Mental Health Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 31st March 2025 Lords Chamber

Those two things are important and, I hope, would bring much-needed clarity and consistency to the difficult job that approved mental health professionals do. If they do not have that degree of consistency, they could potentially leave themselves vulnerable to legal challenge. These amendments, taken together, would ensure that the Children Act was no longer, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, ignored and that, through the scrutiny of this Bill, we had ensured that these two very important Acts were aligned.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, this is Report and I do not propose to do more than underscore all that is been said by noble Lords who have spoken, particularly my noble friend Lady Berridge. Approved mental health professionals carry with them a huge responsibility for the well-being of those whose interests they are called upon to protect. When a child or young person suffers a mental health crisis, it is the job of the AMHP to make the right assessments, take the right decisions and follow the right procedures under the law to ensure that the young person is looked after appropriately and swiftly. To do that, he or she needs a clear set of ground rules to follow.

We need to imagine a situation, such as the one posited by my noble friend, in which a child’s mental and emotional condition is such that they lack decision-making competence. An AMHP is then called in. In that situation, when it comes to appointing a nominated person for the child, the scope for confusion and indeed delay is enormous. Who should be appointed? Is it the mother or the father, or is there someone else who should take precedence?

The Minister has acknowledged through the government amendments before us that, when there is a care order for the child, the AMHP should have no choice but to appoint the local authority as the nominated person for the child. That is a welcome step forward but, as my noble friend has rightly said, what if there is a special guardianship order or child arrangement order issued by the court under the terms of the Children Act? In those circumstances, too, the AMHP should be relieved of the obligation of making a decision that, if it is the wrong one, could leave them open to legal challenge. I very much hope the Minister will be receptive to the powerful arguments that my noble friend and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have advanced on these significant issues.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions in this important area, and I thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for Amendment 2.

On that point, I can say that a copy of the report made following a care and treatment review must be sent to those who have a legal duty to have regard to the review recommendations, so that they are implemented appropriately. We agree that parents play an important role. However, it may not be appropriate for the report to be sent to parents in every case: for example, where safeguarding concerns have been raised. Inappropriate sharing of information could result in the patient withdrawing their consent to the review. So we will provide statutory guidance on the role of the parent to assist the responsible commissioner in considering who to involve in care and treatment reviews.

On Amendment 25, also tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the Bill already allows anyone involved in the patient’s care or welfare, which includes parents, to apply to the county court to terminate the appointment of a nominated person. I can assure the noble and learned Baroness that we will make this clear in the code of practice and the Explanatory Notes for the Bill, as she has raised an important point.

To address Amendment 27, we are concerned that making it a requirement for parents always to be consulted when a nominated person is chosen could put undue pressure on a child to choose a parent. However, we agree that the witness should consider the views of parents and others who may have insight into the suitability of a nomination. I can tell the House that we will therefore set out in the statutory code of practice how the views of the family and others should be fed into the witnessing process.

I have also heard the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, about the nominated person regarding children who lack competence. In response to this, as she acknowledged, I have tabled Amendments 29 to 33 to make it clear who an approved mental health professional must appoint in certain circumstances. For an over-18 lacking capacity, an approved mental health professional must appoint a competent lasting power of attorney or Court of Protection deputy, if they have one. For all under-18s lacking capacity or competence, where there is a care order, they must appoint a local authority which has parental responsibility for them or, if relevant, a competent Court of Protection deputy. Where there is no care order, the approved mental health professional can appoint a person who does not have parental responsibility for 16 and 17 year-olds. This allows for suitable alternative arrangements, for example, informal kinship arrangements for young people who live independently. I hope that this reassurance and commitment on my behalf provides the further clarity for which the noble Baroness has been advocating.

Finally, in response to Amendment 34, we agree that in the vast majority of cases we would expect a parent, or whoever has parental responsibility, to be appointed. This would include consideration of special guardians and child arrangement orders. As I have set out before, we do not agree that a person with residual parental responsibility should always be blocked from being a nominated person. A child arrangement order or special guardianship may be in place for reasons other than the parent being a risk to the child. For example, the parent might struggle with their own health issues but could still be an effective nominated person.

