Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Anna Dixon Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Evans]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I thank the Minister for his collaborative tone on some of the difficult amendments that we have discussed.

I will open where the shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston (Edward Argar), left us on Second Reading. As he rightly emphasised, the importance of updating the Mental Health Act cannot be overstated. I fully share his view that it was right to take the necessary time to get this legislation right. The cross-party commitment to reform in this area, spanning both previous and current Governments, reflects a shared recognition of the urgent need to modernise our approach to mental health, particularly for those who are most vulnerable.

I welcome the Bill’s focus on enhancing patients’ voice and autonomy, including through the expansion of independent advocacy and the shift away from using police and prison cells as a place of safety. Those are positive and overdue steps. At the same time, as my right hon. Friend outlined, the Opposition’s role is to engage rigorously and constructively with the details of the Bill. Over the next few weeks, I look forward to working with colleagues on the Committee to ensure that, for example, the principle of patient choice is embedded not only in policy but in practice, such as through the use of advance choice documents.

We will continue to scrutinise the Bill in good faith, proposing improvements where needed, with the aim of delivering the strongest possible protections and outcomes for patients, their families and the community. How we begin a conversation often determines whether it becomes dialogue or dispute, so I hope that the Committee can take a constructive and productive look at what lies ahead of us.

I support clause 1, which will rightly update section 118(2B) of the Mental Health Act 1983 and embed a refreshed code of practice at the very heart of the mental health framework. This is not merely a procedural amendment; it is a statement of values, placing humanity, dignity and recovery at the centre of how we treat some of the most vulnerable people in our society, who are profoundly affected by mental health legislation. It is vital that the framework guiding professionals be clear, principled and rooted in respect for individuals.

Why do we need these changes? For too long, the Mental Health Act has been criticised as outdated and insufficiently centred on patient autonomy and dignity. Concerns raised by successive independent reviews, clinicians and, crucially, by people with lived experience have pointed to inconsistencies in how decisions are made, which can often result in over-restriction, lack of patient involvement and insufficient therapeutic focus.

The independent review of the Mental Health Act, which was published in 2018, made a landmark contribution by recommending the adoption of the four core principles in front of us today: choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and recognition of the person as an individual. These principles are designed to shift the culture and practice towards one that respects autonomy while safeguarding wellbeing and public safety.

The historical context is that the Mental Health Act has undergone several amendments since its introduction—notably, in 2007, updates were made to some of the detention criteria and safeguards—but it was clear that the Act remained predominantly paternalistic. The 2018 independent review was a comprehensive, evidence-based re-examination of the entire Act, informed by extensive consultation, including with patients, families and clinicians. It concluded that embedding the principles formally into the law and code of practice was essential to modernise and humanise mental health law.

The four key principles—choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and the person as an individual to be treated with dignity—are not abstract ideals. They are the foundations of compassionate, lawful and effective care. They echo the spirit of the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and signal a move away from paternalism and towards genuine co-production of care plans. Involvement ensures that decisions are not made about patients without them. The principle of choice and autonomy reminds us that the mental illness must not be a justification for blanket restrictions. The principle of least restriction challenges us to find community-based alternatives before defaulting to detention. Therapeutic benefit ensures that care is not custodial, but meaningful healing. These principles are what most of us would hope to see for our own family.

[Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. Does he agree that the Wessely independent review setting out these four principles gets right the balance that even though people may need to be detained, they should not lose their personhood and control, and that embedding these principles in this updated Bill will ensure that those rights are enshrined in law?

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Member is absolutely right. The key part is about trying to change not only the legislative framework, but the culture around clinicians and society as a whole. We saw that impact in 1983, we saw it in 2005 with the update on capacity, and we saw it in 2007. Now is the right time to look again at this, and it is well overdue.

I am glad that it has taken a while to ensure that the Bill has been thoroughly thought out. As we heard in the House of Lords debate, this is exactly the kind of framework that we need to make sure that society moves forward in a collaborative way that puts the patient at the centre, but also protects the wider community. Given some of the high-profile incidents that we have seen, we must also make sure that relatives, the community and the wider public at large are all protected.

