Mental Health Bill [HL]

Baroness Tyler of Enfield Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Lords Chamber

There could, of course, be circumstances in which two clinicians might conclude in good faith that a patient’s express wishes should be overwritten—for example, where there was a doubt over the bona fides of the patient’s nominated person. But the point of the amendment is to add an extra layer to patient autonomy when the morale and mental equilibrium of the patient is so very shaky. I hope the Minister can provide some words of reassurance on these very troubling and sensitive matters. I beg to move.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendments 50 and 51 are both about the importance of non-drug-based interventions. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, this group is all about maximising therapeutic benefit. I am very supportive of all the amendments in this group and my amendments are complementary to those just introduced very powerfully by the noble Earl.

I am the first to admit that I am not a clinician, and it is, of course, vital that individual decisions about treatment are made by qualified clinicians. But I am firmly of the view that, in the right circumstances and where clinically appropriate, non-drug-based interventions can be highly beneficial.

New Section 56A establishes a clinical checklist. An approved clinician will be required to go through this checklist when making treatment decisions to ensure that any given treatment is appropriate. Amendment 50 would make it clear that non-drug-based interventions are included in the alternative forms of medical treatment available, which must be identified and evaluated as part of the checklist. In short, it will establish beyond doubt that clinicians must consider and evaluate the use of non-drug-based interventions when they make decisions about treatment.

Non-drug-based interventions can cover many things, such as psychological and talking therapies, counselling, occupational therapies, art and creative therapies, physical exercise, physical activities—the list goes on. It is vital that evidence-based non-drug-based interventions are thought about, identified and considered equally when treatment decisions are made.

As I said in our discussions on Monday—this point was also just made in the introduction to this group—autistic people and people with a learning disability are too often overmedicated in hospital settings. Again, although medication may be appropriate in many places, people cannot and should not be left on their wards with little to no other meaningful therapeutic input other than that medication.

People must be seen as human beings in the round when these treatment decisions are made. That should be reflected in the type of treatment offered, including non-drug-based interventions, such as talking therapies, which are adapted to the individual and have a real prospect of offering therapeutic benefit, either in place of or in addition to medication. I readily acknowledge that treatment can involve either. That judgment is for a clinician to make.

I was very encouraged that the Joint Committee on the Bill recognised in its report the importance of non-drug-based treatment and recommended that the code of practice makes clear that appropriate treatment includes non-drug-based treatment. However, to ensure the Bill aligns with the principle of therapeutic benefit, it is important that this emphasis on non-drug-based interventions is reflected in the Bill.

It is well known that the transition from children’s services to adult services can be particularly difficult when it comes to overmedication and failing to adequately deliver non-drug-based interventions. This has included cases where young autistic people on children’s wards have been provided with some level of speech and language therapy, arts and crafts, and general help with establishing a routine. However, when the transition is made to post-18 adult services, the quality of care can drop off markedly, with no non-drug-based therapeutic treatment delivered, leading to a decline in well-being. In many ways, as has already been said, this is little different from being held in a cell.

Having a wide range of these interventions means that in-patients can have greater choice and control over their care—another key principle of the Bill. The use of non-drug-based therapies in hospital is important, not only to provide a therapeutically beneficial environment during detention but to ensure some essential continuity of support after discharge.

My Amendment 51 differs from Amendment 50 in that it would apply only to autistic people and those with a learning disability detained under Part III. It would ensure that the clinical checklist is followed when treatment decisions are made when making those decisions includes specific consideration of whether non-drug-based interventions are more appropriate in place of, or in addition to, medication.

As we have already discussed, one of the most significant changes in this Bill is the change to the detention criteria in Part II, Section 3. This means that autistic people or people with a learning disability cannot be detained under Section 3 unless they had a co-existing psychiatric disorder. However, this is not being applied to Part III patients—that is, those detained through the criminal justice system. This means that autistic people and people with a learning disability can continue to be detained for “treatment” in mental health hospitals under Part III, even if they do not have co-existing psychiatric disorders. One of the concerns about the Bill, as we have heard, is that a consequence of poor implementation could mean that more autistic people and people with a learning disability are diverted into the criminal justice pathway to get round, frankly, the new detention criteria for Section 3.

It could well be the case that Part II patients who are autistic or have a learning disability will exhibit behaviours that challenge, for which certain psychotropic medications can be prescribed. These medications can include anti-depressants, anti-seizure or anti-psychotic medications, sedatives or stimulants. NHS England’s website states:

“People with a learning disability are thought to be 16 times more likely and autistic people 7 times more likely to be prescribed an antipsychotic than the general population”,


despite existing guidance that people should be given psychotropic medication for only the right reasons, in the lowest dose and for the shortest time.

