Mental Health Bill [HL]
Wednesday 6th November 2024
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Monday 25th November 2024
(2 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Merron
That the Bill be now read a second time.
Relevant document: Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill, Session 2022-23. Welsh legislative consent sought.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
My Lords, it is an honour to move the Second Reading of the Mental Health Bill—a Bill which Members of both Houses have been waiting for and working on for some considerable time.
There is much consensus that our mental health laws are not fit for the 21st century. Many elements of the Mental Health Act 1983 are outdated. Its operation is associated with racial disparities and poor care for people with a learning disability and autistic people, and it fails to give patients an adequate voice. Modernising the Mental Health Act is a vital manifesto commitment for this Government, so I am proud to introduce reforms that will ensure that care is appropriate, compassionate and effective; give patients more say over their care; improve support to help patients understand and exercise their rights; and protect the safety of the public, staff and patients.
The wait has been too long. I know that a number of noble Lords were involved when the Act was last amended substantially in 2007, but, although attitudes to mental health have, thankfully, changed since then, the law has not kept up. The Bill is the product of the combined effort over some years by Members of both Houses and many outside Parliament, and all parties have rightly come together to support it. Sincere thanks are due to many, but I will highlight just a few, starting with Members of your Lordships’ House who served on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee in 2022: the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, as chair, as well as the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Berridge, Lady Hollins and Lady McIntosh of Hudnall, and the noble Lord, Lord Bradley. All have given a huge amount of time, expertise and energy, which has informed and motivated this Government to strengthen the Bill. I confirm that we have improved the previous draft Bill by heeding the committee’s recommendations to include guiding principles and advance choice documents in this revised Bill.
I pay tribute to the former Prime Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady May, whom I had the pleasure of meeting earlier today with the Secretary of State. The noble Baroness, Lady May, identified the need for modernisation and set up the independent review of the Act in 2017. Without this, we would not be here today. I thank the independent review chair, Sir Simon Wessely, and his vice-chairs, including the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, who made the case for change and provided the blueprint to follow. I know they will continue to be champions for reform. I also thank the many stakeholders and parliamentarians who have engaged with us ahead of Second Reading and over the years, and those with lived experience, who have bravely told their stories.
The Bill will complement other major reforms that this Government have announced. The Budget announced £26 million to be invested in new mental health crisis centres to reduce pressure on accident and emergency departments. To cut mental health waiting lists, we will go further still, recruiting an additional 8,500 staff. As part of our mission to reduce the number of lives lost to suicide, these NHS workers will be specially trained to support people at risk. We will improve support for young people, with walk-in hubs in every community, making support workers more accessible to children, and a specialist mental health professional based in every school. The NHS has asked every provider of mental health services to review its offer for serious mental illness. By focusing on early intervention—prevention is the key—we seek to prevent people reaching crisis and to reduce the need for detentions in the first place.
I turn to what the Bill seeks to achieve. The Mental Health Act is there to protect people. Its core purpose is, and will remain, to be able to intervene, detain and treat when someone is so unwell that they present a risk to themselves or others. The overall aims of these reforms are to improve the care and treatment of people with severe mental illnesses when detained under the Act, to improve patient outcomes and recovery, and to protect the public, patients and staff. The existing Act confers certain rights on people who are detained, including the right to appeal their detention at a tribunal and a right to an advocate as well as to a medical second opinion in certain circumstances. The Bill seeks to strengthen and expand these rights. It will require the inclusion in the statutory code of practice of the new and revised guiding principles recommended by the independent review, which in turn informs professional practice around the Act. By doing this, we aim to improve things for patients and support a change in culture.
We are strengthening and clarifying the detention criteria to make clear that people will be detained only if they pose a risk of serious harm to themselves and/or others, and if there is a reasonable prospect that they will benefit from the proposed treatment. We are reforming the use of community treatment orders—CTOs—to reflect the revised criteria, to increase oversight and scrutiny of decision-making, and to improve the transfer of patients under a CTO from hospital to community services. We are also introducing statutory care and treatment plans for patients detained under the Act, except when under very short-term sections, to provide a clear plan for a patient’s recovery and a path to discharge.
Where the patient’s voice has previously been unheard, the Bill will place them at the centre of their care and treatment. We are introducing a new clinical checklist requiring clinicians to, as far as possible, involve patients in decisions about their care and to take their feelings and wishes into account.
We are making sure that patients know they can create an advance choice document and that appropriate support is available to help them do so, allowing those at risk of detention under the Act to outline their wishes and decisions while they are well. This document helps them retain control over decisions about their admission, care and treatment if they later become too unwell to communicate these preferences. Last week I saw and heard about the differences that these can make on my visit to the South London and Maudsley, where the words of welcome from service users about these measures highlighted the contribution that advance choice documents can make, particularly to tackle racial inequalities.
We are allowing patients to choose a nominated person to look out for them and their interests when detained and will be increasing their powers. The independent mental health advocacy service was a notable success of the 2007 reforms to the Act. It is a thriving sector, with advocates and volunteers working for excellent organisations such as VoiceAbility, making sure that people are involved with decisions about their care.
We are now looking to expand these services in two ways. First, we are making sure that patients who come into hospital voluntarily can access an advocate to help them understand their rights and be involved in decisions about their care. Secondly, for detained patients, access to advocacy will be on an opt-out basis, ensuring that patients are proactively offered this support when detained to improve advocacy uptake among detained patients.
I know only too well that noble Lords are acutely aware that for some people with a learning disability and autistic people, detention is both non-therapeutic and unnecessarily long. In order to better meet people’s needs in the community, we will limit detention so that people with a learning disability and autistic people can no longer be detained beyond 28 days, unless they have a co-occurring mental health condition that requires hospital treatment. This will affect only civil patients. Hospital will remain an option for those in contact with the criminal justice system, where the only alternative to detention in hospital is prison.
For people with a learning disability and autistic people, the right measures and support are very much needed alongside this change. That is why the Act will require that when people are detained, there is a care (education) and treatment review to be given due weight in decision-making. We are also creating new duties on commissioners to hold registers to help manage the risk of people going into crisis and being detained, and to better meet the needs of people through appropriate community services.
I am grateful for the work of the Ministry of Justice Minister, my noble friend Lord Timpson, and his department, to improve access to mental health care and treatment for people in the criminal justice system. The Bill will end the use of both prison and police cells as places of safety. It will end the use of remand for own protection under the Bail Act where the court’s sole concern is the defendant’s mental health.
We will introduce a statutory 28-day time limit for transfers from prison and other places of detention to hospital when a person requires treatment for their mental health under the Act. We will also introduce a subset of conditional discharge, called supervised discharge, to support the small number of restricted patients who are no longer benefiting from being in hospital.
We are aware that there have been concerns about public safety and are therefore ensuring that our reforms do not weaken the ability to detain people who could pose a risk of serious harm to themselves or others. I assure your Lordships’ House that these reforms do not change the core function of the Mental Health Act. Clinicians will remain able to intervene, to detain, and to treat whenever someone with severe mental illness presents a risk to themselves or others.
We are confident that this is the right package of reforms. However, the Bill further strengthens the measures in respect of public protection. The Bill improves on the previous draft Bill by: first, accepting the Joint Committee’s recommendation to remove “how soon” from the new detention criteria, making sure the Act cannot be misinterpreted to mean that a harm must be imminent to justify detention and early intervention; secondly, introducing a new requirement for the responsible clinician to consult another person when they are making a decision about whether to discharge a patient; and thirdly, strengthening the code of practice’s guidance on discharging patients and promoting the need for discharge planning tailored to the individual needs of patients and their circumstances. We will consult on changes to the code.
I am very grateful to noble Lords across the House for their ongoing support for and interest in the Bill. It has been a long time coming, and I know that we all want to get this on the statute book, which is why it is a priority piece of legislation for this Government. There has been a failure to reform, but today we begin to change that. I look forward to what I know will be a collegiate and constructive debate, which many will follow—inside both Houses and outside. I beg to move.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I begin by extending my gratitude to the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, for introducing the Bill into your Lordships’ House and for her very clear exposition of its contents. It is a Bill that we on these Benches warmly welcome. That welcome should not come as a surprise because, as the noble Baroness said, the Bill before us is the successor to a draft Bill prepared by the previous Government, a draft that owed its origin to my noble friend Lady May, on whose watch a review of the 1983 Act was initiated some seven years ago during her time as Prime Minister. Much of what we see laid out here is the product of diligent work carried out by Professor Sir Simon Wessely and his review committee, as well as the Joint Committee of both Houses, so ably chaired by my noble friend Lady Buscombe.
The passage of the Bill presents us with a golden opportunity to address both the current state of mental health provision and the law that governs it. The last major update of the Act took place in 2007 under the previous Labour Government. That may not sound like a long time ago but, as we shall no doubt hear from others, experience gained in the intervening years has taught us that a further update is indeed warranted if we are to ensure that the Act remains relevant and appropriate, and that its powers are proportionate.
Wherever the state uses its powers to deprive an individual of their liberty, the necessary safeguards must be in place so that those powers are used sparingly, proportionately and with the highest regard for human dignity and autonomy. That is why the Bill is so important. Since the last set of changes to mental health legislation in 2007, the number of people being detained under the Mental Health Act has grown exponentially. In fact, since 1983, the numbers have nearly doubled to a total of over 52,000 new recorded detentions between 2023 and 2024.
Within that total, we have also seen a stark disparity in the classifications of those being detained. Black people are 3.5 times more likely to face detention under the Act. Shockingly, to my mind, there are currently over 2,000 people with autism and learning disabilities detained in mental health hospitals across the country. I was equally shocked by the realisation that people with autism can be detained even if they do not have a mental health condition, leading to disproportionate, burdensome and wholly inappropriate treatment.
These issues occupied centre stage in the Wessely review, which proposed the formal recognition of four key principles that should from now on govern both theory and practice in this area of the law. The principles are: choice and autonomy; least restriction on liberty; therapeutic benefit; and the person as an individual. The previous Government fully accepted these four principles and—giving life, as it were, to those principles—the draft Bill set out to make a number of important changes. It strengthened the rights of patients with a learning disability, it gave patients greater autonomy in choosing how they wish to be treated, it introduced duties on commissioners to better understand and support people with a learning disability or autism, who may be at risk of crisis, and it sought to update community treatment orders, which are one of the key drivers of racial disparities in the numbers of people subject to restrictions under the Act.
It is therefore very pleasing indeed to see this Government’s firm commitment to enacting exactly these reforms, and I, for one, hope that as the Bill proceeds, we can come together as a House to implement and, where necessary, improve this hugely beneficial set of changes.
With consensus as the thread that, happily, we expect to run through our consideration of the Bill, there are nevertheless certain themes within it that are likely to require our particular attention. The first of these is community treatment orders. CTOs were first introduced in the Mental Health Act 2007. The Joint Committee on the earlier draft Bill was very clear that CTOs had been widely overused and that they are one of the leading causes of the racial disparities that I referred to a minute ago. The Bill before us makes a number of changes to the criteria governing the use of CTOs, all of them designed to support two of the key principles in the Bill: those of least restriction and therapeutic benefit.
As far as they go, these changes are desirable. However, the Bill stops short of including the full suite of recommendations made by the Wessely review. The Centre for Mental Health has raised this as a key concern. It points out that there is still no persuasive evidence of the benefits of CTOs. Against that background, it argues that a number of checks and balances are needed on the use of CTOs in future, over and above those already in the Bill. In particular, it notes that the committee recommended a full statutory review of the use of CTOs to report within a fixed timeline, which, on the face of it, is the least that we should be doing. I think we will want to debate in Committee why the Government have not felt it appropriate to go as far as the Joint Committee and the independent review recommended in this area.
The next important theme is children and young people. According to NHS data—and this was highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, in his recent review—932 children in mental health units were subject to restrictive interventions in 2023-24. In total, more than 84,000 restrictive interventions were carried out on these children, which is a 51% increase from the year before. This is the highest number of restrictive interventions recorded since figures were made available in 2019, and that is despite the number of children in mental health units appearing to decrease.
We have a duty to use the Bill as an opportunity to identify ways of reducing such restrictive interventions and using them more humanely and more proportionately. Two years ago, the Government launched the Oliver McGowan training for NHS staff to help them better deal with young patients with autism. Noble Lords may remember that this was in response to a truly harrowing and appalling set of occurrences that ended with the death of a young man. It is fair to say that the case shook the health service to its core. I believe we have in the Bill the opportunity to take forward those lessons so as to protect children who may be at risk from unwarranted detentions.
The independent review and the Joint Committee had much to say about how treatment of children under the Mental Health Act could be improved. Unfortunately, by no means all those recommendations have found their way into the Bill. One such omission relates to the inappropriate placement of under-18s into adult wards or facilities that can sometimes be miles away from their home. The Joint Committee found that in each of the years 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19, over 1,000 children were placed out of area, and that in 2020, 21% of children and young people were placed as in-patients more than 50 miles from their home.
It is perfectly obvious that being taken to an unfamiliar environment in a place far away from friends and family is almost guaranteed to exacerbate the issues young people face when experiencing a mental health crisis. On top of this, data from the Care Quality Commission showed that in 2021, 249 children and young people admitted for mental health treatments were housed on adult wards for more than 48 hours, some for a good deal longer than that. These are uncomfortable figures; I hope noble Lords on all sides of the House will want to ensure that, through this Bill, we take all possible steps to bear down on the scale of these problems and strengthen the protections afforded to children and young people.
One of the core themes that has remained prominent throughout the process that has led to this Bill is that of choice: giving patients as great a degree of autonomy as possible in how they are treated and maximising their ability to determine what happens to them if they are detained. In that regard, I think the Bill succeeds on many counts, but one measure recommended by the Joint Committee was that there should be a statutory right to an advance care document for every patient who has been or may be detained under the Mental Health Act. The Bill, as it stands, does not follow up on this recommendation. Instead, it places a duty on NHS England and integrated care boards to make information regarding such documents available to patients. I do not doubt that this is a beneficial reform, but we should debate whether it goes quite as far as it usefully might. Guaranteeing patients and service users the chance to state and record their preferences for care and treatment plays directly into the key principles of choice, autonomy and treating every person as a rounded individual—so what are the barriers to doing that?
There are a whole host of detailed issues which we will need to cover in Committee. The final, major area I want to touch on is that of the role played by the police. Inevitably, circumstances arise in which the police are required to become involved with people who may be a risk to themselves or to others. There is a strong feeling that encounters with the police are far too common for people with mental health conditions. As the independent review and the National Police Chiefs’ Council have pointed out, the presence of the police in situations where a mental health issue poses a risk of serious injury or death can be counterproductive. In its written submission to the Joint Committee, the Metropolitan Police stated that:
“Our officers simply cannot provide the specialist care needed, exposing both patients and officers to extreme risks”.
The NPCC has also expressed its concern that the role of the police in mental health pathways must be reduced.
It is welcome that the Bill goes some way to addressing this. Clause 46 removes police stations and prisons as places of safety, thereby preventing patients experiencing mental health crises from being locked up inappropriately. However, there is a potential knock-on effect that we should talk about in Committee. Well-intentioned as the provision is, it could well lead to a rise in people being admitted to accident and emergency departments, escorted by the police, and having to wait in crowded spaces with the lack of the necessary, specialised facilities until they can be assessed by clinicians. In this environment, the risk of harm could well be multiplied. We need to ask how this risk can best be mitigated. I fear that any realistic answer will need to involve resources, by which I mean taking steps to ensure that the requisite arrangements are made for NHS trusts to deal with an increase in the number of mental health patients being admitted to hospitals as places of safety. This is not an easy set of issues, but it is a subject that we cannot duck.
Parliament must see to it that wrongful, inappropriate and untherapeutic detentions of those undergoing a mental health crisis are brought to an end. The Bill provides us with a necessary and welcome opportunity to transform the treatment of those with mental health conditions and to bring both doctrine and practice well and truly into the 21st century. Along with my noble friend Lord Kamall, I look forward to working with the Minister and with noble Lords on all sides of the House to scrutinise and—where we can—improve the Bill’s provisions. Many thousands of the most vulnerable members of our society are depending on us to do so.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of an advisory panel for Rethink Mental Illness.
The House of Lords is an institution that is frequently criticised. Those of us who are often called on—not least by schoolchildren—to defend it often find ourselves having to give examples of work it has done which would not have been done by anybody else. As a veteran of the pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act, the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Health Act 2007 and all the various bits of subsequent legislation, I think that we have arrived at the point with this piece of legislation where we can make a defensible case for the unique contribution of this place to legislative progress. As the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, was generous enough to say in her introduction, there are a lot of us in this place who have got form on this. Specifically, there are an awful lot of us who have detailed knowledge of all those bits of legislation and of the workings of the 1983 Act.
If the noble Baroness will not mind me saying, we come to these pieces of work in two minds. It is great to have the opportunity to go back, look at what we did in the past and rectify some of the mistakes. However, it is always also deeply frustrating because, in truth, here we are again putting another patch on the 1983 legislation. We will never get the mental health system that we so badly and desperately need until we do more than that.
Having said that, along with other noble Lords, I congratulate Sir Simon Wessely and his team, and specifically the working groups that worked with him. If any noble Lord who has been inundated with briefings from all the interested parties, as we all have been, is ever in doubt about a subject, they should go back to the report of the working groups to understand how people have arrived at their conclusions and what we should perhaps strive for. I say that as the person who sat here night after night during the passage of the 2007 legislation, arguing for an advance choice document against a lot of entrenched opposition, not least from practitioners. It is really important that we use the privilege of our position—I mean that: privilege—to work away at this legislation as we did with that so that, perhaps uniquely, we can make some progress.
Those of us on these Benches will support anything that makes clinicians have to be more accountable and transparent in their work. We can have any legislation we like but, until such time as we call decision-makers to account, we are not going to get anywhere on behalf of people who are detained. They may be detained for their own good. They may be detained for the safety of others, but they are none the less detained. Their opportunities to challenge the decisions made are quite rare. As ever in this House, in the end, when we are coming to a decision, we always have a duty to defend human rights. Human rights legislation exists to defend the people that nobody in society likes. Quite often, that means the people subject to this legislation.
On the issue of principles against the Bill, having gone through the Mental Capacity Act, and having then subsequently reviewed it and its implementation, with serried ranks of professionals coming in to tell us that they just ignored the principles which had been in that Bill since the beginning, I am not overjoyed that they are going to be stuck into a code of conduct. This will surprise the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, not a lot. I do not honestly think it will make any difference at all. They are very good principles but, unless and until they are in the Bill and practitioners believe that their decisions will be judged against them, they will be useless.
Lots of other people can speak about learning disabilities far better than I can. I want to say just two things. First, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, talked about training professionals in relation to young people. Increasingly, people are diagnosed with learning difficulties, and particularly autism, as older adults. We should listen to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has been telling us for years and require all mental health practitioners to have training in the diagnosis of learning disabilities and autism. That is the one thing that would make a swift and tangible difference in this area.
Secondly, the alignment—or non-alignment—of the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act has been problematic. We have known about that for more than 20 years. To everybody who knows about it, I simply say “Bournewood gap”. To those who do not, I say that the two pieces of legislation are built on completely different bases. Two people, sitting side by side, can be treated according to one or the other depending on who is in the room at the time. If you get banged up under one, you have quite a lot of rights; if you get banged up under another, you do not. I understand why Sir Simon and his team thought that it would be too long and too difficult a job to sort this out. It was much better that we carried on to do some of the more urgent things in this Bill, but we have to go back and do it. Other jurisdictions are going down that path.
The one thing that the noble Baroness and the Government have to do is give a commitment that they will monitor that and, upon the passage of this Bill, put in place a system of funded research about the change to bring in what is known as fusion legislation. If we do not, we will just consign a load of people to being wrongfully treated, so I hope that she will do that.
In a similar vein, Dr Lucy Series and Luke Clements, who are academics and practitioners who have worked on this for a long time, sent us a briefing that explains in characteristic detail the deficiencies that arise under Section 73 of the Care Act 2014. It means that people who are being treated in private settings, even though their treatment was commissioned by the NHS, are not being properly protected by the Human Rights Act. They have written a very short but effective paper for us, and I simply ask the noble Baroness to commit to a meeting of interested Peers—there are a number of us—with Dr Series and Luke Clements, so that we can deal with that. Can we stop treating people differently just because of the person or organisation that happens to be providing their care?
On CTOs, we are not allowed to wear T-shirts in here but, if we were, I would be sorely tempted to wear one that reads, “Told you so”, because we did. In 2006-07, we sat here night after night saying, “You are telling us that this is not going to be used very often or used disproportionately against some people. That is not true, is it?” It really was not. Because of that and the racial disparities, I and others were for a long time of the view that CTOs really should go because they were enabling bad practice by practitioners. What changed my mind was listening to patients and their families, because there are a small group of people for whom CTOs work, are the least restrictive option and are beneficial. We should therefore keep them. I am reluctant to admit that, but we really have to change all the processes around them to make sure that practitioners are sticking to the intention.
Advance choice documents are another “I told you so”. I am so pleased that they have done what enlightened practitioners said they would back in 2005-06; they have improved care for people. I am indebted to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for telling the joint scrutiny committee about the work that was done in the field of palliative care to make sure that advance choice documents are electronic, and therefore more widely available, and to minimise excuses on the part of practitioners: “Well, I didn’t know about it”. A team from King’s has been looking at that. I hope that, during our discussions, we can go into that in greater depth. I do not quite know how that will work, but it is important.
On prisons and police stations, we were very lucky in the joint scrutiny committee because one of our members was an A&E doctor so we talked about this quite a lot. The truth is that people will still turn up in A&E because the lights are on. That is where people in distress will go. There will also be people who, faced with somebody who is having an episode, still call the police, because they are frightened and do not know what to do. During the passage of the Bill, I hope that the Minister will explain how £26 million will deal with what is quite a big problem and that we look at the transition to the police stepping back to leave everybody else to deal with people who, at the point they meet them, are very ill and disturbed and who need help.
Finally, some of us argued strongly for a mental health commissioner. That was not because we wanted another commissioner—we have lots of commissioners for things already—but because we were trying to deal with a key issue. We do not have a system of mental health care or joined-up services. We have episodes of care, some of which are very good at the time but do not work together as a system. After the hours that we have sat in this place and looked at the various different bits of legislation in great detail, we do not understand why we lock up more people, year on year, and what the best use is of the resources available—they are not infinite—not only to deal with people who are experiencing real crises and trauma but to ensure that we use the best of what we have to put as much as we can into services that are also preventative.
It is a great privilege to be in this House. It is an enormous relief that we can do our work in great detail and largely away from the pressure of headlines, which I know people in the other place always feel whenever there is a failure. It may well be that, during the passage of the Bill, something in the media changes the national mood on this, but our job, privilege and responsibility is to think of the people who are in the worst possible place under this legislation and to do the best possible job that we can for them to make sure that we get the best out of this legislation.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the previous three speakers. I declare my interests as a non-executive member of the NHS England board and 45 years as a registered mental health nurse.
I warmly welcome the long-overdue reform of the Mental Health Act and congratulate the new Government on bringing it swiftly in their term. I appreciate the opportunity that the Minister has taken in holding discussions about the Bill prior to Second Reading and offering to consult further about potential amendments to strengthen and clarify particular sections. Modernising the 1983 legislation provides a real opportunity to reduce injustices in implementation and provide equitable support for people suffering from a mental health crisis, giving them more autonomy and choice and including a new right for service users to choose a nominated person to advocate for their interests.
First, I am pleased that the Bill aims to end the unnecessary detention of those with autism or learning disabilities, yet I share the concerns of the Royal College of Psychiatrists and other professional bodies that further clarity is needed around assessment and treatment. For many, the proposed 28-day limit for assessment may not be long enough to reach a comprehensive diagnosis, especially considering that those with autism often present with additional complexities. It may be difficult to admit, assess and support some patients within the time limit outlined in the Bill, risking recurrent use of overstretched A&E or admission and detention under Part III of the 1983 Act should there be safety concerns. The NHS Confederation drew on the example of New Zealand, where similar changes to mental health legislation saw a temporary increase in patients being sent
“to prison, left neglected in the community or admitted to forensic facilities as secure patients”.
Failing to allow for thorough assessment may worsen mental health care provision and further racial inequalities, as currently Part III detentions disproportionally affect black men.
To combat this, an emphasis on continuity of community care would cut the number of people admitted for an assessment, while ensuring that patients remain safe within the community, yet there is a chronic lack of community-based workers, with a third of all nursing vacancies being in mental health services. I therefore ask the Government to provide clarity on how they will ensure that those who, in the past, would have been detained for assessment and treatment will still be able to obtain a full diagnosis and the support that they deserve, preferably without hospital admission. Careful consideration of workforce planning in the community for social work and allied health professions, as well as psychiatrists, general practitioners and nurses, should form a significant part of the preparation for this Bill’s implementation; then patients and cares could more often be appropriately assessed, treated and cared for by both mental and physical health services, in community and primary care settings, thus avoiding admission.
The Bill offers an opportunity to improve support for those under the age of 18 who are admitted formally under the 1983 Act, yet it is estimated that 31% of under-18s are—thank goodness—admitted informally to hospital for assessment and treatment. I fully support the introduction of new statutory care and treatment plans, but I ask the Minister if they could be extended to those admitted informally, if it is a correct solution.
The Government are right to state that these plans will encourage patients to engage with treatment towards their discharge and beyond. Care and treatment early in a person’s life provides better outcomes than later intervention, so extending these plans to the significant number of informal patients aged under 18 could provide a solid foundation for later life. Additionally, ensuring the availability of quality community services would also reduce childhood detention. I therefore ask the Government to confirm their plans to encourage this early intervention via both the community and the care and treatment plans.
The Bill would be strengthened if it were to improve the environment for young patients. I will not repeat what has been so ably explained by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. However, we really ought to move to a statutory requirement that young people are not allowed to be kept in adult wards for treatment in crisis, or treated miles from home.
There must also be an exploration of the place of parental responsibility before the Bill is finalised. The introduction of a “nominated person” as well as “advance choice documents” are commendable steps to improve agency for those detained under the Mental Health Act. Some young people will choose not to include their parents for either of these. I therefore ask whether the Government can provide clarity as to how this will function with expectations of parental responsibility.
Healthcare professional bodies support the principle of ensuring that prisoners with severe mental health conditions are swiftly transferred to hospital, where they can receive proper treatment, but I have questions of practicality for the Government. What is the plan to ensure capacity in the in-patient sector? What happens to those who clearly cannot be properly treated in the in-patient sector, or who are a significant danger to others on the ward? As a former ward sister, I know that this is a real question from people working in those environments at the moment.
Will there be an assessment at the end of a patient’s treatment to determine whether they are recalled to prison or given a community treatment order if it is safe to do so and better for their mental health? I would welcome working with the Government to get clarity on this issue, particularly in relation to a code of practice.
As I have already said, continuity of care in the community will be essential to prevent unnecessary detention and to provide support to patients after detention. I therefore ask the Government to clarify the implementation timetable for the Bill in order to ensure that current staff have time to receive the development needed and that the necessary new staff are recruited.
I ask too whether there should be a research investigation into safe staffing ratios in the community. The Royal College of Nursing is calling for a maximum caseload for mental health community nurses to ensure that community treatment orders are conducted properly and that nurses can assist in preventing crises, but very little research into this ratio issue has been done outside in-patient facilities. It seems right that research and planning be done to ensure that the community can help fulfil the Bill’s admirable aims. A recent paper by King’s College refers to “frugal innovation” in healthcare. Investing properly in community care will reduce the costs overall.
I trust that the potential shortcomings of the Bill as it stands can be amended and/or resolved through the code of conduct to ensure that it is future-proofed and significantly enhances mental health service provision for patients, which is the aim of His Majesty’s Government, the vast majority of Members of this House and healthcare professionals themselves.
The Lord Bishop of London
My Lords, I am grateful to be able to participate in Second Reading of this important Bill. It is a privilege to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Watkins, who have a real breadth of experience in this field. I too welcome, along with many noble Lords, the reform of the Mental Health Act, which is long overdue.
The noble Earl, Lord Howe, highlighted the over-representation of minoritised communities detained under the Act but also placed on community treatment orders. Some groups are also more likely to be detained through contact with the criminal justice system or emergency departments. It is important to remember that we are speaking about these inequalities in the wider context of health inequalities; some groups present to health services far later, when their symptoms have worsened. The Royal College of Nursing notes in its briefing that mental health services are
“not seen as accessible to all communities”,
and that:
“Many black men have a first interaction with a service via the police during a crisis”.
Many of the organisations that have helpfully sent briefings ahead of the debate have acknowledged that the legislative actions available to address this issue are limited. The Minister highlighted the advanced choice directives, which are a welcome step towards this. As the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill notes, this is important for those who have experienced trauma, disempowerment and discrimination.
Data collection has also been discussed during scrutiny of the Bill. Although data collection is improving, capturing more complex data on ethnicity is important when looking at health inequalities in this way. In much of the work I have done on health inequalities with the NHS and faith groups, ethno-religious identity is significant if communities are to be better understand at an ICB level or higher how to reduce inequalities.
It is also important that, in evaluating the changes to the Act, the Secretary of State has the appropriate data to do so. What steps are the Government are taking in the Bill or in other ways to mandate this kind of data collection, so that racial inequalities are monitored?
The Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists also emphasises that communication considerations are important to the Bill. In my experience, some faith communities find it very hard to discuss mental health, and that is made worse by the biases and discrimination they meet when they seek help. The patient and carer race equality framework is to be welcomed as the first ever anti-racism framework for mental health trusts and service providers. In order to assist in this, the Royal College of Nursing has recommended that mandatory training on equalities be given to all working under the Mental Health Act. As I often say in this place, faith literacy is an essential component of that.
Much of this is still about trust and culturally competent care. It is critical that services be accessible and effective for people with different traditions, cultures and faiths. Empowering patients to offer their data is as important as mandating that it be collected.
Many briefings note that the Bill will be effective in reducing racial discrimination and health inequalities only if there is investment in community services and other actions. Not everything we can and should do is medical; the involvement of the voluntary and community sector is also crucial.
I welcome the provisions in the Bill to restrict the long-term detention of autistic people and those with learning disabilities. I support the Joint Committee on the draft Bill’s recommendation of clearer duties for ICBs and local authorities to develop robust community services and social support.
I pay tribute to the work of the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the independent care and treatment review programme to expose the serious harm and trauma inflicted by the use of solitary confinement, detention and long-term segregation in mental health and specialist learning disability hospitals. I too support the comments made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, with regard to young people.
The right reverent Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester is the lead Bishop on prisons for the Church of England, and she apologises for not being in her place. She and I commend the Government on bringing forward the long-overdue provisions to end the use of prisons and police cells as places of safety. The right reverend Prelate has told me that last year more than 300 people suffering mental health crises were taken not to a hospital but to a police station. According to the recent report from the Chief Inspector of Prisons, the average time to wait to transfer mentally ill patients from prisons to hospitals is 85 days—almost three months. We welcome the statutory time limit of 28 days, but I highlight, as other noble Lords have, that if this is actually to happen, it needs to be resourced. As the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, highlighted, there is a question of resource not just on this point but for much of the Bill.
Shortages of mental health nurses and doctors impact on those detained under the Mental Health Act and in the community. The learning disability nursing workforce in the NHS has dropped by 44% since records began in 2009. Investment in the workforce will be key to the success of the Bill. Community services can be developed and resourced only as far as the NHS, local authorities and directors of adult social care are supported to do so. I welcome the Bill and look forward to following its passage and working on what is an extremely important reform.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, I refer the House to my interest as a vice-president of the National Autistic Society, a role I share with my good and dear friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Browning.
I welcome the Bill. It has been a long time coming, and I passionately hope that it will allow us to end once and for all the myth that autism is a mental health condition. Autism is most definitely not a mental health condition, and our failure to address this has meant decades when autistic people have been wrongly incarcerated, often in appalling and degrading conditions, and robbed of their human rights. More than 2,000 autistic people and people with a learning disability are in mental health hospitals in England, a point made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, in his opening remarks. The National Autistic Society tells us that 68% of these people are autistic.
Some 93% of autistic people and people with a learning disability in mental health hospitals are detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. The average length of stay is five years, but for a great number of autistic people the detention lasts for decades. Professor Sir Simon Wessely’s review of the Mental Health Act in 2018 found that the experience of detention was often damaging and traumatic. The Bill includes measures to improve care and support for autistic people, reducing reliance on hospital-based care. That certainly is good and is welcomed.
However, there are aspects of the Bill that concern me, and I have had a chance to discuss them with my noble friend the Minister. I have been fortunate to have had a number of fruitful meetings and discussions with a team from the Autism Centre of Excellence at Cambridge and, as a result, they and I share some concerns. First, the Government have said:
“For those with a learning disability or autistic people, the act will be amended to place a limit of 28 days for which they can be detained unless they have a co-occurring mental health condition”.
My noble friend mentioned this in her opening remarks. I stress again that autism is not a mental health condition, but given that eight in 10 autistic people experience mental health issues, without the right safeguards there must be concern that the new provisions could simply lead to a continuation of the current intolerable situation. I hope my noble friend, who kindly met with me recently to discuss these matters, will seek to assuage my fears on that point.
The Government have also said:
“Police and prison cells will also no longer be used to place people experiencing a mental health crisis … Instead, patients will be supported to access a suitable healthcare facility that will better support their needs”.
The right reverend Prelate referred to this in her remarks. The Lampard Inquiry was set up to look at more than 2,000 deaths of people in in-patient mental health facilities, specifically in Essex, and it is believed that many of those who died were autistic. I say to my noble friend that it would be wrong to assume that simply switching the location where autistic people are detained is going to achieve a much better way of protecting them.
The Government have also said the reforms will
“introduce statutory care and treatment plans”.
I share the Cambridge centre’s belief that every autistic person who needs support should have access to a statutory plan to enable them to get the help they need. It should not take an autistic person falling into crisis and being detained in a mental health hospital for such support to be provided, as is often the case today. Autistic people who are at risk of falling into crisis should have a similar right to such plans to prevent in-patient detention becoming a risk in the first place.
A focus on prevention would be in line with Wes Streeting’s idea of reforms of the National Health Service. It is recognised that the current system does, in fact, have a range of provisions, legal rights and safeguards that should, in theory, have reduced the number of people detained in in-patient mental health services. But published statistics show us that this has not happened, with thousands of people still inappropriately detained, so I ask my noble friend to consider these concerns as the Bill passes through the House in Committee and so on.
There is a danger of allowing, even unintentionally, the creation of a critical gap between what happens at a policy and legislative level and what happens on the ground. Without reckoning with this gap and setting up measures to ensure that what is said by government turns into real action on the ground, these reforms will not change the decades-long scandal of thousands of autistic people being detained inappropriately. To do this will require clear measurement, consistent and regular accountability and the necessary funding to enable the National Health Service and other agencies to deliver the hoped-for change that we need from this Bill.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
My Lords, it gives me enormous pleasure to speak in this debate. For me, this legislation is above politics: it is a real opportunity for constructive opposition. I welcomed the call in July from the Secretary of State for Health, Wes Streeting MP, asking whether I would support the Bill and assist in its progress. Yes, there are some aspects of the Bill on which we on these Benches will wish to press the Government. However, our view is that it is overdue and critical for so many people who have felt misunderstood and suffered serious neglect for too long.
I feel lucky to have chaired the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill. Everyone on the Committee apart from me had professional and practical expertise and experience and/or powerful personal experience and knowledge through friends and families. We received evidence from more than 50 organisations and many people who were service users, to whom we remain eternally grateful. We had many hours of strong debate and always managed to find a way through. Results sometimes involved compromise but were also consensual. I thank each and every member for their invaluable contributions, together with our advisers and the brilliant Alex Ruck Keene KC for his extraordinary drafting skills. I also thank the clerks and officials who worked skilfully against a very strict timetable.
I pay tribute to all our medical staff who work in this complex and, in many ways, challenging field of medicine. My sincere admiration for them, and the difficult choices and decisions that they must make, knows no bounds.
A key point for me—I speak as a lawyer—is that so much that directly affects the well-being of patients must be improved, not necessarily by legislation, which can hamper positive change, but through a step change in culture in order to genuinely value every individual and improve their life through choice, dignity, support and advocacy. The Bill seeks to address that, although it lacks a key tool: the use of technology and the drive for data, which I urge the Minister to consider.
The process of amending the current Act speaks volumes. Would that we could have torn up all the current Acts and started again with a fused approach to treating mental health, but we were persuaded that that would just take too long. It has taken too many years to get this far, and now change is urgent.
I have time to touch upon just a few of the many aspects of the Bill. It is right that the Government have agreed—here I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that we have good news—to embed in primary legislation what I call the Wessely principles: choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit, and the person as an individual. Each principle should be tested against the implementation of current proposals, future reform and change to ensure that patients as individuals remain the heart of the matter.
Least restraint is a key reason for reform, although in practice it is a difficult balance to strike. As the Wessely inquiry report makes clear, as a society we now benefit from a greater understanding of mental health. However, at the same time society has become much more risk-averse. Much of our debate centred around the need to address all avenues of least restraint, particularly given the current inequalities of outcomes, against the risk of unintended consequences for the protection of society and the therapeutic benefit of the patient.
To apply the principles, we need the data to track every patient and their outcomes. I remain appalled at the lack of information and communication across the NHS, which has a negative impact upon so many lives. Each time a person is moved, they are registered as a new patient. How much does that contribute to flawed data and poor outcomes? I urge the Minister to look at that.
A key missing element is technology, as I have said, and I do not mean some clunky, one-size-fits-all NHS-wide system. In short, we need to swiftly develop a national dataset to allow for real-time monitoring and accountability, evaluating variation and inequalities, understanding medium- and long-term trends and informing future policy decisions.
For choice, dignity and autonomy, we recommended a statutory right for patients who have been detained under the Mental Health Act to request an advance choice document to be drawn up and recorded in a way that is accessible digitally. There is no mention of digital in the Bill. Instead, it introduces duties on integrated care boards, NHS England and local health boards in Wales to make arrangements so that people at risk of detention are informed of their ability to make an ACD, a written statement, and be supported to make one.
Our report referenced the potential for creating ACDs via an app, similar in some ways to one already working for end-of-life palliative care, to support all patients. Simply put, it is a no-brainer and transformative, easily accessed by anyone, either on a mobile phone or even on a patient’s clothes, so that when that person is in crisis there is an instant critical guide to who that person is. That would greatly assist the police, if they are in attendance, and those in A&E. I am hopeful that this approach and other smart, cost-efficient moves will be in the code of practice.
The implementation of reform requires constant oversight. We recommended the appointment of an independent mental health commissioner with overarching responsibility to ensure consistency of delivery of the Government’s priorities for patients across England and Wales. This is not about the Government losing control; on the contrary, it is about an overarching small body with the ability to focus upon consistency across the whole sector, ideally using digitised national data to track and monitor the implementation of the reforms over a period of years, working with the associated NHS bodies to promote better outcomes. I ask the Minister: who else will do that?
Furthermore, we must address unacceptable racial disparities and inequalities, particularly among black men, who, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Howe, are three and a half times more likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act and seven times more likely to be placed on a CTO. But how is that data collected and verified? Indeed, the facts could be worse. Our report was clear that better outcomes would be achieved and inequalities reduced if each health organisation introduced culturally appropriate advocacy and appointed a responsible person to collect relevant data and publish and oversee policies to address these inequalities. A mental health commissioner could ensure that that was done.
Mental health services currently operate in a static world. What happens when someone has a crisis far away from their local authority? We heard on a visit to SLaM in Lambeth that patients sometimes travel miles to Lambeth when on a downward spiral to receive, in their view, better treatment there than within their local authority. That is another reason to have accurate data.
Another critical area is children and young people. Issues highlighted in our report, including the role and profile of nominated persons, detention in adult wards and conflict with the Children Act, must be clarified and assurances given to families and their young. Investing in and building the right community support and action plan for people with learning disabilities and autism no longer detained under Section 3 is critical, as is monitoring the outcomes for those with learning disabilities and autism who may be at risk of being detained under the Mental Capacity Act or through the criminal justice system instead. This is an area where our committee had a strong debate, concerned about unintended consequences that might impact on the patient and/or society at large if the right protections, including safe spaces, were not in place. Are the Government content that they have achieved the right balance?
I feel I must record—because I want to be helpful to the Government—that our committee had one opportunity to put some of the crucial questions to, and test the opinions of, around 18 officials from the DHSC and the MoJ who had worked on the Bill for four years. That meeting was cut very short because one official said she had to collect her child from school, so all 18 walked out. That must not be allowed to happen again.
Priorities must be set for the implementation of the many proposals, and there needs to be a significant increase in capacity right across mental health services, all of which requires enormous investment. I wish the Government, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, well.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, this is a long-overdue Bill, as many have said, and I hope it will progress through the House as quickly as possible. Quite why it has taken six years for Sir Simon Wessely’s report to be acted on, I am not sure, but I am particularly pleased that we have got advance directives in, even if in a slightly watered-down form.
However, there are some rather troubling changes that have been squeezed in recently for reasons that are difficult to understand, and I shall want to explore those in Committee. There are differences between the criteria for Parts 2 and 3 of the Bill, for example, which is bizarre, and I am scared that the changes in relation to learning difficulties and autism, in spite of all the good intentions, will be extremely difficult to implement. Throughout the Bill, there is an assumption that if you change the legislation, it happens, but we know very well that it does not—it takes years to implement—so I am concerned about that overall. Having said that, I will remain on the theme that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, picked up. We will leave the rest until Committee, where we are going to have very detailed debates.
It is now 20 years since I came into this House with the certainty of the optimistic new girl that we would see a new mental health Bill that addressed the deeply flawed legislation that we had been living with since 1959, but I am pretty sure now that I shall leave the House having seen no fundamental change. I am ashamed that in England and Wales we are falling so far behind many other countries, when we used to be in the advance in devising mental health law that was fit for purpose. Scotland is 20 years ahead, as is Northern Ireland.
I was told back in 2017 by Simon Wessely and others that it would take 10 years to develop a unified mental health and capacity Bill. If we had started then, we would be almost there by now. We tinkered with the 1959 Act in order to produce the1983 Act. We added a new Mental Capacity Act in 2005 that cut across mental health legislation. Then we added the ludicrously undeliverable deprivation of liberty safeguards and added tiers of bureaucracy to an already overburdened system, all reducing the time for clinical and social care professionals to spend with patients as they had to spend more time filling in forms. The new Bill makes no attempt to address the complicated relationship between the 1983 and 2005 Acts or how they are meant to be used for individuals, and this is particularly difficult for patients with learning disability and mental disorders and also older people with dementia where people are tossing up which Bill is going to be used. It is clinically ridiculous.
I would have liked to see a Bill that addressed all mental health and capacity issues, putting capacity for decision-making at its heart, consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which we currently contravene and have done since its implementation by the UN in 2008. The human rights implications of the current Bill are profound. It does not address the fundamental rights of thousands of mentally ill people, primarily because of the absence of having decision-making capacity at its heart. We accept that patients with physical disorders can make decisions that may be seriously detrimental to their health or safety. In contrast to this, in mental health law capacity plays little or no role in decisions to initiate psychiatric treatment against a patient’s wishes. The criteria for the involuntary treatment of mental disorders fails to respect the autonomy of the patients. The key considerations are the presence of a mental disorder and risks to the patient’s health or safety. For persons with physical disorders, their personal values are given dominion. Those with mental disorders are not accorded this privilege in this Bill, even though we make such a meal of it in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There is an underlying assumption that mental disorder necessarily entails an inability to make sound or rational judgments, but even among the most ill patients—those admitted to acute psychiatric wards—40% to 60% retain capacity.
People with mental disorders are unusual in being liable to detention, usually in hospital, because they are assessed as presenting a risk of harm to others before they have actually committed an offence. This constitutes a form of preventive detention that is selective. We spent some time in this Chamber a couple of weeks ago debating indeterminate sentences for people in prison thought to pose a continuing risk in the community. There was widespread agreement here that it was an iniquitous thing. And yet mental health law allows the detention of those with mental disorder on the basis of risk alone. How can that be justified? There is no evidence that risk is easier to assess in those with mental disorder or that violence is more predictable in this group, and it is an expression of the prejudicial stereotype that people with mental disorder are intrinsically dangerous, contrary to research evidence.
This does not mean that people’s dangerousness is unimportant. If it is reliably linked to an individual’s mental disorder, then, if the person lacks capacity, involuntary treatment may be justified, but if the patient has capacity, protection of the public becomes the sole interest. I do not deny there are problems with a capacity-based regime. Many people think you have to fudge the decision, but I would say it was because they do not understand the fundamental ways to assess capacity and the full influences on it.
One of the aims of this Bill is to reduce sections. The number of new sections, as we know, has rocketed again. Last year, there were over 52,000 sections, a further 5,000 or so placed on a community treatment order, and 140,00 people on mental capacity deprivation of liberty safeguards. If the aim of the new Act is to reduce detentions, I cannot see how. The discharge rate from tribunals has reduced from 25% in the mid-1980s to about 6% today. How is it going to happen exactly under this legislation?
I do not see how the overrepresentation of black people in the detained population is to be addressed by this Bill. We need a completely different new way of assessing people and allowing people to get access to services that are sensitive to their needs, providing something that they want to access. I cannot think that there is anything new in this Bill which reflects new thinking that is going on about how you encourage people to access services when they first begin to feel ill.
The Bill has nothing to say about restraint and seclusion. It does not address the hundreds of people in the prison system and their non-consensual treatment except to speed up those that are suitable for transfer. The majority of the mentally unwell will never even be considered for transfer, but they have terrible problems which impact on the prison system tremendously.
Finally, it is now 14 years since the Mental Health Act Commission was abolished and replaced first with the mental health commissioner and now by the totally inadequate low-profile CQC, which has no legally qualified members and no mental health representation at executive board level. Whereas the former chair and vice-chair of the commission had direct access to the Secretary of State for Health, as I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Bottomley, will remember—she got tired of seeing us, I should think—mental health does not now appear to have the same direct influence. Perhaps it is not surprising that mental health appears only on the government agenda when there is some crisis that has been brewing for years or, as now, after meandering for years through our scrutiny and committee systems.
I have had my say. I am not going to raise this issue again. I felt I had to say it once. I will throw myself into Committee with enthusiasm and hope we can get this Bill through, but I do hope that one day we will get the mental health and capacity legislation that we really need.
Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be able to contribute to the Second Reading of this very important Bill, albeit, as other speakers have already said, a Bill that has been too long coming. I wholeheartedly welcome this Bill and I thank the Government and commend them for bringing it forward so quickly in their term of office. I also thank the noble Baroness the Minister and the Secretary of State for the meeting that they held with me earlier today. Like others, I also want to look back and thank Professor Sir Simon Wessely and his team—including, not least, the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger—for the invaluable work that they did that has led to the Bill before this House today. I want to say a particular thank you to those with lived experience who were willing to come forward and inform and advise the review panel, but also the pre-legislative scrutiny work and at other stages too, so that the Bill could be based on real experience, not just on what politicians and, dare I say it, the civil servants thought would be the right thing to do. So I welcome this Bill.
When in October 2017 Sir Simon Wessely was commissioned to undertake the review, there were a number of reasons that led to that. The first was the one that the Minister has already referred to: the Mental Health Act 1983, which was in place for over 30 years, had had some amendments subsequently but was felt to be out of date. Society and clinical treatments had moved on, so there was a need to look at it. But, for me, there was a more fundamental issue, which was the fact that so many people who found themselves in mental health crisis felt that, somehow at those points of crisis, they were people to whom things were done, to whom society did things, rather than people who were able to be part of and involved in that decision-making—they lost their human dignity in the processes that they went through. There were also issues about family members who were concerned that they were not listened to, when they felt that they knew when people were coming to points of crisis, or family members who felt that they were shut out from the discussions about their relative who was potentially at a point of crisis.
Then there was the overuse of detention. Reference has already been made, and I am sure will be made by others in this debate, to the racial disparity in the use of detention, a matter which should concern us all. There was also the question of the use of detention for those with autism and learning disabilities. All those issues underpinned the reason for looking at reviewing the Mental Health Act 1983.
The first point has been that issue about the loss of dignity and the way in which people in mental health crisis are treated. I hope that will be dealt with by those very first principles that appear in Clause 1. I draw particular attention to the fourth of those:
“The person as an individual”.
Under “Matters to be addressed”, it says:
“treating patients with dignity and respect and considering their attributes and past experiences”,
although I accept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, just said, that it is not enough simply to put it on a page of legislation. For that to be enacted requires changes of culture and attitude from all those who deal with people in mental health crisis.
Part of this sense, though, of people being able to feel that they are making decisions for themselves is the advance choice document enshrined in this legislation. I am sure that the Government will want to think carefully about the matters that it might encompass, and about its interaction with potential future legislation.
I want to pick up the issue of the nominated person. I mentioned families feeling that they are sometimes cut out but of course, as we know, sometimes for the individual with mental illness or mental health problems the nearest relative—that family member—might not be the most appropriate person to be their nominated individual. That individual may actually be somebody with whom—how can I put it?—the tensions can lead to increased difficulties for the person with mental illness, rather than reducing them. That ability to nominate somebody else as the person who someone wants to be there is critical. The noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, referred to this in relation to children but I think that, in general, it could create some tensions with family members who feel that it is their right to be that person alongside the individual in mental health crisis. Having said that, I believe that the nominated person point in the Bill is absolutely appropriate.
I want to focus also on the questions of detention. I have referenced how we need to look carefully at the inappropriate racial disparity in detention, but I also want to comment on the police issue. I am pleased to see the outlawing in the Bill of the use of police cells and prisons as first places of safety. This is of course the culmination of work in progress. There was voluntary work with the police and the health service, in 2012 and subsequently, to encourage and help them to ensure that the first person who someone in mental health crisis saw was not a police officer, and that they were not taken to a police cell as a place of safety. We then ensured that work in the Policing and Crime Act 2017, so that police cells could not be used as places of safety for those under the age of 18. The Bill takes it that bit further and it is absolutely right that it does—and right to do it for the individual who is in mental health crisis.
It is also right to do that for the police, because one issue that police officers themselves constantly made reference to me about was their fear and concern about being expected to deal with somebody who was in mental health crisis, when they had no training and no capability of knowing what to do in those circumstances. Of course, it is bad for the individual too if they are faced with somebody who has no actual understanding of what their condition is or how they should be dealt with.
Perhaps I may gently say to the Minister that in 2015 we put £15 million into providing alternative places of safety and in 2017 the Government put £30 million into providing them. This Government are now putting £26 million into providing those alternative places of safety. It is easier to say this from this side of the House, but the Government might wish to consider those figures, if I can put it like that. I also suggest to the Government that they consider alternative places of safety as not necessarily being a healthcare facility. Many places in the third sector are able to provide those facilities and the Government should look at that as well.
Finally, we also need those facilities to try to ensure that people are less likely to get to the point of crisis. If they are less likely to get to that point, they are also less likely to turn up at A&E because they are in crisis. That would be a win-win for the individual concerned, for the Government and for the health service.
Overall, I welcome the Bill. There are some very good provisions in it. As we have heard, it will be subject to detailed scrutiny in this House but it is no bad thing—I can say this now—that it started in this House. I welcome it and look forward to its passage.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. I remind the House that I worked clinically as a psychiatrist for about 35 years and had been a consultant for two years by the time that the 1983 Act was introduced. I argued then, as now, that mental handicap, as it was called, had no place in legislation—although others disagreed. Profound changes in societal attitudes, alongside advancements in the understanding and treatment of mental illness, have occurred during my career. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and my noble friend Lady Murphy that fusion legislation really should have been considered.
There is no minimum age limit in the Mental Health Act, meaning that its provisions apply to children and young people as well as adults. The Joint Committee, of which I was a member, recognised their unique needs, saying that this is
“a crucial opportunity for the Government to strengthen the rights and protections for children and young people”.
We must never forget that the mental health of babies, children and young people is fundamental to the mental health of the adult population, and that we cannot legislate for the treatment of serious mental disorder without taking mental health seriously from the very beginning of each person’s life.
Psychiatry’s past has included some harmful and forced interventions, rather than the preventive approaches, early intervention and evidence-based treatments that are so needed. The Bill aims to safeguard dignity and autonomy, and ensure best practices for all, including people with learning disabilities and autistic people. A major current concern for me is that there are nearly 2,000 people with a learning disability and autistic people in psychiatric hospitals. Usually, that is because of a lack of individually tailored support and housing—they have an average stay of five years—and because of the shortage of effective treatment options in the community and lack of training for the wider mental health workforce.
My Heart Breaks, the report of a review that I chaired and which was published by the Government last year, shed light on the harrowing realities faced by many of the 100 or so of those 2,000 in hospital who are detained in long-term segregation at any one time. The systemic failures we found reflected a troubling overreliance on detention as a substitute for meaningful care, despite such detentions often lacking therapeutic goals, a pattern that unfortunately affects other patient groups as well, including those with personality disorders.
Historically, policy and practice have overlooked complex intersectional vulnerabilities, including learning disability, autism, gender, race, poverty and physical health issues. Marginalised groups, especially people from racialised communities, are detained more often. Trauma histories may be compounded by the excessive use of medication and restrictive practices which contain people, with an eye to safety, but disempower and just do not support recovery. People need better-adapted psychological therapies but are less likely to access them, and poorly co-ordinated discharge processes further trap individuals in a dysfunctional system. This violates people’s human rights and ethical care standards.
As a long-time advocate for people with learning disabilities and autistic people, for me, one of the Bill’s most significant reforms is the removal of learning disability and autism as stand-alone grounds for detention under Section 3, part 2. This change is complemented by new duties on health and care bodies to provide the community-based support and therapeutic approaches needed to prevent unnecessary detentions. But legislation alone will not provide better care; the right people in the right place with the right skills are needed. So the Bill introduces mandatory care, education and treatment reviews, which aim to create personalised care plans and facilitate timely discharges. Additionally, dynamic support registers are intended to track those at risk of crisis, allowing for early intervention before issues escalate. Advance choice documents could also be valuable for choice, safety and care.
The National Autistic Society, Mencap and several other charities have welcomed the Mental Health Bill as a step toward safeguarding the rights of individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people. All stress the need for robust support systems, including housing and social care. These are essential to prevent unnecessary admissions, emphasising that the Bill’s success depends on effective implementation, accountability and substantial investment in community services. They also request a new action plan to replace the Building the Right Support action plan. This is particularly urgent, given that targets to reduce in-patient numbers of people with a learning disability and autistic people have been repeatedly missed over the last decade, and only one in five integrated care systems have currently met the March 2024 target for reduction of in-patient numbers.
Can the Minister confirm whether a plan such as that being requested will indeed be co-produced and implemented with the help of people with lived experience, families, campaigners and relevant bodies, alongside the implementation of this legislation? Both the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the BPS have cautioned against removing autism and learning disabilities as stand-alone criteria unless there are substantial improvements, warning that this could divert unsupported individuals into emergency services or the criminal justice system. Easy to say, better not to do it—but we must use this as a lever to change the culture of care and support for these groups of people.
We do not want to risk criminalising people’s mental health needs, and we do not want to disproportionately impact already marginalised groups. I ask the Minister, what assurances can Government provide to ensure adequate funding to deliver minimum safe services in the community, such as early prevention measures, rapid response teams, crash pads and effective therapeutic approaches in the community? Indeed, could these alternatives be mandated?
Compulsory detention and treatment of individuals with personality disorders under Part 2 of the Mental Health Act is another issue. Personality disorders stem from relational difficulties and cannot be effectively treated in restrictive in-patient settings. Research shows that admissions without structured, evidence-based psychological interventions provide no benefits and can indeed worsen symptoms.
Why is Section 117 aftercare limited to Section 3? Social and health care should be integrated for all patients based on need, not the section they were detained under. For example, a financial crisis causing suicidal thoughts in a farmer might lead to a Section 2, when a social prescription might have been effective. After assessment, they will return to the same situation without appropriate support, such as legal or financial advice to resolve the crisis.
The new Mental Health Bill gives us an opportunity to address the stigma that shaped policy in the 1980s and create a legal framework which keeps pace with scientific advancements. We need to reframe our focus from risk management to supporting accessible, evidence-based community interventions, ensuring that care aligns with ethical and therapeutic principles and prioritises a rights-based, person-centred approach.
Our actions now will shape mental health care for the 21st century. Let us enact compassionate and progressive reforms that future generations will respect.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, with her expertise in this area. I declare my interests as listed in the register and am pleased to make a short contribution to this debate. It has been some time coming.
Following the excellent review of the Mental Health Act, initiated by the noble Baroness, Lady May, Sir Simon Wesley produced his report in 2018 and a draft Bill was published by the last Government, as we have heard. This was followed by detailed scrutiny by the Joint Committee of both Houses, which I was pleased to be a member of and which was so admirably chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe. It was disappointing at that point that the deliberations were paused, but I was delighted that the new Government, following a manifesto commitment, immediately introduced this Bill, which everyone has welcomed today.
In the time available I will focus on only a few areas, the first of which is the proposed changes under Part 3 of the Bill—essentially, the interface between mental health and the criminal justice system. I am delighted that Clause 35 proposes a statutory time limit of 28 days for the transfer of acutely mentally ill patients held in prison to appropriate hospital provision. It is now well recognised that the prison environment and care capacity is detrimental not only to the prisoner but to other prisoners and the staff who care for them. I made a similar recommendation in my independent report to government in 2009, nearly 16 years ago—albeit with the perhaps unrealistic time limit of a 14-day transfer. Clearly, you have to be patient and persistent to achieve legislative change.
Secondly, on Clause 46 and the removal of police stations and prisons as places of safety, I made related recommendations back in 2009, and I am obviously now pleased that there is overwhelming recognition that both facilities are not appropriate as places of safety. Clearly, detailed examination of these proposals will be required in Committee to ensure that the wording delivers their intention. For example, when will the clock start on the 28-day limit?
Thirdly, for this to be effective, investment in alternative community-based healthcare provision will be required for places of safety, as will investment in liaison diversion services, to ensure that only those who need to obtain a place of safety. Otherwise, as we have heard, A&E departments will continue to be the default position, at huge cost to the NHS and to the police service. We also need additional acute mental health beds in every local area to ensure timely transfers and to make the legislative changes a reality.
There is also concern, well articulated by the Children & Young People’s Mental Health Coalition, that children and young people are still inappropriately placed in settings outside their local area, and on adult wards. It is imperative that the Bill strengthens safeguards against this and recognises the Joint Committee’s recommendation for stronger procedural requirements where such inappropriate placements are considered, including a requirement that such a placement is demonstrably in the child’s best interest.
There are many positive elements of the Bill, as the Minister clearly outlined in opening this debate, including improving the patient experience, improving patient choice and autonomy, and limiting the detention of people with learning disability and autistic people without qualifying co-recurring mental health conditions—all of which and much else, as we have heard, will be carefully considered in Committee.
However, I believe we need further debate on where the principles outlined by Simon Wessely are placed in the Bill. I am particularly disappointed that the Government have not currently accepted the recommendation to establish the role of a mental health commissioner and seemed silent on the issue when the Bill was introduced. As we have heard, the Joint Committee recommended that this post be statutorily positioned and that the mental health commissioner should be created with a number of roles, which I would like to briefly elaborate on.
The mental health commissioner should be a voice at a national level, promoting the interests of those who are detained and who are likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act, as well as the interests of their families and carers, raising awareness of their needs and challenging stigma and stereotypes. They should work in conjunction with the Care Quality Commission and other bodies to make recommendations on further reforming mental health law in the direction of more rights-led and fused legislation, such as we have heard on the Mental Capacity Act.
Critically, the commissioner should be a mechanism for tracking the implementation of the reforms in and associated with this Bill and other legal changes, essentially and particularly with the inclusion of the provision of data to understand how the Bill is operating. We saw the role of the commissioner as primarily to act as a watchdog to oversee the direction of travel for the key reforms in the Mental Health Act and mental health policy generally, overarching the whole government system. This has been supported by many organisations working in the mental health field, including the Centre for Mental Health, of which I am an ambassador. The centre added that, in addition to overseeing the reforms to the Mental Health Act, a commissioner could play a wide-ranging strategic role across all government departments.
Finally, I will say a few further words about resourcing and implementation, which will be crucial to the success of this legislation. Again, the Joint Committee recommended that the Government publish a comprehensive implementation and workforce plan alongside the Bill with key milestones detailing the implementation of the Bill and, crucially, how they link to milestones in the implementation of the NHS 10-year plan and other government initiatives. These should include milestones on workforce development, not only for mental health staff but allied health professionals, such as speech and language therapists. I declare my interest as honorary vice-president of the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists.
The plan should also include milestones on training, advocacy and community care capacity, as well as on numbers of detentions, length of stay and, critically, reducing racial and ethnic inequality. There should also be a statutory duty to report annually to Parliament on the progress against these milestones during the implementation period. Disappointingly, unless I have misunderstood the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, the Government have so far offered only a financial assessment over a 20-year period, which is not at all coherent with the NHS 10-year plan.
However, in conclusion, I am very pleased that we are debating this incredibly important Bill now and in the coming weeks and months to try to ensure that we go a long way to producing a progressive Mental Health Act which is fit for 2025 and years beyond. I look forward to the Minister’s response at the end of the debate.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, who was the MP for the constituency I lived in when I was a student. In those days, I campaigned against him, but, from listening to his speech today, I am sure that we will campaign together in Committee on some of the reforms that may be required in the Bill.
This Bill is a welcome direction of travel for mental health legislation in the United Kingdom, but it is only an extra stop. As other noble Lords have said, sometimes we have to look at the bus we are on—the underlying legislation. That bus was built when I was 17 years old, if we go back to the 1983 legislation, and it had its last MOT 17 years ago, in terms of its amendments. I believe that, although these measures are welcome, there is still a fundamental issue in terms of the basis of what we are traveling on. I understand the problems with that.
The questions we are really asking in this Bill are quite limited in the sense of the balance between individual freedoms and public protection when it comes to the detention of individuals. Because we look at such legislation infrequently, we must do our best in Committee to ensure that the balance is at its best and that, wherever we can, we take a person-centred, rights-based approach to this legislation. Having said that, there are some pleasing points in the Bill, including the tightening of the criteria for the detention and compulsory treatment of individuals. It is welcome that the four key principles are mentioned but it is a shame that they are not on the face of the Bill and are down as guidance only. It is important that those of us who really support the principles fight for them to be on the face of the Bill in Committee.
The advance choice documents are a welcome provision but, as many noble Lords have said, they need to be fully accessible 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to those who care for people who have given an advance choice document. I question why they are only for people aged 18 and over. If we are looking at Gillick competence, there are issues around those who are younger, who should be able to provide an advance choice document. I worry that they are not a right or a duty but are only to be given as a consideration.
I welcome the right to a nominated trusted individual but many people who have been involved in healthcare will know that it is not just about having that person as a right; it is about the way in which professionals listen to them and carry out the advocacy that they provide. I am not sure, as we start with this Bill, that the balance is correct; I believe that certain issues will have to be addressed in Committee.
I have also looked at the potential implementation of the Bill. It is always good to start with the impact assessment. It has in it some quite startling issues that I think we will want to look at in Committee. For example, community treatment orders are not meant to change for at least another seven years, but the implementation start is in seven years. The existing CTO regime will last for another seven years and, from the Government’s impact assessment, it looks as though the new regime will start in seven years at the earliest.
I will come back to people with learning difficulties and autism in a second, but the implementation of the measures for them not to be held for more than 28 days and for other provision in the community to have to be available will be in three years’ time, according to the impact assessment. However, there is no money in the next two years to start to provide for those community facilities. It is as though they will come on stream the second the implementation date is reached; I question the Government’s planning on that and whether it is a realistic adaptation for people with learning difficulties and autism.
My passion and focus in Committee will probably be learning disabilities and autism, because they are personal to me. I have close family members who are loving and warm but very misunderstood by those who do not have a close relationship with them. It is scandalous that, in 2024, having those labels attached to you means that you could be detained under the Mental Health Act for more than 28 days. I welcome the fact that the Bill’s provisions will move away from Section 3 and towards Section 2 detention, but I worry that it will not stop detention of people with learning disabilities or autism. For example, DoLS will be used, because these people are misunderstood. The legislation in itself will not change what happens to them. Individuals who are seen not as a threat but as difficult will be detained. As other noble Lords have said, fused legislation needs to be used to ensure that those individuals are not detained using different pieces of legislation.
As other noble Lords have said, it is also worrying that people with learning disabilities or autism who are under a Section 2 detention or detained under the Mental Capacity Act will not have access to Section 117 community facilities. It is quite fascinating that the very things under Section 117 that need to be in place to ensure that these people are not detained are the very facilities that they do not have a statutory right to. That needs to be looked at in this legislation.
There are many things to welcome, but many further questions need to be asked and drawn out, particularly regarding some of the contradictions in different parts of the legislative process on mental health provision within the UK and around the rights-based approach, which the Government seem not to have in place. We will want to explore that as we go forward.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, consideration of this Bill has been greatly assisted by the thorough scrutiny and analysis undertaken by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and its compelling report, published in January 2023. Parliament will now need to look with care at its recommendations, including those not incorporated into the Bill as now presented, and the justifications for any omission.
The first question tackled in that report was whether what is now required is fundamental reforming legislation rather than another amending statute. If I may follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, the bus was not built in 1983; its chassis was built in 1959, and we are still dealing with it. The report states:
“The Mental Health Act 1983 is … forty years old. It has been amended multiple times over those years, making it hard to use even for experienced professionals. It is overly complex, especially where it interacts with the Mental Capacity Act 2005”.
For example, the committee noted:
“Attempts to both protect and empower children in these settings have resulted in a complex mixture of statute law and case law alongside the MHA that … makes assessing a child’s rights to access certain safeguards in this draft Bill complex and obscure”.
For essentially good and pragmatic reasons, as the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, explained, the Joint Committee did not wish to introduce further delay or uncertainty, so favoured the form of the Bill considered by it, which is now before Parliament. However, for the courts, tribunals, lawyers and all the other consumers of the legislation, the question will remain, as per the quote in the invaluable Mental Health Act Manual:
“If the Mental Health Act is to be modernised, is it appropriate to base the modernisation on a legislative structure that was established over 60 years ago by the Mental Health Act 1959? The process of bolting on multiple miscellaneous amendments to that structure over the years has resulted in an Act which is overly complex, confusing, and expensive to operate”.
Inevitably, those problems will be exacerbated when this Bill adds further amendments to the 1983 Act. It is therefore to be hoped that the Government will see the Bill, as the Joint Committee put it, not as
“the end—or even a pause—in the process of reform of mental health legislation”.
Meanwhile, the code of practice under the 1983 Act will need, and I understand will now receive, further revision and updating once the Bill is enacted to cover the stronger requirements of the new legislation and provide clear guidance to meet the needs of patients and for all those who operate the changes.
I turn to some of the Bill’s detail. It is certainly welcome that it recognises the real problem that too many autistic people and others with learning difficulties have been detained inappropriately and for far too long. It is also welcome that the Bill removes police stations from the definition of a place of safety in the 1983 Act. Inevitably, the police will continue to have to deal with disturbed and distressed people suffering a chronic or temporary mental health crisis, but these are people who should not be in police stations any longer than absolutely necessary, particularly if expert assessment or treatment are required.
It is to be hoped that the changes will relieve the police of some of the difficult decisions as to risk required under the existing code of practice, but, as others have said, these changes will not work without sufficient community alternatives. As the noble Earl said, it will not be helpful if they simply pass the problem on to an A&E department. I do not want to get anecdotal, but I had a brief admission to A&E. It was, happily, not long lasting, but it was extraordinary to watch the staff in that hospital cope with a very determined and disturbed man. Unfortunately, I did not see the end of that because, luckily, I was released. Nevertheless, it is a problem that needs to be thought about hard.
By contrast with the ethos when I started as a lawyer, all courts now strive to ensure that people are not defined by their mental health problems, even if it is not always possible to prevent those with mental health problems entering the criminal justice system or to divert them from it once they are in it. Professionals in that system need help to deal with these people and their problems. Therefore, the improved provisions for transfer of prisoners to hospital, including those detained under the Immigration Act, should be valuable, but will always depend on compliance with the code of practice, which requires the need for in-patient treatment for a prisoner to be identified and acted on quickly.
The same problems apply when the criminal courts consider sentencing options. The courts depend on the Probation Service and legal representatives to draw attention to the possible need for psychiatric reports and detention. Having sat as a judge in the Crown Court, I can convey the real exasperation of the judiciary when necessary reports are not available or when suitable hospital places cannot be found without further delay and hearings in an overloaded court system.
I turn to a different topic, which has been referred to. The Bill will implement recommendations about replacing the existing “nearest relative” with “the nominated person”, under the principle of patient choice and autonomy. I have some concerns about the selection and replacement of nominated persons, and the complicated provisions within the Bill. Now is perhaps not the time for that, and I will leave it to Committee, but it needs to be looked at again. In particular, there is a need to focus on the consultation, at the very least, and recognition of the legitimate interests of parents and others with parental responsibility.
On this topic, I question—although, again, I leave this to Committee—the continued use of the county court for applications to terminate appointments of nominated persons. The use of the county court is left over from the 1959 Act, at a time when there was neither a separate family court nor a Court of Protection. I suggest that these would now be better equipped to deal with these applications.
There are further points focusing on the needs of children, one of which has already been touched on. It was highlighted by Dr Camilla Parker in her evidence and will strike a chord with many practitioners. It concerns the overlapping factors governing capacity and competence, and the differing processes for assessment. Dr Parker observed that, even after 40 years, we do not have “clear and consistent criteria” for determining whether a child is competent to make a decision. It would be helpful to understand the Government’s current intention, particularly if formulating any statutory tests is not intended.
More fundamentally important is the location for the placement of children. This overlaps with the real problem, which has been highlighted repeatedly by the judiciary, the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory and the Children’s Commissioner, of the use of deprivation of liberty orders, or DoLS, and placing children in unregistered settings—not just adult wards but unsuitable, unregistered settings. Again, I will return to this in Committee.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a vice-president of the National Autistic Society, with the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and as having some responsibility for family members on the autistic spectrum.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, I am a veteran of the Mental Health Act 2007 and the Mental Capacity Act. When I came to this place, I was pleased to be involved in the review of the Mental Capacity Act. This and other Bills of this nature would merit looking at, to see what happens after we legislate. My concerns with the 2007 Act were, primarily, community treatment orders. Looking at the Bill, I see that these are to be altered, but I still share the view of the charity Mind, which would like to see them abolished altogether. I hope that, as we go through Committee, we can make substantial changes to what we have in front of us.
I was also concerned about the deprivation of liberty generally and the situation for autistic people in relation to mental health services. I am still concerned, but I welcome the proposed changes for people with autism and learning disabilities, making it illegal to detain an autistic person or a person with a learning disability unless they have a coexisting mental health condition. Presently, of the 1,385 autistic people detained in mental health facilities, 93% are detained under the Mental Health Act—they are not voluntary patients.
I make no apology for making the case for autism being a special condition that needs to be treated differently to other conditions. I say that because, apart from the Mental Health Act, autism is the only medical condition that has its own Act of Parliament. That tells you that something about it is different from other conditions. In 2009, both Houses of Parliament passed a short but important Act, which was introduced by my friend the late right honourable Cheryl Gillan MP.
So what is it about autism that makes it so different that we should have special regard to it as the Bill progresses? I will first look at how autistic people come into contact with psychiatric services generally. Autism is, of course, a spectrum, so we are talking about a wide range of conditions. There is the old adage that, if you have met one autistic person, well, you have met one autistic person. Although we may look at commonalities among this whole group of people, they are all individuals and should be treated as individuals.
Autistic people come into contact with psychiatrists, although a wider range of people diagnose autism now. I give apologies immediately to the eminent psychiatrists in this Chamber, but, over 32 years in this House—and having taken up many cases and I hope assisted several Members with their casework—I have seen what can often happen if a psychiatrist does not understand autism or, even worse, receives a patient with an autism diagnosis from another psychiatrist but will not accept that diagnosis. That is shocking. So often, misdiagnosis can occur when somebody is admitted to a mental health institution but the psychiatrist will not accept that diagnosis and starts to rediagnose somebody, giving them medicated treatment that clearly does not work. I have seen the results of that.
I particularly remember—it is fixed in my mind—a young man who was a very good artist and whose autism diagnosis was overridden when he was admitted. The diagnosis was, “No, no—this is schizophrenia”. Interestingly, that is a common mistake. As each medication was applied and did not work, that young man’s ability to hold a paintbrush and produce the sort of work he produced before was completely diminished. So autistic people come into contact with psychiatrists, and my point about psychiatrists is that they must have specific autism training. There is a huge lack of psychiatrists generally but particularly psychiatrists with that type of training.
As the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, rightly said, although autism itself is not a mental health condition, people with autism can of course have a mental health condition or a learning disability. But, out in the community, if an autistic person needs medication of one sort or another—I am talking not about drugs that are used for psychosis but drugs to help control anxiety, which is a natural side-effect of autism—accessing the correct drugs through a psychiatrist is impossible in some parts of the country. It is very much a postcode lottery, because psychologists—whom autistic people are very often referred to—cannot prescribe. So, if there is no local psychiatrist whom a GP can refer you to, your only option is very often to pay to see the right person privately. If any of us had a cardiological condition, we would not expect to have to pay for a cardiologist to treat us. I believe the Bill should address access to appropriate—that word is used so often—care from trained and qualified people, whether psychiatrists, CPNs or whoever.
The other thing about autistic people that must be taken into account is that so many of them have sensory side-effects to their autism. There is a vast variety of side-effects, which perhaps may not seem important to people who do not experience them. They can be anything from lighting to noise, sound and the proximity of other people to them. These things need to be taken into account, like the things that have been said already: what a horror it is for any of us to be admitted to A&E now, but, frankly, it can produce very serious results for an autistic person.
I would like this Bill to produce the right training and the right services in the community. For autistic people, the downward spiral into very severe anxiety is there when community services are not provided. When I talk about community services, I am not always talking about something that will cost a fortune; it is actually the low-hanging fruit of low-cost measures. Sometimes it can be as simple as something that provides somebody—a child or an adult—with a friend: somebody with whom they can form a relationship. That does not cost a fortune. However, when money is tight—and we know money is tight—those are the first sorts of services that get taken away, and the downward spiral of an autistic person when these services are no longer provided or are not provided in the first place is what results in them needing to come into contact with the more serious mental health services that this Bill will address.
The noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, mentioned parental responsibility, and in this debate we have not yet mentioned lasting powers of attorney. These are powers for people who are able to sign them when they have capacity, which may well be a very useful thing when people are denied access to their relatives or carers. I hope we will include that in the Bill.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, it is somewhat humbling and not a little intimidating to follow so many insightful speeches from those at the heart of the issue. For me, as a bit of an amateur outsider, I broadly welcome the Bill, with some reservations that I will pursue in Committee.
For Second Reading, I suggest that we should always remember the cultural and political context of our deliberations and indeed definitions—I will come back to that. We also need to remember the lessons of history: locking people up for mental illness has been mired in ethical and political scandal over many years. We all can cite the former Soviet Union, where political dissidents were labelled mentally ill, but even in democracies it was not until 1973 that the American Psychiatric Association voted to declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder—and let us not forget those unmarried mothers who were sectioned in the 20th century.
However, even with this misuse of psychiatric power, it is still possible to be a defender of liberty—such as myself, I hope—and yet acknowledge the need for some people to have their liberty restricted because of their mental health. Many years ago, when I worked for Mind, this was a very polarising debate; but I argued then, and continue to believe, that when someone is severely psychotic, manic or out of their mind, psychiatric coercion is not a violation of individual autonomy. That is because the subject at that point in time—“at that point in time” is key—is not autonomous in any moral sense.
However, is release not different? And that brings me to the issue of community treatment orders. Along with others, I too would like them to be abolished. The general problem of CTOs was well explained by Dr Ken McLaughlin is his pamphlet Escaping the Straitjacket of Mental Health. In it, he makes the point that, while the case for compulsion can be justified at the point of hospital admission, when the patient is likely to be in an acutely psychotic state, can compulsion be justified at the time of hospital discharge when the patient should have mental capacity restored? Prior to 2007 and CTOs, on leaving hospital, an ex-patient regained their full rights of citizenship, including the right to refuse medical treatment. The problem of being released with a CTO is that you return to the community as neither a patient nor a citizen. This hybrid state is troubling in terms of compromising civil liberties.
I tend to agree with the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and others: at the very least I question why the Bill will allow indefinite CTOs to occur. I agree with the Centre for Mental Health’s call for the safeguard of time limits, and then CTOs could be extended only if there was proof of proportionality for the individuals concerned.
The question of indefinite “coercive orders” inevitably reminds us of the plight of the almost 3,000 prisoners held indefinitely behind prison bars under the abolished and discredited IPP sentence. Many of these people are incarcerated in prisons precisely because their mental health has deteriorated as they have been refused release, even on licence; a sort of unacknowledged section is happening here. What is more, shockingly, a wide range of experts now blame this very sentencing regime as the cause of IPP prisoners’ mental distress. The hopelessness—“psychological terror”, as it has been described—of never-ending sentences has literally driven prisoners to lose their minds, and even their lives through suicide.
