening environmental protections. We published that statement when the Bill was introduced.
I listened carefully to what the hon. Member for Cambridge said about the TCA. The scientific advice is clear that precision breeding poses no greater risk to the environment than traditional breeding, and we therefore believe that the Bill is consistent with our non-regression commitment to the EU. Indeed, the EU is consulting on its own new regulatory framework for precision bred plants. The TCA aims to prevent either party from weakening their environmental protections below the levels that were in place at the end of the transition period. Article 391 states:
“The Parties…shall not weaken or reduce, in a manner affecting trade or investment…environmental levels of protection”.
I am listening to a really good debate. Does the Minister agree that the Bill gives us the opportunity to strengthen our environmental protections, not just to maintain the status quo? It is a great leap forward.
The Government certainly believe that there are real environmental benefits to allowing carefully regulated precision breeding that enjoys public trust, and we are keen to realise those benefits. Although I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill) is no longer in position, I was pleased to take over the Committee stage of the Bill because, as Farming Minister, I have long taken a close interest in it. I am very excited, for example, by the reduction in pesticide use that may be brought about really quite quickly if we pass the Bill and crack on with appropriate precision breeding. I do not think it is necessary or appropriate for regulations to be made subject to amendments 26 and 27.
Two things concern me. First, we know that the Secretary of State has repeatedly expressed doubt about the precautionary principle, suggesting that it is implemented in too strong a fashion and that he wants to row back from that. Secondly, in 2017 we were promised these environmental principles imminently. Now, in 2022, we have a draft statement. That suggests that the Government are not keen to get these principles into law and to implement them; rather, they are doing everything they can to drag their feet. Does the Minister not realise why I have concerns about that?
Order. If Members wish to make interventions, they should be brief. If they want to make longer interventions, they should try to catch my eye and make a speech.
I understand the hon. Lady’s reservations but I do not share them. The Government have moved as fast as they can, with substantive and lengthy environmentally friendly legislation, much of which the hon. Member for Cambridge and I have discussed at considerable length in Committee and otherwise.
I am proud of the Government’s record on environmental protection. The passing of the Agriculture Act 2020 and the Fisheries Act 2020 will put us on a much more sustainable level in both those industries, in terms of how we apportion public subsidy and how farmers and fishermen grow and fish the food we are proud to enjoy. I am proud of our recent work in the food strategy, where we set out as a Government policy goal the level of self-sufficiency we enjoy at the moment. All that must be read under the overarching protections in the Environment Act 2021, which was also passed by this Government. I am proud of our record.
I will move briefly to clause 43, which provides for the parliamentary procedures to be used when making regulations under the Bill. The clause allows for transitional, transitory or saving provision to be made to ensure a smooth transition from existing arrangements to new ones. That is necessary, because these are complicated pieces of legislation. To reassure hon. Members, I will give one example. Consequential regulations under clause 42 might make provision for entries in the GMO register concerning any qualifying higher plants grown in field trials. Under the changes recently introduced by the Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2022, those can then be copied across to the PBO register, which we will have established under clause 18. I therefore beg to move that clause 43 stand part.
It is okay. You have made your points, Minister. If any other Members wish to speak on clause 43, that will come later.
What the Minister said was very interesting, not least because one of the questions we have puzzled over is whether qualifying higher plants fit into this structure. We are beginning to see that it is as a consequence of some of these powers, which are, to put it mildly, obscure. As I commented the other day, it is quite hard to discern the overall structure of this legislation, given how little is in the Bill, so I found her comments quite helpful.
We will not pursue amendment 26, which concerns the trade and co-operation agreement, today. I am sure the matters in that amendment will roll on inexorably—they are complicated. The basic point is that different people can interpret things differently, and that gives the possibility of challenge. That is the problem. I fear we will be locked into these kinds of problems for a long time to come, sadly, and we will need to rely on good will and co-operation with our neighbours, which is important.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East made a very strong set of points on the question of the environmental principles and the link to the precautionary principle. Of course, this debate has been ongoing for a long time. I do not think it is unfair to point out that the Secretary of State sees this—a diminution of the precautionary principle—as a Brexit opportunity. Labour does not agree with that, and we have sought at every opportunity to tease their position out of the Government, but frankly they are saying one thing and doing another.
However, that is a debate that can be conducted another day. Environmental lawyers are looking closely at all of this. It is a complicated area, to put it mildly. I dare say it will be contested and probably determined elsewhere. In the meantime, we will continue to point out that gap. On that basis, I will not press amendment 26, but I would like to put amendment 27 to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 27, in clause 43, page 28, line 6, at end insert—
“(7) No regulations may be made under this Act unless—
(a) a policy statement on environmental principles has been laid before Parliament under section 18(6) of the Environment Act 2021, and
(b) section 19 of the Environment Act 2021 is in force.” —(Daniel Zeichner.)
This amendment would prevent the exercise of any powers granted by the Bill until the Government’s policy statement on environmental principles has been finalised and Ministers are under a statutory duty to have due regard to it.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 48, page 30, line 18, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (3)(b) may not appoint a day on which any of sections 11 to 15 is to come into force unless the welfare advisory body has advised the Secretary of State that it is satisfied that regulations made under Part 2 establish a proper process to ensure that the health and welfare of animals, and their qualifying progeny, in respect of which a precision bred animal marketing authorisation is made will not be adversely affected by any precision bred trait.”
This amendment would prevent regulations being made on precision bred animals until the welfare advisory body is satisfied that animal health and welfare will be ensured.
I would like to speak briefly on this amendment, which concerns the extent and application of the sea areas. On Second Reading, I raised the fact that there are legitimately held and differing views within the different Administrations in the UK. It is fair to say that the devolved Administrations were not happy with the way this had been handled so far; I suggested that
“the Government should tread carefully.”—[Official Report, 15 June 2022; Vol. 716, c. 382.]
As I have said today, the regulation of genetically edited organisms is a devolved matter. The central divisions of the Bill apply to England only, but the Welsh and Scottish Governments were consulted at a late stage. Based on evidence I heard in this Committee, it is clear that the frustrations with the Government’s approach to co-operation with the devolved Administrations are ongoing. I am disappointed that the Government did not consult the Welsh and Scottish Governments earlier, as I said before, and that they have not laid out more detail, in either the explanatory notes or the impact assessment accompanying the Bill, as to the precise impact it will have on Wales and Scotland and any proposed mechanisms moving forward.
The Opposition have tabled a new clause on labelling, and we have already raised a point about how some of the information-sharing provisions in the Bill could be strengthened to facilitate supply chain tracking and coexistence. I hope that the Minister will say more about the Government’s discussions with the devolved Administrations and the plans they have.
Are we speaking only to amendment 3? I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling the amendment. I can assure him that the Government are committed to appointing a welfare advisory body that will provide expert scientific advice to the Secretary of State, as set out in clause 22. We want to ensure that the body will be functionally independent and that it will provide scientific advice. We are committed to appointing a body with the most suitable expertise for the role. We will work closely with existing animal welfare experts, such as the Animal Welfare Committee, to ensure that there is a rigorous and proportionate system to safeguard animal welfare.
In responding to the Minister’s excellent contribution, I should explain that what I said previously relates to clause 47 and so can be ignored—I managed to speak to completely the wrong clause, which of course happens late in the day.
I am not surprised. I will try to find my way back to the right clause.
Amendment 3 is relatively straightforward. It would prevent regulations being made on precision bred animals until the welfare advisory body is satisfied that animal health and welfare will be ensured. I have previously cited evidence in which DEFRA itself admits that the elements of the Bill relating to animals that are delegated to secondary legislation are not yet fully investigated or prepared. Sadly, we have been unsuccessful in removing the animals from the scope of the Bill. In the absence of that, we have tabled a series of amendments that would provide a check and balance on any secondary legislation, especially given that some of it will be subject to the negative procedure.
The Government have emphasised that the welfare advisory body provided for in the Bill will be composed of experts in their field. The Opposition think that it seems sensible for the body also to play a role in determining the effectiveness of the Government’s proposal on animals, and that is what the amendment seeks to achieve.
I am conscious that I am responding to the Minister. I heard what she said. I do not entirely agree, but given that I have not explained it very well, we will let this one pass. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 48, page 30, line 20, at end insert—
“(5A) Regulations may not be made under or by virtue of this section unless a common framework agreement relating to the release and marketing of, and risk assessments relating to, precision bred plants and animals, and the marketing of food and feed produced from such plants and animals, has been agreed between a Minister of the Crown, the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government.
(5B) “Common framework agreement” has the meaning given by section 10(4) of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020.”
This amendment would prevent the operative parts of this Bill coming into force until a common framework agreement on the regulation of precision breeding had been agreed between the UK Government and the Scottish and Welsh Governments.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 9— Power of the Scottish Parliament to legislate on the marketing of precision bred organisms—
‘(1) Schedule 1 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 11 insert—
“Marketing of precision bred organisms
11A The United Kingdom market access principles do not apply to (and sections 2(3) and 5(3) do not affect the operation of) any Act of the Scottish Parliament, or any subordinate legislation made under or by virtue of such an Act, relating to the marketing of—
(a) precision bred organisms, or
(b) food or feed produced from precision bred organisms.”’
As has been stated, this is English legislation. As I said on Second Reading, the regulation of genetically modified organisms is a devolved matter—no ifs, no buts. That has been clear from the responses from the Welsh and Scottish Governments. The Scottish Government have been clear in their opposition to the UK Government’s moves on this. They do not presently intend to amend the GMO regulatory regime in Scotland to remove categories of products currently regulated as GMOs while they sensibly await the outcome of the EU’s consultation on whether some gene-edited organisms will be excluded from the GM definition. No one in Scotland wants to see further barriers to trade with our largest trading partner, but as the hon. Member for Cambridge mentioned, there are clear indications in the impact statement that that is a very likely outcome of having different approaches. It should be further noted—we have not really discussed this to any great extent—that the EU is currently considering only plant-based GEOs, not animals.
The potential impact of the Bill on Scotland through the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, as referred to by the Minister, must be recognised. If the Scottish Parliament did not ultimately decide to allow gene edited organisms to be sold, Scotland would still be prevented under the Act from stopping those products being sold in our shops. That, of course, is exactly the kind of scenario that the Scottish National party warned against when the legislation was forced through this place.
As the UK Government’s own impact assessment for the Bill acknowledges, removing gene edited products from England’s regulatory regime for GMOs would mean divergence from the current EU approach. As such, it would have implications for compliance, costs and future trade. New trade barriers could also come in the form of checks and certification requirements on UK food exports entering the EU’s single market, which could affect not only products exported to the EU that contain precision bred plant material, but those in the same product categories that do not—something that, again, emphasises the importance of labelling and traceability, which I will address a little later.
The Scottish Government have made it clear that they intend to stay aligned with EU regulation as far as possible and practicable. The UK Government’s refusal to commit to dynamic alignment with the EU has already led to significant trade impacts and costs for Scottish businesses. For example, Scottish businesses have written to the UK Government on numerous occasions regarding the losses to the multimillion-pound Scottish seed potato industry from being unable to access the EU export market, yet there has been very little progress in re-establishing that trade. There are many other examples I could mention. We do not want to erect further barriers to our largest market, so we are waiting to see the position as the EU progresses its review, including its consultation.
If the EU retains its current opposition to gene editing, there are concerns about, for example, the export of Scottish salmon—a huge export product to Europe, and particularly to France. It has been suggested that products might be considered on a product-by-product basis, but there is little detail for us to scrutinise that and to examine potential costs and logistics challenges. In the meantime, the SNP Scottish Government, and indeed the Welsh Government, simply insist that the devolution settlement is respected.
Nobody disputes that it is within the devolved competencies for the Scottish Government to determine genetic modification in Scotland, but if the European Union did change—we heard in evidence that it is considering doing so, and one of the worries of some of the people who gave evidence was that the UK would be left behind if we did not remove the legislation now—would the SNP be prepared to consider accepting the Bill and working with the UK Government, so that we stick together?
That is exactly why the Scottish Government intend to wait for the outcome of the consultation, and why we would like to see the UK Government doing similarly. I would point to the New Zealand Government, who undertook a really extensive consultation with stakeholders, consumers and citizens generally. Ultimately, they chose to continue to include gene edited organisms within their definitions of genetically modified organisms. The outcomes are by no means guaranteed, and I think the precautionary principle should be applied here as well.
New clause 9 would amend the United Kingdom Internal Market Act to ensure that the Scottish Parliament’s authority to legislate in the marketing of precision bred organisms is upheld. Similarly, amendment 37 would prevent the operative parts of the Bill coming into force until a common framework agreement on precision breeding has been agreed between the UK Government and the Scottish and Welsh Governments.
I would be really grateful if the Minister—I appreciate that she is very new to her post—could offer an explanation for why common framework procedures prior to the Bill’s introduction were not followed before it was introduced. As the Minister will know, the Scottish and Welsh Governments repeatedly requested sight of the draft Bill, but it was introduced to Parliament before that happened. That is simply not the action of a Government who respect devolved Governments, and I would be grateful if the Minister also provided an explanation for that.
On amendment 37, the regulation of GMOs is, as we have heard, a devolved matter. We have invited the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government to join us in bringing forward the Bill. If they took up our offer, it would provide confidence to investors who are looking to support Scottish and Welsh research into precision breeding.
A common framework covering GMO marketing and cultivation was within scope of the common frameworks programme, but all four Administrations agreed that a common framework was not required because the administration and co-ordination of this policy area was provided for through existing inter-governmental arrangements under the GMO concordat. If the DAs were in agreement, we would be willing to revisit that analysis and look again at whether the GMO concordat and the intergovernmental arrangements for which it provides are sufficient for intergovernmental working, and, where relevant, to manage divergence in the regulation of genetic technologies. I would be delighted to take that work further if it is of interest to the DAs.
In addition to engagement between DEFRA and DA genetic technology officials, it is worth noting that precision breeding policy interacts with four of the provisional common frameworks. Engagement among respective officials is also ongoing through the relevant framework fora in those four areas.
As the Committee heard from Professor Bruce Whitelaw of the Roslin Institute, and as has been presented to the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government by the National Farmers Union—I have read the evidence it gave—the provisions in the Bill apply substantively to England, but they have the potential to bring benefits across the UK.
We have introduced the Bill to ensure that we keep up to date with the latest science, and to remove the limitations placed on us by outdated regulation that has not kept pace with scientific development. Amendment 37 would put us at further risk of falling behind other countries, which the NFU was concerned about in the evidence sessions. We will continue to engage with the DAs to address the concerns that they have raised, but I encourage the hon. Lady to embrace the opportunity that the Bill presents to unlock the benefits of scientific research and development and ensure that the UK continues to invest in innovation in the agri-food industry and reap the wider potential benefits from it.
New clause 9 would exclude legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament relating to the marketing of precision bred organisms, and regulations made by the Scottish Government under that legislation, in scope of the UK Internet Market Act 2020 market access principles. There is an established process for considering exclusions to the application of the UKIM market access principles in the common framework areas. That process has been agreed by the UK Government, the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive. The UK Government are fully committed to common frameworks and to taking forward discussions with the Governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on the interaction between the proposals in the Bill and UKIM.
As we heard from Dr Ferrier of the NFU, it will be at least five years before products come on to the markets for farmers and growers. We hope that consumers across the whole of the UK will be able to benefit from the research into precision bred plants and animals that the Bill will enable. We therefore urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment so as not to pre-empt the outcome of those discussions.
It is kind of the UK Government to want to bring benefit to all of the devolved nations of the UK—a very benevolent approach that I am sure everyone appreciates—but this area is devolved and we should have full control over it.
I just want to clarify, should we be surprised that the United Kingdom Government are interested in the rural interests of every nation in the United Kingdom?
I am actually very interested in rural interests, as the hon. Gentleman knows, and I am very concerned about the impact on trade with the EU, which is the UK’s largest trading partner, and the impact, potentially, on farmers. The Minister mentioned that it will be five years before commercial benefits can be felt—at least; we were hearing anywhere up to 11 years —so why the rush? Why push this through when we potentially could really impact our trade with Europe?
I do not wish to sound rude about it at all, because I respect the Minister hugely, and particularly the way she has stepped up this afternoon—excellent effort. Given that it sounds as if there is likely to be some movement in discussions on the GMO concordat, perhaps I could arrange a meeting with her, before Report, to discuss that further and get a clearer understanding of what is entailed within those discussions. I would appreciate that very much.
The Minister is nodding her head, so I assume that is acceptable. Given that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Labelling
“(1) A person must not—
(a) market a precision bred organism, or
(b) place food and feed produced from precision bred organisms on the market
unless labelled in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.
(2) Regulations under this section must ensure that the labelling referred to in subsection (1) provides sufficient information to support informed consumer choice, having regard in particular to—
(a) nutritional content,
(b) the potential presence of allergens or other substances which may cause adverse human health impacts, and
(c) the environmental impact of the product.
(3) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must—
(a) consult representatives of—
(i) consumers,
(ii) food producers,
(iii) suppliers,
(iv) retailers,
(v) growers and farmers,
(vi) the organic sector,
(vii) other persons likely to be affected by the regulations, and
(viii) any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and
(b) seek the advice of the Food Standards Agency on the information to be required to be provided on labelling.
(4) Section 30 (Interpretation of Part 3) has effect for the purposes of this section as it has effect for the purposes of Part 3.” —(Daniel Zeichner.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make regulations about the labelling of precision bred organisms and food and feed products made from them.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 10—Labelling of food or feed produced by precision bred animals—
“(1) Food or feed produced from a precision bred animal or its progeny that is placed on the market must be labelled to inform prospective purchasers that it has been produced from a precision bred animal or its progeny.
(2) The labelling required under subsection (1) must be in easily visible and clearly legible type and, where packaging is used, it must be placed on the front outer surface of the packaging.
(3) Regulations must lay down the labelling terms to be used to meet the requirements of subsection (1).
(4) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.”
I have been referring to new clause 1 throughout the Bill’s passage through Committee. Labour has been clear that we regard labelling as an important part of this new regulatory framework, and it is sadly not really referenced in the Bill, although it is discussed and then dismissed in the impact statement.
The Bill will create a new type of food product on supermarket shelves: the precision bred organism. As I said earlier, it is clear that there is a trend towards consumers wanting more information about their food—what it contains, where it comes from and its environmental impact, which are all important. As I am sure the Minister now knows, and will be tired of hearing, Labour will buy, make and sell more in Britain. How could one do that without knowing how our food is made and where it comes from?
Our new clause 1 would require the Government to introduce regulations to ensure that precision bred food and feed is labelled to provide
“sufficient information to support informed consumer choice, having regard in particular to—
(a) nutritional content,
(b) the potential presence of allergens or other substances which may cause adverse human health impacts, and
(c) the environmental impact of the product.”
It would also require the Secretary of State to consult stakeholder groups before pursuing that and to seek the advice of the Food Standards Agency.
The Government have said time and again that they support nutritional labelling to inform consumers of any allergens or if the nutritional content of a food is changed from its natural state. They must put that in the legislation and make it a commitment in the Bill. We have also heard about the issues of co-existence with other production systems and supply chain tracing, and how the legislation might have an impact on the organic sector. It is important that it is properly consulted, so that whatever labelling regime the Government introduces, it allows for different types of food production to co-exist.
The only information the Government have divulged in writing regarding labelling is their opposition to it, in the impact assessment, based on the costs it could incur for businesses. However in the impact assessment they have not actually calculated the costs and benefits of labelling, so I am unsure how they came to that judgment. Perhaps the Minister can tell us. Indeed, in that part of the impact assessment, around pages 40 and 41, it is interesting that, in paragraph 114, the Government notes that
“maintaining a labelling and tracing system could also have wider benefits, most notably, improved consumer confidence in food products potentially adding value across the food supply chain.”
Well, absolutely.
The impact assessment also states:
“Given uncertainties, as set out above, we have not monetised the estimated annual cost of a labelling and tracing system to business.”
That was identified by the Regulatory Policy Committee, which in its report—which, I have to say, categorised the Bill as “not fit for purpose”—stated:
“The traceability and labelling costs, the primary benefit for the preferred option and which differentiates the two regulatory options considered, is not quantified. As this is the main difference between the two regulatory options, the Department needs to provide some quantification of the scale of the potential impact from this change.”
I would be grateful if the Minister commented on what is, frankly, a pretty damning assessment. I appreciate that she is new to this area and that it may not be possible for her to do so today, but a written assurance that those serious issues will be addressed would be welcome at a later stage.
