Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Tuesday 9th September 2025
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
18:42 - The House divided: - Ayes: 116 / Noes: 333 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:56 - The House divided: - Ayes: 330 / Noes: 179 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Mr Speaker
The reasoned amendment in the name of Kemi Badenoch has been selected. I congratulate the Minister on his new position.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Luke Pollard)
I beg to move, That the Bill be read a Second time.
On 22 May, the Prime Minister signed a landmark treaty with the Republic of Mauritius that guarantees the continued UK operational control of Diego Garcia for the next 99 years and beyond.
Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)
Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?
Mr Bailey
I congratulate my hon. Friend on his recent appointment. It is important, right at the outset, that we understand that there has been almost no change in position. I refer him to the comments of the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) in 2023, when he stated that his
“primary objective is to ensure the continued effective operation of our defence facility on Diego Garcia.”—[Official Report, 13 June 2023; Vol. 734, c. 151.]
Can my hon. Friend confirm that that has not changed?
Mr Speaker
Order. I know that the hon. Member also wants to make a speech. I would not like him to use up his whole speech in an intervention in the first 10 seconds of the debate.
Luke Pollard
It was a timely intervention. I am happy to confirm that this precise deal delivers on the objective as originally set out when the Conservatives were in government. It secures the continued operation of the UK-US military base.
Several hon. Members rose—
Luke Pollard
To be fair, I will give way to one Opposition Member, and then I will make some progress. I give way to the former Deputy Prime Minister.
Sir Oliver Dowden (Hertsmere) (Con)
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his appointment. I had not intended to intervene so early, but I will, given that the record of the previous Government has come up. Can he confirm whether it is the case, as was the position under the previous Government, that we will retain sovereignty after 99 years on a rolling basis? Can he confirm the basis on which he is compensating the Mauritians, because it certainly was not the case that the last Government would have agreed to a remotely similar sum being paid? On this, as on so many other measures, there is an enormous gap between the negotiating position set out under the last Government and the total capitulation by Labour when they came into office.
Luke Pollard
To borrow a phrase, if the right hon. Member shows me his, I will show him mine. The whole point is that our deal is published. If he would like to go into the files and dig out his deal and publish it, we would be able to see where this deal has enhanced those protections, secured the operation of the base and got a better deal for the British people. I would be very happy if he would like to go into his files and publish the deal.
Several hon. Members rose—
Luke Pollard
I will come back to the former Deputy Prime Minister and then I will make some progress.
Sir Oliver Dowden
The Minister invites me to respond to him. He needs to appreciate that there is an enormous difference between a tough negotiating position in the British national interest and the capitulation of the Government’s deal.
Luke Pollard
I do not think the right hon. Gentleman wants to show me his draft deal, and there is a very good reason for that: this deal, this treaty and this Bill improve on that deal.
Luke Pollard
I said I would take one intervention from each side of the House. I have done that, so I will make some progress, but I am certain that Members will get another chance in a moment.
This treaty is indispensable to keeping Britain secure at home and strong abroad. It is an expression of our unbreakable defence and intelligence bonds with the United States. It strengthens and extends our power to respond to terrorists and hostile states, wherever they may be. It protects some of the world’s busiest trade routes, on which British businesses and consumers rely. It is a long-term investment in our core national interests, and it will benefit British people for generations to come.
Luke Pollard
I am going to make some progress, but I will be happy to give way in a moment.
Before I start getting into the detail, I want to recognise up front the Chagossians affected by decisions taken by Britain many years ago. We recognise in the preamble to the universal deep regret over what happened. It is acknowledged on the face of the treaty, and I know there is cross-party support for the Chagossians, although there is a range of views on the deal within the Chagossian community. I want to place that on the record right at the start of the debate—[Interruption.] I will return to the Chagossians in a moment.
Both Houses have now had the opportunity to scrutinise the treaty under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who is sitting next to me, gave evidence to three parliamentary Committees during the scrutiny period, allowing Members of this House and the other place to fully interrogate the details of the treaty. The International Agreements Committee concluded that if the treaty were not ratified, the future of the base on Diego Garcia would be at greater risk. The purpose of this Bill is to make the necessary changes to domestic law to implement the treaty, so that it can be ratified and brought into force.
Let me remind the House why we needed to secure this treaty. The Diego Garcia base is central to our national security—I know that all Members of this House will recognise that very simple fact.
Luke Pollard
I am going to make a wee bit more progress, but I always like giving way to a Luke, and I will do so in a bit—do not worry—but not quite yet.
I pay tribute to all Members of the House who have taken the time to scrutinise the treaty in detail.
Allow me to set out why it is so vital. The importance of the base cannot be overstated. The joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has played a vital role in defending the UK and its allies for over 50 years. The base plays a key role in operations that support UK forces and our allies across the middle east, east Africa and south Asia. Its deepwater port, airfield, and advanced communications and surveillance capabilities, give the UK and our allies crucial strategic capabilities, which have played a key role in missions to disrupt high-value terrorists, including Islamic State threats to the United Kingdom.
But the base on Diego Garcia was under threat. Had we not signed the treaty, we could have faced further legal rulings against us within weeks, because the negotiations begun by the Conservatives had been stayed. Further legal rulings might have included arbitrary proceedings against the UK under annex 7 of the UN convention on the law of the sea, known as UNCLOS.
Luke Pollard
In a moment. I will come to the hon. Gentleman—he should not worry.
A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. It would impact on our ability to protect the electromagnetic spectrum from interference, and impair our ability to ensure access to the base by air and sea, to patrol the maritime area around the base and to support the base’s critical national security functions.
Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)
My hon. Friend has spoken about the important capabilities of this vital US-UK base. Does he agree that it would be dangerous and counterproductive to put those capabilities at any risk—certainly if that could have happened in a matter of weeks or months?
Luke Pollard
I agree, and it is precisely the reason why the Conservative Government started the negotiations in the first place. You do not accidentally rock up one day to the Foreign Office and decide to start international negotiations; you do so because there is a clear risk to the future of the military base. That is why the Conservatives started the negotiations, why they had 11 rounds of negotiations, and why we had to conclude the deal.
Luke Pollard
As I have taken one intervention from this side of the House, I am happy to take another from the Opposition Benches.
Sir Roger Gale
The International Court of Justice ruling is not binding. It is not in law. We did not have to abide by it. Why are we giving away British territory to Mauritius and then renting it back? There was no need for us to do so. Why are we doing it?
Luke Pollard
I have a lot of time for the right hon. Gentleman. The provisions of those judgments affect the operations of the base—that is what is important here. It is also about the extension of the judgments, because other powers could be used on the basis of those judgments. That is the reason that the Conservatives started the negotiations. [Interruption.] If they would like to explain that there was a better reason that they started the negotiations—if it was not to ensure the security of this vital base—they are welcome to do so.
Luke Pollard
If the hon. Gentleman would like to explain why the Conservatives started the negotiations, I am happy to give way.
Paul Holmes
I thank the Minister for giving way, and I welcome him to his new position. He keeps saying “could”, “if” and that things “might” have happened. Will he accept that the legal judgments that have been cast down, which he is using as evidence, are not binding? Does he accept that when he talks about our deal—in other words, the last Government’s deal—he is actually being a bit duplicitous? There was no deal, because we ended the negotiations.
Luke Pollard
I think the Opposition have got their attack line sorted, but not the reasons why they started the negotiations.
Mr Speaker
Order. I did not like the word “duplicitous”, and I definitely did not like the carrying on afterwards. I am sure that “duplicitous” will not be said again today.
Luke Pollard
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will make some progress, but I will take Members’ interventions in just a wee moment. [Interruption.] The shadow Foreign Secretary will get a go in a moment, but if she wants to continue shouting at me, she is more than welcome to do so; I will make some progress in the meantime. I hope she understands that this debate is best approached in a good-natured way, and I am certain that she will be doing so, with less shouting.
Luke Pollard
As I just mentioned—the hon. Gentleman might have missed it—I will give way in a moment, but I will now make some progress.
Courts and international bodies were already making decisions that undermined our position. Others would have followed suit, taking us down a path towards making the base inoperable. This Government will not allow that to happen. There has been a wealth of misinformation on these legal points, and those who have suggested that the UK should simply ignore international law fail to recognise the true impacts of these cascading adverse rulings, which would have not only impeded our ability to control and operate the base, but would have swiftly undermined our ability to control the waters, the air and the electromagnetic spectrum on which the base relies. Such rulings would have fundamentally undermined the very capabilities that make the base so uniquely valuable to the UK and the US, our allies.
This treaty eliminates that legal threat. Under the treaty, the UK will retain all the rights and authorities necessary for full operational control of Diego Garcia. It provides for unrestricted use of the base.
Luke Pollard
In just one moment.
The treaty provides for control over the movement of all persons and goods on the base, and for control over the electromagnetic spectrum used for communications. It ensures that nothing can be built within a buffer zone of 24 nautical miles without our say so, and it delivers an effective veto on any development in the Chagos archipelago that threatens the base—something that the previous Government failed to secure in their negotiations. It prohibits foreign security forces from establishing a presence on the outer islands.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I congratulate the Minister on his new position
May I get one little moment of agreement here? The Government say they abide by the law. Given the opt-out that we had, the original judgment was specifically not found in law, because we did not allow the ICJ to rule on Commonwealth issues. The question is a matter of law, so if the Minister is suggesting to the House that other actions would have taken place, they would have been unlawful. In what world was it necessary to block off those by assuming that this was law? It was not lawful.
Luke Pollard
The Foreign Office and the Government published the Government’s legal position when the treaty was laid. That assessment says:
“The longstanding legal view of the United Kingdom is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty”
in any future sovereignty litigation. That important and long-standing view predates this Government. Again, it was one of the reasons why the Conservative Government began the negotiations and held 11 rounds.
Alex Ballinger
Does the Minister not think it is the height of hypocrisy for those in the last Government, who negotiated 85% of this treaty over 11 rounds, to wait until they were in opposition to make these claims, none of which they made during their negotiations?
Luke Pollard
I thank my hon. Friend for that. It must be quite a freeing experience, because we now know that nearly every single legacy Tory MP during the last Government—whose Ministers started the negotiations, negotiated a deal, and made statements and answered questions in this House—were not actually supporting their Front Benchers, which is what we saw, but were deeply upset with the Conservative Government. If that is their genuine position, not just their political position now, they should have raised those concerns with the Foreign Secretary at the time. They should have been clear about it, but I believe that not many of them did so, and that tells a story.
Simon Hoare
I welcome the hon. Gentleman to his promoted position. If he is asking the House to thank him for negotiating what we already have, I think our thanks will be a long time in coming, because the outcome of the negotiations is pretty poor as far as this country is concerned. Surely we have given away what is of most strategic importance in this space as we now have to notify the Mauritian Government any time we want to do anything there. We do not currently have to do that, and therefore the element of surprise has been lost.
Luke Pollard
I have a lot of time for the hon. Gentleman, but I am afraid he is incorrect about the notification criteria. There is a lot of fake news out there—which I and the Minister beside me, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, have corrected in this House before—about the suggestion that pre-notification of action is required; it is not. As is explicitly set out in the documents, we do not need to undertake pre-notification. It is established under the criteria that post-action notification for overseas bases is normal, and that would be normal for the UK and our overseas allies that have overseas bases. It is not unusual, and he will be familiar with the fact that there is further international reporting of any military action. It is important that we go on the facts. Some people are worried about the situation that the hon. Gentleman outlined, but I can reassure him that they do not need to worry about it, because what he said is not accurate.
Graham Stringer (Blackley and Middleton South) (Lab)
I sincerely congratulate my hon. Friend on his new position. I have to say to him that I have never found it a satisfactory basis for arguments or positions in this Chamber to say that those on the other side are doing it. However, I do think it is important that we are consistent. When we were in opposition and the Conservatives were in government, they made the Foreign Secretary a Member of the House of Lords, and we created about it. We shouted about how someone in a senior Cabinet position should be directly accountable to this House. We now have a super-active Attorney General making many controversial decisions. Does my hon. Friend agree with me that we should be making the case that the Attorney General should be in this House, not the other place?
Luke Pollard
That is not a matter for me in relation to this Bill, but my hon. Friend has put his views on the record, and I am certain that others on the Front Bench will have heard what he has said.
Several hon. Members rose—
Dr Luke Evans
The Minister has made it absolutely apparent that this is about the long-term security of the base, so could he explain why, under article 13, if after 99 years the Mauritians decide not to negotiate, the base will just stop. We will get first refusal, but we can easily see that the Chinese would outbid us because we in this country decide that that is not affordable. We are a hostage to fortune, and that base will crumble. He has not secured the base, he has just deferred the issue by four generations, and this House will then have to decide what to do.
Luke Pollard
It is good that the hon. Member has read the detail of the treaty. As he will know that, at the end of the initial 99-year lease, a first refusal will be offered to the United Kingdom. That is the right place to be, and that offer will mean—as he describes it, in four generations’ time—there is a decision for this House to take about what it wants to do based on the circumstances at the time. This gives us first refusal, so we can conceivably see that full control of the UK-US base on Diego Garcia could extend well beyond the 99 years I have mentioned.
Richard Tice
Does the Minister accept that we owned the freehold of the Chagos islands, and does he agree with me that in the mid-1960s we paid Mauritius £3 million in old money—some 80 million quid in today’s money—to cede all future claims over sovereignty?
Luke Pollard
The legal analysis that this Government have received, and indeed that the last Government received, showed that the position of UK sovereignty over the Diego Garcia military base was putting the base’s operation at risk. The reason why the last Government began the negotiations was to secure the continuing operation of the base, and it is the reason why we are doing so. Securing the future operation of that base is the primary concern of this Government. Indeed, as we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey), it was the primary concern of the last Government as well. That is what this deal secures, and it is really important that that is understood clearly: the base is what matters in relation to its continuing operation, and that is what this deal secures.
Luke Pollard
I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman first and then come to the hon. Gentleman.
Jeremy Corbyn
Could I ask the Minister to return to the human cost and the human story? In 1968, the Chagossians first began to be removed from Diego Garcia and the archipelago. Their treatment was abominable and disgusting by any stretch of the imagination. It needs a bit more than a statement of regret; it needs a full-hearted apology to all the Chagossian people for the way they were treated.
Since there is a legal judgment that the Chagos islands in their entirety, including the archipelago and Diego Garcia, should return to Mauritius, is this treaty not just completing work that was not properly done in the 1960s? Would the Minister confirm that the question of returning to live on the outer islands is agreed, but be clearer about the Chagos islanders who want to return to Diego Garcia, either to visit or to reside, in the future? History has treated them badly, and that needs to put it right.
Mr Speaker
Order. I always respect the right hon. Gentleman, and I could put him down to speak because of his knowledge—if he wants me to, I can certainly add him to the list—but it would be better if we had shorter interventions.
Luke Pollard
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about the way the Chagossians were treated. For those who have a copy of the treaty to hand, part of the preamble says that the parties are
“Conscious that past treatment of Chagossians has left a deeply regrettable legacy, and committed to supporting the welfare of all Chagossians”.
That is in the treaty because their treatment was unacceptable, as he has explained, and it has caused a legacy of pain and suffering for that community. It is the reason why the Foreign Office Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, has engaged so much with the different views of a range of Chagossian voices in this debate.
I will come on to answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question when the interventions slow down a wee bit but, to get ahead of that, people will be able to visit Diego Garcia. Chagossians will be able to visit Diego Garcia as part of this treaty, which they are not currently able to do, but they will not be able to reside on Diego Garcia. They will be able to do so on some of the outer islands, for which the provisions will be different, but the military base is a military base for a reason, and although people will be able to visit, they will not be able to reside there. I will come back to that in due course.
Luke Pollard
If the hon. Member does not mind, I will come back to him when I deal with the Chagossians later, but in the meantime I am happy to take the other intervention.
Lincoln Jopp
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way on the negotiations. He is making great play of the fact that the previous Government started the negotiations and that there were 11 rounds of them. Is he not aware that, in 1965, the United Nations passed a resolution saying that we should enter into conversations with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. Those negotiations went on for 17 years and ended in 1981. In 1982, we all know what happened. So it is not where we start; it is where we finish.
Luke Pollard
I say politely to the hon. Gentleman—for whom I have a lot of time, and I respect his military service—that that comparison we have seen of the British Indian Ocean Territory with the Falkland Islands is shameful. I have seen the tweets from the Conservative party asking, with a map of the Falkland Islands, “Are they next?”—a shameful comparison, which stokes the flames of division and threatens the sovereignty of such overseas territories. Let me be clear, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth from the Foreign Office has been clear at the Dispatch Box: there are no changes or implications for any other British overseas territories. Indeed, the British overseas territories support the deal. I hope that we will not need to revisit this again, but any implication that seeks to apply the experience of BIOT to other overseas territories is unhelpful to them. I am certain that the hon. Gentleman wishes to create no question marks over those overseas territories.
Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)
To go back to the point that the Minister was making earlier about control, can he confirm to the House that, contrary to the reasoned amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), we are not ceding control of the Diego Garcia military base, consistent with clause 3?
Luke Pollard
My hon. Friend is exactly right. On the reasoned amendments, my colleague who is to conclude the debate, the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, will respond to some of the details of the reasoned amendment selected by Mr Speaker. However, there is a lot of misinformation about this treaty, and I believe that in some cases it is deliberate misinformation to confuse the picture. Clearly, securing the operation of the base is the priority of this Government and of this treaty. Indeed, I believe in good faith that it was the priority of the previous Government as well, which is why they started the negotiations and held them for 11 rounds, and why we concluded them, because we agreed with the previous Government that securing the future operation of the base was the priority. That is why they started them; that is why we completed them.
Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)
The Minister has already outlined the support of the British overseas territories. Will he please remind us of who else supports the Bill? Who supports it and who else opposes it, in addition to the Conservative party?
Luke Pollard
I will come to the level of international support in a moment, but our allies back this Bill and support it strongly. When we look at which column people choose to be in—the column of those in support of the Bill, with our allies, with India, the United States and others, or the column of countries and people who oppose it—I know which side I am on. I am on the side of our allies. It is up to each of the opposition parties to choose whether they oppose the Bill and to decide which column they are in. That is a choice not for me, but for them. Only one column has our allies in, including our principal security partner, the United States. It is on the side of the treaty.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
I have long been interested in Diego Garcia, not least because I am one of the few Members of Parliament who has visited it, 40 years ago with the Defence Committee. May we get some certainty? Every time we mention the £35 billion estimate of the Government Actuary’s Department, the Minister’s colleague, the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), brushes it aside and says that he does not recognise the number. Given that we are spending a lot of taxpayers’ money on this—something we already owned—will he tell the House in detail how much the agreement will cost us over its lifetime?
Luke Pollard
I am grateful to the Father of the House for helping me to get back on track with my speech, because that is the topic of my next section. I will answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question in my remarks, but if a bit is missing, he may ask to intervene on me again.
We have heard some outrageous claims artificially boosting the costs of this deal. It will cost an average of £101 million per year in today’s money. That is an investment in today’s money of £3.4 billion over 99 years. That has been rigorously calculated, based on net present value, the methodology endorsed by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Office for Budget Responsibility. All the associated costings have been laid previously before the House and were explained in full at the time of signature.
Crucially, the exaggerated numbers that have been cited ignore inflation, the OBR deflation mechanisms and the Green Book. The Government have secured a strong deal. I remind those who criticise it that the previous Government knew full well that the status quo was dangerous and unsustainable—that is why they entered into negotiations in the first place, why they held 11 rounds of negotiations under successive Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries and Attorneys General, and why the Conservatives have never been able to provide serious alternatives to this deal.
Luke Pollard
I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman and then to my hon. Friend.
Dr Luke Evans
Can the Minister point to any other country in the world that has used NPV to give away sovereignty? As far as I am aware, there is none, so why are we pioneering that way forward?
Luke Pollard
This deal secures the base. The calculated value of the deal uses the Green Book. Other countries look at overseas bases that they rent and make the calculation based on their national accounting standards. We base it on the Green Book. Indeed, the Green Book was updated by the previous Government and has been used for such decisions for the past 20 years.
Several hon. Members rose—
Luke Pollard
I will return to the Green Book in a moment, but will give way first to my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey). I am trying to be fair to everyone.
Mr Calvin Bailey
Will the Minister place that £101 million in context? Perhaps the US or other nations have entered into such agreements. Will he make reference to the value for money that we received for the deal?
Luke Pollard
The deal represents broadly 0.2% of the defence budget. The total deal represents less than the cost of the unusable personal protective equipment acquired by the previous Government and burnt during the first year of the pandemic. A helpful comparator useful for the House to know about is the French base in Djibouti. Recently, France agreed a deal with Djibouti worth €85 million per year to rent a base. Diego Garcia is a larger—15 times larger—more capable and more strategically located military asset and, importantly, it is not next to the Chinese naval base that sits next to the French one in Djibouti. As a comparison, that is useful for people to understand in terms of present value.
Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)
Will the Minister give way?
Dr Murrison
I congratulate the Minister on his promotion, but must say how sorry I am that his first outing has been to defend this load of nonsense. What does he say to the UK Statistics Authority and to the Government Actuary’s Department, which appear to have a very different view of the costing of this to the one that he has just outlined? Is it not the case that what he has said represents a load of accounting double-speak and is dubious, to put it politely and in parliamentary terms?
Luke Pollard
That is not quite correct. Indeed, unfortunately, this is not my first outing. My first outing was at Defence questions yesterday, supporting British jobs in the defence sector and celebrating the £10 billion frigate deal that this Government achieved. My second outing was yesterday afternoon with the statement on the defence industrial strategy, making the case for more investment in British businesses. My third outing, though, is here today, securing the most vital military base that the UK and the US operate together. It is absolutely right that, as part of it, we present the costings to Parliament. It is also precisely right that those are reviewed properly by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Office for Budget Responsibility. That has happened, and that is why we have been able to use the figures with certainty. The costings are also entirely consistent with the Green Book.
The Green Book point is a useful one to dwell on for one moment, because if the policy of the Conservative party is not to use Green Book calculations for long-term investments—the same Green Book used for costings of our nuclear deterrent or pensions—I want to understand how much spending the Opposition are now committing to. In how many other examples would the Green Book no longer apply? What are their new accounting principles and what would be the increased cost to the public purse? How many more people will pay increased taxes, because of their disapplication of the Green Book principles? Those are entirely fair questions. The shadow Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Central Devon (Sir Mel Stride), signed the reasoned amendment, so surely he would be able to say how many other areas the Green Book no longer applies to. Perhaps the Opposition Front Benchers will be able to specify any other areas that they no longer believe that the Green Book applies to. We calculated our figures based on the Green Book, and that is why we are confident in them.
Several hon. Members rose—
Luke Pollard
I will take two more interventions, and then I will make some progress. I am aware that the debate is one that people want to speak in.
Lincoln Jopp
If the Minister is such a big fan of the social time discounting method that has been applied, will he tell the House where the social time discounting method has been used in other parts of Government to generate net present value?
Luke Pollard
The hon. Gentleman will know that we have published the full methodology, and that the social time preference rate is only one part of the calculation that we have used; we have also used the OBR’s inflation deflator mechanisms as well. He will also know that we published the full costings at the point of the treaty being applied.
Several hon. Members rose—
Luke Pollard
I will make a little bit more progress and then I will come back to the hon. Gentleman. [Interruption.] I can hear the shadow Foreign Secretary has gone back to her shouting again, but it is still not the politest way of running the debate. Let me keep going.
It was left to this Government to finish what our predecessors were unable to deliver. In doing so, we have secured a much stronger deal that will protect our interests well into the next century. Let me remind the House of the international context. The ruling of the International Court of Justice against the UK was a low moment for our country globally. It left our allies fearful that we might lose control of the base, it left our adversaries with opportunities to exploit, and it tarnished our reputation in the global south. In contrast, as we have heard on countless occasions from a range of colleagues, this deal has been welcomed wholeheartedly by our allies and the wider international community.
Alex Ballinger
Does the Minister agree that it is completely wrong for the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) and Reform UK to claim that President Trump did not support this deal, when he said it was a “very strong” deal that was secured for a “very long” time?
Luke Pollard
In support of the deal, the US Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth, put it well when he said:
“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the US. The UK’s (very important) deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region. We are confident the base is protected for many years ahead.”
President Trump has described the deal as “very long term” and “very strong”.
That follows a rigorous US inter-agency process, involving the whole of the US security apparatus, both under the previous Biden Administration and the current Trump Administration. This involved the Department of Defence, the National Security Council and the intelligence agencies, including the CIA. Do Conservative Members say that they do not trust the assessment of the CIA, the US and all the security apparatus? The deal secures the use of the base—they are happy with it and we are happy with it. Our Five Eyes partners recognise the benefits of the treaty for our collective security. The deal is supported by Japan, South Korea and India. It is also a deal publicly welcomed by the African Union, the UN Secretary General and the Commonwealth.
I turn now to the issue of Chagossians, which needs to be raised as well. While the negotiations were necessarily conducted on a state-to-state basis, we are alive to the diverse views of Chagossians about their future, and we have the utmost respect for their past suffering.
Luke Pollard
I will come back to the hon. Gentleman in a moment.
Although the Chagossians could not be part of the negotiations as they were conducted on a state-to-state basis, both the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), and Foreign and Commonwealth Development officials have met and had regular meetings over the past year, and stayed engaged with their diverse views. There are diverse views within the Chagossian community that are strongly held, and we have listened and respected those.
Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)
As some Members laugh about the nature of the 99 years and other Members talk about the sums of money involved, I ask all of us to look at the Public Gallery to remind ourselves that there are Chagossians here today who feel deeply aggrieved by the deal. They feel that the Foreign Office and this Government have not gone above and beyond to consult all the groups involved. The Minister said that this deal does not refer to other overseas territories, but the principle of self-determination of our overseas territories’ citizens—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
Order. Interventions need to be brief.
Luke Pollard
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s argument. It is the reason why, right up front, before I went into the military utility of the base at Diego Garcia, I wanted to speak about the Chagossians. It is important. I will come on to the engagement that the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, has had in this respect, but I understand the strength of feeling that the hon. Gentleman describes. I will come to the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin), and then I will make progress.
Sir Bernard Jenkin
I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. I am afraid my question goes back to the cost of the deal, which will hang around the Government’s neck like an albatross for the rest of their time in office. We know that the Government Actuary says the gross cost is £35 billion. Please can the Minister enlighten the House and help hon. Members to understand his own calculations? What is the meaning of “social time discounting”?
Luke Pollard
The hon. Gentleman’s intervention is not about Chagossians, but I realise I could not take his intervention earlier. He asks about the meaning of the social time preference rate in relation to the deal. Discounting in appraisal of social value is based on the concept of time preference, and that the value of goods or services today is greater than in the future. This is the discount rate that has been used in the Green Book since 2003, including in every year that his party was in Government. It was the basis on which this was there.
Several hon. Members rose—
Luke Pollard
To return to the issue of Chagossians, on which I am trying to make progress, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth and FCDO officials have met with the Chagossian communities. Under the treaty, Mauritius will now be free to carry out a programme of resettlement of the outer islands, and we have agreed a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of Chagossians and the resumption of visits to the Chagos archipelago. Over the coming months and years, we will increase the UK Government’s support to and engagement with UK Chagossians, including through UK-funded projects designed through a new contact group, informed by the Chagossians’ own wishes, which met for the very first time last week and was attended by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)
The Minister will be aware that the payment from the 1960s, referred to by the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Richard Tice), was also supposed to be spent on Chagossian welfare, but many Chagossian groups have raised the fact that that money did not go on Chagossian welfare. It went on many other things for the Mauritian Government, but not on Chagossians. What confidence does he have that this agreement is any more valid than the last one?
Luke Pollard
That is precisely why my FCDO colleagues are working very closely with Mauritius to ensure that the money that is included in the treaty, and the obligations that both the UK and Mauritius sign up to in the treaty, are fully delivered so that the Chagossians receive what this treaty says they should receive. That is a really important part of the treaty.
Jeremy Corbyn
Have the meetings undertaken by the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), included all the Chagossian groups, including the Chagos Refugees Group, based in Mauritius?
Luke Pollard
The Minister of State has met a full range of groups, including the group mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman.
Dr Murrison
The Minister is being extremely generous with his time. He was pressed earlier, but I would like to press him again on the social time discounting method. He should be able to give examples of big projects to which his Government have applied this method. Could he now do that and say why, for example, the right hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner) did not use that method when she was calculating the cost of the 10-year affordable housing programme?
Luke Pollard
I understand the argument that the right hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but I hope that he appreciates my argument that the calculation is based on the OBR’s inflation and deflation figures and on the social time preference rate. It is a figure that has been calculated and supported by the OBR, and it stands up to scrutiny. If Conservative Members are saying that they no longer wish to use the Green Book for calculating long-term investments like this, which is their inferred argument, then it is worth looking at what they are suggesting that we no longer use the Green Book to calculate—they are making an awfully large spending commitment when they suggest that.
Several hon. Members rose—
Luke Pollard
I am going to finish my remarks on Chagossians, if I may.
I hope that all Members of the House will recognise that the treaty is not just about the importance of the military base on Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia and the wider Chagos archipelago have a unique environment. I hope that protecting the world’s oceans is a point of cross-party unity in this debate, advanced across our overseas territories by the blue belt programme. The UK supports Mauritius’s ambitions to establish a marine protected area to safeguard the globally significant ecosystems in the Chagos archipelago, and the UK will provide technical support and assistance to enable that to happen. The UK and Mauritius will work with international conservation organisations to ensure implementation of science-backed strategies for conservation.
I want to conclude, but I realise that I have not been able to allow all the hon. Members to intervene who wanted to do so, so I give way to the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson).
Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
The Minister seems to be arguing about exactly how much it will cost. My constituents just see that he is giving away British territory and paying rent for it, which is completely unacceptable to them. He talks about how it is good for the global south, because they agree with it; good for other countries, because they agree with it; and good for Mauritius, because it is getting extra money. What about the British people that he, as a British Minister, is here to represent? What are they getting for this deal? They are losing territory and it is costing them money.
Luke Pollard
We are securing one of the most valuable military bases on the planet. We are securing our close intelligence relationship with the United States. We are securing a vital base for operations in the region. We are securing a vital base for allies. That is the key British objective. It was the objective stated by the previous Government, which I believe the hon. Lady was serving in at the time, when they started negotiations. If she would like to say that she vividly opposes it and wants to publish the letters she was writing to the then Government for starting negotiations, she is welcome to do so, but I do not believe that any Conservative Members really did that.
Let me say one final thing on cost. The average payment cost is 20% less than the cost of the festival of Brexit under the previous Government. We can cite statistics, but the key thing the previous Government said that their deal would secure was the future operation of the base. This deal secures the future operation of the base. It is a surprise that Conservative Members are not going to accept it.
I will now conclude, because I want everyone to have a chance to speak in this debate. Let me do so by explaining what the Bill will do in practice. The Bill, along with the secondary legislation that will follow, will allow the treaty to be ratified and to enter into force. The Bill preserves the current laws of the British Indian Ocean Territory, which will ensure the base’s continued effective operation without any disruption during the transition. The Bill also ensures that there are no changes to the rights of Chagossians to acquire British citizenship, and no changes to the status of Chagossians who currently hold British citizenship or British overseas territory citizenship. Protecting national security is one of the utmost priorities of this Government, and we are delivering on that with this deal and the Bill. The Bill is crucial to securing the critically important military base on Diego Garcia for the next century and beyond, and that is why I commend it to the House.
Priti Patel (Witham) (Con)
I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “That” to the end of the question and add:
“this House declines to give a Second Reading to the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill because it implacably opposes the United Kingdom ceding sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory to Mauritius, and is therefore opposed to the terms of the Treaty to which the Bill gives effect, in particular Article 11 of the Treaty which will mean the United Kingdom paying £34.7 billion to Mauritius, leading to tax rises in the United Kingdom to provide tax cuts in Mauritius; because the Treaty does not secure the base on Diego Garcia, in particular because it does not embody the “right to extend” the 99-year lease to which the then Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs referred in this House on 7 October 2024; because the measures in the Treaty leave the base vulnerable, and therefore represent a threat to the strategic interests of the United Kingdom; and because the Treaty does not properly protect the rights of the Chagossian people, or the future of the Marine Protected Area.”
We on the Opposition side of the House stand against Labour’s £35 billion Chagos surrender deal. Everything about this surrender deal is wrong, from the way it was negotiated behind closed doors within weeks of Labour coming to power, to the betrayal—[Interruption.] I will happily give way.
Graeme Downie
The right hon. Lady says “behind closed doors”. Will she please publish the previous Government’s negotiating position, including the cost of the deal they were looking to do?
Priti Patel
Let me be clear: I was not a member of the previous Government, but the hon. Member knows perfectly well that no one on the Conservative Benches has any authority to publish classified papers from previous Governments. [Interruption.] He might laugh about that, but those on the Labour Benches might want to apologise to Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, who actually stopped the deal. He has been grossly misrepresented this afternoon in this debate.
Priti Patel
I will return to that point in a minute.
On top of what else is wrong with this surrender deal, it is a fundamental betrayal of the British Chagossian community, whose rights have been ignored and neglected. I pay tribute to them. They have joined us today in the Gallery. If I remember rightly, this is the fifth or sixth time they have joined us to show how strongly they feel about the deal.
The deal undermines the defence and security interests of this country, and it brings a risk of the destruction of the unique marine environment and a failure to protect the future of the marine protected area. From refusing to grant this House a meaningful debate and vote on the treaty when it came, to the scenes in the Mauritius National Assembly—I hope Labour MPs watched the debates in the Assembly, where the Prime Minister was gloating about how easy it was to secure concession after concession from the Labour Government—and the deceit, misinformation and gaslighting of the British people through to the £35 billion cost to hard-working British taxpayers, which will be used to fund tax cuts in Mauritius.
Richard Tice
I am most grateful to the shadow Foreign Secretary for giving way. The Minister described the deal as an investment. Does the right hon. Lady agree that it would be helpful to educate him that a freehold is an investment and a lease is a liability?
Priti Patel
Exactly right. On top of that, there is the whole issue of the liabilities, costs and everything else that goes with it. The hon. Gentleman makes a fundamental, important point.
Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)
We talk about the cost. The TaxPayers’ Alliance has concerns about the amounts we are calculating, because they will be dependent on inflation. The calculations do not take into account market values, so the £35 billion stated by the Government Actuary’s Department will actually be more like £47 billion.
Priti Patel
Absolutely right. Of course, this Government do not like speaking about inflation for all the macro-economic reasons we know about. Inflation under this Government continues to rise, which speaks volumes about their handling of the economy.
This deal is so bad for Britain, it has left our country humiliated and weaker on the world stage. Our friends and enemies alike are laughing at the UK and Labour’s epic diplomatic failure to stand up for our national interests.
Alex Ballinger
The right hon. Lady says that this is an international problem for the UK, but does she not agree that the Americans, the Canadians, the New Zealanders, the Australians, the Indians and even the Pope support the deal? It is really important that our Five Eyes security partners are behind us.
Priti Patel
Having led Five Eyes for our country—I am very proud to have done so—it is a matter of great concern that the deal has been backed by Iran, China and Russia. I say to the hon. Gentleman that that is exactly why this is a bad deal for our country. [Interruption.] It is correct, actually, and I can point him to the references where those countries have spoken in favour of the deal.
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
I thank the right hon. Lady for giving way. I am going to give her another opportunity to confirm that she agrees with our Five Eyes allies that this is a good deal. Those are the people who back this deal.
Priti Patel
I met our Five Eyes partners at the weekend and I can tell the hon. Gentleman that they are not paying for this deal and they are not gloating about it. They see it very much as a failure of this Government. He can go and justify that to his constituents.
I congratulate the Minister on his new post and his promotion, and I welcome him to this wider discussion. He has tried his best to sell the surrender deal to the House, but the choices made by his Prime Minister, the former Foreign Secretary who is no longer in post, the Attorney General and Labour Ministers will leave Britain weaker and poorer, humiliated into giving away the sovereignty of our British territory and paying a fortune, £35 billion, to lease back a base—the point has been made a number of times—that we already own. While Labour has spent months trying to hide the details of its Chagos surrender deal and the scale of the financial cover up, it has been the Conservatives holding Labour to account constantly, exposing its shameful decision.
Mr Calvin Bailey
I come back to the right hon. Lady’s point about security. I must have misread our colleagues in the US Department of Defence when they told Defence Committee members, some of whom are sat behind her and heard the same words, that they did not understand her consternation about the deal—but let us assume that she has not put that in an incorrect way. If there was not a problem, will she please explain why her party started the negotiations?
Priti Patel
For the benefit of the House and everyone, to provide absolute clarity again, it was the Conservative Foreign Secretary who ended all discussions on this matter. I say it again: in all respect to Lord Cameron—[Interruption.]
Several hon. Members rose—
Priti Patel
No, sit down. In all respect to Lord Cameron, I think the Labour party should apologise for the gross misrepresentation that has taken place. Speaking of Foreign Secretaries, it is a real shame that the new Foreign Secretary is not here today to speak on the Bill. She could have come in, reviewed the details and got out the slide rule, which would be quite a good tool in this case. [Interruption.] I have just heard that the treaty has been signed, without it even coming to this House for debate and a vote. The Foreign Secretary could have come to the House to review the deal—she could even have scrapped it and saved the British taxpayer billions of pounds. However, like her predecessor, she has left it to junior Ministers to defend the deal.
Several hon. Members rose—
Priti Patel
I will give way once again to the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger).
Alex Ballinger
Could the right hon. Lady outline what was in the deal that the last Conservative Foreign Secretary was negotiating? The points of sovereignty and everything else were conceded by her party.
Priti Patel
I will now give way to the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Lillian Jones).
Lillian Jones (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab)
Could the right hon. Lady tell me why the US and the Five Eyes have backed this deal?
Priti Patel
They have not gone on the record to say that they have. I have already made it quite clear why it is not in our interest.
It tells us something about Labour’s priorities that within days of coming into office, the Prime Minister met the then Prime Minister of Mauritius to commit to the surrender deal. Encouraged by the Prime Minister’s obsession with left-wing activism and distorted views of international law, and advised by one of the Prime Minister’s best friends and supporters—one could even say his cheerleader—Mauritius knew it was on to a winner negotiating with this naive, foolish and Britain-hating Labour Government. True to form, instead of standing up for Britain’s interests, Labour rushed to accept the advisory opinion of a foreign court that few had heard of, and swiftly agreed to Britain’s surrender of sovereignty.
Dr Caroline Johnson
Is my right hon. Friend aware of any of our allies who think that the insecure and expensive leasehold deal that we have now is better than the freehold sovereignty and security that we had before?
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend makes a good point. I have not heard our Five Eyes allies speak about it being a good way of effectively securing any national interest whatsoever—the concept of leasehold is completely wrong.
Dr Murrison
The Government are clearly not going to take any lessons from us, but I wonder whether they would listen to one of their own. Lord West of Spithead was a Security Minister under the previous Labour Administration and then First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, so he knows a thing or two. He has said very clearly that in his expert opinion, this deal is “irresponsible” and that it will damage our strategic interests. Who are we to believe: the Labour party or my old boss, Lord West?
Priti Patel
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right.
There is something fundamental here about the negotiations—I think the Minister alluded to this earlier on. The Government were effectively just listening to leftie lawyers and advisory judgments and acting because they were frightened that their left-wing lawyer friends would pursue even more lawfare against us. The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) told the Foreign Affairs Committee:
“Our view is that, without this deal, it was inevitable that Mauritius would pursue and secure a legally binding judgment against the UK. Indeed, legally binding provisional measures could also have been secured within weeks”.
The Government have never—not once—detailed what the legal threat is beyond hiding behind spurious aspects of international law.
I have to say that it is a defeatist attitude that Labour has taken. Britain is Europe’s leading defence power, a pillar of NATO in Europe and a P5 member of the UN Security Council with a right of veto. We are not bound by advisory judgments pursued by Mauritius at the ICJ—which, by the way, included a judge who is a member of the Chinese Communist party. By being vocal in conceding defeat and unwilling to defend Britain from a barrage of lawfare, Labour has let Britain’s standing on the world stage plummet, and its decisions will have serious consequences for us.
Let us talk about the money. We all know that this Labour Government are big spenders when it comes to splashing about taxpayers’ money, and the costs of Labour’s surrender treaty are astronomical at £34.7 billion—a figure which, by the way, we had to drag out of the Government Actuary’s Department because Labour Ministers repeatedly refused to disclose the cash payments when asked. In fact, because the payments are linked to inflation, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool) has pointed out, guess what? The cash cost could be even higher. That means higher taxes for our constituents, which is nothing for those on the Labour Benches to crow about.
Peter Swallow
The right hon. Lady comes to this Chamber claiming that this deal has astronomical costs and all that, but what she will not put on the record is the cost of the deal that the Conservatives were negotiating. She can say all she wants about that being a matter for the public record, but she needs to be clear with the British public.
Priti Patel
I will be absolutely crystal clear for the benefit of this House and for Hansard, too: there was no deal whatsoever. The Government can put out as much fake news as they wish and carry on pretending and crowing that there was a deal, but there was no deal. It was the last Conservative Foreign Secretary who stopped any negotiations and discussions, and they were stopped—Lord Cameron himself has said that. On that basis alone, I think Labour Members should all apologise to Lord Cameron, and perhaps even correct the record.
Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)
I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. Does it not speak volumes about the real nature of this Government that despite facing a fiscal crisis and potentially a crisis in their finances—they want more money spent on health and benefits, because that is what they do—their priority is listening to leftie lawyers pontificating about decolonisation and committing billions of pounds of long-term liabilities to give away and lease back something that we already own? Does that not say something about the extraordinarily myopic preoccupations of this Government? Of course, we told the Foreign Office to get lost.
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It speaks volumes about the priorities that this Labour Government—socialist to the core in how they like to spend public money—are focused on. Come November, when the Chancellor has her Budget, there will be no point crowing about the past and blaming other people, other countries and international forces and factors. This is a fiscal mess made by this Labour Government with this utterly scandalous, appalling and reckless financial giveaway.
Dr Luke Evans
The Minister challenged the Opposition and the shadow Chancellor about our position on net present value, but the reason is that the use of NPV is unprecedented. It is used for commercial deals that the Government make and is standardised for that alone, not for international agreements on sovereignty. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we will not change on net present value, which has its place in commercial deals but not in giving away sovereignty?
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend is absolutely right; it is absolutely shameful. I come back to the fundamental principle that this House will have to consider: at a time when hard-pressed British taxpayers are struggling, with significant tax rises and the share of the tax burden on the public going up, the Government will have to have a good, hard look at themselves and justify this appalling cost to their own constituents.
Joy Morrissey (Beaconsfield) (Con)
My right hon. Friend made an excellent point earlier about the underlying socialism in this agreement. The initial agreement—[Laughter.] No, let me just clarify: the initial agreement from May very clearly says it is about apologising for the colonisation of Mauritius and that it is about the regrettable legacy. Everything is laid out: it is about apologising for our British history and heritage. It is not about being proud of protecting our sovereignty, protecting the realm and protecting our security. We should not be saying that we will apologise and pay out because we feel bad about everything that we have done. That is the difference between the Conservatives and the Labour party, and that is why we are taking such objection to this Bill.
Priti Patel
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I say gently to some Labour Members, who are laughing and sneering at a fellow Member of this House when she is making a very valid point, that they are simply being disrespectful. It says a great deal. The hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) can laugh as much as he wants. The British public see Labour as a party that does not stand up for Britain and British values, and that is not something to be laughed or sneered at.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Just to settle this whole argument about net present value, the reason it simply cannot be used for a long-term treaty obligation is that it is necessary to make a really heavy estimation of what will happen socially and economically in that area. It is just about possible to use some of that in the UK, where the Government control certain aspects, which they will not control after this treaty is signed. That is why it has been recommended that it not be used for long-term effects when not within the UK. That is why the actuarial department advised going for the total amount, not this net present value.
Paul Holmes
My right hon. Friend is concerned about the cost of the deal, but does she also share my concern about the way in which the deal was negotiated? The Prime Minister of Mauritius has said that only the Prime Ministers of our respective countries were in the room; officials were asked to leave the room, so there are no records of what was discussed. Is that how a responsible, democratic Government should show transparency when negotiating on the international stage?
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend is absolutely right; at the heart of this is transparency about negotiations, including fiscal negotiations.
Graeme Downie
The right hon. Lady talks about transparency, but once again we have not heard a word from her about what her Government’s position would have been, so there has been no transparency at all. They went through 11 rounds of negotiations. If she did not believe a deal was possible, surely she would have stopped after two or three. She knew that a deal was vital to UK security interests, but her Government could not conclude it.
Priti Patel
The hon. Member, who was laughing and sneering at fellow colleagues earlier—that is simply not acceptable—should have listened to what I said. I will restate it for the House: there was no deal done whatsoever.
Priti Patel
I will not. As we have already heard from Conservative Members, we have rarely seen the methodology that the Government are now hiding behind used for any spending announcements. When the Minister winds up, I wonder if he will commit to presenting all future spending decisions using this methodology—or perhaps he could explain why the Government have singled out this large and embarrassing expenditure to be formulated in this way. That is down to the fact that they are covering up a colossal cost.
Sir Roger Gale
The point has been made over and over in this discussion that we are giving away something that we did not have to give away, and are renting it back—and the British taxpayer is paying for it. Last week, I asked the Leader of the House how much this was going to cost. She said,
“alongside legislation we publish all the necessary documents, including the costings, which we have been transparent about.”—[Official Report, 4 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 453.]
I regard the Minister as a friend, but to say the least, his figures have been opaque. Let me ask one simple question that my right hon. Friend might know the answer to: how much is the United States contributing to this deal?
Priti Patel
I thank my right hon. Friend for his contribution, and for pursuing this line of question in the Chamber with other Ministers. He is absolutely correct. We know that the United States of America is not contributing to the cost of the deal. The cost is solely on the British taxpayer. [Interruption.] Operational costs of the base are different; that is not in this treaty or this Bill.
The Bill represents a series of measures, not the treaty in its entirety. The Government blocked this House from voting on the treaty during the 21-day process provided for in the Constitutional Reform and Government Act 2010. Last week, when asked at oral questions why we were not getting a vote on the costs, the then Foreign Secretary—now Deputy Prime Minister—proclaimed that there would be a vote, but the Government have not seen fit to put forward a motion. As the explanatory notes to the Bill confirm, the Bill will not authorise expenditure. That is not acceptable. We will table amendments to the Bill to hold the Deputy Prime Minister to his word and ensure that this House has a rightful say over the payments to Mauritius.
Let us be clear: unless there is a direct vote on the costs, Labour will have cheated Parliament and Britain out of having a say on the financial implications of the £35 billion that British taxpayers are being forced to pay a foreign Government. That expenditure means higher taxes for British taxpayers and less spending for British people across all constituencies around the country. Shamefully, this is all to fund tax cuts, debt reduction and new investment in not our country, but Mauritius. I will gladly give way to any Minister or Government Back Bencher who wants to explain why it is acceptable to deny Parliament a vote on this £35 billion of expenditure, and why the money should be given to a foreign Government, not invested in this country. If they need to check that with Rachel from accounts or Lord Hermer, I am sure they can do so before the end of the debate. Labour giving away British taxpayers’ money to a foreign Government to rent land that we already own is reckless and irresponsible.
Dr Caroline Johnson
My right hon. Friend is making a great speech. She says that this is a reckless giving away of British money. Unlike many of the other things we have had to watch Labour do, such as take the winter fuel allowance away from old people and heavily tax charities, hospices and others, this cannot be undone. Once the money is given away to a foreign country, there is nothing that any future Government can do to claim it back easily.
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend is right. At the end of the day, the real judge of this will be the British people.
Priti Patel
No, I am answering my hon. Friend. The real judge will be the British people. How will they view a Labour Government giving away £35 billion to a foreign Government? That money could be spent in this country. It is simply not acceptable at all.
Priti Patel
I am going to make progress, and I have taken plenty of interventions.
The Minister touched on the base at Diego Garcia, which is one of the most important military assets in the world. It gives us and our US allies significant global reach, but the treaty undermines that position, and the Bill contains no measures to mitigate its effects.
Priti Patel
I will not; I have given way plenty of times to the hon. Gentleman.
The surrender of sovereignty means that Britian will be a rule taker, taking the laws, rules and commands of Mauritius, and that restricts and impedes base operations. For example, Mauritius has signed up to the Pelindaba treaty, banning the stationing and storage of nuclear weapons; no Minister has been able to provide a definitive answer when questioned about how that may impact our security and defence, once the UK is no longer sovereign in, or able to exercise sovereign rights over, the Chagos islands and Diego Garcia.
Under the terms of the treaty, we are bound to notify Mauritius of various activities relating to our use of the base, including operations from the base against that country, and movements of our allies’ vessels. Despite heavy questioning, at no point have Ministers explained in detail how the notifications will work, and who will have access to the information.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
The shadow Foreign Secretary is coming to the nub of the matter. This is about the future security of the world, including the United Kingdom. We are arriving at a situation where the sovereign power is a signatory to an empty nuclear treaty that prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons anywhere within the ambit of the countries that are signatory to that treaty. How could we even use this base for our nuclear submarines?
Priti Patel
The hon. and learned Member is absolutely right. That is why it was important to have a debate on the Floor of the House when the treaty came together, but we did not have one. The treaty brings into question everything about security, including our ability to be as strong and secure as we need to be.
It will come as no surprise to Members to hear that now that our sovereignty over the base is being surrendered, our enemies are queuing up to—guess what?—make friends with Mauritius. Just days before the surrender treaty was signed, Russia agreed a new partnership agreement with Mauritius that includes marine research. That so-called “marine research” conducted by Russia could take place just a handful of miles away from our base. Mauritius has also been courted extensively by Iran and China for further partnerships in a range of other areas. Despite the warnings, this inept Labour Government have failed to act to safeguard our interests.
Sir Bernard Jenkin
On the previous question of how much operational independence we will really have, can my right hon. Friend comment on point 4 of annex 1 of the agreement, entitled “Mauritian Security Review”, which requires us to consult Mauritius before any
“construction or emplacement of any maritime installation”
or
“any proposal for development in the land territory of the Chagos archipelago”?
It also states that Mauritius shall conduct a security review, and that our permission to carry out works is dependent on the outcome of the Mauritius security review. We do not have operational independence under this treaty. It then goes through the dispute process, and there is no decisive way of deciding anything unless there is agreement between the two Prime Ministers. It is a completely inadequate agreement.
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend has summed it up: the whole process is completely inadequate, with no transparency and no dispute resolution mechanisms. This is just too messy, given that we are talking about the defence and security of the country. Again, this is exactly why we should have been able to debate the treaty on the Floor of the House and give it the scrutiny that is required. Let us hope that the Prime Minister and his lefty lawyers are not involved in the dispute resolution mechanisms, because Britain will come out worst. As we know, when Labour negotiates, Britain loses.
At the press conference announcing the signing of the treaty, it was interesting to hear the Prime Minister almost gaslighting critics of the treaty by comparing them—that is, us—to China, Russia and Iran as he arrogantly declared his views and position. On 4 and 11 June in the House, he said that the treaty “has been opposed by our adversaries, Russia, China and Iran”. We know that 6,000 miles away, at the celebration party press conference in Mauritius, China was singled out by the Mauritian Government for praise. According to the press release, Deputy Prime Minister Paul Bérenger noted that China’s
“unwavering support played a critical role in the international recognition of Mauritian sovereignty.”
A few days later, the Chinese ambassador issued Mauritius with “massive congratulations” on securing the surrender of the Chagos islands. This summer, the Mauritian Government published a press release saying that the President expressed “gratitude” for China’s “unwavering support” for Mauritius’s sovereignty claim over the Chagos archipelago.
Iran has also been supportive of the Mauritian claim for the Chagos islands, with its ambassador saying earlier this year:
“The Islamic Republic of Iran has always supported Mauritius’s position regarding the Chagos issue. So, Chagos belongs to the Mauritian people. We support its return and have made many efforts in the past toward that goal.”
As for Russia, when meeting Putin, the former Mauritian President Vyapoory stated:
“We appreciate the support of Russia in our claim for our sovereignty on Chagos.”
Ministers have been asked in parliamentary questions for the evidential basis of the Prime Minister’s claims about the apparent opposition of those three countries who threaten our interests, but they have not come forward with it. When the Minister responds, will he finally explain the grounds behind the Prime Minister’s malicious, almost spurious, remarks, or apologise for those claims? All the evidence shows that, far from opposing the surrender treaty, our enemies actually back it, which means that Britain is weaker.
Priti Patel
I will not. I know that the hon. Gentleman will speak later.
I turn to the British Chagossians. As well as undermining our security and defence interests and ripping off British taxpayers, Labour has betrayed the British Chagossians. Members on both sides of the House have recognised and acknowledged that the Chagossian community has faced injustice and hardship. Their removal from the Chagos islands is a source of great and profound regret. I pay tribute to the Chagossian community in Britain for their campaigning, and to Henry Smith, our former colleague as Member of Parliament for Crawley, who kept pursuing and raising the issue, and who fought in the House for their rights. As a result, we gave the community new rights in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which Labour voted against. I hope that the Minister can give assurances that those rights will not be undermined by the citizenship measures in clause 4 of the Bill. Because of that past, it is so important that any decisions made about the future of the Chagos islands are made with the community in mind, and that their needs are fully respected.
Ten years ago, when the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), was the Opposition’s spokesman, he said:
“The people of Chagos must be at the heart of decisions about their future…the UK Government have a fundamental moral responsibility towards the islanders that will not go away.”—[Official Report, 28 October 2015; Vol. 601, c. 192WH.]
But this treaty fails them. I have met the community many times and heard their concerns and frustrations; I think everyone in the House will acknowledge their frustrations. They feel that they have been ignored throughout the process, and that the treaty has no guarantees for them. There is a £40 million Chagossian trust fund that UK taxpayers will capitalise, but the UK and the British Chagossians will have no control or say over how it will be used or controlled by the Government of Mauritius. I highlight that point because the Chagossians feel strongly—they fundamentally know—that they cannot trust the Government of Mauritius. The Bill and the treaty make no provision for the British Chagossians to benefit from the trust fund, or be involved in its governance; nor are they guaranteed any right to visit the Chagos islands. Those decisions will be controlled by Mauritius once sovereignty is surrendered.
Hon. Members across the House who have spoken up for British Chagossians know of their fears. It is right that I amplify those fears, or at least raise them in the House, because their voices have not been heard. Now is the time for them to be counted, for their voices to be heard, and, importantly, for their rights to be defended.
Another damning indictment of the Bill and the treaty is the way in which they fail to safeguard the 640,000 sq km marine protected area. Its unique biodiversity enables important marine research to be conducted. In just the last few weeks, a study that included researchers from Exeter and Heriot-Watt universities and the Zoological Society of London was published. It noted:
“Our results provide clear evidence for the value of the Chagos Archipelago VLMPA for protecting a diverse range of large and mobile marine species.”
Yet all we have heard thus far from the Government is warm words about intentions to continue with an MPA. No details have been published.
Dr Luke Evans
On the conservation point, is it not that the case has already been tested in UNCLOS between 2010 and 2015, when it was said that we could not go ahead with a marine protection area for this British territory because we had not consulted properly with Mauritius? At that point, it was also determined that UNCLOS could not rule on sovereignty as that was not its basis. So we found out not only about the sovereignty side, but that we cannot protect the islands on the environmental part. What guarantees does my right hon. Friend see in the treaty that we will have ecological protections in the area, given those findings?
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend is absolutely correct about UNCLOS and in highlighting the insecurities and serious challenges. It may be forthcoming, but at this stage we do not know what levels of protection will be provided or will continue. We do not know what level of resource Mauritius will put into the MPA or what the UK will contribute.
Dr Murrison
My right hon. Friend is making a powerful case. The answer is none, because Mauritius has no navy and practically no coastguard. With which means will Mauritius defend a territory that is hundreds of kilometres away? It cannot possibly do so.
Priti Patel
My right hon. Friend has summed it up, and it is not just that Mauritius is unable to do so; it clearly will not be interested in this whole area.
It is important for the House to reflect on that point. After decades of investment in and support for the MPA, there is now a major issue of jeopardy. We do not know at this stage what the governance arrangements will be. In fact, in response to questions about that from my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton (Alison Griffiths) at the Environmental Audit Committee in April, the Minister, Baroness Chapman, said:
“It will belong to the Government of Mauritius, and they will make decisions about how they protect the seas around the Chagos archipelago… You want more detail than we have… We and the Government of Mauritius want to see the marine protected area continue, but I do not know what the precise nature of it will be.”
What we do know is that the Fisheries Minister of Mauritius, Dr Boolell, is eyeing up the marine protected area to exploit it. He boasted to his National Assembly on 7 February that he wants to issue fishing and trawler licences. He declared that
“what stops me tomorrow to say that I am going to give fishing licence for any fishing trawler company or any fishing vessel to go to any part of Chagos”.
This issue has been raised extensively in the Foreign Affairs Committee, with no Minister being able to give any assurances. If the Bill passes and the treaty is implemented, the unique marine environment will be put at risk.
I will briefly touch on two areas. Another part of the Chagos surrender Bill that should concern the House is its Henry VIII clause. Clause 5 grants the Government a free hand, with little or no parliamentary scrutiny, decisions or authority, to
“make any provision that appears to his Majesty to be appropriate as a result of the Treaty”.
That could mean the Government making further concessions to the Government of Mauritius. With the treaty making provision for a joint commission with the UK and Mauritius, that could take place without anyone in this House having any sight or knowledge of it. We need a clear commitment from the Minister in his winding-up speech what those measures will be or will he rule out on the Floor of the House that any further concessions will be made to the Government of Mauritius?
In conclusion, this Bill, its six shameful clauses and the treaty it partly implements are a damning indictment of the failures of this Labour Government. It surrenders sovereignty of a land we own to a foreign Government, increasingly allied and growing closer to countries that are not our allies and which pose the biggest threats to our national security and defence. It binds the hands of British taxpayers into paying £35 billion—a surrender tax. It puts the interests and demands of a foreign country and left-wing lawyers above our national interests. It leaves our country poorer, weaker and less able to defend our interests from foreign threats and it undermines our standing in the world.
Labour’s Chagos surrender deal is an epic failure of diplomacy and an expensive humiliation for Britain. When Labour negotiates, Britain loses. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition will continue to stand up for Britain’s national interests and our defence and security. We will fight for our sovereignty, we will defend British taxpayers by opposing Labour’s surrender tax and, we will make the case for the British Chagossians to have their rights safeguarded and the marine protected area preserved. We will oppose this Bill and fight this treaty every step of the way.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)
I rise to speak on the Bill and proposed agreement, with particular focus on its defence implications. Given substantial other ongoing work and the fact that other Committees have looked into it, this is not an issue that our Defence Committee has investigated thus far. Let us not be under any illusion, however: this is a matter of strategic importance, financial prudence and moral responsibility.
The British Indian Ocean Territory and in particular the Diego Garcia military base have long served as a cornerstone of our defence and security capabilities, not just for the UK but for our allies in the US and across the Five Eyes community. That is why having their stated support for this deal, in addition to that of India and others, is so vital. The base’s role in disrupting threats to the UK, supporting counter-terror operations against ISIS and protecting us against hostile states must continue. Including the management of the electromagnetic spectrum satellite used for communications and the prevention of other powers operating on the outer islands without permission is vital for countering hostile interference. It is not just a diplomatic formality; it is a strategic firewall against encroachment by hostile states.
Maintaining US and UK autonomy on the base cannot be overstated. I note the Government position is that Mauritius will be expeditiously informed of activities. However, I look for reassurance that we do not need to provide Mauritius with advance warning about our operations. I would therefore welcome clarification on that point from the Minister to guarantee that all current and future operations can continue unimpeded.
Dr Evans
Given the importance of the Chagos islands to our defence, has the hon. Gentleman’s Committee thought about even doing a review into the Chagos islands and what this would look like? That way, such questions could be addressed directly in a decent period of time—we only have four or five hours tonight—and he could spend several weeks looking into the matter. Is that something he and his Committee would consider?
Mr Dhesi
As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, given that various other Committees have been looking into this and that it has been extensively debated on the Floor of the House, and considering the other work that the Committee is undertaking, including an inquiry launched this week into the Afghan data breach, that is why we have not looked into this matter. However, I will give way to the Minister, who I hope will give me some sort of reassurance.
Luke Pollard
To reassure my hon. Friend, as I did the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) earlier, we are not required to give pre-notification of any military activities to Mauritius. That is important, because some people are erroneously suggesting that we are. That is not correct; we do not have to give pre-notification.
Richard Tice
We have heard today that this deal—this supposed investment that is actually a liability—is essential to the defence of our realm. Yet the Defence Committee has not studied that investment or liability. I think the British people have a right to know why not.
Mr Dhesi
I have already stated, on two occasions, the various reasons why our Committee has not looked into this particular aspect. The matter has been given extensive airing in various other contexts, and we have been given assurances that there will be no fettering of our ability to operate from the base in the defence and security of the UK and its allies. I also point out to the hon. Member that during the Defence Committee’s recent visit to our most trusted and closest ally, the US, during various discussions and on numerous occasions when we raised the matter with very senior individuals in the US, whether on Capitol hill, in the State Department or at the Pentagon, they were supportive of the deal. I am sure that other Committee Members, when they discuss this, can attest to that.
Sir Roger Gale
We have been given an assurance from the Front Bench that no advance notice will need to be given about operational arrangements from the base. However, my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) earlier indicated that there had to be Mauritian Government approval for the construction of facilities. How can we have the operational facilities without the construction of the facilities that back them up?
Mr Dhesi
The right hon. Member makes a strong point. Indeed, I hope that in the Minister’s winding-up speech, just as we have had clarification that we do not need to give advance warning about the operations of the US and our forces, he can give clarification about construction as well.
On the matter of cost, which is a concern rightly raised by hon. Members across the House, it is important to be transparent and precise. From my previous briefings with Ministers—I am grateful to both the Defence Minister and the Foreign Office Minister on the Front Bench for their time—I understand that that will be an average of £101 million annually over 99 years, with the United States covering all defence operations.
Sir Bernard Jenkin
I should clarify that what I quoted from article 4 of the treaty does not apply directly to Diego Garcia; it only applies to an area beyond Diego Garcia and for the development of land territory that is on the archipelago but beyond Diego Garcia. I should have made that clear. I inadvertently misled the House, and I apologise for doing so.
Mr Dhesi
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that clarification and for setting the record straight. I did not want to say anything on the Floor of the House that could inadvertently have misled the House, but my understanding was that all our operations regarding the Diego Garcia military base would be unfettered, so I am glad that he has given that clarification. No doubt I would have had to do more bedtime reading to catch up on exactly what was in the treaty.
While this arrangement will ensure that our strategic interests are protected, we must ensure that the cost does not spiral and that proper oversight is given to all the financial implications. Security and cost are not the only factors that we must weigh in evaluating this deal, however. We must also address the rights of the Chagossian people, including those who are in the Gallery today. I have raised these issues on the Floor of the House with the then Foreign Secretary, and I again urge the Government to ensure that all parts of this deal are carried out in line with international law and with full respect for the dignity and rights of the Chagossian community. I would welcome any comments from the Minister on ensuring that Chagossian voices will be heard.
One of the issues raised by the Chagossians, which the shadow Foreign Secretary also mentioned, is the protection of the Chagos archipelago, which is home to one of the most ecologically rich marine environments on the planet. I welcome the creation of a protection zone. This represents a significant step forward in our shared commitment to environmental conservation and biodiversity protection. It also provides a framework for scientific co-operation, marine research and community engagement, particularly with the Chagossian diaspora, whose cultural and historical ties to the islands must be respected.
I welcome the guarantees and stability that this agreement brings, but it is imperative that long-term stability is achieved and secured into the future. In an increasingly complex global landscape, we must act as a responsible global leader, ensuring that our national security and strategic interests are never compromised.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Calum Miller (Bicester and Woodstock) (LD)
I thank the Minister for his statement and congratulate him on his new appointment. On 3 November 2022, the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly), as Conservative Foreign Secretary, stated that
“the UK and Mauritius have decided to begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)/Chagos archipelago.”—[Official Report, 3 November 2022; Vol. 721, c. 27WS.]
On 7 November 2024, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), as Labour Foreign Secretary, made a statement to confirm that the UK and Mauritius had concluded those negotiations. On that same day, I met the group of UK-based Chagossians who came to Parliament to protest against the deal, which had been reached without their involvement. Maxwell Evenor said to me in desperation that his people had no state and no power. He said:
“All we have is our voice but that has been silenced for so long.”
The views of the many Chagossians living here in the UK have not changed since.
The right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel) peppered her speech with breathless hyperbole, but let me speak plainly. There has been consistency between the approaches of the last Government and this Government—[Interruption.] Conservative Members do not want to accept that fact, but it is true. Both Governments accepted that legal challenges, not only in the International Court of Justice, were a threat to the UK’s vital security interests. Both Governments pursued negotiations over the sovereignty of the Chagos archipelago, with the goal of securing legally our use of Diego Garcia, and both Governments failed to protect the interests of Chagossians in their negotiations with Mauritius. The reasoned amendment tabled in my name and those of Liberal Democrat Members today seeks to address those facts. From the very start, the process of securing the treaty to be given effect by this Bill has been characterised by this glaring omission.
There has been an abject failure by successive Governments properly to consult the Chagossian people or to ensure that their rights were protected in the final settlement. We recognise and support the importance of abiding by international law and believe that it is in the UK’s interest to negotiate with Mauritius, given the risk—which the Conservatives and Reform now appear recklessly to be ignoring—that a judgment against the UK in any court would present a threat to our security interests in Diego Garcia, but the treaty that has been agreed tramples over the Chagossians. Not only does it fail to provide adequate protection of their rights; it also fails entirely to establish a right to return or a programme of resettlement of the islands for the Chagossians. For much of their history, the Chagossians have been denied consultation on who governs them and their right to self-determination. We now fear that this treaty, if enacted, will only reinforce that historical legacy. Mauritius—which, let us remember, lies over 1,300 miles from the archipelago—will become the new colonial master of the islanders.
I also have grave concerns about the degree to which this deal will genuinely support the UK’s security over the long term. There is a concerning lack of detail regarding the extension of the Diego Garcia military base lease beyond its initial 99-year term. Nor does the treaty appear to reckon seriously with generating guarantees or protections against encroachment by revisionist powers such as China, which could threaten and undermine UK interests in the region.
The unique maritime environment around the Chagos archipelago is one of the most ecologically valuable regions on earth. It is home to an extraordinary range of wildlife and acts as a sanctuary for many threatened species. I fear that the treaty does not afford adequate protection to this precious environment. Protecting and restoring it is not only vital for global marine conservation; it also offers unique opportunities to deepen our understanding of natural ecosystems. Resettlement of the Chagossians could have provided a model for community-led conservation on the islands. Instead, short-sighted opposition to Chagossian proposals and the controversial marine protected area designation squandered that opportunity.
Finally, there is the cost of this deal. The Government shrouded this in secrecy when they first announced it, and then appeared to reopen it to appease the new Mauritian Prime Minister. UK taxpayers are right to ask how Ministers justify the sums involved at a time when public finances are so stretched in the UK.
The treaty in this Bill fails to put in place the necessary oversight and accountability mechanisms over the very large sums involved and the annual payments to Mauritius and the Chagossian trust fund. The Government elected not to provide time for a debate and vote in this Chamber on the treaty, and I regret that Members were not given that opportunity. We are also awaiting the statement on the rights of Chagossians, which the noble Lord Collins promised would be discussed in both Houses before ratification. I hope the Minister will clarify when this will be scheduled. In the meantime, for all the reasons that I have set out and are set out in the reasoned amendment in my name and in the names of the Liberal Democrat colleagues who have signed it, I believe that this Bill to give effect to the treaty should not receive Second Reading.
Peter Lamb (Crawley) (Lab)
I congratulate the Minister on his appointment, and thank Ministers for the time they have given me to raise with them matters in relation to this Bill and for the responses they have provided to my questions.
I can see no logical reason why the Government would go through the painful process of bringing this Bill to the Floor of the House today if they were not 100% convinced that it was in the UK’s national security interests. However, I am afraid that I must vote against the Government today because I do not believe that their concerns, no matter how important they might be, give us the right to override the Chagossian people’s right to self-determination. We cannot vote to give away these islands, because they are not our islands to give away in the first place.
I know that many Members have taken an interest in the plight of the Chagossian people over the years, and that in the last year, hopefully, many more have learned more about their history and their circumstances, so I will recount the key points briefly. The first recorded contact with the islands was from those in the Maldives, but its modern history begins with France, which bound the islands together in a colonial administration with Mauritius. This is the only basis on which the modern state of Mauritius makes any claim on the islands.
In the late 18th century, the UK claimed the colonies from the French and planted coconut plantations on the islands. We used slave labour to do that, and it was among those slaves that the unique island culture began to develop. In 1965, the UK divided that colonial entity, granting the modern state of Mauritius independence and at the same time, in return for financial compensation, agreeing to give up any future claim on the islands. However, we had already come to the determination at that point that this would be a convenient location for a military base, jointly run with the United States. I believe that in that initial deal we got a discount on Polaris for providing the site.
In order to facilitate the base, the decision was taken to forcibly remove the islanders from the archipelago—something that began under a Labour Government but concluded under a Conservative Government. Official documentation from the time stated that the base was too important to the UK for “Tarzans” and “Man Fridays” to get in the way, and made it clear that the islanders must be referred to only as Mauritians or Seychellois, recognising the opposition that they would face—even in the 1960s—if it was known that the displacement of an entire people was taking place in the interests of national security.
The islanders were deposited on Mauritius and the Seychelles—islands of a different culture—without a penny to their name, and for decades were abandoned by the British Government, left in poverty and facing discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity. For years, they have fought for their rights, and they have won some concessions in that time, including the right to UK citizenship, with most British Chagossians choosing to set up their home in Crawley. That move came with enormous challenges—a point to which I will circle back in due course.
I have known and worked alongside members of the British Chagossian community for almost two decades. As council leader, I promised them that as a part of Crawley’s community, it was my job to be their voice to Government, not the other way around. It is that promise that leads me to vote against this deal today.
It is true to say that there are Chagossians who enthusiastically support the deal, just as there are those who desperately oppose it—that is the same with any community on absolutely any issue—but what is not disputed is that the islands belong to the Chagossians, and that it is for that people and that people alone to decide the future of their homeland. We have not given them that chance to decide their future. Until every Chagossian has had the chance to have their say, I cannot support this deal.
Dr Evans
The hon. Member is making a powerful point. We heard an impassioned defence not to bring the Falkland Islands or other British overseas territories into this, but Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands have self-determination, voted for by their people. Is it his thesis that that will apply for the Chagossians, and therefore they would make the determination whether to be British or, indeed, go to the Mauritians on that basis?
Peter Lamb
It is incredibly unfortunate that the Chagossians have not been given that opportunity—that is my view. Had we given them that opportunity, whatever the outcome, I would have had no problem honouring that because we are talking about their land; it is not our land.
Jeremy Corbyn
The hon. Member is speaking very well on behalf of his constituents. He will acknowledge that the argument for Chagossians having a right of nationality and abode in Britain was hard fought by many of the Chagossians, and some of us who were here at the time were pleased to support them in that. Yes, there are differences of opinion among Chagossians, including the Chagos refugee association, which, broadly speaking, supports this treaty, but does he not think that it is time to bring all the communities together and recognise that they have achieved an enormous amount in gaining the right of return and the right of residence, at least on the archipelago?
Peter Lamb
There is an enormous challenge, as I am sure the right hon. Member is aware of from his many years working with the group, in the number of disparate voices. Crawley borough council had taken it on itself to work with the different community groups, helping them to come together and form a coherent voice, out of the belief that they will only ever secure what they are all seeking by having one coherent, democratic voice for the community. Unfortunately, the deal emerged during the course of that process so there has not been that opportunity, and its timing has, to an extent, driven a rift through that community.