The situation is different in the case of a care order because the local authority is being given lead parental responsibility. We have engaged with the Children’s Commissioner on this point. As I believe the noble Baroness may be aware, I recently met the Children’s Commissioner on a range of issues, including discussions about the Mental Health Act.

If there are no relevant people, approved mental health professionals must follow the patient’s past and present wishes and feelings when deciding who to appoint. We do not believe that the eldest person should be given preference, as this represents an outdated assignment of responsibility. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that I have been advised that my officials met the chair—but I understand that the term is lead—of the AMHP Leads Network last November.

I can make a further commitment, which I hope will be helpful to your Lordships’ House. I am committing to establishing an expert taskforce to support the development of the statutory code of practice to provide clear guidance for professionals involved in the nominated person appointment process for children and young people. Views will be very much welcomed on who should be part of this; I have already invited the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to make suggestions about that. With these reasons, I hope that noble Lords can support our amendments and will not press their amendments.

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Moved by

[Earl Howe]

12: Clause 8, page 14, line 19, at end insert—
“(iii) seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma;”

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 12, I will speak also to four other amendments in my name included in this group: Amendments 13, 15, 37 and 41.

To set the scene, there is a theme running through all the amendments in this group—not only mine—which is patient empowerment. All of us, I am sure, welcome the fact that patient empowerment is already writ large in the substance of this Bill, and as the changes that it makes are taken forward, as they will be, I am certain that they will be hugely beneficial to patients. However, as we heard in Committee, there remain features of mental health law and practice that give cause for real concern. My contention, which I am sure is shared, is that we should try to do all we can to make sure that the procedures, clinical practice and, if possible, cultures are made as good as they can possibly be in the way that this legislation is drafted.

My Amendments 12 and 13 are identical to amendments that I tabled in Committee. The point of them is to signal something important about the culture of mental health care. Many of us may take for granted that the aim and purpose of treatment in a mental health unit is to promote psychological well-being and recovery and to minimise distress, but we know that there are many patients undergoing treatment for whom distress and psychological trauma are ever-present features of in-patient care, particularly children and young people. The noble Lord, Lord Crisp, reminded us of that earlier. My Amendment 58, which we will debate in a later group, is designed to tackle this problem in a practical way.

The same applies to my Amendment 41, which brings us back to an issue that I am glad to say received strong support from noble Lords in Committee: the need to beef up the provisions in this Bill around advanced choice documents. ACDs are a great idea and I am delighted that the Government have recognised their potential for enhancing patient well-being, because that is what they will certainly do. We know from research that they have the potential to reduce compulsory detention rates appreciably, as well as reducing time spent in hospital. However, as the Bill is now expressed, patients will not be guaranteed an opportunity to create an advanced choice document, if that is their wish. All that we have in Clause 42 is a provision to allow commissioners to make information on ACDs available to people for whom they are responsible. I do not think that that is good enough.

I turn to my Amendment 15 and, in doing so, focus on an issue that has been brought to my attention by the Law Society relating to nasogastric tube feeding of patients in mental hospitals. The central concern here is that the Mental Health Act 1983 contains no specific safeguards for situations where nasogastric tube feeding of a patient is being proposed. That is because it is considered to fall under Section 63 of the Act, which does not require a second opinion appointed doctor. I suggest that this is unsatisfactory.

In January of this year alone, according to the most recent data, there were 1,975 uses of restraint to facilitate nasogastric feeding in England. Furthermore, a recent comprehensive audit of in-patient mental health units in England reported that the duration of nasogastric tube feeding under physical restraint ranged from a single feed to 312 weeks, with a mean duration of 29.1 weeks. In other words, this is an invasive procedure and the degree of invasiveness can be measured not just by the amount of force used but by the length of time for which the treatment lasts.