Further to that, in its written evidence to the Committee, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics noted that the Government’s present stance on labelling
“runs contrary to the findings of many public engagement initiatives that have broached this question... in this context, not labelling amounts to the withholding of information about consumer preferences”.
In the oral evidence sessions, we heard about not only the costs of implementation but the practical challenge with labelling precision bred organisms, which is that they are scientifically and practically indistinguishable from traditionally bred organisms—that is, the ones that we have, know and love day-to-day. I note that the hon. Gentleman has not touched on a mechanism for how that labelling could be executed. The only practical way that we could know for certain whether a crop, for example, was precision bred would be to insert exogenous DNA for the purpose of labelling, which clearly goes against the spirit of some of the other debates we have had.
The hon. Lady raises a series of interesting and important points. I do not disagree with what she has said, other than to say that I think it is possible—this came through in some of the evidence as well—to maintain traceability throughout the process if we are careful about how we do it, but we have to set up systems to do so. It is clear from the impact assessment that the Government have thought about this issue, and our view is that to maintain the necessary public confidence it is absolutely right for it to be considered carefully. As such, our new clause would put the structure in place for that discussion to happen. If the hon. Lady looks carefully at what the new clause actually says, she will see that.
I was about to make exactly the same point as the hon. Lady: we understand the challenges that labelling may pose. However, as was said in the impact assessment, the significant benefit it would bring in terms of public trust and supporting consumer choice may well be worth having. Our view is that the Government have not given sufficient thought to the matter nor evaluated it sufficiently, as is admitted in the impact assessment. Our new clause 1 would require them to undertake further consultation on labelling and then introduce an appropriate system.
I know that labelling has been raised as a concern by Committee members and others, and I understand that the new clauses intend to provide information to consumers, so I will try to provide some reassurances on that point.
The Bill is based on the science, and the science tells us that precision bred organisms are equivalent to, and pose no greater risk than, their traditionally bred counterparts. We have received advice from independent scientific experts and heard from many witnesses who considered labelling to be unnecessary in the case of precision breeding. Dr Helen Ferrier of the NFU agreed that it would be “misleading” to consumers to require a compulsory label, as there is no scientific difference. Dr Richard Harrison said,
“I do not think there is any scientific rationale to have additional labelling criteria for gene-edited products, because they are fundamentally indistinguishable from nature.”––[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022; c. 63, Q103.]
The Bill is consistent with the science, but also with the approach taken by many international partners around the world that have already legislated in this way. We do not think it is necessary to label based on the technology used.
Much of the proposed new clause is already covered by existing food legislation—in particular, regulation 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to consumers. We know that there are exciting developments to improve the nutritional content of some food, but consumers will want to know of any nutritional or allergen composition that might affect them.
Regulations on the provision of food information to consumers already adequately cover nutritional and allergen labelling, and that does not change because the product is derived from a precision bred organism. We therefore do not think it is necessary to include additional provisions in the Bill. We will respond to the further information that the RPC requests in an enactment 1A, to be brought forwards towards the end of the Bill’s passage through Parliament.
I listened closely to the Minister and am wondering what an enactment 1A means and when it will happen.
I am not sure I am totally reassured by that. I would be grateful if the Minister could write to us at some point about how the Government are addressing those criticisms.
Yes. In a way, we are going round in circles. We entirely understand the scientific arguments, but the question is how we maintain consumer confidence. The Food Standards Agency’s work shows that the public want to know. We believe the public have a right to know, and the question is how that might be done. The most recent advice from the FSA, which I cited earlier, shows that it has been thinking hard about that and may be able to draw distinctions between different types of product coming on to the market. That suggests to me that there is the possibility to provide more consumer information.
I suspect there is a wider debate about labelling, because we want to ensure that the information that we offer to consumers is not so overloaded in so many different areas that it is hard to interpret. That is a legitimate debate, and I am sure we will pursue it. We think it is important that this option remains under consideration in the Bill, and for that reason I want to press new clause 1 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 2 is another of our attempts to make the introduction of the Bill’s provisions on animals contingent on DEFRA and the Government undertaking the work that we think they need to do before they are ready to bring forward serious and detailed proposals on this issue. The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022—I suspect there are veterans of its passage here—enshrined the recognition of the sentience of animals into law and established an Animal Sentience Committee whose role is to consider
“whether, or to what extent, the government is having, or has had, all due regard to the ways in which the policy might have an adverse effect on the welfare of animals as sentient beings.”
As I understand it, the Animal Sentience Committee is yet to be established. Perhaps the Minister can provide a timeline for that, because we cannot find any commencement information on it.
The 2022 Act was introduced as part of the Government’s action plan for animal welfare, which they made a lot of and said was the “first of a kind”. The Government made big promises and indicated that the Act was a defining piece of legislation to promote the health and welfare of animals. My question to the Minister is: why did the Government not wait for the Animal Sentience Committee to be established and have time to report on the Bill before introducing it? If they really wanted to recognise the sentience of animals, they would prioritise the committee’s establishment before pressing ahead with legislation that will have a real and significant impact.
Before I call the Minister to respond, I should say that I sense there is some confusion among Members about new clause 10. The place to discuss new clause 10 was in the previous debate. The vote on it is at the end because the new clauses are taken in order. I will ask the proposer of new clause 10 whether she wished to move it at that stage. If the hon. Member for Edinburgh North and Leith wants clarification, I am happy to give it to her.
I am a little confused, because new clause 10 was grouped with new clause 1 and I thought I would be speaking at the same time as the hon. Member for Cambridge. Forgive me.
The debate on new clause 10 should have taken place when new clause 1 was moved. I read out “with which it will be convenient to discuss new clause 10”. The vote on it comes in the order of the new clauses.
Given the confusion, I will withdraw any suggestion of a vote.
It is my job to keep order and try to make sure that hon. Members ask the Government what they want and make whatever points they want to make. When we come to vote on it, although it will not be completely orderly, if the hon. Lady wishes to make a small number of comments, I will allow it.
The 2022 Act received Royal Assent in April, and work is now under way to establish the Animal Sentience Committee by the end of this year. Applications to the committee have now closed and we are proceeding with the next steps. We very much hope to have the committee up and running by the end of this year. Given that, as the hon. Gentleman said, it will be some years before precision bred animals are anticipated to be released or brought to market, delaying the provisions for 12 months from the date on which the Animal Sentience Committee is established is unnecessary. We fully expect the committee to be established much more than 12 months prior to the first precision bred animals being released or brought to market.
The Government were clear during the passage of the sentience legislation that we would not dictate the Animal Sentience Committee’s work plan. It will be for the committee, once established, to decide which policy decisions it wants to scrutinise, and its expert members will be best placed to know where they can add value to the animal welfare debate. It would be contrary to that important principle if this Bill was used to mandate the committee to produce a report before the provisions in the Bill can be commenced. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.
There is nothing in the new clause to mandate the Animal Sentience Committee to do anything; it would give the committee the opportunity to make a report, should it wish. I would be surprised if it did not wish to do so. The problem is the wider question of the framework of protections, which is clearly under discussion and under review in general. It is now quite a complicated web, and we want to make sure that the new element—the Animal Sentience Committee, which we strongly support—fits in an appropriate manner.
This goes back to the points we made at the start of the Bill Committee, when we questioned why the Government are so determined to include animals in this legislation at this stage when there are so many reasons not to, not least the Government’s own reasons, given that they say it will be some years before the process moves forward. It would be better to separate animals out; we stand by that point and the new clause is a further example of why that would be sensible. I hear what the Minister says, but we will have a vote on it anyway.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this, it will be convenient to consider the following:
New Clause 4—Accounts and audit—
“(1) The Authority must keep proper accounts and proper records in relation to the accounts and must prepare for each accounting year a statement of accounts.
(2) The annual statement of accounts must comply with any direction given by the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Treasury, as to the information to be contained in the statement, the way in which the information is to be presented or the methods and principles according to which the statement is to be prepared.
(3) Not later than five months after the end of an accounting year, the Authority must send a copy of the statement of accounts for that year to the Secretary of State and to the Comptroller and Auditor General.
(4) The Comptroller and Auditor General must examine, certify and report on every statement of accounts received under subsection (3) above and must lay a copy of the statement and of the report before each House of Parliament.
(5) The Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General may inspect any records relating to the accounts.
(6) In this section “accounting year” means the period beginning with the day when the Authority is established and ending with the following 31st March, or any later period of twelve months ending with the 31st March.”
New Clause 5—Reports to Secretary of State—
“(1) The Authority must prepare and send to the Secretary of State an annual report as soon as practicable after the end of the period of twelve months for which it is prepared.
(2) A report prepared under this section for any period must deal with the activities of the Authority in the period and the activities the Authority proposes to undertake in the succeeding period of twelve months.
(3) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of every report received under this section.”
New clause 6—General functions of the Authority—
“(1) The Authority must—
(a) keep under review information about the use of genetic technology in plants and animals and any subsequent development of genetic technology and advise the Secretary of State about those matters,
(b) publicise the services provided to the public by the Authority or provided in pursuance of release notification requirements or marketing authorisations under this Act,
(c) provide, to such extent as it considers appropriate, a code of practice, advice and information for persons to whom release notification requirements or marketing authorisations under this Act apply
(d) maintain a statement of the general principles which it considers should be followed—
(i) in the carrying-on of activities governed by this Act, and
(ii) in the carrying-out of its functions in relation to such activities,
(e) promote, in relation to activities governed by this Act, compliance with—
(i) requirements imposed by or under this Act, and
(ii) the Authority’s code of practice
(f) perform such other functions as may be specified in regulations.
(2) The Authority may, if it thinks fit, charge a fee for any advice provided under subsection (1)(c).”
New Clause 7—Duties in relation to carrying out its functions—
“(1) The Authority must carry out its functions effectively, efficiently and economically.
(2) In carrying out its functions, the Authority must, so far as relevant, have regard to the principles of best regulatory practice (including the principles under which regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in which action is needed).”
New Clause 8—Power to delegate and establish committees—
“(1) The Authority may delegate a function to a committee, to a member or to staff.
(2) The Authority may establish such committees or sub-committees as it thinks fit (whether to advise the Authority or to exercise a function delegated to it by the Authority).
(3) The members of the committees or sub-committees may include persons who are not members of the Authority.
(4) Subsection (1) has effect subject to any enactment requiring a decision to be taken by members of the Authority or by a committee consisting of members of the Authority.”
New Schedule 1—Genetic Technology Authority: Supplementary Provisions—
“Status and capacity
1 The Authority is not to be regarded as the servant or agent of the Crown, or as enjoying any status, privilege or immunity of the Crown; and its property is not to be regarded as property of, or property held on behalf of, the Crown.
2 The Authority has power to do anything which is calculated to facilitate the discharge of its functions, or is incidental or conducive to their discharge, except the power to borrow money.
Expenses
3 The Secretary of State may, with the consent of the Treasury, pay the Authority out of money provided by Parliament such sums as he thinks fit towards its expenses.
Appointment of members
4 (1) All the members of the Authority (including the chairman and deputy chairman who must be appointed as such) must be appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) The following persons are disqualified for being appointed as chairman or deputy chairman of the Authority—
(a) any person who is, or has been, concerned with the creation, release or marketing of plant or animal organisms, gametes or embryos created using genetic technology, and
(b) any person who is, or has been, directly concerned with commissioning or funding any research involving such creation, release or marketing, or who has actively participated in any decision to do so.
(3) The Secretary of State must secure that at least one-third but fewer than half of the other members of the Authority fall within sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b), and that at least one member falls within each of paragraphs (a) and (b).
5 (1) A person (“P”) is disqualified for being appointed as chairman, deputy chairman, or as any other member of the Authority if—
(a) P is the subject of a bankruptcy restrictions order,
(b) in the last five years P has been convicted in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man of an offence and has had a qualifying sentence passed on P.
(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(b), the date of conviction is to be taken to be the ordinary date on which the period allowed for making an appeal or application expires or, if an appeal or application is made, the date on which the appeal or application is finally disposed of or abandoned or fails by reason of its non-prosecution.
(3) In sub-paragraph (1)(b), the reference to a qualifying sentence is to a sentence of imprisonment for a period of not less than three months (whether suspended or not) without the option of a fine.
Tenure of office
6 (1) Subject to the following provisions of this paragraph and paragraph 7, a person holds and vacates office as a member of the Authority in accordance with the terms of the person’s appointment.
(2) A person may not be appointed as a member of the Authority for more than three years at a time.
(3) A member may at any time resign their office by giving notice to the Secretary of State.
(4) A person who ceases to be a member of the Authority is eligible for re-appointment (whether or not in the same capacity).
(5) A person holding office as chairman, deputy chairman or other member of the Authority is to cease to hold that office if the person becomes disqualified for appointment to it.
(6) If the Secretary of State is satisfied that a member of the Authority—
(a) has been absent from meetings of the Authority for six consecutive months or longer without the permission of the Authority, or
(b) is unable or unfit to discharge the person's functions as chairman, deputy chairman or other member, the Secretary of State may remove the member from office as chairman, deputy chairman or other member.
(7) The Secretary of State may suspend a member from office as chairman, deputy chairman or other member of the Authority if it appears to him that one of the conditions in paragraph (6) is or may be satisfied in relation to the member.
7 (1) This paragraph applies where the Secretary of State decides to suspend a member under paragraph 6(7).
(2) The Secretary of State must give notice to the member of the decision and the suspension takes effect on receipt by the member of the notice.
(3) A notice under subsection (2) is treated as being received by the member—
(a) in a case where it is delivered in person or left at the member's proper address, at the time at which it is delivered or left;
(b) in a case where it is sent by post to the member at that address, on the third day after the day on which it was posted.
(4) The initial period of suspension must not exceed 6 months.
(5) The Secretary of State may review the member's suspension at any time.
(6) The Secretary of State must review the member's suspension if requested in writing by the member to do so, but need not carry out a review less than 3 months after the beginning of the initial period of suspension.
(7) Following a review the Secretary of State may—
(a) revoke the suspension, or
(b) suspend the member for another period of not more than 6 months from the expiry of the current period.
(8) The Secretary of State must revoke the suspension if at any time—
(a) the Secretary of State decides that neither of the conditions mentioned in paragraph 5(5) is satisfied, or
(b) the Secretary of State decides that either of those conditions is satisfied but does not remove the member from office as chairman, deputy chairman or other member of the Authority.
Disqualification of members of Authority for House of Commons and Northern Ireland Assembly
8 In Part II of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 and in Part II of Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act 1975 (bodies of which all members are disqualified) the following entry is inserted at the appropriate place in alphabetical order—
“The Genetic Technology Authority”.
Remuneration and pensions of members
9 (1) The Authority may—
(a) pay to the chairman such remuneration, and
(b) pay or make provision for paying to or in respect of the chairman or any other member such pensions, allowances, fees, expenses or gratuities, as the Secretary of State may, with the approval of the Treasury, determine.
(2) Where a person ceases to be a member of the Authority otherwise than on the expiry of their term of office and it appears to the Secretary of State that there are special circumstances which make it right for that person to receive compensation, the Authority may make to that person a payment of such amount as the Secretary of State may, with the consent of the Treasury, determine.
Staff
10 (1) The Authority may appoint such employees as it thinks fit, upon such terms and conditions as the Authority, with the approval of the Secretary of State and the consent of the Treasury, may determine.
(2) The Authority must secure that any employee whose function is, or whose functions include, the inspection of premises is of such character, and is so qualified by training and experience, as to be a suitable person to perform that function.
(3) The Authority must, as regards such of its employees as with the approval of the Secretary of State it may determine, pay to or in respect of them such pensions, allowances or gratuities (including pensions, allowances or gratuities by way of compensation for loss of employment), or provide and maintain for them such pension schemes (whether contributory or not), as may be so determined.
(4) If an employee of the Authority—
(a) is a participant in any pension scheme applicable to that employment, and
(b) becomes a member of the Authority, that employee may, if the Secretary of State so determines, be treated for the purposes of the pension scheme as if the employee’s service as a member of the Authority were service as employee of the Authority, whether or not any benefits are to be payable to or in respect of the employee by virtue of paragraph 7 above.
Proceedings
11 (1) Subject to any provision of this Act, the Authority may regulate its own proceedings, and make such arrangements as it thinks appropriate for the discharge of its functions.
(2) The Authority may pay to the members of any committee or sub-committee such fees and allowances as the Secretary of State may, with the consent of the Treasury, determine.
12 (1) A member of the Authority who is in any way directly or indirectly interested in a release notification or marketing authorisation under this Act shall, as soon as possible after the relevant circumstances have come to the member’s knowledge, disclose the nature of that interest to the Authority.
(2) Any disclosure under sub-paragraph (1) above must be recorded by the Authority.
(3) Except in such circumstances (if any) as may be determined by the Authority under paragraph 9(1) above, the member must not participate after the disclosure in any deliberation or decision of the Authority with respect to the release notification or marketing authorisation, and if the member does so the deliberation or decision is of no effect.
13 The validity of any proceedings of the Authority, or of any committee or sub-committee, is not affected by any vacancy among the members or by any defect in the appointment of a member.
Instruments
14 The fixing of the seal of the Authority must be authenticated by the signature of the chairman or deputy chairman of the Authority or some other member of the Authority authorised by the Authority to act for that purpose.
15 A document purporting to be duly executed under the seal of the Authority, or to be signed on the Authority’s behalf, may be received in evidence and is deemed to be so executed or signed unless the contrary is proved.
Investigation by Parliamentary Commissioner
16 The Authority is subject to investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioner and accordingly, in Schedule 2 to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (which lists the authorities subject to investigation under that Act), the following entry is inserted at the appropriate place in alphabetical order—
“Genetic Technology Authority”.”
I am sure that hon. Members will be happy to know that the finishing line is in sight. However, I am afraid that between now and then there is actually what we think is an extremely important set of suggestions as to how the Bill could be strengthened, because these new clauses and new schedule would establish a genetic technology authority, whose purpose would be as per new clause 6.
Sharp-eyed members of the Committee may recognise the language used in our new clauses, because it is modelled on the legislation introduced to establish the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, the body set up to oversee the use of gametes and embryos in fertility treatment and research. In practice, the new clauses consider many of the wider ethical questions that the topic of genetics throws up, and the practical application of the law based on their expert independent judgment. To some extent, this follows on from my previous comments about the broader landscape of how we regulate these issues.
Several of the stakeholders in this field have argued for, and/or alluded to in our evidence sessions, the establishment of a similar body for gene-editing technology. They include the Nuffield Centre on Bioethics, the Royal Society of Biology and the Royal Society.
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has raised examples in its report of such ethical dilemmas that the Bill does not address. It says that
“we identified the need for further scrutiny and controls to ensure that animals are not bred in ways that diminish their inherent capacities to enjoy experiences that constitute a good life.”
It also says:
“The case for such a body has only strengthened over time, as a result of developments in breeding practices and the prospect of new breeding technologies such as genome editing. It would ensure that the welfare of founder animals”—
breeding stock—
“would be properly evaluated.”
The report concludes by saying:
“In the current governance architecture in England, there is no existing body with the appropriate powers and relationships to undertake this function”.
That is a really important point. There is no existing body with the appropriate powers and relationships.
Likewise, I was very struck by the evidence from Dr Madeleine Campbell of the British Veterinary Association. She said there needs to be
“an independent body, with suitable expertise to understand and interrogate both the basic science and the animal welfare science, and to understand and explain the ethics around that...it needs to be able to look both proactively and retrospectively at data about the health and welfare of animals…It would be an independent oversight body—in my mind’s eye, very analogous to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority—that can take an independent look at the data and then make recommendations for policy changes in light of that data, as the science develops.”––[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2022; c. 102, Q164.]
She also made the point that the situation needs to be monitored over time, because sometimes things do not show up immediately, which is the way that the Bill is set up to analyse. As it stands, the Bill does not seem to make provision for that kind of long-term monitoring.
The editing of the DNA of living beings clearly raises many ethical and practical questions. Several have been discussed in this Bill Committee, ranging from intellectual property to animal welfare.
On intellectual property, the potential for the patenting of DNA has been raised. I found the evidence from Bill Angus, of Angus Wheat Consultants Ltd, very compelling. He said that he was
“worried about perhaps an agenda that this could be dominated by large multinationals, although one of the joys of wheat-breeding globally over the last 100-plus years has been the freedom to exchange germplasm. As soon as we start putting constraints on that, as soon as we start having people talking about ownership of genes and ownership of genetic material, or licensing genes that are already in the public domain, it starts to fill me with a great sense of foreboding.”––[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022; c. 44, Q74.]