So, while I am delighted the Bill will remove prisons from the list of places of safety, how does it help IPP prisoners? They are deemed too mentally unwell to be released safely. Their illness is derived at least partly from a shameful state mistake, yet IPP prisoners are coercively detained indefinitely in institutions that the Bill would have the state now deem as unsafe for those with serious mental illness.
One case that has recently attracted headlines illustrates an IPP prisoner’s plight as it relates to the Bill. Forty year-old Thomas White has served 12 years as part of his indefinite IPP for a non-violent theft of a mobile phone in 2012. According to his psychiatrist, Thomas developed his religious hallucinations and psychosis as a direct result of being on an IPP sentence. His sister Clara has been campaigning for over a year to have Thomas transferred to a hospital, but his recent assessment appointment was cancelled due to staff shortages. Clara notes despairingly:
“We waited a long time to have Thomas assessed again by the psychiatrist. We more than likely won’t get the assessment again. The system is nothing but criminal—people like my brother are being seriously failed”.
James Frith, the Labour MP for Bury North, agrees. He said:
“Thomas’s indefinite imprisonment has had a hugely detrimental impact on his mental and physical wellbeing. Thomas should be a patient, not a prisoner”.
Hear, hear.
Things are little better for the general prison population. The annual report from the Chief Inspector of Prisons complains of high healthcare staff vacancy rates and chronic recruitment and retention issues. In that context, Richard Garside, the director of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, concludes that the provision in Clause 35 to introduce a statutory target of 28 days for transfer from prison to hospital, while welcome, feels aspirational rather than practically implementable in the current system.
The broader crisis of staffing and resources and whether it will hinder the Bill, as we have seen in jails, is also mirrored outside the prison gates. Many briefings that we have all received for this Second Reading query whether the Bill will deliver its promises as a consequence of such problems.
I will now raise a related concern. I think that overstretched mental health services are not just a question of resources but rather a consequence of a recent cultural trend: the problematic medicalisation of more and more aspects of the human condition. Ever greater numbers of people are being encouraged—often by Government-backed policies—to view normal, if adverse or perhaps painful, life events through the prism of mental illness. As a consequence, a greater number of people now demand expert pharmacological or therapeutic intervention.
Over recent decades, this huge increase in classification in the psychological realm has moved the job of diagnosis far beyond the field of psychiatry. A veritable industry of counsellors, therapists and psychotherapeutic practitioners now label an ever-expanding set of behaviours as mental ill-health. As the number of labelled conditions has grown, those reporting that they suffer from such problems has risen exponentially. The stats bandied around are eye-watering. According to the psychologist Oliver James, a third of the adult population shows sign of “psychiatric morbidity”. The problems of worklessness and sick leave, which the Government are rightly tackling, seem dominated by those who have removed themselves from productive work because of mental health-related problems.
Student Minds reports that one in three students experiences clinical levels of psychological distress, but as it is now claimed that students might suffer PTSD if exposed to certain literary texts, it is difficult to assess the clinical authenticity of the so-called mental ill-health epidemic among the young.
The main thing is that the pathologising of ever more aspects of life has unintended consequences, some pertinent to the Bill. For example, we risk reducing the time and resources available to those who desperately need professional help if the system is clogged up with inappropriate referrals and arguably overdiagnosed conditions.
Finally, there is a danger of confusing public opinion if the true horrors and tragedy of serious psychotic illness are relativised and given the same mental health moniker as unpleasant but mundane psychological challenges.
Lord Adebowale (CB)
My Lords, this has been a fascinating debate so far. It is an honour to contribute and to listen to so many learned Peers around the House. In fact, earlier on I detected an almost kumbaya moment around the agreement on some of the aspects of the Bill.
I declare my interest as chair of the NHS Confederation, which is a membership organisation representing health and care leaders in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. We have the privilege of having 100% of all mental health trust leaders in membership.
This debate is overdue, just as updating the Mental Health Act is long overdue. I could not help thinking, during the contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Scriven, that if we were to go back to 1959, this House would be of archaeological interest before we got anywhere near where we have got to today—so we shall start where we are and continue to make the Bill the best it can be.
I should also point out that a member of my family is on the autistic spectrum, so I get it, just as people who have that experience also get it.
Organisations such as the NHS Confederation have warned that the success of reforms will be dependent on the wider infrastructure to support them. My first question to the Minister is: can she confirm that as well as the important measures in the Bill, we will see further details in next spring’s spending review and in the 10-year NHS plan about how patients and staff working in mental health will be supported in years to come?
The Bill is welcome, not least because it is intended to stop people with learning disabilities and autistic people from being detained long-term, unless they also have a serious mental health condition, but only when there is sufficient and appropriate community care in place to support them. It is clear, therefore, that a plan on how this capacity will be built up is vital; otherwise, people will continue to be detained inappropriately. Can the Minister provide more details on what the Government will do to ensure that we see that capacity is built up, so that people with learning disabilities and autistic people are able to benefit from the support that community care can provide?
Concerns have also been highlighted to me by many of our members and other organisations that the changes for people with learning disabilities and autistic people may unintentionally risk these groups falling into the criminal justice system due to a lack of community provision, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins. This is similar to the changes in New Zealand she referred to, which led to people with learning disabilities and autistic people sometimes being sent to prison and left neglected in the community or admitted to forensic facilities as secure patients, as they were unable to be detained under its equivalent of the Mental Health Act.
I welcome the safeguards that the changes relating to people with learning disabilities and autistic people will be enacted only once sufficient provision is in place. Can the Minister provide more details on what the Government will do to ensure that capacity is built up so that people with learning disabilities and autistic people are not inappropriately—and indeed unintentionally—detained for many years, often far away from home and for very long periods?
The Government are committed to enacting the changes to detention regarding people with learning disabilities and autistic people only once sufficient community provision is in place to reduce the risk of these people falling into the criminal justice system. Again, can the Minister outline how the decision to enact this part of the legislation will be made?
The reforms that we are debating introduce duties on commissioners to ensure an adequate supply of community services to prevent inappropriate detentions in hospital, but without a funded plan to build up this provision, there is a risk that the proposed changes to the legislation will never be enacted, and people will continue to be inappropriately detained. Can the Minister say what measures the Government will put in place to help commissioners get it right at local level?
In addition, as the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, mentioned, referring to the 28 days, some people are very concerned that it is not long enough to complete a thorough assessment to identify whether patients with a learning disability or autistic people have a co-occurring mental health disorder, due to the complexity of what patients often present. Does the Minister acknowledge these concerns, and will she remain open to discussions with the sector throughout the passage of the Bill so that the views of those who work day to day with vulnerable people, as well as the views of people with learning disabilities and autistic people and their families, can be fed directly into the legislative process?
It is nice to note that many have referred to the stark racial inequalities in the use of CTOs, and wider concerns around their use. However, mental health providers and many professionals agree that they can be beneficial to patients as they can be the least restrictive option, and we welcome the Government’s commitment to reviewing CTOs. Can the Minister share details about the scope and timescale of this review?
The NHS Confederation has raised concerns about high vacancy rates across the sector, which are bound to impact on staff capacity. Again, can the Minister give assurances that this will be addressed as soon as possible, if not as part of this legislation then through the upcoming 10-year plan or the review of the NHS workforce plan? This was mentioned by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London, and indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, whose points on data I also agree with.
The NHS Confederation has pointed out that more opportunities for patients to challenge their detention are likely to increase the number of tribunal hearings. This would require an additional 33% expansion of the in-patient responsible clinician workforce. Given that national consultant psychiatrist vacancy rates are currently around 10% to 15%, this will be very challenging. With the Government set to publish an updated long-term workforce plan for the NHS next year, as mentioned earlier, can the Minister give an assurance there will be measures in this plan to specifically tackle workforce shortages in mental health?
In referring back to the issue of racial inequality, the patient and carer race equality framework is the key vehicle in reducing the racial disparities that exist in the Mental Health Act and in wider services—which mean, for example, as we mentioned, that black people are far more likely to be detained under the Act or to be placed on a community treatment order than white people. The so-called PCREF is not part of legislation, but all mental health providers are expected to implement it. Concerns exist that the lack of understanding of the framework, as well as the lack of resources available, are hampering its implementation. Again, will the Minister consider using legislation to address these concerns?
Racial disparities are a significant issue, and the NHS Confederation has described the disparities in rates of detention of people from different racial backgrounds as unacceptable—I agree. For example, black people are more than three times more likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act. There is evidence that advance choice documents reduce racial disparities in the level of detentions. This led to many in the sector calling for them to be made statutory. Indeed, this was recommended by both the Mental Health Act review and the pre-legislative scrutiny committee which looked at the draft Bill. Can the Minister set out why advance choice documents will not be made statutory? Is she confident that measures in the Bill concerning such documents will help reduce those racial disparities in detention rates? There are very few evidential interventions that actually reduce racial disparities, so let us use the one that we know works.
The NHS Confederation has highlighted concerns that the new criteria for detention set out in the Bill—namely, that serious harm may be caused—need to be defined. If they are not, we risk inconsistency in how the definition is interpreted. Will the Minister come forward with a definition of what constitutes serious harm so that there can be no doubt about what this means in practice?
Funding for new mental health crisis centres announced in the Autumn Budget was welcome, but we need to see more funding provided for the NHS and mental health in the coming years. As the confederation has pointed out, successful implementation of the legislation we are debating will depend on ensuring that the workforce and resources are in place. That includes capital funding to improve the safety and therapeutic environments of in-patient wards. I have seen some shocking places, as no doubt many noble Lords have. Can the Minister say whether, alongside these much-needed reforms, we will see further funding for mental health in next spring’s spending review? I urge her to speed dial the Treasury.
The Government estimate the overall cost of the reforms to be around £5.3 billion for housing, health and social care costs and £313 million for costs to the justice system in England and Wales. The upcoming 10-year plan and next spring’s spending review are key opportunities for the Government to acknowledge what is needed to enact these reforms. The money for the NHS in the Budget was very welcome. I am a big fan of £22 billion for the NHS, but will the Minister give an assurance that further funding will be made available so that these reforms have the best chance of being effective?
The Government’s commitment to shift more care into the community is welcome because it supports better patient outcomes and is a more efficient use of funding. However, the NHS Confederation and I are among those who have pointed out that we need to make sure that the right provision is in place for that community care. Can the Minister provide assurance today that the Government acknowledge this, and can she set out the Government’s plans to ensure that we have this provision?
As the NHS Confederation pointed out recently, on behalf of our members, people with mental health needs and those with learning disabilities—
Lord Cryer (Lab)
Let me just point out that the limit of nine minutes is voluntary, but a lot of people want to speak.
Lord Adebowale (CB)
I know. I have two things to say and then I will finish, honestly. People with mental health needs, those with learning disabilities and autistic people are waiting too long for appropriate care and support. The mental health estate has also experienced years of underinvestment. Can the Minister give an assurance that alongside this Bill, the Government will use every opportunity they have with the 10-year plan and the upcoming spending review to ensure that we see further investment in care and support for those who need it and into the mental health estate?
Baroness Parminter (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale. I will not have quite as many questions for the Minister as he had, but I very much agree with what he says about community treatment orders, which I will return to at the end of my remarks. Like many other Peers, I welcome the Bill, which I hope will improve the treatment of people who are detained when they need to be, for their safety and other people’s, because they are in mental crisis. As others have said, it is a long time coming, and I very much congratulate the Government on bringing it forward so early in their term.
I am not an expert in the field, unlike just about everybody else in this debate, and nor do I have scars on my back from considerations of the legislation in the past. I come to it as someone with lived experience of the impacts of the deadliest of all the mental health conditions, eating disorders, and, in the context of the Bill, as the mother of a daughter who was sectioned aged 17. I know that sectioning is hard. It is hard for the individual: they are separated from their loved ones and the people who care, they cannot do what they want, and they are not where they want to be. It is hard for families and loved ones who are trying to navigate the system. But I know that sectioning works. It saves lives. It saved my daughter’s life when she was in the grips of an extremely vicious eating disorder. She was so malnourished that she could not even allow anyone to feed her by a nasogastric tube, and the state had to step in and save her life. She went to a hospital more than 100 miles away. She was initially restrained and then kept there for five months. We visited her and they kept her safe. At the end of those five months, we were able to bring her home. She was treated in the community by the NHS team, and we are grateful for that care.
I know that detention works, but as the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, rightly said, we would need less of that detention if there were more provision of community services all around the country so that people could be treated quickly and appropriately. We know that will require more funding, and that was a point that the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale, raised very well. It will require a bigger workforce, and it will require those community services to support people when they need it.
It will also need more specialist beds, and these are particularly needed in the field of eating disorders. At the moment, there are only 251 NHS beds in our country and 198 in the independent sector of specialist adult eating disorder services. The Bill covers England and Wales, but there are no beds at all in Wales. Yet we know that they are absolutely needed. Beat, the leading charity for eating disorders, estimates that about 1.25 million people in this country have an eating disorder. Mental health eating disorder services are absolutely up to the gunnels and beyond, and since 2010 the number of hospital admissions for eating disorders has quadrupled from 7,000 to 28,000—so there is a real pressure point.
When my daughter Rose needed an eating disorder bed, one was not available. She was kept for a month on an adult general ward in the local hospital, where her condition deteriorated to the extent that she had to be sectioned. We need more of these beds. It is no good if we just spend all our time in this Chamber focusing on the particulars of this very small but important part of the Mental Health Bill, on detentions, if the Government do not also grasp the nettle about the need for more beds for people when they really need them.
The other worrying aspect about not having beds is that it stops the mental health law being applied in the first place. The 1983 Act insists that local areas make arrangements for beds in urgent circumstances. I was talking to Dr Ashish Kumar, the chair of the eating disorder faculty at the Royal College of Psychiatrists, who told me that
“even after two medical recommendations, clinicians are not allowed to apply the section because the tier 4 (inpatient unit) services do not offer them a bed. Hence this is a silent crisis—where these seriously unwell patients are not admitted to psychiatry wards or given the opportunity to have a legal provision of the MHAct applied … The whole legal provision is disregarded in a very high number of cases”.
Therefore, I ask the Minister to reassure us—in summing up today and, I am sure, in Committee—that the Government will put equal focus on ensuring that there is community provision for people with eating disorders to minimise the need for people to go into beds, and that there will always be sufficient beds for people with severe eating disorders who really need it.
I agree very much with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale, about community treatment orders. It pains me to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, for whom I have the highest regard, and with Mind. When we faced Rose being sectioned, the place we turned to for advice to understand the Mental Health Act, as parents literally pushed into it, was Mind and its fantastic website, and I pay tribute to it for that. But I believe that for eating disorders, community treatment orders can be very beneficial.
If you are sectioned for an eating disorder, it is because your condition is such that you are at risk. When you come to be released, you are at high risk, even if you have community support, of losing weight quickly and facing an urgent readmission. That is because the complexity and the tyranny of the eating disorder mean that the person cannot, of their own volition, maintain their weight. A community treatment order puts a boundary around the eating disorder in a way that a voluntary agreement could not, in that it makes it clear what will be the result and what will result in an in-patient setting.
Eating disorders are a really complex battle of control. The person with an eating disorder feels that they are completely out of control, but they are desperate for control. A community treatment order gives them control by not keeping them in a hospital, but it also gives them some sense of control through the terms of the order: they know what is going to happen. Let us not forget that it also gives some control to the community treatment team, who do not have to wait for a medical emergency in order to readmit if that is needed.
I contend that if it is done in the right way—in an open and consultative manner, with the intention of supporting that person to live in the community and access their community care—a community treatment order can be uniquely beneficial for people with eating disorders. It has the benefit of keeping that person out of hospital, and the restriction is on the eating disorder and not on the person. In Committee, I hope to carry on making the case for people with eating disorders and their carers, alongside the many other experts in this field, so that we can ensure that this welcome Bill is as good as it needs to be.
Lord Alderdice (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in this debate. I declare an interest as a retired psychiatrist and a fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists.
So much of what I will say comes from my experience of working as a consultant psychiatrist in Northern Ireland. This is particularly important because the legislation in Northern Ireland has always been different from the legislation on this side of the water. The 1950s’ legislation was referred to earlier. In Northern Ireland, the 1961 Act did not, for example, permit admission or detention on the basis of personality disorder. I will come to that in a minute because that foundational difference is of enormous importance.
I welcome this Bill, not because it is a perfect Bill and not even because the foundations of the Bill are particularly good, but because it is at least an improvement on the way things have been for some time. I welcome the four principles it identifies. There are choice and autonomy, a least restrictive approach, and therapeutic benefit—although, of course, this is a difficult one to assess in a short period, as the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale, has pointed out. It can be difficult to work out whether particular approaches to treatment are going to work in the short term. Often we need time. The fourth principle is treating the person as an individual, although again this is not as straightforward as it might appear.
As Dr Lade Smith, the president of the royal college, has pointed out, there are ways in which a piece of legislation such as this can be introduced. Although with plenty of resources there would be a good outcome, if there are inadequate resources the situation can be made much worse. It is not just that not enough resources do not make the situation sufficiently better; that can actually make it worse. For example, if a decision is made not to admit the most seriously ill patients to hospital, which is a very good principle, the consequence is that the people in the wards are even more disturbed and much more difficult to handle. Keeping the same level of staff makes it impossible to manage them because that number is not sufficient to deal with an increasingly toxic and non-therapeutic environment.
Changing from the most direct family member to a nominated person is very good. I entirely support it, but it is not without its consequences. If, before admission, the person is living with the family, but they decide to choose someone outside the family, the family may not be prepared to accept them back again. The nominated person may not be in a position to accept them either.
The truth is that none of us is simply an individual. We exist in the context of relationships. If we do not find ways of engaging with those relationships, simply operating on the basis of individual autonomy and human rights may actually create problems of its own. I absolutely agree that we should not admit disturbed people to police cells or to prisons, but if we do not provide sufficient alternative resources then either they are admitted to psychiatric units and other people who should be in those units are unable to be admitted because there is no room, or they are not admitted at all and things become worse.
This is a complex issue; it is not at all simple. There are unintended consequences. A whole list of colleagues have pointed this out: the noble Baronesses, Lady Murphy, Lady Hollins, Lady Buscombe and Lady May of Maidenhead, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London. Almost anyone who has had direct engagement with the care of patients in these circumstances realises that there is a degree of complexity in dealing with them that a piece of legislation on its own will not resolve, especially if it is not legislation that requires the provision of resources—which, of course, this Bill does not. Doing something without resources can not only be unsuccessful; it can make the situation worse.
Are there better ways of dealing with this? Yes. The Northern Ireland legislation is much better. It is what was referred to earlier as fusion legislation. That is to say that it looks first at the question of whether a person has disturbance of mind and brain function and, secondly, at whether they understand the information relevant to decisions and appreciate the relevance of it. For example, a person who had delusional thinking would obviously not understand the relevance or appreciate it. It gets away from lots of the problems that this part of the country finds itself dealing with because of the separation of mental illness and mental capacity. Those two things were brought together in the Northern Ireland legislation. That was easier because, as I said earlier, personality disorder was never regarded as an appropriate basis for a formal admission in the first place.
As has been said by a number of colleagues, one of the difficulties that has to be dealt with when legislation is changed if that change is not fundamental—or, frankly, even if it is—is that the culture being operated in is one in which all the staff have been working for decades. Trying to change that is really difficult. One way of doing it is to take little steps. I regard separating out autism and learning disabilities as a positive step in the right direction. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is not in her place but I agree—perhaps unusually—with what she said about the overmedicalisation of problems of living. It is true in universities, where there are huge problems now in dealing with students. It is true in all sorts of areas. Every time someone has problems of living it is called mental illness: “I’ve got mental health, doctor”. We wish they did have mental health; that is what they do not have. That is why they have a problem.
All sorts of problems of living are now thought of as disturbance and disorder. That, in my view, is a serious mistake. I have to say that psychiatrists have made their own contribution to developing things in that way, but we have to pull back and look at it again. That is one of a number of very good reasons pointed out by noble Lords for why taking autism and learning disability out of that kind of package, and seeing them in a different way, is an important step in the right direction but—I come back to this again—as long as there is appropriate provision of resources. Without that, things will not go well and we will have unintended consequences.
Those who have produced this legislation and those who will scrutinise it have done and will do it with the best will in the world. They want to make things better and they are doing their best, but a funny thing happens in science: you produce a theory, do some work with it and then discover that it does not quite cover an issue, so you put in a little caveat. Then it does not cover that issue, so you put in another little caveat, and more and more. The whole thing becomes more complex until suddenly, one day, somebody says, “Do you know what? This is not the right theory”, and then there is a shift in understanding to a whole new way of thinking about it.
That is where we are with problems of this kind. We really need to make a paradigm shift. Your Lordships would expect me to say it but, on this issue, the approach that was taken where I was working in Northern Ireland is useful to explore, just as bringing together health and social care was useful. There are other useful things, such as advance choice, but there are so many that we could not possibly deal with them all in one debate. That is why we will be discussing them for quite some time.
Baroness Keeley (Lab)
My Lords, I am glad to take part in this debate in your Lordships’ House, after four years as a shadow Minister for Mental Health and six years on the Health Select Committee in the Commons.
In welcoming this Second Reading, I will speak about dealing with the inappropriate detention of autistic people and people with learning disabilities in mental health hospitals. Noble Lords, including those who served on the Joint Committee on the draft Mental Health Bill, understand that too many autistic people and people with learning disabilities have been detained in inappropriate facilities and for far too long. But we, as politicians and legislators, have not made the changes needed to stop this.
The Winterbourne View scandal and a series of other scandals since 2010 have shown abusive treatment meted out to autistic people and people with learning disabilities detained in inappropriate units. In 2011, following the shocking revelations made by journalists of the abuse to residents detained in Winterbourne View, which was rightly described as “torture”, the then Prime Minister pledged to close all inappropriate in-patient units by 2014. That did not happen. Since then, successive Governments have also committed to targets to reduce the number of autistic people and people with learning disabilities in in-patient settings and to prioritise housing and support in the community for those individuals. These targets have all been missed.
In 2021, the Commons Health and Social Care Select Committee, of which I was a member, completed an inquiry into this treatment. Commenting on the missed and delayed policy targets, the inquiry report suggested that “a more radical approach” was needed to unlock community provision for this group of people. Now there is a chance for reform but there are widespread concerns to raise with my noble friend the Minister that the measures in the Mental Health Bill will not be enough in themselves. While it is welcome that the Bill makes it harder to detain a person under the Mental Health Act on the grounds of autism or learning disability, there are widespread concerns, as we heard in this debate, that this could lead to people being held under alternative routes, including the Mental Capacity Act 2005 deprivation of liberty safeguards. We must guard against that happening.
In many cases, autistic people and people with learning disabilities are not being detained just because of the legal framework they are under. They get stuck for years in mental health hospitals because of the lack of support for them in the community. In too many cases, discharge planning is repeatedly delayed because those responsible see the needs involved as too complex or feel that there are no suitable care providers. I will mention two cases to illustrate this: a young autistic woman called Bethany, and Tony Hickmott.
When I first raised Bethany’s case in the Commons, she was a 17 year-old autistic woman with extreme anxiety, kept in seclusion in St Andrew’s hospital, Northamptonshire. In a cell-like room, she was fed through a hatch in a metal door. When her father Jeremy visited, he had to kneel at the hatch in the door to speak to her. Bethany was detained and held in seclusion despite an assessment that the hospital setting that she was in could not meet her needs and a recommendation that she should be moved to a community residential setting with high support.
The lack of funding for support in the community was clearly a factor. The Walsall Council officer responsible for her placement told Bethany’s father that her care had already cost the council £1.2 million. “To be frank,” the officer said to him, “Walsall could do with a breather”. Moving Bethany to a community setting would involve her local council paying £100,000 to £200,000 a year from the adult social care budget, instead of leaving the NHS to pay the much higher bill, which was £676,000 a year. It seems that Bethany was being held in isolation so that the local council responsible did not have to pay her costs, but the very high costs of her detention were then borne by NHS England.
I raised Bethany’s case numerous times in the Commons and she was at last discharged to live in the community. Fast forward seven years and her father talks about what a happy life his daughter now has, in her own property, with good support from a wonderful care team.
The outcome has not been as positive for Tony Hickmott, an autistic man with learning disabilities. In 2022, Tony had spent 21 years in a secure assessment and treatment unit and it looked as if he could finally move back to his hometown of Brighton, close to his parents Pam and Roy.
Tony had stopped meeting the criteria for being detained in a psychiatric hospital in 2013, but it was ruled that he could not be discharged from there because a suitable community placement could not be found for him. His parents applied to the Court of Protection in 2019 and, after a number of hearings, the judge ruled that Tony should be discharged from hospital to live in a specially renovated house with care from a brought-in provider.
This should have been a happy ending too, but it was not. Reports describe that Tony is now effectively barricaded into the bedroom, with the care staff in his home operating the house like a seclusion room. Tony’s parents, now in their 80s, are prohibited from taking him out into the community. He is held under the deprivation of liberty safeguards. I hope that Tony Hickmott’s care provision can be improved.
Much could have been done by Governments over the last 12 years to tackle this issue of inappropriate detention. The new Government now have the chance to change this. First, we must act to prevent new inappropriate admissions of autistic people and people with learning disabilities. Secondly, we must act to enable the discharge of the 2,000 autistic people and people with learning disabilities detained inappropriately in mental health units.
As we have heard in this debate, the average length of detention for this group is 5.4 years, with 355 people detained for more than 10 years. Mencap has estimated the cost of this care in inappropriate units for this group as £534 million a year. Detentions are often, as we have heard, far away from family and friends, with alarming reports of people from this group being overmedicalised, subject to physical restraint and shut away in isolation. All this is as traumatic for those detained as it is devastating for their families. As Mencap has said, its findings on the staggering cost of institutional care show that this is
“an appalling waste of public money on the wrong type of care”.
I hope that there is now a will to change this.
As I mentioned, there is first the issue of ensuring no new placements of autistic people and people with learning disabilities in those inappropriate mental health units. The Commons Select Committee inquiry report made recommendations on how this could be achieved.
Secondly, the issue of who is paying for care and community support must be tackled. I support the plea made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, for an action plan to succeed the Building the Right Support Action Plan. The Commons Select Committee inquiry recommended that the Department of Health and Social Care should
“redesign the financial incentives … so that local authorities”
and local NHS bodies
“do not seek to ‘offload’”
the care of
“autistic people and people with learning disabilities onto the NHS or place these individuals in inpatient facilities”.
Tackling these issues of funding flows now needs strong cross-governmental action.
There are some further actions that could be taken to improve the mechanisms around this area of work. I thank the human rights lawyer Dr Oliver Lewis for his input. Currently, mental health tribunals are not considered useful in dealing with people stuck in hospital in-patient units. Tribunals dealing with cases for this group should be required to have a medical member with expertise in autism and learning disabilities. Working through the practical issues of achieving a discharge destination for people currently detained could be improved if mental health tribunals are given the power to compel a local authority or NHS body to find a discharge destination in the community or if the Court of Protection was used more to rule on discharge arrangements.
The Bill presents an opportunity to correct an oversight under Section 73 of the Care Act 2014 affecting human rights, which the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, raised earlier. I too thank Dr Lucy Series and Professor Luke Clements for information about the issues raised in the Sammut judgment. As we have heard, that is a ruling that means the Human Rights Act does not apply where mental health patients get Section 117 aftercare in private settings. There is a real concern about the broader implications of this for patients receiving continuing healthcare through private services, children in private social care, and even patients detained in private hospitals under the deprivation of liberty safeguards. This latter group could expand to include the numbers of learning disabled and autistic people who are detained in hospital under the deprivation of liberty safeguards because they are no longer eligible for detention under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act. I am sure it was Parliament’s intention to protect the human rights of vulnerable adults and children for whom the state arranges health and care services. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will agree to the suggested meeting with Lucy Series and Luke Clements to discuss that.
I hope that we can bring forward amendments as necessary to correct this oversight as well as to address the other issues I have raised.
Lord Crisp (CB)
My Lords, I too welcome the Bill. It is overdue and times have changed. People’s views and sentiments, and our knowledge, have changed over those years. I welcome the principles that seek to rebalance the way we handle these issues.
All this is in the context of a Bill that is about the safety of service users as well as public safety. I want to come back to the former but, very briefly, on public safety, I note that the bar for detention will be higher—there must be evidence that
“serious harm may be caused to the health or safety of the patient or of another person”.
The question is: what counts as evidence? Where is the place for the judgment of experienced clinicians? Is that evidence? Is the testimony of relatives? What is the definition of “serious harm?” I understand the need for transparency, but this is a very difficult area that will obviously need much more discussion at later stages of the Bill.
I also welcome the separation out of the care for people with learning disabilities and autistic people, the attention to the needs of people in the criminal justice system and, of course, the importance of tackling racial disparities.
We have had a lot of impressive briefings for this Bill. I will quote one of them, from Blooming Change. That was the one about children who had experience of the system. There were lots of issues about patient safety and quality of care. They talked about being injured during restraint, just being drugged and restrained and being scared all the time. There is a dreadful sentence there, which I will read out:
“Hospital makes you worse … going into hospital with one problem and then leaving with trauma, new behaviours, new diagnoses, assaults, PTSD – it’s awful”.
I noted the earlier comments by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about the very large number—I think it was 52,000—of uses of restrictive interventions in the last year, and the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, about this, and about the importance of children not being in adult wards. It seems to me that this is a great example of what we just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, about admission making the situation worse. The idea was to put people into a ward, but, actually, it led to a deterioration of their condition.
If I think about the Mental Health Act, I understand why the review that a lot of this was based on was focused, but actually we cannot think about the Mental Health Act in a vacuum. Let me pick up two or three examples of that. The first one is that the very same Sir Simon Wessely asked me 10 years ago to look at the capacity of acute adult wards across England. I did so, and with a group we were in contact with every service in England and with consultants who were leading the admission and discharge of patients. One of the interesting findings of that was that something over 20% on average of discharges were delayed because of housing. Indeed, of all those units in England, only two had any links with the housing authorities. This seems to me to be a very fundamental point: if you are stuck in hospital, you may well lose your accommodation, which will lead to other problems. That is just one example of many wider social issues that need to be taken into account, even though we are focusing on something as narrow as the terms of the Mental Health Act.
There is also the impact on A&E, which the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, referred to very early on about just shifting the problem if we are not careful: shifting it from one place to actually landing up in A&E, where there may not be liaison, psychiatry or anything else that will help with the problem.
A number of noble Lords deplored the lack of a wider Bill in which this would nest, but it is very clear that this needs to be implemented in the context alongside other changes that are already under way. There are some profound questions here about care and treatment. We have been very privileged to have heard from a lot of people who know a great deal about this, including a number of very distinguished senior commissioners who could give us insight, as well as parents who can give us remarkable insight and profound comments.
If you look at some of the statistics, healthy life expectancy for all of us has improved massively over the last 40 years, but the gap between life expectancy for those with severe mental illnesses and life expectancy for the rest of us has doubled since the 1980s and is now 20 years behind. If we also look at some other evidence, the NHS independent Mental Health Taskforce argues that outcomes from severe mental health problems have worsened in recent years, and others have argued that they flatlined for about 40 years and, in some cases, have deteriorated.
Various noble Lords have talked about the importance of the change in the model that we are talking about here, with much more focus on the community, much more focus on prevention and much more focus on thinking of this end to end, rather than just as isolated incidents involving isolated patients who do not have relationships with the rest of the world in that sort of model. It really seems to be fundamental that we get hold of those issues; even if they are not in this Bill, they need to be linked to an understanding that those changes may well come with the forthcoming 10-year plan and the implementation of this.
I want to touch on a wider point about the overmedicalisation of common problems. Here is another statistic: in the year to April, 8.7 million people received antidepression tablets—and that is just England, without counting anywhere else. The major problem in that area, apart from the overprescribing itself, is helping people to get off those drugs in due course, which is another example of where some of our current practices have been doing harm. We need a new emphasis on some of the social interventions that many noble Lords have mentioned and a new emphasis on patient safety.
Lastly, this is only legislation. It needs to be accompanied by a real implementation plan for the management of change because it cannot be treated in isolation. These other moves and other leaders are making change happen elsewhere. I very much welcome the Bill and look forward to the discussions about some of these important issues in Committee and beyond.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, it was a privilege to sit on the Joint Committee to scrutinise the Bill, but it was disturbing to see for how long the legislation has been failing patients, their families and clinicians. I thank my noble friend Lady May, who is not in her place, for instituting the process and for placing a clear focus on the disproportionality faced by racialised communities. There is much to commend the Bill, such as the change in detention criteria, and statutory care and treatment plans, but it could still be improved.
The introduction of community treatment orders made a bad disproportionality situation even worse. The mental health factsheet accompanying the Bill says that black communities are seven times more likely to have a CTO than their white counterparts, although that is an improvement on the evidence to the committee, where we were told that it was up to 11 times, while Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology research states that it is up to 10 times. Whatever it is, it is too high. If CTOs are to remain, I hope the Minister will outline that proper research will be undertaken to understand what is causing that disproportionality.
While I welcome the changes to CTOs, I stand by the Joint Committee recommendation that they should be abolished for Part II patients; I stand with Mind on that. There are differing opinions on this issue now, and it would be useful to return to it in Committee. Because of disproportionality, the CTO issue is of particular importance to certain communities. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale; we also heard about the informed research showing that advance choice documents are known to reduce detentions and reduce medicalisation when someone is detained. So, while I am pleased to see the advance choice document in the Bill, I ask His Majesty’s Government to consider that there should be a right to request that.
As the Bill goes through Parliament, I hope that the hard work of a smaller, often less-resourced group of activists for these communities will be appreciated. The work of the NAS and Mencap is exemplary, but sometimes those who are not able to shout the loudest are in the greatest need of our support. I am sad to notice that two of the provisions that are particularly important to racialised communities are being diluted.
One of the most important changes is that the outdated use of nearest relatives is being replaced by nominated persons who represent the patient and exercise relevant statutory functions. It is important to note the power that the nominated person has. It includes the power to order the discharge of the patient, unless of course a barring order is made. Ideally, the nominated person is chosen by the patient, but if they do not have capacity, that function is done by the approved mental health practitioner—AMHP. Those are welcome changes for most adults—I note the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice—but the Joint Committee’s report highlights that all is not clear with regard to the nominated person and children and young people.
The decision not to have a new piece of legislation is a particular problem. When the Mental Health Act 1983 was passed, it was envisaged that it would really apply only to children in the criminal justice system. To complicate matters, the Children Act 1989 was passed, with further amendments later on giving 16 and 17 year-olds the right to consent to medical treatment if they have capacity. Then came the Mental Capacity Act, which does not apply to under-16s but does if you are 17. Then Gillick competence was added to the mix. Yes, it is all rather fudgy, even before you add on the nominated person under the Act.
I will give a couple of examples. For the under-16s, under new Schedule A1, the nominated person must be the person with parental responsibility, but what of the situation of a special guardianship arrangement where the parents keep some residuary parental responsibility? Does the AMHP have to appoint the parents and the special guardian? That would set up quite a difficult arrangement for clinicians. Also, why does this schedule refer to a local authority being “willing” to act as the nominated person? Under the Children Act when there is a care order, local authorities have a duty to act when they have parental responsibility.
I turn to the 16 or 17 year-old who lacks capacity to appoint a nominated person. There is no mention at all of parents’ responsibility in paragraph 10 of that schedule, yet the young person might be living with them. So if the nominated person uses the powers of discharge, a process takes place for them to be discharged. You are relying on the mental health institution to remember that parental responsibility lasts until someone is 18 and to tell the parents that the patient is on their way home. That might not sound like a problem, but if you have got other, younger children in the household, it might be a risk to them to have that person back in the household. Also, a 16 or 17 year-old may be under a care order. Is the local authority going to be informed because it is going to be providing the accommodation? The schedule is silent on that. A common statutory mechanism is to mandate for particular circumstances like those of the under-16s but to have a presumption for other situations. So why not have some kind of presumption that a 17 year-old person with parental responsibility should be the nominated person if they are residing with them?
The previous Government accepted that after the independent review on children and young people more thought needed to be given. So will the Minister agree to have a meeting about children and young people with officials, interested Peers, and the experts in this field who are practising in this niche area of the Mental Health Act and the Children Act?
Children and young people are also in a vulnerable position if they have learning disabilities and autism and no co-occurring mental health illness. If they are in crisis and the parents need help, if there is no Mental Health Act provision, then what happens? We have heard about the use of DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act, but if you are 17 or 18 and lack capacity and are held under that, there is no Section 117 aftercare. However, if you are under 16, or 17 with capacity, you are not under the Act at all. Where does that leave you? That probably leaves you under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court or, rarely, a care order. Only last week the Children’s Commissioner reported on around 1,000 children a year who are now under the jurisdiction of what is called a High Court DoLS order. Let us just say her report is not good news about that third provision to restrict a person’s liberty.
While the situation for those with learning disabilities and autism is currently shocking—and I marvel at the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins—the Act could make a bad situation worse. This is also important to cover at the meeting that I have suggested and as High Court DoLS are a relatively new creation, it would be good to have there former members of the judiciary who have had experience of imposing those orders on children and young people.
I am disappointed not to see the recommendation from the Joint Committee of a mental health commissioner as part of the Bill. Since the Joint Committee reported, rare events have shown the danger to the public if mental health services fail. Often it is those who not medically trained but are friends and family who can see that someone is getting really unwell and needs help. Is it obvious to know where to go if you have tried the previous hospital and you have tried to use PALS? Do friends and relatives know that it is the CQC that they need to go to? The police have rightly stepped back in some respects in these situations. Not appointing a mental health commissioner is a missed opportunity as it is imperative that those people know somewhere to go to. While the Joint Committee’s report was not overt about this being a function of the mental health commissioner because it was before the events I have outlined, an emergency process such as this could well fit within their remit. It would be a one-stop shop. While there is a mental health homicide review under way, if there is the need to legislate, we could now be missing it. However, if His Majesty’s Government established a mental health commissioner whose functions could be by way of secondary legislation, the door to legislation remains open if that review suggests such measures.
Finally, I hope the Minister will inform your Lordships’ House that the Law Commission is being requested to look at whether, in England and Wales, we should be doing what the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, recommended, and which is happening in Northern Ireland: the fusing of our mental capacity and mental health laws. This is a sticking plaster only on an area of law that badly needs a restart.
Baroness Neuberger (CB)
My Lords, I declare interests as chair of University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Whittington Health NHS Trust, and as a member of the North Central London Integrated Care Board. I am delighted to be able to speak in support of the Bill today, which has been a long time coming. As noble Lords know, I was one of the three vice-chairs of Simon Wessely’s review. It seems a long time from when we published that in 2018.
I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, and her team for their pre-legislative scrutiny, which did so much to clarify and to push the draft legislation nearer to what our original review had said, but your Lordships will not be surprised to hear that there are still some areas of concern. I say that as I pay tribute to the Minister for all her engagement, both formal and informal, with members of the review team.
The Government have published the impact assessment for the Bill, showing what they believe will be the costs of the improvements that we all wish to see happen, but have said absolutely nothing about how they will pay for all of this. If we are going to make these reforms work, we are going to need money in the system. Other noble Lords have said precisely that, notably the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, on the subject of staff. You have only to speak to people working in this field to realise that they are desperate for resources, beds and staff—particularly nurses—alongside alternatives to detention that provide real care and do not leave people on the streets. That goes back to the issue of community treatment orders, which we will no doubt come back to in Committee, because this is a really serious concern.
We all know that public finances are under huge pressure but I urge noble Lords, and particularly the Minister, to push as hard as possible for funding for these reforms and the mental health system as a whole. It really is needed and if we do not do that, whatever we legislate will make precious little difference to what happens. That is what we ought to worry about. It is also vital that this House notes the commentary from the Royal College of Psychiatrists whose president, Dr Lade Smith, warns us that these reforms must not make worse the racial disparities already associated with the use of the Act. We need to take heed of that, as many other noble Lords have said.
I want to thank some people in particular, notably Sir Simon Wessely, the chair of the review and, one might argue, the architect of these reforms, and my co vice-chairs Mark Hedley and Steven Gilbert, for their essential contributions. I want also to pay tribute to the Civil Service teams in the Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Justice, particularly Matthew Lees, who put in huge amounts of hard work and showed astonishing devotion to the cause. Some of them have seen it all the way through.
We are delighted that the Bill includes the new guiding principles that we devised and recommended, as well as provisions to promote the use of advance choice documents; but as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, have said, there is something very peculiar about the way this is framed. Advance choice is not given as a right to patients; it is a duty upon the ICBs. When we get to Committee, we need to push that one quite hard.
We also remain disappointed that the Government have not been able to include measures relating to our recommendation that the tribunal consider appeals from patients whose expressed preference for a particular kind of treatment has been overturned by doctors. We believe that that would be an uncommon occurrence; nevertheless, it is an important safeguard for patients’ rights—a right to be involved in decisions to do with your own care. I really hope that the Government will reconsider this proposal, ideally before we end consideration of the Bill.
We are living in a time of increasing tolerance and understanding of mental ill health and decreasing stigma surrounding it, but that is not what many people in the system experience. Many people are most distressed not by the detention itself but the way in which they are treated and made to feel helpless, ignored and stripped of their dignity and self-worth. That is why the review identified—and this is key—a clear gap when it comes to supporting and valuing patient autonomy. It is why we argued that we must move away from what we heard all too often: the default position of clinical staff rejecting what the patient wants. Many of the independent review’s recommendations therefore aim to shift the dial in favour of greater respect for the wishes, choices and preferences of patients. It was also clear that when people were—rightly, in their own view—being deprived of their liberty, they were also all too often being deprived of any say in how they should be treated. As one service user who was part of our core team told us when we started on this process:
“I am sure being detained saved my life, but did it have to be such a terrible experience?”
In one significant respect, the Bill goes beyond any recommendations that we made, proposing, in effect, to exclude learning disability and autism from the scope of the Act, except for short-term admission. Other noble Lords around the House have spoken on that; however, we were and remain concerned that exclusion from the scope of the Act might not solve the problem—although it should—but instead simply shift it elsewhere. The noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, I believe, was hinting at that too.
This Bill, unlike its predecessors—I am a veteran of 2008 as well—enters Parliament with a considerable level of agreement from all the political parties, professionals, media, the charitable sector, service user groups, and in particular stakeholders representing ethnic minority communities, although there are considerable worries.
So there are some concerns, and we know about that. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to meet once again with the team from the Royal College of Psychiatrists and with some user groups, particularly people with autism and other disorders who are expressing major concerns—all of us will have had some of those emails. I hope that that can happen as the legislation goes through, so that we can see if any further fine tuning can be done. But this is without doubt the right time—one might even say it is overdue—to modernise the Act, and I very much hope that the House will support it.
Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath (Lab)
My Lords, today I will focus on those aspects of the Bill that concern children and young people with learning disabilities, autism or both. I also want to note that I found listening to the lived experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, very moving indeed.
My formal interest in this issue dates from my being the independent chair of NHS England’s children and young people transforming care steering group—for children and young people with autism and learning disabilities—from 2017-20, and before that as chair and non-executive board member of various NHS organisations. My close personal interest, however, is lifelong, as the younger sister of Patricia, who I mentioned in my maiden speech.
Patricia was born in a much less enlightened time than we enjoy now, with a learning disability that denied her expressive language and deemed her at the time of her early childhood in the 1950s as a mental defective under the then mental deficiency legislation. My brother Jim followed soon after. My younger sister and I came some years later, to our loving parents’ great joy, but neither she nor I ever lived with my sister Patricia, as she was taken away from our parents when she was seven—before we were born—to a huge and forbidding mental hospital near Birmingham, three long bus rides away from where our parents lived. They had to write each month to the hospital authorities for permission to visit, a maximum of once a month.
When our father died in 1990, my mother asked me to become Patricia’s co-guardian with her and gave me a box that he had kept containing all the paperwork concerning Patricia. The letters from my father asking for permission for Jim, my brother, to visit his sister once she was removed from the family home are heartbreaking to read, as he was always refused, even at Christmas time, because Jim was under 12. So Jim did not see his sister for years.
By the 1960s, these rules had relaxed, and my other sister and I were taken to visit one Sunday a month. I am ashamed to say that I dreaded those visits as a little girl—not because of Patricia, who I liked to see and spend time with, but because the heart of the hospital was a forbidding Victorian building where patients with mental health issues were kept. Sometimes I would hear screams and see figures trying to put their arms out of the tops of windows. At the side of the hospital for the learning disabled—by then called mentally handicapped—which was physically a much pleasanter part of the site, we would sit and eat with and cuddle our sister, who was always delighted to see us, especially our mother.
In time, my parents got a car, and my father would drive us to a café with Patricia. Sometimes we were made welcome, and sometimes not so much. My sister never went to school as she was 18 by the time the duty to educate children with learning disabilities came in following the 1970 Act. My mother found that heartbreaking.
As a child, I did not know that my parents were campaigning to get Patricia moved nearer home, hoping to take advantage of a more benign regime that was developing in the 1970s of long-stay campus-style hospitals where young adults with learning difficulties could live, still under NHS care but with fewer restrictions on the number of visits and more activities for patients—later residents. Eventually, my parents were successful, and those were happier years, with much more contact and my sister being able to visit the home that she had not grown up in.
After my father’s death I took up the campaigning mantle from him to make sure that Patricia genuinely benefited from the latest initiative: care in the community. My sister lived her last years, until she died in 2018, in a real house near our family home with three ladies she had been with previously, and we could visit whenever we wanted. My brother died 30 years ago, so he did not live to see this. My other sister and I had moved to London, but my mother was delighted, as were we, that Patricia lived in a proper house with its own kitchen with home-cooked meals and we could visit whenever we liked.
When the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, in his previous role as chief executive of NHS England, asked me to establish and chair the steering group in support of transforming the care of children and young people with autism and learning disabilities, your Lordships can see why I jumped at the opportunity. As the chair of the steering group, my task was to help bring together all those organisations which had important roles in reducing the number of children and young people with autism, learning disabilities, mental health conditions and behaviours that challenged, but with no criminal backgrounds, being detained.
The steering group included representatives from the Department of Health and Social Care, the Department for Education and local government, as well as charities advocating for these children and young people. What became crystal clear was that detention happens when local education, health and children’s social care services either do not or cannot meet their complex needs appropriately. Although the world has clearly moved on a long way from the days of my sister’s incarceration, I am afraid that I heard some very distressing accounts from families and hospital staff about the reality of detention, as eloquently described by my noble friend Lady Keeley, and not so short of enforced solitary confinement, as described so eloquently in the important work of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins.
At the same time, I saw inspiring examples of what is possible when local community services come together around the needs of children and young people, including on a visit to a special school in north London where I saw pupils who in other circumstances would have been locked away in secure hospitals. The head teacher worked with a multidisciplinary team, including social workers, speech and language therapists, psychologists and others, who liaised closely with the pupils’ families.
One key issue was raised repeatedly by families and those youngsters who could speak for themselves in the stakeholder engagement meetings we held. Although NHS guidance states that each child or young person in such a situation should receive a care (education) and treatment review—CETR—and DfE guidance requires that they should also receive an education, health and care plan, or EHCP, this was all too often either not happening in a timely manner, or it was happening but not being acted upon. This was partly a matter of resources, partly a matter of priorities, and partly a lack of joined-up work between health, education and local government.
This important Bill includes proposals to strengthen current arrangements, and this is to be greatly welcomed. In particular, the assumption that children and young people with autism and learning disabilities should not be detained if at all possible—and, if this is not possible, for only the minimum of time and with a proper review and plan for treatment in place—is a huge step forward. I am delighted that it has received wide support across the political parties, beginning with the noble Baroness, Lady May, when she was Prime Minister and subsequently under more recent Governments. It shows families such as mine that society is beginning to make real progress towards greater understanding and humanity in its attitude towards people with learning disabilities and autism—albeit sometimes more slowly than we would wish for.
However, legislation on its own can take us only so far. Genuinely sustained improvement will require multiagency work—including at government level, as my noble friend Lady Keeley said—with high levels of co-operation in the community to provide effective support for children and young people at risk of being detained. Stronger multiagency community services, combined with the Bill’s provisions, would ensure a very different life for those children and young people and their families from the one my sister had.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
I am very pleased to follow that very powerful speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsey, which reminded us all of the personal stakes that we are debating, as did many other such speeches today. I started my NHS career 30-odd years ago running a large psychiatric hospital outside Newcastle, where in some respects the quality of care was high but in others, frankly, far too many people with long-term mental health problems had been warehoused, in effect, for decades. That was a point in time when there was a big shift to re-provide services in less restrictive community settings.
I mention that simply to remind us that it was not the Mental Health Act 1983 per se that triggered all that; it was a combination of better therapies, alternative services and, frankly, greater power and influence for the voice of users of mental health services that together constituted that initial shift in services. So, as we think about the Bill before us, of course we must attend principally to the content of the legislation but we must also think about how quickly it will be implemented and the context in which it will land.
As we have heard, this is a very well-vetted piece of legislation. We will want to pay attention to the unintended consequences that various noble Lords have raised and I agree with others that some components are seriously underpowered. The advance choice documents provision, I am afraid, will not cut it as currently described. We heard that from the noble Baronesses, Lady Buscombe and Lady Barker, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and many others. Unlike the clinician checklists set out as a requirement in Clause 11, the care and treatment plans that are a statutory requirement in Clause 20, or the new rights for voluntary in-patients to access independent advocacy set out in Clause 38, when it comes to the advance choice documents all we have is a fairly vague, subjective responsibility on the NHS and integrated care boards to give it their best shot. I am paraphrasing, but only slightly. In effect, they are asked to provide information and help to the extent that they consider appropriate. Frankly, a notice on a noticeboard with a phone number to call would constitute progress as far as the Bill is concerned. We need to address this fundamentally. Based on the comments this evening, it sounds as if there may be a latent majority for an amendment when we get to Report, depending on how our debate in Committee has gone.
That is just one example of the Bill’s content. The related question is the one the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, very powerfully raised: however good this is, when will it actually see the light of day? When will it be implemented? Actually, the most salient piece of this legislation is lurking right at the end, at Clause 53(3), which says that most of this stuff will spring into life only through the fiat of the Secretary of State at a date yet TBD. As the impact assessment—which, again, as the noble Lord said, is a very important and revealing document—says, a lot of these measures are seriously back-loaded. Even the ones that are supposedly front-loaded are highly dependent on a set of resourcing which may or may not occur.
For example, the new detention criteria for people with learning disabilities and autistic people may start in 2026-27, but next to a little asterisk is written:
“This timeline is highly indicative as an illustration for modelling purposes. This reform will commence once systems are able to demonstrate sufficient levels of community support for people with a learning disability and autistic people as an alternative to hospital-based care”.
As we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, and others, we have been waiting for that for some long years. My concern is that we run the same risk here as we saw with, say, the implementation of the Dilnot reforms: something sits on the statute book but never actually comes to life because it is always, “Mañana, mañana”, given the chicken and egg problem of resourcing and alternative services to allow the thing to come about. There is an implementation timescale question that I am sure we will want to pay attention to.
Related to that is the extent to which the Bill interacts with the real-world state of mental health services, social care, housing, the criminal justice system and so forth. Two of the four principles in Clause 1—“Choice and autonomy” and “Least restriction” of care—are intrinsically tied to the availability of alternative services. Therefore, you cannot divorce the Bill from decisions that this Government and future Governments will make on its resourcing.
If we want a moment of legislative humility, let us cast our minds back to the Health and Social Care Act 2012, where parity of esteem was legislated from the rooftops. Frankly, we did not see parity of esteem begin to kick in on the back of that declaration. In fact, between 2010 and 2016—a time of rising mental health need—the mental health workforce was cut by 9.4%. I took the decision—with the support of the now noble Baroness, Lady May, as Prime Minister—that, from 2016 onwards, we would introduce the mental health investment standard. This required that, each year, the share of NHS funding going on mental health could not fall—it had to be at least constant and should be rising—to stop the squeeze that was otherwise taking place. As a result, in contrast to that 9.4% reduction, we have seen a 26.5% increase since then. In his review for the new Government, the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, said:
“This important intervention has … enabled much of the mental health capacity that was cut in the first part of the 2010s to be rebuilt”.
That is why this House was good enough to support my amendment to the 2022 health Act, which was then adopted by the Government. This ensured that, prospectively, before the start of each financial year, the Government of the day have to set out their stall and declare whether they intend that mental health spending will grow as a share of the overall pie in the year ahead. The reason that is so important is not just history: at a time when, understandably, there will be great political focus on waiting times for physical health and routine operations, the most likely outcome, absent that mental health investment standard, would be that mental health services would get screwed at a time when other things are prioritised.
We will want a renewed commitment by the new Government to that mental health investment standard, perhaps as early as the planning guidance for the coming year, 2025-26. We will be able to take stock of that before Committee to make a judgment about whether we should recommend a strengthening of that mental health investment standard in the statute, because it is inconceivable that the good measures laid out in the Bill can actually be implemented while mental health services are squeezed as a share of the growing NHS budget.
In the western movie “The Magnificent Seven”, Steve McQueen said that, as gunslingers, “We deal in lead”. Clearly, here in Parliament, we deal in law, but my underlying point is that law gets you only so far. The question is not just the content of the law but how it is implemented, how fast and in what context. We need to keep our eyes on all those as the Bill proceeds.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, as the last Back-Bench speaker in this rich and informed debate, I note that we in the Green group start our meeting each week by asking ourselves what original things we have to say, specifically as Greens, about a Bill or a debate—so it is useful to come at this particular point in the circle. As Greens, we very much agree with the need for the Bill, which virtually every noble Lord noted. We also very much agree with the need to strengthen it.
I respectfully disagree, however, with a number of noble Lords who have suggested that we are seeing an overmedicalisation of life events. Perhaps this is not quite what they meant to suggest, but it sounded like they were saying that we do not have a mental health crisis in our society. I would very much say that we do. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, that there is a great need for more talking therapies and that, for want of those, medical professionals are very often forced to resort to pharma solutions.
We need the talking therapies, but we also need treatments because we have a mental health crisis. Behind that is not any characteristic of individuals but a deeply unhealthy society and, when we are thinking about this Bill, we have to think about it in that context. We have to think that when we compare ourselves to the societies we generally consider comparable, we have much greater health problems than them. We must ask ourselves why. This is true of mental and physical health, in so far as it makes any sense to make a division between those two. I do not think anyone this evening has yet used the phrase “the gut-brain axis”, but in the last decade there has been an explosion of understanding of the link between the microbiome and mental health. We have, particularly in the UK, a broken food system. This is of course a long way from legislation but, if we are to think systemically, it is the context in which we have to think about the Bill.
As some noble Lords have made reference to, there are also the social issues to consider, whether the levels of poverty, the insecurity of income and housing, or the pressurised jobs that treat workers like robots and make them ill. We have a loneliness epidemic, which I do not think anyone has mentioned yet, but that is very much related to our mental health epidemic. We have a huge problem with domestic violence, which is also related to mental ill-health, particularly among the victims. We need to take a public health approach to mental health. While that is not directly part of the Bill, we cannot talk about mental health without talking about all those issues.
On other areas on the Greens’ unique approach to mental health issues, we do not believe that the coercive power of the state—which is what the Bill is talking about—should ever be put into private hands; nor do we believe that healthcare should ever be run on a for-profit basis. Here, I remind us of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, about when the private provision of mental health care has gone horribly wrong.
A number of noble Lords have focused on the problem of stigma; perhaps we have made progress over recent decades, but we still have a long way to go. We have to think very carefully about using the rhetoric of “strivers versus skivers”, and the suggestion that all we have to do is get these people into a job and then they will be fine, because that is the underlying message we are hearing from certain very senior quarters in our society. I must mention that there has been talk of combining support for people seeking jobs and mental health care. I would not necessarily say not to do that, but it has to be done with extreme caution to ensure that it is not something that puts more pressure and stress on people, interfering with them becoming well.
More positively, I commend the Government on bringing the Bill forward so early in their term and on making it a Bill that starts in the House of Lords. I compare it to the Domestic Abuse Act, during the passage of which many noble Lords who have taken part in today’s debate also took part. There was a genuine effort from all sides of the House to make that Act better, and it has been very clear this evening that there is the same desire in this Chamber today.
Many noble Lords have made the point about the need to resource what is in the Bill—we also said that about the Domestic Abuse Bill—including, to single out a few, the noble Lords, Lord Alderdice and Lord Adebowale, and many others. There have also been some really good ideas in this debate, and here I particularly single out the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins. The idea of a safe staffing level for community services strikes me as a potentially transformative idea that is really essential. Far too often, care in the community has simply meant being abandoned in the community, being left in the hands of horribly overworked staff, who are then subject to abuse and questioning when things go wrong because they simply have not been able to handle the workload, through no fault of their own. It is really crucial that we tackle those issues.
I will quickly whizz through some specific points of the Bill, particularly focusing on things that other people have not said. I have not heard a great deal of discussion of the idea, as recommended by the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill, that we have a mental health commissioner. The briefing from the Centre for Mental Health draws a parallel with the powerful impact of the Children’s Commissioner; I would also add the impact of the Patient Safety Commissioner, on which I worked with the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, over many years. Again, that was a case in which your Lordships’ House was very powerful in pushing to create that position. Having the Patient Safety Commissioner has made a real difference, and having a new statutory role to champion mental health across government and speak up for people with mental illness is something we really should be including in the Bill.
Very briefly, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on community treatment orders. The Bill still allows these to be continued indefinitely rather than placing a time limit on them with an option for a new one if needed. These should not be renewed without proof of necessity and proportionality.
I will use my remaining time to focus particularly on the importance of children and young people. Many other noble Lords have addressed and given us statistics on how our mental health services are failing young people. I want to draw another parallel with another element of what the Government are doing and which I have praised. A couple of nights ago, rather late in your Lordships’ House—about this sort of time, actually—we were discussing the Government’s plan for a new youth strategy and their plan to make sure that there is really strong consultation on it with young people. The one direct question I will put to the Minister is: I am sure the noble Baroness is aware of the phrase “Nothing about us without us”. What is being done to ensure that there is a real say for young people, particularly young people with experience of the mental health system, to ensure they actually have the chance to be involved in the Bill?
I will rush into one final, technical point. The Bill introduces the new statutory care and treatment plans for all patients. That is welcome, but many under-18s are admitted on an informal basis, so they will not be covered by this. How will that be dealt with?
One final rushed point is that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and others, have talked about how we can learn from other parts of the UK. The mental health Act in Wales includes a measure to give people the right to have a mental health assessment if they request help. That is surely something we could learn from and include in the Bill.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I apologise for my croaky voice. It has been an excellent and very well-informed debate. Like all other noble Lords today, I welcome the early introduction of this Bill, after so many years of delay, to modernise the woefully out-of-date 1983 legislative framework. Indeed, it has been one of the longest and most tortuous gestation periods of any piece of legislation I can remember.
I thank so many organisations for the excellent briefings I have received, as well as those who have worked so hard to get us to this stage, including the independent review chaired by Sir Simon Wessely and the cross-party Joint Committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe.
Those people directly affected by this piece of amending legislation deserve better. From these Benches, we welcome the introduction of the Mental Health Bill as an important step towards modernising the mental health care system and enhancing patient rights. We are encouraged by the Bill’s emphasis on empowering patients and giving them greater control over their treatment decisions, and we want firmly to establish the principle that detention is an opportunity for treatment and a path to recovery, rather than being seen solely in terms of containment.
Like so many others, I particularly welcome the fact that the Bill seeks to limit detention for people with learning disabilities and autistic people who do not have a co-occurring mental health condition and removes prisons and police cells as suitable places of safety. As my noble friends Lord Scriven and Lord Alderdice said, this reform package moves incrementally in the right direction, seeking to balance the rights of individuals with the imperative of public safety.
But there is much more to do to strengthen and improve the Bill and to look at the wider context, particularly at the adequacy of existing mental health services outside of the Act and broader social inequalities. Ensuring we have the necessary funding, the workforce with the right skills and training in the right place will all fundamentally affect the implementation of this Bill.
However, I am disappointed that quite a number of the recommendations by the Joint Committee have not been picked up, in particular those on a mental health commissioner, on the interface between the Mental Capacity Act and this Bill and on strengthening duties on integrated care boards and local authorities to ensure an adequate supply of community services for people with learning disabilities and autism—points to which I shall return. Will the Government provide a detailed response to the Joint Committee report setting out the rationale for the recommendations that have been accepted and those that have not?
There are a number of themes that we will want to explore in Committee, and the first is prevention. We all know that, in healthcare, prevention is better than cure, and the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, Wes Streeting and the Prime Minister have all said it is one of the big three transformational shifts that are needed. We need to apply that same principle to this Bill and live up to that mantra. Put simply, we need to focus on preventing people from reaching the point where they risk being sectioned in the first place. That means deeper and wider preventive mental health in our communities. Currently, as a country, we focus on treatment rather than prevention. We spend around £230 billion on healthcare but only £3.5 billion on public health and only about 3% of that on preventive public mental health work. There is so much more we could do in schools, with walk-in hubs in the community and regular mental health check-ups et cetera.
A key Liberal Democrat objective in this Bill will be promoting good mental health. I believe we need a power included in the Bill that enables the relevant health and local authorities to undertake the promotion of mental health with realistic resources attached. That is also why I want to see a new right to both assessment and treatment for mental health introduced, similar to the Care Act rights that we introduced back in 2014, for people to get the help they need at earlier stages, directly preventing unnecessary admissions.
On racial disparities, given that two of the key drivers of the 2018 review were to reduce detention rates and the stark disparities in the application of the Act on some racial groups—as the noble Baronesses, Lady May and Lady Berridge, said so powerfully—we must explore what other opportunities exist to strengthen legislation in this regard. Specific examples would be putting the Patient and Carer Race Equalities Framework on a statutory footing and including an equity principle—in addition to the four existing guiding principles—which, like the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, and my noble friend Lord Scriven, I would like to see in the Bill to underline that these principles sit at the heart of all decision-making covered by it. I also support a new responsible person role at hospital level to oversee and monitor race equality in the day-to-day operation of the Act, with a corresponding duty on the Secretary of State to report annually on progress against reducing inequalities. Such a package could have real teeth.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, and others, I also strongly support the establishment of a mental health commissioner, as recommended by the Joint Committee. Such a commissioner would both promote access to treatment across the spectrum of mental health services, including things like beds for eating disorders, and oversee implementation of the Act, including ensuring that racial disparities are fully addressed and monitoring the use of community treatment orders.
On seeing detention as an opportunity for treatment and recovery, I would like to see the definition of appropriate medical treatment strengthened to take account of the settings in which treatment is delivered, including community settings, and the importance of non-drug-based intervention—either in tandem with medication or on its own—where it is clinically effective.
As many noble Lords have said, the Bill makes some important changes to better regulate the use of CTOs. These were originally meant to be a route out of disproportionate sectioning but, in reality, they have exacerbated the number of black people who are subject to compulsion under the Act. However, the revisions in the Bill currently stop well short of adopting all the independent review’s recommendations. For example, they allow CTOs to continue indefinitely, rather than placing a time limit on each CTO, with the option to make a new one if it is still needed. As my noble friend Lady Parminter made clear, we should explore this in Committee.
As many others have said, we need to view equal treatment between Part II and Part III patients as paramount. Ensuring that all patients detained under the Mental Health Act, including those involved in the criminal justice system, have equal access to advocacy, mental health tribunals, appeals and other rights—no matter which part of the Act they are detained under—is a key principle. Given, as I have said, that one of the key drivers for reform was addressing racial inequalities, and that black people are significantly more likely than white people to be detained under Part III, we currently risk further entrenching these disparities.
Much has rightly been said about people with learning disabilities and autism. The changes to Section 3 are an important step in ending the human rights scandal of inappropriate detentions of autistic people and people with a learning disability. As the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, said, legislative change must be accompanied by investment in the right community support. Without this, autistic people and people with learning disabilities will continue to reach crisis point with their mental health. There is a real risk of these groups falling into the criminal justice system, simply due to lack of community provision. This has been the New Zealand experience, as the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, highlighted. They are then unable to access Section 117 aftercare support. We are told that this change will be enacted only once sufficient provision is in place. Can the Minister provide more details on how this decision will be taken and what the Government will do to ensure that capacity is being built up in the community?
My noble friend Lady Barker, the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, and others expressed concerns about the interface between this legislation and the Mental Capacity Act. I share these concerns. I feel that it is currently fuzzy and unclear, leading to inconsistency in practice and confusion as to which legal framework applies. We must explore this further in Committee, including understanding what has happened to the liberty protection safeguards that were introduced under the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act but have not yet been implemented.
I am also aware of concern within the sector that there has not been adequate or meaningful engagement with people with learning disabilities or autism, or sufficient time for them to be properly involved in decisions that directly affect their lives. How do the Government intend to remedy this? Do they have a plan of stakeholder engagement, particularly with groups led by people with learning disabilities and autism?
One area which particularly concerns me and about which we have heard a lot today is the position of children and young people who are too often receiving poor-quality care in unsuitable conditions. There are many things we can do in Committee to strengthen the position for children. I was profoundly moved by the family experience that the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsey, recounted. I thank her for that.
There is much else that I would like to say about implementation, but I have probably run out of time. I welcome the collaborative style adopted by the Minister towards improving the Bill. I look forward to working with other noble Lords on this vital and long-overdue piece of legislation.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, this has been a fascinating debate. Having read the various reports sent by many organisations, including the excellent briefing from the House of Lords Library, I felt pretty well briefed but, having listened to today’s contributions —including the moving contributions from my noble friend Lady Browning and the noble Baronesses, Lady Parminter, Lady Keeley and Lady Ramsey—I realised that there is so much more for us to learn.
These Benches welcome the Bill. In particular, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady May, who, as Prime Minister, commissioned the Wessely review to consider a number of issues: why, as we heard from many noble Lords, were detention rates increasing and, in particular, what could be done to reduce inappropriate detention? I understand very well the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, about when detention may be appropriate or inappropriate. The review also considered how to improve the way that different agencies respond to people in crisis to ensure that they are treated with dignity and respect. It looked at the disproportionate number of people from certain ethnic backgrounds, specifically Afro-Caribbean men, being detained under the Act and what should be done about it.
I am also grateful to noble Lords who served as members of the pre-legislative Joint Committee on the 2022 draft mental health Bill, which was based on the recommendations of Sir Simon Wessely’s review. Some of them have spoken in this debate: in particular, my noble friend Lady Buscombe, who chaired the Joint Committee; my noble friend Lady Berridge; the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who has a long history in this area from personal and professional experience; the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, who has many times said, “I told you so”; and the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, who was a champion for mental health during the passage of the Health and Care Bill. Quite often I was urged to resist some of his amendments but, with hindsight, I am glad that he prevailed to ensure that we continue to discuss the parity between mental and physical health. As many noble Lords have said, the challenge is how we turn those words into action throughout the system. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, who sat on the Wessely review and who, when we looked at and discussed this when I was the Minister, gave me quite a bit of time—partly, I think, because she chairs the trust of the hospital where I was born.
They all had very incisive insights so, in approaching this debate with my noble friend Lord Howe, we considered the report from the Joint Committee and this generated many of our questions. We wish to probe the Government on the recommendations from the report, especially those with which the Bill seems to disagree. We will not, at this stage, tell the Government where we agree or disagree; it is more to understand the Government’s reasoning for not including specific recommendations from the Joint Committee.
We also ask the question: if and when the Bill is passed, what next? How and when will the Government implement the main changes in the Bill, as was alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven? Last week during Oral Questions, one of the ministerial colleagues of the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, made what sounded like a government commitment. But when questioned by one of my noble friends, that Minister admitted that it was not a commitment but an aspiration.
Similarly, the briefing notes accompanying this year’s King’s Speech stated that the Bill would take
“a number of years to implement”
and that the Government would introduce these reforms
“in phases as resources allow”.
At this stage, therefore, we would like to understand which changes the Government plan to introduce immediately and which reforms they are aspiring to, rather than actively planning. This is to make sure that we avoid some of the problems that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, alluded to in his contribution.
I move now to the main areas that have been raised in today’s debate on which we would like to learn more about the Government’s intentions. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, reminded the House that autism is not a mental health condition. My noble friend Lady Browning highlighted the lack of understanding of people with autism. The Joint Committee recognised the risk that people with autism or a learning disability could be given additional and unnecessary medical mental health diagnoses in an attempt to justify detention, when they can no longer be detained under Part II of the Mental Health Act. What firm plans do the Government have, in this Bill or otherwise, to try to manage and mitigate this risk?
The Joint Committee recommended a full statutory review of the use of community treatment orders within three years but, as my noble friend Lord Howe pointed out, there is no commitment to such a review in the Bill. Can the Minister explain the Government’s reasoning for not committing to a review within three years?
On children, both the independent review and the Joint Committee made recommendations—some of which are not in the Bill—about the treatment of children, such as the inappropriate placement of under-18s into adult wards or into facilities that may be miles away from their home. Can the Minister clarify the Government’s position on these two specific issues?
On advanced care documents, which the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has championed for many years, the Joint Committee recommended that these be made a statutory right for all patients detained under the Mental Health Act. As my noble friend Lady Buscombe has said, this could be done in the form of an app if we make sure to push through the digitalisation of the NHS and the whole care system. The Bill as it stands does not follow up on this recommendation, preferring to place a duty—one noble Lord alluded to it being “vague”—on NHS England and ICBs to inform patients about advance care documents. Many noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, have raised this issue, so I think the House would find it helpful if the Minister could explain the Government’s reasoning behind not introducing these documents as a statutory right in the Bill.
We welcome the Bill removing police stations and prisons as places of safety for patients not in the criminal justice system. However, as my noble friend Lord Howe said, one unintended consequence raised by several bodies was that this could lead to a rise in the number of people admitted to A&E departments, sometimes escorted by police and having to wait in crowded spaces with a lack of specialised facilities until they can be assessed by clinicians. When do the Government envisage that NHS trusts will be able to deal with the potential increase in the number of mental health patients admitted to hospitals as places of safety?
The president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, who contributed to the independent review, raised concerns about the proposed changes to the treatment of those with learning disabilities or autism, as there may be times when community services cannot manage the level of risk that such patients present, and when it might take some time to decide whether this is related to co-occurring mental illness. In such cases, patients may be brought into A&E, but what happens if their behaviour is perceived as affecting the safety of others in the A&E department? This could lead to the police being called, and suddenly they are in the criminal justice system. I wonder how the Minister sees the Bill dealing with such a situation.
I now turn to the issue of early intervention, which the British Association of Social Workers raised during pre-legislative scrutiny and which the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, raised today. The BASW stressed the importance of early intervention to prevent the admission of mental health patients into hospitals in the first place, which they described as being at
“the interface of mental health and mental capacity legislation”.
A number of noble Lords have talked about whether we could have gone back to first principles and started with fusion legislation. We note that Sir Simon Wessely suggested that this was not practical or would take too much time; I do not wish to misquote him. My noble friend Lady Berridge also mentioned the interface with the Children Act. This all asks how we can do this in a holistic way, but by taking a step back are we just waiting even longer for something to be done to fix the problems with the existing legislation? We have obviously decided on this route but I ask the Minister what thought is being given to future fusion legislation or rethinking the interface between the various Acts affected here?
The pre-legislative scrutiny committee also recommended
“the creation of a Mental Health Commissioner … to oversee the direction of travel … and implementation, monitoring outcomes and supporting cultural change … be an advocate for patients, their families and carers and speak up about the stigma still attached to severe mental illness”.
Yet the Government have decided not to accept this recommendation. I note that a number of noble Lords across the House have spoken on this missing part of the legislation. Can the Minister explain why the creation of a mental health commissioner has not found its way into the Bill?
One of the main reasons for commissioning the independent review was to examine why so many people of Afro-Caribbean heritage are detained under the Mental Health Act. Indeed, Sir Simon Wessely wrote in his report that one of his earliest academic papers, in 1989, was on the subject of the overrepresentation of those of black, African and Caribbean heritage among those diagnosed with schizophrenia. Are the Government, the NHS and the department any closer to understanding the key factors behind this overrepresentation? What do they believe can be done to reduce this disparity, or does it need further research?
The Minister might find this odd coming from me, given that when I was Minister I quite often tried to shield the Government from this—now that the roles are reversed, there might be a certain irony—but I will ask about a workforce plan. In all honesty, when we were in government we were pressured by the Treasury not to accept this, and it quite often pushed back when we tried to make the case for this, so I understand that it is a real challenge for the Government. We completely understand, and it would be unfair of me now to take advantage of the fact that I am in opposition. Our Government belatedly published a workforce plan. What is the thinking on publishing a workforce plan, given that many noble Lords across the House have asked about this, particularly once the Bill becomes an Act? How long would it take to actually implement this? We need to understand more about the resources—otherwise, it could make things worse.
I realise that I and other noble Lords have asked many questions, and I certainly do not envy the Minister. We look forward to her responses, either now or in writing, and we welcome her engagement with noble Lords across the House.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I put on record my gratitude to all Members of your Lordships’ House for contributing to what was widely agreed, I am sure, to have been an excellent debate—excellent not just because of the level of engagement but because of the detail. I really feel that spirit of wanting to improve the legislation and the support for the Bill thus far. I will endeavour to respond to as many themes as possible; I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, for his sympathy, which I accept, but I regard that as a good thing. I regard it as admirable that I will not be able to answer all the questions, because that is the purpose of being here. It sets us up for Committee. It is obviously going to be a very rich Committee, and I very much look forward to it.
I hope noble Lords will understand that I look forward to following up on the many points that I will not get a chance to address in the time I have and doing a proper review of the debate today, picking up points as needed. I pay tribute to the dedication and the detailed attention to the Bill that noble Lords have already given. I am very glad to see my right honourable friend the Secretary of State gazing on. The reason I say that now is that the Secretary of State knows only too well—and not just from me—the contribution that your Lordships’ House makes and will continue to make. I for one certainly appreciate it, as I know he does.
I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, for her bravery in sharing her and her family’s experience and anguish of eating disorder. I say the same to my noble friend who shared her experience about her sibling. It is not always easy to do that, but it really brings a lived experience of those around the person we are often thinking about, and it is so important that we do that. This debate has confirmed to me what I knew already—but it is always worth doing it again. It is the product of persistence and of a number of investigations and recommendations. It is also inspired and underwritten by the tireless campaigning that many have undertaken to improve the rights and experiences of people with mental health conditions and learning disabilities and autistic people.
It also reflects the input of those with lived experience, which was first raised as necessary in the debate by the noble Baroness, Lady May. It is about striking the right balance between getting the details of a framework of legislation right, along with the urgent need for reform, and the point that noble Lords have raised about how that is going to be done.
Attitudes and knowledge, as many noble Lords have acknowledged, have changed radically. Mental health is increasingly out of the shadows, and through the Bill we can make sure that legislation does a much better job of keeping up with a shift in societal attitudes and expectations and the development of treatment.
Regarding the role of your Lordships’ House, like the noble Baronesses, Lady May and Lady Barker, I recognise the relevance of this House. I too welcome that the Bill has started its passage through Parliament here because I believe your Lordships’ House will do the job that it is here to do, which is to improve legislation, and this debate today has certainly confirmed that.
In looking at what we are trying to achieve, I am reminded of the words of Professor Sir Simon Wessely in his foreword to the independent review’s final report, where he said that
“we want the Mental Health Act to work better for patients, the public and professionals. We hope that the result will be to reduce the use of coercion across the system, whilst giving service users more choice, more control and better care, even in the event that detention is still required. And we particularly hope that the end result will be to reduce the inequalities and discrimination that still remain”.
Almost six years after the former Prime Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady May, commissioned that independent review, the draft legislation before us speaks to those aspirations as well as delivering our manifesto commitment to modernise the 1983 Act.
On the reduction of detentions, I certainly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and other noble Lords that reducing detentions cannot be achieved by legislation alone. It will depend on having the right services in the community.
New models of care in the NHS are already giving over 400,000 adults greater choice and control over their care. We are also trialling new models of care through six early implementers, bringing together community crisis and in-patient functions into one neighbourhood team that will be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to increase access and improve continuity of care in the community. I know from the debate today that many noble Lords are looking for that sort of development and good practice.
As we know, the Bill makes a number of improvements in respect of patient experiences and care, and of the increase of choice and autonomy. It seeks to tackle racial discrimination and provide safety for public, staff and patients, and to provide better support for those with autism and learning disabilities.
I turn to some of the main themes that have been raised. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, that we continue to be committed to engaging with those with lived experience. Part of the point of the Bill is that, where those with lived experience have not had their voices heard, I believe our continued engagement will allow that.
On racial inequalities, many have spoken passionately about this matter, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Watkins and Lady Buscombe, and the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale. The racial disparities associated with the operation of the current Act were one of the many drivers of reform, and rightly so. The changes in this Bill will give patients greater say in their treatment and encourage more collaboration and less coercion in care and treatment planning, which are all crucial to reducing inequalities. This will include increasing oversight and scrutiny of community treatment orders, where racial inequalities are at their most acute. It will also be about encouraging the uptake of advance choice documents, where those with lived experience, as I said in my opening remarks, have been very generous in their reference to their use in reducing inequalities. Legislating so that people can choose their own nominated person will also protect rights.