I am not naive; I am certain that the Bill will proceed today, so let me turn to the question, “What next?” Although mention of the Chagossians is made in the wording of the deal, I remain concerned, as other Members have alluded to, that there are gaps that leave the Chagossian people at risk. While there is the option for Chagossians to be allowed by the Mauritian Government to return to the islands, there is no requirement in the deal that that happens. There is no guarantee that any Chagossian who does return to the archipelago will not face restrictions that prevent permanent habitation, even at a subsistence level of economic activity. There is no guarantee at this time that the trust fund that is being created will be in the control of the Chagossians and used exclusively to address the consequences of their forcible removal from the islands. There is no guarantee that returning Chagossians will not face a 10-year prison sentence for questioning Mauritian territorial integrity through taking on British citizenship.
I know that many remain upset that Diego Garcia remains off limits for permanent habitation, with a view that some creativity could be used to enable rehabilitation without affecting security, particularly given the prolonged period in which asylum seekers have been present on that island. I say all this because I want to urge Ministers to continue to engage on these matters with the Mauritian Government to give the Chagossians certainty over their place in this deal.
Closer to home, there are many challenges facing Chagossians who choose to exercise their right to UK citizenship. Chief among those problems, as with so many other issues, is housing. As part of our national housing strategy, we need to ensure that every UK citizen has access to good-quality housing, and that includes British Chagossians, who, by the legal complication of their citizenship, despite having lost their homes in Chagos, receive none of the support offered by relocation schemes to other groups. That creates enormous pressures on local authorities near airports and leaves many Chagossians living in dilapidated housing conditions, if they can find accommodation at all. With the second worst housing crisis in the country, the reality is that Crawley borough council cannot on its own owe the entire country’s housing duty to the Chagossian people; a national strategy is needed.
There are challenges around access to language training and support services, which often lead Chagossians to be highly reliant on other members of the community. I regret to say that for the enormous amounts of goodwill and charity on the part of that community towards other members of it, we have had instances of that trust being abused in the form of fraud. We need a mechanism for qualifications issued in Mauritius to be recognised in the UK, and for children and young people to transition into UK educational systems—something that is complicated by the differences in term times.
Lastly, there is a desperate need for facilities for the Chagossians to preserve their unique, intangible cultural heritage, which sits at the heart of an individual’s identity and which forced deportations have to a large extent erased. With so few first-generation Chagossians left, if we do not act now, this is likely to be the last generation that sees its culture on the earth. I know that Foreign Office Ministers are meeting with Chagossian groups and have been working to get funding moving again. I am hopeful that these meetings will continue and that progress can be made on these and other challenges.
I say to all Members in the House today that this House has done enormous harm to the Chagossian people, all the way from their enslavement to the present day. I believe that handing these islands to Mauritius without their consent risks making some of that harm permanent. Nevertheless, it is within the Government’s power to address many of the consequences of forcible deportation so long ago. Regardless of the outcome of today’s vote, I beg Ministers to let this be the start and not the end of the process of making things right.
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
It is a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb). I admire his principles and his persistence in his advocacy for his Chagossian constituents, and I know that he would recognise that his predecessor did the same.
There is no dispute that Diego Garcia is crucial to the UK’s security and that of its allies; that is not something we are arguing about. I do not think—although I will be corrected if I am wrong—that it is the Government’s position that, in terms of the day-to-day practicalities of operating the Diego Garcia base, this new arrangement whereby we no longer have sovereignty over Diego Garcia but will continue to administer it, at least for 99 years, is better than what we have now. Rather, it is a more secure arrangement because of what has been described as the legal uncertainty surrounding our sovereignty over it. I see the Minister nodding, and I am grateful for that.
Dr Evans
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way and using his legal background. It is more secure legally for those 99 years but, more definitively, at that 99-year point, if the Mauritians decide not to have a base there, categorically that is their decision. Therefore, by proxy, it is actually more unsafe, just in 100 years’ time.
Sir Jeremy Wright
I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes, and it is reinforced by the point made by our hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) in reading from the agreement as to how any disputes are resolved. But I want to focus on the position now and the legal justification that the Government have already deployed for the arrangement that they seek to make. My hon. Friend is right that there will be further problems down the road, but there are problems already.
It seems to me that if the position the Government take is as I have set it out and as the Minister accepts that it is, that must be right because it would surely be difficult to argue that, were it not for that legal uncertainty, renting Diego Garcia back from someone else would be better than owning it from a security point of view. So for the Government to persuade us in this House, and indeed the country as a whole, that this is a good deal for Britain, everything turns on the question of legal uncertainty, which Ministers have often referred to as the reason why the treaty, and therefore the Bill, are necessary.
Having spent four years as Attorney General, I am quite familiar with legal uncertainty—there is a lot of it about in Government. It is, I am afraid, invariably the case that whenever a decision is made in Government, someone disagrees with it, and some of those who disagree will be prepared to go to a court and challenge the validity of that decision. Until the court—sometimes until the Supreme Court—has resolved the matter, there can fairly be said to be legal uncertainty about it. Legal uncertainty hangs around Government like the clouds, and it cannot be allowed to paralyse a Government. Nor should that sort of atmospheric legal uncertainty be the only cause of a decision as significant as that which this Government are now making to give up sovereignty over a vital military facility.
There must be something more substantive—more tangible—to the legal uncertainty to which Ministers have referred. Many of us have tried to find out what exactly that is, but with very limited success. Given that, as far as I can tell, the legal uncertainty that is being talked about constitutes the entirety of the burning platform on which the Government rely to justify the Bill and the treaty, surely this House, before we approve either, must be given a proper and clear explanation of precisely what legal jeopardy the Government are acting in response to. In pursuit of that, it is worth having a look at the explanations that Ministers have given so far.
Let us start with the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), who of course is now the Deputy Prime Minister. He made a statement on the British Indian Ocean Territory negotiations on 7 October last year. He told the House that the issue of contested sovereignty over Diego Garcia was becoming more acute, and that
“A binding judgment against the UK seemed inevitable”.—[Official Report, 7 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 45.]
Many of us have been asking where that binding judgment might come from. The only court that had by then been mentioned was the International Court of Justice, which had issued an advisory opinion on sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. Indeed, on this subject it could only have been an advisory decision, because the UK accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by declarations dated 22 February 2017—I was Attorney General at the time. Those declarations made it clear that the UK did not, however, accept that compulsory jurisdiction in relation to
“any dispute with a Government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”.
That involves and includes Mauritius, so any dispute with Mauritius before the ICJ could not result in a binding judgment against the United Kingdom. That point has been put to Ministers and, as far as I know, they have not dissented from that analysis.
If the ICJ could not make the binding judgment that the former Foreign Secretary told us was inevitable, which other court might? On that, again, I am afraid that we have not had clarity. On 13 November last year, the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty)—who I see has the misfortune of having to defend this position once again today—answered an urgent question on the Chagos Islands. He said:
“International courts were reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago.”—[Official Report, 13 November 2024; Vol. 756, c. 793.]
The Minister did not at that point say which courts, but I have done some digging, and I think I am supported in my assumption by what the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said in opening this debate. I think that he may have been referring to a determination made in January 2021 by the special chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea when considering a dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. Tragically, I do not have time to go into the fascinating detail of that case, but in essence it was a dispute about the delimitation of maritime territory between those two states. The Maldives argued that the special chamber could not determine the case in question because there was an ongoing dispute about the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands between Mauritius and the UK. The special chamber decided, however, that it could treat Mauritius as the coastal state in the dispute before it, because of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the matter, which it said had legal effect.
If that ITLOS case is what the Government are relying on, I think there are a few problems: first, the UK was not a party to that case; and secondly, the ITLOS chamber was seemingly basing its decision on that of the ICJ, which, as I have already indicated, could not make a binding ruling on the matter. I am not expecting the House, much less the Government, to accept my opinion on this, but it seems to me that, at the very least, the UK would have the basis of a decent legal argument here. It does not seem to be that this ITLOS decision demonstrates that there was no further hope for UK claims of sovereignty over Diego Garcia.
After a bit more prodding, the Government’s argument moves on and introduces the issue of access to the electromagnetic spectrum. On 5 February this year, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office answered yet another urgent question on the subject.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
Before my right hon. and learned Friend moves on to the spectrum, may I bring him back to UNCLOS? As I understand it, article 298(1)(a) and (b) give us specific exemptions from UNCLOS judgments across all those areas. That is relevant to the UK in
“disputes concerning military activities…by government vessels and aircraft…in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities”
in those areas. On that, the Government’s argument on UNCLOS falls, surely.
Sir Jeremy Wright
I will give my right hon. Friend a lawyer’s favourite answer to any question: “It’s complicated.” But here is the point: the only legal analysis being offered here—the only explanation—comes from the Opposition Benches. The Government are not giving us anything. If he is wrong in what he says, we need to hear why from the Minister, but we are not and that is what troubles me.
Mr Calvin Bailey
If the right hon. and learned Gentleman is willing to give explanations, will he please explain why his party chose to start the engagement but has at no point explained the rationale for doing so?
Sir Jeremy Wright
If the hon. Gentleman is patient, I promise that I will come to that, but I wish to deal in a logical order with what Ministers have themselves said to justify their actions.
On 5 February, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office answered another urgent question. In answer to my plea to give us more clarity on exactly what legal basis the Government were acting on, he said:
“We currently have unrestricted and sole access to the electromagnetic spectrum, which is used to communicate with satellites and which is guaranteed and governed by the International Telecommunication Union, a United Nations body based in Geneva. If we lose it we can still communicate, but so can others.”—[Official Report, 5 February 2025; Vol. 761, c. 760.]
I understand the point that he was making, but he did not explain how that issue might lead to a binding court ruling against the UK, and he did not even take a second opportunity to do so when asked about it again by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp)—those interested can find that answer in column 762.
Luckily, however, my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary called a debate on this subject in Opposition time on 26 February, which was answered by the then Minister of State, the right hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds).
She repeated:
“Without a negotiated solution with Mauritius, it would pursue its legal campaign…That would lead to an inevitable, legally binding judgment,”.
She was then interrupted, but went on to say that
“in that kind of situation”—
presumably that is the delivery of a binding judgment against the UK—
“we would unfortunately see international organisations following that determination, such as the International Telecommunication Union.” —[Official Report, 26 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 874.]
If we put all those ministerial utterances together, we are going round in circles.
The Government say that they have to act because of the inevitability of a binding court judgment against the UK. They mention the ICJ, but the ICJ cannot make a binding judgment against the UK on this. They hint at ITLOS cases, but those refer to ICJ decisions. The Government then say that they are worried about the actions of the International Telecommunication Union, but when pressed that seems to mean actions that would follow a binding court judgment. We are back to square one.
Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
Is it the case—my right hon. and learned Friend is a former Attorney General—that the ITU treaty to which we and others are a party states specifically that the ITU has no authority over the allocation of military spectrum, or military communications? It is clear that the ITU has no leverage legally at all over Diego Garcia.
Sir Jeremy Wright
My right hon. Friend makes an important point, which I know he has made before. I repeat the point I made earlier: we are simply not getting from the Government an adequate rebuttal of these points, and we need to have that. If the Government have a good answer to what he and my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) have said, Second Reading of the Bill is the moment for the Government to deliver that explanation. We are all still waiting.
Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)
My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) is right, but the existing position goes even further. Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of the written answer from the Government on 7 February this year:
“Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum.”?
Sir Jeremy Wright
I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend, and perhaps I should refine my argument. It is not just that the Government are not answering the questions; it is that when they do answer the questions, they undermine their own argument. It is worse than we thought. We are not getting clarity from the Government about what would be the legal judgment that they themselves have relied on as almost the entire basis for their actions, and this really matters. The Government owe us a proper explanation.
I am prepared to concede—I hope the Minister will accept that I am a fair-minded person—that there may be a persuasive argument that the Government could make about which court and which circumstances would deliver the kind of judgment that makes this action inevitable and necessary, but I have waited a long time to hear it, and I am still waiting. I hope that when the Minister stands to sum up the debate he will give us that answer, because the House of Commons deserves to hear it.
Mr Francois
This is fundamental to the whole argument. We have pressed the Government for months to tell us what the legal threat to the islands was. In his opening speech the Minister said that it was UNCLOS. That was the justification they have given us. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that we have a general opt-out and two specific opt-outs under article 298(1)(b) of the United Nations convention on the law of the sea, which includes “disputes concerning military activities”? We have an opt-out from UNCLOS. The Government’s whole case is spurious—£35 billion worth of spurious.
Sir Jeremy Wright
It is certainly very expensive. I know lawyers who charge big fees, but none of them would come close to that.
My right hon. Friend makes his point, and again, the Minister will have another opportunity when he speaks. It is not good enough, I am afraid, for hints and oblique references to be made. We are owed a clear explanation. This is a fundamental decision on defence and security, and in financial terms as my right hon. Friend has just said, and we deserve to know. If the Minister tells the House that describing all that in detail is the sort of confidential and sensitive information that the whole House cannot hear, I have good news for him: that is what the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is for. I have the honour to be a member of that Committee, and it is perhaps regrettable that the Government did not choose to explain themselves and make their case to us before they brought the Bill to the House, but they did not.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
Sir John Hayes
I am extremely grateful to the former Attorney General for giving way. He is right to say that the matter could have been—and still could be, as I think he will also want to confirm—brought to our Committee. If, even at this late juncture, an overture were made to our Committee—clearly, it would have to be discussed at Committee—it would be perfectly possible for the Government to set out in those terms the advice they received that legitimises the position that they have taken.
Sir Jeremy Wright
My right hon. Friend makes a good point. Although all our hearings are held within closed doors, he is right that until that happens, our door is open. There is an opportunity for the Minister, if he wishes to take it, to make that proposal.
Let me come back to the point that the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) made. His rejoinder and the rejoinders of his colleagues and Ministers have always been the same throughout this debate. They say, “The last Government began negotiations on this, so clearly the last Government accept the same logic that we accept.” That simply will not do. As Ministers and the Back Benchers behind them have been very keen to point out, the last Government had 11 rounds of negotiation on this question. If they had chosen to do the deal that this Government have done, they had ample opportunity to do it, but they did not. That can only be because they did not believe it was the right deal to do.
This Government are undoubtedly enthusiastic about getting swift resolution of disputes—it seems that they apply the same principles to labour disputes—but settling a negotiation fast is really very easy if we give the person with whom we are negotiating everything they want. What Mauritius wanted out of this negotiation was sovereignty over the entire Chagos archipelago, and that is what this Government have given them. I am afraid that we really cannot award any points for the fact that this Government have managed to resolve this issue more swiftly. The fact that the Government of which some of us Conservative Members were part did not resolve it that quickly is perhaps because they were not prepared to give ground on that particular issue.
We need an explanation of why the Government feel it is necessary to do this deal. We need an explanation on what precisely the legal jeopardy they face is and what its origin is, and we need to know what the binding legal judgment they fear is. Frankly, without those explanations, this House should not be asked to agree to this Bill or this treaty.
Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)
We have heard from Members on the Opposition Benches a slew of political opportunism, scaremongering, some cliché bingo and some derogatory terms—something that belongs more in a tabloid than in this House—about the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Back when these negotiations started, the Conservative party knew that a deal was needed—it may have been somewhere on its list of priorities when it still had some lingering credibility about the good of the nation. The Conservative party knew that a deal was in the best interests of the United Kingdom and our allies. It knew that without a deal, Mauritius could very well have pursued a sovereignty claim and allowed Russia and China into the waters around Diego Garcia. People do not sit through 11 rounds of negotiations if they do not think something is important; they walk away. To give the previous Government credit, they did not do that. They understood the importance of a deal.
Graeme Downie
That point was covered before. We have already seen scaremongering from the Opposition about the other British overseas territories, including the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. I hope that the Conservative party will reflect on and apologise for that.
None the less, the previous Government knew that a deal would keep Britain safe. They knew that without a deal, international courts could effectively make the base inoperable, and they knew that that could plant China right on our doorstep. Now, they cannot even say why it was important. They cannot say why they even started the negotiations; several Government Members have raised that point, and not once have the Conservatives been able to say why, other than hiding behind the fact that they are being entirely politically opportunist. They knew all that, and they now pretend that none of it matters. They are playing politics with Britain’s safety.
Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)
It is rare that I find myself aligned with the Conservative party, but I share its concerns for the structure and veracity of this deal. That being said, does the hon. Member share my bewilderment that the Conservative party has chosen this particular hill to die on, given that the Bill is as much a product of its work as it is of Labour’s?
Graeme Downie
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. At the beginning of the intervention, I was going to point out that there were five years during which the Liberal Democrats were very close to the Conservative party, but I will remove that thought from my head and agree with him. This does seem a very strange hill for the Conservative party to die on, but I am not surprised by the level of hypocrisy we have seen from some Conservative Members.
That is the real hypocrisy. The Conservatives have attacked the cost of this deal, but they will not reveal what their own deal would have cost. Government convention means that their numbers are locked away—secret, hidden, unable to be scrutinised and compared. They will hide and hide. Would Conservative Front Benchers like to give any figure, in any currency of their choosing? What was their number? How much was it going to cost? What was the number on the bottom of the piece of paper after 11 rounds of negotiations? The truth is that this Government secured the deal that the Conservative party knew was critical for our national security, but could not deliver.
While we are talking about costs, let us put this into perspective. As the Minister said in his opening speech, France pays €85 million a year for a base in Djibouti, one that shares a fence with a Chinese naval facility and enjoys none of the security that comes with this Government’s deal on Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is 15 times bigger, more secure, and delivers unmatched operational freedom for the United Kingdom and our allies. Let us be clear about what this treaty delivers. It secures Diego Garcia; it locks in control of the land, the sea and the electromagnetic spectrum; and it shuts out foreign militaries from the outer islands. That is a serious deal—a deal that represents value, one that the Tories could never close, but now choose to attack from behind a shield of secrecy.
Lincoln Jopp
I do not know whether the hon. Member listened to the outstanding, forensic dismantling of the Government’s case by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), but on the basis that every constituency in this country will kiss away the opportunity to have £52 million as a result of this deal—that is what it is going to cost in total—would he like to tell the people of Dunfermline and Dollar why he would rather give away that amount of money to a foreign Government on a spurious legal basis than invest it in his own constituency?
Graeme Downie
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention—he is someone for whom I have a lot of respect. I would tell my constituents that this country is now safer and more secure because of the deal that this Government have done.
Let us see who is on the Government’s side. The United States backs the deal, with President Trump having called it
“a very long-term, powerful lease”.
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, NATO and the overseas territories all back the deal, because they understand that Diego Garcia is vital to our security and theirs. Who lines up against it? Who is the proud company that the Conservatives keep? Nigel Farage and Reform.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. We do not refer to Members by name, but by constituency.
Graeme Downie
I apologise for that, Madam Deputy Speaker.
We have seen Reform UK peddling fantasies about America that were flatly wrong. Beyond these shores, what do we see? Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in Beijing both know that they could have access to the waters around Diego Garcia were it not for the deal that this Government have secured. That is the roll-call—that is who Conservative Members stand with, and that is who they will be voting alongside if they block the Bill. We saw Reform swaggering around, claiming that it would get President Trump to block this deal, but the truth has been the exact opposite. The United States has clearly welcomed this treaty, as we have heard so often this afternoon. Reform did not just misread the room; it misread and misrepresented one of our closest allies, talking Britain down and peddling fantasy while a serious Government deliver and secure our safety. This Bill is about strength and weakness. This is strength and that is weakness—order from the Government versus chaos from the Opposition, Britain standing with our allies versus Britain opening the door to our adversaries.
Just a couple of years ago, the Conservatives knew that this deal was vital. They wanted it in office—like the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas), it pains me to sometimes agree with the Conservatives, but for once, they were correct. They were right to want this deal, but only when they lost power did they suddenly discover their doubts. That is not principle; it is opportunism.
Sir Jeremy Wright
I understand the argument that the hon. Gentleman is making, but why does he think that the last Government did not make the deal?
Graeme Downie
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his intervention. I listened very carefully to his speech—it was very interesting indeed, and I respect his viewpoint. My short answer is that the last Government just could not seal a deal, like they could not seal a deal with the EU and could not seal a trade deal with India. They abandoned the people of this country.
I will close by saying that I will proudly vote for this Bill tonight. It puts the UK on the side of our allies and on the side of security, and ensures that we will be protected for generations to come.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
Just to make a small comment on the previous speech, I have been here a little while, and I have never once stopped regretting taking a Government handout to speak in support of the Government, because more often than not, it rebounded on me. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and many others have made clear, there are two elements to this issue.
Before I start on that, I want to say something about the Chagossians. They are the last people to have been seriously consulted about any of this. The way that we behaved to them back in the 1960s was appalling. It should never have happened, and there was no need for it to have happened. They should have been able to stay on the archipelago, and we should have supported them in that. They must be a part of this. I know that they are very fearful of this deal as it stands.
My other point is that this arrangement is vague about what happens after 99 years. We are supposed to guess, or believe that we can trust Governments to make the right decisions. The statement on the rights of the Chagossians is completely missing a sense of where they will be, what they want and how we will bring that about. I pay tribute to the Member who made a good intervention on that point.
Let me quickly deal with the legal case, and then I will discuss the cost, and China and Russia. The Government have been peppered with requests non-stop since this process began to explain the legal threat that meant that we would be in real trouble if we did not seal a deal—any deal. Right the way along, they would not exactly explain. There were little suggestions here and there that a judgment would lead to certain things. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam has been absolutely right on that.
Today, I thought that the door slightly opened. I have known the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), for a long time, and his name is a good description of his solidity and purposefulness. The Minister who opened the debate, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), made the point that the legal threat was to do with UNCLOS. I was intrigued by that, because, as I just said to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam, within UNCLOS, clear for all to see, is a complete let-out for the UK Government when it comes to the case that they suggest would be brought against them under UNCLOS. The threat simply does not exist. I repeat that there are two exemptions, under article 298(1)(b) and 298(1)(c). The first has the UK opted out of
“disputes concerning military activities…by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities”.
The same applies under 298(1)(c) in relation to matters taken up by the UN Security Council.
The important point is that the threat does not need to be recognised, because ultimately this comes back to the original International Court of Justice ruling. That was an advisory judgment, because the Court cannot make an absolute judgment on anything to do with our relationships with the Commonwealth, either existing or previous; that is an important point. We keep coming back to this check on what would happen. The idea that everybody will dispute with us on that is simply nonsense. From a legal perspective, I think the Government have come unstuck in this debate. I have sat through many debates in this House, and it is rare that a Government completely come unstuck on a case of legalities.
The second bit that the Government have come unstuck on is the money. On the legal side, they will not tell us exactly what the situation is. There have been hints, proposals and suggestions that somehow we were in a desperate situation. On the money, I have never seen a Government as unable or unwilling to tell us exactly how much things cost or are worth. They are normally quick to do so, and to blame the other side, or whatever—it does not really matter. Everybody has been chasing the Government for that information, and now we discover that they have gerrymandered the figures for the overall statement. The total cost is nearly £35 billion, and we need to deal with total cost.
Let me remind the Government of the problem with what they call the GDP deflator and the so-called social time discounting method. The Government Actuary’s Department has dismissed that as a real way of calculating cost for this kind of issue, and it has re-emphasised the fact that understanding the total cost is the only way to look at a long-term treaty. The Government is relying on the cost-benefit analysis used for social projects. There is particular concern about long-term projects, and a real dispute about whether such a method can predict precisely, or even reasonably well, the overall cost in the long term. There is a lot of concern about whether that is the right way to go. Add to that the fact that the Government are trying to predict what will happen in Mauritius, under the Mauritian Government, over the next many years. This is a 99-year deal, and there is no way on earth that we have any control.
Tom Tugendhat
I wonder whether my right hon. Friend can help me in giving a prediction. Two families have swapped leadership of Mauritius over the last 60 years. Does he see any reason to doubt that the same two families will swap leadership over the next 60?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
That is exactly the point. There are serious concerns about the uncertainties surrounding future growth and societal wellbeing. If there are such concerns when it comes to UK predictions about the UK, imagine how difficult it is to predict what will happen in Mauritius, so this should be dismissed.
It is interesting that after not answering the question for so long, suddenly the Government have popped up with a new device. They say that if we do not accept the figures, we are completely dismissing the Green Book, but the overall cost is not a Green Book issue, because this is about paying somebody money outside the UK, not about controlling cost. That is why the Green Book has never been used for this purpose before, and never will. I simply say to the Government that the money side of this has fallen apart again.
I come to the third element. As I said earlier, we have had no real vote or debate on the treaty, as opposed to the Bill. The old CRaG system has been rushed through, without a vote. I have to tell the Minister, for whom I have a huge amount of respect, that that is simply appalling, given that we are dealing with something as strategically important as this treaty.
Clause 5 of the Bill, which is a very flimsy document, is entitled “Further provision: Orders in Council”. Anybody who reads that will have a sudden intake of breath. The whole point of this Bill is negated by clause 5. What is the point of debating the rest of the Bill, given that clause 5 says that at any stage, and under any circumstances, the Government can change it all by Orders in Council? Absolutely everything can be changed by Orders in Council, with no vote and no dispute. If the Government decide to go in a different direction, they do not have to consult Parliament any more.
The sweeping powers in the Bill are ridiculous. When the Minister was in opposition, he used to spend his whole time moaning—quite rightly—about Governments who give themselves such powers. Even by the standards of previous Governments, this Bill is pretty astonishing. It is a massive sweep. This is not really democracy any more; it is monocracy. In other words, we have given up debate and dispute, and we have handed things over to one person—the Prime Minister. I say to the Government that the Bill is appalling, and they really need to rethink it. We simply cannot go through with something as appalling as this. I can remember the Maastricht debates, and various others in which we spent a long time debating clauses on the Floor of the House. That was the right thing to do, because such issues are important. International treaties are vital to our wellbeing, and the Bill simply does not work.
The last thing I want to say is on China. I would say this, because I am sanctioned by China, as are some of my hon. Friends. I suspect that others will be sanctioned as well in due course. If they carry on working with me in the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, they are bound to be sanctioned, and I look forward to their joining us at that table. There is no way on earth that China does not benefit from this Bill. China has its eyes on the very important flow of commercial traffic that runs just below the Chagos islands, which it has always wanted to be able to block, control or interfere with.
The Chinese already have a naval base in Sri Lanka, which they got by default on the back of the belt and road initiative, due to non-payment. For a long time, they have been looking at how, under their arrangements with Mauritius, they will eventually be able to intervene. They are two or three steps further forward as a result of this Bill. It does not secure us against that absolutely, because we gave up absolute security and control when we decided to hand over sovereignty to Mauritius.
Cameron Thomas
I am not yet on the Chinese Communist party’s sanctions list, but perhaps I will be shortly. Does the right hon. Member share my concern about the 99-year lease of the islands, given that some of our adversaries across the world plan and strategise over the very long term, and 99 years is actually a short period of time?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that the Chinese Government have a long-term plan. In fact, they are very clear about what they wish to do. If anybody does not think that China poses a threat on all these issues, what were they doing last week when, on our television screens, we saw President Xi, with the North Korean dictator on one side and the Russian dictator on the other, talking about a new world order? That continues to be the Chinese Government’s purpose. They should have been taken into the upper tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. Why are they not there? My suspicion is that this was not done because it might well have ended the whole negotiation on the Chagos islands, as there would have been huge interventions, and we could not possibly have done aught else but stop the negotiation.
In conclusion, I honestly think that the Government need to pause this, go back to the drawing board, and say, “We got it wrong”, but I say this in answer to the endless briefing they have given Labour Members on what the Conservative party did about the Chagos islands in government. I have reached the conclusion that no matter who is in power, I am in opposition, so I can categorically tell the House that, whatever else happened, this was quite rightly ended by Lord Cameron when he became Foreign Secretary. Some of us made it very clear that this should not have gone ahead for many of the reasons that I have laid out. I end by saying to the Minister that it is no good coming back later and saying, “I wish we hadn’t done this.” Now is the time to stand up and say, as the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) did, that this does not work, it must stop, and the Government must think again.
Lillian Jones (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab)
I rise in support of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill. This Bill is not only timely, but essential for our national security, our international obligations and the strategic future of the United Kingdom.
To be clear, Diego Garcia is not just an isolated atoll in the Indian ocean, but one of the most geopolitically significant military outposts of the 21st century. It serves as a critical base for joint UK-US operations in a region fraught with instability from piracy off the horn of Africa, and given the growing threat of Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific. This Bill secures long-term operational certainty for our armed forces. It ensures our ability to meet NATO commitments, protect trade routes vital to the global economy and respond quickly to humanitarian crises across Asia and Africa. In a time of escalating global tensions everywhere from the South China sea to the Red sea, we cannot afford ambiguity when it comes to our defence infrastructure.
I have listened with concern to the arguments made by Opposition Members, some of whom appear more preoccupied with ideological purity than practical governance. Is it not strange that 85% of the negotiating rounds on the Diego Garcia deal took place under the Conservatives? They had access to the same legal advice, the same security briefings and the same threat assessments as we do. Only after leaving government and with no deal of their own did they begin playing politics with national security. Their sudden opposition is not principled; it is opportunistic and irresponsible. Opposition Members talk about international law and cite advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice as if they were binding judgments. Let us not forget, however, that sovereignty is not a matter of hashtags or press releases; it is a matter of law, treaties and responsibility.
The United Kingdom has administered the British Indian Ocean Territory for more than half a century, and we have done so in close co-ordination with our allies, especially the United States. Simply to walk away, as some have suggested, would be an act of geopolitical negligence. To those who argue that the base should be dismantled or handed over to another power under the banner of anti-colonialism, I say that they should be very careful for what they wish. If Britain and the United States vacate Diego Garcia, we would leave behind not a vacuum, but a prize, a strategic jewel, which would be swiftly eyed by authoritarian regimes that have little regard for human rights, international law or democratic principles.
Our responsibility is not to rewrite history by dismantling today’s defences, but to shape the future by ensuring that they remain strong, legitimate and effective. The Bill provides legal clarity and the operational authority for the continued use of Diego Garcia. It will strengthen the framework for oversight, introduce renewed commitments to environmental stewardship and, importantly, establish a pathway for dialogue with Chagossian representatives about resettlement and heritage—it is important that their voices are head and listened to. This is not a Bill that closes doors, but one that opens them, without compromising national and global security. Opposition for the sake of opposition is not leadership. Would the Opposition have us abandon a key, NATO-aligned military base to prove a point? Would they rather hand strategic influence in the Indian Ocean to those who undermine the international rules-based order?
Let me remind the House of the real threats in our world: cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks and networks, illegal arms trafficking and hostile naval activity. Diego Garcia is not some relic of the cold war; it is a strategic capability that we rely on today.
Several hon. Members rose—
Lillian Jones
I will not give way. The Bill is pragmatic, proportionate, grounded in the national interest and fully compatible with our democratic values. It does not ignore the past; it confronts it, and seeks to chart a responsible path forward. I urge my colleagues across the House, especially those wavering on the fence, to vote not out of ideological purity, but out of practical necessity. The world is watching. Our allies are watching. History, too, will judge what we choose today. Let us choose strength, responsibility, regional and global security, and to back the UK’s national security.
Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker. During an intervention on the Minister for Defence Procurement, I said that he was acting in a “duplicitous” way. I have already been rebuked by Mr Speaker, so you do not have to step in, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I would like to say that I misspoke when I said that the Minister was not being genuine. I apologise to him—I never play the man; I always play the ball. It is a shame that he is not present to hear that apology.
However, I welcome the Minister for Defence Procurement—he is a good friend of mine, and I look forward to him serving in that position—but I will say that that career has not started well. The first moment that he appears before the House in charge of defence procurement in this country, he single-handedly starts by advocating disposing of a vital piece of defence infrastructure, which is not only relevant but essential to the national security of the country. He stood here to try to defend the indefensible. I suggest to the Whips Office that they might want to look at some of his decisions in future, if he is in charge of procuring defence equipment on behalf of this country, because so far he has only been successful at getting rid of vital infrastructure. I hope that he does better.
The first job and the first duty of any Government that serve the great people of this great country is to keep their people and themselves safe. I never thought that I would come to this House on a day like today to see a Government, this Government, creating the biggest act of self-sabotage that I think we have seen in generations of elected Houses in the history of our nation. The Government are harming not only our security, but the strategic interests of our people and the security of this country.
Jacob Collier (Burton and Uttoxeter) (Lab)
If the deal is harming our strategic interests, why is it backed by our allies, the United States and NATO?
Paul Holmes
If the hon. Gentleman had bothered to show up for the entire debate—I think that he has only just arrived in the Chamber—then he would have heard the answer to those questions in excellent speeches given by hon. Members from across the House. In response to his question, why is the deal also backed by so many counties that have malign influences towards the interests of the United Kingdom, such as Russia, China and Iran? If he stays for the rest of the debate, he might hear some answers to those questions too. It is easy for Labour Members to stand in the Chamber and read a Labour party briefing, thinking that if they say things time and again, they must be true, and that people outside the Chamber will expect what they say will be true.
I was the Parliamentary Private Secretary to Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton when he was Foreign Secretary. He said to Foreign Office officials at that time that the negotiations that had started and were being explored went past his red line. My right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly), who was Foreign Secretary when some of the negotiations happened, said to his Foreign Office officials, “As the democratically elected Foreign Secretary, these recommendations go beyond my red lines.” Those negotiations were then stopped by Lord Cameron—I remember him instructing Foreign Office officials to stop those negotiations—so I say to hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie), that just because negotiations and conversations have started, we do not have to accept a conclusion that we do not want.
Graeme Downie
As we have heard already in the debate, apparently we cannot hear a negotiating position, so will the hon. Gentleman describe in detail exactly what those red lines were?
Paul Holmes
I will tell the hon. Gentleman what one of those red lines was: not paying £35 billion to another country. In case he wants to read his Labour party briefing again, I remind the hon. Gentleman that another red line for the last Foreign Secretary was that he clearly did not accept unilaterally that the sovereignty of the Chagos islands fell with Mauritius. That is a key difference between the last Government and this Government.
This is a bad deal for Britain: it will cost £35 billion, while the Government tax and spend and make people in this country poorer, and in an ever-changing international security situation, this country is unilaterally giving up a strategically important defence base, in an area of the world where we are seeing more geopolitical uncertainty. I cannot put into words how bad this Bill is, except to say that it is an act of self-sabotage that we have not seen in this House by a democratically elected Government for generations.
To reiterate, not only is this a bad deal, but it is backed by every nation that is malign to our national interest, including China, Russia and Iran. Last week, at an international summit, those countries were actively advocating some of the malign influences about which this Government and the last Government spoke about, and they are actively backing this deal. I challenge Labour Members to look Opposition Members or any of their constituents in the eye and say that a deal that is successful for this country should be backed by Iran, China and Russia.
Madam Deputy Speaker, I am trying to work within the confines of parliamentary etiquette, but I have to say that there is something deeply concerning about the way that this Government have chosen to negotiate the terms of the agreement. We have to look at the close links between the key people who negotiated this deal with the Mauritian Government and the links—private links—to the Prime Minister and Ministers in this Government. The Prime Minister of Mauritius has said in the Mauritian Parliament that officials were asked to leave the room while private negotiations were going ahead. I have never known a responsible Government who are trying to hand over sovereignty of a British overseas territory to ask officials, who are there to protect the integrity and the transparency of the of decisions that Ministers take, to leave the room so that a negotiation can go on. Why have the Government hidden the cost of the deal? Why have they refused to give this House a solid and sustainable way to scrutinise the decisions of the Government? They have avoided scrutiny at every turn.
Sir John Hayes
Perhaps I can invite my hon. Friend to be helpful to the Minister. He clearly holds him in some regard, and he is right that he has got himself into something of a mess. By far the best way for the Government to proceed from hereon would be to make much more available either to this House or, as the former Attorney General, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) suggested, to the Intelligence and Security Committee. That would clarify the terms of this trade—why it happened and the assessments that were made that led up to it—in a way that the House would be able to either legitimise what the Minister claims or refute it. A lack of transparency is half the Minister’s problem.
Paul Holmes
I agree with my right hon. Friend. I found it quite concerning earlier that the Chairman of the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi), relied on the fact that American counterparts in an Administration that he does not scrutinise backed the deal, so there was no need for the Defence Committee to interrogate Ministers of the Government it is supposed to scrutinise. There have been two offers this afternoon, one by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), and the other by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam, in his expert speech. There is a scrutiny structure in this House called the Intelligence and Security Committee to which the Minister could refer this decision, and he can rest assured in the knowledge that there are expert Members across the whole House who could offer their expert opinion on the deal. The Government have chosen not to do that. That is an indictment of the transparency and the drive the Government have shown in getting the deal very quickly.
Alex Ballinger
The hon. Gentleman will know that the Foreign Affairs Committee had the Minister in front of us to discuss the deal, so there has been parliamentary scrutiny on this, including by other Committees, just not by the Defence Committee. On the costs, as the PPS to Lord Cameron, maybe he can say a little bit about what the cost was of the deal they negotiated at the end of those 11 rounds—whether it was higher or lower than the deal we have reached now.
Paul Holmes
I can tell the hon. Gentleman. Let me say it very clearly and very slowly, because I know that hon. Members have written their speeches before the debate started: zero. Zero is less than the deal the Minister is choosing. Let me repeat it very slowly for the hon. Gentleman and for Members across the House: the deal was ended. There was no deal. The negotiations stopped. There were no negotiations.
Paul Holmes
I will in a second. I just want to emphasise the point so we do not hear it again. There were no negotiations. There was no deal. [Interruption.] The negotiations were stopped. There was no deal on offer, and no money was being offered. I hope that Members will scratch that bit out of their speeches as they go forward.
John Slinger
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. The former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), called the Mauritian Prime Minister on 22 February 2024 and reassured him that
“the UK remains committed to a mutually beneficial outcome…and their teams look forward to continuing to work on this.”
Will he comment on that?
Paul Holmes
Yes, I absolutely can. I am not a lawyer, but I would say it is crystal clear in the sentence the hon. Gentleman has just read: “mutually beneficial”. What the democratically elected Government of the day decided, through Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, who I said—if the hon. Gentleman was in the debate earlier, he would have heard it—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman says he has other things to do, Madam Deputy Speaker. I suggest that if he thinks this is very important, he should have been here for the whole debate and not just intervene on a debate that I think is about national security. I repeat the point to him: the Foreign Secretary at the time ended the negotiations because, as the then Prime Minister said, “mutually beneficial” was deemed not to have been the case.
I want to touch briefly on the arguments put forward by the Government about hiding behind international law. I cannot do it justice like my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam, but it is clear that the Government keep hiding behind judgments that they have to follow. I remind the Minister again that it is not a binding judgment. If the Government had chosen to challenge that non-binding judgment, he would have had the support of those of us on the Opposition Benches. The Government decided not to do that and have accepted a non-binding judgment and fast-tracked the capitulation and surrender of a British overseas territory for the first time in a long time. The Minister could have challenged that decision, because it was non-binding. I shall let the record stand with the speech by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam, who went through the numerous international structures that this Government have signed up to and set out how we did not have to follow that.
Lastly, clause 2 is absolutely disastrous. The hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) spoke of the historical context here. I congratulate and commend the hon. Gentleman for his speech; he is an incredibly brave and principled man who stands up for his constituents. Under clause 2, this Government have decided unilaterally to recognise that Mauritius has sovereignty over the Chagos islands. I remind the House and the Government that Mauritius has never in the historical context of the Chagos islands had sovereignty, and that this Government have chosen to give sovereignty over the islands to a country that has never had it.
Paul Holmes
I will in a second.
Some, including the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), have said that we want to “return” the islands. I say that is impossible, because it is not possible to return sovereignty to a country that never had sovereignty in the first place. This is a decision and a negotiation undertaken by this Government, and they should hang their heads in shame over the way they have done it.
Jeremy Corbyn
The agreement that was reached between the British and Mauritian Governments in 1965 was to separate the Chagos islands from Mauritius. Decolonisation processes of the UN and all others have confirmed that it should never have happened, and that they should never have been separated. If they had never been separated, we would not even be having this debate today.
Paul Holmes
I disagree with the right hon. Gentleman, because it was clear in the negotiations that took place in the ’60s, when the United Kingdom paid Mauritius, that Mauritius actively accepted that it had no sovereignty claim over the islands, and that stands in international agreements from times gone by.
This Bill is a bad deal. It is a bad deal for the United Kingdom and for our constituents; and it is a bad deal because of the money that this Government have decided to spend, and because of their decision to tax people while spending £35 billion overseas. The Government have abandoned the usual norms of the traditional Governments of this country of standing up in a transparent way for the way we act internationally; they have decided to abdicate their responsibility in doing that.
This is a bad deal for this country. It has been welcomed by malign international partners, it has undermined our defence, and it will cost us billions. Above all, with this Bill, the Government have abandoned and avoided every scrutiny mechanism within the House of Commons that would enable hon. Members to challenge them and get the answers that this House quite rightly deserves—[Interruption.] Government Members say that we have the chance today, but I remind them that many, many Members have asked questions of Ministers about the legal position on refusing this, and Ministers have been unable and unwilling to provide answers in the context of the international law that we have spoken about to do that.
This is the day that the Labour Government showed the British people out there, as well as the Chagossians in the Public Gallery today, that they do not stand up for the people of this country. They did not stand up when we saw that international law might go against us. They chose to abandon their responsibilities to protect the people of this country and the military assets that this country has in the overseas territories.
I predict that, in the four years ahead, this £35 billion surrender treaty will come to haunt this Labour Government. I remind Government Members that after they have gone through the Lobby and voted for the Bill tonight—after they have read out their Labour party briefing saying that it is the right thing to do—they will have to knock on doors and explain how they gave £35 billion of taxpayers’ hard-earned money to a country that never had sovereignty over this British overseas territory. They should hang their heads in shame, and I think they will do so.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. Before we move on to the next speaker, I remind right hon. and hon. Members that it is not in order to impute false or unavowed motives to any other individual hon. Members in this place.
Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)
It has been a long afternoon, but I should say from the start that I genuinely believe that the motivation of all of us is the national interest of the United Kingdom. Whatever differences of opinion there might be, I think it is important that we try to avoid hyperbole in this matter and think coolly and calmly about what is in the UK national interest.
There are tests we need to apply to what we are discussing: first, does it protect UK national security; secondly, do our allies and the professional military and security establishment support it; and thirdly, are the costs and obligations reasonable and proportionate? We also need to have a weather eye to our responsibility to the Chagossians, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) for speaking passionately on behalf of his constituents. I believe the answer to those three tests is yes, and I will address them in turn.
Diego Garcia is not just another overseas facility; it is fundamental to our security. It is where our forces and US forces have launched operations against high-value terrorist groups. It is a communications and logistics hub, and it is where we monitor hostile states and safeguard global trade routes that underpin our economy. Without this treaty, all that is at risk.
Ministers have outlined that international rulings could make the base inoperable. I spoke earlier to Dr Marco Longobardo, a specialist in international law, and it is clear that even the non-binding ICJ judgment is nevertheless a matter of international law and potentially gives hostile countries the opening that they need to contemplate interference in the islands—in the same way that Chinese claims in the South China sea are not recognised by many countries. That is all at risk. Our ability to berth submarines, patrol waters or launch operations would be compromised, and a vacuum would be created.
Tim Roca
I believe that the hon. Member has had quite a lot of turns today, and I have been waiting a long time without intervening, so I will proceed. If we allowed a vacuum to be created, it would be filled by China or others in a region that is vital to our security. I will come back to China in a moment, because what China thinks about this treaty is important as well.
Turning to the first test, the treaty secures 99 years of guaranteed access, with the option to extend it by a further 40 years; 99 years was good enough for Lord Salisbury, so it is good enough for me. It gives us full operational control over installations, logistics, communications and the electromagnetic spectrum. It establishes a 24-nautical-mile buffer zone and bans any foreign military presence on the outer islands. We have talked about how it protects a unique maritime environment and provides tangible support through the trust fund for Chagossian communities. On the first test I am satisfied.
On the second test—whether the agreement commands the backing of allies and experts—other colleagues have spoken powerfully about this, but Lord Goldsmith, a former Attorney General, said it was
“consistent with our national security interests and with our respect for international law”.
The international support is equally strong. Australia’s Kevin Rudd called it a
“good outcome for Mauritius, for Australia, for the UK and for our collective security interests”.
Canada’s foreign ministry said that it ensures
“the long-term, secure and effective operation”
of the joint base, strengthening a free and open Indo-Pacific.
In the United States, where there is not much that gets bipartisan support, it is a bipartisan matter. Antony Blinken said that America “strongly supported” the negotiations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio commended the “leadership and vision” shown. The Democratic former Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin said that the agreement will
“safeguard strategic security interests into the next century.”
I believe an hon. Member has already quoted President Trump, who described it as an amazing deal, a beautiful deal or whatever kind of deal—but a good deal, that is the main point.
The international consensus is clear. Our allies, partners and experts back the deal. I was very taken by the comments of Professor Benjamin Sacks of the RAND school of public policy in the United States. He said:
“I contend that Beijing privately views the agreement, even if modified to ameliorate some Chagossians’ outstanding demands, somewhat as a setback. In practical terms, it gains little if any advantage from it.”
He added:
“The Chagos issue constituted a perennial problem for British foreign policy; one that China could simultaneously exploit to demonstrate its supposed adherence to existing RBOs”—
rule-based orders—
“and undermine the UK’s traditionally important role in maintaining it.”
He also said that the deal deters Port Louis—Mauritius—from becoming an effective client state of Beijing. On the point of whether our allies support it, I believe that the treaty meets the test.
Tim Roca
I will not. I experienced the right hon. Gentleman defending the hereditary principle last week, and I do not think I have the strength in me this week to listen to another argument.
The final test was on costs and obligations. Again, Ministers have talked powerfully about the deal being less than 0.2% of the defence budget. Comparisons have been made with what the French are paying in Djibouti, and I am glad that we are getting a better deal than the French. Of course, Diego Garcia is 15 times larger than those bases and in a more strategic location. The treaty gives us immense operational freedom. It therefore seems to me that this is a modest investment for an irreplaceable asset. The risks from delay or abandonment—in this argument, we have to balance the treaty with the risks of what could happen—are vastly greater.
Dr Pinkerton
The hon. Gentleman describes Diego Garcia as an irreplaceable asset, but the Chagossians sitting in the Gallery do not see it as an asset; they see it as their home. Even though they have been displaced from their home for the best part of 50 years, they tell me that they see the actions in the Chamber as a new round of the same colonial humiliation they experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. What does the hon. Gentleman say to those Chagossians here today?
Tim Roca
I thank the hon. Member for raising that important aspect. We should all be honest that, as was put powerfully by my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb), our country’s history with the Chagossians has been very poor—if we look at some of the diplomatic cables from the 1960s, we see that disgraceful language was used—but I was reassured by what Ministers said about the preamble of the treaty and some of the provisions put in place.
It is a matter of fact that the previous Government were in negotiations with Mauritius over this issue. That was the case, and there will have been motivations for their doing that. I am worried about how our other overseas territories are being dragged into this. A couple of months ago, I was in Gibraltar with colleagues who privately told me they were horrified that party politics were being played with their communities. I am glad to see that Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was clear on the record that there was “no possible read across” to Gibraltar, and the Governor of the Falklands said that the
“historical contexts…are very different.”
I am confident that we meet the three tests.
Tim Roca
No, I am afraid that I will not.
In closing, I believe that the three tests have been met: the treaty meets our national security requirements, it has the backing of our allies, and it comes at a reasonable cost. It would be very dangerous for us to dither or delay any longer in view of the potential threat to that base.
Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to take part in the debate. The Foreign Affairs Committee, on which I sit—I welcome two of my Labour colleagues from the Committee and my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth) to the debate—has had the opportunity to question the Minister, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), although I was not entirely persuaded by some of his answers. That is not to say that the Intelligence and Security Committee, which has other powers, is not an appropriate body for looking at some aspects—indeed, the Defence Committee should also do so.
The one thing that I think everybody agrees on is the importance of Diego Garcia and the Chagos islands to the United Kingdom. My right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) quoted Admiral Lord West, his former boss—he was, of course, a Minister in the last Labour Government and the security adviser to the Prime Minister—who said:
“It is no exaggeration to say that Diego Garcia—the largest of the Chagos Islands—hosts the most strategically important US air and logistics base in the Indian Ocean and is vital to the defence of the UK and our allies.”
I have no doubt that Labour Members share that sentiment, but perhaps not his later comment, which was:
“An agreement with Mauritius to surrender sovereignty over the Chagos Islands threatens to undermine core British security interests, and those of key allies, most notably the United States.”
We do need to listen to the warning he gave.
Sir Julian Lewis
Admiral Lord West has been referred to twice so far in the debate. My right hon. Friend may be unaware that Admiral Lord West had a letter published in the national press on 28 May in which he talked about the
“disgraceful decision to hand over ownership of the Chagos archipelago”.
He added:
“I do not accept that the move is ‘absolutely vital for our defence and intelligence’, as the Prime Minister claims.”
I wonder what Government Back Benchers who have been slavishly reading their scripts make of that from someone of that calibre—a former director of Defence Intelligence.
Sir John Whittingdale
If I might just answer my hon. Friend before doing so. Admiral Lord West has immense experience and knowledge. If the Defence Committee should decide to look at this, it might well ask him to give evidence on the basis of his considerable experience in the area.
Sir John Whittingdale
I will come on to UNCLOS. As the hon. Member knows, it is an organisation that has expressed a view, but not one that is binding on the United Kingdom. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), the former Attorney General, set out very clearly the various international opinions that have been expressed but which are not binding or mandatory for the United Kingdom to follow. That is critical to this debate.
Sir John Whittingdale
I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman specifically on that issue, but I can tell him that it has been absolutely clear that whatever the UNCLOS opinion is, it is not binding on this country. We will read with interest its view, but it is not one that we are necessarily required to follow.
The existing position has safeguarded the interests of this country for a very long period, so the first question one is required to ask is: why are we changing a guaranteed security status for this country by handing over the sovereignty of Diego Garcia? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam has said, it is based on opinions that have been expressed but not ones that we are required to follow.
As the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) said, I understand that the original linkage of the Chagos islands to Mauritius that took place was regarded as a matter of administrative convenience. However, they are actually 1,250 miles apart. On that basis, when the United Kingdom agreed to the independence of Mauritius, it was separated from the Chagos islands. There was no suggestion at that time that the two should be linked and that the islands be given over to Mauritius, which, despite the linkage, had no claim and no involvement in their running.
Alex Ballinger
Does the right hon. Gentleman, who is my colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee, acknowledge that by opening negotiations with Mauritius, the last Government conceded that there was a point around sovereignty to be discussed and that, certainly from then onwards, it was difficult for this Government to roll back that point?
Sir John Whittingdale
It had already been rolled back. The hon. Gentleman is right that the last Government began discussions because Mauritius expressed a view. However, that was on the basis that a mutually beneficial arrangement could be reached. It was concluded that such an agreement could not be reached, and on that basis the last Government ceased the negotiations. It is not a question of their being rolled back; it was this Government who chose to reopen negotiations that had been closed down by the previous Government.
I come back to the international judgments. The other one cited by Ministers on the Government Front Bench early on in the discussion, when this issue was first raised, was the risk to access to electromagnetic spectrum as a result of the ITU potentially reaching a judgment that might be based on the non-binding judgment expressed by the ICJ. There is no actual evidence that it was going to do that, but it was possible that it might, and for that reason the Government expressed the view that this was important.
I would point out that the ITU has no ability to determine the use of spectrum. The Minister, in answering a written parliamentary question in February this year, made it clear that the allocation of spectrum was a matter for sovereign states. The ITU is a sort of gentleman’s club where everyone gets together to discuss these matters, but it is not able to hand over the right to the use of spectrum from one country to another. It is also worth noting that the ITU has, over the years, been subject to considerable pressure from China, which had a secretary general of the ITU. I recall from my time dealing with issues around the ITU the real concern about how the Chinese were seeking to use the ITU, so in my view it is a good thing that the ITU does not have the power to allocate spectrum.
There are also serious strategic concerns that the Government have not yet properly addressed. As has already been mentioned, an element of the agreement involves a requirement for us to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base. When the Minister gave evidence to the Committee, I pressed him on whether that would require advance notification—
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)
indicated assent.
Sir John Whittingdale
He is nodding. He gave me a very firm assurance that that was not the case. That is of some reassurance, but it does not go far enough. The fact that we are no longer able to carry out actions from our own base without then having to notify Mauritius, and presumably take note of any objection it has, represents a limitation that could well affect decisions as to where to deploy assets.
Sir John Whittingdale
I shall give way to my right hon. Friend, who is an expert on these matters.
Sir Julian Lewis
If this means that we do not have to inform Mauritius in advance of a direct armed attack from the base, presumably it means that we have to inform it as soon as possible after such an attack. If such an attack were an overt attack, Mauritius would presumably know about it already because everyone would have seen it, so this rather suggests that we might have to inform it if there had been some sort of covert attack that other people had not seen and that it would otherwise not know about. Is that a satisfactory situation?
Sir John Whittingdale
My right hon. Friend makes a fair point. A requirement for us to tell the Mauritians what has been happening from the base is exactly what might influence decisions as to its use for operations of the kind he describes. The Minister gave evidence to the Committee on this point just a few days, I think, after the Americans had launched their attack on Iran, which did not involve Diego Garcia. That was something I raised with the Minister.
Stephen Doughty
I know how seriously the right hon. Gentleman takes these issues, and it is important for the House to understand this. I can confirm what I said to him previously, but also I draw his attention to article 3(2)(b) in the treaty and to annex 1. Article 3(2)(b) sets out clearly that
“the Parties shall not undermine, prejudice or otherwise interfere with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base, and shall cooperate to that end; and…the United Kingdom shall have full responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia.”
It sets out clearly our unrestricted ability to conduct the operations, including with the United States. That is very clear; it is in the treaty, and it is important that the House understands that.
Sir John Whittingdale
I understand that that is part of the treaty, but I hope that when the Minister winds up, he will address the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) that the requirement to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius, even after an operation, presumably means that we must do so as soon as possible, and that that will presumably apply to whatever kind of operation has taken place using the base. Perhaps he could tell us whether that might compromise decisions about the use of the base.
The other aspect I raised with the Minister when he was in front of the Committee was Mauritius being a signatory of the Pelindaba treaty. The Pelindaba treaty states that signatories will not have nuclear weapons on their soil. Britain, the UK, is not a signatory of it, but, as I say, Mauritius is. Again, the Minister told the Committee that there was no way in which anything in the agreement would affect the operational use of the base, but he would not go further and comment specifically on the aspects of potentially nuclear weapons on the Diego Garcia base. That is something of real concern, and I hope the Minister might say a little more about that conflict between his assurance and Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty, which specifically says that there should not be nuclear weapons held on the sovereign territory of signatories.
I turn to the cost of the treaty to the UK. We are told that there is some disagreement about the precise figure. I have to say that even £3.5 billion seems pretty large to me, let alone £35 billion, which is universally believed on the Opposition side to be a more accurate figure. It has been suggested, nevertheless, that this is a relatively small amount of money and it is a good deal. I recall that when this was first suggested, a different Mauritian Government were in power. The Prime Minister of Mauritius at that time had signed a deal, which the current Prime Minister of Mauritius described as a terrible deal and that as soon as he was elected, he would reopen the whole discussion. It certainly appears that he was successful in doing so: the sum that has now been agreed is, the Mauritian Prime Minister has told us, considerably bigger than his predecessor had originally agreed, and this was a great success of the new Prime Minister of Mauritius that he managed to squeeze even more money out of the British Government. That does beg the question: at what point does it stop being a good deal? The impression given is that the British Government were so keen to sign up to this deal, they basically have signed away to almost any sum advanced by Mauritius. As one or two of my hon. Friends have made clear, that will be a difficult message to sell on the doorstep at a time when the Government are having to make significant savings and to raise taxes.
In particular, I am concerned—the Minister will understand why—about the impact on the Foreign Office budget, because the Foreign Office suffered the biggest cuts of any Whitehall Department in the last spending round. It is already unclear about how those savings will be met, and there is speculation that the budgets of the British Council or the World Service, or our representation in embassies around the world, will be reduced. Despite those pressures and potentially very damaging cuts to Foreign Office expenditure, the Foreign Office appears to be expected to meet part of this bill. The Minister was unable to tell the Committee how the bill would be divided up between the Foreign Office budget and the Ministry of Defence budget. Perhaps that is something else that he might say a little more about when he winds up.
I will also touch on the other aspect of the consequences of this deal: the impact on the environment, which has been referred to by one or two Members. I pay tribute to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who is, I think it fair to say, engaged in other projects at the moment. She was assiduous in raising with the Minister her concern about the treaty’s impact on an incredibly important marine environment—that is recognised around the world. She wrote to the Minister, as he will be aware, and said:
“My principal concern is that there is now no funding mechanism in place to ensure Mauritius will properly resource marine protection in the Chagos Archipelago… Without any dedicated funding mechanism…there is nothing to ensure that this protection will continue other than the on-going willingness of the Mauritian Government to allocate resource”.
As has been observed, the archipelago is 1,250 miles away from Mauritius, and we are not entirely convinced that that willingness in Mauritius, on which the Government appear to be pinning their hopes, exists.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the presence of the Chagossians in the Public Gallery. They have been very badly treated over years, and it is of concern to me that they appear to have had virtually no input in this agreement, and that there has been no consultation with them. I know that a contact group is being established in the Foreign Office, but there is some scepticism about whether it has ever met, and about how many staff will be allocated to it. Perhaps the Minister might give details in his reply. [Interruption.] I am pleased to hear him say that it met last week.
I am grateful to the Government for answering questions so far, but an awful lot remain, and the answers that I have heard have failed to convince me that this treaty is in the economic, strategic and environmental interests of this country or the Chagos islands.
Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to speak in support of the Bill, which safeguards our national security and protects our constituents.
Diego Garcia is one of the most important military bases in the world. From that facility, Britain and the United States project stability across the Indian ocean, the Gulf and the wider Indo-Pacific. The base has been vital in the fight against terrorism and piracy for many years. Today, it is indispensable in containing the growing reach of the Chinese Communist party, as others have said. Beijing is building ports, airports and naval outposts right across the region; its so-called “string of pearls” is designed to encircle and dominate. If we are serious about standing up for the values that we hold dear—human rights, democracy and, at its heart, freedom—Diego Garcia must remain secure and undisputed, which can be achieved only through the treaty that the Government have concluded.
Conservative colleagues may huff and puff, as they have been doing ad nauseam over the past few hours, but let us not rewrite history. As has been pointed out, it was not Labour that opened negotiations with Mauritius.
Phil Brickell
I will make some progress, if I may. I wanted to intervene on Opposition Members earlier, but was not allowed to.
It was the Conservatives who rightly described the situation in 2022 as unsustainable, and it was they who held 11 rounds of talks on sovereignty. In 2023, when he was Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) said that he wanted to conclude a deal soon. At the time, when they were in government, Conservative Members recognised that the base’s legal status was under serious threat, and that an interminable sovereignty dispute risked paralysing operations.
Let me make a quick point about international law. In reflecting on the ICJ advisory opinion, the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel) said that it is an international court that few have heard of. Those kinds of reckless throwaway remarks undermine the United Nations’ highest judicial organ. She mentioned that we are a permanent member of the UN Security Council. There are judges sitting in the ICJ who are elected by members of the General Assembly, and through the Security Council. Although we have had judges sitting in that international court since its inception, we have not since 2018, which is a source of much shame for the country at large. I hope that she will take back those remarks denigrating the international system of law that underpins our international work. Let us not forget, after all, that in the 1940s, the United Kingdom was the first country to submit a case for arbitration by the ICJ. [Interruption.] I ask those Opposition Members who are chuntering: where were you when those 11 rounds of negotiations took place? I know that two years is a long time in politics, but have you already forgotten—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. I wasn’t anywhere, and I have forgotten nothing. Will Members please be careful about the language they use in the Chamber?
Phil Brickell
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Labour has finished what the previous Government started—what was left to us after former Prime Minister Liz Truss let the genie out of the bottle in starting negotiations with Mauritius in 2022. That was reported, and much maligned, by Matthew Parris in The Spectator at the time—let us not forget that. This Government have sought to strike a deal in Britain’s best interests, given the legal mess that they inherited. Let us be clear: this agreement secures the future of the Diego Garcia base. Britain retains control of the base, as the Minister confirmed in response to my intervention near the start of the debate. There is a protective buffer zone, and no foreign security forces will be on the outer islands. There will be a robust mechanism to prevent interference, and for the first time, Mauritius has agreed back the base’s operations. That is a huge strategic win.
What about cost? Let us get this clear, because some of the disinformation coming from the Conservative party is concerning; it is unnecessarily setting hares running about the future of other British overseas territories, including the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. The overall cost has not changed from that negotiated with the former Mauritian Prime Minister, and suggestions to the contrary are simply false. When set against the cost of inaction, the financial component is modest. It is far cheaper than the spiralling costs of legal uncertainty, and far cheaper than the price we would pay if Chinese expansionism went unchecked in the Indian ocean. For a fraction of our defence budget, we will secure a cornerstone of global stability. Let us not forget that the agreement will have an average annual cost that represents 0.008% of total Government spend, according to the Government Actuary’s Department.
Dr Pinkerton
Earlier in his very carefully crafted speech, the hon. Gentleman said that this deal protects freedom. One of the freedoms that citizens of the British overseas territories to which he referred most appreciate is the freedom to determine their own future. Why does he think that Chagossians should be made an exception and denied the right to determine their own future?
Phil Brickell
I am sure that the Minister will come to that in his closing remarks. I have to concur with other Members that the way the Chagossians were treated in the ’60s and ’70s was utterly shameful. I am proud that there will be rights of return, and the ability to visit.
Conservative Members claim to be the champions of defence, but that is not borne out by the facts, which include an 18% cut in defence spending in their first five years in government, and their shrinking the Army to its smallest size since the Napoleonic era. In how many years out of 14 was the target of 2.5% of GDP spent on defence hit? Zero. They should not lecture Labour Members on national security. The Government’s plan is straightforward, transparent and serious. We have the largest increase in the defence budget since the cold war; we are rebuilding alliances that previous Governments wantonly vandalised; we are acting where there was dither; we are governing in the national interest; and, importantly, we are securing the long-term future of the Diego Garcia base.
It is clear that a binding adverse judgment against the UK was inevitable. Since 2015, 28 international judges have expressed views on Chagos sovereignty. That was under the previous Government, and not one of those 28 judges backed Britain’s claim. Without an agreement, our ability to operate the base would have been compromised. Overflight clearances would have been at risk, contractor access would have been uncertain, communications would have degraded, costs would have soared, and investment would have fallen. Who would that benefit? I put that to Conservative Members, but I will give them a clue: it is not Britain, and not Britain’s allies. This deal secures Diego Garcia, cements our role in the Indo-Pacific, strengthens our ability to push back against Chinese influence, and shows that Britain is a dependable ally that takes national security seriously.
I wish to make a closing remark on the reasoned amendment by the Reform party, in the names of the hon. Members for Clacton (Nigel Farage), for Boston and Skegness (Richard Tice), for Runcorn and Helsby (Sarah Pochin) and for Ashfield (Lee Anderson), who seem not to be present. I will read out a part of it that I am gobsmacked nobody has picked up on in this debate:
“because the reason for the UK-Mauritius Treaty and for bringing forward this Bill follows a judgment from the International Criminal Court, from which the UK does not recognise judgments as binding, only advisory”,
they will oppose this Bill. I want Reform to answer: which case before the International Criminal Court is it referring to? Is Reform suggesting that, were it to come to power, it would not recognise the binding judgments of the International Criminal Court? Will it take us out of the ICC? Unfortunately, Reform Members are not here to respond.
The Conservatives opened the door to this treaty. Labour inherited a legal mess, but it has delivered a deal in the long-term national interest. For a small cost, we have achieved a huge strategic win. That is why I am proud to support this Bill, and I will vote with the Government tonight.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)
So many Labour Members seem to have forgotten that the reshuffle was a couple of days ago. They will have to wait another few months, possibly years, for their obsequiousness to be rewarded.
May I suggest that we are in a somewhat through-the-looking-glass world? Over the last few hours, we have heard very clear questions from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who is no longer in his place. He explained that we are hearing a circular argument about legal intervention to which there is absolutely no response. All we hear from Government Members is ChatGPT-generated press releases—“I rise to speak”, “I rise to speak”, “I rise to speak”. ChatGPT knows you are there. That is an Americanism that we do not use. Still, they should keep using it, because it makes it clear that this place has become absurd.
This building and this Chamber are a complete waste of time when our electors and fellow citizens hear that we have listened to the arguments of Mauritius, China, India and the United States, but are not willing to listen to the arguments of Britain. We are not willing to stand up for the interests of the British people, or to look at the strategic interests of UK defence. Instead, all we hear consistently is that the Americans are for the deal. Of course they are for it; this is a territorial deal, and they have no interest in the territory. All they are interested in is the lease of the base. They are leasing the base off us at the moment, and they will be leasing the base off Mauritius via us into the future, so there is no change for them.
Of course, India is in favour of the deal. By the way, I respect the position of the Indian Government greatly, but do you know what? I am not an Indian MP. I have a different perspective, because my job—and, I thought, the job of Labour Members, but clearly I was wrong—is to stand up for the British people. Instead, all I hear is that Labour Members are standing up for the interests of different foreign powers. That is absolutely fine. They worship international treaties and stand up for so-called international law, but they conveniently forget—[Interruption.] Members should hear the end of the sentence. They forget that international law is conflictual, challenged and regularly, if not almost always, in direct confrontation with itself, because it highlights different interests. At different points, Governments champion different aspects of international law in order to seek different outcomes. That is how it has grown up. It is the job of sovereign Governments to stand up for our interests. I thought that was the job of our Government, but it clearly is not the job of this Government. Instead, this Government do something quite different; the moment that they are challenged, they run away. Brave Sir Keir bravely turned his tail and fled.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. This debate has to be fair on both sides. I will not have Members referring to the Prime Minister by name.
Tom Tugendhat
It could have been any Sir Keir —there are so many of them. I apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker.
This Government have decided that instead of fighting for Britain’s interests, all they will do is turn around and capitulate.
Tom Tugendhat
I will not. The problem is that this case is not just about these islands, or the issues we are debating today; it is about the way in which Governments approach these debates.
Just in case we are in any doubt about the changed nature of the use of law against us, it is worth looking at the timeline of these events—which is completely coincidental. We know, because colleagues have mentioned it, that in the 1960s a deal was done, a payment was made, Mauritius accepted it and we moved on. Just after the Falklands war, a legal action was begun, using Mauritius and extending a claim. Just after the Falklands war, the KGB started to fund the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. By the way, it is not me saying this—it is in the Mitrokhin archive; it is all public. Just after the Falklands war, when the Soviets realised that they did not have the military power to defeat NATO, they started experimenting with lawfare, and we have seen them do it again and again. If Members would like to read reports on this issue, Policy Exchange very kindly published a report by me in 2013, and another one in 2015—“Fog of Law” and “Clearing the Fog of Law”, for those who have trouble sleeping.
Since then, we have seen lawfare grow. We have seen states using the power of lawyers against the interests of the British people time and again, and the trouble with the capitulation we are seeing today is that it is not just about Diego Garcia, these islands or this interest; it is about the question of whether or not this Government will stand up for the British people, and for our security and our interests. Let me sketch out a hypothetical situation for you, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is possible, although I hope it is not necessary, that British troops will be asked to do some peacekeeping in somewhere like Ukraine. It is possible that they will have to leave at a moment’s notice with the equipment they have, without the ability to re-equip—simply to go with the best that they have. It is possible that countries like Russia will object.
We know, because we have seen it happen in the late 1990s and all the way through the 2010s and 2020s, that the Russian Government and others have encouraged legal action against our armed forces. To be honest, Governments have been poor on this issue since 1999—Labour Governments initially, and then Conservative Governments—so it was very welcome that Lord Cameron stopped this, recognising that a different position could be taken. Sadly, this Bill reverses that position. It reverses the presumption that our Government, the British Government, will represent the legal interests of the British people and fight these cases. Instead, they will capitulate. The problem is that capitulation is what got us into this problem in the first place. We can look at the Bici case in Kosovo in the late 1990s, where we settled rather than fought, or at cases in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we settled rather than debated—rather than going to court and seeking a judgment. Those cases created precedents, and I am afraid that this Government are creating another precedent.
I know that the Minister will say that the Governments of the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, and many other places have correctly said that this case has no connection to them. I am delighted that they have said so, and they are right, but they are sadly mistaken in thinking that that means nobody will test that point.
Tom Tugendhat
Had the hon. Gentleman been in the Chamber at the beginning of the debate, he would have been welcome to contribute, but given that he has such a passing interest, I am sure he will not mind if I carry on.
The reality is that it is not up to the person who is pursued by law as to whether they will be challenged; it is up to the aggressor, and we know who the aggressor is. We know who has been using lawfare against us. We have seen it time and again, and I am afraid that the effect of this Bill is to concede that point. I am fascinated that so many Government Members feel that they had no choice but to conclude the negotiation. Admittedly it was begun mistakenly by a Conservative Administration and, yes, I did write to the then Prime Ministers—both of them—complaining about it and pointing out the error of their ways. I was a Minister, and I wrote about it and complained about it, as did Lord Murray of Blidworth—I think that is right. I am going to get his name wrong, forgive me—that is one for Hansard. We both wrote, because we both thought it was wrong at the time.
What can I say? We left office. The civil servants re-presented the same offer and sadly, here we go again. The British people feel so disenchanted at the moment because we see changes of Government and no changes of policy. We simply see a continuation and the Whips’ briefings coming out again. We simply see the pointlessness of democracy in this place, because we might as well not bother being here. The Foreign Office stitched this one up. The Minister cannot even change the judgment, and he has sacrificed everything on the whims of an international process with no regard to the interests of the British people.
Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his speech earlier, although he is no longer in this place. We have heard clearly from those on the Opposition Benches that they are opposed to this deal, so it is first worth outlining what sort of deal they are opposed to. They are opposed to a deal that secures our vital national interest on probably the most important base in the country’s history in the Indian ocean. They are opposed to a deal that is supported by every one of our Five Eyes closest security partners. As we have heard from many of them, they are opposed to a deal that they spent 11 rounds negotiating over two years, and we have not quite heard from them why they started negotiating that deal in the first place. They spent 11 rounds negotiating it, but they have not yet told us—the shadow Minister or otherwise—why they felt it was necessary and why they think this Government might have come to the same conclusion as they did at that time. I believe, as many of us do on the Government Benches, that that dangerous rhetoric puts the security of our base in Diego Garcia at risk. It is playing politics with our national security.
I want to take us back in history for one moment to look at a similar situation. During the second world war, the UK established another airfield in the Indian ocean known as RAF Gan. RAF Gan was the southernmost island in the Maldives, and it was secured in 1942 by the Royal Navy, and then taken over by the Air Force, to secure our operations all across the Indian ocean into the far east, combating the Japanese threat we were facing there. It was such a successful base that the Japanese did not even discover its existence until close to the end of the war, once their expansion plans had ended. Later, in the cold war, it became a vital staging post for the UK and our allies to get our forces across to Singapore and other bases in the far east. In fact, my father served there in 1974, and it was a great shame that two years later we closed that base and handed it over to the Maldivian Government at the same time that we secured our base in Diego Garcia.