That is exactly the sort of issue a genetic technology authority could look at.
Mr Angus explained the current system for intellectual property with respect to conventionally bred plants, stating that
“company A produces a variety and he introduces a trait into that variety. In two years’ time, once that variety has been added to the UK national list, another breeder can use that trait. That is the freedom to operate. It is really important that this is sustained and that people are not locked out of new developments. What may happen—this is an area I feel quite uncomfortable with—is that we may start to see larger organisations move the goalposts in terms of trying to stop other breeders from using genetic resources that have been developed.”––[Official Report, Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Public Bill Committee, 28 June 2022; c. 46, Q77.]
This topic is not covered in the Bill at all. I hope that is because the status quo will be maintained. Will the Minister tell us that today and explain the safeguards in place?
The point serves to highlight the importance of careful deliberation. Based on the evidence I heard from the previous Minister and from DEFRA officials, I am not convinced the requisite time has gone into making the necessary preparations for the Bill. We understand why the Government have moved in haste, but it is for political reasons. That does not make for good legislation or environmental safety.
Labour are pro science and pro innovation. We really want to be able to capitalise on the potential benefits of gene editing here in the UK and see that investment directed here. We need a strong regulatory framework— stronger than what is provided in the Bill—and remain concerned that if we do not get this regulation, companies will decide not to set up their businesses here, to await others and consumers will be nervous. If that happens, far from speeding up the technology, the Bill would have the opposite effect. Doing it right matters; doing it quickly is not the same thing.
The Regulatory Policy Committee has also raised the cost to the system if consumer confidence is not achieved, saying:
“The Department presents the concerns that the public may have with gene edited products, as being driven by misinformation or worse...However, the IA should consider the relationship between public attitudes and public acceptance, with the former typically driving the latter. Consumer sentiment towards gene edited products has real cost implications, even if only as risk to the policy fully realising the benefits”.
I am grateful to organisations such as Beyond GM, who have taught me much about how these technologies are regulated elsewhere in the world, and have highlighted aspects we may learn from.
Australia takes a principles-based approach, with regulations taking into account societal and environmental benefits. In Argentina, gene edited products are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, based on the characteristics of the gene edited products and their potential risks to human health, animals and the environment, as compared to the risks presented by their conventional counterparts. There are other models around the world.
Establishing a proper regulatory body that can look at these issues of consumer confidence, proportionality, environmental safety and the implementation of the legislation could address these issues and make the new system better for everyone. It would be better for the researchers and businesses working in this area, as they can have confidence in the regulatory system and its public acceptance, better for consumers, who will have the confidence to consider buying precision bred products based on informed choices, and better for the country as a whole, with the benefits of the Bill being realised while any potential environmental issues and risks are safeguarded against.
New clause 3 would establish such a body. New clause 4 provides detail of the accounts and auditing of the authority. New clause 5 sets out the annual reporting requirements of the authority. New clause 6 sets out the functions of the authority, which I have already referred to. New clause 7 sets out that the authority must carry out its functions effectively, efficiently and economically. New clause 8 allows the authority to delegate its functions to a committee or member of staff, and new schedule 1 lays out supplementary administrative provisions for the establishment of the authority. This seems to us to be a sensible, proportionate approach that strengthens the Bill and I commend it to the Minister.
I have listened very carefully to what the hon. Gentleman has said and let me give him an alternative solution. We have committed to consider wider regulatory reform of genetic technologies as part of our stepwise approach to developing a more proportionate governance framework in this area. This is a more appropriate context for discussions on an over-arching body, such as a genetic technologies authority, and it is consistent with a recommendation made by the Regulatory Horizons Council in its recent report.
The Bill has a narrower focus, and we know this is not in scope, but science is at the heart of the Bill, which is why I listened so carefully to the considered thoughts of the hon. Gentleman. The Secretary of State is required to make decisions based on the advice of expert committees. We intend ACRE to advise the Secretary of State on whether he should confirm the status of a precision bred organism. That is the committee that advises on genetically modified organisms.
ACRE’s opinion formed the basis for our intervention in a pivotal European Court of Justice case in 2018 and for the consultation we held on the regulation of genetic technologies last year. More recently, it has published technical guidance on the distinction between a GMO and a precision bred organism, which is fundamental to this role. This is a complex and controversial area, as the hon. Gentleman acknowledges, and we can expect ACRE to be put under considerable scrutiny, rightly. However, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the committee operates to the highest standards of impartiality and has the expertise to deal with the task in hand.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his detailed considerations on this topic but establishing a new independent body is not necessary at this point and does not provide value for money when we have an established committee with a superb track record in this area. However, I acknowledge this is a topic that we are likely to come back to when we consider wider GM regulatory reform in the future.
With your leave, Mr Stringer, as I believe this is the last time I will speak in this Committee, may I do some thank yous, not least to you for coping with a new Minister halfway through the Bill proceedings and for keeping us in order?
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill), whose work on the Bill and generally in the Department, on climate change and adaptation in particular, I really value, as I do her personal friendship and help to me over the time she has spent in DEFRA. I very much hope she will be back.
I thank the hon. Members for Cambridge and for Edinburgh North and Leith for their constructive help with the Bill. I would be delighted to discuss the points that arise from our deliberations with them at any point.
Specifically, I thank Laila Sedgwick, Fiona White, Janet Talling, Lizzie Bates, all the Bill team and my private office, who managed to brief me on the Bill so effectively in the few hours we have had available. I also thank the Bill Committee, our Whip—in particular, of course—and, indeed, the Government Whips Office, who have shown extraordinary grit over the past 12 hours. I thank everyone for their work on the Bill.
Thank you for those kind words, which were of course completely out of order. I call Daniel Zeichner.
Thank you, Mr Stringer, and I shall seek to be out of order in a similar way. Before I do so, I will address the points made by the Minister.
There is a fundamental difference of opinion between the two sides of the Committee. Our view is that the Government are being far too deregulatory. We understand why they are doing what they are doing, but we think that they would achieve their objectives more effectively by setting out a stronger regulatory framework. That is probably a fundamental difference of political philosophy, not to be resolved at this point.
I noted with interest the Minister’s comments about possibly coming back to this issue of a wider authority if the Government have opportunity in time to look at the broader issue of genetic modification. I suggest that the better thing to do is to establish that wider body sooner rather than later, so that the overall framework can be established to give the kind of public and investor confidence that I believe is essential if we are to reap the benefits of the technology, while ensuring that the public have confidence that the environmental safeguards are in place.
I am disappointed, though not surprised, that the Minister has rejected our suggestion of a new body. One of the striking things about Parliament is that, often, when things are rejected, they reappear a bit further down the line. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that that would be the right thing to do. We will press for a vote on the new clause. I will not detain the Committee by having votes on the whole string of new clauses; we will make do with one on just new clause 3.
Briefly, however, I make my thanks to you, Mr Stringer, and your fellow Chairs. This has been a well-conducted discussion about a complicated set of issues. I have already expressed my commiserations to the previous Minister, who is not present today, and I congratulate the Minister who is, because it is a tough thing to be dropped into something like this at a very late stage.
I thank the Clerks in particular, Huw Yardley and Abi Samuels, who have done an amazing job in translating our sometimes half-formed ideas—perhaps they used CRISPR-Cas9 to edit them, although whether they managed to remove it again, I do not know. They have managed that with huge good humour and good will, often working rather late.
I thank my colleagues in my office, Rob Wakely and Milly Lynch, who do an amazing job. As Conservative Members may discover at some point in the future, it is quite tough being in opposition sometimes—not terribly well resourced—but I hope that we have done justice to a very complicated set of issues.
I thank colleagues across the Committee. Our debates have been constructive and positive. I particularly thank my hon. Friends and my Whip, and the SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Edinburgh North and Leith. The discussion has been carried out with good humour through difficult times. But I do want to go to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Just so that we are clear, new clauses 4 to 8 and new schedule 1 fall, because they are consequential provisions. Does the hon. Member for Edinburgh North and Leith wish to press new clause 9 to a vote? We debated it with—
I said that I would not press new clause 9 but would have further discussions with the Minister. Thank you, Mr Stringer.
New clause 9 is not moved. We now come to new clause 10, where I will allow the hon. Lady to say something if she wishes to do so.
That is much appreciated, Mr Stringer. I will be brief. I suspect that I have a very good idea of what the Minister would say, if she were to answer, because of her answers to the hon. Member for Cambridge, but I tabled new clause 10 because it would ensure that the sale of precision bred products came with appropriate labelling and traceability.
Having no requirement to label obstructs the enforcement of Scotland’s devolved powers to regulate produce and impedes our intention to align, wherever possible, with the EU. By not requiring labelling of GMO products for sale in England, the UK Government make it much harder to filter products for sale to markets such as Europe. The new clause would therefore ensure clear and visible labelling on the front of the packaging of food or feed from a precision bred animal or its progeny.
We have heard from witnesses that it is scientifically possible to tell precision bred organisms from traditionally bred ones. Nevertheless, it has to be remembered that that is not a unanimous view, across all scientists. I am of the view that transparency and consumer choice are really important and that we need to recognise that citizens are crucial stakeholders in the food system. As we have heard, a recent survey showed that 84% of the public consider it important that all GE products introduced for sale in the UK be labelled as such and 63% of people consider it very important. A mere 8% do not consider it important. The public have a right to know how their food is produced, even if the changes in GE foods that come down the line could have occurred in crops naturally.
It is my belief and that of the Scottish Government that labelling is vital. I will revisit this point on Report. I think it is incredibly important and I want it to be on the record, and then I will perhaps have further discussions with Labour colleagues.
Bill to be reported, without amendment.
Westminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
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(2 years, 5 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move,
That this House has considered the Third Report of the Home Affairs Committee, Session 2021-22, The Macpherson Report: twenty-two years on, HC 139, and the Government Response, HC 274.
It is an enormous pleasure to serve under your chairship today, Ms McDonagh. I am grateful to the Liaison Committee for allocating time for this debate, although I am well aware that events outside this place may be occupying hon. Members’ time this afternoon, so we do not have many Members present.
I am very pleased to see that we have a Home Office Minister with us, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove); I was worried when I heard that the former Policing Minister, the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), had been promoted to the position of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. I send my congratulations to him. I am very pleased to have the Minister here, and I am sure he is fully apprised of all the issues that I will raise.
I am sorry that the Home Affairs Committee felt the need to hold this debate. When we produce a report, it is normal to get a response from the Government within eight weeks. In this case, it took eight months. The Committee applied to the Liaison Committee for a debate in which to discuss the report, because we were concerned to ensure that the important issues we highlighted were raised in this place, and had not yet had a response from the Government. We subsequently got a response, and we are disappointed, shall we say, that the clear calls that we made on the Government in our very detailed and evidence-based report were not always heeded. We are pleased to have this opportunity to discuss some of the shortcomings of the response with the Minister.
This debate is particularly timely in the light of recent events, including the report on Charing Cross police station by the Independent Office for Police Conduct. I thank the former Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, now the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), for leading the Committee during this inquiry.
I want to set the report and this debate in the proper context. Stephen Lawrence, a black teenager, was murdered on 22 April 1993 in an unprovoked racist knife attack in Eltham, south London. The inquiry into his murder, led by the late Sir William Macpherson, uncovered major failings in the police investigation and in the way Stephen Lawrence’s family and his friend Duwayne Brooks were treated. Many of the findings and the subsequent 70 recommendations made by the Stephen Lawrence inquiry focused on long-standing issues that remain relevant today.
The Committee’s inquiry was prompted by concern that in some areas, in the words of Baroness Lawrence,
“things have become stagnant and nothing seems to have moved.”
Our inquiry sought to assess progress against some of the most important Macpherson report recommendations on: community confidence; tackling racist crimes; recruitment and retention of black and other ethnic minority officers and staff; race disparities in the use of stop and search and other powers; and the late Sir William Macpherson’s overall aim of
“the elimination of racist prejudice and disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing.”
The Committee found that policing today is very different from 23 years ago. Since the Macpherson report was published, there have been important improvements in policing, including significant improvements in the policing of racist crimes, commitments made to promoting equality and diversity, and good examples of local community policing.
At this point, I ought to acknowledge the work of our police officers and staff. Across the country, police forces work hard each day to tackle crime and keep all our communities safe. Police officers and staff work immensely hard to deliver fairness in policing, to support black and minority ethnic victims of crime, to tackle racist hate crimes and to support community cohesion. The important role the police play in our communities is the reason the Home Affairs Committee produced the report.
Having said all that, I want to be clear that our inquiry also identified persistent, deep-rooted and unjustified racial disparities in key areas, including a decline in confidence and trust in the police among some BME communities, lack of progress on BME recruitment, problems in misconduct proceedings, and unjustified racial disparities in stop and search. In those areas, we proposed urgent action. We found that there had been an increased focus in policing on race inequality since the murder of George Floyd by a police officer in the United States of America in 2020, which again shone a spotlight on race injustice across the world. Reforms announced by individual forces, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services and the IOPC are, of course, welcome. However, it should not have required video footage of the murder of a black man by a police officer and the ensuing Black Lives Matter protests to concentrate the minds of the Government and the police on the imperative of race equality.
We are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed to our inquiry. We recognise that, for some, that involved retelling difficult and painful events. We would particularly like to thank Baroness Lawrence, Dr Neville Lawrence and Duwayne Brooks for their time and contributions. I also particularly thank the young people who shared their experience of the police with the Committee and who, along with the many other contributors to our inquiry, provided invaluable evidence that underpins our recommendations and conclusions. I thank our specialist adviser, Dr Nicola Rollock, and our specialist adviser on policing and the former chief constable of Greater Manchester police, Sir Peter Fahy, for their valuable input.
Although the report was extensive and we covered many issues, I will focus my contribution on four key areas that the Committee considered. First, I want to focus attention on confidence in policing among BME communities. The Macpherson report called for it to be a ministerial priority that all police services should
“increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities.”
However, all these years on, evidence to our inquiry showed that there is a significant problem in black communities with confidence in the police, particularly among young people. The report noted:
“Adults from Black and mixed ethnic backgrounds are less likely to have confidence in the police than adults from White or Asian backgrounds and the confidence gap has widened over the last few years.”
Our report also noted that 67% of white adults said they believed the police would treat them fairly
“compared to 56% of Black adults. All victims of crime should feel confident in turning to the police for help.”
It is of deep and serious concern that black people have much lower expectations than white people of being treated fairly and with respect by the police.
Data for England and Wales also suggest that the confidence gap between black people and white people in their local police is even greater among young people. In May 2019, we held a private roundtable with a group of young BME people from London aged 17 to 30 on their experiences, their views of their relationship with the police, and the use of stop and search. This was not universal, but the majority of participants told us that their experiences with the police had been negative, and that they did not feel confident in approaching the police for protection. The former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Dame Cressida Dick, told us that,
“in London, following police encounters with young people, she often saw officers sending the young person off with a smile on their face.”
Indeed, our report added that
“She said that it was the police’s responsibility to ensure that ‘each interaction’ with a young person was as positive as possible”.
By contrast, a young participant at our roundtable told us that the Metropolitan police’s stop and search procedure was
“more hostile than professional”.
He said it was difficult for young people to trust the police due to their stereotyping of BME communities as likely criminals.
Our inquiry also found a lack of data on confidence by ethnicity at a local force level. That makes it much harder to hold local forces to account for concerns about BME communities’ confidence in the police. Concerningly, we found that increasing trust and confidence in policing is not being treated as a policing priority, or a ministerial policing priority.
I am pleased that the Government have agreed on the need to monitor trust and confidence in policing, both nationally and locally, and that they have improved the way in which they collect and use data, including on stop and search and community confidence. However, their response did not say how the Home Office is monitoring confidence among black and minority ethnic communities in policing locally. I hope the Minister can provide us with an update on progress, specifically on how his Department is working with police forces to collect data on confidence in policing.
I turn to the issue of recruitment and progression of BME officers and staff. Throughout our inquiry, we heard concerns about community confidence in the police, the use of certain police powers, and wider racism in policing. Communities’ concerns about the racial disparities that we identified are exacerbated by the lack of BME police officers and staff at all levels of the police force.
The Macpherson report recommended that police forces be representative of the communities that they serve, and that targets be set for recruitment, progression and retention of minority ethnic police officers. However, the 10-year target set by the then-Home Secretary included a target for overall minority ethnic representation of 7% in the service by 2009. That was not met. Our report highlighted that even by 2020, BME officers represented just 7.3% of the police service across England and Wales. That figure is now 7.6%, but that is still far below 14%, which is the percentage of the population in England and Wales who identify as BME. Concerningly, under-representation is most marked in senior ranks. Only 4% of officers at or above the rank of chief inspector were from BME backgrounds; that figure is now 5%.
We found that police forces across the country have failed to do enough to increase BME recruitment, retention and promotion for decades; there has been a lack of focus, consistency and leadership on driving that recruitment and promotion for far too long. Shockingly, our analysis suggests that, at the current rate of progress, we will not have a properly representative police force in England and Wales for another 20 years. Just think for a moment: that would be four decades after the Macpherson report raised the seriousness of this issue, and nearly half a century after the murder of Stephen Lawrence.
More positively, we found that some forces—notably Nottinghamshire and Greater Manchester—are making significant progress in increasing BME recruits by taking positive action such as having targeted recruitment campaigns, working on youth engagement and outreach, and working with local community and faith leaders. However, the vast majority of forces are still failing to recruit enough BME officers to ensure that the proportion of BME people in the force is the same as the proportion in the local population.
I am therefore disappointed that the Government have rejected our recommendation to agree minimum targets for the recruitment of BME officers, so that constabularies reflect the composition of their local populations and we achieve at least 14% BME representation of officers nationally by 2030. Instead the Government response suggests that
“forces should be striving to become more representative of the communities they serve”.
That is not good enough. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister outlined what work the Home Office is doing to monitor how all 43 forces in England and Wales are working to reflect the composition of their local populations. Could he tell us what proportion of police forces are currently representative of the communities they serve? Also, what work has the Home Office planned to improve BME recruitment in policing when the uplift programme ends in 2023?
On police misconduct and discipline, during our assessment of the progress police forces have made on the Macpherson report’s recommendations about diversity in the police workforce, we repeatedly heard concerns about the higher likelihood of BME officers resigning voluntarily or being dismissed from their force. There is a clear racial disparity in the number of officers being dismissed from police forces—BME officers are more than twice as likely as white officers to be dismissed—and in the number of BME officers subjected to internal disciplinary processes. It is extremely troubling that the disparity has been allowed to continue for so long without serious action being taken by police forces to investigate or address the problem, so we welcomed the work by the NPCC to instigate reforms, including improvements to training, misconduct guidance, welfare support and addressing the lack of BME officers in professional standards departments.
We also noted the NPCC’s 2019 report on disproportionality in police complaints and misconduct cases for BME officers and staff, which identified that 63% of Home Office police force professional standards departments had no BME police officers or staff. That is deeply troubling and totally unacceptable. Our recommendation is that forces must address unacceptable racial disproportionality in their PSD composition. More positively, we welcomed the work done by some forces to draw on BME advisers and seek to address the lack of BME representation in PSDs, as reported in the NPCC’s recent review. However, we urged all forces to address the problem and demonstrate progress by the end of 2021. Additionally, we recommended that the NPCC conducts a review on this issue and reports within a year.
I am pleased that, in their response, the Government recognise the risk posed by a lack of appropriate BME representation on a number of PSDs. It is also encouraging that ethnic minority representation on PSDs has risen by 2% since 2020, but clearly there is a lot more to do. The Government response said that the NPCC is working across policing to ensure appropriate representation and involvement of minority ethnic officers in decision-making processes in professional standards departments, so can the Minister update us on the progress, and provide details of both the Government’s work and that of the NPCC to address ethnic diversity in PSDs?
Finally, I want to discuss the use of stop and search. We heard troubling examples of stop and searches being conducted in a manner that was deeply alienating and uncomfortable. Many of the young BME participants that the Committee heard from in a private roundtable session felt that they were unjustly targeted by the police from a young age, which led to mistrust. One such participant, Witness M, who reported that he was first arrested at the age of 13, told us that he was “nearly stabbed” in 2018 but did not want to speak to the police when they asked if he was involved, due to his negative experiences with the police from such a young age.