Inequalities in outcomes are not just a result of how the Act has been applied but also due to wider social and economic factors. We will therefore be working across government to ensure that the Bill’s provisions are effectively implemented, aiming to reduce those racial disparities in decision-making under the Act, starting with using the code of practice to make clear which actions can be taken in the application of the Act. We are also taking forward non-legislative reforms recommended by the independent review, including the Patient and Carer Race Equality Framework and also piloting culturally appropriate advocacy models to support those from minority ethnic backgrounds to understand their rights under the Mental Health Act and to give voice to their individual needs.
On the mental health commissioner, I have heard many comments, including those expressed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Murphy, Lady Barker, Lady Buscombe and Lady Berridge, and the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, and others. That is quite a group to address, but I will have a go. It is true that we have not taken forward the pre-legislative scrutiny committee’s recommendation to establish a statutory mental health commissioner. We recognise that improvements need to be made to the quality of care and the patient safety landscape. However, the concerns are that the proposed mental health commissioner’s function would be potentially largely duplicative of existing bodies and functions, and nobody wants to risk diluting accountability or causing confusion. As noble Lords will know, Dr Penny Dash has been asked by the Secretary of State to assess if the current range and combination of organisations within the healthcare regulation landscape is effective and to make recommendations of what might be needed, and I think it is important that we await her recommendations.
Learning disability and autism were raised by a number of noble Lords, in particular by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Buscombe and Lady Browning, my noble friends Lady Keeley, Lady Ramsey and Lord Touhig, and the noble Lords, Lord Scriven and Lord Adebowale. This is a very important point and I recognise that we want to improve care and support for the over 2,000 people who are currently detained, as well as anybody who may need support in the future. We know from the NHS’s safe and wellbeing reviews that four in 10 people who are detained in this group have needs which could have been met in the community with appropriate support. That is why we are going to be focusing on developing community services and improving the quality of care, which will happen alongside the Bill’s reforms.
Through the Bill, we will be taking forward a package of measures for those with a learning disability and autistic people, so there will be a significant programme of work, alongside investment. I will be pleased to engage with expert stakeholders and those with lived experience, including parliamentarians, and to update your Lordships’ House as we progress.
With regard to the recommendations of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, there is no doubt in my mind that the Bill has benefited greatly from undergoing scrutiny in 2022. It is a better Bill for that and we have tried to incorporate more of the Joint Committee’s recommendations within it. Many of those recommendations relate to the statutory code of practice and we will consider how we take these forward following Royal Assent.
On the important point of implementation, raised by many noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Adebowale and Lord Bradley, the truth is that we estimate that the full implementation of these reforms will take around 10 years. The speed at which we can implement will be limited by the time that we need to expand and train the workforce. This goes to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and I am grateful for his honesty in the way that he described previous work on the workforce. I thank him and his ministerial colleagues—predecessors of mine—who have worked on this.
The reality is that while some reforms can commence much sooner than others, we will need to commence powers under the new Bill in phases. Implementation will depend on what happens during the passage of the Bill and the reality of future funding settlements—to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens—as well as other developments, such as the 10-year plan, but I can briefly give an indicative timeline.
A small number of reforms relating to the criminal justice elements of the Bill will commence within two months of Royal Assent. In the first year after Royal Assent, there will be a focus on updating the code of practice and creating the necessary secondary legislation to enable implementation. We will need a further year to train existing staff on the reforms and ensure that processes are in place. We would therefore hope to commence the first phase of significant reform in 2027, and to commence further reforms as and when there is sufficient resource in place to do so. In the spirit of honesty, the truth is that for what I would call the most burdensome reforms—for example, the increased frequency of mental health tribunals—those would not be likely to commence before 2031-32.
Alongside the passage of the Bill itself, we are looking closely at implementation in relation to learning disability and autism. Again, the exact timing of implementation of the reforms will depend on future funding. I know that noble Lords will understand that I am limited in what I can say on that, but we have already demonstrated our direction of travel by: treating and resourcing mental health seriously, including having a mental health professional in every school; introducing open-access Youth Futures hubs; recruiting 8,500 mental health workers; and having £26 million in capital investment. Indeed, there is the priority that many noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, have acknowledged of bringing this Bill forward as a matter of urgency.
The noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, raised the disparity of treatment between children and adults. It is true that there are a small number of reforms which do not apply to children and young people, as was also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins. It is the case that there is a difference; nevertheless, we are committed to improving children and young people’s autonomy over their care and treatment. We still believe that these reforms will go some way to achieving this. Like adults, under-18s should be supported to share their wishes and feelings by the clinician when it comes to care and treatment decisions.
On the issue of prison transfers, which was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, and the noble Lords, Lord Scriven, Lord Bradley and Lord Adebowale, we recognise that operational improvements are needed to ensure the safe and effective implementation of the statutory 28-day limit. NHS England is indeed taking steps to address some of the barriers to timely transfer of patients. The wording in the Bill, which refers to the need to “seek to ensure” a transfer within 28 days, should be sufficiently robust to provide accountability for a breach of that time limit, while recognising that there are multiple agencies involved.
As we know, while this legislation—
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I hate to interrupt, given the lateness of the day and the lateness of the hour, but the point that a number of noble Lords were making in relation to children is that this Bill potentially does not sit with the principles under the Children Act. If the Government intend impliedly to repeal parts of the Children Act, then it would be good to have that clarification from the Dispatch Box.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I look forward to coming to that point in Committee. The marrying up of legislation will be important, as is making progress on the Bill. That applies to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and others about fusion. We do not want to hold up this Bill while we make progress, but we will be mindful of the interface with other legislation.
In this Bill we are starting with the most overdue reforms to make the law fit for the 21st century. I very much look forward to working through the Bill in much greater detail in Committee. I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have not just spoken this evening but worked to get us to this point.
Baroness Merron
That the Bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House, and that it be an instruction to the Committee that they consider the Bill in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3, Schedule 1, Clauses 4 to 23, Schedule 2, Clauses 24 to 38, Schedule 3, Clause 39 to 54, Title.
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Tuesday 14th January 2025
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 47-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (14 Jan 2025)
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
“Equity | addressing inequalities in treatment, particularly racial inequalities, outcomes, and related provisions regarding protected characteristics” |
The purpose of this amendment is to include a fifth guiding principle to ensure that there is equity in treatment and outcomes addressing inequalities related to protected characteristics, particularly racial inequalities, in the operation of the Code of Practice and the Mental Health Act 1983 more generally.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 1 standing in my name, I will also speak to Amendment 3 in my name. There are other important amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, in this group.
Before I turn to my two amendments, I would like to make one general point. On these Benches we very much welcome this long-overdue Bill and will work with others to strengthen it further. The 1983 Act, which we are amending, is more than 40 years old and no longer reflects current understanding, attitudes or best practice in relation to severe mental illness or learning disability and autism. We need to ensure that the final law is truly fit to serve people’s needs for years to come, and our proposed amendments reflect a comprehensive effort to strengthen mental health services by promoting equity, tackling racial disparity, supporting the well-being of children and young people and ensuring that adequate resources are in place to deliver the Bill’s provisions.
A brief look back at the history shows that significant changes to mental health legislation happen on average every 15 to 20 years. That is understandable because it takes time for legislative reforms to take shape and be implemented. This Bill is likely to be the legislation that impacts on the health and well-being of people with mental health conditions for the next two decades. During our debate, we will be raising issues. It may not be possible to deal with them all in the legislation but they are important to mental health services overall, so I hope the Government will view them as part of a wider package of reform, be they issues around resources in the community or the interface between this Bill and the Mental Capacity Act. It is all part of our wider scrutiny, and I hope that the Government welcome that.
Amendment 1 would add a fifth principle to the existing four set out, which of course I fully support, and provide additional momentum towards the goal of addressing the racial disparities in the Mental Health Act. I believe that making equity one of the guiding principles, as in my amendment, would give it far greater clarity, weight and focus. If we look back at the underlying rationale for this legislation, addressing inequalities, particularly racial inequalities, is one of the key issues identified in Sir Simon Wessely’s review of the Act and is one of the key drivers behind this Bill. However, concerns remain in the sector and beyond that the Bill as drafted does not go far enough to address this deeply entrenched inequity. Adding such a principle would also reflect existing duties under the Equality Act and the requirements of the patient and carer race equality framework, a point made by many noble Lords at Second Reading. This would go some way to recognising one of the key drivers behind reforming the Act: to address racial disparities.
I will give a quick reminder of the key facts. Black people are more than four times as likely to be detained under the Act than white people. Black people are over seven times more likely to be placed on a community treatment order, a CTO. On average, people from racialised communities have a worse experience of care and worse outcomes, and black and black British people are more likely to be detained for longer and to experience repeated admission. They are also more likely to be subject to police powers under the Act and to experience higher levels of restraint than white people. These are gaping disparities in the use of the current Act, and we must ensure that the Bill does something about them.
My Amendment 3 is intended to probe whether the principles in subsection (2B) will be statutorily binding. Given that the code can only reflect law and act as guidance, placing the guiding principles in the code leaves a loophole in which they can be deviated from. That is the purpose of this amendment. The Bill provides an updating of the principles to be contained in the statutory code of practice, and that is welcome, but it does not include the statutory principles appearing in the legislation in the way that principles appear in Section 1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. I am not clear about the reason for this distinction between the two pieces of legislation, hence this probing amendment. I would welcome an explanation from the Minister of the thinking behind this distinction.
I am aware of strong views held by those working in the sector that it is hard to understand how the principles will be binding unless they are included in the Bill itself. Many feel that this would have much greater force than simply being referenced as “things the Secretary of State must consider” when writing the code. There is also case law. Back in 2005, R (Munjaz) v Ashworth Hospital Authority made it explicitly clear that the Mental Health Act code is guidance rather than instruction.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, I first apologise for not having been able to speak at Second Reading; I would have welcomed the Bill. In speaking to Amendments 2, 49, 52, 60, 112, 114, 118, 119 and 126 in my name, I declare my interests as honorary vice president of the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists, as a former member of the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust board, as a patron of the British Stammering Association, and as a stammerer myself. I thank the Royal College for its briefing and my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, for their support. I also warmly support Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I shall add amendments consistent with it in a later group.
My amendments, which are supported by 49 professional, charitable and training organisations, are all based on the premise that speech and communication difficulties are an insufficiently recognised component of a very great number of mental ill-health symptoms and that professional speech and language therapy could—and should—enable more successful treatment. One study found that 80% of people accessing mental health services had a difficulty with language and 60% with communication or discourse. Especially in the case of children and young people, those with a mental health disorder report having five times more speech or language problems than those without. One study found that 81% of children with social, emotional and mental health needs had significant unidentified language deficits.
One of the problems with the lack of specialised staff to help such children is the demoralisation or challenging behaviour that comes from frustration with unmet communication needs, quite apart from the impediments to treatment. I could quote many examples of this, as well as some success stories—for instance, where speech and language therapy effected a sizeable reduction in the use of restraint in a secure children’s home, or enabled psychological treatment to work and give the inestimable benefit of the ability to cope. I must emphasise that most of us take the ability to communicate for granted, perhaps without realising how essential it is to our lives. It is when it is lacking that you notice what it means. I am therefore sure that it must underpin the principles of this excellent Bill.
Amendment 2 does that. Without a rider of that kind to the principles, we will not have effective treatment in very many cases of acute distress and challenging behaviour. Amendment 49 puts the speech and language therapist squarely in the frame of responsible clinician, so that where communication difficulties are the key problem, that can be tackled. Amendment 52 does the same for treatment decisions and Amendment 60 for care and treatment plans.
Amendment 112 provides the same safeguard for detained patients who need to complain and Amendment 114 is to make sure that patients can understand their information on discharge, which is surely essential. Amendments 118, 119 and 126 have a similar function: to make sure that advance choice documents are properly understood and properly made.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 2, to which I have added my name, but first I declare my interests as listed in the register, especially as honorary vice-president of the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists and as an honorary fellow of the same organisation. I am able to speak briefly as a result of the excellent explanation of these amendments by my noble friend Lady Whitaker, which I am pleased to support.
As we have heard, the lead amendment would place a requirement in the statement of principles to specify in the table the communication needs of the individual and recognise the disability, difficulty or difference to ensure they will be identified and supported. This requirement then flows throughout the Bill—as evidenced by the number of amendments to which I have also added my name—ensuring a thread of consistency for this vital area of support. These include, as we have heard, Amendments 49, 60, 112, 118 and 126, but I will not speak specifically to each of those and test the patience of the Committee.
The importance of Amendment 2 is clearly laid out in the excellent briefing, as we have heard, prepared by the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists and endorsed by at least 46 related organisations representing this crucial area of work and service.
As we know, communication is fundamental and foundational to human life. It is central to how we express ourselves, how we understand others and how we interact. It is also fundamental and foundational to the aims of this Bill. It underpins the principles to inform decisions and is key to the matters to be addressed. Crucially, it ensures the individual is properly involved in the decisions taken as a consequence of this legislation. As we know, many people accessing mental health services have some form of communication disability, difficulty or difference. This can affect whether they are able to make themselves understood, understand what is being said to them, and how they interact with people. Left unidentified and unsupported, it can subject people to a range of negative outcomes, including inaccessible referrals, assessments, treatment and care and, potentially, unnecessary detentions and detentions longer than necessary.
I first recognised this issue when I undertook my independent report for the then Government, published way back in 2009, about people with mental health problems or learning disabilities in the criminal justice system. At that time, I identified appropriate adults as a key group to support people with communication issues and recommended that they should receive specific training to ensure the most effective support. They still play an invaluable part in such communication. I also recommended the establishment of liaison and diversion services, and I am pleased that in the subsequent years they have been rolled out across the country and we now have 100% coverage for that service.
These liaison diversion teams, placed in police stations and the courts, identify, assess and support people with complex needs, including mental health problems, to try to divert them away from the criminal justice system and support them along the criminal justice pathway. I recognised during this rollout that certain key additional services should be connected to the teams, including speech and language therapists, to enhance the support required for these people with communication difficulties in a variety of settings and circumstances. As the speech and language therapists who I have met over the years themselves identified, these many situations and settings include significant unmet communication needs among individuals on mental health wards, challenging behaviour relating to communication needs, lack of staff knowledge and skills in relation to communication needs in people with mental health conditions, and many more.
Although it is welcome that the Bill’s Explanatory Notes highlight that a care and treatment plan
“may also contain other information, for example, how the patient’s communication needs will be met”,
clearly this is not sufficient. The Bill must therefore be strengthened to make it explicit both that communication is central to the Bill’s aims and that
“communication disability, difficulty, or difference”
must be identified and supported. This would help to ensure that people receive the best possible treatment and care to support their recovery, including through the necessary reasonable adjustments that should be made. It would also help to reduce the risk to them, including of their being unnecessarily detained, and to assure the wider public. These issues must also be fully covered in the code of practice. I hope therefore that the Government will recognise the importance of such communication being in the Bill and look forward to the Minister’s response on these points.
Lord Patel (CB)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of all these amendments, including Amendment 114 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. I apologise for having to scratch my name from the speakers’ list at Second Reading, as I had been struck down by the dreaded virus.
In all areas of healthcare, communication between patient and healthcare professionals is extremely important for diagnosis and treatment, and to achieve the necessary outcomes. This is drummed into medical students and other health professionals daily.
I declare an interest: I am an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists—an honour awarded to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who is not in her place, when she was its president. The citation of unknown accomplishments in mental health on my part was read out by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, who is also not in his place.
I remember, however, that although my professor at the time, Sir Ivor Batchelor—a well-known psychiatrist—was a quiet man, during our psychiatry clinical attachments he used to drum into us that not all mental health patients can communicate well. We had to be patient to learn and understand their ways of communicating to help them communicate their problem. I had forgotten that I was taught that; at the time, I think he hoped that he would make us all psychiatrists, but that did not happen.
The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, has highlighted the extent to which patients with mental health problems have communication disability, difficulty or difference. NHS Digital research has shown that children and young adults with mental health problems are five times more likely to have communication problems, and that in 81% of children with social and emotional needs their needs remain unidentified. Even without communication disability, difficulty or difference, people with chronic acute mental health problems also show communication problems.
As the number of people with complex mental health needs increases, so does the need for more speech and language therapists. Very few multidisciplinary teams include such professionals and, where they do, most of the professionals work in in-patient settings. NHS Digital research suggests that there are about 256 such professionals, mostly working in in-patient secure settings. The provision of such services in community settings is patchy or non-existent, leading to long waits.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 49 on this issue. I do not disagree with anything that has been said about the vital need for communication and to ensure that the patient understands what is happening and has access to specialist help. But I particularly want to comment on the proposal that speech and language therapists should become responsible clinicians.
The role of responsible clinician under the Mental Health Act is really quite onerous. Of the 50,000 or so clinicians who take on the role and are appointed the responsible clinician when somebody is detained, the vast majority are consultant doctors. Fewer than 100—0.002%—have been psychologists or nurses. The appetite for taking on this role is low and, of all the members of the team who could take it on, it would be appropriate only in a very small minority of cases for it to be speech and language therapists. I do not want to rule them out because I know how valuable these people are, but we must see that, in practice, this will probably not fly very far. It is important that we concentrate on how we get proper communications, but this particular amendment would probably not find favour. I do not think that profession is yet trained to the full extent of what would be required for that role. Although I hope that it will be one day, this Bill is maybe too early for it.
Lord Patel (CB)
My Lords, with the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, I did not suggest—and I did not hear any other noble Lord suggest—for a minute that language and speech therapists would become clinicians in their own respect. I said that they would be part of a team that would help to establish appropriate communication. As doctors, we are not the best people for that—so I do not see how the amendment cannot fly, when there is a need for such people.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I entirely agree with the noble Lord. However, the reality is that the responsible clinician, as mentioned in Amendment 49 to Clause 10, has a wide range of roles. It is very onerous and specific, so this is not likely to be a good idea for a speech and language therapist. I agree with the rest of what everybody has said.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, but without any qualifications, unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. For the reasons that have already been given, I entirely agree with the whole group of amendments, which have been proposed so much better than I could do—so I do not propose to say any more.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
In supporting Amendment 1, I am delighted that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, began Committee with this focus on the impact of the Mental Health Act on racialised communities, because that is where this whole journey began, with the noble Baroness, Lady May, when she was Prime Minister, announcing it in that context—and then, of course, it became a wider reform of the whole Act.
I served on your Lordships’ Joint Committee with the other place, scrutinising the Bill. In the course of that, I became aware of the relative strengths of civil society among some of the groups. There were excellent civil society groups speaking on behalf of people with learning disabilities and autism; they were highly professional and articulate. We had one evidence session on the effect of the Mental Health Act on racialised communities, but I saw that the strength of civil society and of media coverage in that area was less—so I am sympathetic to Amendment 1, which would give a profile to one of the main issues under the legislation.
On whether the table should be in the Bill to be in the code or in the Bill sitting as primary legislation, I have sympathy for that proposition. We have learned that the code of practice merely reflects primary legislation. I am aware, of course, that the independent review came up with those four principles, and this fifth one was not part of that. I expect to hear the Minister say that it is already in the Equality Act, so we do not need to put it in the Bill—but I am persuaded of the merits of the amendment. During the whole process of an independent review, a White Paper, a response to a White Paper, a draft Bill, a Joint Committee and now the Bill before your Lordships’ Committee, it has become clear to me that many of the changes that ethnic minority communities need to see are in practice. They are in resources and training—people would not look to the Bill and see their needs as the first or an important priority in it. I would be grateful if the Minister would take seriously this consideration of putting this equity principle in the table and putting it in the Bill, full stop, and not within the code.
Lord Kamall (Con)
I begin by thanking all noble Lords who spoke to this first group of amendments in Committee. Before I comment, I refer noble Lords to my interests as set out in the register. I am not an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, noble Lords will be relieved to know, but I should mention my previous work with a couple of think tanks—the Institute of Economic Affairs and Politeia, which have both published on health and social care issues. There is also my work at St Mary’s University, where I am a professor of politics and international relations, and which has recently applied to open a new medical school. I also sit unpaid on the advisory board of a start-up coalition, and I know that there are a number of start-up companies helping people with mental health conditions. I just wanted to cover those interests, in case anyone made any accusations.
This group addresses the principles that will guide the application of the Mental Health Act, as set out in the Wessely review. Sir Simon pointed out, rightly, that there are already guiding principles in the code of practice, but that
“there is limited awareness of these, and it seems very likely that they do not inform practice in the way they should”.
Clearly, as noble Lords said at Second Reading, the important aim of including the four principles is to improve their application and ensure the highest level of care and therapeutic benefit for patients, while ensuring that all patients are treated as individuals.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for her Amendment 1. Of course, equity is at the heart of the Bill, as my noble friend Lady Berridge just said. The Wessely review was commissioned by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead with the intention of understanding why a disproportionate number of black people were being detained and receiving community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act. I think all noble Lords welcome the idea of including equity in principle, as long as it then feeds through into practice. That is the key here, and my question for the Minister is: would putting the principle in the Bill make a difference to practice? How do we make sure that it makes a difference to practice, rather than simply adding the words or adding the principle? One of the values in the NHS constitution is that “everyone counts”. Does this equality duty go further than that, and would it have a greater practical significance? That is one of the questions we need to dig out and probe the Government on.
The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, makes an interesting observation with her Amendment 3. The principles were included in the Bill, as the Wessely review argued, to improve clinical practice. This is vital, because we know that the Mental Health Act is the legislation that is used to compel detention in hospital for treatment. This may very well raise awareness of the principles, but once again, how do we make sure that this is applied? We have to keep pushing this point, although I will not repeat it again, of making sure that this gets fed in to practice in the clinical setting.
I also note the amendments in this group of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. I will not repeat the statistics that she read out about the impact of the lack of or inappropriate support for people with mental health issues or learning difficulties. Of course, it is not difficult to appreciate the complexities. Someone in my close family worked with speech and language therapists in his youth, and I could see the difference it made. It is almost too obvious to say, but how do you get your needs across if you cannot communicate them, or your needs are not understood by the person who is supposed to be offering treatment? As the noble Lord, Lord Patel, mentioned, this is included in the Explanatory Notes, but how do we make sure that it gets into the Bill and into practice? Obviously, it is a problem that is acknowledged by the Government, or it would not be in the Explanatory Notes, but why have the Government chosen not to go any further on this issue?
I was very struck by what the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said about Amendment 49 and her concerns. Will the Minister address that debate? Of course, we all want to make sure that patients feel that they are understood. We know that patients have to be supported as much as possible to make sure they get their point across and that they are understood, in order to give them adequate treatment, but I noted the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, even though the noble Lord, Lord Patel, intervened. Have the Government taken a view on this or does the Minister need to write to us? I look forward to her comments.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
My Lords, I feel it necessary to start, instead of talking about the Bill, by offering our condolences to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on the very recent loss of her dear husband, and to thank her, as I know all noble Lords will do, for her close engagement on these reforms over many years. I say to the noble Baroness, who said she would be watching if she could, that we absolutely understand why she cannot be with us today. We miss her and I know that the thoughts of all noble Lords will be with her at this very sad time.
If I may make a few general points, as we know, this legislation has been in development for many years. I put on record my thanks for the collaborative and constructive nature of that work and the discussions I have held in my post over the past few months with Peers on all sides of the House. I extend my appreciation to the former Prime Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, for her highly significant role in commissioning the independent review which informed this Bill and to Sir Simon Wessely and all those who worked on this landmark review, which provided a blueprint for this Bill. Like other noble Lords, I am very pleased to have got to this point.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
I apologise for interrupting my noble friend’s eloquence, but it is not the case that speech, language and communication difficulties are a protected characteristic. Can she absolutely assure us that they do come under the Equality Act?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am grateful for my noble friend’s intervention. I will later make specific points about speech and language therapists.
The revised code of practice will give guidance for decision-makers and those involved in care and treatment on how to support individuals with communication needs to make sure that their voices are heard. Following Royal Assent, we will draft, and consult on, a code of practice, and it will be laid before Parliament. In addition to the code, we will lay secondary legislation to support the reforms set out in the delegated powers memorandum. I am committed to sharing papers setting out further details on this, including what we expect the content of care and treatment plans to cover, some of which is highly relevant to this debate.
Amendment 3, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, would mean that the individuals and organisations referenced in Section 118(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 must have regard to the code of practice when making decisions. It seeks to probe whether the principles set out in the table in Clause 1 of this Bill—under new Section 118(2B) of the 1983 Act —will be statutorily binding. Practitioners are already under a statutory obligation to take account of the code when making decisions under the Act. Anyone who must have regard to the code of practice under Section 118(2D) must therefore also have regard to the statement of principles that the Secretary of State must include in the code when carrying out specified functions under the Act. That includes all those referenced in Section 118(1).
The Government expect practitioners to follow the code. Anyone seeking to depart from it must have compelling reasons for doing so. Reasons for any departure must be recorded clearly, as courts have the power to scrutinise such reasons to ensure that there is sufficiently convincing justification for not following the code.
I believe that this is the right approach, because relevant individuals and organisations must have regard to the code and, in turn, the principles. But the system is not so inflexible that a principle must be followed irrespective of the circumstances, because there could be very rare cases whereby it could create a risk that an individual is not being treated according to their own particular needs, which is not the intention of the Bill.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I think the Committee would understand that if it was to do with a therapeutic intervention. This is about the principles according to which clinicians and others have to work when dealing with the Act. First, can the Minister enlighten the Committee as to which principles, as a framework, would not be suitable for a particular patient? It is a principle. Secondly, my noble friend tabled this amendment because case law on codes of practice in the public sector goes back to 1998 and Regina v Islington Borough Council, in which the court made it very clear that public bodies have the right to deviate on admissible grounds where there is good reason. I can see no reason, unless the Minister can give one, why deviating from a principle is acceptable. That is why my noble friend wants the principles to be in the Bill. I could understand if it was a restrictive practice, but it is not; it is a principle.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
To add to what the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, has said, I am having a problem understanding why the code is not statutory.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their interventions, for which I am grateful. They give me the opportunity to say now what perhaps I should have said at the outset: I will of course reflect on all the points that are raised as we move forward. I will be honest and say that I am not sure that what I am about to say will do justice to the points that have been raised. Overall, the real concern is about making very complex legislation even more complex. We are wrestling with our attempt to update the Mental Health Act—we are not starting from scratch. That is the point I would like to like to move on to.
The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, raised a comparative point about the Mental Capacity Act and asked why, if that could include principles, it is not possible for the Mental Health Bill to. To extend what I have just said, it is because the Mental Capacity Act was structured around principles from the outset when it was drafted and did not have to meet the challenge that we are trying to debate today. As I said, we are currently looking at amending the existing Mental Health Act, which has not been designed or structured around statutory principles. In my language, I would say that we are starting from an entirely different place.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I hate to interrupt the Minister’s flow, but we are going to come back to the code of practice again and again. Can she outline whether we will get to see a draft of that code? If the argument from the Government is that it needs to be in the code and not on the statute, it would be very helpful to see a draft code of practice before Report, at the very latest.
Baroness Barker (LD)
Those of us who were here in 2006 listened to the Minister’s predecessor at the Dispatch Box making pretty much the same speech that she has made now, and nothing has changed in the meantime. We are trying to do what we can to make sure that we do not have the same situation for the next 20 years.
I take the point that the Mental Health Act 1983 was not built on principles. Does the Minister accept that it is time that we moved forward to a situation where both the Mental Health Bill and the Mental Capacity Act are built on principles, including that the people who are subject to them have rights to dignity and so on, as we have seen set out in different places, and that if they are not treated in that way they have the right to take people to court?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their interventions. I will take the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, first. Following Royal Assent, we will be drafting and consulting on a revised code of practice, which will be laid before Parliament. We will be working with key partners to ensure that everyone is trained in the new Act before the first major phase of reforms. I hope that that will be helpful.
I hear the disappointment in the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. On her request for specific examples, I will need to write to noble Lords on that. I hope noble Lords realise that not having the principles in the Bill, as the amendment refers to, does not mean that there is less intention that they apply. For me, it is about the way of getting there, rather than the commitment to it. However, I hear the question about that point.
Amendment 49, on the matter of speech and language therapists, is in the name of my noble friend Lady Whitaker, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lord Bradley. I turn first to the question raised by my noble friend Lady Whitaker. It is true that not all speech and language difficulties or differences would count as a disability under the Equality Act 2010, so my noble friend makes a relevant point.
The definition of who can and cannot be approved as an approved clinician was spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. That definition is set out not in primary legislation but in instructions issued by the Secretary of State, under the power in Section 12ZA of the current Mental Health Act. These instructions have the same status as secondary legislation, so it is our belief that it would not be appropriate to specify in primary legislation that speech and language therapists can be approved clinicians, because all other professional groups are covered only in the instructions.
For that reason alone—but noble Lords should bear with me—we will seek to reject this amendment. However, I can commit that we will be revising the statutory instructions under Section 12ZA following the passage of the Bill, and we are very happy to consider extending the criteria to include speech and language therapists. I offer an invitation to the royal college to discuss this matter with the department and to consider how it can work to support and encourage those of its members who may be interested in this role.
I am aware that time is not on my side. However, a number of amendments in this area have been tabled—
Lord Kamall (Con)
I wonder whether I can be of help to the Minister. The timing is advisory so, if there are important points that the Minister wishes to make, she should please go ahead.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I have never had so much encouragement to carry on speaking. Noble Lords will be glad to know that the flashing clock always makes me very nervous. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kamall.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
Can I just add to what the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, just said? I have never before sat through a Committee where the Minister has been restricted in going beyond any advisory time. She should say what she darn well likes. She may have to respond to an awful lot of complicated spots in this; there is no reason at all why she should not carry on, in my view—and that of everyone else in the Committee, I think.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for helping me out there.
I referred to my invitation to the royal college. Given this commitment to pursue these changes, that will be subject to agreement with the royal college. I hope that will be of assistance to noble Lords.
I turn now to Amendment 52 in the name of my noble friend Lady Whitaker, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lord Bradley. It seeks to ensure that clinicians consider a patient’s communication needs and make reasonable adjustments as part of the new clinical checklist; this requires clinicians to consider a number of matters when deciding on a patient’s treatment, with the aim of making treatment more patient-centred.
We share the goals of this amendment. However, the checklist already requires the clinician to take steps to assist and encourage the patient to participate as fully as possible in the decision-making process. We consider assistance to include making reasonable adjustments to account for a patient’s communication needs, which is something that noble Lords have rightly raised as being of concern. We very much intend to make this clear in the code of practice, which will already provide specific guidance on the need to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act. For example, the clinician should provide information in an accessible form, perhaps by involving an interpreter, a signer or someone who can communicate via the person’s preferred communication method.
My noble friend Lady Whitaker has also tabled Amendment 60, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lord Bradley. It seeks to ensure that the new statutory care and treatment plan introduced by the Bill covers
“information about a patient’s communication disability, difficulty, or difference”,
and how these might be identified and supported. The Bill makes it clear that a statutory care and treatment plan is a plan made in accordance with regulations, so we intend to set out in regulations that a patient’s plan must include, among other things, information that is important for the treating clinical team to be made aware of during the patient’s detention. This is to encourage the treating clinician, as noble Lords have spoken about, to consider the individual needs of patients—including communication needs—so that the appropriate reasonable adjustments can be made. A record of how their needs will be supported should be evident throughout their plan, which should, as far as possible, be developed in consultation with the patient and others, such as their family members.
Regarding the identification of any communication needs, as already set out in the Mental Health Act code of practice under the Equality Act, mental health professionals should already be identifying and making any reasonable adjustments to account for a person’s communication needs. Where applicable, a patient’s care (education) and treatment review may also identify and make recommendations about a patient’s communication needs. We intend to set out in regulations that these recommendations must be attached to the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan, so that they can inform planning and delivery of care. I hope that this will reassure noble Lords that the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan should cover any communication needs and how they will be met, but in reflecting on this debate I will ensure that the actions we are proposing take account of this.
Amendments 112 and 114, tabled by my noble friend Lady Whitaker, would require managers of hospitals or registered establishments to provide information in an accessible format when discharging duties under Clauses 39 and 41 to give information on complaints to detained and conditionally discharged patients. I agree that it is important that all patients can access information about their detention, including the complaints process, and in a format that is accessible to them. However, the clauses are already drafted with the overriding obligation that the patient is helped in whatever manner is practical to understand the information being given to them. Therefore, it is unnecessary to add the words in the amendment proposed by my noble friend. Additionally, hospital managers have an existing duty under the Equality Act to make reasonable adjustments based on disability, which is the legal basis for ensuring that information for patients is accessible.
I reiterate that I understand that communication needs will not always be related to the letter of the Equality Act. There is already guidance in the mental health code of practice on how a patient’s communication needs should be considered when providing information on complaints. When we come to revise the code, we will engage with stakeholders to explore whether further guidance on the complaints process, including how information on complaints should be provided, is required.
Amendment 118 in the name of my noble friend, supported by my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Bourne, seeks to ensure that the advance choice document template is available in a format that the service user can understand. We strongly agree with the principles of this amendment and are committed to mitigating any barriers that people may face to creating an advance choice document or making their wishes and feelings known in advance. Where a person wishes to make an advance choice document, our intention is that they are given a standard template to complete, alongside supporting guidance and, where the individual wishes to receive it, the support of mental health practitioners. The template should prompt the individual to think about the sort of things they may wish to consider and decide in advance of becoming unwell. We will work to develop these resources.
We also plan to set out in guidance to health commissioners that these resources and the support provided by mental health practitioners must be delivered in a way that is accessible to individuals and that responds to their needs. That will be in line with the Equality Act and the public sector equality duty. Of course, if a person wishes to create a record of their wishes and feelings in another format that is easier, they absolutely may do so. We have purposefully made it that individuals do not need to complete a prescribed form in order for their advance wishes and feelings to be considered at a later stage. I agree with the need and hope that this will provide maximum accessibility and increase patient voice and autonomy.
Finally, Amendments 119 and 126, tabled by my noble friend Lady Whitaker and supported by my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, seek to ensure that the support provided to people to create an advance choice document is responsive to the needs of people with a
“communication disability, difficulty or difference”.
I agree that is important. To achieve this, it is important that support and information around advance choice documents respond to people’s needs individually, so that no one is unfairly disadvantaged. That includes communication needs.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
I thank the noble Baroness for her extremely comprehensive but very helpful response to all the amendments, and I am happy to withdraw.
“Application of the Mental Health Act 1983: autism and learning disability(1) Section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (application of Act: “mental disorder”) is amended as follows.(2) Omit subsection (2A).(3) Omit subsection (4).(4) At end, insert—“(4A) Mental disorder does not include autism or learning disability for the purposes of this Act.””
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 4, I will speak to the Schedule 1 stand part notice, which is consequent on Amendment 4. Both appear in my name. I will not speak to the other amendments in this group, although my understanding is that Amendments 5 and 38 to 41 inclusive—tabled, variously, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven—are effectively trying to achieve the same thing but by different means. I will leave them to speak to their amendments, because I want to explain why I have structured mine in this way.
I must begin by thanking Jen Smith at the Bill office for her great patience and expert assistance to this non-lawyer in producing this and a number of other amendments. I also want to stress that I am not, unlike many people taking part in this debate, an expert in this area, but I seek to represent voices of people who have reached out to me who may not otherwise be heard in your Lordships’ Committee.
I will set out the background to Amendment 4. I had a detailed briefing from the group Liberation, a user experience group led by people who have experience of mental distress and trauma, which has the slogan “for full human rights”. It is seeking a complete end to involuntary detention in psychiatric hospitals and forced treatment for the people it represents—people given mental health diagnoses. It asked me to exclude all people from what is known as detention or sectioning.
Liberation says that involuntary detention and forced treatment are forms of disability-based discrimination, and these people should not be subject to them. This may not be the case under the European Convention on Human Rights—I acknowledge that the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, signed a statement to that effect in the Bill—but I understand that it can be argued to be the case under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I note, however, that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has, in line with Articles 12 to 14 of the UN CRPD, strongly endorsed a complete end to involuntary hospitalisation and compulsory treatment and recommended the removal of Article 5.1(e) from the ECHR—the paragraph that limits right to liberty if people are judged to be “of unsound mind”. It describes it as
“not compatible with our 21st-century understanding of human rights”.
I note that the recent report on the situation in the UK from the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, particularly paragraphs 79 and 80, expresses concern about the lack of government measures to end disability-based detention and that the then Conservative draft mental health Bill continued to allow involuntary detention and forced treatment. The Bill brought before us by the Labour Government still has the same kind of provisions. The argument is that the Bill as it stands remains non-compliant with the UN CRPD deinstitutionalisation guidelines and the World Health Organization publication Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation: Guidance and Practice, in which countries are urged to replace institutions with high-quality services.
I can almost feel your Lordships’ Committee saying, “How can that be possible?” Starting from now, that looks like such a long way away. That was indeed the question that I put to Liberation, which presented me with a number of case studies from around the world. I imagine that the Minister is aware of the case of Trieste, in north-eastern Italy, which almost managed to abolish involuntary detentions. They have been replaced with wide-ranging and accessible community services, based on a whole-person approach. Its community mental health centres are open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and they play a key role in preventing people reaching a point of crisis. This has enabled people with mental health diagnoses to remain in and be part of their local community, in line with Article 19 of the UN convention. Compulsory psychiatric treatment orders are still possible, but the numbers are very low and orders typically last seven to 10 days.
In Spain, Act 8/2021 recognises the legal capacity of all adults and stipulates that disabled people should receive the same legal treatment as non-disabled people, including those with mental health diagnoses and learning disabilities. This is still not complete equality but it is heading that way and has made further progress than we have.
Costa Rica, Peru and Colombia have all taken steps in this direction. In Peru, for example, a recent study on the impacts of crisis interventions indicates that involuntary detention rates have been significantly reduced and that, when people are detained, they typically leave hospital after a couple of days.
In Mexico, the general health law of 2022, a national civil procedure code, says that everybody has legal capacity, including people with mental health diagnoses. It enables access to supported decision-making for everybody. Mexico City, in particular, has set a real lead in delivering on this, but I acknowledge that not all of Mexico has.
Why have I tabled an amendment that would, in effect, end detention for those with autism and learning difficulties? I feel like I must apologise to the people I have spoken to, as I did not feel able to put down another amendment—this a probing amendment, by nature—as I looked at the realistic situation. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, in starting our debate, referred to the extreme lack of resources. I and many others have amendments later in the Bill referring to the need for it to specify the level of resources. I am sorry that I did not feel able, even in this probing stage of Committee, to table another amendment. I would like to, and I would very much welcome the Minister’s comments on how we sit in that UN framework and whether the Government have a long-term goal to reach the kind of levels that an increasing number of other countries have attained, as I have just set out in my quick survey.
But I have to look at the reality of the statistics. I have looked at the figures in the briefing from the Royal College of Psychiatrists. The number of recorded detentions in 2023-24 is 52,500. We really have to reflect on that number. Of those, we have seen a fall, to 1,880, in the level of detentions relating to learning disability and autism—that seems a step in the right direction. We are talking about disabilities. Can we really continue, a quarter of the way into the 21st century, to detain people for their disability rather than provide them with the support they need in the community? That is a question this amendment seeks to raise.
I want to reflect on the fact—we will come back to this again and again—that people are not getting the help they need, and that is leading to the state of crisis we have now. I note in Mind’s briefing that people are crying out for help and not getting it. In June 2024, very urgent referrals to crisis teams for adults were 45% higher than a year before. I should here declare my position as a vice-president of the Local Government Association and refer to the LGA briefing, which talks about the significant resource implications for councils of the Bill as it stands as presented by the Government.
There are voices here that should be heard. We should frame this in the context of the international situation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. That is why I have tabled this amendment. I hope we can have a constructive discussion and see some real progress here today. I beg to move.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a vice-president of the National Autistic Society and a co-chair of the APPG on Autism, and I have responsibilities for close relatives who are on the autism spectrum.
I will speak to Amendment 5 first, and to the Mental Capacity Act, which is not the Act we are looking to change but it is my contention in this proposed clause that the Mental Capacity Act has a relationship with the Mental Health Act.
There has for some years been concern about the deprivation of liberty safeguards as defined in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. They were inserted into the Mental Health Act 2007 following the Bournewood judgment in the European court which involved an autistic man whose liberty was denied, whose carers were ignored, and who had had what I can best describe as an autistic meltdown that resulted in his incarceration for a very long time.
Although the Mental Capacity Act has much to commend it, there has been ongoing concern about the deprivation of liberty safeguards—often referred to as DoLS—and I managed to obtain a House of Lords inquiry into the Act in 2013, ably chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, who is in his place today. I will quote a section of the summary of that inquiry that deals specifically with deprivation of liberty safeguards. The House concluded:
“The provisions are poorly drafted, overly complex and bear no relationship to the language and ethos of the Mental Capacity Act. The safeguards are not well understood and are poorly implemented. Evidence suggested that thousands, if not tens of thousands, of individuals are being deprived of their liberty without the protection of the law, and therefore without the safeguards which Parliament intended. Worse still, far from being used to protect individuals and their rights, they are sometimes used to oppress individuals, and to force upon them decisions made by others without reference to the wishes and feelings of the person concerned”.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, has done in relation to this matter. This is a matter that we considered in great detail in the Joint Committee. I am grateful that that gives us the opportunity to discuss in the round the legal basis on which people are detained. The independent review did not recommend what is currently in the Bill, which is the removal of learning disabilities and autism from the Act. The Joint Committee’s report quotes it saying,
“the risk of completely removing learning disabilities and autism from the Act is too high”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, outlined one of the reasons for that, which is that if you remove the legal basis for detention under the Mental Health Act, then the bucket that these individuals and patients would fall into without Amendment 5 would be the Mental Capacity Act.
In the consideration by the Joint Committee, there is the other danger that—when there is no co-occurring mental health condition—you end up with people coming through the criminal justice system, instead of being detained under the Mental Health Act. That is the worst of all the evils we could be discussing here today and would be completely inappropriate.
I would be grateful if the Minister will ensure two things when we know that these are dangers: first, an increase in diagnoses of co-occurring mental health conditions to use the Mental Health Act; and, secondly, an increase in the use of the Part III criminal justice provisions. It is important that we know the exact statistics for the group with learning disabilities and autism before implementation of the Act. Then we would know whether the Act has caused an increase in diagnoses of co-occurring mental health disorders and an increase in the use of the criminal justice system.
I believe that currently 39% of people detained with learning disabilities and autism are detained under Part III of the Act. I see the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, nodding. It is important that we remember that New Zealand tried this, removing learning disabilities and autism from its mental health legislation. I cannot remember whether it had the co-occurring mental health diagnosis provision, but, only a few years later, it had to amend the law, as it had caused an increased number of learning disabilities and autism patients to come in through the criminal justice system.
What would be the position if the Bill were amended in accordance with Amendment 5? The evidence that we received in Joint Committee was that there would be no patients—that community facilities would be at a level where they could not think of anybody who would need to be detained. I wish the world were thus, but the ideal world portrayed in that way does not exist. Even with the community facilities that we all wish to exist, it seems clear to me that there would be circumstances in which there would still be a need to detain.
I recognise that, in reality, we may see that increase in diagnoses of co-occurring disorders. Physicians may reach for that to protect someone—to detain them to get them treatment. However, it was made clear to us that 28 days is a relatively short time. You can be detained for assessment, but it can take many days to get the level of distress down—I do not want or like to use the word “meltdown”—to assess the mental health of the person and whether there is a co-occurring disorder.
The Joint Committee came up with a special exceptional tribunal that would still allow the Mental Health Act to be used in that small number of cases—once community facilities are as we would like them to be—to continue detention. Why? For the reasons outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning: the protections under the Mental Health Act are much greater. You have the nominated person, you can go to the Mental Health Act tribunal, and—ker-ching—you get Section 117 aftercare, which, of course, is not available under the Mental Capacity Act.
If Amendment 5 were accepted, we would have no Mental Health Act, no co-occurring diagnoses, no criminal justice system—I hope—and no Mental Capacity Act to refer to. If a clinician is in that circumstance where someone is so distressed and they do not have that diagnosis in the 28 days, where is the law? We are not talking about the practicalities here. Where is the law?
In any event, the Mental Capacity Act does not apply to under-16s. So the risk would be an increased use of what we now know as High Court DoLS. These are not DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act. They are DoLS under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. They are a most unsatisfactory way of restraining the liberty of under-16s.
Only two or three weeks ago, the Children’s Commissioner issued a report outlining the problem, and outlining that, already, some children with learning disabilities and autism are under a High Court DoLS. It is a matter that your Lordships’ House needs to consider. Nearly a thousand children are detained under a High Court DoLS.
Obviously, the Mental Capacity Act would have applied to 16 and 17 year-olds and adults so where does that leave those vulnerable adults? Where is there a power to detain them? The Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act will both have gone. If clinicians are in that circumstance where there is no co-occurring mental health disorder, there is a vacuum which may end up being filled by the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court using vulnerable adults. We will have created another little bucket of people. I accept the criticism made by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, about DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act. They are supposed to be replaced by protection of liberty safeguards, but those are not in force yet.
If we accept Amendment 5, are we going to create more work for the High Court with clinicians in that situation because the law will not have provided any means for them to detain? I recognise and repeat that the practicality will probably be a co-occurring mental health disorder but, as far as I understand it, that is where the law will be left if Amendment 5 is accepted.
Although the Mental Capacity Act is far from ideal, I hope the Minister can help us understand what the situation would be if we were to accept the amendment. As I say, for the under-16s it would be more cases under High Court DoLS, as far I understand it.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I have an amendment in this group but I want to speak particularly to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for her good sense. I agree with every word she has said.
I had earlier tabled amendments to Clause 3 and Schedule 1 to give effect to opposing any change in the definition of mental disorder for the meaning of the Act in the same way as Sir Simon Wessely’s committee recommended and I withdrew them in favour of a compromise amendment because I was not sure, to be honest, that I would get here at all today. I have. I am not quite sure how many more I will be able to get to but for the moment I am here so I will speak to this one.
I want to make it clear right from the start that if we had changed our legislation to be a hybrid Bill that was a fusion of a mental capacity and a mental health Bill we would not be in this pickle because we would have capacity-based legislation and therefore we could have proceeded without any of these silly criteria for what is this diagnosis and what is another. As the legislation is at the moment, I believe the move to remove autism and learning disabilities from what is a mental disorder is frankly bizarre, akin to having Parliament establish that for the purposes of legislation, the earth is flat and the sun goes round the earth. Galileo had the same problem. I want to ensure that Hansard will record that not everyone is in agreement with the notion that autism and learning disabilities are somehow separate and different from other mental disorders.
Neurodiversity, which, of course, exists, is the term used to describe statistical outliers from the norm and, of course, as for many other mental states, there can be many positive and interesting aspects of alternative ways of thinking about and responding emotionally to the world that enrich society. I understand that many people with autism and learning disabilities do just that and that is where neurodiversity has been so supported by people who want to ensure that they are recognised as individuals and citizens just as the rest of us are. But that does not change the fundamentals.
I know noble Lords know that I was a professor of psychiatry for many years at the University of London but I ought to mention at this point that I also have a special interest in mental health legislation because I was for six years vice-chair of the Mental Health Act Commission. I co-authored this now much revered code of practice for the 1983 Act. It is actually my only bestseller—if only it did not say Secretary of State on it—and I know first-hand how the Acts and codes are used. That is why I do not get involved in the principles of where this should be. The code does have statutory effect, by the way—I am sorry that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has left, because I can reassure her it does have statutory force. I was also UK advisor to the WHO on mental health and older people and was exposed to the developments in mental health legislation in other jurisdictions, not only in the UK, with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Acts as they were being developed, but in the Republic of Ireland when it introduced its new Act, and abroad in English-speaking legislatures.
Baroness Browning (Con)
The noble Baroness asked me a question. Was it rhetorical? I wonder whether she could accept that autism is different. From the time that Kanner first identified autism, which is what a lot of psychiatric bases are based on—we then had Asperger and others, and the very good, more recent documentation from Lorna Wing, with whom I am sure she is familiar—autism has been different. If people doubt that, it is important to note that, apart from the Mental Health Act, the only other condition, however you label it, to have its own Act of Parliament is autism. In the Autism Act 2009, this Parliament unanimously agreed—in both Houses—that autism is different and deserved its own Act of Parliament.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I would say that all mental disorders are different but that they cannot all have their own Acts of Parliament. I do not accept that autism is different. Of course, it is different in the way that it manifests—
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
I will make a slightly cheeky intervention, if I may, on the noble Baroness. I am not weighing into the debate that is taking place but simply make this point. Does she accept that the fact that a condition is listed in the DSM or the ICD is not itself definitive? Until 1973, homosexuality was listed as a psychiatric condition in the DSM and until 1990 it was, I believe, included as a psychiatric diagnosis in the ICD. Therefore, that is not the strongest evidential basis for her claims.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I agree with the noble Lord, but the reality is that we use DSM-3 and ICD-11 in the international classification of disorders. If we in Britain are to go outside that, for reasons of our own, then we had better have some pretty good ideas why that should be. I am not so sure that we have them.
The Wessely review rejected the notion because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said, it carried serious risks that individuals would be extruded and neglected, the opposite of what is intended. Similar anxieties were expressed in the development and creation of other Acts—I am sorry that I am going to go on longer than the advisory—so as not to exclude anybody from this group, because we want mental disorder to be an inclusive thing and not to exclude whole groups of people. Their protections are gone if we exclude them.
I accept that almost all the developments for autism and learning disabilities in the Bill are very positive. They will really improve the way that people think about autism and will have an extremely beneficial effect on trying to develop services and improve training, but there is no evidence that changing the criteria under the Act will do anything to improve it. Getting money into services and service design is what we need and not a change in the legislation for criteria. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ group of specialists in learning disabilities have pointed out, the vast majority of them do not want this change in legislation. We should think very carefully before we submit people to something when we do not know what will be unleashed as a result.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, I wish to speak on this group; I have tabled two amendments, Amendments 38 and 40. I declare an interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. I also wish to share an interest which is similar to that of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning. I used to have two nephews who had learning disabilities and autism. One of them, sadly, has died—there is a statistic that people with learning disabilities and autism die, on average, at 20 years below people without them. I still have a loving, warm, neurodiverse and very proudly different nephew, who I love. I see his behaviours and the way that many people do not understand him and deal with him differently.
I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and was going to make the exact point that, as a gay person, before 1973 I would have been defined as having a mental illness. The discussion among psychiatrists and the mental health professions at the moment is not as robust as the noble Baroness made out. Many people within the profession say that those with learning disabilities and autism are not on the mental health spectrum and should not be treated as having a psychiatric illness.
We are in a difficult position. My amendments are probing amendments to try to preclude Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Capacity Act being used to detain people who do not meet the Mental Health Act detention criteria. It is fascinating that, in some cases where people are detained at the moment, it is not because there is a therapeutic benefit but because there are no community facilities—this is completely at odds with the code of practice. Professionals are using a lack of facility to detain people. Let us be clear: these people are detained for 4.8 years on average, in solitary confinement, and this has a lifelong detriment. They are scarred for life. Many probing amendments in this group are trying to tease out exactly what will happen and to ensure that the Mental Capacity Act is not used to detain people because provision in this country does not exist.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out, there are places, such as Trieste, where this issue has been dealt with starting from a different view: starting from what is needed, rather than this power being required because things are needed. That is the fundamental change that we need to make because, if not—I am glad the Government are moving down this path—we will continue to see people detained when they have not a mental illness or a psychiatric disorder but a development issue, which is not a psychiatric disorder. There are many papers on learning disabilities and autism by professionals who would argue that that is the case. We are all probing to try to work out what will happen.
I fully support the change to the detention criteria for autistic people and people with learning disabilities, and I believe it is key to reducing the number of autistic people and people with learning disabilities detained in mental health hospitals. But to achieve this policy intent, the Government need to make sure that a backdoor to detention is not opened through the inappropriate use of the Mental Capacity Act—detention in a mental health hospital under the deprivation of liberty safeguards instead. Without further guidance on the use of the Mental Capacity Act, the Government’s intent to reduce the number of autistic people and those with learning disabilities in mental health hospitals may be undermined.
I am concerned that the Mental Capacity Act may not be generally appropriate for use in deciding on treatment in a mental health hospital, as its primary intention is to help decide issues relating to people’s overall care and living arrangements. I am also concerned that somebody detained under the Mental Capacity Act would not benefit from procedural safeguards and access to the mental health tribunal if required.
Amendment 35 from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, would mean that people with a learning disability or autism could be held for six months. There could be a six-month period of detention but only in exceptional circumstances, which are not defined but are to be defined and put in the code of practice. Again, as we know, people can divert from the code of practice, so it is not the safeguard that the noble Baroness would suggest. Exceptional circumstances in a code of practice could be diverted from. Furthermore, based on the noble Baroness’s amendment, there could be a further six months for a tribunal to decide. Nowhere in here is there anything about therapeutic benefit and how that detention would be to the benefit of the individual rather than of society. So I am not clear how therapeutic benefit would be determined under the noble Baroness’s amendment.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
What does the noble Lord think will happen to the people in the gap?
Lord Scriven (LD)
As I said, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out what happens internationally, in Trieste in Italy, for example, and I therefore suggest that good international comparisons and practice could be enacted in legislation to ensure that the needs of as many people as possible are met in the community, rather than them being held in detention because the provision is not there. That is exactly what will happen unless this gap is dealt with by looking at what is required rather than looking at the gap and continuing detention.
Lord Hardie (CB)
My Lords, I apologise that I did not speak at Second Reading, but I have been listening to this interesting debate and it seems to me that Clause 5 is introducing the concept of detention in extreme cases, where there is a risk of serious harm to the health or safety of the patient or another person unless the patient is detained. That is the reason for the detention: to protect the patient from serious harm to himself or herself, or to protect others from serious harm.
As I read the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, it simply seeks to suggest, or to put on the statute book, that someone suffering from autism or a learning disability would not satisfy the test in Clause 5. But the amendment permits the admission to hospital of someone with a learning disability for the purpose of assessing whether he or she has a mental disorder. I am not sure that this amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, would result in people slipping through the net.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I wrote the amendment in a terrible hurry as a compromise amendment when I could not table the amendment that I really wished to table, which was seeking to get back to having clarity about the diagnostic criteria. I apologise if that was not the provision that the noble Lord wanted in the Bill—I am not sure that I want it very much either. I do not have any great devotion to the proposed new clause; it was just a way of trying to address this leaving of the gap. We used to do that, by the way. After the 1983 Act, noble Lords will remember that we dropped alcohol addictions and drug misuse from the Act, saying that we could not detain people for those reasons alone. What happened was that there was total neglect for the next 20 years until voluntary organisations and local authorities got moving and said, “This won’t do—we must do something”.
Noble Lords should remember that that is what happens. If you leave somebody out of protective legislation, they will not be included; they will be neglected and they will end up in prison. That is what Sir Simon Wessely thought and it is what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has been talking about. I can guarantee that nobody will be interested in autistic meltdowns if there is no way in which to intervene to save a family from having that person with them, seven days a week and 24 hours a day, during the period of this terrible disturbance.
Community services are great. I urge noble Lords to visit Trieste, as it has brilliant services in a tiny area; it is one of the very few in Italy, and it continues to work very well. It is cited all over the world, and that is very good. But this is Britain, with 80 million people and massively underfunded services, and it ain’t going to happen. I want to know what will happen to those people noble Lords would like to see neglected until such time as the Government produce some alternative provision.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I do not think that I or anybody else who has a different opinion from the noble Baroness wants to see those people being neglected. We have a different view. The issue I have with her stance is that the evidence is that putting people with learning disabilities and autism in a psychiatric hospital—and that is where they will go if there is no provision, because that is where they go at present—is damaging. It is not the correct provision. I believe that what she is arguing for—to continue the neglect of provision by putting them somewhere—is significantly not in their best interests and causes damage.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
Perhaps I can clarify. I think that the noble Baroness’s amendment is to some extent based on the spirit of the Joint Committee’s report, which was about providing some kind of mechanism, after the 28 days—I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, nodding. There would be a specialist tribunal, and we said that it should be composed of people with experience of learning disabilities and autism, so that there was not a get-out for clinicians that they had not done the assessments properly. There would have to be grounded reasons to go beyond the 28 days and, in exceptional circumstances, you could authorise the detention, to make sure that the law covered that gap or group of people. No one wanted to see people detained for the reason that there was no community provision—that is ridiculous.
I accept that the reality is probably going to be that clinicians will find a mental disorder diagnosis to use the powers under Part II to do what is in the best interests of that person and their family at the time. But the law should also cover that situation and not force clinicians into those diagnoses—hence the need for accurate data, so that we can track what is happening when the law is enacted.
Lord Kamall (Con)
Once again, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke to this group of amendments. The purpose of today’s Committee is to probe the Government, but it is interesting that we find noble Lords probing each other—though I have learned a huge amount from these discussions. They say that discourse leads not only to liberty but to an increase in knowledge.
I add my words to those of the Minister and offer my condolences to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who is not in her place today. I recall a debate in 2021 led by the noble Baroness—one of my first as Health Minister—in which she highlighted that people with learning difficulties and autism were being detained in secure settings, even when an assessment had recommended that they should live in the community. This goes back to the words of my noble friend Lady Berridge, who talked about how we can deal with the world as it is and not with the ideal world that we want to live in.
I was shocked at the time by what the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told the House about some of the findings from the oversight panel for the independent care (education) and treatment reviews. I bear in mind what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said, when she gave some examples of other countries with much shorter detentions, but I will never forget the story that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told about a Mr W, who had been detained in hospital for more than 20 years, spending most of his time in what amounted to solitary confinement. At the time of the debate, Mr W had been living in his own home for nearly three years, near his family, with his home environment and care being built around his needs. That is something that all noble Lords are trying to push for in this group of amendments. It was not only a heart-warming story but the point was made that, financially, it cost no more to support Mr W living in his own home than it did to detain him in hospital. More importantly, the noble Baroness shared the happy ending that, despite the trauma of being in the wrong environment for so many years, Mr W was, we hope, going to live happily ever after. That highlights the reasons for the amendments in this group.
I should add that I recall the noble Baroness who is now the Minister pushing the Government from these Benches on ending detention. I am sorry—I am going to be a little naughty here, but she can do it if we ever get back into government. She told the House that the average length of stay for people with a learning disability and/or autism in in-patient units was 5.4 years, saying:
“That is 5.4 years that no person will ever get back”.—[Official Report, 28/10/2021; col. GC 231.]
She asked how that could be justifiable when the cost of living in the community was the same as the cost of detention. I know that she is naturally sympathetic to ending these detentions. The detention of those with autism and learning disabilities was one of the central issues addressed by the Wessely review.
I was interested in Amendment 4, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, arguing the definition of “mental disorder” under the Bill. While I am sympathetic to the amendment, can the Minister confirm whether my understanding is correct that the World Health Organization defines a mental disorder as
“a clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotional regulation, or behaviour”,
and whether the WHO includes neurodevelopmental disorders, which includes autism? If so, are the Government sympathetic to Amendment 4 and considering bringing forward their own amendment? How would they avoid running contrary to the definition accepted by the WHO and included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, particularly DSM-5? I understand the point that these things can change, as the noble Lords, Lord Stevens and Lord Scriven, have very importantly alluded to.
Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Browning, seeks to ensure that, if a person has autism or a learning difficulty but not a mental health condition, we should not be using deprivation of liberty safeguards to replace detention under the Mental Health Act. We fully support my noble friend’s amendment and the intention behind it.
I am grateful to noble Lady, Baroness Murphy, who has tabled Amendment 35, for the time she has taken to share her experience and expertise with me and my noble friend Lord Howe. She addresses an issue that we should all be aware of with any legislation: that of unintended consequences. While most noble Lords here today would accept and support ending these detentions, for all the reasons that we have all given, and particularly after the harrowing stories that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told all those years ago, how will the Government ensure that anyone with learning difficulties who could potentially pose a considerable risk in the community receive the required supervision? That is the challenge here, and it is the challenge to which my noble friend Lady Berridge referred when she reminded us that we have to talk about the world in which we live and not the ideal world that we all want.
I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Berridge for sharing some of the deliberations of the pre-legislative Joint Committee, particularly on the issue of the High Court DoLS. Given that, and the point of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, if we are to have alternatives, how do we prevent detention by the back door or opening a massive loophole for detention?
Amendment 39, from my noble friend Lady Browning, would ensure that detention was for needs associated with the degree of psychiatric disorder, along with Amendment 40. We are sympathetic to that, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I am most grateful to noble Lords across the Committee for their contributions. I will start by referring to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. A range of views has been expressed today on the matter of detention. The noble Lord asked what provision will be in place to ensure that we are not using some kind of backdoor, and that is a very good general question for us to hold in our heads. It is a very important matter, given the very poor outcomes we have seen for those with a learning disability and for autistic people under the current Act. I know this is something that has really exercised noble Lords—rightly so, in my view.
The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, is quite right to remind me of comments I made from that Dispatch Box, which I still stand by. I have concerns, as I know he does too. The proposals here are intended to address the matter of improving outcomes. The debate today has been extremely helpful and will allow me to reflect on where we need to go in respect of these. I am also grateful for the range of wider topics raised in this group—for example, on the importance of the community sector—and I look forward to moving on to these when we come to subsequent groups later today.
Let me first address Amendment 4 and the notice to oppose Schedule 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Currently, a person with a learning disability can be detained for treatment under Part II, Section 3 of the Mental Health Act when their learning disability
“is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”.
I heard what the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Berridge, said. The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, used the word “meltdown”, and she has spoken to me about this before. I know that not all noble Lords like that word, which is why I put it in quotes, but the point is well made and the noble Baroness has explained to me about understanding a person’s conduct. It is also the case that an autistic person can be detained under Section 3 on the basis of mental disorder.
While the independent review found examples where use of the Act can deliver therapeutic benefit, it also found that hospital detention—a number of noble Lords spoke about this—can be detrimental for people with a learning disability and autistic people, due to exposure to environments or experiences that are completely insensitive to what I would call reasonable adjustments. This obviously causes stress and leads to behaviour considered to be challenging. We have heard that it is too often the case that people with a learning disability and autistic people are being inappropriately detained due to a crisis—which may be a better word in this instance—that has arisen due to a lack of community support, rather than for treatment of a mental health condition. That is unacceptable and the point has been extremely well made, both in the Chamber today and on earlier occasions.
The Government are committed to ensuring that hospital detention happens only when an individual has a mental disorder that warrants hospital treatment that has a reasonable prospect of providing a therapeutic benefit. It should not be some form of punishment. Schedule 1 and Clause 3 will change how the Act applies to people with a learning disability and autistic people by introducing new definitions for “psychiatric disorder”, “learning disability” and “autism” in the Act, and making amendments using those definitions throughout the Act. These amendments remove, for the purposes of Part II of the Act, learning disability and autism from the scope of conditions for which a person can be detained for compulsory treatment under Section 3. I hope that will be of reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and other noble Lords.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, argued that the Bill is non-compliant with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The measures in the Bill give patients greater choice, enhanced rights and support, and seek to ensure—I know that noble Lords want to probe this—that everyone is treated with dignity and respect throughout their treatment, and that the treatment is appropriate to the situation. It is the view of the Government that the Bill is compatible with the convention. Detention under the Act is not based merely on the existence of disability: that is something I really want to emphasise. Detention is risk-based. Detention and other compulsory measures are permitted only where they are justified by the risk posed by a person’s mental disorder and, through the Bill, I hope that we are very much strengthening the criteria for detention. We will come back to this later in Committee.
Amendment 4, tabled by the noble Baroness, would leave out Clause 3 and put in a new definition of mental disorder to remove learning disability and autism from the scope of the Mental Health Act entirely. This would mean that a person could not be dealt with under any section of the Act on the grounds of learning disability or autism alone. We very much recognise the arguments for removing these conditions from the scope of the Act, but there could be unintended consequences in the removal of critical safeguards. I know that the noble Baroness does not wish to cause that effect.
For example, the Bill retains the ability to detain people under Part II, Section 2, for a maximum of 28 days, for the purpose of assessment. That can be necessary both for the safety of the individual and the public, and for a clinician to understand fully whether a treatable mental health condition is the cause of the behaviour. I suggest that this is particularly important when considering conditions associated with high rates of co-occurring mental health conditions. Without these powers, there is a risk that the mental health needs of these groups of people are not identified or met appropriately, leading to further health inequalities for this group of people. I know that is not something that noble Lords would wish.
Baroness Barker (LD)
I have not spoken in this debate so far, but I have listened intently to everything that everybody has said, including the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. Members of the Select Committee will remember—they could not forget—the evidence given to us by particular witnesses who have autism and have been through the trauma of being detained. They made to us, unforgettably, the point that there are some people with autism and learning disabilities for whom detention is an aggravating factor.
I happen not to agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that there should be an end to all detention, although I have some sympathy with her arguments. I believe there are people for whom detention is necessary—both for them and for the safety of others—but they should be held in mental health facilities and not the criminal justice system.
I listened intently to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. I understand that it may be absolutely correct to define people with autism and learning disabilities as having a disorder, but we have moved on over 20 or 30 years to understanding that their manifestations and treatment are different from those of other mental health conditions. There is therefore a problem in having the diagnosis and treatment carried out by the same people. I hoped that she would explain, but she did not, why keeping people within the definition would improve their care.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
Does the noble Baroness accept that, in talking about treatment, we are talking about care, education and training in social circumstances? Treatment is not about medication, which may be totally inappropriate, but about looking at the individual’s developmental needs as a whole, which include a whole raft of things. I agree that it is not just about psychiatrists or psychologists; it can be about teachers, people with a special understanding of speech and language, and so on. I would never deny that you have to encompass the whole thing—I would promote it.
Baroness Barker (LD)
I am sure that the noble Baroness would. Does she accept that for some people, particularly those with autism and learning disabilities, being held in conditions that are noisy, filled with light and full of people they do not know—in which they are made to feel completely powerless and do not know what will happen to them next—will be a contributory factor to their illness? I make that point to the noble Baroness, Lady Merron. She talks about choice, but what increased protections are there in this Bill for people with autism or learning disabilities who find themselves in detention, which is an aggravating factor causing them to be wrongly diagnosed?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I will be pleased to come back to that point. I think agreement broke out for a moment, which I would share, on the fact that detention takes many forms. It is about getting the right form and being sensitive to the needs of the individual, which is what the Bill is all about. I am grateful for those comments.
To pick up my point about the expert consultation that has taken place, a decision was taken to retain the ability to divert people who are autistic or have a learning disability, who have committed a crime, from prison to hospital under Part III of the Act. Without this safeguard, the only alternative to detention in hospital is detention in prison. Noble Lords have referred in this group to how, often, this would be inappropriate in meeting those people’s needs and would exacerbate and manifest distress. On balance, we believe it is right to retain the ability to divert such patients to hospital, where they are much more likely to access the right kind of support and care that they need.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, raised concern about resourcing implications for local authorities. I refer her to the impact assessment, which sets out anticipated costs, including a breakdown of costs for councils. I assure her that we will do further work with MHCLG to assess any new burdens on local authorities created by the Bill. We are very alive to that situation.
Baroness Browning (Con)
The Minister will not be surprised to hear that I like what she just said. Is there no way she can put that in the Bill under a government amendment?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am grateful for the invitation, as always. Government amendments will be considered as we progress through Committee, but I say that as a broad point, as I know the noble Baroness understands.
The intention of the provisions in the Bill on registers and commissioning is that people with a learning disability and autistic people are not detained but supported in the right way. The proposed changes to Part II, Section 3 will be commenced only where there are strong community services in place.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I am aware of how much time the Minister has given and how generous she has been in allowing interventions. If she is minded on Amendment 5, can she outline whether she is proposing that there would be the special tribunal that the Joint Committee outlined? If so, how would she then deal with these issues for under-16s in respect of DoLS and for vulnerable adults? When there is no legal basis at all, it is then left for clinicians to detain anybody after the 28 days.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I became a little worried, listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that perhaps I had been a bit too generous.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am sure that I have not been generous enough. I cannot give a commitment to government amendments on any of these areas. As noble Lords will be aware, that is the purpose of the kind of debate that we are having in Committee. However, we will certainly return to these matters.
The Mental Capacity Act protects people subject to arrangements that may amount to a deprivation of liberty in hospitals, care homes and other settings, by allowing a deprivation of liberty only when it is necessary and proportionate. There are instances when it is important that the Mental Capacity Act can be used to protect and to safeguard people where appropriate, and we do not want to lose that aspect.
The concern about the amendment is that it might have the effect of undermining decision-making, or of denying a specified group of people the right to protections under the Mental Capacity Act—although I know that this is not intended. I will give an example. Where a person lacks capacity but does not have a psychiatric disorder that requires treatment, there may be elements of that person’s care plan and arrangements that require deprivation of liberty safeguards to ensure that they can access the community safely and maintain a safe home environment. Similarly, certain specialist community placements are also registered hospitals, so the proposed amendment could unintentionally—I stress “unintentionally”—remove such provision as a viable community-based option, where the individual lacks capacity but would benefit from this placement as an alternative to in-patient care.
The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, rightly made some comments about the statistics for LDA detention rates. I assure your Lordships that the data and statistics being referred to are absolutely key. They are collected and published, and they will continue to be monitored. If there are any matters where the noble Baroness or other noble Lords feel that we should go further, I would be very pleased to receive their comments.
On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, about the use of High Court deprivation of liberty safeguards for children, I will refer to the action of the previous Government, which I hope will be seen as very helpful. In 2023, a task and finish group was established called “Improving cross-sector support for children in complex situations with multiple needs”. It was made up of a number of central government departments, operational local agencies and representative bodies, the NHSE and the Youth Custody Service to represent the voice of children and young people, as well as the Children’s Commissioner. This group has been developing a cross-sector response to help ensure that there is suitable provision in place for children and young people with complex needs who are at risk of being deprived of their liberty. To that point, I will take a particular interest in the task and finish group and its work, and we may come back to it.
Baroness Barker (LD)
I thank the Minister for giving way again. Listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, set out and explain her amendments, it seems to me that they require the people making the decisions about whether to detain somebody to be clearer about which law they are using to decide to detain at a particular point for a particular person. As I understand it, they are not excluding or preventing the use of either bit of legislation for an individual; they seek just to have greater clarity about which legislation is being used and why, and therefore what protections the person will have. The Minister said that, if these amendments go through, some people will, somehow, be excluded from the correct treatment. Is there a particular group of patients or conditions that are at risk if the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, are implemented? Can the Minister give us some examples? Otherwise, I fail to see the logic of what she is saying, given the explanation that the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, gave the Committee.
Baroness Browning (Con)
I agree. The amendment seeks to strengthen and to clarify, rather than to make changes that would be completely different to what is intended in the Mental Capacity Act.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am grateful for the noble Baronesses’ comments. I will come back with some examples before I sit down, because that is a very good suggestion. If I fail to do so, I will gladly provide them in writing.
Amendment 35, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, intends to provide a route to detain people with a learning disability and autistic people who do not have a diagnosed psychiatric disorder. Detention could be authorised only with the approval of the tribunal in “exceptional circumstances”, with power to provide guidance on what those circumstances will be in the code of practice. The amendment seeks to address the needs of those with a learning disability and autistic people, with whom I know the noble Baroness is concerned, where a considerable risk is being posed in the community, but who do not also have a diagnosed psychiatric disorder warranting detention for treatment under Part II, Section 3.
Our clear intent throughout the Bill is that people should be detained beyond Section 2 only when they have a psychiatric disorder that requires hospital treatment. It is our feeling that this amendment runs contrary to that intent. I am also grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, for his comments on Amendment 35.
We also have some concerns about the scope of the “exceptional circumstances”, which would potentially result in a position no different to the current effect of the Act. It is unclear, in advance of the code of practice being developed, how broadly this might be defined. There would be considerable scope for different, divergent approaches in comparable cases, which, again, I know is not the intent of noble Lords.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am sure that the noble and learned Baroness’s yawn speaks for many.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
There is no need to apologise.
I am pleased to provide the reassurance that the proposed changes to the Section 3 detention criteria mean that it would no longer be possible to detain someone with a learning disability or an autistic person under Section 3, unless they have a psychiatric disorder. Additionally, the Act already requires a statement of rationale for detention and statutory forms. The registered medical practitioner will have to confirm that the patient meets the criteria for detention, including that they are suffering from a psychiatric disorder requiring hospital treatment and not just that the patient has a learning disability or is autistic. I hope that will be of reassurance to the noble Baroness.
For the reasons I have set out in respect of all the amendments—I thank noble Lords for them—I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw hers.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
I thank the Minister for her rich and full response, and indeed all noble Lords who have taken part in this important debate. It has been long but that has been quite necessary. I thank the Minister particularly for responding directly to my question about the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I do not agree with her response but I appreciate that she engaged fully with it, so I thank her for that.
I will not go through and summarise all the contributions, but I just want to make two points, which are perhaps specifically directed to the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. A phrase which has been missing from our whole debate is the “social model of disability”. That is the idea that society is discriminatory, and that people are disabled by the barriers in society, not by their difference. That position was endorsed by the Government Equalities Office in 2014, and so far as I know, that still holds, and it is preferred by most disability charities.
I invite noble Lords to consider another phrase in this healthcare space, which is “parity of esteem”. I think that when we come to the social model of disability and physical disabilities, most people have now accepted that if there are only steps and not a ramp, that is a failure of society, not the failure of the person in the wheelchair. However, we have not heard in this debate an acknowledgement of the same parity of esteem—the same approach to mental disability as we have accepted towards physical disability—and we should consider and think about that.
In that context, just to pick up a couple of points from the Minister, she talked about how people with autism or learning difficulties can be detained for aggressive or irresponsible conduct. The Trieste model—if I can call it that—which is being adopted by many countries around the world, asks: “Can we intervene before that point and ask what has provoked that person? Can we intervene before we need to detain someone?” That needs to be very carefully considered.
The other point that the Minister addressed, which I confronted myself with, asking why I did not table the broader amendment that I might have done, is what happens when people get to the point of being a danger to themselves or—I stress that this is extraordinarily rare—a danger to others as a result of a mental disorder. Again, how did people get to that point, and should there not be services and support and community wraparound in the Trieste style? I do not think that any nation or area is saying that it has totally got to that point, but surely we should be aiming at that.
Lord Kamall (Con)
The noble Baroness referred to the Trieste model, and I thought that led to quite a deal of interest from noble Lords across the House. Could she share some details on the Trieste model with other noble Lords but especially the Minister and the department, so we can all start learning those lessons?
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
I should absolutely stress at this point that I am not an expert, but I will certainly do my best to secure as much information as possible and share it with all noble Lords. The Minister may also have access to resources that may not be available to me. Reflecting on the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, perhaps we could even arrange some kind of discussion—it might be useful—and perhaps even hear some testimony, because that would really inform our consideration of the Bill. But in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Barker
“(iv) housing”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that housing needs are considered as part of care, education and treatment review meetings.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, since this is the first time during our proceedings that I propose something, I declare an interest as a member of an advisory panel for Rethink Mental Illness in an unpaid capacity.
I apologise if I risk sounding like a broken record; it is just that I have been here discussing these issues so many times in the past, as indeed have many other Members of your Lordships’ House. I will not apologise for taking a long-term view of things or for saying that there have been areas of change and areas of progress. But I also do not apologise for explaining to your Lordships the amount of effort and discussion that it has taken to bring about change and movement, not least against some of the entrenched views of the professions, which over the years have put up quite a deal of resistance to change.
It is also our job to look at the proposals that have come forward from patients’ groups and say that some of them are valid and some of them are not. We are in a unique and very privileged position in this House where we get to take a long-term and wide perspective, and we should use it wisely.
I say that because we have debated care and treatment plans time and again. Mental health institutions up and down the country are littered with files of care and treatment plans, many of which have sat on shelves and never been implemented. With this legislation, we are moving to the position we need to get to where everybody who is subject to mental health treatment has a care and treatment plan, the decision-making behind that plan is open to scrutiny, and the people responsible for delivering it are held accountable.
I cannot imagine what it must be like to sit day after day in a place where I know I am supposed to be given treatment that will enable me to get better and get out, and to receive nothing. I imagine the temptation to sit there and think about that all day long is in itself is a gravely depressing factor. That is the sort of thing that we have listened to over the years from people—particularly young people—who have been subject to mental health treatment and care plans and never had them delivered, so how pleased we are to have moved forward to this point. I am also very pleased that Members are trying to take this opportunity to beef these plans up, in particular the accountability around the delivery or failure to deliver them.
I want to include housing in the Bill. You do not have to have a mental health condition to be severely worried about housing these days. Any young person in this country can have real concern about availability of housing, tenure and all the rest of it. If you have a mental health condition and are likely to be detained for an indefinite period, and therefore very likely to lose your tenancy or whatever, that must be a huge aggravating factor.
One reason why I was prompted to table this amendment was because I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee for the then Bill back in 2006. Somewhere there is an unwritten law that, when mental health legislation is coming up, Members of this place will be sent to the South London and Maudsley. There is no way out; you have to go. But it is always good to go to SLaM to talk to the staff, who are immensely generous with their time. You cannot go on one of those visits and walk out unchanged from the experience.