I mention that case in particular because it was a vital strategic secure base of ours in a similar situation to Diego Garcia. As soon as the Maldivian Government took possession of that base, the Russians began to exert influence to try to take it over. They were attempting to take over the base that we occupied—that we spent decades developing—and turn it into a secure base for the Soviet Union. They are doing exactly the same thing again on Diego Garcia. They are trying to influence the Mauritian Government to claim the base for their own use.
Dr Evans
Is this not the point that we have heard time and again from Government Members? This deal runs out in 99 years, and at that point Mauritius can simply close the base or hand it on to the biggest offer. We get first rights on it, but if the Chinese decide to invest hundreds of billions, we may not be able to match that. We are over a barrel. In 100 years’ time, people will be in this place having this exact debate saying, “How do we solve this problem?” Is the hon. Member as concerned about that as I am?
Alex Ballinger
I go back to the example of RAF Gan. The Maldivians refused the Soviet Union back in 1976, because the UK had a good reputation with them. We honoured our agreements and respected international law, and they felt that it was inappropriate for them to be seen to be supporting a country that had not done the same.
In the case of Diego Garcia, this is a situation that has been negotiated for many years. The Conservatives recognised that there was a threat to our sovereignty, because they started the negotiations. As we have heard from my hon. Friends, if we are unable to conclude a deal soon, there is a serious risk that our operations at the base would be thwarted. It would not be in 99 or 140 years after the deal; it would be in weeks or months.
Alex Ballinger
I will carry on for a moment, and then I will give way.
Despite the risks, the Conservatives have come out in opposition to this deal. The right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly)—the former Foreign Secretary, who is not in his place—has described the deal as “weak, weak, weak”, but it was he who started the negotiations back in 2023. He pledged that he would complete the deal in the same year, but he was unable to do so. Maybe it was his negotiating tactics that were “weak, weak, weak”, rather than anything else. For all the Conservatives’ complaining about this agreement, they have failed again to offer any insight into why they started the negotiations in the first place.
Sir John Hayes
The hon. Gentleman is right. Questions about why the negotiations started have been raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), given that the national interest is the primary concern of all responsible Governments and could easily be compromised by this deal, but will the hon. Gentleman deal with this point? It has been made absolutely crystal clear in this debate that Lord Cameron, when he became Foreign Secretary, ended those negotiations. Lord Cameron is a man of immense experience, who has probably negotiated at a level beyond anyone present in this Chamber. He would have certainly taken legal advice within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office before he closed those negotiations. Why does the hon. Gentleman think that Lord Cameron closed them down, and why does he think that this Government reopened them?
Alex Ballinger
We do not know why Lord Cameron closed them down, because the Conservatives have not released any details of the deal that they negotiated up to that point. Maybe the costs were too high because they had not negotiated a better deal, or maybe things like the 24-mile security zone were not included in the deal, but this Government have secured a better deal. It is important for us to secure our national security.
It is also worth pointing out that Conservative Governments have not looked after our national security over the last 14 years. I have served, and I have seen the damage that was caused by 14 years of under-investment and neglect of our armed forces. Our Army has been reduced to a size that has not been seen since the time of Napoleon. Service accommodation standards are scandalous, which our people do not deserve in the slightest, and the Conservatives cut the defence budget so deep that Russia felt that we were too weak to stop an invasion in Europe. I am pleased to see that this Labour Government are investing again in our armed forces and starting to fix the damage of those 14 years.
Since we are talking about investment, let me touch on the investment value of this deal. Diego Garcia’s location—far from major population centres—makes it the ultimate secure base. It is a deepwater port in a key staging area in the Indian ocean, and is vital for our submarine operations. It contains the longest runway in the entire Indian ocean, putting our aircraft in reach of Africa, the middle east and east Asia. In order to continue the operation of such a base for 99 years, we are looking at an average cost of £101 million a year. That is around 0.2% of our defence budget—less than the cost of a single aircraft carrier. As we heard from my hon. Friends, it is a better deal than the French have achieved in Djibouti for a base that is right next to the Chinese operations, and has a total cost that is less than the amount of money that the last Government wasted on faulty PPE during the pandemic.
Diego Garcia is vital for our national security—I think everybody in this place agrees with that. Two years ago, the Conservatives also agreed on the need for a deal.
Lincoln Jopp
I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for giving way. On the pricing, he said that Government Front Benchers are putting it out that this is a good deal. Would it still be a good deal if it was £35 billion or something like that?
Alex Ballinger
As the hon. Member will know, the official Government statistics say the cost is £3.5 billion, which is about 0.2% of our defence budget. I wonder what other assets in the entire world that may be worth 0.2% of our defence budget are quite as effective and important as Diego Garcia.
I will come to my conclusion. The last Government wanted a deal. They started negotiating a deal and conducted 11 rounds of negotiations on a deal. Now, however, because they think that they can score some political points, they are choosing to side with our adversaries. I humbly suggest that if they really had the UK’s national security in mind, they would agree with what the US State Department told the Foreign Affairs Committee on our recent visit to Washington, and some of the Conservative Committee members were in that meeting. The US State Department told us, “Thank you for securing this deal, which we think is vital for both our nations’ security.”
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is a privilege to speak in this debate, particularly following some of the incredibly insightful speeches, certainly on the Opposition side of the House.
Today is a hugely consequential day. The House is not being asked to debate in abstract, and neither are we considering ordinary legislation that can be repealed should its effect turn out to be unfavourable. We are being asked to endorse the permanent and irrevocable surrender of British sovereign territory. There is no way back from this, and I cannot support such action. My opposition is shared by Members on this side of the House and, I suspect, by more Labour Members than may be prepared to say so publicly.
We have heard the point before, but it bears repeating: the British Indian Ocean Territory is of immense military, security and geopolitical importance, and this Bill will give it away forever. It does so at a time of heightened instability and threat around the world. It does not take an expert on defence or foreign affairs to know that this is a terrible decision. It is one that puts virtue signalling before the national interest, plays into the hands of our enemies and ultimately puts this country and our citizens at risk, which is unforgiveable of any Government.
If what we are presented with today is indeed to be the final settlement of the issue, it is a settlement that satisfies neither the strategic nor the political doubts that have been raised. My first concern is the implications of this handover for our defence and security. For decades, Diego Garcia has played a critical role in the collective security of the United Kingdom, the United States and our broader network of allies in the region. The base serves as a launchpad to defeat our enemies, to prevent threats to our nation and to protect our economic security. It directly contributes to Britain’s strength at home and abroad.
In practice, the facility, known as Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, fulfils multiple essential military roles. It supports approximately 15 key military tasks, including logistics, communications and intelligence gathering. The base acts as a prepositioning hub, hosting vessels carrying armoured vehicles, munitions, fuel and even mobile field hospitals for rapid deployment to wherever they are needed. It is equipped with a deep-water port capable of docking nuclear submarines and naval vessels, as well as runways accommodating strategic bombers, aerial refuelling operations and pre-launch operations across the Indian ocean.
Diego Garcia remains indispensable, but we are now being asked to jeopardise it. In truth, Parliament has been shown nothing of real substance that addresses the concerns that have been raised by Conservative Members. This House is being asked to vote blindfolded on the future of one of our most strategically important overseas territories.
This matters because, despite what Ministers seem to have convinced themselves to be true, the Republic of Mauritius is far from being a passive actor in the geopolitics of the region. Mauritius has repeatedly aligned itself with states hostile to our own strategic interests. It voted against the UK in the UN General Assembly and the International Court of Justice over the future of the Chagos islands in the first place. It maintains close diplomatic and economic ties with China, and China’s use of slave labour and expansionist agenda against Taiwan are well documented. More to the point, Mauritius has signed up to the global security initiative proposed by Beijing, which has been described by many regional experts as China’s attempt to displace US-led security partnerships. These concerns have repeatedly been brushed aside by Ministers keen to remind us that Mauritius is in fact an ally of New Delhi, not Beijing.
Sir John Hayes
The critical point here is that national security and the national interest are inseparable. Both depend on the sovereignty of this nation and the primacy of this Parliament, so although international treaties and agreements matter, of course, they can never matter more than that primacy. We cannot subcontract the national interest to an overseas place that in years to come might want to defend that interest, or might not, in exactly the way that my hon. Friend is describing.
Rebecca Paul
As always, my right hon. Friend makes his point well, and I completely agree.
The reality is that Mauritius is not a reliable or neutral guarantor of our security interests, and it is staggeringly naive for Ministers to suggest otherwise. To put it plainly, if the transfer proceeds, there can be no guarantee that our interests will be protected. As has already been raised multiple times, what will happen in 99 years is of significant concern.
On top of all that, we are not just giving away one of the centrepieces of our global security posture, but paying extortionately for the privilege. Hard-working taxpayers—my constituents—will be left footing the bill for the next 99 years, paying £35 billion or perhaps £47 billion for the lease that the Government have agreed. In Britian, we have faced cruel cuts, harmful tax rises and economic gloom under this Government. By contrast, the Mauritian Government have now begun celebrating their shrinking national debt and announcing a series of planned tax cuts, all as a result of the billions that we will send them.
Countries have lost wars and gone on to be offered treaties with more generous terms than this one, yet those on the Government Front Bench come to this House and call the deal a triumph. The UK will be weaker and poorer as a result, and it is shameful that the Government have brought such a damaging, insulting and senseless document to this House. By moving forward with this, the Government are failing in their first duty to ensure the safety and security of our citizens and nation. This day will go down in the history books as the day that the United Kingdom was diminished by dangerous fools.
Sarah Smith (Hyndburn) (Lab)
Diego Garcia is not just another military facility; it is the cornerstone of Britain’s national security and our most important contribution to the UK-US security relationship. From tracking terrorist networks to ensuring freedom of navigation and global trade, the base has saved lives and safeguarded our people. Let us be clear, however, that the reason we are here today is the failures of the Conservative Government on defence and foreign policy. For years, they dithered, delayed and mismanaged. They gambled with a capability that no other site on earth can replicate and with our security. Some 85% of the negotiations that delivered the treaty took place under the Conservatives.
The right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly), then Foreign Secretary, launched the process and the right hon. Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch), now the Leader of the Opposition, sat at the Cabinet table, received the same security briefings and never raised objections—not in Parliament, in written questions or on social media. They knew then, as we know now, that without a treaty Diego Garcia was at risk of being made inoperable. They knew the dangers of hostile powers exploiting the vacuum and of our ability to berth submarines and patrol the region being fatally compromised.
Today, however, the Opposition have been unable to answer the basic question of why they started the negotiations. They tried to present the argument that they stopped the negotiations, yet in April 2024 Lord Cameron wrote to the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) to say that
“the future administration of the islands”
was
“subject to ongoing bilateral negotiations”.
Shortly following that, there was a general election. In opposition, those same people posture against a deal that they once championed. They offer no alternative—no plan, no strategy; just opportunism. They play politics with the safety of the British people. That is not leadership; it is pure hypocrisy.
By contrast, the Labour Government have delivered a treaty that secures 99 years of guaranteed access, with the option of extending it for another 40 years. We have secured rock-solid safeguards: full UK control over the base, command of the electromagnetic spectrum, a 24-nautical-mile buffer zone to protect operations and a ban on any foreign military presence in the wider archipelago.
Crucially, the treaty is backed by our allies. The United States welcomes it, with President Trump calling it a
“very long term, powerful lease”.
Our Five Eyes partners, as well as India, all back it, because they recognise what the Conservatives once admitted but now deny: it is irreplaceable.
We must also address the position taken by Reform UK, whose Members have all vacated the Chamber for the debate that they proclaim to be so important. The hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) and his colleagues loudly claimed that the United States would reject the agreement, and they told the British people that President Trump would oppose it outright, but they were embarrassingly wrong. The United States has welcomed the deal and President Trump has said that it is “very strong” and “very long term”. Once again, Reform UK misread our closest ally and talked Britain down. Parading as patriots, their instincts are to undermine alliances and weaken the very partnerships that keep this country safe.
Let us be clear that, when put in context, the costs are modest and represent less than 0.2% of the annual defence budget. To put them into greater context, the cost of the whole deal is less than the cost of the unused PPE in the first year of covid under the Tory Government. The Conservative party had 14 years in Government to get this right, but it instead wasted billions of pounds on defence mismanagement while leaving the future of our most critical base to hang by a thread. This Labour Government have secured it for a century, protected our people, supported the Chagossian community and strengthened Britain’s alliances.
To oppose the Bill is to abandon the base, and to abandon the base is to abandon Britain’s security. I will not do that. I urge all Members to support the Bill and to put the safety of the British people above the short-term games of a divided Opposition and the reckless posturing of Reform UK.
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
At the start of this Parliament, I could not have imagined that we would be asked to consider a Bill that is so uniquely detrimental to our national security, the British taxpayer, the British Chagossian people and the environment. Not only are we ceding sovereignty of a critical overseas territory, but we are paying a huge financial cost for the privilege of doing so. We have heard much today about the cost of this deal—a cost that the Government claim is £3.4 billion over 99 years, but in reality it is many times greater.
This deal is unique: it will leave the UK strategically weaker in one of the most contested regions of the world, which is likely to shape the future direction of geopolitics, at a time when the world is more volatile than ever, with 2024 seeing the greatest number of conflicts around the globe since the second world war.
Allow me to start with the finances of the deal. It took a freedom of information request for this Government to level with the British people that this deal would in fact cost £35 billion, with some analysis even suggesting it could be as much as £47 billion. It would have been far better for the Government to have come clean over the true cost of the Chagos deal, rather than trying accountancy tricks to pull the wool over our eyes.
I would like to put into context the sheer scale of £35 billion of taxpayers’ money: it could be used to pay for 10 Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers; it is over half the annual schools budget; it is the estimated cost of the entire Hinckley Point C nuclear reactor project; it would pay for 70 hospitals, or a 5% cut on income tax—the list could go on and on. We knew this anyway, but it is worth reiterating that when the Prime Minister negotiates, Britain loses.
The hard-working people of Chester South and Eddisbury deserve a better return for the tax they pay, and they ought not to have to watch as this Government sign away British sovereign territory. Adding to that, the omission from the Bill of a money authorisation clause, removing Parliament’s ability to vote on sending billions of pounds to Mauritius, is completely wrong.
That leads me to the strategic implications of the Bill. The Diego Garcia base is one of seven permanent points of presence within the Indo-Pacific region. Owing to its position in the middle of the Indian ocean and proximity to shipping lanes, it is vital for our national security and regional influence. It is a key base from which our armed forces can protect us from hostile states and non-state actors and activity. From a security standpoint, it is deeply concerning that we are losing sovereignty over this base and the influence that we could exert from it.
According to the treaty, the UK is compelled to notify the Mauritian Government on certain aspects of military activity in and around the base. This does not make us safer. Think back to earlier this year when our American allies conducted strikes against Iran. What if the UK were to support our allies in such action? This deal would require, as we have heard, for us to expeditiously inform the Mauritian Government of our actions. I appreciate that the Minister has clarified that no advanced notification is required, although one might ask why we should have to inform Mauritius at all, expeditiously or not. Perhaps the Minister can clarify whether the provisions under annex 1, paragraph 2 also extend to special forces operations, and, if so, what guarantee there would be that highly sensitive security information would not end up in the hands of our adversaries.
China, Iran and Russia have all welcomed the deal. As the shadow Minister highlighted, the Chinese ambassador to Mauritius congratulated the Government of Mauritius and the Deputy Prime Minister in a press conference following the deal’s announcement, thanking China for its support throughout the process. China does not do geopolitical favours, so its support should cause the Government to pause and reflect. Iran has also welcomed the deal and we know that it is forging closer ties with Russia, so perhaps in his closing remarks the Minister can share with the House how Ministers have somehow come to a different conclusion and deduced instead that all three of those geopolitical threats are opposed to the deal.
But it is not just the huge financial cost or the significant security implications of the deal that are deeply concerning, but that it has ignored the voices of British Chagossians. In June this year, I met people from the Chagossian community who came to Parliament to speak with MPs. Their message was very clear: they feel let down by a lack of transparency and consultation, and are deeply uncertain about their future. It is not surprising that they feel ignored and betrayed, given that the former Foreign Secretary met them only once—once—on a deal that is so significant for them.
The Government must put that right and take the opportunity to implement a recommendation put forward by the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee and International Agreements Committee, outlined in the report that looked at the treaty. They urged the Government to
“Enhance Chagossian engagement by establishing a formal consultation mechanism with the Chagossian community to monitor the Agreement’s implementation and ensure their meaningful inclusion in decision-making.”
Will the Minister confirm whether that recommendation has been implemented?
The deal provides British Chagossians with no guaranteed rights of return to their homeland. I therefore ask the Minister to state clearly whether the Government have negotiated an agreement in which British Chagossians’ rights to visit the Chagos islands are left entirely in the hands of Mauritius, and whether it is feasible that they may be refused the right to return or even visit. That would be wholly unacceptable.
Further, the Chagos trust fund, established as part of the UK-Mauritius treaty and financed by the UK, is to be distributed solely under the control of Mauritius, yet the Bill contains no provisions to monitor whether the rights of British Chagossians are upheld or to create any statutory oversight of the trust fund. Have Ministers secured from the Government of Mauritius any firm commitment that British Chagossians will have a formal role in the oversight and decision making regarding the fund? Indeed, why was a model of joint governance not agreed, ensuring that British Chagossians themselves have a voice in how the fund is governed and can benefit directly from it?
Added to all this, the deal currently risks leaving a pristine marine environment unprotected. The waters around the Chagos islands are home to 220 species of coral, 855 species of fish and 355 species of molluscs. These waters have been fully protected since 2010 by the UK Government. Although it is welcome that there is a commitment to continue with a marine protected area, we do not know what levels of support Mauritius will put into the MPA. Indeed, there are real concerns that the Mauritian Government do not have the capabilities to monitor, enforce and protect these waters, with no assurance that there will be no fishing and trawling in them.
From the eye-watering costs to the grave security risks, the betrayal of British Chagossians and the environmental damage this treaty risks unleashing, this is a uniquely bad deal. It asks us to pay more, risk more and gain nothing in return. For the sake of our national interest and our duty to the Chagossian people, I cannot support this Bill.
Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)
I rise today not to upset a Speaker or Deputy Speaker—let us see how this goes, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Mr Bailey
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I am proud to speak in favour of the Bill. I do so as a proud former member of our armed forces, having devoted 24 years of my life in uniform to the safety and security of this nation, particularly in intelligence gathering, where UNCLOS is a tool of the trade. That experience shapes my view of the Bill. I find it rich to hear lectures on national security or faux patriotism from the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel), whose party spent 14 years hollowing out our armed forces.
The Bill exemplifies the forward-looking, effective and patriotic approach that this Government have taken to our security and our place in the world. It is a major achievement to be implementing an agreement that will ensure that our base on Diego Garcia can operate securely in conjunction with our allies—notably the US—until at least 2124.
Mr Calvin Bailey
Not yet.
Allied naval, aviation and communications assets will be able to protect UK interests across a vast area of the western Indian ocean and beyond throughout the next century, no matter the change, turmoil or insecurity that the coming decades may bring.
The agreement provides the UK and our allies with the freedom of action necessary to guarantee the security of the base. This is detailed in a great many ways by the treaty, but I will highlight just three. First, we will have joint control over the electromagnetic spectrum communications and electronic systems. Secondly, we will have joint control over whether any security forces—military or civilian—will be permitted, except for our own and those of the United States and Mauritius. Finally, we will have joint control over any land development and any construction of sensors, structures or installations at sea. These are very broad and flexible rights; they apply not just to Diego Garcia, the 12-mile boundary within which territorial sovereignty extends or the 24-mile boundary surrounding it, but to the entire Chagos archipelago of 247,000 square miles.
What the Opposition have missed is that it is not what UNCLOS precludes but what it allows that is the threat. When it comes to the activities of third parties, control will be joint between the UK and Mauritius. This joint control will give us the ability to veto decisions if, after engaging fully with our Mauritian partners through the joint commission, we are ultimately unsatisfied about the security risks in a way that we cannot now. Within 12 miles of Diego Garcia, our control will be unrestricted, not joint; the same will apply to our rights, and those of US forces, to access Diego Garcia by air and sea. This will deliver the control that our armed forces need to keep the base secure over the decades to come.
In achieving the agreement, we have bolstered our relationships with key allies and partners, including India, as I will come to later, but first and foremost with the United States. It is a shame that the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) has left the Chamber, because I have some questions for him.
We need to be clear about the games that Opposition parties have been playing over this issue. Reform and the Conservatives have attempted to undermine this agreement at every stage, damaging UK interests and trying to drive a wedge between the UK and our allies. We saw the same approach from the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) in his anti-UK PR campaign on Capitol Hill last week, and I note that I can see none of the Reform party present.
As I have told this House from personal and professional experience, the United States military and its allies value written agreements and long-term guarantees. Our allies rely on the same kind of lease agreements to underwrite their own bases, so they see that this model can stand the test of time despite huge geopolitical shifts, and all of us can see that too.
The right hon. Member for Tonbridge said that we should save the base for our unilateral action, but he did not once explain how we would pay for operating and maintaining a base unilaterally. Instead of recognising the benefit of these negotiations, as a way to bolster our cross-Atlantic alliances and increase the value of our contribution to Indo-Pacific security, the Conservatives have repeatedly tried to undermine the process that they themselves started. Thankfully, they have failed. Our international partners have welcomed this agreement, and it now falls to us to ensure that the necessary changes are made in law so that the treaty can come into force and we do not let down our allies.
By far the strongest international advocate for this treaty is India. India is, as we know, an utterly indispensable partner in ensuring that the region remains free and open for navigation and UK trade. India is already a geopolitical force to be reckoned with, and her power and importance as a balancer preventing Chinese domination will only grow over the decades to come. The continuation of the UK and US forces on Diego Garcia, while resolving the question of sovereignty, aligns our strategic interest more strongly with India’s and helps to counter anti-UK rhetoric from the likes of Russia, which can still have influence by playing on the legacy of the anti-colonial struggle. The Conservatives conceded that by starting negotiations about sovereignty. I have asked them all repeatedly about that, and not one of you—
Madam Deputy Speaker
Order. You were so close to succeeding. Let us try to get the language right.
Mr Bailey
I did not receive a single response from any of them, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I have mentioned colonial history, which is going to get some Conservative Members very excited and make them want to use patriotic-sounding rhetoric about the concept of sovereignty, which, as I have just explained, they do not themselves understand. I will take the issue head on. The simple fact is that despite its name, the British Indian Ocean Territory has never been British in the way that Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands are. It has never had a resident population who were British and said with one voice that they wanted to remain so. Perhaps the Chagos islanders could have had such a population if history had gone differently, but they were robbed of that opportunity when the territory was created.
I welcome the apology from the Minister earlier, and I was grateful to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) speak so powerfully about this matter. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response shortly. Sadly, we cannot turn back the clock. What we can do is what we are doing: giving the Chagos islanders a pathway to permanent citizenship and integration here if they choose it, while supporting resettlement options within the agreement reached with Mauritius.
The absurdity of making a big song and dance about sovereignty is reflected in one simple fact. As the explanatory notes to the Bill point out, the UK has always committed to returning the islands to Mauritian sovereignty when they were
“no longer needed for defence purposes.”
That was part and parcel of the decisions made when the British Indian Ocean Territory was created. All that is happening through the treaty and the Bill is the creation of a more secure and durable solution that safeguards those defence purposes; and we are making good on our promise that the UK’s sovereignty would be continued only temporarily, not forever.
When the flag of the British Indian Ocean Territory—the flag of a tarnished endeavour—is lowered on Diego Garcia, the Union flag will be raised in its place: the flag of a modern, forward-looking nation of which Government Members are proud. By passing the Bill, we will not only address the growing vulnerability of a vital military asset, but entrench our alliances and our position in the Indo-Pacific, furthering Britain’s interests across the world.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Ind)
I am pleased to be able to say something in the debate. The points made about the history of this really need to be amplified a bit more. It was a disgraceful deal, done in 1965 by the then Labour Government, that created BIOT and led us on the pathway to expelling the Chagos islanders from both Diego Garcia and the wider archipelago. That was done when Mauritius was still a British colony, and the US was putting on a lot of pressure to get a base to fuel the Vietnam war. That was the context in which the deal was done.
The treatment of the Chagos islanders, which has been written about extensively by some brilliant writers, was unbelievably brutal. They were dragged out of their homes, put on boats, and sent to either Seychelles or Mauritius with no rights, no acknowledgment and no real support whatsoever. They lived for a long time in poverty in both those places. Former Members of the House who have sadly passed on did quite a lot to try to support them. The late Tam Dalyell, former MP for Linlithgow, went to Mauritius to meet Len Williams, the new governor-general at the time, and asked why people were sleeping on the streets of Port Louis. He was told, and from that point, he took up the cause of the Chagos islanders, because he thought they had been disgracefully treated. The late Robin Cook also took the matter up, both at the time and much later, when he became Foreign Secretary. We should pay tribute to them for what they tried to do.
The reality is that it was the Chagos islanders themselves who managed to get some decency and recognition. Olivier Bancoult, who has become a great friend of mine, first wrote to me in, I think, 1988. It was a beautiful handwritten letter, saying, “Dear Mr Corbyn, could you do anything to help the Chagos islanders?” We kept in touch. Indeed, I have met him many times since, including recently at the launch of his book.
The Chagos Refugees Group was founded, and it operated from Olivier Bancoult’s house. It made demands on the Mauritian Government, demands on the British Government and enormous demands on somebody who later became the British high commissioner to Mauritius, namely David Snoxell. He and Olivier Bancoult did not always get along. The latter’s pressure on David Snoxell was enormous; he once went to the extent of locking him in his office until they had a proper meeting. Olivier Bancoult is a feisty guy, and the group are feisty people. We should recognise that the group’s determination brought about compensation and a litany of court cases all over the country and the world. I have been to many of the hearings; I have heard arguments made in the decolonisation committee and at the UN Human Rights Council, and at a whole series of court processes in Britain to try to get compensation and recognition of the rights of the Chagos islanders.
Today, we are dealing with the consequences of the unbelievable heroism of the Chagossian people, who have been seeking recognition and justice. I regret that there are now differences within the Chagossian community. Tam Dalyell and I strongly supported the move to get a right to British nationality for Chagos islanders, and to amend the relevant nationality Act. That was eventually achieved, and that is how, I am pleased to say, they now have unfettered access to this country. I am also pleased that the treaty continues to include that unfettered access. I hope that the Minister, when he comes to reply, can explain what discussions he has had with all the elements of the Chagossian community. The last thing we want to see is division in a community that has suffered so much, and deserves so much decency and recognition.
If the Chagos islands in their entirety are not passed over to Mauritius and Mauritian sovereignty, there are two consequences. First, there will be even greater dishonesty than we thought there was in 1975, and secondly, Britain will be in breach of an ICJ judgment. If that is what people want—if that is what Conservative and Reform Members want—so be it, but they would be acting illegally by hanging on to the islands. BIOT will go, and there will be Mauritian sovereignty over the whole area.
I supported the principles behind the marine protection zone, although I did not support the no-take element that was included at the beginning. I wanted Chagos islanders to be able to return to the archipelago, and to undertake sustainable fishing and so on. I am assured that the Mauritian Government support and recognise the need to preserve the pristine beauty of the ocean around there. I am less convinced that the military and the United States forces are equally committed to the preservation of the natural world and the environment. The record is not good—not perfect. I hope that the Minister, when he comes to reply, can assure us that there will be proper inspection, not just of the outer islands, but of the seas and the land of Diego Garcia.
It is wrong that the islanders were removed. It is right that they have an opportunity to return, which is what they have always campaigned for. I find it unfortunate beyond belief that they will only be allowed to visit Diego Garcia. Imagine if we could only visit the home where our parents lived, or the graves where many of our relatives had been buried. There is an emotional relationship there that will be broken by the refusal of the right of abode in future. I understood from previous discussions with the Minister and others that there could be a possibility of the return of a right of abode. I am not sure; maybe he can reply to that.
Am I happy about there being a huge military base on Diego Garcia? No. Am I happy about the rhetoric that has been used in this debate, which seems to be cranking up the idea of yet another cold war, when we should be looking for a world of peace, rather than one of war? I find that depressing, and not really fit for this debate.
There is a right of people who live under colonisation to achieve their independence. That was achieved by Mauritius, but it was thwarted in 1965. By agreeing now to return all the islands and the archipelago to Mauritius, we are completing a process that should have taken place in 1965, prior to Mauritius’s independence in 1968. Had that happened, and had there been no separation and creation of BIOT in 1965, we would not be having this debate today, because the issue would simply not have arisen.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
May I say how much of an honour it is to follow the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)? Although we do not necessarily agree on a lot of policy, I am always struck by the fact that he puts people at the heart of his speeches. That has never been the case more than during his long campaign on this issue, on which he spoke eloquently. He is putting Chagossians right at the heart of any decision making. He deserves a lot of acclaim for that. He is right to call out some of the rhetoric in this debate, because, at the end of the day, those people really matter. I thank him for putting his points on the record.
There are three broad areas that I would like to cover: sovereignty, costs and some of the scariest parts of the Bill. I listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), and I must admit that I am not nearly as learned or experienced as him; I bow to his legal analysis. I am a mere doctor, so I look for an evidence base when trying to understand the process. To that end, I thought it would be useful to write to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which I duly did. I received a letter on 28 July 2025 from the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who I see will kindly respond, and is sat in his place. Much to my surprise and pleasure, a lot of what is in the letter was in the Minister’s speech. This debate allows me to walk through some of the letter and pose the questions that hit me as I looked into this case.
I must admit that when I stepped into this House in 2019, this was not a topic that I knew a huge deal about—I think many Members on both sides would say the same—but it very quickly became a topic that I realised we should look into understanding, especially as it deals with security.
The letter states:
“We had to act now because the base was under threat.”
That implies urgency, but the letter is loose on who was under threat, where and how. There is legal uncertainty but, as we have heard, we do not know which court is involved or why. It goes on to say:
“The courts have already made decisions which undermine our position.”
Courts, plural. We know that the ICJ is involved, but as has been stated, its opinion was non-binding, and there is a carve-out relating to the Commonwealth.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said, after being pushed to speak on the matter multiple times, that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was the area of concern, but he will know that back in 2015, under annex VII, the tribunal agreed with the UK that sovereignty could not be determined by UNCLOS. This was a marine protection issue. Britons were trying to protect the area, and Mauritius wanted to open it up to farm it, and we were found against, under that treaty, in that court. This raises an important side issue: what protections are there in the Bill for the environment? They seem scant, or just not there.
The letter goes further, stating that
“in 2021…a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea…ruled that Mauritius’ sovereignty was inferred from ICJ”.
So the Government themselves point that out. The letter goes on to say:
“The UK was not party to this case”.
Well, obviously, it would not be, but that means that we have not had our day in court to explain why we do not think that the judgment should apply. Mauritius’ sovereignty was inferred from that non-binding, political judgment.
The letter goes on:
“If Mauritius were to take us to court again, the UK’s longstanding legal view is that we would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.”
Well, which court? If this advice is so long-standing, why do we not know about it? How have we got this far, going for year upon year with no agreement, without any urgency? It seems sensible and appropriate to release the advice on this. At the start of that quote, the letter said “If Mauritius”. It states later that it is
“highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would be brought quickly by Mauritius against the UK.”
What evidence do the Government have to back that up? What is it that they say Mauritius will act so quickly on? We certainly have not seen it, if it was from 2021. The dates 2023 and 2024 have been mentioned, and we are now in 2025. I would be interested to see the Government release the evidence base for their claim about how quickly litigation would come forward, because as they rightly point out, there have been 11 rounds of negotiations, so there has clearly been time to sort things out.
Before someone jumps in and says, “Well, you opened the negotiations”, I would point out that we did that for the Falkland Islands as well. I find it amazing that we have trade unionists who built their whole careers on negotiating suddenly chastising the Conservatives for listening to the other side of a disagreement. That seems bizarre to me, because we want to respect each other and exchange ideas, but not have an agreement. It is rightly pointed out by Conservative Members that the agreement was not there; we did not take it. On the cost of the deal, there is no cost, because we did not have a deal to sign off.
The very next sentence in the letter says:
“This might, for example, include further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK.”
Dr Evans
It is. It is true about the legally binding aspect within the area that the tribunal covers, but that does not cover sovereignty, as we learned in 2015 when the tribunal sided with the British Government. Here we have the farcical situation of a House of policy and law shining light on one side and another, but never on the truth. This is where my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam is exactly right. If the Government were to come forward and say exactly which court, where and why, they might get more sympathy from Opposition, but we have been through an entire five-hour debate and we still do not have answers to those questions.
Another court that is often cited is the International Telecommunication Union covering spectre, radio and radar. Article 48.1 states
“Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations,”
and the Government know that. Even the written answer from the Minister—it has been hinted at before—states:
“Individual countries have the sovereign right to manage and use the radio spectrum, within their borders, the way they wish, subject to not causing interference with other countries. This right is recognised in the Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations are the international framework for the use of spectrum by radiocommunication services, defined and managed by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum. The ITU cannot challenge the UK’s use of civilian or military spectrum.”
It is clear here—the Government know it in their own answers—that the ITU has no role in sovereignty. It all boils down to where one believes British overseas territories stand.
Now we must talk about the cost, which has been much debated. There have been three figures in the debate: £3.4 billion, £10 billion and £34 billion. The £3.4 billion is the net present value using social time preference rate. The £10 billion is inflation adjusted, and the £34 billion is the nominal value by the Government Actuary’s Department. The question is, why use net present value? I put it earlier in the debate that there is no other precedent in the world for NPV being used in sovereignty matters. The Minister at the time asked whether the Conservatives want to do away with using NPV—of course not.
Dr Evans
Absolutely, the Minister says it is within the Green Book. Absolutely not, because it has a perfect place in domestic use for commercial practicalities, not for international sovereignty issues. No other country has looked, or would look, at this because it does not make sense.
The House of Commons Library said when asked that
“this methodology is regularly used in government accounting, but its main use is for cost-benefit analyses. It is unusual to see it used in this situation like this, where only the cost is being assessed and it is not being compared to any benefit”.
On that basis, and listening to the House of Commons Library, what cost-benefit analysis has actually been done in this case, and would it be put in front of the House so we might be able to see it?
At the end of the day, NPV is highly political because it assumes a discount rate, and what is the discount rate that one should choose? In the details, it talks about 3.5%, but the US will use 3.5% or 7%, which would vastly differentiate the figures. It goes on further, for the social time preference rate is 3.5%, but for 30 years. This deal is for 99 years, so how can the Government respond in a written parliamentary question that this
“represents good value for UK taxpayers”?
On what basis are they comparing that if there is no international comparison? We are talking only about domestic uses and for an accounting point.
As I come to my conclusions, possibly the scariest thing to me—I have tried to highlight it throughout the debate—which does seem to be falling on deaf ears, is article 13. I believe this treaty is legally bomb-proof. It looks sensible, and I am no legal expert as I have attested to, but it seems to stand the test of time. That means when article 13 says explicitly that in 99 years Mauritius can say no and just take control, that is a big worry. We have heard from many Government MPs how it secures the long-term aspirations of this country for a period of 99 years. When I mentioned that, several Government MPs scoffed. But is it not the duty of this House to provide not only for the next generation, but the rest of time for our country, in the best interests of our country? After listening to all the arguments that have been made about how essential the base is, the very fact that Mauritius could pull the base is a very scary prospect. There is, of course, a caveat: the right of first refusal. But if China decides to do a deal with Mauritius at exorbitant cost, we are over a barrel and the British taxpayer must fork out yet again to guarantee our security. Mauritius has been given a golden ticket, and it knows it.
Beyond the sovereignty and cost, my biggest concern is that we are outsourcing decision -making for our children and our children’s children. That is the modus operandi of this Government—we need only look at the borrowing in the Budget to see how they borrow on the backs of future children. Pushing this decision out for 99 years is not security for now; it will help, but it creates a far bigger problem in 100 years’ time. If the Government want to give away our islands, they should be open and transparent about how and why.
The biggest thing is that we have not even had our day in court. That is what most troubles the British public. I think that the British public would be reasonable if a court found against us—they would happily say, “We follow the rule of law”—but the Government will not even try that. They say that there is a risk. As has been said, this has been going on for years, and still we are looking at a treaty to sign it off.
That inevitably poses final questions about what happens with Gibraltar, the Falklands and Cyprus. The Minister is correct to point out that there are differences, but the biggest fundamental problem that the Government have in arguing to the British people and the people of the Falklands is about understanding. If this House cannot understand the legal concepts of the places where we are likely to fight these causes, how can we expect the public to do so? When it comes to delivering comms to the UK public, that is what they need to understand.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
There have been some fantastic speeches from Opposition Members standing up for British interests, so I will not go on at length, but I wish to make a few points.
This surrender Bill is madness. The Government have decided, against the security and financial interests of the United Kingdom, to surrender territory to which there was no claim to a country that has no historical or cultural connection to it. They are doing so because, in the words of the Prime Minister,
“If Mauritius takes us to court again, the UK’s long-standing legal view is that we would not have a realistic prospect of success.”
Let us be clear: there is no legal or moral obligation to surrender the Chagos islands to Mauritius.
Labour is the worst negotiator, spending tens of billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money to surrender the Chagos islands, bunging billions to its unionised paymasters on day one of forming a Government, and showing a lack of will on tackling welfare dependency. Whatever Labour touches, the costs to the taxpayer go up and the benefits diminish. This spectacularly bad deal will leave Britain less secure while British taxpayers stump up tens of billions of pounds for tax cuts in a foreign country—equivalent to 4% of the Mauritian budget and to £50 million for every constituency represented in this House.
The staggering £35 billion cost is 10 times more than was originally claimed because of the Government’s creative accounting—even the UK Statistics Authority does not endorse the figure. It was arrived at by applying an assumed annual inflation rate of 2.3% over the 99-year lease period, despite inflation running at almost 4%. The total was then lowered again by between 2.5% and 3.5% per year through a Treasury practice called the social time preference rate, which reflects the fact that people value benefits received immediately more highly. It converts future costs and benefits into their present-day value rather than allowing for a more accurate valuation of future costs. The Government are happy to apply that rate in the case of their surrender deal, but will not use the same methodology to cost their affordable homes programme.
What is worse is that the Government have refused to allow Parliament a separate vote on the financial obligations under this terrible deal—they could have done, but chose not to. That £35 billion could have been spent on new hospitals or schools or, in the case of my constituency, on infrastructure to support the thousands of new houses that the Government want to build. It could have been spent on tax cuts to stimulate the economy or even to plug Labour’s own financial black hole. Labour is cutting tax for Mauritians off the back of hard-pressed UK taxpayers.
Then we get to the national security risks. Diego Garcia, located on the Chagos islands, is the UK’s most important military base in the Indian ocean. The geopolitical significance of the base cannot be overstated in a world in which China seeks to undermine us. We know that China thinks in a multigenerational capacity. It is a dictatorship that does not share our values, and this is the blink of an eye in terms of how it plans its future. China has made no secret of its intent to deepen its relationship with Mauritius. It is an increasingly hostile state towards the UK, and it knows too well that Mauritius is key to supporting its long-term strategic goals. Furthermore, Mauritius has signalled that it is working more closely with Russia on research and development, and with Iran on developing closer relations. Mauritius has gone on public record stating that it is grateful to the Chinese for playing a critical role in its pursuit of international recognition of Mauritian sovereignty over these islands.
Bradley Thomas
I will not. While the Government and the Prime Minister are trying to paint this as a good deal, they know that Beijing, Moscow and Tehran have watched closely and have all taken note.
Finally, it is not just this country’s taxpayers who recognise that this is a bad deal. Lord West of Spithead, former First Sea Lord, Chief of the Naval Staff, and Labour Security Minister, said that ceding the Chagos islands to Mauritius would be “irresponsible”, risk our strategic interests, and undermine the fundamental principles of international law. Why do the Government prioritise any interests other than Britain’s, and foreign sovereignty over that of the UK? The Bill will leave Britain poorer, weaker and exposed. It is a betrayal not just of UK interests but also of British Chagossians, and it does not deserve a Second Reading.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. I now call Lewis Cocking for the final Back-Bench contribution. Colleagues who have contributed to the debate should be making their way back to the Chamber.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
There are no two ways about it: this is a surrender Bill with no benefits to my Broxbourne constituents. Ministers have shamefully attempted to hide the shocking cost of this deal from the British people and the public at large. When the new Labour Government took office, they kept telling us in this Chamber about the pretend £22 billion black hole in the public finances. If the black hole of £22 billion that we are continually told about by the Government did exist, I could solve it overnight—don’t do this deal. This deal is £35 billion to the Mauritian Government. The Labour Government go after British family farms with the family farm tax. They go after our pensioners and take their winter fuel allowance away, and they increase national insurance contributions for businesses, to make it more expensive for them to employ people, but they could just not do this deal. They talk in fiction, and this is an absolute disgrace.
How will Mauritius spend this money? By cutting taxes for its own citizens and paying their debts. Is the Minister proud that the only income tax cuts that this Labour Government will deliver are 6,000 miles away at the expense of the British taxpayer? The last time I checked, this was the British Parliament and we are supposed to stand up for British interests, not the interests of foreign countries or foreign citizens. We should be cutting taxes here and turbocharging the economy, not giving stuff away that we already own. We already have a base, and now we are going to lease it back, as we have heard from a number of colleagues.
Lewis Cocking
No, I will not give way. There have been lots of interventions, and I am fed up with the same interventions coming from the same Labour Members. Quite frankly it does not help the debate—just because they say something several times does not make it true.
The Bill is costing us financially, but it also has security risks. China supports the deal and is welcoming Mauritius into its sphere of influence with open arms. Mauritius is strengthening relations with Iran and Russia. As a Policy Exchange report notes, it is impossible to assert with certainty how much influence China will have over Mauritius in the next five or 10 years, let alone for the 99-year duration of this lease.
We already have British sovereign territory with a base, so I cannot understand why we have done that negotiation, and why we are hurting the British people with tax rises. As I said, we are being cruel to older people by taking away their winter fuel allowance, going after farmers with the family farm tax, and going after British businesses with the increase to national insurance contributions, yet we can find money out of nowhere—£35 billion—to give to Mauritius.
In summary, I gently say to the Government that people out there know that. When we knock on doors, as I am sure we all do across our constituencies, people will say to us, “Hang on a minute. How come we are being punished? How come we have to pay more taxes, but you soon find money when it suits you?” That is why the British public have fallen out of love with this Government already. Hopefully the Government will wake up and start representing the people who they were elected to represent in this Chamber: the British public, not foreign Governments such as that of Mauritius.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
Today’s Second Reading is not only important, but historically significant—sadly, for all the wrong reasons. We are debating a Bill that will leave Britain less secure, undermine our strategic interests and leave British taxpayers out of pocket. The decision by this Labour Government to surrender sovereignty over the Chagos islands to Mauritius and to pay billions of pounds for the privilege, with no checks or balances, is nothing short of a national humiliation. It is a deal that weakens Britain at home and abroad, and one that the official Opposition will oppose every step of the way.
John Slinger
On the point that the right hon. Lady makes about the alleged surrender of sovereignty, which has been made consistently by Conservative Members, does she accept that on 29 April 2024, just weeks before the election, the former Prime Minister—the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), under whom they all stood for election only a year or so ago—and the Mauritian Prime Minister discussed negotiations on the “exercise of sovereignty” and instructed their teams, no less, to “continue to work at pace”?
Wendy Morton
I remind the hon. Member of two things. First, talking and signing are two very different things. Secondly, some of us on the Conservative Benches remember that no deal is better than a bad deal.
Paul Holmes
The hon. Member for Rugby (John Slinger) has omitted some of the quote, because he was proven wrong before. He has failed to say that the former Prime Minister said “mutually beneficial”. Some of the gain that came out of that discussion was the fact that it was not mutually beneficial for this country, and we stopped the negotiations.
Wendy Morton
My hon. Friend makes a very valid point. If Labour Members had spent a little more time actually listening to some of the contributions from Conservative Members, they would perhaps understand things a little more. I will come back to that point shortly.
Before I turn to the substance, I wish to pay tribute to colleagues on the Conservative Benches who have spoken powerfully about the sheer folly of this deal. They have rightly highlighted its staggering costs, the accounting methods used, the reckless security implications, the lack of transparency and the way in which it sadly sidelines the Chagossian community.
There have been a number of contributions, but I very briefly pay tribute to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), the former Attorney General. He has not just demonstrated his extensive legal knowledge and expertise in this area, but questioned the legal uncertainty that Ministers are relying on. He has taken the time to explain and to remind this place of the issues relating to article 298 of UNCLOS, which is very relevant to today’s debate. He highlighted some key unanswered questions. Quite frankly, I urge every Member of this House to have a read of Hansard before they go into the voting Lobby this evening.
Similarly, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) highlighted and reinforced the important point about article 298 of UNCLOS. My hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley (Paul Holmes) reminded Labour Members of the red lines put in place by Lord Cameron, who stopped negotiations—it quite clearly seems that they needed to be reminded that talking and signing are two very different things. My right hon. Friends the Members for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) and for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) talked about strategic issues and the costs of the deal. There were valuable contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate (Rebecca Paul), for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth), for Bromsgrove (Bradley Thomas), for Broxbourne (Lewis Cocking) and for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans).
One thing that is very obvious is that we need clarity. To give just one example, the Government claim that we may have problems with spectrum if we do not agree a deal, but other parts of the Government have indicated that the International Telecommunication Union has no power to veto the use of military spectrum. [Interruption.] Government Members do not want to intervene now. These are not passing political points; they are hard truths about the dangers that this deal poses to Britain’s security and standing. Before I move on, though, I wish to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) for his wise and brave words today, and for standing firm as a constituency MP and standing up for members of his community.
Turning to the Liberal Democrats, I have to say that I struggle a little to understand their position. They say that they oppose the Bill, but they did not vote against the treaty in the House of Lords—in fact, they chose to prop up Labour, rather than defend Britain and the rights of the British Chagossians.
Calum Miller
I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for allowing me to clarify. As she well knows, their lordships in the House of Lords invited the Government to provide a statement on the rights of the Chagossians, and the Government agreed that they would not ratify the treaty until such a statement had been laid before both Houses, allowing for a debate in both. As I made clear in my speech, I look forward to that opportunity, and I very much hope that the Minister will confirm when that statement will be laid before this House.
Wendy Morton
I am grateful for that intervention—let us wait and see whether the Minister does confirm that date. However, the fact of the matter remains that the Liberal Democrats did not vote against the treaty.
Turning to costs and taxpayers, the financial costs of the deal alone should be a cause of shame for this Government. Thanks to Conservative FOI requests, we now know that the true bill for this surrender is not £3.4 billion, as Ministers have claimed, but closer to £35 billion—a sum that is 10 times higher than originally admitted, and one that will fall squarely on the shoulders of British taxpayers. Let us be clear what those billions will fund. They will not fund better schools or hospitals here at home, or defence capabilities to protect our citizens; they will fund tax cuts in Mauritius. At the very moment when this Labour Government are hiking taxes on family farms, education and businesses, they are content to bankroll over 4% of another nation’s budget. To Conservative Members, that is indefensible.
However, the risks to Britain’s security are even greater. Diego Garcia is our most strategic and important base in the Indian ocean, critical to our partnership with the United States and vital to our ability to project influence in the Indo-Pacific, yet this Bill leaves huge questions unanswered. What guarantees are there that the UK can extend the lease over Diego Garcia unilaterally when the Mauritian Prime Minister has said otherwise? What safeguards will prevent hostile powers such as China, Russia or Iran from seeking a foothold in the archipelago once Britain steps back? We know that Beijing already describes Mauritius as a partner with “strategic advantages”, while Port Louis boasts of advancing co-operation with Moscow. Does the Minister really believe that this makes Britain more secure?
We also cannot ignore the issue of nuclear deterrence. Mauritius is a signatory to the Pelindaba treaty, which prohibits the stationing and storage of nuclear weapons, yet Ministers have failed to explain what that will mean in practice once sovereignty is transferred. Will it constrain our closest ally, the United States? Will it put limits on what we can do on Diego Garcia in future? These are not trivial questions, because they go to the heart of our security posture in the Indo-Pacific, yet we still have no clear answers. Even Lord West, a former Labour Security Minister, has warned that ceding the Chagos islands is “irresponsible” and dangerous, yet this Government press on regardless, blind to the risks and deaf to the warnings.
Let us not forget the Chagossians themselves. For years, Labour politicians claimed a fundamental moral responsibility towards this community, but in government they have abandoned them, offering only token consultation and denying them a real say in decisions that affect their homeland. Once again they are being sidelined. This is about the Chagossians and their future, and that of future generations.
We are told that millions will be channelled into a so-called trust for the Chagossian people, but under this deal Britain will have no meaningful role in determining how those funds are used. Decisions will sit entirely with Mauritius, with no mechanism for proper oversight by Parliament and no guarantee that the Chagossians themselves will see the benefit. There is no accountability to them, no accountability to us, and no accountability for how British money is spent. There are many questions about the fund, not least what guarantees and safeguards exist to ensure that it reaches all the Chagossians, given that so many of their communities are spread around the world.
Time and again, Ministers have refused to come clean with Parliament about the terms of this deal. We have had contradictory accounts from the Mauritians and from Whitehall, confusion about the sums involved and secrecy so deep that even officials were asked to leave the room during negotiations. If Ministers cannot be open with Parliament, they have no business asking Parliament to support this Bill.
Before I conclude, I will touch briefly on the other overseas territories. Let me be clear: we are debating and discussing the Chagos islands, and at no stage have those on this Front Bench ever conflated surrendering the sovereignty of the Chagos islands with that of the other overseas territories. It is clear that when Labour negotiates, Britain loses. That is the story of this deal. This is not a settlement forced on us by law. The Government have chosen to hide behind advisory opinions, rather than to stand firm, defend our sovereignty and protect our national interests. It is simply the behaviour of this unpatriotic Labour Government. We on the Opposition Benches could not be clearer: Britain should not surrender the Chagos islands and we will fight this Bill every step of the way.
I will conclude, but I had hoped that the new Foreign Secretary would be here today. Where is she? She has chosen to be elsewhere, rather than answer to the Chagossian people. I will end with a plea to the Minister, for whom I have the highest personal respect. We have often been in opposite positions across the Dispatch Box, but I ask him please to step back, pause and reflect. Britain does not need to surrender the Chagos islands. Do the right thing by our country, by our taxpayers and by the Chagossian people. Stand firm and keep the Chagos islands British.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)
What a debate. I genuinely think there were some thoughtful contributions from all parts of the House, but some were simply rhetoric and, frankly, a lot of nonsense. I single out the Chair of the Defence Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi), and my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb). Although I disagree with him, I thought he made passionate points of conviction on behalf of his constituents. There were also thoughtful contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie), for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Lillian Jones), for Macclesfield (Tim Roca), for Bolton West (Phil Brickell), for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger), for Hyndburn (Sarah Smith) and for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey).
On the other side there were particularly thoughtful contributions—which I might not have agreed with—from the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who is a former Attorney General, and the right hon. Members for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) and for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). There was a thoughtful contribution from the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), until he got on to the overseas territories at the end. I was pleased to hear that commitment from my opposite number, the right hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton), although she may want to check the Conservative Twitter feed for what it was putting out about the overseas territories, which I thought was deeply shameful and damaging.
I want to be clear about the purpose of this Bill and the decisions we have taken, which are about defending this country and our national security. That is the first duty of this Government. It is the first priority of our Prime Minister, our Foreign Secretary, our Defence Secretary and the entire ministerial team. I am afraid that whatever exhortations to the contrary we hear from the Opposition Benches, we will not take risks with our national security or engage in gambles in courts or anywhere else. That is not the action of a responsible Government, and we are not prepared to take those risks.
That is why this Bill will ensure that we ratify the treaty with Mauritius, resolve the legal status of this vital base and, crucially, protect its operations, which is the most fundamental aspect of what we are discussing today. It will ensure that we retain the critical security capabilities that support key operations around the world. Those are capabilities not only for ourselves, but for our allies. Fundamentally, those capabilities keep the people of this country safe on our streets, they keep our armed forces safe, and they keep our allies safe. We will not scrimp on national security or take gambles with it, which is essentially the argument that we have heard from the Opposition today.
I will start with the reasoned amendment, because it is full of so many holes and so many wrongs, including claims about the costs. It says that the treaty
“does not secure the base on Diego Garcia”.
That is wrong. It says that we do not have the “right to extend” the lease. That is wrong. It says that
“the measures in the Treaty leave the base vulnerable”.
That is wrong. It says that the treaty does not
“protect the rights of the Chagossian people”.
That is wrong. And it say that the treaty does not protect
“the future of the Marine Protected Area”.
That is wrong. I urge the House to reject the reasoned amendment today.
This all comes back to a fundamental question: if there was not a problem, why did the previous Government start negotiating? Why did they continue negotiating until just weeks before the general election? It is simply not correct to claim that the negotiations were stopped. We have heard what the official readout of the meeting with the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), said and it was very, very clear: he instructed the teams to act at pace in order to make the agreement. The evidence is there, and claims to the contrary are simply wrong.
A number of important points have been made today, but I will start with those about operations, because some very sensible questions have been raised. It is the operations of the base that are currently under threat from the legal uncertainty. That is why we have taken steps to secure it, and why our allies and Five Eyes partners—the United States and others—back this deal. In the future, those operations will now be secure. The Bill ensures that we can exercise all rights and authorities granted through the treaty. We will retain full operational control over Diego Garcia, which we have continued to have for the last 50 years—the Bill secures that.
I want to reiterate our commitment to expeditiously inform Mauritius of military action. Let me repeat for the record: we are not obliged to give Mauritius advance notice of any action under the treaty. No sensitive intelligence will be shared, nor operations put at risk—it is there on the face of the treaty. Our allies, especially the United States under two Administrations, have gone through it with a fine-toothed comb. They would not be supporting this deal and signing off on it if that operational autonomy was not protected.
I turn to Members’ points about the law. Many reasonable questions have been raised, and we have heard some historical revisionism at different points. The right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) expressed worries about lawfare, but we have acted precisely because of the threats of action that could impede the operations in the short, medium and, indeed, long term. It is totally wrong to say that Mauritius had no claim; decades ago, we agreed that sovereignty would ultimately revert to Mauritius. The Government’s legal case has been published—it was there for all to see on the day of treaty signature. In summary, Mauritius would have secured a binding judgment that would have harmed the operation of the base. That has been the consistent position of the Government. We have set it out on a number of occasions, and our position is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.
The right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who is a former Attorney General, and others have reflected on a number of issues. I will not go into all of them but, for the record, let me refer to the comprehensive rejection of our arguments by 13 judges to one at the ICJ in 2019; the loss in the UN General Assembly vote by a margin of 116 to six; the maritime delimitation judgment that is binding on Mauritius and the Maldives, which was handed down in 2021 by the special chamber of ITLOS; the obligations placed on the BIOT Administration by UN bodies to cease specific activities; and a series of complications and blockages at international organisations, including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation. We have also set out where future risks are likely to take place, and we are not willing to gamble with that. Those are the fundamental facts here, and that is why it is necessary to do this deal.
Questions were raised about the extension. It is very clear that we have the right of first refusal, and that we might extend the lease for a further 40 years.
Sir Jeremy Wright
The point I made in my contribution was that I relied entirely on what Ministers had said to this place about the Government’s legal justification for their actions. That chain starts with the former Foreign Secretary saying that, in the Government’s view, a binding legal judgment was inevitable. The Minister has just given us a list of a variety of opinions and clear opposition —it is true—to the UK’s position from a variety of different organisations. As far as I can tell, he has not told us from which court a binding judgment might come. We have said that it cannot be the ICJ. Which court could give a binding judgment against the UK in this matter?
Stephen Doughty
First, the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows that I am not going to disclose the full privileged legal advice to the Government, which the previous Government received, for very good reasons. We have set out very clearly that provisional measures could be brought forward that would immediately affect operations—within six to eight weeks—and the conditions in chapter 7 of ITLOS. In a number of areas, there were very significant risks. I will not, and he understands why I will not, go into the details of that, but it is simply not a risk that this Government are willing to take or, as he knows, that the previous Government were willing to take, which is ultimately why they started the negotiations.
I am conscious of the time, and I have explained the extension, but I want to talk a little about our allies and opponents. The shadow Foreign Secretary said that people have not said publicly what they feel about the deal, but that is not the case. We have heard from President Trump and US Defence Secretary Hegseth. US Secretary of State Rubio said:
“The U.S. welcomes the historic agreement between the UK and Mauritius on the future of the Chagos Archipelago. This agreement secures the long-term, stable, and effective operation of the joint U.S.-UK military facility at Diego Garcia, which is critical to regional and global security.”
Our Five Eyes allies support it, with Canada’s Foreign Ministry saying that it welcomes the signing, and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong saying that Australia welcomes the signing, while Australia’s ambassador to the US said that it was great to see a resolution to this important issue. New Zealand’s Foreign Minister and India’s Ministry of External Affairs have said the same. Japan has commended the efforts of the Governments to reach agreement, and the Republic of Korea similarly welcomed its signing. In addition, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar and others have welcomed the deal.
It is, therefore, clear that the Government are on the side of the United States, our Five Eyes partners and other allies around the world, and we are protecting our operations and national security. Given the US bipartisan support, what is not good enough for the Opposition? Our key security partners back the deal, and that is why they have agreed to it.
Quite frankly, we have heard some outrageous claims about the costs. We have been very clear about them, and the £34 billion figure is absurdly misleading and inaccurate. It ignores inflation and the changing value of money over 99 years—£1 today will not be worth the same in 99 years’ time—and the £101 million annual average cost compares favourably with other countries’ bases. Our accurate figures reflect how the Government account for long-term project spend. Funnily enough, when we add a sum each year, which is entirely reasonable, over a 99-year period, it adds up to a larger sum. This is equivalent to the spending on the NHS for a few hours, and a tiny proportion of our defence budget. It compares very favourably with what France has paid for its base in Djibouti. This base is 15 times larger, while France’s base is next to a Chinese facility, and ours has unique security provisions in place.
Quite frankly, it shows some brass neck for the Opposition to be making claims about defence and security when they presided over the hollowing out of our armed forces, appalling accommodation and decline. That is changing under this Government. We are spending on our national defence, our NATO commitments and our security relationships with the United States, and we will absolutely not apologise for that or scrimp on our national security. One final point is that a financial element was always key to the deal, as the Conservatives conceded in their engagements under multiple Prime Ministers.
Important points were made about the environment and the marine protected area. Fundamentally, Mauritius will determine the area’s future, but Prime Minister Ramgoolam recently reaffirmed to the former Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham and Croydon North (Steve Reed), his country’s commitment to protecting that unique ecosystem. We are engaged in active discussions with the Mauritians about that, and I will keep right hon. and hon. Members updated.
I conclude as the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) started, by paying tribute to the Chagossians who have joined us here today. Both in opposition and in government, I have repeatedly met a range of Chagossian communities with a range of views, and I have a deep respect for their dignity and their different views. There will be people who fundamentally disagree with this treaty, but there are many who fundamentally agree with it, as we have heard in this debate.
The Government deeply regret how Chagossians were removed from the islands. We have heard concerns about the impact on them and their ability to access British nationality. The Bill will ensure that Chagossians have no adverse effects on their nationality rights—no Chagossians will lose their existing rights to hold or claim British citizenship. It will be for Mauritius to set the terms of and manage any future resettlement. Reasonable questions have been asked about why people cannot resettle on Diego Garcia, but it is an active military base with security restrictions so that is not realistic, but we will restart the heritage visits.
Stephen Doughty
To anticipate what the Liberal Democrat spokesperson might be about to ask me, I confirm to him that before ratification, there will be a ministerial statement. I will not give him the exact date, because I do not set the dates of business, but it will provide a factual update on resettlement eligibility and how the trust fund will work. I am engaged actively in those discussions, and that will enable further discussion in a proper manner.
Calum Miller
Will the Minister please confirm, as Lord Collins did in the other place, that time will be set aside in both Houses for a debate on the statement?
Stephen Doughty
Absolutely. I confirm that we are happy to discuss that further. Such decisions are not for me, but for the usual channels and the leaders in both Houses. However, I want to confirm the commitment that was made previously.
This comes down to one fundamental question: why did the Opposition start the negotiations if there was not a problem? Why did they continue the negotiations until just weeks before the general election? It was because fundamental national security interests and the protection of the British people were at risk. This Government recognise that, our allies recognise that and we have acted to secure a deal to protect Diego Garcia and its operations well into the next century. While Reform and the Conservatives speak of national security but fail to do anything to secure it, this Labour Government negotiate and deliver. We deliver deals—with the United States, with India, with the European Union and on new frigates—and, fundamentally, we deliver national security by securing this base on Diego Garcia. I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Monday 20th October 2025
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 20 October 2025 - (20 Oct 2025)
21:44 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 174 / Noes: 321 - Question accordingly negatived.
21:59 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 83 / Noes: 319 - Question accordingly negatived.
22:12 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 318 / Noes: 174 - Question accordingly agreed to.
22:25 - divided: - Ayes: 172 / Noes: 322 - Question accordingly negatived.
22:56 - The House divided: - Ayes: 320 / Noes: 171 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I remind Members that in Committee, they should not address the Chair as “Deputy Speaker”; please use our names when addressing the Chair. “Madam Chair” or “Madam Chairman” are acceptable.
Before we begin proceedings on the Bill, I can inform the House that I, as Chairman of Ways and Means, am minded to select amendment 7 and new clause 1, in the name of the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel), and amendment 9, in the name of the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), for separate decision at the end of the debate.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the duties outlined in section [The additional period and right to extend: duty to publish legal advice and risk assessments] are discharged.”
This amendment together with NC2 would prevent the Treaty from coming into force until the Government has published any legal advice or risk assessments regarding the UK’s ability to extend its rights over Diego Garcia after the initial period specified in the Treaty.
The Chairman of Ways and Means
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Amendment 7, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State lays before Parliament a memorandum on the obligations under international law which require the UK to cede sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory to the Government of Mauritius.
(1B) The memorandum specified in subsection (1) must include—
(a) a summary of the legal advice received by the UK Government on this issue;
(b) an analysis of the status of UK's sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory under international law;
(c) the legal argument for the cessation of British sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory; and
(d) the risks which the UK Government may have faced had it not reached an agreement with the Government of Mauritius.
(1C) The report specified in subsections (1A) and (1B) must be laid before Parliament no later than two months after this Act receives Royal Assent.”
Amendment 9, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(1A) Before sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force, the Secretary of State must—
(a) seek to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius on whether Mauritius will establish a right for Chagossians to return and reside in the Chagos Islands; and
(b) seek agreement to a referendum for Chagossians on self-determination within any negotiations which take place under paragraph (a); and
(c) lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on progress on establishing negotiations with the Government of Mauritius and the outcome of any that take place.
(1B) Within two months of the report being laid before the House of Commons under paragraph (1a), the Secretary of State must table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the contents of the report.”
This amendment requires that the Government must undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return and on a referendum, with a report laid before Parliament on the outcome of the negotiations. The Government must subsequently table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the content of that report.
Amendment 10, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State establishes a public consultation of Chagossian people residing in the UK on the Treaty.
(1B) The public consultation under section (1A) must be established within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”
This amendment requires the Government to establish a public consultation with the Chagossian people residing in the UK, before the Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act can come into force.
Amendment 11, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State makes a statement before Parliament outlining proposals for a public consultation on the Treaty.
(1B) A statement made under subsection (1A) must be made within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”
This amendment requires the Government to make a statement before Parliament outlining proposals for a public consultation on the Treaty within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, before the Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act can come into force.
Amendment 14, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State lays before Parliament an impact assessment detailing the benefits and costs to the United Kingdom, including in financial and security terms, of the Treaty.
(1B) The Secretary of State must lay the impact assessment under section (1A) within 2 months of the passing of this Act.”
This amendment requires the Government to publish an impact assessment detailing the benefits and costs to the United Kingdom, including in financial and security terms, of the Treaty within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, before the Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act can come into force.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 13, in clause 2, page 1, line 17, leave out subsection (b).
This amendment removes section 2 (b) of the Bill which aims to remove citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory from the list of British Overseas Territories recognised under the British Nationality Act 1981, thus preserving British Chagossian’s nationality and associated rights.
Clauses 2 to 4 stand part.
Amendment 3, in clause 5, page 3, line 29, leave out subsections (1) to (4).
Amendment 4, page 3, line 36, at beginning insert—
“With the exception of the subject matters listed in subsection (3A),”.
Amendment 8, page 3, line 40, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(2A) An Order under this Act may not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”
This amendment provides that any order made under the Act would need to have the approval of each House of Parliament.
Amendment 6, page 3, line 40, leave out
“is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament” and insert “may not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House”.
Amendment 5, page 4, line 3, at end insert—
“(3A) An order under this section relating to Diego Garcia, or the rights of Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom, may not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”
Clause 5 stand part.
Amendment 2, in clause 6, page 4, line 17, leave out “see section 1(2)” and insert “see section 1(1A)”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2.
Clause 6 stand part.
New clause 1—Approval of payments to Mauritius by the House of Commons—
“(1) No payment may be made by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Mauritius under Article 11 (1)(a) of the Treaty without the approval of the House of Commons.
(2) No development framework under Article 11 (1)(c) may be agreed by the Government of the United Kingdom with the Government of Mauritius without the approval of the House of Commons.
(3) No payment may be made under any development framework agreed between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Mauritius without the approval of the House of Commons.
(4) The approval required by subsections (1), (2) and (3) must be in the form of a resolution of the House of Commons.”
This new clause requires parliamentary approval for any payment by the UK Government to the Government of Mauritius under the Treaty.
New clause 2—The additional period and right to extend: duty to publish legal advice and risk assessments—
“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament any legal advice and any risk assessments given to the Government relating to—
(a) the ability of the United Kingdom to extend the duration of the Treaty’s provisions for the additional period of 40 years (“the additional period”) specified in Article 13(2) of the Treaty, including—
(i) any advice pertaining to the automaticity, or otherwise, of the UK securing the additional period;
(ii) any obligations placed on both parties to negotiate the additional period;
(iii) any risk assessment of the impact on the United Kingdom’s strategic interests of not securing the additional period; and
(b) the ‘right of first refusal’ offered to the United Kingdom should the additional period not be negotiated at the end of the Treaty’s initial duration under Article 13(5) of the Treaty, including whether such a right exists if the additional period expires without a further extension being agreed.”
New clause 3—Written instrument on the Marine Protected Area: approval by the House of Commons—
“(1) No written instrument on the establishment and management of its Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Archipelago provided for by Article 5 of the Treaty, including any changes to current restrictions on fishing, commercial and extractive activities, may be agreed to by the Government of the United Kingdom unless—
(a) a Minister of the Crown has laid before Parliament a copy of the written instrument,
(b) the written instrument and an explanatory memorandum has been published, and
(c) period A has expired without the House of Commons having resolved, within period A, that the written instrument should not be agreed.
(2) Period A is the period of 21 sitting days beginning with the first sitting day after the date on which the requirement in subsection (1)(a) is met.
(3) ‘An explanatory memorandum’ has the meaning given in section 24 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.”
This new clause provides that any written instrument on the Marine Protected Area will be subject to the approval of the House of Commons in a process equivalent to that required for treaties under section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
New clause 4—Ecological status of the Marine Protected Area—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within two years of the passing of this Act and within every subsequent two years, lay before both Houses of Parliament and publish a report on the status of the Marine Protected Area (the ‘MPA’).
(2) Any report made under subsection (1) must include, but not be limited to—
(a) numbers of different species of coral, fish and molluscs in the Marine Protected Area;
(b) coral reef resilience;
(c) fish stocks;
(d) ocean acidification;
(e) any degradation of the marine or terrestrial environments; and
(f) a complete record of the vessels (nature and flag) that enter the MPA.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report regularly on the status of the Marine Protected Area.
New clause 5—Reports to the Intelligence and Security Committee—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, and every year subsequently, report to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, established under section 1 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, on the security of the military base on Diego Garcia and the buffer zone.
(2) The report in subsection (1) must include, but shall not be limited to—
(a) the security of the buffer zone;
(b) the management and use of the electromagnetic spectrum;
(c) the presence of any foreign security forces on the islands, whether civilian or military;
(d) a complete record of the vessels, including their nature and flag, that enter the Marine Protected Area;
(e) a complete record of the notifications the United Kingdom has given the Government of Mauritius about activity on Diego Garcia;
(f) a complete record of any information passed from the United Kingdom to the Government of Mauritius, including any military operations, personnel movements, infrastructure development, communications, and logistical support.
(3) For the purposes of this section, ‘buffer zone’ has the meaning of the 24 nautical miles surrounding the island of Diego Garcia.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report annually to the Intelligence and Security Committee about the security of the military base on Diego Garcia and the security of the buffer zone.
New clause 6—Report on the impact of UNCLOS on the operation of the Treaty—
“(1) The Secretary of State must report to Parliament within one year of the passing of this Act, and each subsequent year, on the impact that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’) has had on the operation of the Treaty.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament annually about the impact that the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea has on the operation of the Treaty.
New clause 7—Rights of Chagossians—
“(1) The Secretary of State must consult the Chagossian community based in the United Kingdom on the implementation of the Treaty.
(2) The matters the Secretary of State must consult on shall include, but not be limited to—
(a) the Government of the United Kingdom’s response to any consultation by the Government of Mauritius on the regulations to establish a Trust Fund under Article (11)(b) of the Treaty; and
(b) any areas of dispute concerning the rights of the Chagossian people that arise between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Mauritius, before such disputes are formally discussed in the Joint Committee under the dispute settlement process established in Article 14 of the Treaty.
(3) Within six months of the passing of this Act, and at least once every subsequent year, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report containing an assessment of the efforts of the UK Government to uphold the rights of Chagossians under the terms of the Treaty.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to consult the Chagossian community in the UK on the discharge of the UK Government’s obligations under the Treaty, and to report annually on how the UK Government has upheld the rights of Chagossians.
New clause 8—Report on compliance of the Treaty and the Act with UN General Assembly Resolutions on Decolonisation—
“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must produce a report on the compliance of the Treaty agreed with the Government of Mauritius, and the provisions of section (2) of this Act, with the following Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly—
(a) Resolution 567 (VI),
(b) Resolution 648 (VII),
(c) Resolution 742 (VIII),
(d) Resolution 1514 (XV).
(2) The report specified in subsection (1) must be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, within two months of its publication, the Secretary of State must ensure that a substantive motion relating to the report is tabled, and moved, in both the House of Commons and House of Lords.”
New clause 9—Marine Protected Area: Progress Reports—
“(1) Within twelve months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, and every twelve months thereafter, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on—
(a) the progress made in establishing; and
(b) managing a Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Archipelago.
(2) The reports required under subsection (1) must include—
(a) a list of any meetings held during the twelve-month period between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Mauritius in which the Marine Protected Area was discussed;
(b) a summary of the non-financial support and assistance provided by the Government of the United Kingdom in the establishment, and management, of a Marine Protected Area; and
(c) the costs incurred by the United Kingdom, including any money paid by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Mauritius, in connection with the establishment, and management, of a Marine Protected Area.
(3) Within two months of a report being laid before the House of Commons under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the contents of the report.
(4) Within twelve months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must seek to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius to secure additional guarantees of its commitment to the development and preservation of a Marine Protected Area.”
This new clause requires the Government to produce an annual report on progress in establishing and managing, and to seek negotiations on securing further guarantees of Mauritius’s commitment to, a Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Archipelago.
New clause 10—Annual report: Treaty implementation—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of commencement and every twelve months thereafter, publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on—
(a) the expenditure of public funds made under the Treaty during the most recent financial year; and
(b) progress on the UK’s implementation of the Treaty.”
This new clause requires the Government to publish an annual report on the expenditure of public funds made under the Treaty and on the progress of the UK’s implementation of the Treaty.