At the time the Committee’s report was published, Home Office data showed that black people were over nine and a half times more likely than white people to be stopped and searched. The latest Home Office data—to 31 March 2021—show that black people are seven times more likely than white people to be stopped. Our report acknowledged that stop and search is an important police power, and the Macpherson report’s conclusion that it has a useful role to play in the prevention and detection of crime still applies. However, no evidence to our inquiry has adequately explained or justified the nature and scale of the ethnic disproportionality in the use of stop-and-search powers, particularly in possession of drugs searches.
At the time of our report’s publication, evidence showed that black people were less likely than white people to have used drugs in the past year, but they were 2.4 times more likely to be stopped and searched for drug possession. Indeed, in its February 2021 spotlight report on the disproportionate use of stop and search and the use of force, Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services found that
“Drug enforcement, mainly through stop and search, contributes to ethnic disproportionality despite evidence that there is no correlation between ethnicity and rates of drug use.”
Our report also recognises the importance of the police being able to take action against knife crime, including through stop and search, but highlights that only 16% of reasonable grounds searches in 2019-20 were conducted to find offensive weapons. I am encouraged by the fact that the Home Office’s response confirms that the NPCC has undertaken an initial review of forces’ implementation of recommendations made by HMICFRS in its 2021 report on the disproportionate use of police powers, which the Home Office said
“showed that the majority of forces have already implemented the recommendations or have plans in place to do so.”
I hope the Minister can tell us how many of the 43 forces in England and Wales have implemented those recommendations on the disproportionate use of police powers. Can he also confirm whether that review is in the public domain?
Unfortunately, I have only been able to touch on the surface of the myriad issues we raised in our report, but I hope I have been able to give an overview of what is a very comprehensive report and the issues it raises—some of which, sadly, have not been satisfactorily answered in the Government’s response. Our inquiry has found that the Macpherson report’s overall aim of the
“elimination of racist prejudice and disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing”
has still not been met. We have identified persistent, deep-rooted problems where too little progress has been made because of a lack of focus and accountability on issues of race. While that is the case, trust between the police service and black and minority ethnic communities will remain low, and the long-standing Peel principles of fairness in policing and policing by consent will continue to be undermined. The commitments made over the past year by the NPCC, individual forces, and senior police officers to a step change in addressing race equality in policing are important and welcome, but commitments have been made in the past that were not then delivered on. This time needs to be different, or confidence may be permanently undermined.
I call Anne McLaughlin to sum up on behalf of the Scottish National party.
Thank you, Ms McDonagh. It feels a little strange to be summing up after just one speaker, but the speech of the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) was a comprehensive one that took us on the journey that led to the need for this report. Twenty-two years on from the Macpherson report, it is clear that work remains to be done to tackle racism in society and in policing.
We wonder why people become disillusioned. I am sure that all those decades ago, when the report was published, there were many who heaved a sigh of relief—its aim, after all, was to
“increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities”.
I am also sure that all those decades ago, when the aim of the report was stated to be
“the elimination of racist prejudice and disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing”,
many felt they had finally achieved progress. I am sure that everyone involved was aware that Rome was not built in a day, but had some hope, and maybe even allowed themselves a little confidence that life for those experiencing racism would soon change for the better.
The family of Stephen Lawrence, who was murdered and then denied justice because of the colour of his skin—the family in response to whom the Macpherson report came about—perhaps felt when that report was published that his death had not been completely in vain. I have met Stephen’s brother, Stuart Lawrence, and of course we all know or know of his father, Neville Lawrence, and his mother, Baroness Doreen Lawrence. Anyone who listens to Stuart or reads his book, “Silence is Not An Option”, begins to understand the catastrophic impact Stephen’s death had on everyone in his family and how they have all had to work so hard, almost every minute of every day, simply to survive.
To a lesser degree, the impact on whole communities was also devastating and life-changing. To have the hope that things would get better for other mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, brothers and sisters when the report was published 22 years ago, and then to come to the conclusion that Doreen Lawrence reached recently, namely that
“things have become really stagnant and nothing seems to have moved”,
which is the view that prompted the Home Affairs Committee’s third report on Macpherson, must make it all the harder to keep going.
That third report recognises that there remains an awful lot to do. As we have heard, it refers to a lack of confidence in the police among black people—a belief that they will not be treated fairly by the police and a belief that they are not treated with respect. We have heard the figures about stop and search. Saddest of all, there is the belief among black people that the police will not keep them safe.
The report is about England and Wales, but Scotland, of course, is not immune to these challenges, and the Scottish Government and Police Scotland have also taken decisive action recently to try to tackle them. The Chief Constable of Police Scotland, Iain Livingstone, spoke in March of the need for
“practical, firm, progressive, visible action”.
And he also said that
“Words and good intent are not enough.”
He is right, and he also made an offer to police forces across the UK to share the insight and value that Scotland’s hard-earned lessons can provide, in order to improve policing for communities across the UK.
I am very conscious that when Scottish National party MPs talk in this place about things that we do better, or just differently, in Scotland, sometimes there is a collective rolling of eyes: “Oh, not this again”. However, I hope that colleagues will accept that, yes, sometimes we are trying to make a political point but mostly we are trying to share our experience in the hope that it can help other public bodies, in this case police forces. The SNP group is always looking to the experiences of other countries, including the other countries of the United Kingdom, to see how we can improve our own public services. So I acknowledge that this is a two-way thing. In that spirit, I will talk about a time when I believe Police Scotland got things spectacularly wrong and also got its response wrong, too.
I am talking about Sheku Bayoh. Sheku died after being stopped in the street by two police officers, who were soon joined by another seven police officers, in Kirkcaldy, in Fife, in May 2015. There is a public inquiry under way about this case right now. However, it has been seven years since Sheku died and his family, who I have met on a number of occasions, have still not had answers. How did this fit young man in his thirties—a brother, a son, a dad, a partner, a friend—who had no weapons on him end up dead after encountering the police?
I cannot answer that question and I will leave it to the inquiry, but what I will say is that in any other situation where nine people confronted one person, and the one person ends up dead, those nine people would be taken in for questioning, at the very least. They would not be allowed to discuss what had happened with each other; they certainly would not be allowed to send out press releases that were later found to have wrongly characterised the dead man and that told their side of the story before the dead man’s family even knew he had died. It simply would not happen.
Given that we know—nobody denies this—that Sheku was sat on, and given that we know that there was no question over who was with him or who was sitting on him at the moment of death, how on earth can it have taken seven years before we even start to hear what happened that day? The inquiry continues and is considering whether race was a factor in Sheku’s death.
So, Members will not hear me nor, I imagine, anyone in my party claiming that Scotland or our police force is racism-free.
However, the overall approach to policing in Scotland is a community-based approach, which is built on policing by consent. It is about reducing tensions rather than inflaming them unnecessarily. The aforementioned Chief Constable of Police Scotland has consistently made it clear that the policing tone and style must reflect the need for positive engagement.
If we look at the recent lockdowns, we see that the vast majority of people complied with the rules, and policing in Scotland was focused on engaging, explaining and encouraging. That is reflected in public confidence in the police in Scotland, with figures from last year’s crime and justice survey showing that the majority of adults in Scotland believe that the police in their local area are doing an excellent job or a good job. That majority is 55%. Clearly, we want it to be higher than that.
I agree with the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee when she says that we need technology, and that the vast majority of police officers and other police staff work tirelessly to protect and support people in communities. That majority feel as let down as the rest of us when a small minority of police officers fall short of the expected standards.
As I have already alluded to, they do not always work but there are robust processes in place to investigate misconduct. It is a matter for Police Scotland to consider any disciplinary allegation, but if there are allegations of criminality against a police officer, Police Scotland will refer the matter to the Crown Office. What matters more than anything is that there are robust, clear and transparent mechanisms in place to investigate complaints or other issues of concern. I am pleased to say that things have moved on and improved in that respect, since Sheku Bayoh’s death.
In 2018 the Scottish Government commissioned Dame Elish Angiolini to independently review police complaints handling, investigations and misconduct. Her final report was completed 2020; her review made 111 recommendations, the majority of which the Scottish Government accepted. The Scottish Government and Police Scotland are doing a lot more work on that than I have time to detail. However, some of the positives are around mainstreaming equality, diversity and inclusion, and working with diversity staff associations, such as SEMPER Scotland, which is an association that supports all minority ethnic employees in Police Scotland. The Chair of the Committee talked about recruitment targets. SEMPER has talked to me about not only recruitment but retention, and ensuring that environments are made in such a way that they retain those members of staff.
Finally, I will say a few words about the Scottish Government’s new hate crime strategy, to be published later this year. It will set out our approach to tackling hatred and prejudice in Scotland, and it will complement the implementation of a modernised hate crime legislative framework. It is vital that the legislation is implemented effectively, so that once it is in force it offers strength and protections to those targeted by hatred and prejudice. It includes rigorous safeguards on free speech; it does not prevent people from expressing controversial, challenging or offensive views, nor does it seek to stifle criticism or rigorous debate. What it does is criminalise and hold to account those who express or demonstrate their prejudice in a threatening or abusive way with the intention of stirring up hatred or committing other offences motivated by prejudice.
I hope when the Government are able to get on with their day job fully—I understand why they cannot at the moment—the Minister’s Department will look at that afresh. I echo the calls of the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, and I look forward to the Minister’s response. I will end by remembering just two of the many people failed by our systems on these islands. I think saying names out loud is important. Stephen Lawrence, rest in power. Sheku Bayoh, rest in power. You will never be forgotten.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McDonagh. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson), the chair of the Home Affairs Committee, on her important contribution today. I put on the record how incredibly important the Home Affairs Committee report is, how thorough and good it was, and how important it is, 20 years on from the Macpherson report, that there is something looking back on what has been achieved and what has not.
My right hon. Friend set out very well what stage we are at, and how much more needs to be done. I am particularly pleased that during the process the Committee managed to talk to young people about their experience at the other end of a stop and search. I was talking to a Conservative police and crime commissioner the other day, who is black, and has been stopped and searched many times. I suspect that most of us in this Chamber have not had that experience because we are white. To understand what it feels like, and how intrusive it can be, I think we need to speak to people who are affected. I congratulate the Committee for thinking to do that—and for ensuring it was done.
We have been talking about racism and disproportionality in policing for decades, certainly since the Scarman report in 1981, the death of Stephen Lawrence in 1992 and then the Macpherson report in 1999. That report was a watershed moment for British policing. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North said, the national figures on public confidence show that there is a significant variation, depending on their ethnicity, in people’s confidence in the police. Confidence in the police was at 74% for white British people, 69% for black African people and 54% for black Caribbean people. The murder of Stephen Lawrence and the campaigning that has been done since has been so important in shining a light on these issues. I cannot not mention Doreen and Neville Lawrence, who have been so instrumental and gracious in the way they have tried to help us all do better when it comes to these big problems of racism.
When the Home Affairs Committee looked at Macpherson, it did find, as has been said, that there has been positive progress in some areas and that the policing of racist hate crimes and the representation of ethnic minorities within police ranks has improved. However, it found that there are persistent, deep-rooted and unjustified racial disparities in key areas. It found a lack of confidence in the police, a lack of progress on recruitment, problems in misconduct proceedings and stark racial disparities in stop and search. Although the Committee found that policing today is very different from 22 years ago and that there have been improvements, there are persistent problems and unjustified racial disparities in a number of key areas.
Macpherson rightly called for police forces to be representative of their communities. At the current rate of recruitment, it will take 20 years until police forces are such. I represent Croydon Central. Croydon is a very diverse borough and although our police force have done some brilliant work with local communities on building trust and confidence—important work, and I praise them for it—the colour of our police officers is still not reflective of the communities that they serve. The unit that goes out and does stop and search in Croydon has about 80 people, and last time I checked there was not a single black officer among them. That absolutely has to change, and change is happening too slowly.
Black and minority ethnic police officers are more than twice as likely to be dismissed from their role than white officers. The report also found that stop and search is more disproportionate now than it was 22 years ago. We know that when it comes to stop and search, the measure of success is whether a knife or something similar is found. When the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) was Home Secretary and reduced the number of stop and searches and made it more intelligence-driven, the incidence of disproportionality fell in that period. It has got worse again with greater use of section 60 stop and search.
Just on that, does the hon. Lady agree that allowing suspicionless stop and search under the Public Order Bill will increase disproportionality rates between the different ethnicities, because now officers will not actually need an excuse to stop and search somebody who might be near a protest?
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We both served on the Public Order Bill Committee and it was deeply concerning to note that there has been a large increase in the use of section 60, not just to tackle violent crime and threat of harm but protest without any real consideration of how that will increase disproportionality. That is a real risk. The figures on disproportionality and ethnicity and drug use have already been given. They are really stark, and there is a lot of work to be done on stop and search in that context.
Recent high-profile cases have highlighted concerns around policing. The conduct of officers following the murder of Bibaa Henry and Nicole Smallman was deeply shocking for everybody. The strip-searching of children such as child Q and the adultification of children, particularly black children, that seems to be commonplace, the failings in the case of the death of Richard Okorogheye and the IOPC report on that and the conduct unveiled in the IOPC’s report into the Charing Cross police station show that there are pockets in policing where progress is not happening fast enough. Those pockets seem to cover large areas, because such problems have not just been seen in the Met police; we have seen similar issues across the country, so all forces need urgently to address the deep and troubling lack of confidence among black communities in policing and the criminal justice system.
I have been working with police chiefs and the NPCC since they set up a big programme of work on disproportionality and racism in policing, and I am pleased that their action plan is significantly better than it was when first drafted. It has been beefed up and has some real legs. I am pleased to see the recommendations in there and the very honest way in which the police chiefs have articulated the problem. They have set out an ambition to identify and address disproportionality in the use of stop and search, particularly in relation to drugs and searches of children. They will have robust accountability and learning processes, based on security and supervision.
The challenge with stop and search and disproportionality across the board is that we can see the numbers but we do not know why there is an issue. We assume things about racism, but there is not proper evidence. Evidence needs to be gathered about the places where people are stopped, the interactions and what happens to people. For example, if someone driving a car is stopped and searched, recording data is now being introduced. That was not the case before, and we know that there is huge disproportionality in stop and search for people who are driving. The evidence is not there for us to pull together and find out what needs to be done.
The NPCC will review the use of the smell of cannabis as grounds for stop and search, because that increases disproportionally. It will also review the use of Tasers, section 60, intimate searches and standardised recording practices. The breadth of what it has set itself to do shows how seriously it takes this issue. It will increase the awareness and understanding of every officer and member of staff about racism, anti-racism, black history and its connection to policing, through the introduction of a mandatory programme of training for all police officers and staff. Of course, we welcome that. It is looking at reducing racial disparities in misconduct cases and the complaints process, and is improving support to black officers and staff. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North highlighted, there are pockets of good practice, but it is not across the board.
The NPCC is looking to trial and test methods for better enabling black people to have their voices heard and raise concerns. It is looking at the criminal exploitation of young black men, which we have talked about, and is working to disrupt the cycle of victims becoming offenders.
The NPCC is introducing a national standard across all recruitment and promotion processes to minimise race disparities. The Home Affairs Committee suggested targets. I am quite a fan of targets, and I have had lots of conversations with police officers about the unintended consequences of them. It is good that the NPCC has gone for a national standard.
All that work is good, but I worry that the Government do not take this issue as seriously as they should. They tend to push it out to individual police forces or to the NPCC, when it chooses to come together. I worried about the introduction of serious violence prevention orders in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 without a proper analysis of what the disproportionate impact will be on young black men. I worried about the extension of section 60 to protests without any proper consideration of disproportionality. We all worried when we read the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities report, which the Government commissioned, and the lack of action in it.
I worry that the Government have a habit of waiting for the IOPC or HMIC to look at something and bring out a report, which often takes years, instead of taking action themselves. For example, the IOPC and the inspectorate looked at what happened during lockdown in London, where there was an increase in the use of stop and search. Habits formed around handcuffing people—in particular, young black men—when they were being stopped and searched, which the police are not supposed to do unless there is a threat of violence. What I think happened was that a lot of new, inexperienced police officers came in through the uplift. They were not supervised properly and they learned bad behaviour. They learned how not to do stop and search, because more experienced people were not there to do it. I worry that the Government did not see that problem and intervene to do something about it.
The Labour party has long called for improved anti-racism policies and for tougher action to increase diversity in all ranks of policing. A clear combined plan needs to be implemented by police forces, driven by the Home Office, with proper scrutiny and consequences if action falls short. Racism and bias must be tackled wherever they are found.
After child Q, we all called for new guidance on strip searches, but we still have not seen it. When it comes to the pressing issues of reforming police culture and standards, there are myriad actions that Ministers could choose to take, but they point to inquiries that have been set up and tell us that we must wait for this and wait for that, without taking action themselves. A record number of police forces are in the engage phase, a form of special measures. We need a national overhaul of training and standards. There is much to be done on leadership in the police. We need better leadership development at every rank and a new vetting system. We need to overhaul misconduct cases and new rules on social media use. All of those things would help tackle some of the disproportionality and bad culture in the Home Office. All of those issues could be led from the front, with the Home Office taking action.
A lot of these problems are in the Met. If we look at its ratio of PC to sergeant, we will see that supervision has been cut more than that of any other force, so there are not enough supervisors to make sure that the right cultures and practices are in place for PCs. Surely the Government cannot be happy with that ratio and the lack of support for the raft of new officers. There has been a hollowing out of experience. The Government cannot replace the 21,000 experienced officers they have cut without losing all their helpful experience.
The report is very important. It highlights that progress has been made, but there is lots more to be done. I congratulate the police leaders and the NPCC who are independently pushing new proposals to improve things, but without Government intervention and leadership I do not think we will go fast enough. The suggestion that it will take 20 years to have a police service that is reflective of the communities they serve is a stark example of that.
The policing style in Britain is one of consent. The public have to trust the police for the system to work, and at the moment some communities, particularly black communities, do not. The public need to trust the police. Victims need to get the justice they deserve, regardless of the colour of their skin, and our officers deserve to work in a police force that has high standards and a respectful culture.
Given the chaos around us, the Minister does not have this power right now, but the new Government could choose to drive up standards. They could insist on the recruitment of more black officers, tackle disproportionality and increase professionalism in policing, instead of saying, time and again, as the former Policing Minister always did, that there is an inquiry into this, a report on that, and that we would just have to wait and see. Tackling racism is an active job. As one of the resigning Ministers, the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid), said yesterday:
“not doing something is an active decision.”—[Official Report, 6 July 2022; Vol. 717, c. 876.]
It is a great privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McDonagh. I will start by congratulating the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), on his appointment. He has moved on from being the Policing Minister, which explains why I am here in Westminster Hall to respond to this debate on behalf of the Government. I will, of course, do my best to engage in the subject and answer the points that have been raised. If there are any gaps in my knowledge, after having had a brief opportunity to familiarise myself with the subject matter, I will be delighted to write to Members to make sure that answers are provided.
I offer my thanks to the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) for securing this debate and for the work of the Home Affairs Committee on what is clearly an immensely important topic. She raised the delay in the Government’s response to the report. I can only apologise; we took longer than usual to respond. That allowed for the publication of the “Inclusive Britain” report, which is a more detailed account of action taking place across policing in response to the issues that the Committee’s report raised. It was useful for that to be developed in full and for this debate to consider it in that context.
I hear the Minister’s point, but I wonder whether he might be able to help me further. A Home Office response is also outstanding to another of our reports on rape investigations and prosecutions. We had expected a response within eight weeks, but we are now well past that. When he goes back to the Department, will he chivvy it along and see whether we can get a response to that report as well?
It is fair to say that I and the Department are always keen to be as helpful as possible to Select Committees. I think that is important, as Select Committees perform an important function in scrutinising the work of the Government. I will very happily take away that request and see what can be done to try to expedite the Government’s response to that report.
Let us go back to the subject of today’s debate. The murder of Stephen Lawrence was a heinous crime that shocked this country to its core. While this is a case that has gone on to assume wider significance for policing and for society more generally, it is important to remember that it all started with the senseless killing of a young man who had his whole life ahead of him. My thoughts remain with his family.
As parliamentarians we are accustomed to discussing reports, but very few, if any, have such a profound, long-lasting impact as the Macpherson report. It has left an indelible mark on policing. It is no exaggeration to say that the findings were seismic. They continue to reverberate today, with the report remaining a marker against which we can track and measure progress. And over the past two decades, there has been progress. The police service is more diverse than ever before, forces have worked hard to improve community engagement, and we have seen major improvements in the way in which the police deal with racially motivated crimes, but there is undoubtedly more to do.