I remember, in particular, a bunch of your Lordships going to talk to one of the best teams that I have seen in practice. Back in those days they were called an assertive outreach team; I do not know what they are called these days. They were absolutely brilliant, dedicated individuals. Their job was to work with people out in the community, to know them all and to predict the problems that would arise. One thing I remember them telling us was that they would frequently go to the local authority or to landlords when they had somebody whose particular crisis was that they had got into arrears. They would head it off by negotiating and de-escalating the situation so that the person did not get turfed out and therefore end up in acute care.
Similarly, we know that discharge is a lottery for anybody who goes into any acute hospital for any reason at all. Discharge from the NHS is one of those things that when it goes brilliantly, it goes brilliantly. When it does not, it is an absolute and utter disaster, and the person at the centre of it has absolutely no control over it at all—even less, I would suggest, when they are being discharged from mental health treatment.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak my Amendments 8, 11, 15, 18, 19 and 20 in this group. They are to do what my noble friend Lady Barker said: to try to beef up the care (education) and treatment reviews, because something is amiss. As my noble friend said, too many of them are sitting on stuffy and dusty shelves, and not enough people get access to them to be able to advocate for and follow through on them.
Amendments 8 and 15 are important regarding the people who are legally entitled to receive a copy of the care (education) and treatment review. I support the amendment from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to add the parent and guardian, which was an omission. Currently, the Bill provides for a copy to be sent only to the responsible commissioner, the patient’s responsible clinician, the ICB and the local authority. To ensure that the patient and their family, carer and advocates are fully aware and informed of the decisions being made around their care, can hold services to account and can follow up on the care and treatment plan recommendations, it is essential that they too receive a copy of the report.
These amendments would ensure that the patient, the patient’s nominated person and the patient’s independent mental health advocate receive a copy of the care and treatment report. I note that the Minister has tabled an amendment setting out that a copy of the report “may” be given to other persons, but this does not place a strong enough duty to involve the patient and significant others to ensure that adequate oversight of the care and treatment review reports is available to them.
Amendments 11 and 18 reduce the maximum time between the reviews from 12 months to six months for adults and children. This is in line with the recommendation of the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill. According to NHSE data, 24% of autistic people and people with learning disabilities detained in mental health hospitals have been waiting for more than one year for a CETR or have no CETR at all, and 31% have had the date of their next scheduled CETR pass or have no scheduled CETR at all.
We know that autistic people and people with learning disabilities face lengthy stays. There must be a drive to discharge these people. The idea that we would have a CETR only every 12 months to help prevent a lengthy stay shows how worryingly normalised long lengths of stays have become for these individuals. In many cases, a maximum interval of 12 months may be too long and mean that autistic people and people with learning disabilities face delays to their discharge planning. The current frequency of CETRs in the Bill is not in line with NHS England’s policy, which states that, for adults, CETRs should be held at a maximum frequency of six months.
Amendments 19 and 20 seek to ensure that the recommendations of CETRs are followed through. This is essential to ensuring that the needs of individuals are being met and that steps are being taken to prepare for their discharge. Often, the recommendations arising from CETRs are constructive, and those attending may leave with the impression that the right steps are being taken. However, the frequent failure to carry out the recommendations arising from these reports undermines faith in the process and can lead to unnecessary delays in an individual’s needs being met and in their discharge.
CETRs, which are essential to providing safeguards for autistic people and people with learning disabilities under the Bill, are important. Their being undermined cannot be allowed. The current language in the Bill for the responsible clinicians, commissioners, integrated care boards and local authorities says that they must “have regard” to the recommendations. I believe that this is too weak. Legally, the definition of “regard” is that a public body must consider something and, once it has been considered, has discretion to carry out or ignore it. A duty in law is an obligation and must be followed, and the reason why it has been followed must be given. These amendments would substitute “regard”—the weaker definition—for “a duty” to carry out these actions unless a compelling reason is provided for why this is not possible. This follows a similar recommendation from the Joint Committee on the Mental Health Bill, which stated that ICBs and local authorities should be required to “follow” recommendations in reports—that is, have a duty.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendment 9, following on from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, on Amendment 8.
We are dealing with the responsible commissioner making arrangements for the care (education) and treatment review meetings and the report. I do not know whether I am a lone voice speaking in this House but I am a mother and a grandmother, and there is not a single word in any part of this Bill about parents or guardians—not a word. I could find references to parental responsibility only in new Schedule A1 and Schedule 2, although I may be wrong.
Can I just suggest something to noble Lords? Where you have a child—here, I am dealing specifically with a child—with autism or physical or mental disabilities, it is quite probable, if not most likely, that that person will be living with their family and their parents. I must say, my experience as a family judge led me to believe that only about 5% to 10% of parents who came through the courts were not suitable to look after their children full time. But according to Clause 4—which inserts new Section 125A—the one group of people who will not be told what the future care (education) and treatment review given to their child will be includes the people with whom that child has been living for all their life. I cannot understand why this Bill seems to think that parents, guardians and other people with parental responsibility do not matter. That is why I have raised this issue. I feel intensely strongly about it, as a mother and a grandmother.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I shall speak very briefly, having attached my name to Amendments 19 and 20. I support all of the previous amendments, which are in essence about people knowing about care and treatment review plans. I particularly wanted to sign these two amendments because of the clause identified by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. It states that integrated care boards and local authorities “must have regard to” the plan—as the noble Lord outlined, that is a very weak, weaselly form of words—rather than having a duty to deliver the plan that has been established for the well-being and health of a person. The phrase in the Bill now really is not adequate.
I want to share something with noble Lords. On Friday night, I was in Chorley, in Greater Manchester, at a meeting with the local Green Party and NHS campaigners. One of the things I heard there was a huge amount of distrust and concern about integrated care boards and the restructuring arrangements that have happened with the NHS. I am not going to get into those issues now but, with the words “must have regard to”, we are leaving an open door and a door to distrust. Surely the right thing is for this Bill to say that the ICB has a duty to deliver a care plan.
On Amendment 20, we will undoubtedly talk endlessly about resources, but that there must be a compelling reason is the right terminology to have in the Bill; it really has to be justified. I believe that both of these amendments should be in the Bill.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 13 in my name in this group, but wish to add my support to the amendments that have already been talked about: those in the names of my noble friends Lady Barker and Lord Scriven, and the very important amendment in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I have experience in my wider family of someone with autism, so I know full well the importance of having the parents and the wider family involved in review meetings. Frankly, it would be very difficult indeed if they were not there for those review meetings to express the wishes and preferences of the individual concerned.
I guess that that is quite a helpful link to my amendment, which is about communication needs. I know that we explored this issue pretty thoroughly in our debate on the first group—you could argue that my amendment could have been in either the first grouping or this grouping, but it is in this grouping. I will keep it short, because we have talked about this quite a lot. In essence, the amendment is designed to ensure that communication needs being met is included on the list of the subject matter that must be considered and on which recommendations must be made during the care (education) and treatment review meetings.
It is clearly vital, as we have all acknowledged, that every effort is made to ensure that autistic people and people with learning disabilities are involved in their own care and treatment decisions and are able—this is the critical point—to express their preferences and needs. To ensure that this is the case, their communication needs must be understood, considered and met; the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, made that point powerfully in our debate on the first group. Often, this needs to include understanding a person’s communications preferences; having the right sort of environment; making sure that the environment is supportive; or, sometimes, using very specific communication tools, which do exist. This can also include—this refers to the amendments from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—the involvement of a person who knows and understands the patient well, quite often a family member or advocate. That can be key to meeting someone’s communications needs.
I am sure we all agree that care and treatment reviews need to be designed to ensure that the person affected is central to the decisions being made about their care and treatment. It is therefore absolutely self-evident that communications needs should be considered and discussed at the beginning of those meeting to ensure that the person concerned is able to express their thoughts, wishes, feelings and preferences, so that everyone involved in the care and treatment of individuals is equipped to meet those moving forward.
I am very supportive of the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Scriven which would lengthen the time between reviews from 12 months to six months. I think 12 months is just too long. An awful lot can happen in that period and circumstances can change. I know that we have a subsequent group on care and treatment plans, but on the point made by my noble friend Lady Barker, it is important to think of the individual in a fully joined-up way, looking at housing needs as well. I know that we are going to return to it in a subsequent group, but it vitally needs to include things such as money matters, debt advice, ensuring that the individual does not fall into financial exclusion and all of that. I have put my name to an amendment on that in a later group.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, with relation to housing. I do not want to go back 20 years for any reason except to say that, when we were closing the vast majority of mental health in-patient beds, the main aim of many of us doing those change programmes was to ensure that people had somewhere to live when they had been living in hospital for 10, 20 or, in some cases, 30 years, and that the housing had to be appropriate to their level of ability. Spending 30 years in a hospital does not exactly teach you self-reliance. There are some real challenges about that, so housing must be considered in any discharge planning.
On Amendments 19 and 20, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has sent me a copy of her speeches in her absence. Like others, I think that it shows her commitment to this House that at this point in her life she is trying to make sure that her voice is heard. I add my condolences to those of others in the Committee. Her point is that you would not discharge people from acute hospital without some proper care and treatment plan. I want to use my own words rather than hers, but when you say that somebody needs dialysis or that they need regular checking of their heart monitor, we automatically do it. Elective care is still getting a huge amount of focus, but elective care in this country is defined as acute hospital care, not elective care for mental health patients and people with learning disabilities. I want to rest it there, but that is why I support Amendments 19 and 20 so strongly.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
I too am supportive of the spirit and intention behind Amendments 19 and 20, but I want to raise two textual questions relating to whether they would give effect as was intended.
In respect of Amendment 19, I am not sure that the explanatory statement accurately characterises what the amendment proposes. It says that the amendment ensures that ICBs and local authorities would
“have a duty to carry out”,
whereas at the point at which those words would be inserted it appears that the duty would also then fall to the patient’s responsible clinician. Amendment 19 by itself would essentially see CETRs overriding the judgment of the responsible clinician, which I think is quite a significant step to take.
In any event, I wonder whether Amendment 20 undoes any of the good work that Amendment 19 proposes in the first place. It says that you can ignore the exhortations of Amendment 19 if there is a “compelling reason” to do so. My question to the drafters of Amendment 20 would be: what statutory interpretation should be placed on “compelling reason” and how might the courts be expected to adjudicate in the event of judicial review?
Lord Bradley (Lab)
I support and have added my name to Amendment 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, around communication issues. As she rightly pointed out, this could have been linked to Amendment 2, which has already been debated at some length. I will not repeat the same arguments, but they apply to this amendment, which is why I support it.
I also very strongly support the amendment on housing tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. I am chair of NHS England’s health and justice advisory board and have worked on the development of RECONNECT, the service to support people coming out of prison back into the community, which is very much a health-based initiative. Unless their housing needs are met at that point, their treatment, their support and their care plan can fall apart very quickly. Consequently, they are very quickly back in the criminal justice system. The same comparison can be made with this amendment. I strongly support housing being at the core of all issues relating to health and social care.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on Amendment 9. I know that there are other amendments in relation to the inclusion of parents and guardians. I raise just two small points in relation to this.
When one looks at where this amendment is inserted in the list, the last of the persons currently listed who would receive the report is
“the local authority in whose area the patient is ordinarily resident”.
That potentially will not always be the local authority where there is a care order. Therefore, in those circumstances, the local authority is caught with an
“other person who has parental responsibility”.
However, that is not how this is drafted in other parts of the Bill, where an
“other person who has parental responsibilities”
means guardians et cetera. For consistency of drafting, we need to look at that.
I know that the Minister has been very generous in the time that we have had with her and her officials, but we need a consistent phraseology within the Bill because with this amendment, if there was a special guardian the report would also go to the person with what is informally known as residual parental responsibility. Normally they are informed only, for instance, of the change of name of the child or if the child is going to leave the jurisdiction. We need to look at everybody with parental responsibility and have some consistent phraseology within the Bill when we are meaning the local authority when there is a care order and parental responsibility, to include all the different circumstances in which a child may have their status changed from the ordinary situation of living at home with parents when a court order is in place.
The Earl of Effingham (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments aim to strengthen provisions for care (education) and treatment reviews—CETRs, as we have heard—for individuals with autism or a learning disability. These amendments collectively aim to address gaps in the current drafting and ensure that the needs and rights of these individuals are fully considered and respected.
This reflects the dignity, respect and patient-centred care principles that strengthen the Bill. Amendments 6 and 12, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, highlight the importance of considering housing needs during care (education) and treatment review meetings. A stable, safe and appropriate home environment is a critical determinant of mental health and well-being. Failure to address housing can undermine the effectiveness of care plans, leading to avoidable crises, as the Minister put it earlier, and setbacks that can risk damaging the long-term success of these care plans. Can the Minister please clarify how housing needs will be integrated into the CETRs under the current provisions of the Bill?
Amendments 8 to 10 and 15 to 17 focus on ensuring that the CETR process is inclusive and transparent. These amendments expand the list of those who should receive CETR reports to include the patient, their nominated person, independent mental health advocates and, where relevant, their parent or guardian. These measures should help foster trust and collaboration in the care process and create a more holistic approach to care planning by ensuring that all key individuals are kept informed. Can the Minister please confirm whether the current drafting of Clause 4 sufficiently addresses these inclusivity concerns or whether these amendments are necessary to achieve that goal?
Amendments 19 and 20 address the issue of ensuring that recommendations from CETRs are acted upon. It is not enough for reviews to generate reports and recommendations: there must be a clear and enforceable duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to act on them. Amendment 19 would strengthen this by replacing the current requirement to “have regard to” recommendations with a “duty” to carry them out; while Amendment 20 ensures that “a compelling reason” must justify any deviation from these recommendations.
These amendments reflect the frustration often experienced by patients and families when well-intentioned recommendations are not implemented. A stronger duty to implement recommendations would not only improve outcomes but restore trust in the system. Can the Minister outline how the Government intend to ensure that recommendations from CETRs are indeed implemented effectively?
Amendment 13 highlights the importance of addressing communication needs during the CETR meetings. It is highly welcome that the issue of communication and language has been addressed by so many noble Lords. Effective communication is essential for patient-centred care, ensuring that patients can meaningfully participate in that very care. Ensuring that individuals’ additional or alternative communication needs are met is not merely a courtesy, it is a necessity and a must-have. This group of amendments highlights the importance of a holistic, inclusive and accountable approach to care and treatment reviews. They seek to ensure that the needs of patients, including those related to housing, communication or support networks, are fully recognised and addressed. They also emphasise the need for timely reviews and actionable recommendations backed by clear accountability mechanisms.
His Majesty’s Official Opposition are broadly supportive of the aims of these amendments, and we look forward to the response from the Minister.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments and contributions today. It seems a while ago that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, originally spoke, but I put on record that I hear her frustration about having been here before. I certainly acknowledge that; and I am grateful for the contribution and time that noble Lords have given to this really important matter, so that perhaps, finally, we will not have to keep going where we have been before.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I entirely understand what the Minister has just said, although I do not agree with her, but the point she made about other persons is not contained in the clause that I was complaining about.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for making that point, and I will gladly review this in the light of it.
To return to the specific amendments, they would ensure that the patient, the patient’s nominated person, the independent mental health advocate and the parent, guardian or other person with parental responsibility receive in all cases a copy of the report following a care and treatment review meeting—or a care (education) and treatment review meeting for children and young people. The current drafting of the Bill is intended to make clear that a copy of the review report must be provided to those who have a legal duty to have regard to the review recommendations, so that any recommendations are implemented as appropriate.
We recognise that there may be individual circumstances that mean it is appropriate for the report to be provided to other people, including the patient themselves. For children and young people, this report is most likely to be shared with a parent, guardian or other person with parental responsibility, but it is important that the legislation does not inadvertently create a legal requirement that must be complied with, which would not be appropriate for every person.
A longer list of people with whom the report must be shared, in every case, may increase the chance of an individual withdrawing the consent for a review to be held if they do not wish for some or all the people to see the report. There may also be circumstances in which the report should reasonably be shared with other people in addition to those set out in the amendments—for example, a family member who has been part of the review process with the patient’s consent but is not the patient’s nominated person or someone with parental responsibility.
We have tabled a government amendment to make it clear that the arrangements may include provision authorising or requiring a copy of the report to be given to other persons, so that the patient may also ask that a copy be provided to others or decide to provide it to others. Statutory guidance will help assist the responsible commissioner when exercising its functions, including when considering other persons who are to receive the report. We wish to allow flexibility for this, so that individual circumstances can be taken into account based on the needs of the patient and their wishes, rather than by providing a prescriptive list of people to whom the report is to be sent in every circumstance.
Lord Scriven (LD)
For clarification, is the Minister therefore saying that the Government’s amendment will lead to some statutory instrument, or will it be just at the discretion of the Minister to determine a list and change it without any scrutiny?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am approaching this without going down the amendments’ route of having a fully prescriptive list, which might have unintended consequences.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I really need to understand the intent of the Minister’s Amendment 17
“authorising … a copy of the report to be given to other persons”.
How do the Government intend to draw up that list, to change it and to make it public, so that people know that they are appropriate persons and might be able to get the report?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I hope it helps to advise that the responsible commissioner will be key to all that. I emphasise the need to design around the patient and their needs. If there are further points that I need to look at on this, I would be very pleased to. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising it.
Amendments 10 and 17 are technical and minor government amendments that make it clear, for the avoidance of doubt, that the responsible commissioner may make arrangements for a care and treatment review report—or a care (education) and treatment review report for children and young people—to be provided to persons other than those listed in the clause. They could, for example, be those who have an interest in the recommendations because they are involved in the review process, such as an independent mental health advocate, a nominated person or a professional involved in the patient’s care and treatment. This would be subject to the patient’s consent. We believe that this is important to clarify, since the review process is likely to involve more people than those who are listed in the legislation, although this will vary according to the individual and their needs and circumstances.
In addition, the Bill makes specific provision to clarify which persons and bodies are to receive the report in every case to ensure that they can comply with their duty to have regard to the review recommendations. I hope that these government amendments find favour with noble Lords.
Amendments 11 and 18 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, who raised the point that around a third of people have no CETR or CTR. My response is perhaps to provide the assurance that that is exactly why we are putting them on a statutory basis. It seems that Amendments 11 and 18 are intended to reduce the maximum amount of time between CTRs for adults and CETRs for children and young people from 12 months to six months following a patient’s initial review meeting. These amendments would apply to children and adults.
I listened closely, as I have listened closely to all comments from noble Lords, but we believe that these amendments are somewhat unnecessary. Current drafting provides that review meetings take place at least once in a 12-month period, in line with the maximum timeframe within NHS England’s policy and guidance. This is in addition to the requirement that arrangements must be made for everyone to have a review promptly upon admission, within 14 days for children and 28 days for adults. Commissioners should use their judgment to determine the frequency of subsequent reviews, in line with the specific needs of the patient. Patients, their families and advocates can also request a review meeting at any point.
There will be statutory guidance to provide commissioners with further information on factors to consider when determining whether more frequent reviews should take place. I understand the noble Lord’s point, but I hope that helps. For example, it is current practice that children under 18 have a review meeting every three months, and this would be articulated in the guidance. We consider it preferable to set out this information in statutory guidance, which can provide detailed case studies. That would not be possible if we set it out in the same way as primary legislation, not least because guidance can be readily updated in line with emerging best practice, including on frequency and considering particular circumstances.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I have listened very carefully to the Minister about flexibility. Why is 12 months in the Bill? All I am trying to do is to change a statutory timeframe that the Government have put in the Bill to six months. That flexibility is not there because 12 months is in the Bill. I am trying to move that fixed point from 12 months to six months, regardless of what guidance says.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
Yes, I understand the intention, but I refer back, perhaps usefully, to the point I made earlier that review meetings would take place at least once in a 12-month period; it is not a maximum—I think I have got it the right way round. It will be at least once in a 12-month period; it is not that it can be only once in a 12-month period. That is, as I said, in line with the maximum timeframe in NHS England’s policy and guidance.
Amendment 13 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, relates to care and treatment reviews. The amendment seeks to ensure that a patient’s review makes recommendations about ensuring communication needs are met where there are additional or alternative communication needs. That is something we discussed very constructively in the first group and it was referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Effingham. We believe that current drafting already provides for that in the Bill.
As set out in the clause, those meetings are to review any needs of the patient for social care or medical treatment and can make recommendations about whether and how those needs can be met. This should include recommendations about the patient’s communication needs, which may be important in ensuring that their treatment is effective and to support their discharge from hospital. As set out in the clause, a number of named persons and bodies are to have regard to the recommendations of the review. That will give them the appropriate legal weight to ensure that they are considered and that there must be clear reasons if they are not taken forward.
The Bill also introduces statutory care and treatment plans for all patients detained under the Act, excluding those under short-term sections. We plan to set out the required contents of the statutory care and treatment plan in regulations. It is our intention that this includes information about communication needs to enable the treating clinician to consider the protected characteristics and individual needs of the patient, which speaks to the point I made in the first group to my noble friend Lady Whitaker, and to make reasonable adjustments. Regulations will also require that the report from a patient’s care (education) and treatment review is attached to the care and treatment plan so that recommendations are included as part of this.
Finally, I turn to Amendments 19 and 20, tabled and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Bennett. These amendments seek to ensure that there is a duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to carry out recommendations from a patient’s CTR, or CETR if the patient is a child or young person, unless there is a compelling reason provided for why a recommendation cannot be carried out. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, for their differing but nevertheless significant contributions.
These review recommendations should be given the appropriate legal weight to ensure that they are given serious consideration. We have decided to include these provisions in the Bill to put the existing NHS England policy on a statutory footing.
The duty to “have regard” is a well-established duty that clinicians, ICBs and other public bodies are used to applying and it already exists within the Act. The noble Earl, Lord Effingham, asked how the Government will ensure that these recommendations are implemented effectively. I hope that my comments will assist the noble Earl. Where effective care and treatment is the central aim, we would expect careful consideration of all recommendations. Where those bodies decide not to accept a relevant recommendation, we would expect them to have very good reasons for making that decision. It is an appropriate duty in this context because we do not intend to place an absolute duty on a body to follow recommendations in every case—that would be incompatible with understanding the individual needs and requirements of the person concerned.
The legislation must not impose unreasonable duties on relevant bodies that they cannot fulfil or where it would be inappropriate for them to do so; for example, if a recommendation was made that was outside of their purview. The Bill already requires that certain named persons or bodies carefully consider the recommendations and give them appropriate weight.
In view of all those comments, I thank noble Lords and ask that they do not press their amendments.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I thank everybody who has taken part in the debate on this group of amendments. We were, in essence, trying to get answers to the following questions. Who is responsible for drawing up the care plans and for reviewing the care (education) and treatment reviews? Who is responsible for ensuring that what is in those plans is compliant with the law? Who is responsible for making sure that it actually happens? Who is responsible for finding out whether it has not happened? Who carries the can if it has not happened?
At various points in the Minister’s answer, I was quite hopeful, then, towards the end, we went down the slope quite badly, because it turns out that, apparently, duties will not be put on people, and that is highly regrettable. The Minister does not need to explain to the Committee the difference between a statutory code of practice and a statutory instrument; the issue my noble friend was trying to get to is the extent to which Members of this House will see that these plans reflect what was intended in the law and what scope they will have to call it out if they do not.
I am pleased that it will be a statutory code of practice. That is one step up from nothing—it is not great, but it is better. I am also glad that the Minister said that care and treatment plans will be put in regulations. Will those regulations be done under the affirmative or the negative procedure? That is quite important. In light of all our discussions, we in this House should have the chance to examine that at considerable length and, if it is not right, to have a second go at it.
It is always salutary to sit and listen to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the subject on which she is quite rightly famous, not just in the House but outside it. I listened to her strong statement. She will know from other discussions that we have had on the wider subject of health that I have said many times, and I believe it to be true, that we have a health and social care system that is openly predicated on people’s families doing much of the work, and that is never more so than when it comes to discharge. She will have heard me bang on about this before, but I have a considerable degree of concern about what happens to people who do not have families or children. We have never done research on hospital discharge, but I suspect that, if people do not have a relative standing by the bed saying, “No. You are not discharging this person because they are not fit to go home”, they end up being discharged far too early, and I suspect they then go back into hospital as acute admissions a result of that.
That said, I understand what the noble and learned Baroness says about the involvement of parents. However, in 10% of cases, the parent is not the right person. We have heard that in evidence before, which she may recall, where young people who have been subject to mental health treatment have talked about problems within their families. Similarly, people under the Mental Capacity Act have sometimes been the subject of overbearing, overprotective parenting that they have found to be detrimental to them. I am not being anti-parent or asking that parents be excluded. Nobody knows better than the noble and learned Baroness that families are complex, and, as the Minister said, we must make sure that there is the scope to do the right thing for a child.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is absolutely right. Any amendment I might put forward in future would have to allow for that, as there must be some parents who would not be suitable.
Baroness Barker (LD)
It is getting late, and people wish to have their dinner because they been here a long time. I think we have had a partial response from the Minister. I believe that care and treatment plans and reviewing them are sufficiently important that some of us will want to go away to see whether, on issues that we may not have got technically right, we can come back, perhaps in discussion with the Minister, to satisfy ourselves.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
When I review all of the debates, particularly where there are areas where we need further discussion or information, I will be glad to pursue that. I give that assurance to the Committee.
Baroness Barker (LD)
I thank the Minister and welcome that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Tuesday 14th January 2025
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 47-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (14 Jan 2025)
Lord Cryer
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and my other amendments to Clauses 4 and 43 are minor and technical amendments to clarify that the references to after-care services include services arranged (as well as directly provided) by a public authority under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Cryer) (Lab)
My Lords, in moving government Amendment 7, in the name of my noble friend the Minister, I shall also speak to government Amendments 14, 87 to 94, 127, 161 and 162, also in the name of my noble friend the Minister.
The minor and technical government Amendments 7, 14 and 127 make changes to Clauses 4 and 43 to clarify that the references to aftercare services include services arranged, as well as directly provided, by a public authority under Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
I turn to government Amendments 87 to 94, which concern Clause 31, and Amendment 162 on the commencement of certain provisions within Clauses 29, 31 and 34. Amendments 87 to 94 divide Clause 31 into two clauses to allow for automatic referral rights to the mental health tribunal to be commenced separately for patients who will be subject to conditional discharge subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. This is an important safeguard for this new form of conditional discharge, given the level of restriction that these individuals will be under. Under Clause 31, patients conditionally discharged under deprivation of liberty conditions will be referred to the tribunal 12 months post discharge and every two years thereafter.
Amendment 162 amends Clause 53 to adjust commencement for certain provisions currently commenced by regulations to be commenced two months after Royal Assent, and vice versa. Automatic referral to the tribunal under Clause 31 and increased application rights under Clause 29(2) shall now commence at two months post Royal Assent for conditionally discharged patients subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. That is to coincide with the introduction of this new subset of conditional discharge at Clause 33 and ensures that the new measure is introduced with the full suite of carefully considered safeguards in place.
Amendment 162 also adjusts commencement for the change of detention criteria for transfers from places of detention to hospital under Sections 47 and 48 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to commence via regulations. This change in the detention threshold ensures that the detention criteria can be met without the need for a hospital bed to be identified, and is closely linked to the introduction of the statutory time limit at Clause 35. The ability to commence this reform simultaneously with the time limit at Clause 35 will allow for streamlined implementation planning around the new statutory notice process and accompanying guidance.
Finally, government Amendment 161 creates an equivalent power for Welsh Ministers to make consequential provision in areas of their devolved legislative competence. This is a limited power and allows Ministers to make regulations containing such provision as they consider necessary to deal with legislative consequences that arise as a result of the Bill. The power cannot be used to make substantive policy changes. This new clause would mirror the powers of the Secretary of State, as set out in Clause 51. This provision was requested by the Welsh Government in their legislative consent memorandum, in which they recommended that the Senedd grants consent to the Mental Health Bill. We believe that this is appropriate, and I am grateful to the Welsh Government for their close collaboration and support for this important piece of legislation.
I hope that noble Lords are able to support these technical and necessary amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord is thinking, “If only all groups went as swiftly as this one”. I thank him for bringing forward these government amendments. We understand that although they are largely technical in nature, they address some important points regarding the delivery of aftercare services, tribunal reviews and the broader application of this legislation.
We see the point of Amendments 7, 14, and 127 to clarify the references to aftercare services under Section 117 of the Mental Health Act, including services arranged by public authorities in addition to those directly provided. We understand that this reflects the practical realities of service delivery and may help to avoid ambiguity in how these obligations are interpreted. If we have heard any lesson throughout this debate, it is about how we avoid ambiguity when it comes to the treatment of patients.
We understand also that Amendments 87 to 94 focus on tribunal reviews for patients subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty, which we have discussed in other groups. The proposal to commence these provisions two months after Royal Assent is pragmatic and necessary to provide patients with timely access to justice. The amendments also introduce a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to refer certain cases to the tribunal within defined timelines. We agree that this will ensure that patients who are conditionally discharged but not recalled to the hospital are not left in a state of indefinite uncertainty. Once again, that was covered in the last group of amendments as somewhere where the patient could fall between the cracks, as it were. Timely tribunal reviews are essential for safeguarding patients’ rights and ensuring that any conditions imposed remain proportionate and necessary.
We understand also that Amendments 161 and 162 propose adjustments to the commencement of specific provisions, including granting Welsh Ministers powers to make consequential provisions within their devolved competence. Though these amendments are largely procedural, they underline the importance of clarity in implementing the reforms set out in the Bill. Of course, we understand that healthcare is a devolved matter. I remember having to deal with the devolved Administrations when I was a Health Minister, and we always did so collaboratively. Welsh Ministers should indeed have the same right to make consequential provisions, although if I have a question for the Minister, it is: what safeguards and oversight mechanisms will be in place to ensure equal application of the Bill to Wales, as in England? I am sure he will be aware that we have sometimes had questions in this place as to why the standard of health or social care in another part of the United Kingdom might be different, even understanding that it is due to devolution. Are there any safeguards to ensure that one part of the UK is not seen as having an inferior service to the rest of the UK? How would the Government address that?
With that, we very clearly understand that these are technical amendments and we will not oppose them.
Lord Cryer (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord and take his point about ensuring there are equal standards across the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. However, nothing is guaranteed. As he undoubtedly did when in government, we will endeavour to collaborate with Welsh colleagues—as well as others—to ensure that equal standards are applied across England and Wales. That includes regular contact with the Senedd and the Welsh Executive on a variety of matters, including health. That may be a slightly vague answer, but at the moment it is the best I can do.
I thank the noble Lord for his other comments. I have spoken about the need for these minor, technical and necessary amendments, and I hope noble Lords can support them.
Lord Kamall (Con)
This raises another issue, which I know has been raised in other areas of healthcare, of families who live across borders—if the parents live in one part of the United Kingdom and the children live in another, or if someone who has lived away from home moves back. I do not expect an answer now, as that would be unfair, but if the noble Lord could write to noble Lords on cross-border issues, where someone has commenced care in one area but then they or their parents have moved to another area, that would be satisfactory. We had a number of issues around this in healthcare, particularly mental health care, and it is important to resolve them.
Lord Cryer (Lab)
I am happy to do that. I remember having those sorts of issues when I was a Member of the other place. Probably a number of us have experienced them. I suppose that, at present, it is how it has always been: you have to try to communicate with the respective authorities and bring them together so that there is some sort of continuity.
Lord Cryer
“(The arrangements may also include provision authorising or requiring a copy of the report to be given to other persons.)”Member’s explanatory statement
New section 125A(3)(b) requires arrangements to include provision for reports to be given to the people listed in that provision. This amendment provides, for the avoidance of doubt, that arrangements may also include provision for reports to be given to others.
Lord Cryer
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 4, page 5, line 20.
Lord Cryer
“(The arrangements may also include provision authorising or requiring a copy of the report to be given to other persons.)”Member’s explanatory statement
New section 125B(3)(b) requires arrangements to include provision for reports to be given to the people listed in that provision. This amendment provides, for the avoidance of doubt, that arrangements may also include provision for reports to be given to others.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
“(ba) the person is under 18 years old and satisfies the conditions in (b)(i) and (b)(ii),”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment inserts a new subsection that extends the duty on integrated care boards to establish and maintain a register for those at risk of detention to all children and young people under the age of 18.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 27 and 32 in my name. My amendments all relate to children and young people, but this group also includes important amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Scriven, which I support, on the duties on commissioners, integrated care boards and local authorities regarding care provisions for people with a learning disability or autism. Also important are the amendments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins. I add my condolences to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. I am sure we are all thinking of her today.
By way of context, the Bill introduces a new duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to commission community services for those with a learning disability and autism. The Bill also places dynamic support registers on a statutory footing. These are welcome and much-needed duties, and the Bill presents a crucial opportunity to strengthen the support provided to those with learning disabilities and autism. However, I want to go further. I recognise that there is some piggybacking on my part, but I am passionate about the mental health support that is available to children and young people, so I believe that the duties to provide community services should be extended to include everyone aged under 18, to ensure that children and young people can have their needs met without them having to be admitted as in-patients. That is where is my Amendments 21, 27 and 32 come in—they are all interrelated.
Amendment 21 seeks to extend the duties placed on integrated care boards to maintain a register of those at risk of detention to all under-18s. Amendments 27 and 32 would extend the new commissioning duties on integrated care boards and local authorities to include under-18s. In essence, the duties are both to identify and to commission services in the community that meet the needs of all under-18s.
As I think we all know, the Bill has been introduced at a point when waiting times and thresholds for mental health support for children and young people across early intervention services, targeted support services, CAMHS, et cetera are worryingly high. Consequently, too many children and young people are left to reach crisis point. Evidence shows that the number of children referred to emergency mental health care in England has increased by more than 50% in three years. These amendments will not only help to achieve improved outcomes for children and young people but have wider benefits for the mental health systems through intervening at an earlier stage, providing improved care for children and young people in the most appropriate settings, and reducing costs. This is all in line with the Government’s key drive to move to a more community-based, preventive model of healthcare—and, frankly, that should apply to mental health as well as to physical health, and to children and young people as well as to adults.
We all know, as we have discussed so many times in this Chamber, that children’s mental health support has historically been woefully underfunded. There is a lack of clear accountability to ensure that effective community provision is in place. I therefore consider that adding all children and young people to the new commissioning duty placed on local authorities and ICBs in the Bill is crucial to ensuring that their needs can be met at an early stage, preventing crisis and later admission to mental health in-patient care. We should worry about the whole system and try to prevent people getting to in-patient care, as well as worrying about those who do. In short, my argument is that their needs should be met without the need to detain children and young people, wherever that is possible.
Research has demonstrated that children’s and young people’s experience of in-patient care is consistently poor, too often further harming their mental health. A survey conducted by Mind on children’s and young people’s experience of care in mental health hospitals found that 69% of the young people surveyed said that their experience as in-patients had not been positive. In my view, a shift to such community-based provision would not only reduce the number of children and young people requiring in-patient beds but would in turn reduce demand for in-patient care and the risks of children and young people being cared for in what can often be highly unsuitable environments. It would also ensure that those with the most complex needs who do need in-patient care receive high-quality care in a setting that is right for them.
In case people are sceptical as to whether this sort of care can be provided in the community, I am aware of case studies of types of support in the community, such as hubs and the like, that can be used to manage high levels of risk. Where that care is provided in the community, in a relaxed, warm and calm environment, it can often be an alternative to young people having to visit A&E, where they may not get specialist mental health support and waiting times can be so long. I beg to move.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, this group includes Amendment 22, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, to which I have added my name—to which I will not speak because I think it will be fully discussed—and two amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. She is a dear colleague and friend of many years, and this is my first opportunity in the debate to express my personal sympathy for her loss this week.
I will speak to Amendment 28 in this group, which is in my name. In addition to local authorities’ market-shaping function—I have to say I find the choice of words there a little difficult; I had to read it a few times just to make quite clear that I know what that is—the Bill includes reference to the “commissioning functions” of local authorities when having regard to information from risk registers and ensuring that the needs of people with a learning disability and autistic people are met.
Under the Bill, new Section 125G makes it clear that integrated care boards’ commissioning functions are related only to health services. New Section 125E(3) makes clear that
“‘market function’, in relation to a local authority, means its function”
to
“promoting diversity and quality in provision of services”
under the Care Act 2014. This amendment would add local authority commissioning explicitly, by which is meant the local authority’s commissioning duties in relation to providing care and support under the Care Act 2014. The proposed duty in relation to local authority market shaping does not adequately cover local authority commissioning. The issue of poor commissioning in relation to this group has been frequently cited in reports. This is an opportunity to redress that and to be clear about their function.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30 and 31 in my name in this group. I support Amendment 28, which was just spoken to very ably by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and Amendments 36 and 37, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. I want to put on record my condolences to her at what must be a very sad and difficult time.
Quite a number of amendments that I have put down in this group, particularly Amendment 22, are about prevention. It is about getting upstream and trying to use the dynamic support registers—the risk registers—in a better way, and, by so doing, having the correct information that is available to a place, rather than just to an organisation, such as the NHS or the ICB, within that place.
Amendment 22 would ensure that local authorities have an active role in assisting ICBs in identifying people for inclusion in the risk registers. NHS England’s policy and guidance on dynamic support registers states:
“Early identification of people at risk of admission to a mental health hospital and their access to person-centred planning and support are essential for the prevention of avoidable admissions”.
Many people with risk factors will first come into contact with a local authority, particularly people with learning disabilities and autism. It is important that the local authority has a clear responsibility to assist ICBs in identifying people for inclusion on the register, to ensure that people get the right support at the right time. I hope that the Minister will take this amendment in the spirit that it is given. This is an important issue which is not strong enough in the Bill and which really needs to be taken account of.
There have been difficulties for some people getting enrolled on the DSR, and this is particularly true for autistic people without a learning disability. Additionally, NHS England data shows that 52% of autistic people and people with a learning disability detained in a mental health hospital are not on a risk register prior to admission. Therefore, there is a gap, and the Bill gives us a chance to help plug it. Hopefully, placing this duty on local authorities will facilitate greater uptake and enrolment on the register for all, therefore helping to reduce admissions, improving support in the community and being a good preventive measure.
Coupled with this, Amendments 36 and 37 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would help with that prevention role by making sure that proper provision was available. Taken together, Amendments 22, 36 and 37 would be a really good group of steps forward to help with preventive measures to make sure that all people who can be identified who come into contact with a local authority but are not known to the ICB go on the register, and that provision is made.
Amendments 24 and 29 would change the current language in the Bill. After listening to debate on previous amendments, I will not labour the point because I have a good idea what the Minister might say, but again I think the provision needs to be strengthened so that ICBs and local authorities have a duty to consider the risk register when exercising commissioning and marketing functions.
In Amendments 25 and 30 there is the same approach by strengthening the words in the Bill to ensure that ICBs and local authorities have a duty to ensure that the needs of autistic people and people with a learning disability are met in the community wherever possible. The current language in the Bill states only that ICBs and local authorities must “seek to ensure” that the needs of autistic people and people with a learning disability are met. This wording is vague and does not compel a strong enough duty to meet the needs of people in the community. Again, the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would strengthen my amendments even further.
These amendments are important. I hope that the Minister has listened very carefully, will make efforts to implement some of these steps and reports back on Report.
Lord Crisp (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to my noble friend Lady Hollins’s Amendments 36 and 37. I add myself to the comments by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, about the remarkable commitment that my noble friend is showing at this awful time and express my personal condolences. What I am going to say is based on comments that she has passed to me. I should perhaps say at the beginning that I too am an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists—“(unqualified)”, as others have made that disclaimer.
The purpose of these amendments is very clear. Amendment 36 states that ICBs
“must ensure the availability of integrated comprehensive, accessible, and responsive community services for autistic people and people with learning disabilities … to reduce hospital admissions … and … reliance on restrictive interventions”.
As the previous two noble Lords said, it is very much about prevention and creating appropriate services.
I note that the Explanatory Notes to the Bill say that Clause 4
“is designed to help ensure that ICBs can monitor individuals at risk of detention and put in place the necessary preventative measures to help keep people out of hospitals”.
Putting it simply, this amendment takes that rather weak wording in the explanation and toughens it up. The issue here is not about good intentions and ensuring that it is possible for something to happen. I am sure that all noble Lords share the intention and the hope that these things will be in place, but this is about making sure that something happens. It is about implementation and seeing that a change happens.
This is vital because it is clear that there are major problems in service coverage right now. For example, only a quarter of integrated care systems are meeting their target of having only 30 people per million admitted. Of course, that number would ideally be much lower than it is, but only a quarter of these systems are even meeting that. Amendment 36 spells out what these services should include. I will not read them out in detail but noble Lords can see that they cover all the relevant areas that one would expect: evidence-based treatments, crisis prevention and intervention services, non-restrictive walk-in services, and the provision of “suitable housing”.
I will comment on two of those items in a moment. All of them are important but what I think the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, had in mind was not just discussing these items but seeing her amendment as an opportunity to discuss which services are the right ones—the ones that should be there—and which areas ICBs and local authorities should address. The key point at this stage is not so much about the detail but the need for some clear legislative requirements on what services must be provided. Good intentions are simply not good enough; implementation is what is needed.
I will mention two of those items that relate to points made earlier by other noble Lords in our debates on this group and others. One is the reference to “non-drug-based interventions” and “social prescribing”; their importance in community services applies in all kinds of ways. The second is the point about housing, which, as has been discussed, is vital. Ten years ago, I did a review for the Royal College of Psychiatrists on discharges from acute adult hospitals. A third of the people in those hospitals were there because they did not have adequate accommodation anywhere else. That third included people who had nowhere to be discharged to, in terms of adequate housing. It is a really serious issue. I make those points because both of these issues go beyond this amendment: in some ways, they are not about healthcare as much as they are about enabling people to have a decent life and creating the conditions for people to be healthy and live in the best way possible.
Amendment 37 is about issuing guidance on standards and monitoring and reviewing progress. Again, without that, we cannot be sure that this legislation will make a difference to the people who matter.
I will make three final points. I recognise that there are perverse issues of finance here because, of course, the NHS pays when people are in hospital and the local authority pays for the services in the community. Of course, that reminds us all of the need to get the social care policy right and the importance, wherever the boundaries fall between public bodies, of using public money wisely across organisations.
In that context, I stress that what the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has set out in this amendment is not an unachievable wish list. Even in today’s circumstances, some people are making real progress. Mencap pointed me towards the Black Country’s emergency response team, which noble Lords may know about and which meets many of these criteria for services. In 2022-23, it supported 51 people who were presumably being paid for by the local authority and who might otherwise have been admitted for the equivalent cost of a single assessment and treatment bed, presumably paid for by the NHS. Preventive and good-quality services so often make good financial sense, as well as being better for the people concerned. I do not know whether the Minister is familiar with that project but I would certainly encourage her to have a look at it if she has not already done so.
The second point I want to make is that, although I have not actually checked the reference, I believe that the Minister said something at Second Reading about delaying the implementation of some parts of this Bill until the services are in place. I would be grateful if she could say what was meant by that, but also why it is necessary when people can make progress quite quickly.
The Black Country example—and I suspect that there are others—shows that people are making progress and that, in many ways, it is better to have a stretching target that people are moving towards rather than saying, “If you don’t have the services, we won’t implement the legislation”. We need to keep moving forward and show faith both in what this Bill is designed to achieve and in the Government’s agenda on prevention and on moving towards the community. No doubt the digital transformation is also extremely relevant here.
The Earl of Effingham (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, my noble friend Lady Browning, the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins—who sadly is not in her place today—for their amendments in this group.
Given that it is now widely accepted that we should be moving towards a system of health and care focused on prevention, these all appear to be sensible amendments. They seek to understand how integrated care boards and local authorities are identifying those with autism or learning disabilities, the risk of them being detained and, if appropriate, the risk to the community, as well as ensuring that those with autism and learning disabilities receive the appropriate level of care.
Amendment 28, in the name of my noble friend Lady Browning, specifies that local authorities must seek to ensure the needs of people with autism and learning disabilities can be met without detention when they are exercising not only their market function but their commissioning functions. This acknowledges the roles that local authorities play in commissioning health and social care. Local authorities commission publicly funded social and healthcare services, many of which interact with mental health service provision, such as authorised mental health professionals and addiction services. By explicitly mentioning the commissioning functions of local authorities and not just the market functions which arise out of the Care Act 2014, this amendment gives the Bill greater clarity.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has tabled Amendments 36 and 37 in this group, which relate to the provision of community services for autistic people. These amendments are in a similar vein to Amendment 139 in the name of my noble friend Lord Kamall, which will be discussed in the next group and which seeks to ensure a greater availability of community services. Amendments 36 and 37 expand the duties on integrated care boards and local authorities to provide better and more responsive care to those on dynamic support registers.
Of particular interest is subsection (3)(a) of the new Section 125I proposed in Amendment 37. That new provision states that integrated care boards must
“establish digital systems to … assess, monitor, and address sources of inequality”
arising out of the current provision of mental health care. As my noble friend Lord Kamall has been keen to stress, digitalisation in health and social care is the way forward for improving productivity and ensuring the best possible care outcomes.
I know the Minister believes in the value of the expanded use of technology and digital systems, and it would be welcome if she could give some commitment here. When we hear from her, we would be interested in whether there are any legal reasons for not being able to accept what these amendments seek to do, such as around issues of privacy, or whether the barriers are financial. We very much look forward to the response of the Minister.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lords present for their contributions this evening. Perhaps I can make a general point to the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Earl, Lord Effingham, about the main pillars of change which we look forward to in the 10 year-plan. The noble Earl has just referred to one of them, which is the move from analogue to digital. In that context—the noble Baroness raised a point about parity between mental health and physical health—the moves from sickness to prevention, from hospital to community and from analogue to digital apply at least as much to mental health as they do to physical health. That is our way forward. I am looking forward to the 10 year-plan to really give structure to that.
Let me turn to Amendment 21, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. This amendment seeks to ensure that the register under new Section 125D includes autistic children and children with a learning disability who have risk factors for detention, so that they can be supported in the community. We absolutely agree with the intention behind the amendment, although I have to say that it is regarded as unnecessary because the current drafting does not limit the duty to adults; it includes anyone who meets the other criteria, including children, which I know the noble Baroness is rightly looking for. The register is designed to provide health and care bodies with additional information about the needs of those with a learning disability and autistic people who have risk factors for detention under Part II of the Act. That is to ensure there is a particular focus on their needs, so that they can be better supported in the community.
The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, made the observation, which I understand, about too many children being left to reach crisis point and the increase in the number of children in need of mental health services, particularly over the last three years. I very much recognise this concern. We have seen an increase in referrals and access across children’s and young people’s mental health services, including crisis services. This is due to an expansion of the services to meet need but also to an increase in prevalence and intensity. It might be helpful if I indicate that NHS England is in the process of developing proposals for a new model of specialised children’s and young persons’ mental health services, supported by a new service specification and quality standards. This new approach would support delivery of specialised services in the community, as well as in appropriate in-patient settings close to the child’s or young person’s family and home. That is a matter that has been raised many times in this Chamber and one that I am very sympathetic to.
Amendment 22 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning. If taken forward, this amendment would require each local authority to assist the integrated care board in its duties in respect of support registers for people with a learning disability and autistic people. We certainly agree with the intent of this, and I am pleased to be able to provide reassurance that the clause already provides the Secretary of State with the general power to make further provision about the register in regulations. We expect this to include detail on how relevant information is to be obtained and from whom. This is to include the role of local authorities, alongside other relevant health and care bodies, in providing further relevant information.
We believe that it is most appropriate to include this detail in regulations rather than in primary legislation, since the way in which information is obtained, what information is obtained and who might be involved may change with emerging best practice. As noble Lords will realise, that point has been made in respect of a number of these amendments. Returning this to Parliament at every instance would be disproportionate.
However, it is important that the process actively involves health and care system partners. We are clear that the integrated care board must retain overall responsibility for the register. Providing a list of named bodies that have a role in providing information in the legislation may create an unintended diffusion of responsibility, which could negate the benefits of putting these registers on a statutory footing.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister in mid-flow. She has just explained why it would be wrong to put the process for collecting the data in the Bill, with which I completely agree, but my amendment does not seek to do that. It seeks to make it a legislative requirement of local authorities to be part of the process.
The reason I have tabled the amendment—and I am sure it is the same for the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, in putting her name to it—is that NHS England’s figures say that a lot of people who are admitted to hospital, 52%, are not on the register, but many will have come into contact with the local authority. That is why it is important for the Bill to make local authorities part of the process of identifying who should be on the register. That would subsequently allow the Government to provide statutory guidance about the collection of the data, but it is important that there is a statutory duty in the Bill to do that.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for adding to the points that he made in response to my comments and the assurances that I have just given, and I am happy to review them. I understand the intent.
Amendments 24 and 29, tabled also by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, seek to impose a duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to consider information in the register, or obtained by virtue of this clause, when exercising certain existing functions. I strongly agree with the principles behind these amendments, although it is considered that the current drafting in the clause, which requires both integrated care boards and local authorities to “have regard to” the relevant information, already achieves the intended effect. The common duty to have regard is one that both integrated care boards and local authorities are familiar with and used to applying. In this context, we expect this duty to result in careful consideration being given to the information.
Departing from the wording of a well-established duty could create ambiguity, leaving it to the interpretation of individual integrated care boards and local authorities. As I can see the noble Lord agrees, that would be a very undesirable outcome. It may inadvertently create a weaker duty than that set out in the Bill or lead to variation in interpretation and response to the duties.
If Amendments 25, 26, 30 and 31, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, were taken forward, they would put a duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to ensure that the needs of people with a learning disability and those who are autistic could be met without detaining them, unless there was a compelling reason why that was not possible. A point was raised, including by the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, about difficulties in enrolment on dynamic support registers and the need to address that in the Bill. DSRs are part of existing NHS England policy and we have heard that they can be effective in preventing hospital admissions. That is why we propose putting these important registers on a statutory footing and making them a requirement.
The Bill already places duties on integrated care boards and local authorities to seek to ensure that the needs of those with a learning disability and of autistic people can be met without detaining them under Part II. This is a legal requirement to ensure that particular attention is paid to the needs of people with a learning disability and of autistic people, and that services should be commissioned accordingly.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. I also thank other noble Lords who have participated in this debate.
For me, the nub of this grouping has been the whole issue of prevention—I think “getting upstream” was the phrase my noble friend Lord Scriven used—and having in place within the community better and more responsive services, with the aim of reducing admissions to in-patient care but, at the same time, improving the in-patient care that is available, because the only people there are those for whom nothing else will work. It is very welcome that the Bill puts the dynamic support register on a statutory footing. On the two amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, beefing that up still further, I think I heard a slightly encouraging response from the Minister. I will look carefully at Hansard tomorrow, as I am sure will the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, to see what was said.
I can see that while some people may think that prevention is very important, they would ask what it has to do with this Bill. I do not see it like that. You have to take a system-wide approach. To get the whole mental health service working, even when you are looking at what I call the hard end—the crisis end—you have to look at what is happening at the preventive end and try to reduce the number of people who might need to be admitted. That would send an important message that there are clear legislative requirements for what services should be available within the community. This Bill, frankly, is the obvious place to do it—hence the amendments around children and young people that I raised.
I was pleased to hear the Minister say that the transformation and the 10-year plan will apply at least as much to mental health as to physical health. That is very encouraging and I am glad that we have got it on record. I was not altogether surprised that the Minister thought that my amendments were unnecessary. I do not agree. I was not just talking about children and young people with learning disabilities and autism. They are obviously a very important group, but my rationale for trying to broaden it out to all children and young people was, in essence, to make sure that only those with the most complex needs would receive that higher-quality care in an in-patient setting—everyone would benefit from that approach. The Minister talked about a new approach to children’s and young people’s services, and I look forward to hearing more details. I do not know whether the Minister can tell us when we might expect to see that.
Finally, my view is that the 1983 Act was never really designed with children and young people in mind; I think everyone agrees with that. This Bill is an opportunity for us to put children and young people centre stage—hence my amendment. This is such an important topic that I think we shall be returning to it on Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Monday 20th January 2025
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 47-II(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (17 Jan 2025)
Earl Howe
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to clarify the Government’s intended definition of “specified risk factors for detention” under Part 2 of the 1983 Act.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 23 I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group, Amendments 139 and 141. These amendments, although they may not look it, are all of a piece, because they bear upon the fulcrum for any decision to detain a patient under the Mental Health Act, which is the concept of “serious harm” and what we mean by it. My noble friend Lord Kamall’s Amendment 141 offers such a definition, but we have tabled the amendment more as an Aunt Sally than anything else, because what matters is how we want the phrase to be interpreted in real-life situations by clinicians and others on the ground.
The concept of serious harm as a determining factor for detention is introduced by Clause 5. Clause 5(2)(b) replaces Section 2(2)(b) of the Act, which refers instead to detention in the interests of a person’s own health or safety, or with a view to the protection of other persons. The new wording is undoubtedly tighter than the old wording and, on that account, it is to be welcomed. However, it is not, as far as I can see, fleshed out by any definition. That could, of course, be deliberate, because, in the end, a decision to detain someone will always be a matter of clinical judgment. Such judgments, though, ought surely to rest on established understandings. Serious harm, as applied to the health or safety of the patient themselves, may be a relatively straightforward clinical judgment to make in many, if not most, circumstances. But what about serious harm as applied to the health or safety of another individual? Do we mean just physical harm or are we talking also about psychological harm? If so, of what kind and to what degree? Detaining someone on the grounds that serious psychological harm may be caused to another person raises all sorts of issues that fall outside a standard clinical judgment about the health and/or safety of a prospective in-patient.
The threshold of serious harm being caused, or at risk of being caused, is of huge significance for different types of patients. One of the really good things that this Bill seeks to do is to keep individuals with autism or a learning disability out of a mental health unit, unless they present with other behavioural symptoms that are treatable. That is because we recognise that not only is there no point in detaining such individuals when they display no treatable symptoms, it is also positively harmful to them to do so. In the same way, I think it is accepted that to detain a child or a young person forcibly in a mental health unit is a very big decision indeed, because what is meant to constitute a therapeutic environment is all too often no such thing. On the contrary, a mental health ward or even an A&E department can often seem both alien and frightening to a young patient, in a way that can exacerbate their acute disturbance of mind.
Nobody wants to see people detained forcibly in a mental health unit unless it is essential and right, but so often the choice is a binary one: to detain in hospital or not to detain in hospital. How much better it would be if, in particularly sensitive cases, there were another option, a place of safety and comfort close by in the community.
That is why I tabled Amendment 139. We know that community-based services can be a significantly positive alternative to treatment in mental health hospitals and secure units. We need to look at affordable ways of creating more, especially for those with autism and learning disabilities and for children where the alternative may indeed be forcible detention under the Mental Health Act.
The King’s Fund reported in July 2024 that
“community health services have about 200,000 patient contacts”
every day. Anxious Minds argues that community-based mental health services provide three key benefits:
“Geographical convenience of mental health facilities”,
the relative affordability of such services and, importantly, culturally sensitive approaches to care
“that appeal to diverse populations”.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has mentioned, we will be talking about risk factors in the next group but one, and I will not go into the statistics and predictions at this point.
As has been pointed out, Clause 4 implies that specific risk factors for detention under Part II are readily identifiable and assessed, but as we will see, predicting episodes of violent behaviour or self-harm is peculiarly difficult to do. The clause suggests that it is not clinicians who will be doing these risk assessments but that the Secretary of State will somehow have some expertise from ICBs in how to do this. Apart from the rather obvious wisdom that the best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour, I am not sure how these regulations can be drawn up.
I am anxious about the common prejudices around, for example, black patients of African Caribbean descent living in London, who have a higher risk of being detained under Part II than white patients, or Asians of an Indian subcontinent background. Who will draw up this list to say which of these items is going to lead to the risk of detention under Part II?
There have always been opportunities for the Secretary of State to intervene in the detention of patients under Part III of the Act, and some Secretaries of State have been more risk averse than others. I suspect that under this clause we will find some Secretaries of State taking a more hard-line view about who should and should not be detained. That gives cause for enormous anxiety, so I would like to know how the Government intend to devise these regulations to document specific risk factors.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, this is an important set of amendments, and, as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, they are central to decisions about whether to detain people under the Act.
I agree that the definition of “serious harm” is important, and it would be helpful to hear from the Minister what the Government are thinking there, how it will be applied, and how any thresholds will be established.
I endorse what the noble Earl had to say about children and young people, what a huge decision it is to detain someone under 18 in hospital against their will, and how hard we need to work to avoid that, whenever that is safe for themselves and other people.
Finally, and very much linked to that, I strongly support Amendment 139 on the availability of community-based services, which we have already talked about and which we will turn to in subsequent groupings. It is a very good amendment, particularly the provision which states:
“The Secretary of State must publish a report to assess whether there should be more community-based services for community patients in order to prevent”—
I see this as a key preventive measure—
“detention under the Mental Health Act 1983”.
My one point is that the amendment talks about publishing that within two years of the day on which this Act is passed. I personally think that in an ideal world we might see a report a bit earlier than that. However, as I say, Amendment 139 certainly has my full support.
Baroness Parminter (LD)
I am sorry that I did not jump up in time before my Front Bench spoke.
I just wanted to add my voice to support Amendment 139 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the report on community-based services. It is really timely and we need it. The case was made very carefully and well by others, so I will not expand much other than to say that an extensive report was done in November by the leading charity, Beat, which looked at the case for more intensive community care and daycare for people with eating disorders in order to avoid—the very point that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, made—ending up getting to such a point of severity that they need to go into mental health facilities and be detained, which indeed happened to my daughter, as I made clear at Second Reading.
The case has been well made that a report should be made. I agree with my noble friend Lady Tyler that two years seems quite a long time off, particularly as recent work has been done, particularly in the field of eating disorders, to show that you can both reduce the number of patients and reduce the cost if you make the investment up front in community services.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
My Lords, as an ex-community mental health nurse, I wish in particular to support Amendment 139. I am convinced that we need appropriate ratios of such staff to deliver preventive services in the community as well as ongoing support. We need to remember that the NHS rests in the future on preventing rather than treating, and this is an important amendment that acknowledges that.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
My Lords, I want to add to what the noble Baroness just said. Amendment 139 goes to the heart of the Bill in terms of changing the culture and the way that we treat people. The Bill will become a piece of law that is practical only if we can honestly put hand on heart and say that we will substantially increase community-based services. Without that, it will not deliver that which we all believe will be the minimum to improve people’s lives.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, on the amendment outlining the definition of “serious harm”, two situations were raised with us on the Joint Committee. One was that the change in the criteria is the main tool that will help with racial inequalities; I would be grateful if the Minister could outline how she envisages that will work in practice. The second point was about the period during which such serious harm has to be exhibited. We heard numerous times about people with psychosis, many of whom—I think it was over 70%—do not realise that they are getting ill when they are presenting. How poorly do they have to get? Sometimes the intervention might need to be sooner than in the definition we understood of “serious harm”, which was slightly different from that which the independent review had, which I think was of “significant harm”. If the Minister could address those two points, that would be very helpful.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this important debate in which a number of key issues have been raised.
Amendment 23, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, relates to new Section 125D, regarding registers of people with a learning disability and autistic people who are at risk of detention. The amendment would remove new Section 125D(5), which defines
“specified risk factors for detention”.
I heard the noble Earl, Lord Howe, refer to this as an Aunt Sally amendment—I politely have “a probing amendment” here but I hope that we are in the same area—that is intended to clarify the definition of
“specified risk factors for detention under Part 2 of this Act”.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate on this group of amendments. As I trust was clear from my opening speech, all three are intended as probing amendments designed to tease out some key definitions. It was actually Amendment 141, regarding the definition, that I described as an Aunt Sally.
I was particularly grateful for noble Lords’ support for Amendment 139 and for the Minister’s helpful comments. There is very little doubt that, as I think is generally accepted, community services delivered in partnership by local charities and civil society both reduce the cost to the state and carry the benefits I articulated earlier. Without implying any criticism of the NHS, those sorts of organisations will of course know their own communities better than an NHS hospital will.
I am grateful to the Minister for what she was able to say about the definition of “serious harm”. The Explanatory Notes state that a test of serious harm has been introduced
“to provide greater clarity as to the level of risk of harm that a person must present in order to be detained”.
They then state that further guidance on what constitutes serious harm will be set out in the code of practice. So far, so good, and it is welcome that that will be clarified in the code of practice, but one of the issues here is that that will come later. Serious harm is included as one of the two key tests for detention in Clause 5, so what is meant by serious harm will impact on all future decisions made within the scope of the legislation. Therefore, we need maximum clarity from the Government as we debate the Bill.
As regards the “specified risk factors”, I am again grateful to the Minister. I slightly worry that a person’s past history of admission to hospital could constitute a specific a priori risk factor for detention. There is a danger that that may turn into a directly determining factor for detention, rather than a factor to be taken into account in assessing an individual set of circumstances.
As regards drug and alcohol misuse, we need to be careful not to encourage a circumvention of the Mental Health Act, which explicitly excludes drug and alcohol addiction as grounds for detention.
I am once again grateful for the support that noble Lords were able to give to my amendments. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 23.
Lord Scriven
“125FA Report: sufficient commissioning services for people with autism or learning disabilities(1) Within four months of the day on which the Mental Health Act 2025 is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan to allocate sufficient resources for commissioning services regarding the treatment and detention of autistic people and people with learning disabilities to ensure operability of provisions in this Act.(2) The plan must include—(a) revised assumptions of the number of autistic people and people with learning disabilities who may require detention under this Act;(b) the actions that the Secretary of State will take to ensure community services are available to meet demand after the 28-day detention period;(c) plans for data collection to support commissioning sufficient services;(d) plans to allocate appropriate resource to ensure operability of services, including, but not limited to, financial resource;(e) plans to ensure that responsible bodies and individuals receive the necessary training to carry out support, diagnostic, and treatment plans.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to present a plan within four months to ensure sufficient services, resources, data, and training are in place to support autistic people and those with learning disabilities under the Act.
Lord Scriven (LD)
This group of amendments has to do with learning disabilities and autism, and the implementation of the Government’s recommendations, particularly on the change in detention criteria. My Amendment 33 is probing; I shall come to its details shortly. The Committee needs to look into this subject, because many times before in government policy we have seen a good aim and good intentions of moving care into the community, but all too often the facilities have not been there, and people have ended up in crisis.
I tabled Amendment 33 to probe the Government’s staged approach to ensure that community facilities are in place before the change in detention happens, and to understand their timing. On page 72 of the impact assessment, the suggestion is that the change will not happen until the community facilities are in place. That is good, but that could be five, 10 or 15 years away, so the Committee needs to understand the Government’s approach to timing.
Amendment 34, tabled by my noble friend Lady Barker, and the amendment tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, cover mandatory training for medical staff and others associated with looking after people with learning disabilities and autism, to detect the signs, so that people are not missed and put into detention.
My Amendment 33 would create an obligation for the Government to lay a costed plan for sufficient services before Parliament within four months of the passage of the Bill. The four-month period is important, because we really need to understand the Government’s intentions on timing. The change in detention criteria for autistic people and people with learning disabilities is a vital change in the Bill, to ensure that people are not inappropriately detained but are supported in the community instead.
As I have said, success depends on there being sufficient services in each area across the country to meet the needs of autistic people and people with learning disabilities. Based on the impact assessment, we know that the Government do not plan to enact those, so it is important that when the Minister replies, she lets the Committee know exactly what the timing is and what the Government’s assumed plans are.
In the equality impact assessment, there are dates for both funding and implementation, which seem to be at the same time. As a former NHS manager, I can say that people cannot start a service involving such a change and receive the funding in the same year. There has to be upfront funding to enable people to plan the services over time. Otherwise, the services are not there, and staff run round trying to get services when people are in distress. It is important to understand that.
Additionally, as the NHS long-term plan target to reduce the number of detentions of autistic people and people with learning disabilities has been missed, there are no active targets to get people out of hospitals. My amendment tries to put in targets to hold the Government and the services to account on ensuring that people are not inappropriately detained.
It is important to have a comprehensive action plan, which is what my amendment seeks to do, and to find out exactly how the Government intend to build and fund those community services moving forward. Additionally, this must include new targets to reduce the number of detentions of autistic people and people with learning disabilities. The timelines for building this support will also be crucial if the Government are to meet the expected 2026-27 commencement date for the new detention criteria for autistic people and people with learning disabilities.
I hope that the Minister will fully brief the Committee so we can make an informed decision about not just the thinking of the Government but the detailed implementation around community services with the change of criteria. I look forward to hearing noble Lords speak to their amendments on the provision of training and the appropriateness of medical practitioners’ expert knowledge of learning disabilities and autism. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 34. As I do so, I extend my condolences to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. We miss her very much today. She was extremely helpful to me only a few days ago when we were discussing the subject of this amendment, so I hope I do her a lot of justice with this.
We have heard time and time again that people with learning disabilities and autism find themselves on the wrong end of diagnoses made by practitioners with the best of intent, quite often when people are at points of severe distress, that are inappropriate because the people making them have not perhaps had the degree of experience and knowledge of working with people with learning disabilities and autism as they would otherwise have done.
We started to discuss last week that, while there are mental disorders for which detention in the sorts of facilities that we fund in acute hospitals in the NHS is right and appropriate, there are also some people for whom detention in those circumstances is absolutely not; it is an aggravating factor. Therefore, in my amendment I am seeking to address that issue: not just the competence of the people making decisions about detention and treatment but also the confidence with which they, as professionals, can approach the jobs that they are increasingly being required to do. Knowledge and understanding of learning disability and autism is expanding all the time. We now have a greater number of adults than ever before who, at stages in later life, are being diagnosed as being autistic, and I am quite sure that quite a number of those people have been subject to misdiagnosis.
The particular thing that I want to focus on is training for people who are responsible for detention and high levels of treatment. Noble Lords will be aware of the tragic case of Oliver McGowan, a young man with learning disabilities who was inappropriately treated and died. There has been an amazing campaign by his mother to ensure that that does not happen to other people by making sure that anybody who is involved in the provision of mental health services has undergone appropriate training and understands learning disabilities and autism.
My understanding from Oliver’s mother is that there are three tiers of training. Tier 1 is a level of training which is required for all people who work generally with people with learning disabilities and autism. They need to have this general level of awareness. Tier 2 is for health and social care staff and others with responsibility for providing care and support for a person or people with learning disabilities or autistic people but who would seek support from others in a complex management and decision-making process. They would be part of a team referring up to others. Tier 3 is specialist training for professionals who have a high degree of autonomy and are able to provide care in very complex situations, which might include people with learning disabilities and autism.
The training appears to be sequential. You have to have completed tier 1 training in order to go on to tier 2 and then tier 3. Tier 1 is an e-training module which takes about half a day. As far as I understand it, about 1.5 million people have done that. That is a good thing: we are getting to a greater basic understanding of learning disability and autism by many people across the NHS going about doing their jobs. Tier 2 is a one-day intensive training programme, and that has not gone so well. There have been problems with its implementation, and it is not clear how many people have undergone that training. There are also some quite considerable questions about the quality and scope of that training.
Tier 3 is not part of the Oliver McGowan programme, although it is the most relevant to this Bill. As of December 2024, the Department of Health website makes absolutely no mention of tier 3 training at all. Can the Minister tell us where the development of that training is up to, and who is responsible for ensuring that the content of it is suitable? Is it sufficiently developed for people who are having to make very difficult decisions, particularly around detention of people who are quite often in a state of disturbance at the point at which that decision is taken? If we do not follow up on this tier 3 training, then we are going to carry on in the situation where we are now, where we know that people are being wrongly diagnosed by people who, perhaps, should not be expected entirely to understand them because their professional training up to this point has largely not included such people.
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and I bow to her superior knowledge, very much made the case to us last week that we are talking about different types of mental disorders and very different specialisms across the mental health services. I am therefore asking that anybody who is in a position of making the decision to detain—and let us remember that people are making decisions to detain not just under the mental health legislation but also, at times, under the mental capacity legislation—should be appropriately trained. That is why I put down my amendment which, I admit, is not perfect, but I hope that the Minister might take some of my point and my intent and that we might take this forward together.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 42A in this group, which follows on from the two previous amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, particularly the details that the noble Baroness has gone into about the need for training and expertise for people who are dealing across the piece with those with autism and learning disability and, importantly, when those clinicians take the decision to admit somebody. As we know, one of the problems that is facing us and why it is so important that these issues have come forward in this particular Bill is because there have been so many inappropriate admissions where people have been detained for so long that it has become a scandal.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. If this Bill is a success, we shall, I hope, see fewer people with autism and learning difficulties detained under the Mental Health Act. However, the noble Lord’s amendment goes to the heart of the problem of resources. The current system is broken. It is a market system, which ends up with a lot of people finding themselves detained in facilities far from home, and getting out of that system can be very difficult.
The collection of data will be important: first, to find out how many people are being detained. Having spent 23 years in the other place and having been a passionate advocate for mental health, I always found that data is one thing that is never really kept. It is kept between the Department of Health and various other healthcare providers. Getting that visibility for the numbers we are talking about will be very important.
We need to be honest that, in the entire mental health debate, people with autism and learning disabilities have been overlooked. To get this right, having proper community-based facilities will be very important, but it will be expensive. The market model we have at the moment means that lots of private companies provide care at very high cost, and commissioners tend to have to commission only from certain providers. This leads to a shortage of supply and prices going up. The Minister needs to spell this out.
I understand what the noble Lord said in moving the amendment, but it is important to have visibility of not only the numbers but where the community facilities are going to be. New Clause 125FA(2)(b) in the amendment says the Secretary of State should ensure that community services are available to meet demand after 28 days. If you speak to any commissioner at the moment, they will tell you that that is completely unrealistic. I accept that it was put in the amendment for debate, but that is an aim we should be trying to get to in supporting people in the community. I have seen sad cases of people being stuck in the system. With the best will in the world, and I think there is cross-party support for this, we should not have people with learning disabilities and autism stuck in the system for as long as they are, with no way of getting out. I accept that the Bill aims to give a voice to those individuals, but without the resources to match, they will still go round the merry-go-round of different funders.
Another important issue that we need to highlight is the lack of support staff in the community for dealing with people with learning difficulties and autism. That is not seen as a priority at college. We need to put more emphasis on making it an attractive career and on the fact that it is vitally needed and will make a real difference to the individuals concerned. Training is important, but so is getting people into the service in the first place. I accept that the noble Lord is not going to press the amendment, but it goes to the heart of most of the matters in the Bill. We are deluding ourselves if we think the good and well-intentioned things in the Bill will be delivered without the resources to do so; they will not. The one without the other will lead to people still being detained when, in a modern society like ours, they really should not be.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I give my strong support to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, asking for a road map, which I think is the political phrase we use now, to get to where we want to be. I remind him that, back when the then Government came in in 1987, we had a documented timetable for closing the learning disabilities hospitals but that never happened; it went too slowly. So, we have left people stranded in various independent sector and NHS facilities, partly, to be honest, because the Department of Health took its eye off the ball as to what was happening to people in long-stay care and just stopped looking. So I agree that we need some kind of timetable; otherwise, the Bill becomes simple aspirations, as we have already said.
Unfortunately, it is not just autism and learning disabilities that require special training. In a lot of areas of mental disorder, people get inadequate training in subspecialties when they are studying the general psychiatric stuff. Psychiatric nurses do not get enough, either. I agree that there are issues here that require a special target, but at the moment they do not get it, so I support that as well.
On the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, of course it is true that there are an awful lot of bad psychiatrists around. There are bad physicians and bad surgeons—not the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, before he punches me on the chin. We should not say “bad”; I would say “not the best”. A friend of mine was visited by a community psychiatrist in old age psychiatry about a month ago. I asked his partner how it went, and he said, “Well, he was in and out in 15 minutes. He’d got 10 assessments he was going to do in people’s homes around south Norfolk in that time”. That was a totally inadequate amount of time to get a history from relatives, to get an understanding of what was going on in the home situation and to understand the problems this person was experiencing. I was shocked, but I was told not to be because it happens all the time that there is an inadequate length of time for people’s assessment.
It is hardly surprising that diagnoses are wrong and that people end up with the wrong prescriptions. It is deeply regrettable, but this will happen for as long as community services are underresourced. As we have heard from all around the Chamber, you can put as much in place as you like, but if it is underfunded, has the wrong facilities or is too far away from where people live, it just will not happen. We need a road map, and we need to know when these facilities will be made available, because the rest of it cannot happen until they are.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 152. We have already had a rich debate, concentrated on certain areas. This amendment deals with a somewhat different area, which is why I wanted to include it at the end. We have talked quite a bit about training and research and the link between the two. The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said in introducing this group that it was all about autism and learning difficulties, but this amendment also covers mental health, for the interests of clarity.
This is a probing amendment, but there is an argument for doing what it calls for, which is having a report to Parliament, two years after the Bill is passed and then every three years thereafter, about the provision for and progress in research, and the transfer of research findings, in mental health and autism and learning difficulties. This would enable Parliament to keep a check on how much resource is being put into this area and, crucially, how much knowledge is transferred into practice. It would also be a really useful tool for informing Parliament about what is an extremely fast-changing area.
It is worth noting that mental health and disabilities are areas in which research is not just redefining our understanding but often entirely demolishing old models and forcing a restart from the basics. We are also seeing a change in approach, in which I am very pleased to say that there is an increased focus on ensuring that experts by experience can guide and have input into research directions in a way that certainly was not true in the 20th century.
I note, for example, an interesting study from the University of Stirling last year, which spoke to people in Scotland—though I have no doubt this applies more broadly. It looked at how research in autism currently tends to be directed towards biological studies and a search for treatments and cures, but autistic people said that they would prefer a focus on a good quality of life, and that they should have a real say in the research directions. They were concerned that continuing even now are ableism, objectification, and other othering approaches in research directions. I spoke on the previous day in Committee about the failure to apply the social model of disability to learning difficulties and autism. That is very much the case. I hope that that will change, which would change what we should be researching and how we should be training people.
Moving to perhaps more comfortable ground for many people, I note that there is a replication crisis across many areas of research. That is particularly true in the mental health space, where, unsurprisingly, there has been a recent dawning that conducting a great deal of research on US college students does not necessarily produce findings that can be replicated all around the world in all sorts of different research conditions. For example, with Alzheimer’s disease, are amyloid plaques a cause, a symptom or simply correlated? I have no idea, and I doubt that anyone can say, with their hand on their heart, that they know either. This an area in which the continuous failure of medical trials has shown our lack of knowledge.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I want briefly to make a couple of comments on this important group. As everyone has acknowledged, an absolutely vital change to the Bill is that, in the future, people with learning disabilities and autism will not be detained by the Bill and their needs are to be met in the community. I am sure we can all agree on and gather around that.
The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made the point that, far too often in the past, people with learning disabilities and autism have been overlooked. I see the Bill as a real opportunity to do something substantive about that. That is why I note some of the amendments we have heard about in this group—certainly those in the names of my noble friends Lord Scriven and Lady Barker, and others—about the importance of having properly trained staff with up-to-date knowledge and expertise, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has just mentioned.
For any of this to happen, it is important that there is a proper plan, that is costed; the resources need to be available, and properly trained staff with up-to-date expertise need to be available in the community. To ensure that there is some sort of accountability around all this, I reiterate the question that my noble friend Lord Scriven asked the Minister: when will we see new targets—we have not got any at the moment—to reduce the number of detentions of people with learning disabilities and autism? It would be helpful to know that those targets will be put in place and that there is some way of monitoring the progress on all the important things we have been talking about in this group.
Lord Patel (CB)
I agree with what has been said: we need a definitive plan for how things will work out. We cannot rely on it being in five or 10 years because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, it then just becomes an ambition rather than a target to achieve.
I support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, which strongly asks that the people who look after children with autism and learning disabilities are properly assessed by properly trained and accredited people. We know that, currently, children are ending up in detention inappropriately because they are assessed to have a psychiatric condition such as schizophrenia—as the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, said—when, although they might have some psychiatric sub-condition, they fundamentally have autism or learning disability problems.
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale, is not here to speak to his Amendment 150, which asks quite powerfully for a clear plan to be laid out, with resources tied to it, to achieve the ambitions there are in the Bill. I would have supported his amendment probing the Minister as to how resources will be allocated to achieve the ambitions for those targets to be met.
Lord Kakkar (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 42A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and I ask the Minister what justification there could be for refuting the amendment. It seems entirely appropriate, and indeed essential, that in taking such an important, far-reaching decision, one of the two registered medical practitioners who is responsible for that decision, taken at one point in the management of the natural history of disease in that individual, has the specialist skills and training to be able to make an appropriate assessment, one that will affect interventions on all future occasions for that individual.
I hope that, in addition to accepting this important principle, the noble Baroness might outline how His Majesty’s Government will go about ensuring that the development of such medical practitioners and their training is adequately resourced to ensure that, in future, as a result of the Bill being enacted, what we have seen in the past, regrettably on repeated occasions, does not remain the norm for managing patients with autism and learning disabilities.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I shall be very brief, because other noble Lords have already eloquently articulated the arguments that are almost self-evident about the importance of services for people with autism or a learning disability and, in particular, the importance of training all staff who may find themselves working in those fields. I agree very much with the remarks of my noble friend Lady Browning and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and I was particularly interested in the research mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, which brings us into a whole new dimension, I think, in this debate.
