Mental Health Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Berridge
Main Page: Baroness Berridge (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Berridge's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest as an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, but without any qualifications, unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. For the reasons that have already been given, I entirely agree with the whole group of amendments, which have been proposed so much better than I could do—so I do not propose to say any more.
In supporting Amendment 1, I am delighted that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, began Committee with this focus on the impact of the Mental Health Act on racialised communities, because that is where this whole journey began, with the noble Baroness, Lady May, when she was Prime Minister, announcing it in that context—and then, of course, it became a wider reform of the whole Act.
I served on your Lordships’ Joint Committee with the other place, scrutinising the Bill. In the course of that, I became aware of the relative strengths of civil society among some of the groups. There were excellent civil society groups speaking on behalf of people with learning disabilities and autism; they were highly professional and articulate. We had one evidence session on the effect of the Mental Health Act on racialised communities, but I saw that the strength of civil society and of media coverage in that area was less—so I am sympathetic to Amendment 1, which would give a profile to one of the main issues under the legislation.
On whether the table should be in the Bill to be in the code or in the Bill sitting as primary legislation, I have sympathy for that proposition. We have learned that the code of practice merely reflects primary legislation. I am aware, of course, that the independent review came up with those four principles, and this fifth one was not part of that. I expect to hear the Minister say that it is already in the Equality Act, so we do not need to put it in the Bill—but I am persuaded of the merits of the amendment. During the whole process of an independent review, a White Paper, a response to a White Paper, a draft Bill, a Joint Committee and now the Bill before your Lordships’ Committee, it has become clear to me that many of the changes that ethnic minority communities need to see are in practice. They are in resources and training—people would not look to the Bill and see their needs as the first or an important priority in it. I would be grateful if the Minister would take seriously this consideration of putting this equity principle in the table and putting it in the Bill, full stop, and not within the code.
I begin by thanking all noble Lords who spoke to this first group of amendments in Committee. Before I comment, I refer noble Lords to my interests as set out in the register. I am not an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, noble Lords will be relieved to know, but I should mention my previous work with a couple of think tanks—the Institute of Economic Affairs and Politeia, which have both published on health and social care issues. There is also my work at St Mary’s University, where I am a professor of politics and international relations, and which has recently applied to open a new medical school. I also sit unpaid on the advisory board of a start-up coalition, and I know that there are a number of start-up companies helping people with mental health conditions. I just wanted to cover those interests, in case anyone made any accusations.
This group addresses the principles that will guide the application of the Mental Health Act, as set out in the Wessely review. Sir Simon pointed out, rightly, that there are already guiding principles in the code of practice, but that
“there is limited awareness of these, and it seems very likely that they do not inform practice in the way they should”.
Clearly, as noble Lords said at Second Reading, the important aim of including the four principles is to improve their application and ensure the highest level of care and therapeutic benefit for patients, while ensuring that all patients are treated as individuals.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for her Amendment 1. Of course, equity is at the heart of the Bill, as my noble friend Lady Berridge just said. The Wessely review was commissioned by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead with the intention of understanding why a disproportionate number of black people were being detained and receiving community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act. I think all noble Lords welcome the idea of including equity in principle, as long as it then feeds through into practice. That is the key here, and my question for the Minister is: would putting the principle in the Bill make a difference to practice? How do we make sure that it makes a difference to practice, rather than simply adding the words or adding the principle? One of the values in the NHS constitution is that “everyone counts”. Does this equality duty go further than that, and would it have a greater practical significance? That is one of the questions we need to dig out and probe the Government on.
The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, makes an interesting observation with her Amendment 3. The principles were included in the Bill, as the Wessely review argued, to improve clinical practice. This is vital, because we know that the Mental Health Act is the legislation that is used to compel detention in hospital for treatment. This may very well raise awareness of the principles, but once again, how do we make sure that this is applied? We have to keep pushing this point, although I will not repeat it again, of making sure that this gets fed in to practice in the clinical setting.