As Ministers have said on many previous occasions, public confidence and trust is integral to the long-standing model of policing by consent, and that confidence and trust must never be taken for granted. Recent events have provided a reminder of that, not that anyone should need one. The police have a unique role in our society, and they are invested with immense powers to enable them to perform that role, so when things go wrong or when those powers are abused, the repercussions are far-reaching and significant.
The Government have consistently challenged the police to improve. We will continue doing that, because that is what the law-abiding majority expect and deserve. All communities should have confidence in the police. The police’s ability to fulfil their duties is dependent on their capacity to secure and maintain public trust and support for their actions, as part of our long-standing and cherished model of policing by consent.
The Home Office has fundamentally reformed its governance and oversight of policing. In 2019, the Home Secretary established the National Policing Board to bring together key partners, providing strategic direction and strong cohesion across the law enforcement system. Through the board, we are providing strong leadership on key issues, including violence against women and girls, diversity and trust in policing.
Police leaders also have a vital role to play and the National Police Chiefs’ Council is central to the effort to drive improvements and embed reforms. Local accountability is another important feature of our policing model. Different forces have different challenges, and elected police and crime commissioners are there to hold chief constables to account.
We must remember that confidence and trust in the police are impacted by many factors. Many people have very little engagement with policing, and so their perceptions are much shaped by other sources, including social media. That is why communicating to the public the action that policing is taking is so important. There is more to do, and together we must press on with urgency and energy, chasing improvements that benefit both policing and the public.
Given my brief within both the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, and as the victims Minister, I am acutely conscious of this issue. It is one of the reasons why the Government are bringing forward the victims Bill to enshrine the rights of victims in law, to ensure that there are more expeditious complaints processes in place, to remove barriers to victims coming forward, and to ensure that complaints are properly heard. Accountability must be better structured at both the local and national levels, with a focus on being able to get to grips with systemic issues and challenges where we find them. That is also, of course, about public confidence.
We also need to make sure that data can be used to help boost confidence, which is something that has been touched on, particularly by the Chair of the Select Committee, who asked about data collection. The Home Office will continue to work with bodies such as the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners to consider how best to support forces in collating data on confidence and making it publicly available. As part of the “Police Race Action Plan”, the NPCC and the College of Policing expect to work across policing to improve the consistency of capture, application and use of data and information relating to race and inclusion. We also support the use of data in better informing leaders, such as PCCs, about the information needed to hold forces to account.
The Home Affairs Committee’s report highlighted the importance of a diverse police force, and I could not agree more. I am pleased to say that our police forces across England and Wales are more diverse than they have ever been. The 20,000-officer uplift is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to support all forces to become more representative of the communities they serve. The latest uplift data—to 31 March 2022—shows that there are now 11,172 officers from ethnic minority backgrounds, which is the highest number on record. The figure represents 8.1% of all officers, which is the highest proportion ever and an increase from only 4.7% in 2010.
It might be helpful for the context of the debate if I add that 49,000 female officers are now in place, which equates to 34% of the total—the highest number and proportion on record—and that 18 forces are at representative level compared with force area population. Undoubtedly there is still more work to do, which is precisely what we will continue to focus on. To provide a little more detail, the police workforce are more diverse than ever when it comes to recruiting officers from minority ethnic groups, but we know, as I have said, that there is much more to do. We are supporting efforts to achieve the diverse police workforce that our communities need, by co-ordinating efforts between the Government and policing not only to attract more diverse candidates into policing, but to ensure that it is a career in which all recruits can thrive.
Sharing best practice, engagement with associations, upskilling recruitment teams and enhanced data capture are just some of the efforts being made to improve police diversity. We are supporting forces with a variety of attraction and recruitment strategies, while delivering a campaign that has been designed to reach the widest and most diverse audience possible. We use real police officers with real experiences in our campaign, which seeks to speak to our diverse communities and reinforce the message that policing is a career choice for all. I think that is a message that all Members of this House would want to take out in encouraging people of all backgrounds to come forward and serve in our communities across the country.
On the issue of black, Asian and minority ethnic representation in professional standards departments, the police uplift programme gives us a once-in-a-generation opportunity to support all forces to become more representative of the communities they serve in the way that I have described. As of March 2022, there are more than 11,000 officers from ethnic minority backgrounds. In March 2021, 9.8% of officers working in professional standards departments were of a BAME background—up from 7.9% in 2020. Although positive, that alone does not lead to improvements on disproportionality, so we must not be complacent about this issue.
The Government published “Inclusive Britain” this year. It presents a clear strategy to tackle entrenched disparities, promote unity and build a more meritocratic, cohesive society. It sets out over 70 actions to level up the country and close the gap between different groups across education, health, employment, policing and the wider criminal justice system.
The Government have made a series of commitments, including driving forward local community scrutiny of police use of powers, helping police forces to become more representative of their communities, and bringing into force the serious violence duty. We will also support the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to review and deliver any necessary improvements to police officer training in de-escalation skills and conflict management in everyday police-citizen encounters.
There is no place for racism in the police. The public rightly expect every police officer to act with the highest levels of honesty and integrity. This includes an effective and transparent police culture. That is why policing must take action now. The National Police Chiefs’ Council and College of Policing will deliver a new race action plan that gives officers the tools they need to build trust and confidence with black communities, so that they are better equipped to challenge racism and identify and address racial disparities across policing.
The majority of police officers act with the highest standards of professionalism, serving our communities and keeping us safe. Those who breach professional standards by discriminating against others should be held to account through robust and effective systems for dealing with allegations of misconduct. This Government have introduced a number of reforms to strengthen the police complaints and disciplinary systems, including creating the IOPC, the successor body to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was established following Macpherson’s report.
As recognised in the Home Affairs Committee’s report, much progress has been made on hate crime. The Government have created a comprehensive system of reporting and recording of all crimes targeting race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity. It is now mandatory for police forces to record the ethnicity of victims of racially or religiously aggravated offences. To tackle online hate crime, we are taking forward the Online Safety Bill, through which companies will be held to account for tackling illegal activity and content, such as hate crimes, harassment and abuse.
On stop and search, the police engage daily with communities who are worried about the safety of their neighbourhoods and want to see more done to protect them from knife crime. Around 45% of stop and searches take place in London, where data shows that young black men are disproportionately the victims of knife crime. Police chiefs are clear: stop and search is a vital tool to reduce serious violence and keep people safe. For the purposes of the debate, it is worth adding that in 2020-21, stop and search removed almost 16,000 weapons and firearms from our streets and resulted in nearly 81,000 arrests.
We could not be clearer that every weapon taken off our streets is a potential life saved. The consequences of those weapons being on our streets can be catastrophic, as we know. Nobody should be stopped and searched because of their race or ethnicity, and safeguards exist to ensure that does not happen. We recognise and agree that more can be done to improve accountability and transparency about the use of these powers. That is why we have committed to look carefully at strengthening the system of local community scrutiny of police decision making, to give greater clarity and context to stop-and-search data and reassure the public about its use.
We will also seek to remove unnecessary barriers to the use of body-worn video, which can be a vital tool for transparency and safety. This is about building trust. With that in mind, the Government have already improved our data collection on stop and search, and now collect more data than ever before, but we will not stop there. We have committed to work with policing partners and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners to consider a range of metrics for stop-and-search rates in order to identify and, where necessary, challenge disparities at police force area level.
A question was raised about what would happen after the uplift of officer recruitment. Recruitment will continue. Forces have to maintain numbers and replace officers who retire or leave. The Department are putting building blocks in place, through much better data and greater understanding, and would expect forces to continue to attract and recruit diverse candidates where possible.
In closing, I again thank the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North for securing this debate, and for her work as Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee. I am also grateful to all other hon. Members who have contributed today. As I have set out, progress has been made over the last 23 years. The police service today is not the same service that it was when the Macpherson report was published. It is important to acknowledge that, and to remember that thousands of men and women go out every day to keep the rest of us safe, performing their duties with pride and professionalism. However, much more needs to be done. The Government do not shy away from that fact, and neither must the police.
I thank everybody who has contributed to what has been a well-informed debate. We do not often spend enough time looking back and taking stock of what has changed and what perhaps has not changed. When Select Committees produce reports that are able to do that—take evidence, look across the piece and come up with recommendations—it is important that we are able to debate them, and that the Government take them seriously and consider them fully.
Today’s debate has highlighted where we may be storing up future problems for ourselves, such as the reference in the Public Order Bill to the right to stop and search. I was pleased to hear what the Minister said about improvements in data collection—particularly, again, on stop and search—and the progress made on recruitment from BME communities. I think he said that the figure is now 8.1%, so progress is being made, but it is still not fast enough. It is also pleasing to hear that 18 forces are at representative level for their communities, but that is out of 43, so again, it is not good enough. We will continue to monitor the progress of police forces and the Home Office in the months to come, and I am sure the Home Affairs Committee will return to the issue of policing in future months.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered the Third Report of the Home Affairs Committee, Session 2021-22, The Macpherson Report: twenty-two years on, HC 139, and the Government Response, HC 274.
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I beg to move,
That this House has considered the Restoration and Renewal Programme in the House of Commons.
Good afternoon, Mr Twigg. I thank you and Mr Speaker, through the Backbench Business Committee, for granting me this opportunity to move the motion. I also thank the Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr Jones), who has stood in at very short notice, because I gather the Leader of the House is required in a Cabinet Committee going on at this very moment. May I thank all my colleagues for attending? The right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown) and the hon. Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts) have been with me on the same journey for many years, through the Finance Committee, on this restoration and renewal debate. We have seen all the twists and turns. I also thank the shadow Leader of the House for being here to reply.
To begin, I should draw attention to my declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as a chartered surveyor—although I do not expect to profit in any way from this whole venture. The Palace of Westminster has played a 900-year role in our political history. It is no surprise, therefore, that we are under a UNESCO world heritage site obligation to protect this wonderful grade I listed building, which has iconic status throughout the world. We need to maintain high standards so that it is a safe and accessible place for all who work and visit here.
The restoration and renewal programme has been briefly defined as a major refurbishment programme that is needed to protect and preserve the heritage of the Palace of Westminster and ensure that it can continue to serve as the home to the UK Parliament. Both Houses agreed that there was
“a clear and pressing need”
for the repair works to be done. There are a range of essential works that need to be carried out to prevent any further major fire incidents or falling masonry, to remove asbestos and to improve the services, which are cracking at the seams.
That could mean doing the minimum amount of work to ensure that the existing building’s layout remains largely the same, so that we are able to function properly for the next generation of, say, 30 to 50 years. It could involve making sure the building is entirely safe, with every bit of stonework thoroughly inspected, ensuring it is completely watertight, carrying out a proper asbestos removal programme so that everyone, both inside and outside the building, is properly at minimal or no risk from that hazard, and, finally, renewing all the services, as there is currently a significant risk of major failure.
A more ambitious project, which would inevitably add considerably to the costs and timeline, would see other major developments also taking place. The Palace could become increasingly more accessible for people with any kinds of disability, and services could be upgraded to the latest design, with digital future-proofing and improved, redesigned energy systems to provide optimal green standards to meet the aims set out in the public sector decarbonisation scheme.
As the Public Accounts Committee heard this week, the public sector has a target of achieving a 50% reduction in direct emissions by 2032 and a 75% reduction by 2037, compared with 2017 baseline emissions. The R and R delivery authority has set out an ambitious programme to enable the parliamentary estate to achieve net zero. However, it will be difficult to properly assess the details of how the policy will be achieved until a definitive way forward is decided. Even without that information, it is unlikely that the Palace will be able to meet the same decarbonisation standards as many other public buildings due to its historically old nature. The energy system, which has not yet been decided, could be completely redesigned to provide optimal costs and energy efficiency.
The Palace has four main floors and 65 different levels, with just one lift that meets modern disability standards. That means that 12% of the building is accessible to wheelchair users. I have experienced for myself, as I am sure other Members of Parliament will have, the difficulty of getting disabled people into this place. We have, under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, to do better, so that is an essential part of the upgrade in renewal and restoration. The programme is committed to improving accessibility, which is outlined in the business case, which has been updated following regular engagement with representatives of staff with disabilities, and with independent accessibility and inclusion technical experts.
However, the size of the project is enormous. It is estimated to cost somewhere between the Olympics, at £8.77 billion, and Crossrail, which cost £18.25 billion. The cost will ultimately be decided by the scenario chosen. In my capacity as deputy Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, I have seen time after time large public procurement projects—whether by the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Health or another Department —experience time and cost overruns. Some cost the taxpayer billions of pounds more than the original budget, due to the client—usually the Department—changing its mind on specification as the project progressed, always wanting the latest bells and whistles.
All this work is bound to come at significant cost to the public purse, running into tens of billions of pounds. Although it has been assessed that some essential work, such as the removal of asbestos, can be done in stages and by working around the usual business of the House—meaning at weekends or when the House is not sitting—it would appear that a level of decant for some period will be a serious option to consider, in order to prevent the time for works and the costs becoming completely excessive. As the Clerk of the House said in a recent Public Accounts Committee hearing:
“We have asbestos incidents about once a year…The asbestos is a really extensive challenge. The largest other project that we could find had about 90 people for 18 or 20 months”.
Therefore, it has become quite clear that it will be impossible to complete this project without some decant from both Houses at some stage.
The decant option would minimise costs, even if it is only a partial decant, or if one House at a time is upgraded, which would have the advantage of allowing one House—say, the House of Commons—to remain in Parliament throughout the period, allaying the fear of some, who believe that we will never return once the project is complete. It would also mean that important speeches at both a Government level and at an individual level—for example, a Member’s maiden speech or their retirement speech—can still be made in one Chamber or another.
A partial decant would allow all the necessary works to take place to remove asbestos to whatever is deemed to be an acceptable level and to renew all the services. It is technically possible to carry out the work around the House, but not only would that take considerably longer, it would not account for anything unpredictable found as the works go along. As any chartered surveyor in particular will know, no matter how good the intrusive surveys are, there are a huge number of areas—voids, floorboards, roof voids—where it is impossible to rule out any unacceptable snags being found as the work progresses. Those will of course need to be resolved, which means the project will take considerably longer. Thereafter, it would be possible for both bits of the Palace to be reoccupied—for example, both Chambers—with all the necessary essential services, namely restaurants, Committee rooms, and so on, by siting those services in nearby temporary structures.
In 2018, the House of Commons voted by a majority of 16, or just 4% of the 456 Members voting, for the two Houses to be fully decanted during the works, before returning as soon as possible. After that debate, the House of Lords approved a motion for a full and timely decant. In April 2020, the Sponsor Body said that it expected to start works in 2026, assuming that that was required to develop a business case by 2023. The Sponsor Body now estimates that the main works will start in 2027. However, the cheapest plan involves a full decant of the Palace of Westminster for between 10 and 20 years, with the work costing in the region of £7 billion to £13 billion—these were the figures given to the Commission by the Sponsor Body.
Another suggestion, which would cost the most and take the longest, is for the project to be done with the Houses remaining within the Chambers throughout the entirety of the restoration and renewal programme of works, with no transfer. It is estimated that this option would cost a staggering £11 billion to £22 billion and take in the region of 46 to 76 years.
The Leader of the House has tabled a motion for next week that seeks the House of Commons’ endorsement of the Commission’s latest recommendations. It seeks the approval of the establishment of a new joint department to take over the Sponsor Body’s functions. If the motion is approved, secondary legislation will then be required to abolish the Sponsor Body and transfer its functions to the new joint department, with staff TUPE-ing over.
In hindsight, it is clear that the Sponsor Body did not function as successfully as it could have, or even as it was supposed to under the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019. It was supposed to fully consult Members of Parliament, peers and above all people who work in this place, if for no other reason than to seek their views and see if there was a consensus on the way forward, particularly on the controversial aspects such as decant. More importantly, Parliament should have been consulted, because it was all of us who were going to be inconvenienced by this project over a number of years. I would suggest that this consultation exercise is critical for the new joint body.
Without a clear deadline or line of responsibility, there is a degree of confusion surrounding this project—unlike the Olympics, where the sponsor body was able to deliver because it had clear deadline and remit from the Government Department involved, so it had a much simpler task. It was envisaged that the House itself—the Commissions—would transfer its clients function to the Sponsor Body, which would then get on and do the job. Actually, I think the Commissions, authorised by the House, would inevitably always have a role closely liaising with the Sponsor Body. I think it was a disconnect, partly perhaps because of covid, that that did not happen. Suspicions arose, and the Sponsor Body came up with a huge cost, which the Commissions then said was unacceptable.
It would have been preferable if Parliament had been more closely involved in the decision making on this project. Far too much power has been delegated to the Commissions, instead of them consulting Parliament, as we saw in February when the Sponsor Body was abolished with very little publicity or explanation. Having had a series of hearings since with the Public Accounts Committee and meetings with the Clerks, union representatives and the chief executive, it is clear that the lines of authority need to be much clearer if this project is to succeed in future.
There is a further problem. With general elections taking place every five years or less, new parliamentarians will be elected. That will inevitably change the balance of Parliament, and that will change the parameters of the project. This will add significantly not only to the costs, but to the time it takes to complete the project. We have to find a way to ensure that, once we do have this proper consultation, we somehow enshrine whatever we decide we should do to take this enormous project forward and make sure that we do not continually add to it—to use my phrase, adding bells and whistles—because that will add huge uncertainty.
The misconception about how the 2019 Act set up the delivery authority meant that it was not able to talk properly to the decision makers before February. After the Commission’s had decided that the Sponsor Body should be abolished, the delivery body then started talking directly to the Commissions. This shortened line of communication started to unblock some of the blockages that had crept into the system. There is a misconception about how the Sponsor Body is responsible for restoration and renewable, compared to the sponsor body that ran the Olympics. However, it is now being abolished, and we will now have this new joint department. I urge that new department to improve its communications, not only with the Commission—to which it is directly accountable—but Parliament as a whole, so that it is constantly updated. If Parliament is updated, it can have a view on the whole matter, and hopefully the project will not continually need changing as it goes on. Major buy-in to the project will help with its more controversial aspects, such as the decant debate.
The parliamentary Sponsor Body failed in two important areas. First, it did not engage comprehensively with parliamentarians and staff to ascertain what they wanted from the project. Secondly, off its own bat, it gave unacceptably long decant completion times, which came with momentously large accounts attached. As I have said, the House of Commons and House of Lords Commissions became increasingly alarmed by those figures and decided to abolish the Sponsor Body. However, at a stroke, that baked in certain nugatory and unnecessary costs: £80 million for the replacement of an unwanted Chamber in Richmond House, £20 million for the fire safety system in the cellar—which will now need to be ripped out—and at least £100 million for setting up and abolishing the Sponsor Body. It adds up to well over £300 million completely wasted. We can all imagine what that £300 million would buy in our constituencies, such as upgraded school programmes and so on.
However, I believe we are on a better track, now that we can see exactly what was wrong with the previous line of authority. When the new department is set up, it will be working on a grid of essential works, which will help to ascertain exactly what timeline the new works should take place over. That can then be considered by the Commissions and the House, and based on hard evidence, both Houses will then need to be consulted again to establish the general direction of travel.
I am listening with interest to the hon. Member’s comments. As he says, we have been on the Finance Committee together for many years. I have some concerns, which I do not know whether he plans to reflect on. We have had long debates and many reviews, although I have not been involved in all of those. I thought we had got some agreement, although it was controversial, that we were going to have a decant and it was going to be expensive. Maybe there were concerns about how the Sponsor Body operated, but the main thing I am concerned about is that bringing the arrangements for the organisation of this massive project in-house will not necessarily solve those difficulties. We do not have a great track record in this place of managing large capital projects efficiently and well, and those projects were nothing like as large as this one.
My hon. Friend, if I may call him that—I have known him so long in this place—makes a very good point. I will come to that issue towards the end of my speech, which I am working towards, something the Minister will be glad to know.
The Palace needs to be upgraded to the highest possible digital and security standards, and if there are any changes to the working of Parliament, those will need to be accommodated. While I commend the adaptations made during the covid-19 period, especially for online working and digital voting, it should not have taken such an unprecedented crisis to push us to adapt those things for the 21st century. We need to be faster and more accommodating of change to meet the challenges of the modern world.
Finally, the education services in Victoria Gardens were only ever given temporary permission. A permanent solution needs to be found, with modern digital working facilities, so that the aim of giving a parliamentary visit to every schoolchild throughout their school career can be encouraged. If taxpayers’ money were no object—of course, we can never say that—there would be the potential to go much further by providing glass roofs over some of the Palace’s walkways and pathways, in order to provide extra work space. However, with my Public Accounts Committee hat on, we must always consider the taxpayers and the value-for-money aspects.