The need to train all healthcare staff, no matter what role they perform or which part of the health service they serve in, should surely be taken as read. This should be training both in the initial identification of those with autism or a learning disability and in the skills needed to handle such individuals with the necessary sensitivity and insight. I was interested in what the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, had to say about that. The behaviour of a person who is on the autistic spectrum can be baffling to anyone who has had no experience of it, and because of that it can be open to misinterpretation. A situation of that kind carries dangers, which is why it is so necessary for healthcare staff to know how to react in a way that will make the situation better and not worse.
This is not the first time that we have debated this important topic. I believe we may be told by the Minister that mandatory training in these areas is already provided for in Section 20 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. The provision reads:
“Regulations under this section must require service providers to ensure that each person working for the purpose of the regulated activities carried on by them receives training on learning disability and autism which is appropriate to the person’s role”.
That broad provision was inserted into the 2008 Act thanks to an amendment which your Lordships approved three years ago, during our debates on the Health and Care Act 2022.
So, a provision on training is already enshrined in law; the problem is that we have no way of knowing the extent to which it is being implemented in practice. Hence, Amendment 145 would require the Secretary of State to publish a review on mandatory training for all persons who treat patients with learning disabilities and autism under the 1983 Act and consult as necessary to determine the extent to which health service staff are actually in receipt of such training. I see this amendment as perhaps a logical partner to Amendment 152 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and indeed, in his absence, to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale.
While the vast majority of people who provide care to people with learning disabilities and autism do so with compassion and professionalism, we have seen a number of failings in care for people with those conditions. At the same time, detention will continue to be necessary in some cases where a patient with autism or a learning disability is suffering from a separate mental health condition. In all those cases, regardless of the context in which a person presents, we need to have confidence that the people providing care have the training they need to deliver that care sensitively, and above all, capably. I would venture to say that the people who need to have most confidence in the system apart from the person receiving the care are the parents or nearest relatives of that person. Hence, I believe we need more transparency on how well the system is working than we have currently.
Incidentally, one of the things that could come out of a review of training is an opportunity to look at the current processes for whistleblowing. An important aspect of improving standards of care is to have a system of accountability that includes listening to everyone in the sector, from the most senior staff to the most junior. No one should be afraid to speak up when they see something going on that does not look right, and I should be very grateful to hear what the Minister has to say on this whole theme and on the other important issues that noble Lords have raised.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I express my gratitude to noble Lords, not just for their amendments but for the way in which this debate has been conducted. I appreciate much of what lies behind the contributions and amendments today.
I first turn to Amendment 33, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and also Amendment 150 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale. All of these were spoken to throughout this group, including by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Murphy. I noticed that Amendment 150 was particularly referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe.
On the matter of data collection, I absolutely share my noble friend Lord Beamish’s view on its importance, the need for the visibility of data and the need to find out what is behind detention. However, I can give the reassurance that the data and statistics that were referred to are being collected and published. They will continue to be monitored and published monthly in the assuring transformation statistics for learning disability and autistic people, and I hope that will be helpful to my noble friend.
The amendments I am referring to, which the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, introduced, require the Secretary of State to publish plans within a specified timeframe, outlining the Government’s plan to allocate sufficient resources for the commissioning of services for the detention and treatment of autistic people and people with a learning disability, as well as costed plans which show how integrated care boards and local authorities will ensure provision of adequate community services for these groups.
Baroness Barker (LD)
This is a key point for a lot of the amendments that noble Lords have asked about. Can the Minister write to all noble Lords with more detail of the training programme—its content, the timetable, who is going to be responsible for making sure that it is implemented and reviewed? Will she specifically deal, in that letter, with my question about whether tier 3 training is included?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I would be very pleased to write to noble Lords, as the noble Baroness suggests.
Amendment 42A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, which the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, also spoke to, relates to appropriate expertise in learning disability and autism for medical practitioners with responsibility for recommending admission for treatment. We strongly agree with the principle of this amendment. The current code of practice sets out that, where a patient is known to belong to a group for which particular expertise is desirable, at least one of the professionals involved in their assessment should have expertise in working with people from that group wherever possible. The code also makes clear that consideration should be given to any disability the person has in order that the assessment has regard to that in the way that it is carried out.
The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, asked further about how the Bill will make sure that professionals have the right skills and expertise. This whole area rightly comes up repeatedly when we debate.
I accept that it is crucial that those with a learning disability and autistic people are dealt with sensitively and professionally. It is crucial that clinicians are able to make distinctions between a learning disability or autism and any co-occurring mental health disorder—that point was made powerfully. It is a matter for clinical judgment to determine whether a person with a learning disability or an autistic person meets the criteria for detention under Part II, Section 3 due to a co-occurring psychiatric disorder. To assist clinicians in decision-making, we will update the code of practice to provide the guidance that will be necessary, and I hope that that will make a major change.
Baroness Browning (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister and very encouraged by her response. I want to flag up something else that I raised. Occasionally, at some point of crisis for undiagnosed adults, the question is asked: could this be autism? At that point, we need people who have a very good working knowledge for them to raise that question, because it can make a world of difference if they are right. It is not just about somebody who presents with a diagnosis; it is about those who are undiagnosed. I do not know the quantity, but my gut feeling is that there are quite a lot of adults out there who are still undiagnosed. I do not know how the Minister will accommodate that situation.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
The noble Baroness makes a good point. Indeed, not everybody has a diagnosis. I suggest that, when we look at provisions, we should make clear—through the appropriate means and not in primary legislation—how the practice should take account of the point that she made very well. I will be extremely mindful of that.
We believe that the code of practice is the most appropriate place to articulate the type of experience that might be required in this area, through a non-exhaustive list of practical examples, which would avoid the need to define in primary legislation exactly what constitutes sufficient experience. The reason for that is to allow flexibility on the particular needs and circumstances of the individual. As we update the code of practice, we will engage with expert stakeholders to improve practice and to reflect the new Act. The code will be laid before Parliament before its final publication. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, for her comments in this area.
The number of long-term detentions was rightly raised by my noble friend Lord Beamish and the noble Baronesses, Lady Murphy and Lady Browning. The number of people with a learning disability and autistic people in mental health hospitals is indeed unacceptable. Too many people are still being detained who could be supported in their communities with the right provision. Work is under way to address this. For example, NHS England has allocated £124 million of transformation funding for services, which includes funding to reduce reliance on mental health in-patient settings. Noble Lords can be reassured that I will take a particular personal interest in this area.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
On that point, I welcome what my noble friend the Minister has announced, but the real problem is about housing, including specialist housing in different areas for individuals leaving secure units. That is not universal throughout this country, as people leaving mental health units are then having to travel long distances. Surely we need local plans, and that money going in locally to provide the housing needed.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My noble friend makes a good point about housing; we discussed it on day 1 in Committee. We are working with our ministerial colleagues who deal with housing on the need for the right kind of housing to be available. The point was well made and is taken.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
I understand that the Minister may wish to write to me on this, but I wonder whether there is a real prioritisation of those experts by experience guiding that research, and what input there might be. If the Minister can write to me, that would be fine.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I would be pleased to write to the noble Baroness.
As I set out in response to other noble Lords, I hope the Committee has heard how much I agree that the adequacy of training is a key issue. We are aware that developments in best practice in caring for people with a learning disability and autistic people need to be reflected throughout. As I set out, the Health and Care Act 2022 requires that staff be given the training appropriate to their role, and we expect that this should be reviewed in line with the up-to-date situation. The CQC assesses staff training as part of its regulatory function. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this useful and informative debate, and I thank the Minister for a thorough explanation of what happens. However, there does seem to be a disjoint between what is happening on the ground and what people in an office in Whitehall seem to think is happening. That is why noble Lords have discussed issues to do with data, training, a costed plan, research and development, and the implementation of people who at least have training and an expertise in diagnosis. Something just does not feel right. The Minister has explained what is happening, but without a fully costed plan up front, with targets, accountability and data ongoing, what will happen is what happens now. Things will be diverted and diluted, and we will not be able to hold the plan to account. For that reason, while I thank the Minister for the explanation she has given, I feel that we will return to this issue at a later stage to dig down and get that deliverable framework. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Murphy
(b) there is a risk of serious harm to the health or safety of the patient or of another person;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and others in the name of Baroness Murphy remove from the criteria any mention of “likelihood” or “may be caused” and replace them with wording that allows a clinician to evaluate risk in the individual case and give evidence more straightforwardly and comprehensively without making predictions for individuals about risk.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, in this group, we return to the issue of serious harm and risk. Clause 5, on the grounds for detention, implies that the risk factors for detention under Part 2 are identifiable and that risks are readily assessed. A number of clauses in the Bill are all about the same thing, which is why there are so many amendments in this group. They imply, again, that risks are quantifiable and predictable—if only.
Academic research has often stressed how difficult it is to predict episodes of violent behaviour in individuals, because they are rare. Risk assessments given as likelihoods are of limited use when the base rate for violence in a population, particularly serious violence, is low. The same is true, by the way, for suicide and suicidal thoughts.
It has been calculated, using the average of all the current tests and rating scales that have been carefully assessed in research studies, that if 5% of the patient population were in a high-risk category, the tests would correctly identify eight in 100 people who would go on to commit acts of violence, but misidentify as violent another 92 people. In fact, less than 1% of community patients will commit serious violence over the period of a year, which means the tests would correctly identify only three patients out of 100.
Homicides occur at a rate of one in 10,000 patients suffering from a psychosis per annum, which makes prediction more or less impossible. A number of factors are statistically associated with later violence at a group level. Even the most effective predictive combinations of variables constructed by statisticians perform poorly, except at group level. So making statements about individual risk based on the use of these tools is complex, and some would say unsafe and unethical.
Structured risk-assessment systems can be useful in routine clinical practice; indeed, most people use them in day-to-day team thinking about what these risks are. When employed by staff properly trained in their use, they are useful pointers. They perform better than unaided clinical judgment in predicting future violence, but again, at a group level. On an individual level, these checklists need to be part of a detailed understanding of a patient’s mental state, life circumstances and thinking, which is a major contributor to the prevention of harm. This is best achieved, as always, by well-trained professionals operating in a well-resourced environment where staff know well the patient’s history, response to treatment and life circumstances.
The wording of the Bill encourages pseudo exact probabilities and predictions of individual behaviour, which are not possible. This exerts pressure on psychiatrists, particularly at tribunals, to make predictions that may be seriously wrong. Unreasonable expectations of what can be predicted lead to defensive practice—to detaining people where it is not justified by the unreliable evidence. There are several places in the Bill where the impression is given that risks are reliable and predictable, but it is not so. As I say, the same problem arises with suicide and suicidal behaviours.
I ask the Government to look at whether the wording of these clauses is reasonable, given the evidence, and to substitute these certainties with something more flexible, indicating that a more rounded, holistic and comprehensive assessment is necessary. I beg to move.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 86 and 67, in my name, in this group. I put them in that order as Amendment 86 more naturally follows on from—
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I am awfully sorry, but I should have mentioned that I also have almost all the other amendments in this group. They cover the same question—it is just about the wording of these two phrases. Amendment 45, along with one other, is not mine, but most of the amendments are covered by those brief words.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I think that I am speaking in the right group. Amendments 45 and 48 are in my name, and although they are in this group, they are of a rather different nature. They are about the framework and definition of “appropriate medical treatment”.
I will briefly outline the overall context and why I thought it important to bring these two amendments forward. I am particularly concerned that many in-patients in mental health hospitals, particularly autistic people and people with a learning difficulty, continue to face detention in hospital settings which can provide little or no therapeutic benefit. The environment of these hospital settings can be incredibly overstimulating and distressing. We continue to hear stories of restrictive practices, including physical, mechanical and even chemical constraint, as well as the use of solitary confinement.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, given that all those who have spoken to this group of amendments have been brief, I shall try to be brief. Once again, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, for discussing with me in an exchange of emails over the weekend the intent behind the amendments in her name.
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, makes a reasonable point about clauses in the Bill that contain the phrase “likelihood of the harm” or “serious harm may be caused”, because it is assumed that such risks are quantifiable and predictable. I was struck by her observation that psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses and academics have warned about the difficulty of being able to predict episodes of violent behaviour in individuals because the base rate for violence, particularly serious violence, in the population is low. One of the things that we keep saying throughout this debate is that we need to see the evidence and the data, and that that should drive decisions that are being made. Given that, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for sharing the statistics, which I will not repeat but which reinforce the point that she wanted to make.
Considering those statistics, I am sympathetic to two specific points that the noble Baroness made. The first is that making statements about individual risk based on such statistics is complex and possibly unsafe, and, as the noble Baroness said, may be unethical. The second is that it may be helpful to use structured risk-assessment systems in routine clinical practice, if used by appropriately trained staff, to predict possible violence at a group level. However, given that many noble Lords have spoken about patient-centred care and the importance of understanding the individual and their sensory profile, surely we should be looking at patients as individuals, where the clinician better understands the individual patient’s mental state, relevant history and response to treatment given his or her life circumstances.
I will be interested in the Minister’s response to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, urging the Government to replace wording such as “likelihood of the harm” or “serious harm may be caused”. These terms are inexact and somewhat ambiguous and do not appear to be driven by evidence. Perhaps there are more appropriate terms for more holistic and comprehensive assessments.
Amendment 45, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, proposes that the definition of appropriate medical treatment includes the setting in which treatment takes place. This takes us back to a point made on the first day in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and just now by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, that for those with autism and learning disabilities, being held possibly in noisy, bright, busy settings full of people who may be strange to them, and where they may feel powerless and worry about what will happen next, is likely to affect their mental health and well-being. Therefore, surely it is important that we take account of the points made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, particularly in Amendment 45.
On Amendment 48, it is really important that care is led by the level of therapeutic benefit. That should be based on evidence to drive those decisions. Given that, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I am most grateful for the contributions that have been made and the amendments that have been tabled.
I turn first to Amendments 37A, 37C, 38A, 38B, 42B, 42D, 42E, 42G and 42H, all tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and spoken to by other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, regarding the new criteria. Let me say at the outset that the new criteria explicitly require decision-makers to consider the risk of serious harm and the likelihood of those harms occurring in order to justify detention. Clearly, the reason for this is to ensure that any risks to the public and the patient are consistently considered as part of the assessment process, and to protect patients from lengthy detention when these risks are unlikely to occur. I hope that this will be helpful for some of the debate that we have had.
The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, seek to revise the proposed new risk criteria to remove any mention of risk that “may be caused” or the “likelihood” of the risk transpiring. The purpose appears to be to remove any prospective assessment from the detention decision and instead focus on the risk as it can be established at the time. The noble Baroness, in her introduction, asked about the reasonableness of the words in the provisions, and I understand that this is where the concerns lie. I should also thank the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, for his comments on evidence and data and their importance. In answer to the noble Baroness, I should say that the independent review found that the current criteria for detention are too vague and recommended that the Government should update the detention criteria to be more explicit about how serious the harm has to be and how likely it is to occur to justify detention. The intention of the revised detention criteria in the Bill is not to ask clinicians to make predictions but to clarify that they should consider whether a harm is likely to occur, based on their assessment and knowledge of the person—something that the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, focused on—rather than based on risks which may never occur.
Any consideration of risk arguably preserves the need to look at what might happen rather than what is happening or has happened in more concrete factual terms. We think that it is important that the detention criteria allow clinicians to detain based on the risks that they think are likely to happen, rather than just the risks that have already materialised. This enables them to act early to prevent harm to the patient or others. In line with the intention of the noble Baroness’s amendments, this should be based on personalised individual risk assessments and information about the patient’s history and personal circumstances—again, something that I know noble Lords are exercised by, which is about the individual approach to this.
We did engage again on the changes to the detention criteria last summer, in light of the recommendation on this issue by the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, and to assure ourselves that the detention criteria struck the right balance between allowing clinicians to continue to take early action when they are concerned about a patient’s or others’ safety and the independent review’s concerns that people could be detained on the basis of risks that might never occur.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I thank the Minister for her response. I have to say that psychiatrists remain worried about this and the possibility that they will be expected to make decisions on risks which they are simply not capable of doing. But I would not want there to be a feeling around that we want to discourage people from taking action much earlier than they sometimes currently do, because, in my view, they often leave it too late before they admit somebody—we have seen a number of such cases recently. I reserve the right, perhaps, to come back with some alternative ideas, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness May of Maidenhead
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and others in the name of Baroness May seek to introduce a new category of “authorised person” who can carry out detentions under the 1983 Act to offer better inter-agency response. The proposed amendments would remove the need for the presence of police at mental health incidents in the absence of any risk.
Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group standing in my name, Amendments 37B, 38C, 42C, 42F and 128B, are all intended to widen the definition of those who can attend a mental health incident and act to detain an individual in a variety of circumstances.
It is a pleasure to speak after a number of noble Lords who have a considerable wealth of experience on the issues in this Bill. I can claim no such breadth of experience, but the amendments I have tabled speak to one issue, which I have dealt with in the past: that of who can attend a mental health incident and particularly the attendance of the police at such incidents.
Back in 2010, it became clear to me, as I spoke to more and more police officers in my role as Home Secretary, that there was one issue that was at the forefront of their mind, and it was the problem they had in dealing with people at the point of mental health crisis. Their concern was understandable: they had no training in mental health, they were not professionals in this area, yet they were being called out to situations. They were being expected to determine whether someone was at the point of crisis or not, and what should happen to that individual; more often than not that meant taking that individual to a police cell as a place of safety. For the police officer, there was concern that they were being asked to deal with something for which they had no training or knowledge.
Of course, the police presence was often not good for the individual concerned. Inevitably, it meant they were not being given the healthcare support they needed at that point in time; but more than that, the very essence of a police presence—somebody in the uniform coming to deal with them—could actually exacerbate their mental health situation, and a police cell is not designed to improve somebody’s mental health. Finally, for the police force, of course, it meant that it was taking up resource which could have been used elsewhere, and which was, in many cases, inappropriate; often if somebody was in a police cell as a place of safety it meant that an officer had to sit outside the cell to ensure that they did not harm themselves.
The issue of the use of a police cell as a place of safety is dealt with in other parts of the Bill, but they do not deal with this wider question of the police resource that is being used. Even if the police are lucky enough to get somebody to a hospital, they still could have to have an officer in A&E sitting with the individual to make sure they do not harm themselves or cause harm to others. Indeed, the Metropolitan Police, in its evidence to the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, cited a case study where a patient was required to be guarded by the police in A&E to prevent them becoming a high-risk missing person, and eight Metropolitan Police officers had to attend that individual for over 29 hours. Police officers were worried about the job they were doing, the individual concerned was not being treated or dealt with in the way that was appropriate for their mental health needs, and police resource was used unnecessarily.
Over the years, I and others have tried to address this situation, initially with some success. But what often happens in government, as noble Lords and the Minister will find over time, is that an initial success is turned back because over time people revert to the previous behaviour or mode of operation. That is what we have seen in this case, and it came, of course, to the point where the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police said that the force would not give an ultimatum and would not turn up to these mental health incidents.
As drafted, the Bill has the capacity to at least maintain, if not exacerbate, this problem, but the Government could accept amendments or amend it in a way that would improve the situation. I should say that, of course, if there is an immediate risk to life or serious injury, the police will always have a role to play; but they are clear that they want to see mental health repositioned as a health matter and not seen through the lens of crime and policing-related risk. This is the position that the National Police Chiefs’ Council took in its letter on the Bill to the current Secretary of State for Health, which said:
“The current position of the law arguably views mental health through the lens of crime and policing related risk, which raises a number of issues including disproportionality in the criminal justice system, discrimination, adverse outcomes for people suffering with poor mental health as well as increasing stigma attached to mental health”.
That concern that the focus and statutory footing of the police as the primary responder to incidents of mental health should be removed from the Bill is what has led to my amendments—it is what they are intended to deliver.
I see similarities between my amendments and Amendment 158 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. If I may be so bold, I think we are both trying to achieve a situation where the expected response to someone in mental health crisis is not limited to police; in other words, “right care, right person”. My amendments are intended to widen the description of those who can attend mental health incidents beyond a constable, but they specify that a police officer—the holder of the position of constable under the Crown—can respond if there is a genuine need for a police presence.
Recognising that we do not want to see healthcare professionals put at risk, the amendments specify that the authorised person attending an individual should have been
“trained and equipped to carry out detentions”
and by carrying out that function should
“not be put at unnecessary risk”.
It is worth noting, perhaps at this point, that the College of Policing’s mental health snapshot 2019 found that almost 95% of calls that police attend that are flagged as a mental health response do not require a police response.
I referred to the reasons behind my amendments in relation to the police, but there is support among healthcare professionals for such changes. In the joint Home Office and Department of Health review of Section 135 and Section 136 powers, 68% of respondents to the survey, alongside the review, agreed that all or part of Section 135 and Section 136 powers should be extended so that healthcare professionals could use them provided they were not putting themselves at risk. Paramedics particularly supported the change, with 93.3% of paramedics agreeing and 61.1% strongly agreeing.
Beyond the interests of the police and healthcare professionals, of course, we must also remember the interests of the individual at that point of mental health crisis. They deserve the right response, the right care, the right person—and I do not believe that that is always a police officer. This Bill should reflect that and enable a wider range of authorised persons to attend mental health incidents. I beg to move.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
My Lords, this is an area where I feel I have the possibility of a solution or part of a solution, while supporting very much what my noble friend has put forward in her amendment. My solution comes from knowledge that we have gained from the world of palliative care. It is a subject matter that we covered in detail on the joint scrutiny committee, because the whole issue of the police turning up to such an incident where somebody is absolutely in crisis can, in many instances, lead only to an increase in the fear and extraordinary pain that that person is feeling when they are in crisis. It is not the fault of the police; it is just the situation that they find themselves in.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, in speaking to my Amendment 49A, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady May, for her amendments. Those of us on the joint scrutiny committee spent a lot of time focusing on the fact that, in truth, a lot of what happens to people who are having mental health crises depends entirely on where they are, who is there and who somebody passing in the street and tries to help them thinks is the right person to call at a moment of emergency.
We are all in agreement that the police have for too long been the default answer to a problem but are not the right answer to a problem. The police know they are not the right answer to a problem—I say that as somebody who has lots of police officers in my family. A lot of people having a mental health crisis will end up in A&E just because the lights are on and that is where people go. We are still dealing with one of the problems the Wessely review touched upon, and that is lack of timely access to an accurate diagnosis.
My amendment, which I admit was suggested by practitioners in the field, tries to deal with the fact that we do not have an abundance of consultant psychiatrists who are there at the drop of a hat to make assessments. The amendment probes whether we might help things by opening up the eligibility to make diagnoses under Section 12 to people who are health professionals but not necessarily medical practitioners. Back in 2006-07, we had the massive argument about bringing in approved mental health professionals. That was a big battle and there was a lot of rearguard action on the part of consultant psychiatrists, who saw it as a downgrading. Approved mental health practitioners are now very much part of our mental health services and they are a good part of our mental health services.
The amendment is trying to open up the making of assessments, simply in order to speed up access to appropriate services. We all understand, and are talking about, the fact that, although we can see the effects of waiting lists and so on on physical health services, waiting lists and the lack of access to appropriate treatment in mental health services are much more hidden. People end up in limbo unless and until there is some kind of outrage, or, to go back to the noble Baroness’s point, until they do something sufficiently serious.
We ought to be freeing up the capacity of consultant psychiatrists in particular, because not only is demand growing but there are also particular areas of specialist demand—young people with eating disorders, for example. I frequently hear of worried parents being told that their children are not sufficiently ill to get treatment. They are not alone; there are other people in that same situation. My modest amendment is an attempt to open up and make better use of the skills we have within the NHS workforce.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
This is the first time I have spoken in Committee on the Bill, so I declare my interest as a member of the advisory panel of the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute. I shall speak to my Amendment 158, which, as the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, said, covers essentially the same ground as hers, and they both aim at the same endpoint. Her elegant and compelling speech has left me in the position of just having to emphasise issues; the case made was compelling, and I hope the Committee will agree. In particular, I hope the Minister will be able to make some sort of positive response.
This proposal does not flow specifically from the independent review, but it is in the spirit of what was in that review. The background to the changing nature of mental health services is the significant material increase in the demand for mental health services over the past few years, and the growing number of people on the mental health waiting list or seeking community support.
This unmet need has consequences, which are felt by front-line medical staff. My amendment seeks to address that by giving additional powers to paramedics and appropriate mental health professionals. It would extend the reach of Section 136 of the Act, currently confined to constables—or police officers, as I say in my amendment. As previous speakers have said, that needs to be shared more widely.
The unfortunate reality of the current situation is that those detained under Section 136 get suboptimal care; we just do not have the resources available for them. There is inadequate provision of suites for Section 136 detention, and there are simply not enough clinicians. We all applaud and support the practice of “right care, right person”, but we must acknowledge that that only increases the demands on the service.
The result of all this is that, as we have heard, police officers are taken away from front-line policing duties for many hours. That is bad for everyone involved—for the police officers, for the health service, and particularly for the patients. At the same time, the skills of non-medical health service staff have increased. They are now moving towards the sort of training that equips them to handle such situations. Obviously, giving staff extra powers will not resolve the situation, but we can learn from experience abroad, especially in Australia and New Zealand, where a range of health service staff have a practice called emergency care orders, with the intention of providing greater dignity, removing the sense of criminalisation, and providing appropriate care.
As my noble friend the Minister said, what we are looking for is beneficial interventions at the earliest possible stage. A key element in achieving that aim is extending the powers under Section 136 to wider professions. That is not to say that there is no role for police officers—there will always be occasions when their intervention is required—but saying that the single source of entry to services of someone suffering an acute mental health problem is through the intervention of the police is just wrong.
There have always been concerns when the powers of medical staff are extended, but this will be an issue of training, guidance and codes of practice—clearly, those will have to be provided—so that the additional powers can be used effectively.
To conclude, I emphasise the point that the noble Baroness, Lady May, made in opening the debate. We have moved beyond the point when the powers in Section 136 were essentially about public order—which is, quite rightly, a role for the police. We must ensure that now, commitments under Section 136 are the first stage of a process of medical treatment, in which the unfortunate individual suffering an acute problem with their mental health must be considered first. This is not about public order; it is about appropriate healthcare, where a range of health service professionals can exercise their trained judgment to the benefit of the patient.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
My Lords, I support this group of amendments in principle, but I want to make two points. We talk about powers a great deal, but the therapeutic relationship is not about power; it is about collegiate working with patients and users of the service. I appreciate that there are times when we need to intervene when the patient does not want intervention, but we must be careful about the nomenclature as we redraw elements of the Bill.
In particular, I welcome the phrase that the noble Lord has just used, which is used so frequently in New Zealand and Australia: emergency care orders. We should think carefully about the fact that what we need is emergency assessment and care orders. People who work regularly with patients over a long period are often the best people to recognise a change in a patient’s behaviour earlier.
I fully support the idea that this should be extended beyond police constables, as the noble Baroness, Lady May, outlined, but I also recognise that there will be healthcare professionals, be they psychologists, nurses or social workers, who do not want to take this on. We must make certain that we do not lose some of our valuable team by making it compulsory to take on that extended responsibility.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
I shall make a few points in response to the amendments that we have been discussing in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady May, made, very powerfully, an incredibly compelling case. The point she made about police officers sitting in A&E for many hours is so important. Not only is that a waste of police resources, it is often completely inappropriate for the person suffering from acute mental health problems. It can also be incredibly alarming for others in A&E. We all know that, sadly, far too many people are waiting for far too long in A&E, in the sort of environment that is in no way conducive to their overall health, physical or mental. That is my first point.
My second point relates to something that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said. There will still sometimes be a role for police officers. I know from personal experience how much a police presence can be required when a person suffering a very acute mental health crisis is likely to harm both themselves and others. Those others can often be family members who are trying to support the person suffering from the crisis but are also pretty scared for their own safety. It is important that we are talking about widening the range of people who can be that primary responder, but we are not saying that it should never be the police.
I agree that if we have a wider primary responder, that individual must be prepared to do it, happy to do it and appropriately trained. We heard a lot in earlier groups about the importance of good training. I was particularly taken with the statistic that the noble Baroness, Lady May, raised about the views of paramedics and how many of them support this, because they are the people right at the sharp end. I cannot quite remember the number who support it, but it was very large, and so I think it is something that we should take seriously.
Finally, I want to lend my support to Amendment 49A in the name of my noble friend Lady Barker. Speeding up access to appropriate services is important, as is making the best use of the workforce that we have. For those two reasons, the amendment that my noble friend put forward is important.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt, but I want to make much the same point that the noble Baroness has made based on my experience of a trip to A&E last year. I mentioned it anecdotally at Second Reading. There was a very disturbed person in A&E when I was having to wait there for some three hours. The hospital staff were struggling to contain the person in one room, as he kept leaving. He was not violent, but he was obviously distracting the hospital staff and worrying the other people present, who included children. As soon as anybody asked the staff what they were going to do, they said that they had to wait for the police. I have no doubt that the whole episode that I witnessed was prolonged by the need to wait for the police. Clearly, if this amendment or something like it is approved, it will widen the range of those who could be called upon to deal with such a crisis.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, there is little for me to do following the persuasive speech of my noble friend Lady May, other than to say how much I support her in putting forward her amendments. I hope that the Minister will approach the proposals my noble friend has made in a receptive and constructive way.
I was struck by the case put forward by my noble friend Lady Buscombe about how technology could assist in the handling of mental health incidents. I hope equally that the Minister will wish to follow up on my noble friend’s suggestions.
The question of whether police officers, and only police officers, should exercise the powers under the Act to remove a person suffering from a mental health crisis to a place of safety is one that, as my noble friend Lady May said, has been simmering in the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care for a decade or more. Extending those powers to suitably trained healthcare professionals would be a change that I suggest goes with the grain of this Bill as regards the emphasis that it places on looking after mental health patients in the best possible way. That is not a criticism of the police in any sense. The police do a magnificent job in tackling anything that they are called upon to do, but, as we have heard, the police themselves say that the vast majority of instances in which they are called upon to deal with a mental health incident do not require a policing response.
The issue of risk is important to consider. Statistically, as my noble friend said, most mental health incidents present no risk whatever to the police attending. Admittedly, it is not always possible to tell in advance how risky a particular encounter is likely to be, but I agree with my noble friend that, provided that a paramedic is suitably trained and equipped, they will have the necessary skill set to deal with any risk to their own safety, bearing in mind that if a police presence turns out to be necessary, they can always call for one.
I very much hope that, between now and Report, the Minister will agree to meet my noble friend, if that is what she wishes, to map out a way forward that will lead to a broadening of the Sections 135 and 136 powers.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate, with much agreement across the Committee. I noted the support from both the other Front Benches, from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for much of what has been said.
Let me first discuss Amendments 37B, 38C, 42C, 42F and 128B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady May, along with Amendment 158 in the name of my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton. I am most grateful to the noble Baroness and my noble friend for bringing this issue before the Committee today. Amendments 37B, 38C, 42C and 42F would add a new category of authorised persons and would provide that police constables and such authorised persons may detain a person under Sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Act.
I share the recognition from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, of the noble Baroness, Lady May, who I commend for her work to pave the way and dramatically reduce the use of police cells as a place of safety for those who are experiencing a mental health crisis. I listened carefully to the noble Baroness’s words of advice to all government Ministers; all I can say is that I cannot think how much better we could be advised than by a former Home Secretary and Prime Minister.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, for what I might call her notes of caution in respect of extending provisions, and the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for sharing his first-hand experience to add to the debate today.
We understand the broad intention of these amendments and of Amendment 128B, also in the noble Baroness’s name, to reduce police involvement in mental health cases for all the reasons that were said, including the extra distress that an officer may—inadvertently, of course—bring to a very delicate crisis situation.
The noble Baroness, Lady May, asked how the Bill will ensure that pressure is not placed unduly on police resource. I understand that that is very much a driving consideration, so let me say a few things on that matter. We recognise the pressure on the police, who are responding to a very large volume of mental health-related incidents, although—this is not to dismiss the point—detentions under Section 136 have decreased this year by 10%, and we are removing police cells as a place of safety to reduce some of this burden. We recognise, in particular, that police time in health settings should be reduced. I give an assurance that we have committed to look at this issue and to update the code of practice to clarify the handover process between police and health, including in A&E, which the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, spoke about. We recognise the confusion around the application of the legal framework that can tie up police time when it would be lawful for them to leave a patient with health staff.
Baroness Barker (LD)
I thank the Minister for her characteristically full and attentive response. I understand why she is not too enamoured by my amendment, and I do not intend to push that much further. However, having listened to her response to the noble Baroness, Lady May, I cannot help but arrive at the conclusion that, while we are quite content, because we all agree, to see police officers being taken away, we are not going to change anybody else’s roles or responsibilities to plug what will be an inevitable gap. I return to something I have said today and previously: this will be the only mental health legislation for 20 years. If we let this go through, in the certain knowledge that we are creating a big gap which will not be filled by existing roles or the deployment of people within the NHS, we are being quite negligent. We are consigning a lot of people to finding themselves without appropriate support at moments of distress, and that goes for staff who happen to be around at the same time.
The noble Baroness, Lady May, is a fan of Geoffrey Boycott. I hope that she goes in to bat again and does not give up. There is an enormous gap here and we have just made it worse.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I appreciate the contribution of the noble Baroness. None of us, including the Government, wishes to create a gap, either intentionally or unintentionally. I should have said in my remarks that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, asked whether I would meet the noble Baroness, Lady May, should she so wish. The answer is yes. I was glad to do so previously with the Secretary of State; it was extremely helpful.
I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that there is no intention to create a gap, and we would be happy to elaborate further. She is absolutely right to say that we should be cautious and that it would not be good legislation to do that. The challenge is whether the amendments before us are the answer. I hope that this is a helpful comment.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I have listened very carefully to the debate on this set of amendments. Those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady May, would create a specialism within the relevant professions which is not there at the moment, based on a change of law. The Minister’s response was focused on the skills of people now, based on their generic roles. My question is this: in responding to the noble Baroness, Lady May, did officials and the Minister look at the potential change that would happen to the skill set, and at the skills and professionals that would be specific for this purpose? In practice, if the law changed, that is exactly what would happen to those professions: a subset of skills would develop, which would allow the gap to which my noble friend alluded to be closed.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
With your Lordships’ permission, I want to respond to what the noble Lord has just said. On the front line in this are the paramedics; they are the ones who will have to deal with this issue, most of the time. They need recognition for the additional work that they are already doing. The noble Baroness referred to the gap—the gap is being filled, but in a very inefficient and unrecognised way. We need to recognise that this is something that needs to be dealt with properly, with the staff involved being given the appropriate powers to deliver.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
To add to that, the key thing about paramedics is that they do not have long-term therapeutic relationships with the people we are talking about. Therefore, an intervention is totally appropriate.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I too want to add, equally with great care, to this very interesting discussion. I am concerned about the police. I have not quite understood from the Minister her thoughts on a point that has been made twice now by the noble Lord, Lord Meston about everybody waiting for the police. Are the Government thinking of making it unnecessary for the police regularly to attend?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their interventions. To the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—how can I put this?—I say that the police should be there only when they are needed because they are the police. It is true—the point was made very well in the course of the debate introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady May—that it often goes beyond that. That is why “right care, right person” is something that colleagues are working on with police forces, as well as looking at the whole connection with health services. It is well understood.
I heard the comments of my noble friend, as well as those of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, following on from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. When the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, was speaking, the words that came into my head were “chicken and egg”, about legislation and skills. We looked at skills, but—these are not quite the right words—not at the expense of addressing the question of whether the law is in the right place. They are connected, but I refer the noble Lord to the points made earlier, by me and the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, about the response we have had from health and care professionals. It is about finding the right way. I take the point that there is a gap now. We do not want to make it worse, and we know that it is not acceptable.
Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)
My Lords, may I say how grateful I am to all those across the House who have supported my amendments. When the Minister first stood up and started to respond, I got quite excited and hopeful. I thought the points had landed, but then, as she carried on speaking, my hopes were dashed as I realised that, in a very elegant way, she was actually rejecting all the points that I had made in my amendments.
The Minister emphasised the code of practice and dealing with the issue of the handover between police and medical professionals. The whole point of my amendments was to ensure fewer handovers between the police and medical professionals, because there would be fewer times when the police were called as the first responders to a mental health incident. The Minister kindly said she would meet with me, and I hope she might be willing for the noble Lord, Lord Davies, also to be part of that discussion.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, referenced my admiration for Sir Geoffrey Boycott. One thing about Sir Geoffrey Boycott was that his centuries tended to come quite slowly. Maybe the response and government reaction to this will be a little slower than I had anticipated; but, on the basis that I anticipate that that reaction may come and the century may be scored, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Browning
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 43 in my name is to a list of grounds under which community treatment orders will be allowed. I have to say that, judging by the Second Reading of the Bill, including my own contribution, community treatment orders have not been a great success. I think that is a general view but here they are, listed in the Bill, and it is incumbent upon us to make them as strong and comprehensive as possible so that they are fit for purpose, if they are to remain.
I felt that there was an omission from the list of grounds in the Bill. I say to the Minister that I put my hand up immediately: I have had this this discussion with her outside the Chamber. This is something that I want to put into the Bill, but I am still not entirely sure that this is the right place for it. I hope she will not bat it out of—I do not know what to say in cricketing terms because I do not have my noble friend’s expertise in cricket. Anyway, I shall quickly move on.
We know the problem: there is a shortage of psychiatrists. In some areas, people are well served but in others they are not. Today’s debate has focused on psychiatrists who have expertise in autism and learning disability.
I am looking at a scenario where a person has autism or a learning disability, as well as a recognised mental health condition, and is discharged into the community on a community treatment order. Despite what I have said about my reservations about them in principle, because there is such a paucity of psychiatrists, particularly those who have expertise in autism and learning disability, once that person is being cared for on a community treatment order—or, for that matter, someone in the community who is not on a community treatment order but is medicated—where are the psychiatrists that they can turn to?
To my certain knowledge, there are around the country some integrated care boards that feel they are serving the autism community well enough if they can identify psychologists with expertise. There is nothing wrong with that, as there are excellent psychologists around the country, but of course, psychologists cannot prescribe. So there is a real challenge for people in that situation who need ongoing medication—the dosage of which may need to be changed, for example—having local access to an appropriate psychiatrist.
I am a bit nervous about the wording of the amendment—it is my wording, but I am still nervous about it—as it includes the word “local”. I assure the Minister that I am realistic enough to know that there is not going to be an appropriate psychiatrist just round the corner, but in many cases, as I am personally aware, there is not even anyone in the county. If someone has been subject to an in-patient stay in a mental health hospital, admitted in an emergency, that does not necessarily mean they are going to be in a local hospital; because of the shortage of beds, they may be quite far from home. So the community treatment order may not be exercised close to where someone has previously been an in-patient.
We also have problems at the borders between Wales, England and Scotland. For mental health services, there are mutually agreed agreements about where patients can be seen, and particularly where hospitalisation can take place. However, if community treatment orders are to be maintained, on discharge they may well be a long way away from where they live. That is why I have added my wording at the end of the list of grounds for community treatment orders.
We in Parliament make a great virtue of saying that decisions are made at local level. That is all well and good, but if the decision made at local level is, “We don’t need a psychiatrist within our geographic area who has that expertise”, that is not much help to the patient. I have shared with the Minister cases involving people who are not necessarily under a community treatment order but who have an ongoing need for medication and cannot access a psychiatrist with that expertise, and who end up having to travel to centres of population and paying very nice fees, thank you, privately because it is not available in any other way. That cannot be right, which is why I have added my wording to the list of grounds for CTOs. If the Minister does not think that that clause is the appropriate place for it, I will understand; but if so, I hope she will tell me where in Bill it should go, because I really believe it should be there.
As a postscript that has nothing to do with community treatment orders, for people with mental health conditions who need medication, people with autism without mental health conditions—I am looking away from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, at this point—and people with autism who need ongoing medication for, for example, autism-related anxiety, personalised medicine is going to be a real advantage, enabling them to know exactly the right drug and the right dosage. It is out of reach on the NHS at the moment, but personalised medicine, using DNA testing to get the right dosage, is very good. I hope we are going to see it pretty soon, particularly in mental health. Let us start with mental health. I beg to move.
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Monday 20th January 2025
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 47-II(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (17 Jan 2025)
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 44 in this group. Having listened at Second Reading, I was minded to table this amendment based on my noble friend Lady Parminter’s speech giving her real-life experience of the need for community treatment orders. Both the amendments and the Second Reading debate show the wide range of views on community treatment orders, ranging from some who feel they are not needed to those who feel that they are needed and those who feel a review is needed. However, something in the present system is not quite right, so, again, this is a probing amendment to try to understand where the Government’s thinking is.
Given that, even if a review were to take place, CTOs would still exist, my amendment would in principle provide an initial 12-month period for a community treatment order with some very clear provisions. If we are going to have these provisions, they need to be on the face of the Bill rather than in the code of practice—even if they are not the provisions in my amendment. I suggest that the initial order is for 12 months and that, before the order is made, the patient has to be consulted, as well as
“the patient’s nominated persons, and any relevant mental health care professional involved in the patient’s treatment or care planning”.
Importantly, the CTO has to be in line with the necessity for therapeutic benefit, and it has to involve consulting a second medical professional. I understand that the wording of the amendment may not be correct, because a particular type of medical professional, a psychiatrist, would need to be consulted with regards to the community treatment order and whether it will have therapeutic benefit.
I suggest that, at the end of the 12 months, if the clinician feels that an extension is needed, a review takes place, which goes through the process that I have just outlined—to ensure that there is therapeutic benefit, and a second medical practitioner is consulted—and that it is then reviewed after a maximum of six months. That is absolutely right in terms of trying to ensure that the therapeutic benefit is central and a second medical opinion is provided, particularly at the review stage, to ensure that there is a need for the CTO. The reason for this is the wide range of views on CTOs but also the statistics regarding the racial discrimination that there appears to be around their use, which is well documented and well evidenced.
I look forward to the Minister trying to explain the Government’s thinking on community treatment orders and how they need to change. Clearly, something is not quite right in the implementation, the length of time that people are on CTOs and whether CTOs have therapeutic benefit for many of those who are on them.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 67 and 86. I think that this is the right place—I apologise for my earlier confusion; I had a problem with the list.
I will start with Amendment 86 because it follows on from the very important contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. I should preface this by saying that I cannot claim that what I will say originates from me; it is based on the Law Society briefing, which many noble Lords will have received. I saw that nobody else had picked up this amendment, but I thought that it was so important that it should be picked up. As the explanatory statement says:
“The amendment would keep the safeguard of an automatic referral to the tribunal when a patient’s Community Treatment Order is revoked which results in them being detained in a mental health hospital”.
As the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said, a range of views on CTOs has been expressed in these debates, but the general direction of travel is certainly not to remove safeguards and we should be keeping the safeguards that already apply. I will not claim great expertise on this, but it seemed to me that this is an important issue that we need to discuss in Committee.
Amendment 67 is somewhat different but really important. Later on, we will discuss very important issues, which I have signed amendments about, concerning minoritised communities being potentially overtargeted or subjected more to mental health provisions. This amendment picks up something that no one else has picked up, which is economic and social disparities relating to community treatment orders. I went looking for some statistics on CTOs in disadvantaged communities, but I was not able to split them out; perhaps the Minister has them. However, the charity Rethink Mental Illness talks about the burning injustice of how Mental Health Act detention rates are three and a half times higher in the most deprived areas of England compared with the least deprived. Looking at those figures, I can only see that CTOs must be something very similar to that.
We need to ask a question here, and we need the stats and that is why we should have the reporting. It is probably unclear whether we have a psychiatrisation of poverty, so that when people are living in conditions of poverty, that is seen as some form of mental illness in itself, or a discriminatory application of the law against people living in conditions of poverty. The third possibility is that poverty is making people ill. Either way, we should know about these facts. They should be regularly reported, and we should be able to examine them and check on them.
I was just looking at an issue that will be raised later about debt and mental health, on which I will point noble Lords who have not seen it to a really interesting POSTnote that the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology produced on that subject last year. It suggests a two-way relationship between financial and mental well-being. People with mental health issues are three or more times more likely to have problem debt.
Some interesting recent research in a study published in Public Health indicates how social conditions are related to mental health. “Sandwich carers” in the UK —the 1.3 million people who have responsibility for caring for children and older parents—have experienced a significant decline in mental health.
These issues around social and economic disparities and the use of community treatment orders are embedded in the community, and it is crucial to see what is happening. Amendment 67 aims to ensure that we get regular reports relating to community treatment orders.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I wanted to speak to this group because I made some harsh criticisms, on principle, of community treatment orders at Second Reading concerning their coercive and intrusive nature. Since then, perhaps similarly to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, I have had cause to think again, not least after speaking to a number of working psychiatrists and taking on board the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, at Second Reading, which really had an impact on me. It is quite unusual to change one’s mind in this place—maybe it is just me—so I wanted to note that.
I was reminded of this issue by practitioners—I was once one of those—when they said, “We worry about how many idealistic discussions about mental illness just do not take into account the reality of chronic mental illness”; I thought that was a fair reprimand. There are a group of people who are chronically symptomatic, perhaps some of them may never be well, and CTOs are a way to allow people to leave hospital who otherwise clinicians might worry would be too risky to release.
I have been thinking about this issue and in that sense was happy to see and support Amendment 44 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, which sets out time limits. It is useful to think about probing time limits, renewal safeguards and so on, because one does not want automatic continuation and therefore indefinite CTOs on the books, which is what people are concerned about.
I would have been more enthusiastic about Amendment 66, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, which calls for a statutory review of CTO use, but the wording implies that CTOs are problematic per se. Perhaps we need a more open-ended review, because one of the reasons why CTOs are so contentious for so many people is their spiralling and increasing use, and we need to understand why that is.
One worry I have about the Bill in general, and not just this group of amendments, is that, because the drivers of the legislation are concerns about inappropriate hospital admissions and wanting to ensure that we have proportionate detention powers which are used only as a last resort, we need to be wary of demonising hospital care and recognise how much good can be done for mentally distressed patients in hospitals, particularly if they are given time and resources and the right kind of medical intervention. But, as with all hospital matters, that is not necessarily what is happening. Many psychiatric wards are under pressure to get people out into the community as soon as possible—in the sense not of them being well, but of freeing up hospital beds. One might wonder whether the CTOs are a mechanism for effectively turfing patients out before they are ready or well enough.
It also seems that CTOs are necessary when community care is under huge strain, because the idea of voluntarily accessing a wide variety of support in the community is a myth in today’s circumstances. All the briefings we have been sent draw attention to this. A range of groups and people have argued—and a number of noble Lords have said this today—that we need more resources, money and staff for appropriate care in the community to really work. That sounds reasonable, but I am concerned that this will miss the target. I want to reiterate the elephant in the room that I mentioned at Second Reading, which I have not changed my mind about: culturally, we are seeing the medicalisation of more and more problems of the human condition. This encourages ever greater numbers of people to view social, economic, educational and personal difficulties through the prism of mental health.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendments 44 and 66. The Joint Committee on which I serve recommended that community treatment orders be abolished for Part II patients. That recommendation is supported by organisations such as Mind. That is partly due to the awful racial disparity statistics—you are up to 11 times more likely to be under a CTO if you are from a black or Caribbean background—combined with a lack of evidence that CTOs reduce hospital admissions. It took a brave gulp, even as the Joint Committee, to recommend that. The independent review had not gone as far as that, but it was in the report of the Joint Committee.
I, too, like the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, recognise the powerful speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, at Second Reading. I remember that, because of the extremely tight timetable the Joint Committee was given, it did not have time to consider in detail eating disorders or personality disorders, which was regrettable.
I can see from the reasons the noble Baroness outlined that there may be a case for retaining CTOs, perhaps even just for eating disorders. To quote her words from Second Reading, a CTO
“puts a boundary around the eating disorder … that a voluntary agreement could not, in that it makes it clear what will be the result”.—[Official Report, 25/11/24; col. 555.]
The Bill outlines protocols for specific treatments, such as ECT, so it seems possible in principle to have the law apply to specific disorders.
Most reluctantly, I have not made an amendment in Committee in support of the Joint Committee’s recommendation. But the independent review stated that “action is required”. We must not lose sight of that urgency. There are significant problems with CTOs. The argument that is proffered—that they help and are the least restrictive measure for a very small number of patients—is not a good basis for retaining them, bearing in mind the enormous harm they are doing on the other side. I ask the Minister to look for another way, going forward, to help this small group, and not to ask racialised communities to, once again, pay such a high cost for such a small group of patients.
In the Joint Committee’s report, it seemed that the group of patients we were talking about were unrestricted patients under Part III of the Act. Bearing in mind that 79% of CTOs are under Part II, which is for civilian patients, can we look in detail at the evidence to find out which small group of patients we are talking about? There are particular issues, according to our report, if a restraint or restriction is being used on people when the small group of patients seems to be within the forensic context rather than under Part II.
I ask the Minister to put CTOs where they need to be, as a result of these amendments. The independent review said that they should be in the last chance saloon. We must be careful not to lose the urgency that the independent review gave to these issues. Although I support Amendment 66, tabled by my noble friends, it is the very least we can do. The restrictions outlined in Amendment 44 are about ending them after a certain period, because part of the problem is that they go on and on, rolling over for years and years. That coercive effect on certain communities seems to remain, as the path of least resistance.
Baroness Parminter (LD)
My Lords, I want to say a few things about a couple of the amendments. I thank noble Lords for listening and for recognising the situation. It was powerful to hear that, and I am sure that many in the eating disorder community will be delighted to hear it.
I will not repeat what I said at Second Reading, as there seems no need, but in mentioning that, I want to support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, which picks out the focus on community care and the need for more psychiatrists. I and others have made the case for why CTOs can be valuable for people with eating disorders—and for forensic patients, I understand. The value of the CTO is that the individual is helped to engage in the community with their mental health team. It is a multidisciplinary team, but the anchor is the psychiatrist. The noble Baroness was not sure if this was the right place to put her amendment because it has wider ramifications, but it certainly has value in this debate. CTOs, which I believe should be retained, can work only if there are proper multi-disciplinary teams anchored by a psychiatrist in the community, so that those individuals can be kept out of detained settings and engaged in the community. I thank her for bringing that forward, and I support it.
With regard to Amendment 44, I do not support a maximum duration for a community treatment order, because this is about the individual and what they decide, with their multidisciplinary team. What I like about the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, is that it rightly says that we have to review community treatment orders. People’s mental health situations change, and it is important to have step points at which people know they will be reviewed. I do not support a maximum time limit but the break points, which his probing amendment talks about, are worthy of further debate and discussion. I am grateful to him for bringing that forward.
I say with regret that I do not agree so much with the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for retaining the automatic referral to a tribunal of any CTO that is lifted. Again, that goes against my sense that CTOs are about what is right for the individual. With eating disorders, there will be cases of CTOs being lifted because the person is no longer able to engage with the community team because the eating order has gone beyond the bounds of the CTO and is compromising their health and putting them, bluntly, at risk of death. I do not see why, in those circumstances, there needs to be an automatic referral to a tribunal. Strengthening people’s rights to go to a tribunal where there is a case for that is right and proper, but, because of my view about personalised care—especially for eating disorders, but this has wider ramifications—I do not support the case for automatic referral.
I know that there are people around the Committee who understand the concerns far better than me, particularly about the high preponderance of people in the black community who are on CTOs. I understand and hear that concern. I tried to get to the bottom of the figures, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, to find out how many forensic patients were on CTOs. Given that you are four times more likely to be in prison if you are a black person than a white person, I tried to work out what the figures were to get the correlation to say whether it is because there are more people in prison that CTOs are preponderantly in the black community. I could not work that out. Equally, I could not work out how many people with eating disorders were on CTOs. I got the Library to try to help me, and it said that the figures are not cut that way and do not work that way. It seems to me that there is an issue about the data that we, and the Minister, are working with to make informed decisions.
I am not sure about the exact terms and conditions of the review that has been proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and which in a later group is proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, but I think there is an issue about the data out there. It is not helping us, or anyone else, make CTOs work for those where they can work, are working and should work in the future, and is clearly causing a problem. We need to get to the bottom of that.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group. I will speak to Amendment 66 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Howe. One of the motivations when we were considering amendments from our Benches was not only to respond to concerns raised by stakeholders but to probe the Government on why they did not accept some of the recommendations of the pre-legislative Joint Committee. That is the nature of these amendments. To the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, I say that the amendment is meant as a probing amendment to ask the Government why they have not adopted all the recommendations of the Joint Committee.
One of the things that drives many of us—I feel particularly strongly about this, given my background—is why so many people of an Afro-Caribbean background are being detained or are subject to CTOs. The noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, made a valuable point. One of the reasons I have tabled other amendments along those lines, which will be discussed in later groups, is that, after all these years of saying that too many people from the black community are being detained, if we want to do something about it, we need data, and we need to understand why they are being detained. Without the data, it is left to rumour or speculation, or people make up reasons. Everything needs to be driven by the data if we are to address the fact that a disproportionate number of black people are detained.
We tabled Amendment 66 because the pre-legislative committee recommended that community treatment orders be abolished for Part II patients, those not in the criminal justice system, and wanted a statutory process and timeline to be put in place for the review and potential abolition—I say those words from the Joint Committee’s recommendation very carefully—for Part III patients, those involved with the criminal justice system.
Many noble Lords came to the Second Reading debate wanting to see an end to community treatment orders, and many noble Lords have spoken tonight about this. We were all struck by the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, and of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, who very honestly said that, having listened to patients and families, she knows that there is a small group of people for whom CTOs work, are the least restrictive option and are beneficial, and we should therefore keep them. I was particularly struck by that. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said that people do not change their mind very often, but the views that we brought to the debate in the first place have been challenged.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made the important point that, while she is reluctant to admit it, she believes that there should be a change in the process around CTOs. That is important. This is why this probing amendment is asking for a comprehensive review of CTOs. We have listed a number of criteria that should be in that review, but I know that many noble Lords have concerns over CTOs.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
My Lords, I am most grateful to noble Lords for their contributions in this important and interesting area. There have been, and to some degree still are, many different opinions across the Committee. This has been one of those rare occasions when parliamentarians may say that they have changed their minds having listened to the debate and looked into things further; that has added to the richness of what we have before us.
Amendment 43 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, would require clinicians to ensure that patients had access to a local prescribing psychiatrist when deciding on a community treatment order. I heard the noble Baroness’s comments about the word “local”; I appreciate her drawing the attention of the Committee to that. I particularly heard the support given by the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter.
In the Bill, to put someone on a community treatment order, it must be necessary for the patient to receive medical treatment, which can be provided without detention in a hospital. I think I heard the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, say—I hope she will forgive me for not quoting her directly—that we should not demonise hospitals. She is nodding; I thank her for that. I can assure her that there is no intention to do that; it is about getting a better balance in the interests of getting the right care for individuals. The responsible clinician must consider whether appropriate medical treatment is available. That would, by necessary implication, include access to a local prescribing psychiatrist if it is what the patient needed.
For a CTO to be made, our reforms also require a community clinician with oversight of the patient’s treatment in the community to agree. The Bill therefore already means that, when deciding whether a CTO is appropriate, access to a prescribing psychiatrist will be fully and properly considered if access to medication is required.
I recall that the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, raised an important point about the shortage of prescribing psychiatrists in some areas and the impact that this could have. We intend that the measures in the Bill in relation to dynamic support registers will improve the monitoring of the needs of, and support for, people who may be at risk of going into crisis and being detained under the Act. ICBs and local authorities will be required to have regard to information on the register when exercising their commissioning and—we have discussed this before—market-shaping functions respectively.
I mentioned earlier the requirements in respect of learning disability and autism training, and autism training for psychiatrists. I hope that will help to reassure the noble Baroness.
Amendment 44, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and spoken to by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Berridge, Lady Parminter and Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, relates to the review into the extension of CTOs. I completely understand why the noble Lord was inspired to come forward with this, having been inspired, as the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said, by the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, at Second Reading and the way in which she relayed her personal experience. That kind of contribution and the impact that it has is exactly what we welcome, and I am glad she is pleased that people listened— indeed we did.
The amendment would ensure that CTOs aligned with the statement of principles in the code of practice and could be extended beyond 12 months only under certain conditions, with a review of the ongoing necessity and the therapeutic benefit of the CTO. I strongly agree with the intention behind the noble Lord’s amendment but it is fully supported by existing provisions in the Bill. Alignment with the code and the four principles is already achieved by new Section 118(2D), which requires clinicians before placing someone on a CTO to have regard to the statement of principles in the code. Under Clause 6, the patient can be put on a CTO only if there is a reasonable prospect of it having therapeutic benefit for the patient, and the Bill will mean that a responsible clinician cannot extend a CTO beyond six months unless the conditions, including therapeutic benefit, continue to be met.
The current code of practice states that, before renewal, the responsible clinician should consult the multidisciplinary team, the patient, the nearest relative—or, in future, the nominated person—and an advocate. The Bill adds that the patient’s community clinician must be consulted before renewal. We are therefore increasing the frequency of automatic referrals to the tribunal to ensure that patients can come off CTOs when they are no longer benefiting. Under the new system, a CTO cannot be extended past the 12-month point without a referral to the tribunal. In the current system, the patient can go for three years before a further referral is required.
Lord Scriven (LD)
That is pleasing to hear from the Minister. So what would stop that going in the Bill?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
As we have discussed before, it is about ensuring that we are able to update in line with good practice, and that can be nimbly—if I may use that word—outlined if it is not in the Bill. We are trying to future-proof it, as the noble Lord is aware, and to ensure that our reviews of our practice and so on are continually updated. That is how I would put it to the noble Lord.
Baroness Barker (LD)
Would the Minister reflect on this? CTOs were brought in under the 2007 Act. The then Labour Government went shopping around the world for various different models of CTOs and cherry-picked bits and pieces out of the ones that they liked to come up with the model that they did. CTOs were brought before the House, and we were assured that they would be used sparingly and we would not run into all the problems that people then foresaw about them being used disproportionately against some minoritised communities.
This is the first opportunity we have had to go back to CTOs. In the 20 years since, absolutely nothing has changed in practice. Twenty years on, there is no indication—even though there must be ample evidence, not just in this country but around the world—about how they work in practice and the fact that they have not worked in the way they were meant to when they were introduced. Does the Minister understand why those of us who have been here so often before are reluctant to accept the argument that is trotted out time after time, that Governments need to be flexible and make change, when within 20 years there has been no change in the face of overwhelming evidence that the law is not working in the way that was intended?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I can understand the frustration that the noble Baroness outlines. It is hard for me to comment on a number of those 20 years. My feeling is that that is why we are here today updating the Bill. Indeed, at the risk of repeating myself—I will try not to—I take the point that she is making, yet I feel there is a need, under the updated Bill, which I hope will become an Act, to review the overall impact of the new provisions. I understand that we cannot be on a hope and a wing and a prayer. That is not the intention. We will keep CTOs under review as we implement changes. I certainly want to keep a very close eye on their impact, as I know your Lordships’ House will. I know that noble Lords will not be shy to raise any concerns that they have.
Amendment 66, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and supported by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, would require the use of community treatment orders to be reviewed within two years of the Act being passed. As a number of noble Lords have said, we believe that CTOs can be valuable for certain patients—indeed, as we have referred to, the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, spoke about their benefit for eating disorder patients, as she did at Second Reading—but reform is needed so that they are used only when appropriate and for the shortest possible time.
The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, made a couple of points, which I am happy to write to him about, about concerns about resources. He asked about the role of mental health nurses—an important point—and the effectiveness of CTOs. I will write further on those points.
Lord Kamall (Con)
If the Minister and the officials look at Amendment 66, they will see it asks four specific questions. It could include more, but I wonder whether we can understand what the Government understand about each of those four things, including the impact of community treatment orders on people from different ethnic minorities and the effectiveness of the continued use of community treatment orders. I think it would be interesting for noble Lords to understand what the Government currently understand, if that makes sense.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
Yes, it does. I thank the noble Lord for the clarification. I will come to some of those points, particularly on racial disparity, but I just wanted to ensure that I did not miss the points that he made.
The noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, raised how people with eating disorders will be supported on CTOs. To elaborate a bit on what I said previously, for some people CTOs allow them to be cared for in the community with the least restriction, but with the safeguard that they can be recalled for treatment if necessary. That is a very necessary aspect.
I hope noble Lords are aware that I certainly would agree about the importance of the right data being used to inform decisions, trends and reviews. Data on community treatment orders are published as part of the annual Mental Health Act statistics. My officials are working with NHS England and others to understand what additional data should be collected to understand the impact of the reforms—this relates to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall.
I know that noble Lords more than understand that gathering new data takes time. Therefore, it is felt that a review after two years would be somewhat premature, as it would be based on data from before the reforms were commenced. So, rather than committing to a review in legislation at a fixed date, the Government are committed to ongoing monitoring of CTOs as we implement the changes. This will form part of our overall commitment to evaluate the impact of reform and to consider next steps. I am sure that your Lordships’ House would wish to continue to be involved in this.
I turn to Amendment 67, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, requiring a review of economic and social disparities in relation to CTOs. I agree, as I have many times, that there are significant disparities in the use of community treatment orders, particularly between different minority ethnic groups. This was spoken to by not just the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, but the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. I will make a few points about this. Those who are black are currently seven times more likely to be detained on a CTO—we have discussed this in your Lordships’ House a number of times, and rightly so, in my view. For CTOs, we are strengthening decision-making in three ways: first, by requiring that an individual must be at risk of serious harm to be made subject to a CTO; secondly, by requiring that the community clinician be involved in all community treatment order decisions; and, thirdly, by increasing the frequency of automatic reviews of patient cases by the tribunal. We will work closely to ensure that the Bill’s provisions are effectively implemented, because a main plank of this legislation is to reduce racial disparities in decision-making under the Act. I am sure we will return to this point many times, and rightly so.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
I have two questions about data, and I entirely understand if this could perhaps be included in a letter. The racial disparities are well known and well canvassed, but I am wondering about disparities of people living in relatively deprived communities—those that used to be described as “left behind”. There seems to be some evidence of disparity between people in those poorer communities and wealthier communities. Also, on individuals living in poverty versus individuals not living in poverty, what difference is there in CTOs—and more broadly, but CTOs might be a particular area of concern? I am interested in what information the Minister can give—not necessarily now—because we need to focus on that as well.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
The noble Baroness makes a fair point. We will certainly cover CTOs in the planned evaluation of the reforms, including consideration of economic and social disparities. I hope that reassures her.
I turn to the noble Baroness’s Amendment 86. The intended effect given in the explanatory statement provided by the noble Baroness is to retain the requirement for
“an automatic referral to the tribunal when a patient’s Community Treatment Order is revoked”.
The amendment as drafted does not achieve this because it amends a different part of Clause 30—
Baroness Merron (Lab)
Indeed the noble Baroness did try, and I have therefore taken its intention at face value.
The Bill removes the requirement for an automatic referral following the revocation of a CTO. This was a recommendation of the independent review which found that, in practice, the automatic referral was an ineffective safeguard, as often the patient is back in the community or back in hospital as a Section 3 patient before the tribunal has had the opportunity to review their case. Therefore, the current process creates a burden on tribunals but does not protect the patient. The Bill improves other safeguards for patients on a CTO, including increased access to tribunals. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who has contributed on this group of amendments. Everybody has bought something different to the table. There have been some good things. I think we are all grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, who led us at Second Reading to have a better understanding of how CTOs can help with eating disorders. I just think back to 2006 and the pre-legislative scrutiny committee of the previous amendment of the 1983 Act. I think there are three of us in the Chamber tonight who were part of that pre-legislative scrutiny. I think that the noble Baronesses, Lady Murphy and Lady Barker, and I were members and I recall the debate on community treatment orders at that time, 20 years ago, when we had quite a lot of strong reservations about how they would work in practice.
Despite some of the good things we heard tonight on this group, I still sense that reservation. I think that if what we had before us was 20 years of lived experience—practical examples of where CTOs have been good, where they have been bad, where they needed to be amended and where they have been amended—we would feel a lot more confident. Too many parts of this jigsaw still seem to be missing to make what I feel is a substantial change to the 1983 Act 20 years later and know that we have got it right. I always think that when we are in doubt about legislation, there is that old, hackneyed thing: “Suppose this was something in a court. What would they say about this? What was Parliament’s intention at the time?” Can I actually define Parliament’s intention at the time? I am not sure that I can define it in as much detail as I would like, in order to feel we are doing the right thing as far as this legislation is concerned.
I thank the Minister. She has, as always, been as helpful and courteous as she can be with this very difficult issue, but I do not quite feel that we have got there yet. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Barker
“(c) after subsection (6) insert—“(6A) Any person subject to a community treatment order must be informed orally and in writing at the time of the making of the order of their right to an independent mental health advocate under section 130A of this Act.””Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would ensure that people who are to be subject to a CTO would receive information about their right to advocacy.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I do not want to bore people who were not present 20 years ago when we were discussing the introduction of this measure, but the main focus of our discussion was that CTOs would be a means of enabling people with serious and enduring conditions, such as schizophrenia, to be compelled to take medication in the community. That was as a matter of public safety and protection for those people. Twenty years on, we are talking about people with eating disorders: it is completely different.
The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, is right: the evidence base behind the discussion is woefully lacking. What we do not know—we do not have the evidence for it—is what change has come about on the part of clinicians. It was sold to us that we were going to stop people being held inappropriately in acute services where they did not need to be and where there was not going to be any therapeutic benefit for them. We have never, to the best of my knowledge, seen that there has been change, nor, indeed, that there has been a flow of resources that has enabled those patients who have been on CTOs to leave acute hospitals and not go back. Unless and until we get that evidence base, frankly, we can all come up with our theories about what are the causal factors, but they are nothing more than our own prejudices and theories.
That said, my amendment on CTOs comes from real-life, front-line experience. As the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, read out from the briefing, there are people whose experience of being on CTOs has been so bad that they want to see an end to them; they do not want to see other people being subjected to them, and I have a degree of sympathy with that. Having said that, I accept that there are some people for whom they work.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I will speak to Amendment 100 in this group, and there are four or five consequential amendments which I have added. Noble Lords will therefore be pleased to know that the group is a lot smaller than it looks.
The purpose of this amendment is, on the face of it, to remove informal patients from qualifying for help from independent mental health advocates, on the basis that, given the resources required, to expand the services for detained patients to all in-patients is impractical, as in the impact assessment done by the Government. There will be some who assume from this amendment that I do not like IMHAs, but nothing could be further from the truth.
On the face of it, one cannot criticise what appears to be an extension of services and automatic referral to IMHA services, for both detained and informal patients. Local authorities, under direction from Schedule 3, will be obliged to provide the service and will need to extend it significantly. There are currently 50,000 new detained patients eligible for the service every year, but this would double to 100,000 people when informal patients are included. The impact assessment for cost to local authorities calculated that these new services will be an extra £571 million over a 20-year period—that is over half a billion pounds, or £81 million or so every year.
One might assume, therefore, that some serious evaluative research had demonstrated what a boon advocates are, as we all hope so, and that patients valued them and that they made a big difference to their outcomes. However, there is just one small UK study, by Karen Newbigging and her colleagues, which, on quality of services, suggested that where they were accessible— and they were not really very accessible in all the places studied—patients found the process was a positive experience, although they had no impact on outcomes of care and treatment. The advocates concentrated on explaining people’s rights but did not advocate more creatively to change decisions on care, which the authors rightly suggested could be an important role.
It is generally thought that, where IMHAs are from the same ethnic community as the patient, this is one step that could be taken to make the service more friendly for black and other ethnic-minority patients. There is better evidence in the States, where it has been demonstrated that independent advocates are central to the success of advance choice documents; patients do not create advance choice documents without a facilitator. A study in North Carolina showed that providing a facilitator in the form of an independent advocate increased the number of people making a psychiatric advance directive from 3% to 60%. Since we hope that these will be increasingly helpful to patients, I can understand why we think it is very important that detained patients should have them.
However, I would suggest that it is a bit of a leap to go for a massive expansion without much more evidence on how best to use these trained advocates and on who benefits the most. In September 2023, there were 28,600 vacancies—19% of the total workforce—in mental health services, including 1,700 medical and 13,300 nursing vacancies. In spite of training more staff, there is ample evidence that the current challenges posed by in-patient environments mean that many services rely on agency and bank staff simply to keep the ward open. The King’s Fund survey of approved mental health professionals found that, to meet the requirements of a 24-hour service, there would need to be a 30% increase in the number of full-time equivalent staff, in addition to accounting for the vacancy rates of over 11%.
Yet here we are proposing that the local authority should spend a huge amount of money on independent mental health advocates, when it does not have a satisfactory number of psychiatric social workers and cannot fulfil its obligations to provide decent social care for older people or protect vulnerable children from harm. If any noble Lords were reviewing their own local authority spending, do we seriously think that expanding IMHA services to informal patients would be high on the agenda? I think probably not, although I believe they will be helpful, especially for patients matched to someone of the same ethnic background. I would like to see more consistent evidence about how best to recruit and train them and develop their skills because it is crucial, if we do fund them, that we get the basics right, so that when they do get appointed, they are doing the right things for the right people. Otherwise, we should be extremely cautious in expanding these services.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 102, 105 and 106 in my name. These amendments all deal with extending the provision of advocacy services to informal patients below the age of 18. When I read the other amendments in this group, I thought, “Goodness me, this is going to be a bit tricky, isn’t it?”. It felt at one point as if we were diametrically opposed, and that is not a comfortable position to be in against someone with years of expertise who is as distinguished as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. However, I have listened carefully to what she has to say and the nub of it is her concern about resources. On that point, I fully get it, about the workforce generally and advocates in particular. I am going to press on with my amendments none the less, because I am trying to deal with the principle as opposed to the resources.
Both the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act and the Joint Committee on the draft Bill recommended that advocacy should be extended to informal patients. Currently, only those detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 have a legal right to advocacy services. The Mental Health Bill introduces a new opt-out scheme, meaning that all detained patients will get an automatic referral to advocacy services. The Bill also extends advocacy to informal patients, but they will not be captured by the new opt-out scheme, meaning that informal patients will still be required to ask for support via an advocate. This is at the very nub of the problem with which I am concerned.
It is crucial that children and young people aged under 18 admitted to mental health in-patient care informally should have an automatic referral to advocacy services, in line with those who are detained under the Act. There may not be very large numbers—that is relevant to the resource concerns—but it is worth remembering that a higher proportion of children and young people are admitted to mental health hospitals informally. Indeed, it is estimated that around 31% of under-18s are admitted to in-patient care this way—namely, on the basis of their own or parental consent. Having access to an advocate automatically will help young informal patients understand and exercise their rights and ensure they have a say in the decisions made about their care and treatment. This could also lead to improved outcomes and prevent young people being kept in hospital for any longer than they need to be—something I am sure we all agree on.
It is worth adding that the lack of access to advocacy for informal patients has been a long-standing concern. There is a real concern that children and young people admitted informally will continue to experience problems accessing an advocate under the new system proposed as part of the Bill. It has been noted that, often, young informal patients do not understand their rights and feel an underlying threat that, if they break the rules in some way, they will be sectioned. We have to take that into account. Despite the concerns about resources, which I fully understand, access to an advocate is crucial in helping children and young people who are informal patients navigate what is a very complex system.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. The extension of advocacy services to children and young people is important, because, as she outlined, there is a disproportionate number of children who are voluntary—I think there are just under 1,000 a year—in mental health institutions.
It is also important to recognise that there are other additional rights that children have when they are detained, or when they have agreed and consented to go into hospital. They need to continue their education while they are in there. It is important to advocate for what their entitlement is while they are in hospital—I think we are all used to walking past the hospital school that is within a normal physical illness hospital—thereby enabling them to continue their education and considering what their rights are in that regard. That is obviously so important for them and their recovery, so I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, I have a few brief comments on this group of amendments. In response to Amendment 43A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, given that anyone subject to a CTO already receives something in writing, it should not be too difficult for the Government to accept her amendment. Assuming that they have a right to access independent mental health advocates, it seems like a very reasonable amendment.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, I must admit that, when I read the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I wondered—given that the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, seek to extend access to independent mental health advocates—why she would want to exclude informal patients from access to those advocates. However, as she explained, and as my noble friend Lady Berridge commented on day one in Committee, we have to deal with the world as it is, not the ideal world that does not exist. As the Minister has often reminded us, this will not all happen in one big bang; the Government’s plan is for it to take over 10 years, subject to spending reviews and resources.
In fact, the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, made what appear to be two valid points. The first is that we need to be realistic about resourcing. As the impact assessment suggests that expanding access to independent mental health advocates to informal patients will cost £81 million every year, we have to ask: is that the best use of that money, if it were available, given all the other demands on it?
On the noble Baroness’s second observation, I thought that the research cited was interesting: that extending these independent mental health advocates from one environment or cohort of patients to another does not necessarily mean that it will work.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I just wonder where this £81 million per annum comes from. I think that there is a total cost of £99 million over the period, but I am not sure where the £81 million comes from.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
It is taken directly from the Government’s impact assessment on the Bill to local authorities, with these particular resources for IMHAs.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I am reading the impact assessment, and the annual amount is between £6 million to £7 million, and not £81 million. Perhaps the Minister could clarify that when she responds, as the impact assessment that I am reading is different from the £81 million that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, are referring to.
Lord Kamall (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, for that, as I would not want to be using inaccurate information. Maybe the Minister can check with her officials, thanks to the wonderful use of technology, to ensure that we have an accurate figure by the time that she gets up to respond to our points. Whichever number is accurate for the cost of extension, it does have an impact on how noble Lords may feel if these amendments come back on Report.
The study that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, shared with us contained two statements which I picked up on, and which I hope the noble Baroness will correct if I am wrong. First, patients found the process was a positive experience. But, secondly, the study found no evidence that it had any impact on the outcomes of the care and treatment. That is an important point to make. Once again, what is effective, and what works? Sometimes, feeling better and being more positive is part of a treatment, and we should not dismiss that.
I do not want to sound too negative, as I thought that the North Carolina study was very positive, and the noble Baroness and I corresponded about this over the weekend. It was interesting that it found that black mental health patients benefited from having an independent mental health advocate, especially if the advocate was also black, as patients felt better supported, and more confident that they would be listened to by someone. The crucial point was that it appeared to reduce the rate of repeat detentions. This is one of the crucial issues throughout the Bill. This is one of the reasons why my noble friend Lady May asked for the Wessely review.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I do not wish to interrupt my noble friend’s flow, but this is one of the key things that is evidence-based, and that does reduce detention for those communities, so it is important.
Lord Kamall (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend for that intervention, because this is something that we could learn from here. Given the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, made at the beginning, would taking that lesson from the black community in North Carolina work with black communities up and down the country here? I hope it is something that the Government could look into, or respond to, as one of the ways, once we have the relevant data, to reduce the rate of detention and CTOs for people from the black community.
I end by asking the Minister that question: is she aware of whether her department has looked at—was it North Carolina or South Carolina?
Lord Kamall (Con)
I would not want to upset any people from South Carolina. In fact, I did some work in Raleigh and Durham a few years, so I should get this right. Is the department aware of that study, and has there been any analysis of what could be learned from that study which could be relevant to the United Kingdom, especially given one of the main reasons we are here tonight is to reduce the disproportionate detention of people from black communities? I look forward to the Minister’s responses.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to and tabled amendments for this important discussion, which, I am sure my Whip will tell me, will be the last one of the evening.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I have had that confirmed.
I will first address Amendment 43A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. Patients on CTOs already have the right to independent mental health advocate services. Community treatment order patients will be informed of their right to an independent mental health advocate when they are under Section 3, as part of the opt-out approach for all detained patients, as a patient cannot be placed on a CTO without having been detained first in hospital. They will be aware of this right. In addition, the revised code of practice provides opportunities for further guidance on how to improve the uptake of services for CTO patients, and we will consult on this.
Amendment 102, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, was also spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. We appreciate that advocacy plays a vital role in supporting choice and the person as an individual, and that under-18s are a vulnerable group who would benefit from independent mental health advocate representation. I am pleased to say that the Bill already extends the right to an independent mental health advocate to informal patients, and this includes children and young people. It places a new duty on hospital managers to inform them of this right. As we seek to revise the code of practice, we plan to provide further clarity on how to meet the needs of children and young people, including through this increased access to advocacy, so the point is well made.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, for bringing Amendments 100, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110 and 111 before the Committee today, which were also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. Currently, independent mental health advocacy support is available only to detained patients. We want to extend this support to all in-patients, as we believe it is important for all patients to understand their rights and legal status, not just those who are detained under the Mental Health Act. This is in line with the approach already taken in Wales, where both detained and informal patients are eligible.
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, raised points about expanding advocacy and the use of resources. The figures suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, overstate the costs that are set out in the impact assessment. Table 7 in the impact assessment shows that the estimated annual cost of informal advocacy would be between £6 million and £7 million a year. I hope that clarifies things for noble Lords.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I apologise. Obviously, I was looking at another figure from a different bit of the impact assessment.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I think the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, added up all the years and got to the final cost, and then described it as an annual cost. I think it was a genuine mistake.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am sure that what the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said is absolutely right—and the noble Baroness has absolutely no need to apologise.
We intend to implement these reforms in phases, when funding and system capacity allow, prioritising an opt-out approach for detained patients. We will expand eligibility for independent mental health advocates to informal patients only when we are sure that doing so will not impact on the resource available to detained patients.