As the Minister has rightly highlighted, the core principles must be the default for everyone. Clause 1 therefore represents an important step forward: by requiring the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers to include the four principles explicitly in the code of practice and by making it a legal duty for decision makers to have regard to them, the clause will strengthen the ethical foundation of mental health law. However, we must be honest about the challenges. The success of the principles depends on the culture, not just the codification. Training, supervision and leadership across clinical settings will be essential to bringing the values off the page and into practice.

These principles will also require resource backing. We cannot call for the least restrictive or most therapeutic interventions while community mental health services remain as they are. A plan for investment and a timeline for delivery will be imperative, or else we risk embedding principles we cannot fulfil. Members on both sides of the House understand that. I know that the Minister will have to think carefully about setting out a timetable, but it is key.

We must also guard against tokenism. We must guard against lofty principles being left unenforced and becoming rhetorical wallpaper. If we are to legislate for these values, we must look for accountability, with regular auditing, patient feedback mechanisms and a duty on the provider to report on how the principles are being upheld. Those are all areas that His Majesty’s Opposition will scrutinise.

To that end, I wish to raise several important questions for the Government and the Committee to consider. The first is about enforcement and accountability. How will the Government ensure that decision makers truly have regard to the principles in practice, and is there a robust mechanism for monitoring compliance and addressing breaches?

The second question is about balancing conflicts. In some cases, principles may conflict: for example, the imperative to respect patient autonomy may clash with the need to impose restrictions for safety. How does the code intend to guide practitioners to navigate these difficult trade-offs?

The third question is about care and interested parties. Although the clause highlights patient involvement, what explicit protections and roles will be afforded to carers and other interested parties, and how will their sometimes divergent perspectives be balanced?

The fourth question is about training and resources. Embedding the principles requires more than words on paper. What investments are planned to equip practitioners with the skills and understanding necessary to apply these principles sensitively and consistently?

The fifth question is about the timeline and consultation. The explanatory notes mention that the code must be consulted on and presented for scrutiny. What is the proposed timeline for that process, and how will people with lived experience continue to be involved?

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[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to amendment 56, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. The amendment proposes to grant the Secretary of State the power to update the definitions of “mental disorder”, “autism”, “learning disability” and “psychiatric disorder” by secondary legislation, subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses of Parliament. Currently, the Bill sets out fixed definitions of those terms in the primary legislation—the Mental Health Act, as amended. Those definitions can be changed only through further primary legislation. That means that any further change, reflecting new scientific knowledge or evolving clinical consensus, would require a full legislative process. Given that the Act was passed in 1983, and we are here more than 40 years later, I think that the problem is clear.

[Anna Dixon]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise the work of the World Health Organisation in producing the international classification of diseases and ICD-11, which provides a scientific, evidence-based update, including on psychiatric disorders, autism and other neurodevelopmental disorders? Has he considered whether that is an appropriate reference point for the Bill?

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Member makes a good point. We have had ICD-10 and DSM-5, which aim to codify those disorders. Part of the problem is that someone with Korsakoff syndrome, which is brain damage from alcohol, or with Rett’s disease would potentially come under the scope of these definitions. That makes it very difficult. What about acquired brain injury? That is an emerging field—the House has looked at it and has put a strategy in place. However, there could be problems in the legislation going forward.

The amendment is asking, I think, how we scientifically proof the Bill so that we do not need to introduce further primary legislation. That is the question that the Government need to grapple with. As a doctor, I have seen the difficulties and practicalities of these definitions, and of trying to put people in a box. For example, where does Asperger’s fit on the autism scale? What does that look like on the spectrum of conditions? Are we trying to codify that? These are the real, pragmatic problems of putting definitions in place. That means it is all the more important to look at definitions, but, as the hon. Member for Shipley has rightly pointed out, the definitions have already moved on while we have been discussing the Bill. Introducing a mechanism that allows the House to update the legislation in keeping with advances in scientific knowledge is really important. The question is whether this is the right amendment to do that.