I simply conclude by saying that the focus on non-drug-based interventions in these amendments is not about saying that medication should not be used. Indeed, it can be highly beneficial in many cases. It is about ensuring that other factors that contribute to therapeutic benefit are always considered and put on an equal footing.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield]

55: Clause 19, page 28, line 27, at end insert—
“(7) In section 24 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Advance decisions to refuse treatment: general), after subsection (5), insert—“(6) For an “Advance decision” in relation to a treatment for a mental disorder under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, a person may make a decision once they have reached 16.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment extends advance decisions to those who are 16 and over.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55 I will speak to Amendment 136; both are in my name. This is another very important group, about children and young people’s competence and decision-making. Amendment 55 is about extending advanced decisions to those who are aged 16 and over. I recognise that there is also an important amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about advanced decisions—a similar issue, but perhaps taking a different approach.

The Bill will give legal weight to advance decisions within the Mental Health Act, which I very much welcome. Adults will be able to record their advance refusal of a particular treatment if they lose capacity. An advance decision will have the same effect as a refusal of treatment made with capacity and will ensure that the individual can access enhanced safeguards before the treatment can be given. Although advance choice documents, where advance decisions will be recorded, will be available to adults of all ages, the Bill as drafted does not permit under-18s to make advance decisions. As such, someone aged under 18 could say in an advance choice document that they refuse a particular treatment if they would not want it, but that would have limited weight. Specifically, it would mean that, if the child or young person lacked capacity or competence to consent to treatment when it was offered, their advance refusal would not give them access to the enhanced treatment safeguards that are available to adults, including tribunal appeal.

This means that, rather than being on an equal footing, children and young people would be disadvantaged compared with adults. Therefore, I see this very much as part of parity of treatment between children and adults. I am strongly of the view that the safeguards that flow from advance refusals of treatment should also be made available to young people. This is what my Amendment 55 is designed to do.

I add one more general point. We still have work to do in Committee to strengthen safeguards and protections for children and young people in mental health in-patient care. There should be a general principle of parity of treatment between children and young people and adults. Of course I recognise that some distinctions have to be made due to the legal status of under-18s, but I said at Second Reading, and it remains my view, that this Bill was never really designed with children and young people in mind, yet it can affect them greatly. In responding, can the Minister set out how much input DfE Ministers and officials have had on the drafting of the Bill?

It will probably help if I explain that Amendment 136 is closely related to Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, whom I have had the opportunity of corresponding with. I do not want, in speaking first, to pre-empt what the noble Lord will say, but I need to reference his amendment to explain mine. I share the concern that the Bill does not include a test to determine the ability of children under the age of 16 to make decisions—in other words, whether they are competent. Without such a test, this age group will not be able to benefit fully from the rights and safeguards included in the Bill; the question is how we best get there.

Under-16s are currently at a disadvantage. Whereas all those aged 16 and over are presumed to have capacity to make decisions for themselves unless evidence shows otherwise—in which case the Mental Capacity Act kicks in—under-16s are presumed to be unable to make decisions for themselves unless they demonstrate that they are competent to do so. There is also no clear and consistent approach for determining whether a child is competent. Although the concept of competence is generally understood, how to assess a child’s competence is not.

That is why I have a lot of sympathy with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, which would insert a test for determining the ability of someone aged under 16 to make decisions under this legislation. His amendment explicitly limits this test to decisions made under the mental health legislation and is explicitly focused on the criteria with which to determine whether a child is competent. No doubt he will explain his amendment far more eloquently than I could ever do. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to review whether a statutory test for under-16s would be expedient for the purpose of this Act and for mental health legislation more generally. It is very much a stepping stone towards that position and, I hope, supports change in this area.

Such a review is important because it could address some of the concerns that have been expressed in this area. It could include whether such a test should be in the Bill or in a code, how best to make it clear that a test will be specific to the scope of legislation rather than having wider application, and how such a test would help with the successful implementation of the Bill. It could help to establish that the test is specific to whether a particular child can make a particular decision at a particular time, and set out what information is required.

I am aware that, in some of our broader discussions, concerns have been raised about the possible unintended consequences of such a test in relation both to parental responsibility and to a child being seen as Gillick competent—that is, they have the ability to understand the decision. I feel that a review would be helpful in looking at these issues and addressing those concerns head-on. In that way, we would make important steps in ensuring that the whole of the mental health reforms work properly and fairly for all children and young people. I beg to move.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness has just said, my Amendment 147, which deals with competence and decision-making, would provide what I suggest is a necessary statutory test to determine the decision-making competence of children under 16 years of age in all matters under this legislation for which such a determination is required. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill pointed out, echoing what was said in the independent review of the 1983 Act, that attempts both to protect and to empower children have produced a complex mixture of statute and case law with no single method of assessment and no consistent criteria to establish either capacity or competence. This is a particular disadvantage for children and young people, who do not have the benefit of any statutory presumption of competence such as that which applies to adults.