Professor Phil Fennell outlined the significant gaps in patient protection in the use of nasogastric tube feeding in his 2019 article, The Regulation of Tube Feeding: a Critical Analysis, and this highlighted the need for regulations.to govern the use of nasogastric tube feeding to achieve a more patient-centred approach to what is quite a drastic medical intervention. The same issue was previously raised in 2007 by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which pointed out that forcible feeding is potentially a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the convention, and it, too, questioned why it was not subject to regulation in the same way as ECT is under Section 58 of the Act. The response at that time was that the provisions were compliant with the ECHR.

However, this was before the decision in X v Finland, and in this case, the European Court of Human Rights found that Finland violated X’s rights under Articles 5, 8 and 13 of the convention. X was involuntarily admitted to a mental institution and forcibly medicated with nasogastric tube feeding, which the court deemed unjustified and a breach of her rights to liberty and privacy. Additionally, X lacked an effective remedy to challenge the forcible medication. However, the court did not find a violation of her right to a fair trial under Article 6.

The Law Society has put it to me that this highlights the wider need for safeguards, as patient X did not have sufficient avenues for challenging forcible nasogastric tube feeding. It strongly contends—and I agree—that the Bill represents a real opportunity for making a change to the law in a way that creates a direct safeguard for patients consistent with the safeguards applicable to electro-convulsive therapy, and that is what my amendment seeks to achieve.

Finally, I direct the House’s attention to Amendment 37. This returns us to a Committee debate we had on 22 January. The patient voice in mental health care is, I would argue, inherently weaker than it is in other fields of healthcare, and the patient experience that much more determinative of outcomes. That really matters because, as we know from evidence provided by the CQC and many patient-representative groups, the care of patients in mental health settings is frequently underresourced. It therefore carries with it a heightened degree of risk that acceptable standards of care are not always maintained.

In this amendment, which replicates the amendment I tabled in Committee, I am putting forward the idea that, if every patient discharged from a mental healthcare setting were to be given the opportunity to rate, comment on and provide constructive feedback on the treatment they had received while in hospital, the value to the system and the potential value to the patient could be very significant.

I know that the Minister does not take issue with this. Indeed, I am sure she is sympathetic to what I have said. What I must question, though, is the premise of her response to me in Committee. In that response, she sought to argue that the visits and interviews with patients carried out by the CQC fulfil a function that, in terms of transparency and empowerment of patients, is identical to the kind of debriefing that I am arguing for.

Having heard what I have heard from well-informed patient groups, I must beg to disagree. The reality of the CQC’s encounters and interviews with patients is an evidence-gathering process that is all too often skewed. Here are some of the comments from patients that have been relayed to me. “I know when we had a CQC visit, the nursing staff would steer CQC in the direction of patients who would reflect positively about the ward.” Someone else said: “A lot of the time, if you speak to the CQC, they will have staff present at the same time, so you can’t be honest”.

Patients have also expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the CQC’s monitoring process in general. I will share a couple of typical comments. “There’s been examples of where it took three to four years of the same consistent reports”—of a mental health unit—“for the CQC to eventually do something about it”. And again, “If this process”—of the CQC—“was working, young people would be having a much better experience”.

It has been put to me that one of the differences between the process adopted by the CQC and the debriefing process that my amendment proposes is that the CQC does not take an individualised approach to its monitoring. I am sure that the CQC is sincere in wanting to speak to people about their poor experience of hospital care, but, in practice, people say they have often felt dismissed when speaking about what they have experienced.

There is a wider point here as well. In the words of another patient: “De-briefing isn’t just complaining. It’s discussing and reflecting on events during admission and the patient’s experience in order to learn from it. A complaint is given and then dealt with behind the scenes, whereas a de-brief is a reflective discussion between multiple people where the young person is an active participant in discussing their own experience”. Another said: “It gives people the room to process things”.