The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to make updates through regulations—secondary legislation—which would thereby enable a more flexible and responsive approach. Importantly, it requires that any such regulations must be laid before Parliament and approved by both Houses, which maintains parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight.

The potential benefits of this approach are clear. It offers the possibility of allowing the law to evolve and stay aligned with scientific evidence and clinical best practice without undue delay. That could prevent outdated or overly rigid definitions from adversely impacting vulnerable people, and better reflects the complexities of mental health conditions. It would allow the law to keep pace with advances in the scientific understanding of autism, learning disability and mental disorders, without the need for primary legislation. It could help ensure that the definitions remain clinically accurate and relevant, improving how the law is applied and reducing the risk of outdated criteria causing harm or confusion.

As the hon. Member for Shipley pointed out, that is part of the problem. As new criteria come up, there is a delay in the uptake of definitions. From my experience in clinical practice, keeping up to date with definitions can sometimes be a challenge. It is part of the personal development plan to make sure there is that understanding, but there is always a drip through as change in practice comes through, along with clinicians being comfortable and happy to use the new definitions. With any new medication, it is important to understand the side effects and the pros and cons of what it is trying to achieve, and to be able to explain that fully so that a patient can consent when taking that medication. The same applies when trying to explain a condition to patients. If there is a change and a new aspect to the way in which a definition is being applied, it is important that we have some flexibility.

The affirmative procedure preserves Parliament’s role, offering safeguards against unchecked ministerial power. However, there are some important considerations and potential drawbacks. Definitions of mental health conditions have profound legal and social implications. Delegating this power, even with parliamentary approval, risks politicisation or inconsistent application if regulations are used too frequently or without adequate consultation.

Secondary legislation typically receives less parliamentary debate and public scrutiny than primary legislation, even with the affirmative procedure, which may not suffice for such significant changes. There is also a risk that the changes could be made in a reactive or piecemeal way rather than with a coherent legislative framework, potentially leading to legal uncertainty or unintended consequences.

Given those points, I have several questions for the Minister. How do the Government propose to keep the legislation updated, given that we are only updating the Mental Health Act now, 40 years on? Do they have a mechanism in mind to ensure that any updates to the definitions are accompanied by robust clinical and expert consultation, while reacting to advances in medical understanding? Would the Government consider a formal review mechanism such as a mandated periodic independent review of the definitions? That could solve the problem of legislation becoming outdated, and put the safeguards in place. If there is a difference in the scientific community, we need to make sure that any changes are broadly in agreement with the direction of travel of scientific knowledge.

Furthermore, in considering the need for balanced, flexible and democratic accountability, the Government could introduce a sunset clause on any regulations, so that any changes would be revisited and renewed by primary legislation within a set period, unless Parliament agrees otherwise.

Crucially, to my knowledge, there are no standing statutory bodies or panels tasked with reviewing or advising the Government on the legal definitions of mental health conditions. There is an argument that without a dedicated expert body to guide the Secretary of State, we cannot be sure that any changes are robustly evidence-based and clinically sound. Currently, we have the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the royal colleges, the Department of Health and Social Care and the intermittent mental health review bodies, but have the Government considered establishing a formal advisory mechanism to address problems in the future? The Opposition can see the argument both ways, but to govern is to choose, and it would be useful to understand the Minister’s thoughts on this area.

[Anna Dixon]

The hon. Gentleman seems to be overcomplicating the need for additional scrutiny. Will he acknowledge the work of the World Health Organisation to review the evidence on a global basis and update the definitions of psychiatric disorders?

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Member is correct about the way in which the world looks at this issue. The problem is that we are sat here debating definitions in legislation that is 40 years old. Will we be here in 40 years debating definitions that have moved on? The amendment suggests that, somehow, we need to try to ensure that legislation is flexible and updated enough, and has the scrutiny and safeguards in place. That relates to not just health, but any part of government that we tend to look at in the House.