I also note the amendments in this group of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. I will not repeat the statistics that she read out about the impact of the lack of or inappropriate support for people with mental health issues or learning difficulties. Of course, it is not difficult to appreciate the complexities. Someone in my close family worked with speech and language therapists in his youth, and I could see the difference it made. It is almost too obvious to say, but how do you get your needs across if you cannot communicate them, or your needs are not understood by the person who is supposed to be offering treatment? As the noble Lord, Lord Patel, mentioned, this is included in the Explanatory Notes, but how do we make sure that it gets into the Bill and into practice? Obviously, it is a problem that is acknowledged by the Government, or it would not be in the Explanatory Notes, but why have the Government chosen not to go any further on this issue?
I was very struck by what the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said about Amendment 49 and her concerns. Will the Minister address that debate? Of course, we all want to make sure that patients feel that they are understood. We know that patients have to be supported as much as possible to make sure they get their point across and that they are understood, in order to give them adequate treatment, but I noted the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, even though the noble Lord, Lord Patel, intervened. Have the Government taken a view on this or does the Minister need to write to us? I look forward to her comments.
I thank noble Lords for their interventions, for which I am grateful. They give me the opportunity to say now what perhaps I should have said at the outset: I will of course reflect on all the points that are raised as we move forward. I will be honest and say that I am not sure that what I am about to say will do justice to the points that have been raised. Overall, the real concern is about making very complex legislation even more complex. We are wrestling with our attempt to update the Mental Health Act—we are not starting from scratch. That is the point I would like to like to move on to.
The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, raised a comparative point about the Mental Capacity Act and asked why, if that could include principles, it is not possible for the Mental Health Bill to. To extend what I have just said, it is because the Mental Capacity Act was structured around principles from the outset when it was drafted and did not have to meet the challenge that we are trying to debate today. As I said, we are currently looking at amending the existing Mental Health Act, which has not been designed or structured around statutory principles. In my language, I would say that we are starting from an entirely different place.
I hate to interrupt the Minister’s flow, but we are going to come back to the code of practice again and again. Can she outline whether we will get to see a draft of that code? If the argument from the Government is that it needs to be in the code and not on the statute, it would be very helpful to see a draft code of practice before Report, at the very latest.
Those of us who were here in 2006 listened to the Minister’s predecessor at the Dispatch Box making pretty much the same speech that she has made now, and nothing has changed in the meantime. We are trying to do what we can to make sure that we do not have the same situation for the next 20 years.
I take the point that the Mental Health Act 1983 was not built on principles. Does the Minister accept that it is time that we moved forward to a situation where both the Mental Health Bill and the Mental Capacity Act are built on principles, including that the people who are subject to them have rights to dignity and so on, as we have seen set out in different places, and that if they are not treated in that way they have the right to take people to court?
I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, has done in relation to this matter. This is a matter that we considered in great detail in the Joint Committee. I am grateful that that gives us the opportunity to discuss in the round the legal basis on which people are detained. The independent review did not recommend what is currently in the Bill, which is the removal of learning disabilities and autism from the Act. The Joint Committee’s report quotes it saying,
“the risk of completely removing learning disabilities and autism from the Act is too high”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, outlined one of the reasons for that, which is that if you remove the legal basis for detention under the Mental Health Act, then the bucket that these individuals and patients would fall into without Amendment 5 would be the Mental Capacity Act.
In the consideration by the Joint Committee, there is the other danger that—when there is no co-occurring mental health condition—you end up with people coming through the criminal justice system, instead of being detained under the Mental Health Act. That is the worst of all the evils we could be discussing here today and would be completely inappropriate.
I would be grateful if the Minister will ensure two things when we know that these are dangers: first, an increase in diagnoses of co-occurring mental health conditions to use the Mental Health Act; and, secondly, an increase in the use of the Part III criminal justice provisions. It is important that we know the exact statistics for the group with learning disabilities and autism before implementation of the Act. Then we would know whether the Act has caused an increase in diagnoses of co-occurring mental health disorders and an increase in the use of the criminal justice system.