I have laid out what needs to be done. The much more important question, as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts) mentioned, is how it should be done to provide the most value for money and the optimal outcome for reaching project deadlines. As I have said, the project is likely to cost in excess of tens of billions of pounds. As I know from long experience as deputy Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, the scope for mission creep and overruns for large Government projects, such as Thameslink, Crossrail and HS2, is enormous. The only exception was the Olympics and the reason was that there was an absolute deadline for when it had to be delivered. Equally important is that it was set up with a sponsor body that had clear delivery guidelines for completing the work. That is why the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019 tried to mimic that governance structure.
Now we have a proposal to form a joint department in Parliament, there will be a joint client team, which brings me to point made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. That approach is fraught with difficulties. The Clerk of the Parliaments and the Clerk of the House signed off the contracts for the original Elizabeth Tower project, which was originally estimated to cost £29.9 million. That project has not even finished yet, but it is estimated that it will end up costing £86 million, which is nearly three times the original cost projection. It is unfortunate that the Clerks signing off and having legal responsibility for this project will be the same people.
I do not wish to denigrate the Clerks in any way—they are splendid people. They have huge legal and parliamentary knowledge and huge knowledge of parliamentary procedure, but they do not have the knowledge to manage a project of this size. To be fair to them, they were wise enough to create an expert panel of knowledgeable and well-qualified people, but it is unclear whether that panel will be in place throughout the project. In my view, it is imperative that it is and that the Commissions accept its advice. That would mean the decision-making process of the Clerks and the Commissions would get professional advice, in a form that is hopefully digestible and understandable.
What should happen next? The joint department should be set up as soon as possible, with the advisory panel being given statutory status, with an expectation that its advice be followed. Any department must be given the authority of Parliament. It should then widely and rapidly consult parliamentarians and staff on what is expected from the project and, within three months, produce a properly costed business case, which must be approved by Parliament. It must then move as swiftly as possible to putting the project out to tender, with strong expectations on timetables and costings. Any departure must be approved by Parliament. In any case, a quarterly update must be given to Parliament as a matter of course—not six months after the Sponsor Body has been effectively abolished—in line with the procedure Parliament has for HS2.
I am pleased that one of the recommendations in the Public Accounts Committee report issued yesterday is that the Leader of the House and the Treasury will be completely bound into the process of R&R. While of course Parliament funds the process through its debates and votes, the Government have a major input, because however much is spent on the project has to be raised by taxation. They are crucial partners in the whole operation.
I hope I have demonstrated that, not only is this is a huge and complicated project that is going to cost tens of billions of pounds and go on for tens of years, it is also critical to our democracy that we get it right so that future generations can benefit from it. If we—this generation—take the correct decisions and the pain of all the disruption, and do the project all in one go with the necessary, but minimum, decant, future generations will thank us. If we have a building project in this place for the next 30 to 70 years, I do not think they will. I do not think they will thank us if one of the Commissions’ objectives is that the work should be done on a short-term basis—make do and bodge, I call it.
Whatever work we decide to do needs to be done to the highest possible standards, meet the highest environmental standards, and be expected to last for the longest possible time, so that we can leave a legacy, possibly with some improvements—certainly to disability access, hopefully to education facilities and also to our way of working, through work on creating a properly digital Parliament—so that future generations can be proud of what this generation has done to uphold the highest standards of maintenance of our wonderful Palace of Westminster.
I remind right hon. and hon. Members that Mr Speaker has ruled that iPads can be used in the Chamber, but not with a connected keyboard.
It is an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. We have long been colleagues in this place and you might say to me, “Who would have thought we’d both end up here?”, but we have done.
It is an even greater pleasure to take part in a debate secured by the hon. Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown). I could fairly describe him as a fellow traveller, but that might not help him in the 1922 Committee elections—although he can take comfort that the electorate seems to be changing quite substantially, which might be a good thing. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts), I will call the hon. Member for The Cotswolds my hon. Friend. We have been at this for so long, have travelled over much the same ground together, and have come—as anybody who looks at this subject does—to very similar conclusions. There might be differences in nuance, but no more than that. It is also reasonable to place on record that we have served together not just on the Public Accounts Committee, but on the Finance Committee, which I have the honour and privilege of chairing for the second time in my long and exotic political career. The current leader of our party was kind enough to put me back where the previous leader found me, and has temporarily brought me back to other duties for the third time.
I am wondering if by calling the first ever Joint Committee with the other House this week, my right hon. Friend—as I might call him—is envisaging an even longer career as Chair of the Finance Committee.
Who knows what the future holds, but I am full of fear and trepidation. My hon. Friend kindly refers to the historic meeting of the other place’s Finance Committee and our Finance Committee for the very first time. The first individual report that we considered was about the overrunning costs on the Elizabeth Tower. Every commentator has said how nice it looks and how well it has been done, and they are genuinely excited. Then they read a bit about us and say, “What about the cost overruns?” We have had a comprehensive explanation, which I find credible. There is nothing improper but, as my hon. Friend says, it would have been better if the costings had been much more realistic and subjected to more detailed professional advice at the beginning, because we would not have ended up where we have ended up. The report on this issue was a model of candour and contrition, and it was satisfactory, but it was in front of both the other place’s Committee and our Committee, so it was a pretty inquisitive audience.
That brings me to my next point: I believe that financial oversight is absolutely crucial in all this. I am astonished at the reluctance of officials to come to the Members’ base Committee, which wants to proceed on the basis of good will. We are not there to tell officials off; we are there to try to give our views, to ask penetrating questions and to try to help them with the decision making, rather than thwart them in it. Insufficient use was made of the mechanisms available—I am understating the case. It would also be fair to say that for the big projects, such as Richmond House and the northern estate before it, consulting a lot more Members would have greatly benefited the eventual outcome. For example, the northern estate programme was to be done under the current House estimates and did not draw on R&R at all. It involved Norman Shaw North being cleared and Richmond House being used for a decant. Then, Members would be put back and the Norman Shaw South Members would get their offices done.
We have ended up with Norman Shaw South not being in the programme at all, or being in the programme, some way to the right, in an ill-defined way—I am quite happy to be corrected if I have got this wrong. It will still fall to be paid for—it will not be paid for out of R&R; it is a legitimate charge on the House budget. However, the elegance of getting a whole chunk of the work done—finished—has been lost. I question the wisdom of that.
I would also question whether, if the Members had been taken through it at the time as thoroughly as they should have been, they would ever have agreed to it. I cannot help but feel that we just slipped into it, rather than had the facts put before us. There is a very good summary in The Observer of the journey that we have undertaken. It is elegantly written by a journalist whom I do not know, called Rowan Moore, and it is a fine piece of work. If someone wanted a plain man’s guide to the complexities of R&R, they could do a lot worse than start there.
There is an ideological divide between us. There is what I think is a minority, now, of the House, who do not really want to do this at all and would settle for giving the building a lick of paint, maybe replacing the Anaglypta, and calling it quits. Most of us—I would certainly say the majority of those who studied the questions, which are complex—would like to see us do something that is worthy of the building and what it stands for.
The decisions that we will be invited to make are crucial. I do not think that there is anything to be ashamed of in admitting that, on the structure of the two separate independent authorities, we were wrong. It is what I voted for in the original vote, and what I hoped would work. In other words, we would outline the things that needed doing and then hand the whole problem over to independent authorities. There was a thought that they would come back and talk to Members about what was being done for them and around them, or where they were to be decanted to. I still accept that the decant is an essential part of this, and that it would create more trouble than it would solve if we tried to go ahead, working piece by piece through the building.
I also agree strongly with the current Leader of the House, the right hon. Member for Sherwood (Mark Spencer), that it is correct to see what works could be done over a long summer recess. Could we, by agreement between the Government and the Opposition, alter a parliamentary year so that we had a longer recess period, where a longer run could be taken at some of the more extensive works? That has been looked at on our behalf, and my understanding is that that is not possible, but I would be open to returning to that to see if something were possible that would save money and get the work done in a more expeditious way. It may be possible to have the House meet in other buildings for specific purposes, or it may be possible to vote electronically; there are all sorts of things that might help us get the journey on its way.
Some of us asked questions about that when we still had not decided on matters. We used to have a longer summer recess, when a lot of works could be done in this place, but it suddenly got shortened because some elements of the popular press criticised it as us simply going on 12 weeks’ holiday. However, there is a big problem here, which needs to be looked at and could save us a lot of money. I am not saying it is an absolute solution, but we at least ought to have a look at it to see if, in the long term, it would save us money and enable the place to work better.
I agree with my hon. Friend. It is also the stated view of the current Leader of the House, who, I think, makes an entirely reasonable point. He is taking, more generally, from my point of view, a much more reasonable approach to all of this, and a much more consensual approach—or at least is trying to, in the current, troubled times—to bring this together and get us to a point where we are confident in the progress we are making.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way a second time—he is being very generous. Contrary to what I had understood, when the asbestos is removed, it is possible to seal individual areas. One area is sealed, the asbestos is removed, and then we move on to the next area. That is very time-consuming, whereas if we shut all of the Palace, or at least half of it, to do that work, it is much more cost-effective and takes much less time, so it might be better for us to decant for a little while, while that dangerous work is done, rather than try to do it piecemeal.
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. Also, the Chamber of the House of Commons, of course, was rebuilt in the 1950s when asbestos was extensively used as a fire prevention and building material. The dangers were not as well known then, or were not as accepted as they are now. The survey work to see how much asbestos is there has not been fully undertaken yet. Some excursions have been made and, as he hints, it is not looking good. There was a large exercise in the 1990s, I think, to remove asbestos from the House of Lords. How well that was done needs to be checked. Asbestos is a killer. Mesothelioma is a terrible condition.
The thinking behind decanting is not just about the asbestos. There is a sewerage system that runs from one end of the building to the other. Stopping it halfway down—be it left or right—is not feasible because it would involve a sewerage system outside the building and considerable complications. Added to all the other facilities in there now, we would have the same problem.
That problem goes back to the beginning of the debate about whether we could decant Chamber by Chamber, or whether it would all have to be done as one big decant because of the pooled facilities. Again, survey work is not completed yet. We have agreed the R&R estimate that should bring the survey work to completion, and I eagerly await the conclusions.
Re-routing has been thought of. The interesting thing about the article I referred to is that it had photographs of what the original conduits look like now. They have been colonised by electricity cables, which are not labelled. They have been colonised by gas and water pipes that run through the original utility that was supposed to draw in air, so that it would become hot air heated by the fires underneath, which, given the fate of the previous building, was quite a brave thing to install in Victorian times. Is it appropriate now? Probably not. A bolder solution might be to just concrete over the whole thing and put new services in. A great danger of being on a Members’ scrutiny Committee is that we start finding Members’ solutions to problems, and that is probably worse than calling in the experts.
We have made mistakes; we should admit it. I do not think they are quite as expensive as my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds thinks, but there are things that have not been done as well or as elegantly as they could have been. I do not think we will get another chance to make a major change because we are about to embark, in perhaps two years’ time, on really big expenditure, depending on the directions we choose. For certainty, that will require another decision of the House, perhaps in the next Parliament, but soon-ish in our terms, and then there is no going back. If the costs are to escalate dramatically, we need to get there first. If the time that we are decanted from this place is to be longer that we had hoped, given the starting point for this discussion—it could be a lot longer than we hope—we had better get the decision on that right and reconcile ourselves to it. I do not think there is a more rational way forward.
I am sorry to interrupt my right hon. Friend again, but it was in the early stages of the High Speed 2 project that the money got out of control. Once Parliament started getting quarterly reports based on an end cost, and once there were fixed dates for completion, it was able to see whether the trajectory was right. If we do that from the beginning with R and R, so that Parliament has control of the project, it has a much greater chance of being on time and on budget.
I accept that point, and I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman does, too. We should keep a sharp eye and a controlling grip on the money—not on what we spent last year, which tends to be what we get told, but on what we will spend in two or five years’ time—and on where the programme takes us. There is a chance to—dare I say it?—reduce expenditure in other areas, and perhaps spread the cost over a longer period. Making absolutely certain that we have a grip on the project is key. That has to come out of the reorganisation that we will discuss next week and presumably bring in soon after.
This must be one of those rare occasions when we welcome the direct involvement of the Treasury as an adviser and overseer; that is the new proposal. This is almost an act of desperation, but I think it is the right thing to do. It is forced on us by the circumstances so ably described in the article in The Observer. It is important that we face up to them today.
I am delighted that you are guiding us through this, Mr Twigg. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) on securing this debate. It seems to have had a really good first effect, which is that a motion on the subject will be before the House on Tuesday. I think he can take credit for that, even if it is not quite justified.
As I think everybody in the Chamber would agree, this project must move forward. It is sad that there are not very many of us here. Two colleagues are here from compulsion, and three or four of us are here because we are interested, but out of 650, that is not a very good sign.
We have been looking at this issue for quite some time. The first reference that I could find to the House of Commons looking at it was from 1904, and we have done nothing much since. The need for the works has been set out by the professional here, my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds. I was intrigued when the right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown) talked about concreting over. Of course, when we walk into the subterranean areas of this building, we see that we cannot concrete “over” everything, because we are talking about all along the floor, all across the walls and all across the ceiling. I am a little taller than the right hon. Gentleman, and I find it quite difficult to walk down there. If everything were cleaned out, it would be a straight walk, and we would not have to hunch down. That is an indication of the amount of stuff there. As he said, we are talking about sewage, water, electricity and fibre. Nobody knows whether some of the electric wires are working, and whether there is any power in them. The insulation is coming off. There are fire detectors from one end to the other, and somebody walks up and down checking it 24/7, because we do have fires.
The basic structure of the building seems to be in reasonable order, as far as I can tell, although we have learned a few lessons from the Elizabeth Tower, where, when we lifted a brick, we found a frog underneath it; I guess we will find that. I hope that we can explain to the public that if we come up with an assessment of costs, it will undoubtedly be expanded upon, because we do not know what is underneath, or some of the problems that we will find.
The services really need to be sorted. My belief, having walked up and down the basement and above it, is that they have to be taken right out from end to end—a complete removal and replacement. At the end of January 2019, we debated the state of the infrastructure, and we agreed that the work should be done, and that it should get moving, but nothing has really happened. I am delighted that we managed to get work on the Elizabeth Tower moving; mostly that has been done because it was separated out and totally independent. The task is absolutely enormous. However, one does not need to be an expert to realise, even before somebody gets down to the basement and has a look at it, just how enormous the task is. I have taken one or two members of the press down there who were scathing about the costs until they went. Even the most scathing of them, from The Telegraph, came back saying, “You’re right. It’s got to happen. It’s got to be done.” If we do not do it, we are in for real problems.
There are some little things that my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds, who is an expert in the field, did not mention. We have little problems, such as 86 vertical chimneys running right along one passageway. That is where the heated air was supposed to go up. If there is a fire in the basement, it will go through the building as if it was made of timber. The trouble is that those chimneys now carry a mass of the services that run horizontally and are then directed up. There was mention made of the Chamber being built in the ’50s; I was not around and did not see it, but I understand there is an awful lot of stuff behind the panels. The panels of the Chamber will have to be pulled off, and everything will have to be cleared from behind them. Replacements will have to be put in if necessary, and then the panelling needs to be put back. That makes it rather difficult to think we could use part of it alongside that work.
There are gas pipes, air conduits, steam pipes, telephones, and communication fibres, and then there is that ghastly, huge, overloaded sewage system. The infrastructure serves the whole building from end to end, and vertically through the chimneys, and there is a duplication of it in the roof. I do not know if anyone in the Chamber has been in the roof and seen it, but it is a smaller edition of the horrendous mess in the basement.
The dangers of asbestos are well known and talked about. When I went down to the basement, I asked the engineer, “Where is all the asbestos?” He replied, “Well, they didn’t know about asbestos when they put it in, and they went in with buckets of it and big brushes and sloshed it up and down over the walls.” In other words, it is absolutely everywhere.
The situation is actually more serious than my hon. Friend suggests. Each one of those ventilation chimneys is surrounded by asbestos. Virtually every Committee Room in this House has asbestos in it. The experts need to tell us whether it needs to be removed.
The decision to do that would be so much easier if we were not occupying the building. Every time I cough, I think that a certain Committee Room has caused it. The thing that staggered me was the sewage system. It runs from end to end of the building, and it tends to run down, of course, toward the House of Commons. At that end, it has two very large steel bowls. They were installed in 1888. When we think of the volume of usage, and how it has gone up over time, I am amazed that they still work. I understand why it leaks, I understand why there is panic when it leaks, and why we have to seal it up and stop it. There is an added problem, in that one of the tanks is listed. If we are going to do anything with it, we will probably have to try to get it out; knowing English Heritage as I used to, it will probably want us to set up the listed tank as a symbol. That would be a complete waste of time and money.
For safety and efficiency, we have to have a full decant. We have debated that before. In the last main debate, we definitely came down on that side. There were one or two pseudo-engineers, who I would not give a Meccano kit to, who were saying we could do it bit by bit. However, logic says that we cannot. What complicates matters even more is that if we do decant and move, we need to cover the security requirements. They are now worse than when we first started them. We have to be within the enhanced security envelope; otherwise, we might find that we are severely damaged.
As I have said before, this is an enormous and extremely complex task. I am looking forward to the revelations we will get on Tuesday, and to learning how this is to be done. It has been more than 100 years since 1904. I am nervous that there will be yet another delay, and that 100 years from now, we will still have not done the job.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) on securing this important debate; he and I have spoken about this issue outside the Chamber, and he knows that we share concerns about it. I will start by paying tribute to those involved in what I have heard already this afternoon, because many people have already worked on this project. I am a relatively new member of the Sponsor Body—an interest that I am happy to declare. In the few months I have been on the Sponsor Body, it has already become clear that a number of people attached to this project and who have taken an interest in it have both developed great knowledge and expertise about it, and demonstrated a clear passion and care for its effective delivery, as reflected in this debate.
For the purpose of declaring interests and making clear the relevance of my comments, I note that I trained in civil and structural engineering at university. During my first few years working in that field, a lot of my work was on older buildings and their conservation and restoration—in fact, on one occasion, I had the great privilege of crawling through the ceiling space over the Commons Chamber, little knowing that I would come back years later to sit on the green Benches. Having said that, I do not presume to second-guess the real experts who are working on the projects: the engineers, or the procurement, management and administrative experts who will help with decisions about the formation of the governance and other bodies that will be set up. As I have said, I joined late in the process. That should not be interpreted as a way of distancing myself from previous decisions, which I recognise; it is more to explain my focus on what lies ahead, and on the future of the restoration and renewal project.
In the time I have, I offer three observations, drawn from the time I have spent on the Sponsor Body and the discussions I have heard. My hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds mentioned the importance of not allowing specification creep—a problem that plagues so many projects—whereby what was intended is embellished, enhanced and even replaced, very often with the best of intentions. At its heart, it should be possible to boil every project down to three things: how much it costs, how long it will take, and what the client will get for their money and time. If a project cannot be boiled down to that simple description, I would suggest that it is not properly understood. Those three parameters define the scope of the project.
The scope of this project was set in law, which presents the danger of that scope becoming fixed and immovable. I suspect that may be what happened in this case. I have heard the criticisms made of the Sponsor Body, but there is another factor, which is that the Sponsor Body was dealt a fixed hand of cards. I have been impressed with the knowledge and care of the people I have met, and suggest that another way of looking at the Sponsor Body’s role is that it was asked to deliver a set of proposals against fixed legislation, and has done its best to do so. I would not want to cast doubt on that, but the inflexibility that was created through legislation is at the heart of the problem. I will return to that at the end of my speech.
In any construction project, there has to be a dynamic relationship between the client and the contractor—the person who wants it and the person who is building it. The difficulty with legislation is that unless the client is absolutely clear from the start about exactly what they want, they are stuck with it once the gun has been fired, once the document has been signed and the law has been passed. While that works for what we might call a black box project—the client commissions it, walks away from it, and returns in time to cut a ribbon, pull a rabbit out of a hat or what have you—in the case of a project like restoration and renewal, where a key part of the scope has been the ongoing function of the site, that is not necessarily the case. That is where some of the confusion and disappointment might have crept in.