I wanted to speak to the amendment to probe the Government on how they will safeguard the legislation. I do not have all the answers, but this is important. I do not want to see my successors—the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth from whatever party—sat here debating this issue in 40 years’ time because the definitions that we happen to set today have become outdated and have unintended consequences.

That is the balance that I am looking for. I do not see a body across the UK, given that this is UK legislation, that fulfils this role. It could be a transitory role or fully established. A psychiatrist could take it on, or it could come under NICE. With the abolition of NHS England, it could be a new role for the Department of Health to take on. All those are viable vehicles that could potentially look into the definitions. I want to ensure that what we pass in Parliament actually translates into the real world for clinicians, patients and the public.

The Opposition can see the argument both ways, as I mentioned. Perhaps it would be useful to have an expert panel, with representatives of clinicians, legal experts and service users to support regulatory updates. I put those questions to the Minister and I look forward to his answers.

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[Dr Evans]

It is a pleasure to speak to clause 3, which brings forward the vital and long overdue changes to the way our laws treat autism and learning disabilities under the Mental Health Act. The clause responds to a persistent injustice: the inappropriate detention of autistic people and people with learning disabilities in mental health hospitals, often for years at a time, without meaningful therapeutic benefit. Those individuals are not mentally ill, yet they have too often been detained, medicated and restrained as if they were.

As the law stands, individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people can be detained both for assessment, under section 2 of the Act, and for treatment, under section 3. Notably, people with learning disabilities may be detained under section 3 when their condition

“is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”,

whereas that does not currently apply to autistic people. Evidence and reports show that some such detentions can be lengthy and may not always provide therapeutic benefit. That raises concerns about the appropriateness of detention on the basis of disability alone. In my time on the Health and Social Care Committee, we looked specifically at this topic and produced a report, some of which has influenced the Bill.

The clause aims to directly address the issue of lengthy detentions for such individuals. For the first time, the law will clearly define autism and learning disability—something that has not happened for 40 years. As science has moved on, legislation must follow. Autism will now be recognised as a “lifelong developmental condition” that affects perception, communication and interaction, and learning disability will be defined as “significant impairment” of intellectual functioning.

Supported by schedule 1, the clause seeks to clarify and refine that position by introducing formal definitions of “autism”, “learning disability” and “psychiatric disorder”. Crucially, it removes autism and learning disability as stand-alone grounds for compulsory treatment and detention under section 3. Instead, detention for treatment will be permitted only if a person has a co-occurring psychiatric disorder—that is, a mental disorder other than autism or learning disability. Additionally, the change applies to community treatment orders, meaning that they cannot be applied solely on the basis of autism or a learning disability. However, the Act makes it clear that the changes do not apply to people detained under part 3 of the Act who are within the criminal justice system. For that group, autism and learning disabilities with serious behavioural consequences remain grounds for detention and treatment disorders.

The Bill introduces the new term, “psychiatric disorder”, meaning any mental disorder excluding autism or a learning disability. That distinction matters because detention under section 3 of the Act—compulsory admission for treatment—will no longer be permitted solely on the basis of someone being autistic or having a learning disability. From now on, a person may be detained only if they have a co-occurring psychiatric disorder or their learning disability is associated with “serious behavioural consequences”, such as

“abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”.

That reflects a fundamental shift in the philosophy of the Act from using hospitalisation as a containment tool to ensuring that any detention has a clear clinical and therapeutic purpose.

This reform is rooted in the recommendations of the 2018 review of the Mental Health Act, which was led by Professor Simon Wessely, and has been championed by groups such as the National Autistic Society. It represents a more modern understanding, as we currently see things, so there are many positives—it protects people’s rights, preventing detention simply for being different, it promotes community-based care rather than institutionalisation, it modernises the law in line with current clinical understanding and it seeks to end the harm caused by prolonged non-therapeutic hospital stays, which often involving over-medication and restraint.

However, I also sound a note of caution: the clause alone will not be enough. There is rightly concern about the provision for robust community services. We risk creating legal protections that are admirable on paper but ineffective in practice. I know that the Minister appreciates this dilemma. If people cannot get the right support in the community, they will still end up in crisis, and possibly still be detained—just under a different part of the law.