In practice, the independent mental health advocate would take responsibility for the debriefing process. The Minister expressed concern about that and about the risk of overburdening those individuals. I appreciate that concern, but suggest that a conversation with a patient, or former patient, taking the form of a debriefing is squarely in line with the existing role of an independent mental health advocate. It would not be asking him or her to do appreciably more than they do already. As one patient put it:

“The IMHAs doing the de-briefing is already technically what they do, there just isn’t a formal name to the process … They don’t need any specific training to be able to manage the process as they already know what to do. They are there to advocate”


for them.

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I turn finally to Amendment 63. This would significantly change the tribunal’s role, which focuses currently on reviewing detention, not treatment decisions. The previous Administration consulted on a similar recommendation from the independent review, and noble Lords may recall that serious concerns were raised. The tribunal is not designed to deal with complex treatment disputes, which need specialist input and established therapeutic relationships between the patient and clinician. However, the emphasis on therapeutic benefit in the revised detention criteria will see that the tribunal pays particular attention to the patient’s care and treatment and whether it is proving effective, as part of discharge decisions. For these reasons, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken so powerfully in support of the amendments in this group. I also thank the Minister for her full reply. In the interests of time, I will not cover all the issues at length; however, I am grateful to the Minister for her welcome assurances on my Amendment 41. It is excellent news that the Government will be taking forward my plea to strengthen the provisions around advance choice documents when the Bill reaches the other place.

On nasogastric feeding, I was glad to hear that discussions would be taken forward with the professions in the mental health sector. I hope that the Law Society’s concerns will be taken into account in those discussions.

Finally, I must express some disappointment at the Minister’s reply about the idea of a debriefing process for patients after leaving hospital. We cannot be sure that the work of Dr Dash will deliver progress in this area, and I still feel that the case I tried to put is strong. I will reflect on what the Minister said, but I reserve the right to test the opinion of the House when Amendment 37 is reached. For now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 12.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

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[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for detailing very clearly the Government’s amendments. I also thank the Minister, who I see in her place, for, again, a very collaborative approach and for, on this occasion, implementing exactly not just what was in my previous amendment, so ably moved by my noble friend Lady Tyler, but what came from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

On the use of ECT, the powers in the government amendments before the House mean that the balance is absolutely correct on not having the second doctor’s signature and consent, as well as on the need to save life and the use of ECT. I thank the Government sincerely for not just listening but acting on the concerns that were around.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, the House will be grateful to the Minister for these government amendments, which, as the noble Baroness made clear, cover two principal policy issues. Accordingly, I have two sets of queries.

On the changes for the rules for authorising electroconvulsive therapy, I am sure it is not the Government’s intention in any way to water down the safeguards surrounding the administering of ECT. However, in relation to Amendments 16 and 17, taken together, can the Minister reassure me? The Bill, as modified by the proposed amendments, will posit that there could be circumstances in which a patient who has the capacity to consent to ECT but who has not consented to it could nevertheless find their refusal to treatment overridden by the decision of a single treating clinician. Even in a situation where the judgment of the clinician was that ECT was necessary to save the patient’s life, it seems to me a significant change from the current rule whereby the decision of a second opinion appointed doctor is required in all cases where it is proposed to administer ECT to a non-consenting patient who has the capacity to consent.

Amendment 17 makes it clear that the regulatory authority—the CQC, in other words—may give permission for ECT to be administered only on the say-so of a single doctor where a SOAD is not available and “exceptional circumstances” apply. I will not ask the Minister to define what “exceptional circumstances” might consist of, but it is to be assumed that a primary example of such circumstances might be when time was of the essence and no SOAD could be located soon enough to avoid exacerbating the risk of harm or death.

So my questions are, firstly, has this proposed change been prompted by a general awareness across the mental health sector that the availability of SOADs can frequently prove a problem in circumstances where urgent decisions are needed? In other words, to put it bluntly, are we being asked to change the law because of habitual shortcomings in NHS communication arrangements? I would be concerned if that were the case.