New clause 11—Annual Parliamentary Oversight and Approval of Expenditure—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, once every financial year, lay before the House of Commons, for its approval, an estimate of the expenditure that is anticipated to be incurred by the Government of the United Kingdom in connection with the commitments made under the terms of the Treaty, including, but not limited to—
(a) any payments made or to be made, or financial commitments entered into, with the Government of the Republic of Mauritius in accordance with the Treaty; and
(b) the costs associated with the continued administration, maintenance, and operation of Diego Garcia.
(2) If the payments incurred by the Government of the United Kingdom are greater than those anticipated in the estimate specified in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay before the House of Commons, for its approval, a supplementary estimate.”
This new clause provides for an estimates and supply scrutiny process for expenditure to be incurred by the UK Government as a result of the Treaty and the UK’s continued involvement in Diego Garcia.
New clause 12—Review of the welfare and needs of Chagossians residing in the UK—
“(1) Within a year of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must undertake, and publish the findings of, a review of the welfare, integration, and general needs of Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom.
(2) In undertaking the review specified in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult representatives of Chagossians residing in the UK, including community organisations.
(3) Within a month of publishing the report specified in subsection (1), the Government must make time available for a debate in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords on a substantive motion relating to the report.”
This new clause requires the government to undertake a review of welfare and integration of Chagossians in the UK within a year Act receiving Royal Assent with a substantive motion relating to the report of the review tabled in both Houses of Parliament.
New clause 13—Impact of this Act and the Treaty on Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, consult with—
(a) Chagossian persons residing in the United Kingdom; and
(b) bodies representing, or working with, the Chagossian community residing in the United Kingdom regarding the impact of this Act and the Treaty on the Chagossian community residing in the United Kingdom.
(2) The terms of reference for the consultation specified in subsection (1) must include, but not be limited to the impact of this Act and the Treaty on—
(a) the socio-economic status of Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom;
(b) the family life of the UK based Chagossian community; and
(c) any implications for the Chagossian community residing in the United Kingdom, of changes to British nationality law.
(3) Within twelve months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament summarising—
(a) any findings from the consultation; and
(b) any steps the Government intends to take as a result of those findings.”
This new clause requires the Government to consult the UK based Chagossian community on the impact of the Act and the Treaty, and to publish the findings of the consultation.
New clause 14—Duty to produce proposals for a referendum of Chagossians residing in the UK—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, lay before both Houses of Parliament proposals for an advisory referendum of Chagossians residing in the UK, seeking their opinions on the Treaty signed with the Government of Mauritius and the provisions of this Act.
(2) Within a month of publishing the proposals specified in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must make time available in both Houses of Parliament for a debate on a substantive motion relating to the proposals.”
New clause 15—Review of the operation of the Treaty—
“(1) Within five years of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must commence a review of the operation of the Treaty.
(2) The review must include, but need not be limited to, an examination of whether it is in the UK’s national security interests to continue being a signatory to, or to seek the termination of, the Treaty.
(3) A report summarising the findings of the review must be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the Government to undertake, within five years of the Act receiving Royal Assent, a review of the operation of the Treaty and publish its findings, including whether it is in the UK’s national security interests to continue to be a signatory to the treaty.
New clause 17—Access to the archipelago under the Treaty—
“In any discussions with the Government of Mauritius relating to the provisions of Annex 1(3)(d) of the Treaty, the Secretary of State shall not give consent to the presence of any Indian or Chinese security forces, either civilian or military in nature, in the Chagos Archipelago.”
This amendment would require the Government to withhold consent, in any discussions with Government of Mauritius held under the provisions of Annex 1 (3) (d) of the Treaty, to the presence of any Indian or Chinese civilian or military security forces in the Chagos Archipelago.
Wendy Morton
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Madam Chairman, and to speak to the amendments that stand in my name and in the names of other right hon. and hon. Members, as we open this Committee of the whole House to debate Labour’s Chagos surrender Bill.
It has been more than a year since the surrender of the Chagos islands was announced, with the Prime Minister, the then Foreign Secretary—now the Deputy Prime Minister—and the Attorney General waving the white flag of surrender and putting the demands of their left-wing lawyer friends above the British national interest. Since then, Labour has denied this House a vote on the whole treaty under the 21-day process in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, and has kept details secret from us.
Over in Mauritius, the Prime Minister of that country has been bragging about how he squeezed concession after concession after concession out of Labour. It is shameful that we have found out more about the treaty from debates in the Mauritius Parliament and statements by its politicians than from Ministers accountable to this House. It has been five months since the Prime Minister of this country signed away £35 billion of British taxpayers’ money, stumbling through a press conference rather than coming to this House to face scrutiny and challenge.
At a time of serious fiscal challenge for the public finances, Labour has imposed a £35 billion surrender tax on our country—money that could fund public services here in Britain or support an easing of the tax burden. Instead, it will be handed over to a foreign Government who are using this resource to cut taxes for their citizens. Not only is it shameful, but Ministers have tried to pull the wool over the eyes of the British people by using accountancy methodologies and valuations to try to show a far lower cost. Even then, it is an extraordinary figure of £3.4 billion. The Chancellor may struggle with numbers, but the British people do not. They can add up, and they see what the real cost of this is. On top of that, Ministers still cannot tell us from which budgets in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence the money will come.
Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)
Is the simple truth not that this deal is cheaper than what was proposed by the Conservative party in government, and actually has more protections baked into it?
Wendy Morton
I think the hon. Gentleman needs a little memory check, because we did not propose a deal.
The British Chagossians, some of whom are watching from the Gallery—I pay tribute to them for their dignified and strong campaigning over many, many years—have been betrayed by Labour. Their rights have been ignored, as have their fears, leading to hundreds fleeing Mauritius and coming here. Labour’s surrender Bill, as presented, does nothing for them. It does nothing for the marine protected area—one of the most important and largest marine environments in the world—which has been protected while under British sovereignty and has become a centre for scientific research and development. That is at risk, and promises and aspirations announced by Ministers to ensure that it continues are not reflected in the Bill.
Shockingly, Labour’s surrender Bill as drafted does nothing to safeguard, defend and protect our national security. Labour is surrendering British sovereignty and territory to a country that is increasingly aligned with China.
Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)
The right hon. Lady describes this as a surrender Bill. Can she please tell me which flag will be flying over the Chagos islands if this is a so-called British surrender? It will be a British flag that is flying. Is that a point she understands?
Wendy Morton
There will be one flag that is flying, and that is the white flag of surrender.
Thousands of Mauritian public officials are being trained—or should that be “indoctrinated”?—by China on courses the Chinese are paying for. Both Russia and China are signing partnerships with Mauritius, but Labour’s surrender Bill fails to protect our interests.
Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)
Reports today suggest that China and India are entering into negotiations to sign leases to islands surrounding those on which British military operations will continue under the proposed lease agreement. Does she think that connection to China would be a risk and pose a threat to national security?
Wendy Morton
My hon. Friend is 100% right, and that is one of the reasons why we oppose this Bill and have done so from the very start.
The promises given by Ministers that nothing can happen in the Chagos archipelago that threatens our interests are already being undermined. Mauritius is in discussions with India about a security role that it can play in the archipelago, and the UK is not even in the room. If these discussions with a friendly country are taking place without the UK, one can only wonder what discussions are taking place in secret with China and Russia. There has been a report that China is already negotiating with Mauritius for Peros Banhos. When he speaks, perhaps the Minister can tell us what he knows about that.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)
I want to say on that point that this is absolute nonsense. Is the shadow Minister willing to provide any evidence that that is going to take place? This treaty protects the security of the outer islands and expressly prohibits foreign forces building bases on them—something on which her Government did not succeed in their negotiations.
Wendy Morton
I am grateful to the Minister, but can he actually give me the reassurance that no discussions are taking place? Perhaps he can answer that question when he responds to the debate later.
The promises given by Ministers that nothing can happen in the Chagos archipelago that threatens our interests are already being undermined. If these discussions with a friendly country are taking place without the UK, I can only wonder what discussions are taking place in secret. If such discussions are taking place, that would undermine the assurances Ministers have given to this House and be an act of bad faith on the part of Mauritius. The House knows that this Government kowtow to the Chinese Communist party, leading it to threaten our interests here. Now, they are failing to take seriously the warnings about China, and the threats it poses to Diego Garcia, our military assets and our interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Graham Stuart (Beverley and Holderness) (Con)
My right hon. Friend has highlighted the Prime Minister misleading—perhaps I have to say inadvertently misleading —us about the cost of this, when the Government Actuary’s Department has shown that it is £35 billion. More than that, he was suggesting in his press conference that China, Russia and others—
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Caroline Nokes)
Order. The right hon. Member may like to rethink his words about the Prime Minister.
Graham Stuart
I bow to you, Ms Nokes. Having misrepresented—I think I am allowed to say that—
Graham Stuart
Oh, I cannot say “misrepresented”. Having inadvertently confused the £35 billion that is actually going out with the £3.5 billion he claimed was going out, the Prime Minister, equally inadvertently, Ms Nokes, made out that China, Iran and Russia were in the column—he used the word “column”—of those opposing this deal, although I think each and every one of them came out publicly to say how much they welcomed it. Can my right hon. Friend share any knowledge about that with us?
Wendy Morton
I think my right hon. Friend makes some very interesting points, and perhaps not surprisingly, one might ask the question: are the Government sleeping with the enemy here?
Wendy Morton
If the Minister will allow me, I will just finish this point. The key thing we are asking for is a reassurance from the Minister, and he will have more than ample opportunity later to respond to the points I am making.
Stephen Doughty
I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, but she and the right hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart) have raised China, Russia and Iran. Why does she think that the United States, our closest security ally, backs this deal if there is any possibility of any of the fantasy things she is suggesting taking place. They cannot take place, because the treaty prevents them. She clearly has not read it.
Wendy Morton
It can be very easy to back something when you do not have to pay for it, but let us move on.
Now, the Government are failing to take seriously the warnings about China, and the threats it poses to Diego Garcia and our military assets and interests in the Indo-Pacific. Labour’s surrender Bill is bad for British taxpayers, bad for our national security, bad for the marine environment and bad for the Chagossians. It also grants Ministers huge powers to make further decisions and avoid parliamentary scrutiny.
Amendment 1 would in effect block Labour’s surrender treaty coming into force and the dissolution of the British Indian Ocean Territory unless and until Ministers reveal the legal advice they have received about Britain’s ability to extend and exercise sovereign rights over Diego Garcia after the initial 99-year period. The Government constantly claim they have secured the military base, but they have totally failed to do that. All they have done is pay Mauritius £35 billion to lease back a base we currently own, but only for 99 years. We have no certainty whatsoever about the fate of the base after the 99-year period. After paying Mauritius £35 billion, it would kindly give us the option to extend the treaty for another 40 years, but on what terms? If we extend it, will Mauritius make it conditional on more extortionate payments? What if we are outbid by a hostile power? In fact, what is to stop China putting in a bid? If no agreement is reached before the specified deadline and the base is offered to another country, what will happen to all the fixed assets belonging to Britain? We have had no answers from the Government on any of these vital points, which is unacceptable, and the terms of the treaty and the Bill, as they stand, are reckless.
Amendment 7 is necessary because the Government’s legal justification for surrendering the Chagos islands constantly shifts, because it has no legal basis. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) explained on Second Reading, the Government’s entire legal case is spurious. Many of us have been asking where the binding judgment we are constantly told is inevitable would actually come from. No credible answers have been forthcoming. We know it cannot be the International Court of Justice, and we know that a case at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea would see the UK able to put forward a decent legal argument. Then the Government completely contradicted their own argument about the electromagnetic spectrum. They are planning to dissolve a strategically invaluable British overseas territory, and they cannot even tell us on what legal basis they are doing so.
It looks as though this is part of a wider sinister picture—the Government’s relationship with China. We know that the Government are desperate for Chinese investment to help grow our economy, which they are trashing with their reckless economic policies. The Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius has credited China for its support in enabling Mauritius to gain sovereignty over the Chagos islands. Why? Because China wants to deepen its strategic partnership with Mauritius, which it believes to have strategic advantages. Once again, the Prime Minister does not have the backbone to stand up for our strategic interests against China. Amendment 7 would flush out the truth once and for all.
Taken together, amendments 3, 6 and 5 would delete a huge and unacceptable Henry VIII power that the Government are brazenly trying to award themselves, and would give this House the oversight it is entitled to on the implementation of the treaty. It is wholly unacceptable—in fact, it is quite outrageous—for the Government to give themselves such a sweeping power that they could, through an Order in Council,
“make any provision that appears to His Majesty to be appropriate as a result of the Treaty”.
This is a totally open-ended power. The military base itself is in scope, and so are the rights of Chagossians. The House should not be deprived of a voice on these matters of huge concern. Our amendments would ensure that this House has a voice and a vote. That is totally right and proper.
Turning to our new clauses, the Government could have inserted a money authorisation clause into the Bill. They chose not to and no wonder. The Government want to spare their own disgruntled MPs the ugly spectacle of having to vote in favour of spending tens of billions of their constituents’ money to Mauritius, as Britain’s economy sinks under the weight of the Chancellor’s inflation, unemployment, debt and taxes. Labour is asking the hard-pressed British taxpayer, already struggling under the weight of the Chancellor’s punitive tax rises, to stump up £35 billion to lease back a territory we already own and which we are not legally obliged to give away. As it leaves pensioners vulnerable and cold, destroys family farms and crushes businesses, the Minister is content to send our constituents’ hard-earned money to Mauritius with no strings attached, allowing the Government there to cut taxes—tax cuts over 6,000 miles away and tax rises at home. And Labour is inflicting this surrender tax on the British people because of its abject failure to negotiate. We all know that when Labour negotiates, Britain loses, but this is a new low. At seemingly every twist and turn, this Government have rolled over and capitulated to the demands of the Government of Mauritius.
Graeme Downie
The right hon. Lady mentions that she does not believe there is a legal basis. What was the legal basis for the previous Government, when they conducted 11 rounds of negotiation and achieved absolutely nothing?
Wendy Morton
I am not sure where the hon. Gentleman has been for the past year and several months, but we have gone over this time and again in this Chamber. There was no legal basis. We stopped—[Interruption.] Maybe I will repeat this very slowly for his benefit: we stopped the negotiations.
Stephen Doughty
I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, but I must, Ms Nokes, correct the record here. This has been a repeated argument, by the shadow Minister and others, claiming that the then Government stopped the negotiations. They did not. In fact, they carried them on. There was a gov.uk statement on 24 February reflecting the continuing of the negotiations by the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak). Indeed, they carried on into May, just before the election. It is there in writing on the previous Government’s own website.
Wendy Morton
We have made it very clear, repeatedly, at the Dispatch Box. Lord Cameron, the then Foreign Secretary, stopped the negotiations.
Sir Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is doing a very good job of forensically demolishing the Government’s case, such as it is. May I just correct what the Minister has said from the Dispatch Box? There is a very great difference between carrying on and discussing negotiations, and doing a deal. As I was the Deputy Foreign Secretary under both my right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) and my noble Friend Lord Cameron, I can tell the House that the then Government would never, ever have done this deal. Secondly, I do hope my right hon. Friend will probe the Minister further on where this extraordinary amount of money is coming from. Is it the defence budget or is it the development budget? Since the Labour party—a Labour Government—has slashed development spending from—
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Caroline Nokes)
Order. That is a very long intervention. Perhaps the shadow Minister should take over.
Wendy Morton
My right hon. and gallant Friend and constituency neighbour makes some very, very important points. He adds a certain weight and clarity to these discussions, and I urge Labour Members—certainly the newer Members—to listen to his wise counsel.
The House of Commons should be given a vote on the payments and that is the purpose of this amendment. In scope will also be the Chagossian trust fund, which, inexplicably, British taxpayers capitalise and Mauritius then distributes. We pay and Mauritius has total control over how it is spent. We will have no say over its governance and British Chagossians have no guarantees that they will benefit from it. How can that be right? The least this House and British Chagossians deserve is a vote on sending the money. What possible explanation could the Government provide against that?
Mike Kane (Wythenshawe and Sale East) (Lab)
The former Government set up a trust fund of £40 million for the Chagos islanders. After four years, only £12,000 had been spent. That is how they treated Chagossians under the last Government.
Wendy Morton
The point, though, is where is this money coming from? This House has not had a vote. Where is the transparency? Where is the democracy ?
Turning to new clause 2 and amendment 2, as we have already discussed, the duration of the agreement is a matter of serious national security concern. There are too many unanswered questions about what could happen to the base. We need to understand the basis on which the Government have settled that, especially as the then Foreign Secretary told this House on 7 October 2024 that the Government would have a right to extend the lease, which we do not, and the Mauritian Government claim the UK gave up a unilateral right of extension at their request. If that is true, it would be a scandal. No wonder we never get straight answers from Ministers. But then, it was also a scandal for Labour to sign the agreement with a previous Mauritian Government just before that country went into an election, only for there to be a change of Government who then wanted to change the deal and extract more money. Extending the agreement is essential, because we simply cannot lose the base. The House deserves to see the advice that the Government are relying on when they ask us to sign this £35 billion blank cheque.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that under the Bill, if there is no agreement, although we can be first offer, Mauritius can decide simply to close and fold the base, leaving it completely void, so there is no protection against that?
Wendy Morton
My hon. Friend is 100% right. This goes to the heart of the Bill. There are so many unanswered questions, which Conservative Members have been raising time and again. For example, how likely are we to be able to extend the base? What will the structure of the negotiations be? What conditions could Mauritius impose, given that it will have our negotiators over a proverbial barrel? How watertight is the first right of refusal?
Wendy Morton
I will make a little more progress.
What happens if the base is not secured? Will it need to be decommissioned? How could we prevent an adversary inheriting our fixed assets? What is the role of the United States in all this? These are serious matters, and the House needs serious answers. The purpose of the amendment is to secure those answers.
Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
In this House, there is often talk about millions of pounds for this and billions of pounds for that. It is difficult sometimes to get in one’s mind the scale of the money. Last year, the Chancellor said that she was going to raise national insurance and lower the threshold. We know how much damage that has done to the country, yet it was said at the time that it would raise £25.7 billion. That would not even pay for this deal. That is the amount of money they are going to give away today.
Wendy Morton
My hon. Friend makes a really valid point by putting that into context. There is only one thing that will result from the Government insisting on pushing this through: tax rises. I reiterate my earlier point that we still do not know which budget the money is coming from: FCDO or MOD. Who is going to pay for it?
New clause 3 will give Parliament a vote over the agreement on the Chagos marine protected area. The Chagos MPA is one of the jewels in the crown of the Blue Belt programme, a magnificent achievement of the last Conservative Government and a globally significant contribution to marine protection. It should not be altered without consent. At present, we apply among the strictest criteria to the Chagos MPA and it has been very well preserved, unlike much of the Indian ocean, which has suffered terribly in recent years.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Ind)
Will the right hon. Lady give way on that point?
Wendy Morton
I will make a little more progress.
We are not talking about a small area. The British Indian Ocean Territory spans 640,000 square kilometres of ocean. The Government’s treaty with Mauritius compels the UK to help Mauritius to establish and manage a new MPA, but we are being asked to fly blind with this Bill, because no agreement has been reached on what the MPA managed by Mauritius will look like.
Jeremy Corbyn
The marine protection zone was agreed by all parties. It is a sustainable protection zone. There has never been any debate or dispute about it; Mauritius has fully supported it all along and guaranteed its continuation. I do not understand why the shadow Minister is raising these matters. Does she believe that Mauritius will not look after the area properly? It seems to me that there is an attitude that is disrespectful of Mauritius and its determination to preserve the pristine nature of the ocean around the islands.
Wendy Morton
I have to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman on many of those matters. We have raised questions about this issue time and again, and we have simply not received the answers from Ministers.
Dr Luke Evans
This issue has been disputed. Is it not the point that the United Nations convention on the law of the sea cannot pass judgment on sovereignty because of the ruling that was made between Mauritius and the UK on marine protection back in 2015? That was under annexe VII, which was tried and tested. Britain was found wanting on that, because we had not properly talked through what should happen with the Mauritians. What the Mauritians actually wanted to do was to open it for fishing. How can we assure the protection for this area? That is why we need to amend the Bill.
Wendy Morton
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly why we have continued and will continue to probe the Government on the MPA. We have not had answers to our questions; we have not had the transparency that I think this House deserves.
It is very possible—in fact, it is very likely—that Labour has committed Britain to helping Mauritius dismantle an MPA that we ourselves established. There are no assurances that we will not be committing British resources to actively harm our own interests and undo our work. Mauritius does not have the capability to manage, monitor or enforce an MPA. It does not have the infrastructure at sea or any such experience. It would leave the stocks in those waters exposed to real risk of pillaging, including by Chinese vessels. It is not likely to have the will to do so either, as we know the economic potential of the waters is of interest to Mauritius.
Despite the Government’s ludicrous and insulting claim that those who oppose this deal side with Russia and its friends, Mauritius has been developing closer ties with Russia on marine matters, announcing as recently as May 2025 that the two countries are strengthening their ties on marine innovation, including marine research, while Mauritius’s close relationship with China—a strategic partnership, no less—opens up the possibility of Chinese fishing trawlers in these waters. It is therefore absolutely right that this House gets a say over the fate of the MPA, and the CRaG-equivalent process set out in our new clause would provide for an appropriate level of scrutiny.
New clause 4 would require regular reporting on the ecological status of the Chagos MPA, which is necessary for the same reason as new clause 3. The Government have bound us to support Mauritius to manage the MPA, so there must be scrutiny of what the Government are doing and the ecological consequences. There are widespread concerns across the House on the future of the MPA, and Ministers have so far failed to give any answers or any assurances; when asked, they have said that they do not know about the future and cannot tell us what resources and costs will be incurred to meet these obligations. Given our role in managing the MPA, the UK should be able to access the data required for this report. This new clause reaffirms our commitment to the MPA.
We recognise the sensitive nature of the military arrangements on Diego Garcia, but oversight of the agreement is none the less essential. New clause 5 would allow for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny while respecting the need to protect critical information. The new clause covers the key areas of security consideration and will act as a catalyst for the Government to maintain their own monitoring of each area. We believe that that is critical as there are holes in the provisions. There must, for example, be agreement on upgrading infrastructure in the buffer zone, such as sensors—but what if there is no agreement? Likewise, the treaty stipulates that Mauritius and Britain must jointly decide on the management and use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Of particular importance in new clause 5 are paragraphs (d) and (e). On (d), we must ensure that only vessels that should be in the area are in the area, and that Russian and potentially even Chinese vessels are deterred from entering—I have already mentioned the closer ties and partnerships between Mauritius and those countries, which should concern all of us.
With reference to paragraph (e), the treaty states that the United Kingdom agrees
“to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia”.
Given the huge range of security threats in the Indo-Pacific and the middle east, it is far from impossible that in future this mechanism may need to be used. It is important that the notifications are presented to the Intelligence and Security Committee, as once again it would force the Government to log and monitor the mechanism, including any operational impacts it might have. We know that there are genuine concerns that third countries—potentially even China—might try to establish themselves in the archipelago, and the arrangements in the treaty must be monitored to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to stop that happening.
New clause 6 probes the Government’s argument that a legally binding ruling under UNCLOS would have an impact on our ability to operate the electromagnetic spectrum, and impede air and sea access as well as the ability to patrol the area around the base. We take issue with that assertion, not least because there is an argument that provisions under article 298 of UNCLOS allow for exemptions relevant to disputes concerning military activities. The Government have not addressed this issue when we have probed, including on Second Reading, so we have had no choice but to table this new clause to test the Government’s assertion.
I turn finally to new clause 7. The British Chagossian community have been treated appallingly by this Labour Government. Twice the deal has ended up in the courts because of the way Labour has ridden roughshod over their concerns. This Bill sells them short, too. The resettlement programme for the Chagos islands under this treaty is entirely in the hands of Mauritius—a country to which, I should add, Chagossians feel little affinity. Indeed, we have seen many Chagossians arriving in the UK from Mauritius in recent weeks. I hope the Minister will respond to that from the Dispatch Box, because it is clearly concerning that they have been moved to take this action.
The Bill also stops British overseas territories citizenship being awarded on the basis of descent from a person born on the Chagos archipelago. Sadly, we cannot amend the treaty through the Bill; it just is not within the parliamentary rules. However, new clause 7 would require the Government to consult the Chagossian community on the implementation of the treaty—including on the establishment of the trust fund, which we capitalise and Mauritius distributes—and on areas of dispute arising between the UK and Mauritian Governments prior to their being discussed at the joint committee created by the treaty. It also requires the Foreign Secretary to present a report to Parliament within six months of the Act becoming law, and in every subsequent year, on how Chagossian rights are being upheld under this agreement. We have a national obligation and responsibility to the Chagossian community, and the Conservatives will always stand up for their rights.
To conclude, taken together, our amendments and new clauses will hold the Government to account. Let us be clear: the Conservatives oppose this surrender Bill, its colossal costs and the adverse impact on our defence and security. Accepting these amendments and new clauses will simply strengthen accountability and transparency.
Mr Calvin Bailey
I have set out the security and geopolitical importance of the treaty many times in this place, and would therefore have appreciated the opportunity today to engage with detailed scrutiny of the treaty and the defence arrangements it enables. Sadly, that is not the line that the Opposition are going down. Instead, we are faced with a series of wrecking amendments that do not attempt to improve the Bill in any way. They are designed to force the Government to let our allies down, undermining our international credibility and reputation, and creating greater geopolitical risk and legal and security risks to our base on Diego Garcia.
If Opposition amendments were passed today, it would be impossible for us to meet our commitments in a timely way by implementing the agreement with Mauritius that Ministers have completed—an agreement that the Conservative Government started and carried through 11 rounds of negotiations but now want to throw back, no matter the damage that it would do to our nations. At no point have they made clear the legal basis for starting the 11 rounds of negotiations in the first instance.
I fully understand and sympathise with the motivation behind amendment 9. The creation of the Chagos islands as a separate territory created a deep injustice, because it was bound up in the dispossession of the Chagossians, but that historical injustice cannot simply be undone. We cannot turn back the clock, however much we might want to do so. The question of a right to return is not remotely simple, because access to Diego Garcia is inevitably a serious question of security. People obviously cannot return to exactly where their families lived, because of the highly sensitive military facility that now stands in their place. Perhaps a limited right of return could be negotiated, but that would engage security procedures that are secret and involve the UK and the US as well as Mauritius, as was acknowledged by the right hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton). The amendment imagines that if the negotiations were rejected by even the narrowest of margins, the entire treaty would fall apart and would need to be renegotiated afresh, significantly increasing geopolitical risk to the base and our interests. Perhaps the Minister could invite some assistance on this point from those who conducted the first 11 rounds of negotiations.
Let us get real: there are reasons why international treaties are negotiated by the Government and subject to democratic scrutiny in this House and through these procedures. What the Liberal Democrats are proposing amounts to making a UK foreign and defence policy dependent on a referendum, and that includes vital defence interests that are shared with the US and other allies. That referendum would apparently comprise non-UK citizens just as much as it would British Chagossians. Frankly, I would have thought that the Liberal Democrats more than others would have learned from the disastrous experience of Brexit that making foreign policy by referendum is not the wisest course of action.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Bailey
There is already a barrage of misinformation coming from the Opposition, and I am not going to invite any more of it to flow across the Floor. There are a multiplicity of bad actors internationally who would benefit from the collapse of this Bill—and just imagine how many more there would be if we took the course the Opposition urge us to take.
Chris Coghlan (Dorking and Horley) (LD)
The hon. Member just said that foreign policy should not be made by referendum. Does he disagree, then, with article 1(2) of the UN charter—that the right to self-determination is a core principle in international relations and that we should therefore have a referendum for Chagos?
Mr Bailey
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. The Bill has been before the House already, and at the moment we are discussing the amendments that have been tabled. The hon. Member will soon have the opportunity to discuss the amendments he has tabled. However, abdicating this Chamber’s decision—[Interruption.]
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Caroline Nokes)
Order. There is far too much noise and many private conversations, which make it very difficult to hear the hon. Gentleman.
Mr Bailey
Abdicating this House’s responsibilities to a referendum is not something on which we will agree. This treaty is a vital step to secure UK interests. It puts the Diego Garcia base on a secure footing for at least 100 years. I understand that Opposition colleagues have a range of objections to this treaty, not all of which are jaw-droppingly hypocritical, however—
The Second Deputy Chairman
Order. I will give the hon. Gentleman the same warning that I gave the right hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart). He needs to be very careful with his language.
Mr Bailey
Not all the objections are jaw-droppingly confused, but some colleagues will vote against the Bill tonight on the basis of them. That is no reason to support an amendment that would undermine the Government’s ability to navigate the difficult and chaotic world we live in today and keep our country safe.
Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)
I will speak in support of seven amendments tabled in my name. For too long, decisions about the Chagos islands have been made without the consent of Chagossians. My grave concern is that the treaty to be given effect by the Bill fails to rectify that historical and ongoing injustice. Not only does it fail to provide adequate protection of their rights, it fails to establish a legally binding right to return or a binding programme of resettlement of the islands for Chagossians.
Turning to amendment 9, we recognise and support the importance of abiding by international law and believe that the UK was indeed right to open a process of negotiation with Mauritius—especially so given the risk that a judgment against the UK in any court could threaten our sovereignty over and security interests in Diego Garcia and the wider Chagos archipelago. However, the treaty that has emerged not only falls short in addressing past injustices, but introduces new injustices of its own.
At the very core of the United Nations charter—a document that this country helped to shape—lies the right of all peoples to self-determination. Article 1(2) could not be clearer: one of the purposes of the United Nations is to
“develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.
Yet for the Chagossian people that right has been denied for more than half a century. They were exiled from their homeland in the Chagos archipelago, scattered across the globe, and left without the means or permission to return. It was, and remains, a moral stain on our modern history.
Jeremy Corbyn
I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman about the lack of morality in how the Chagossian people were treated—he is correct on that. Would he accept that there was something fundamentally wrong in 1965 in separating Diego Garcia and the archipelago from Mauritius when the whole area had always been administered from Mauritius as part of Mauritius, and that under decolonisation statutes they should have been included in the independence of Mauritius at that time?
Dr Pinkerton
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I am aware that he has a long history in advocating for this particular cause, but I am relentlessly surprised by the position he takes on this point. He would seek to effectively reinscribe the colonial construction that was British Mauritius and in doing so ignore the right of Chagossians as a people to self-determine their own future. I do not see the colonial convenience of administration as anything other than overwriting a people’s right to determine their own future.
On that point, in 2019 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion that concluded that the decolonisation of Mauritius had not been legally completed and that the United Kingdom should end its administration of the Chagos islands as rapidly as possible. The General Assembly subsequently endorsed that same view. But I say to this House that the ICJ opinion, however well intentioned, poses a profound problem. It proposes to hand sovereignty not to the Chagossians themselves but to Mauritius, without consulting those who were born of the islands or who are descended from them. That is not self-determination but the transfer of sovereignty over a people without their consent. The right to self-determination belongs to peoples, not to Governments. It is not and should not be a device for tidying up the diplomatic ledger of empire, but a recognition that every community has the right to shape its own future. To remove the Chagossians once was a horrific wrong. To barter away their sovereignty now without their voice compounds that wrong.
If we truly honour the UN charter and the principles that this country has long championed, the Chagossians themselves must be placed at the centre of any future settlement. They must have a say over their citizenship, over the governance of their islands and over the prospects of return. The commitment to a referendum that sits at the heart of amendment 9 seeks to address that long and burning injustice by providing Chagossians with the opportunity to exercise their right to determine their own future.
Chris Coghlan
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend on the importance of having a right of referendum. I have had Chagossian constituents contact me with their outrage about the compounding of injustice in the new treaty. How realistic does my hon. Friend think it is to find people eligible to vote in a potential referendum, given the length of time that has passed since they were moved from Diego Garcia?
Dr Pinkerton
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question. He is right that, were a referendum able to be secured, it would be unusual because of the nature of the displacement of the Chagossians. But there have been previous international consultations, and with the collective will and intelligence of a House like this, the terms of a referendum could undoubtedly be negotiated. After all, Chagossians are not backwards in coming forwards and making themselves known to all of us.
For Chagossians, this is not a geopolitical abstraction, but a deeply human matter: one of belonging, fairness and justice. Requiring a report to be made to the House would ensure their voices are not lost amid the technical language of treaties and transfers. Amendment 9 would enable transparency, accountability and, above all, genuine recognition of the rights of Chagossians to self-determination. I encourage right hon. and hon. Members across the House to think carefully when they vote tonight.
New clause 9 speaks to another vital principle: our shared moral duty to protect the natural world. The Chagos archipelago is among the most biodiverse marine environments on Earth. Its coral reefs, migratory species and rich ecosystems are a global ecological treasure and a testament to what nature can be when left largely untouched by human exploitation. In recent months, I have spoken with scientific advisers who are deeply concerned about the Bill’s lack of provisions for establishing and governing marine protected areas. The environment and sustainability institute stresses that very large marine protected areas are vital for global conservation goals. Its research shows the archipelago’s exceptional role in protecting diverse mobile species across the Indian ocean.
New clause 9 would require the Government to publish an annual report produced with the Mauritian Government setting out the progress made in establishing and managing marine protected areas and the meetings held between the two Governments on the issue. Such reporting is critical to ensure that environmental protection does not fade into the sotto voce diplomatic arrangements. It must remain a visible, audible and measurable commitment to international conservation standards. If the Government are to honour their biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction pledge, future Governments must ensure stronger marine conservation, sustainable stewardship and shared responsibility. I believe that the new clause would achieve that.
New clauses 10 and 11 would build on the principle of accountability by ensuring regular oversight of how the Bill and its associated treaty arrangements are implemented. We believe that the Secretary of State should, within 12 months, lay before both Houses a report detailing the expenditure of public funds made under the treaty during the most recent financial year and the progress made by the UK in implementing the treaty’s obligations.
Chris Coghlan
At a time when the cost of living is so high, does my hon. Friend agree that the cost of maintaining and operating the Diego Garcia military base and military operations must be evaluated by the House against the expenditure of public funds made under the treaty each financial year?
Dr Pinkerton
The maximum possible financial transparency around the treaty arrangements is essential, not least for securing and establishing public trust. I fear that, without those high levels of accountability, public trust would rapidly dissipate. Furthermore, once every financial year, the Secretary of State should present to the House an estimate of the expenditure expected to be incurred in connection with the treaty, including payments or financial commitments to the Government of Mauritius and the cost of maintaining and operating Diego Garcia. If actual payments exceed those estimates, a supplementary estimate must be laid before the House for approval and parliamentary scrutiny. I reassure Conservative colleagues that the Liberal Democrats will support any amendment to the Bill that would increase financial transparency of the treaty.
However, our moral duty extends beyond matters of territory and finance. New clause 12 would require a comprehensive review of the welfare, integration and general needs of Chagossians living in the UK. Many Chagossians here face significant challenges, including housing insecurity, barriers to employment and limited access to public services. The review would assess what support is needed and ensure a full debate in this House and the other place on its findings. That is how we show genuine care for those displaced by the actions of our predecessors in the Chamber and in Whitehall.
Finally, new clause 13 would require the Government within six months to consult with Chagossians residing in the UK and the organisations that represent them on how the Act and the treaty affect their community socially, economically and legally.
Graham Stuart
The hon. Gentleman is giving a powerful speech on the Chagossians and marine protected areas, as well as the need for transparency. But it is not just about transparency. What I have not heard from him, on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, is any sense of outrage at the very fact that we are to pay out £35 billion for sovereign British territory on which we have arguably the most important base in the whole Indian ocean.
Dr Pinkerton
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his question. It is precisely in order to cast the strongest possible spotlight on the financial transaction involved that we are asking for financial accountability to be magnified. On his geopolitical point, nobody can question the significant geopolitical importance of the base—it is vital to our national security and to global security. It is essential that it is maintained in British hands, but that must be achieved with the consent of the Chagossians.
The resulting report to be laid before Parliament within 12 months would allow us to evaluate whether the Government’s legislative intent has translated into justice and inclusion in the lives of those who are most directly affected.
These amendments would address critical shortcomings with the Bill. They would embed accountability, environmental protection and a commitment to the right to self-determination within its framework for implementation. I urge Ministers to ensure that the Chagossians are not treated as diplomatic collateral in any future discussions with Mauritius. They are not a footnote to be managed between states; they are a people deserving of justice, agency and dignity.
The Chagossians have waited more than 50 years to go home. The least we can do now is let them decide freely and finally what home means for themselves and ensure that they have the tools they need to exercise their rights. The amendments tabled in my name seek to afford those protections and ensure that those rights are respected.
Stuart Anderson (South Shropshire) (Con)
I am delighted to be called so early. I will speak to the amendments in the name of the official Opposition, specifically on the reports going to the Intelligence and Security Committee, especially on security of the buffer zones, foreign security forces, military operations and personnel movements. The ceding of Diego Garcia is a monumental strategic error that will diminish the UK’s standing on the world stage, and I will gladly set out why I believe that is the case.
If anybody thinks they can predict what will happen in the next five years, they have learned nothing from the last five years. When we start extending that to 10-plus years in the current global geopolitical situation, that is so hard to look at. Everybody is playing by a set of rules and working to a past system, which is currently changing.
Strategic leadership is the ability to shape the environment we are in. Let us take two strategic leaders, regardless of our view of them at the moment: President Trump and Xi Jinping. They both want the world to change from where it is, and they want to adjust the shape of what it looks like. The world is currently seeing a disruption to the world order as we know it. The international rules-based order is being challenged. We are setting out a deal and a treaty based on an older system that we being asked to believe will be honoured for the next 99 years, but I do not believe it will be.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I just want to re-emphasise the point that my hon. Friend is making about the growth of the threat. Is he aware that China today has 130 times the capability to build naval ships that America does? One shipyard in China in this last year has built more naval ships than the whole of the United States. We talk about the threat to the South China sea. It is done.
Stuart Anderson
My right hon. Friend makes a great point. I spoke to one of the submarine commanders from the US navy only about six weeks ago. He told me that 15 years ago he would see one Chinese ship or submarine per week, and now he sees 100 a week. The whole area is full of them. When we start looking at the security of buffer zones, we see that we cannot move in this area for Chinese submarines. The whole space is swamped with them.
We are doing a deal that will remove our ability to sit at the table where we used to have such strength. Our armed forces now would have trouble supporting our allies in any area, particularly the Indo-Pacific—[Interruption.] The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry says that is not true. We have HMS Spey and the carrier strike groups, but we have no permanent presence in the Indo-Pacific. With our current commitments, we would need a brigade strength or more to enable us to have a permanent base, to rotate troops through and to have a credible offering without burning out the UK armed forces, given the numbers who are currently on sick at the moment and the strength of the military. I want to see larger armed forces, but we do not have the ability to offer the level that we want.
We believe that the world is playing by an international rules-based order, but not all countries will do that. An international rules-based order is a set of rules set out by, normally, the largest countries around the world. When countries such as Iraq or Kosovo do not adhere to them, they expect everyone else to accept it, but the rise of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea is throwing everything into the mix. I believe that this will be a huge loss for us strategically. I reiterate my point that the ceding of Diego Garcia is a monumental strategic error that, in the next decade, we will come to regret.
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Father of the House.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
I commend my hon. Friend the Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson), who has spoken with great authority about the military threat. I also commend the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton). I agree with everything he said; he spoke with great good sense and moderation.
I wish to speak to my new clause 14—I am grateful to my friends who have signed it—which states:
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, lay before both Houses of Parliament proposals for an advisory referendum of Chagossians residing in the UK, seeking their opinions on the Treaty signed with the Government of Mauritius and the provisions of this Act.
(2) Within a month of publishing the proposals specified in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must make time available in both Houses of Parliament for a debate on a substantive motion relating to the proposals.”
An advisory referendum would be a moderate and sensible proposal, and I am not sure why anybody would disagree with it. Surely we in this House have a moral duty to the Chagossian people, not to bureaucratic convenience or diplomatic horse trading. My new clause simply calls for the Chagossians to be consulted on their own future. That is not unreasonable. It is a modest and entirely proper request. After decades of exile and neglect, it is indefensible to negotiate their homeland’s fate without even asking them. Have we ever handed over a people to a foreign power without even consulting them?
Proponents of paying Mauritius to take the island cite international law, but the entire point of decolonisation was to assert the self-determination of peoples. The United Nations was founded upon the principle that nations and peoples should be free to determine their own destiny in a peaceful way. Chagossians, as we now all agree, were wronged by both the British and the Mauritian authorities. By the way, I am probably the only person sitting in this Chamber who has actually been to the islands—[Interruption.] I am sorry; I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell). I went there with the Defence Committee 40 years ago.
We kicked those people out of their homes, albeit for perfectly the legitimate reason of promoting the stability and security of the free world, and Mauritius accepted money to help look after displaced Chagossians. No one can dispute the fact that Chagossians are treated as having second-class status in Mauritius. Chagossians who have been living there are fleeing in increasing numbers to the United Kingdom. Many of them happily assert that they want the sovereignty of the United Kingdom to continue over the British Indian Ocean Territory, but they also want a right to return.
Righting the wrongs we have committed means listening to the Chagossians directly, and that is all I am asking for. The amendment would give Parliament the chance to ensure that justice is finally done for those who suffered most. Britain should not repeat the sin of dispossession under the guise of decolonisation. I repeat, Britain should not repeat the sin of dispossession under the guise of decolonisation. To hand the territory to Mauritius would not “end empire”, but merely pass the islands from one remote capital to another; from one imperial power to another. The United Kingdom must not compound historic injustice by ignoring the only people with a legitimate moral claim to these islands.
The Chagos islands are of course a linchpin of regional security for Britain, the United States and our allies in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. Undermining that strategic position would embolden hostile powers and weaken our ability to uphold freedom of navigation. Those who call this a colonial relic misunderstand it. It is a forward defence post, not a backward-looking possession. As has been said time and again, the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion carries no legal binding force and should not dictate British policy. Allowing unelected judges in The Hague to override Parliament’s responsibilities is an abdication of national sovereignty. The Government should resist any creeping judicial globalism that seeks to erode British self-government under the cloak of “international law.”
I will end on this point, and I believe it is a very powerful point: consultation with the Chagossians through a UK referendum is an act of basic democratic respect, not a legal technicality. My new clause would strengthen rather than weaken Britain’s moral standing by showing that we act with fairness and consent. We should not wash our hands of responsibility for British subjects in favour of imagined diplomatic convenience. The right course is to combine justice for the Chagossians with the preservation of Britain’s strategic obligations, not to sacrifice one for the other. Parliament should back these new clauses and amendments as an affirmation that Britain remains a nation that keeps faith with its peoples and its allies alike.
Nigel Farage (Clacton) (Reform)
Before I speak to amendment 10, which stands in my name on the amendment paper, I have a quick reminder: the International Court of Justice made an “advisory” judgment—it has no force in law. Quite why the previous Government sought to enter 11 rounds of negotiation off the back of it is beyond me, but it is even more extraordinary for a Government that is full to the rafters with human rights lawyers. They believe in human rights so much that somehow they are seeking to follow a court that is part of the United Nations in total contrast, as the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton) pointed out, to one of the most basic principles of the United Nations: namely, national self-determination. We thought it mattered so much 40 years ago that we sent a taskforce 8,000 miles away to defend the rights of the people of the Falkland Islands.
I feel great sympathy for the Chagossians. They got a rotten deal 50 years ago, and in many ways they are perhaps getting an even worse deal now. They should be consulted. The fact they are not being consulted is shameful for a Government who go on endlessly about human rights and the international rule of law. That is the human cost of this.
As to the economic cost, well, lots of sums have been bandied about, from £3.4 billion from the Prime Minister to £35 billion, but it all depends on the rate of inflation. If the average rate of inflation over the next 100 years is 3%, it will be over £50 billion, but that may be as nothing to the opportunity loss here. This marine park should have been turned decades ago into the greatest marine tourism site in the world.
Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)
The hon. Member will be aware that his friend President Trump is in favour of this deal, so would he tell us whether he disagrees with him?
Nigel Farage
I certainly will, and I will come to that in short order.
The opportunity for marine tourism is massive; it is worth billions of pounds a year, and it would provide a lot of jobs for Chagossians. On top of that—perhaps more controversially—I have little doubt, having spoken to some geologists who work for the world’s biggest mining companies, that within those waters we would find cobalt and many of the minerals needed for the very green revolution that this Government say that they are in favour of, so economically we are not just paying £50 billion or whatever the number is; we are losing out on a huge future opportunity.
Stephen Doughty
I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman has the gall to come here and talk about national security today, when the former leader of his party in Wales admitted to taking bribes from Russia, and when again he has been using talking points that come right from the Kremlin in blaming NATO for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—absolutely shameful. The Mauritian Attorney General was interviewed on Mauritian TV today, and he said regarding the hon. Gentleman’s tweets claiming that Mauritius was negotiating a lease on Peros Banhos that that was a gross falsehood and a political gimmick. The hon. Gentleman talks about the United States. The Secretary of War, Secretary Hegseth, said:
“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the United States.
The UK’s…deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region.
We are confident the base is protected for many years ahead.”
Why is the United States backing this deal, if anything that the hon. Gentleman says is true?
Nigel Farage
I can assure you that America is not backing this deal. What it is saying is, “What we have is what we hold.” That is the American attitude at the moment, but as I said, when it wakes up to the satellite observation deal done with India already, as reported in The Economic Times of India on 12 September this year, and once you realise—
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Caroline Nokes)
Order. When the hon. Gentleman says “you”, he is referring to me. Perhaps he would refer to the Minister as “the Minister”.
Nigel Farage
When the Americans realise that, actually, Mauritius is not a trustworthy nation—it is bankrupt; it needs the money; it will not honour this treaty—we will be in a very different place. I do ask the question about the role of our National Security Adviser, somebody very much in the news in the last few days. He was seemingly very happy that a trial against two alleged Chinese spies, operating at times within this building, had disappeared. Not only is he honouring the Labour manifesto, which is very soft on China, but apparently he is very for this Chagos deal.
I put it to Members that this deal is un-British, it is against our national interest, and there is no upside or gain. I can assure them that a future that a future Reform Government will not honour this treaty—end of.
Graham Stuart
I refer the Committee to my interests, having observed the Mauritian elections last year as a guest of the Mauritius Labour party.
It is hard not to feel a little bit sorry for the beleaguered Minister at the Dispatch Box today, sent to defend something that is so clearly a betrayal of this country and its interests. Out of the grand total of 400-plus Labour Members of Parliament in this House, he was backed by just one—the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey)—who sat with his face glued to his iPad, reading the words put there by Lord knows who, and who struggled so much when he finally took an intervention and had to speak off the cuff. Indeed, he has fled now, doubtless to lick his wounds. Not one single other of those 400 Government MPs wanted to come here and defend this Bill.
The Minister is in fact a decent man, and he will know that this Bill has no defence and brings no benefit to this country. Last week, too, we had a Minister sent out to answer for the China spy case. He had never spoken at the Dispatch Box before; it was his very first outing, but he was thought the best person to defend the Prime Minister’s blushes by knowing nothing about the topic in hand and denying things—without lying—by dint of ignorance. It was indeed a triumph, of sorts.
Armando Iannucci and “The Thick of It” cast could not script something as cynical, empty and damaging as this Government’s behaviour in so many spheres. As we can see in the amendments and new clauses before us, which will doubtless all be rejected by the Minister, amidst the betrayal of first-time buyers, farmers, small businesses, special needs children, pensioners, young workers—
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Caroline Nokes)
Order. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman might stay within the scope of the Bill.
Graham Stuart
Thank you, Madam Chair. I was setting the context for the amendments to the Bill that we are rightly proposing to ensure that the Government report back on the money that they plan to spend and to ensure that the Mauritius taxpayer is not the only taxpayer to benefit from this.
As I say, the amendments and new clauses come amidst the betrayal of those first-time buyers, farmers, small businesses, special needs children, pensioners, young workers, restaurants and pubs, and amidst the expense grifting, tax dodging, scandals and resignations packed into 14 busy months. Amidst all that, this Chagos sell-out is still a stand-out disaster for this country, and the Ministers on the Front Bench know it. That is why not a single one of their 400-odd colleagues—bar one, glued to his iPad—has been prepared to come to this Chamber tonight and speak in favour of the Bill.
That is why there is no provision to allow a vote on the £3.4 billion—sorry, not £3.4 billion; the £35 billion that has now been set out. As the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) rightly says, that is based on a rather small c conservative estimate of the interest, but that is what the Government themselves have said it is likely to cost. This Labour Government decided to give away UK sovereign territory and the location of a critically important military base to another country, and to pay £35 billion for the privilege.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
On the argument about the money, which comes up throughout all this and which we had in the last debate, the Government have used a dodgy system to calculate it. It is called the GDP deflator. Their own actuarial department has dismissed that completely because, of course, it is all about a forecast of where social issues will go on an island that will never have anything to do with us after all this, so we have no idea how to predict it.
Finally, clause 5 makes this whole debate meaningless, because the Government can change anything they like whenever they wish to, so what the heck are we doing debating this even now?
Graham Stuart
My right hon. Friend makes an extremely powerful point. The Henry VIII powers in the Bill are not limited at all. I heard so many complaints when I was a Minister from the Labour party about Henry VIII powers. The Bill literally gives Ministers the ability to change any existing piece of legislation in any sphere whatsoever if it is necessary to implement this deal. There can never have been a Henry VIII power as powerful as that given to Ministers by this legislation, which is all to do with the surrender of Chagos and the transfer of tens of billions of pounds to a foreign power—a foreign power that is in a strategic partnership with China and in close workings with other countries that are not on our side. What on earth was the Prime Minister thinking? As the Minister lay in bed last night tossing and turning in anticipation of the debate, I am sure that that was the question that went round and round in his head.
So many questions remain to be answered. Why did the Prime Minister say that the payment would be £3.4 billion when the Government’s own offices now show that it will be at least £35 billion? Is this the most important strategic base in the Indian ocean? Can the Minister confirm that Diego Garcia is effectively a US base, manned by thousands of Americans, with at most a few dozen Brits there in liaison? If this is in fact a United States base and not operationally—
The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry (Luke Pollard)
It is a joint base.
Graham Stuart
It might be a joint base technically, but what is it in reality? I would love an intervention from the Defence Minister; he could tell us. How much do we use it operationally, because there are thousands of Americans there and, as I understand it—unless he corrects me—at most dozens of Brits. In other words, it is a United States base on sovereign UK territory that we will pay tens of billions of pounds for over the next 100 years to provide it to the Americans for free. It makes no sense, and I do not see why we have had no answer from Ministers as to why that is a sensible use of public money.
Graham Stuart
I will give way to the Minister and then to my right hon. Friend.
Stephen Doughty
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his generous comments. He and I have always had robust but friendly discussions on many issues. However, I do have to correct him on this point. The US pays for the operations, and the value to the British taxpayer, the US taxpayer and, indeed, all our allies is priceless in that it protects the people of this country from multiple threats, so what he says simply does not make sense.
Graham Stuart
The United States plays a critical role as a member of NATO and as a key ally—if not the key ally—of ours, but despite the priceless nature of the service it provides, we do not typically pay for it. We do not normally pay for its bases; we pay for our own.
Graham Stuart
I said I would give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis).
Sir Julian Lewis
My right hon. Friend is quite right. On the face of it, this does not make sense, unless we look at it in one particular way. If the Government have made a decision that they wish to have a strategic economic partnership with communist China, this makes sense, the closing of the case with the China spies makes sense, and the willingness for China to have the biggest embassy of any country in Europe makes sense. Even though the Government say that that is a quasi-judicial decision, it is interesting that for political reasons, they put it off till December. None of it makes sense, or all of it makes sense, as long as the National Security Adviser wants us to suck up to communist, totalitarian China.
Graham Stuart
My right hon. Friend makes a powerful point. That is at the heart of it. There are so many questions but one question is: why? Why would a deal like this be done by the Government? He puts forward a credible case as to why it might be.
Graham Stuart
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman, who is not brave enough to speak fully but is prepared to intervene, can tell us why he would like to vote, if only he was given the chance, to give £35 billion to Mauritius and hand over a sovereign British base to someone in strategic partnership with China.
Phil Brickell
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman can enlighten me on which of the amendments he is speaking to. New clause 4, which his party tabled, mentions coral, fish stocks, molluscs and ocean acidification in the marine protected area. Even the cynic in me is somewhat flabbergasted by the official Opposition’s apparent interest in environmental and climate change all of a sudden, given their desire to ride roughshod over the Climate Change Act and frack our countryside.
Graham Stuart
That is rather desperate. I give way to the right hon. Member for East Antrim.
Sammy Wilson
The Minister described this asset as “priceless”, yet he is giving it away—and not only is he giving it away; he is paying someone to take it! Is this the kind of decision people would expect from a rational Government? More importantly, if it is priceless in security terms, why are we compromising it?
Graham Stuart
The right hon. Gentleman is quite right to ask that question. That is what we are trying to get to the bottom of, and we hope to hear answers from the Minister this evening so that ordinary citizens of this country can understand how it is in the UK’s interest to do this.
Of course, other points have been touched on, including, quite rightly, the Chagossians. Why is the Labour party—the party so committed to human rights and which very much sees itself as champion for the underdog—absolutely disregarding the Chagossians? As the hon. Member for Bolton West suggested, Labour also sets itself out as a nature and climate champion, yet it is handing this asset over to a country without the wherewithal—I do not know about the will, but it is certainly without the wherewithal—to ensure that the protection of that marine area continues. That is the problem, and it is why we need answers from the Minister. The Government may be unable to get anyone to speak in favour of the Bill, but they should think again, accept the amendments and new clauses, and bring some light to bear on this rather murky issue.
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
The treaty that the Bill will implement is shocking for so many reasons: the security implications, the staggering costs, and the voices that it has ignored—the voices of British Chagossians. Their views and concerns are many and varied. I had the privilege of meeting members of the community when they came to Parliament, while the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), met British Chagossians only once, and that was on the very day that the treaty was signed—far too late for their voices to have any influence. They are rightly frustrated that they have been excluded from negotiations and denied meaningful engagement. It is painfully clear that their voices were not considered; if they had been, the treaty might have placed their rights at its very centre.
Instead, article 6 gives Mauritius the freedom to resettle Chagossians, but not the duty to do so. After half a century of waiting for it, their right of return is left entirely at the discretion of a foreign Government. Under article 11, despite the billions of pounds that the Bill will transfer to Mauritius, only a fraction—in the form of a trust fund—is intended for Chagossians. Even then, it will be administered solely by Mauritius, with no guarantee that British Chagossians will have any say in how it is spent.
The treaty says that the UK and Mauritius want to
“recognise the wrongs of the past”,
but how can we recognise a wrong if we refuse to listen to those who suffered it? New clause 7, tabled by the shadow Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), is vital because it would require the Government to listen to and consult the Chagossian community here in the UK, and to report back on how their rights are being upheld. That would give British Chagossians the voice that they have been denied again and again.
Another vital issue is the risk that the Bill poses to one of the most precious marine environments on earth. The waters around the Chagos Islands form one of the world’s largest and most pristine marine protected areas. As we have heard, it is a haven of biodiversity, untouched by industrial fishing since 2010. Yet the treaty places that fragile ecosystem in jeopardy. Mauritius has promised to establish a new marine protected area, but it lacks the capacity to enforce it. It has no navy, and its coastguard of nine vessels is already stretched by patrolling waters thousands of miles away. By contrast, the UK has spent over £1.2 million since 2022 on monitoring and protecting those seas, developing world-leading expertise in remote enforcement through ships, sensors and satellite imagery.
Illegal fishing is already rife across the Indian ocean. China’s distant-water fleet is the largest in the world and the worst global offender for illegal fishing, according to the illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing index. What confidence can we have that Mauritius—a close ally of China—will be able or willing to resist such pressure and protect these fragile waters?
Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)
Is my hon. Friend aware that Mauritius does not have a navy?
Aphra Brandreth
My hon. Friend makes an important point. It has no navy and only nine coastguard vessels; it is not able to protect those waters.
Even if illegal fishing were controlled, the Mauritian Fisheries Minister has already spoken of wanting to issue fishing licences around the Chagos Islands. The agreement provides no guarantees; the extent of future protections will be decided only after the Bill has passed. New clauses 3 and 4 are essential to ensure parliamentary oversight of any future agreement and regular reporting on coral health, fish stocks and biodiversity.
As it stands, the Bill would hand billions of pounds of UK taxpayers’ money to Mauritius, with no guarantees of protection of the marine environment, no provisions to safeguard the rights of British Chagossians, and no mechanism for Britain to monitor whether the safeguards around the strategic military base on Diego Garcia are effective. The Conservative amendments offer a chance for the Government to be transparent, publish the legal advice on which they surrendered the Chagos Islands, and give the House a vote on the payment of £35 billion to Mauritius. The treaty is damaging in so many ways, but let us not make the damage worse by waving it through unchecked.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
Since this House first learned of the disastrous terms of the Chagos surrender deal, there has been significant focus on the spiralling cost and on the defence and security implications—we have heard many such arguments today. The Government’s weakness has compromised our national security. They are surrendering British territory to an ally of China and paying £35 billion—or perhaps as much as £50 billion—for the privilege. Their failure to defend the British national interest is shameful.
Equally shameful is the Government’s failure to consider the impact that the deal will have on environmental protections for marine areas. Members from across the House have reflected on that today, but it is a shame that so few Labour Members came to stand up for our environmental protections in the Indian Ocean Territories. I will address the importance of new clauses 3 and 4, two sensible amendments tabled by the shadow Foreign Secretary to strengthen oversight of the marine protected area.
The region of the Indian ocean that hosts the unique and remarkable Chagos Islands is of critical importance to wildlife. The archipelago is a biodiversity hotspot. The 640,000 sq km marine protected area, which has been monitored by the UK for the past 15 years, has kept the surrounding waters in near-pristine condition. The coral reefs in the untouched marine protected area are some of the healthiest in the world. They are a sanctuary for marine life, including endangered species such as hawksbill turtles, green turtles and reef sharks, and they are located along hugely significant migratory routes for species of tuna, whales and seabirds. The remarkable resilience of the reefs to coral bleaching events also makes them highly significant for scientific research to better understand resilience to changing climates.
Peter Prinsley
Like me, the hon. Member is a new Member, so I am puzzled: why does he consider that his party started these negotiations, if the whole thing is such a terrible idea?
Blake Stephenson
There is a difference between talking with other countries and doing a deal. I know that those on the Opposition Front Bench who formed part of the previous Government were not going to do this deal. They may have been talking, but as we have heard, there was going to be no agreement. I thank the hon. Member for his intervention and reflecting that I was not part of the previous Government, but he knows full well that this agreement would not have been made under these terms if the Conservatives were in government now.
The marine protected area is one of the largest untouched marine ecosystems, and it is globally significant. As such, instead of heedlessly driving this hopeless surrender deal through Parliament, the Government should have been ensuring that protections for wildlife and the marine environment were watertight. When answering questions before the Foreign Affairs Committee in June, the Minister would not give any clear assurances or guarantees on the future of the marine protected area. Within his obfuscation about separate agreements with Mauritius, which hope we can “share objectives and values”, he admitted that we can only
“take it on trust that there will be a Marine Protected Area”
after sovereignty has been surrendered.
We absolutely do not need to take that on trust. The Government have failed to secure any meaningful safeguards or guarantees, and are instead hoping—merely hoping—that a memorandum of understanding will somehow protect that pristine ecosystem. How on earth can we have any confidence in that at all?
A simple change of Government in Mauritius, or even just a change of heart, would render the UK powerless to stop Chinese trawlers turning up and devastating the marine environment. Given the evidence of China plundering the high seas, for example in the south Atlantic, just outside the Falkland Islands zone of economic interest, it absolutely will do the same in that territory.
Sammy Wilson
The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful point about the marine environment in the area, but does he accept that we do not even need a change of heart by Mauritius? We do not need it to decide that the treaty was not worthwhile—it does not have the ability to give the protection. Even if there was no change of heart, there is no ability to give such protection, which is why this is a bad deal for the environment.
Blake Stephenson
I absolutely agree, and I note that the right hon. Gentleman and I are the only Members in the Chamber from the Environmental Audit Committee, which I think is a damning indictment on those Members in this House who are here to protect our environment and hold the Government to account on environmental protections.
Will the Minister now explain what will happen to the MPA in future, and say whether the Government will commit resources to support the protection of the MPA? If so, where will those resources come from? With the fisheries Minister of Mauritius talking of issuing fishing and trawler licences, it is more important than ever that we have lasting confidence in marine protections before British territory is surrendered to Mauritius. When the Minister sums up the debate, will he say whether he shares my concerns over new fishing and trawler licences?
New clause 3 would require that any written instrument on the establishment and management of the marine protected area be subject to the approval of this House to ensure that it is fit for purpose. Will the Minister say what progress has been made with developing the “separate…instrument”, referenced in article 5.2 of the treaty? Will it be in place before Mauritius assumes sovereignty? Any agreement on the Chagos MPA must be scrutinised like a treaty and presented to Parliament.
New clause 4 would require the Secretary of State regularly to report on the status of the marine protected area. Reports from Committees in the Lords have raised concerns about Mauritius’s track record on environmental protections. Does the Minister agree with those concerns, and therefore agree that the ecological status of this extraordinary environment must remain on the British Government’s agenda, and will he reflect on that in his summing up of the debate? Will he now accept that, as well as costing British taxpayers £35 billion, betraying British Chagossians and undermining our security, without better protections secured in the treaty, the Government’s Chagos surrender deal will harm the marine environment? All of this at a time when the Government argued that the state of public finances required tough choices—choices that punished pensioners, family farmers, and taxed education for the very first time.
The annual cost of the surrender of the Chagos islands could pay for 3,068 new teachers, 3,253 new nurses or 1,975 police officers. In the first year, the money paid to Mauritius could deliver a new GP surgery in 30 communities —communities such as Wixams and Wootton in my constituency of Mid Bedfordshire, which are still waiting for improved access to local healthcare. This was all a choice—a choice to prioritise ideological surrender over our communities, over our security, and over marine protections. It is shameful, and I encourage hon. Members across the House to support new clauses 3 and 4.
Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Reform)
I speak in support of new clause 1, which would ensure that this House had a vote before any money was paid to the Government of Mauritius under the treaty. I support the new clause because it demonstrates the important principle of this House asserting its rightful role as the guardian of both public money and British sovereignty. The privileges of this House have been serially insulted in the debates we have had today, which I want to mention quickly. With this new treaty we see the height of what we saw earlier: a dereliction of the responsibilities of this House and the Government. Earlier, in the urgent question on the China spy case, we heard that politicians should not be consulted—
The Second Deputy Chairman
Order. The hon. Gentleman will keep within the scope of this Bill, and not seek to rehash urgent questions held earlier.
Danny Kruger
I understand, Madam Chairman, and of course you are quite right. The point I was making is that there has never been a Government who are so reluctant to govern as the one we have today. We have heard from hon. Members how baffling the decision is to surrender the Chagos islands. The only rational reason that could account for it is some kind of secret deal with China. I do not know if that is the case. The Government’s obeisance to international law might well trump national sovereignty, and in fact there is no rational calculation behind this decision except that of submission to their ideas of international law.
Stephen Doughty
Again, I have to take serious issue with what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting. If what he is suggesting is true, why do the United States, our Five Eyes partners, and other key allies support this deal? It protects our national security, and it secures the base on Diego Garcia. Why would they support it? There is no secret deal—this is absolute nonsense.
Danny Kruger
I am grateful to the Minister. I suspect there has been a private conversation with the American Government as well, and that in recognition of the fait accompli that this Government have yielded to Mauritius, the Americans have extended this somewhat limited statement of support for the deal as some kind of favour to the Prime Minister, in exchange for support he has given them on other matters. The fact is that this deal is bad for Britain and bad for Britain’s sovereignty, and behind the scenes we know that the Americans do not support it.
I want to talk about secret deals, because my only addition to the debate—very powerful points have been made already—is to say that secret deals have been done with respect to the Chagos islands in the past. Under the 30-year rule, archival evidence has come out recently of a secret deal with respect to the base at Diego Garcia between the British Government of the day—the Thatcher Government—and the American Administration. That deal was done in the national interest. The renewal of the nuclear deterrent—the Trident programme—was being set up, and there was an agreement with the Americans whereby they could expand their access and the use of Diego Garcia in exchange for a reduction in the fee, essentially, that the British Government were charged for collaboration on the Trident programme. We had to pay significantly less than we would have paid otherwise because of the expanded access that we were giving to the Americans in those years. It was called the Diego-Trident package in the negotiations and the correspondence between the British and the Americans at that time. It was kept quiet for understandable reasons, and we only know about it now. I worry that there is a similar lack of transparency around this deal because, as I say, it cannot possibly be a deal that is in the national interest.
Graham Stuart
We are trying to get to the bottom of precisely why the Labour Government would make this deal. The hundreds of people who worked at the Vivergo plant in my constituency were sold out by the Prime Minister who, in a personal call with the President of the United States, surrendered the entire bioethanol market of this country to the United States, with nothing in return, at the end of an already concluded trade deal negotiation. It is things like that that make us worry what is behind this Bill, what is the secret deal and exactly who has been sold out.
Danny Kruger
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The key demand that this House is making is for greater transparency about what is going on behind the scenes with this deal. I implore the House to insist that, before Parliament accepts any new arrangements for the sovereignty of the Chagos islands, Ministers explain what is going on. Specifically, is the Minister aware of any effect on our nuclear posture? Is there any relationship between the deal that is being done today and implications for our deterrent? The base is vital to our national interest, and I would be grateful to understand whether any discussions have been had with reference to the deals that were done many years ago about the relationship with the nuclear deterrent.
Dr Luke Evans
I will speak to the amendments, starting with amendments 1 and 7, and take a canter through my position, as my constituents will have an interest in that.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart) asked the important question why. Amendments 1 and 7 try to address the most important issue: context. As my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) pointed out, our signing this deal does not make sense. The Government have been weak in presenting the evidence for why they think we should sign the deal. I wrote to the Government to ask them to explain, and I was able to pull their response apart on Second Reading, one step at a time, explaining why their reasons do not fit.
Context is really important. I thought that the deal did not make sense, but factoring in the collapsed spy trial, the billion pounds provided to the steel factories, the pending decision on the embassy—yes, maybe no—and the change in the language used around the subject of China, we need to get to the heart of what is going on. The amendments are an attempt to do that in the name of transparency, which is hugely important.
Blake Stephenson
Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government are treating China like it is our friend, rather than the threat that it is?
Dr Evans
I would be interested to hear an answer to that, as we have tried several times to get the Government to quantify whether China is a threat, a friend, an ally or a foe.
Amendment 7 tries to look at
“an analysis of the status of UK’s sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory under international law;”.
From talking about this previously, we know that UNCLOS, which is often used as the example of why we have to secede the territory, cannot preside over sovereignty, as was said in 2015 when dealing with the marine protected area. We have also heard the Government stress the importance of the International Telecommunications Union, saying that the issue is to do with spectre and spies. However, we know that there is a carve-out, because we heard about that on Second Reading.
That leaves us with the International Court of Justice, which is often held up as the key point. On Second Reading, I was taken by the fact that it is alleged that we have an opt-out under the Commonwealth, so I went away to have a quick look. On the ICJ website, as hon. Members can see, the “Declarations recognising the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory—United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” were published on 22 February 2017. I quote:
“1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland accepts as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, ln conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after 1 January 1987, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date, other than:”—
these are critical points—
“(i) any dispute which the United Kingdom has agreed with the other Party or Parties thereto to settle by some other method of peaceful settlement; (ii) any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth;”.
That is there in black and white.
However, the Government have yet to mention that in any of debates or letters about their legal position. We need amendments 1 and 7 to be able to understand why the Government do not see that as a strong enough argument to hold up. This nonsense about whether or not there are negotiations is answered there too, because those declarations say:
“any method of peaceful settlement”.
Any good Government would try to resolve the dispute in a peaceful manner.
I am surprised at that from a Labour party whose Members pride themselves on being trade unionists, who make a living from negotiating and trying to come to a solution without the matter going to a court. That is exactly what they should be doing, but the Conservatives are being chastised for trying to have a conversation to resolve the situation. The fact was that we did not come up with a deal because the deal was not good enough.
The Labour Opposition moved into power and have now put forward this horrendous Bill that gives away power, but at what cost? They are not even going to try in court or use some of the simple arguments which I, as a doctor, have found after spending time researching. I am sure that in this great country we have many legal buffs that could put forward that argument, but if the government do not feel that it stands, they should come to this House and tell us why—put it in evidence, write it out and tell us all, and we will go quietly. However, we are not hearing or seeing that from this Government, which is why we need amendments 1 and 7.
Turning to amendments 3, 4 and 6, as has been rightly pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Beverley and Holderness it is clear that the Bill gives carte blanche to this Government, or any other, to do whatever they want. We may as well not even bother having a debate about the Bill—it is not worth the paper it is written on—because the Henry VIII powers mean that Ministers can do what they will, when they will without coming to Parliament. At least these amendments try to ensure some accountability of the Executive to this House, because this House should be making these decisions, especially given their magnitude. We have heard from the Government that it is a priceless base and we have heard from the Conservative Benches about its geopolitical and security importance. Should the House not be making decisions about what that looks like?
New clause 1 talks about the payments. On Second Reading, I asked the Minister whether he could give me any example, from any part of the world, of when we have dealt with sovereignty using net present value. He said it was in the Green Book, but that is for domestic sites and used by the Treasury to look at civil development. I hope the Minister has gone away and done some research, because I think he will find that there is not a precedent, as net present value is not the correct measure and is open to political interference. For example, we use 3.5% and America uses 7%. We can fudge the numbers to fit the narrative that we would like to set.
There is one other problem. The explanatory notes stipulate only 30 years. Unless I have misquoted, this deal goes for 99 years, so what happens in the remaining 70 years? That is why new clause 1 would bring in a robust check to ensure that when the finances are paid out, we know exactly why we are paying, who we are paying and what we are paying for. Most importantly, we would know the mechanism of how the finances were calculated, because the Government still have not come to this place and set that out exactly.
Let me turn to new clause 2. What happens at the end? I raised that as my final point when I spoke on Second Reading. We have heard about long-term security, but in this place we think only on a five-year cycle; this is a 99-year cycle. My biggest fear is that my children’s children’s children, if they are ever elected to this Parliament, will be having a debate in 99 years with the same issues about what happens. It is a dereliction of duty on our behalf in this House not to think things through.
Sir Julian Lewis
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. I am surprised that nobody has referred to Hong Kong. When the decision was taken and the agreement was reached in 1984 for the handover in 1997, China agreed that it would be “one country, two systems” for at least 50 years. Within less than half that time, Britain came to the conclusion that all those safeguards were being deliberately violated.
Dr Evans
As ever, my learned right hon. Friend has pipped me to the punch. That is exactly a good example of the kind of sites we are worried about. What has that meant? We have taken on British nationals overseas and invited them in to give them security, because they feared for political interference and, worse still, for the safety of themselves and their families.
We are not doing our duties if we are not thinking about these things, because, as we have already seen, it is hard enough to predict things in two or three years’ time, let alone 100 years. At that point, as it is written, we will get the best offer, but it will be only offered to us. We could be outstripped by China, Russia or a BRIC country in the future—we do not know; it is 100 years away—and there is no mechanism to solve that. Worse still, Mauritius could simply say, “We do not want a base here at all,” and there is nothing in this Bill that would stop that. The Government repeatedly have been asked those questions, and they cannot set that out. That is why new clause 2 asks for those impacts to be considered and looked at.