Turning to Amendments 105 and 106, tabled by noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, as I mentioned, the extension in the Bill of the right to an independent mental health advocate to inform all patients does include children and young people. With regards to an opt-out approach to advocacy, we believe that detained patients have a particular need, given that they are subject to greater restrictions and are potentially more vulnerable compared with informal patients. The Mental Health Act, its code of practice and the regulations relating to the independent mental health advocate services set out that local authorities should ensure that independent mental health advocates understand equality issues and that there are enough independent advocates with a specialised understanding of the specific needs of particular groups—for example, children and young people. As we revise the code of practice, we plan to provide further clarity on how to meet the needs of children and young people, including through this increased access to advocacy. I hope that this reassurance will be welcome.
The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, asked whether the department was aware of the North Carolina or South Carolina study. As we have all agreed, it is in respect of the North Carolina study. We are running culturally appropriate advocacy pilots in Manchester and Birmingham which are testing the approaches to delivering improved culturally competent advocacy services that support specific preferences and needs of people from minority ethnic groups. We have also commissioned an independent evaluation of these pilots and will be looking at that alongside the international evidence that has been discussed this evening. I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, for raising this.
For all those reasons, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister very much. I will not delay the Committee for very long, particularly given the time of night and that people are screaming to go home. However, there are two or three important points that we need to make. First, on community treatment orders, let us remember that it is compulsory treatment in the community. It happens in people’s own homes or wherever they live, but it is compulsory treatment. We are in danger of forgetting that. Secondly, the Minister said that the intention was to ensure that all detained patients have access to an advocate. Advocacy services are in the acute hospitals. They are not out in the community, yet the treatment which is happening in the community is compulsory treatment.
Both of those two points flag up something that a lot of us mentioned at Second Reading. We have taken the 1983 Act and patched it up, and bolted things on and taken things off so many times that we are now at the point of squeezing stuff in and shoving it around, and we no longer have a basic legal framework which is fit for purpose. We are not talking about building seamless community and acute services which people pass through, get better and come out; we are now in Heath Robinson territory. That is why we are in danger of missing some tricks.
The organisations that came up with my amendment are made up of the people who work, day in and day out, to try to build a proper service, as opposed to episodes of care. They are saying that people who are subject to compulsory treatment are not getting advocacy because of the way that the services are set up. I hope that the Minister might take that on board, but at this stage and time of night, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Wednesday 22nd January 2025
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 47-III Third marshalled list for Committee - (21 Jan 2025)
Earl Howe
“(iii) seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma;”
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 46, I will speak also to Amendments 47, 53, 54 and 95 in this group. These amendments have one central aim in common, which is that of maximising the therapeutic benefit of being cared for in a secure mental health unit. That aim should be common to all mental health patients, young or not so young, but it is largely the concerns of younger mental health patients which have prompted these amendments.
Blooming Change is a small independent charity whose membership is comprised of children and young people who have experienced detention in mental health in-patient units in England as children. It is at their urging that I have tabled Amendments 46 and 47. I have done so after hearing some first-hand accounts of incidents in which children in mental health settings have been treated in a fashion that is the very opposite of therapeutic, by which I mean treated with a lack of understanding, with an obvious vindictiveness, sometimes, and sometimes even with outright cruelty.
It is perhaps hard to imagine this happening when we know how professional and caring most staff in mental health units are, but I am absolutely persuaded that it does happen, and not just rarely. Medical interventions such as nasogastric feeding or sedation are threatened and used as punishments. Patients who have raised concerns with their parents have been silenced by their parents being told by staff that they should take no notice of the concerns, because the child was either unwell or lying.
One young person reported as follows: “Young people on section were essentially incarcerated, yet still not able to voice views or share how they felt or generally engage with their treatment. This would lead to overuse of medical interventions or the threat of this, leading to young people living in fear and not having a way to raise concerns. Many of these things had a long-lasting impact on me. Had this coercion not occurred and medicalisation not been used as punishment, I would have been able to access treatment and recover, instead of the treatment compounding my illness and in many ways contributing to me being stuck in the cycle”.
Blooming Change has pointed out the significance of childhood trauma as a factor underlying a large number of mental health admissions involving young people and the challenging behaviour that they then exhibit. The problem is that, all too often, the link between childhood trauma and the way that a patient behaves is not recognised or understood. As a result, someone with autism or a severely troubled and traumatised young people person going into meltdown —as was well described, incidentally, by my noble friend Lady Browning during our first day in Committee —is simply viewed as wilfully disruptive or downright disobedient, with punishments doled out in response.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, my Amendments 50 and 51 are both about the importance of non-drug-based interventions. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, this group is all about maximising therapeutic benefit. I am very supportive of all the amendments in this group and my amendments are complementary to those just introduced very powerfully by the noble Earl.
I am the first to admit that I am not a clinician, and it is, of course, vital that individual decisions about treatment are made by qualified clinicians. But I am firmly of the view that, in the right circumstances and where clinically appropriate, non-drug-based interventions can be highly beneficial.
New Section 56A establishes a clinical checklist. An approved clinician will be required to go through this checklist when making treatment decisions to ensure that any given treatment is appropriate. Amendment 50 would make it clear that non-drug-based interventions are included in the alternative forms of medical treatment available, which must be identified and evaluated as part of the checklist. In short, it will establish beyond doubt that clinicians must consider and evaluate the use of non-drug-based interventions when they make decisions about treatment.
Non-drug-based interventions can cover many things, such as psychological and talking therapies, counselling, occupational therapies, art and creative therapies, physical exercise, physical activities—the list goes on. It is vital that evidence-based non-drug-based interventions are thought about, identified and considered equally when treatment decisions are made.
As I said in our discussions on Monday—this point was also just made in the introduction to this group—autistic people and people with a learning disability are too often overmedicated in hospital settings. Again, although medication may be appropriate in many places, people cannot and should not be left on their wards with little to no other meaningful therapeutic input other than that medication.
People must be seen as human beings in the round when these treatment decisions are made. That should be reflected in the type of treatment offered, including non-drug-based interventions, such as talking therapies, which are adapted to the individual and have a real prospect of offering therapeutic benefit, either in place of or in addition to medication. I readily acknowledge that treatment can involve either. That judgment is for a clinician to make.
I was very encouraged that the Joint Committee on the Bill recognised in its report the importance of non-drug-based treatment and recommended that the code of practice makes clear that appropriate treatment includes non-drug-based treatment. However, to ensure the Bill aligns with the principle of therapeutic benefit, it is important that this emphasis on non-drug-based interventions is reflected in the Bill.
It is well known that the transition from children’s services to adult services can be particularly difficult when it comes to overmedication and failing to adequately deliver non-drug-based interventions. This has included cases where young autistic people on children’s wards have been provided with some level of speech and language therapy, arts and crafts, and general help with establishing a routine. However, when the transition is made to post-18 adult services, the quality of care can drop off markedly, with no non-drug-based therapeutic treatment delivered, leading to a decline in well-being. In many ways, as has already been said, this is little different from being held in a cell.
Having a wide range of these interventions means that in-patients can have greater choice and control over their care—another key principle of the Bill. The use of non-drug-based therapies in hospital is important, not only to provide a therapeutically beneficial environment during detention but to ensure some essential continuity of support after discharge.
My Amendment 51 differs from Amendment 50 in that it would apply only to autistic people and those with a learning disability detained under Part III. It would ensure that the clinical checklist is followed when treatment decisions are made when making those decisions includes specific consideration of whether non-drug-based interventions are more appropriate in place of, or in addition to, medication.
As we have already discussed, one of the most significant changes in this Bill is the change to the detention criteria in Part II, Section 3. This means that autistic people or people with a learning disability cannot be detained under Section 3 unless they had a co-existing psychiatric disorder. However, this is not being applied to Part III patients—that is, those detained through the criminal justice system. This means that autistic people and people with a learning disability can continue to be detained for “treatment” in mental health hospitals under Part III, even if they do not have co-existing psychiatric disorders. One of the concerns about the Bill, as we have heard, is that a consequence of poor implementation could mean that more autistic people and people with a learning disability are diverted into the criminal justice pathway to get round, frankly, the new detention criteria for Section 3.
It could well be the case that Part II patients who are autistic or have a learning disability will exhibit behaviours that challenge, for which certain psychotropic medications can be prescribed. These medications can include anti-depressants, anti-seizure or anti-psychotic medications, sedatives or stimulants. NHS England’s website states:
“People with a learning disability are thought to be 16 times more likely and autistic people 7 times more likely to be prescribed an antipsychotic than the general population”,
despite existing guidance that people should be given psychotropic medication for only the right reasons, in the lowest dose and for the shortest time.
I simply conclude by saying that the focus on non-drug-based interventions in these amendments is not about saying that medication should not be used. Indeed, it can be highly beneficial in many cases. It is about ensuring that other factors that contribute to therapeutic benefit are always considered and put on an equal footing.
Lord Crisp (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 148, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hollins. I also support all the amendments in this group. Indeed, on the ones introduced by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I very much support the stories that we have heard and which he spoke about at Second Reading. I also note the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, about non-drug therapies, which relate very much to what I will talk about.
I will make one general point: a generational change in the whole field of mental health is happening globally, with a shift towards more social interventions and preventions. This wider context needs to be recognised a bit more in the Bill. Amendment 148, which is about withdrawal from dependency-building drugs, is part of that context. I also agree very much with the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, just made that drugs are needed, and with the powerful points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in the last day in Committee on the real pressures and problems that people within the NHS and beyond face in working with some of the people they end up having to work with, and on the conditions that they are working in. This emphasis on social interventions, therefore, is not at the expense of other aspects of mental health.
Some of these interventions do harm. I will come on to the point about withdrawing from drugs. On reducing prescribing and supporting withdrawal, I do not understand why this Government, through the Bill or otherwise, are not making changes that could help to reduce costs and improve services, which would take pressure off all services and, indeed, improve people’s economic position by enabling them to be fit to work.
Lord Mawson (CB)
I support Amendment 148 from the noble Lord, Lord Crisp. I have just arrived back from a three-day event with Professor Brian Cox in Northern Ireland, where we had been bringing together the NHS, schools, the business community and the public sector around a whole programme on innovation and how we think about the future with regard to these matters, taking the principles that we originally developed at the Bromley by Bow Centre in the East End of London, now nationally across the country.
If I look like I am in recovery, it is because I am—I have literally just landed trying to get back here. I apologise that I could not take part in the Second Reading, because being a working Peer, sometimes it is not very easy to fit all this into the diary. One does one’s best.
I am very aware of the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, is raising. Indeed, I tabled a number of Written Questions this week about this very matter. I support the amendments because we have a very serious problem out there. My GP colleagues are telling me, as the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, has said, that one in five adults in England is on antidepressants; it is one in four in Scotland. This is a really serious problem.
As a country, we need to return to a discussion and a conversation, as the Health Secretary—I hope, in the spring—prepares to help us rethink the future of the NHS. We need to return to the question that we asked 40 years ago in the East End of London, the fundamental question: “What is health?” What we see happening here is serious for hundreds of thousands of people and is driving a culture. We also need to start to worry about what is happening within the machinery of the NHS and the state, as it drives these sorts of cultures.
Finally, as I put down in one of my Written Questions, we need to be asking, practically, “How much is it costing the taxpayer to drive these kinds of cultures?” It is serious, but the problem is also an opportunity, if interest is raised in the work of those of us who have been doing stuff on the front line for many years with our GP colleagues. I see the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, there: we have rebuilt a street together, with a £40 million school, a £60 million health centre, 600 homes and now a primary school, exploring this, in what when we began was a dysfunctional housing estate.
There is a real opportunity out there, but we now need to get real about antidepressants.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have some points I would like to probe in this group.
I especially welcome Amendment 95 and the proposed new clause:
“Ascertaining and learning from patients’ experiences of hospital treatment”.
The noble Earl, Lord Howe, made very powerful and moving points; we could really take those on board. I have some reservations, however: we live in a complaints culture. I am concerned that this important notion of learning from patients’ experiences does not become a way of stigmatising hospital staff and psychiatrists, with people queueing up to point the finger. There are many people I know who have experiences of hospital who will, at a particular time, tell you it was a terrible experience, and then, at another time, acknowledge that it saved their life. It depends on what phase they are in, in relation to their illness, in some ways—it is about their perspective. So I both welcome it and challenge it.
I am very keen, as we all are, that treatments are taken seriously, whether administered in hospital or in the community. As the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, note in Amendment 148—for me, the most important amendment in this group—we need to be alert to when, for example, the use of psychiatric medication as a treatment creates a problem of dependency. We all know that this is a growing problem. We must consider that.
On the tenor of Amendments 50 and 51 from the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Bennett, on non-drug-based forms of medical treatment, I am less convinced by the emphasis here. I am worried about simply giving a wholly positive view of psychological and therapeutic treatments, because it perhaps misses some of the changes in today’s culture that lead to the overprescription of, for example, antidepressants.
When I was working in community mental health many moons ago, the fashion among progressives in the therapeutic community was often anti-psychiatry, anti-hospital and most definitely anti-pharmacological interventions, with a huge hostility to the pharmaceutical industry. I did not always go along with it, but that was the kind of mood. Peculiarly, I would argue that, today, it is therapeutic experts, counsellors and psychological practitioners who, by becoming diagnostically trigger-happy in labelling people as ill, are creating a huge demand both for third-party interventions, as I have discussed in previous speeches, and for treatment. That often leads to a clamouring, especially among younger people, for pills to help them to cope with the travails of life, and it has been egged on in some ways by therapeutic practitioners.
I had my attention drawn to this when, at the Academy of Ideas, I organised a debate on young people, mental health and those kinds of issues. The audience was largely young people, who said that the problem was that psychiatrists, GPs and doctors would not listen to them and would not believe that they were mentally ill. They demanded treatment and were quite aggressive. It was young people saying, “Where are my tablets?”, and I thought, “Oh, life’s changed slightly”. The psychiatrists in the room were trying to hold the line and gently suggest that maybe they were not ill, but that led to an even more hysterical reaction: “How dare you say I’m not ill?” They went on to explain how they had had a chat with their school counsellor, and they were sure they were ill, and they wanted the tablets.
If we can take a popular example that I appreciate might get me into the heart of an argument that I do not want to be in regarding the slippage between autism and mental illness, I am going to talk about ADHD. ADHD is the fashionable disorder of the day. Huge numbers of students and school pupils are demanding that their neurodevelopmental disorder is recognised and catered for. In my view, it is often diagnosed promiscuously and that is leading to huge demands that are detrimental to education and likely to make councils go bankrupt and schools collapse—but that is for a different debate and a different Bill. ADHD is also leading to a demand for tablets.
I go along with those who were warning about overdiagnosis. The Times reports that 278,000 people in England are on central nervous system stimulus to treat ADHD, and there was an 18% hike in prescriptions for ADHD drugs between April 2023 and March 2024. In the US, the figures are startling, and we should be wary of them, with 7 million American children who are said to have ADHD. As the New York Times has said, there is a danger that we are using stimulants to suppress
“all spontaneous behaviour in normal children”
by pumping them with Ritalin and other calming drugs and sedating normal children. In a broad sense, that is a worry.
Talking of treatments, I think the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, made the point that a social problem is being created of people feeling that if they are ill, they cannot go to work and of over-giving them drugs. All sorts of problems go along with that. Is it not tragic that so many people want to have these drugs, either for themselves or for their children, in order to feel that they can cope, when they are really not that ill or not ill at all, but they have the label? I am wary of inappropriate treatments, but perhaps the problem needs to be looked at differently, as stemming from inflated and expansive diagnostic criteria often deployed from within the therapeutic community rather than psychiatry.
We should not be naive in thinking that non-drug-based therapeutic interventions are virtuous per se. Counselling, for example, has extended its reach into British society so much that it is now a rare family that has no experience of the phenomenon. I am sure that we all know that going to a therapist or counsellor is, to say the least, a mixed bag when, ironically, they end up saying that you need to have third-party intervention or medical intervention. It is bad for the nation’s health.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I will be brief, but in following the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I have to note that I do not believe that a complaints culture is a problem in the contexts covered by this Bill. There is, perhaps, a lack of listening to patients and those affected, and a lack of action rather than a problem with listening to complaints. In that context, I commend the noble Earl, Lord Howe, who cited extensive testimony from Blooming Change. One thing that struck me when looking back over the previous days of Committee was that it would have been good to hear, perhaps even more than we did, direct testimony and the voices of those who are experts by experience. The phrase “nothing about us without us” really stuck in my mind and it is important that we keep that in mind throughout Committee. Again in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, I think it is important not to seek to downplay the mental health crisis that we are seeing across our society. There is a huge shortage of services meeting people’s very clear and acute needs, and acute needs are what we are largely covering in this Bill.
I attached my name to Amendments 50 and 51 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, which address non-drug-based interventions. In essence, I agree with everything the noble Baroness said; I just want to stress her points. When we talk about non-drug-based therapies, we are tempted to think we mean talking therapies and psychological therapies. Those are tremendously important, but this is where we also need to take the broader public health context. I mentioned on an earlier group digital treatments such as Avatar for those who hear voices. They are the kind of new, different ways of looking at things that people may not have been trained in, and it is important that they are considered. I also talked a fair bit about the gut-brain axis and dietary interventions such as green prescribing, in which we have seen great advances across the medical fields in recent years—exposure to green spaces and the chance to get exercise in green spaces. That makes me think that we need to think about facilities and how we make sure there is provision within them, which, in some ways, this amendment would help to cover.
As a noble Lord said earlier, we are talking about making sure we are treating the whole person and not a condition with a drug. I thought the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, was very important, as is his amendment. I am not sure whether it needs to be in the Bill, but it would be interesting to have the Minister’s comments on making sure that consideration of withdrawal symptoms is part of prescribing practice. That is absolutely key and central. I note a report from the universities of Berlin and Cologne out last year which showed that the second-most prescribed antidepressant in the UK, venlafaxine, also has the second-highest rate of problem withdrawal symptoms. We need to make sure that is carefully considered pre-stage—before we get to the withdrawal stage, are we going to create that problem? I do not know whether it could be incorporated in the amendment, but it is something to think about anyway.
The other amendment—slightly oddly—in this group in my name is Amendment 154, which again, as on a previous group, I put down at the request of the Law Society. It is about mental health tribunal pilots for challenges against treatment decisions. To some degree, we have already discussed this in the earlier group, but I would be interested in whether the Minister has any comment on the amendment. I think that it is fairly self-explanatory, so I will not go through it further.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 54A and 54B in my name, which are on a very narrow part of the treatment plan for individuals. Before I do that, let me say that I support the amendments in this group, particularly the general thrust of what been said; that is, that the automatic medical model must no longer be the default position and a much more social model must be added on to the medical model so that they complement each other.
Having said that, I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, but found it very difficult to understand what was required. She argued against the use of medication but then argued against quite a lot of the non-medicated issues. Her intervention was a bit confusing in terms of understanding what the importance was.
My amendments are predominantly about Clause 18, which is about the use of ECT. The clause allows for the emergency use of ECT based on a second medical opinion. The element I wish to speak to is the very wide Henry VIII power that the Government wish to give themselves in regulations to do away with the second medical opinion in an emergency. The Bill says:
“The appropriate national authority may by regulations amend this Act to provide for circumstances in which functions of a second opinion appointed doctor in relation to treatment falling within section 62ZA(1) may or must be carried out instead by the approved clinician in charge of the treatment in question”.
New Section 62ZB(3) then says:
“Regulations under this section may make … (a) provision subject to specified exceptions; (b) different provision for different cases; (c) transitional, consequential, incidental or supplemental provision”.
That is quite a wide Henry VIII power.
To prove that I really am Billy No-Mates and do not get out often on a cold night, I read the wonderful 10th report of this Session from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which makes exactly the same points but in more eloquent language. This is a very wide Henry VIII power, and the committee does not really understand why the Government are seeking—even though it is through the affirmative procedure—such wide powers in such broad language.
The committee said that it would expect the power to be drafted with significant limitations and a framework for when it could be used. My amendment seeks to do exactly that. It would not prevent the clinician in change from using ECT in an emergency case without referring to a second practitioner in certain circumstances, but the regulations would be within a framework laid out in Amendment 54B, that
“the treatment is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life … obtaining a second opinion would cause a delay that places the patient at a significant and imminent risk of death or serious physical harm, and … the treatment is reversible”.
The regulations would have to be written so that
“Any amendment made under subsection (1) must specify the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which the second opinion may be dispensed with”.
A report to Parliament on subsection (1) dispensations would also have to be made.
I believe, from reading the wise words of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report, that it is important that the regulations have a framework, so that the Minister still has flexibility but is constrained by what is in the Bill. That is why I have spoken to this amendment.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I feel I must poke my nose in on these of amendments, even though I do not have an amendment. I support the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and his various amendments. I particularly like the amendment that would require children and their families to be asked the month after how it all went.
We are hearing described the appalling nature of many mental health services. It is not just children’s services. Although they may be a very good example, as many of them are not fit for purpose, we would get the same complaints and the same appalling state of affairs if we went around other mental health services across the country. It is heartbreaking. I truly believe that services have deteriorated since I practised in hospitals. People, including my former colleagues who are still practising, say that services are completely disorganised and not fit for purpose. We have known for 50 years that the social model of care was an appropriate model, and that you need psychological and social psychotherapeutic interventions, as well as any drugs that might be helpful. They are not going on because there is no availability anywhere.
We have known since at least the 1960s that patients with schizophrenia, for example, can benefit by being taught, one-to-one, about how to interact with people when they are recovering from an episode. That never happens, because we do not employ teachers in the NHS—we just do not do it. We do not employ the right sort of people and we do not have the right sort of facilities. When people are employed, there are so few of them that it is simply impossible to do what is necessary. I am not defending this, because there are some very good units—I am sure that there are some very good children’s and young people’s units—but they are not the norm anymore, and that is a very sad state of affairs.
Sadly, legislation through mental health Bills will not, unfortunately, solve the problem. What we are talking about is not only a fundamental change of culture and getting on with all the things that we know should be done; there needs to be investment and a totally different approach to mental health. All the things that we know should be done cannot be delivered by mental health legislation alone. I say that because we are trying to shove too much into the Bill and hoping for the best, but I do not think that it will work.
Later in the debate on these amendments, noble Lords moved away from talking about people who were very unwell and who need in-patient care to talking about this vast mass of people who are diagnosed with conditions where they cannot work. That is a whole new ball game. I agree with almost every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, because there is no doubt that there is a massive overdiagnosis of things that are called “mental disorder”, when they are in fact distress and need a different sort of approach.
A young friend of mine—a gentleman who is now in his final years training as a maxillofacial surgeon—had a period of great distress because of family circumstances. He sat down on his own one evening and went to a website, “Diagnose yourself”. He rang me and said, “I’ve been diagnosed as having ADHD”. I cannot imagine anybody who is less likely to have ADHD than this young man, who is the most socially competent young man I know. This morning, my husband and I had a go on the website together—he did one test and I did another—and we both came up with the same result: “You probably have ADHD”. Well, maybe I am, folks, but I am not going to go on the Ritalin yet. There are a lot of websites that are utter rubbish and encourage people to pay money to see psychotherapists and other counsellors to see what the matter is with them, so that other people can put money in their pockets for doing not much.
That is the different end of the spectrum. When we are thinking about these things, we have to think about what the patient has. Is it something that can be diagnosed—heaven knows that colleagues here were very keen that we should have a diagnosis—or something at the other end of the spectrum? With the Mental Health Bill, we are talking about when you can detain people, take away their rights and say, “We are detaining you”, to treat them, and protect them from wrong treatment, bad doctoring and bad staff. That is what the Mental Health Act is for.
But I am afraid that it is not to do with any of this other stuff. We have to think through what really has to be in the Bill to protect the patients and the staff and what cannot go in there because it is not relevant to these issues.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I want to ask the noble Baroness a question. I agree that this Mental Health Bill should be confined to and is about the people who are very poorly and could be in danger of being detained—I understand that. However, all the time when we have these discussions, we are talking about a problem with a lack of resources. In the noble Baroness’s experience, is the broader mental health crisis taking away resources and focus, not in this Bill but in society, from giving that acute mental health care the resources that it needs—because it is being spread far too thinly across ever greater numbers?
Baroness Murphy (CB)
Yes, I would say that indeed it was. That year when they gave an extra £400,000 to spreading psychotherapy around was the same time when we were having incredible crises in acute hospital services, and I thought that it was not justified. But the mental health crisis that we have in this country is the same one that they were complaining about in 1860, 1870 and 1880; every generation believes that it is worse off than the generation before, but there is not much evidence that it is.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, having just heard the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I shall be extremely cautious about what I look at on the internet. I want to say just two or three words. I have experience from my own family and from my friends of two sets of drugs—anti-depressants and Ritalin—and they really should be used a great deal more cautiously.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, now is not the time to have the extensive debate that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, has opened up. I said right at the outset that we are talking about legislation that comes into play when a person is going to be detained because they are very ill and at risk of harming themselves or somebody else. But I would say to the noble Baroness that the Wessely review looked at this issue at considerable length, and I was among the Peers who listened to Sir Simon Wessely when he came to present his findings. One thing that has stuck with me is the person who gave evidence to his review who said: “I was very ill. I had to have treatment. Why did it have to feel so awful?”—I am using parliamentary language there. Does the noble Baroness accept that mental health legislation debates such as this might be limited, but they do an important thing in sometimes challenging the prevailing orthodoxy among the professions, and they are an occasion where the experience of patients, which have built up over many years, gets a chance to change practice? That is why we should look at all the amendments in this group, and in particular those of the noble Earl, Lord Howe.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
I agree with everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has said. She is absolutely right that professions should be challenged, and that is partly what legislation can do, particularly in debates such as this. But we are losing the very important amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about young people and what we can do to improve circumstances through the Bill, and I want not to lose them, because they are very important.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
Very briefly on the question that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised, the notion of supply-induced demand is a well-known phenomenon across health services. However, I have to say to her that I think that we are a long way off that being the problem that is principally confronting children and young people’s mental health services. We have a massive gap between the need for effective therapies for children and young people and their availability.
When the process of trying to expand children and young people’s mental health services kicked off several years ago, the goal was that we would get to a situation where one in three children and young people with a diagnosable mental health condition would get some form of specialist mental health support. That number has now been exceeded. I was just looking at the stats published last week and, although I do not see the most up-to-date number for it, I would be surprised if more than one in two are currently getting specialist mental health support for a diagnosable mental health disorder, not just distress. So, we are a long way off confronting this problem of supply-induced demand, whatever broader cultural or therapeutic labelling questions that she rightly points to may be in the ether. Fundamentally, we are going to need more services to benefit the children and young people who need them, not pretend that this is somehow all vapourware, imaginary or a cultural deformity, unlike our predecessors in the Victorian era.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions on this important set of amendments. I say at the outset that I note the various observations that are outside the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, pointed out, but I have noted them and I am sure we will discuss them on a number of occasions.
First, I turn to Amendments 46 and 47, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe. I have heard how many noble Lords are in support not just of those two amendments but all the amendments in the group. I am sure noble Lords will not be surprised to know that I understand where people are coming from and I will be pleased to go through the response to them.
The noble Earl, Lord Howe, spoke about “troubling and sensitive matters” and about being inspired by testimonies that came through the charity Blooming Change—I express my thanks to that organisation for the work it does. Officials in the department have met the group and it made a very helpful contribution. Hearing from those with lived experience is crucial to making sure that this is the best Bill, and I know that many noble Lords have done that, so I thank the noble Earl for bringing that into these amendments.
Amendments 46 and 47 would change the definition of appropriate medical treatment to include treatment which
“seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma”.
Childhood trauma can of course have a devastating impact on psychological well-being. Effective and compassionate in-patient care must be informed, as I have said, in co-production with people with lived experience and be trauma informed. NHS England’s Culture of Care Standards for Mental Health Inpatient Services certainly underlines this.
The noble Earl, Lord Howe, and other noble Lords raised concerns around in-patient settings and how appropriate they are, which I understand. I hope it will be helpful to say in answer that the new definition of “appropriate medical treatment” introduces the requirement that treatment has to have a reasonable prospect of benefiting the patient. We would expect the setting in which someone is going to be detained to be considered as part of this. Of course, I am more than aware—without wanting to go into the generics in this group or any other group—that the place in which we start, in terms of the suitability and availability of the right settings, is not where I am sure any of us would want to be.
We also know that the sensory environments in settings can cause difficulties for people with sensory sensitivities. To support NHS services to address sensory aspects of the environment, which the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to, NHS England has published a sensory-friendly resource pack, which outlines 10 principles to improve the sensory environment and signposts other resources.
The clause in the Bill that defines “appropriate medical treatment” already requires decision-makers to take into account the nature and degree of the disorder and all other circumstances, which could include childhood trauma, when considering whether medical treatment has a reasonable prospect of therapeutic benefit. The definition of medical treatment is unchanged and is indeed broad, including nursing care, psychological therapy and medication. All these interventions could include an overall aim to minimise distress and promote psychological well-being.
Amendments 50 and 51, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Bennett, aim to ensure that the clinician considers non-drug-based interventions as part of the new “clinical checklist”. The checklist requires clinicians to identify and evaluate alternative forms of medical treatment when deciding whether to give a particular medical treatment to a patient. As I have already mentioned, the definition of medical treatment under the Act is broad. As well as non-drug-based interventions, it includes specialist mental health rehabilitation and care. On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, which is an important one, it does include the therapeutic environment or setting. This requirement, as outlined, would apply to all patients falling under Part IV of the Act. It includes patients with a learning disability and autistic patients who are detained for assessment under Section 2 and patients detained for treatment under Part III.
With specific regard to those with a learning disability and autistic people, I recognise the concern that they are more likely to be prescribed an antipsychotic than the general population. I emphasise that psychotropic medication should only be given for the right reasons, in the lowest dose, for the shortest time. NHS England has a national programme of work to stop overmedication and the inappropriate prescribing of these medications, which is aimed in particular at people with a learning disability and autistic people. Noble Lords will be aware of the STOMP programme. Alongside it is a national supporting treatment and appropriate medication in paediatrics programme called STAMP—the two are not to be confused. These programmes work particularly closely with those with lived experience, families and carers organisations, and a wide range of health and social care professional bodies.
Amendment 53, in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, would require the approved clinician to offer a patient any treatment that is appropriate, having applied the new clinical checklist. The reference to medical treatment in that checklist should already be read in accordance with Clause 8, which inserts a new definition of appropriate medical treatment to enact the principle of therapeutic benefit.
The clinician must also support the patient to participate in decision-making to make sure that they do not simply offer their preferred treatment to the patient, with no discussion or consideration of alternatives. The Bill also requires clinicians and, where relevant, the second opinion appointed doctor to provide a written record that the treatment being administered meets the definition of appropriate medical treatment. Therefore, it is felt that the Bill already meets the intention of this amendment. Furthermore, if the intention is to ensure that a range of treatments is being considered by the responsible clinician, I can reassure noble Lords that this is already the case, because, as I have said, the definition of medical treatment is broad.
Lord Scriven (LD)
The Minister has reeled off a very good list of what is already in place. Have the Government done an assessment to see exactly how that learning is ingrained and how effective it has been in changing mental health provision and mental health services? If not, could she please go back to her department to try to find that, and write to Members of the Committee so we can see that in writing?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I would be very pleased to look into it further, but, as I have described, this is a rolling programme. I emphasise that the CQC has that duty both to monitor but also to make the relevant bodies subject to sanctions if needed—in other words, more immediately. So I am concerned that through this amendment we could be creating a structure which is actually less flexible and responsive than the one we have now.
Amendment 148, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would impose on integrated care boards—ICBs—a legally binding duty to provide local, in-person, specialist withdrawal treatments for patients on psychiatric medication prescribed during the course of their treatment by services under the Mental Health Act. In addition, there would be a duty on each ICB to send to the Secretary of State an annual report on the availability, uptake and outcomes of this support. Under this amendment, the Secretary of State would be obliged to lay these reports before Parliament. ICBs would also be subject to a requirement to provide a 24-hour helpline and online platform to support patients to receive withdrawal treatment.
Let me say at the outset that I recognise the difficulties that withdrawal can pose. I recall that the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, spoke on this very point in the Chamber last month and was also good enough to speak directly to me. It is, I agree, an issue that will not go away and, per the noble Lord’s request, I would be happy to arrange a meeting. I feel there is a whole area here to which we today, considering amendments, cannot do justice, so I would be pleased to do that. To the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, who has tabled Written Questions, I say that I look forward to answering them, and I hope that he will look forward to reading my Answers.
Where relevant, we would expect the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan to include a tapering plan and put in place whatever additional support is needed to enable a patient’s recovery and effective discharge. On the requirement to provide support in the community and report on availability, this is the responsibility of local health commissioners. In 2023, NHSE published a framework for ICBs and primary care boards on how to optimise personalised care for patients prescribed medicines associated with dependence or withdrawal symptoms. With regard to the requirement in the amendment for a 24-hour helpline, this would not seem proportionate, given the relatively low numbers of people who might need this service, who should already have a support plan in place, including access to relevant local support services.
Finally, Amendment 154, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations giving people detained in hospital and those subject to community treatment or guardianship orders the ability to have certain care and treatment matters considered by a mental health tribunal.
This is a very complex area, as I am sure the noble Baroness is aware. The amendment seems to draw on the recommendation made by the independent review to give patients a new right of appeal to a single judge of the mental health tribunal regarding compulsory treatment. I recall that the previous Government publicly consulted on this new right, and the majority of respondents raised major concerns in this regard. The consultation was followed by further long and careful consideration with stakeholders, which led the then Government to the conclusion that this safeguard is just not viable. A solution could not be found that provided an efficient and effective route of appeal for patients while avoiding the risks of the tribunal intervening in clinical decision-making, alongside significant resource burdens. Many of these concerns were reflected in the report of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, which also acknowledged the complexity of the issue.
We believe that the other provisions in the Bill will better achieve the same objectives of providing patient choice and autonomy, so while we do not support introducing a new role for the tribunal, I assure your Lordships that the emphasis on therapeutic benefit within the detention criteria will mean that whether care and treatment are proving effective will play a role in the tribunal’s consideration of whether or not detention should continue to be upheld. With these explanations, I hope that the noble Earl feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate in such compelling ways, and I think we can see that when it comes to the experiences of children and young people in mental health units, we are dealing with a story that is a lot more substantial than mere anecdote. From briefing I have received, I am afraid I have been left in no doubt that the therapeutic environment in a number of mental health hospitals around the country—not all, of course—is, to put it mildly, a lot less than optimal.
Clearly, it is unacceptable for any patient, of whatever age, to be detained compulsorily without being offered treatment. It is unacceptable that drugs or restraint should be used as punishments. Challenging behaviour can be difficult to deal with, but staff should be trained to deal with it in a way that demonstrates that they understand the root causes of the behaviour. Those causes can be extremely complex.
To pick up another strand of the debate, I am in no doubt that medication has a place in mental health therapy. It can often be the treatment of choice. It is one tool in the toolbox. However, I very much agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, had to say about social prescribing. It can not only be clinically effective but save costs if it is delivered, for example, by local charities that work in the fields of music, drama or art. Incidentally, it can help budding musicians, actors and artists in their downtime to train as music, art or drama therapists, which is an added bonus.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
“(7) In section 24 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Advance decisions to refuse treatment: general), after subsection (5), insert—“(6) For an “Advance decision” in relation to a treatment for a mental disorder under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, a person may make a decision once they have reached 16.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment extends advance decisions to those who are 16 and over.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 55 I will speak to Amendment 136; both are in my name. This is another very important group, about children and young people’s competence and decision-making. Amendment 55 is about extending advanced decisions to those who are aged 16 and over. I recognise that there is also an important amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about advanced decisions—a similar issue, but perhaps taking a different approach.
The Bill will give legal weight to advance decisions within the Mental Health Act, which I very much welcome. Adults will be able to record their advance refusal of a particular treatment if they lose capacity. An advance decision will have the same effect as a refusal of treatment made with capacity and will ensure that the individual can access enhanced safeguards before the treatment can be given. Although advance choice documents, where advance decisions will be recorded, will be available to adults of all ages, the Bill as drafted does not permit under-18s to make advance decisions. As such, someone aged under 18 could say in an advance choice document that they refuse a particular treatment if they would not want it, but that would have limited weight. Specifically, it would mean that, if the child or young person lacked capacity or competence to consent to treatment when it was offered, their advance refusal would not give them access to the enhanced treatment safeguards that are available to adults, including tribunal appeal.
This means that, rather than being on an equal footing, children and young people would be disadvantaged compared with adults. Therefore, I see this very much as part of parity of treatment between children and adults. I am strongly of the view that the safeguards that flow from advance refusals of treatment should also be made available to young people. This is what my Amendment 55 is designed to do.
I add one more general point. We still have work to do in Committee to strengthen safeguards and protections for children and young people in mental health in-patient care. There should be a general principle of parity of treatment between children and young people and adults. Of course I recognise that some distinctions have to be made due to the legal status of under-18s, but I said at Second Reading, and it remains my view, that this Bill was never really designed with children and young people in mind, yet it can affect them greatly. In responding, can the Minister set out how much input DfE Ministers and officials have had on the drafting of the Bill?
It will probably help if I explain that Amendment 136 is closely related to Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, whom I have had the opportunity of corresponding with. I do not want, in speaking first, to pre-empt what the noble Lord will say, but I need to reference his amendment to explain mine. I share the concern that the Bill does not include a test to determine the ability of children under the age of 16 to make decisions—in other words, whether they are competent. Without such a test, this age group will not be able to benefit fully from the rights and safeguards included in the Bill; the question is how we best get there.
Under-16s are currently at a disadvantage. Whereas all those aged 16 and over are presumed to have capacity to make decisions for themselves unless evidence shows otherwise—in which case the Mental Capacity Act kicks in—under-16s are presumed to be unable to make decisions for themselves unless they demonstrate that they are competent to do so. There is also no clear and consistent approach for determining whether a child is competent. Although the concept of competence is generally understood, how to assess a child’s competence is not.
That is why I have a lot of sympathy with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, which would insert a test for determining the ability of someone aged under 16 to make decisions under this legislation. His amendment explicitly limits this test to decisions made under the mental health legislation and is explicitly focused on the criteria with which to determine whether a child is competent. No doubt he will explain his amendment far more eloquently than I could ever do. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to review whether a statutory test for under-16s would be expedient for the purpose of this Act and for mental health legislation more generally. It is very much a stepping stone towards that position and, I hope, supports change in this area.
Such a review is important because it could address some of the concerns that have been expressed in this area. It could include whether such a test should be in the Bill or in a code, how best to make it clear that a test will be specific to the scope of legislation rather than having wider application, and how such a test would help with the successful implementation of the Bill. It could help to establish that the test is specific to whether a particular child can make a particular decision at a particular time, and set out what information is required.
I am aware that, in some of our broader discussions, concerns have been raised about the possible unintended consequences of such a test in relation both to parental responsibility and to a child being seen as Gillick competent—that is, they have the ability to understand the decision. I feel that a review would be helpful in looking at these issues and addressing those concerns head-on. In that way, we would make important steps in ensuring that the whole of the mental health reforms work properly and fairly for all children and young people. I beg to move.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness has just said, my Amendment 147, which deals with competence and decision-making, would provide what I suggest is a necessary statutory test to determine the decision-making competence of children under 16 years of age in all matters under this legislation for which such a determination is required. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill pointed out, echoing what was said in the independent review of the 1983 Act, that attempts both to protect and to empower children have produced a complex mixture of statute and case law with no single method of assessment and no consistent criteria to establish either capacity or competence. This is a particular disadvantage for children and young people, who do not have the benefit of any statutory presumption of competence such as that which applies to adults.
Importantly, the amendment, although offering a test, does not create any presumption of capacity in a child. Moreover, the reason for the child’s inability to decide is irrelevant. It would, however, require that those determining whether a child is competent must give reasonable grounds for reaching that conclusion. It is important to emphasise that this amendment is concerned only with how to assess whether a child is competent and not with the consequences of any determination that a child is competent.
This Bill has been produced with numerous references to capacity and/or competence in various contexts, including consent to CETR meetings, “disclosure of information”, “consent to treatment”, making advance choice decisions,
“terminating the appointment of a nominated person”
and involving “mental health advocates”. However, the Bill is currently silent on what is meant by “competence” and how it should be determined.
The existing statutory test in the Mental Capacity Act does not apply to those under 16. The separate concept of Gillick competence—it is derived from the pivotal case of that name, decided in 1986—requires inherently subjective assessments of the child’s understanding and maturity. I speak with some experience of having to decide whether or not a child is competent to participate independently in court proceedings concerning them. That exercise sometimes feels rather paternalistic and is, as has been pointed out, really subjective, with the test in Gillick offering no guidance on the extent to which adjustment should be made for factors such as peer pressure, drug and substance abuse, family stress, emotional disturbance or illness.
More recent case law shows that the Mental Capacity Act can be used to inform an assessment of child competence, but it is not mandatory to do so. The factors set out in this amendment to indicate a child’s ability to decide are the features carefully identified by Mr Justice Cobb, as he then was, in a case decided in 2017 concerning the difficult question of whether or not a girl under 16 had the capacity to consent to her child being adopted.
I therefore suggest that there is now a need for clearer and more rigorous guidelines—structured guidelines that are not just mechanistic checklists—for mental health and legal professionals to work with. The assessments that have to be made of a child’s ability to understand and weigh relevant information need to be decision-specific, child-specific and time-specific, and they have to recognise that competence can fluctuate as well as evolve. These are not straightforward assessments and are certainly not a mere formality.
A statutory test would be welcomed by practitioners and the courts. This is too important to be left to the code of practice; such codes are intended to reflect and supplement the law, not to create law. A clear test in the statute would only be of assistance to practitioners and would allow children to benefit from the safeguards within the Bill.
Baroness Browning (Con)
With the wealth of his experience in dealing with children, could the noble Lord give the House a feel for whether, when assessing the competence particularly of children from a younger age group, there are cases where they understand the situation that is explained to them but, when a decision is subsequently required, there is less clarity on how to make it themselves? I ask that because I know that, often, certain adults on the autism spectrum in a similar situation can fully comprehend a situation that is explained, if necessary, and have capacity, but making the decision between one, two or more choices is much more problematic.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, I understand the dilemma. The point I emphasise is that, in deciding this, one has to be clear that the child has a proper explanation of the ultimate decision that has to be made. It is to that end that the competence has to be assessed.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
For those of us who are not anywhere near as legally expert as the noble Lord whose wise deliberations we have just heard, could he clarify the amendment that talks specifically about ring-fencing this new test for the Mental Health Bill? To what extent would that be consistent or not with, for example, the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Bell v Tavistock—the NHS trust—in the case of puberty blockers, which concerned the interpretation that the High Court had given to the Gillick test?
Lord Meston (CB)
I am tempted to say that I really do not know. That was a faster ball than I expected to receive. I think the answer is that the case law would be consistently applied, even as it stands now, but would undoubtedly be aided by a statutory test. Whether it would apply in cases such as that which the noble Lord just mentioned, I do not know. The purpose of the amendment is to provide a test for decisions that have to be made consequential upon this legislation, not other situations.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, just said. The two interjections were very interesting but they do not really affect the guidance. That is crucial. The question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, as to whether you can understand it but cannot make a decision, may well affect how the person applying the guidance does so. That would be one of the issues for whoever has the uncomfortable task of making the decision.
I think the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, is too cautious. If we go back to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, there is clear explanation and guidance in primary legislation as to how anyone who has to judge capacity is to do it. What we are talking about here—incompetence—is quite simply capacity. For some reason, which I find quite difficult, we seem to think that children under 16 have competence or do not, but over-16s have capacity or do not. It would have been far more sensible to use the same word for every person who will, in fact, be judged on whether they do or do not have capacity to make a decision of great importance, as it would be, in relation to mental health issues. I find it very odd.
However, and equally importantly, if it is in primary legislation for over-16s, why on earth would it be in guidance for under-16s? If it is good enough for over-16s, why is it not good enough for under-16s? The way the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has set this out seems admirable. It is very close to the Mental Capacity Act. I take and entirely agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, but the Government seem to have ignored children to a very large extent, although children are a very important part of this Bill. I do not blame the Minister, because she did not draft it, but she has to bring it to us. I tabled a lot of amendments about parents and people with parental responsibility because they are largely ignored; I will speak about that later. But where we are dealing with children aged under 16, it is essential that they are treated in the same way as everybody else and that has to be in the Bill—in primary legislation.
Young people have had to deal with these issues ever since Lord Denning was presiding in the Court of Appeal in Gillick, but he did not help us at that stage as to how actually to deal with it. Like the noble Lord, Lord Meston, I have also had to make decisions as to whether under-16s were giving me advice that I thought was really worthy of listening to. Children of five can give extraordinarily good explanations, though I do not expect them to give them on mental health issues. I urge the Minister: it is crucial that everyone whose capacity is a matter at issue has it treated in exactly the same way. Therefore, to put it into guidance really will not do.
I will also speak on Amendments 55 and 56. I am very concerned about children. Bear in mind, however much we treat children aged over 16 with respect and as having the capacity to make decisions, and however much we listen to them, as we should listen to all children, there are stroppy teenagers—we all know about them—who, for one reason or another, will not do what adults tell or advise them. I am very concerned, and I am not quite sure about this because I am no expert on mental health legislation, that if a 16 year-old has the right to make advance decisions and they just say, “I do not want any injections, I do not want any pills, I absolutely refuse to have any treatment”, then unless there is an ability to override them they will have capacity and cannot be ignored. One has to view advance decisions for 16 to 18 year-olds with some degree of care. I am not saying that they should not happen, but I am not happy about them being universal and without some ability for them to be overridden.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 147. I find myself in agreement with much that has been said. It has been a consistent recommendation to His Majesty’s Government since the independent review that there should be a statutory test of competence or capacity for those aged under 16. Of course, that means it should be in the Bill. This has been supported by the Children’s Commissioner of late and by the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Alliance.
Therefore, I was disappointed to see the code of practice solution outlined in the Minister’s policy paper that we received yesterday. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, outlined, in the Mental Capacity Act, which applies to over-16s, there is a functional capacity test followed by the secondary mental impairment test. I also agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, that under-16s are presumed to lack capacity, so you start from the opposite premise of the Mental Capacity Act for over-16s, who are presumed to have capacity. That puts them at an advantage: it has to be taken from them, rather than being given to under-16s.
I agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Meston. Great work is being done by clinicians up and down the country to apply Gillick competence tests, but throughout my time on the Joint Committee we did not seem to know whether there was any review or assessment as to how and when it is applied in hospitals and healthcare settings up and down the country. I fail to understand the Government’s reluctance to put this test in the Bill. How is such a reluctance compatible with one of the four guiding principles—to treat the person as an individual? Perhaps the Minister could outline the reasoning for this omission.
I also want to point to the problem of relying on the code of practice made under Section 118 of the Mental Health Act. On page 13 of the code of practice, there is a very clear description of the code and its legislative function:
“Whilst the whole of the Code should be followed, please note that where ‘must’ is used, it reflects legal obligations in legislation, (including other legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998) or case law, and must be followed. Where the Code uses the term ‘should’ then departures should be documented and recorded”.
It then refers to explanatory paragraphs and continues:
“Where the Code gives guidance using the terms ‘may’, ‘can’ or ‘could’ then the guidance in the Code is to be followed wherever possible”.
In the Minister’s policy statements, there is often the use of “will”, which, as far as I understand, is a “must”. Bearing in mind what I just read, unless something is in the Bill then even putting this test into the Bill will mean that it is only, at the very best, a “should” and can be departed from. Obviously, that applies across all of the places in which the Minister relies on the defence of, “We’re going to put it in a code”. I note that it is a code that we have not seen and will be consulted on only after the passing of the legislation.
Dealing again with the amendment, it is important to determine capacity and, as Mind has said in its excellent briefing, the question of whether a person has capacity or competence to make the relevant decision is fundamental to the operation of key rights and safeguards. To build on the point from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, as I understand it the Bill contains 13 references to competence. It deals with such important matters as the appointment of their nominated person and, if you are under the age of 16, your freedom to choose someone other than the person with parental responsibility depends on your having competence. There is also the ability to refuse medication. To deal with the point made, I think, by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, who was concerned about leakage across, this is a very particular piece of legislation with such coercive power, as I am sure he is aware, that the case for putting the test in the Bill to open up those safeguards for young people is very important.
The Government’s response to the consultation stated:
“We are committed to ensuring that children and young people benefit from the reforms we plan to introduce”.
Will the Minister therefore explain again how the lack of a statutory test is consistent with maximising that choice and autonomy?
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I rise briefly having attached my name to Amendment 147, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, was just speaking so powerfully. I will not repeat anything that people far more expert legally than me have already said, but will just make a couple of small points.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I make two specific points in response to what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said. The amendments refer to Section 24 of the Mental Capacity Act, but if one goes on to Section 25 of that Act, there are a number of conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for a record of an advanced decision to be deemed valid. I think it is worth pointing out subsection (5) to noble Lords, which states:
“An advance decision is not applicable to life-sustaining treatment unless … (a) the decision is verified by a statement by P to the effect that it is to apply to that treatment even if life is at risk, and (b) the decision and statement comply with subsection (6).
Subsection (6) states that it must be,
“in writing … it is signed by P or by another person in P's presence and by P's direction … the signature is made or acknowledged by P in the presence of a witness, and … the witness signs it, or acknowledges”
it to be true.
I am trying to convey to the noble and learned Baroness that these are very formal procedures. They are not taken lightly. That applies to somebody who is 18 and one day, and I think it should be applied to somebody who is younger than that with as much seriousness.
Noble Lords and others have referred to these decisions as advance decisions to refuse treatment. Advance decisions can also be for treatment. People can say in an advance decision, “I know that when I am in an episode of illness, I may be saying that I do not want medication. At this moment in time, when I have capacity, I wish it to be put down in writing that if I do that, you are to ignore it”.
I would like us to have a fuller appreciation of what it is we are talking about, although I do not detract from any of the considerations that people want to bring in about young people.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I venture to say that all the amendments in this group approach similar issues in not dissimilar ways. The most compelling point that perhaps should be underlined in relation to them all is that implied by the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Meston: that there is no earthly reason why the law should prohibit a young person with sufficient decision-making competence recording a valid expression of their wishes and preferences around their own mental health care, and the logical consequence of that is the need for a competence test, or a capacity test for child patients.
My Amendment 56 seeks to address an issue allied to those addressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Meston. As it stands, the Bill does not permit a 16 or 17 year-old to make a valid advance decision about their mental health care. An advance decision has the same effect in practice as a capacity decision to refuse a particular treatment. It is important to understand that under the Mental Health Act, making an advance decision does not give someone an unfettered right to refuse that treatment. Treatment can still be administered notwithstanding the advance decision, albeit only if certain strict conditions are met. Nevertheless, an advance decision made by an adult patient carries a huge amount of weight, and placed within or alongside an advance choice document, which enables a patient to outline their treatment preferences, it does a great deal to ensure that the patient is placed genuinely in the driving seat when it comes to their mental health care and treatment.
Under the terms of the Bill, young persons aged 16 and 17 will be able to execute an advance choice document, but what they cannot do is to make an advance decision to sit alongside it. That means that an advance choice document that purports to include an advance decision made by an under 18 year-old is likely to carry a good deal less weight than such a document executed by an adult. My amendment invites the Government to put this right.
An associated but distinct issue arises in relation to children under the age of 16. I will not repeat the excellent arguments for a competency test put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, but I agree entirely with what they have said. The point that resonates most with me in the context of a Bill that places great emphasis on patient empowerment is that in the absence of a statutory competence test to determine a child’s decision-making ability, it will, in practice, be impossible for someone under 16 to execute an advance choice document and then expect professionals to take due notice of it.
Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, seems to me to be as good as it gets in articulating the key requirements necessary to establish decision-making competence in a child. My only hesitation about his amendment is that it invites us to place the terms of a competency test in the Bill without further ado. For a measure of this significance, I tend to feel that any final formula for a competence test merits a prior consultation exercise, and then encapsulation in regulations approved by Parliament. I fully agree with my noble friend Lady Berridge that relying on a code of practice in this context would be wholly unsatisfactory. For what it is worth, I suspect that a consultation would be likely to throw up some further considerations that would need to be factored in to the formula. That aside, I very much hope that the Minister will be receptive to the arguments she has heard. If we can deliver this added empowerment to children and, as regards advance decisions, to 16 and 17 year-olds, the prize will be very great, and I hope she agrees that the challenge is one we must address.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, if the noble Earl is suggesting that the provisions in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, should go either to consultation or to further consideration, will we not end up in a situation where this Bill becomes law and nothing is done to advise anyone, on the face of the legislation, how to deal with those under 16, although it is there for those over 16? Why should, in this particular instance, those under 16 basically be discriminated against? Whether or not they have capacity is the point of the amendment.
Earl Howe (Con)
I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness. I hope it was implicit in what I said that I would look to this Bill to include an order-making power that would enable regulations to be laid in due course that would cover not only 16 or 17 year-olds but also those under 16, and Parliament would then approve them. No doubt this is a matter that we can discuss further after this, but I hope that the point of principle is clear, which I fully support, that this issue needs to be sorted through this Bill.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I have listened to the noble Earl’s argument carefully, and in principle I support what he is trying to do. The only problem with leaving the matter to a statutory instrument, rather than putting it on the face of the Bill, is that it is far easier for the Secretary of State to change that, even despite the will of Parliament, based on the way that Parliament works. Why could it not be on the face of the Bill, to give absolute certainty, rather than in a statutory instrument, which normally gives flexibility and powers to a Minister?
Earl Howe (Con)
There are two answers to that. First, it is generally unthinkable for a Government to lay regulations without first having consulted the relevant parties. Secondly, if we are honest, putting something on the face of a Bill is not the whole story; there would need to be proper clinical guidance published alongside that for practical purposes for hospitals and elsewhere.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for examining the important issues that have been raised in this group of amendments.
Amendment 55, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, seeks to change the Mental Capacity Act to allow young people aged 16 or 17 the ability to make a binding advance decision to refuse medical treatment for mental disorder. I shall set out some concerns about the amendment that may be helpful.
First, the amendment would mean that a young person who is not detained under the Mental Health Act could refuse a mental health treatment, even if it was life-sustaining. While the Mental Health Act and the Bill currently provide safeguards that enable a person’s advance decision to be overruled, detention under the Act may not always be appropriate. For example, if a 16 year-old is left very unwell following an attempted suicide, then currently they may be given treatment on the basis of what is in their best interests, under the Mental Capacity Act, if they lack capacity to consent at the time. However, under the amendment, if the 16 year-old had made an advance decision to refuse treatment necessary for their recovery or to sustain their life, then they might need to be detained under the Mental Health Act simply so that their advance decision could be overruled. This is important in terms of timely access to treatment and to avoid loss of life, of course.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
What the Minister has just said is complex, but it strikes me, listening to that situation, that this might be a matter of hard cases making bad law. Could we be denying lots of people the chance to have a say because of the risk in a small number of cases? How would she respond to that?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
The overall concern is as I have identified. Yes, indeed, as always, it is a complex area that we need to unpick, but our main concern has to be for the welfare of the young person. The concern about the amendment is that, inadvertently, it would work in the opposite direction.
To finish on Amendment 55—this might also be helpful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett—we are of the view that the Bill strikes the right balance between self-determination and responding to the needs and vulnerabilities of children and young people. For example, in the clinical checklist, many of the new treatment safeguards and provisions around care and treatment planning apply equally regardless of age and aim to ensure that treatment is more patient-led.
Amendment 56, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, is somewhat similar to Amendment 55 in seeking to change the Mental Capacity Act to provide a mechanism by which children and young people can make an advance decision to refuse medical treatment for mental disorder. However, under Amendment 56, the child or young person’s advance decision would have legal weight only if they were detained under the Mental Health Act. As I have already discussed, while we recognise the principled position to extend the rights of adults to children, giving under-18s the right to make an advance decision to refuse treatment would conflict with a long- standing legal principle established by common law in the courts and codified in the Mental Capacity Act and would, therefore, mean that the amendment would not achieve its desired effect. This principle recognises that, in some serious cases, the courts, parents or those with parental responsibility may overrule the refusal of a child or young person, especially in cases where the child’s life is at risk.
I reassure noble Lords that we are nevertheless committed to giving children and young people a voice as far as possible when it comes to decisions about their care and treatment. I refer again to the example of the clinical checklist, which requires consideration of a patient’s wishes and feelings, including those expressed in advance.
Lord Scriven (LD)
What legal status does the checklist that the Minister keeps referring to actually have?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I will come back to the noble Lord on that, and I thank him for asking the question.
I was about to refer to the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I may not be doing so in quite the right place, so I hope she will forgive me, but I do not want to lose this point. She asked what engagement we have had with the Department for Education. Our officials have engaged with DfE officials on the development of the Bill, including on the interaction between the Bill and the Children Act, which I know is of quite a lot of interest to noble Lords. We have also discussed questions around the statutory test with both the DfE and the Ministry of Justice, given that competency tests apply in wider children’s settings than mental health. I hope that is helpful.
Amendment 136, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, would require the Government to hold a review of whether a statutory test of competence should be introduced into the Mental Health Act for under-16s within a year of the Bill being passed. While we recognise that there are competing views about Gillick competency, it is nevertheless the established framework for determining competency for children. To introduce a statutory test for under-16s only under the Mental Health Act is likely to risk undermining Gillick, which remains the accepted competence test for under-16s across all settings, including reproductive health and children’s social care, and the wider legislative framework on matters related to children.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
The trouble with Gillick is that it does not provide, for those who have to make the decision, how to do it.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I appreciate the point that the noble and learned Baroness has made. As I said, I know there are competing views about its application. I reiterate the observation that it is the current established framework, but I hear what she is saying about what she believes are the implications of that.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
The Minister’s own policy document says that this test should be in the code of practice. How does that not also contribute to the undermining of Gillick that the Minister refers to?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
Actually, my feeling about the code of practice is something that I wanted to bring up, because it has come up quite a lot. The code of practice is statutory and aimed at practitioners, and it allows nuance and so on, but Gillick is in case law and it guides us throughout. The point I am trying to make is that if it is changed in respect of this Mental Health Bill then that has implications across the wider question of competency for younger people, and that is of great concern.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I apologise for interrupting the noble Baroness again, but the fact is—I speak as a former lawyer and judge who applied Gillick—it does not actually give guidance. All it says, as I understand it, is that under-16s have to be listened to. That is great, and I totally agree. What it does not do—but the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, would—is set out the guidance that those who make the decisions need to have.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
Obviously, I am listening closely to the noble and learned Baroness’s experience and feeling on the matter, and I will certainly be pleased to reflect on the points that she and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, have made.
If I continue, that may be of some assistance—we will see. It is of concern to me that the possible creation of two different tests will potentially cause further confusion and uncertainty on the ground. We are therefore not in a position to welcome a statutory test of competence in the Mental Health Act.
Before I continue to Amendment 147, I will come back to the good question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, about the legal status of clinical checklists. Because they are in the Bill, they are a statutory requirement for clinicians, to be followed in respect of all patients. I hope that will be useful.
Lord Scriven (LD)
It is useful, but it is therefore contradictory to what the Minister has just said. If the checklist is statutory and it is legally binding that it has to be followed, how would a young person in that checklist having a view about their care be different from an advance directive? That is the issue. The Minister said the other alternative is that a person under 18 or 16 can make a decision in relation to the medical checklist, and she has just said that the decisions are legally binding. Alternatively, is it that carrying out the process is legally statutorily binding but the views of somebody who is 16 on that list are not?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I was referring more to situations, of which I know the noble Lord is aware, where there is a need for intervention. I think I used the word “overruling”, and I used some examples where there was a risk to life. So it is about application in that regard. I will look at that question in greater detail when I reflect on this area of debate and, if there is more that I can add to assist the noble Lord, I will be pleased to do so.
Amendment 147 is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. It would create a statutory test of competency for children in respect of decisions under the Mental Health Act. Under that test, competence for under-16s would be defined by reference to the functional test of capacity established in the Mental Capacity Act but without the diagnostic test, and by having due regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The courts have already made clear that the approach of the functional test is not suitable for children. We do not think that the functional test is appropriate or compatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the amendment itself makes reference to. The amendment, as drafted, is therefore not considered to be in line with established case law.
The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked about the justification for not including a test in the Bill. As I have mentioned, Gillick is established in case law, not statute, and the code explains how the Gillick decision is to be applied. But this does not mean that the House of Lords decision is not mandatory. There is a duty to follow case law. It is not discretionary, as I know noble Lords are aware.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that response. One thing we can all agree on from this discussion is that these are complex issues and people sometimes have rather different understandings of what certain things might say or mean.
Having said that, I would just like to say where I think we are on the two issues. First, on advanced decisions, I have a strong view that children and young people aged 16 and 17 should have choices that are made available to adults extended to them. As I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said, it is about having a sense of agency and autonomy and feeling that their wishes and feelings are being respected. It may be that I did not draft it very well, but I was not suggesting that everyone was going to be forced to do it. It is there as an option, and that is a really important point that possibly did not come out sufficiently in the debate. The fault for that is mine. It may be that the approach that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, was suggesting is a better way forward. I do not know; I do not mind. I just feel that, because to me this is so fundamental and a question of human rights, we will need to return to this on Report.
I turn with some trepidation now to the statutory competence test for under-16s. I have been accused of being too cautious. That is fine. I understand where noble Lords were coming from. I did not say it when I introduced it, because I thought it would be a bit to odd to say it, but I was seeing my amendment as a bit of a backstop. In other words, if the Government are not minded to accept that recommendation, at least something would happen and at least there would be some sort of progress. As I said, I was very sympathetic to the test and the way that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, set it out. It had a fair amount of support, of course, across the Chamber, but the debate also showed that there are still some quite tricky issues that need to be teased out. I do not think it was quite as clear-cut as perhaps was being suggested, not least about issues around the consistency or otherwise of the application of Gillick.
It may be that, again, I did not get the wording right when I talked about a “review”. I accept that. Reviews can be kicked into the long grass and you never see anything again. But I thought the idea of a consultation was very important and, in fact, I think it would be quite difficult, having listened to this debate carefully, to move straight to having something in the Bill without having some sort of consultation first. It might be that you would want to take some sort of powers that would enable such a thing to be put in place after that consultation had happened, but to me it just felt that some issues still needed to be teased out.
Perhaps my initial amendment was not completely ludicrous, but it has been a really good and interesting debate—
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
Probing, absolutely. Thank you. And again, on this issue I sense that we will be returning on Report. But, having said those things, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this debate and thank the Minister for her responses. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, I do not want to prolong this, but I have to say that, although I am disappointed and a little surprised by the response from the Government, the intention is to align the Mental Capacity Act and Gillick. It is frankly not correct, if I understand the situation, to say that it is not based on case law. I referred to a specific case in which the judge formulated, essentially, the test that appears in my amendment. As I say, I do not want to prolong this but, if necessary, I can refer the Government to that case.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
Perhaps I can just say to the noble Lord that, when I reflect on the discussions on this group, as well as all the others, it may be helpful to discuss this further.
Lord Kamall
“(ba) is a patient who has been informally admitted to a mental health unit in accordance with section 131, or”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that patients who are admitted informally to a mental health unit will also benefit from a care and treatment plan.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 57 stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Howe. The amendment is an attempt to ensure that patients who are admitted informally to hospital for a mental health disorder are also able to benefit from a care and treatment plan. As noble Lords will be aware, the Bill introduces statutory care and treatment plans but, as drafted, extends that right only to a select group of patients. As per the new Section 130ZA(2) of the Mental Health Act, patients who will be eligible for these plans are those who are formally detained under that Act, those who are subject to guardianship under the Act and those who are under a CTO.
I do not think there is any disagreement that these patients rightly deserve access to a care and treatment plan. But what about informal patients who voluntarily admit themselves for treatment? The Explanatory Notes explain that the purpose of putting these plans on a statutory footing is
“to ensure that all relevant patients have a clear and personalised strategy in place describing what is needed to progress them towards recovery”.
They also detail some of the possible inclusions in that care and treatment plan.
I note, however, that the exact inclusions in the care and treatment plan are to be made by the Secretary of State by regulations at a later date, possibly due to consultation. So, although we may have some idea of what might be included, it would be helpful if the Minister could confirm to your Lordships what the Government envisage will be included or could be included. I am not wanting to put the noble Baroness too much on the spot here.
As many noble Lords might well know, care and treatment plans have been part of the package of mental health treatment in Wales since June 2012 under Section 18 of the Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010. Those regulations specify that the areas that must be included in the patient’s care and treatment plan include
“finance and money … accommodation … personal care and physical well-being … education and training … work and occupation … parenting or caring relationships … social, cultural or spiritual … medical and other forms of treatment including psychological interventions”.
Can the Minister confirm whether the care and treatment plans in England will follow the same format or possibly be inspired by the same format? Will there be differences? Are there England-specific issues?
I hope the Minister will understand that I have a few more questions. How will the Secretary of State decide what to prescribe in these plans? What level of consultation will there be? Indeed, what level of consultation has there been to date to inform this, particularly with the clinicians who will be responsible for drawing up the care and treatment plans?
One of the things that many noble Lords have discussed during this debate is the fact that we want to see evidence-led practices. We know that, particularly in mental health but also in physical health, these can help to inform care and treatment plans that have a positive impact on clinical outcomes and therapeutic benefit, because they are based on treatments unique to the patient’s needs.
A meta study in 2023 in the United States found that evidence-based practices
“improve patient outcomes and yield a positive return on investment for hospitals and healthcare systems”.
I note the Minister has referred a number of times to the Government making and implementing these changes when resources allow.
The Social Care Institute for Excellence has also highlighted the importance of person-centred care, writing:
“Research on mental health and wellbeing demonstrates that involvement leads to improved service outcomes and enhances mental wellbeing”.
The institute argues forcefully that care plans for mental health patients should include active involvement from the patient. It is therefore vital that care and treatment plans are not developed in a silo; they should be developed in conjunction with the patient. Given the benefits that access to care and treatment plans should bring patients with a mental disorder, it would be more than appropriate for informal patients to be included as well.
If anyone actually listened to what I said in the debate on our second day in Committee, they may be aware that I had some sympathy with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, who is not in her place. She argued that she did not want to extend the independent mental health advocates to informal patients, possibly because of resource constraints but also because of limited evidence on their therapeutic benefit. I could be accused of being inconsistent, but I would say that, for care and treatment plans, the issue is rather different.
The clinicians will draw up these plans. The Bill states that it is the “appropriate practitioner” who will already be treating that patient, so it may not be the same issue of resources. Perhaps it will take extra time, and I understand that time adds up the more you require of a clinician. But, given that the informally admitted patient will already be being treated by a clinician, we would not necessarily be adding much resource or burden on to the clinician, in the same way as if we had extended the IMHAs, as in the argument made the other night.
Therefore, I hope this amendment will extend provisions that will benefit informally admitted patients, as they will benefit the patients already decided upon in the Bill. I beg to move.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment. I will not detain the Committee long, but I support the amendment and I want to flag the point my noble friend made about Wales and England. To my certain knowledge, when people living further north around the Shropshire border, for example, are admitted, they will almost certainly be offered placements in north Wales. It is important that there is some harmony in these regions; otherwise, it will cause additional problems. I hope my noble friend will press his amendment in due course to make sure that that harmony exists.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 61. I recognise that the purpose of the Bill is to give children and those under 16 greater rights and opportunities to be heard. I entirely agree with that; it is absolutely sensible. But there is a danger of ignoring the fact that parents are basically not considered anywhere in the Bill. They are not in the contents of the Bill or any of the schedules.
Most parents are suitable; some parents are not. It may be that my amendment should perhaps be put in slightly different way, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has done. I recognise that there is a small percentage of parents who may not have total parental responsibility or, if they do have it, they are in the situation of one parent having what used to be called custody and the other having what used to be called access. For most parents, they care about their children. As far as I can see, they are completely ignored, but they do have something to contribute.
I am not suggesting for a moment that parents should make the decisions. What I am asking the Minister to do is to give them the chance to be heard; that is all I ask. They really should, throughout the Bill, be consulted where that is appropriate, but they are not put in for consultation, as far as I can see, in any part of the Bill. This is one place where that really will not do.
Speaking as a parent and grandparent, I would be extremely upset if my child was about to be detained and everybody was discussing what should happen to my child, but nobody asked me. At the moment, as far as I understand, the Government do not seem to think that parents, special guardians or anybody else who happens to have parental responsibility need to be consulted.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
My Lords, my amendment is very closely aligned to the amendment just moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, but it is in relation to children. This is an issue that I raised at Second Reading. A number of children and young people are admitted to mental health settings informally on the basis of their own consent or parental consent—notwithstanding what was just said by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
Research from the Children’s Commissioner for England suggests that around one-third of in-patients aged under 18 are informal. However, NHS Digital does not publish data on the number of young people admitted informally so it is impossible to accurately track the total number of young people in hospital or to identify trends. Concerns have previously been raised, particularly by the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition, that young people who are informal patients are often under exactly the same conditions as those who are detained but without access to the safeguards that children formally detained have. Many children and young people who are informal patients are also often unaware of their rights and, as has already been acknowledged, do not feel that their voices are listened to.
The coalition believes that it is crucial that informal patients aged under 18 have the same safeguards as those detained under the Act. There are two key provisions in the Mental Health Bill that can be strengthened to improve care for children and young people admitted informally. The most important, the coalition argues, is extending care and treatment plans to informal patients aged under 18, which is what my amendment is designed to do.
The reason for that is, if you manage to get somebody who is under 18 to accept informal care, they have no mental health formal record for their future. Most of us who have worked with young people under 18 bust a gut to get them to accept an in-patient admission if it is really necessary—I am talking about families as well as professionals—in order to ensure that they get treatment.
If that treatment is not guaranteed on discharge through a care and treatment plan, in the way that it would be for a detained patient, can your Lordships not see that families would be put in such difficult positions? They would ask, “Would it be better if my child is sectioned and detained in order for them to get long-term care?” This brings me back to my continued, impassioned plea that we need to think about proper standards of elective care for people with mental health problems, most importantly for those under 18.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
My Lords, I remind the Committee of my entry in the register of interests that I am on the advisory board of the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute. I mention this particularly because the three amendments in my name, dealing with the financial implications for people who struggle with their mental health, have been based on the work of the institute.
As I have reminded the House on many occasions, these amendments speak to the undeniable but all too often overlooked fact that our mental health and money are closely linked. When someone is hospitalised for a mental health crisis, bills still need to be paid and debts can mount up, resulting in financial difficulties that greatly damage people’s prospects of recovery.
It is worth focusing on the numbers. In 2022-23, almost 90,000 adults were admitted to hospital for a mental health problem. The Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey indicated that around one-quarter of people experiencing a mental health problem are also in problem debt. The rate of problem debt is undoubtedly higher among people experiencing a mental health problem, which leads to hospitalisation. An earlier study from 2008 found that one-third of all people with probable psychosis are in problem debt.
The three amendments dealing with the link between finance and mental health deal with different aspects of the problem, and they are, quite rightly, being considered in turn in relation to the relevant parts of the Bill. Today, we start with my Amendment 59, and I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler of Enfield and Lady Neuberger, for their support for it. Like the other amendments in this group, it deals with care and treatment plans. Later, we will come to the implications of advance choice documents, which is currently in group nine, and then provision for mental health crisis breathing space, which is currently in group 17.
The Mental Health Bill provides an important opportunity to tackle the vicious cycle of poor mental health often leading to financial problems, and financial problems often leading to poor mental health. We must break that cycle and ensure that people’s financial needs are addressed as part of a supported recovery from a mental health crisis. That focus is missing from the Bill in its current form, and my amendments seek to address that gap.
As I have already indicated, these amendments are informed and supported by the independent charity, the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute, which has done considerable and excellent work in this area. They are small changes designed to improve the Bill and the outcomes for those it aims to help, by ensuring that a person’s financial situation is routinely considered and acted on as part of their treatment and recovery from a mental health crisis. Addressing a person’s finances is one of the many factors that mental health practitioners must consider in their assessment and care planning.
However, services cannot rely on patients to tell them when they are facing financial difficulties. The experience is that people rarely take the initiative to tell mental health professionals about money problems, often because they are too unwell or because the stigma around both mental health and financial problems acts as a barrier to disclosure. Adding an explicit prompt about people’s financial situation in care and treatment plans will ensure that this is routinely and consistently considered by healthcare professionals and will open up more opportunities to safeguard patients from financial harm.
There is a precedent for this. In Wales, “finance and money” is already included as a section in the care and treatment plan template. That does not mean that busy healthcare professionals are required to support people with their money in a way that they are not trained or intended to do. Rather, this is a case of empowering them to identify those in need and refer them to the relevant welfare adviser in their service, so that healthcare professionals can focus on medical care. Ultimately, that could free up time for health professionals, as well as improving outcomes for patients.
I will illustrate the need for this proactive inquiry with testimony from someone with lived experience of money and mental health problems, as they do it so much more powerfully than I can. A participant in Money and Mental Health Policy Institute research shared:
“I didn’t realise how much my mental health affected my finances and vice versa. I lived for years in shame and horrific anxiety about money which caused my mental health to spiral. I thought there was no help out there for me and I didn’t want to be alive, as I couldn’t see a way out of my money troubles”.
Legislating to include a consideration of people’s finances, when they are in a mental health crisis and throughout their recovery, will help prevent further illness, support recovery and reduce waiting lists, and will help people return to daily life, including work, more smoothly.
I can imagine what my noble friend the Minister’s response will be, because she has already written to the institute. She said in her letter: “We intend to set out in secondary legislation the required contents of the statutory CTP. However, we plan to further consult stakeholders to make sure that the CTP covers all the information that is critical to an individual’s recovery and timely and effective discharge from the Act”. I hope that she does not mind me taking the opportunity to stress the importance of this issue. Does she agree with that, including the importance of its place in treatment plans?
Baroness Neuberger (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 59, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, to which I have added my name. I must declare rather a lot of interests. I am chair of the University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and of the Whittington Health NHS Trust, which provides child and adolescent mental health services. I was also one of the vice-chairs of the independent review of the Mental Health Act in 2018, which feels like a long time ago.
I am keeping my comments in Committee fairly short and sparse, because I feel that I have had quite a lot of say already, having been involved in that review. However, I want to speak about the issue of financial difficulties and mental health problems, because we should have looked at it in greater detail when we were conducting the review. It was an omission on our part, as we did not focus on it in any detail. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, cited one of the people who spoke incredibly movingly to our review and who talked about how awful it is to be an in-patient. She said that she recovered and was given the care she needed, but she asked why it had to be such an awful experience.
One of the things that is becoming clearer—the noble Lord, Lord Davies, alluded to it—is that when you have had a mental health crisis and your finances are in an absolute mess, because you did not get it together to do anything about them, why does your recovery have to be so awful because nobody helped you and gave you the advice you needed at the time? That is why this is so serious. If you are in hospital, you may not even get access to your computer, you may not be using your mobile phone all the time, you may be in something of a mess and your cognition may be severely affected. If that is the case, you will not be paying your bills, claiming your benefits or paying your rent. When you recover, it will take you ages to get into a situation where you can live a normal life again and not be hugely in debt.
I was going to cite some of the experts by experience—the quotations have been given to me by the amazing Money and Mental Health Policy Institute, to which I am extremely grateful. However, since I do not want to take much more of your Lordships’ time, I shall just say that, although NICE stipulates that assessments in care and crisis plans at present should consider patients’ holistic social and living circumstances, which would include things such as housing and finance, mostly, in normal circumstances, the issues are too great. Often, the mental health needs are at crisis point and it just does not happen, and the same will happen with care and treatment plans unless we put this in the Bill.
I ask the Minister—I have already heard what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said—whether she will think quite hard as to whether this could be in the Bill, along with parental involvement. I agree with all the amendments in this group. There are some things that need to be in the Bill that would make sure that, when we see treatment in place—and I see a lot of it in what I do in the other part of my life—those things are taken into account. If it is in secondary legislation, it is much harder and much less likely.
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Wednesday 22nd January 2025
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 47-III Third marshalled list for Committee - (21 Jan 2025)
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 60A. At this time of night, I do not intend to make a very long or detailed speech; I simply wish to make two points. Previous speakers, such as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, talked about factors that should be included in care and treatment plans and often are not, for a variety of reasons. But they are crucially and directly important to the health and well-being of an individual.
I wish to talk about the inclusion of housing, for two reasons. First, housing is a source of anguish and mental strain, full stop. It does not matter whether people have mental health problems, but if they have and they find themselves in an acute hospital, either detained or as a voluntary patient, I am sure that, when they come back, there will be a very high incidence of them losing their tenancy and then being unable to find suitable accommodation, particularly if they are young.
Members of your Lordships’ House have already spoken about the fact that there are very few treatment centres dotted around the country for young people with eating disorders—here in the Bill we are talking about England. That therefore means that young people are having to go very long distances for treatment, which can have a significant disruptive effect on their living circumstances.
