Mental Health Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Berridge
Main Page: Baroness Berridge (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Berridge's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(3 days, 9 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 34; I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for adding her name to it. I am grateful too to the Minister for beginning, by way of the government amendments, to ensure that the Mental Health Bill does not conflict with orders of the family court under the Children Act.
Amendment 34 would ensure that the AMHP—approved mental health professional—appointing the nominated person for a child who lacks competence must appoint either the special guardian, when the family court has ordered one, or the parent with whom the child lives under a child arrangements order. His Majesty’s Government’s amendment reflects the current position under Section 37 of the Mental Health Act, and this amendment merely reflects the current position under Section 38. Under the Bill, however, the nearest relative becomes the nominated person and moves from a “must” in the Mental Health Act to a “should” in a code of practice.
According to the Government’s policy paper, His Majesty’s Government wished to give the AMHP the discretion to appoint someone other than that special guardian or the parent with whom the court has ordered that the child resides. Both those court orders affect parental responsibility. A special guardian takes all effective day-to-day decisions for the child and, according to the Children Act 1989, parents are left only with consent to a change of name or if the child is to leave the jurisdiction.
A kinship carer or foster carer is given parental responsibility by way of a court order after a report that has to be produced by the local authority to the court. Under a child arrangements order, the matter of who the child lives with or sees is determined, again, by a court order. A matter that is usually part of parental responsibility decided between the parents is now the subject of a court order. Breaching that order is, in fact, contempt of court—or a breach of a court order, as is normally said.
Many of these admissions of sick children who have no capacity are in the evenings or at weekends. That is what I was informed last Thursday by Dominic Marley of the AMHP Leads Network, whose clear view is that it does not want to be foisted with the discretion that His Majesty’s Government offer them. Why? It is because, quite simply, AMHPs are not equipped, unlike the family courts, to assess that there is now no risk of harm to a child, or to appoint someone other than the special guardian or the parent with whom the child resides.
How can AMHPs assess, at 10 pm on a Saturday night, that the daily life of a child is no longer what was outlined in the special guardianship order, or if the child now lives with that parent without a problem, even though that parent may have a history of not being able to care for them due to illness, or a history of violence, but has now recovered or reformed sufficiently? How can AMHPs assess that the parent who was ordered not to have contact after a week-long trial of the evidence in the family court is, in fact, safe to have contact with the child as the nominated person? AMHPs are simply not equipped to delve into complex family issues that have already been determined by the family court—nor, when they are trying to do a mental health assessment of a sick child, do they want to be distracted by this.
The remedy, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, outlined, is to enable the reformed parent in either of those cases to go to the county court under the nominated persons process, which, indeed, often hears cases within 24 hours. There is, of course, also the remedy to go back to the family court, but that would take longer. It is for that court to assess, we hope with a family judge, what the position is and whether that parent is now safe to be involved in the child’s life as the nominated person. It is unfair to put that responsibility on AMHPs, who see only a small number of Children Act cases each year. Also, as these cases are not straightforward—by definition, they have been subject to an order in the family court—AMHPs would almost certainly need His Majesty’s Government to provide out-of-hours specialist legal advice across England and Wales to help them do this. That matter would, obviously, be open to litigation.
AMHPs and the staff of a unit should not have this responsibility or discretion. What if a father who has a no contact order is given access as the nominated person and harms the child? Even if that does not happen, I cannot help wondering, can the mother go to the family court and say that the dad is in breach of the no contact order or in contempt of court by seeing the child as the nominated person? And would the dad defend that breach and say, “I need to call the AMHP to the family court”? This seems to be getting rather expensive and complicated. Family court orders should be respected, so who the AMHP must appoint as the nominated person should again be on the face of the Bill. Most importantly, this would eradicate the risk of harm to a child from a parent, who has been found by a court to be a risk to their child, getting contact with them, or getting access as the nominated person until another court determines otherwise. Court orders are amended by court orders, not AMHPs.
After eight years of looking at the Mental Health Act to reform it, we are now at Report stage and there are still significant conflicts between this Bill and the Children Act. I am left wondering why. Sadly, despite the considerable engagement that other noble Lords have mentioned by the Minister, which I know is appreciated, as of last Thursday, His Majesty’s Government have not met with the lead AMHP network that I have outlined, which represents over 90% of local authorities in England and Wales and has been in existence for over 20 years. The network is not aware of any other professional network being in existence. It was promised by the last Government that, before a Bill was produced to Parliament, it would be met with. As of last Thursday, His Majesty’s Government have also not consulted with the British Association of Social Workers, which has a special interest group of AMHPs. Why not? Will the Minister please outline precisely whether any AMHPs have been met with and, if so, tell us who are they are and make them known? The network I have spoken to is very concerned about this discretion.
The Minister has immunity while being a servant of the Crown; AMHPs and the staff of a secure mental health unit do not. All the AMHPs are asking for is what is indeed reflected in Whitehall. The DHSE has responsibility for the Mental Health Act and DfE for the Children Act. This is not their expertise. I do hope I will not be attaching this Hansard to a letter to a coroner, a CQC inquiry or any other inquiry if, God forbid, a child is harmed or killed in a secure unit by a parent.
Governing is about deciding. Without Amendment 34, His Majesty’s Government have, in my view, decided to take an unnecessary risk with the safety of some of our sickest children. As noble Lords may be aware from how I have outlined this speech, I intend to divide the House if necessary—but I hope the Minister will concede the point.
My Lords, I would like to support both the amendments of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the amendment just spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. It seems to me that, in the potentially complex and fluctuating family situations with which mental health professionals may find themselves having to deal, it is absolutely fundamental that they identify and consult those who have parental responsibility. It would be quite wrong, even in a hasty or urgent situation, for such people to be marginalised.