I believe that currently 39% of people detained with learning disabilities and autism are detained under Part III of the Act. I see the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, nodding. It is important that we remember that New Zealand tried this, removing learning disabilities and autism from its mental health legislation. I cannot remember whether it had the co-occurring mental health diagnosis provision, but, only a few years later, it had to amend the law, as it had caused an increased number of learning disabilities and autism patients to come in through the criminal justice system.
What would be the position if the Bill were amended in accordance with Amendment 5? The evidence that we received in Joint Committee was that there would be no patients—that community facilities would be at a level where they could not think of anybody who would need to be detained. I wish the world were thus, but the ideal world portrayed in that way does not exist. Even with the community facilities that we all wish to exist, it seems clear to me that there would be circumstances in which there would still be a need to detain.
I recognise that, in reality, we may see that increase in diagnoses of co-occurring disorders. Physicians may reach for that to protect someone—to detain them to get them treatment. However, it was made clear to us that 28 days is a relatively short time. You can be detained for assessment, but it can take many days to get the level of distress down—I do not want or like to use the word “meltdown”—to assess the mental health of the person and whether there is a co-occurring disorder.
The Joint Committee came up with a special exceptional tribunal that would still allow the Mental Health Act to be used in that small number of cases—once community facilities are as we would like them to be—to continue detention. Why? For the reasons outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning: the protections under the Mental Health Act are much greater. You have the nominated person, you can go to the Mental Health Act tribunal, and—ker-ching—you get Section 117 aftercare, which, of course, is not available under the Mental Capacity Act.
If Amendment 5 were accepted, we would have no Mental Health Act, no co-occurring diagnoses, no criminal justice system—I hope—and no Mental Capacity Act to refer to. If a clinician is in that circumstance where someone is so distressed and they do not have that diagnosis in the 28 days, where is the law? We are not talking about the practicalities here. Where is the law?
In any event, the Mental Capacity Act does not apply to under-16s. So the risk would be an increased use of what we now know as High Court DoLS. These are not DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act. They are DoLS under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. They are a most unsatisfactory way of restraining the liberty of under-16s.
Only two or three weeks ago, the Children’s Commissioner issued a report outlining the problem, and outlining that, already, some children with learning disabilities and autism are under a High Court DoLS. It is a matter that your Lordships’ House needs to consider. Nearly a thousand children are detained under a High Court DoLS.
Obviously, the Mental Capacity Act would have applied to 16 and 17 year-olds and adults so where does that leave those vulnerable adults? Where is there a power to detain them? The Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act will both have gone. If clinicians are in that circumstance where there is no co-occurring mental health disorder, there is a vacuum which may end up being filled by the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court using vulnerable adults. We will have created another little bucket of people. I accept the criticism made by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, about DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act. They are supposed to be replaced by protection of liberty safeguards, but those are not in force yet.
If we accept Amendment 5, are we going to create more work for the High Court with clinicians in that situation because the law will not have provided any means for them to detain? I recognise and repeat that the practicality will probably be a co-occurring mental health disorder but, as far as I understand it, that is where the law will be left if Amendment 5 is accepted.
Although the Mental Capacity Act is far from ideal, I hope the Minister can help us understand what the situation would be if we were to accept the amendment. As I say, for the under-16s it would be more cases under High Court DoLS, as far I understand it.
My Lords, I have an amendment in this group but I want to speak particularly to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for her good sense. I agree with every word she has said.
I had earlier tabled amendments to Clause 3 and Schedule 1 to give effect to opposing any change in the definition of mental disorder for the meaning of the Act in the same way as Sir Simon Wessely’s committee recommended and I withdrew them in favour of a compromise amendment because I was not sure, to be honest, that I would get here at all today. I have. I am not quite sure how many more I will be able to get to but for the moment I am here so I will speak to this one.