The other reason I thought it was worthwhile to table this amendment and have the debate was that the other day, we had a wider debate about care and treatment plans. The one question many of us were trying to ascertain the answer to was: who is responsible for them? Who is responsible for drawing them up and implementing them? Crucially, who is responsible if they are not implemented and there is a consequence to that for an individual? If we cannot focus our minds on that now, given what has been going on in the country, we never will. The only thing I could take away from our discussion the other day was that nobody is responsible for it at all; nobody is going to carry the can.
When we are talking about people who have been in acute care, very little attention is paid to their housing needs, because that is not the duty of that service provider, whose focus is on acute care. We know that local authorities are already required to provide aftercare and advice to individuals, but advice in the face of a bailiff turfing you out of your house is frankly of limited use. So, I would like the Minister to please consider this amendment and give assurances that, when we ever get to the bottom of who is responsible for these care and treatment plans, this is on the list of things for which they can be held accountable.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 62 in this group, which is in my name, and I will try to be as brief as possible. This group is all about the statutory care and treatment plans, and I very much welcome them. They are a very positive part of this legislation and should help patients achieve recovery and hopefully discharge from mental health in-patient units as quickly as possible.
My amendment seeks to ensure that individuals who are turning 18 during a care and treatment plan have their plans reviewed to ensure that there is continuity of care when transitioning from child to adult services. I spoke earlier about the tricky issue of transitioning from child to adult services. It is important for three reasons. Young people aged 16 to 25 experience high rates of mental health problems but are less likely to access the support they need; young people often experience tricky transitions, meaning that too often they fall through the gaps—we have heard so many stories about in this Chamber in the past; and, again as we have said earlier today, young people really should have a say in their care and treatment.
We know that there is a high level of mental health need among young people in the 16 to 25 age group and that it is going up. I have no wish to return to the earlier debate about whether that rise is real, but the numbers according to NHS Digital are very much on the increase. So, while 16 to 25 year-olds are experiencing high levels of need, they are often having real difficulties accessing support. It is sometimes talked about as the treatment gap, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, talked about earlier on, and it is far wider here than for other age groups.
These poor transitions between CAMHS and adult services are generally the problem because, after someone reaches their 18th birthday—which is the upper limit for CAMHS—young people too often face a real cliff edge when trying to access mental health support. They are no longer in the age range for CAMHS and simultaneously may not reach the threshold for adult services. Effectively, it leaves young people in limbo, with no access to the mental health support they require.
There is a range of reasons for these challenges, including poor information and, very importantly, a difference in treatment models. While children’s services are generally seen as more nurturing, with a focus on treating developmental and emotional disorders, adult services in contrast focus on treating severe and enduring mental illness, meaning that young people with these diagnoses are less likely to be accepted. Just as I have mentioned, the high thresholds for support often result in young people being told that they are not ill enough for the services they need, so unfortunately things get worse and they end up being detained. Without that support during transition, young people can experience all sorts of worsening symptoms and other life outcomes. That is the rationale behind my Amendment 62.
I will mention another couple of amendments in this group that have my strong support. Amendment 64, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, from whom we have still to hear, really emphasises the critical importance of ensuring that, where young carers are involved in a family situation, they are identified, particularly by adult mental health practitioners, who may not have them in mind first and foremost, that people proactively look for them, and then that the young carers—who are often hidden, with their needs only identified when there is a crisis—are supported. That amendment has my full support.
Lastly, I support Amendment 59, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies. At this point—because I have not done it yet—I refer to my interests in the register, both as a member of the Financial Inclusion Commission and president of the Money Advice Trust. I absolutely support what the noble Lord said about the importance of these plans, including matters to do with finance. The links between money problems and mental health are now well proven and this legislation should reflect them. The Bill provides a once-in-a-generation opportunity to ensure that people’s holistic needs, including finances, are considered as a key part of supporting recovery from a mental health crisis.
Baroness Keeley (Lab)
My Lords, I rise to explain the significance of Amendment 64 in my name, which aims to cover the situation of both young carers and young children in a family where a care and treatment plan is being prepared for their parent. I thank the Carers Trust for suggesting this amendment and providing a briefing on this issue. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, for his support for the amendment and, of course, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, who has just spoken of her support for it.
Briefly, the amendment adds the requirement that a practitioner preparing or reviewing a care and treatment plan must ask whether there are children in the family and take actions to respond if the children need help or protection from harm. This amendment would, as I said, cover young carers, but it would also cover young children where there may be safeguarding concerns—a topic which the Child Safeguarding Practice Review Panel highlighted as a theme in its latest annual report.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, just touched on, young carers are so often hidden, and often their needs are identified only when there is a crisis. Even then, the extent of their caring role and the impact it has on the child’s development may not be recognised quickly or fully assessed. This amendment would help to ensure earlier identification of children who might be in need of information, support or protection from potential harm. It would mean staff asking the right questions early on to ensure that the right information is recorded and actions taken. It would help with adequate signposting of information and a chance to offer appropriate support to avoid a crisis or manage it appropriately.
The amendment also mirrors the new wording in the Working Together to Safeguard Children statutory guidance, which covers adult social practitioners:
“When staff are providing services to adults, they should ask whether there are children in the family and take actions to respond if the children need help or protection from harm. Additional parenting support could be particularly needed where the adults have mental health problems”.
There is evidence that having a parent with a mental health problem is one of the biggest risk factors for a first episode of major depressive disorder in children and adolescents.
This is not inevitable. Research suggests that intervention can enhance parenting skills in households affected by parental depression, and it can change the way that children cope. In turn, this can reduce the risk of children internalising problems that may threaten their life chances. The amendment is designed to enhance the ability of agencies working individually and together to identify and respond to the safeguarding needs of families. It is about supporting the challenging work of finding out what is happening to children and anticipating risks and harm, of knowing when action is needed. In most cases, children receive the support, help and protection they need, but sometimes children are seriously harmed or, worse, they can die because of neglect.
Policy initiatives in recent years have called for a wider family focus on safeguarding children so that all staff recognise that meeting the needs of family members who may put children at risk benefits the child, the adult and the family as a whole. This amendment would support those efforts. The amendment is in keeping with guidance from the Social Care Institute for Excellence to “Think child, think parent, think family”, to ensure that the child is heard and their needs are met.
The Carers Trust believes that the amendment would unlock additional support from mental health professionals to work with parents and children to enable the child to have age-appropriate understanding of what is happening to their parent and information about what services are available for them in their situation and how they can access them.
To illustrate the need for the amendment, I have two short case studies. Aidan was four when his mother was first sectioned under the Mental Health Act. Throughout his childhood, Aidan’s mother was regularly sectioned and would sometimes be in hospital for a number of months. There were many occasions when the police were involved because his mother had disappeared, which was particularly scary for Aidan. In his words:
“To me, you only ever saw the police if you’d done something wrong, so I remember when they turned up at our house, I thought mum was in trouble”.
Seeing his mother being taken into hospital on a regular basis meant that Aidan had lots of questions and worries. In his words again:
“There were so many times where I wondered whether mum would ever come home. I knew she’d been sectioned but I had no idea what that actually meant or if she would ever get better”.
Staff at the hospital who were treating Aidan’s mother would regularly see him visiting. Despite this, none of the staff there told Aidan or his father about support that might be available or asked whether Aidan might need any help. It was only when Aidan was 12 and his attendance dropped at school that he was identified as a young carer.
The second case is Vamp’s story. This is a pseudonym chosen by her family. The case study is taken from a recently published child safeguarding practice review which found that a 13 year-old girl died as a result of taking drugs sold to her in a park. It was identified that her mother had had a period of serious mental illness, and that illness was identified as the catalyst for things deteriorating for the young person. Tragically, two years on, the young person had died. This is taken from the relevant extract from the child safeguarding practice review:
“Vamp’s mother did not feel that her daughter had been a young carer … as the mental illness was short term. However, Vamp’s sister described the situation as being so difficult for both. When their mother was discharged home from hospital, it was only Vamp and her mother at home. Vamp’s sister was only a young adult, and with her own baby to care for. She … said she felt that no one checked in on their mother. Vamp’s sister … said that professionals expected her mother to manage to parent Vamp, which she was not able to do alone, she needed professional help”.
This is a simple but important amendment to protect young carers. I urge my noble friend the Minister to consider it, and I commend the amendment to the House.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 64, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, and shall speak briefly in support. I have not contributed to this Bill before, but I have sat through many of the debates. Without sounding pompous, it struck me that this was our House at its best, dealing with a complicated Bill in a sensitive and non-partisan way and drawing on the unique expertise we have in our House.
As I listened to the earlier debates on detention and community treatment orders, I asked myself how the children in the families concerned would be informed and what the impact on them would be. We have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, the impact on Aidan when his mother was sectioned. By definition, the people covered by the Bill are vulnerable people; many of them will have carers, and many of those carers will be young carers. As the noble Baroness has just said, this amendment simply helps improve the earlier identification of children of parents being detained under the Act and to ensure that they have access to support, if they need it, and are safeguarded where necessary.
The 2021 census showed that there are 50,000 young carers caring for over 50 hours a week. An astonishing number—3,000 of them—are aged between five and nine. The Carers Trust has shown that those young carers at school are at risk of a poorer attendance record, lower academic achievement and more liable to social isolation and, sadly, bullying, if they are not identified early. As the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, just said, having a parent with a mental health problem is actually one of the biggest risk factors for depression in children and adolescents. But it is not inevitable: research suggests that intervention can reduce that risk and change the way that children cope.
As a vice-chairman of the APPG on Young Carers, I know that we took evidence last year from young carers, and we heard that on average it takes three years for a young carer to be identified, with some of them taking over 10 years before being identified. Improving early identification is one of the top priorities of the all-party group, so that they can access support and not be negatively affected by their caring situation.
This amendment will help to tackle the issue, which is reported by young carer services, that many potential young carers are not identified by adult mental health services. For example, one young carers service, the Young Carers Alliance, reported that 20% of the young carers it supports are supporting a parent with a mental illness, yet they did not receive a single referral from the adult mental health services in the space of an entire year.
In our inquiry, we also heard from the charity Our Time how, when it comes to identifying young carers by mental health professionals, we are way behind countries such as the Netherlands and Norway. Both those countries have introduced requirements for health professionals to consider whether adults with mental health problems have children. This referral may not be a one-way process; if the child is a carer, he or she may have an insight into the events that trigger an episode in the parent and may actually help the professionals to identify an appropriate treatment pathway.
A final benefit of this amendment is that it would help adult mental health in-patient units ensure that they are complying with the duty under Section 91 of the Health and Care Act 2022 to consult with any carers, including young carers, before discharging an adult from hospital. Again, last year, we heard of patients being discharged without the young carer being informed, often where they were the principal carer. For these reasons, I hope that the Government can support this amendment. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I add my support for Amendment 58, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, and to which I have added my name. Briefly, given the time, the care and treatment plan is a major plank, a pivotal safeguard of the Bill. The safeguard is not open to voluntary patients. As the noble Baroness outlined, we want to encourage many young people to voluntarily enter a hospital to get the treatment that they need. A 2021 UCL research project found that only 23.6% of young people were detained involuntarily. The large cohort would be those who have consented by parental consent and those who voluntarily entered the treatment. As such a high proportion of the under-18 population are entering voluntarily, it is imperative that they also have a care and treatment plan.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the pertinent points that they have made.
I will start with Amendments 57 and 58. There is no doubt that all patients who are in a mental health hospital for care and treatment should have a care plan, whether or not they have been detained under the Act. This is already set out in guidance for commissioners and in the NHS England service specification and care standards for children’s and young people’s services. In line with the independent review’s findings and recommendations, care and treatment plans for involuntary or detained patients are statutory. This is because such patients are subject to restrictions and compulsory orders, including compulsory treatment, which places them in a uniquely vulnerable position.
Rather than bringing voluntary patients into the scope of this clause, we feel it is more appropriate to use the Mental Health Act’s code of practice to embed high standards of care planning for all patients—voluntary and involuntary. Specifically with regard to children and young people, any provisions that are relevant to voluntary patients are already met by existing specialist care planning standards and the NHS England national service specification for children’s and young people’s services, which providers are contractually obliged to follow. NHS England is already in the process of strengthening that current service specification.
Regarding points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and my noble friend Lord Davies on the contents of the care and treatment plan and patient discharge plan, as my noble friend Lord Davies kindly set out for me, which I appreciate, the Government have consulted on the required contents of the care and treatment plan, as originally proposed by the independent review. The expected contents of the plan are described in the delegated powers memorandum, which has been published online. I understand the points that my noble friend made; we will return to them regarding what we intend to include in the patient discharge plan.
I turn to Amendment 59, tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies and supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Neuberger. The plan needs to include details of interventions aimed at minimising financial harm to the patient where this is relevant to their mental health recovery. My noble friend asked for my agreement on this point. I hope that he will take that in this way. We intend to set out in regulations, rather than in primary legislation, what that plan must include. We will consider personal financial matters that are relevant to a number of the elements that we intend to require in regulations, such as the services that a patient might need post discharge. My noble friend’s point, and that of the noble Baronesses, is very well made and is taken on board.
Turning to Amendment 60A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, I confirm that the Bill sets out who is responsible for the statutory plan. For in-patients, this is the clinician who is responsible overall for the patient’s case. The quality of plans for detained patients is monitored by the CQC. Any housing, accommodation or wider social care needs that are relevant to the patient’s mental health recovery are already captured within the scope of the statutory care and treatment plan. We intend to require in regulations about the content of the plan that a discharge plan is a required element of the overall care and treatment plan—which noble Lords rightly have pressed the need for. Existing statutory guidance on discharge sets out that a discharge plan should cover how a patient’s housing needs will be met when they return to the community. Currently, where a mental health in-patient may benefit from support with housing issues, NHS England guidance sets out that this should be offered, making links with relevant local services as part of early and effective discharge planning.
Where a person is receiving housing benefit or their housing is paid for via universal credit, there are provisions already in place that allow them to be temporarily absent from their property for a limited duration. We know that the vast majority of people entering hospital will return home before the time limit expires, therefore avoiding a negative impact on their living situation.
We intend to use the code of practice to clearly set out expectations on mental health staff around care planning, including consideration of accommodation and housing needs, and also to highlight existing provisions that protect a person’s living arrangements while they are in hospital.
On Amendment 61, tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, we of course recognise the importance of involving parents, guardians and those with parental responsibility in decisions around care and treatment. We have already provided for this in the clause by stating
“any … person who cares for the relevant patient or is interested in the relevant patient’s welfare”.
The clause seeks to include also carers and other family. As I said last week, this is consistent with existing established terminology used in the Mental Capacity Act and the Care Act.
The amendment would also make this a requirement for all patients, not just children and young people. We do not think it is appropriate here to give an automatic right to parents to be involved in an adult patient’s care. However, we have made provisions to ensure that anyone named by an adult patient, including parents, are consulted where the patient wishes them to be.
Baroness Browning (Con)
On that last point about adults, I realise this is a more difficult area, but we have debated in this House reports from the charity Mind about adults, and young adults at that, who, when they have been admitted not just to mental health hospitals but to general hospitals and have had difficulty communicating —I go back to autism, but it might not be uniquely autism—hospital staff have said, “They are over 18, so we’re not listening to you, mum”, while standing by the bedside asking why a person is not eating, when there is probably a very good reason why not. We have recorded deaths of young adults because the parents of people over 18 have not been listened to. It is a mantra that I have heard many times, in many situations: “They’re over 18, it’s up to them”, when, in fact, quite clearly, their lives could be saved, or their health improved, if hospital staff had listened to mum or dad at the bedside. That is on the record and we have debated it in the past, so I wonder how the Minister thinks we can resolve it as far as mental health patients are concerned.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
The noble Baroness is right to raise that point. This is the difference between legislation and practice, and we have to bridge that gap. We are very alive to the point she makes, but the important point about this amendment is that we are trying to include all those whom the patient wants to be involved, not just restricting it to parents. I take the point she has made and will, of course, ensure that we attend to that. I would say that that is, as I say, more a case of how things are implemented.
On Amendment 62, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, it is important that the transition of a young person to adult services is planned and managed with the utmost care by the clinical team. This is reflected in existing care standards and guidelines, which set out what should be met, what relevant teams should meet and how to provide specific support where a young person’s care is being transferred to adult services. This should take place six months prior to the patient turning 18 years of age. On reviewing the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan when they reach adulthood, in Clause 20, subsection (5)(d) of new Section 130ZA already sets out that that plan must be reviewed following any change in circumstances or conditions. We think that turning 18 and transitioning from children and young people’s services to adult is a significant change and absolutely requires review of the plan. We will make this explicit in the code of practice.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 64. I thank my noble friend Lady Keeley for sharing the reality of how this manifests itself by sharing with us individual circumstances. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Young, whose work on young carers is well known and respected. We support the intention to ensure that children are properly safeguarded. If a person is known to services, immediate safeguarding needs to form part of the planning by approved mental health professionals on behalf of the local authority and others involved in the Mental Health Act assessment before bringing a person into hospital. If a person is not known to known to services, the professionals should work with the relevant agencies to make sure the necessary steps are taken. The statutory guidance Working Together to Safeguard Children sets out how all practitioners working with children and families need to understand their role in this regard.
Baroness Keeley (Lab)
I just want to reflect that the noble Lord, Lord Young, said in his speech that young carers services almost never receive any referrals from adult mental health services, despite the provision that already exists and has done for a number of years in codes of practice. This is a difficult thing—I tried to bring in legislation for that in the other place on a number of occasions. I just thought that was worth pointing out.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for pointing that out. On the points raised about protections for young carers, the code highlights that children who are caring for parents with severe mental illness are entitled to request a young carer’s needs assessment under the Children Act. It goes on to cover the information that young carers should be offered to help navigate such a challenging time.
Returning to the guidance about which I was speaking, as has been identified, it already outlines the responsibility of multiagency safeguarding partners. Protecting children at risk of abuse and stopping vulnerable children falling through the cracks is very much at the heart of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which was introduced to Parliament last month.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
I thank the Minister. I want to raise the issue that so many children and adolescents are placed for care out of their area, which makes the subsequent treatment plan hard to manage. Can the Minister at least look at whether the code of conduct needs strengthening on that issue? For example, it could include a recommendation that a local team visits the person in the hospital before they are discharged. Of course, I would like to see more beds closer to home, but we have to face the reality.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I appreciate that point, and I certainly would be happy to have a look at that.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in the debate on this group. In responding to the Minister, I will touch briefly on some of the other amendments, but particularly on Amendment 57 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Howe. I thank my noble friend Lady Browning and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for adding their names to it.
On Amendment 61, I agree very much with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the importance of parents and guardians, not only in respect of this amendment but all throughout the Bill and in the subsequent amendments that she tabled. It is very important that we do not forget that point and that we keep coming back to it.
On Amendment 58, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Watkins, and my noble friend Lady Berridge, we are very sympathetic to the idea of extending this to under-18s. We have to reflect and may come back to this on Report.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I were fortunate enough to have a conversation about his Amendment 59 during the dinner break. It is on a fundamental issue and we need to raise awareness of the link between finance and mental health. One can lead to the other: you might start off with financial difficulties and then find yourself with mental health issues, or mental health issues make it far more difficult to manage your finances. Frankly, when there are banks that do not necessarily understand the individual circumstances or are moving toward semi-automated decision-making, this is a whole minefield that we ought to tackle as soon as possible and not wait 20 years for the next mental health Bill.
On Amendment 62, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, continuity of care is absolutely important, and not just for mental health; I have been in debates in this House where it is really important for allergies or diabetes. When children are treated for a condition by children’s services they then worry, when they transfer to adult services, about whether they will continue to receive the same level of care, particularly if the clinician is different when they move over. They may well have had a very good relationship with that clinician as a child, but then they feel that they have to explain everything all over again, even though there are patient records.
Amendment 64, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, and my noble friend Lord Young, seems eminently sensible. It almost seems obvious; I was surprised that it does not happen at the moment. I take on board what the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, said about previous attempts to put it into legislation; it must be fiendishly difficult.
One of the points that the Minister made was that young carers are entitled to some of the things that the noble Baroness was asking for. How do they know they are entitled to them? It is all very well to be entitled to them, but how do they know? This is true for physical health as well, but given it was raised on this specific issue, I would be interested in the Minister’s response. If she is not able to give that response, thanks to technology, over the airwaves to the iPad then perhaps she could include it in her letter to noble Lords afterwards.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made an important point about Amendment 60A and housing. Housing, like finance, is one of those things that could lead to mental health issues, or having mental health issues makes housing much more difficult. The lack of adequate accommodation could lead to readmission, when we think about discharge afterwards, suitable accommodation and suitable circumstances.
I should be positive. I am grateful to the Government for the care and treatment plans in the first place. I think they are very sensible, which is why many noble Lords want them extended to not just that cohort of patients. I understand that sometimes we have to roll things out and learn from experience, and perhaps that can feed into future rollout—I understand sometimes not going for the big bang, as it were. On Amendment 57, I will read Hansard carefully and reflect on what the Minister said. I particularly thank her for the reference to the link to see what is being considered for inclusion in the care and treatment plan. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Whitaker
Member’s explanatory statement
The appropriate practitioner must provide culturally appropriate information when preparing or reviewing a care and treatment plan.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, I have apologised that I was not able to be at the Second Reading of this most welcome Bill. I declare interests as a former member of the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust board and various positions in Gypsy, Traveller and Roma organisations as set out in the register. I read the Hansard record of the Second Reading debate and was particularly heartened by my noble friend the Minister’s acknowledgment of previous legislation’s lack of attention to racial disparities.
This deficiency is especially applicable to the situation of Gypsy, Traveller and Roma people, which Amendments 63, 101, 107, 113, 116 and 124 address, but I warmly support the other amendments in this group. The communities I speak of are usually airbrushed out of consideration of race discrimination. That is partly because their numbers have been small when national surveys have been made in the past, even though the proportion within their populations who suffer the multiple effects of discrimination is larger than in any other recognised minority-ethnic group, and perhaps partly because they are not distinguished by colour.
I am grateful to the Traveller Movement for detailed briefing and to the noble Lord, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for their support. The amendments I speak to are all intended to probe how this Bill can avoid the same cruel mistake of omitting ways to deal with the mental health effects of discrimination against these communities. Basically, they stipulate that mental health practitioners must be trained and obliged to ensure that the care, treatment, advice and information they give are attuned to the culture of the people they are looking after. In healthcare generally, almost one-third of respondents to a Traveller Movement survey said that they experienced discrimination. These are the voices that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to, and I thank her for adding her name to one of my amendments.
There is reason to believe that this discrimination experience applies significantly to mental ill-health because this is not a familiar concept to some in the more traditional communities. Most of the rare, targeted provision has come from the voluntary sector. ONS research, which has now begun to put right the gap in our knowledge, shows that mistrust and fear of discrimination have delayed them seeking help. We do, however, still need its data to be disaggregated with regard to Gypsies and Irish Travellers, which are very different communities. Incidentally, the NHS data dictionary is not collecting such data at all, so the full picture may be even worse.
Amendment 63 applies the principle of cultural attunement to care and treatment plans. Only then would new subsection (6), which requires consultation to establish the patient’s wishes and needs, be properly fulfilled. This will mean taking account of possible mistrust, literacy rates, digital exclusion and any language barriers, because although Romani Gypsies and Irish Travellers have been in the UK for centuries, there may also be new arrivals from the Roma communities of east and central Europe.
Let me quickly sketch in the context. At present, one survey found that 66% of domestic abuse service providers—professionals—did not know how to engage with Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people. There is in particular a fear on the part of those communities that their children may be taken into care if they seek support for acute mental health problems, and some cases of suicide have thereby resulted. In fact, suicide is, tragically, much more common in these communities than in other groups. The NHS’s own research, carried out by the University of Worcester, cites an estimate that suicide is seven times more likely. It makes recommendations mandating specific cultural training in all aspects of healthcare. Research by Friends, Families and Travellers has found that lack of support from mental health and other public services is specifically mentioned by those affected to be one of the causes, together with cultural stigma. Anxiety is three times more likely and depression over twice as likely. The Roma Support Group also picks out cultural stigma as one of the barriers to effective treatment for mental illness, as well as lack of knowledge on the part of practitioners about the background of Holocaust survival experienced by older members of the Roma community, and often transmitted over the generations. Where literacy is low, it has been found that there is little understanding of mental health and insufficient access to services; and 46% from these communities reported that they had no access to digital primary care services.
Amendments 101 and 107 apply the same principles of trained cultural access to the provision of an independent mental health advocate, as does Amendment 112 to giving information about the complaints procedure. Amendment 113 brings in the providers of information on complaints for community health patients, and Amendments 116 and 124 do the same for advance choice documents in England and in Wales.
Finally, the Women and Equalities Committee pointed out in 2019:
“Despite the fact that information and guidance has been available to frontline healthcare staff for some time, discriminatory practices are more widespread than they should be”.
Apart from the new, most welcome planning policy, very little has changed since then, no doubt because the committee’s other recommendation, that there should be a cross-departmental strategy to tackle the overlapping inequalities faced by these communities, which have resulted in the worst health outcomes for any minority-ethnic group, was never developed by the previous Government despite the initial steps taken by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, when Minister for Communities. The Minister has cited the NHS role in a
“wider equality monitoring review programme”
in a Parliamentary Answer. Can she tell the House how this will cover access to mental health services? The present lack of engagement is why cultural understanding, created by specific training, must be in the Bill. These amendments would help the Bill realise its ambition of fully informing patients of the choices available to deal with serious mental ill-health, strengthening their voice and improving their involvement in their own care. I beg to move.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, Amendments 65 and 133, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Scriven, are both about tackling racial injustices in the operation of the Act. I am sympathetic to the amendments that we have just heard about from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, who set them out eloquently. I also strongly support Amendment 138, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall.
As I have said in previous debates, a primary driver of the review of the Mental Health Act was the shocking racial injustices in the use of the Act, and we need to have that front and centre in our minds as we work our way through the Bill. Addressing racial inequalities is one of the key issues identified in the 2018 review, and there remain concerns that the Bill still does not go far enough to address that deeply entrenched inequity. As I set out on the first day of Committee when introducing my amendment on including equity as an additional principle in the Bill, black people are more than three and a half times more likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act than white people and over seven times more likely to be placed on a community treatment order. I make no apology for repeating those figures because I think they are scandalous.
Evidence shows that, on average, people from racialised communities experience greater difficulty accessing mental health services and have poorer experiences and outcomes, and we have heard examples of that. For example, black or black British people are more likely to be detained for longer and to experience repeated admission. They are also more likely to be subject to police powers under the Act and experience higher levels of restraint. It is worth noting that the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, in his recent report on the NHS, said the use of restrictive interventions in in-patient mental health settings had continued to rise, and the most recent data shows that people from a black or black British background are still significantly more likely to be subject to restrictive intervention.
I readily acknowledge that there are some measures in the Bill that should have a positive impact for people from racialised communities—for example, the introduction of the advance choice documents that we were talking about earlier, which I very much welcome—but, in my view, the Bill in its current form still only scratches the surface, really. It does not take on many of the recommendations in this area from both the independent review of the Act and the pre-legislative scrutiny committee. Can the Minister explain why those recommendations were not taken on board?
I turn to my amendments. Amendment 65—and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for adding her name—is a probing amendment designed to understand better the Government’s thinking on how they intend to address racial disparities in the use of community treatment orders, which we debated at length on Monday. I do not want to repeat that, save to say that community treatment orders have been used more widely than anticipated and disproportionately on individuals from particular ethnic backgrounds. It is vital that this is closely monitored to ensure that the disproportionality in use is tackled head on. We must not focus just on reductions in the overall numbers of CTOs. Does the Minister agree that that should include collecting evidence on the effectiveness of NHS England’s patient and carer race equality framework and its approach to reducing the overrepresentation of people from black and minority ethnic communities?
Just to show that, rather like my noble friend Lord Scriven, I do not get out enough, I noticed that page 88 of the lengthy impact assessment talks about 13 pilots—trusts that have already started to make changes as a result of this anti-racism framework. Can the Minister update the House on their progress? If she cannot do so now, perhaps she could write to me.
We know that people from these racial backgrounds may also be reluctant to seek help from formal services, based either on previous negative experiences or in some cases because of social stigma attached to mental health issues within their own community. Amendment 133 would require mental health units to appoint a responsible person to address and report on racial disparities and other inequalities relating to the use of the Act. This is really important and it is vital that a new responsible person role is introduced at hospital level to oversee race equality and address inequalities in the operation of the Act.
The responsible person would be responsible for publishing a policy on how that unit plans to reduce racial and other disparities which are based on protected characteristics in that unit or community mental health service. They would have responsibility for monitoring data on equalities as well as overseeing workforce training and policies and drawing up policies to address bias and discrimination. In my view, the creation of a responsible person role at local level would materially help us to move forward to a more transparent and accountable mental health system, and this accountability would be reinforced and amplified by the responsibility this amendment also places on the Secretary of State to report on progress made on reducing inequalities at national level. That is set out in proposed new Section 120H.
I really believe that such a dual-pronged approach to clear and transparent accountability could make a tangible difference in this critical area of public policy, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, as has already been acknowledged, I have put my name to Amendment 63, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. Both of them have done a comprehensive job of introducing the amendments so I will be extremely brief.
The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, is well known in your Lordships’ House for championing the many issues affecting Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people. I particularly wanted to sign Amendment 63 because it is a very broad-ranging amendment—it is crucial that everybody gets culturally appropriate forms of explanation. It struck me as we were debating that we are focused now on mental health, but I think this probably would also apply right across the NHS to physical health because there are, of course, cultural differences in understanding our bodies, et cetera.
If we imagine the case, perhaps, of a refugee who suffers mental health difficulties, having fled their home country, where they were subject to abuse by the authorities. It is important to make sure, if they are to be sectioned, that that is carefully explained to and understood by both the patient and potentially the patient’s family. There needs to be an extra level and a sensitivity to that person’s circumstances. We will all have different circumstances, but it is important to look at it in that broad frame.
On Amendment 65, we have already canvassed quite extensively the way in which minoritised communities are currently seeing significant disparities in the way they are treated under the law in the area of mental health, particularly in community treatment orders. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, described this as a probing amendment. Whether this is the exact means or not, it is clear that we have to have much better data and to make sure that as soon as trends and patterns emerge in that data, they are acted on. It is encouraging to hear that this is being piloted and work is being done but it is crucial that this becomes standard and that is why it is tempting to feel that it really has to be in the Bill.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. I also want to communicate the support of my right reverend friend the Bishop of London, who apologises that she cannot be in her place this evening.
Turning to the amendments led by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, on culturally appropriate care, I appreciated the noble Baroness’s references to the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community. I have worked with that community much over many years and very much enjoyed my interactions with it.
These amendments highlight issues that my right reverend friend has spent a lot of time considering, particularly from a faith perspective. I do not think we have heard that in the debate so far tonight. It is sometimes hard to grasp just how differently our health, especially our mental health, is culturally understood across different communities and faith groups. While our ability to discuss our own and others’ mental health may be generally improving—I think it is—it remains an extremely difficult discussion point for many cultures and many communities.
When you combine that with the extensive inequalities of outcomes that we find, and many people’s experiences of culturally inappropriate care in mental health and other settings, it is inevitable that many people are reluctant to engage with preventative services. It was said at Second Reading that minoritised communities are likely to engage at a crisis point rather than seek early interventions. My wife worked for many years as a maths specialist in the home and hospital tuition service of a large urban authority. She regularly found that she was working with pupils whose mental health needs had been picked up late, if at all, because the culture of the parental home saw mental health issues as shameful, and not something you could raise with external service providers. So culturally appropriate care is a crucial step if we are to build the trust that is ultimately vital to reducing health inequalities.
In order that culturally appropriate care is deliverable, training on faith literacy, as well as different cultures and beliefs, will be crucial. Again, I have found that myself; I have been working with my fellow faith leaders in Greater Manchester, including the excellent Caribbean and African Health Network. I make no apology for banging on about religious literacy in your Lordships’ House on yet another occasion: it does really matter. Service providers in all sectors do us a huge disservice when, through their own faith illiteracy, they operate with a presumption that religion matters only in the realm of private affairs. Getting it right in this Bill will of course necessitate additional resource. In supporting these amendments, I hope that sufficient resources will be allocated to this work.
I turn finally to Amendments 65, 133 and 138, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. I am a statistician by background. We know the importance of good and useable data to ensure that we have an understanding not just of the gulfs of inequality of outcomes but of the more nuanced and complex patterns that lie underneath them. Amendment 133 recognises the need for regular training and has a consultation element as part of the policy. I hope this will be taken up and I hope that will include consultation with faith groups. We must commit to work with such groups to build trust with communities that service providers are wont to call hard to reach. I do not believe we should call any group in our society hard to reach. What we do have, all too often, are service providers who just do not make enough effort to reach. So instead, let us work with organisations such as CAHN, which I mentioned earlier, to ensure earlier interventions than those we often see.
I also warmly welcome Amendment 138, which, as others have said, highlights an appalling scandal in our society. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, for tabling that amendment.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I know the hour is late, but I want to note the irony that the issues covered by these amendments are central to the whole process of why we have arrived at this Bill. In a sense it is unfortunate that, because of the hour, there are so few of us present. I want to stress that we cannot assume it is job done. It is really important to keep this whole area under review, whether we do it precisely in the terms of the amendments before us or not. I urge my noble friend the Minister to give an assurance that this issue will not be left for another 17 years before we decide that we have got it right, and that the workings of the Bill in this central area will be kept under close and continued review.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support Amendment 133. I know the hour is late. As I asked the Minister, why is it that issues relating to this focus, which was the focus of the Bill, seem always to end up at the end of our debates? I am not sure why, but they are some of the most important issues. I reflected at Second Reading and earlier in Committee on the Joint Committee’s work and our concern about the strength of civil society and media focus on this issue. Although what we saw seemed expert, we then saw a comparison with what I would call Premier League—which was learning disabilities and autism in terms of that focus.
I turn to new Section 120H, which the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, mentioned, and the statistics I cited before. The right reverend Prelate mentioned the importance of data. It is very concerning that, when we talk about the data on under-18s, we are not quite clear about what is going on in relation to it. The data on under-18s that I mentioned has three subgroups: those who are detained, those who are in the cohort because their parents have consented and those who have consented themselves. It is imperative that we know exactly which subgroup is which in the under-18s group—which, thankfully, is a small group of about 1,000.
Even in the data I cited from the UCL study, of the 23.6% of under-18s that were detained, three times as many black young people were detained as their counterparts. That issue is starting early. What is happening even at that early stage—the disproportionate number detained under the Act—was also reflected in the data on the lack of parents consenting to children going into hospital for the treatment that they need.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, during the debates on this Bill—and throughout my time in this place—I have learned that there are specific topics about which other noble Lords are passionate. For example, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who is not in her place for sad reasons, is passionate about many issues; but, in the context of this Bill, she has long championed issues around the detention of those with autism and learning disabilities, as has my noble friend Lady Browning. My noble friend Lady Berridge is very passionate about children and young people and about tackling racial discrimination, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is very passionate about the link between finance and mental health. Many noble Lords are passionate about specific issues. For me, Amendment 138, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Howe, goes to the heart of an issue in which I very strongly believe, based on my own experiences of racism while growing up in Britain.
Before I go into that, I will touch on the amendments from by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. In one of my first work experiences—in Chase Farm Hospital many years ago—I got to know and speak to a young patient from the Traveller community. He told me about the problems that the Traveller community had in getting access to medical care, and how members of the community were always treated with suspicion and not in the same way. So I am very sympathetic to those amendments.
To get back to my own experience, the Britain of recent years, which my children grew up in, is much less racist than the Britain that I grew up in the 1970s and 1980s, when it was common to be called offensive names or to be chased by skinheads, sometimes actually with weapons and knives. But my experience was a lot better than the racism that my father faced when he came here in the 1950s. There are horrendous stories that he told my siblings and me when I was younger. I believe that we can be proud of that progress, as a country and a society.
When I was a Member of the European Parliament, I used to chat to the taxi drivers in Belgium and France. I would tell them that I was from London, and not all of them but many of them would say how lucky I was, since they had a friend or relative in London and they thought that London was incredibly diverse and tolerant compared with where they lived. That was very touching to hear—but I have to admit that that is my experience, and some will have had different experiences. Even my experience does not mean that the battle against racism and racial disparities is over. As many noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the right reverend Prelate and my noble friend Lady Berridge, have rightly said, we have to be vigilant on this.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said, one reason for the review and this Bill is because my noble friend Lady May commissioned the Wessely review due to the disproportionate number of black people being issued with community treatment orders or being detained; noble Lords have referred to this. We have known about that issue for a long time. Although politicians in the other place and many noble Lords here have raised the issue many times over many years, we do not really seem to have grasped the issue or to be on top of it. When I ask colleagues and medical experts about the disparity, I get a variety of answers. In the absence of any widely distributed and comprehensive study, the vacuum is filled by anecdotes or assumptions, sometimes racial stereotypes. One of the most common responses I have heard is that it is complex or multifaceted.
I remember when I did not initially get into the local grammar school, despite having the best grades in the class—better than some of the white pupils who got into the school; it also happened the previous year, in the year above me, when one of my friends who was black, an Afro-Caribbean, topped his class and did not get into the local grammar school—and my mother challenged the decision and asked for the reason, she was told “It’s complicated”. Fortunately, she persisted, and I got my place thanks to the help of my local Member of Parliament, who later became the late Lord Graham of Edmonton, may he rest in peace.
So when I hear the response, “It’s complicated”, I hope noble Lords will understand that I am simply not satisfied with that answer. It is just not good enough any more. The purpose of my amendment is to probe the Government to understand what they know and what research they are aware of, so we can understand the reasons for these racial disparities and put in place measures to tackle them. If it is complicated, can the Government or NHS list the various reasons and say what they are going to do about it? As noble Lord after noble Lord has said, we need the data.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, who is not in her place, reminded noble Lords that many of the answers from the Minister sound similar to the responses from 20 years ago. That is not a political point. I suspect that the answers given by the Minister, who is well liked and respected, would not be very different from the answers prepared by officials for any Health Minister of any party. Some of the answers are probably very similar to answers that I gave when I was a Minister. That is not to disrespect the diligent civil servants in the department, who work really hard, but we need answers to the following questions.
What studies are the Government, DHSC and NHS aware of? What do we understand from the various studies? What secondary data do we have, and what are the known unknowns? What do we know that we need to know more about? Has there been any attempt from that secondary data to generate the questions for the primary research so that, once and for all, we can understand why a disproportionate number of black people are subject to community treatment orders and to being detained? Do the Government, DHSC or the NHS, if they have the data, know how to use it to reduce those disparities? If so, when will they begin to reduce these disparities?
I was very pleased to hear a reference to some of the pilot schemes. Perhaps the Minister can refer to some of those schemes, and maybe that would be helpful. But I have to say that if the answers that we receive to these questions, either tonight or when the Minster writes to noble Lords between now and Report, are not adequate, I suspect that noble Lords will have to send the Minister back to the department to kick the tyres and get a better answer. It is as simple as that; otherwise, I am afraid that we will return to this issue on Report. If it comes to that, I hope that we will not see a Government urging noble Lords from the governing party to vote against an amendment that would seek to tackle these huge racial disparities in a methodical way and with an evidence-led approach. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for the points they have made. I shall start with those from my noble friend Lady Whitaker regarding Amendments 63, 101, 107, 113, 116 and 124 and immediately address the point about the limited available data on Roma communities.
I absolutely acknowledge that the data on Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities is indeed very limited. I emphasise that I say this not as an excuse; it is just what I have discovered. This is largely due to lower numbers, but we are working with NHSE to improve ethnicity reporting for all patients. More broadly, the Office for National Statistics is working with a range of government departments to undertake research into the barriers and enablers for this community in accessing a range of public services, including mental health services. Findings are expected later this year. I know my noble friend has been very active in pursuing this point and I am grateful to her for doing that. I hope that will be a generally helpful response.
I add to all noble Lords that I absolutely agree that information, communication and support should be provided in a culturally appropriate manner. However, we do not believe that the amendments would achieve that aim, nor are they necessary. The duty to take cultural differences into account in how services are delivered is already enshrined in the Equality Act 2010. These existing duties are the legal basis for ensuring that services are culturally appropriate. That said, we absolutely acknowledge that, in practice, many services still fall short, but that is the position that we find ourselves having to tackle. This is where we need to strengthen guidance. The patient and carer race equality framework is already in place to strengthen the application of these principles, and we will strengthen guidance in the code to ensure that duties under the Equality Act are embedded in practice. We therefore believe that these amendments would not have any additional benefit above what is already in place and what is planned.
On Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, we recognise that there are very significant disparities in the use of community treatment orders between different groups. This data is published as part of the annual Mental Health Act statistics. As the noble Baroness said, in 2023-24 it certainly was the case that patients from black and black British ethnic groups were around seven times more likely to be placed under a CTO than those from white groups. I add that patients from all minority ethnic groups are more likely to be subject to the use of a community treatment order than patients who are white. These disparities are explored in the impact assessment.
The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, drew on his personal experience, for which I thank him. I am sorry that he has to bring that personal experience here, but of course it is the case that the battle against racism and racial disparities is far from over—I completely agree. I am sure he will have noted the commitments made by this Government to tackle racism and racial inequalities, particularly in the NHS and social care.
The reality is—many noble Lords have spoken about this—that we are in a position where we have less data on outcomes and patient experience of being subject to community treatment orders. Officials are now working with NHS England and system partners to understand what additional data it would be wise and helpful to collect. We will cover CTOs in the planned independent evaluation of the reforms but, as ever, I have to share, in honesty, that it will take time to gather new data. A review after 12 months would be premature, not least because it would mean it was based on data from before any reforms commenced. I do not feel that that would be helpful. I assure noble Lords that, rather than committing in legislation to a review at a fixed date, we are committed to keeping existing and additional future data under review.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I think one of the reasons why people are asking for an open and transparent review—and, in some cases, one that reports back to Parliament—is that this is about not only the data but accountability for carrying out actions and implementation. That is the bit that is missing. Everything I have heard from the Minister on this subject so far—maybe she is coming on to say something else—suggests that without accountability, and overview and transparency of that accountability, the guidance is not going to work. Believe me, as somebody who used to work in the service: if you know that the Government were looking at this and that it was going to Parliament, it sends a powerful message for action to be taken in each individual unit. That is what is required, and I do not see that coming from the Minister’s answers. Can she tell me where that accountability streak will be, and how we, in this House and the other House, can put pressure on if the guidance is not being followed, based on the process she has outlined?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I understand the point the noble Lord makes. However, it does not lead me to accept the amendments. I understand the intent and I am sure noble Lords realise how sympathetic I am to it, but I repeat the point I made earlier: if one looks at what the amendment actually does, it will not serve that purpose. I take the point about transparency and accountability, and I hope the noble Lord has heard many times that that is very much the mode of direction. Perhaps it will be of some assistance to say that the PCREF will improve data collection on racial disparities over the coming year, and the CQC has existing duties to monitor and report on inequalities under the Act. We will continue to monitor racial disparities in the use of CTOs. That situation will be ongoing. If it is not doing the job that it is meant to do, we will not be complacent and will seek to act.
We agree there is a need to improve organisational leadership—
Baroness Berridge (Con)
Just before the Minister talks about that point, I understand her concern about the 12-month time limit, because it would be before the reforms are introduced. However, is she satisfied that there will be a robust baseline before the reforms are introduced so that we know what we are measuring against? Otherwise, in a few years’ time, we could be asking whether the reforms have worked, but we would not know because we did not have the baseline data. That is the starting point.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
The noble Baroness is quite right: one has to be able to compare, and that baseline will be in place. You could collect all the data you like, but it has to be meaningful. Her point is well made.
There is a need to improve organisational leadership to improve data collection and change culture across the mental health system. Again, this is exactly what the PCREF is designed to do and something we want to embed further through the revised code of practice.
The creation of a responsible person was an additional recommendation from the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, and it is one we have considered in some detail. However, ultimately, we think that the role is not necessary, because it would duplicate existing roles and duties. There are already duties on providers of mental health services to identify and address inequalities relating to protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 and specifically the public sector equality duty. CQC already has a duty under the Mental Health Act to monitor as health services exercise their powers and discharge their duties when patients are detained in hospital or are subject to CTOs or guardianship. It publishes an annual report, Monitoring the Mental Health Act, which includes detailed commentary on inequalities. The PCREF is now part of the NHS standard contract. It has created new contractual obligations on providers to ensure that they have a framework in place to record and address racial inequality in mental health systems and to look at training and other policies to address racial disparities. Ultimately, we do not think that a responsible person is necessary to achieve all the aims, which are understood, set out in the amendment.
Finally, I want to turn to Amendment 138 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and supported by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. We recognise, as I have said, that there are significant inequalities in the use of detention under the Mental Health Act and of CTOs between different minority-ethnic groups, and in particular the overrepresentation of black men. We monitor those inequalities through routinely published data and are improving this data through the PCREF. The CQC, as I have mentioned, reports on inequalities in its annual report under existing duties, but we agree that we lack robust evidence on what drives those inequalities, and that has been a matter of considerable debate in your Lordships’ House. We need to conduct research into this, and we are exploring with experts, including academic researchers, the best way to tackle it.
I am concerned that two years is not enough time to scope and commission the report, collect and analyse new data, and form meaningful recommendations. Additionally, we hope that through improved decision-making under the reforms we will see a reduction in the number and proportion of black men who are subject to the Act and a reduction in racial disparities more generally. It is a major driver of why we introduced the Mental Health Bill. A report after two years feels premature, because it would be likely to be based in reality on data from before the reforms were commenced.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way and sorry for interrupting her flow again. The point about having a staging report after two years is to get ahead and upstream of what is happening rather than retrospectively being able to do stuff after it has gone on. Two years in management terms to be able to determine trends of intended or unintended consequences and then put different things in place is really important. I believe that this amendment, with a report back to Parliament, would send a very strong signal and allow the Government, the department and NHS England to pick up trends, even if it was not the total picture, which would determine different policies and practices and potential changes in the code as well as management action. I think that is what lies behind the noble Lord’s amendment.
Lord Kamall (Con)
I am sorry to interrupt at this time. I note that the noble Baroness thinks that 12 months is too short, and many noble Lords can perhaps see the point that two years is too short. Does the department have any idea of what a reasonable timeframe is? There has to be some accountability, as the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said. We could accept the warm words and the intentions of the Minister here tonight, but what happens if nothing changes? Where is the accountability? Can the Minister think about asking the department whether there is a reasonable timeframe for some meaningful research? I have supervised academic theses over time. You can have the one-year and then you go on to the three-year for PhD, and sometimes that is quite comprehensive data. There might be a meta study that could be done of lots of existing studies. First, what is a reasonable time? The noble Baroness does not have to answer now; it can be in writing. Secondly, if we let this go, how do we make sure there is accountability? How do we come back to this in three years or four years or five years? I look forward to the answer.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I was about to say that I do understand the need for pace, but I know that noble Lords understand the need to get this right and I know they are not suggesting that we should get it wrong. I will certainly be glad to look at the points that have been raised. I assure noble Lords that I do not want this to be warm words and I understand what noble Lords are seeking. I want to ensure that it is right and that the pace is right. I will look at the points raised because—although I do not think anyone is accusing me of this—it is the exact opposite of avoiding accountability and transparency; it is just about dealing about what is in the amendments.
The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, asked me a number of very pertinent questions and to do justice to them I will write to him. In conclusion, I hope that noble Lords—
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
Before the noble Baroness sits down, could I tease out from her a few words about the religious literacy point that myself and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, raised earlier? While we have rightly focused much on race and ethnicity this evening, which is important, I find that sometimes people take a pride in being religiously illiterate and in not paying attention to somebody’s faith in a way that they would probably not take a pride, as a professional, in not attending to somebody’s ethnic background. Does the Minister have a little word to say about that?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I suspect that the right reverend Prelate knows where I would be coming from on this. He and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, are quite right that consideration of one’s religion and religious practices and not making assumptions about them are absolutely crucial.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for her understanding of the crucial meaning of the data shortage and for her very helpful account of further work. The problem with relying on Gypsy, Roma and Traveller being covered by equality legislation guidance is that, unless they are specifically named as what they are, lots of people have no idea that they are there, that they are subject to an appalling level of discrimination and that they need a targeted response, directed—as it would be with a faith community or other community—at the reason they are so discriminated against.
But, on the whole, I am glad that the Minister has got the point about so many things and I sense that she has sensed the depth of feeling raised in this very short debate. I will thank very briefly everyone who joined in. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, quite rightly pointed to the range of cultures that are potentially alienated by not being understood at all, as well as the need for data. I was very grateful for the support of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, because what he says is based on his real experience. I am very glad that my noble friend Lord Davies went on about the centrality of this issue; it is not a marginal add-on, it is part of our society. Of course, the plea of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, for more research and proper data is really essential. I enjoyed his note of hope and I hope very much that we will be able to continue it and increase the progress. I had better withdraw my amendment for the time being, but we may need to return to this.
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Monday 27th January 2025
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 47-IV(Corrected) Fourth marshalled list for Committee - (23 Jan 2025)
“30AA Overruling a nominated person(1) The appropriate tribunal may, on application made in accordance with this provision, make an order overruling a decision of a nominated person.(2) An order under this section may be made on the application of—(a) the patient,(b) an approved mental health professional,(c) any person engaged in caring for the patient or interested in the patient’s welfare, or(d) any person with parental responsibility for the patient.(3) An application for an order under this provision may only be made on the grounds that—(a) the nominated person unreasonably objects to the making of an application for admission for treatment or a guardianship application in respect of the patient,(b) the nominated person has, without due regard to the welfare of the patient or the interests of the public, exercised the power to discharge the patient under this Act or is likely to do so, or(c) the nominated person unreasonably objects to the making of a community treatment order in respect of the patient.(4) In this section “patient” includes any person by or for whom a nominated person is appointed.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would give the Mental Health First-Tier Tribunal the power to overrule decisions of a nominated person.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I shall also speak briefly to the other amendments in this group. I warn those who are planning to speak after me that I will be brief, because this amendment is self-evident and set out in our papers. I begin by reflecting on the fact that I think there is universal welcome for the creation of the nominated person situation. This is a good step forward and widely welcomed. What your Lordships’ Committee is trying to do is perhaps to fulfil its traditional role to make sure that it is set up in as watertight, practical, useful and effective way as possible.
This amendment did not originate with me; it originated with the Law Society. It provides for a mental health First-tier Tribunal to overrule the power of the nominated person. I note that the next amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, suggests not the county court but the Court of Protection. I do not have any particular position on any of these things. It is useful for us in Committee to discuss this in detail. People far more expert than me will outline that, so I shall not go on at length.
I will note for the Committee’s understanding that my Amendment 71 was withdrawn, because it was doubled up with someone else’s but was put in a different place. It was just one of those technical juggles that happens. With that very brief introduction, I beg to move.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 69, which would replace the reference in the Bill to the county court with reference to use of the Court of Protection to deal with applications to terminate appointments of nominated persons. The single reference to the county court, currently in Schedule 2, is the only place where the county court is given jurisdiction to do anything in this legislation, which I suggest makes it something of an anomaly as well as an anachronism.
The reference to the county court simply carries forward the use of the county court from the 1959 and 1983 Acts, which provided for that court to deal with applications to displace nearest relatives. When I was first appointed a judge, I well remember being presented with an urgent application to displace the nearest relative, of which I then had no experience and in which I had never had any training. In the days before judicial computers, I had no access to anything but out-of-date and very limited books in the small court, no longer in existence, where I was then sitting for a few weeks and without help from any legal representatives. Few learning curves have been more rapid.
Since then, I would like to think I developed some expertise, but my later experience of those applications has led me to question whether the modern equivalent in this Bill concerning nominated persons would be better dealt with elsewhere. Such applications can involve detailed understanding of psychiatric reports and of the family dynamics for the patient concerned, particularly if the nominated person is unco-operative or disengaged. At the time when the earlier legislation stipulated the use of the county court, there was neither a separate family court nor the Court of Protection, which was created by the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
Of course, I do not suggest that county court judges could not deal with these applications—my life with my present and former judicial colleagues would probably not be worth living if I did so. A judge has to be prepared to turn his or her hand to whatever comes their way. However, I do suggest that the Court of Protection is now better equipped to deal with these applications with its specialist expertise and specifically nominated judiciary.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 77, 82 and 84 in this group. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for mentioning my amendments in advance. I am adding the other choice for His Majesty’s Government, which is the mental health tribunal, on the basis that the Court of Protection deals with the Mental Capacity Act and, obviously, at the moment, the mental health tribunal deals with claims under the Mental Health Act.
However, there are one or two points of clarification on the process on which it would be useful to hear from the Minister. As I understand it, for the county court to take an application to displace the nearest relative involves means-tested legal aid, whereas the mental health tribunal, I believe, has Legal Services Commission funding—I am talking in old money here—so it is non-means-tested. I am not aware of what the situation is with the Court of Protection. However, an important concern of people making these applications is whether their legal representation is funded. I expect they are in a situation similar to that outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, when he spoke of getting one of these applications for the first time; for many people making these applications, it will be their first time not only making such an application but being in front of any kind of court or tribunal, and at a time of great distress with a relative detained under the Mental Health Act.
Given that the policy document disclosed last week references this process as the solution to certain situations, could the Minister please outline, either today or in a letter, how many county court applications there are, how long people wait for such applications and what the rate of success is? How many of those who go to the county court currently get legal aid?
Is the Minister satisfied that the county court can act swiftly enough to remove a nominated person who is a risk to the patient? An example given, I think either in the review or in the response to the White Paper, is that, if you have a coercive, controlling boyfriend of a 17 year-old girl as the nominated person, or someone who is suspected of having trafficked that young person to the UK, then time is of the essence for practitioners to have that person removed—on evidence, obviously—from having such powers as, for instance, to apply to discharge the patient from hospital.
At this stage, it might also be appropriate to ask the Minister what is meant in the policy document by the concept of “temporary” nominated persons? We had interim nominated persons in the review, but there is no concept that I have seen in the Bill of temporary nominated persons.
Finally, Amendment 82, although it may be in the wrong group, talks about parental responsibility. We have had other discussions in Committee about this, and I think it was in the review; we must make sure, at the very least, that appropriate people with parental responsibility have the relevant information. That is a baseline. Whether we go on to consultation or being able to apply to remove a nominated person, I would submit—and Amendment 82 outlines this—that they should have all the relevant information. I have exempted the person with residual parental responsibility under a special guardianship order. This reveals some of the complications of the Children Act. In this type of situation, the child has been removed to live with someone else; it is similar to a care order, in that the people with parental responsibility remain there, unless there is an adoption order. One has to be careful even about the rights to information, and who with parental responsibility receives that.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, if I may, I shall start with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. I agree with almost everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has said. I will talk first about which court it should be in. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, had said. Oddly, the county court was one of the only courts in which I did not sit, but I have never heard a circuit judge who was very keen on dealing with these particular applications.
Judges of the Family Division sit in the Court of Protection. As I would hope noble Lords would agree, they are somewhat expert in family law, and they do a great deal of mental care and medical cases. As president of the Family Division, I spent probably 50% of my time doing one sort of medical case or other, quite a lot of them mental health cases. The Court of Protection is probably the best court to deal with this. I do not feel very strongly against the mental health tribunal—I just do not think it would be quite as good. Legal aid is an issue, and I assume that it probably would not be automatic in the Court of Protection.
I turn to my Amendment 70. I entirely share what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has just said. The law is that, until the age of 18, one is a child, regardless of the Gillick case, regardless of being 17 and very nearly grown up. Until a person is 18 they remain, technically, in law, a child. I am very concerned about a child of any age, living at home with parents, who has a mental health problem sufficiently serious to require attention and a nominated person, who is at odds with the parents or guardian and chooses somebody who is totally unsuitable. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, pointed out that this could be someone who might be trafficking, or an unsuitable boyfriend.
The one group of people not included in new Section 30B(2) in Part 1 of Schedule 2 where it says that, to discharge a nominated person,
“An order under this section may be made on the application of…”
is anybody who has parental responsibility for the child. This means that when a child who is at odds with their parents goes into hospital, when those parents know the boyfriend and that he is unsuitable, those parents have no voice whatever in saying that he is not suitable to be a nominated person. Subject to the important points that the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has made, it seems that there are certain cases where, in what used to be called a custody order or a special guardianship, the parental responsibility of the natural parents is limited.
I would have hoped that the Government would see that, however much they want to empower children, including children under the age of 16, they cannot take away 100% the responsibilities of parents. Under Section 2 or 3 of the Children Act, parental responsibility is defined as having rights as well as responsibilities. I am really talking about the responsibility whereby parents may really want to be able to tell someone, “Look who my daughter is going out with”, but under the Bill they have no right do so, and as far as I am concerned that is utterly wrong.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
My Lords, perhaps I may quote from our report on the draft Mental Health Bill on this point, while agreeing 100% with both previous speakers. During our evidence sessions, we heard from a number of people who had real concerns about the issue of nominated persons for young people. We heard
“that choosing a Nominated Person outside of the family can put pressure on family relationships. Respondents also noted the importance of ensuring that the families and carer are still given a voice in a patient’s treatment even if they are not chosen as the Nominated Person. This is particularly important for children and young people. Additionally, one respondent who identified as a carer of someone with a mental health condition expressed their concern that not all nominated people may know the patient well enough to assist in making decisions in their best interest … Another respondent noted that, for those under 18, there may be overlap between the rights of those with parental authority and those of the Nominated Person”.
Our belief during that whole process was that this all seriously needs to be clarified, either in law or in the code of practice. I remember that one respondent was very concerned that young people would assume that a nominated person could be a friend and that the friend would really understand their role, but in some cases that just was not happening.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I hope I may be forgiven for getting up again, because I completely forgot to refer to Amendment 76. It would come in under paragraph 3(2) in Part 1 of new Schedule A1, where the parents and any person with parental responsibility are not even consulted on the appointment. That is exactly the same point as I made earlier.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, with this group of amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, my noble friend Lady Berridge, the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have exposed a crucial set of issues: in my judgment, one of the two or three most important issues that we shall be dealing with during our debates on the Bill. At their heart, I suggest, is the conflict, or perhaps I should say the high risk of a conflict if nothing is done, between the arrangements that the Bill seeks to put in place for the creation of nominated persons on the one hand and, on the other, the law of the land as set out in the Children Act 1989.
Both this group of amendments and those in the next group in the name of my noble friend Lady Berridge focus on matters of the highest significance for child protection and child safety in all its aspects. The assumption inherent in the Bill’s provisions for nominated persons is that the process for appointing a nominated person is rigorous enough to ensure that someone unfit to be appointed to that role will not in practice be appointed, or that, if they are, the system will find them out. I believe that it is evident from what we have heard in this debate that that assumption is a highly dangerous one.
A nominated person will be someone in a position of considerable power. They will be able to exercise all the functions exercised currently by a nearest relative, as well as availing of additional powers as set out in the Bill. Children and young people under 18 will be able to appoint a nominated person. That person will be someone of their own choosing. It could be a parent or someone other than a parent, but the principal qualification for such a person is that they must have the child’s best interests at heart.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for an extremely helpful debate. I want to say how much I understand the concerns around the nominated person regarding children and parents, and the great need to get this right in the way that noble Lords have rightly unpicked today.
It is very important that parents are involved in a child or young person’s care. I say to noble Lords, as this has come up before, that we do not intend or wish to undermine the rights or responsibilities of parents. In the vast majority of cases, the nominated person for a child or young person will be their parent or whoever has parental responsibility, either because they have decided that themselves, with the relevant competence or capacity, or because they are appointed by the approved mental health professional.
For under-16s the Bill sets out that if they lack competence to make this decision, the approved mental health professional must appoint a parent, or a person or local authority with parental responsibility. The Bill aligns with the Mental Capacity Act on decision-making capability, with young people aged 16 and over considered to have the capacity to make relevant decisions. We think it is important, as I know noble Lords do, that children and young people have the right to choose a nominated person, and I understand the need to get the nominated person right. Some 67% of over 1,200 respondents to the White Paper consultation supported extending this right to under-16s.
We must have the right processes and safeguards for all patients, and additional protections for children and young people. These safeguards will cover the nomination process and the ability to overrule the nominated person or remove someone from the role if they are not acting in the patient’s best interests. The noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Berridge, and the noble Lord, Lord Meston, have all put forward amendments to give responsibility to the tribunal or the Court of Protection in these matters. The county court already has a role in displacing the nearest relative. We believe that it has the expertise, procedural tools and legal framework to handle sensitive disputes involving external parties, such as conflicts of interest or allegations of abuse. I emphasise the word “sensitive”. I believe that the debate today has acknowledged that we are in very sensitive territory and that we need to get this right.
The noble Lord, Lord Meston, mentioned the training of judges. I can confirm that we will be working with the county court to ensure that it is aware of and can fulfil the requirements of the new provision.
The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked for figures on county court applications, and I will be very glad to write to her and answer her fully. Similarly, I will be very pleased to write to her in detail on the matter of legal aid.
The Act and the Bill allow for someone who is not acting in the interests of the patient to be overruled or removed from this role. On Amendment 68 specifically, the Bill enables the responsible clinician to overrule the nominated person on the grounds included the amendment, so I am grateful for its being brought before us today. This will be quicker and will avoid burdens on the tribunal.
On Amendment 69, transferring the role of the nominated person to the Court of Protection would expand the court’s remit to under-16s. Currently, the court can deal only with the financial affairs of under-16s. The Court of Protection makes decisions for those lacking capacity, but patients need to have capacity to have appointed their own nominated person. Where they lack capacity or competence, the approved mental health professional will appoint, and the Bill sets out the grounds for them to terminate the appointment.
On Amendments 77 and 84, the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked about the concept of a temporary nominated person. This is in recognition that such an appointment by an approved mental health professional is only until the person concerned has the relevant capacity or competence to choose their own—that is what is meant by the word “temporary” here.
The First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) in England and the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales are focused on reviewing detention under the Mental Health Act. The provisions of the amendments would add additional burden on that tribunal. My concern is that it would risk undermining its core function and delay detention reviews, which I know is not something that noble Lords would wish.
Amendment 70, tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, would specify that parents, guardians and anyone with parental responsibility can apply to the court to displace a nominated person. The Bill already allows anyone involved in the patient’s care or welfare to apply to the county court to terminate the appointment of a nominated person. This includes parents, guardians and anyone with parental responsibility, as her amendment seeks.
On Amendments 72 and 73, in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, I wholeheartedly agree that the law has to prevent exploitation and manipulation. The nomination process is indeed intended to ensure that the decision is the patient’s own. I recognise the circumstances that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and other noble Lords described as possibilities. We have to consider all the potential scenarios, which are very real challenges to us. A health or social care professional, or an advocate, must witness the nomination and confirm in writing that the nominated person is suitable and that there has been no fraud or undue pressure. On the point the noble Earl raised, the code of practice will include guidance on how to determine this.
Amendment 76 was tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. We understand the desire to involve parents in the decision, and for the vast majority this will be appropriate. We are concerned that the amendment’s requirement to consult a parent, guardian or someone with parental responsibility could risk undermining the principle of giving children and young people a choice. It could also, in a different way, pressure the child into choosing the parent, in circumstances that might be far from desirable. Although we do not think that we should require consultation with the parents in all circumstances, we would expect the witness to discuss the nomination with parents and others with interest in the welfare of the child as part of the assessment of suitability. We will consult on guidance in the code on how practitioners should encourage the child or young person to involve their parents, even if they are not the nominated person, unless it is inappropriate.
On Amendment 82, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, I agree that parents and carers are to be given information about the care and treatment of their child. If a child nominates a person other than their parent as their nominated person, their parents retain legal rights under parental responsibility. These rights include the right to be consulted on certain decisions and to receive information about the child’s care. The Bill also introduces a duty on the responsible clinician to consult with people involved in the child’s welfare on care and treatment planning, which includes parents and carers.
With those comments in mind, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her careful and detailed response to an important group of amendments. It may affect only a small number of cases, but they are cases where we really need to get this right. Those two adjectives apply very well to this whole debate.
I will make a couple of comments in response. We have had three suggestions about where the applications to remove the nominated person should be. Personally, I do not have a strong view. I thought the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, about legal aid was important. Justice unfunded is justice denied, so it really is important that there is that full and necessary support, wherever they end up.
With that, I pick up the important point made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about the witness being such an important person to ensure that this process goes well. The noble Earl talked about making sure the guidance is right. I add that we have to make sure that the resources are there, thinking about our overstretched mental health services. We need to ensure that the person who will be the witness has the time to put in the resources to ensure that they can properly be a witness. It may not be a subject of law, but it certainly needs to be thought about.
Baroness Berridge
“(3) Regardless of whether a person is appointed as a nominated person, if they have parental responsibility that person must be given appropriate and relevant information about care and treatment of a relevant patient.(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to persons with residual parental responsibility for the relevant patient when the patient is subject to a special guardianship order under section 14A of the Children Act 1989.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with another amendment in the name of Baroness Berridge, seeks to ensure that regardless of whether persons with parental responsibility are appointed as the nominated person, they should have access to the appropriate and relevant information about care and treatment of the relevant patient (unless a Special Guardianship Order has been made).
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 74 properly sits alongside Amendment 82 in the previous group, so I rise to speak predominantly to Amendments 75, 78 and 79A to 81. This group seeks to ensure that the expansion of choice and autonomy for children and young people under the Bill sits consistently with the child protection law of the Children Act, which I believe the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was involved in creating.
This is not a new issue. The independent review way back in December 2018 stated:
“There needs to be careful consideration of how the powers and rights of the NP”—
the nominated person—
“will interact with other areas of the system, including care orders, guardianship and child arrangement orders, where the overlap with parental responsibility is particularly important”.
Parental responsibility has been dealt with in a series of amendments by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, so I will not address that. It is regrettable that over six and a half years later, we still have not sorted this matter and there is no draft code of practice for noble Lords to refer to.
However, I am grateful for the meetings the Minister has had with colleagues, and for the policy document disclosed last week, which made small steps. I hope the Minister can confirm that she has met the Minister for Children and Families and DfE officials regarding this matter, as they hold responsibility for the Children Act. I am also grateful that the Children’s Commissioner has now stated her concerns in this aspect, as well as for the excellent work of the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition.
To avoid this being dry law, I will give two quick examples that illustrate the conflict remaining between the proposed reforms and the protections under the Children Act.
First, a 15 year-old child is Gillick competent but still does not quite understand why she has not had any contact with dad. However, there are days of evidence in the family court showing that dad is violent, controlling and coercive; a child arrangements order was made, giving him only what is called letterbox contact. The child appoints dad as the nominated person, and dad of course now has contact. Cannily—these people are canny—on the Thursday before a bank holiday weekend, he applies to have the child discharged. The 72 hours to bar this application pass by the locum’s staff, et cetera—we can all imagine the inquiry—and dad has now taken the child and disappeared. I leave it to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to outline what mum, who has parental responsibility under this Bill, knows is going on. Children and young people should of course be given choice and autonomy—my amendments do not seek to undermine either that or Gillick competency—but surely we must consider circumscribing that when the family courts have, for child protection reasons, restricted the role of adults who should normally care for and love that child or young person.
I turn to the second scenario. A 17 year-old lacks the capacity to appoint so the AMHP is making the decision to appoint the nominated person. However, the 17 year-old is under a special guardship order—maybe they ran away from the special guardian—and was picked up by the police while trying to find dad, whose address they had on them. Dad still has parental responsibility, of course, so the AMHP contacts him and appoints him as the nominated person. Again, he applies for discharge. The child tries to return to the special guardian, who has no idea that the child is about to return home, so no one is there to receive them. The child leaves in distress and harms themselves.
The AMHP can be forgiven for thinking that child special guardianship orders end at 16 years old, as I cannot find them mentioned at all in the Bill. The same scenario would apply to a child in care as paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 to the Bill is blissfully unaware that 16 and 17 year-olds can be under a care order. The AMHP, according to the Bill, is under no duty to appoint the local authority for a 16 and 17 year-old under a care order or a special guardianship order in this scenario.
The solution to the second scenario is in Amendments 79A and 80A; I am grateful that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has added her name to the latter. Where any person under the age of 18 is being detained—that is about one-third of young people—the AMHP is given a list of people who must be the nominated person, not just those with parental responsibility and the local authority in relation to care orders, as in the Bill and as outlined in the policy document.
Dominic Marley, the co-chair of the AMHP Leads Network, has written to me. He says that he
“fully supports the amendment … In its current form, the Bill conflicts with other legislation affecting children, such as the Children Act 1989. The Bill fails to consider the various orders relating to parental responsibility as outlined in the Children Act 1989”.
He goes on to say:
“This is a deeply concerning omission and is likely to give rise to confusion and uncertainty in practice. We believe the amendments you have tabled will provide clarity in this regard, clarity which should be provided by primary legislation”.
My final point on this second scenario is that the Minister’s policy document states that, for under-16s who lack competence, as in this scenario, the AMHP will appoint the special guardian as the temporary nominated person. Can the Minister explain why the Bill says that the AMHP must choose the local authority if there is a care order in place, but not if there is a special guardian? I repeat the point made in the previous day in Committee: the mental health code cannot create a “must” unless it is included in the Bill or secondary legislation.
The solution to my first scenario is more difficult, and I accept that it is less likely to occur in practice. Most of the one-third of young people who are detained under the Act will lack capacity by the time they are detained but, if we want to maintain as much of a child’s or young person’s choice and autonomy when they have capacity, we must act when they have capacity. Amendments 75, 78, 80 and 81 disqualify certain people, such as the no-contact parent under a child arrangements order or the residual person with parental responsibility when a special guardianship order has been made. The amendments also mandate certain people who have to be chosen, such as special guardians.
I accept that that is a very clunky way of doing it. Another option is for His Majesty’s Government to forbid certain people rather than mandating anyone. Another option would be to give the job of disqualifying people to the family court by amending the Children Act. Therefore, the court, on making a care order, a child arrangements order, or a special guardianship order—for which it often hears evidence—would name certain people as being disqualified from acting as a nominated person.
So I hope the Minister can clarify her policy document, as it includes the child-in-care scenario where the nominated person is a parent—usually where the child resides—who has their parental responsibility limited. It states that the witness—the person involved in the process—
“would assess the appointment of such an individual as unsuitable due to the potential risks to the child and therefore prevent this”.
Is that mandatory language? If it is, why not use “must” and put it in the Bill? Are the Government actually giving the AMHP, the young person or that witness the ability to go behind the care order of the family court? If the Mental Health Act code says that the witness just has to document that, if it is “should” rather than “must”, do we really want to enable that?
The policy document then immediately says:
“We will set out in the Code of Practice considerations for the witness to make beyond those set out in legislation”—
I am not sure that makes sense—
“including how to make these judgements”.
That now seems to be truly discretionary language. I again outline the three categories from the code: “must”, “should” and “may”. Which one is this? If this is “should” then, as I say, the child can go behind the family court order as long as the witness writes down the reasons. I expect the Minister to be very clear in her response, if we are undermining the authority of the family court.
Amendment 79 is a quick clarification of whether the child or AMHP can appoint more than one person as the nominated person. Amendment 85 adds the grounds of
“not acting in the best interests”
so that the AMHP can remove the nominated person—for instance, if they discover that they have trafficked the child to the UK. That is not just for children and young people but for all patients.
I return to the risks to children and young people in both the scenarios I have outlined. These are not triggered by the AMHPs, and they will not be triggered by poor training, a lack of resources or levels of staffing—nor triggered by those who the family court said could pose a risk to the child or young person. These would be triggered by how His Majesty’s Government currently propose to change the law. In the worst-case, but sadly foreseeable, scenario where a child dies at the hands of a nominated person who had already been known to be a risk, as outlined by the family court, I expect that the Chief Coroner would need informing of your Lordships’ debate. Otherwise, professional and other staff might take all the blame. Also, would the Secretary of State for Education in fact still be able to do a serious case review of the death of that child, or would she not be conflicted? A dangerous person got access to a child because the nominated person process was a backdoor to the Children Act. So can the Minister outline whether the nominated persons part of the Act will be enforced before the consultation on the code of practice she is so often relying on?
Finally, I quote from the policy document again:
“We appreciate that there are complications inherent in the complexity of modern family structures, (e.g. separated parents) in addition to the existing system around children’s legislation (e.g. special guardianships, child arrangement orders). These are not complications which have been created by the Nominated Person policy and they exist in the context of Nearest Relative as well”.
Yes, of course the current situation is complex, but this view in the policy document is not shared by the independent review, by the response to His Majesty’s Government’s White Paper—where these concerns were also raised—or by the Joint Committee, civil society or the Children’s Commissioner. The Minister is alone in this view. I know that, in your Lordships’ House, we are not entitled to see legal advice that His Majesty’s Government obtain, but I hope the Minister can assure the Committee that Treasury counsel with specialisms in the Children Act and mental health have been asked to give an opinion.
The child protections that the Children Act has upheld for decades are so vital. I hope we will come back to this on Report, when I hope the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and the Secretary of State for Education will lay the necessary government amendments. I beg to move.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 80A, to which my name has been added.
I did not intervene in the first group but I share the general view expressed, which is relevant to this group of amendments, that not enough thought has been given to the interaction between the Mental Health Bill and other key legislation, particularly the Children Act 1989. That concerns me, because that is where really key and important child protection sits. That is a general concern I have.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Indeed, we should be grateful to her for exposing the complexity and variety of situations which may arise and of which mental health professionals must be made aware, so that the decisions they have to make are properly informed by knowledge of the operative orders and the terms of any orders made by the family court. That seems absolutely fundamental. It reinforces the point I wanted to make at the end of the last group before I was very properly curtailed. It applies not only to the county courts if they are to retain some jurisdiction in this area but to the family court. Some serious thought must now be given to judicial training.
Has the Minister considered an approach to the Judicial College with a view to ensuring that both county court and indeed family court judges will be properly trained with regard to the obligations that will arise under this new legislation?
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, for the reasons that have been given I also support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Just to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, I respectfully point out to the Minister that if she does get in touch with the Judicial College, which I think would be a very sensible move, she should also let the President of the Family Division know.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, in this group of amendments my noble friend Lady Berridge has raised an armada of issues which I think it is clear to all of us cannot be ducked. These issues, as she said, were examined at length both during the independent review and by the Joint Committee, but it has to be said that in both instances it proved too much of a challenge to identify a satisfactory resolution to them. For that reason, as we observed in our debate on the previous group, the weight of these matters now rests on the shoulders of this Committee and of the Government.
In summary, we need arrangements that are robust enough to ensure that a nominated person’s appointment can be effectively challenged, and that, in certain circumstances, where necessary, the exercise of their powers can be legally contested and blocked. Without those measures, we shall leave an unacceptable lacuna in the law and, more pertinently, run a high risk of exposing children to personal danger.
My noble friend is to be thanked for assisting this Committee’s deliberations with the clear way in which she has set out the challenge, and I hope and trust that the Minister will wish to grip the challenge with her usual vigour.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, like the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for introducing an appropriately wide range of scenarios, questions and testing. That is important for the Committee but also for our ongoing work. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said, to describe this area as complex is to use too small a word, and I think we are all wrestling with that to get it in the right place. I know that noble Lords are aware that the work is ongoing, and I thank them for their engagement and interest in this issue. As I said previously, I very much understand the need for a robust process to keep children and young people safe and ensure that only appropriate individuals can take on the role of nominated person, while giving children and young people that right to choose.
I will respond collectively to the amendments put forward in this group. As I set out earlier, we agree that in the vast majority of cases there is an expectation that a parent or whoever has parental responsibility would take on this role, and that would include consideration of special guardians and child arrangement orders. We also agree that, where parental responsibility has been removed due to care proceedings, in the vast majority of cases it is unlikely to be appropriate for such a person to take up this role. My reference to this being a complicated area—
Baroness Merron (Lab)
Perhaps the noble Baroness will let me make a bit of progress.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
I think I need to clarify a point of law—I am looking to the noble Lord, Lord Meston. In care proceedings, is parental responsibility removed? I do not believe it is; it remains with the parents. That is very important.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for that exchange, which brings me to my repeated point about the complicated area in which we are treading.
As was highlighted by the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, we will set out our expectations in the code of practice as to whom approved mental health professionals would appoint, or the witness would confirm suitability of, in a range of circumstances, including in the more and most complex cases. We will consult on this to ensure that we cover as many scenarios as we can.
I can confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that we are working with NHS England, the Department for Education, the Association of Directors of Children’s Services and others to ensure that our policy and guidance reflect what can be a very complex arrangement for some children under the Children Act.
The Bill is clear that where an approved mental health professional is appointing a nominated person for an under-16 they must appoint someone who has parental responsibility, and the amendments extend this approach to all under-18s. As I said previously, we are allowing more flexibility for 16 and 17 year-olds rather than prescribing in legislation who this must be.
While the amendments put forward a wide range of circumstances, we all know—and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, demonstrated this—that there will be nuanced and complex cases, especially for 16 and 17 year-olds. Someone outside the proposed list, such as a step-parent, may be the most appropriate person, or a kinship care arrangement may be in place. These amendments propose regulatory powers in recognition of this but we feel that updating statutory guidance will allow us to keep this up to date and in review as new policy is implemented.