There are also concerns about ambiguity. The phrase “serious behavioural consequences” may be open to a wide interpretation. Without clear guidance and training, we risk inconsistencies and even potential loopholes that could undermine the intent of this reform. I commend the Government’s intention to protect autistic people and people with learning disabilities from potentially inappropriate detentions, and to ensure that compulsory treatment is targeted to those with mental disorders warranting hospital care.

The emphasis on therapeutic benefit and the principle of least restriction aligns well with the human rights standard and the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. However, I have several questions that I hope the Government will be able to address. How will clinicians reliably distinguish between behaviours arising from autism and learning disabilities and behaviours arising from co-occurring psychiatric disorders, given the complexity of presentations in this population? Is there, or will there be, clear guidance and training to support those assessments? For individuals with severe autism or learning disabilities who display challenging behaviours but do not have a diagnoseable psychiatric disorder, what alternative pathways and supports are envisaged to ensure their safety and wellbeing without resorting to detention?

On the issue of patients under part 3 of the Bill, I know the Government’s rationale for maintaining broader detention definition criteria, but will there be additional safeguards or oversight to ensure those patients are not subject to unnecessarily prolonged or restrictive detention? The removal of “social functioning” from the definition of learning disability is intended to create a clearer distinction from autism, but could the changes create any unintended legal or clinical ambiguities in practice?

The changes could introduce some unintended consequences. Previously, impairments in social function were considered part of the learning disability definition, which helped capture individuals whose social difficulties accompanied intellectual impairments. Without that, there may be legal and clinical uncertainty for people with borderline or overlapping conditions. For example, someone with moderate intellectual impairment and significant social difficulties might no longer clearly fit the learning disability definition. Similarly, autistic individuals with mild intellectual disability who experience social challenges could find their diagnosis and legal status less certain. Those ambiguities risk inconsistent assessments and potential gaps in access to appropriate care unless the Government provide clear guidance to clinicians and tribunals on how to navigate complex presentations. What plans are in place to monitor and evaluate the impact of the changes on detention rates, patient outcomes and the availability of community-based alternatives?

In closing, this is an important clause that moves us closer to a system that respects autonomy, delivers appropriate care and upholds the rights of neurodivergent people. But we must be mindful that passing this legislation must not be seen as the end of the job. As the Minister understands, it is the beginning. If we are to drive reform, the Government will need to set out the funding and workforce pathway for the services that will deliver it. We must train professionals, empower families and support voices of lived experience at every level. Only then will clause 3 deliver on its promise not just to change law, but to change lives.

I turn to schedule 1. Schedules are an important and yet often overlooked part of the legislative process. It is worth reminding the Committee that a schedule is a part of a Bill’s function, like a detailed appendix. It contains the granular, often technical amendments that give practical and legal effect to the broad principles set out in main clauses. In other words, the clause tells us what Parliament intends to do and schedules show us how it will be done: amending existing statutes, updating definitions and ensuring consistency across legal frameworks.

In this Bill, schedule 1 is particularly consequential. It does the heavy lifting of applying the reforms in clause 3 to the existing Mental Health Act 1983, especially with regard to how we treat autism and learning disabilities within the scope of mental health law. Let us be clear that the schedule is not simply technical. It is transformational in what it attempts to do. Where the 1983 Act spoke broadly of mental disorder, schedule 1 now creates a more precise legal category—“relevant disorder”—defined to include psychiatric disorder, autism and learning disability with serious behavioural consequences. That matters enormously. In fact, it is one of the key reasons for the review of this entire piece of legislation. Individuals with autism or learning disabilities have been subject to compulsory powers, including detention, as we have heard, in the absence of any co-occurring mental illness. That is a practice with which the Committee should rightly be uncomfortable.

Schedule 1 amends not only the criteria for compulsory admission under section 3, but those for guardianship, community treatment orders, tribunal discharge and even the treatment provisions in part 4 of the Act. This breadth shows that clause 3 is not merely a rhetorical shift; it is being operationalised throughout the entire Act. With such significant implications, the schedule raises serious and legitimate questions that I am sure will form the backbone of the ongoing discussions in Committee over the next few weeks.