New clause 3 would move the marine protected area. I will return to a point I made earlier. The fact is that when Britain and the United Kingdom were taken under UNCLOS in 2010 by Mauritius under annex VII, we wanted to implement protections in the area. Mauritius felt that that impeded on its ability to make its own decisions, which the court found in favour of, and it also wanted to fish in the area. Hang on a second! We are putting weaknesses into this Bill when we know that Mauritius has set its intent. I hope it has moved on, as the debate on climate has, but this new clause would be a guarantee to ensure that that has been thought about.
Let me turn to new clause 5. I appreciate the Minister stepping up, because there has already been debate about the Peros Banhos islands, and he has said there are no concerns that they will be leased to China. Let us be real: this Bill has only just come out—the ink is barely dry—and we already hear stories. Many journalists have already talked about this issue. Maybe I am wrong, but that shows the examples of what could and will come without paying attention to the security and the geopolitical and strategic advantage that these islands have, which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson) talked about. All new clause 5 asks us to do is ensure that that is reported on and looked at. Again, there is a dereliction of duty by not having that reported.
I could go on, because there are many more amendments, but the salient points in this debate have been made. All the amendments tabled in the names of Conservatives— and, to be fair, in the names of Members of many other Opposition parties—ask for one simple thing: transparency and explanation. They ask for a simple way of seeing what the legal advice does and where the financial outcome comes.
Dr Evans
The Minister is nodding along, but there must be something wrong if the public and Opposition Members cannot simply understand the arguments for what is being put in place. We cannot see the wood for the trees. It is a Government’s duty to show those arguments, and I look forward to the Minister doing that in his response and putting these arguments to bed once and for all. Otherwise, the British public will not forgive him.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
I will primarily focus on new clause 8, which is in my name and the names of colleagues. First and foremost, this Bill is about perfecting the decolonisation of the British Indian Ocean Territory—that is self-evident in clause 2—but it does that in a way that ignores a primary component of decolonisation. We subscribe to United Nations resolution 1514. That resolution talks about respecting not only the integrity of territory, but self-determination. The British Indian Ocean Territory has existed, de facto and de jure, for over 50 years, yet the Government’s approach in justifying this completion of decolonisation is to focus solely on territorial integrity by claiming that the Chagos islands are, in fact, part of Mauritius.
Resolution 1514 contains a number of components. Its first point is that
“The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights”.
Its second point is that
“All peoples have the right to self-determination”.
The question for this House is surely this: are the Chagossians a people? I certainly think that they are. They are distinct from the Mauritians by their ethnic background, by their religion and by geography. Mauritius and the Chagos islands are over 1,300 miles apart, approximately as far as it is from this House to north Africa, so after 50 years of the existence of the BIOT, it really is a stretch to say that the sole defining issue is that of territorial integrity. To say that is to ignore the right to self-determination.
This nation has dealt with decolonisation before, and we did not approach it on the basis that it is only about territorial integrity. Take the example of India. We decolonised in India, but we allowed it to be subject to self-determination—that is why we have India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is quite clear that this is not a situation in which territorial integrity trumps everything else. It does not trump self-determination. An experience of decolonisation such as India’s shows that territorial integrity is secondary to self-determination, yet the right of the people who claim the Chagos islands as their homeland to any measure of self-determination is the one thing that has been utterly ignored in this process. We have in our history the shameful episode of their forceful removal from the Chagos islands, and now under this treaty, we are going to compound that shame by legitimising that removal. Saying that this is only about territorial integrity is to legitimise their forceful removal from the Chagos islands—that is how we get around the question of self-determination. That is wrong. The people of the Chagos islands are a people. They are a people with a homeland; therefore, under international law, they are a people with a right to self-determination, so why do this treaty and this Bill trash that right? That is the fundamental haunting question when it comes to the humanity and international legal requirements of the situation that prevails.
The Government are obviously holding to the line, “It is only about territorial integrity,” but they are hoisted by their own petard, because they have recognised the Chagossians as a people by setting aside some millions of pounds for them. They cannot say it is only about territorial integrity, and there is no people to whom to give the right to self-determination, and then say, “For those people to whom we deny the right to self-determination, here is some conscience money.” They cannot do that, yet that is what the treaty does.
The BIOT recognised the separateness of the people of the Chagos islands, and even the much-vaunted advisory judgment of the International Court of Justice gives respect and acknowledgment—to an extent—to the question of self-determination. At one point, the judgment states:
“It follows that any detachment by the administering Power of part of a non-self-governing territory, unless based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned, is contrary to the right to self-determination.”
Even that advisory judgment recognised the exception of the freely expressed and genuine will of the people, but that is what we have not had on this issue. This Government have gone out of their way to deny the free and genuine expression of opinion by the people whose homeland is the Chagos islands. That shameful indictment compounds what we did to those people at the end of the 1960s. The Government now totally dehumanise their human rights by saying, “You have no rights whatever when it comes to self-determination.” That is fundamentally wrong.
If the splitting of that wider colony in 1965 was illegitimate because there was no self-determination, according to the advisory judgment of the Court, then equally the Chagos islands rejoining Mauritius without self-determination is illegitimate. The Government cannot have it both ways, but that is what this Bill is seeking to do. The Government say that because it was illegitimate to split the Chagos islands off from Mauritius in 1965 because there was no self-determination, the Bill is about territorial integrity only, but if the basis of rejoining the Chagos islands to Mauritius is without self-determination, then that equally is illegitimate. Those are some of the points that this Government have not faced, and if they have faced them, they have not answered them. This House is legitimately asking those questions tonight, and waiting for answers. If those answers do not come, it will illustrate how this is the tawdry, unacceptable and unenforceable Bill that it will ultimately be seen to be.
Jerome Mayhew
The Minister will try his best in a few minutes to defend this wholly indefensible Bill, but the public know what it is: they see it as an absolute sell-out. I suspect that the Government Members who are not filling the green Benches see it as a sell-out, too. That is why every single one of them failed to support the Bill in Committee, save for one brave or perhaps misguided Member.
The public can see that they are a weak Government without the backbone necessary to stand up for the British public’s interests. They see this Bill as the sell-out that it is geopolitically, with the Government blind to the associated security risks, the sell-out that it is financially, with £35 billion going to a foreign Government, and the sell-out that it is of the Chagossian people, with their exclusion from negotiations.
Graham Stuart
We are all wrestling with the question “Why?” As my hon. Friend has said, the Government’s position was clear in 2017: namely, that the ICJ had no power over a deal we made with a Commonwealth member. Perhaps this Prime Minister has, without telling us, reversed that in some way, and the Government have decided that this should be subject to the ICJ, in which case the Minister would have a point, but should we not know that we made ourselves subject to the ICJ when previously we were not? What other answers are there?
Jerome Mayhew
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to ask those questions—questions that have been asked of the Government time and again throughout this legislative process, but to which we simply have not had an answer.
The Government seem to be blind to the risk of the craven withdrawal of influence from the Indo-Pacific region. This is more Jonathan Powell. He was, of course, the Prime Minister’s envoy, and the architect of the negotiation and the deal. The more I learn of Jonathan Powell, the more I realise that he seems to have a long-term instinct to downplay the threat from China—a threat in the Indian Ocean through this negotiated deal. Let us not forget that this is the same Jonathan Powell who now wears a different hat. He is now the National Security Adviser, and that, very unusually, was a political appointment. There is the question of his involvement—or perhaps it is not his involvement— in the collapse of the Chinese spying case. We are asked to believe that he was not involved in it, and that seems baffling as well.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. I do not think we need this chuntering from the Front Bench. Can we ensure that the speech remains within the legislation that we are debating and voting on tonight?
Jerome Mayhew
I will endeavour to do so, Madam Chair. In fact, I will more than endeavour; I will do so.
The reason this is relevant is that it speaks to new clause 5. While the Government have their head in the sand in respect of Mauritius’s relations with China—this is why it is important, Madam Chair—their first argument is that Mauritius will not be influenced by China, and is it not awful of us to suggest that it might be. I raised this question with the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), back in October last year. I raised concerns that Mauritius was an ally of China and was open to influence from that country. With the disdain for which he is now famous, the right hon. Gentleman pooh-poohed that. He said that Mauritius was not a Chinese ally because it was not part of the belt and road agreement in Africa.
When we look at the relationship between China and Mauritius, however, we see that they have strong bilateral ties that go back to 1972, on economic co-operation and diplomatic support. China is the largest trading partner of Mauritius, which entered into a free trade agreement with China—the first such free trade agreement that China has entered into on the African continent. Perhaps it did not need to belong to the belt and road agreement in addition to its free trade agreement.
There is influence expressed through investments, loans and grants. China built the international airport terminal for Mauritius. It has invested in the Jinfei economic and trade co-operation zone—a flagship belt and road initiative—and between 2000 and 2012 China also funded 47 development projects in Mauritius through loans and grants. So forgive me, Madam Chair, if I do not swallow the argument that Mauritius is wholly beyond the influence of China.
The Government say, “If Mauritius is under the influence of China, don’t worry, because China don’t support this deal. China will be arguing against this deal.” We were told by the Prime Minister that China, Russia and Iran do not support the Chagos deal. Therefore, presumably my geopolitical security fears must be wrong. Well, Ministers have repeatedly been asked for the evidence that China does not support this deal, and none has been provided to date. If I am wrong on that, perhaps the Minister will say from the Dispatch Box where China has expressed its concerns about this deal.
If you were to listen to the Chinese ambassador to Mauritius, even you, Madam Chair, would be forgiven for thinking that China is thoroughly in favour of this deal, because he sent “massive congratulations” to Mauritius and said that China “fully supports” Mauritius’s attempt to “safeguard national security.” That is the definition of doublespeak if it does not mean that China is wholly in favour of this deal and is celebrating it with Mauritius. I am not convinced, and neither are the Government.
Mike Kane
I am fond of the hon. Gentleman, who speaks of “doublespeak”. It was not long ago in my political lifetime that the former Member for Witney, the then Prime Minister, invited His Excellency Xi Jinping for a pint in The Plough at Cadsden, in Oxfordshire. As he departed back to China from the airport in my constituency, I sat with the Prime Minister as he fawned over the Chinese Administration like it was some papal visit. What is going on with the Conservatives? Are you divided on what our approach to China should be?
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. Mr Kane, do not use the word “you”, because that refers to me.
Jerome Mayhew
I am not often compared to the noble Lord Cameron, but it is absolutely right that as the geopolitical environment changes, so should our policies. We on this side of the House are realists.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
As I was in government at the time, I can answer the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Mike Kane): the golden decade proposed by the then Chancellor, with whom I did not get on very well, was a disaster. If anything should have been learned by that, his Government should have learned that when you sup with the Chinese, you better have a very long spoon, because they suck you in. We got nothing out of those 10 years, and now look at us.
The Chairman
Order. Mr Mayhew and colleagues who hope to intervene, let us remember the scope of the debate in front of us.
Jerome Mayhew
It is for exactly those reasons that we so desperately need new clause 5, which would require an annual security report to the Intelligence and Security Committee. That would mean that we are not caught with our heads in the sand again.
We are beginning to build a picture of a slippery Government who are not being honest with the British people, not being honest about the legal justifications for this deal and not being honest about the security risk associated with the deal, and who are now being slippery about the financial cost as well. Again, the Prime Minister himself said that this slippery deal was going to cost the taxpayer £101 million a year for 99 years. He rounded that down from £10 billion, which my maths would have come to, to £3.4 billion. Through a freedom of information request, the Government Actuary’s Department has confirmed that the actual cost is £34.7 billion. Did the Prime Minister just get the decimal point in the wrong place, or was it something more sinister?
Madam Chair, you could be forgiven for thinking that the Government should no longer be trusted. They are changing their story in relation to this agreement, and they changed their story in relation to the China spy trial collapse. We need new clause 1 so that no payments can be made without direct approval from the House of Commons. At least then the Government would have to explain the real figures and be open to transparency and scrutiny.
The public see through Labour’s deal, and they know a sell-out when they see one. The Opposition amendments and new clauses bring transparency to expose this sell-out from a weak Prime Minister without the backbone to stand up for Britain. No wonder Labour Members are about to vote against them.
Jeremy Corbyn
I will be brief, but I am very pleased to be able to speak in this debate as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on the Chagos islands, which last week had its 103rd meeting. It has been ably supported by David Snoxell, the former British high commissioner to Mauritius, who has done incredible work with his knowledge of and empathy for the Chagossian people. There are two former chairs of the group in the Committee at the moment—the hon. Members for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) and for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Mike Kane)—and the former Member for Crawley was also chair of the group at one time.
We founded that group a long time ago to listen to, and take action in support of, the Chagos islanders, who were angry that they had been forcibly removed from their homes, angry at the way they had been treated by successive British Governments, and very angry at the initial decision that was taken and the sheer brutality that went with it. To give Members a brief example, in 1973 a 20-year-old Chagossian woman, Liseby Elysé, while carrying her unborn child, was forcibly removed from the Chagos island of Peros Banhos. She lost her unborn child soon after her traumatic upheaval and the journey, and she and her husband survived with considerable uncertainty and in very precarious living conditions, like all other Chagossians. However, 45 years later, in 2018, she represented her community at The Hague when she spoke about her life and her losses. Her story was compelling and memorable, like those of so many other Chagos islanders, because of the personal horror, trauma and abuse that they suffered. They have always demanded and fought for their right of return, and that is the central core of what the all-party parliamentary group on the Chagos islands has done.
I realise there are now different opinions in the group about the sovereignty or otherwise of the islands, but there has always been a fundamental agreement on the right of return. That led to massive legal actions, which were bravely fought by the Chagos islanders with very little support. There were a few people such as Richard Gifford, their solicitor, who were fantastic in their support. Eventually, we gathered wider support, and we got favourable decisions at all levels of justice around the world, including at the United Nations General Assembly.
It is worth recalling, as many Members have done, the 1965 decision made by Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister. In offering Mauritius its independence, he came to this extraordinarily complicated deal, which essentially involved the United States getting a base on Diego Garcia and, in return, Mauritius getting its independence. Somewhere along the line, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire (Danny Kruger) pointed out, there would either be a discount on the next generation of nuclear weapons, or free delivery of weapons at some point in the future. A lot of this was shrouded in mystery, in the private conversations between Wilson and Prime Minister Ramgoolam at the time, so there is a lot of confusion surrounding that.
Somewhere at that time the idea was to set up the British Indian Ocean Territory, and somewhere at that time the decision was made that the archipelago—including Peros Banhos, which is a considerable distance from Diego Garcia—would be separated from Mauritius as well and that it would have to be depopulated, hence the utter brutality of the removal of the entire population from the islands. So the question that many Members have brought up is this: should the Chagos islands be separate from Mauritius or part of Mauritius? Interestingly, during the 1965 discussions Mauritius never accepted the separation. It never accepted that the Chagos islands should be separated either constitutionally or in any other way from Mauritius. As we know, the decision was basically forced on the Mauritians in return for their independence.
We now have a situation in which we have finally got a treaty. It has its imperfections—of that everyone is agreed. Personally, I am less than happy about the idea of a massive military base on Diego Garcia, and even less happy that it might be there in 100 years’ time. However, a treaty has been agreed that will ensure the right of Chagos islanders to return to the Chagos islands, but unfortunately only a limited right of return to Diego Garcia itself. I am looking forward to the Minister’s speech, and I would be grateful if was able to say a bit more about the rights of access to Diego Garcia for Chagos islanders, their right to visit the church and the graves of their ancestors, and whether there is some possibility of a degree of residence on Diego Garcia. There is no other place in the world where a military base is surrounded by an entirely depopulated area, in this case an island, and I would be grateful if the Minister was able to say something about that.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
For no apparent reason, and in a crowded field, the Government have chosen the Chagos islands as one of the many hills they wish to die on. The surrender of the sovereignty of the Chagos islands has been a puzzling mis-step for months, with today’s votes the culmination of it.
There was a clumsy rush to try to force the deal through, first before the elections in Mauritius and then before the US elections, and there now appears to be an attempt to salvage some dignity, having seemingly surrendered
“meekly to a Mauritian shakedown”,
as my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) has put it, while trying to upsell the deal to a US Government that publicly backs it, given that it will not cost them a penny, but privately must have concerns over the impact of allowing Chinese encroachment in the region. With recent developments shifting the focus of US foreign policy to the Indo-Pacific, the Chagos islands deal surely takes on greater significance. The base is now more important to US policy, not less.
Last December, the previous Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), who is in his place, announced that the deal
“secures the future of the UK-US base on Diego Garcia”,
and said that
“when everyone looks at the detail of the deal, they will back it”.—[Official Report, 2 December 2024; Vol. 758, c. 28.]
Indeed, the Minister for the Overseas Territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) confirmed to me that
“There has been no change to the substance of the deal”.—[Official Report, 5 February 2025; Vol. 761, c. 764.]
That is strange, because the new Prime Minister of Mauritius, Navin Ramgoolam, described the deal struck with the previous Mauritian Government as a “sell-out”, stating that the deal should be indexed to inflation, take exchange rates into account and fully recognise Mauritius’s ownership of the islands, which could affect the UK’s unilateral right to renew the lease. That was in mid-January. Less than a fortnight later, the Minister confirmed to me in a written answer that the UK would not have the unilateral ability to extend the agreement at the end of the lease. What changes were made to the original deal during discussions with the Government of Mauritius, and why have the Government gone on record as saying that the deal has not changed, in direct contradiction with the statements of the Prime Minister of Mauritius? Surely the Minister for the Overseas Territories is not suggesting that Prime Minister Ramgoolam is mistaken.
In January, when I asked the Prime Minister whether he had ever discussed the Chagos islands with Philippe Sands KC, his answer was a brusque, “No.” Brevity is key when trying not to give too much away. Philippe Sands has represented Mauritius at the International Court of Justice in multiple disputes over the Chagos islands. In 2022, Mr Sands published “The Last Colony: A Tale of Exile, Justice and Britain’s Colonial Legacy” about Chagos. It is worth highlighting that Philippe Sands and the Prime Minister have apparently been very good friends for several years; they even interviewed one another at the Hay festival.
Earlier this year, The Telegraph reported that the national security justification for surrendering the Chagos islands used by the Prime Minister came from Philippe Sands, who wrote about it in the 2023 book, “The International Legal Order in the 21st Century”. With Mr Sands apparently no longer representing Mauritius following the change in regime, it does make one wonder if that was the reason why there was such a rush to conclude the deal before the election, after which Mr Sands’ services were no longer required—did the Government lose their in?
I would be interested to know how the Government think the International Telecommunication Union would block our use of the electromagnetic spectrum. How would it block communications equipment on Diego Garcia without encroaching on our territory? What active blocking of electromagnetic frequencies is a UN agency capable of doing anyway? What steps would the ITU have taken to block the US military’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum had we not progressed this deal? The national security argument simply does not stack up.
New clause 6 would require the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the impact of UNCLOS on the operation of the treaty. The Government have previously stated that it is ITLOS that would pose the greatest threat to the operation of Diego Garcia. It was cited specifically by the Defence Secretary for the first—and only—time on 22 May, when he said:
“There are a range of international legal challenges and rulings against us. The most proximate, and the most potentially serious, is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.”—[Official Report, 22 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 1291.]
In July, the Minister for the Overseas Territories referred to ITLOS for the first time since he was a shadow Minister for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, when, in December 2022, he had stated that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
“did not have competence on territorial disputes”,
going on to say:
“It is a fact that China has made increasing encroachments into the territorial waters of its neighbours and vast claims in the South China sea while ignoring judgments against itself. That has been matched by a growing assertiveness, and even belligerence, towards some of our allies and partners in the region”.—[Official Report, 7 December 2022; Vol. 724, c. 162WH.]
He asked for assurances then. Now, nearly three years later, with a belligerent China flexing its naval muscle in the region and adopting a robust posture towards us over the delay to the decision on its London embassy and the obvious ongoing spy debacle, what assurances can the Government give the Committee that this opportunity will not be exploited by the Chinese Communist party?
As recently as August, the Mauritian Government referred to
“The strategic role of Mauritius as an investment gateway to Africa and a trusted partner for Chinese enterprises seeking to expand their footprint therein”.
Mauritius is committed to working closely with China—far closer, it would appear, than it is to working with us. Why are the Government prepared to embolden Chinese ambition in the Pacific? Why are they prepared to embolden Chinese spying in Parliament? Why are they prepared to allow the Chinese to build an embassy in London without absolute clarity on its structural plans? With all that in mind, why will the Government not include China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? The shadow of Jonathan Powell looms large over this deal, as it has over every aspect of the Government’s dealings with the Chinese Communist party.
Across the globe, we are seeing changes in the rules-based order. We must navigate this better. My fear, which is shared by all on the Conservative Benches, is that this capitulation shows no understanding of the changes we are facing. We need to ensure that this great nation stands up for safety, freedom and security across an increasingly dangerous world, and this opaque and furtive deal puts that at unacceptable risk.
Sammy Wilson
A deal of such implication, one would have thought, would have been hotly debated in this House, yet as has been pointed out, there has been no attempt to defend it by the Government. In fact, one could hardly call this a debate—it has all been one-sided. In a debate, people usually argue in favour of whatever the proposal happens to be and listen to and rebut the arguments from the other side. We have had no rebuttal from the other side—the Government—today, despite the fact that this is such an important deal.
For some people outside the House, this deal might seem to be an unimportant issue—where are the Chagos islands, and why do they matter? However, even if the attitude taken by Government Members is to say, “Our constituents are not all that interested in the issues around the Chagos islands,” there are issues with this deal that have been raised this evening that should concern them all.
Let us look at the issues, because they are addressed by the amendments. The first is human rights—the human rights of the people who were displaced in the 1960s and who are ignored in this deal. Their rights to self-determination and to decide where they live are being ignored, yet we are not getting any response from the Government—the party that talks about human rights all the time. They say that we cannot leave the European convention on human rights because human rights are so important, but they are ignoring the human rights of the people who are affected by this deal.
Sammy Wilson
Since we are going to have a debate, I will listen to the Minister.
Stephen Doughty
I thank the right hon. Member for giving way. He says that he wants a debate, and I have given a number of rebuttals. He mentions the Chagossians, whom I will come to in my concluding remarks. I respect what he has to say, but I point him to remarks from the Chagos Refugees Group, which said in its communiqué to all of us: “We urge all Members of Parliament to support the Bill at its final stages and deliver long overdue justice to all our people. Passing this Bill will mark a turning point and the moment when Parliament stands on the right side of history and begins to restore what was unjustly taken from us.” There are a range of views within the Chagossian community, and I think it is important that those are put on the record.
Sammy Wilson
Of course there are many who take a totally different point of view and whose wishes are not reflected in this Bill. The amendments that have been tabled to seek to remedy that situation are being ignored and opposed by the Government.
The second issue is the economy. On a regular basis, we hear how difficult the fiscal position is for this country—black holes we have to fill by taking money off pensioners, reducing benefits, cutting here and cutting there, and taxing people to the hilt. Yet when amendments are tabled that simply request transparency and the opportunity to look at the expenditure involved in this treaty, we hear no support from the Government. Either we are concerned about the fiscal position of this country or we are not. I would suggest that £35 billion—and rising—is a significant figure that we should be looking at.
Dr Luke Evans
The right hon. Member is making a powerful point. Is not part of the problem that we do not even know which budget the money is coming out of? That is the kind of simple question that the man or woman on the street would expect us to be able answer.
Sammy Wilson
We may not know which budget it is coming from, but we know whose pockets it is coming from: the pockets of taxpayers. To a certain extent it does not really matter, because all our constituents will pay for this deal. The Minister said that the Chagos islands were priceless, yet we are giving them away and giving away taxpayers’ money for them—and we do not even know how much we will be giving in the long run. I would have thought that some Government Members have concerns, if not about human rights then about the financial implications of the deal.
Especially at this time, national security is an important issue for every Member of the House, yet amendments that seek to ensure that there is scrutiny over what happens to these islands, who has influence in them and whether the treaty that has been entered into guarantees that our security will not be jeopardised are being refused. The Government are not even attacking the amendments or explaining their opposition.
Paul Holmes
Does the right hon. Member share my dismay that, despite a Government majority of over 170 and the fact that there are over 400 Government MPs, on an issue of national security only one Government Back Bencher spoke in this debate? Does he think that is an indication of how the Labour party views national security and an overseas territory being given away for nothing?
Sammy Wilson
I do. Since the hon. Member has given me the opportunity, I will make the point now—I was going to make it later on—that while no Government Members have been rushing to defend the Bill in the Committee, hundreds of them will be rushing through the Lobby at 10 o’clock or half-past 10 to vote for it. That is the worrying thing. Defence of it, there is none; support for it, despite the issues we have highlighted, there will be.
Sammy Wilson
I will in a minute, but let me finish this point. Yet here we have a Bill that does not give any long-term security to one of the pristine marine environments. Indeed, we are handing over responsibility for it to a Government who could not even get a boat to put a flag up, yet we are supposed to believe that they will be able to protect the marine environment if foreign countries attempt to destroy it by doing deep-sea trawling, bottom trawling and so on. I would have thought that the environmentalists on the Government Benches might at least have asked some questions about the treaty, or would have supported some of the amendments that seek to do that, yet we find that is not the case.
This is a bad Bill. It will have long-term implications for our country financially and it will have long-term implications for those people who felt that perhaps there was an opportunity for their rights to self-determination to be granted. They have not been. Of course, there are also dangers to our long-term security.
I will finish with this point. I have no doubt that the Minister will repeat the point he made. Sure, the Americans support it—as if the Americans always make good strategic decisions. They do not. Given the time tonight, I know that you would stop me, Madam Chairman, if I started going through some of the bad strategic decisions the Americans have made that we and the world have lived with and their consequences. Just because the Americans—for short-term gain or short-term interest—have supported the deal, let us not say it is okay. It is a bad deal. Amendments were made to try to improve the Bill. The shame is that those amendments were not debated. The Bill goes contrary to the beliefs of many Members on the Government Benches. Unfortunately, I suspect the Bill will go through with a huge majority.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
For the final Back-Bench contribution, I call Mr Jim Shannon. If people have contributed, they should make their way back to the Chamber. Danny Kruger, I am looking at you to whip your colleague.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
Thank you for allowing me to speak on this issue once again, Ms Ghani. I will prefix my comments with this. It is always good to see the Ministers—the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) and the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard)—in their place. They are both honourable men whose friendship I value. Being ever respectful, and with great respect to both hon. Gentlemen, I wish to make some comments that will be very contrary to what they have put forward today.
It will be no surprise that I rise at the last hour and as the last Back-Bench speaker—that is often the case, but none the less it is always a pleasure to make a contribution —to ask the Government again to reconsider their decision and ask the Committee to oppose the Bill, even though I know that the numbers game does not stack up.
As we all know, the treaty provides for Mauritius to exercise full sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, with the UK exercising rights on Diego Garcia during an initial 99-year period. Over those 99 years, the UK will pay Mauritius a total of around £3.4 billion in 2025-26 prices, and that will probably rise. At a time when the Government are taxing farmers, taxing widows’ pensions and taxing the middle class into oblivion, handing over £3.4 billion with a benefit that is not tangible is unacceptable. Our constituents will be worse off in the next financial year. Indeed, a typical British family are as much as £15,000 a year poorer than they were five years ago, according to recent Telegraph Money analysis. Why, then, have we entered into this agreement, which may fluctuate and cost substantially more than the figure that has been predicted?
I want to make it clear that I believe this treaty should be renegotiated from beginning to end, but if the Bill is to go ahead, it is essential that any increases in payments should come through this House, and that whatever Government are in place at that time should present that. I therefore support new clause 1, which would give certainty and security that increases would not take place without the approval of this House.
Turning to new clauses 2, 5 and 7, I have long stated that there are now substantial risks to our military bases, and that has been reiterated by every person bar one in the Committee today. I am anxious to understand our legal standing on this. I believe it is right and proper for the Committee to understand the nature of how renting from Mauritius will give us the safety and security needed to ensure that those stationed on the base, or relying on support from the base in that area, will not feel vulnerable or exposed. I believe that this deal does expose us, and that we need to be very much aware of our standing and take the necessary steps. That begins with having full knowledge and not simply empty assurances. The recent debacle with the Chinese spies decisions has shown that openness, transparency and accountability are needed even more tonight than they have been in the other statements and urgent questions today. New clause 2 would enforce that as a minimum.
New clause 9 is similar to new clause 8, tabled by the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) and my right hon. Friend the Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson). I support new clause 9, given its similarity to the new clause brought forward by my Northern Ireland colleagues, who are intimately aware of how issues on the ground can be vastly different from those that are reported. This addition to ensure that a report is made on the compliance of the treaty and the Act with the UN General Assembly resolutions on decolonisation is vital and, I believe, underlines the words of support that have been given to those in the area who are fearful of the removal of British influence and support and fearful of the Mauritian ideals, which were flagged by our American allies in their human rights report in 2023.
As the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on international freedom of religion or belief, I know that the two issues of human rights and persecution are married together as one, because when we highlight the issue of human rights, we also highlight the issue of persecution of religious beliefs, and vice versa. I really have to express some concerns over human rights in this context. I understand that the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth will reply to the debate. Although I believe he understands and believes in these issues as strongly as I do, I still have great concerns about human rights. It is essential that we do not simply hand over control and abandon not just the military base but all in the region who have relied on our support and friendship over the years.
Unfortunately, this has been a bad treaty from beginning to end. Our Chagossian citizens remain unhappy, our armed forces remain unhappy and the families who are footing the bill are unhappy. I believe that the Government have made the wrong decision on this. The recent Chinese debacle has heightened the need to continue to have boots on the ground and eyes wide open against those who would seek to thwart British interests and the interests of freedom and democracy worldwide. We have recently seen the result of appeasement when the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister highlighted the difficulties brought about by this Government’s decision to recognise terrorism and a Palestinian state with no borders, no working non-terrorist Government and no social care system. The handing over of Chagos and renting it back will prove to be a costly and dangerous exercise in capitulation, and even at this very late stage I urge the Government to think again and, at the very least, accept additional protection for the sake of all our collective security.
Stephen Doughty
I thank all hon. and right hon. Members for their contributions. I will attempt to respond to the specifics of the amendments and new clauses in due course, but I want to come back to some of the fundamental points that have been raised during the debate first, and I also want to respond to some of the specific questions that were raised.
With the exception of some genuine questions in relation to the Chagossians, the MPA and the environmental protections, and the implementation of this treaty, it was a shame to see the rehash of the same arguments that were made on Second Reading. There were some outrageous and nonsensical arguments and claims, particularly relating to the costs and to other matters, which I will come to.
I was shocked by some of the anti-American, conspiracy-fuelled nonsense that we heard at various points during the debate. The base is critical to the United Kingdom, the United States, our allies and our national security, and the Bill and the treaty protect the functioning of that base. It does not surrender it; it secures it into the future. This is a Government who inherited a mess from the former Ministers on the Opposition Benches. We are getting stuff done. We are a patriotic Government; our first duty is to protect the national security of this country, and that is why we have got this deal done. It is why it is backed by the United States. It is why it is backed by our Five Eyes partners. It is absolutely crucial to protect the British people and our allies.
We have been very transparent about the reasons for it, and they are the exact opposite of what has been suggested. I come back, as I always have done, to the fundamental question: if there were not a problem and a risk to the operations of this crucial base, why did the previous Government start the negotiations, why did they continue them through 11 rounds of negotiations, and why did they continue them right up until the general election? Those are the facts.
Stephen Doughty
I will happily take interventions, but first I want to respond to the points that have been made. This agreement has been backed by our key allies and international partners, including the US and our Five Eyes allies. India, Japan and South Korea have also made clear their strong support.
Many questions were asked about the robust security provisions that we have in place to protect the UK and the base for decades to come. The treaty and the Bill secure full operational control of Diego Garcia, a strict ban on foreign security forces across the archipelago and an effective veto on any activity that threatens the base on Diego Garcia. It has been welcomed by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Development Committee in the other place, which said that they
“were assured that the Agreement preserves the UK’s and the US’s freedom of action.”
The legal rationale has been referred to many times, but legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, for example, affecting our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia, and even if we did not comply, international organisations and other countries would. We have set out the legal rationale on a number of occasions. We have been very clear. We also published documents around it.
Stephen Doughty
I will respond to some points first. Hon. Members have had plenty of time to make their case. I have also responded to many of their points during the course of the debate, and I am going to respond to the questions.
China has been raised erroneously on many occasions, but we have negotiated robust security provisions to protect the UK and the base for decades to come, and that includes a strict ban on any foreign security forces, including the Chinese, across the archipelago.
The question of finances was raised by a number of Members, and indeed a number of the amendments refer to it. I have to be absolutely clear, as I was on Second Reading: the £30 billion to £35 billion figure quoted by some from the Opposition is totally inaccurate and wildly misleading. It is utterly wrong to ignore the effects of inflation and the changing value of money on the real costs of a deal that lasts 99 years. We published the full costs alongside the treaty. [Hon. Members: “How much?] They ask how much. I have been very clear about that throughout the debate and at the earlier stages. The average cost per year in today’s money is £101 million, and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion. Just for comparison, the costs compare favourably to other international basing agreements. France, for example, as I said, recently announced an €85 million a year deal with Djibouti. This base is much larger and has much more capabilities, so it compares very favourably.
Conservative Members ask about costs. The total expected cost of the treaty using that NPV methodology, which is the same that has been agreed by the Government Actuary’s Department and others, is just over one third of the value lost by the Department for Health and Social Care under their Governments on PPE that was wasted in the first year of the pandemic, if they want to talk about costs and wasting money. This is a clear investment in our national security. We will not scrimp on our national security, and we will not apologise for keeping our base safe.
Stephen Doughty
I have been clear throughout. We have set and published the methodology. It has been backed by the Office for Budget Responsibility, the statistics regulator and others, and I am happy to set that all out again in writing for the hon. Member if that would be helpful.
I was quite surprised to hear some of the unfortunate remarks made by some Members about the United States and its commitment to this base. The United States pays for the operating costs. We have a crucial national security relationship, which keeps us, the United States and our allies safe. This is a joint base on Diego Garcia. It is absolutely right that those arrangements are in place. As I said, the value from the capability of the base is priceless. This is absolutely the right investment to make.
I was appalled by some of the comments being made. I remind the Committee that President Trump, Secretary of War Hegseth and Secretary Rubio have publicly supported the treaty, as have Five Eyes partners and others.
Stephen Doughty
No, I will not give way to the hon. Member. He was not even here throughout the debate. His leader, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), is missing in action—oh, he’s turned up now. He came up with so many figures throughout this process, but he has finally turned up; it is good to see him here.
Questions were raised about the Chagossians, and I want to respond to them seriously because I recognise, as I have done, the very sincere feelings that are felt among different parts of the Chagossian community. We have heard a range of views expressed today by different Members, and I acknowledge the Chagossians who are here in the Gallery. I understand many of them will not support this treaty, but other Chagossians and Chagossian groups do support it, as we have heard during the debate. But I repeat again for the record that the Government deeply regret the way Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship that is built on respect and acknowledgment of the wrongs of the past. The negotiations were between the UK and Mauritius, with our priority being to secure full operation of the base on Diego Garcia, but we will finance a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of the Chagossian communities. We will work to start a new programme of visits, including to Diego Garcia. Of course, Mauritius will be able to develop a programme of resettlement on the islands other than Diego Garcia. We will continue our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects.
Mike Kane
I hope the whole Committee can unite around this point. I pay tribute to the Chagossians in the United Kingdom for the contribution they make to the schools in their communities and to the Catholic churches where they live and, in my constituency, for their work at Wythenshawe hospital and Manchester airport—it is second to none. They are welcome here, and we value them very much, despite our political differences in this Chamber.
Stephen Doughty
I completely and wholeheartedly associate myself with those comments from my hon. Friend. I know he has been a passionate advocate for Chagossians in the UK, and particularly in his constituency, over many years. We have spoken about this matter many times, and I know he and other Members speak passionately on the matter.
Sir Edward Leigh
Will the Minister reply to the point made by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), myself and others that not in the last 100 years since the exchange of colonies after the first world war has a people been transferred from the sovereignty of one empire to another without being properly consulted?
Stephen Doughty
The right hon. Member knows that we regret what happened historically in relation to the Chagos Islands. He will also know that the islands are not permanently inhabited. That was necessarily a negotiation between the United Kingdom and Mauritius.
Let me respond to the many points about the environment, on which many amendments were tabled. We are absolutely clear that the United Kingdom and Mauritius are committed to protecting one of the world’s most important marine environments. Indeed, the Mauritian Prime Minister met the former Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham and Croydon North (Steve Reed), in the margins of the third United Nations ocean conference in Nice on 9 June, where he reaffirmed his commitment to the creation of that marine protected area around the Chagos archipelago. That will be supported by an enhanced partnership with us. The treaty has been welcomed by leading conservation NGOs, including the Zoological Society of London. We continue to work with Mauritius on the implementation of that measure. We are considering seriously the many genuine concerns that right hon. and hon. Members, including the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and members of the Environmental Audit Committee, have raised. They are serious and important questions, and I assure the Committee that we are taking them seriously, and I will try to update the House on them in due course.
Graham Stuart
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way—he is being very generous. In 2017, the clear position was that the International Court of Justice was not in a position to adjudicate on the relationship between us and a member of the Commonwealth. Has that changed, and, if so, when?
Stephen Doughty
We have been very clear about the legal position and the legal risk. The right hon. Gentleman’s Government knew this; it is why they started the process. I do not want to detain the Committee by going through all the arguments that I made on Second Reading—[Interruption.] But he knows that we faced the comprehensive rejection of our arguments at the ICJ in 2019, we lost votes at the UN General Assembly, we had the maritime delineation judgment binding on Mauritius and the Maldives—[Interruption.]
Stephen Doughty
Thank you, Madam Chairman. The Opposition ask questions and then make so much noise—they do not even want to hear the answers.
I have mentioned the obligations placed on the BIOT Administration by UN bodies to cease specific activities. I have mentioned the series of procedural complications and blockages at international organisations, including the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. There are many examples of clear risks. I have explained before the potential under annex VII of UNCLOS—
Stephen Doughty
The hon. Gentleman chunters “potential”, but is he willing to gamble with our national security? Is he willing to gamble on the operational effect? [Interruption.] Oh, he is willing to gamble! I find it absolutely extraordinary that he is willing to gamble with our national security and that of our allies. That is exactly why the United States and our Five Eyes partners back this deal: it settles that debate.
I will turn to the amendments. The right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel) tabled amendments 1, 2 and 7 and new clause 2 on the publication of legal advice. She will know from her time in government that it is highly unusual for the Government to publish legal advice that they have obtained. That advice is privileged, and it is important that the Government are able to take frank and confidential advice, as she well knows. In some circumstances, the Government may publish a statement of their legal position, as we did in the case of the Diego Garcia treaty, on the day it was signed. As I have repeatedly explained—Members keep chuntering about it—if a long-term deal is not reached between the UK and Mauritius, it is highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would be brought quickly by Mauritius against the UK. It might include, for example, further arbitral proceedings against the UK under annex VII of the UN convention on the law of the sea. A judgment would be binding on the UK.
Let me turn to amendments 11 and 14. The hon. Member for Clacton, who has finally turned up but is not even listening, tabled several amendments that appear to serve no function other than wasting Government and parliamentary time. The public consultation proposed in amendment 11, and the impact assessment, would be needlessly costly and time-consuming. They would only confirm the conclusion—on which he had no answers—already reached by our closest ally, the United States, by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee, and by our Five Eyes partners. The public already know that the treaty secures the future of the critical base on Diego Garcia. The strategic value has been debated at length and is well understood. We are not willing to gamble with our national security, even if the Member for Clacton is willing to. Quite frankly, he has some gall to turn up after his comments on NATO and Russia—I find it quite extraordinary.
In amendment 13, the hon. Member for Clacton offers an ill-conceived proposal that would keep Diego Garcia listed as an overseas territory while accepting that His Majesty the King would no longer be sovereign. Not only is that constitutionally inaccurate, but in the context of the British Nationality Act 1981 it would have serious consequences for the nationality rights of Chagossians born on different islands in the archipelago. Surely his intention cannot be for individuals born on Diego Garcia to be treated differently from those born on Peros Banhos or the Salomon Islands.
Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6, tabled by the right hon. Member for Witham and amendment 8 tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), seek to change or remove the statutory powers to make an Order in Council. It is, of course, absolutely right that Parliament should be able to scrutinise the use of power, which is why the Bill provides for the negative procedure to be used. The vast majority of changes that the Government will make using that power will be technical and operational amendments on matters to ensure that our domestic law is consistent with the new status of Diego Garcia—those are matters as varied as police pensions, copyright law, and changes to student finance. The proposed amendments would mean that the House would be obliged to spend valuable parliamentary time on each change to legislation for 99 years. Members surely cannot wish us to spend that amount of time on all those things, and that approach is consistent with powers taken to amend existing legislation in previously comparable situations.
New clauses 1, 11, and 10 regard the prior approval of payments. I have set out clearly the costs, and the absolutely nonsensical figures that have been put forward by the Opposition and the hon. Member for Clacton, and we wholly reject the new clauses. It is entirely usual and proper for payments under international treaties to be made under the royal prerogative, and requiring a separate distinct vote before payments can be made would create unacceptable risk for the long-term sustainability of the treaty. Without the certainty that the Bill and the treaty provide, the UK and US military would not be able to invest in vital capabilities. That would have major operational implications for the base. On new clause 11 tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, the House of Commons will scrutinise our annual estimates in the usual way, and spending under the treaty will be included in that process. New clause 10 is not necessary either.
New clauses 3, 4 and 9 are on the marine protected area. There is no requirement for the UK to consent to Mauritius establishing such an area or to its management, and that would be inconsistent with the treaty. Although the UK will be playing a different role in respect of the future MPA, both the UK and Mauritius remain committed to protecting that vital marine environment. That is why, under the terms of the treaty, we will provide technical support and assistance to Mauritius, in accordance with a separate written instrument. We will not make any additional direct payments to Mauritius as part of that activity.
On Chagossians and the right of self-determination, amendments 9 and 10, and new clauses 7, 8, 12, 13, and 14 concern the Chagossian community, and I understand and share the strength of feeling on the wider subject, and the historical treatment of the Chagossian communities. That is why the Government have put the preservation of nationality rights at the heart of the Bill. I am sympathetic to the concerns put forward about resettlement. I understand the intention of amendment 9, but it is not necessary. Under the agreement we have already agreed that Mauritius will be able to develop a programme of resettlement on islands other than Diego Garcia—I refer the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to comments from Olivier Bancoult and the Chagos Refugees Group. They have been clear that that is why they support this measure, and are urging us all to support the treaty. I also understand the questions on consultation, but as I have said, those negotiations were between the UK and Mauritius. The islands that make up BIOT do not have, and never have had, a settled population and have never been self-governing. No question of self-determination for a population therefore arises now.
New clauses 5, 6, 15 and 17 relate to national security issues, but they are simply not needed because the treaty protects our national security and secures the base. We have maintained full operational control of Diego Garcia with all the necessary rights and authorities, as well as a series of additional protections. In closing, the Bill and the treaty have been thoroughly scrutinised—
Several hon. Members rose—
Stephen Doughty
No, I am not going to give way now. There have been plenty of debates and questions, and plenty of discussion. The Government have provided all the information necessary for Parliament to hold us to account, including publishing the full costs of the treaty and the legal rationale for the deal. The International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee have confirmed their agreement that the Bill does what we have set out, and the Government do not take risks with our national security, as the Opposition or Reform would do. That has been our priority throughout. I reject the amendments and urge the passage of the Bill.
Priti Patel
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 7, in clause 1, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State lays before Parliament a memorandum on the obligations under international law which require the UK to cede sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory to the Government of Mauritius.
(1B) The memorandum specified in subsection (1) must include—
(a) a summary of the legal advice received by the UK Government on this issue;
(b) an analysis of the status of UK's sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory under international law;
(c) the legal argument for the cessation of British sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory; and
(d) the risks which the UK Government may have faced had it not reached an agreement with the Government of Mauritius.
(1C) The report specified in subsections (1A) and (1B) must be laid before Parliament no later than two months after this Act receives Royal Assent.”—(Priti Patel.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry (Luke Pollard)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
In a world that is growing more dangerous, this Labour Government will always put Britain’s security first, and if there is one thing that Members should take away from today’s debate, it is the absolute necessity of this Bill to secure the military base on Diego Garcia, which has played a critical role in defending the UK and our allies for over 50 years. Both the treaty and the Bill guarantee the long-term, secure operation of our military base and ensure that it will continue protecting our national security for generations to come.
Let me take this opportunity to thank Members on both sides of the House for their scrutiny of the Bill throughout its passage. I am grateful to those who contributed to the vigorous debate on Second Reading in September and to those who participated in today’s Committee proceedings. I thank the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee for their thorough inquiries into the substance of the treaty. In particular, I want to thank the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), for his tireless efforts in guiding the Bill through the House.
I would also like to thank the officials who worked on the Bill and the treaty, both under this Government and under the previous Government. Lastly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our international allies, especially the United States, for their support throughout the treaty negotiation process. Their backing was crucial in ensuring that this treaty, in the words of the US Defence Secretary Hegseth,
“secures the operational capabilities of the base…for many years ahead.”
This treaty also recognises the importance of the islands to the Chagossians. This Government respect the diversity of views within the community, so we will continue to engage with the Chagossian groups over the coming months and years. We have also committed to increase our support through new and existing projects. The US, our Five Eyes partners, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea have all supported this deal. Our adversaries would have loved to see this deal fail and the military base placed under threat, but this Government are not risking our national security, as the Opposition parties would claim we are.
Let me make it clear why we are here today. We inherited a set of negotiations started by the Conservatives. They chose to start negotiations to deliver what Lord Cameron said in January 2024 would be the
“safety, security and long-term viability of this base”.
The right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) explained the objectives at this very Dispatch Box. He also said they were to
“secure an agreement on the basis of international law…to strengthen…cooperation”
with Mauritius on
“maritime security…the environment…and to tackle illegal migration”.—[Official Report, 3 November 2022; Vol. 721, c. 27WS.]
That is what this deal secures, and that is why I wish it a speedy and successful passage through the rest of its parliamentary proceedings.
Let us be absolutely clear: the Conservatives started the negotiations. They held 11 rounds, but they failed to secure a deal. It is a question that not a single Tory MP wanted to answer today: why did they start these negotiations if it was so bad? If it was such a threat to national security, why was it a Conservative Government who started the negotiations? Why did they hold 11 rounds? It was a Labour Government who secured the deal; it is a Labour Government who are going to secure the future of our military base, and that is why I commend the Bill to the House.
Priti Patel
Let me begin my remarks by once again paying tribute to the heroic Chagossian community who have joined us once again for this debate and have been here for a good four hours. In response to the Minister’s last point—he may have heard us say this previously on Second Reading and during Opposition day debates—no deal is better than a terrible deal, and the Conservative party would never have put this deal forward.
Throughout the process, the Government—[Interruption.] They can all make as much noise as they want on the Government benches. None of them were here—[Interruption.] They can point their fingers as much as they want; none of them were sitting here earlier to defend their Government on this terrible deal.
Let me come back to the Chagossian community, because throughout this process, they have been silenced and ignored by this Government, and they have faced decades of pain and hurt. [Laughter.] This is not a laughing matter at all. Hon. Members may want to sneer about this, but they should pay some respect to the Chagossian people, because we praise them and are grateful to them for their dignified campaign. There are some Members in this House, even on the Government Benches, who have Chagossians as their own constituents, who they have made representations on behalf of as well. I think we should thank them for the work that they have done.
I also want to thank hon. Members from across the House for their interest in this Bill and their diligent scrutiny. I say that because the Labour Government have sought to keep debates on their surrender treaty as short and restricted as possible, and we have seen that again. [Interruption.] They have not been here to contribute to those debates—what would they know? I am particularly grateful for the efforts of hon. Members who have challenged and debated the Bill, including the interest in the Foreign Affairs Committee evidence session. Opposition Members on the Environmental Audit Committee and the Science and Technology Committee spent valuable time in Select Committees—let me emphasise that: in Select Committees—scrutinising this treaty. Opposition Members have been relentless and I thank them for their forensic questioning and for exposing the scandalous way in which this Government have acted. These debates have benefited from the legal expertise and knowledge of former Ministers and Law Officers, and I am thankful to them for their contribution and support.
I also want to pay tribute to the Minister for the Overseas Territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty). He has been diligent in responding to questioning, and he has probably spent more time in the House debating this issue, as well as responding to written communications, than he originally expected. He has become the Minister for defending the indefensible. Although we do disagree robustly on this treaty, we thank him and respect him for his contributions.
Let us be clear: this is a bad Bill for Britain; the Opposition will continue to oppose it, and our colleagues in the other place will give it further scrutiny. It leaves Britain weaker and poorer, it gives succour to our enemies, and it has shown the world that, under Labour, Britain is being governed by weak Ministers who appease the whims of left-wing lawyers and activists, rather than standing up for our national interest. Friend and foe alike will now see Britain as a soft touch that can be bullied by lawfare into waving the white flag of surrender, rather than proudly flying the Union flag.
For Britain’s standing in the world, for our defence and national security, and for our suffering British taxpayers, I bitterly regret the passage of this Bill. For months we have been calling on Labour to step back from the brink and ditch this mind-boggling surrender deal, but this Government have arrogantly blundered on. Britain comprehensively lost in these negotiations, the treaty and the Bill that we have considered today as a result. Ministers have squirmed and rolled over at every turn and have been eaten for breakfast by the Mauritian Government.
Let me be clear: we will oppose this Bill every step of the way in this House and in the other place. It is worth noting that within weeks of coming to power, this soft-touch Government decided that they would end more than 200 years of British sovereignty over this vital territory for our country’s security and national interest, and for no justifiable reason. We are not just giving up the islands of the archipelago; more than that, the national interest is being squandered, and so is peace and stability in that area.
The Government are asking British taxpayers, whom they have already thrashed with vindictive taxes, now to shoulder the burden of this scandalous deal, and it is simply not on. Labour Governments often bang on about the redistribution of wealth, but today they take it to a new level with the redistribution of wealth from Britain to Mauritius. How much of the money will be plundered from the Defence budget, hindering our armed forces’ ability to procure new capabilities at the worst possible time? It comes as the Minister for Defence Procurement has overseen a freeze on procurement as the world gets more dangerous, and we do know that the world is getting more dangerous. The much-vaunted strategic defence review, which Labour pledged would see off all the major threats, was overdue and underfunded—but guess what? Labour has no plan to pay for it now.
Here we are now: the Government have found it within themselves to spend £35 billion on this deal. This is not just money from down the line in the future; it is hundreds of millions of pounds each year within this Parliament. Today the Government have sunk to a new low: Labour MPs have voted against giving Parliament, this House, a say over sending £35 billion of our constituents’ money to Mauritius with no strings attached. Mauritius will now use our money to reduce its debt and cut taxes because of this Government. Labour MPs have voted to block the publication of a summary of legal advice on which the Government relied to make this dodgy deal. We might have thought that they had learnt from the current China debacle that this is not the right way, but no, they still cannot offer a sound legal explanation for why they have rushed through this deal.
The Government have refused to adopt our amendments to ensure the monitoring of how the rights of Chagossians will be safeguarded. The Chagossians, to whom we have a special responsibility, have been neglected and ignored by Labour since the election, so it comes as no surprise—and it is now a bitter blow for them—that there is no cost implication or, indeed, any good reason as to why we are going down this route.
The Government have also declined to adopt our amendment to keep the Intelligence and Security Committee apprised of the security protections in this treaty, again denying hon. Members the scrutiny to which we are entitled. It is astonishing, in the light of the national security concerns that this terrible deal now brings, and it leaves our country weaker and poorer. This is a deal that this Government and our country will come to regret.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Dr Al Pinkerton
It gives me no pleasure to say that this Bill fails the Chagossian people. For decades, decisions about the Chagos Islands have been taken without the consent of those most affected. The treaty continues that injustice, offering no guaranteed right of return, no legally binding resettlement plan and no meaningful protection of Chagossian rights.
The Liberal Democrats support negotiations with Mauritius and support respect for international law, but never at the expense of Chagossian dignity. The treaty, as it stands, lacks transparency, environmental safeguards and accountability for the substantial public expenditure that it entails. That is why we tabled seven amendments to inscribe parliamentary oversight, to protect the marine environment and to uphold Chagossian rights to self-determination. That includes provisions for scrutiny of ministerial decisions, mandatory environmental reporting and a referendum of the Chagossian people themselves. We also called for full financial transparency and a review of the welfare of Chagossians living in the UK, many of whom continue to face hardship as a direct result of their historical displacement. This is not merely a matter of geopolitical assets or territorial claims; it is about justice, belonging and moral responsibility to those who call the Chagos islands home.
I thank the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), for the numerous conversations that we have had during the passage of the Bill—he has been generous with his time. I am disappointed, however, that he did not feel able to accept some of my amendments and suggestions during that process.
I will finish with words lifted from the UN charter, a document that this country helped to shape:
“The Purposes of the United Nations are…to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.
That right has been denied to the Chagossian people for more than 50 years, so I urge Members across the House to think carefully when voting this evening about whether they wish to compound that half century of injustice or embrace the foundational principles of the UN. [Interruption.] If this House wishes to do the latter, we cannot allow the Bill to pass without ensuring that Chagossians themselves are sovereign over their citizenship, the governance of their islands and the prospect of return. [Hon. Members: “How are you voting?”] I ask Conservative right hon. and hon. Members on my right-hand side, who have lauded the efforts of the Chagossian people but sat on their hands when they had the opportunity to give Chagossians the right to a referendum, whether they wish to keep chuntering from a sedentary position.
In direct response to the Minister, who challenged this in Committee, I say that the forced displacement of a people does not and cannot annul the identity or the rights of the Chagossians as a people. To suggest otherwise perpetuates the disgraces of the past and, as a sentiment, that is unworthy of this Bill and of this House.
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Tuesday 21st October 2025
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 20 October 2025 - (20 Oct 2025)
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Tuesday 4th November 2025
(4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 20 October 2025 - (20 Oct 2025)
Baroness Chapman of Darlington
That the Bill be now read a second time.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
My Lords, the Bill that we are to discuss today is vital for the security of our nation. It enables the ratification and entry into force of the treaty between the UK and Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, and thus protects the operation of an essential UK military base in the Indian Ocean. The consequences of not ratifying this treaty should not be underestimated. The inevitable effect would be to expose the UK to an unacceptable level of risk and legal uncertainty, which could deny us key military and security capabilities, dramatically reducing the effectiveness of our Armed Forces and security services. A binding judgment against the UK from an international court or tribunal would undermine our ability to operate globally to protect UK influence and counter the threats we face in an increasingly dangerous world, and it would put at risk security at home.
I understand that the treaty has divided opinion. We have had good debates in both this House and the other place on its substance, and I, of course, welcome this scrutiny. Since the Government signed the treaty, there have been Statements and debates across both Houses, hundreds of Questions raised and answered, and the completion of several committee inquiries by learned colleagues.
The necessity of the Diego Garcia treaty and of this Bill has been amply demonstrated. It has been tested in detail by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Both agreed that protection of the strategic value of Diego Garcia—a vital national asset—was necessary. The IAC clearly set out the path to significant risks to the base if the treaty were not ratified.
The Diego Garcia treaty has the support of our international allies. The United States has been engaged throughout the negotiations and supports it, as do the rest of our Five Eyes partners; Japan, South Korea and India support it as well. The UN, the Commonwealth and the African Union all welcomed it. Our overseas territories family supports it. The list goes on.
I welcome the opportunity to test this further today. The treaty is an important matter that the Government considered with great care. We bore the full weight of responsibility for not only the security of the British people but the integrity of the UK’s position on the global stage, and for respect for the experiences of those who had lived on the islands.
This treaty is critical to our national security. The base holds a range of vital capabilities, some of which are highly secret. I know that those with experience in this House will understand the military advantage of being able to deploy forces rapidly across the Middle East, east Africa and south Asia, and will appreciate the political and security importance of operating such a prized asset jointly with our closest partner, the United States.
The deal preserves this vital security footprint. With it, we will retain full operational control over Diego Garcia, with robust provisions to keep adversaries out. These include: unrestricted access to and use of the base for the UK and the US; a buffer zone around Diego Garcia; a UK veto to ensure that no development or construction on the outer islands threatens base operations; and a ban on the presence of any foreign security forces. The protections were designed, tested and endorsed at the highest level of the US political and security establishment.
The Government acted to protect this vital asset because it faced an existential threat. This was well understood by the previous Government, which is why they started negotiations more than three years ago—negotiations that they entered in good faith, despite what we heard in the other place, and continued for 11 rounds, including detailed text-based negotiations in the weeks and months before the general election.
It was under the previous Government that Mauritius secured its string of legal and political victories against the UK. Noble Lords will be aware of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion in 2019 and the loss of votes at the UN General Assembly. This was followed in 2021 by a ruling by a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on a maritime delimitation dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. The special chamber, in a decision that was binding on the parties to the dispute, ruled that Mauritius’s sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s determinations. This gave a clear indication of how this tribunal—and, quite possibly, other international courts and tribunals—would approach the ICJ’s advisory opinion and the sovereignty dispute between the UK and Mauritius.
I urge noble Lords to reflect on the sound conclusions of the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. The learned members of both committees took evidence from eminent legal scholars, including a former member of the ICJ. The IAC concluded that, if the treaty is not ratified,
“Mauritius is likely to resume its campaign against the UK through international courts”
and stated that it heard evidence that
“any international court looking at this issue would be unlikely to find in favour of the UK”,
putting the base at risk.
The Government have been clear about the legal position. Had a long-term deal not been reached, it was highly likely that wide-ranging litigation would have been brought quickly against the UK. There were several potential routes for this, which included further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. The United Kingdom’s long-standing legal view has been that we would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending our legal position on sovereignty in such litigation. Even if we had chosen to ignore legally binding judgments against the UK, their legal effect on third countries and international organisations would have given rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions. We have all heard the counter- positions—that the Government are bowing to an opinion that is merely advisory and that there was no viable route to a binding judgment—but I am afraid those simply do not reflect the reality of this situation.
It is clear that securing a deal was essential. The agreement that the Government have signed protects the base for generations and is firmly in the national interest. The Government did not secure the base at any cost; we negotiated a deal that is good value for money for the British people. The full financial details were published alongside the treaty on the day of signature. The average cost per year in today’s money is £101 million, and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion. These figures have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. These figures draw on long-established methodology, used under this Government and previous Governments, to account for long-term projects. We have all heard, and I suspect we will hear again today, the Opposition claim that the cost is higher. This is grossly misleading. Accounting norms and processes set out in the Green Book are there for a reason: so we can understand the true value of things. Let us debate those values with transparency, not exaggeration or manipulation for political point-scoring.
I suspect that some in this House will have heard concerns regarding undue influence on Mauritius from hostile forces. The Opposition were quite vocal on the subject in the other place—although, interestingly, we heard barely a peep before 4 July last year, when they were in negotiations. The treaty is the only way to ensure the base continues to operate as it has done, with all the protections that I listed earlier, including threats from our adversaries; whereas, had Mauritius secured a binding judgment against the UK, there would have been nothing to stop it leasing different islands to different countries, dramatically undermining the utility of this prized military asset.
As with any government policy, it is crucial that we discuss the people who are at the heart of it. I know there is a deep strength of feeling, genuinely held, in this House and the other place about Chagossians. Let me be clear: this Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily state-to-state between Mauritius and the UK, and it is true that our priority was to secure the base, but that does not mean that the interests of the Chagossian community were set aside. Indeed, the treaty has the support of many in the Chagossian community. Olivier Bancoult, chair of the Chagos Refugee Group, which is the largest Chagossian group, has said
“we remain convinced that this agreement provides the only way forward”,
and in a recent communiqué urged all Members of the UK Parliament to support the Bill.
The treaty provides that Mauritius may develop a programme of resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago, other than Diego Garcia, and noble Lords will also be aware of the £40 million trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of Chagossians. I know many in this House are interested in the operation of these commitments. My noble friend Lord Collins noted in this place that, ahead of ratification, the Government would make a ministerial Statement in both Houses providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement and the modalities of the trust fund.
I know that many noble Lords are also interested in the environmental consequences of the treaty. It is crucial that one of the world’s most pristine marine environments is protected, and this Government and Mauritius are committed to that. Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam has publicly stated his commitment to the marine protected area and confirmed it directly to the former Environment Secretary at the UN Ocean Conference in June.
Just yesterday, the Mauritian Government announced plans for the establishment of the Chagos Archipelago marine protected area. This will be based on the robust International Union for the Conservation of Nature categories for marine protected areas. Critically, it makes it clear that there will be no commercial fishing across the entire 640,000 square kilometre area. The Great Chagos Bank will be given one of the highest levels of protection, with the rest of the MPA categorised as a highly protected conservation zone. There will be limited provision for controlled levels of artisanal fishing in confined zones intended for resettlement to allow for sustenance of the Chagossian community, while maintaining the commitment to nature conservation. This development should assuage the concerns we have heard in this House and the other place about Mauritian commitments to environmental protections.
Despite this progress, and the passage of the Bill in the other place, there are still those here who want to relitigate the debate that we had in July. There are Motions intended to probe and amend at Committee and Report. They are welcome, but Motions that are designed to wreck are not about the welfare of a community; they are a cynical tactic of delay and disruption. The Opposition Front Bench has tried blocking ratification, yet seems unable to accept the will of this House. I am disappointed, but unsurprised, that we all now look likely to have to witness an unedifying spectacle of it having another go.
Noble Lords will notice that we are not considering a committal Motion to commit the Bill to Committee today. As noble Lords know, it is extremely unusual to table a Motion to seek to divide the House to delay the passage of government legislation passed by the House of Commons. It is even more unusual for the Opposition to press such a Motion to a vote on the Floor of the House, as they have indicated they would. We know that His Majesty’s Opposition take their responsibilities seriously. They have said on multiple occasions to my noble friend the Leader of the House of Lords that their motivation is to properly challenge and scrutinise government legislation. That is their job; it is not to block legislation or stop the Government getting their programme through.
Let me share the truth of this matter. The amendment to the committal Motion favoured by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is, in effect, a fatal Motion. I will explain why: it makes committal conditional on consultation. It is not credible to undertake meaningful consultation in the 30-day period set out in the Motion. It would therefore risk progress towards ratification becoming bogged down in litigation. The Front Bench opposite should know that; I would be surprised if they do not.
The Motion would wreck the Bill and mean a delay not of 30 days but of months, maybe years. In these circumstances, the Bill and the treaty that it is intended to implement could not move ahead. This is both reckless and deeply cynical. It is reckless because it threatens the continued operation of the base on Diego Garcia and, with that, the national security of the British people. It is cynical because the Opposition now seek to use, for their own ends, a community they systematically disregarded when in government. We all know their record: the decision not to consult Chagossians when meaningful consultation was possible at the start of negotiations; the decision in 2016 not to permit any resettlement by Chagossians across the archipelago; and the dramatic failure to spend 96% of the £40 million commitment to support Chagossians.
It is worth contrasting that record with the record of this Government. We are financing a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of the Chagossian community. We are working with Mauritius to start a new programme of visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The treaty we have entered allows Mauritius to develop a programme of resettlement on the islands other than Diego Garcia. This Government are also increasing our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These are initiatives that actually deliver for Chagossians; they are not empty promises or hollow words.
The Bill is relatively short. It preserves the current laws of the British Indian Ocean Territory as laws that will continue to apply to Diego Garcia once the treaty is in force, allowing for the base’s continued, effective operation with minimal disruption. The Bill also grants a new power to make the domestic legal changes needed to implement the treaty and to manage responsibly the base’s future operation.
There will be no change to the British nationality status that any Chagossian currently holds, whether it is a British citizenship or a British Overseas Territory citizenship, and current pathways for Chagossians to acquire British citizenship are also maintained. Most of the provisions in the Bill will commence only when the treaty enters into force. I trust that we will have a lively and thorough debate on this subject matter, and I look forward to debating the Bill’s contents. I beg to move.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the Bill, and I will come to some of her points shortly. This is now the second opportunity that we have had to debate the UK-Mauritius agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, but it is of course the first time that your Lordships’ House has been asked to approve the agreement in law.
When we debated the Motion to approve the treaty under the CRaG process, I lamented the fact that the other place was denied the opportunity to have a substantive debate on the treaty at that point. If the Government are so confident in their arguments, why did they deny the other House the opportunity to debate this properly? As I said then, the Government played fast and loose with the conventions on treaty approval, despite promises that had been given by their own Ministers when the CRaG process was first introduced. The Government were elected on the back of pledges to put public service and integrity first; refusing to adhere to the conventions in this case hardly lived up to those promises.
That said, as a responsible Official Opposition—and recognising the primacy of the other place, which approved the Bill at Third Reading—we will not seek to deny the Bill a Second Reading today. We already know that the other place did not have the opportunity to debate the treaty when it was laid before the House, and the Bill subsequently received minimal scrutiny. In fact, Committee and Third Reading were both taken on the same day, and a total of just 17 hours of debate were allocated to a Bill that fundamentally changes our strategic security role in the Indian Ocean and puts £35 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money in the hands of politicians thousands of miles away from the UK.
Not only was there no mention of the Bill in the Labour manifesto; there was a specific promise to protect our overseas territories. For the election, the Minister’s party’s manifesto said:
“Defending our security also means protecting the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies … Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination”.
It seems that tax is not the only manifesto commitment being binned today.
Crucially, the views of the Chagossian people have not been heard. We feel it is only right that the Government should be required to consult the Chagossian community on the implementation of this treaty, including on the establishment of the Chagossian trust fund, which the Minister discussed. The UK taxpayer will fund it, but the Mauritian Government will have sole responsibility to distribute it however they see fit.
That is why I tabled the amendment to the original committal Motion that would have required the Government to consult the Chagossian community over a period of 30 days. If the Minister is concerned that 30 days is not long enough, I note that we talked about making it longer, but we did not do so because we wanted the Government to have the opportunity to get their Bill through this Session. If I had set the Motion at three months, the Minister would have told us that there is no time to have a Committee debate before the end of this Session because the Opposition are trying to deny them the Bill. We deliberately selected a short period so that the Minister could not argue that we were trying to wreck the Bill—that was not our intention. It was a measured, reasonable approach which we felt would have made up completely for the Government’s failure to consult the Chagossians to date and would help us in our work to give the Bill the proper scrutiny it deserves, informed by the outcome of that consultation. It was not a wrecking amendment, and the Minister knows that in her heart of hearts. Without that additional consultation—
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
If the noble Lord was so concerned to do this, first, why did he not consult earlier? Secondly, he can achieve his aims—which would not be wrecking but would be perfectly legitimate —by amendment to the Bill, delaying implementation, perhaps. Those things are standard. He could make his case, or perhaps even win his vote, and achieve his aims, should they be genuine and not a wrecking amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
This treaty is due to last 100 years. How is it a wrecking amendment to take 30 days to consult the people who will be affected by it? The Minister is talking nonsense, and she knows it.
Without that additional consultation of the Chagossian people, we fear that the Bill, which received so little scrutiny in the other place, will go on to become law without the affected Chagossians having their views heard, as they rightly should. I know that a number of them have turned up to the Public Gallery to hear this debate today.
I hope that the Government’s decision to withdraw the committal Motion at the last moment is an indication that they are listening to us and want to think about this more deeply. It is clear to us that we need that consultation, so I call upon the Minister to bring it forward as part of the committal Motion when the Government eventually bring it back to the House. As I said, the Government intend this treaty to last 100 years; surely, we can take one month to consult the people most affected by it.
To call the Bill a surrender Bill is an understatement. This is a strategic capitulation that will see us give away sovereign territory that has been British for two centuries. To add insult to injury, taxpayers are paying tens of billions to Mauritius for the privilege of doing so. We know the important, strategic role that the British Indian Ocean Territory has played internationally as a staging post for forward operations in both the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Handing over sovereignty, even with a lease agreement in respect of Diego Garcia military base, puts, in our view, that strategic role in jeopardy.
In particular, the requirement in the agreement that Mauritius must be informed of armed attacks on third states directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia is an astounding failure of diplomacy. Could the Government tell us how this would actually work in practice, in a rapidly changing armed conflict? Has the US, which actually runs this base, agreed to do that? How would it work in practice? How would we inform them in an emergency situation, with proper notice to enable us to take strategic action, as required?
My noble friend Lady Goldie will expand on some of the security implications of this agreement, but we are clear that it is a capitulation that weakens our influence on the international stage. It is a surrender orchestrated by international lawyers and implemented by a Prime Minister who is either unwilling or unable to stand up for the UK national interest.
The Bill does not just relate to the UK’s affairs in the Indian Ocean; the sheer cost of the treaty with Mauritius makes the Bill a domestic issue, too. By pressing ahead with this legislation, the Government are facilitating an agreement that will see the UK pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius. I notice that the Minister spent quite a bit of her time disagreeing with those figures, yet only one hour ago, when I asked her how much of the ODA budget is being dedicated to this agreement, she got a cheap laugh, and avoided the question once again, as she has now done four times. However, she knows, as I know, that some of that ODA budget is being used to fund this agreement. If she wishes to be so transparent and disagree with our figures, why does she not tell us how much of it is going to be spent from the ODA budget? She can stand up and do it now, if she wishes.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
All of our ODA spending is published. It is probably one of the most transparent bits of government funding. I will send the noble Lord the website address so he can have a look and satisfy himself on this point.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am grateful for that; that is a concession, of sorts. I have only asked her the question four times during Questions so far. Now that she is willing to be more transparent, that is progress, at least.
Against that backdrop, hard-working Britons will be furious that Ministers have somehow found £35 billion to send 6,000 miles away when we face such financial challenges here at home. The fact is that the treaty facilitated by the Bill will fund tax cuts for Mauritius while taxes are being hiked here at home. We put this deal on hold when we were in Government, when it was in its infancy. We saw its flaws, and we paused it. Alas, Ministers no longer have the clarity of mind needed to deliver for the British people and are—
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am sorry, but that is factually incorrect and I would like to give the noble Lord the opportunity to correct it. It was paused, but when the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, was appointed Foreign Secretary, he restarted those negotiations.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am happy to tell the Minister that I have spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, about that. He agreed that it was paused, which I think she has just confirmed.
Alas, Ministers no longer have the clarity of mind needed to deliver for the British people and, as so often with this Government, they have allowed themselves to be taken in by their international lawyer friends and donors. This all begs the question: why? Why did Ministers feel the need to pursue this agreement that puts Britain’s interests last? Why have the Government seen fit to saddle taxpayers with an additional financial burden, at a time when we are all being softened up for massive tax rises from the Chancellor of the Exchequer?
Ministers have told us, as the noble Baroness did again today, that this agreement is a legal necessity, but, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar when we debated the Motion to approve the treaty—I commend his speech to noble Lords who have not had the chance to see it yet—there is a range of views among very senior lawyers on this matter. The Government cannot hide behind legal advice, unless they want to publish it for us all to see. This was a political decision for which Ministers must take the political responsibility.
The almost single-minded obsession with international law has blinded the Government to the real threat from a country that itself pays absolutely no heed whatever to that same international law. We know that China has said that it wants to deepen its strategic partnership with Mauritius. As recently as 15 May this year, China’s ambassador to Mauritius said that the People’s Republic of China wanted to strengthen ties with Mauritius, noting the country’s “strategic advantages”, and expressed a commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. The Chinese ambassador to Mauritius is on the record as offering, unsurprisingly, massive congratulations on the deal and stating that China fully supports Mauritius’s attempt to “safeguard national sovereignty”. It is a shame that China does not show that same regard to the national sovereignty of other nations.
That is who the Government have appeased with this agreement. When the Government took office, they claimed that they would protect our national security. Can the Minister please explain how ceding national sovereignty to a country that is known to be deepening its ties with a nation that we know to be a threat to the UK will help them achieve that manifesto commitment?