So far as the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, is concerned, I likewise entirely agree that the practical realities of operative family court orders, which may or may not be relevant, will certainly need to be understood and properly looked at before any urgent decisions are made. They will also need to be fully considered later when more measured decisions have to be made. For that reason, I would certainly wish to support her amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions in this important area, and I thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for Amendment 2.
On that point, I can say that a copy of the report made following a care and treatment review must be sent to those who have a legal duty to have regard to the review recommendations, so that they are implemented appropriately. We agree that parents play an important role. However, it may not be appropriate for the report to be sent to parents in every case: for example, where safeguarding concerns have been raised. Inappropriate sharing of information could result in the patient withdrawing their consent to the review. So we will provide statutory guidance on the role of the parent to assist the responsible commissioner in considering who to involve in care and treatment reviews.
On Amendment 25, also tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the Bill already allows anyone involved in the patient’s care or welfare, which includes parents, to apply to the county court to terminate the appointment of a nominated person. I can assure the noble and learned Baroness that we will make this clear in the code of practice and the Explanatory Notes for the Bill, as she has raised an important point.
To address Amendment 27, we are concerned that making it a requirement for parents always to be consulted when a nominated person is chosen could put undue pressure on a child to choose a parent. However, we agree that the witness should consider the views of parents and others who may have insight into the suitability of a nomination. I can tell the House that we will therefore set out in the statutory code of practice how the views of the family and others should be fed into the witnessing process.
I have also heard the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, about the nominated person regarding children who lack competence. In response to this, as she acknowledged, I have tabled Amendments 29 to 33 to make it clear who an approved mental health professional must appoint in certain circumstances. For an over-18 lacking capacity, an approved mental health professional must appoint a competent lasting power of attorney or Court of Protection deputy, if they have one. For all under-18s lacking capacity or competence, where there is a care order, they must appoint a local authority which has parental responsibility for them or, if relevant, a competent Court of Protection deputy. Where there is no care order, the approved mental health professional can appoint a person who does not have parental responsibility for 16 and 17 year-olds. This allows for suitable alternative arrangements, for example, informal kinship arrangements for young people who live independently. I hope that this reassurance and commitment on my behalf provides the further clarity for which the noble Baroness has been advocating.
Finally, in response to Amendment 34, we agree that in the vast majority of cases we would expect a parent, or whoever has parental responsibility, to be appointed. This would include consideration of special guardians and child arrangement orders. As I have set out before, we do not agree that a person with residual parental responsibility should always be blocked from being a nominated person. A child arrangement order or special guardianship may be in place for reasons other than the parent being a risk to the child. For example, the parent might struggle with their own health issues but could still be an effective nominated person.
The situation is different in the case of a care order because the local authority is being given lead parental responsibility. We have engaged with the Children’s Commissioner on this point. As I believe the noble Baroness may be aware, I recently met the Children’s Commissioner on a range of issues, including discussions about the Mental Health Act.
If there are no relevant people, approved mental health professionals must follow the patient’s past and present wishes and feelings when deciding who to appoint. We do not believe that the eldest person should be given preference, as this represents an outdated assignment of responsibility. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that I have been advised that my officials met the chair—but I understand that the term is lead—of the AMHP Leads Network last November.
I can make a further commitment, which I hope will be helpful to your Lordships’ House. I am committing to establishing an expert taskforce to support the development of the statutory code of practice to provide clear guidance for professionals involved in the nominated person appointment process for children and young people. Views will be very much welcomed on who should be part of this; I have already invited the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to make suggestions about that. With these reasons, I hope that noble Lords can support our amendments and will not press their amendments.
Before the Minister sits down, the information I have is that Dominic Marley of the AMHP Leads Network had not seen a draft of the Bill that was to go before Parliament. Can the Minister confirm that? The Minister has outlined that there can be an assessment of ill-health already before the courts. Is she confident in legislating when a group of professionals are saying that they are not competent to assess the illness or otherwise of that parent and that the matter, already determined by a court, needs to go back to a court to be re-evaluated? They say that they are not competent to do what you are asking of them.
My Lords, I will be brief, bearing in mind the time. I have tabled these amendments again on Report, regarding the appropriate tribunal to hear the nominated person’s claims. I am very appreciative of the information given earlier to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that parents would be able to go to the tribunal. I am also very grateful for the letter that the Minister wrote to me.
The only point on which I wish to have clarification is that there is a difference between the Mental Health Act tribunal and the county court in relation to funding. A parent who goes to the county court will be subject to means testing for Legal Services Commission funding. That is not the case for the Mental Health Act tribunal. So, bearing in mind the importance of the county court to parents, will the Minister outline whether there are any proposals to enable parents to access Legal Services Commission funding?
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing this point up again. I mentioned it in Committee. The reference to the county court, currently in Schedule 2 to the Bill, is the only place in this jurisdiction where the county court is given anything to do. It seems to me now to be an anomaly and an anachronism. It is simply carrying forward the use of the county court from the 1959 Act and the 1983 Act, which provided for that court to deal with applications to displace nearest relatives.
I do not believe that, if the mental health legislation was now being started afresh, it would refer to the county courts. The county court is, in any event, now greatly overburdened, but that is not the only reason to replace it. A mental health tribunal, or indeed the Court of Protection, would be better equipped to deal with these cases, having specialist expertise and judiciary.
I am grateful for the Minister’s comments, the reassurance she has given and the details she will provide me with, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the Minister’s reasoning, but I am sure it will not be a surprise to her that there is now a matter of disagreement, so I wish to test the opinion of the House.