Mental Health Bill [HL]

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 27th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, I too support the aim behind Clause 35, which is to ensure the speedy access to specialist mental health support for people in prison. Like the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, I also think that there is great merit in his Amendment 163A, which seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State produce statutory guidance on the definition of what will count as exceptional circumstances for the reasons that the noble Lord has given.

The Explanatory Notes give examples of what might count as an exceptional circumstance where the 28-day standard would not apply: prison riots, hospital floods or exceptional clinical reasons. Those are three examples, but it would be good to see more precision on this question because, as the Government’s Delegated Powers Memorandum says, the meanings of these words will be litigated. They will show up in judicial review and private law action. Therefore, the clearer the Government are prospectively, the less frictional cost and time there will be through the justice system and health system in giving effect to the new standards that are set out here in what hopefully will become the Act.

However, having supported the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, on that amendment, I will disappoint him now by just injecting a note of caution on his Amendment 96B. As we have just heard, it would leave out “seek to” in respect of delivering on the 28-day standard; excising those words, as he said, would in effect make it an overarching requirement—a “must”—even if there is a shortage of hospital accommodation or no staff available.

If the thought behind this is that the principal drivers of delays are essentially administrative processes then a “must” on 28 days can, in a sense, be given effect without a downside. But I wonder whether we actually have sufficient evidence to know that that is the root cause of such delays as occur. As I understand it, about four-fifths of the transfers from prisons to our specialist mental health facilities in the first half of the current financial year were to psychiatric medium-secure units and psychiatric intensive care, both of which are in very high demand and incredibly expensive resources, with highly constrained supply.

The impact assessment rather glosses over this question. When describing whether this new standard for transfers to hospital from prisons might introduce additional cost, it says at paragraph 169:

“Costs for the measure have not been monetised because they are principally driven by wider systematic changes which are supported by the legislation”—


that is, its administrative friction. It goes on to say something which I do not quite understand. I would be grateful if the Minister could interpret for us what the department meant when it wrote that an additional reason the costs were not being monetised was to ensure that

“resources are available to achieve transfers within the time limit in a greater proportion of cases”.

What are these “resources available to achieve transfers”? Are they additional or substitute resources? What is the scale of them? What was meant in the drafting of that paragraph?

My hypothesis is that this is not just about administrative friction. It is actually due to constraints on the supply in expensive and specialised mental health services, and therefore the unintended consequence of mandating, through excising “seek to” and making 28 days a trump card for people coming from prisons, would be one of three consequences.

Prisoners with severe mental health needs would find themselves in unsafe and poorly staffed facilities; or, by virtue of being in prison, you would displace a non-prison-based mental health patient who might have higher needs, as that is what the statute requires; or, under the Clause 49 powers, you would, effectively, see the Department of Health using the Henry VIII power, which it has in this Bill, to quickly rewrite 28 days and make it 180—or something else—because, as the delegated powers memo said, it might do so in that circumstance

“where insufficient beds are available to meet demand over a sustained period of time”.

For all those reasons, there may be unintended consequences of Amendment 96B which require further scrutiny.

However, in the spirit of wanting to make this work practically, I have laid down Amendments 97 and 98, which, essentially, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, look to reciprocate the 28-day requirement. If you are aiming to get prisoners transferred to mental health facilities in 28 days or, similarly, when their treatment is complete, one should expect that the Prison Service or Immigration Service will ensure the return the prison estate to free up those scarce and specialist beds for other prisoners or patients who require treatment.

In a way, my amendment is a very gentle one. All I suggest is that if there are people stuck in specialist mental health beds who ought to be being returned to prison, that would constitute an exceptional reason for being unable to accept new intakes of prisoners being transferred. The reason this is such a gentle amendment is, of course, that the Government pray in aid the June 2021 best practice guidance for the transfers, which says that, although it should be a 28-day standard for moving from prison to mental health facility, it should be 14 days if moving back the other way to free up the bed. I have not proposed a 14-day requirement on the Prison Service, just the reciprocal 28 days, so, in that spirit of joint working, I hope these amendments will find wide support.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, briefly, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, as opposed to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, on the “seek to” question. When I read Clause 35, I was very excited about what it promised; I thought that, at last, this was being taken seriously. I talked to a range of people who worked in criminal justice, and they said: “Oh, it is not going to happen; what are you excited about?”—they just did not believe it. At Second Reading, I cited Richard Garside from the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies saying that Clause 35

“while welcome, feels aspirational rather than practically implementable in the current system”.”.—[Official Report, 25/11/24; col. 549.]

I started to look at it again and thought that the danger for those of us who are following this debate is that we get bought off by this aspiration, and that, in practical terms, it will not mean what we all thought it was meant to. I am quite keen that we toughen up the statutory requirements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

My Lords, I also support Amendment 151 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Whether such reporting should be specifically confined to community mental health services or be more expansive than that is obviously for debate. Whether it should be bi-annual or more frequently, or once a Parliament, does not really matter. The point is to try to continue to put a spotlight on the gap between need and availability in mental health when, for all the reasons that we have talked about, there is sometimes a tendency to downplay that aspect of health and what the health service does.

As the noble Baroness said, if we cast our minds back to last Wednesday when we had that debate about whether the apparent increase in demand for children and young people’s mental health services was real or not, it was paradoxical that, later that evening, the embargo dropped on the Lancet Child & Adolescent Health paper on mental health. It showed that there had been a genuine and unparalleled increase, particularly in younger women’s needs for specialist eating disorder services. Having young people who are severely ill is not an artefact of culture.

Having those kinds of data brought together in one place and published with the imprimatur of the Government would be helpful, rather than as a sort of periodic post-election exercise of the sort that the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, provided. He, of course, also drew attention to the gap that exists between need and the availability of mental health services. I think he used a figure from April 2024 to point out there were more than a million people waiting for mental health, learning disability and/or autism services, of whom 345,000 referrals had waited longer than a year and 109,000 of those were for children and young people under the age of 18. There is a real gap here and a need to continue to put the spotlight on it, to mobilise attention and resource. I welcome the spirit behind Amendment 151.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have spoken a lot about the dangers of medicalising ordinary life and giving it a mental health label. The contribution I made in the previous Committee day on ADHD managed to get picked up by newspapers and generally cited as, “Cruel Baroness hates everybody that says they have ADHD”, so I have become even more infamous.

I welcome the call by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for a review, because the more information and data we have about what is available in the community, the better. My only word of caution is that we should also recognise that, although we need more data, sometimes that data can be used as part of an advocacy for more resources and that data can be unreliable. My only caveat is that whatever the review does, it should not just take superficial headlines or self-diagnosis and self-ID as the truth, and that we should have some scepticism in that regard. We are going to have to understand the implications of this Bill when it is enacted for community care and provision. Therefore, I would welcome any attempt at getting to grips with the reality of that.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I briefly want to support Amendment 151 in the context of the delays experienced by CAMHS—delays in obtaining appointments and assessments, and in getting treatment. When I last had to look at this, only recently, those delays were still very serious. They are distressing for the children concerned and for their parents. They are also frustrating for local authorities, social workers and the courts, which need to make informed decisions but are unable to do so because they are still waiting to understand what CAMHS have to say about a particular child’s problems.