Secondly, what guidance, if any, will the CQC formulate for itself to ensure that, when its decision is sought to temporarily waive the requirement for a SOAD, it will not do so just on the basis of a SOAD being unavailable? Will it also commit itself to a standard procedure whereby it will seek at least some background detail from the treating clinician of the case before him or her, such as the reasons why they consider that administering ECT to that particular patient carries particular urgency? In other words, can we be reassured that the treating clinician’s opinion will be subject to at least a modicum of testing and cross-questioning before the CQC issues the go-ahead for ECT to be administered? I hope so, because anything short of that could turn into a tick-box exercise.

The other government amendment on which I would appreciate further clarity is Amendment 26, which

“changes the process for appointing a nominated person”.

One of the changes proposed is that the various statements and signatures required for appointing the nominated person no longer have to be contained in the same instrument. The other is that the nominated person’s signature no longer has to be witnessed. I was grateful for the Minister’s explanation, but it implies that the written instrument that appoints the nominated person and is signed by the patient in the presence of a witness can be executed without the nominated person themselves being in the room, or indeed anywhere near. At the moment, the Bill says:

“The instrument appointing the nominated person must … contain a statement, signed by the nominated person in the presence of”


the same person who witnesses the signature of the patient.

I previously assumed that the reason for that provision was the responsibility that the Bill places on the witness—quite a serious responsibility—to ensure, as far as possible, that the nominated person, whoever they are, is a fit and proper person to act in that capacity. It would appear now, with this amendment, that there is no need for the witness even to clap eyes on the individual who is nominated. How can that be right? Without at least meeting the nominated person, how can any self-respecting witness certify, hand on heart, that, in the words of the Bill, they have

“no reason to think that the nominated person lacks capacity or competence to act as a nominated person,”

or that they have

“no reason to think that the nominated person is unsuitable to act as a nominated person”.

Are they simply meant to take the patient’s word for it?

This alteration in the wording raises all sorts of question marks in my mind, given the concerns expressed by noble Lords in Committee about misplaced loyalty towards a particular individual, a naivety on the part of a child or young person, or even some degree of psychological manipulation of a young person—for example, someone who makes it their business to set a child against their own parents.

In Committee, the Minister herself emphasised the need for the law to prevent exploitation and manipulation. While I did not at the time think that her response was completely reassuring, I saw it at least as an acknowledgement that the role of the witness could not be fulfilled properly without some sort of contact with the nominated person. Was I right or wrong on that? It would be helpful if the Minister could explain how my misgivings in this area, about the way in which the nominated person procedure comes to be implemented in practice, might be allayed.

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, for his comments and express my thanks also for the many contributions made by noble Lords around the House.

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, asked some searching questions. I think the main thrust of his comments was to look for reassurance that due diligence will be gone into in all of the areas that he raises. I am not sure that I can answer every line in detail, but I want to reassure him in particular about the nominated person question, which I know has caused him enormous concern.

In addition to what I have said, I emphasise that there is no intention at all to water down the safeguard, and that Amendment 26 will make sure that patients get access to a nominated person quicker, along with all the rights and powers that entails, meaning that safeguards provided by the role will not be delayed. That is the crucial point that we have to factor in as to why these amendments are deemed necessary. As he quite rightly says, this is particularly important for patients and those who may be subject to out-of-area placements.

The change that we are bringing in is that the nominated person’s signature does not need to be witnessed in person. None of the safeguarding checks is changed in any way by this. In answer to the noble Lord’s concern, we would expect that, in the majority of cases, the witness will still meet the nominated person face to face. In exceptional circumstances, where this is not possible, we believe that it is better to be able to appoint a nominated person, subject to all the appropriate safeguarding checks, than to have to wait until a person can have their signature witnessed.

A second opinion doctor is not currently required for urgent and compulsory electroconvulsive therapy; this is new under the Bill. I need to emphasise this point. What the amendment does is sets out the exceptional circumstances where a second opinion appointed doctor—sorry, it is a bit of a mouthful—is not required. I hope that gives some clarification.