As the Official Opposition, we will seek to amend the Bill in your Lordships’ House to ensure that the Chagossian community is properly consulted and that the agreement facilitated by the Bill does not put the desires of international lawyers before the interests of the British people, who have paid the taxes which are now to be transferred with careless abandon to Mauritius.
Speaking of the rights of the Chagossians, I find myself on this occasion in the unusual position of agreeing with noble Lords to my left when I say that the Government have not handled this well. In the other place, the Liberal Democrat spokesman, Dr Al Pinkerton, said that,
“this Bill fails the Chagossian people”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 756.].”
On this, we agree. Ministers have failed to properly consult the Chagossians to the point that the community is now furious with this Government, as we have all seen from our email inboxes.
However, there was another way. In the other place, the shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, tabled a presentation Bill which included specific requirements
“to consult and engage with British Chagossians in relation to any proposed changes to the sovereignty and constitutional arrangements of the British Indian Ocean Territory”.
That is what should happen. The Chagossian community should be heard and not ignored.
In conclusion, the questions at the core of all our debates will remain these. Is this treaty a good deal for Britain? Does the Bill put us in the service of the British people? I do not think that it does—
Lord Callanan (Con)
We will set out our reasons in detail, if the Bill ever returns to your Lordships’ House. I give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I have listened carefully to all the noble Lord’s contributions. I fear that he has missed something out, and I want to help him. First, can he explain briefly whether international law advice which was given to the previous Administration over the status of British sovereignty, and which has not changed for this Administration, has changed? Secondly, why did James Cleverly, on 3 November 2022, make a Statement to Parliament that that Government had decided to begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the BIOT Chagos Archipelago? If everything that he said was a point of principle, why did the previous Government accept that negotiations had to start on ceding sovereignty?
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am always suspicious when the Liberal Democrats say that they want to be helpful. We have debated all these points at length.
Lord Callanan (Con)
Noble Lords should listen to the answer.
It is a matter of public record that discussions took place. I have spoken to both James Cleverly and to my noble friend Lord Cameron about this, and we are very clear that no agreement was possible along the terms that had been outlined. That is why the negotiations were paused and why we did not reach any agreement at the time. That is why we believe the process is flawed and why we will oppose the Bill.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
My Lords, I have been advised that it is not obligatory for me to declare an interest in this matter but, on the basis that it is better to be safe than sorry, I will do so. During a period in 1979, I was the head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office department responsible for the British Indian Ocean Territory.
The Bill to which we are giving a Second Reading—and I hope that is what we are doing—is by no means the first time the House has debated the UK-Mauritius treaty on the Chagos Islands. Ratification under the CRaG procedure took place on 30 June on the basis of a report from your Lordships’ International Agreements Committee, on which I have the honour to serve but not to represent. The House was divided by the Opposition on that occasion but the report was endorsed by a majority, and the CRaG process was thus completed in the sense recommended by the committee. Today’s Bill is simply needed to bring our domestic legislation into line with that decision. I hope that that can now be done speedily and without further controversy. It is with some regret that I hear signs that that may not happen.
The legal testimony the International Agreements Committee was given before it reached its conclusion that the agreement should be ratified was not unanimous, but the committee’s view was that the most compelling evidence was that of Sir Christopher Greenwood, a former British judge of the International Court of Justice. His view was that if the UK were not to ratify the agreement, Mauritius could be expected to pursue actively the matter through international courts and, in the light of the opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice, to win such cases with damaging consequences for our security interests in the base at Diego Garcia and for those of our closest security ally, the United States. In addition, Sir Christopher pointed out that it was not correct to assert that the UK agreement with Mauritius amounted to the seceding of sovereignty since the International Court of Justice opinion already established that that step had been taken when the UK granted independence to Mauritius. That view was accepted by the international community.
It is relevant too to recall that Governments of both main parties have frequently stood at the Dispatch Box and stated, without ambiguity, that the British Government upheld the rules-based international order. It cannot seriously be disputed that a finding of the International Court of Justice, whether advisory or mandatory, is an integral part of that rules-based order. To suggest now that the International Court of Justice opinion could be ignored or set aside would surely be incompatible with those statements of policy so frequently repeated. At a time when the rules-based order is under such widespread attack, that course could hardly be in our national interest. Nor can we afford to ignore the fact that the 99-year lease on the base at Diego Garcia, with the possibility of extension, is sufficient to meet the security requirements of our closest ally, the United States, which is backing the agreement. To put those interests at risk by frustrating their implementation would seem to be an act of singular folly.
All this is to ignore the fact—as has been made clear in the debate already—that the previous Government held 11 rounds of negotiations on a similar basis to what has now been concluded in a negotiated agreement. If last year’s election had had a different result, can it be seriously doubted that the present Opposition would have been defending an agreement similar to the one that this House cleared on 30 June? None of these considerations invalidates the judgment that successive British Governments behaved in a lamentable way towards the Chagossian inhabitants of the islands, many of whom are now British citizens. The provisions agreed to mitigate these past failings are part of the Bill before us today, and rightly so. They are not, however, a reason to reject the agreement, or to delay it. To do that would in reality bring no satisfaction or benefit to anyone—quite the contrary.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of Friends of the British Overseas Territories, and as an adviser. It is with great sadness that I rise to speak to the Bill. Earlier today I spent some time with my friends from the Chagos Islands, and they have often felt ignored by many Governments of different hues but never have they felt as badly treated as by this Government. They have taken court cases to deal with their lack of agency with this Government, as they were left with no other option; indeed, there is a case still before the courts today.
Even at this late stage, if the Government do deign to consult with the Chagos community living here in the UK, it will be a start, at least, to listening to their needs and aspirations, as opposed to them being told what is happening to their homeland through government statements. I was shocked when I was told today by Chagossians living here in the UK—who are British citizens—that, despite repeated requests to meet their Members of Parliament in person, they have been told there is no time. I think that is absolutely wrong, and I hope the Minister will agree that it is wrong. It is anti-democratic, and if we are going to support a government policy, the Government must at least have the wherewithal to meet those affected by that government policy and defend it to them.
Chagossians, I am very pleased to say, have come along today to hear the debate. They are accompanied by colleagues from other overseas territories, because they too are concerned about what is happening. No doubt, as we have already heard, the Bill is all to do with national security and therefore should not be challenged. I was told as much in this House when I had the temerity to ask about the details of the trust fund being set up in Mauritius with British taxpayers’ money.
I contend that treating people with dignity and addressing their needs does not mean you are challenging national security needs. The two issues can and should exist together, and it saddens me greatly that this Government have chosen a different course. In January 2015, a report commissioned on behalf of the British Indian Ocean Territory—BIOT—and carried out by KPMG undertook a feasibility study for the resettlement of BIOT. Unlike our present Government, that study took the views of a range of stakeholders, including the Chagossian communities in Mauritius, the Seychelles, Manchester, Crawley and London. The study looked in depth at the environmental issues as well. This public document concluded:
“There are no fundamental legal obstacles that would prevent a resettlement of BIOT to go ahead”.
That was in 2015.
The Government of the day decided not to proceed with resettlement because of costs, but, crucially, the costs identified in the report for resettlement at that time are nowhere near the costs associated with this deal. How have the Government arrived at a place where we are now handing BIOT to Mauritius and paying for the privilege? By the way, we have already paid Mauritius, because in 1965, when it agreed to BIOT being created, we paid it £3 million, so this is us paying again for the privilege.
The Government have also told us that they had no option but to conduct and conclude. We have heard a lot about these 11 rounds of negotiations, but none was ever concluded. As someone who has experienced many negotiations throughout the years, the deal is not done until the deal is done. That is the critical issue here. We have already heard from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that there is a lack of clarity on the basis for proceeding with this deal, so it is imperative that the legal opinion is shared to bring transparency to what is very murky water. We are also advised by the Government that investment by the US has paused after the advisory judgment due to the lack of certainty. Surely such certainty could have been provided in another way. We could have asserted sovereignty over our territory instead of colluding in handing it away. That surely would have brought certainty for our American allies as well.
The Government also claim that we have to do this deal to protect the joint US-UK exclusive access to the electromagnetic spectrum on Diego Garcia, but the International Telecommunication Union, which supervises global communications technology, has no enforcement mechanisms to either terminate or interrupt our satellite operations on the Chagos Islands. I thank Policy Exchange for its work in this area; in particular, its publication The Chagos Debacle, A Critique of the British Government’s Shifting Rationales. Former NATO commander and Royal Navy Rear Admiral Chris Parry said recently that handing away the Chagos Islands is
“the biggest strategic mistake I have seen in my lifetime”.
Moving to the specifics in the Bill, or rather the lack of specifics, there is very little detail. We are told that there will be secondary legislation and there will be ministerial Statements to deal with a lot of the issues. That means that there will be less scrutiny. It is a matter of record that the Chagossian people were forcibly removed from their homes in the late 1960s. The Government are now telling us that by doing so, they do not have the right to self-determination. I find this very skewed thinking. You remove the Chagos Islanders from their homes by force and now they do not have self-determination. I think it is morally wrong.
At the very least what should be happening is a referendum of those of Chagossian heritage here in the UK, because despite what previous Mauritian Administrations have had to say, the Chagos people are a distinct people on the basis of ethnicity and religion and should be afforded the respect they deserve, not forced into a country that they have no affinity with and which is 1,300 miles away. Let me be clear. Even if Mauritius was the closest country, geography is not political destiny, especially when you have a distinct people, and I want to make that clear for a whole variety of reasons. KPMG, on behalf of BIOT, consulted in a meaningful way with the citizens back in 2014-15, and the Government should do so again. This is an historic decision we are making here and we need to listen to what the Chagossians have to say.
The Bill has nothing to say about the welfare of British Chagossians. Not one clause is drafted to deal with their needs. There is nothing in the Bill about the £40 million which has been sent to set up a trust fund in Mauritius for Chagossians who live there, but we have been told that British Chagossians will not benefit from that trust fund. Many Chagossians have left Mauritius in the past few months as they choose to be British and not live under the authority of Mauritius. Of course, those Chagossians who choose to remain in Mauritius are content with what is happening and are supporters of the Mauritian regime. That is why we should not be surprised that there are statements coming out of Mauritius in support of this deal.
As regards visiting the atoll, that, we understand, will be at the discretion of the Mauritian Government, who denied the very existence of the Chagos people until very recently, telling them that they were Mauritian instead. Having listened to many Chagossians talk about their identity, I can tell the House that the last thing they are is Mauritian.
Finally, there is nothing in this Bill about the very fragile and internationally important ecostructure of the many little islands and their marine area. I recognise that the Minister referenced the environment in her opening speech, and I am pleased to hear that there has been some movement in relation to that. I know that very many are concerned about the stewardship of the environment in the future, given that we are giving away all this to the Mauritian Government without any sanctions if the ecosystem is damaged.
I hope that the Government will take the opportunity to consult the Chagossian people. They deserve to be listened to, even at this late stage.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the powerful speech by my noble friend Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee. I am tempted just to say “ditto” and sit down, but that is not the practice in this place, so I will focus on some aspects that differ from the focus that she gave. The importance she attached to the Chagossians enables me to be a bit briefer than I would otherwise have been.
I want to return to a powerful assertion that was made the first time this House considered a Statement on this subject, which was diluted a bit today in the defence put forward by the noble Minister. The original Statement by the Defence Secretary said
“without this deal—within weeks we could face losing legal rulings, and within just a few years the base would become inoperable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]
What is the likelihood of us facing a legally binding ruling? If so, I ask the Minister, from which court is it likely to come?
First, as even the Foreign Office recognises, the opinion of the International Court of Justice was purely advisory, not binding. Secondly, it was based on UN General Assembly resolutions. Such resolutions are not legally binding, especially as they have not been endorsed by the Security Council. Thirdly, when the UK signed up to the International Court of Justice, our declaration specifically said that the Government of the UK excluded the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on
“any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”,
as is Mauritius. Hence, the opinion of the ICJ was triply non-binding, and no future ruling of the ICJ on this dispute could be binding on us.
Ministers never mention these facts; either they are unaware of them, or they do not want us to know. Instead, they segue on to discussing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as the noble Baroness did today, since that also has a tribunal. However, Article 298 of that treaty provides that states may “at any time” exclude “disputes concerning military activities”. Therefore, it is hard to see how the UNCLOS tribunal could reach a binding ruling which would impede our use of the base, still less do so in ways that the Defence Minister originally spelled out when he said:
“Rulings against us would mean we could not prevent hostile nations from setting up installations … on the outer islands … we could not guarantee the safe berth of our subs, patrol the waters around the base, control the airspace directly above or protect the integrity of our communications systems”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]
All that seems impossible to come from a tribunal which excludes, or where we can exclude, military matters.
These are not the only issues which the Government refuse to address. They never mention—even the Explanatory Memorandum on the agreement ignores it—the Pelindaba treaty, to which Mauritius is a signatory. It is signed by all countries counted as in the African region—and Mauritius is one—making Africa a nuclear-free zone. The treaty allows no reservations, at the time or subsequently, so it will apply to Diego Garcia, and it cannot be overridden by our treaty unless Mauritius resiles from the Pelindaba treaty. Do the Americans accept that that will mean that no nuclear weapons-carrying vessels or planes can use the base?
The agreement with Mauritius purportedly relates to completing the decolonisation of Mauritius. There are two relevant principles that have a bearing on the process of decolonisation. The first is the right to self-determination, and the second is the principle of territorial integrity. This agreement elevates the principle of territorial integrity above that of the right to self-determination.
It is bizarre that boundaries laid, and former administrative arrangements imposed on an area, by the colonial power should be treated as so sacrosanct, whereas the rights of the people who were displaced—many of whom would like to return or have the right to return—are to be ignored. It is even more bizarre given, as my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out, the promise in the Labour Party manifesto that it would support the sovereignty, integrity and right to self-determination of peoples in the British Overseas Territories. I wait in the summing up to hear how the Government reconcile their promise made to the British people, and to the peoples of those territories, with what they are doing today.
Why are the Government ploughing ahead? Of course, they refer to the fact that negotiations began under the previous Government, although they were paused by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. At the time they were paused, I found myself discussing this with a Foreign Office official, who I heard mention the agreement. I said, “Isn’t it good that these negotiations have been paused?” He obviously did not approve of the negotiations. He said, “Oh, it’ll make no difference; they’ll continue. It is the settled policy of the Foreign Office, whichever Government are in power, that we shall continue with this process to give away the sovereignty of them”.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
All the legal considerations that the noble Lord has outlined to the House, including those in the latter part of his remarks, pre-date November 2022, when the previous Government started negotiations to cede sovereignty. They took all his remarks into consideration, so why did they start negotiations to cede sovereignty?
Lord Lilley (Con)
The noble Lord is making a party-political point, as the Lib Dems always do. I am accepting that both parties are allowing themselves to be driven by the settled policy of the Foreign Office. We have to recognise that.
Lord Lilley (Con)
Whenever it started, the settled policy of the Foreign Office will probably continue for another 22 years. Anyone who has been a Minister knows that every department has a settled policy that continues unless Ministers come along and determine to overthrow it.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Earlier in 2022, the then Government’s view was that there would be no change to the sovereignty of Chagos. That was a Statement given to Parliament in early 2022. The policy changed under Liz Truss as Prime Minister and James Cleverly as Foreign Secretary to start negotiations to cede sovereignty. If there had been a settled will, it had been the one before the Government changed policy. It was the noble Lord’s Government who changed the policy.
Lord Lilley (Con)
Of course it was, but they allowed it to be changed from pressure from the Foreign Office. We can go into the archaeology of when this surfaced in the form of government policy and when it was internal, but I have no doubt that it was. Whenever I have spoken to Foreign Office officials, they have acknowledged that we are not bound by rulings of the court, nor are we likely to be, and nor are we bound by the obligations of any treaty, but they argue that Britain must none the less abide by even non-binding advisory opinions, since if we do not, how can we tell other countries that they must abide by international law? That is precisely the argument that was forwarded just now by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay.
It is touching that our diplomats believe that countries that might otherwise flout international obligations and rulings will change their ways and become law-abiding if they see us obeying rulings that we do not have to abide by and being purer than pure. I believe that the policy of the Foreign Office, and, above all, the policy of elected officials in charge of the Foreign Office, should be to pursue British interests and not to set about setting examples to other countries and virtue signalling. That is what this is doing, and it is weak for that reason. I hope that the House will in the weeks to come persuade the Government to abandon it.
Lord Thurlow (CB)
My Lords, in my comments today I wish to give your Lordships a short break from the tangle of treaties and policies and who did what in diplomatic circles. In my contribution, I shall talk about the protection of the ocean surrounding the Chagos Archipelago. In doing so, I thank the Library and others for their assistance. I was encouraged by the Minister’s opening comments regarding the environment.
By way of background, a marine protection area was established around Chagos following a determined and successful campaign by the British charity Blue Marine and others, which persuaded the then Labour Administration to designate an MPA in the closing weeks of the Brown Administration. They created what was then the largest no-take fishing zone in the world—an extraordinary achievement. Blue Marine, together with other NGOs, seeks to protect and restore ocean health worldwide by securing MPAs like this. It has successfully established protection over some 4.3 million square kilometres of ocean—an outstanding achievement—and the Chagos MPA is a significant part of that success. It works.
For those unfamiliar with MPAs, they are precisely that: the designation protects the marine area from overfishing and destructive fishing techniques, and they work to restore marine habitats and support coastal communities with sustainable fishing practices. These large-scale marine reserves enjoy the critical mass to allow the restoration of vital marine ecosystems. They enjoy international acceptance and, critically, they need policing to enforce that protection.
The present arrangement enables the UK to police the Chagos MPA against illegal fishing activity, but what of future protection? The Chagos agreement that we are discussing today refers to a “separate written instrument” that will outline how the management of the MPA and its policing will be managed. Why the simple matter of managing the Chagos MPA cannot be dealt with in the Bill, I fail to understand. Reference to a separate written instrument sounds like a response from an instalment of “Yes, Minister”—a slow process of obfuscation and delay until following the next election, when it all falls apart. I hope not. Will the Minister please explain more of the detail relating to the separate written instrument in her closing remarks? For many, the lack of clarity about how policing and management will be paid for is a worry.
The agreement that we are discussing refers to an annual payment of £35 million, £40 million or £45 million per annum over 20 years, to be gifted as development capital to Mauritius. How much of that will be allocated to managing the marine protected area? Where is the detail? Are we really committing hundreds of millions of taxpayers’ money over 20 years to an agreement with little detail?
The Bill transfers sovereignty of the islands to Mauritius while retaining control over Diego Garcia for 99 years. This dual authority could complicate the enforcement of the environmental protections. While Mauritius has pledged to maintain the MPA—and yesterday’s news is welcome—economic pressures, such as fishing licences and development deals, could lead to relaxed regulations. Experts warn that even slight deregulation could unravel decades of ecological resilience.
We must protect our oceans, just as we seek to protect the rest of our planet from the climate crisis. We are more familiar with the land-based effects of the crisis: the destruction of the rainforest, the growing red list of endangered species and the melting ice. Above all, there is an interdependence between the health of oceans and survival on land. Protecting the health of these oceans seems to me to enjoy fewer column inches in the media, notwithstanding the remarkable television series narrated by Sir David Attenborough, which has been eye-opening and persuasive.
It is worth pointing out that the Chagos Islands are some 2,000 kilometres away from Mauritius. Its maritime enforcement assets include two small planes, which cannot reach Chagos, and two ocean-going vessels. Can we really expect it to invest the sums of money and resources that are required to administer protection and to maintain and enhance this vital MPA? There must be serious doubts about this and about the effectiveness of our agreement with Mauritius, which includes hands-on involvement in the management of this MPA.
With the current awareness of the climate crisis, I do not think that it is appropriate to leave the details of administering this ocean area to a separate written instrument. The agreement risks leaving Mauritius with an overwhelming conservation burden. It is worth noting that the International Agreements Committee of this House considers it vital that an appropriate portion of the annual grant funding be allocated specifically to supporting the marine protected area.
I look forward to the Minister’s responses to these concerns. I would specifically like an indication of how much of the proposed annual payments will be directed towards policing the Chagos MPA.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a friend of the British Overseas Territories. Can I say how delighted I am to hear the excellent speech from the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, because I, too, shall focus on MPAs at the end of my remarks?
We have to ask ourselves how we are now in the position of giving away a vital British Overseas Territory to a nation that has no legitimate claim to it—and paying it a fortune in the process. It simply comes down to the traditional role of our Foreign Office: always selling out British interests as we kowtow to hostile foreign states such as China while abandoning our friends and allies. Of course, the Foreign Office has a long history of this.
Last week, the Telegraph contained an obituary for Vice Admiral Sir Jonathan Tod, who flew more than 2,000 hours in 25 types of aircraft and commanded the aircraft carrier “Illustrious”. His talent was soon recognised and, in 1980, he was promoted early to captain and sent to the Cabinet Office. There, he headed the assessments team in analysing intelligence from central and South America.
In July 1981, Tod told the Joint Intelligence Committee that, if the Argentines were to conclude that there was no peaceful solution to the Malvinas question, they would be capable of mounting an invasion swiftly and with little warning. The Foreign Office absolutely rubbished that as scaremongering and the intelligence watch on the Argentines was scaled down, giving Argentina the signal that we did not care about the Falkland Islands. However, Tod stuck to his guns. In the October, he warned that the threats emanating from Argentina were not disinformation. Six months later, Argentina invaded; the rest is history.
Then we have Gibraltar. Again, the FCO tried to sell it out to Spain, with secret negotiations on shared sovereignty in 2001 and 2002. There was no reason for sharing sovereignty with Spain apart from the FCO wanting to kowtow to a foreign EU Government. Once the plan was in the open, of course, the Gibraltar Government organised a poll. Some 98.97% voted against the UK Government’s plan and wanted to stay with the UK—another FCO plan scuppered.
Now I come on to the Chagos Islands. These islands have been British since the end of the Napoleonic wars, long before Mauritius existed as an independent country. Nobody had ever lived in Mauritius until the Dutch brought in slaves, and then the French took over. No Mauritians ever landed on the Chagos Islands, some 2,000 kilometres away, to inhabit or claim them. Thus, Mauritius has never owned or controlled the islands; the Mauritian sovereignty claim is totally bogus and nothing more than a rewriting of history. France and the UK administered the Chagos Islands and Mauritius from Mauritius, but they were never owned by Mauritius.
Its false claim was strengthened by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the judicial arm of the thoroughly discredited United Nations in its usual anti-colonialism stance. I do not mean to offend noble Lords, but I say discredited because there has never been any UN condemnation of the genocide being perpetuated by Russia in Ukraine, nor in China with the Uyghurs, nor in Myanmar. When we come to the current genocide in new Sudan, which was debated about an hour ago in this Chamber, while US officials have explicitly declared that the RSF and associated militias have committed genocide, the UN as an organisation has generally used terms such as “risk of genocide” or “genocide could be occurring”. It is typical UN cop-out speech. The UN cannot denounce genocide, but it can denounce UK ownership of the Chagos Islands as colonialism. The ICJ’s so-called ruling was merely an advisory opinion from a political court, which in 2017 was involved in a grubby episode to remove the Security Council nominee judge who was British, the renowned Sir Christopher Greenwood, stack the court with more Asia-Pacific judges and reduce western influence.
If it is the Government’s case that we have to obey the ICJ in this case, will we have to obey it when it gives an advisory opinion on giving the Falklands to Argentina or on giving Gibraltar to Spain? The previous Government, of course, were negotiating and negotiating, but they had no intention to sell out. It is one thing starting negotiations but another to conclude them in a bare three months as Mr Lammy did.
We first need to look at why Labour did it. I think we need to look at the past behaviour of the Prime Minister. Before entering politics, Sir Keir Starmer was invited to a high-profile legal conference in 2013 hosted by the Mauritius Bar Association at the InterContinental hotel on the intriguingly named Balaclava beach. It was a gathering of international lawyers. While there, Sir Keir delivered a keynote speech. More notably, he used the visit as an opportunity to engage in discussions on the Chagos issue with Mauritian legal and political figures. He met the then Prime Minister, Navin Ramgoolam, who is now leading Mauritius’s negotiations over the islands and is back as Prime Minister. Ramgoolam later recalled their 2013 meeting as a moment of shared values and mutual understanding. Another prominent Mauritian lawyer and friend of Sir Keir Starmer, Satyajit Boolell, has stated that he “cleared things up” for him regarding the Chagos issue.
Thus, we have our new Prime Minister already keen to sell out to Mauritius, and then came along the new Foreign Secretary, David Lammy MP, not known to be the sharpest knife in the drawer and ripe for the FCO to con him into a sell-out. I can imagine what the FCO said to him at their first meeting: “Welcome, Minister. You have a unique opportunity to settle a long-running issue, which the last Government failed to do. We have an International Court of Justice ruling, and we must hand back the Chagos Islands to their rightful owner, Mauritius. You can get the credit where the last Government failed. They started negotiations, but they were unable to conclude them. Naturally, we will have to pay them a small amount to keep our lease on the military base at Diego Garcia, and that will keep the Americans happy. It is a win-win for you, Minister. We avoid condemnation from the UN, the Americans are content, and you will get the credit for a diplomatic success”. I challenge anyone to say that that description of what happened is not reasonably accurate in all probability.
The previous Government had started negotiations in November 2022 and were nowhere near an agreement after 11 rounds of negotiations by the general election in 2024. That is 18 months of negotiations, including six months led by my very able noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton. I have to hand it to Mr Lammy: he was a mere three months into the job and a new Foreign Secretary with no experience whatever, and yet he concluded the deal in a mere three months. No wonder the deal is so diabolically bad for the UK and the Chagossians.
We have surrendered a UK strategic asset to China, which is already talking to Mauritius about doing deals there. Which country will fund development in the Chagos Islands? It will be China, of course—possibly India too, but certainly China. If Mauritius wishes to exploit the archipelago economically, it will need to establish infrastructure on the islands, and the most likely investor for that is China. China will most likely build a huge military base on one of the other 70 islands, some of which have very shallow water around them. We have seen how China has illegally built massive military bases on sandbanks in the South China Sea. It would be a piece of cake to do likewise on one of the Chagos Islands.
I leave it to others to try to get to the bottom of the cost: £5 billion, £9 billion, £18 billion or £35 billion. Even £1 million is an outrageous sum to give to a foreign power with no rights whatever to the islands, along with our giving away our own territory.
I conclude on the environmental crime that we will soon see there when the marine protected area is destroyed, as it surely will be. Mauritius ranks very low globally in overall ecosystem vitality and biodiversity protection metrics, with fish stocks showing a decline. The Chagos Islands boast some of the world’s most pristine coral reefs and marine biodiversity, making their preservation critical not only for ecological reasons but for future scientific research on climate change adaptation and marine conservation.
In 2010, the UK Government established an MPA of approximately 640,000 square kilometres around the islands. This no-take zone is one of the world’s largest marine reserves and protects the Chagos Archipelago’s coral reefs, deep-sea habitats and wildlife. However, China’s distant ocean fishing fleet is ravaging and destroying our oceans, invading the Galápagos MPA. It is a constant battle to keep it out of our gigantic Pitcairn Islands MPA, the second largest in the world at 841,000 square kilometres. So when China does a deal with the Mauritius Government, now mired in corruption scandals, the MPA will be the first target for Chinese exploitation and destruction as China fishes it dry and destroys the coral reefs with bottom trawling. Four of the top 10 MPAs in the world are UK overseas territories, and we will have destroyed one of them.
I ask the Government: is there nothing you will not sell out in this grubby deal—the Chagossian people, our defence and security, the costs to our economy, the perception that we may sell out other overseas territories and now even our pristine marine environment? I pray that this appallingly bad Bill can be amended or stopped before it does more damage to our country.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I think we all agree that what a Labour Government did 60 years ago in displacing the Chagossians was disgraceful and that there has been a tangled web of deception ever since under Governments of all parties. The Chagossians have been treated with shameful contempt and disdain. This treaty, and hence this Bill, while not perfect, open the way to some sort of justice after 60 years; that is a good advance.
This is a remarkable week of anniversaries concerning Chagos. Yesterday marked no fewer than three of them: 3 November was the 25th anniversary of the High Court judgment in 2000 allowing the Chagossians to return to the outer islands. In Mauritius, 3 November is Chagossian National Day when the Prime Minister lays a wreath at the Chagos monument on the port side in Port Louis, accompanied by the chairman of the Chagos Refugees Group, Olivier Bancoult. As my noble friend Lord Purvis noted, 3 November was also the third anniversary of the UK announcement to Parliament in 2022 by the then Conservative Foreign Secretary that constructive negotiations on sovereignty, the protection of the base, the Chagossians and the marine protected area would begin with Mauritius, with a view to reaching agreement in early 2023.
We can now add a fourth notable 3 November event: the creation by Mauritius, announced yesterday, of the Chagos MPA, as the Minister noted. To cap it all, 8 November, Saturday, is the 60th anniversary—a sad one—of the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and the creation of BIOT by Order in Council in 1965 with, of course, the beginning of the disgraceful expulsion of Chagossians from their home.
I have supported the Chagossians for several decades and declare my long-standing membership of the Chagos All-Party Parliamentary Group, founded 20 years ago, which has shaped my desire for a resolution of this long-open wound.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has used a lot of extravagant terms at different times to deplore this treaty, calling it variously in the last few months a “strategic capitulation”, a “surrender”, “obscene” and “dangerous”. He did not disappoint today—he was very entertaining—but the Opposition are being utterly disingenuous, dishonest and hypocritical, as this treaty is pretty much what they would have concluded in the two years from the launch of negotiations in autumn 2022 to their loss of power in July 2024.
My noble friend Lord Purvis has said in his interventions today and when we debated the treaty in June:
“The treaty is a consequence of now completing the previous Conservative Government’s policy. Some who agreed with it then disagree with it now, but that does not change the fact that the Conservatives made a major policy choice to cede sovereignty and to do it under the context of the International Court of Justice decisions”.—[Official Report, 30/6/25; col. 475.]
After hearing Sir Christopher Greenwood, a former judge of the International Court of Justice, our International Agreements Committee concluded that the future of the base on Diego Garcia would be at greater risk in the likely event of a future binding legal judgment in favour of Mauritius. Sir Christopher recognised that the ICJ opinion was advisory and not binding, but that it is
“a very authoritative guide to the legal position. In reality, it would be very difficult for any state just to ignore an almost unanimous opinion of the international court”.
Liberal Democrats want to be assured that the UK would not permit the United States to breach international law at Diego Garcia, as the then UK Government did in colluding in the use of the base for extraordinary rendition after 9/11. As my colleague in the other place, James MacCleary, said in a debate in May:
“Having now confirmed this deal on a shared UK-US asset, how confident is the Secretary of State that Diego Garcia will not be used by this White House to advance foreign policy objectives that we deem contrary to our principles and interests?”—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1289.]
I would welcome an answer to that from the Minister today, if she is able to provide one.
The treaty does not bring Mauritius closer to China; rather, it strengthens Mauritius’s relationship with the West. Mauritius has not joined China’s belt and road initiative and has no intention of doing so. A long-term agreement between the UK and Mauritius reinforces not only UK but Commonwealth ties, especially with India, which is a close ally of Mauritius. Mauritius also has close ties with the EU, France and Australia. The treaty strengthens NATO’s position and potential operations in the Indian Ocean, and India recently participated in military exercises with the US out of Diego Garcia. The Bill and treaty will bring BIOT to an end, allow Chagossians to return to their native outer islands under Mauritian sovereignty and provide for visits to Diego Garcia. I realise that the treaty does not provide for a right to self-determination, but the House needs to recognise that the majority of Chagossians none the less support it.
The Chagos Refugees Group is the largest and longest-standing group of its kind. It is led by Olivier Bancoult, whom I have met several times, including earlier this year. The CRG, the members of which are all dual citizens of the UK and Mauritius, has campaigned for the rights of Chagossians to return, including through pursuing litigation in our Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and other international courts. The CRG believes that the UK-Mauritius treaty is the only way Chagossians will be able to return for visits and resettlement. In a statement made three weeks ago, Olivier Bancoult said on behalf of the group:
“For the last 55 years since our exile began we have implored the UK government to permit us to resettle in our homeland. After repeated rejection of our demands we remain convinced that this agreement provides the only way forward, in which our compatriots will be allowed to restore the ancestral connection to our islands … Unless, therefore, the Agreement is approved and implemented our exile will continue with no hope of restoring our fundamental human right to return”.
He added:
“This resolution has come about after comprehensive consultation of Chagossians worldwide”.
However, he warned that,
“if Mauritius will not fulfil its responsibilities to us of course we will raise our voices”.
In fact, not only has Olivier Bancoult been consulted over 30 times by the Mauritian Government but Stephen Doughty, the UK Minister responsible, has met Chagossians throughout the process and briefed them ahead of the agreement. There was also mention earlier, I think, of a government-commissioned study conducted by KPMG in 2015, which involved considerable consultation with the Chagossians.
Sir Christopher Greenwood, in his evidence to the International Agreements Committee, said:
“Britain’s standing to argue that Mauritius should be required to resettle Chagossians on the other islands, frankly, is somewhat undermined by the fact that the United Kingdom has consistently refused any suggestion of resettlement on the other islands. That is a position that the UK Government have reaffirmed relatively recently”.
He cited a reply by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, in 2022, to a Written Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, in which the noble Lord confirmed that, in November 2016, which was also under a Conservative Government,
“the UK Government announced that resettlement of Chagossians could not be supported on the grounds of feasibility, defence and security interests, and cost to the British taxpayer. There remains no right of abode in BIOT”.
That was the position under the Conservative Government—no resettlement in the Chagos Islands. It is an improvement on the situation under previous Governments that resettlement is now to be possible, even if not assured.
It is true that the provision in the treaty on resettlement is permissive, saying that Mauritius is free to arrange for resettlement on all the islands except Diego Garcia, rather than obligatory. As my noble friends here and friends in the other place have consistently argued, more clarity is needed about the implementation of the agreement and the impact on Chagossians, including on funding from the trust fund and on resettlement. It would be good to hear more detail from the Minister today.
Finally, other provisions of the treaty or Bill which merit a mention are citizenship and environmental matters. While the Bill removes the ability of people to acquire British Overseas Territories citizenship on the basis of connection to BIOT, it preserves a route to full British citizenship for Chagossian descendants. The treaty includes provisions for the UK to support Mauritius in establishing and managing marine protected areas. We have noted that, yesterday, Mauritius created one called CAMPA: the Chagos Archipelago MPA. The treaty commits the parties to co-operate on environmental protection, maritime security and illegal fishing. My friend in the other place, Dr Al Pinkerton, understandably put forward the need for accountability, with an annual report on progress on the MPAs so that environmental protection does not fade from view. My last request would be to hear from the Minister a commitment to such regular reporting on environmental protection.
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, the people of Northern Ireland have a particular interest in the Chagos islands, because the United Kingdom took on responsibility for the islands and, crucially, a duty of care for the Chagossian people in 1814, when the UK was represented by one of the most successful Foreign Secretaries, Viscount Castlereagh. He went on to play a pivotal role in laying the foundation for peace in Europe for nearly 100 years through the Congress of Vienna the following year, the success of which stands in sharp contrast to the shortcomings of Versailles, 160 years later. His family home, Mount Stewart, in Northern Ireland, is now owned by the National Trust and contains the state chairs from the Congress of Vienna, which were donated to Castlereagh after the conclusion of the congress, in recognition of the crucial contribution that he made to proceedings.
In my comments today, I want to reflect on the serious human rights failures attending the Bill before us and the treaty to which it relates. The argument for the Bill and treaty is that, on 8 November 1965, the UK Government, with the consent of the Mauritian Council of Ministers, removed the Chagos Islands and made them into a separate colony, the British Indian Overseas Territory, in order to meet the American request for a military base on the islands. This means that Mauritius gained independence in 1968 without the Chagos Islands
The argument is that this was contrary to UN Resolution 1514 on decolonisation, because it involved the colonial power, the UK, changing the territorial integrity of the colony before decolonisation. In this context it is said that, notwithstanding that the Mauritian Council of Ministers consented to the separation of the Chagos Islands in 1965, this decision was not valid because the United Kingdom acted contrary to international law in seeking this separation, and therefore since 1968, the decolonisation of Mauritius has been only partially secured and will not be fully secured until the islands are returned to Mauritius. This argument, however, depends on abstracting a concern for the territorial integrity of the 1965 colony, frozen in time, apart from all other considerations of international law.
The distance from the island of Mauritius to the Chagos Islands is a huge 1,339 miles—the distance from here to north Africa. Not surprisingly, the people are of a different ethnic group and religion. Thus, in international law regarding decolonisation, rather than self-determination being subject to territorial integrity, territorial integrity is very much subject to self-determination.
In the second instance, turning to the events of 1968 to 1973, the delivery of self-determination was undermined from 1968 because, after creating the British Indian Ocean Territory, the UK Government embarked on one of the most shameful episodes in our history, as has already been mentioned in your Lordships’ House today. We would like to think that the events of 1968 to 1973 took place in an earlier age—between 1768 and 1773, or perhaps between 1868 and 1873—but they did not. They happened within my lifetime and those of many noble Lords, and involved the forced removal of the Chagossian people not just from their homes but from their islands.
In this context, the Government’s argument is that we can somehow forget about the self-determination of the people of the islands and just revert to the pre-8 November 1965 territorial integrity, and so effectively reassert the validity of what happened between 1968 and 1973. Rather than alleviating our national shame and moral responsibility, the Government’s decision to use the fact that we forcibly removed the Chagossians from their homeland as an excuse for denying them self-determination makes our moral failure much worse. It involves our acting as if the Chagossians do not exist.
The Government might seek to argue that their position is not that the Chagossians do not exist but that they are properly conceived of as Mauritians for two reasons. First, because pre-8 November 1965 they lived in the colony of Mauritius, the boundaries of which the Government are seeking to restore; and secondly, because some Chagossians live in Mauritius.
This argument, however, is completely unsustainable. First, most Chagossians do not live in Mauritius and those who do have been leaving in large numbers. Secondly, those who remain in Mauritius are there only because they were forcibly removed to Mauritius, not because they wanted to go there. We need to give some thought to that. Thirdly, the relationship between the Chagossians and Mauritians is such that it is plainly very difficult, if not impossible, for Chagossians to place themselves in the identity of Mauritian, because the Mauritians played a crucial role in facilitating what amounted to an existential attack on the Chagossians: their forced removal from the Chagos Islands in agreeing they would be moved to the island of Mauritius, 1,339 miles away.
The 1965 decision of the Mauritian Council of Ministers was not valid because it took place while Mauritius was a UK colony. How much more valid is any attempt to pretend that the decision of the Republic of Mauritius in 2025 can be regarded as a valid decision on the part of the Chagossians, who, unlike the Mauritian Council of Ministers in 1965, were not consulted?
Going forward, two things are absolutely clear. First, having taken advice, it would be perfectly possible to facilitate a robust and secure referendum of the Chagossians, who live principally in the UK, the Seychelles and Mauritius, to find out whether they self-determine that their islands—which, from this Saturday, will have been functionally separate from what has become the Republic of Mauritius for 60 years—should rejoin Mauritius or not. This is critically important because the informal referendum, facilitated by a BIOT citizens group which has engaged around 40% of Chagossians, has demonstrated that over 99% of them do not wish their islands to be given to the Mauritians. Secondly, according to the crucial KPMG report already mentioned in your Lordships’ House today, the resettlement of the Chagos Islands would be significantly cheaper than leasing just one of the islands, Diego Garcia, from Mauritius.
It was unconscionable that we should have taken the people of the Chagos Islands from their own lands, but now the UK Government’s Mauritius treaty and Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill are about to make things much worse. First, the Bill—the concluded passage of which facilitates the coming into force of the Mauritius treaty—seeks to give the Chagossians’ lands to what many of them regard as a foreign country, without their consent and without even requiring the Mauritians to resettle the Chagos Islands with the Chagossians. Secondly, the Government propose paying the Republic of Mauritius—which many Chagossians regard not only as a foreign country but a foreign country that has a history of discriminating against Chagossians—an extravagant amount of money for the use of just one island when that would pay for the resettlement of the Chagossians in their islands right now. Thirdly, the Government then hoist themselves by their own petard by engaging directly with the Chagossians, as distinct from the Mauritians, through Article 11 of the treaty, but then make no attempt to facilitate their self-determination.
There is more we would all like to say, but if the Government decide to proceed they will unwittingly make provision for an even more disturbing TV drama than “Mr Bates vs The Post Office”. I urge them to think about that. The British public expect more from their Government in 2025. I strongly advise them to step back from the brink.
Lord De Mauley (Con)
My Lords, the International Relations and Defence Committee, which I have the honour to chair, decided, on the announcement of the deal with Mauritius, to have a look at the proposed handover of sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory. As a result, the committee raised a number of issues. In view of the fact that we are a cross-party committee, we did not get into an argument about the Government’s detailed reasons for doing the deal. We simply observed that the decision to proceed was ultimately political. That statement itself acknowledges the fact that several members of the committee, including me, were very doubtful about the Government’s stated legal and other reasons. My noble friend Lord Lilley eloquently set out the basis for some of those doubts.
Our witnesses were unanimous in their view that Diego Garcia holds a pivotal strategic role for the United Kingdom and the United States, and that it is critical for broader western security strategy in the Indo-Pacific—on that much at least, we can agree with the Government. The Government argue that the deal secures Diego Garcia as a UK base. As an article from RUSI issued since our inquiry points out, however, the base was already secure prior to the ceding of sovereignty. We heard arguments that I find persuasive that the deal could, in fact, make the base less secure in absolute terms. I will come to some of those in a moment.
The committee focused on four key areas: the future of defence and security arrangements on Diego Garcia; the rights of the Chagossian people; the environmental protection of the archipelago; and the costs arising from the agreement.
As regards defence and security, witnesses alerted us to a number of potential risks. Most of these revolved around increased vulnerability to Chinese political warfare tactics. Our attention was drawn to the fact that there remains a risk, particularly in the context of expanding Chinese influence on the African continent, that the base may need to be used in a way that is perceived as contentious in Africa—for example, arising from the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty—and could cause diplomatic difficulties, to say the least, for the UK in the future.
As regards the long term, we heard evidence that the Government’s confidence in the strength of the UK’s right of first refusal to an extension after 99 years was unconvincing. This was because, among other things, it lacks the mechanism for enforcement and would be difficult to assert in practice. This is a significant potential source of future vulnerability that the Government must address now as part of their long-term strategic planning.
Being in Hong Kong at the time of its handover to the Chinese in 1997—and look what a success that has been—brought home to me that 99 years today is little more than a single lifespan. We noted that the agreement has introduced a risk that Mauritius—as the sovereign power, if the treaty is ratified—could object to a specific military operation from Diego Garcia, due to differing views on whether it meets the requirements of international humanitarian law. While the Government were categorical that this would not limit UK-US freedom of action, we were warned that such objections could lead to lawfare and create diplomatic difficulties for the UK, bringing the risk that they affect military operations.
I turn to the rights of Chagossians. We met a cross- section of members of the community in UK and Mauritius. While we acknowledge that their views cannot be representative of the entire community, those we met expressed unanimous dissatisfaction with the consultation processes conducted by both the UK and Mauritian Governments. Concerns revolved principally around, first, the vague language relating to resettlement and, secondly, the inadequacy of arrangements to ensure that Chagossians benefit from the financial package being given to Mauritius by the UK. It is notable that under Article 10 of the agreement, the UK is required to give preference to suitably qualified Mauritian nationals, to the maximum extent practical when employing contractors, but no reference is made to prioritising employment for those of Chagossian heritage.
To date, the Government have not provided a clear or convincing rationale for excluding Chagossians from employment on Diego Garcia. The lack of attention to the interests of Chagossians is even more stark in the context of the financial package. Concerns were raised to us about the £40 million trust fund that the UK will set up under Article 11 of the agreement, dedicated to the Chagossian community, with Mauritius establishing the fund under its financial regulations, in consultation with the UK.
A key theme during our discussion with the Chagossians was the lack of clarity on how the trust fund would be managed, with participants highlighting the Mauritian Government’s poor record in supporting their community. For example, in 2016 the UK provided £40 million to the Mauritian authorities to improve Chagossian lives, yet only £1.3 million was disbursed, and even those funds came with restrictive conditions. Given this, it is surprising that the Government have surrendered the right to manage this fund to Mauritius, when the UK is itself well equipped to manage funds on behalf of others.
The Government have committed to providing a factual update to Parliament on the modalities of the trust fund, and on eligibility for resettlement. I ask the Minister when that update will be forthcoming. Alongside the trust fund, a £45 million annual development grant will be provided by the UK for a period of 25 years, to support development projects aimed at improving the economic welfare of Mauritius and its citizens. Why has a proportion of the grant, at least, not been earmarked for the benefit of Chagossians? I find it extraordinary that it was a Labour Government, in the 1960s, who evicted the population of the Chagos Islands callously from their island homes, and it is a Labour Government, in 2025, who have so blatantly failed to give adequate attention to the rights of the Chagossians.
I turn to the environmental implications. The committee heard the archipelago described by a credible environmental expert as
“the most important reef wilderness on the planet”.
Concern arises partly because there is uncertainty about the future of the marine protected area established around the BIOT in 2010 by the UK, as the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, said, given that it has not been recognised by Mauritius. We were told in particular that the Mauritian Government’s track record in marine governance is poor. Furthermore, assuming that Mauritius acts in good faith in the matter of the environment, its enforcement capabilities are currently limited, as again the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, said, to just two ocean-going vessels and two aircraft that are incapable of reaching Chagos directly.
I turn finally to the cost of the agreement. For each of the first three years, the UK will pay Mauritius £165 million. It will then pay £120 million per year for the following 10 years. Thereafter, it will continue to pay the equivalent of £120 million annually, increasing in line with inflation. In addition, the UK will fund the £40 million trust fund and the £45 million annual development grant that I referred to earlier. The Government calculate the total cost of all this at approximately £3.4 billion. However, critics have questioned the methodology used and argued that the total cost of the agreement could be very considerably greater.
Attempting to justify the cost of the agreement, the Minister asserted to us that the payments to Mauritius compare favourably with payments made by others for overseas bases. For example, he indicated that France had recently arranged an €85 million per year deal with Djibouti on its basing arrangements for a military base 15 times smaller than Diego Garcia. We noted, however, that the Government’s emphasis on the size of the Djibouti base draws a false equivalence between size and cost; it therefore calls into doubt any such comparison. We called on the Government to provide the committee with further information on how the overall leasing costs for Diego Garcia were determined and how these may affect the allocations in the defence budget. No such data has yet been produced.
As I hope I have outlined, the Government still have some very serious questions to answer on the future defence and security arrangements, the rights of the Chagossians, the environmental protection of the archipelago, and the costs arising from the arrangement.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
My Lords, as a former Defence Minister and current chair of the ISC, I recognise the vital importance of the base on Diego Garcia. It is significant because of its strategic location. It has been vital in combating some of the most serious threats against us and our allies, including from terrorism and hostile states. It has a unique capability of collecting data, which has been used to counter terrorism both abroad and at home. It has made our security, not only ours but that of our allies, greater. It is also a strategically vital logistics hub and protects some strategic shipping lanes. On national security, we usually have consensus across the House, both here and in the other place. Therefore, I am saddened and disappointed that the Official Opposition are using this as a political football on such a vital interest, not just to us but to our allies.
There have been four main issues put forward against the Bill. One is the legal issue around sovereignty; the second is cost; the third is the threat from China; and the fourth is the way in which the Chagossian people have been treated. In opening, my noble friend Lady Chapman outlined the issues around the legal uncertainty surrounding the Diego Garcia base. The excellent report of the International Agreements Committee— I congratulate Members who were involved in it—covers those in good detail but, like all legal questions, there are different opinions. Clearly, the committee took evidence from different opinions in its work and Professor Richard Ekins KC was of the opinion that the ICJ opinion was not legally binding.
As has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, Sir Christopher Greenwood said that he could envisage at least two possible routes to make that agreement binding. Clearly, there is a division; there is uncertainty, and that is what the Bill is about, as was said by the Minister in opening the debate, and that is why the last Government entered into negotiations on this.
On the issue around sovereignty, what I find difficult is this. James Cleverly, the Foreign Secretary at the time, said on 3 November, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that negotiations would begin
“on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory”
and that it was the Government’s
“intention to secure an agreement on the basis of international law”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
The then Government were clear about discussing sovereignty, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said. The rhetoric from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is that this is the sovereignty surrender Bill; I challenge the Conservative party to say what has changed in that time, when it was quite clear that the last Government were going to discuss the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands.
The noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra, said that it was all those nasty people at the Foreign Office who have basically bamboozled Ministers of both Governments, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that the Conservatives would have come to a similar conclusion: if they had been returned to office, this Bill would have been put forward.
Secondly, on the issue around costs, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, did the usual trick of adding up all this money to get to £35 billion to give the impression that this money will be paid out tomorrow, when it will be over 100 years. This investment underpins the already huge investment that not only we have put into the Diego Garcia base but, more importantly, the Americans, and will continue to do for years to come. The committee report mentioned Djibouti, as did the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, and possible issues around size, but this is not an unusual arrangement. However, the joint agreement gives certainty to ourselves and our American allies to invest in the future of that vital capability.
Thirdly, on China, there is a lot of hyperbole spoken on this issue—and not just on this Bill. A lot of ill- informed comment is often portrayed as fact. I urge noble Lords to look at our ISC report of 2023 on China. Yes, China is a threat. Is it a threat to Diego Garcia now? Yes, it is. Will it be in the future? Yes, it will be. But the Bill does nothing to make that more likely. On the issue of China, who is Mauritius’s main interlocutor? It is India. Our Five Eyes partners have all agreed this and think it is a good way forward. It has been suggested that Mauritius will have a veto over military operations; no, it will not, if we look at the Bill—it will have the same rights as the Republic of Cyprus in terms of the sovereign base areas. If military action takes place, people will be informed afterwards. That is not giving it a veto. The idea that China will somehow get close to our very valuable assets there is not the case, because for the first time the outer islands, which are vulnerable, will be secured; that is something we should welcome. It also underpins the strategy of working with our Pacific partners to ensure that we face down China in that part of the world.
Fourthly, on the Chagossian people, I think everyone agrees that the way they have been treated over decades has been completely shameful. This agreement makes a movement forward—as my noble friend said, the funding coming forward allows some limited resettlement —but I urge those Chagossians listening not to be fooled by the Conservative Front Bench. I spent 23 years in the House of Commons, and the only person who consistently raised this issue was the Member for Islington North, Jeremy Corbyn. I never heard a single Member on the Conservative Benches, so it is clearly political opportunism to say now that, somehow, they care about the Chagossian people; they do not at all. I would be very wary about that being put forward.
This is an important Bill. The agreement has the support of our Five Eyes partners and of regional players. Please, if we are talking about national security, this is too vitally important to be kicked around, as it is being, as a political football. We need this Bill. It gives a secure future for our continued occupation of Diego Garcia and, more importantly, the facilities that it brings to keep us all safe.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. He deployed a lot of knowledge and insight, and I have great respect for him. He mentioned the former leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, who has been consistent in his interest in this subject; I would also add Andrew Rosindell, who, from the day I joined Parliament, has been consistent in his challenging of Governments of all colours and standing up for the Chagossians.
My noble friend Lord Callanan mentioned his amendment, and the Minister was pretty impolite about that amendment. If the Government were serious about challenging our amendment, why did they not put it to a vote? Incidentally, where are the Labour Peers this evening? If they did not like our amendment, they could have voted it down and allowed the Bill to be committed to a Committee of the whole House. Surely, that would have been the sensible thing to have done.
In 2010, I was appointed Minister for the Overseas Territories. Some 31 years on from when the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was the director of the overseas territories directorate, I was taking a great interest in this subject; whether that makes him very old or me very young, I do not know, but we both care passionately about this subject. I remember at the time looking at the whole issue of the Chagossian people, and we agreed at the time, in 2010, to set up a feasibility study, which then eventually reported in 2014. It is a great shame that the then Government, which, I think, was in transition from David Cameron to Theresa May, did not pick up the recommendations of that feasibility study, take action and look at different schemes to allow the Chagossians to return.
The Chagossians have been treated quite appallingly. There is no doubt about that. Under a Labour Government, decisions were made that were egregious, on a par probably with the Highland clearances and the appalling evictions during the famine in Ireland. These people were forcibly removed from their territory, from their land, and we should be ashamed—my Government as well, over successive decades, but all Governments.
There has been talk about consultation with the Chagossians, involvement with them and engaging with them, but I agree 100% with the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow: we should have a referendum of the Chagossian people. If it is possible to have a referendum for the position of chancellor of the University of Oxford and poll all the alumni around the world, surely it would be perfectly feasible and possible to have a referendum of Chagossians, who are living in this country, in Mauritius and in the Seychelles, with some in different parts of Europe. I believe very strongly that we should do that. One of the observations I have come away with, having had many conversations with Chagossians, is that they are a very proud group of people. What is extraordinary, beyond belief, is that they are still incredibly loyal to the Crown. We do not deserve that. We owe them a duty.
On the deal itself, we have heard many different legal opinions. We heard my noble friend Lord Lilley, who I thought made an excellent speech in which he dealt with this subject, so I will not go over that ground again. I do know Sir Christopher Greenwood extremely well—we were immediate contemporaries, reading law at Cambridge and then at the Inns of Court—and I respect his opinions enormously. During my time as the Minister for the UN, I used to go and visit him at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, where he was our resident judge. He has not once said that these decisions—there is more than one decision—and potential decisions could be totally binding. Other legal experts have said that they are always going to be advisory.
We are where we are. I personally think that the Truss Government, who did not last very long, were quite wrong to launch these negotiations, but the negotiations were launched. Eleven rounds of negotiations took place. A number of Labour Peers who are not here today have said that after 11 rounds we were bound to reach a decision, and it was only a matter of time when the new Government came in that they would decide this. Well, I have spoken to James Cleverly and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and they had red lines beyond which they were not prepared to go under any circumstances.
I will not go into them all, but there were two key red lines. The first was a properly managed MPA, preferably with joint sovereignty, and the other, more important red line was negotiating with Mauritius for a sovereign base area, and I think Mauritius would have agreed this. A sovereign base area is very different from a lease; it is a sovereign base in perpetuity. The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made the point about us being obliged to notify Cyprus that the two Cyprus sovereign bases are our sovereign territory. In this case we have no obligation to do that; this will be not our sovereign territory but Mauritius’s, and we will be in a very different position as a lessee.
If one looks back at the Cyprus negotiations under a Tory Government in 1960, Cyprus was a country fighting for its independence after a very bloody, unpleasant conflict between the British occupying forces and EOKA. After painful negotiations, we got to the stage at which Cyprus was going to reach its independence, but we stood firm and insisted on those two sovereign base areas. The Cypriot Government were not happy, but I suggest to your Lordships that they had a much stronger bargaining position than the Mauritian Government had over the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. In fact, if we had negotiated a 99-year lease on those sovereign base areas in 1960, we would now be looking at 34 years to go.
If one looks at Hong Kong, would it not have been better if the Government in 1897 had secured a sovereign grant of the New Territories? Obviously, we had outright sovereignty on Hong Kong and Kowloon, but it was decided after the war that it was not feasible to maintain sovereignty over Hong Kong and Kowloon without the New Territories. If the Government then had insisted on an outright grant of sovereignty, which may well have been quite possible—I have read all the debates at the time—we would have been in a very different position. If one looks at what happened with Hong Kong, there was enormous pressure on leases and discussion, debate and uncertainty running up to 1997, and that started about 30 years out. I suggest to the Minister that, probably in about 70 years, those discussions will start taking place about the future of Diego Garcia. We may well get a very warm reception from the Mauritian Government in terms of extending the lease by those 40 years, but we may not. A lot of things can change.
The bottom line is that we have lost control. If this treaty goes through, we will have completely lost control of the future of that base. Yes, it will be secure in the short term, subject to all sorts of caveats that have been mentioned. That is why I am very disappointed and sad that that red line was crossed. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, would have allowed that red line to be crossed. Furthermore, had he tried to cross it, he would never have got it through the House of Commons anyway.
On the marine protection area, one of the first things I dealt with when I became Overseas Territories Minister was to look at the biodiversity within the territories—92% of our total biodiversity is in the OTs, of which 20% is in the Chagos Archipelago. It may well be that the commitments of Navin Ramgoolam—whom I know well—will be honoured by future Governments. His Excellency is an honourable, decent man, but he could be replaced by someone completely different. As the noble Lords, Lord Thurlow and Lord Blencathra, have pointed out, the agreements that have been made around the MPA could easily be rescinded or changed, and that MPA, which is one of the jewels in the crown of the overseas territories, could be put at very severe risk indeed.
I will not go into details about the costs, except to say that I think the Minister was wrong in her figures. If one includes the 40 years at £101 million, that comes to £14 billion, not the £3 billion that she mentioned. This decision by the Government not to commit has given us a pause to reflect on what we do now. I urge the House to remember that we have a duty to consult the Chagossian people and improve the Bill, and we absolutely must do that.
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, and particularly his very thoughtful speech today. I say at the outset that I support the Bill as a necessary consequence of the Chagos Islands agreement, which I also support.
I will not deal with the future of the Chagossians or environmental issues today, important though they both are. I will focus on security, but I think that both the British and Mauritian Governments will need to work hard to meet the justified demands of the Chagossian people.
I will not go over all the ground covered by the Minister in her opening speech, but I want to emphasise the importance of the base on Diego Garcia for our security and, more generally, for western security. A simple look at the map shows why it matters so much for our security, and for western security, in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and why security of the base in the years ahead is so important.
For that reason, I continue to think—and, as I have said before in this House, I thought at the time—that it was absolutely right for the previous Government to start intensive negotiations with Mauritius, with the aim of ensuring
“the continued effective operation of the joint UK/US military base on Diego Garcia”;—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
that it was absolutely right for the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to decide, after examining the issue, to continue with the negotiations; and that it is absolutely right for the present Government to conclude them.
As I understand it—and I have listened carefully to the Minister—the agreement will provide us and the United States with the certainty we both need over the future of the military base on Diego Garcia for 99 years, plus another 40 years if we exercise our rights under the treaty. It does not surprise me that our Five Eyes partners—the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—have welcomed the deal, recognising its importance for their and our security, nor that India, South Korea and the African Union have welcomed it too.
It would, of course, have been nice to have secured the deal without the cost. Some £101 million a year in today’s money is not cheap, and it would build a lot of hospitals. But surely the question is whether paying 0.2% of the defence budget is a price worth paying for the security it brings. I believe that it is.
Finally, it is worth considering the implications of our not agreeing a deal, of continuing with a contested relationship with Mauritius, the UN and the ICJ, and of ditching an agreement that we have reached with, and that has the support of, our Five Eyes partners. I know it is always risky to peer into the future, particularly given today’s uncertain world, but we can be pretty certain that the ICJ and UN General Assembly resolutions condemning us would continue. It is likely that they will be legally binding on us in the future. Could we just ignore that? Yes, we could, but in doing so, in these circumstances, we would be flouting international law. I believe—and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, is listening—that the United Kingdom should be supporting and respecting international law, not flouting it. That has been, and should remain, our tradition, whether under a Conservative or a Labour Government.
May I also say to the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra—
Lord Lilley (Con)
The noble Lord said that we should pursue international law. Does he accept that we have, under the International Court of Justice, an opt-out for disputes between ourselves and Commonwealth countries—or was he going to mention that anyway?
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
I was not going to mention that; I was making the simple point that respect for international law has been, and should remain, an extremely important part of British foreign policy.
I say this to the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra. When I was in the Foreign Office, serving under the late Lord Carrington and Lord Hurd, I was not conscious that there was a Foreign Office policy and not a government foreign policy. I have to say, I did not have the privilege of serving under the noble Lord, Lord Cameron.
The agreement with Mauritius and the treaty we are now considering respect international law, protect British and western security, have the support of our Five Eyes partners, India and others, and, in my view, unquestionably deserve our support.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, there is pretty stiff competition for the accolade “worst Bill of this Session”, but this Bill is right up there in contention.
The Chagos Islands are linked to Mauritius only by virtue of the fact that they were both once administered as part of one colony. There is no historical, geographical or cultural basis for Mauritius claiming ownership. I have no idea why, in 1965, the Labour Government decided to pay Mauritius £3 million for agreeing to detach the Chagos Islands, but that is what they did. That £3 million is something like £70 million in today’s money. Labour has form on chucking taxpayers’ money at Mauritius. The cost of this Bill is what I want to focus on today.
The Bill itself contains no financial provisions, but it is important because, if it passes, it will pave the way for ratification of the treaty, which will trigger the payments described in the treaty. This is where the smoke and mirrors start to come in. As has already been mentioned today, the Explanatory Memorandum to the treaty says:
“The average annual cost to the UK … is £101 million in 2025/2026 prices”.
That is technically correct, but we will be spending taxpayers’ money in cash, not as expressed notionally in this year’s prices.
The biggest element of the package runs for the whole of the 99 years. It starts at £165 million for the first three years, then it is £120 million for the next 10 years. After that, it is indexed for the whole of the remaining period using the GDP deflator. This means that, by the end of the 99 years, we will be paying more than £650 million a year—assuming that the deflator comes in at 2%, which is a fairly heroic assumption given the Bank of England’s current performance on controlling inflation. That is what compounding does, even when using the very low rate of 2%. As say, if inflation goes above that, the figure could be very much more. In cash terms, the average is not £101 million; it is at least three times that.
That is not all. The payment structure is front-end loaded, which means that using an average of 99 years understates the short-term fiscal impact. If we look just at the first 10 years, the average payment in 2025-26 prices is not £110 million; it is about £150 million. In cash terms, it is around £170 million. The Secretary of State for Defence told the other place that the treaty would cost the UK less than 0.2% of the defence budget. That is about £120 million, using the 2025-26 budget numbers. In cash terms, we will never, never pay less than £120 million a year. At current prices, we do not pay less than £120 million until about year 30 of the deal. Did the Secretary of State for Defence not understand the deal—or had he concocted this description in a deliberate attempt to confuse?
The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to say that the total expected cost of the finance package, using a net present value methodology, is £3.4 billion, as we have already heard. The total cash cost to taxpayers via the Exchequer is nearer 10 times that. The figure of £3.4 billion not only knocks off future inflation to get to 2025-26 prices; it then knocks off very much more by using a social time preference rate in accordance with the Treasury’s Green Book, and that rate starts at 3.5% and drops down to 2.5%. I will spare noble Lords a discourse on the social time preference rate. It is a fact that the Government use a lower figure when it suits them. Indeed, when the noble Lord, Lord Stern, was asked to analyse the economics of climate change, he used a discount rate of 0.1%. The Government did not even challenge that. Far from it: they used the report to justify the completely crazy costs of net-zero policies.
It is clearly convenient for the Government to use a high discount rate when they are calculating what they claim to be the cost of this policy. I am not going to argue about the discount rate. Instead, I am going to argue that it is simply not relevant. The Treasury’s Green Book draws a clear distinction between what it calls the economic dimension, and the financial dimension. Discounting is relevant to the economic dimension but not to the financial dimension. The Green Book describes discounting in the following terms. The reason for social discounting is to allow proposals of different lengths and with different options, and with different profiles of net costs and benefits over time, to be compared on a common basis. That is not what we are doing here. There is no question of comparing differing proposals in the Bill we have before us. The Government are using discounting to try to pull the wool over our eyes, but we are not deceived. The financial cost of this Bill is not £3.4 billion. It is £35 billion at best.
This is a bad Bill, for the many reasons that have been given by my noble friends and other noble Lords today. For me, it is another example of the reason why the Labour Government cannot be trusted with taxpayers’ money. This morning, the Chancellor of the Exchequer as good as announced that she is going to raise taxes in this month’s Budget. In the first five years alone, hugely important to the Budget arithmetic, nearly £900 million will be given to the Mauritian Government. How can the Government look British taxpayers in the eye and say that they will make us pay more tax so they can give it away to a foreign Government?
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I first mentioned the Chagos Islands back in 2008 in the other place, when we had set up an all-party group on Chagos. I have to say that over the years, when I was at those meetings in the other place, I never once heard a Chagossian say that they were asking to be put under Mauritian rule; they were asking for the British Government to allow them back home. To me, a basic underlying problem with the Bill is that, despite how we behaved to the Chagos Islanders—in our lifetime, let us remember, not in some far-off time in colonial history—when we arbitrarily evicted them out of their homes, which was a gross abuse that we undertook and, let us be clear, would these days be called ethnic cleansing, this Labour Government are repeating the mistakes of the past, with no involvement of the Chagossians and no attempt to get their views by way of a referendum.
I know it would be difficult to organise a referendum right across the world for Chagossians, but it could be done if there was the will to do it. Instead of rushing to announce this deal with Mauritius, the Government could have started a process of real engagement with Chagossians all over the world. That would have shown all the various bodies passing judgment on us that we were serious about looking after the interests of those whose islands were being discussed. The entire basis for this surrender of sovereignty seems to be the principle in international law that territories generally ought not to be divided at independence, but there are countless examples of that having occurred and having been right at the time—India, for example.
The Government say it is important that we ensure the future of the Diego Garcia base, and that without this treaty its future would be uncertain. Why should it be uncertain? There is no one in this House who disagrees about the importance of the base for our security. The uncertainty they mean is based on three international judgments. The International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 2019 was just that—advisory. The UN General Assembly resolution of 2019 is only a recommendation. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea judgment of 2021 followed a process that did not even involve the UK and is therefore not binding.
I am afraid this is just another example of our Government refusing to stand up for our own country and our own national interest. Can anyone imagine China or the United States giving up territory because of some international legal opinion? Of course they would not, because they put their own country first, and it is about time that we did that too. What if this advisory council suddenly said, “We think the Falklands should be given back to Argentina”? Would the Government then say that perhaps that might be something we should do?
We are now going to pay out millions of pounds to give away our own territory, and no amount of fine words from lawyers, liberal ideas and international law will convince the public that this deal is anything other than a shameful act of betrayal of Chagossians. As it stands, not a single Chagossian has the right to return to the islands. It is all down to the Mauritian Government —a Government who are getting closer and closer to China and will face any direction if the money is there. They will decide how the money that we give will get to the Chagossians, if it ever does. Whatever assurances there are on paper are likely, in a short time, to become of little value. Guarantees will be worthless, and where then will be all these pillars of international law? I doubt they will be anywhere to be seen.
This Bill was not in the Labour Party’s manifesto. It was announced very soon after the election and I think that it came out of the blue to all of us. Yes, the Conservatives had started to negotiate, but I am not really interested in blaming who started what. The reality is that the Conservatives did not actually sign up to anything; it is the Labour Government who are signing up to it now. That is their decision that they took quickly just after they were elected.
Why are the Government surrendering a vital geopolitical asset, a matchless environmental protection order, vast reserves of increasingly precious seabed resources and the right of self-determination of the Chagossian people, to say nothing of the massive price tag that the people of the UK will pay for generations to come to rent something that we presently own? Why the rush?
This whole deal and the Bill make no sense to me morally for the British Chagossians, legally, economically or from a security perspective. I genuinely do not understand where it has come from, and that makes me wonder if the only way to understand it—I know noble Lords will not like me saying this—is to look at the role of the Attorney-General, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer. For it is the Attorney-General who, as a barrister, moved from Doughty Street Chambers, which he had shared with his friend, the current Prime Minister, to join the chambers jointly founded by their mutual friend, a certain Philippe Sands, the lawyer who has represented Mauritius’s interests over those of the British Chagossians throughout this sorry saga. The noble and learned Lord became a member of Matrix Chambers and I can only assume that he assumed his friendship with Sands presented no conflict of interest when he became Attorney-General. Nor, indeed, did he suggest a conflict of interest when, in 2023, before he was Attorney-General, he represented a group of Sri Lankan asylum seekers in Chagos and then decided a few years later, as Attorney-General, to allow their case and let them resettle in the UK. Surely this was a conflict of interest.
I am raising this because this is what people out there are asking. If I cannot raise it here in this Chamber, where can we get these answers? Some people may say that this is all above board and it is not for me to say it is not, but it is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, observed in an interview with the New Statesman recently on the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer—he actually said, “He’s got to go”; I will not quote what he said about the noble and learned Lord, because it was pretty harsh—that
“They talk about the rule of law but what they want is a rule of lawyers”.
The Attorney-General said in his 2024 Bingham lecture on the rule of law:
“Since taking office, this Government has already taken steps to uphold those obligations and demonstrate our deep commitment to international law. We have reached agreement with Mauritius to settle the historic sovereignty claims over BIOT/Chagos Archipelago in a manner that successfully marries our international law obligations with vital national security requirements”.
There was not a single mention in that speech of the Chagossian people—shameful. Surely he should recuse himself from anything to do with the Chagos Islands. We should get a statement from him on his position and we should get the legal opinion.
I am deeply ashamed of the Government’s position on this. It is probably the most shameful act of their one-year tenure. I am pleased—people will not like this either—that Reform has said quite clearly and unequivocally that if it gets into power it will tear this treaty up. I will back that, whatever lawyers and international bodies say, because this deal is wrong for our country. It is outrageous that a Government are getting away with giving away our sovereignty in this very short time.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I would prefer the noble Baroness to be consistent. If she is criticising the Attorney-General under this Government for giving advice on continuing negotiations to cede sovereignty, why is she not as critical of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, who was Attorney-General in November 2022, when, presumably, she gave advice to the previous Government to commence negotiations to seek sovereignty?
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
The noble Lord has obviously seen some of these legal agreements. I have not. I would like to see all this legal advice. I see no reason why this House should not see the legal advice.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, we have an opportunity to right an old wrong and prevent a new injustice. We have an opportunity to stop the handover of tens of millions of pounds a year—billions in total—to fund tax cuts somewhere else while taxes are rising here. We have an opportunity to prevent the handover of strategic territory to a state that may come under the influence of unfriendly powers. Above all, we have the ability to stand up belatedly for the injured party here: the Chagossian people.
Sitting silently in the Gallery throughout your Lordships’ debate has been a contingent of our friends from the British Indian Ocean Territory. Their role as silent spectators has been eerily symbolic of the role they have played these past 50 years, and especially these past five years, as decisions about them have been made without them. But we have an opportunity to go in a different direction. Article 18 of the treaty makes it clear that it cannot enter into force until both parties have informed each other that they have concluded all the national ratificatory procedures.
I remind noble Lords one more time of what the Labour manifesto said about this. As my noble friend Lord Callanan quoted, it said:
“Defending our security also means protecting the British Overseas Territories … Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination”.
I would argue that, under the Salisbury convention, it works both ways. You could at least make the claim that this Chamber has not just the opportunity but the duty to enforce the manifesto on which Labour was elected, and that means recognising the self-determination of the Chagossian people.
Why are we doing this? I will not repeat my noble friend Lord Lilley’s speech. There is no legal obligation. For one thing, military facilities are excluded from the purview of these courts, but even if you set that aside, it was expressly drawn up in the clearest language that our lawyers could devise that there was no purview for a court such as this in a dispute between two present or former members of the Commonwealth. That was expressly put in to prevent challenges of this kind.
I think we all know the answer—we heard it from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, a second ago. I cannot help noticing from the sparse Benches opposite that there is no great enthusiasm from the governing party for this measure, but there is a clique of people for whom “Decolonise” is everything. It is painful for them to see little union jacks in the upper corners of flags. They approach these questions impressionistically, based on vibes and emotions, almost regardless of the legal rights and wrongs or the interests of the people concerned.