I stress that point on continuity of function. As a new MP who has spent just two and a half years here—and for some of that, I decamped to my constituency because of the pandemic—I have seen that this place really deserves the reputation of being the mother of Parliaments. I therefore take very seriously the need for it to continue to function in that way. It should not tip over into being just a relic or memory of what it once was, preserved for the past and for future generations in a historical sense, rather than remaining a living and dynamic mother of Parliaments around the world.
My second point is on procurement. Every commission has a buy-or-build stage. A decision is made about whether the solution will be bought or procured, or whether it will be developed in-house. That is true of this project too. With a project of this scale, complexity and importance, it is important to recognise the knowledge that develops along the way. By way of illustration, we can look at other Government procurement exercises. Perhaps I should not draw this comparison, but one of the difficulties that the Dreadnought programme has run into—it will replace the ageing Vanguard submarine fleet—is that the level of knowledge developed with the contractor responsible is so great that there is no alternative; they cannot be told, “It is taking too long and costing too much; we will switch to another contractor.” There is a real danger of a different kind with this project, in that the knowledge, understanding and professional expertise developed needs to be carefully curated, and we need to think carefully about where that resides.
I am not scared by the prospect of making a buy-or-build decision and deciding to bring things in house, and I am not overly worried by others’ observations that the Clerks may not have the necessary expertise, because we are talking about a commitment to a way of working, not an expectation of instant expertise. We need to make a strategic decision about where the knowledge that will come through working on the delivery of the project over time will accrete. Does it rest here, or does it go out into the marketplace? I have a very conservative question about where that fits, and how well it fits in the private sector.
I draw the analogy with what happens in France, especially in work on large, old buildings. There, there is recognition that such projects are ongoing and will take decades, if not a lifetime. Indeed, the old cathedrals very often took centuries to build—longer than the life of the architects who conceived them. Generations of builders worked on them. We need to adjust our timeframe, and our mindset to thinking in that way. The advantage is that a master craftsman commissioned to work on a building like this would have plenty of time to bring up the next generation—or generations—of apprentices, who would also work and develop expertise. They could then be deployed to other parts of the UK. The question of knowledge and where is it held becomes one of how that knowledge is best used, and how the restoration, refurbishment and renewal of this site is used to leverage improvement around the rest of the UK. Enhancing the number of workers skilled in this kind of work is a key way of doing that.
I will quickly make one point about innovation. A project of this scale, complexity, timeframe and cost should demand innovation from us. In looking at this place, we think it is so great, expensive and time consuming that we need to go with what is familiar and certain. I argue the opposite. Where is the innovation in governance structures? Time does not allow, but I could point to construction projects such as T5 at Heathrow, where an innovative relationship between client and contractor ensured that risks were managed better. I can see an opportunity for that here; in fact, the official documentation sets out that a third priority of the new approach is
“establishing a governance structure that is receptive to Parliament’s requirements as a working legislature”,
which links to my first point on concerns about scope.
I could say more, but I will conclude. I share the concerns about cost and timescale, but in defence of the Sponsor Body, it has been working within the constraints placed on it. I welcome this debate and the transparency of understanding that it offers. I look forward to the new arrangements, because this is a Parliament of which this country can be proud and a project of which MPs can be proud. Being involved on behalf of colleagues is a privilege of which I am proud, too.
I thank the hon. Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) for securing the debate and hon. Members who have contributed.
Great ideas, constructive debates and empathetic policies need a home. The space in which ideas, debates and policies flourish really matters. In the wake of the bombing of the House of Commons Chamber during the second world war, Winston Churchill said:
“We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us.”—[Official Report, 28 October 1943; Vol. 393, c. 403.]
The Palace of Westminster is a glorious building. It is a work of art filled with works of art, a UNESCO world heritage site that is recognised the world over, the home of scoundrels and the odd hero for 1,000 years.
We are meeting here in the shadow of Westminster Hall, which was built in the 11th century by William II, son of William the Conqueror. He conceived the project to impress his new subjects: it was the largest hall in England, and probably all of Europe, when it was built. It was here that Charles I and Sir Thomas More were tried. It was here that the great Scottish patriot William Wallace faced a kangaroo court before being murdered by the English state, all because he wanted Scottish independence; Edward I had said, “Now is not the time,” and refused a section 30 order. The hall has seen monarchs lie in state and witnessed great state occasions such as Nelson Mandela’s address.
Fires have been a scourge throughout history, but from the ashes of the 1834 blaze rose the glories of Charles Barry and Augustus Pugin’s Gothic revival masterpiece. Of course we should repair and restore it—it has been crumbling around us, and as the scaffolding comes down we can see that some ancient skills are still flourishing. The hon. Member for Aberconwy (Robin Millar) made an excellent point about skills being passed on from generation to generation in a single building. The honey stonework repairs are beautifully done, and the iconic tower housing Big Ben has been restored with the original Victorian clock face’s colours returned and the finest German craftsmanship on display, with 1,300 German-made glass panes glittering in the sun as we speak.
There has always been a debate in architectural refurbishment circles between restoration and conservation. Do we return buildings to their original form with exact replicas, or do we keep the best of what has gone before but allow buildings a useful present and future-proof them for coming generations? Our constituents have rightly questioned the cost of the works at the Palace of Westminster, especially in the midst of a cost of living crisis. We have to justify what we are doing and explain our decisions, so it is important to communicate this stuff to members of the public. How can we serve our constituents to the best of our ability if, even after so much taxpayer money has been poured into this place, it remains so ill-suited to the work that we were sent here to do?
I think we owe it to history to repair this magnificent building, and good restoration does not come cheap, but if we consent to the costs, we owe it to the taxpayer to make the building an efficient place to work in. We should respect history, but not wallow in it. Restoration should not mean stagnation.
Much about how we go about our business here is absurd. We have more than a dozen bars, but not a single crèche anywhere on the estate. We have sword hooks in the cloakroom, but no wheelchair access to much of the Chamber. As a teenager, I remember reading with horror that a Member of Parliament, Alfred Broughton, offered to be stretchered on to the estate from his deathbed to have his vote registered on a motion of confidence to save the Callaghan Government. It was indefensibly cruel.
We took the opportunity to address our absurd voting system during the pandemic, and considerable sums of money were spent on devising and then perfecting an electronic voting system. It worked yet, incomprehensibly, the then Leader of the House, already somewhat of a caricature on these matters, decided to abandon the system, resulting in Members on crutches queuing up past midnight to cast their votes. Small wonder that Westminster has been such a covid plague hotbed.
Westminster’s workings are ludicrous in so many ways—we know it and our constituents know it—and we should not defend the absurdities but take this opportunity to reform them. After all, this is the perfect time. The restoration of the building will preserve its architectural glories, but let us also make it a contemporary place of work with electronic voting, disability access, full-time childcare facilities and all the other basic accoutrements of a modern democracy, including the continuation of remote working where necessary. If I might say so, we saw a perfect illustration of some of the strange, peculiar and archaic practices earlier when we discovered that we can use iPads, but only if we tap the screen and not the silent keypads—I mean, really.
Members on both sides of the House tend to agree on much of this, so we should be more assertive. Electronic voting was abandoned against our wishes by a languid Leader of the House who preferred supine siestas on the Green Benches to rolling up his sleeves to ensure that the restoration and renewal of the Palace is fit for a modern Parliament.
I have good news and bad news for the former Leader of the House and the other parliamentary luddites who resist change. Very soon there will be more room to recline. Churchill may have ordered that the Chamber be rebuilt deliberately too small in scale for the number of Members, leaving some literally seatless at great parliamentary occasions, but soon there will be 59 Scottish seats available for Members to stretch out in comfort.
For the three centuries of our parliamentary Union, Scots have walked these halls, bellowed in the Chambers and occasionally, just occasionally, changed the course of history, when we were allowed to, of course. In what will, I hope, be a velvet divorce, we have made it clear that we will assume 10% of the debt and 10% of the assets, but it would only be fair to offer a deal: Members of the House can have all of Westminster, even though we have paid for so much of it, but how about we get Scotland Yard in return? Once the Scottish embassy, accommodating monarchs and diplomatic representatives from the Kingdom of Scotland, it is about time we got it back.
I look forward to joining our architecturally outstanding but accessible, family friendly, hybrid-working Parliament in Edinburgh, but in the short time we have left here I will do all I can to push this Parliament to do better, to support the restoration and to modernise. It is in England’s long-term interest, after all, and what are good neighbours for?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.
I congratulate the hon. Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) on securing this debate and on giving us the time to air the arguments before we come to a possible parliamentary vote next week. I appreciate it a great deal, and I appreciate the consensual way in which most of this debate has been conducted. It has been heartening to hear Members’ understanding of the warp and weft of this debate, and the warp and weft of the wiring and sewerage.
I am particularly impressed with the description of the ventilation shafts provided by the hon. Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford). I am obsessed with the shafts, partly because they provide a good illustration of what happens when hon. and right hon. Members mistake themselves for civil engineers. I understand that some of us are, but most of us are not. If we come up with too many wizard wheezes, we run the risk of building into the fabric of the building, which we all love, something that future generations will come to rue and regret. I heartily endorse what pretty much everyone has said, that whatever we do after next Tuesday’s parliamentary vote, it has to involve both scrutiny of the process and real consultation and engagement with Members, the public and, importantly, the thousands of people who work here. Scrutiny and engagement are the two pillars to which I want to draw everyone’s attention.
I completely agree with the hon. Member for The Cotswolds that there are concerns, and rightly so, about value for money, and I commend the Public Accounts Committee’s excellent work in that regard. It has scrutinised, line by line, in a way that is really impressive and we will need it to continue to do that work.
Similarly, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown) referred to financial oversight and accountability. He also rightly raised the role of the Finance Committee, on which he plays such an excellent role as Chair. As a former Whip, I was obviously distraught to lose him as our Chief Whip, but I am glad that he is now in charge of the finances of this estate. It comforts me to know that his eagle eye will be on every single line, as will be that of the hon. Member for The Cotswolds.
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts), who is no longer in his place, raised concerns, which I think are shared by everybody, about what would happen if we brought this process back in-house. Are there problems of oversight, political meddling and ventilation shafts that turn out to be fire risks? It is important that we hang on to at least some of the consensus that we have achieved here today. We all think that the building is worth preserving. We all have our own ideas about how we would do it if we were in charge, and we all know that we are going to have to compromise.
I think pretty much everybody here also knows that we will have to move out. For too long, this debate has been very binary: it is either a full decant or continued presence. That has not been helpful. I share the view of my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East that the current Leader of the House has done a great deal to create more consensus, and I have watched his view shift from being, “I’m not sure we need to move out,” to, “Actually, we will probably need to and it will probably be for about eight years or so”. Personally, I think it will be for a bit longer than that, considering what the experts are telling us, but the Leader of the House, who is currently in the Cabinet of course, has done a great deal to try to bring people and the Commissions with him.
The hon. Member for The Cotswolds criticised the Commissions over transparency. His points were well made and they have been heard by this commissioner. When I suddenly found myself on the Commission, by virtue of being the shadow Leader of the House, I was somewhat surprised by the fact that commissioners are not provided with a manual explaining what the Commission is, what it is for and how it is accountable to Members. There is a lot that we need to do, and I will return to that in a different debate on another day.
We all agree that the honour of working in a UNESCO world heritage site comes with the duty of being a responsible custodian, and we are that custodian. It is on us, this generation of politicians, to make sure that we carry out the necessary preservation. As the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (John Nicolson) has said, we must do so without making the preservation the enemy of good working practices. I have to correct him slightly, though: it may have been a terminology issue, but one bar has certainly been converted into an excellent nursery. If he is saying that the crèche should be open for 24 hours a day, a whole load of questions would need to be answered. I have heard many colleagues talk about this building being very family friendly, but my initial impression was that it is not. Many Members have told me that they feel that their children are very welcome in this building, but the hon. Member and others raised an important point about accessibility.
We agree that work is pressing. I know that all Members of the House want to see improved fire, mechanical and electrical systems. As they have also said, however, just having a monumental and iconic building does not mean that we can accept lack of safety or asbestos. We are going to have to make sure that the experts can do their job. As the hon. Member for The Cotswolds said, they will need to be able to access the asbestos in order to know what can be done about it and, frankly, to establish whether we are surrounded by it.
As the hon. Member for Aberconwy (Robin Millar) has said, there are issues regarding how we learn about the best practice in commissioning and ensure that we deal in advance with, or at least have prior knowledge of, the tensions involved with such an iconic building. Once we have a contractor, a set of contractors or a supply chain, it will be very difficult to unglue that relationship, because they will need to get to know the minutiae of the building, its quirks and idiosyncrasies, but also our quirks and idiosyncrasies, and it would be strange if we did not admit that we have them.
It is important to say that this is not the same as the Olympics. I love the fact that we decided that the sponsor body and delivery authority for the Olympics would be separate. That was a good model. I was not here at the time, but I applaud that decision. Voting for it was the right thing to do. This is different, however, because it is about a sponsor body for the works on our own House. This is our place of work, but it is not just ours; it is also the people’s place of democracy. I want everyone to feel that they have a stake in Parliament. I want them to feel the same way they feel when they come out of Westminster tube station and look up at the Elizabeth Tower. That is a wonderful experience, and I want everybody to feel the same way about the whole of this lovely estate. Instead, at the moment there is an awful lot of scaffolding and, in my case, a certain amount of trepidation because I know too much about why the scaffolding is there.
I am afraid to say that there has been political interference. Ironically, the Sponsor Body was set up to remove political interference and yet political interference, or certainly obstruction, there has been. Certain Government Members have continued to ask unreasonable things of the Sponsor Body. I also note, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East and others have said, that the Sponsor Body has not always engaged as well as it could have done, for all sorts of reasons.
There is asbestos, sewage, wires, plumbing that nobody knows the function of, flood risk and regular fires. It is testament to the hard-working members of House staff and contractors—I pay tribute to them—that, thankfully, we have not yet witnessed a catastrophic failure of the building, as has happened to other buildings around the world, such as Notre Dame and other Parliaments. But, at some stage, that will not be enough. At some stage, a piece of masonry will fall on somebody’s head, one of the fires will become catastrophic or the asbestos will cause health problems that many of us will not know about in our lifetimes, but others in the future will suffer.
We will have to move out. We have to accept that. It is the right thing to do, for the patriotic reasons of celebrating our democracy and our history, whatever different interpretations we may have of it. As the hon. Members for Mole Valley and for Aberconwy said, this is also an opportunity for apprenticeships in all of our constituencies, and for every single one of us to be able to point to a bit of the building and say, “That bit of rock got quarried from my constituency.”
We have no choice. Both Houses are going to have to move out at some point, but we are going to be the generation that says to the next generation and the one beyond, and to the public, “We did this because we love democracy.” It is not just because we love the building, although we do, but because we love democracy. We know it is worth celebrating. We know that this is not just a tourist site, although it is an important tourist site. Therefore, if there is a vote on Tuesday—I do not yet know what will happen—I will be support the motion. Will the Minister assure us that the Government will do everything necessary to ensure that support will be provided to enable maximum financial accountability and that there will be minimal unnecessary political interference?
I remind the Minister to leave a minute or two at the end for Sir Geoffrey Clifton- Brown to wind up.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. At the start of today, I did not anticipate being in this Chamber summing up for the Government, but over my 12 years in this place, I have accepted that we have to expect the unexpected.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) on securing this debate. All Members have made a valuable contribution to it and demonstrated significant knowledge of the issues. There has, in many ways, been a spirit of consensus. That is always helpful, particularly to someone who is called to respond to a debate after not having done so for many years.
The restoration and renewal programme is on all our minds, for the many reasons set out by my hon. Friend the Member for the Cotswolds and others. I share hon. Members’ view of the important and urgent need to get on with the work of repairing this magnificent but tired building—a building that is, as has been said today, a UNESCO world heritage site of which we can be extremely proud.
I also share the view of Members that the estimated cost of £13 billion simply cannot be justified in the current economic context. A gap has emerged between what is realistic, practical, and can be justified to taxpayers on the one hand, and what is being proposed by the Sponsor Body on the other. That is why the House of Lords Commission and House of Commons Commission have unanimously proposed a way forward, and the House will be asked to approve a motion next week, as right hon. and hon. Members know, endorsing the Commissions’ joint report, which proposes a new mandate for the works and a new governance structure to support them. Let me emphasise that under the proposals, the delivery authority’s role remains unchanged; that valuable expertise and experience will remain in place. The senior leadership of the delivery authority will continue and, following recent discussions, I am confident and positive about its ability to work within the new governance structure.
Some Members in the debate, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds, have gone into detail on the question of decant, which is important to us all. I am sure Members will appreciate that decisions around decant will need to be taken in due course. Members will have the opportunity to express their views, but at this stage no decisions on decant or cost are required of the House. The intrusive surveys will offer us a more detailed understanding of the condition of the House. As my hon. Friend said, they might not give us the full picture, but they will give us a far better picture. Following that, there will be an opportunity for the House to consider all options and costs fully. We can then, at the right time, take the decision, informed by far more analysis and information.
Next week, the House will be asked to endorse a revised governance structure that aims to provide greater flexibility and closer Member engagement, the ambition being for works to start sooner. The House of Commons Commission has already agreed a set of initial priorities, including fire safety and protection, on which we have already made substantial progress through the installation of fire suppression systems in the basement, and asbestos management. We all know the dangers of asbestos, an issue raised widely by Members today. Other priorities include the replacement of mechanical, electrical, drainage, plumbing, data and communications systems, as well as conservation of the building fabric and stonework. Having heard Members discuss their experiences of the building, I think we can all agree that those are the essential priorities.
My hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds raised concerns about bringing the work back in house, and about expert knowledge. The R and R programme will have its own bespoke governance structure, as I am sure he knows, which is the right approach for a programme of such magnitude and technicality. It will incorporate external expertise on the programme board. The technical knowledge of the Sponsor Body will be used by the client team, and the delivery authority’s deep expertise, experience and understanding of the requirements of the Palace will remain. I reassure him that that expertise will be there for the duration of the project.
The right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown) mentioned cost overruns and accountability, which are extremely important issues. I am sure he is aware that the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019 allows Parliament to scrutinise and make decisions about the programme and budget, and I am hopeful that the new governance structure will allow deeper consultation and collaboration with Parliament. I urge all those responsible for the programme to consider carefully how decision making can be transparent and accountable to Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman also made a very good point about how we use our recess time. If the House decided that it wanted to go down the route of being more flexible with that, I know that it is a conversation that the Leader of the House is willing to have.
My hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) said that if work is brought in house, it may be just another excuse to delay the vital work. I reassure him that the revisions to the governance structure should allow us to bring forward the dates for starting the restoration works that we all want. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Robin Millar) was correct about specification creep, and I was impressed by his knowledge and expertise. We cannot allow things to run away with themselves and give this project a blank cheque; that would not be the responsible way to spend taxpayers’ money. He also made an excellent point about the skills required. We all know that skills are at a premium in lots of industries, especially those of skilled craftsmen, whose skills have been developed over generations. We have a good opportunity to develop new skills and apprenticeships for younger people, so that those skills can be used not just here, but across the country, to make sure that our historical buildings are fit for future generations to enjoy.
I heard what the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (John Nicolson) said. In many ways, I agree with him. I did not agree with the cut of his jib on some of his ideas about separating Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom, but that is not a new thing on which we disagree. I bring to his attention that there is already a crèche and nursery in Parliament, which replaced a bar here, but I accept entirely what he and other Members said about disabled access facilities, which are crucial. At the moment, our disabled access facilities are completely inadequate.
I was grateful to hear the constructive comments of the hon. Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire). It is good that there is a degree of consensus, and it was great to hear that she will support the motion next week, so that we can take this project forward, get a start date and, to refer back to my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley, see action and delivery.
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for the opportunity to participate in the debate. It has demonstrated a wealth of knowledge and a depth of affection for this historic building. Once again, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds for securing the debate, which has been extremely important for airing our views in advance of the vote next week.
Mr Twigg, may I thank you again for the professional way you have chaired the debate? I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr Jones). As he said, when he got up this morning, he had no idea that he would be responding to this debate. He has gained a great deal of knowledge in a very short time.
I thank all colleagues for participating in what I think has been a very consensual debate. It is almost universally agreed that we have to get on and do something. We may disagree on the emphasis here and there, but we have not disagreed about the need to do major work to preserve this excellent building for the next generations.