The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked about differences between special guardian orders and special care orders. The Bill says that the approved mental health professional must appoint the local authority or anyone else with parental responsibility as the nominated person. The special guardian, as someone with parental responsibility, would be appointed if a special guardianship order was in place. In relation to the proposal for two people to take on this role, as the nominated person exercises specific statutory functions under the Mental Health Act, we feel it is right that only one person has these limited powers, to avoid the potential for disagreement and confusion about who can exercise the relevant power.
We recognise that there will usually be more than one person with parental responsibility and that the approved mental health professional will need to determine who should be the nominated person. Under the current system, this would be the older parent, which we do not think is necessarily appropriate. We will provide guidance for approved mental health professionals in the code of practice. This may include which of the parents is recorded as the child’s next of kin, who the child lives with and who is accompanying the child.
The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, helpfully inquired about the status of the nominated persons paper that was sent out in an attempt to be helpful. It was developed very much to support the debate, which it certainly has done, and we intend to develop it further. I very much welcome the further engagement from Peers and we will continue to formally consult as part of the code of practice so that it is an aid to the considerations of noble Lords. I hope it is doing that.
In the current nearest relative provision, only one parent will hold this role. As I mentioned in the previous debate, this will not exclude the other parent from being involved in their child’s care. Whether or not they are the nominated person, parents and carers should be given information about the care and treatment of their child, unless it is inappropriate. This is reflected in the Bill. We absolutely agree that someone should be removed as the nominated person if they are not acting in the interest of the patient. Criteria are included in the Bill for when an approved mental health professional may terminate an appointment, one of which is when the person is
“otherwise not a suitable person to act as a nominated person”.
On the points made by a number of noble Lords, suitability includes whether there is any risk to the patient. This may include if the person is behaving in a way that indicates they are unsuitable for the role; for example, if they are exercising their powers without due regard to the welfare of the person.
Baroness Browning (Con)
Reflecting on what the Minister has just said, would that close the Bournewood gap, which we tried to close in earlier legislation, where a professional carer cared for an autistic man who was not able to articulate for himself, but was overruled by the clinician? I am just trying to get my head round what she has just said because that was the Bournewood gap and, as the Minister will know, it ended up in the European Court before it was resolved.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
We need to be considering that as one of the scenarios and I would certainly be very glad to give the noble Baroness and noble Lords a more considered response to the very important point that has just been raised.
Under this policy, an approved mental health professional would terminate their appointment if the nominated person is not acting in line with the patient’s interests. I really wish to emphasise this.
For all these reasons and the responses I have given, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken and for the considered nature of the response and the clarification regarding the special guardianship. However, as we have outlined, other people remain having parental responsibility and it seems that under the Bill, as it is only one person, it could be that the residual person still has parental responsibility. It could just be that person under the Bill and not, in that situation, who is appointed.
I am concerned, not only by the outline at the beginning in relation to parental responsibility being removed. I just feel that there is a lack of understanding—with all due respect to the Minister’s diligence, thoroughness and engagement with colleagues—about the depth of the issue that we have here. She mentioned “would” appoint. That seems something that can be under the Mental Health Act code—“would” seems to be that as long as you document your reasons for that, you can move. It seems that from the situation I have outlined, in which the 16 or 17 year-old has been removed from the dad’s care because he has been shown to be, and proven by the family court to be, a danger, he could be appointed as the nominated person. Then we are relying on a speedy process in the county court—which we are not sure we always get legal aid for—to remove him. I am concerned by phrases such as “more flexibility for 16 and 17 year-olds”. Does that include the 16 and 17 year-olds who are under special guardianship or where there is a care order?
It seems that there is a conflict, based on what the co-leader of the AMHPs is saying, what the review has said and what the response says. We have a conflict between two pieces of legislation that we must continue to grapple with. On phrases such as “working with the DfE”, I asked specifically whether there had been a meeting with the Minister for Children and Families. The responsibility for a serious case review sits with that department. If we are to some extent right, this risk to children will manifest itself in an imperfect system. Obviously, there are professionals and clinicians, but we all know of cases that have gone wrong and ended up in inquiries.
I remain concerned by the lack of clarification on legal advice. Legally, in some ways this is fascinating—but it is not fascinating because it involves child protection. I welcome the engagement and I am sure that we will meet again in regard to this, but the severity of the risks that we are exposing, and allowing young people and AMHPs to go behind findings of fact in the family courts made under the Children Act is an incredibly serious issue. I hope that the Minister will be furnished with that kind of geeky legal advice, because for the children’s sake we need that.
However, I am grateful for the manner of her engagement and of course beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Merron
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, my other amendments to Clause 31 and my new clause inserted after Clause 31 would provide for commencement two months after Royal Assent of provisions about tribunal reviews concerning patients subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.
Baroness Merron
“References: restricted patients not subject to deprivation of liberty conditions(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.(2) In section 71 (references by Secretary of State concerning restricted patients), for subsection (2) substitute—“(2) The Secretary of State must refer to the appropriate tribunal the case of any restricted patient detained in a hospital if—(a) the patient’s case has not been considered by the appropriate tribunal within the last 12 months, whether on the patient’s own application or otherwise, and(b) there is no pending application or reference to the appropriate tribunal in relation to the patient’s case.” (3) In section 75 (applications and references concerning conditionally discharged restricted patients)—(a) before subsection (2C) (as inserted bysection 31(3)(a)of this Act) insert—“(2B) Where a restricted patient has been conditionally discharged, is not subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty and has not been recalled to hospital, the Secretary of State must refer the patient’s case to the appropriate tribunal on the expiry of—(a) the period of two years beginning—(i) in the case of a patient who has previously been subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty, with the date on which the patient most recently ceased to be subject to such conditions, and(ii) in any other case, with the date on which the patient was conditionally discharged, and(b) each subsequent period of four years.”;(b) in subsection (2D), after “subsection” insert “(2B) or”;(c) in subsection (2E) omit “, is subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty”;(d) in subsection (2F), after “subsection” insert “(2B),”;(e) in subsection (2H), after “subsection” insert “(2B),”;(f) in subsection (3), after “subsection”, in the second place it occurs, insert “(2B),”.(4) The amendments made by this section apply in relation to any person who is a restricted patient within the meaning given by subsection (1) of section 79 of the Mental Health Act 1983, or is treated as a restricted patient as a result of that subsection, whether the person became such a patient (or treated as such a patient) before or after the coming into force of this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.
Baroness Murphy
Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of the amendment is to query the necessity of expanding on “appropriate medical treatment”.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, noble Lords will be pleased to know that this is a very small, probing amendment, on a matter that was brought to my notice by some forensic psychiatrists. One of their responsibilities is to train young psychiatrists in the use of the Mental Health Act as it relates to patients who have been engaged in criminal proceedings. In this group of amendments, we are talking about transfers between hospitals and prisons and the use of Sections 47 and 48.
Amendment 96 concerns Section 47 removals from prisons to hospitals. The original Act was very straightforward, stating that
“the said person is suffering from mental disorder; and that the mental disorder from which that person is suffering is of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment; and that appropriate medical treatment is available for him”.
The new version expands the clause by stating that
“treatment can be given for the relevant disorder from which the person is suffering”.
This is repeated in Clause 34(3).
My immediate thought on reading this was, “What else can an appropriate treatment be except one for the relevant disorder from which the patient is suffering?” Also, why is it necessary to expand this clause at all, on the basis that we should be as straightforward as we possibly can, particularly with people who are using this on a day-to-day basis? If the patient is suffering from another disorder, or the patient is not suffering, how could the treatment possibly be “appropriate”?
I understand from the Explanatory Notes, and from what Ben Coffman, special adviser to the Minister, told me about what the Bill team is trying to achieve, that Sections 47 and 48 are generally interpreted to mean that hospital managers are not formally required to provide evidence that a hospital place is available. If an order is made, the hospital specified is under a duty to admit the patient.
However, there was an immigration case, R (ASK) v SSHD, in which the Court of Appeal ruled that, because specialised provision is required for restricted patients, a physical hospital place must be identified for the detention criteria to be met. This did not reflect the government position at the time, which was that “available treatment” should be interpreted to be the same for all Part II and Part III patients. Therefore, the Government are now changing the wording of this to ensure that a physical hospital bed does not need to be identified. This is how “available” treatment is currently interpreted for the detention criteria across the rest of the Act.
With these few words, therefore, Clause 34 aims to correct the divergence in the detention criteria, as opposed to creating one. Well, I must say that I still do not understand why these few words change the detention criteria. They just add more complexity to the wording. I do not understand why they have the effect that the Explanatory Note says they do. I am asking for greater guidance, because I just do not get it. I wrote to my colleagues saying, “This is the answer I’ve got, so maybe this doesn’t need to be asked”. I got a single line back, saying “What?” They simply did not understand the response. So I am asking again.
Those are all my questions on Sections 47 and 48, relating to Clause 34. There are other amendments in this group to which I will say something, in the interests of not having to bob up again. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, has two important amendments on the reciprocal nature of transfers between prison and hospital. If what is good for the goose is good for the gander, and if we are going to make it a lot easier to transfer people from prison to hospital, which I very much hope we will, we must be able to transfer people back in the other direction.
I know that this was an issue very close to the heard of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, who is not able to be in her place today. She has run wards where that very frustrating situation arises where you have somebody desperate to come into the ward from a prison who has been identified by the consultant, but no space can be made available because somebody is blocking that place. I will therefore be giving my support to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, on those amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 96A to 96C and 163A in my name in this group. They deal with the transfer of prisoners from prison to hospital in a specified timeframe of 28 days. I am obviously pleased that this has been included in the Bill under Clause 35, but I briefly give some background.
I first recognised a need to incorporate a time limit in legislation in my independent report to government in 2009. At that time, the Department of Health had piloted a 14-day waiting limit with strong support from stakeholders to roll this out nationally, and I recommended this in my report. Although it was accepted in principle, it was not implemented. However, Sir Simon Wessely’s review picked it up again with a more realistic 28-day time limit, which was then included in the draft Bill and now in this Bill, ensuring a statutory requirement rather than relying on good practice guidance.
My amendments are therefore probing amendments to understand how the 28 days will work in practice—essentially, when does the clock start? First, Amendment 96A would replace the words “As soon as practicable” with
“No later than two days”.
HM Inspectorate of Prisons found that one factor contributing to delay was confusion around when the 28-day transfer period starts, with 34% of patients not referred on day zero of the 28 days. This amendment would ensure that the referral notice is made no later than two days after an initial request, therefore clarifying on what day counting begins.
Secondly, Amendment 96B would change “must seek to ensure” to “must ensure”. The scrutiny committee, of which I was a member, heard that “seek to ensure” is quite vague and open, and therefore recommended this amendment. I believe, as do many organisations such as the Prison Reform Trust, that the inclusion of “seek to” in the current wording of the Bill implies only an attempt to successfully transfer within the 28-day time limit, rather than it being the guaranteed outcome, save for exceptional circumstances. It would provide a clearer, more definitive commitment to adhere to a 28-day time limit for referral.
Amendment 96C would require that a specified, accountable person be appointed by the relevant referring body to ensure that the specified 28-day transfer period is met. While there are many agencies involved in arranging prison transfers, I am concerned that there should be a person to whom accountability is assigned. As it stands, the Bill lists in new Section 48A(3) the persons to whom the referral notice must be given—the notified authorities—but there is no person, agency or authority assigned, either with overall accountability or accountability for each part of the process. I believe that there is significant merit in creating a single role to help increase and assure accountability—for example, a dedicated official whose primary function would be to ensure efficient transfers with the ability and power to liaise and intervene at the most senior level where necessary.
The amendment would clarify accountability and support the desire expressed in the impact assessment to increase,
“accountability for all agencies involved in the transfer process to meet”
the deadline. This was supported by Sir Simon Wessely’s independent review, which stated that it would help
“unblock the institutional barriers and … give … the teeth it needs to push the transfer through”.
I absolutely agree with this, and I hope that the Minister will too in his conclusion to this debate.
Finally, Amendment 163A would require the Government to publish guidance on what counts as “exceptional circumstances” specified in new Section 48A(4) and (5), as inserted by Clause 35. That provision provides for a 28-day transfer period for acutely mentally ill patients held in prison to be transferred to hospital. Examples are given in new subsection (5) of what exceptional circumstances are not, for example:
“a shortage of hospital accommodation”
or
“a shortage of hospital staff; unless occurring as a result of other exceptional circumstances”.
This amendment would provide an opportunity to clarify what does constitute exceptional circumstances. This would help to avoid doubt, confusion and subjective judgment over what may or may not be an exceptional circumstance and to help ensure smooth and efficient transfer. Again, I hope the Minister will be able to respond positively to that, perhaps with examples of what are exceptional circumstances.
Finally, I just note that, for transfers to be successfully completed in the 28-day time limit, the Government must ensure that appropriate bed provision in psychiatric intensive care units and secure care settings in every geographical area of the country is developed, together with a skilled workforce. I am sure that we will return to this topic at a later stage in our debates.
In conclusion, as I mentioned earlier, it is 16 years since I made my proposals on transfers, and I hope that that they are now coming to fruition. I am grateful to the Government for that and for not trying my patience any longer.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, I too support the aim behind Clause 35, which is to ensure the speedy access to specialist mental health support for people in prison. Like the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, I also think that there is great merit in his Amendment 163A, which seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State produce statutory guidance on the definition of what will count as exceptional circumstances for the reasons that the noble Lord has given.
The Explanatory Notes give examples of what might count as an exceptional circumstance where the 28-day standard would not apply: prison riots, hospital floods or exceptional clinical reasons. Those are three examples, but it would be good to see more precision on this question because, as the Government’s Delegated Powers Memorandum says, the meanings of these words will be litigated. They will show up in judicial review and private law action. Therefore, the clearer the Government are prospectively, the less frictional cost and time there will be through the justice system and health system in giving effect to the new standards that are set out here in what hopefully will become the Act.
However, having supported the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, on that amendment, I will disappoint him now by just injecting a note of caution on his Amendment 96B. As we have just heard, it would leave out “seek to” in respect of delivering on the 28-day standard; excising those words, as he said, would in effect make it an overarching requirement—a “must”—even if there is a shortage of hospital accommodation or no staff available.
If the thought behind this is that the principal drivers of delays are essentially administrative processes then a “must” on 28 days can, in a sense, be given effect without a downside. But I wonder whether we actually have sufficient evidence to know that that is the root cause of such delays as occur. As I understand it, about four-fifths of the transfers from prisons to our specialist mental health facilities in the first half of the current financial year were to psychiatric medium-secure units and psychiatric intensive care, both of which are in very high demand and incredibly expensive resources, with highly constrained supply.
The impact assessment rather glosses over this question. When describing whether this new standard for transfers to hospital from prisons might introduce additional cost, it says at paragraph 169:
“Costs for the measure have not been monetised because they are principally driven by wider systematic changes which are supported by the legislation”—
that is, its administrative friction. It goes on to say something which I do not quite understand. I would be grateful if the Minister could interpret for us what the department meant when it wrote that an additional reason the costs were not being monetised was to ensure that
“resources are available to achieve transfers within the time limit in a greater proportion of cases”.
What are these “resources available to achieve transfers”? Are they additional or substitute resources? What is the scale of them? What was meant in the drafting of that paragraph?
My hypothesis is that this is not just about administrative friction. It is actually due to constraints on the supply in expensive and specialised mental health services, and therefore the unintended consequence of mandating, through excising “seek to” and making 28 days a trump card for people coming from prisons, would be one of three consequences.
Prisoners with severe mental health needs would find themselves in unsafe and poorly staffed facilities; or, by virtue of being in prison, you would displace a non-prison-based mental health patient who might have higher needs, as that is what the statute requires; or, under the Clause 49 powers, you would, effectively, see the Department of Health using the Henry VIII power, which it has in this Bill, to quickly rewrite 28 days and make it 180—or something else—because, as the delegated powers memo said, it might do so in that circumstance
“where insufficient beds are available to meet demand over a sustained period of time”.
For all those reasons, there may be unintended consequences of Amendment 96B which require further scrutiny.
However, in the spirit of wanting to make this work practically, I have laid down Amendments 97 and 98, which, essentially, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, look to reciprocate the 28-day requirement. If you are aiming to get prisoners transferred to mental health facilities in 28 days or, similarly, when their treatment is complete, one should expect that the Prison Service or Immigration Service will ensure the return the prison estate to free up those scarce and specialist beds for other prisoners or patients who require treatment.
In a way, my amendment is a very gentle one. All I suggest is that if there are people stuck in specialist mental health beds who ought to be being returned to prison, that would constitute an exceptional reason for being unable to accept new intakes of prisoners being transferred. The reason this is such a gentle amendment is, of course, that the Government pray in aid the June 2021 best practice guidance for the transfers, which says that, although it should be a 28-day standard for moving from prison to mental health facility, it should be 14 days if moving back the other way to free up the bed. I have not proposed a 14-day requirement on the Prison Service, just the reciprocal 28 days, so, in that spirit of joint working, I hope these amendments will find wide support.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, briefly, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, as opposed to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, on the “seek to” question. When I read Clause 35, I was very excited about what it promised; I thought that, at last, this was being taken seriously. I talked to a range of people who worked in criminal justice, and they said: “Oh, it is not going to happen; what are you excited about?”—they just did not believe it. At Second Reading, I cited Richard Garside from the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies saying that Clause 35
“while welcome, feels aspirational rather than practically implementable in the current system”.”.—[Official Report, 25/11/24; col. 549.]
I started to look at it again and thought that the danger for those of us who are following this debate is that we get bought off by this aspiration, and that, in practical terms, it will not mean what we all thought it was meant to. I am quite keen that we toughen up the statutory requirements.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I will just add a couple of brief points. This is a really important set of amendments and the issue of making it easier to transfer people between prisons and hospitals is critical. If you like, it is at the heart of some of the reforms that we are looking at. I have a lot of sympathy for the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley. I am also aware that he has waited a very long time. Did he say that it was 28 years?
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
Just the 16. Anyway, it is a long time to wait.
The amendments aiming to make it clear, as the noble Lord said, when the clock starts ticking are really important, so that there is real accountability injected into the system. Often, when things go wrong it is where no one really feels responsible for something, so it does not happen. I will also be interested to hear what the “exceptional circumstances” do and do not include—I hope we will get some examples—because if they include just things such as shortage of staff or beds, we will not get very far at all, given the current state of mental health beds.
I understand the rationale behind the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens; the reciprocity is a really important point to make. I just have slight concerns that we might be saying that this cannot happen in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, wanted to see, because we know that we have not got the scarce and specialist beds. They are just not available; it is very important to be practical about it.
It comes to the heart of the matter of this whole Bill: we know that, unless proper resource is put into the implementation of the Bill, it is not going to work at all. We know that, with mental health provision, particularly a secure unit, particularly with the state of the estate, the shortage of staff and all of that, there has to be wholesale investment in it for these things to work. I think the time has come. I simply add my voice to others to say that I hope the noble Lord practises patience—but I think he has waited long enough so I hope his patience will not be tested any longer.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke to the amendments. I also thank the Government for allowing the Minister for Prisons, Probation and Reducing Reoffending to reply to this group. That is very much welcomed by the Committee. I think it was the noble Lord’s father who once said, “Kindness is good for business”. In this case, he might find that kindness is good for his noble friend the Minister. Given how hard she has been working on the Bill, I think she deserves some respite, so I am sure that that is very welcome.
So far, we have debated the importance of limiting detentions for those with autism or learning disabilities without co-occurring mental disorders. We have also debated the community treatment orders. But until now, we have not covered the provisions of the Bill relating to this new statutory 28-day time-limited period for transfers from prisons to hospitals. As the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, has said, he has been very patient. Therefore, the Government enshrining this target in law is welcome. Unfortunately, progress towards the goal of 28 days, as set out in the 2021 guidance and the White Paper, has been slower than anticipated.
His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, in its 2024 report The Long Wait—I am sure the noble Lord is aware of this—said that
“people linger in prison for weeks, often months and even, in the worst cases, for more than a year waiting for their transfer to be completed”.
Unfortunately, even though the 28-day guidance was there from 2022-23, only 15% of patients in that period were transferred to hospital within that timeframe. Sadly, the average wait was 85 days, and one prisoner was identified as waiting 462 days for transfer to hospital.
These Benches welcome the 28-day limit being put on a statutory footing, but, as other noble Lords have said—not only on this group of amendments but on others—once again, there is an issue of implementation here. Just because it is in legislation does not mean it will deliver the improvements that are necessary.
The noble Lord’s colleague—the noble Baroness, Lady Merron—has been very candid with noble Lords, saying that not everything in the Bill will be delivered now, and that there is a 10-year timetable for implementation. Given that, will the Minister say, at this stage, whether the 28-day limit is an aspiration or something that could be delivered immediately? If, at this stage, it is an aspiration and—understandably so—awaiting future spending reviews, is he able to give an indicative timeframe? Is the hope for the next 12 months, the next five years or, perhaps, up to 10 years? That information would be very welcome to noble Lords. Many noble Lords have been asking this throughout this debate. We understand that not everything is going to be solved overnight, but it would be good if we could have as much information as possible on the Government’s intentions and aspirations, including indicative timetables, where they are possible. We also understand that not everything is going to be clearly tagged at this stage.
Another finding from the prison inspectorate’s report was that there were serious flaws with the data held on patients who were awaiting transfer. I understand that there is no publicly available data describing the access and waiting times for beds. The Minister might be able to correct me on that. Some of the data on the numbers of prisoners awaiting transfer obtained from providers had significant gaps, due to a lack of consistent and accurate reporting, and some data contained errors and unreliability. This might also impact on Amendments 97 and 98 from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens.
The noble Baroness, Lady Merron, may well tire of hearing me repeat the importance of collecting accurate and complete data, but, as I and many other noble Lords have said on many occasions, we really cannot solve many of the problems we face without data that is as accurate and timely as possible. Therefore, I urge both Ministers to take up the issue of data reporting for patients awaiting transfer from prison to hospital with their respective departments.
Turning to Amendment 96C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, which creates an accountable person who will be appointed to oversee the transfer process and ensure that the statutory 28-day limit is completed, I think this, once again, speaks to the point of implementation. This could be a sensible way of holding providers to account and working with them to address the shortcomings in patient transfers. Given the Government’s 10-year timeframe for implementation, noble Lords have raised the importance of oversight and accountability. Therefore, in the remarks from the Minister and in any subsequent letter, I hope that the Government will be able to address the issue of implementation and to give an indicative timetable. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, this is the first time that I have helped take a Bill through Committee, so I am grateful to noble Lords for bearing with me while I acquaint myself with the procedures. I appreciate the questions and suggestions from noble Lords because this is a subject that is very close to my heart, as someone who has recruited many of the people whom we are talking about, over many years. I have always thought it was very sad when colleagues whom I had recruited often had to leave because of their mental health problems and other complexities that they then found themselves in within the system.
Amendment 96, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, would remove the change to the detention criteria in Clause 34, provided for prisoners who become mentally disordered in prison and require transfer to hospital. This would mean that a physical hospital place must be identified before the detention criteria are met for transfer from prison to hospital under the Act. This differs from how “available” treatment is interpreted across the rest of the Act, and therefore risks delaying access to treatment. It would also affect the implementation of the statutory time limit in Clause 35, as the Secretary of State would not be able to issue a transfer warrant until a bed is identified, regardless of the patient’s needs.
Clause 34 aims to correct a divergence in the detention criteria, as opposed to creating one. I appreciate that the noble Baroness is seeking further clarity on how Clause 34 will operate and the intention of the wording. My officials would be happy to hold a teach-in with the noble Baroness on this. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I turn to Amendments 96A to 96C, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bradley. We have known each other for nearly 10 years, six years after the important topic came on to his radar. Amendment 96A would place a legislative time limit on the referring body to issue a referral notice within two days of receiving a request for an initial medical report to assess whether an individual meets the criteria for transfer. The timing of the statutory referral notice being issued will not impact when the time limit begins. This starts from the day that the healthcare team requests the assessment, referred to in the Bill as “the initial request”. This amendment would therefore not benefit transfer timeliness. Additionally, placing a statutory time limit on the healthcare team in a detention setting to issue a referral notice would not be operationally viable, because not all services operate seven days a week. The current wording of “as soon as practicable” accounts for this and encourages the referral notice to be issued at the earliest point for each case.
Amendment 96B would place a duty on all relevant agencies to ensure, as opposed to “seek to ensure”, that the transfer is completed within 28 days. Due to the multiagency co-ordination required in the transfer process, there is no one body that could ensure punctual transfers. This is why we softened the duty, so that those in receipt of a referral notice must seek to ensure that the patient was transferred within 28 days. Having consulted with relevant agencies, we are confident that this is appropriate, given the complexities in the transfer process.
Amendment 96C, also mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Bradley, would introduce a “specified accountable person”, appointed by the healthcare provider for the relevant place of detention, who would be responsible for ensuring that people are transferred within the 28-day time limit in Clause 35.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
Can I just make sure I heard the Minister correctly? I think he said the that one of the reasons it would not be appropriate to do as the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, suggested—that is, to set out a statutory definition—was because it would take too long to do it and would delay implementation of the 28-day standard. I think he now just said it is intended that that will come into force in 18 to 24 months, the implication being that he thinks it would take 18 to 24 months to produce a piece of statutory guidance about what constitutes an exceptional circumstance. Is that correct?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
Having been in discussions with colleagues over the past couple of weeks on this point, I tested with them the processes involved in making sure that we can make this as robust as possible. One of the issues surrounding exceptional circumstances is the need for flexibility so that some of our professionals do not unwittingly break the law in exceptional circumstances. I am happy to write to the noble Lord with further details.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
Before my noble friend completes his summing up, I welcome him to his first Committee session. He kindly offered to meet me to discuss the accountable person for the process of transfer. Can he assure me that that meeting will take place well before Report?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I will very happily meet as soon as possible and well before the next stage.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
I appreciate that this is this Minister’s first time, but I would like to speak to his team in the department through him. I find it very difficult to understand why the Minister’s team thinks it is necessary or, indeed, appropriate to invite my noble friend Lady Murphy for a “teach-in”. Does the Minister really mean that? It seems to me utterly inappropriate, and my noble friend could not say it.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble and learned Baroness for her comments. I hope the noble Baroness accepts my apology for the way it was phrased. As this is my first Committee, I have been getting a number of messages from officials, and I was trying to work out what I said at which point. I apologise. I will very happily meet the noble Baroness.
Baroness Buscombe (Con)
At the risk of giving the Minister a rather hard time on his first outing in Committee, on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, about people saying that it will not happen, is he not fearful, as I am, that, given the way life is, if we do not rid ourselves of words such as “as soon as practicable” and “seek to”, as suggested in Amendments 96A and 96B, in practice it really will not happen?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for the question. One of the questions that I have been asking colleagues is on exactly this point around whether this will happen. I have been reassured by asking policy colleagues many probing questions that the points in the Bill make it as tight as possible without conflicting professionals in the way they are going about their role.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I welcome the Minister to his first Committee. Clearly, a lot of work has been done on this to work out within 18 months what is required. Will the Minister let the Committee know what the gap is between existing provision and what would be required in terms of beds and staffing for this 28-day provision to come into force? That is an important piece of information that the Committee needs to understand to see whether it is just an aspiration or there are the resources needed to make it real.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I will ask officials to get me that information and to pass it on.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, it is my great pleasure to respond to the Minister. I will keep it brief. I have been using this Act for 40 years since 1983, and I assure the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, that this is the only clause which is interpreted, before the amendment, as somebody can apply for transfer and you have to find a bed. It is only the very new immigration Act that has led to this extraordinary transfer of information that has enabled somebody to put in these extra words, but they do not relate in any way to the immigration Act on which the amendment is based; in other words, it seems to me that we should just stick with what we have. I was trying to say that in as easy a way as I possibly could. It just seems to me that it is making it complex at a time when we need to be simple. There is a lot to learn in this Bill. There is a lot to be done. Nevertheless, if the Minister would like to give me a “teach-in”, I shall be delighted. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Kamall
“Duty to record patients not in the criminal justice system escorted to hospital by police(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision to require the police and hospital trusts to record the number of patients who are not in the criminal justice system but are escorted to accident and emergency departments in hospitals by the police for treatment for mental disorder.(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 99 in my name and to speak to my further Amendment 137; both are also in the name of my noble friend Lord Howe.
Our Amendment 99 places a duty on the police and on hospital trusts to record the number of patients not in the criminal justice system who are escorted to accident and emergency departments by the police for treatment for a mental disorder. The reason behind this amendment is that a number of people are taken into accident and emergency by the police because they exhibit behaviour that is a cause for concern, resulting from a diagnosed, or even an undiagnosed, mental disorder or learning disability. These patients are not necessarily placed under arrest, since they may not have committed any crime, but they are escorted to hospital by police.
Once in A&E, it is quite common that they could wait for six, 12 or even more hours before they see a clinician. This is obviously not an efficient use of police time; I know that my noble friend Lady May spoke to this earlier in Committee. More importantly, a police officer escorting a patient who is demonstrating challenging behaviour could exacerbate the problem. Also, a patient who arrives with or without a police officer may behave in a way that is seen as threatening by other patients, which could lead to their being arrested, as they are seen as at risk of harming themselves or others. The patient then finds themselves in the criminal justice system.
To avoid situations such as this, we are probing the Government to try to understand how often the police take patients into hospital for treatment for a possible mental disorder when they are not under arrest. This data should help us to understand how much police time is being spent accompanying these patients. This is not to take a particular view one way or the other; rather, it is to say that we need to have this information available so that we can fully assess the situation.
Our Amendment 137 states that the Care Quality Commission
“must publish a report on the efficacy of systems designed to prevent the introduction of illegal drugs into mental health units”.
Hospitals are entitled to prohibit patients from misusing drugs or alcohol on their wards, but what they can do to enforce those requirements is less clear, especially with detained patients. We accept that informally admitted patients can be asked to leave by hospital managers or even escorted off-site by security if they do not abide by a hospital’s rules on illegal drug use. However, patients detained under the Mental Health Act cannot be forced off premises for violating these rules.
The risks of illegal drugs being used in mental health units are obvious and severe. There is a possibility of those drugs interfering with prescribed medication, which could make that medication ineffective or even harmful to a patient’s physical or mental health. Further risks include the effects—such as psychosis or aggravating effects—of certain drugs, which could potentially lead patients to become more violent and cause harm to themselves or to staff. Whatever the result, the use of illicit drugs in mental health hospitals does not contribute to the treatment or therapeutic benefit of patients; I suspect that is a British understatement.
Much of the information and literature on substance misuse in in-patient mental health settings seems to be out of date. The major studies that we looked at were conducted in the early 2000s; these included a paper published by the Psychiatric Bulletin in 2000. I am happy to be corrected if there is more up-to-date data, but it seems that we do not have enough adequate and up-to-date data available concerning the prevalence of illegal drugs in mental health units. Can the Minister tell us whether the department has up-to-date figures? If not, does it have any intention of collecting these figures? Once again, this would help us to understand the scale of the problem.
Whether or not we are fully aware of the prevalence of illegal drugs in mental health units, there must be adequate safeguards in place to ensure that their use is as limited as possible. This amendment probes the Government for some answers on how they are trying to achieve this. By requiring the CQC to publish an annual report on this matter, we hope that a fuller picture could emerge, which would, we hope, inform the development of procedures and processes to reduce the harms related to illicit drug use. I beg to move.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 151 in this group, which is in my name. It is a slightly diverse group, in that the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, has just set out his two amendments, which are very focused on specific areas, while mine is a very general one. However, they fall under the grouping as provided to us by the Whips; they are about monitoring and reporting, so there is some kind of sense here.
I start with the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, who in the previous group said that, without proper resources, this Bill is not going to work at all. That is what this amendment aims to address. I think the reason why it was regarded as within the scope of the Bill without any wrestling from me is that, specifically, the aim of this Bill is to have fewer people sectioned and fewer people under compulsory treatment orders. It aims to reshape and have earlier interventions, so that we do not see problems get so bad that we get to that point.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, this is an interesting collection of amendments. I suggest that they are all slightly flawed but with good intent behind them.
In relation to Amendment 99 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, as members of the scrutiny committee will know, we spent a long time talking about what happens in A&E departments. Our committee was very lucky to have Rosena Allin-Khan as a member; she is not just the MP for Tooting but a practising A&E doctor at St George’s Hospital. When we were wandering off into theoreticals, she managed to drag us right back to what actually happens.
The key issue that we returned to, as a committee, was that no matter what the police’s formal position is about their involvement in mental health crisis treatment, they will be there. First, people will go to A&E because the lights are on and, secondly, some of them will be very distressed, so members of the public and members of staff will expect the engagement of police officers. A lot has been said about the particular legal status of somebody who is detained in hospital. They are not technically detained, because they are not in a mental health facility. Yet we know that there is a need for spaces within A&E that are properly built and staffed as safe havens for a time, so that somebody who arrives in a state of distress can be in an appropriate place where they can become calm and, therefore, not be taken off inappropriately into the criminal justice system.
I can see what the noble Lord’s amendment is getting at. It deals with it in a very partial way. Following our discussions, and the discussion we had the other day with the noble Baroness, Lady May, on her amendment about police involvement in crisis moments for people with mental health problems, I hope that we might be able to come up with an amendment which is a bit fuller than the one which the noble Lord has put forward.
Amendment 137, the second in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, is about monitoring what is being done about the use of illegal drugs and substances in mental health services. I listened carefully to what he said. Does he think that this does not happen already? I have been to a number of acute mental health services in London. It is clear that staff have to deal with very difficult situations. This cannot be an issue that does not happen; it must be part of the daily risk assessment of anybody working there. Does the noble Lord think that it is extensive enough to warrant this kind of reporting and is this another legal duty that we want to put on staff? Is it the best use of their time, compared to other things? I am in no way against getting good data out to solve problems, if that is the best way to do it, but I am not entirely sure that his amendment does that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, is absolutely right to focus us again on a question that we have never had answered since 1983, about which resources go into acute services and which into community services. When we have a legal change, as we did in 2006 with the move to community treatment orders, what happens to the flow of resources? Crucially, what is the impact? We just do not have the answer. We have a health system which is very good at delivering itemised care. I suggest that it does not actually deliver that many care pathways. Even when it does, I have never seen any clear evidence that patient information and money flows are sufficiently sophisticated to explain to us whether any of the policy intents that we want to see—that all noble Lords who have ever spoken on mental health in this place have wanted to see—will come about. Her amendment may not be perfect either, but I certainly support the noble Baroness and her intent.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
My Lords, I also support Amendment 151 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Whether such reporting should be specifically confined to community mental health services or be more expansive than that is obviously for debate. Whether it should be bi-annual or more frequently, or once a Parliament, does not really matter. The point is to try to continue to put a spotlight on the gap between need and availability in mental health when, for all the reasons that we have talked about, there is sometimes a tendency to downplay that aspect of health and what the health service does.
As the noble Baroness said, if we cast our minds back to last Wednesday when we had that debate about whether the apparent increase in demand for children and young people’s mental health services was real or not, it was paradoxical that, later that evening, the embargo dropped on the Lancet Child & Adolescent Health paper on mental health. It showed that there had been a genuine and unparalleled increase, particularly in younger women’s needs for specialist eating disorder services. Having young people who are severely ill is not an artefact of culture.
Having those kinds of data brought together in one place and published with the imprimatur of the Government would be helpful, rather than as a sort of periodic post-election exercise of the sort that the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, provided. He, of course, also drew attention to the gap that exists between need and the availability of mental health services. I think he used a figure from April 2024 to point out there were more than a million people waiting for mental health, learning disability and/or autism services, of whom 345,000 referrals had waited longer than a year and 109,000 of those were for children and young people under the age of 18. There is a real gap here and a need to continue to put the spotlight on it, to mobilise attention and resource. I welcome the spirit behind Amendment 151.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have spoken a lot about the dangers of medicalising ordinary life and giving it a mental health label. The contribution I made in the previous Committee day on ADHD managed to get picked up by newspapers and generally cited as, “Cruel Baroness hates everybody that says they have ADHD”, so I have become even more infamous.
I welcome the call by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for a review, because the more information and data we have about what is available in the community, the better. My only word of caution is that we should also recognise that, although we need more data, sometimes that data can be used as part of an advocacy for more resources and that data can be unreliable. My only caveat is that whatever the review does, it should not just take superficial headlines or self-diagnosis and self-ID as the truth, and that we should have some scepticism in that regard. We are going to have to understand the implications of this Bill when it is enacted for community care and provision. Therefore, I would welcome any attempt at getting to grips with the reality of that.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, I briefly want to support Amendment 151 in the context of the delays experienced by CAMHS—delays in obtaining appointments and assessments, and in getting treatment. When I last had to look at this, only recently, those delays were still very serious. They are distressing for the children concerned and for their parents. They are also frustrating for local authorities, social workers and the courts, which need to make informed decisions but are unable to do so because they are still waiting to understand what CAMHS have to say about a particular child’s problems.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their amendments and considerations, including the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for her observations on the group before us.
On Amendment 99, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, services already capture data on instances of police using relevant powers to take patients to emergency departments. The Home Office collects national policing data on detentions under Section 136 of the Act and removal to a place of safety, including the number of times that A&E has been used. NHS England’s emergency care dataset includes data on mental health, including how patients are referred to hospital and their conveyance methods. I understand the points that the noble Lord was seeking to probe, but we feel that it is not necessary to create a new legislative requirement.
My response to Amendment 137, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, will focus on the position in England, because I imagine that that is what the noble Lord is particularly interested in, and of course different arrangements apply in Wales. We recognise the importance of preventing illegal drug use in mental health units and take the issue extremely seriously. All units must have robust policies in place to prevent the introduction of illegal drugs. To pick up the point that the noble Lord put to me about the recording of drug-related incidents, I assure him that such incidents would be recorded as a patient safety incident. While published data does not break down the nature of an incident to get an aggregate view at national level, details of incidents will nevertheless be shared with NHSE and the CQC to allow appropriate action then to be taken.
As I have referred to, providers must inform the CQC of certain events affecting their services. Inspectors review all reported concerns, as I have said, and that is important to determine the necessary follow-up actions. Issues that relate to the introduction and use of illegal drugs in an in-patient setting would be reflected in the CQC’s regulatory inspection findings where concerns have been identified, with potential consequences for ratings and for regulatory sanctions. We believe that there are already processes in place for the CQC in England to receive information about drug-related incidents. We feel that this is a better use of the capacity—which is not infinite, as the noble Lord knows—of the regulator, rather than having a national report on the overall efficacy of the systems that are in place.
Amendment 151 was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and spoken to by a number of noble Lords, and I am grateful for their input. A number of other amendments have called for statutory reports on current community services. As I have said previously in response to those debates, we recognise that reducing detentions cannot be achieved by legislation alone, and will absolutely depend on the right services in the community. The CQC publishes an annual survey on community mental health support, and we will be publishing a 10-year plan for the NHS later this year. Progress in community mental health services is already being made. In the last 12 months, more than 400,000 adults have received help through new models of care, which aim to give people with severe mental illness greater choice and control over their care. However, we recognise that more needs to be done.
I want to pick out a particular focus on innovation in this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to the fact that the impact assessment does not include costs for community services. That is not quite the case. There are significant costs associated with the changes to learning disability and autism, which are included in the impact assessment. I agree that wider reforms in community mental health services are needed for the reforms to achieve their intended benefits in full, but they are not a direct consequence of this Bill. That is why they are not costed in the impact assessment. I hope that will be a useful clarification for the noble Baroness.
As I mentioned last Monday, NHS England is already piloting the 24/7 neighbourhood mental health centre model in England, building on learning from international exemplars, some of which have been brought to the attention of your Lordships’ House by various noble Lords, and I have welcomed that. Six early implementers are bringing together their community crisis and in-patient functions into one open-access neighbourhood team that is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. That means that people with mental health needs can walk in, or self-refer, as can their loved ones or concerned professionals. We are currently commissioning an evaluation of these welcome pilots, which is due to report in June 2026.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to reports last week of an increase in the number of young people admitted to general hospital wards with mental health concerns. NHS England is in the process of developing a new model for specialised children’s and young people’s mental health services, supported by a new service specification and quality standards. That new model would support the delivery of specialist services in the community and in-patient settings to ensure that children and young people are treated in age-appropriate in-patient environments, as well as the least restrictive environment close to the child’s or young person’s family and home. The noble Baroness’s point is well made, and I hope that will be helpful.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
I welcome what the Minister has said about the pilots and the significant changes being made to existing mental health services. Short of someone putting down an Oral Question or securing a debate, how will Parliament be able to monitor that? We know that, in the health service and more broadly, successful pilots happen but then disappear without trace and never get implemented. How will Parliament be able to assess progress from the pilot stage to implementation, along with broader changes? What mechanisms are there?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
The noble Baroness makes a fair point, and that is something I shall return to later in Committee. I am keen, as I hope noble Lords know, to speak in your Lordships’ House about progress that is and is not made, and I will continue to do that.
Overall on this group, given the amount of plans and reporting already in place, we do not think that additional statutory review, particularly in relation to Amendment 151, is necessary. For all the reasons that I have put to the Committee, I hope noble Lords will be good enough not to press their amendments.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this group. I should have also mentioned that I am very sympathetic to the intention behind Amendment 151 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Noble Lords throughout this debate have been speaking about community resources and accountability for those resources; indeed, I have a related amendment in the seventh group. In some ways, the Minister has partly answered that probing amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and will reflect on the points she made. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said previously, this was a probing amendment to see what data was being collected. Noble Lords will understand that, if we want to improve a situation, we need to collect data. It may not be perfect, and perhaps we can have some conversations between now and Report about that. I am very grateful that the Minister said that this data is collected. I wonder if she could write to us with links to where it can be found. That could address some of the concerns raised by stakeholders who wrote to us, which led to this amendment being tabled.
I remember that, when I read the work of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, the Metropolitan Police service’s submission said that, in 2021, for the first time more patients were conveyed to a health setting in a police vehicle than in an ambulance. I wonder if that is still true or if that situation has been reversed. The purpose of these amendments was to seek what data was available, so that we can address the problems that Amendment 99 and 137 sought to address. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Earl Howe
“(1) An eligible patient shall have a right to create an advance choice document.(1A) For the purposes of this section, an “eligible patient” is a patient who—(a) has previously been detained under Part 2 or Part 3 of this Act, or(b) has been diagnosed with a mental disorder which may lead to the possibility they will be detained under this Act in the future.(1B) NHS England and each integrated care board must make such arrangements as it considers appropriate for—(a) ensuring that all eligible patients for whom it is responsible for the purposes of this section are informed of their right to create an advance choice document, and(b) helping an eligible patient to create an advance choice document.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment gives all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document if they so wish.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 115 takes us to one of the features of this Bill which has been universally welcomed: the creation of advance choice documents or ACDs. An ACD is a means by which a person can record in writing their decisions, wishes and feelings about their treatment, should they be admitted to a hospital or a mental health unit as an in-patient, whether informally or detained compulsorily.
On that account, ACDs are a major component part of one of the Bill’s key strands, which is to give mental health patients better control over their own care—which, of itself, carries a therapeutic value. Giving that element of extra control also reduces the risk of discrimination creeping into any decisions about care and treatment.
The Explanatory Notes say that the people most likely to benefit from an ACD are those who may be detained in a mental health unit or who are likely to be hospitalised at some point in the future. This is because research has shown that ACDs have the potential to reduce time spent in hospital and, significantly, to reduce compulsory detention rates by up to 25%. So the creation of ACDs carries enormous potential.
Clause 42 sets out the duties of NHS England and integrated care boards in making the necessary arrangements for facilitating ACDs. Each of them is required to make information about ACDs available to the people for whom it is responsible, as defined in the clause, and to help such of those people as it considers appropriate to create advance choice documents.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, Amendments 117 and 125 in this group are in my name. I tabled them in part to reflect what happened during the work of the scrutiny committee. We had long discussions about the benefits of ACDs, which were originally brought in under the Mental Capacity Act. I speak as the person who spent an awful long time trying to get them into that Act. They were brought in in the face of some resistance from practitioners. In fact, they have worked extremely well. It has been helpful to both patients and practitioners to know in advance, particularly for people who may have fluctuating illnesses, what it is that they want to do.
I point out yet again to the Committee that often, these are referred to as a decision to refuse treatment, but they are not always that. In the case of some advance choice decisions, people may say to their healthcare providers, “At the moment I am well. I know that, when I am ill, I may try to refuse treatment, but I want you to override that; I want you to carry on the continuity of my care”.
My amendment reflects something we were told. It will be no surprise to people that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, drew attention to the work that has been done in palliative care not only to make sure that people are aware of their right to make an advance choice decision about what they may wish to happen to them as their care continues, but to make it electronically. That was found to be one of the biggest barriers for practitioners, who would say, “We were in a crisis, and we couldn’t see it”. A lot of work has been done within the palliative care world to bring in new standard ways of doing things electronically. There is a pilot going on with the assistance of a private company, Thalamos—I think King’s has been trialling it—and it has so far been found to be extremely successful.
On a very prosaic level, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, is absolutely right that the more that patients feel empowered, particularly in mental health care, the better they do. There are also rather simple things: it takes a lot less time on the part of staff to read the stuff and not to be for ever filling in endless bits of paper. There are time and money efficiencies that can be put into front-line care.
All I ask is that, in addition to what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, we go one stage forward. Let us be honest: some mental health patients can have quite chaotic lives and they might not be the most tech savvy, but they need the same opportunities as anybody else to get on to a system that we know works and which needs to become the default position for all practitioners, rather than, as it is at the moment, an aspiration.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
I strongly support the amendments in this group, particularly that in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. I share the concern, as I think I mentioned at Second Reading, that as currently drafted this proposition could amount to an unenforceable, verging on vacuous, set of requirements, be it noticeboards or helplines. I very much hope that, between now and Report, Ministers will look to adopt the alternative proposition that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has put forward. If, for whatever reason, that is not the case, I hope that collectively we might return to the question.
I have two small further points. I think I am right in interpreting the Bill as saying that guidance will be issued as part of a Section 118 code of practice which will give clarity on the duties of ICBs and NHS England in relation to the ACD part of the new Bill. I hope that that will, among other things, specify in more detail the categories of people who must be offered an ACD in accordance with the new statutory right which we will, I hope, have created; by whom the offer may be made; the fact that it should be recorded digitally, for the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has set out; and a number of other elements. Expecting individual ICBs to figure it out is a recipe for a subtherapeutic dose, shall we say.
My third and final point is that early evidence suggests that if the benefits described in the impact assessment come to fruition in the real world then there will be a positive impact, including on reduced compulsory admissions. Admittedly these are small and non-UK studies, as the material makes clear, but there is nevertheless a case for getting on with ACDs at scale, if the benefits that are hypothesised might actually be obtainable. It is therefore surprising to see in Annex C III of the impact assessment the suggestion that ACDs will not actually come online until 2029-30. It will take relatively marginal additional staff costs and time to do this, for a relatively small number of people. The suggestion is that it will be a surprisingly precise 55,071 people who might get a new ACD in 2029-30 and about 8,000 people who will get an updated one. These are not huge volumes, and we may be under-egging the pudding, but if the benefits are potentially there to be had, why on earth should we assume that we do not get going on this until 2029-30?
For all those reasons, I support the amendments in this group, particularly that from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
My Amendment 121 seeks to add financial circumstances to the advance choice documents. I spoke in the last session of the Committee about the importance of the link between financial problems and mental health problems. I draw attention again to work that has been undertaken by the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute, which suggested this amendment, and declare that I am a member of its advisory committee.
It is very welcome to see, in Clause 40, that health commissioners will have a duty to ensure that services inform people about advance choice documents. I listened to the speeches of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about extending the reach of these documents. I very much look forward to the reply from my noble friend the Minister, because they sounded pretty convincing to me.
Ensuring that everyone has access to an advance choice document is something that the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute has called for previously. We believe that this clause must go further to advance a specific prompt about people’s financial situation. It may seem a small matter, but for people who have been detained under the Mental Health Act, who are possibly too unwell to keep themselves safe, finances are understandably often the last thing on their mind. As I mentioned in a previous session, this does not stop bills needing to be paid, debts mounting and collections activities being escalated. Including a section on money in the document would help people have greater choice and control over their finances when they are in crisis.
A person recalling their experience of receiving treatment for their mental health shared this comment with the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute:
“I was never asked if there was anyone who was opening mail and keeping on top of my day-to-day living stuff … It’s always the same. I go in for treatment and come out to find my financial world is in a bigger mess than when I went in. The resultant terror, shame and guilt undoes all the work of the treatment and I am back in crisis again”.
This section should include explicit prompts which encourage people to reflect on and stipulate their preferences around finances. That can include consideration of how priority bills will be paid; preferences around access to credit; and advance planning to identify and empower a third party to manage their finances on their behalf, such as a lasting power of attorney or third-party mandate.
By including a systematic consideration of finances in ACDs and offering explicit prompts, people can be supported to have greater control and choice. It would better enable healthcare professionals, as well as the individual concerned, to put in place preventive measures to safeguard individuals from the financial harm that can be caused by, and exacerbate, mental health crises.
As mentioned previously, this is not about requiring healthcare professionals to support people with financial advice, or to deal with issues they have neither the expertise nor the capacity to deal with. It is about empowering them to identify people in need and refer them to the appropriate existing support.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 122 is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Patel. When I read through the Bill initially, it concerned me that there was no mention of lasting power of attorney, which, of course, is a legal document under the Mental Capacity Act. A registered lasting power of attorney for health and welfare will appoint attorneys chosen by the patient—the donor—at a time when they had capacity, to speak and act on their behalf if they lose capacity. This is particularly important for people who may periodically lose capacity due to mental disorder. The attorneys, of course, could also provide information about the patient, which is essential in distinguishing behaviours that may be associated with autism or learning disability but are not mental disorders. This does not, of course, apply to children, who cannot make lasting powers of attorney, but it would be remiss of me not to raise it with the Committee, because I have become rather concerned.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I will very briefly underline my very strong support for Amendment 121 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I remind noble Lords of my relevant interests in the register.
The noble Lord set it out very clearly so I do not need to add to what he said, other than to say there is a great opportunity for us to ensure that, for the first time in legislation, finances are considered a key part of supporting recovery from a mental health crisis. I am aware of far too many stories of people suffering from severe mental health crises or who are detained whose finances go into complete and utter freefall. It is so difficult for them then to recover their finances. That often means, in turn, that they have further mental health problems. That is all I wanted to say. I support the noble Lord, Lord Davies, very strongly.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
In the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I will just say that I support all these amendments. I expressed concern about under-16s and those aged 16-18, but that does not stop me thinking that these advance choice documents are an excellent plan. However, I am concerned about the point that the noble Baroness makes with Amendment 120. An independent mental health advocate would be extremely helpful, because there may be quite a lot of people who really would not know how to make an advance choice document, would be very concerned about it and might write down some really not very sensible things, when they could have help as to what they really wanted. I strongly support the noble Baroness’s amendment.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for all the contributions in this group. I will start with Amendment 115, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. Under the Bill, services should not only offer individuals who are likely to benefit from making an ACD information and support to do so, they should proactively support such individuals. This is functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document.
The amendment applies to large groups. We have concerns that, for example, it may be practically challenging or sometimes inappropriate to contact people who were detained some time ago. We intend to identify groups in the code of practice that services should target; it can then be updated in response to changing best practice and emerging research.
On the point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, and the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, about how advance choice document information is made available to patients, we will set out in the code of practice detailed guidance on how services should discharge their duties under the Bill to inform and support individuals to make an ACD. Any failure to implement the duty in this aspect of the code could ultimately be challenged in the courts. I hope that gives some indication of the strength of that provision in the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, raised the implementation timeline, as outlined in the impact assessment. We want to ensure that there is appropriate resource in the system before ACDs can be brought in. I am sure noble Lords understand that this is critical, for ACDs to have the right level of impact. For example, the effect of ACDs is dependent on the expansion of the second opinion appointed doctor service. In the meantime, services can, of course, progress with putting ACDs that deal with patient needs and wishes overall should they become detained. That would very much build on the work that South London and Maudsley, and others, have done.
I turn to Amendments 117 and 125 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. I confirm that we are committed to mitigating the barriers that get in the way of creating an advance choice document. The code will make it clear that commissioners should provide accessible information in response to individual needs, with flexibility around how individuals make their preferences known—the point that the noble Baroness raised. We plan to create a standard advance choice document template for people to complete, with supporting guidance. That should prompt thoughts about the things that an individual may wish to consider and decide before they become unwell. I can assure noble Lords that the template will be available digitally as well as in hard copy. Our intention is that a digital version of the document will be created for easy access by professionals as needed.
Amendment 120, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has the stated intention that mental health in-patients create an ACD. While the Bill does not prevent this, in most cases it will not be the best time, as patients may be very unwell and lack capacity. Insights from the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust with King’s College London suggest that encouraging people to create an advance choice document after discharge—when their health has improved and the support network can help—can be useful. The person’s community mental health team is best placed to provide support, rather than an independent mental health advocate whose role is to support people who are detained. The duty on commissioners in the Bill is intended to focus on the community and other contexts outside of hospital. We feel that this is more likely to increase the uptake of advance choice documents.
Baroness Barker (LD)
The crucial question that the noble Baroness is asking is around which staff can access this information and where. That means that the information in the ACD has to be always available to whoever is seeing the patient, wherever they happen to be. Does that mean that, as in palliative care, the ACD will become part of an electronic patient record, and that there will be an expectation that all practitioners, wherever they are, will refer to it all the time?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
The noble Baroness makes a good point. I am sure she is aware that one of the main pillars of change as we move towards the 10-year plan is shifting from analogue to digital. I am sure that this will be part of those considerations.
I now turn to Amendment 121, tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton and supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Neuberger. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, spoke to this very amendment. We know that financial problems can worsen or trigger mental illness. We agree that individuals should be encouraged to include in their ACD any care and support to help them manage their financial circumstances when unwell. The code of practice will include guidance from professionals on this point, while the template will prompt people to consider financial matters.
On Amendment 122, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, it is important for practitioners to be aware of, and, where applicable, to consult with, the person’s attorney. However, we do not agree with requiring people to include all of the information contained in the lasting power of attorney in their ACD. The document is owned by the individual, who should be free to include what matters to them. Some of the information in a person’s lasting power of attorney may not be relevant, and copying over its contents may introduce inaccuracies due to human error. We intend to encourage service users to include the existence of an LPA where applicable in their advance choice documents, and practitioners can then be made aware and take the relevant steps.
On Amendment 123, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, we agree with the aim that is stated here. The code of practice will set out all of the groups which services should proactively target to make an advance choice document, including people on the dynamic support register. The code can be updated in line with emerging research and best practice, as I have said a number of times before, and can include detail and nuance that is not possible in primary legislation.
With those remarks from me in mind, I hope that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.
Lord Scriven (LD)
I have one very quick question. Throughout the whole of Committee, since day one, the Minister has referred to the code of practice being updated. Can she tell us the date by which it will have been updated? It is quite important for implementation and some dates that the Minister keeps referring to. If she cannot let us know now, she could write to the Committee.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I would be very glad to share the date if I could put a date on it. It will be after Royal Assent, and I will keep noble Lords updated.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I very much appreciate the support from around the Committee for my Amendment 115. I support all the other amendments in this group, each of which is designed to bolster the rigour and thoroughness of the advance choice document process.
It is good to hear from the Minister that the code of practice will include guidance on how information on ACDs will be made known to relevant would-be patients. I shall need to reflect on this, but I confess I retain a worry in this area. The CQC in its annual report of 2020-21 on monitoring the Mental Health Act reported that many patients do not have their rights explained to them during their treatment. This is despite the existing requirement in the Mental Health Act code of practice for hospital managers to provide information both orally and in writing. Clearly, if someone without an existing ACD is admitted to a mental health unit for treatment, it will be too late for them to execute a valid ACD during that episode of care. The time to be informed that an ACD could be an appropriate thing for them to draw up is once they are discharged, to cater for possible future contingencies.
I suggest that the CQCs finding is still relevant, its point being that the NHS is not all that good at providing information to patients in a timely or appropriate way. Therefore, I think that creating a duty to do so would add value—perhaps not in the precise terms I have used in the amendment, but in similar language. That could, incidentally, be achieved quite easily if mental health patients were automatically invited to complete a debriefing report following discharge from hospital in the way that I suggested in an earlier amendment.
The prize, let us remember, could be significant. I refer noble Lords back to remarks by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, in an earlier debate, where she indicated that independent advocates have been proved as central to the success of advance choice documents—a facilitator, in other words. She referred to a study in North Carolina that showed that providing a facilitator in the form of an independent advocate increased the number of people making a psychiatric advance directive from 3% to 60%. That is a very powerful set of figures.
I hope the Minister will be open to further discussion on this and the other amendments in the group between now and Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 115.
Baroness Merron
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 4, page 5, line 20.
Mental Health Bill [HL]
Monday 27th January 2025
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 47-IV(Corrected) Fourth marshalled list for Committee - (23 Jan 2025)
Baroness Browning
“Power of Tribunals to require a reportIn section 72 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Power of Tribunals), after subsection (7) insert—“(8) The Tribunal may require a local authority, or an NHS body, to arrange for a report regarding such matters relating to a patient as the tribunal may direct to be made—(a) by one of its officers or employees;(b) by such other person as the authority, or the NHS body, considers appropriate.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would recreate the powers the Court of Protection has under section 49 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, in section 72 of the MHA 1983 to assist discharge.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 128 is in my name. A person with autistic spectrum disorder or a learning disability may be stuck in hospital for years; we know that they often are. We sincerely hope that matters will improve dramatically when this Bill is enacted, but we should not be so optimistic as to think that will happen in the near future. However, when somebody is in hospital that long and no longer needs clinical supervision—some in the autistic and learning disability community, for example, never needed to be in there at all—parents become extremely stressed and frustrated. There may be long periods when a close relative, often their adult child or a younger child, is stuck in these hospitals and the parents cannot get them out.
We heard in debate earlier this evening of the differences between the county courts and the mental health tribunals; of course, there are also people who sometimes resort to the Court of Protection. Although I heard noble and learned Lords giving their different views on these, most seemed not to regard the county courts as the most appropriate course. It is a fact, though, that the Court of Protection has had some success in getting out people who have been unduly held in mental health hospitals.
Amendment 128 proposes that mental health tribunals are strengthened to give them the same opportunity as the Court of Protection to make progress in releasing people from long stays in hospitals. If they are to do that, the mental health tribunals need to have more powers, particularly to require local authorities and the NHS to provide a report to enable discharge for a person who no longer clinically needs to be in hospital. This would give tribunals the same powers that the Court of Protection has under Section 49 of the Mental Capacity Act, because there has been some success.
The Court of Protection has been able to secure discharges because it is able to call for reports from local authorities and health services to put the case that it feels confident that it would be safe to discharge somebody. Parents who do this very often have to fund it themselves. Strengthening the tribunal cases, in line with the sort of powers that the Court of Protection has in getting information collated, to make sure the discharge package is sound is very important. This approach would be stronger and more effective than the Government’s proposal that tribunals make recommendations on Section 117.
That is what the Government propose, but I hope that the Minister will look carefully at this amendment. It would enhance mental health tribunals, increasing the number of people who have proper discharge packages through these tribunals. I do not see this as a competition between the Court of Protection and tribunals. Both have a place, and this will be important if we are to achieve what this Bill wants to achieve: to make sure that people do not stay in health mental hospitals a moment longer than they absolutely have to. I beg to move.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I believe we would all accept—and, personally, I am in no doubt—that my noble friend Lady Browning possesses a breadth and depth of experience in matters relating to autism and learning disability. By that, I mean that she has not just a familiarity with the day-to-day challenges of life for individuals with one or more of these conditions but a knowledge of the practical frustrations and hurdles that often have to be overcome if the best interests of such individuals are to be properly defended.
It is amply clear from what my noble friend has said that, if this amendment were inserted into the Bill, it would have the potential to make a material and beneficial difference to the process of discharging certain patients from a secure mental health unit in particular types of situations. As my noble friend said, and as we all know, there have been many instances where autistic patients have been detained inappropriately and for long periods under the Mental Health Act and where families have struggled to secure their relatives’ release.
I cannot see a logical reason why a mental health tribunal should not be placed on an equal legal footing with the Court of Protection in this very limited respect. I hope the Minister will agree.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, for tabling Amendment 128 and for her contribution, along with that of the noble Earl, Lord Howe.
On the proposals in Amendment 128, I can tell your Lordships that, under the current tribunal procedure rules, the tribunal can direct responsible authorities, which could be a local authority or an NHS body, to provide evidence. The practice directions that apply in mental health cases place a requirement on the responsible authority to provide reports and records relating to the patient’s detention treatment and any after-care plans. The tribunal can use these reports to decide whether the detention criteria are being met. Therefore, it appears that the tribunal has extensive powers to require responsible authorities to provide the information to support its decision on whether to discharge a patient. I hope that the noble Baroness will be satisfied with this response and will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his support from the Front Bench and to the Minister for her reply. Although it was very reassuring, could I ask her to clarify something? Has the level of information leading to a proper discharge plan under the existing powers of tribunals been set in primary legislation, which is what I am asking for under this Bill, or is it in secondary legislation or guidance?
Baroness Merron (Lab)
I am happy to confirm that to the noble Baroness. The important thing for me is that we make sure that, as always, we can move with best practice and keep up with what is needed. With that in mind, I will confirm that later to the noble Baroness to ensure that I am correctly answering her detailed question.
Baroness Browning (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister, as always. She is always helpful with these difficult points. I will just flag up that if the tribunal power to get that information in order to encourage more discharges is not in statute, then perhaps we will return to it at a later date. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bradley
“Implementation report: removal of police stations and prisons as places of safety(1) Within 6 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a report on how they will effectively implement the provisions contained with section 46 (Removal of police stations and prisons as places of safety) within the time limit specified by section 53(3A) (Commencement).(2) The report must include an assessment of—(a) how His Majesty’s Government will provide alternative places of safety with adequate capacity and geographical distribution,(b) the availability of remand to hospital under section 36 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Remand of accused person to hospital for treatment) and,(c) any plans to extend section 36(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 to Magistrates’ courts.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment (connected with another in the name of Lord Bradley) seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State must publish a report on how they plan to implement the provisions contained within Clause 46 in an effective and timely manner.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
My Lords, my Amendments 128A and 163B concern the banning of prisons and police cells as places of safety. By way of background, in my report in 2009, which I have previously referenced, I recommended that discussions should immediately commence to identify suitable local mental health facilities as the places of safety, ensuring that police stations should no longer be used for this purpose at that time. That sat alongside the development of mental health and learning disabilities liaison and diversion teams based in police custody suites and the courts, particularly to support the police in dealing with people with these issues. There is now 100% geographical coverage of the country with those teams. A crucial further element was the development of what was called street triage, where mental health nurses sat alongside the police in emergency control rooms or in police vehicles around local communities, again to support and assist the police.
The recent policy, “right care, right place”, is rightly based on the same principles debated on Amendment 37B, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady May. Again, at that time there was growing concern that A&E departments were, and still are, a default position as places of safety, and therefore the need to develop alternative facilities, often located close to A&E departments, often called crisis care units, should be pursued. There is an agreed protocol with the police to hand over the patients for care and assessment to NHS staff in the way advocated now by Amendment 128B, which has already been debated and is a model that I believe should be replicated across the country.
My amendments today are an attempt to galvanise the Government into action to achieve that. Amendment 163B to Clause 53 would require that Clause 46 came into force no later than 12 months after the passing of the Act. Amendment 128A to Clause 46 would require that the Government must publish a report on how they would ensure effective implementation of that section within the timeframe specified. I am again concerned at the lack of clarity in the timeline for the implementation of provisions in this clause. The impact assessment currently does not show an estimated commencement date for the provision in Clause 46, stating instead:
“Departments are working together to ensure there are clear pathways and provision in place to safely enact these reforms and the timeline for implementation will depend on the conclusion of this work”.
Amendment 163B would require Clause 46 to come into force within 12 months of the passing of the Act.
Amendment 128A would require the Government, within six months of the passing of the Act, to publish a report assessing: how they will ensure effective provision of alternative places of safety with adequate capacity and distribution across geographical locations; the availability of remand to hospital under Section 36 of the Mental Health Act 1983; and any plans to extend the use of Section 36 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to magistrates’ courts. Such a report will be crucial to the successful implementation of Clause 46.
Further—and this replicates concerns already expressed in Committee—I am concerned about the lack of reliable data on the use of prisons as a place of safety. The impact assessment references this, noting that there is no
“reliable data on the number of people in prison as a place of safety”.
Without knowing how many people are being held in prison as a place of safety, it would be difficult to ensure adequate alternative provision is in place. This data should be recorded and made available to inform effective implementation of this clause. Perhaps the Minister in response might be able to assure us that this information will be made available to the Committee.
Taken together, the removal of police stations and prisons as places of safety can be successfully introduced in a timely way, which many organisations, such as the Centre for Mental Health—for which I am an ambassador—and the Prison Reform Trust, have a long advocated. I hope the Minister will agree.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Bradley. As usual, he has been very sensible and measured in the amendments he has tabled. As the noble Lord reminded us, he has been very patient on many of the measures he is proposing.
I will speak to Amendment 140, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lord Howe, and hopefully touch on some of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Bradley. On a positive note, I will say how much we welcome Clause 46 and its removal of police stations and prisons as places of safety under the Mental Health Act. I think that noble Lords across the Committee welcome that, and the Government are to be congratulated on it.
The Wessely review stated:
“Far and away the best way to improve the care and outcomes for those with the severest mental illnesses is to provide more and better alternatives to detention”.
It also remarked that, all too often, opportunities for early intervention were missed. The report noted that this means that the first contact a patient often has is with the police, rather than with a mental health professional. I know we have discussed this and the overall involvement of police a number of times in Committee. I am sure we may come back to this on Report, but all noble Lords are aware that this must be addressed. Clause 46 is therefore very important in implementing that recommendation from the Wessely review.
I want to focus on a sentence that comes after the recommendation in the Wessely report:
“That means that, where they do not currently exist, health-based places of safety will need to be commissioned”.
I think this goes to the heart of the issue the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, was talking about—implementation but also data. Amendment 140 attempts to probe the Government. It would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on alternative places of safety for patients who are liable to be detained, particularly focusing on community care. We need to know this; as the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, said, we need the data.
Noble Lords have raised many times that we know that everything is not going to be done overnight. We understand that. We know there is a 10-year timeframe. We want a better understanding of what will be delivered when. Some of it will be subject to spending reviews, but some of it will be delivered whatever the result of a spending review. It is all very well saying that police stations and prisons and cannot be used as places of safety—no disagreement there—but this will mean that patients have to be placed elsewhere. Clause 46(2)(a) states that a place of safety for an adult is
“any hospital the managers of which are willing temporarily to receive that person”.
So far, the Bill seems to say—the Minister may correct me—that the only place of safety is a hospital. If I have misunderstood, I am prepared to be corrected, but as all noble Lords will know, that is not always ideal. Capacity in hospitals is in short supply. What will happen if a place of safety is needed but there are no appropriate hospitals nearby that are willing to receive that person, for lack of available space or staff? That is why this amendment places a focus on community-based alternatives for places of safety. If we can shift some of the burden here away from hospitals and into the community, part of the problem might be alleviated.
On an earlier amendment, Amendment 151, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said that we all know that capacity in the community is currently quite limited. The report required by my amendment would enable the Secretary of State and the Department for Health and Social Care to consider and create a plan to develop greater capacity in the community for this purpose. We understand that not everything can be delivered now, but we would like to see a plan so that we can understand the Government’s intentions, their own timeframe and how they intend to roll this out. The amendment once again aims to probe the Government on their implementation plan.
I thank the Minister for meeting my noble friend Lord Howe and me to discuss appropriate places of safety. In that meeting, the Minister mentioned the community crisis houses that the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, alluded to, and said that her department was investigating how these might be used as alternatives to hospital or, indeed, police stations. As Mind says on its website, crisis houses provide
“intensive, short-term support to help manage a mental health crisis in a residential setting, rather than in a hospital”.
They can vary; some may simply provide temporary overnight accommodation to ensure that those experiencing mental health crises have a safe space away from other areas of their life, while others may provide treatment as well. Many of these crisis houses are operated by voluntary and civil society organisations.
One of my great passions in politics is to champion the role of local community civil society groups, so that we do not always have to look to the state to provide all the solutions. I think that there is some real promise here, and the Government are to be congratulated on it, for the provision of community crisis houses to be expanded, so that they can act as health-based places of safety, as the Wessely review recommended.
The questions I have at this stage for the Minister are in the nature of a probing amendment. What progress has the department made in exploring these community crisis houses and, indeed, other community-based places of safety, as alternatives to police stations and prison cells? Can the Minister tell us, when the Government are implementing the provisions of Clause 46 and commissioning health-based places of safety, whether they will include discussions with local civil society organisations and charities about how best to implement them, perhaps in partnership? I am sure she will recognise that their expertise will be highly beneficial and that they often know their local community much better than officials do, whether those be national officials or sometimes even local government officials. I appreciate that the Minister will not necessarily have all the answers tonight but, if not, I look forward not only to her comments but to the letter that she will promise to write to us afterwards.
Baroness Merron (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bradley for his contribution and for Amendments 128A and 163B. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, for speaking to Amendment 140 in his name and that of the noble Earl, Lord Howe. We are committed to implementing these reforms as soon as is it safe and practical to do so. We will return to this matter on the next day in Committee.
As I have said before—I know that noble Lords have heard this—we are reluctant to commit to enacting single provisions or publishing single plans or reports at specific times, given their dependence on so many other developments, particularly spending reviews. Removing police stations and prisons as places of safety under Section 55, and removing police stations under Sections 135, 136 and 136A will, as noble Lords suggest, require making sure that viable alternatives and clear pathways into support are fully established and in place. Commencing by regulations enables the reforms to be enacted once this is the case.
I know that my noble friend Lord Bradley is aware of this, but I will repeat it in respect of these amendments. Officials from my department, the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office are working with health and justice partners across government to develop the necessary plans to ensure that sufficient resources and the right processes are in place, and to establish clear timelines for implementation.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response and pleased that progress is being well made to develop alternative facilities to ensure that the use of prisons and police stations as places of safety is banned as soon as possible. The purpose of my amendments was to keep momentum behind that programme. I hope we can properly implement these provisions in a timely way, because that would be to the greatest benefit of people affected by mental ill-health or learning disabilities who find themselves up against or in the criminal justice system. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Bradley
“Implementation report: mental health care for bailed defendants(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a report on how they will effectively implement the provisions contained within section 47 (Remand for a person’s own protection etc) within the time limit specified by section 53(3A) (Commencement).(2) The report must include an assessment of how His Majesty’s Government will ensure appropriate care and support for defendants with mental health conditions who, under the provision in section 47, cannot be kept in custody for their own protection.(3) The report must review—(a) the extent to which services providing such care and support have adequate capacity, and(b) their geographical distribution.(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment (connected to another in the name of Lord Bradley) seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State publishes a report on how they plan to implement the provisions contained within clause 47 in a timely manner, and in a way which ensures that bailed defendants with mental health conditions (who can no longer be remanded for their own protection) receive appropriate care and support.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 128C I will speak also to Amendment 163C in my name. These amendments relate to Clause 47, “Remand for a person’s own protection etc”, and Clause 53, “Commencement”. I will speak very briefly, because the purpose of these two interlinked amendments is substantially the same as the ones we just discussed: Amendments 128A and 163B. However, they stress that remand should always be part of our deliberations when we are talking about people who may find themselves in the criminal justice system.
Amendment 163C would require that Clause 47 comes into force no later than 12 months after the passing of the Bill. Amendment 128C would require the Government to publish a report on effective implementation of Clause 47. These two amendments encapsulate the need to make really rapid progress to ensure that there are adequate community alternatives and community health-based provision to support people who may be placed on remand, where the sole concern is the defendant’s mental health.
We have to ensure that these facilities are geographically spread across the country. We also have to ensure that we can see bail being used in a way that is commensurate with people who may have found themselves going to a place of safety, but with the same support required for their continued treatment as if they were already within the criminal justice system.
With that, I am happy to listen to a positive response from the Minister. I beg to move.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, I will be very brief because of the time. As with the previous group of amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, we are very supportive of the intention to try to tease out of government what the implementation plans are. It is really important to understand that being supportive of Clause 47 does not necessarily mean that we believe it will come into implementation in a timely fashion.
By supporting the noble Lord’s amendments, we wish to tease out of government the exact timing and resources that have been allocated; the planning the Government will have to do in terms of the number of provisions that will be required to implement this clause; the gap between the number of those facilities in place and those needed; and the estimate the Government have of when they would seek to put those facilities in place.
As the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, said, the location of those facilities—where there are gaps geographically and where they need to be filled—is very important. It is important that the Government furnish the Committee with those details so that we can fully understand not just the intention of implementation but the scale of the implementation plan required for this clause.
Lord Kamall (Con)
My Lords, just like in the last group, I will speak to and support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bradley. They follow the amendments in the previous group.
These Benches welcome Clause 47—another positive move—which addresses the issues arising from the current situation. As the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, said, bail can be refused solely on the basis of a mental health condition where it might otherwise have been granted.
In simple terms, as the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said, this amendment returns to the theme that he, and many other noble Lords, have pushed the Government on—and I like the words used by the noble Lord—to “tease out” the plan and timetable for implementation from the Government, since it requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on how they plan to implement these changes within the time period proposed in Amendment 163C.
We have to remember that the impact assessment states, in regard to the changes to remand for a person’s own protection, that:
“Departments are working together to ensure there are clear pathways and provision in place to safely enact these reforms and the timeline for implementation will depend on the conclusion of this work”.
That has been manifested this evening with the presence of a Minister from the Department of Health and Social Care and a Minister from the Ministry of Justice. However, there is currently no set date for the commencement of Clause 46, so it is all contingent on internal departmental assessments. We all understand how government works—how long it takes for things to happen, to get write-round and to get support across government—so I gently suggest to the Minister that the 12-month implementation timeline would be a useful target for the Government to work towards. It could help them to answer some of the questions that many noble Lords have asked in Committee on the plans for, and stages of, implementation. That is not to force the Government to move faster than they want to go, but just for us to understand the various milestones along the way in developing what is in the Bill.
It would also be helpful if the Minister could set out how much progress has been made both in the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Health and Social Care on establishing the pathways and processes to enable these remand reforms to go forward. This is especially true since the impact assessment also states—this is quite an interesting point—that:
“We expect the number of people on remand solely for mental health reasons to be low and therefore health and justice costs relating to this change are likely to be negligible, and therefore have not been monetised”.
We understand the challenges that the Government are often talking about—they have to wait for spending reviews, et cetera—but the impact assessment states that the number of people affected will be low. Can the Minister say whether either his department or the Department of Health and Social Care know what that means and how many people that will be? Does he know how many will be impacted by this change? If he accepts what is in the impact assessment—that the costs will be negligible—this could be a quick win for the Government in relative terms, depending of course on what other processes he feels have to be put in place before they can deliver this. I hope that the Minister can be a bit more helpful on his noble friend’s amendments, given that the costs are low.
We look forward to the Minister’s response, and I would be grateful if he could give an indicative timeframe or an indication of when a timeframe will be in place.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Bradley for bringing this discussion before the Committee. These amendments would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the implementation of Clause 47 within six months of the date on which the Bill is passed and that the reform comes into force a maximum of 12 months after the date on which the Bill is passed.
We are committed to implementing our reform to the Bail Act as soon as is practicable and as soon it is safe to do so. However, before moving to amend the legislation to embed these changes, we will need to make sure that viable alternatives are properly established and clear pathways to the right support are in place, whether in hospital or in the community. Commencing by regulations enables the flexibility to implement the reform at whatever point the necessary alternatives and pathways are safely in place.
I reassure my noble friend Lord Bradley—just as the Minister, my noble friend Lady Merron, did in relation to the previous groups of amendments—that my officials are working with colleagues across government to develop this and to ensure that sufficient resources and processes are in place. This includes the work of the north-east health and justice hub, which seeks to improve the way that courts, health services and prisons work together at a local level to smooth pathways into care, alongside the pilot team collecting data. That will help us better to understand the number of people remanded for their own protection solely on mental health grounds to inform planning.
The reform is currently due to commence by regulation, so we have the flexibility to implement it at whatever point the necessary alternatives to the pathways are in place. The rollout of the bail information service will be completed by autumn this year. This will help the courts to have the information they need to make decisions on bail for this cohort. However, we need to make sure that we have the reliable data on the number of people remanded for their own protection, because if this is rushed, it could create knock-on impacts for health services.
Lord Scriven (LD)
The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, quite rightly pointed out that the impact assessment says that the Government have already said that the numbers will be small and the costs negligible. Upon what data were those assumptions from the impact assessment made? If the Minister cannot give me the answer to that at the moment, could he provide the Committee with the detailed figures and data used to present that within the impact assessment?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for his question. I will be delighted to get the correct information, so that we get it exactly right. We will get it to him as soon as is practical.
Lord Bradley (Lab)
I am again grateful to the Minister for his response and pleased that he will provide that information, because it is fundamental to effective implementation of this policy. I also look forward, hopefully before Report, to visiting the north-east health and justice hub to see for myself what model it is developing, how applicable that could be across the country and at what cost. There is lots to do but, on that basis, I wish to withdraw my amendment.