I want to make it clear right from the start that if we had changed our legislation to be a hybrid Bill that was a fusion of a mental capacity and a mental health Bill we would not be in this pickle because we would have capacity-based legislation and therefore we could have proceeded without any of these silly criteria for what is this diagnosis and what is another. As the legislation is at the moment, I believe the move to remove autism and learning disabilities from what is a mental disorder is frankly bizarre, akin to having Parliament establish that for the purposes of legislation, the earth is flat and the sun goes round the earth. Galileo had the same problem. I want to ensure that Hansard will record that not everyone is in agreement with the notion that autism and learning disabilities are somehow separate and different from other mental disorders.
Neurodiversity, which, of course, exists, is the term used to describe statistical outliers from the norm and, of course, as for many other mental states, there can be many positive and interesting aspects of alternative ways of thinking about and responding emotionally to the world that enrich society. I understand that many people with autism and learning disabilities do just that and that is where neurodiversity has been so supported by people who want to ensure that they are recognised as individuals and citizens just as the rest of us are. But that does not change the fundamentals.
I know noble Lords know that I was a professor of psychiatry for many years at the University of London but I ought to mention at this point that I also have a special interest in mental health legislation because I was for six years vice-chair of the Mental Health Act Commission. I co-authored this now much revered code of practice for the 1983 Act. It is actually my only bestseller—if only it did not say Secretary of State on it—and I know first-hand how the Acts and codes are used. That is why I do not get involved in the principles of where this should be. The code does have statutory effect, by the way—I am sorry that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has left, because I can reassure her it does have statutory force. I was also UK advisor to the WHO on mental health and older people and was exposed to the developments in mental health legislation in other jurisdictions, not only in the UK, with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Acts as they were being developed, but in the Republic of Ireland when it introduced its new Act, and abroad in English-speaking legislatures.
I do not think that I or anybody else who has a different opinion from the noble Baroness wants to see those people being neglected. We have a different view. The issue I have with her stance is that the evidence is that putting people with learning disabilities and autism in a psychiatric hospital—and that is where they will go if there is no provision, because that is where they go at present—is damaging. It is not the correct provision. I believe that what she is arguing for—to continue the neglect of provision by putting them somewhere—is significantly not in their best interests and causes damage.
Perhaps I can clarify. I think that the noble Baroness’s amendment is to some extent based on the spirit of the Joint Committee’s report, which was about providing some kind of mechanism, after the 28 days—I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, nodding. There would be a specialist tribunal, and we said that it should be composed of people with experience of learning disabilities and autism, so that there was not a get-out for clinicians that they had not done the assessments properly. There would have to be grounded reasons to go beyond the 28 days and, in exceptional circumstances, you could authorise the detention, to make sure that the law covered that gap or group of people. No one wanted to see people detained for the reason that there was no community provision—that is ridiculous.
I accept that the reality is probably going to be that clinicians will find a mental disorder diagnosis to use the powers under Part II to do what is in the best interests of that person and their family at the time. But the law should also cover that situation and not force clinicians into those diagnoses—hence the need for accurate data, so that we can track what is happening when the law is enacted.
Once again, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke to this group of amendments. The purpose of today’s Committee is to probe the Government, but it is interesting that we find noble Lords probing each other—though I have learned a huge amount from these discussions. They say that discourse leads not only to liberty but to an increase in knowledge.
I add my words to those of the Minister and offer my condolences to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who is not in her place today. I recall a debate in 2021 led by the noble Baroness—one of my first as Health Minister—in which she highlighted that people with learning difficulties and autism were being detained in secure settings, even when an assessment had recommended that they should live in the community. This goes back to the words of my noble friend Lady Berridge, who talked about how we can deal with the world as it is and not with the ideal world that we want to live in.
I was shocked at the time by what the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told the House about some of the findings from the oversight panel for the independent care (education) and treatment reviews. I bear in mind what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said, when she gave some examples of other countries with much shorter detentions, but I will never forget the story that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told about a Mr W, who had been detained in hospital for more than 20 years, spending most of his time in what amounted to solitary confinement. At the time of the debate, Mr W had been living in his own home for nearly three years, near his family, with his home environment and care being built around his needs. That is something that all noble Lords are trying to push for in this group of amendments. It was not only a heart-warming story but the point was made that, financially, it cost no more to support Mr W living in his own home than it did to detain him in hospital. More importantly, the noble Baroness shared the happy ending that, despite the trauma of being in the wrong environment for so many years, Mr W was, we hope, going to live happily ever after. That highlights the reasons for the amendments in this group.