First, what is the threshold for serious behavioural consequences? Will that be clearly defined? Without precision, we risk substituting one vague standard for another. Secondly, do the transitory provisions offer enough clarity for frontline practitioners, in particular approved mental health professionals and tribunal panels who will be making decisions in grey areas between new and old law? Again, what about the cross-border issue between Wales and England? Thirdly, given the change from mental disorder to psychiatric disorders in some sections but not others, what is the Government’s rationale for that linguistic differentiation? Is there a risk of confusion among legal and clinical practitioners? To clarify—I am happy to share this with the Minister—I went through it and there appear to be a few occasions where the definition was changed, but some areas where it was not. Now, that may be my naïve understanding as a mere shadow Minister, but I would welcome the clarification and I am happy to pass them on to the Clerks to ensure that, if we are going to update the Bill, all parts are updated. Finally, and critically, do we have the workforce, training and services in place to support this cultural and clinical shift away from paternalism towards community-based and rights-respecting alternatives?

Schedule 1 shows us that reform is not just about good intentions, but getting the detail right. It is about ensuring the law reflects modern clinical understanding and human dignity. I support the direction of travel, but I gently remind the Minister to ensure that the operational mechanisms of the schedule are tested, clarified and, where necessary, strengthened. We owe that to the individuals and the families for whom we are producing this legislation to improve their lives.

[Anna Dixon]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers. I will make a few brief remarks on clause 3. For many of us, the detention and long-term institutionalisation of people with autism and learning disabilities is a shameful part of the NHS’s history. The Bill, and particularly this clause, will finally make it very clear that that is no longer acceptable. It is a further shame that, despite the Winterbourne View report in 2012, so little progress has actually been made on providing for people to be cared for in the community and closer to home.

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[Gregory Stafford]

I thank the hon. Member for her helpful intervention. If that is correct, I will draw my comments on that point to a close.

Amendment 6 concerns CETR frequency. It seeks to change the timetabling of these reviews. The same issues, both positive and negative, run through it as in amendment 3.

Amendment 7 would strengthen the legal obligation on integrated care boards and local authorities by requiring them to implement recommendations from the care, education and treatment reviews rather than merely considering them. That would ensure that review outcomes lead to concrete action and improved care. I do not think that anyone in the Committee could possibly disagree with that point. It would lead to greater accountability and would ensure that CETR recommendations are not ignored or delayed. That would clearly improve outcomes, because it would increase the likelihood that patients receive timely and appropriate care.

The amendment would also introduce stronger legal clarity. By removing “must have regard to” and replacing it with

“have a duty to carry out”,

it would remove ambiguity around the responsibilities of the ICBs and local authorities, supporting the rights-based care and the principles of transparency and enforceability in service provision that we all support.

I hope that the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford will be able to clarify the problem of resource pressures, which applies to all these amendments. Local authorities and ICBs may struggle to implement all the recommendations due to funding or capacity constraints. What would be the legal sanction for ICBs and local authorities if, through no “fault” of their own—although one might argue that they should have the necessary resources in place—they genuinely do not have the resources to implement all the recommendations? I would hope that such a sanction did not put them into further financial difficulty.

The reduction in flexibility concerns me. It may limit professional discretion in cases in which recommendations are impractical or outdated. It may require new systems for monitoring and enforcement, and if recommendations are not implemented it could increase the likelihood of legal challenges.

[Anna Dixon]

The hon. Member is going into some detail on these amendments. There is a duty where EHCPs are in place. Local authorities have had their funding cut over many years, so they have found it difficult to meet their EHCP obligations for the many children with SEND needs. Is there not a similar risk that the amendments will put duties on local authorities that they will not be able to meet unless they have sufficient resources? There must be some flexibility as well as duty on local authorities and the NHS to balance their duties and responsibilities with resources.

[The Chair]

There is one minute left, Greg.