Importantly, the amendment, although offering a test, does not create any presumption of capacity in a child. Moreover, the reason for the child’s inability to decide is irrelevant. It would, however, require that those determining whether a child is competent must give reasonable grounds for reaching that conclusion. It is important to emphasise that this amendment is concerned only with how to assess whether a child is competent and not with the consequences of any determination that a child is competent.

This Bill has been produced with numerous references to capacity and/or competence in various contexts, including consent to CETR meetings, “disclosure of information”, “consent to treatment”, making advance choice decisions,

“terminating the appointment of a nominated person”

and involving “mental health advocates”. However, the Bill is currently silent on what is meant by “competence” and how it should be determined.

The existing statutory test in the Mental Capacity Act does not apply to those under 16. The separate concept of Gillick competence—it is derived from the pivotal case of that name, decided in 1986—requires inherently subjective assessments of the child’s understanding and maturity. I speak with some experience of having to decide whether or not a child is competent to participate independently in court proceedings concerning them. That exercise sometimes feels rather paternalistic and is, as has been pointed out, really subjective, with the test in Gillick offering no guidance on the extent to which adjustment should be made for factors such as peer pressure, drug and substance abuse, family stress, emotional disturbance or illness.

More recent case law shows that the Mental Capacity Act can be used to inform an assessment of child competence, but it is not mandatory to do so. The factors set out in this amendment to indicate a child’s ability to decide are the features carefully identified by Mr Justice Cobb, as he then was, in a case decided in 2017 concerning the difficult question of whether or not a girl under 16 had the capacity to consent to her child being adopted.

I therefore suggest that there is now a need for clearer and more rigorous guidelines—structured guidelines that are not just mechanistic checklists—for mental health and legal professionals to work with. The assessments that have to be made of a child’s ability to understand and weigh relevant information need to be decision-specific, child-specific and time-specific, and they have to recognise that competence can fluctuate as well as evolve. These are not straightforward assessments and are certainly not a mere formality.

A statutory test would be welcomed by practitioners and the courts. This is too important to be left to the code of practice; such codes are intended to reflect and supplement the law, not to create law. A clear test in the statute would only be of assistance to practitioners and would allow children to benefit from the safeguards within the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

I can assure noble Lords that we will keep an eye on this but we do not, in all honesty, intend to open this issue in the immediate term, given the broad application in a range of settings, and the wider sensitivity around matters relating to the ability of children to make decisions in relation to healthcare, care and education. We will consult on the guidance for assessing competence in mental health settings in the revised code of practice. With this, I hope noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that response. One thing we can all agree on from this discussion is that these are complex issues and people sometimes have rather different understandings of what certain things might say or mean.

Having said that, I would just like to say where I think we are on the two issues. First, on advanced decisions, I have a strong view that children and young people aged 16 and 17 should have choices that are made available to adults extended to them. As I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said, it is about having a sense of agency and autonomy and feeling that their wishes and feelings are being respected. It may be that I did not draft it very well, but I was not suggesting that everyone was going to be forced to do it. It is there as an option, and that is a really important point that possibly did not come out sufficiently in the debate. The fault for that is mine. It may be that the approach that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, was suggesting is a better way forward. I do not know; I do not mind. I just feel that, because to me this is so fundamental and a question of human rights, we will need to return to this on Report.

I turn with some trepidation now to the statutory competence test for under-16s. I have been accused of being too cautious. That is fine. I understand where noble Lords were coming from. I did not say it when I introduced it, because I thought it would be a bit to odd to say it, but I was seeing my amendment as a bit of a backstop. In other words, if the Government are not minded to accept that recommendation, at least something would happen and at least there would be some sort of progress. As I said, I was very sympathetic to the test and the way that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, set it out. It had a fair amount of support, of course, across the Chamber, but the debate also showed that there are still some quite tricky issues that need to be teased out. I do not think it was quite as clear-cut as perhaps was being suggested, not least about issues around the consistency or otherwise of the application of Gillick.

It may be that, again, I did not get the wording right when I talked about a “review”. I accept that. Reviews can be kicked into the long grass and you never see anything again. But I thought the idea of a consultation was very important and, in fact, I think it would be quite difficult, having listened to this debate carefully, to move straight to having something in the Bill without having some sort of consultation first. It might be that you would want to take some sort of powers that would enable such a thing to be put in place after that consultation had happened, but to me it just felt that some issues still needed to be teased out.

Perhaps my initial amendment was not completely ludicrous, but it has been a really good and interesting debate—

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

Probing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

Probing, absolutely. Thank you. And again, on this issue I sense that we will be returning on Report. But, having said those things, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this debate and thank the Minister for her responses. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I do not want to prolong this, but I have to say that, although I am disappointed and a little surprised by the response from the Government, the intention is to align the Mental Capacity Act and Gillick. It is frankly not correct, if I understand the situation, to say that it is not based on case law. I referred to a specific case in which the judge formulated, essentially, the test that appears in my amendment. As I say, I do not want to prolong this but, if necessary, I can refer the Government to that case.