I should add that I recall the noble Baroness who is now the Minister pushing the Government from these Benches on ending detention. I am sorry—I am going to be a little naughty here, but she can do it if we ever get back into government. She told the House that the average length of stay for people with a learning disability and/or autism in in-patient units was 5.4 years, saying:
“That is 5.4 years that no person will ever get back”.—[Official Report, 28/10/2021; col. GC 231.]
She asked how that could be justifiable when the cost of living in the community was the same as the cost of detention. I know that she is naturally sympathetic to ending these detentions. The detention of those with autism and learning disabilities was one of the central issues addressed by the Wessely review.
I was interested in Amendment 4, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, arguing the definition of “mental disorder” under the Bill. While I am sympathetic to the amendment, can the Minister confirm whether my understanding is correct that the World Health Organization defines a mental disorder as
“a clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotional regulation, or behaviour”,
and whether the WHO includes neurodevelopmental disorders, which includes autism? If so, are the Government sympathetic to Amendment 4 and considering bringing forward their own amendment? How would they avoid running contrary to the definition accepted by the WHO and included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, particularly DSM-5? I understand the point that these things can change, as the noble Lords, Lord Stevens and Lord Scriven, have very importantly alluded to.
Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Browning, seeks to ensure that, if a person has autism or a learning difficulty but not a mental health condition, we should not be using deprivation of liberty safeguards to replace detention under the Mental Health Act. We fully support my noble friend’s amendment and the intention behind it.
I am grateful to noble Lady, Baroness Murphy, who has tabled Amendment 35, for the time she has taken to share her experience and expertise with me and my noble friend Lord Howe. She addresses an issue that we should all be aware of with any legislation: that of unintended consequences. While most noble Lords here today would accept and support ending these detentions, for all the reasons that we have all given, and particularly after the harrowing stories that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told all those years ago, how will the Government ensure that anyone with learning difficulties who could potentially pose a considerable risk in the community receive the required supervision? That is the challenge here, and it is the challenge to which my noble friend Lady Berridge referred when she reminded us that we have to talk about the world in which we live and not the ideal world that we all want.
I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Berridge for sharing some of the deliberations of the pre-legislative Joint Committee, particularly on the issue of the High Court DoLS. Given that, and the point of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, if we are to have alternatives, how do we prevent detention by the back door or opening a massive loophole for detention?
Amendment 39, from my noble friend Lady Browning, would ensure that detention was for needs associated with the degree of psychiatric disorder, along with Amendment 40. We are sympathetic to that, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I am grateful for the invitation, as always. Government amendments will be considered as we progress through Committee, but I say that as a broad point, as I know the noble Baroness understands.
The intention of the provisions in the Bill on registers and commissioning is that people with a learning disability and autistic people are not detained but supported in the right way. The proposed changes to Part II, Section 3 will be commenced only where there are strong community services in place.
I am aware of how much time the Minister has given and how generous she has been in allowing interventions. If she is minded on Amendment 5, can she outline whether she is proposing that there would be the special tribunal that the Joint Committee outlined? If so, how would she then deal with these issues for under-16s in respect of DoLS and for vulnerable adults? When there is no legal basis at all, it is then left for clinicians to detain anybody after the 28 days.
I became a little worried, listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that perhaps I had been a bit too generous.
I support and have added my name to Amendment 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, around communication issues. As she rightly pointed out, this could have been linked to Amendment 2, which has already been debated at some length. I will not repeat the same arguments, but they apply to this amendment, which is why I support it.
I also very strongly support the amendment on housing tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. I am chair of NHS England’s health and justice advisory board and have worked on the development of RECONNECT, the service to support people coming out of prison back into the community, which is very much a health-based initiative. Unless their housing needs are met at that point, their treatment, their support and their care plan can fall apart very quickly. Consequently, they are very quickly back in the criminal justice system. The same comparison can be made with this amendment. I strongly support housing being at the core of all issues relating to health and social care.