I will support my hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton in the vote next week, although I have thought very carefully about it. Let us make a vow that we will not be here in three years’ time. I do not want to still be talking about this issue in three years’ time, should my constituents re-elect me. Let us hope that by then, we have a proper costed plan, with a timetable, and have actually started work.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered the Restoration and Renewal Programme in the House of Commons.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written Statements(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThis Statement concerns an application for development consent made under the Planning Act 2008 by NNB Generation Company (SZC) Limited for the construction and operation of a nuclear power station near Leiston in Suffolk.
Under section 107(1) of the Planning Act 2008, the Secretary of State must make a decision on an application within three months of the receipt of the examining authority’s report unless exercising the power under section 107(3) of the Act to set a new deadline. Where a new deadline is set, the Secretary of State must make a statement to Parliament to announce it. The current statutory deadline for the decision on the Sizewell C nuclear power station application is 8 July 2022.
I have decided to set a new deadline of no later than 20 July 2022 for deciding this application. This is to ensure there is sufficient time to allow the Secretary of State to consider the proposal.
The decision to set the new deadline for this application is without prejudice to the decision on whether to grant or refuse development consent.
[HCWS195]
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsToday marks a significant milestone for the offshore transmission network review and the British energy security strategy, with the publication of the first major deliverable—the holistic network design, developed by National Grid Electricity System Operator. The full holistic network design and supporting documents and maps can be found at: https://www.nationalgrideso.com/future-energy/the-pathway-2030-holistic-network-design.
The UK Government launched the OTNR in 2020 to improve the delivery of transmission connections for offshore wind. Considering the increasingly ambitious targets for offshore wind deployment, the current approach of delivering individual links for each wind farm is no longer fit for purpose and will not deliver the best outcomes for consumers, the environment or local communities.
More recently, the British energy security strategy set out bold plans to scale up and accelerate affordable, clean and secure energy made in Britain, for Britain, so we can enjoy greater energy self-sufficiency with cheaper bills. This included an ambition for 50GW of offshore wind by 2030.
Holistic network design
Developing the GB network in a timely way is vital. Without it we will waste a significant volume of cheap, green electricity. This will require more network infrastructure than today, both onshore and offshore, but through an upfront, strategic approach to network planning we will ensure that new network infrastructure is minimised, and where it cannot be avoided, it is brought forward in the most appropriate place.
The first step to this new innovative approach is the holistic network design, which has been published on 7 July by National Grid ESO. The HND represents a significant shift in how network infrastructure is planned. It is a first of a kind strategic network design for the upgraded and new onshore and offshore network infrastructure needed to connect 18 offshore wind farms. This will provide the network infrastructure needed to meet our ambition of delivering 50GW of offshore wind by 2030.
The holistic network design, for the first time balances economic factors with consideration of environmental and community impacts. It sets out the need for this infrastructure, not a detailed project plan. No decisions have yet been taken on the route for the network, or how best to do this. All projects that come forward as a result of the HND will be subject to the relevant democratic planning processes. These will ensure local stakeholders get their say on developments and impacts are mitigated as far as possible.
Pathfinder projects
Alongside improving strategic network planning for 2030 and beyond, we are also facilitating innovation for well-advanced projects connecting ahead of 2030. Today, four initial pathfinder projects are being announced—in Norfolk, Aberdeen and South Yorkshire. These projects have voluntarily opted in to utilise changes made under the OTNR to increase network co-ordination and maximise the benefits for consumers, communities, and the environment. NGESO will continue working with developers to progress these projects.
Five projects off the coast of East Anglia have today confirmed their commitment to exploring co-ordinated network designs, with a view to identifying future pathfinder projects. Further information on these announcements can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/offshore-transmission-network-review.
[HCWS190]
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Government have announced in the spring statement that they will create a Public Sector Fraud Authority (PSFA) to fight public sector fraud.
The PSFA will focus on performance and outcomes, building expert-led services to support Government Departments and public bodies to combat fraud. It will bring increased scrutiny across the system.
The Government had planned for the PSFA to be launched in July 2022, with a statement to the House. The planned statement will be made, but at a later date.
The PSFA will be part of wider spending by the government of over £750 million to combat fraud. Once launched, it will replace the existing centre of the counter fraud function.
[HCWS192]
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsToday the Government are committing to a series of changes to strengthen the Online Safety Bill further, and deliver our manifesto commitment of making the UK the safest place in the world to be online. This ground-breaking legislation will make technology companies accountable to an independent regulator to keep their users safe, while enshrining safeguards for freedom of expression online.
The Government have tabled amendments to make a series of changes to the Bill.
This includes:
Temporary “must carry” requirements for platforms to carry recognised news publisher content until an appeal on removal or moderation has taken place.
Changes to the illegal safety duties, to include the risk that a service is used for the commission or facilitation of an offence, better to address concerns about cross-platform harms and breadcrumbing.
Providing further powers to enable Ofcom to require companies to take additional steps to tackle child sexual exploitation and abuse online.
Strengthening the harmful and false communications offences, by including a partial exemption for holders of certain licences to ensure licence holders are not able to undermine the offence or avoid prosecution for harmful behaviour.
Changes to make clearer that category one service providers can decide to allow harmful content on their service if they choose to.
In addition, many people are rightly concerned about the threat that state-sponsored disinformation poses to UK society and democracy. The Government have tabled an amendment that builds a bridge between the National Security Bill and the Online Safety Bill. This amendment to the National Security Bill will designate the offence of foreign interference as a priority offence in schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill. This will capture the kind of state-sponsored disinformation that is of most concern: covert attempts by foreign state actors to manipulate our information environment in order to interfere in UK society and undermine our democratic, political and legal processes.
Following careful consideration and consultation with stakeholders and parliamentarians, the Government commits to implementing the following changes, bringing forward amendments in the Lords where necessary:
Small but high-risk services:
Emerging risky services list
The tech sector is fast-moving and companies can rapidly expand. The Government recognise concerns that this pace of change will make it more challenging for Ofcom to keep the register of high-risk, high-reach—category 1—services up to date. To address this, the Government will introduce a new duty on Ofcom to identify and publish a list of companies that are close to the category 1 thresholds. This will ensure that Ofcom proactively identifies emerging risky companies, and is ready to assess and add these companies to the category 1 register without delay.
This new requirement on Ofcom will be combined with Ofcom’s existing duties continually to assess regulated services and to add them to the register of categories if they meet the relevant threshold conditions. This will ensure the regime remains agile and able to adapt to emerging threats, as well as ensuring Ofcom can develop a detailed understanding of new risks.
Deferred power to apply the adult safety duties to small but high-risk services
We also recognise the concerns which have been raised around smaller platforms which allow or encourage suicide, antisemitic, incel and racist content on their services, and we will continue with cross-government work on such issues. These platforms will already be subject to the illegal safety duties, ensuring that they put in place effective measures to prevent the most harmful content being shared on their services.
The current provisions in the Bill relating to legal content that poses a risk of harm to adult users acknowledges that the reach of such content, as well as the functionality of the service, such as algorithmic promotion of harmful content, will affect the risk it poses to users.
Further research is necessary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to expand the duties on small but risky platforms. We will therefore be conferring a deferred power on the Secretary of State to create a new category of small but high-risk services which will be subject to the duties relating to adults’ risk assessment and adult safety. This change will mean those smaller but high-risk services will be held to account for the transparent and consistent enforcement of their own terms and conditions. The services included in this new category would be identified through a similar process as for category 1 services in the Bill, but without a requirement relating to the number of users of the service. The Secretary of State will also be able to consider other relevant factors in addition to the risk of harm, to avoid inadvertently bringing small services into scope where this would not be proportionate to the risk presented.
To ensure the Secretary of State has the necessary evidence to inform the decision on whether to make this change, we will require Ofcom to produce a report with evidence of the prevalence of, and risk associated with, priority harmful content on non-category 1 services. The Secretary of State will be required to consider that report when taking the decision on whether to commence the power.
It is vital that the Online Safety Bill remains targeted and proportionate and does not impose any undue burdens on business. We will only apply the adult’s risk assessment and adult safety duties to services in this new category, rather than the full range of category 1 duties.
Definition of “recognised news publisher”:
We are committed to protecting media freedom and the invaluable role of a free press in our society and democracy. We are clear that online safety regulation must protect the vital role of the press in our society. This is why we have provided protections for recognised news publisher content and journalistic content. News publishers’ websites are not in scope of online safety regulation. The legislation also contains safeguards for news publisher content and wider journalistic content when it is shared on in-scope social media platforms, including a right of appeal for journalists when their content is removed. At report stage, we will strengthen protections, including to ensure that recognised news publishers’ content remains online while an appeal takes place. However, we are clear that sanctioned news outlets such as RT must not benefit from these protections. As such, we intend to amend the criteria for determining which entities qualify as recognised news publishers in the Lords explicitly to exclude entities that are subject to sanctions.
Epilepsy trolling:
Flashing images sent online deliberately to people with epilepsy can result in significant harm. The Government have listened to parliamentarians and stakeholders about the impact and consequences of this awful behaviour. We welcome the Law Commission’s recommended new criminal offence and can confirm that the Government will legislate for a new offence of epilepsy trolling through this Bill at the earliest possible stage. We had hoped to introduce a Government amendment at report stage, but it is essential to create an offence that is legally robust and enforceable so that those perpetrating this disgraceful behaviour will face the appropriate criminal sanctions. We therefore commit to tabling amendments to create this offence in the Lords.
Secretary of State’s power of direction on codes of practice:
We recognise the concerns raised that the Bill allows too great a degree of Executive control. These have focused in particular on the power for the Secretary of State to require Ofcom to modify a draft of a code of practice for reasons of public policy. We remain committed to ensuring that Ofcom maintains its regulatory independence, which is vital to the success of the framework. With this in mind, we have built a number of safeguards into the use of the Secretary of State’s powers, to ensure they are consistent with our intention of having an independent regulator and are only used in limited circumstances with appropriate scrutiny.
We will make two substantive changes to this power: firstly, we will make it clear that this power would only be used “in exceptional circumstances”; and secondly, we will replace the “public policy” wording with a more clearly defined list of reasons for which the Secretary of State could issue a direction. This list will comprise national security, public safety, public health, the UK’s international relations and obligations, economic policy and burden to business.
We are grateful for the continued engagement and scrutiny of the Bill as it moves through its parliamentary stages. These changes ensure that the Bill remains sustainable, workable, and proportionate, and will create a significant step-change in the experience people have online.
Publishing risk assessment summaries:
We recognise the need for companies to be as transparent as possible when it comes to the level of risk in the design and operation of their services. This needs to be balanced with ensuring confidential information is protected, whilst maintaining the Bill’s risk-based and proportionate approach. The Bill already requires in-scope services to carry out risk assessments, keep them up to date and update them before making a significant change to the design or operation of their service. Ofcom will also require major platforms to publish annual transparency reports. Summaries of risk assessments could be included in this; however, we recognise calls to ensure this is more robustly enforced.
We therefore intend to require the highest risk companies to publish a summary of their illegal and child safety risk assessments, with a further requirement that the same categories of company submit these risk assessments in full to Ofcom. This should ensure greater transparency from the highest risk companies, whilst making it easier for Ofcom to supervise compliance with the risk assessment duty.
[HCWS193]
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Online Safety Bill will deliver vital protections for children, ensure there are no safe spaces for criminals online and protect and promote free speech.
All services in scope of the Bill must tackle criminal activity online, and all services likely to be accessed by children will have duties to protect them from harmful content. The major platforms will have additional responsibilities to set out clearly what content harmful to adults they allow on their service, and to enforce their own policies consistently. Nothing in the Bill requires services to remove legal content from their platform and users will continue to be able to hold robust discussions of controversial issues, including those which might cause offence, online.
The Bill sets a threshold for harmful content, which brings into scope content of a kind which presents a material risk of significant harm to an appreciable number of children or adults in the UK. Disagreement online will not meet the threshold of harm in the Bill, including on issues of scientific debate.
A key feature of the online safety regulatory framework will be the designation of priority harmful content for children and adults. Services in scope of the Bill which are likely to be accessed by children will be required to prevent them from encountering “primary priority content that is harmful to children”, and to protect children in age groups at risk of harm from “priority content that is harmful to children”.
The largest and most high risk, category 1, services will also need to be clear in their terms of service how “priority content that is harmful to adults” is addressed by the service. Services will be able to set their own tolerance for legal content for adult users. Category 1 services will need to assess the risk of priority harmful content to adults, set out clearly in terms of service how such content is treated and enforce their terms of service consistently. This could include specifying that the content will be removed or deprioritised in news feeds, but could also include the platform stating that such content is allowed freely or that it will be recommended or promoted to other users. In addition, all services will need to have regard to freedom of expression when implementing their safety duties.
Final details of the types of content covered by the three categories—primary priority content for children, priority harmful content for children and priority harmful content for adults—will be designated in secondary legislation following consultation with Ofcom. This will ensure the types of designated content are based on the most recent evidence and emerging harms can be added quickly, future-proofing the legislation. However, the Government recognise the interest from parliamentarians and stakeholders in the identity of priority harmful content. To provide more detail on the harms that we intend to designate, the Government are publishing a proposed list of the types of content that it expects to be listed as primary priority and priority harmful content for children and priority harmful content for adults.
The Government consider that the types of content on the indicative list meet the threshold for priority harmful content set out in the Bill. This threshold is important to ensure that the online safety framework focuses on content and activity which poses the most significant risk of harm to UK users online. It is important for the framework to distinguish in this way between strongly felt debate on the one hand, and unacceptable acts of abuse, intimidation and violence on the other. British democracy has always been robust and oppositional. Free speech within the law can involve the expression of views that some may find offensive, but a line is crossed when disagreement mutates into abuse or harassment, which refuses to tolerate other opinions and seeks to deprive others from exercising their free speech and freedom of association.
This may not be an exhaustive list of the content which will be designated as priority harmful content under the Bill. We will continue to engage extensively with stakeholders, parliamentarians and Ofcom, including on some of the most harmful content online, ahead of designating the details of the three categories of priority harmful content in secondary legislation.
Indicative list of priority harmful content
Adults:
Priority content (category 1 services need to address in their terms and conditions):
Online abuse and harassment. Mere disagreement with another’s point of view would not reach the threshold of harmful content, and so would not be covered by this.
Circulation of real or manufactured intimate images without the subject's consent
Content promoting self-harm
Content promoting eating disorders
Legal suicide content
Harmful health content that is demonstrably false, such as urging people to drink bleach to cure cancer. It also includes some health and vaccine misinformation and disinformation, but is not intended to capture genuine debate.
Children:
Primary priority content (children must be prevented from encountering altogether):
Pornography
Content promoting self-harm (with some content which may be designated as priority content, e.g. content focused on recovery from self-harm)
Content promoting eating disorders (with some content which may be designated as priority content, e.g. content focused on recovery from an eating disorder)
Legal suicide content (with some content which may be designated as priority content, e.g. content focused on recovery)
Priority content (companies need to ensure content is age appropriate for their child users):
Online abuse, cyberbullying and harassment
Harmful health content (including health and vaccine misinformation and disinformation) Content depicting or encouraging violence
[HCWS194]
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Office for Budget Responsibility has published its Fiscal Risks and Sustainability report today. This report fulfils the OBR’s obligation to examine and report on the sustainability of, and the risks to, the public finances, in accordance with the Charter for Budget Responsibility. The UK continues to be a leading example in fiscal transparency and risk management.
The FRS has been laid before Parliament today and copies are available in the Vote Office and Printed Paper Office. The Government will respond formally to the FRS 2022 at a subsequent fiscal event.
The UK has experienced several significant shocks over the last decade, including the challenges posed by the covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a spike in global energy prices.
The Government have taken a balanced approach, ensuring that it continues to support people and the economy in the face of global pressures and uncertainty with temporary, timely and targeted support, while reducing debt over the medium term. The Government support for cost of living has now totalled over £37 billion this year, with the OBR noting in today’s report that the Government spent as much
“as it did supporting the economy through the financial crisis”.
The Government are also committed to building a stronger economy for future generations, and the OBR today has revised up long-run productivity growth because of the Government plans to deliver over £600 billion in gross public sector investment over the next 5 years, reaching the highest sustained levels of public sector net investment as a proportion of GDP since the late 1970s.
In the long run, the OBR’s projections show that demographic change, other cost pressures and the transition to net zero will present significant challenges to the public finances. The OBR note the actions the Government have taken to strengthen the public finances and reduce debt levels over the medium term, but significant pressures remain. The report also highlights that the UK still faces threats in the near term. The public finances remain sensitive to inflation and interest rates, with the outlook for energy prices being uncertain and made more pronounced by heightened geopolitical tensions. The Government must therefore continue to bring down the level of debt and rebuild fiscal space, so we can safeguard the economy against future challenges and respond as future risks materialise.
[HCWS191]
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Government are implementing a comprehensive reform programme of adult social care with £5.4 billion investment over three years, building on measures in the Health and Care Act. This includes £3.6 billion to reform the social care charging system and enable all local authorities to move towards paying providers a fair cost of care.
Today the Department of Health and Social Care has published updated operational guidance on implementing the cap on care costs, alongside the Government response to the consultation on this draft guidance. This guidance seeks to support all local authorities in their preparations for implementing our reforms from October 2023.
These changes will end the lottery of unpredictable care costs through the introduction of a £86,000 cap on personal care costs, as well as a more generous means test, raising the upper capital limit from £23,350 to £100,000, and the lower capital limit from £14,250 to £20,000.
The Government’s consultation on the statutory guidance to implement charging reform ran from 4 March until 31 March 2022 and sought views on how a cap on care costs would operate in practice. The consultation received 161 responses, indicating broad support of the policy principles and the aims of our reforms. The feedback suggested that sections of the guidance needed further development to ensure they are clear and workable. We have therefore worked with local authorities and the wider adult social care sector to clarify and expand the guidance in line with this feedback.
The guidance updates the existing care and support statutory guidance (CASS) and covers the following areas:
Cap on care costs (including detail on: daily living costs; what counts towards the cap; the metering process; requesting that the local authority meets self-funders’ needs and cross-border issues);
Independent personal budgets (including detail on: the principles of establishing an independent personal budget; verification of the purchase of care; dispute resolution; and moving from an independent personal budget to a personal budget);
Care accounts (including detail on: what should be included in a care account; care account statements; retention of care accounts; and portability of care accounts).
We have also amended the guidance in response to feedback on the implementation of one specific aspect of our reforms, the extension of section 18(3) of the Care Act 2014.
As announced in building back better, from October 2023 we will extend the right for self-funding individuals to have their eligible care needs met by their local authority, such that they can access care at, generally lower, local authority rates. This is aimed at improving fairness and accessibility, as well as supporting the operation of the cap, which is based on how much local authorities pay for care. We will do this by extending the application of section 18(3) of the Care Act 2014.
The consultation sought views on how best to ensure smooth implementation of this change. Respondents pointed towards a need to mitigate the initial impacts of section 18(3) and a common theme in responses from local authorities was concern about the workability of full implementation from October 2023. They were also concerned about the potential impact on those awaiting care and support, should a large number of people with existing care arrangements already in place approach their local authority to arrange their care at this point in time.
The guidance published today therefore clarifies our intention to stage the extension of section 18(3) over 18 months, so that people entering residential care from October 2023 are initially eligible. Additionally, anybody already living in residential care will be eligible from April 2025 at the latest, and earlier if the market can sustain full rollout. This will be kept under regular review. Section 18(3) already applies to individuals who are receiving care outside of a residential care setting.
Section 18(3) does not affect an individual’s ability to use the cap on care costs; all care users will be able to meter towards the cap on care costs from October 2023. Rather, section 18(3) helps individuals ensure that they pay no more than the metering rate when meeting their eligible needs; the metering rate is based on the fees commissioned by local authorities, and these cannot always be secured by individuals arranging their own care. This means that individuals using section 18(3) from October 2023 onwards need not pay more than £86,000 on getting the personal care they need; their local authority will arrange their care and they will meter towards the cap based on the amount they spend. Everyone who funds their own care will be able to ask their local authority to meet their needs from April 2025 at the latest. People with assets of less than £100,000 do not need to use section 18(3); they will be able to ask their local authority to meet their needs from October 2023, as a result of the extended and more generous means test.
This staged approach to introduction will allow individuals funding their own care to benefit from local authorities’ expertise in commissioning as quickly as possible, while allowing local authorities and social care providers to plan for this change and avoid unnecessary disruption to service provision.
Today’s publication is a further milestone on the Government’s journey to reform adult social care, creating a system that is fit for the future and of which we can all be proud.
[HCWS189]