It is very clear from Philippe Sands’ book, in which he wrote about the whole process, how he, the Attorney-General and, I suspect, the Prime Minister, have come at this. You must always back the ex-colony against the ex-coloniser, always back the poorer state against the western one, always back the non-white population against the white one, regardless of the rights and wrongs. This is even though the people being injured here are, of course, the dispossessed Chagossians. Even as a decolonising exercise, it totally fails on its own terms, because here is a territory now being handed to a genuinely colonial power that has no interest in it and no connection except a pecuniary one.
I will not get into the ecological arguments, which were so well stated by the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, or indeed the strategic ones that we have heard from other people. To emphasise the wrong done to the Chagossian population, I just want to canter very briefly through some of the history.
The archipelago was uninhabited until 1783. The French then populated it with enslaved people taken from the African mainland. It was seized during the Napoleonic Wars—or rather, it was not seized, but the Indian Ocean French-speaking territories were seized—by the Royal Navy, as dramatically rendered in one of the Patrick O’Brian novels.
At the end of that war, in 1814, Mauritius and the Chagos Islands were ceded—separately—to the British Crown. The Chagos Islands were never part of Mauritius. They were administered from Mauritius because there was no suitable administrative seat in the archipelago.
I invite noble Lords to entertain seriously for a moment the argument that, because somewhere was once administered from somewhere else, that creates a sovereignty claim. By that logic, Anguilla would be part of St Kitts; the Turks and Caicos Islands would be part of Jamaica; indeed, come to that, Burma would be part of India. It is a ludicrous argument, an incredibly dangerous precedent that we are setting, not only for our fellow subjects in other overseas territories such as Gibraltar and the Falklands, but for any other country that was ever administered from somewhere else, which is a great many places on the planet.
Let us fast-forward to 1965. As we have heard, the Mauritian Government accepted and gladly pocketed the then huge sum of £3 million in return for renouncing in perpetuity any claim to the Chagos Archipelago. They were far from unhappy about that; this was a territory to which they were unconnected, and they saw this as an extremely good deal. I will quote what the then Prime Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, said shortly afterwards. He said this was a territory
“of which very few people knew, which is very far from here, and which we had never visited”.
As far as he was concerned, that was that. The deal was done.
Mauritius then pocketed some further funds that were handed over by this country, supposedly for the betterment of the Chagossian diaspora, although a lot of that money somehow never quite trickled through to the people that it was supposed to help. Indeed, a lot of the bad feeling of the diaspora population towards Mauritius stems from the way in which those funds have been disbursed down the decades.
It was really only 15 or so years ago, as China began to become interested in Mauritius, that the claim was pressed again in earnest. There was a state visit from the Chinese Head of State, an unusual thing for a country the size of Mauritius. The first free trade agreement, I think, between China and an African state was with Mauritius. At that point, suddenly, Mauritius became very interested in exercising sovereignty over this territory, and can you blame it? It has been referred to aptly as the Malta of the Indian Ocean. Of the seven great naval choke points in the world, it is within reach of four of them: the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait and the Cape of Good Hope. It was from the Diego Garcia base in 1991 that the waves of B52 bombers took off to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. It was from there that a brave part of the campaign against the Taliban was waged.
It is worth noting, if we are playing the game of decolonise, that for a diaspora Chagossian to dispute Mauritian sovereignty is an imprisonable offence under a law passed in 2021. Simply to say what I am saying would get me a spell in chokey if I were in Mauritius. However, there is an alternative solution, and it was touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. I want to put this forward because it is not just that we are stopping this; we have to have an alternative. It was one that was initially looked at when Tony Blair was Prime Minister. He commissioned a feasibility study by KPMG into resettling the Chagossian population on the outer atolls. The feasibility study came back much later and said that it could be done for the cost of £3 billion over a century, which, in a rather short-sighted move, the subsequent Conservative Government decided was too big an outlay during the time of austerity. But even if we accept the Minister’s figures on the liability to British taxpayers—and I suspect that my noble friend Lady Noakes is much closer to the actual sum—that is still a lot more expensive than putting in the infrastructure and resettling the Chagossian population as British subjects in a British overseas territory. Then, because it would be an inhabited territory, that would put the sovereignty claim for ever beyond doubt. It would then be up to the people there, and them alone, if they wanted to change their sovereignty.
When this Government took office, they promised growth. What we are seeing is that they are delivering shrinkage in every sense: economically, morally and geographically. If this Bill goes through and we compound the injustice to our fellow subjects of Chagossian descent, we will be in every sense diminished as a country.
Lord Horam (Con)
My Lords, I shallow narrow down the grand anti-colonial views of my noble friend Lord Hannan—it was a splendid piece of radical demography, if I may say so, and really well done—to the point made very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and my good and noble friend Lord Bellingham, which is the position of the Chagossians.
I should declare an interest straight away in that I am vice-chairman of the All-Party Group on the Chagos Islands; this is because I took part in a parliamentary delegation to Mauritius many years ago and have maintained contact with the island since. I have been there once. It is a splendid place to go, by the way—thoroughly enjoyable, rather different from a November day in the House of Lords. There is no doubt that Mauritius is a very pro-British colony, so pro-British that it follows our Premier League football avidly. There is even, I found to my surprise, in the middle of Mauritius, a village called Arsenal, with a football team called Arsenal Wanderers. I tried to find out whether there was a Manchester United, reflecting my own interest, but no luck, I am afraid.
None the less, I reiterate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, made: Mauritius is a significant player and is in a vital part of the world. It is currently very pro-British and successful, and we should be careful in how we handle this diplomatically. It could easily go very wrong if we do not take their point of view into account.
More importantly, there is the position of the Chagossians. There is no doubt that we did a terrible thing to them in 1965. My noble friend Lord Bellingham compared it to the clearances in northern Scotland; what happened in 1965 is similar in that we took their hereditary land and banished them from it. Forget the law—we have a moral debt to these people, which we must fulfil. I am glad some of them are in the Public Gallery. There is no doubt that opinions are mixed: I know that many of the UK Chagossians are against the Bill, but, equally, many of the Chagossians in Mauritius and the Seychelles are in favour of it. Indeed, the chairman of the Chagos Refugees Group, Olivier Bancoult—parts of whose statement was read out by my good friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford; I will not repeat it—makes it clear that there has been good consultation, with which he is satisfied, and that he supports the Bill.
What really worries me is a point that has not yet been made in today’s debate; it was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, the chair of the International Agreements Committee, in earlier debates on this subject. The Bill and the treaty are notably deficient in dealing with the Chagossians’ rights. Only one sentence in the whole treaty deals with the position of the Chagossians, saying that the Mauritian Government are now in a position to do something for the Chagossian people. That is all it says: in effect, that the Mauritian Government are able to do something.
I have a suggestion for the Minister, whom I am glad to see back in her place. My noble friend Lord Callanan homed in on an important point: there is a big gap on the treatment of the Chagossians in the treaty and in the Bill; they are incredibly insufficient in that regard. I am sorry that we are not discussing the amendment he proposed, because the idea of having four or five weeks in which we could discuss all this properly—in a measured way, without relying on what people outside the Chamber are saying, and perhaps through a Select Committee—is entirely sensible. If we cannot have that, could we none the less do something else to meet the problem by a different method?
I understand that, normally, in treaties of this kind, we do not want to get into how a partner to the treaty should handle people who are, after all, its own citizens—namely, in this case, the many Chagossians in Mauritius. We would not normally do that in diplomatic circles; that is not the way it is handled. However, the Government could have attached to the treaty an exchange of letters that drew on any views that may have been expressed by the Chagossian people. There could have been a referendum or some other means to find out opinions on exactly how this should be handled and what they want.
To go forward on this, frankly, sketchy basis is not sufficient. It is a shame that we appear to be so far advanced down the line, but have not fully addressed this in the way we should. I seriously suggest to the Minister, who has admirably put forward her position, that we should attach to this treaty an exchange of diplomatic letters which, at the very least, take into account any views expressed, while we have the further discussions my noble friend Lord Callanan wishes us to have.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP) [V]
My Lords, I first declare an interest as a friend of British Overseas Territories.
The Bill is labelled the Diego Garcia Bill, but we all know it goes much further than that and deals with the full implementation of the Chagos Islands deal. The Government have told us that the previous Government started negotiations on sovereignty. The Opposition have told us that they would not have signed that Bill. I suspect that both those assertions are true.
Our task is to dissect whether the Bill is an appropriate one. In my view, this is a poor deal for the United Kingdom as a whole, but above all, a shameful deal for the Chagossian people. The Chagos Islands have been British since 1814. That was before the final defeat of Napoleon, and indeed before the Falkland Islands, for example, were British. It is before the vast bulk of countries across the world were in their current form—certainly before their current boundaries. It is before even the UK’s current boundaries themselves existed. Yet, we are handing over sovereignty to a country which is over 1,000 miles away from the Chagos Islands and has never ruled over or had control of them. It is akin to us handing over the Isle of Wight to Belarus, so limited are the geographical connections between the two. As the Government have indicated, we are doing so in part because of the advisory ruling of the ICJ and the threat legally of what is to come. I will not reiterate the very wise points, from a legal perspective, made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley; suffice it to say that I am not convinced by the Government’s legal case.
Let me go further—and I appreciate this will appear as heresy to some in the House. When it comes to British sovereignty and the self-determination of those under British sovereignty, while international opinion is always something to which we should have regard, we cannot simply give carte blanche to international opinion. Those who would treat international opinion as sacrosanct in these matters will have to answer at some future stage, when the ICJ, no doubt prompted by some feeling of anti-colonialism, declares that the Falkland Islands should be part of Argentina, or that Gibraltar should be part of Spain. That is the logical conclusion of saying that we cannot at any stage challenge what is ruled by an international court, and it is why I believe that British sovereignty and regard to the self-determination of the people within that must be paramount.
It is not simply a question, as others have said, of giving away sovereignty. We are not simply giving it to Mauritius; we are actually paying them a substantial fee to take it off our hands. Whether we regard that as the £3.4 billion the Government are talking about, the £35 billion the main opposition party is talking about, or somewhere in between, we are paying a vast sum—a cash cow—to Mauritius to ensure that the Chagos Islands become theirs. Not only are we giving a feather in the cap—a big financial gain—to Mauritius, but we are also giving them an asset.
We know already of the deep involvement of China, which sees Mauritius as part of its sphere of influence. There is no doubt that in the days to come, we will see parts of the Chagos Islands being built on by the Chinese, who will encroach more and more in that area. Then, the Government will ultimately be left with no real response, because they have already surrendered the sovereignty of the islands to Mauritius.
The other motivation is, perhaps, a feeling of colonial debt or guilt. But if we take at face value the premise that there is colonial debt, to whom do we owe that debt? Surely it is to those who we colonised in the first place—namely, the Chagossians. They have been treated shamefully. That is no different from what I suspect has happened over the last 60 years—we have a very poor record in the Chagos Islands.
The Chagossians, throughout these negotiations, have not had a veto, have not been directly involved in negotiations, and when it comes to consultation have effectively been consulted after deals have been done. That is not the way to reflect self-determination. In the deal itself, as well as giving over sovereignty to Mauritius we have a trust fund supposedly for Chagossians which will be entirely controlled by the Mauritius Government—not a penny will go directly to the Chagossians themselves. We did not even, within this deal, get a right of return; we have ceded that entirely to Mauritius. I have no doubt that, if there is any form of right of return, it will be for those Chagossians who have shown subservience to the Mauritian Government. Anybody deemed to take a different view from the Mauritius Government will not be able to return to their homeland.
This is a shameful deal. I welcome, at least, that the committal Motion has not gone ahead. I urge the Government, even at this belated hour, to take advantage of that time and genuinely consult and reach a view on the self-determination of the Chagossian people. We have been told by the Minister and others that Chagossians are content to be with Mauritius. Let the Government put that to the test and show proper self-determination to the people of the Chagos Islands. Let us use this pause to abandon this appalling deal and this rotten Bill.
Lord Altrincham (Con)
I thank the Minister for her patience in hosting this debate and welcome the Chagossians who have joined us this evening—they are very welcome in our House.
I start by noting that some matters are not obvious because they are not obvious, and this one is really quite a complicated story to explain. It was interesting to hear how the Minister was able to explain it, in a sense tactfully, because it involves at least three countries, the rights of individuals, a wide-ranging view on legal matters and interpretations, and environmental issues. And only then do we get to the defence issues and, finally, to a very large amount of money.
To understand why we are paying out so much money, we need to understand why the agreement is in the form it is. That always goes back to the claim on sovereignty and the Government’s anxiety over the legal risks. The Minister in the Commons, just like the Minister this evening, referenced once again the International Agreements Committee report from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the statement in that report—the report is very carefully written—that if agreement was not reached then there would be some risk to the base. We always hear this. The Government do not like to quote the other statements made in the conclusion of that report, where it says that the findings in 2019 were non-binding. It also notes that the treaty does not make appropriate provisions for the Chagossians and concludes with an observation that the treaty is a compromise. That is a good word to describe the situation the Government are in: it is some kind of compromise.
Indeed, our colleagues on the International Relations and Defence Committee, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, struggled with the legal position here. They heard lots of legal opinions and they were not able to reach any conclusion. They said there is a wide range of opinions, and came up with the language that it was a political decision. Again, that is a fair way of describing it: we have a compromise for political reasons in the judgment of the Government.
We would expect the financial part to reflect the spirit of that—a spirit of compromise and of a rather complicated story. However, when you get to the financial part of this agreement, you find that, in fact, it is a great deal of money. My noble friend explained the initial payments, but the Government like to talk about an amount of £101 million, in this discounted, not-real-money way. The initial payments, incidentally, are over £200 million a year. The Government always go back to try to justify why we are paying this rental fee. They say, with great triumph, that there is precedent —we heard this in the House of Commons—in the example of France paying €85 million a year for a military base in Djibouti.
Of course, it is extremely unlucky to justify British public spending with reference to French public spending, but, putting that aside, the Minister in the House of Commons was probably not aware that the whole idea of introducing Djibouti came from the Mauritians. They introduced it because they wanted to introduce the concept of an open market rent—this had to be on an open market basis. But this situation is not even beginning to be on an open market basis. As we have just discussed, it is a very complex compromise. We should never have accepted the comparison to the Djibouti example at all and should never have started from that position. With a moment’s reflection—just a moment’s reflection—we find that the UK is in no position to seek an open market rent for an American military base. It is preposterous. It is not even beginning to be an open market situation.
Then we get to the overall economics of the situation. The Government love talking about this number of £3.4 billion. It is a great deal of money for those who do not really wish to pay any money for this. Unluckily for the Government, they do not seem to understand the financial risk of the contract, which could be for a great deal more. The reason for that, as we have heard, is that in the contract there is an inflation ratchet from year 14 to 99. It is not a question of how we account for it today; it will be real money that flows out. The ratchet starts in year 14, so quite soon.
The reason that matters is that a future Government will almost certainly need to retrade this situation, for reasons that we do not know today. What they will find is that the Mauritians do not see the contract the same way—they do not account for it the same way. They will see an extremely valuable exposure to UK inflation. The Government do not seem to understand the risk in their own contract. Could the Minister report to the House whether the value of this contract is actually £3.4 billion—that is, the capped value—with no further exposure above £3.4 billion? It is extremely important that the Government find a way to cap this exposure, because if it rolls any longer then it will be locked in as being uncapped. That will create a frightful row in the future between the UK and the Republic of Mauritius, but we are trying to settle rows between the two countries. We do not want a misunderstanding of the value of the contract.
Finally, I add one other important thought, because we are deficit financing the Government at the moment. It is very burdensome for the Government to pay money out of the country to another country. The Government like to point out that some public expenditure creates domestic stimulus. That itself will always be argued over, because some people will say there is too much waste and that the spending is inefficient. When the Government waste money domestically, there probably is some level of domestic stimulus, but when the money is sent to the Republic of Mauritius, there is not any. It is worse than that because, in addition, the money is not being spent on the military base and the treaty provides for priority to Mauritian contractors and Mauritian workers—there are no jobs for people from the UK in this. It is a straight loss out of the UK. It is particularly burdensome.
The treaty amounts to a shakedown of UK taxpayers by the Republic of Mauritius. In addition, it points to weakness in financial controls at His Majesty’s Treasury and by the Government. It may in due course create great misunderstanding if the Government have not properly appreciated the inflation exposure that they have in the contract. A future Government will meet that exposure with dismay, and future taxpayers will be taking the cost of it.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, there is general agreement about the importance to the UK’s defence security, and to the USA’s, that a stable and legal arrangement should be agreed. The 100-year and more period of this treaty makes some valiant assumptions about the longevity of the relationships between the countries involved. Governments rise and fall, and relationships shift—sometimes dramatically, sometimes on a generational rather than a centenary timeframe. Although this is far from being a well-received arrangement and treaty, it may now be increasingly difficult to change course completely. However, in following from what the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, was saying, I have one question about the arrangements covering the payments to the Government of Mauritius.
Article 11 of the treaty says that in consideration of the agreement, which applies to the whole of the Chagos Archipelago, certain sums will be paid to Mauritius. The exchange of letters dealing with the details of these arrangements also forms part of the agreement, but the British and American interest is confined to the island and surrounding seas of Diego Garcia. In 100 years and more, there must surely be a possibility of some natural catastrophe—an earthquake or tsunami, or even a rise in ocean levels due to global warming. The runway at Diego Garcia is only a metre above today’s sea level. Any of these might make the base and/or the airfield no longer functional. Has the UK any automatic right to cease payments to Mauritius if the base is no longer usable nor capable of recovery at any reasonable cost?
Maybe the Minister will point to some section of the agreement that covers this eventuality. If it is not explicitly covered, will Mauritius still be lawfully entitled to the annual payments even if Diego Garcia is unusable? Were the UK to stop payments, would it have to be settled along the lines outlined in this agreement by arbitration and, ultimately, agreement between the respective Prime Ministers? It would not be in the UK’s national interest to be devoting scarce defence funds to a useless white elephant, but a clash over interpretation could also be damaging to our national interest.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, raised this point on my behalf in the debate on 30 June. In reply, the Minister suggested:
“Like all small atoll islands, it is naturally dynamic”.
He would not speculate about future erosion but was confident that surveys overall concluded that the natural land area
“has decreased by less than a single percent over the last 50 years”.—[Official Report, 30/6/25; col. 535.]
Is that a sufficient reassurance about a natural disaster or sea levels not rising by less than a metre for the next 100 years-plus? Considerable sums might be at stake. If this eventuality is not satisfactorily covered, should it be corrected before the treaty is finally approved?
Baroness Meyer (Con)
My Lords, as I look at the empty Benches opposite, I wonder whether some Labour Peers are just realising how unnecessary and reckless the Bill is.
First, the people of the Chagos Islands were not even consulted about the future of their homeland. Having already suffered the injustices of forced removal half a century ago, they have now been denied a voice in deciding its fate. For a Government who claim to uphold human rights, this is an extraordinary moral failure. The treaty claims to allow a programme of resettlement on some of the outer islands but not on Diego Garcia itself, the very heart of their former homeland. It provides no detail on where, when or how such a return might occur. The Government concede that settlement remains “necessarily uncertain”. In reality, the Chagossians’ right of return depends entirely on the discretion of the Government of Mauritius, who have shown little interest in their welfare. So those who were exiled more than 50 years ago will once again be denied any guarantee of justice or a true homecoming.
Secondly, this Government have chosen to give away British territory to Mauritius, even though there was no legally binding obligation on the United Kingdom to do so. In February 2019, the International Court of Justice issued only an advisory opinion—a political statement that carries no legal force, not a judgment. I will not go on about all the legal bases for why there was no need for us to sign any legal agreement, which the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, pointed out earlier.
In short, the Government are acting not out of legal necessity but by choice, while jeopardising one of the most important axes in the defence of the free world. The Government insist that this is about the long-term security of the base, but under Article 13 the lease expires in 99 years. What happens if Mauritius decides not to renew the lease? Only last month, its Prime Minister publicly questioned the duration and terms of the lease, suggesting that it may not guarantee long-term British or American access. A poor country will always be tempted by Chinese money. What if Beijing simply outbids us? Without a right to extend, this deal does not secure Diego Garcia, safeguard the marine protected area or protect the rights of the Chagossian people.
This is not an investment; it is an expensive and humiliating surrender made at a time when British taxpayers are already struggling. The Prime Minister has admitted that it will cost around £3.4 billion but, as my noble friend Lady Noakes so clearly set out, it will be at least £35 billion. Why are we giving away billions of pounds for territory that we already administer while the Americans keep the base? In other words, Britain pays, America stays and China watches.
Thirdly, the freehold now rests with a non-nuclear power. What if Mauritius objects to nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels using the port or airstrips, or imposes restrictions on operations vital to our defence? What if Chinese trawlers, granted fishing rights close to Diego Garcia, begin gathering intelligence under the cover of commerce? China, Russia and North Korea all have an interest in this vital region. This is not only a very expensive concession but a very dangerous one.
We have weakened our position, undermined our allies, burdened our taxpayers and silenced the Chagossians. This is quite simply the worst deal for Britain in living memory—a moral outrage, a legal folly and a strategic danger.
Does the Minister not agree that it is time to pause, admit that the Government have got it wrong and stand up for what is truly in our national interest? Will the Minister not agree that, before relinquishing sovereignty over any British territory, the Government have a duty to ensure the consent of its people? Can the Minister explain why the Government are proceeding with this Bill without first consulting the Chagossian people—those most directly affected by it? Will the Government commit to rectifying this omission—maybe, as suggested earlier, by a referendum? Will the Minister also confirm whether the Government recognise the Chagossian right to self-determination under international law, and if so, why their right of return has been made dependent on the discretion of Mauritius rather than on a clear guarantee within the treaty itself? Lastly, I remind the Minister that the trust fund is controlled by Mauritius and will not necessarily go to the British Chagossians.
Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer—despite not agreeing with a word she said. I am pleased because I have waited a long time to make this relatively short speech in this debate.
I concluded my contribution to the debate on 30 June on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, with the following sentence:
“I will offer this agreement my full support in these and any other proceedings in your Lordships’ House”.—[Official Report, 30/6/25; col. 524.]
That is still my position in relation to both the agreement and the Bill, the more so because, as my noble friend Lady Liddell remarked in the earlier debate in June, and as the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, reminded us today:
“Our allies, not just the Five Eyes communities of the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand—along with ourselves—but India, Japan and South Korea—
and the African Union
“—strongly support the deal”.—[Official Report, 30/6/25; col. 501.]
I congratulate my noble friend Lady Chapman of Darlington on her comprehensive opening remarks. I thank her and my noble friend Lord Coaker for their openness and engagement with noble Lords on the many issues and complications that are raised by this treaty. I thank my noble friends in particular for arranging an all-Peers drop-in session on the Bill on 29 October, and even more for ensuring that the key FCDO officials, including the UK chief negotiator, Harriet Matthews, were present to share their knowledge and respond to noble Lords’ remarks or questions, which they did candidly and, in my view, credibly. I am only sorry that the representatives of the Official Opposition who were in the room at the beginning of that conversation mostly left without taking advantage of the opportunity to question those who negotiated this and to ask the questions that they clearly have.
In as few minutes as I can possibly do, I will focus my speech on what was the main purpose of my speech on 30 June: to examine, in so far as I am able to, the principles that appear to underlie opposition to this treaty and, consequently, to the Bill.
The strategic importance of Diego Garcia and its base to the United Kingdom and the United States, and to all our allies globally, is well known. Interestingly, I found in my research, despite the fact that much of the commentary about this base refers to it as a secret base, that it is very easy to find out the detail of quite a substantial amount of its capability in open source. It is available in some detail. I proceed on the basis that no one engaged in this debate needs to be reminded of the specific or strategical operational support that it offers. My own experience of its importance to UK security and to that of our allies was the support that it gave our operations both in Iraq and in Afghanistan when I was the Secretary of State for Defence. I have no intention of going into the detail of that, but it is well known and, for those who do not know, a lot of this can be found in open source.
As a consequence of our agreement with Mauritius, we will have access to this capability, enhanced by more investment by the United States. It is not a case of saying that if we pay, the United States stays. The United States invests many multiples of its cash in this base in order to give it the extraordinary capability that it has. Nobody can do anything to change its position on the global map, but the Americans can continue to invest for a period and they have plans to invest further in the long term. We will get value for our money from what the Americans do to help support us and the way in which we work with them to make sure that capability improves all the time.
However, the fact of the matter is that in 2019, when the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion concluding that the UK’s administration of the Chagos Archipelago was unlawful and that Mauritius has sovereignty over the territory, it immediately imperilled continuing new and planned investment in Diego Garcia. I worry if this is not known to those on the opposite Benches. I understand, from an open source comment, that the US suspended that investment until the issue of sovereignty had been resolved. One of the advantages of having the negotiators in the meeting of 29 October was that I was able to ask them openly if the information, which is available for people to see and read, was known to the FCDO: was the fact this link existed known to the Government at the time when the negotiations started?
The uncertainty that justified the United States position is to be found in the evidence given by Sir Christopher Greenwood to the International Agreements Committee, which has also been referred to earlier by other speakers. Sir Christopher Greenwood is one of the UK’s pre-eminent practitioners of international law and a former judge in the International Court of Justice. In his opinion, any international court examining the sovereignty dispute would likely find in favour of Mauritius. Such an outcome would clearly represent a risk to the future of the military base, and thus to the UK’s national interests and security. That is not something we can just dismiss. Had the issue of sovereignty not being resolved by a negotiation, the suspension of US investment would also have represented a risk to the future of the military base, and thus to the UK’s national interests and security. That is the environment in which these decisions to enter negotiations were made back in November 2022.
I practised law for the best part of 20 years before I was elected. A substantial proportion of my practice was in negotiation. There are many lawyers in this House and I am sure that they realise that lawyers spend more time in negotiation than in almost anything else. On some occasions, my clients wanted me to enter negotiations in order to protect a status quo— I think we have called that a red line in this debate. It appears to me, from the many speeches that I have listened to, that this was the latter objective of the negotiations that the Conservative Government started: to get back to the status quo.
I always told my clients that I would argue for the status quo in negotiation but, if there was a judicial assessment that made the status quo unattainable, it would be a failure in the negotiations to try to achieve that. That is the situation that the Government were in in 2022.
The whole process, of course, started with the Written Statement made on 3 November. There has been toing and froing about what was said in the Statement in order to try to water it down, but let me read the first paragraph of that Statement, because it is extraordinarily revealing as to what the then Government were seeking to do. It reads:
“Following the meeting between the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Norfolk … and Prime Minister Jugnauth at the UN General Assembly, the UK and Mauritius have decided to begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)/Chagos archipelago”.
Next comes the important sentence:
“Through negotiations, taking into account relevant legal proceedings, it is our intention to secure an agreement on the basis of international law to resolve all outstanding issues”?—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
In other words, we were beginning to negotiate with the only people we could negotiate with—Mauritius, which was holding this particular card—to transfer the sovereignty to them in a way that would give stability, allow our major ally to get back into the relationship that we had, and continue to build this mother of all bases in the world. It is as simple as that.
I do not understand why everyone is looking for explanations for this by suggesting that, in these 11 exercises of negotiation, we were seeking to do something else. It is perfectly clear what the Conservative Government was setting out to do. They were pushed into this position by the fact that the United States was unwilling to continue to invest in this until that uncertainty was resolved.
On 29 October, I took the opportunity to ask the negotiators if that was what they understood to be happening; that is exactly what they understood to be happening. I understand why now, for political reasons, the Opposition wish to rewrite this, but that is what they were doing and what we continued.
Secondly—
Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)
I am happy to stop there because I have made my point. The nonsense about the Chinese has already been dealt with.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, to pick up on a theme identified by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and as identified by my honourable friend Tom Tugendhat on 9 September, when he noted in his speech at Second Reading of this Bill in the other place, yes, negotiations were commenced under the last Government. As Ministers, both he and I wrote to the Prime Minister—both Prime Ministers—to complain about the decision to institute those negotiations. We were right: the treaty was not one that should have been considered then, and it is not one that should be considered now; the whole principle was wrong then, and it is wrong now.
Why do I say that? The main rationale for handing over the islands is that an international tribunal—the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea—may abuse its jurisdiction in treating the ICJ’s advisory opinion as if it had established, as a matter of binding international law, that Mauritius was sovereign over the British Indian Ocean Territory. As I said when the House debated the treaty on 30 June, the risk of an adverse judgment and the real risk to the operation of the UK-US airfield at Diego Garcia are very significantly overplayed by those who favour this treaty. The ICJ had no such power and did not, in fact, reach the conclusion that Chagos should be transferred to Mauritius. Its advisory opinion left open other courses of action on the UK’s part other than surrender of the islands to Mauritius.
Mauritius cannot, as a matter of international law, secure a binding judgment before an international tribunal establishing that it is sovereign over the Chagos Islands, because the United Kingdom is not required to consent to a dispute of this nature being adjudicated by the International Court of Justice. Accordingly, if I might expand on the point made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, the Government explained their position by saying that they anticipated that another tribunal—as I said, specifically the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which, I may add, has no jurisdiction over questions of sovereignty over territory—will presuppose that the ICJ’s 2019 advisory opinion has settled that Mauritius is sovereign, and will thus proceed to exercise its jurisdiction in relation to disputes about the law of the sea on the premise that Mauritius, rather than the United Kingdom, is sovereign. Yet how can this be, since there is not a word about sovereignty over the Chagos Islands in that advisory opinion of the ICJ?
We must be in no doubt that the Government, on their own account, are handing over a priceless strategic asset and trampling over the Chagossian people as they do so, because they want to avoid being on the wrong end of a potential future abuse of adjudication. However, this is a premature and wholly unnecessary surrender that blazes a trail for other abuses of the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction to be leveraged into future United Kingdom defeats and compromise of our vital interests. We need to resist now, not only for our national security and that of our global allies but also to refute this abuse of law.
Furthermore, the deal is a terrible one, for the reasons ably outlined by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. Some of the examples are that the terms of the treaty provide very little in the way of leverage or protection for the UK. We cannot, for example, withhold payments for a breach of the terms that nominally protect our interests, and there is no machinery to enforce Mauritius’s commitments. Instead, Mauritius will be well placed to take our money and to reach accommodations with other states in relation to the archipelago that are injurious to our interests.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
I am following the noble Lord very closely, and I do not disagree with some of the points is making. Could he, however, clarify why it was that James Cleverly on 3 November said that the Government were to
“begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory”?—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
Clearly, the Government then were talking about the sovereignty of the actual islands.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
As I said earlier in my remarks, that was a decision with which I strongly disagreed then, and I strongly disagree now. He was plainly wrong in so saying.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Forgive me: I have given way once, and time is limited.
Professor Ekins, professor of law and constitutional government at Oxford, set out in detail, when he gave evidence to the House of Lords International Agreements Committee, the failings in the treaty. In particular, he set it out in even more detail in his Policy Exchange paper published at that time. I strongly urge the Minister to consider those two items in detail during the pause in proceedings brought about by the decision not to proceed with the committal Motion tonight.
There can be little doubt, contrary to the Government’s expostulations about saving the base, so ably outlined by my noble friend Lord Altringham, that this in fact weakens the strategic interests of our country. It does so without any sound legal or geopolitical basis, and, as many noble Lords have noted, without any reference to the wishes of those who lived in the archipelago, shamefully removed on the orders of a Labour Government —a shame that, as the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, noted, is about to be repeated and amplified by this present Labour Government.
Finally, the Minister said that the previous Government had entirely overlooked the Chagossian people, a calumny that was repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. Not so. Section 3 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 —a Conservative piece of legislation—was the first legislation to make provision for Chagos Islanders and their direct descendants to obtain British nationality, something successive Labour Governments had failed to provide.
Lord Biggar (Con)
My Lords, the treaty that the Bill before us would ratify vaunts its righting of the historic wrong done to the Chagossians, while doing little for them. It signals its virtue, without much exercising it. That has been made plain several times over the past few hours, so I will not labour it.
As my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere has rightly urged, the treaty’s real concern is not the Chagossians but completing the decolonisation of Mauritius. The Government accept the ICJ’s 2019 advisory opinion that, in effect, the detachment of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius in 1965 was unlawful because it defied UN General Assembly resolutions in 1960 and 1966. These declared that:
“Any attempt aimed at … disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with … the Charter of the United Nations”.
The 1966 one urged that the UK take no action that would dismember the territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity.
However, this principle of non-partition is nonsense. Supporting the 1960 resolution, the president of the General Assembly, Irish diplomat Frederick Boland, invoked Ireland’s loss of its historic integrity to illustrate the injustice of partition. He thereby expressed the Irish nationalist’s typical historical blindness. The island of Ireland had never been a political unit, apart from its union with Great Britain; and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, has already well said, there is no natural law prescribing that a geographical integrity has to be a political one. On the contrary, there can be good reasons for dividing it. Ireland was divided in 1922 because Irish republicans wanted home rule so much that they were prepared to use violence to attain it, while Irish unionists disliked it so much that they were prepared to take up arms to oppose it. Ireland was petitioned to prevent civil war—a justified act of political prudence. What is more, if the principle of non-partition were applied impartially, applicants to the ICJ would be clamouring for the restoration of the territorial integrity of British India and the return of the Gulf states and Burma to rule by Delhi. Oddly, we hear no such clamour.
The 1966 resolution is no less absurd than the 1960 one. It appeals to the national unity of Mauritius—as if the Chagos Islands were not separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian Ocean, and as if the islanders were an integral part of the Mauritian people; but many Chagossians feel as Mauritian as Irish republicans feel British. The only connection between Mauritius and the Chagos Islands is an accident of colonial administrative convenience. Talk of some national unity that was ruptured in 1965 is an opportunistic fiction.
Notwithstanding its opportunistic absurdity, the principle of non-partition was invoked and confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion. What is more, the court used that principle to adjudicate a crucial point of contention between Mauritius and the UK, notwithstanding the fact that, when originally submitting itself to the court, the UK explicitly excluded its jurisdiction over such a dispute.
Among the Government’s several, shifting justifications for signing the treaty is said to be the fear that a subsequent international tribunal—such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea—would use the ICJ’s opinion to make a binding judgment against the UK. Therefore, to avoid that embarrassment, the Government prefer to give up the fight now, conceding sovereignty and negotiating an expensive lease.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, that international law deserves respect. However, I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, that respect requires much more than blind, slavish compliance. When international law embodies an absurd principle that is opportunistically and partially applied outside of its agreed jurisdiction, it brings the international order into disrepute and corrodes the law’s authority.
For the sake of upholding confidence in international law, the UK should stand its ground, argue the strong, rational case for its sovereignty over the Chagos Islands, expose the imprudence and partiality of the General Assembly’s resolutions, and remind the international community that the ICJ has no jurisdiction. If some international tribunal were irresponsible enough to issue a binding judgment against the UK on the basis of the ICJ’s opinion, the UK should, with respect, not comply with it.
I have no doubt that that would cost us diplomatic good will in progressive circles that are entranced by an idealised view of international law, but we have no good will to lose with ideologically hostile states such as China, Russia and Iran. The rest of the so-called global South is not a politically uniform bloc; it embraces nations ranging from India to Nigeria and Peru, which have divergent—sometimes opposing—interests and views. They would not all react with equal disapproval to our principled non-compliance. Some might even be impressed by a self-confident Britain’s refusal to yield to opportunistic lawfare, in bold defence of the law’s integrity.
This treaty is disingenuous in championing the Chagossians and slavish in its blind compliance with absurd and partial law. For those reasons, we should not ratify it.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
My Lords, over breakfast I read the views of the noble Lord, Lord Biggar, and can confirm that they have not changed over the course of the day.
I begin with an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. He, the noble Lord, Lord Jay, and I spent 10 years in the Permanent Secretary’s office in the Foreign Office, and I certainly never discovered the secret plan to cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago that officials were apparently sitting on. I saw a number of changes of Foreign Secretary, and I cannot remember ever seeing the huddle of officials saying, “Is this the soft one we can manage to persuade that it’s time to cede the Chagos Archipelago?” I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, may have been watching too much “Yes, Minister”. It is sad that he has never been Foreign Secretary, because he has far too high an opinion of officials in the Foreign Office.
I have only three small points to make; I will be very brief, because I spoke at enormous length when we debated the treaty in July. At that time, the Opposition suggested that the treaty should not be ratified, but the House voted that it should be ratified. It cannot be ratified without this Bill; therefore, we should now pass it. That is my first point.
My second point is about the China syndrome. We heard then, and we are hearing again today, even from the Opposition Front Bench, the theory that recognising Mauritian sovereignty somehow opens the door to Chinese influence in the Chagos Archipelago and to a Chinese threat to the base. I have never understood this theory. If the risk were real, why did the Indians warmly welcome the treaty? Why did Secretary of State Rubio in Washington call the treaty a “monumental achievement”? Mr Rubio, like President Trump, is hardly soft on China. Mauritius is one of the only two African countries that have not signed up to the belt and road initiative. Why would the Mauritians enrage the Indians, to whom they are close, by helping the Chinese, whom they seriously distrust? Why would they forgo the payments we would be making? The theory makes no sense, and I strongly suspect that some of those who advance it know that perfectly well.
That brings me to my third point, which is, of course, the emollient one. The pernicious doctrine that the duty of opposition is to oppose, regardless of principle, merit or consistency, is perhaps particularly irresponsible in the sphere of foreign affairs. Mr Cleverly announced in 2022 that we would open negotiations to
“ensure the continued effective operation of the joint UK/US military base on Diego Garcia, which plays a vital role in regional and global security”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
We agreed; I heard no dissent. I did not know about the approaches of the noble Lord, Lord Murray. There was no public dissent from what the Government were going to do.
Under Foreign Secretary Cameron, negotiations continued—11 rounds, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, reminded us. I am rather sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, is not here tonight. It would have been very good to have his verdict on the Bill which results from the work he supervised. The legal issues and the China risk explored by Conservative Back-Benchers today will have been thoroughly explained to him at the time. Indeed, we now know that the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, no less, advised against the course that he was pursuing. There is nothing new in these arguments. They were known to the Conservative Ministers who proceeded with the negotiations.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said that it is one thing to start a negotiation about transferring sovereignty and quite another to conclude one. That is very true, but if I were absolutely determined not to cede sovereignty, I do not think I would start a negotiation about ceding sovereignty. I do not think, if I was strongly convinced that it was a bad idea, that I would have let it run on for 11 negotiating rounds.
We are shortly to hear from the Front Benches. I look forward to hearing from the Liberal Democrats; their concerns about the Chagossians do them credit. Their reservations about the treaty are ones I understand —they are honourable, although I believe they are unjustified.
We will also be hearing from the Conservative Front Bench—the heirs of Cameron and Cleverly. I have the greatest respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, not least because she hails from my part of the world. So my hopes are high that, unlike some of her colleagues, including those on the Front Bench, she will contrive to steer clear of the twin rocks of hypocrisy and irresponsibility.
Lord Northbrook (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Chagos Islands APPG. I give its secretary, David Snoxell, credit for persevering with the cause over the years. Unfortunately, having reflected carefully on the issue and the treaty, I have come to disagree on the conclusions formed by many of the group. I now feel that Mauritius will unfairly benefit more from the treaty than the Chagossians will. Indeed, I now feel that this agreement is bad for our national security and financially a disaster.
Until recently, I was under several misapprehensions. First, I was led to believe that the International Court of Justice—ICJ—verdict that the island should be handed back to Mauritius was legally binding on the UK. Secondly, I had not realised that the UK had already paid Mauritius £3 million in 1965 to retain ownership of the Chagos Islands after Mauritian independence. Thirdly, I believed that the UK was bound by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—UNCLOS. Fourthly, I believed that we had to obey the diktat of the International Telecommunication Union—ITU—concerning the threat to the electromagnetic spectrum. Fifthly, I had underestimated the threat to the islands on the defence front from future restrictions on nuclear weapons and from encroachment by China, Russia and Iran. Sixthly, I am not sure that the guarantees and financial promises to the Chagossians will be honoured.
I will now deal with each of the above issues in turn. First, on the ICJ verdict, I have since discovered that, while from February 2017 the UK has accepted in declarations all judgments of the ICJ, it does not accept that they apply to any dispute with the Government of any country which is or has been a member of the Commonwealth.
Secondly, the payment of £3 million in 1965—over £80 million in today’s money—means that we should not be paying Mauritius again.
Thirdly, the UK is not legally bound by the decisions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. According to Dr Luke Evans, at Second Reading in the other place on 9 September,
“back in 2015, under annex VII, the tribunal agreed with the UK that sovereignty could not be determined by UNCLOS. This was a marine protection issue”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/9/25; col. 818.]
Fourthly, as forensically examined by colleagues in the other place—Sir Jeremy Wright, Sir John Whittingdale and Mark Francois—it is clear that the ITU has no jurisdiction over the UK’s electromagnetic spectrum. The ITU treaty, to which we and others are a party, states specifically that the ITU has no authority over the allocation of military spectrum. Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the radio regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum. Will the Minister please confirm this, in light of the fact that any judgment by the ICJ against us is not legally binding?
Fifthly, I want to focus on the defence threat to the West from this deal. The Pelindaba treaty, as already mentioned, to which Mauritius is a signatory, prohibits the stationing and storage of nuclear weapons, yet Ministers have failed to explain what that will mean in practice once sovereignty is transferred. Also, an element of the agreement involves a requirement for us to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base. Can the Minister tell us whether this means that it must be done before the armed attack?
The defence threat also comes from hostile powers in the region. The risk to Britain’s security is great. Diego Garcia is our most strategic and important base in the Indian Ocean, critical to our partnership with the United States, and vital to project influence in the Indo-Pacific. Yet the Bill leaves huge questions unanswered. What safeguards will prevent hostile powers such as China, Russia and Iran seeking a foothold in the archipelago once Britain steps back? Beijing already describes Mauritius as a partner with strategic advantages, and Mauritius could well join its belt and road initiative. Port Louis boasts of advancing co-operation with Russia. Iran, since the first Iran-Mauritius Economic Forum in 2022, has explored export and import opportunities and joint ventures in agriculture, fisheries, pharmaceutical industries and nanotechnology.
Sixthly, I want to focus on the situation for the Chagossians themselves after this treaty. The speeches at Second Reading by the Labour MP Peter Lamb and the Conservative MP Aphra Brandreth are very relevant on the subject. Peter Lamb, MP for Crawley, where many Chagossian exiles live, makes very relevant points, from which I shall quote directly:
“Although mention of the Chagossians is made in the wording of the deal, I remain concerned … that there are gaps that leave the Chagossian people at risk. While there is the option for Chagossians to be allowed by the Mauritian Government to return to the islands, there is no requirement in the deal that that happens. There is no guarantee that any Chagossian who does return to the archipelago will not face restrictions that prevent permanent habitation, even at a subsistence level of economic activity. There is no guarantee at this time that the trust fund that is being created will be in the control of the Chagossians and used exclusively to address the consequences of their forcible removal from the islands. There is no guarantee that returning Chagossians will not face a 10-year prison sentence for questioning Mauritian territorial integrity through taking on British citizenship”.
Aphra Brandreth adds another key point on the issue, saying:
“The Government must … take the opportunity to implement a recommendation put forward by the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee and International Agreements Committee … that looked at the treaty. They urged the Government to ‘Enhance Chagossian engagement by establishing a formal consultation mechanism with the Chagossian community to monitor the Agreement’s implementation and ensure their meaningful inclusion in decision-making.’ Will the Minister confirm whether that recommendation will be implemented?”
Further, she states that
“the … trust fund, established as part of the UK-Mauritius treaty and financed by the UK, is to be distributed solely under the control of Mauritius, yet the Bill contains no provisions to monitor whether the rights of British Chagossians are upheld or to create any statutory oversight of the trust fund. Have Ministers secured from the Government of Mauritius any firm commitment that British Chagossians will have a formal role in the oversight and decision making regarding the fund? Indeed, why was a model of joint governance not agreed, ensuring that British Chagossians themselves have a voice in how the fund is governed and can benefit directly from it?”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/9/25; cols. 773, 812.]
In conclusion, this is a terrible deal for the UK, giving away full ownership of a vital defence asset and paying the Mauritian Government an extraordinary sum of £34 billion in cash terms to lease it back. I have shown how the key pillars of the Government’s argument for the necessity of doing this do not stand up. These are, namely, the ICJ judgment, the ITLOS argument and the electromagnetic spectrum. I reiterate that the Chagossians have certainly not been looked after in this deal, hence I would have strongly supported the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in his amendment.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I wish to acknowledge those of the Chagossian community who are here observing this debate, those following it at home and those who will read it. My noble friend Lady Ludford, in her powerful contribution to the debate, informed by decades of work on behalf of the Chagossians, told us of the remarkable sequence of November anniversaries, including some which are a dark stain on this country with regards to how we have treated the Chagossian community. We should all share blame for this generational mistreatment.
I start by stressing in clear terms that we still need more clarity on the rights given, potentially, to the Chagossians of a permissive nature, but by virtue of us providing those rights to the Mauritian Government, not directly to the Chagossians themselves. I hope the House will recognise that this has been a consistent and constant concern of these Benches, and it continues. We pursued it in the debate on the treaty and I am glad that the Minister acknowledged it in her opening remarks. My colleagues in the House of Commons pursued it when the Bill was in Committee there and I reiterate it today.
A test for us now is how, finally, we give rights back to Chagossians, including the right of self-determination for their future, which should be in their hands. If we negotiate an agreement on Gibraltar with the statement, “Nothing for Gibraltar without the Gibraltarians”, that should apply in this context too. Indeed, we divided the House of Commons in Committee on the right to self-determination. It is worth placing on the record in this debate, which I point out to the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Meyer, that the Conservative Official Opposition did not support us in that. It is fine to call for self-determination and a referendum in this debate, but it is worth recalling that, just a couple of weeks ago, that party opposed it in the House of Commons.
We touched a little on history today. I went through a lot of the history in the debate on the treaty, so I do not need to rehearse it. Today, there was a slight new edge to this. It was interesting that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, criticised the Labour Government for concluding an agreement in 1965. That may well have had cross-party support, but the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, called it a shame on our country. With interesting parallels, it should be recognised that negotiations to detach the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius commenced on 29 June 1964, under the Conservative Government. The Conservative Party has form, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, might say.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Forgive me, but the shame, as I am sure the noble Lord will agree, comes from the removal of the Chagossian people from the Chagos Islands, not from the agreement itself.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Yes, and as the noble Lord will recall from the debate that we had on the treaty, that was accelerated under the Heath Administration in 1970 and concluded under the Conservative Government. The denial of repatriation was then subsequently under another Conservative Government. My point is that all of us in this country have a dark record when it comes to Chagossian rights. Our task now should be how we at least restore some of those.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, started his remarks by saying that the House of Commons was denied the opportunity of debating the treaty during the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act period of scrutiny. He knows, because he will remember the debate we had on the treaty, that, as Erskine May makes perfectly clear, one of the mechanisms for the House of Commons to deny ratification of a treaty would be through an Opposition day debate. During the scrutiny period of this treaty in the House of Commons, the Conservative Party chose a different subject for its Opposition day debate. It had the chance, if it chose to take it, of debating and moving an amendment in the House of Commons during the scrutiny period.
We are here today debating this Bill for one reason and one reason alone: the previous Administration made a political decision to cede sovereignty and to enter into negotiations to conclude this. I hear noble Lords saying no, and I will come on to that, when they may wish to change their minds. Not one Conservative colleague today said why the previous Government opened negotiations to cede sovereignty in 2022. The then Government did not open negotiations to improve relations or co-operation with Mauritius. They made the principal decision to cede sovereignty, but they still have not said why. I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, will outline clearly today why that was the case.
All legal considerations on this issue, which have been debated quite a lot during this debate, predate 2022. The complaints received in this debate predate James Cleverly and that Government’s decision. We have had complaints in this debate from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, of the current Attorney-General and the advice given to this Administration. As my intervention on the noble Baroness suggested, the same would have been the case under the previous Government. I assume that when the previous Government made the policy decision in November 2022 to open negotiations which would conclude with the ceding of sovereignty, they were also advised by Attorneys-General. I have a hunch that it might have been the Attorney-General at the time of November 2022, but it could have been any of the three Attorneys-General that the Government had in 2022. No doubt, history will tell us which one of those it was.
A new argument has been presented today by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra, that the Conservative Government were powerless and feeble and that their Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries were forced against their will by officialdom to make that statement in 2022. This is the argument of being in office but not in power. It was our suspicion at the time that the Conservatives were in office but not in power, and I am glad noble Lords have confirmed that.
I understand the argument that might say that this is a bad deal or that it has been handled badly. I think that many parts of it remain problematic, and I would have liked the Government to have handled it differently. But that is different from the Conservative Opposition in the Commons, who said in their amendment that they were “implacably” opposed to “ceding sovereignty”. They were not implacably opposed to ceding sovereignty in November 2022, so what changed?
Lord Bellingham (Con)
The noble Lord is actually putting a very strong case. What I said in my speech was that there was a red line about a sovereign base area—the concession of sovereignty across all the rest of the territory, but keeping the sovereignty of the base.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Lord; I listened carefully to his speech, which he made in his characteristically sincere way. I will try to address that point in a moment.
I asked: what changed? In the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, explaining when she winds up on behalf of her party what policy changes were being made, I might assume that the only relevant change is the fact that the Conservatives were in government and are now in opposition. Without there being a clear policy change, we can only make that assumption.
This is quite important because the Statement in 2022 said,
“on the exercise of sovereignty”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
I have wondered why the same party that was implacably opposed then can be in favour of it now, especially because that Statement by the Government said that they were doing this to “resolve all outstanding issues” of international law. They knew that they had to resolve those outstanding issues of international law, but now they are denying the very virtue of the fact that they had any issues at all to address. That is quite hard to understand, and they have not made it any clearer today.
The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, was also made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. The 2022 Statement, which was the policy choice of the previous Government, was a mistake—as the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, indicated; I respect his honesty —or was, according to some of his colleagues, the result of deep state. Nevertheless, if that had raised serious defence concerns, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence at the time would presumably have raised concerns about it. That Minister was the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, so she has ample opportunity to address the noble Lords’ points in her speech today.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
We have heard a lot about what has gone on in the past and whether the Conservatives did this or that. What I want to know is: are the Liberal Democrats implacably opposed to this treaty? Do they want to see the Chagossians be given full democracy and have their rights listened to?
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am sure that the noble Baroness heard me—I am sure she was paying attention to the early part of my contribution—when I said that we moved that very Motion in the House of Commons just a few days ago but did not get support from the Official Opposition. So I appeal to the noble Baroness to wait until the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, makes her contribution and then to intervene on her with the same question.
The noble Lord, Lord Murray, made an interesting contribution. It was a post hoc breach of collective responsibility when he referred to his letter of opposition to that policy choice of his Government. I was going to intervene on him to ask politely whether he would place that letter in the Library for us all to see; I am very curious about it. I would be interested to know how many of his colleagues made the same complaints. I have mentioned the fact that one of those colleagues was the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie; of course, another of his ministerial colleagues at the time was the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. He did not intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Murray, so I assume that he did not write a letter of complaint at the time; I am sure that we will find out in due course.
Ultimately, we have to recognise, to be fair to the previous Government, that they entered into negotiations in good faith. I do not think a British Government would likely enter into negotiations on the ceding of sovereignty if they knew that the conclusion of that was not the ceding of sovereignty, so I give credit to the previous Government for acting in good faith about that. The question now is how we seek to raise our concerns on those very aspects of the Chagossians’ right to self-determination and on the scrutiny and operation of the trust fund. I hope we can continue to raise these concerns during the passage of the Bill in good faith.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I will try to get this debate back on track and deal with the issues that I think have been confronting us. The debate was ably introduced by the Minister and it has been predictably interesting, presenting some sharply contrasting views. It has also demonstrated a dichotomy between sincerely held views of former and venerable public servants and political views. There has been a further dichotomy within the political classes as to what constitutes responsible decision-making. As my noble friend Lord Murray indicated, even within the same party you can sometimes find a dichotomy of view—it happens, I say to the Minister. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that when it comes to a party having differences of view, I would think the Liberal Democrats could give master classes.
The position of these Benches was laid out clearly by my noble friend Lord Callanan. He also addressed the precipitate and surprising decision of the Government to delay their own Bill by, unusually, not proceeding with a committal Motion. The Minister, with admirable verbal gymnastics, sought heroically, if perhaps not completely convincingly, to explain that decision, but I think the reason is simple: the Government had concerns that the sensible amendment to the committal Motion that my noble friend had tabled was drawing support, and it may well have been that the Government were fearful that support for the amendment or a version of it would prevail and the Government would lose. But that was a judgment for the Government to make. I observe that the amendment was not prescriptive and would have left matters entirely under the control of the Government. What has now emerged is a welcome breathing space for the Government to consider and answer some serious questions about the agreement on which the Bill is predicated. Some of these questions have already been asked, but it will be my pleasure in a moment to add to them.
My noble friend Lord Callanan raised some of the most serious issues arising from the agreement, and it is interesting that the concerns he expressed were mirrored during the debate by a number of contributors. If we look at the agreement and at the trust fund, we find that there is an absence of knowing in detail what the views of the Chagossian people are on these issues. That was raised by a number of contributors, including my noble friend Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has concerns about that.
The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and my noble friends Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham spoke movingly about the treatment to which the Chagossian people have been subjected over decades. I found that moving— I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I am not being hypocritical in expressing that sentiment—and it was very much echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, who graphically described the lack of engagement in relation to current matters.
Then there is the issue of money—in today’s economic climate, a hot potato if ever there was one. The Chancellor is scratching around looking for every penny she can find, defence urgently needs upfront cash and taxes are almost certainly going up, yet the British taxpayer is going to be asked to pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius, a point that was raised by a number of contributors. My noble friend Lady Noakes gave a devastatingly forensic analysis of the costs and the Government’s disparate approach, and I will leave that to the Minister to respond to. Those concerns were echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, and the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme.
Then there was the position of China, and the not imagined but avowed objective of China to strengthen ties with Mauritius because of its strategic advantages, and China’s commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. These clearly cause concern to many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord De Mauley. Even the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, nobly supporting his Government, said, “China is a threat”. I agree. That was again referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I was a Defence Minister for nearly four and a half years, and one of my areas of responsibility was south-east Asia. China is a resolute prosecutor of its own interests, with an overt desire to exercise influence globally. At our peril do we waver in our vigilance.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I am so grateful to the noble Baroness. I just want to say that I am quite sure that the Mauritians would agree with that.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
That is an unexpected source of encouragement, for which I thank the noble Lord.
Finally, and very importantly, the defence and security implications of this arrangement are clearly ringing alarm bells, as noted in the contributions from my noble friends Lord Lilley, Lord Blencathra, Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham. My noble friend Lord Bellingham helpfully distinguished between this agreement and the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, referred. The whole point is that we have sovereignty in Cyprus and can control these arrangements, but we cannot under this arrangement: we are in the hands of the agreement and Mauritius’s disposition to us.
The Minister described the base as a prized military asset. I was very glad to hear that and, of course, I agree. It was also emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Jay. But it is this aspect of defence and security to which I wish to devote my final remarks. The Minister already has a lot of questions to which a response is required, and the observations from my noble friend Lord Lilley certainly require comment, but here is my addendum.
With the help of the Bill, I have been endeavouring to knit together the components of the agreement with the text of the Bill. Seeking clarification from the Government on a number of vital points is part of a necessary scrutiny process, but His Majesty’s Opposition reserve their overall position on the Bill and will determine their approach at a subsequent stage in the procedure. In the meantime, let me set a general perspective.
We reach the ninth introductory paragraph to the agreement before there is any mention of
“protecting international peace and security”,
with specific reference to
“the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base on Diego Garcia”.
Although I might have hoped for earlier recognition of the primacy of defence and security, this is where we are. But the drafting confirms that this is a pivotal part of the agreement, which then promotes defence and security to Article 3 of the agreement and enhances that status by including Annex 1, so progress has been made. I mention this because it goes to the heart of what the agreement stands for, what it is about, and the need for absolute clarity.
There is the further question of the extent to which material text in the agreement should be replicated in the Bill. I propose to raise a number of factual questions, which I appreciate may require the Minister to go back to her officials. I am content that she does that and can respond by letter, a copy of which could perhaps be laid in the Library. At least the Government have now helpfully provided some time within which to do that.
Going back to the agreement, under Article 3,
“the Parties shall not undermine, prejudice or otherwise interfere with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base, and shall cooperate to that end”.
That is an undertaking of fundamental importance by Mauritius to the UK. It explicitly implies that Mauritius should not enter into any arrangements, either on its own account or with any third party, which could be in breach of that undertaking. That, by implication, logically confers upon the UK a right to respond to such arrangements by taking whatever action is necessary to safeguard the base, and our interests and those of our allies on the base. Can the Minister confirm that that is the Government’s understanding?
An important protection is granted to the UK by Annex 1, paragraph—
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
Forgive me for interrupting, but the noble Baroness said a few minutes ago that the sovereign base area in Cyprus was not the subject of a treaty. It was the subject of three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the treaty of establishment.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
I hesitate to correct the noble Lord. I think what I said in response to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, was that the sovereign base areas in Cyprus and this arrangement are not the same. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made was, in fact, about expeditiously communicating with Cyprus if we are going to do something. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I thank him for his intervention but I think we are slightly on different planes.
I had got to the UK’s position under Annex 1, paragraph 1A, which says that the UK shall have
“unrestricted access, basing and overflight for United Kingdom and United States of America aircraft and vessels to enter into the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia”.
That is good. Annex 1, paragraph 1B(i), says the UK shall have “unrestricted ability” to
“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”
on Diego Garcia. That is strong; it is a clear reassurance and there should be no ambiguity as to what it means. But less clear is Annex 1, paragraph 1B(viii), which says the UK shall have “unrestricted ability” to
“permit access, basing and overflight for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels, upon notification to Mauritius”.
If that is merely a courtesy intimation then it does not compromise the UK controlling the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities on Diego Garcia. If that notification requires the consent of Mauritius then it most assuredly does, so can the Minister confirm that such intimation is purely a courtesy and that consent to the proposed action is not required from Mauritius?
Under Annex 1, paragraph 2, the UK
“agrees to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State directly emanating from the Base on Diego Garcia”.
It is in the middle of the Indian Ocean, and a territorial armed attack on a third state could theoretically be mounted from the base, albeit that is perhaps unlikely. Can the Minister confirm whether that obligation to inform “expeditiously” extends to assets which, for example, merely called into the base to refuel and are once again at sea or airborne? Does that obligation also apply if UK forces disable hostile aircraft, drones, ships or other devices which present a threat to the base?
I ask these questions because in any live conflict, the environment is kinetic. The last thing on the minds of military commanders will be seeking consents. These questions which I have posed require clear, unambiguous answers.
I turn to how the agreement engages with the Bill. I would have thought that the issues I have already raised, plus the importance of the role of the joint commission under Article 12 and the mechanism for setting disputes under Article 14, all merit a specific mention in the Bill. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government are prepared to look at the drafting of the Bill with a view to incorporating some of these issues into it?
Specifically, there is in the Bill a reservation to His Majesty under his prerogative to make laws for Diego Garcia and to empower His Majesty to make Orders in Council. I raised this at the very helpful briefing meeting held by the Minister, for which I thank her, but I will add this point. His Majesty is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. What if a threat to the safety of our Armed Forces manifests in the base itself or in the assets operating from there? If there is a disagreement with Mauritius as to the character and gravity of that threat and how the UK proposes to respond, does the lawmaking power under Clause 3(3) prevail to do whatever is necessary to protect our military and civilian personnel and our assets?
This agreement raises two profound concerns. First, if the Government concede this area of British sovereignty, how safe are our other crown territories—the Falklands, Gibraltar and our sovereign bases in Cyprus? The moment that lawyers come sniffing around any of those, will this Government be resolute and stand up to that? Secondly, this agreement should not be seen as some tying up of loose legal ends with a box ticked. It has a significant impact on the British taxpayer, on the Chagossians themselves and on our defence and security interests.
Notwithstanding the acknowledged authority of the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lord Beamish, and the respect in which they are held in this House, the lack of support from the Government’s own Back Benches is troubling. I look forward to the Minister’s response, because this debate has raised a series of profoundly concerning substantive issues, and this Chamber needs reassurance.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for her closing speech. It was exactly the kind of speech I would have expected from her. It was forensic and detailed, asking absolutely legitimate questions that any respectable Opposition should put to a Government proposing this kind of Bill. I will try to answer all her questions— I was writing as quickly as I could—but I may not get through them all. The idea of a letter in the Library, explaining the detail so that everybody can see what we have to say, is a very good one. I would be happy to do that.
I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. It has been lively, as I suspected it might be. I might say that I agreed with some contributions more than others, and some were probably better informed than others, but that is the nature of these things. I will endeavour to respond to all the points raised by noble Lords, and we will, I hope, have further discussions in Committee on many of those.
I would like to remind the House why we are scrutinising and reviewing a Bill sent to us from the other place. The Bill is essential to ensure that the treaty with Mauritius can be ratified, a treaty that is fundamental to safeguarding the operations of a critical UK-US base on Diego Garcia and to the security of British people. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, the Bill is also vital to protecting the British citizenship rights of Chagossians.
Noble Lords have questioned the legal rationale for this deal and asked what court could give a binding judgment. Let me set this out again: as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, explained well in his speech, if a long-term deal had not been reached, it is highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would have been brought quickly against the UK. Both the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee, in scrutinising the treaty, heard evidence of where these binding judgments could come from.
One possibility is that Mauritius would find a dispute under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that it could bring before an arbitral tribunal under Annexe VII of the convention. That also raises the prospect that Mauritius would seek provisional measures from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Provisional measures of this type and the decision of an arbitral tribunal would each be legally binding on the UK. A further possibility is that a dispute under a multilateral treaty could be brought before the International Court of Justice. A judgment delivered in the manner by the ICJ in disputes between states may also be legally binding.
There are those—we have had this ever since we started debating this issue—who question where this binding judgment might arise, but they are fundamentally missing the point here. The risk was real. International courts were already reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty, and this in turn, as my noble friend Lord Browne explained, put the base at real risk. The point is that the treaty with Mauritius prevents that happening in the future.
Noble Lords are perfectly entitled to take a different view on the extent of that risk; that is absolutely their right. The Government’s view is that that risk is real. Having that view, any responsible Government making that assessment has to seek to resolve it and to come to some lasting, legally enforceable arrangement with Mauritius. That is why we did the deal. Noble Lords are entitled to disagree with the Government, and I have absolutely no issue with that, but please do not impute some sort of bad intent or motive around political correctness, colonialism or any of those things. Our intention is to secure that base for the benefit of the security of our country. We did it so an agreement could be concluded on our terms, rather than it being forced upon us so that we would have to accept the imposition of an arrangement that would not have been in our favour.
I am interpreting the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, on the overseas territories as an invitation to the Government to restate their longstanding and clear commitment to all our overseas territories. The Conservatives, at some points in these debates, although not recently—the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, never did this, but others did—would raise the issue of the Falkland Islands. I thought that that was the height of irresponsibility, and I am very glad that they no longer attempt to bring that question into these discussions, because it was wrong that they did that.
This treaty has a complex resolution process attached to it because it needs to be long-lasting, and we are trying to cover every eventuality that might arise. That is a really good subject for us to get into in Committee, and we must test that to make sure that we have got that right. I have every confidence that the noble Baroness and her colleagues will bring to us situations that we need to hold up against that process, to make sure that we have got that right.
On the notification of activities of third countries with our consent, there is a notification there. I think that is right, but it is not in any way conditional. We do not need consent. It is not about permission or any of those things. I hope that that is helpful.
On the ability to make law, we had an interesting discussion at the briefing about royal prerogative and the ability of the King to make law in Diego Garcia. We need to get into that in Committee. There will be things in the Bill that, when I was sitting in the noble Baroness’s place, I would have been asking questions about, such as powers and flexibilities, the ability of Ministers to make decisions, and the various methodologies. I expect we will be having long discussions about negative and affirmative procedures, for example, and law-making power is one such issue.
I want to address some of the points that were made regarding the Chagossian community. As I stated in my opening speech, this Government deeply regret how the Chagossians were removed from the islands. This is a community that the Government are committed to working with and supporting in the months and years ahead. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. She made a compelling and genuine contribution on this important issue, as did the noble Lord, Lord Horam, and I commend those who have been working on this for very many years. She did her party proud, and I respect the longstanding commitment that she and others have had.
The Bill ensures that there will be no adverse impact on Chagossians’ nationality rights as a result of the treaty. Chagossians will not lose their current rights to hold or claim British citizenship, and no one will lose existing British Overseas Territory citizenship status. The Bill does, however, remove Chagossians’ ability to acquire British Overseas Territory citizenship in the future, because once the treaty comes into force, BIOT will not be an overseas territory.
On the trust fund, the noble Lord, Lord Horam, raised the possibility of an exchange of letters on the future treatment of Chagossians under this fund. This is, again, a genuine issue that we ought to explore. I appreciate that noble Lords will want more detail on how the trust fund will operate. I look forward to discussing this in Committee. Who knows? We might be able to reach some sort of agreement on that issue.
On the citizenship law, which was raised by one or two noble Lords opposite—it may have been the noble Lord, Lord Hannan—there have been mentions of section 76B of the Mauritian criminal code and concerns that Chagossians are leaving Mauritius for fear of being prosecuted for their affiliation with the UK. This is really important: no one has ever been prosecuted under this law; but just because no one has ever been subject to it, that does not make it right. Last week, the Mauritian Government repealed this section, and, as of April 2025, 94% of Chagossians with British nationality also had Mauritian citizenship.
On the right to self-determination, there have been questions during the debate, and leading up to it, about consultation with Chagossians. The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily between states—the UK and Mauritius—and it is true that we have prioritised the operation of the base on Diego Garcia. That has been our priority. There may be people here who disagree with that and who would have preferred us to prioritise other issues, and I respect their right to hold that view, but that is not the view of the Government. We wanted to protect the base.
There were some, including the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who raised the right to self-determination for the Chagossians. I have followed the noble Baroness’s career for many years; I do not know why, but I have always been rather attached to following what she does and says, and I have a real long-standing respect for her. I completely understand why she wants to raise this issue, and why it matters so much to her. The fact is that the Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population and has never been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population, therefore, legally arises.
The English courts, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, have proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritians rather than Chagossians. Both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have considered, in a series of judgments since the 1970s, the related but distinct question of an alleged right of abode or other rights said to flow from that. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed these claims. The transfer of sovereignty, therefore, does not deprive Chagossians of any existing rights. This is a long-standing legal position that previous UK Governments have also adopted, including in claims brought as recently as 2020. That all sounds very legalistic and cold; nevertheless, that is the legal position as it stands.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister for addressing this issue, because it has become a real touchpoint in the general populace. Does she agree that, while we might differ on the legality issue, there is a moral duty on the Government to engage with the Chagossians, who feel so let down, not just by this Government—I made that very clear—but by the whole political establishment in this country?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I agree, and I will say a little about engagement. It is an important point, and it deserves a proper response. If there is more that we can do, we would be very open to discussions about how it could be done in the right way that does not derail the process that we are trying to undertake about bringing the treaty into law.
Having said that, we recognise the importance of the islands to Chagossians, and have worked hard to reflect this in our wider policies. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has, as he said, a long-standing position on this which I understand and respect. His impressive command of the history of this subject was put to good use in his previous interventions. I completely agree with his point about the shameful treatment of the Chagossian population.
On engagement, in the past three years officials have met Chagossians and groups over 30 times to discuss the agreement and FCDO’s wider support to the community. The Minister for Overseas Territories, Stephen Doughty, has met with Chagossians four times since he has been in post since July last year and, on 2 September, the new Chagossian contact group met. It has wide representation from Chagossian communities in the UK, Mauritius, the Seychelles and elsewhere to give Chagossians a formal role that shapes decision-making in the UK Government’s support for their community. The group met for the first time on 2 September and will convene quarterly hereafter.
Claims that all Chagossians are opposed to the agreement fail to respect the differing views of this diverse and vibrant community. We have seen some of that reflected in our discussions this afternoon. Many voices support the outcome reached, and these include the Chagos Refugees Group, the Chagos Islanders Movement, the UK Natives Chagossian Council and the Seychelles Chagossian committee. However, I accept that there are many Chagossians who take a different view, which is their right.
On resettlement, points have been made that the treaty does not guarantee Chagossians the right of return to the archipelago and that it should have done. This has come up several times. In 2016, when in government, the Conservatives ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands. The KPMG report, which has been mentioned several times and was commissioned by that Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. This agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms without requiring the UK taxpayer to foot the bill.
There has been a range of views about Mauritius and its reliability. Some noble Lords have implied that Mauritius is somehow an unreliable partner that cannot be trusted. These claims are insulting to Mauritius, which is a member of the Commonwealth and a westward-facing country with shared democratic values. Mauritius ranks among the top African nations in governance, human development and innovation. It is a full democracy, a regional leader in human rights and a trusted partner in upholding the rules-based international order. It ranks second out of 54 African countries in the Mo Ibrahim index of African governance. It is also one of only two African countries not to have signed up to China’s belt and road initiative. As an act of good faith, Mauritius stopped its legal campaign against us while we negotiated.
Much has also been said about China. There has been a substantial amount of complete misinformation about China’s influence in the region and reported plans to develop a military base in the Chagos Archipelago. The Mauritian Attorney-General has stated publicly that these claims are a gross falsehood and calls them a political gimmick. I can confirm, unequivocally, that the treaty prevents any foreign security forces, civilian or military, from establishing themselves in the archipelago. Furthermore, if the UK believes, for whatever reason, that any activity taking place in the archipelago would jeopardise the security of the base, Mauritius is obliged under the treaty to co-operate with us to prevent that risk, and the UK can veto any construction or development across the archipelago which we consider to be a security threat to the base. As for claims that China supports the treaty because it grants it greater influence in the Indian Ocean, that is, frankly, nonsense.
This is why our closest allies and partners have welcomed the deal, especially the US and other Five Eyes partners. They are satisfied that the treaty protects the base against foreign influence and think that it is essential for our capabilities for generations to come.
Many of the points on the issue of the environment are really quite important, including on marine protected areas. The noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, made a thoughtful speech about this. There have been claims made, both during the debate today and in the other place, that the Mauritian Fisheries Minister wished to issue fishing licences in the area, which would risk, the argument goes, the protection of the unique marine environment of the archipelago. It must be noted that the point the Minister was making was more to do with sovereignty than with fisheries policy, but, as I said in my opening speech, the Mauritian Government confirmed only yesterday that they will establish a marine protected area that follows current bounds of the BIOT MPA and that they will not allow any commercial fishing in any section of the marine protected area.
Noble Lords have quite reasonably sought assurances on enforcement of the MPA, and I expect this is something we will get into detailed discussion about in Committee. For today, I point out that, if the UK at any point believes that Mauritius is in breach of its environmental obligations, we can seek to resolve that using the agreed dispute resolution mechanism in Article 14. In any case, the UK and Mauritius are working to finalise the arrangements on maritime security to ensure that there are patrolling capabilities and that these are maintained.
Lord Callanan (Con)
On the point about the marine protected area, I think the Minister said that Mauritius had duplicated the zone absolutely. Is it not the case that it is not a no-catch zone? Point B in the communiqué issued confirmed that fishing will still be permitted in over 600,000 square kilometres of the zone.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
That is right, and I said that in my opening speech. This is about artisanal fishing. In the event of some sort of resettlement on the outer islands, those communities would need to sustain themselves. They would fish using traditional artisanal methods, and that is what the permission relates to. It would not permit any other form of fishing, because that would clearly be detrimental to marine life.