My Lords, I rise to support the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on Amendment 9. I know that there are other amendments in relation to the inclusion of parents and guardians. I raise just two small points in relation to this.
When one looks at where this amendment is inserted in the list, the last of the persons currently listed who would receive the report is
“the local authority in whose area the patient is ordinarily resident”.
That potentially will not always be the local authority where there is a care order. Therefore, in those circumstances, the local authority is caught with an
“other person who has parental responsibility”.
However, that is not how this is drafted in other parts of the Bill, where an
“other person who has parental responsibilities”
means guardians et cetera. For consistency of drafting, we need to look at that.
I know that the Minister has been very generous in the time that we have had with her and her officials, but we need a consistent phraseology within the Bill because with this amendment, if there was a special guardian the report would also go to the person with what is informally known as residual parental responsibility. Normally they are informed only, for instance, of the change of name of the child or if the child is going to leave the jurisdiction. We need to look at everybody with parental responsibility and have some consistent phraseology within the Bill when we are meaning the local authority when there is a care order and parental responsibility, to include all the different circumstances in which a child may have their status changed from the ordinary situation of living at home with parents when a court order is in place.
My Lords, this group of amendments aim to strengthen provisions for care (education) and treatment reviews—CETRs, as we have heard—for individuals with autism or a learning disability. These amendments collectively aim to address gaps in the current drafting and ensure that the needs and rights of these individuals are fully considered and respected.
This reflects the dignity, respect and patient-centred care principles that strengthen the Bill. Amendments 6 and 12, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, highlight the importance of considering housing needs during care (education) and treatment review meetings. A stable, safe and appropriate home environment is a critical determinant of mental health and well-being. Failure to address housing can undermine the effectiveness of care plans, leading to avoidable crises, as the Minister put it earlier, and setbacks that can risk damaging the long-term success of these care plans. Can the Minister please clarify how housing needs will be integrated into the CETRs under the current provisions of the Bill?
Amendments 8 to 10 and 15 to 17 focus on ensuring that the CETR process is inclusive and transparent. These amendments expand the list of those who should receive CETR reports to include the patient, their nominated person, independent mental health advocates and, where relevant, their parent or guardian. These measures should help foster trust and collaboration in the care process and create a more holistic approach to care planning by ensuring that all key individuals are kept informed. Can the Minister please confirm whether the current drafting of Clause 4 sufficiently addresses these inclusivity concerns or whether these amendments are necessary to achieve that goal?
Amendments 19 and 20 address the issue of ensuring that recommendations from CETRs are acted upon. It is not enough for reviews to generate reports and recommendations: there must be a clear and enforceable duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to act on them. Amendment 19 would strengthen this by replacing the current requirement to “have regard to” recommendations with a “duty” to carry them out; while Amendment 20 ensures that “a compelling reason” must justify any deviation from these recommendations.
These amendments reflect the frustration often experienced by patients and families when well-intentioned recommendations are not implemented. A stronger duty to implement recommendations would not only improve outcomes but restore trust in the system. Can the Minister outline how the Government intend to ensure that recommendations from CETRs are indeed implemented effectively?
Amendment 13 highlights the importance of addressing communication needs during the CETR meetings. It is highly welcome that the issue of communication and language has been addressed by so many noble Lords. Effective communication is essential for patient-centred care, ensuring that patients can meaningfully participate in that very care. Ensuring that individuals’ additional or alternative communication needs are met is not merely a courtesy, it is a necessity and a must-have. This group of amendments highlights the importance of a holistic, inclusive and accountable approach to care and treatment reviews. They seek to ensure that the needs of patients, including those related to housing, communication or support networks, are fully recognised and addressed. They also emphasise the need for timely reviews and actionable recommendations backed by clear accountability mechanisms.
His Majesty’s Official Opposition are broadly supportive of the aims of these amendments, and we look forward to the response from the Minister.