We have to make sure that these are all taken in the round. I reassure the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and noble Lords across the Chamber, that many of these are regarded to be due to exceptional circumstances, where time is of the essence.

As to whether some of these provisions are based on failure, it is from learned experience and bringing together everyone who has a view to make sure that everything we bring forward is in the best interests of the patient. That is the crucial thing. This is where the detailed work will be done under the code of practice, bringing together all the different parties in a measured way. It will take a few months to do this. That is critical, so that we can all be reassured that the processes are brought into play.

I can understand the concern about making sure that communication is there in situations of stress, but I believe that these amendments are designed to address this issue, with, as I have said, the patient’s interest absolutely in the forefront. There will be opportunities as the code of practice is put together for us to make sure that our endeavours are followed, bringing the best opinion together with the best interest of the patients.

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment and, in particular, what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has said. He has considerable experience of the county court, which I do not have, excepting when I used to appear before it.

What concerns me is that, if a case is sent to the county court, to a judge who is not a family judge, there will be considerable difficulties for that judge. I support the idea that it should be either the mental health tribunal or—as I would prefer, and as the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has suggested—the Court of Protection. The judges of the Court of Protection are judges of the High Court, Family Division, of which I was president. That would be the right court. If it is said by the Government that they are not prepared to move on this issue, and I suspect they might not be, could they at least put in the court code of practice that, if it is sent to the county court, it will be dealt with by a family judge in the county court? The county court sits also as a family court. That would at least ameliorate the situation.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in this group tabled by my noble friend Lady Berridge, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, whose last suggestion I hope will be listened to by the Minister.

I must commend my noble friend for her tenacity with this issue. As she has outlined, there is a significant concern that the use of the county courts to decide on matters pertaining to the termination of nominated persons is not the most appropriate process. I do hope that the Minister will give my noble friend words to her comfort.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for her Amendments 24, 28 and 35. They would mean that the mental health tribunal, rather than the county court, handled the termination of appointment of the nominated person. The county court already has a role in displacing the nearest relative. It has the expertise, procedural tools and legal framework to handle sensitive disputes involving external parties, such as conflicts of interest or allegations of abuse. The First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) in England and the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales are focused on reviewing detention under the Mental Health Act. This would add an additional burden on the tribunal, risking undermining its core function and delaying detention reviews.

The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, raised the issue of legal aid. County court mental health cases are largely limited to applications for the displacement of a nearest relative. Legal aid is currently available to a person seeking the displacement of the nearest relative, except where the person bringing that application is doing so in a professional capacity and to the nearest relative themselves. That would also apply for the nominated person, which will replace the nearest relative.

Legal representation is available where the applicant meets the means test, unless they are under 18, and the relevant merits criteria. If there are any further points of clarification, I will be pleased to make them to any noble Lords who have raised points today, including the noble Baroness.

As we do not feel that the mental health tribunal is the right place for what I was referring to before I went on to legal aid, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Earl Howe]

37: After Clause 33, insert the following new Clause—
“Ascertaining and learning from patients’ experiences of hospital treatmentAfter section 23 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (discharge of patients) insert—“23A Ascertaining and learning from patients’ experiences of hospital treatment(1) A patient who has been detained under this Part of this Act must, within 30 days of their discharge, be offered a consultation with an independent mental health advocate to review their experiences of hospital treatment.(2) A report from any consultation undertaken pursuant to subsection (1) shall be produced by the independent mental health advocate in partnership with the patient.(3) The report referred to in subsection (2) shall be provided to the managers of the hospital within 14 days of its completion.(4) The managers of the hospital shall publish each year a report setting out what they have learned from patients’ experiences at the hospital, and the actions they have taken.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would mandate the de-briefing of mental health patients after they have left hospital.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the Minister’s reply to the proposal that I made to give mental health patients an automatic opportunity to avail of a debriefing process after leaving hospital, in the interests of patient empowerment and greater transparency for the system generally. I am afraid that I nevertheless wish to test the opinion of the House.