The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, chair of the ISC, said—and this is about money—it is disappointing that there continues to be reference to artificially inflated figures of the cost of the treaty. It is misleading to ignore inflation and the changing value of money over time. The net present value of the treaty is what we have always said it will be: £3.4 billion over its lifetime. This is in line with long-standing practice in how the Government account for all long-term spend. The Office for Statistics Regulation and the OBR have verified these figures and confirmed that we have applied this methodology correctly.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the point is that, in accounting for money, cash accounting is used in government. What she is talking about is economic analysis, which is not the same as financial analysis. If she had been in the Chamber she would have heard my speech on this subject. It is clear that, when we come to draw up accounts for the Government, cash goes into this in pounds expressed in the time expended.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I apologise to the noble Baroness for missing her speech, and I will read it in Hansard; the bladder is only so strong. What matters here is that there is consistency across government and over time in the way that we do these things. These things are done the same as they would be done for any other agreement.
I know that some people take a different view of the OBR from the one that this Government take. We take it seriously, and it has looked at our figures and verified them. The noble Baroness could by all means come back to this in Committee—I am sure that she will—but, for tonight, I will stick with what the OBR had to say on this issue. The way that we have done this ensures that the figures are realistic and comparable, not inflated by simply adding up future payments while ignoring the depreciation of value over time.
The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, made quite a thoughtful speech. He is worried about the money. I should point out that we do not see this as an open market situation by any means. He seeks clarity about total cost. I can confirm that £3.4 billion is just that—it is the total cost.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, suggested that the US should be contributing to the cost of the treaty, given its joint use of the military base. We have to recognise that the US pays for the operating costs of the base, and these are several multiples greater than any payments by the UK. We benefit greatly from this arrangement. This allows us to access a valuable capability that keeps our country safe and the US is paying far more for it than we do.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
Does my noble friend agree that this agreement also allows the Americans to forward plan for their investment, which, as she quite rightly says, is substantial?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Absolutely. I thought the point made by the former Secretary of State for Defence, my noble friend Lord Browne of Ladyton, added to this very well when he talked about how future investment is jeopardised by the legal uncertainty that we are seeking to resolve.
Some have questioned the use of defence money in particular for this treaty. To be absolutely clear, the cost will be split between the FCDO and the MoD, as is appropriate given the shared interests of both departments in maintaining the future of the base. As set out by the Defence Secretary in his Oral Statement on the treaty in the other place, the costs represent a fraction of a percentage of the total defence budget—less than 0.2%. It is a bit far-fetched to suggest that the annual payments are in any way comparable to the biggest uplift in defence spending that we have seen since the end of the Cold War.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, raised sea level change. I do not know why I am dealing with this in the money section, but this is where I have written it down so we might as well get it on the record. As he said, it is true that sea level change has been less than 1% over the past 50 years, but it would be helpful for us to explore in Committee how a future sea level change, which he quite rightly alerts us to, would be treated by the dispute resolution process. I do not have a clear answer to that tonight but that is what Committee is for: getting to the bottom of exactly those sorts of questions.
I will give the last word to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. He made the very strong argument—it is not one that I had thought of, but I will definitely use it again—that this House voted in July to ratify the treaty. The Bill facilitates the enactment of this House’s wishes, because we voted in favour of the treaty. The Bill is necessary so that we can complete the ratification with Mauritius and therefore secure the critical military base on Diego Garcia. I thank noble Lords for their contributions and look forward to debating this in Committee.
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Tuesday 18th November 2025
(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 139-I(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (17 Nov 2025)
Lord Callanan
“Purpose(1) The purpose of this Act is to—(a) cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago,(b) dissolve the British Indian Ocean Territory,(c) provide for the continued British administration of Diego Garcia, and(d) limit the citizenship rights of the Chagossians.(2) Nothing in this Act grants or recognises that Mauritius has sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to add a purpose clause to the Bill to demonstrate more clearly the Government’s intentions in bringing forward this legislation.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said at Second Reading, this Bill is right up there in contention for the title of “worst Bill of this Session”. It is a surrender Bill and the Government should be ashamed of having brought it before your Lordships’ House. The sparsely populated Labour Benches—congratulations to the three Members who have turned up—illustrate how unpopular it is on all sides. We now begin the detailed scrutiny to seek to improve the Bill and to see just how far the Government are willing to move, if at all, to deliver a better deal for the British people and, crucially, for the Chagossians.
My Amendment 1 would put a clear statement of the Bill’s purposes on the face of the Bill. In essence, it is a clear and faithful description of the effects of the provisions of the Bill. It delivers clarity. The Bill does cede sovereignty over the islands, seek to dissolve the British Indian Ocean Territory after 200 years, provide for the continued British administration of Diego Garcia and limit the citizenship rights of the Chagossians.
Strangely, the Bill is completely silent on who shall have sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago in the future, which is against the precedent set in previous Bills where territory has been conceded. By bringing this Bill, the Government are saying that presumably all these changes are good things that they are justly proud of. I therefore see no reason why the Government should resist this amendment on the grounds of fact. The Minister always seeks to be constructive in her work in your Lordships’ House, so I am sure she would not resist an amendment that delivers essential legislative clarity simply for the sake of delivering an unamended Bill at the end of the scrutiny process.
Against this context, should the Government oppose my amendment we will be led to assume that the Government are in fact embarrassed by the reality of their legislation being set out in simple terms. If they are indeed proud of the Bill, they will have no cause to be embarrassed and should accept the amendment.
Amendments 8 and 9 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley put the Government’s fundamental motivations under scrutiny. I certainly will not presume to make my noble friend’s argument for him before he has spoken to his amendments himself, but the question of whether a court exists that could deliver a binding and enforceable judgment on the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago is essential to the fundamental purpose of the Bill. I am not aware of such a court, and without such a court the Government’s argument for the necessity of the Bill falls apart.
As we all know, this Bill is not necessary or essential. It may have been framed as such by the international lawyer friends of the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General. It may be the deep conviction of the Foreign Office officials who seem determined to act against Britain’s interests on this issue. It may even be the view of the Attorney-General. But ultimately it is a political decision of this Government. Ministers should not hide behind legal advice. They should come to the House with a positive message of whatever benefits they think the Bill provides to the British people and the Chagossians. That is what normally happens with any other Bill before this House.
While we are debating the subject of international law, as I am sure we will be, I would like to ask the Minister a question. I draw her attention to a 1967 international agreement concerning the availability for defence purposes of the British Indian Ocean Territory. This is an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States in which we agreed that the British Indian Ocean Territory
“shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty”.
Do the Government accept that their proposals to cede sovereignty over the territory to Mauritius would involve a breach of their obligations in this treaty? They are always lecturing us on the importance of abiding by international agreements and treaties, so I assume they would not wish to be in breach of an international treaty. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me what they are proposing to do about that international agreement.
Amendment 21 is designed to improve parliamentary scrutiny of the Government’s actions on Chagos by requiring a ministerial Statement to Parliament when the treaty comes into effect. We know that the Commons were, in fact, denied a substantive debate on ratification, despite long precedent under CRaG requiring that debates should indeed be granted. We know the Government are likely to press ahead with the treaty irrespective of any opposition from these Benches, but their conviction to deliver a deal that is good for no one but Mauritian taxpayers should not mean that we have less parliamentary scrutiny. In fact, as I have said before, if they are so proud of their record, I am sure they would be delighted to come to Parliament to talk about exactly how they are pressing this issue.
Finally, I have indicated my intention to oppose the Motion that Clause 1 stand part of the Bill. In my view, this is a bad Bill that should rightly be consigned to the pile of other uncommenced legislation. If it lacked a commencement clause, I think that would be a very sensible outcome.
Before I give way to the noble Lord, I give Ministers advance notice that I intend to degroup Amendments 14, 64 and 84, and I believe my noble friend Lord Lilley will add Amendment 25 to that, on the subject of a referendum. We will take them out of the next group and talk about them when we get to them. I give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Given that the Bill is to give effect to the treaty, I wonder whether the noble Lord could say a little more, because in introducing his amendment he did not, about how his amendment interacts with Article 1 of the treaty that Parliament has ratified?
Lord Callanan (Con)
Well, the Government have said on a number of occasions that ratification does not come into effect until this legislation comes into effect.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
It has been ratified; Parliament has ratified the treaty. It has not been brought into effect, but the treaty, which states that Mauritius is sovereign, has been ratified by Parliament. That is the treaty that the United Kingdom has entered into, and which Parliament has ratified. What is the interaction between that and proposed new subsection (2) of the noble Lord’s amendment, which says:
“Nothing in this Act grants … that Mauritius has sovereignty”?
He is seeking to have an amendment to a Bill which overrides a treaty commitment that Parliament has ratified, is he not?
Lord Callanan (Con)
It is a statement of fact that this legislation gives up British sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, but it does not say who should have sovereignty—the treaty is a separate matter. The treaty cannot come into effect until the legislation is approved, as I said.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
The noble Lord is just factually wrong. The treaty has been ratified—it is now a treaty. His amendment is seeking to alter the treaty. Article 1 of the treaty, which Parliament has ratified, says that Mauritius is sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago in its entirety, including Diego Garcia. Is he seeking for Parliament now to try to change the treaty which it has ratified?
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am saying that we have every right to oppose this legislation. The legislation has come as a result of the treaty that the Government have agreed. We opposed the treaty; we think it is unnecessary. We also oppose the legislation, and we are entitled to table amendments to it because, as the Government have stated, the treaty cannot legally come into effect until the legislation is approved. I beg to move.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 8 and 9 are in my name. Amendment 8 says that the treaty shall not come into force until a binding case in an international court requires us to cede sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. Amendment 9 requires the Government to spell out their legal position on why they believe such a ruling to be possible, let alone likely.
The whole basis of the Government’s case is that
“without this deal … within weeks we could face losing legal rulings, and within just a few years the base would become inoperable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]
At Second Reading, the possibility of such a ruling was contested not just by me but by several other noble Lords, on the basis that there is no international court which can rule against our sovereignty in this way. Yet Ministers failed to address that issue and those arguments. Even noble Lords who have held the highest office in the FCDO—mandarins of our diplomatic corps who tenaciously defended this deal—failed to answer or address the question of which court could reach a binding judgment against us.
First, everyone acknowledges that the ruling of the International Court of Justice was purely advisory and not binding on us. Secondly, it was based on resolutions of the UN General Assembly which themselves are not legally binding; nor have they ever been endorsed by the Security Council. Thirdly, when Britain signed up to the ICJ, it specifically precluded disputes between the UK and present or past members of the Commonwealth. So the ruling was triply non-binding, and the ECJ cannot rule against us on this in future because it is a dispute with a Commonwealth country.
Ministers have chosen to ignore these arguments and not dispute them, although it is not clear that they were aware of this situation when they plunged into these negotiations. I rather suspect they were not. They have tacitly acknowledged the truth of these arguments by moving on to assert that the tribunal of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea could rule against Britain and in favour of Mauritius on the issue of sovereignty. As the noble Lord, Lord Murray, spelled out in forensic detail, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has no such power. Britain has invoked Article 298 of the convention, which excludes military matters, so it is outside its wherewithal.
Even when the Philippines brought a case about artificial islands built in the South China Sea, ITLOS ruled that it cannot rule on the sovereignty of the area around those artificial islands—that is not within its purview. It can rule whether the islands are artificial or real and therefore have some territorial waters or not, but not whose they are and who they belong to.
We wonder why the Government got into this position. If the court has no power to rule on matters of sovereignty and the UK insists on exercising its rights under Article 298 of the convention, it just cannot do so. The Government’s silence on all these arguments must be deemed tacit acceptance that they are true. If there is some court or some hidden clause in the agreements that none of us knows about which overrides the points I have made, Amendment 9 will be no problem for them because they can implement it. According to them, within weeks, an adverse ruling will occur in a court which is binding on us. Since they have quite a long time before they can complete even these processes, we will get to know the answer to that conclusion. Alternatively, they could accept Amendment 9 and spell out the legal basis on which they believe an international court—which international court, why and on what grounds—could find against us.
If the Government reject this amendment, we will know that they do not even believe their own case. We will be forced to conclude that they are following, wittingly or unwittingly, the long-standing view of the Foreign Office—expressed very eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, in the Second Reading debate—that, unless we accept even an advisory ruling, we will not be able to persuade other countries to accept legally binding rulings. That is perhaps how diplomats think, but it ought not to be how this House thinks.
We ought to reject that doctrine and be very cautious about allowing ourselves to be driven along by long-standing arguments of the Foreign Office. Thinking back, it was very keen on us giving up the Falklands to the Argentines, so it is perhaps no surprise to find that it is very keen nowadays on us giving up Chagos to Mauritius. But none of them—and none of the great mandarins who spoke in the debate—spelled out why we are legally obliged to do so. It was all on the basis that the Foreign Office position would be easier to maintain logically and would be more persuasive with Governments that, otherwise, we were recklessly following.
Lord Grocott (Lab)
How far back is the noble Lord going to go in his historic examination of British Governments? Is his position that the British Government should never ever cede sovereignty to any former colony? I am thinking of Australia, South Africa or Canada. How far is he going back in saying that it is absolutely wrong to cede sovereignty?
Lord Lilley (Con)
If the noble Lord wants me to go back further, I think it is a shame that we did not follow the advice of Edmund Burke and reach an agreement with the American colonists to give them independence earlier on.
But we are not talking about giving independence to the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands; we are talking about giving the Chagos Islands to a country which has never ruled them and is 2,000 kilometres away. To do that simply on the basis of long-standing Foreign Office doctrine is, surely, unwise. I hope your Lordships’ House will consider seriously these amendments because, if they are passed, we will know once and for all whether the Government have a strong case or not. If they are rejected, we can be certain that they do not have a strong case for giving away these islands.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
Before the noble Lord sits down, I wonder if he could correct some remarks he has been making about people he has given a Chinese name to. I am not quite sure why he thinks that that is so telling. The arguments advanced were drawn from the testimony of Sir Christopher Greenwood, a former British member of the International Court of Justice. If he read his testimony—which, of course, is all available in the report from the International Agreements Committee of this House, which is being totally ignored by him and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan —he would see what the case is, which was set out very fully. It was set out not by the FCDO but by Sir Christopher Greenwood.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I am certainly very happy to mention that the noble Lord himself mentioned Sir Christoper Greenwood’s testimony in his speech, but his primary reasoning was that we should accept even purely advisory rulings of foreign courts in order that we be able better to uphold the rules-based international order. I remind him that the chairman of the committee that heard that evidence said in the debate that, although the committee was divided on the evidence it heard, he was inclined to agree with the arguments I had put forward.
Lord Grocott (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 1 by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I take it that he was not entirely serious when he dreamt up this particular innovation, which is right at the start of the Bill, whereby the purpose of the Bill should be presented in the way that the opponents of the Bill would find most attractive. It is a novel constitutional idea. In his reasons for the purposes of the Act, he has included only things that obviously he agrees with, but he has not included, for example, that this will secure the base for the UK and the USA for the next hundred years. There are arguments for and against, as there with any piece of legislation, but to think that you should state at the beginning of a Bill that the purpose of the legislation is what the Opposition would like to see enacted is novel. The only parallel I can think of would be if the sundry privatisation measures that were passed by the Thatcher Government had said, “The purpose of this Act is to sell off at knock-down prices the assets of the British people”. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, would have been in favour of that kind of constraint when that legislation was going through. I do not take this as a serious amendment, and I am sure he will not press it to a vote—it might be fun if he did, but we will see anyway.
One part of the noble Lord’s proposed new clause that is contentious—well, a lot of it is contentious—on which I would certainly like to hear more from my noble friends on the Front Bench is paragraph (d), which suggests that the Bill will
“limit the citizenship rights of the Chagossians”.
I do not think the Bill as it stands does that, and I want to be clear about that, but I think it raises an issue which we will come to later in the Bill, which is of concern to a number of us here, about what further rights for the Chagossians are appropriate, given the appalling way in which—we are all agreed—they were treated when they were basically thrown out of their own island.
My specific query, which if my noble friend cannot answer at the moment I would certainly like to hear later on in subsequent amendments, is that I still cannot understand why the military requires the whole of the island of Diego Garcia without any other settlement on it other than what is required for military purposes. I have asked that question of Ministers. The last time I asked my honourable friend Stephen Doughty, the Minister, he answered by saying,
“it is impossible for that to take place”—
that is, to have permanent settlement of Chagossians on Diego Garcia—
“operationally. It is not suitable or appropriate”.
I am very fond of the Minister, but just saying something is not suitable or appropriate, without any further clarification or explanation, is not good enough, as far as I am concerned.
The best I have got so far is to be told that, operationally, it is very difficult if you have civilians alongside the military, and it is much more convenient to the military if they have it all to themselves. In response to that, I can say only that repeatedly, in all parts of the world, including in my former constituency, civilian workers at a base quite happily live adjacent to the base and do a job that is of mutual benefit to the military and the civilian workers.
I think it would be a huge step forward to be able to say to the Chagossians—there may not be many who would want to do it—that those who would really like to settle in the land of their forefathers on Diego Garcia would be able to do that and work at the base or, if necessary, work in other activities as well. So far, I have not had a good argument against that happening, and I hope that at some stage during the passage of this Bill my noble friends can provide me with one.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
My Lords, I rise in support of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I think the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, was being a little bit unfair on him. He said very clearly that this is an appalling Bill that he wants to stop, and he has an amendment about Clause 1 standing part.
I would like to speak on one point about the Chagossians, which I know we are going to come to later. I agree with the noble Lord 100% on that point. There are quite a few Sri Lankan staff at Diego Garcia and there is no reason why there could not have been put in place some while back a scheme for Chagossians—Chagossians from Mauritius, from the Seychelles, from Crawley, from London—rather than the American airbase employing Sri Lankans. That should be the case. Of course, they did not originally come from Diego Garcia; they lived in some of the islands in the outer archipelago. Diego Garcia, as I understand it, was only sparsely populated historically. That was a very good point and we hope that the Minister will answer it.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I first declare my interest as a Friend of the British Overseas Territories. I support the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in his efforts to bring clarity to the Bill, at the very beginning of the Bill.
I particularly endorse the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, in relation to his amendments. It was in the conversation about those amendments that the issue of self-determination came up. I know that we are going to talk about self-determination in relation to amendments later on in Committee. However, there is a fundamental point about self-determination. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, asked whether we would ever cede British territory. Well, of course we have, when we have had self-determination exercised. In this case—the Minister went through this in some detail in Second Reading, because I raised it—it is deemed not applicable to the British Indian Ocean Territory.
We all received a letter today from 650 members of the Chagossian community here in the United Kingdom. In that letter they say:
“To do so, however, in the context of re-denying the people concerned self-determination while simultaneously paying a country that played a key role in denying that people self-determination in relation to their territory on the previous occasion, more money than is required to resettle the people with the rightful claim to the territory, in order to lease one of their islands, demonstrates extreme moral disorientation”.
I completely agree with that.
I also completely agree with the second point that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, made on resettlement. We all heard at Second Reading that there had been an exercise looking at resettling Chagossians into the Chagos Islands. Back in 2015, the KPMG report gave the details of the costs and the then Government decided not to proceed, probably based mostly on cost. But now the costs we are paying to the Mauritian Government far exceed the costs of resettlement. There is an opportunity for some Chagossians, if they wish, to resettle on Diego Garcia. In other British Overseas Territories there are civilians on military bases: Ascension Island comes to mind. So it could be the case that it happens in Diego Garcia as well. We will touch on resettlement rights and the right to return in other amendments, but, given that it was raised in this context, I just wanted to make those couple of points. I support the amendments in this group.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I will start with the amendment from my noble friend Lord Callanan and the objection to it from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, which was that this wasincompatible with the decision taken by Parliament. I will just quote—because I think it is helpful—Article 18 of the treaty. It states:
“This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the first month following the date of receipt of the later note by which the Parties notify each other that they have completed their respective internal requirements and procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement”.
In other words, it cannot enter into force until both Chambers of this Parliament have given their assent.
We have not made any bones about the fact that we do not like the treaty at all. I think it is a bit much to complain about my noble friend making this point in principle.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
The noble Lord will recall that I had said that it is not in force. I said Parliament had ratified it. I am not sure whether the noble Lord can intervene on an intervention, but I am sure he can intervene on his noble friend in just a moment as a proxy to intervene on me. Parliament has ratified the treaty. The treaty is not in force, but treaty-making is a prerogative power, not a parliamentary power. I am sure the noble Lord will agree with that.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
I will, of course, invite an intervention. I do not know what the rules are on intervening on an intervention.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am happy that my noble friend gives way, because, since the noble Lord intervened on me earlier, I have had a chance to check the facts of the case and, unsurprisingly, he is completely wrong. Parliament has not ratified the treaty because Parliament cannot ratify the treaty. The ratification of treaties under the CRaG legislation is a matter for the Government, using the royal prerogative. Parliament can delay the ratification but cannot prevent it. Whatever this House voted, or whatever the House of Commons voted, the Government are entitled, under the royal prerogative, to ratify the treaty in any case. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
That is extremely helpful. I very much welcome my noble friend’s intervention.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
I am very much going to regret getting involved in this, but I think it is helpful to understand what this House has and has not done. Both Houses of Parliament have voted that the Government should ratify this treaty. That is the situation as it is. This debate is about making sure we have the right legislation to enable us to enact the treaty.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
I think lots of positions will be endlessly stated on that; I am not going to take it any further now. I do not see anyone changing their minds about that, but I would like to address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who suggested that this was really about a reluctance ever to cede sovereignty and to allow any colony to go its own way.
One of the peculiar features of British rule overseas was the nature of its dissolution. The British Empire, unlike most others, had a self-dissolving quality because it had the democratic self-determination principle that was adumbrated in this House and then exported. Very few imperial moments ended so peacefully. Yes, there were tragic exceptions in Kenya, Cyprus, India and Palestine, I suppose. Ireland was a slightly different story, because it was not treated as a colony but as part of the country itself. But those were exceptional; in most places, including most Caribbean countries and Malaya, independence happened without a shot being fired in anger because there was that belief in self-determination. Quite often the imperative to decolonise, as my noble friend Lord Lilley suggests, overrode self-determination.
Some noble Lords will, I am sure, remember that in 1956 Malta voted in a referendum, by 77%, to turn itself into three Westminster constituencies and become part of the United Kingdom. It was turned down and, soon after, Malta ended up not just independent but outside NATO and the Commonwealth, and pursuing an extremely unhelpful line. During the Maltese process of accession to the European Union, I discussed this with Dom Mintoff, who was still alive. He was an old and revered figure at that time, and he said, “My wife is British and I love Britain, but how do you expect anyone to respond to being treated in that way?”
I mentioned Malta because there was a similar debate, which I do not think has come up in any of your Lordships’ deliberations, in one of the parties in Mauritius in the 1960s about whether to adhere to the United Kingdom and seek representation at the other end of this building. The idea that this is really about some kind of grasping imperial power refusing to let go is wrong in the generality and especially wrong in this case, because we are refusing to recognise the wishes of the people concerned—the only people who ever formed a permanent population of the Chagos Archipelago between 1714 and the early 1970s.
Self-determination does not always mean independence. It means exactly that: you can self-determine to be part of a larger bloc. The referendum in Scotland in 2014 was an act of self-determination; it did not stop being self-determination because of the referendum result. That is what we mean by democracy. I fear that self-determination, which is a core principle of the United Nations and of the legal order that we have defended even since the Atlantic charter in 1941, is being overridden here for no good reason at all. This is what makes me so frustrated. Every time I sit down to draft what I want to say about these amendments, I start getting angry all over again about the utter needlessness of it all, for the reasons set out by my noble friend Lord Lilley. We are surrendering to a case where there is no jurisdiction over us. If Ministers think that that is wrong, I would love to hear the Minister explain why the Government will not accept my noble friend’s amendments.
It seems that what we are doing here is creating a hierarchy of norms, not by the intrinsic importance of their jurisdictional power, but on the basis of taste and fashion. The principle of self-determination is thus ranked below the principle of general decolonisation—getting out of the way—and that is fundamentally because of a transient public mood. It is considered unfashionable to have flags with little Union Jacks in the top corner, which sets a very dangerous precedent.
It may be—I do not know—that the Government will argue that the reason we are following this non-binding resolution, which is not a legal judgment, is not because there is some hidden reason that we really have to, as my noble friend suggests, but, they may say, because we have to give an example. It would be because the international order is in danger; countries are throwing their weight around; Machtpolitik is prevailing; the whole post-war order is looking shaky; even the United States, on which it rested, is now asserting its interests without recourse to treaties. Therefore, we need to set a lead.
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
My Lords, after the history lesson from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, I am tempted to recount my time in Malta in the 1950s or my visit to Djibouti in 1965, but I will resist that temptation—at least this evening.
As I said at Second Reading, I support this necessary and sensible Bill, but I want to pick up something that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said. I do not agree with the proposed Amendment 1 of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, but, as I said at Second Reading, the Government need to give very serious thought to how the rights, interests and wishes of the Chagossians— I say Chagossians in the plural to mean not just those who have written to us from the United Kingdom but those from elsewhere as well—need to be taken very seriously into account by the Government. I look forward to hearing more about the Government’s intentions later in our discussion in Committee.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, for fear of treading on the toes of my noble friend Lord Hannan, I want to add to the debate that took place a moment ago concerning the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, on my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment. I invite noble Lords to look at Clause 1. Clause 1(1) provides that the treaty is the treaty that was considered by Parliament. Clause 1(2) expressly provides that:
“When the Treaty comes into force, so do sections 2 to 4”
of the Bill.
The Bill is indivisibly connected to the implementation of the treaty, as the Minister will no doubt tell us in her closing speeches to all the groups that we have today. This is reflected in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. I commend to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, paragraph 18 of the Explanatory Notes, which sets out in crystal-clear detail that:
“Entry into force of the Treaty is defined in Article 18 of the Treaty, as being the first day of the first month following the date of receipt of the later note”.
There is nothing in the fact that this Parliament has considered the treaty that precludes an amendment of the type advanced by my noble friend Lord Callanan, because it is a statement of the purpose of the Bill. Purpose clauses have become something of a norm in legislation, and there is nothing wrong in principle with such a statement being placed in the Bill. Indeed, the purpose of the second part of his amendment is simply to state, as a matter of fact:
“Nothing in this Act grants or recognises that Mauritius has sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago”.
That statement is absolutely correct. I give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way; I have listened carefully to what he has said, as I always do. Does he agree that there is a distinction, however, between debating legislation that gives effect to a treaty that has been agreed and ratified by Parliament, which this treaty has, and implementing legislation which seeks to alter a treaty that has been agreed?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The noble Lord seeks to justify his intervention but fails to do so. Because of the way the treaty is drafted and the way Article 18 operates, the treaty can come into force only when this legislation is implemented. That is unusual, but it has the effect of not allowing the noble Lord to make the point he tries to make. He argues that my noble friend Lord Callanan cannot make this amendment because it is in some way in breach of the agreement that has already been signed by the Government, but that agreement is not in force. This is a point we have explored in great detail. I am sure the Minister would agree with me on that point.
Moving to the other amendments in the group, I entirely support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley. I am very grateful to the reference that he and my noble friend Lord Bellingham made to the points that I made at Second Reading in respect of the non-recognition of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. I would just add one point in furtherance of that. The International Court of Justice also has no power and no jurisdiction to query the dispute over the Chagos.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, who I am sad to see is not in his place, heavily relies on the evidence of Sir Christopher Greenwood, but he chooses to ignore evidence which does not favour his case. A very powerful exposition of the contrary case was put by Professor Richard Ekins, KC, professor of constitutional law at Oxford. He made it clear that the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction specifically excludes any dispute with the Government of any other country which is or has been a member of the Commonwealth. Mauritius’s acceptance of the ICJ’s jurisdiction also excludes disputes with the Government of any other country which is a member of the British Commonwealth of nations.
If there had been any basis upon which Mauritius could have sought a binding ICJ judgment against the UK, it would have already done so. The fact is that no such basis exists or has ever existed, which is why Mauritius was forced to use the advisory opinion route to obtain its non-binding advisory opinion. Its bargaining position would have been far stronger if it had had a binding ruling against the UK, but the fact is that it has chosen to negotiate without seeking such a ruling, because it obviously knows that there is no way in which it can obtain such a binding ruling.
For those reasons, I strongly support the lock that is present in my noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendment. It would mean that only if there is a binding ruling should this treaty come into force, and therefore the Chagos Islands should remain in British possession and this act of strategic self-harm should be avoided.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I very much support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord Lilley. Once again, it raises the issue: why do our Government seem to jump as soon as some international court says something that is not even binding but advisory? The public need to know that we are actually selling out the people of the Chagos Islands because lawyers have decided that an advisory court has said that we should transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. I think the public are beginning to realise more and more that we are being ruled far too much by international law that does not take into account morality to start with, and the rights of people to self-determination. These amendments really do get to the heart of what we are discussing.
I will add my remarks to those of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. I was very pleased to hear him talk about the way in which the Chagossian people could go back. It is interesting that, over all those years—from the 1960s right through to 2025—the British Governments, who could have allowed the Chagossians to go back, refused. We are now passing them over. We are selling them, buying them and spending a lot of money. Once the islands belong to Mauritius, they will be allowed to be repopulated, except for the island with the base. I absolutely agree that there seems to be no reason why the Chagossians could not live peacefully on part of that island. As the noble Lord said, we have not had any real answer to why that could not happen. British Governments did nothing over those years to allow the Chagossians to go back, but suddenly it is all right, because Mauritius is going to be running it. Of course, in debates on other amendments, we will go into whether we believe that Mauritius will allow the Chagossians to go back, and the way in which it is going to control them.
Clearly, the issue here is self-determination. I know we are coming to that, so I will not say any more now, other than that I would like a response from the Minister that actually answers some of the questions raised in this debate.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, I will be brief. I was going to intervene on the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, but we reached a point at which there was a triangulation of interventions such that, for a brief period, perhaps the only person who was unable to contribute to that speech was the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, himself.
If we are to base this decision on where we stand on international law, the Government must explain much more clearly why they believed there was going to be an imminent binding ruling against us. At present, we have simply been served with an advisory position that, by definition, clearly does not hold any legal weight. The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has highlighted how weak the legal position is and that it would, in effect, be impossible to force us into a binding position. I do not want to reiterate all his points, but I very much support his amendment.
As I think was mentioned earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, we have heard the opinion given to the Committee on this subject, which, in effect, is an opinion from a third party. It may be a very well-informed third party, but we have not heard directly from the Government themselves. The Government need to explain their opinion. The suspicion of many of us is that that silence—the absence of a watertight explanation from the Government—signals a lack of confidence that this is going to be binding on the UK.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, indicated, in the absence of a binding legal position, we should undoubtedly be looking towards the self-determination of the Chagossian people. Self-determination is more than simply independence, because it is clearly not self-determination if you give people only one choice. Self-determination is about the level of choice, and it is very clear that the Chagossian people want to maintain the link with the UK. At times, the Government, and some Members on Second Reading, disputed that, saying that there are other Chagossian voices who want to go down a different path. There is obviously a very good way to test that out: to pursue the self-determination of the Chagossian people.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, noted that part of the complication stems from the fact that, in terms of the hierarchy of principles, we have seen the subjugation of self-determination to signing up to a fashionable support for anticolonialism. The noble Lord may well be right that this is the motivation of some people, but I would contend that some of the nations keenest to jump on the bandwagon of anticolonialism do not have a particularly good record themselves.
China is perhaps the most colonial nation on the face of the earth. It is not the old 19th-century version of sending a gunboat and an invading army; it is a lot more insidious. No nation is more colonial in trying to spread its effective control over a range of third countries. I do not believe that China or many of the other countries lecturing us on this are in a good position to hand out lessons to the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, indicated, we have a much better record on decolonisation. While there have been some problems, the UK does not have in its past an Algeria, an Indochina, a Belgian Congo or even a Mozambique, as other European countries do. Our record is much better.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I have amendments to this Bill—I think they are in the last group—but I will not address them. I will keep to the amendments in this group, which has strayed into some wider areas. Since the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not seeking the guidance of the Companion, which discourages changing groupings that have already been agreed, we will no doubt discuss all the amendments in detail as we go. I tabled my principal amendment but no others because I chose to respect the work of the International Relations and Defence Committee, which may well have considerations in advance of Report for us to consider.
I will make some short remarks on the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, presented any different, additional arguments in introducing his amendments from those he presented at Second Reading. Therefore, we have heard them before. Other noble Lords agreed with his argument.
Lord Lilley (Con)
If the noble Lord regards the amendments clearly, he will see that the difference is that I am saying, “Suck it and see”. If you believe there is a possibility of a court coming up with these judgments—they say it will be within weeks—then let us see.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I understand that argument, which the noble Lord alluded to at Second Reading, but it is a curious one when a treaty has been agreed. If he had presented this argument under the previous Administration post 2022, during the negotiations, that may have held a degree of credibility, but I did not hear him at any stage ask the previous Government to abort those negotiations. This is important because he and others who agree with him are suggesting that the previous Government perhaps did not enter in good faith into negotiations based on ceding sovereignty to resolve legal considerations. That was the Statement that the Foreign Secretary made in November 2022. As I said at Second Reading, I assume—the noble Lord may be able to correct me—that the Government would not have made that policy choice in November 2022 without advice from the Attorney-General at the time.
Lord Lilley (Con)
Since the noble Lord is famous for his pernicketiness, I remind him that the Statement in November 2022 referred to the “exercise of sovereignty”, not the ceding of sovereignty.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I see. Presumably he is arguing that it would be joint sovereignty. How would you enter into negotiations with another sovereign state on the exercise of sovereignty if we were going to retain it? I do not understand. This is interesting. Is he now saying that the previous Government entered into those negotiations without the intent to cede sovereignty?
Lord Lilley (Con)
I promise the noble Lord and the Committee that this will be my last intervention. I had no insider knowledge and was not in any way involved, but the possibility, from reading the Statement, was that the negotiations would consider the possibility either of joint sovereignty, as has existed in certain parts of the world, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, said—on a much better informed basis—of retaining sovereignty of Diego Garcia but ceding it elsewhere. There are all sorts of possibilities, and none of us knew at the time. That is why I certainly did not want those negotiations to take place, but I was not involved at all.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Part of the noble Lord’s lack of involvement was in not raising his objections in Parliament at the time. If those negotiations were entered into to resolve the legal considerations then the Statement in 2022 undermines his quite novel argument now.
It is the case that the previous Government entered into those negotiations. I believe that they entered into them in good faith and they knew what the conclusions would be. The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, is of course correct with regard to the 2017 declaration by the United Kingdom Government that they would be able to choose not to adhere to any rulings by the ICJ on the basis of a Commonwealth country, if that dispute started after 1987. It is a moot point whether this dispute started before then; there remain many arguments that it had. However, even if he is right, I am certain that the former Attorney-General—one of potentially three in 2022—would have advised the previous Administration that, regardless of that 2017 UK declaration, the ICJ would, as under its statute, refer to the General Assembly, because that is its purpose, and that there would be a resolution at the General Assembly. That was the entire point of the ICJ considering it, because it was referred to the ICJ by the General Assembly. I understand the noble Lord’s argument, but we would not be in a different place now even if his argument was very robust.
On the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and our little to and fro on the treaty, we have been told on many occasions by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and his colleagues in the previous Administration that treaty-making is a prerogative power. We do not have that short a memory in this House; we recall the Rwanda Bill and the Rwanda treaty. I recall the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, telling us that it was not our role to interfere in the prerogative power of Governments making, implementing or changing treaties. I quote:
“My Lords, we are not aware of any precedent for Parliament mandating the Government in international negotiations conducted under the royal prerogative. The Government were not prepared to accept such a significant … shift”.—[Official Report, 24/7/18; col. 1598.]
That is ultimately what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, puts forward. That quote from Hansard is from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. He was insistent that it was not Parliament’s role to interfere or mandate a Government in the negotiation of treaties under the royal prerogative. He was either wrong then and right now, or he was right then and wrong now. I am sure he will be able to say which when he sums up the debate.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate—slightly wide ranging, but that often happens with the first group in Committee. I am sure we will return to some of the issues raised in proper depth when we get to the relevant amendments, and I look forward to that. We have heard some interesting claims from the Opposition, but it is the Government’s contention that none of the amendments in the first group is necessary, and I will explain why that is.
Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is unnecessary because it is clear what the purpose of the Bill is. It has been debated many times over. The Bill implements in domestic law, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, explained very clearly, those elements of the treaty between the United Kingdom and Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago that require such implementation. There are also elements of this amendment that are just false. We will have a further debate shortly, I am sure, but it is incorrect to state that the Bill seeks to limit Chagossian citizenship rights. The Bill makes changes necessary so that no new claims for British Overseas Territory citizenship can be made, but it also preserves the existing British Overseas Territory citizenship for those who hold it. The Bill preserves Chagossians’ rights to obtain British citizenship and the British citizenship of those who already hold it. We have been clear about this, and anything that suggests otherwise is helping, I think, to circulate misinformation, which does no good for anyone, least of all the Chagossians.
Amendment 8 would jeopardise our national security if accepted and fundamentally goes against what this treaty and Bill do, which is to safeguard our national security. This amendment would prevent the UK ratifying the treaty until an international court delivers a binding ruling. In that scenario there is a very real risk of the deal collapsing, and the Government’s view is that this would put the UK in a very weak negotiating position—far weaker than that in which we started negotiating. Actually, we did not start negotiating; as many noble Lords have observed, there were 11 rounds of negotiation under the previous Government. We have set out our legal rationale on multiple occasions, but for the avoidance of doubt I will restate it here: the Government acted to protect the Diego Garcia base because it faced an existential threat. The previous Government knew this, and that is why they started negotiations over three years ago and continued them for 11 rounds. Under the previous Government, Mauritius secured a string of legal and political victories against the UK.
On Amendment 9, the Government have already published their legal reasoning for signing the deal and have set this out clearly to Parliament on several occasions. Committees have heard expert testimony on these points, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, reminded us.
On Amendment 21, a notice will be published in the London Gazette on the day the treaty enters into force, as is the usual practice, and we will consider the utility of whether a Statement in Parliament at that point would be beneficial. It may well be.
On the clause stand part notice, Clause 1 sets out when the different clauses of the Bill come into force. Clauses 2 and 4 commence at the same time that the treaty enters into force. Article 18 of the treaty states that the treaty enters into force on the first day of the first month following the confirmation by both the UK Government and the Government of Mauritius that they have ratified the treaty.
Before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass both primary and secondary legislation, update the UK-US exchange of notes, and put in place agreements on the environment, maritime security and migration. Therefore, this clause provides that legal certainty and ensures that there is no ambiguity as to when the British Indian Ocean Territory is no longer an overseas territory or as to which laws will be saved. As I mentioned earlier, the Secretary of State will publish a notice in the London Gazette when the treaty enters into force.
I will give a little more detail about something that has come up several times. Noble Lords suggested that there is no legal risk here and, further, that there could never be any legal question around this. That really makes me wonder what on earth the previous Government were doing with officials’ time, ministerial time and the time of officials from other Governments, when they set about negotiating for 11 rounds. They paused the negotiations when the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, was appointed Foreign Secretary and then restarted them. If there was no legal jeopardy whatever, what on earth were the previous Government thinking when they set about that process? On the question of what court—
Lord Lilley (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. I asked a very clear, core question: from which international court does she fear a damaging, binding judgment? She will not tell us. She says that she does not know but that the previous Government must have known.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Forgive me, but I did not say that I did not know; I was just about to answer that specific question. I was making a point about the inconsistency and—frankly—ludicrousness of the Opposition doing something that, when they were in government, took up a great deal of time and resource, but which they now contend they never, ever needed to do.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
Will the Minister give way? We keep hearing that the previous Government negotiated over 11 rounds and went on negotiating, but surely that reveals something about the previous Government’s steadfast determination to secure a good deal. If the Government had not been able to get a deal, would they have eventually signed up to an agreement? I do think they would have done.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
At the risk of jumping further down the rabbit hole with the noble Lord, my point was simply that to contend now that there was never any possibility of any legal jeopardy, as many noble Lords have sought to do today, does not correspond with the fact that the previous Government did enter into negotiations. If there was never a legal risk, why did they do that? That is the point that I am seeking to make, a pretty straightforward point.
The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, asked me about binding judgments and courts; they are fair questions. I believe that I have responded to them previously, but I am happy to go into more detail today, as that is what Committee debates are all about. There are numerous avenues through which Mauritius could pursue a legally binding judgment, including under the dispute provisions of the treaties to which both states are parties or further arbitral—
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am getting on to that. Noble Lords are very impatient this afternoon. We are in Committee—we have time, and I am in no hurry. I am prepared to stay here as long as we need to get these things done.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am speaking for myself; other noble Lords may take different views on that point.
Mauritius could also pursue a legally binding judgment through further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK—and I will come on to the points about the extent of those judgments and sovereignty, too. Such cases could be brought rapidly and include provisional measures, themselves legally binding, which could be introduced within weeks. The long-standing legal view of the United Kingdom is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.
The other important element to note here is that, even if the UK chose to disregard any legal rulings—that is not something that this Government would want to do, but we could—we rely on third countries to service the base. Therefore, the operability of the base depends on other states taking a view on such rulings. We of course control what we do, but we cannot control what other states do. If we need those states to agree with us and to ignore a legal ruling too, we may not be successful. It may be that we then compromise the operability of the base. That is a very real threat; we were concerned about that, as were our allies and partners, including the United States.
The risk of a binding ruling relating to sovereignty from this type of tribunal is simply too great, given the importance of the base for national security. Some have pointed to the 2015 arbitration between the UK and Mauritius, in which the tribunal was clear that it did not have jurisdiction over the question of sovereignty. That is right. However, that was before the advisory opinion in 2019 and before the 2021 judgment of a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in a case about delimitating the boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives. In that case, it was ruled that Mauritius’s sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s advisory determinations. These have changed the legal landscape.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Will the Minister confirm that, in those proceedings to which she just referred, the United Kingdom was not a party and made no submissions?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I never said that we did; that was between Mauritius and the Maldives. My point is to make the case to noble Lords that the advisory opinions—advisory though they are—stand to inform subsequent opinions of international tribunals. That is what happened in that case, and that is why I bring that as a supporting argument for the Government’s case—to help noble Lords understand how we have got to where we are.
While an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS almost certainly would not address the question of sovereignty directly, it may reach decisions on related matters based on conclusions about sovereignty. Noble Lords may disagree, but the Government’s position is that we are concerned about this—and I suggest that the previous Government were also concerned about this; otherwise, what were they doing? We are concerned not just about the effects of a binding judgment on the UK but about the legal effect on third countries and international organisations, which could give rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions.
Although I do not expect there to be agreement on this, I believe that we cannot say that the Government have not fully considered all the potential legal jeopardy in which we would place ourselves. Further, we believe that the suck-it-and-see approach that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, advocates would leave us in a much weaker position when it comes to negotiating with Mauritius.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
May I press the Minister on that point? I am very grateful to her for giving way. She said that there was an existential threat to the base. So that I have understood that clearly, is she saying that there was something in addition to the possibility of an adverse UNCLOS judgment? As she conceded a moment ago, UNCLOS has no sovereignty; I just looked up what it says on its website, and it says, “We don’t do sovereignty issues”. That issue was tested with the case between the Philippines and China, when the latter was building reefs over some contested land, and UNCLOS said that it had nothing to do with it. Therefore, is there something else? Is an adverse judgment from a body that cannot decide sovereignty, in her view, an existential threat to the existence of the base? Would it make the existence of that base impossible?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
What do we mean by existential? We could still have a Diego Garcia—there could be something there. However, it would be existential because, if the operability is compromised, the base as it exists today—it is a unique place and it does things that we do not do anywhere else—would be compromised. To that extent, I suggest that that is an existential threat to the operability of the base.
With that, I hope that noble Lords who have presented their amendments are satisfied. If not, we can of course return to these issues on Report.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
Can the Minister answer my point about the UN Security Council and the UK’s ability and right to veto?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
We are not saying that this goes to the Security Council. We are saying that there could be further rulings. With respect, that is a bit of a red herring. There could be rulings that affect how we are able to operate on the base. There could be votes at the General Assembly, which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, explained quite well. He is right; we could veto something at the Security Council, but we do not anticipate that, and that is not the legal threat that we are concerned about. It is a different legal threat.
If there are no further interventions, I respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraw his amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank the Minister for her replies. This has been an interesting debate. As she says, this is how the first debate in Committee normally goes. It is fairly wide ranging, and I am sure we will return to many of these issues.
Just before I address some of the other issues, I return briefly to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. We have already made the point that it is not Parliament’s role to ratify treaties under CRaG. Parliament has the right to delay them only, but the Government still have the right to agree them. I am not questioning the Government’s right to agree treaties under the royal prerogative. I might not like it—in fact, I really dislike it—but of course they have the right to do that. The reality is that they have now presented us with a Bill to implement the treaty that they have agreed. We fundamentally disagree with that treaty, so we have the perfect right to put forward amendments to the Bill that they have presented us with—the Table Office has ruled our amendments in order—and to debate them and vote on them if we wish.
I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Lilley for his excellent amendments in this group. I look forward to working with him throughout Committee and Report. We should certainly return to the question of international law on Report. My noble friend Lord Hannan made some excellent arguments as well.
I listened carefully to the Minister’s reply to my amendments, and I will look carefully at her remarks before we return to the Bill next year on Report. However, there is one point that she has not addressed. I return to and reiterate the point around the 1967 agreement with the United States. There was not a CRaG process in 1967, but that treaty, which has presumably been ratified, was agreed under whatever process we had then. Does the Minister not think it is still valid? Would she like to reply to that?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am very happy to respond to that, and I am very sorry for not including that in my closing remarks. Obviously, the UK and the US are party to that treaty, and parties to treaties can agree to do things with those treaties. I remind the noble Lord and everybody else that the US very much supports what we are doing with our treaty with Mauritius.
Lord Callanan (Con)
Is she saying that the United States has agreed to abrogate that treaty?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am saying that the United States publicly and in terms supports the treaty that we have agreed as a Parliament to ratify with Mauritius.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I heard that, but that was not in fact the question that I asked. If the original agreement is still in force—it is still an international treaty and is presumably still lodged—I assume that the Minister is telling me that the US has not yet agreed to abrogate that treaty. Therefore, if we concede the sovereignty of the BIOT, we are in breach of that treaty. She wants to talk to her noble and learned friend the Attorney- General, who is so keen to refer to international law all the time.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My point is that we will be doing so with the consent of the other party to the treaty.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I will look at Hansard, but I do not think that she has answered the question here.
The other point I want to make, going back to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is that I think he said at one stage that he has proposed amendments—plural. I can see only one amendment, unless another one has gone in recently that I have not yet seen.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am happy to clarify. There will be a second, consequential amendment. As I mentioned in my remarks, there is a principal amendment and there will be a consequential amendment. I am sure the noble Lord is looking forward to reading and supporting them.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I do not see much problem with the one that is there. I will look at any other consequential amendments in detail. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his clarification, but I am slightly confused by the Liberal Democrats’ position. Their Members in the House of Commons thought the Bill was so bad that they voted against it at Third Reading, yet all the Liberal Democrat Benches in this House have proposed only one, fairly mild amendment. From the noble Lord’s remarks so far, and indeed how they voted on the original CRaG amendment, they certainly seem fairly supportive of this treaty, which seems a strange position to be in. I am sure we will return to many of these issues in future rounds of debate. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Lilley
“(2) Sections 2 and 4 of this Act do not come into force until the duties outlined in section 1(2A) (right to return), 1(2A) (lease renewal), 1(2A) (termination), (Referendum), (Employment rights of Chagossians), (Asylum claimants) and (Consultation) are discharged.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Lord Lilley, seeks to make commencement of sections 2 and 4 dependent on certain conditions.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I will speak in favour of Amendments 2, 13, 25 and 28. Amendment 2 is an all-purpose amendment saying that the treaty should not come into force until other conditions in amendments are incorporated. Amendments 13 and 28 call for consultation, and Amendment 25 for a referendum.
As I have mentioned previously, the advisory ruling of the International Court of Justice was based on a non-binding UN resolution about the process of decolonisation. That ruling explicitly says that a colonial state can sever part of a territory if it is the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned that they be separated.
The Chagossians cite the example of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The parallel between the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and the situation of Chagos versus Mauritius is striking. When the Government consulted the people of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands before ceasing to be the colonial power, they found that there was considerable opposition in the Ellice Islands to being lumped in with the Gilbert Islands. The parallels between that and the Chagos Islands and Mauritius are very striking. The Chagos Islands are 1,339 miles away from Mauritius, and the Ellice Islands are just 800 miles away from the Gilbert Islands. The Chagos Islands have a different ethnic mix. They are basically populated by people from the African continent, whereas that is not the case in Mauritius. Likewise, with the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, one was Polynesian and one was Micronesian. The disparity of numbers is, if anything, even greater in the case of the Chagos Islands versus Mauritius than it was in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands.
After consulting, the British Government rightly decided that they should test the views of the people concerned. They had a referendum, and the vote was very striking. The people of the Ellice Islands voted to separate from the Gilbert Islands by 3,799 votes to 293. This is a comparatively small number of people—fewer, in fact, than the diaspora of Chagossian peoples in the UK, the Seychelles and Mauritius itself. It surely is possible for us to consult with them and seek their views, ideally through a referendum. The Government may say, “Why have a referendum? It’s so difficult. We can’t do it”. But the Chagossians themselves have today given the results of an opinion poll they have carried out, which 3,500 people responded to out of roughly 10,000 potential respondents. That is a very high proportion. Of those 3,500, an overwhelming proportion were against being lumped in with Mauritius.
The Government may well say that it is still only a minority of the total population. That is fair enough. Again, suck it and see—have a referendum of the total. Who would be the potential electors? The Chagossian nationals would be, as defined in this Bill. We have done that bit for the Government, so that is already there. It is clearly possible over a period to consult them if the Chagossians can organise a poll like this fairly rapidly and with such a high response rate.
The Government often argue that the Chagossians are “not really a people and in any case they’re no longer there”. However, there are precedents in history for people being removed from a place and allowed back. The Acadians were shipped out of Canada because they were thought to be unreliable French-speaking Catholics but subsequently were allowed back and are still a distinctive community in that part of Canada. Similar things have happened with the Chechens and the Crimeans more recently, after the Second World War. In history, we all know the displacement that was suffered by the ancient Israelites. It is possible to say that people who have been removed from a territory still have a right to that territory and should be consulted about its sovereignty.
These amendments seek to ensure that we do have a referendum. Failing that, if the Government can convince us that it is impossible in some way to organise a referendum, let us have a thorough and prolonged period of consultation. I would like to hear more from the Government on what they are doing now, having been provoked into it by the amendment to the committal Motion to ask the relevant Select Committee of this House to carry out a consultation. How are they envisaging that being carried out, and how will they define the Chagos consultation groups and so on? I think your Lordships’ House would almost certainly welcome greater information about that process and how the Government see it happening. If they do not satisfy us on this, I think we need to press ahead with Amendments 13 and 28 on the consultation, but ideally let us go ahead and have a referendum under Amendment 25.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I introduce Amendment 29 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who is prevented by a family illness from being here. His amendment draws attention to the contradiction between the principles in this Bill and some of the UN resolutions dealing with when it is valid to partition a territory. The legal case on which the Government rest, as we established in the last round of amendments, is fundamentally UN Resolution 1514, which was the basis of the Mauritian claim that it was wrong to have divided the territory at independence.
This is an extraordinary precedent to set. The idea that if a territory, for reasons of administrative convenience, was at one time governed from somewhere else, that creates a lasting claim, would upend borders on every continent and in every archipelago. It would mean that Aden and Somaliland are again governed from India, and that the Cayman Islands are again governed from Jamaica. If we extend beyond British territories, it would mean that the Philippines were governed from Mexico, and that Bolivia was again governed from my native Peru, which was the seat of the viceroyalty. It would be an extraordinary principle.
Indeed, when read in context, the UN is not arguing that. If it did, it would have opposed the split of Czechoslovakia, the independence of Montenegro from Serbia, and so on. Of course it does not argue that. The three resolutions referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, essentially establish criteria where it is proper to divide a territory for reasons of geography, history, ethnic distinction or nationality—a sense of being a people and wanting to live in your own polity. As we just heard from my noble friend Lord Lilley, all those criteria are plainly met in this case. When the Chagos Islands were ceded by the French in 1814, they were ceded as a separate territory from Mauritius. They are populated by a different population, one that came from the west rather than from the east. The only reason that they were governed from Mauritius was not because they were part of Mauritius but because there is nowhere among those sparse and beautiful atolls suitable for a seat of government. It is similar to some of our continuing overseas territories in the Atlantic today, visited occasionally by a governor because there is no permanent seat there.
This is the key group of amendments—and the crux of the entire debate is the question of consulting the people who have the most at stake. They are the only people who have ever constituted a permanent population of that archipelago and their descendants, the people defined in this Bill as the citizens of the BIOT. My noble friend Lord Lilley gave a very good example: the consultation between the Ellice Islands and the Gilbert Islands at the moment of independence. They felt that they had not enough in common to accept government from each other’s hands, so the Ellice Islands became the monarchy of Tuvalu and the Gilbert Islands became the Republic of Kiribati. The distances here, ethnically and geographically, are much wider. There is not much doubt that if we had carried out a consultation in 1965, we would have had the same outcome as in the case cited by my noble friend.
Why does that suddenly stop being true now? Why does the passage of time invalidate that claim? This is a proposal to hand the Chagossian people to a nation that has never governed them, never seen them as part of their demos, that was very happy to renounce all claims in perpetuity and trouser a cash sum in exchange for doing so, and which has continued to treat the archipelago in essentially pecuniary terms. Why not test the proposition today?
I repeat a point made by my noble friend Lord Bellingham at Second Reading. It is perfectly logistically feasible to conduct a referendum across scattered territories. Last year I voted for our absent colleague—my noble friend Lord Hague of Richmond—to be Chancellor of the University of Oxford. There was a poll that was conducted electronically across five continents, the alumni being dispersed in their tens of thousands. There was a simple enough process. You establish the right of somebody to vote, you establish their identity, you show that they genuinely are an alumnus, then you have the vote. We have established who would be eligible here, and the right of descent that conveys BIOT citizenship.
I refuse to believe that it is logistically beyond us to consult the Chagossian people. I cannot speak for everyone on this side, but I am pretty sure that if the Chagossian people voted overwhelmingly for Mauritian citizenship, opposition to this proposal would dissipate and people would accept it as a valid exercise of self-determination. There is something more than perverse about acting in the name of decolonisation when taking a people against their will and transferring them to the sovereignty of a foreign state, a country whose Prime Minister at the time of the partition said that it is a territory which they never visit and of which they know little.
When I was a Member of the European Parliament, Crawley was part of my constituency. I got to know some of the disparate groups that represent our Chagossian fellow subjects, and it is fair to say that they did not always agree on every issue—like many small communities, they had a broad diversity of opinions on a lot of subjects—but honestly, hand on heart, I do not think I ever recall meeting any Chagossian in this country who wanted to be a citizen of Mauritius. There are reasons for that. The experience of Chagossians in Mauritius was not a happy one: they were confined in slums, and they were subjected to, in their eyes, racism and discrimination. The idea that we are now placing this entire population, against their will, because of a non-binding opinion from a tribunal without jurisdiction is a truly extraordinary and shameful moment.
Lord Horam (Con)
I will follow my noble friend Lord Hannan on this subject of consultation. It really is quite shocking that there is no mention in the agreement of any consultation with the Chagossians—no mention at all. Indeed, as I said at Second Reading, there is only one mention of Chagossians and it is not a right that is put into the Bill or into the agreement: it is the possibility that the Mauritian Government are free to implement a programme of resettlement. It is not something that they have to do; it is simply a permissive measure. It is really quite amazing, given the history of the treatment of the Chagossian people that we are aware of, that they do not feature at all in the agreement or in the Bill.
As we know, due to the parliamentary skill of my noble friend Lord Callanan, we now have a possibility that there will be consultation under the auspices of a Select Committee of the House of Lords. That is very good news, but it is only fair that the Government, at this early stage, set out some idea of how that consultation may proceed. It may not be a referendum but, as my noble friend Lord Lilley says, it is at least some sort of consultation. It should not be too difficult. Although there is a widespread diaspora within the Seychelles, the UK and Mauritius itself, it is a small number of people. If they have a referendum, they should be able to conduct that very easily. Proper, organised consultation done fairly speedily—we do not necessarily wish to delay all this—should be within the Government’s remit. I hope that they can say something on that subject during the course of discussion on this amendment.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, Amendments 37, 49 and 56 in this group stand in my name. These are no ordinary circumstances. As my noble friends have alluded to, a group of Chagossians, totalling more than 650, contacted me in writing and asked whether I would consider tabling some amendments and exploring them on the Floor of the Chamber.
The thought behind the amendments is crystal clear: whether the Chagossian people, who were dispersed from their homeland, should have a meaningful voice, clear legal recognition of their identity and a central place in determining the future of the Chagos Islands. Depressingly, it seems the Government have already given their answer, and it is—shamefully, in my opinion—no. For the avoidance of doubt, let me be frank in saying to the Government that I am unreservedly committed to speaking on behalf of the hundreds of Chagossians in the United Kingdom, some of whom have joined us today in the balconies above.
The Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill is a monumental tragedy of an agreement that declares Mauritius sovereign over the entire Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia—a part of the world to which Mauritius has as much of a historical claim as I do to the throne of France. It is farcical. Parliament has been asked to legislate in support of that treaty and the Government do so consciously aware of core groups that are conspicuously absent from the foundations of the treaty—the Chagossians themselves. Allow me to be clear when I say that the people most directly affected by this Bill are not, and have not been, in the room.
The amendments I present seek only to ensure that any settlement affecting the Chagos Islands reflects the rights, identity and aspirations of the Chagossian people. They do not ask for the unattainable. They want recognition, evidence and a proper assessment of what genuine peace and stability requires. Without these, the Bill risks repeating historic injustices and undermining the very legitimacy it claims to secure.
I do not gain anything from bringing such amendments before the Committee, but I am motivated by people and how they can be best served when I read through their correspondence and look those people in the eye—I have had the privilege of meeting some of them. I hope colleagues know that that is why I do this for those who cannot speak in this Chamber themselves. They need a voice.
Amendment 37, in the first instance, addresses democratic representation. It would require the Government to ensure that a Chagossian representative is appointed or elected to act as a liaison between the Chagossian community and Parliament. This is not a radical proposal or proposition. It is, in fact, the bare minimum that we could expect from a democratic state dealing with a displaced people whose fate it once determined without consultation. The onus is on us as Peers to defend all those British citizens, no matter how far away their home might be.
I am conscious that the history of the islands has been repeated throughout the different stages of the Bill, but for good reason. The impact of the forcible action taken between 1967 and 1973, overseeing the removal of the entire population of the Chagos Islands—some 1,500 to 2,000 people—has had long-lasting consequences for the families of that generation. That removal, its circumstances and its consequences are not contested facts. They are recorded in the archives of this country, acknowledged in Foreign Office documentation, examined by parliamentary committees and recognised by numerous international bodies. The result was a community scattered and broken, separated by thousands of miles in some cases. That is why it is essential that we consider the feelings of the Chagossian community now, in 2025, because the colossal failure to do so all those decades ago is the reason we are here today.
Today, the largest Chagossian community in the world resides here, in the United Kingdom. Crawley Borough Council estimates that it is home to approximately 3,500 Chagossians—around two-thirds of the total UK Chagossian population. The community is sizeable and passionate. Yet, in spite of its size, there is no formal mechanism for its representation in Parliament. There is no statutory liaison, committee or structure within Whitehall through which this community can speak with an authoritative voice.
This is untenable. It means that people who were displaced by past British policy have no guaranteed voice in shaping the policy that affects their future. How can we consciously abide this? They, the Chagossian community, remain permanently marginalised: spoken for but never spoken with, and governed but never genuinely consulted.
These are British citizens, as British as the people of Belfast, Cardiff, Edinburgh and London. They are ignored and sidelined in every conceivable form of representation and consultation. Amendment 37 would remedy this democratic deficit. It would ensure that this community had a recognised representative—not imposed, not chosen by government, but selected by the community itself—to liaise directly with Parliament and ensure that their views, concerns and aspirations are considered. If we are to claim moral legitimacy in legislating over the Chagos Islands, we must begin by ensuring that they themselves are heard.
Amendment 49, concerning civic identity and self-determination, would require the Government to publish a report evaluating the credibility of any claim that the Chagossians share a civic identity with Mauritius without a self-determination vote. Additionally, it would direct that the report should consider the historical involvement of Mauritius in the removal of the Chagossian people. This amendment is necessary because the Bill and the treaty on which it rests make a crucial and untested assumption that Mauritius is the rightful and natural representative of the Chagossian people. That assumption underpins the treaty’s logic, the Bill’s purpose and the Government’s narrative.
However, that is simply not the case. It is a historical narrative that has been conjured up by those intent on pushing this forward at all costs. Those of us who understand history will know that, at the time of the 1965 Mauritian-UK negotiations, the Chagossian population was still excluded from any involvement in discussions. Even after the displacement, Chagossians did not prosper under Mauritian administration. Many experienced poverty, discrimination and lack of support, as documented by innumerable NGO reports, parliamentary inquiries and human rights organisations. We have heard testimonies from Chagossians: I was speaking to some of them even today. They describe life in Mauritius as one of hardship and neglect, not solidarity or cohesion. The lives of these people have been shaped not only by geography but by the trauma of displacement and the struggle to preserve a distinct cultural heritage in exile.
I think of the many natives still alive, some of whom wrote to me, including Jenny, Roseline, David, Christof, Marie, Louis and many more, some of whom have joined us in Parliament today. The United Nations has repeatedly stressed that the Chagossian people must be recognised as central to any settlement. In 2024 and 2025, UN human rights experts stated plainly that Chagossians had been excluded from negotiations between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, and that the new agreement failed to guarantee their rights, including the right to participate meaningfully in decisions about sovereignty.
It is ironic that many of the most zealous cheerleaders of this deal are infatuated by notions of internationalism and international law, yet, when it comes to protecting the interests of British sovereign citizens, as emphasised by the UN, the call seems to fall on deaf ears. Amendment 49 simply obligates the Government to gather evidence before taking irreversible decisions.
Amendment 56 directly pertains to peace, stability and the long-term future of the US-UK defence facility on Diego Garcia by ensuring that the Government commit to the publication of a report on whether the goal of peace and legal certainty is better served by the Mauritius treaty or by
“granting self-determination and resettlement to the Chagossian people as a self-governing British Overseas Territory”.
It is not an overstatement to say that this is the central strategic question of this Bill. It seems that this Government are more concerned with the appeasement of foreign states than with the maintenance of our alliances and the protection of our sovereign British citizens.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)
Order. Will the noble Lord come to a conclusion?
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
I am coming to a conclusion. I understand what it is like to feel ignored and sidelined; to have someone in Government tell you that your identity is second class; that you cannot really be a full British citizen. I know what it is like to have fought for your rights to represent your people when a foreign state wades in against you. I understand the struggle to be heard more than most. Parliament therefore has a responsibility to correct that course. These amendments do not ask for much.
Baroness Meyer (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 14 and 25. This treaty and the Bill that will enact it is bad for our country, for our security and for British taxpayers. As we have already discussed, it will leave Britain poorer, weaker and strategically exposed.
This treaty is also bad for the Chagossian people. Half a century ago, they suffered the terrible injustice of forced removal. This treaty compounds that injustice by offering no guaranteed right of return, no legally binding resettlement plan and no meaningful protection of their rights. This is truly shameful. For a Government who claim to uphold human rights, it is an extraordinary moral failure.
Dr Al Pinkerton, the Liberal Democrat spokesman, said at Third Reading in the House of Commons that
“we cannot allow the Bill to pass without ensuring that Chagossians themselves are sovereign over their citizenship, the governance of their islands and the prospect of return”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 756.]
He is right, and I am surprised that no Liberal Democrat in this House has put down any amendment in support of a referendum. To deny the Chagossians their right of self-determination and to shape the future of their homeland is unworthy of a country that champions justice, fairness and democracy. This amendment would give them a chance, but it would also give us, a nation that prides itself on a centuries-old democratic—
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I make the assumption that, in her defence, she did not read my amendment before making her statement, because the right to self-determination is there under proposed new subsection (3)(b)(ii). Can she clarify what her referendum would be? Would it include the sovereignty, the possession and the inhabitation of the military base on Diego Garcia?
Baroness Meyer (Con)
I presume that a referendum would actually ask the Chagossian people what they want for their future and self-determination.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
To clarify: it is the position of the Opposition that the referendum would also be for there to able to be inhabitants on the military base?
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am intervening on the noble Baroness. It is her speech.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
The Chagossian people have made it very clear what they want. They had their own opinion poll on the subject, and that has been independently verified: 99.22% of people voted for it. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, asked what the proposition would be. It is for a resettlement on the outer atolls, under British jurisdiction and as British overseas citizens, in accordance with the plan set out in 2015, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, referred earlier.
Baroness Meyer (Con)
Yes, and they seem to approve what we are saying. Basically, these amendments are about asking the Chagossian people about the right to self-determination through a referendum. I have never met a Chagossian in my life, but I have received many letters from them over the past few days and feel that this is my moral duty, and I think that, in good conscience, the Government should allow them self-determination.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, but I particularly like Amendment 64, because it goes to the heart of the issue and is very simple and straightforward: we want a referendum. I think the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, answered the noble Lord on the Front Bench who asked about what a referendum would mean; I concur exactly with that, and I hope that that has satisfied him.
When we are trying to get an argument for providing the people of the Chagos Islands with self-determination, sometimes it is useful to consider the arguments being put against it. There are two key arguments that the Government seem to deploy for backing the Mauritius treaty and the Bill, rather than a self-determination referendum, the provision of which would be not necessarily easy but technically possible and would include all the Chagossians not just in the UK but around the world.
The Government’s first argument would seem to be that we are excused from the need to provide the Chagossians with self-determination because we removed them from the Chagos Islands and so they can no longer be offered self-determination. So long as the Government say that it was very wrong that the Chagossians were removed, the Government seem to think that the fact that they no longer live on their islands relieves us of the moral obligation to provide them with self-determination on their future. For me, this constitutes a pretty appalling logic that lays bare not only the complete moral failure of the current Government but the deployment of a rather dreadful logic in a way that I believe really lets down the people of our country, the United Kingdom, in a very humiliating fashion.
The Chagossians themselves call this out in a very powerful statement on self-determination, which I am sure the Minister will have read, that they issued yesterday. I am going to quote from it, because I think it is really important. They say:
“In recent years there has been much repenting of colonialism within certain parts of the West, including the United Kingdom. The problem with colonialism is one of alienation. In its conventional form it is problematic because it alienates a people from the dignity of self-government of their home territory, but not from that territory. They can continue to live on the territory that is their home and nurture the hope that at some point they might be afforded the dignity of self-government. The colonialism to which we have been subjected, however, presented a far more extreme and unusual alienation because it alienated us not just from the dignity of a measure of self-government but far more problematically, from our territory, our home, by taking it from us.
If the international community is serious in its commitment to decolonise then it cannot afford to accommodate either alienation. To do so, however, in the context of re-denying”—
I emphasise this—
“the people concerned self-determination while simultaneously paying a country that played a key role in denying that people self-determination in relation to their territory on the previous occasion, more money than is required to resettle the people with the rightful claim to the territory, in order to lease one of their islands, demonstrates extreme moral disorientation.
In this context the policy of the current Government to state that what happened between 1968 and 1973 was deeply wrong but then not lift a finger to put that right, even as they demonstrate that the resources are more than available to do so, not only makes the condemnation of what happened between 1968 and 1973 completely hollow, but also necessarily has the effect of affirming the validity of what happened”.
I think every noble Lord should read that statement carefully; there is more in it.
If we put this another way, attempts by His Majesty’s Government to claim that the United Kingdom is relieved of any obligation to provide the people of the Chagos Islands self-determination in relation to their islands because they are not living there is just another way of saying that we are relieved of the responsibility for having prosecuted the most extreme form of colonialisation because we prosecuted the most extreme form of colonialisation. I think it is plain for all to see that, if we are justifying ourselves in not providing self-determination to the Chagossians—which we would do by at least asking people in a referendum—because we removed them from their islands, we are suggesting that removing them from their islands validates this, as if the crime of their forced removal constitutes a source of validity. Rather than providing a source of validity for not providing self-determination to the people of the Chagos Islands, I believe that this logic lays bare the complete moral failure of the current Government and the way in which it shames us as a nation.
The other argument that the Government provide against affording the Chagossians a self-determination referendum is implicit in their references to Chagossians who support the Mauritius treaty, as if the Chagossians supporting it means that providing the Chagossians self- determination is unnecessary because we already know what they want. I do not doubt that there are some Chagossians, particularly some in Mauritius, who support the Mauritius treaty. There has never been, in my opinion, a self-determination referendum in which 100% of people voted in one way. However, what is incontrovertible is that we have to engage with the fact that not only do we have some 650 Chagossians who have been involved here in the United Kingdom but the survey of over 3,000 Chagossians living in the UK, Mauritius and the Seychelles demonstrates over 99% opposition to being given away—just think about that—to the Republic of Mauritius and support for self-determination as a resettled British overseas territory such as Anguilla or Montserrat. That is 99%. They do not want to be given away to Mauritius; they want to stay British.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I want to speak briefly on this group. I support a number of the amendments in it, in particular those that call for a referendum for the citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory—that comes as no surprise, I am sure, given my Second Reading speech—Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt, asking for Chagossian representation to liaise with Parliament and Amendment 49, also in his name, adding a new clause for the assessment of Chagossian civic identity and self-determination.
The treatment of the Chagossians in 1965 is being exacerbated by their treatment today by this Government —I think that is a fact. We have talked at length about the lack of consultation and the great haste with which this treaty came about. That has led to claim and counterclaim about how Chagossians feel about the transfer of sovereignty. Surely the simplest way to find out the answer is to hold a referendum among those who hold BIOT citizenship. As I said at Second Reading, geography is not political destiny, especially when the closest country to Diego Garcia is not even Mauritius but the Seychelles. Given the past treatment, taking the views of the Chagossian community is now the very least that this Government should do.
Until now, Chagossians living here in the UK have been pushed aside, as I said at Second Reading, even by their Members of Parliament. That is astonishing. We are supposed to live in an open democracy where Members of Parliament are voted in to the other place and are responsive to people who live in their constituencies. It is dreadful that despite repeated requests to meet in person, they have been rejected. As I said at Second Reading, if you are a Member of Parliament and you are going to vote through a government policy, the very least you should do with your constituents is have the wherewithal to meet them and explain why you have supported the position of the Government. I do not think that is rocket science.
Lord Horam (Con)
I should just correct the noble Baroness. When Mr Henry Smith was the Conservative MP for Crawley, he listened very carefully to the people in his constituency. He was also an active member of the APPG on Chagos, of which I am a member.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
Yes. I am not speaking about Henry; the noble Lord is absolutely right. I shared a platform with him at a Chagossian event a number of months ago. However, this is direct testimony from my Chagossian friends, who have been very clear about a number of MPs whom they contacted, and they were not listened to and were refused a meeting.
Treating our fellow Britons—that is how I see my Chagossian friends—with dignity and addressing their needs are very important. It certainly does not mean that we are challenging national security issues. The two can and should exist together. Just because we have a marvellous asset in Diego Garcia—I am not suggesting otherwise—for our national security needs and those of our friends and colleagues in the United States of America does not mean that we cannot also have a conversation with Chagossian people about their rights, aspirations and needs. The two can and should exist together.
I have already mentioned that the KPMG report of 2015 on the feasibility of the resettlement of BIOT indicated that
“there are no fundamental legal obstacles that would prevent a resettlement of BIOT to go ahead”.
Of course, that is what the Government of the day should have done. They decided not to, citing cost concerns, but how cost effective and value for money does that not look today when we consider the costs of this treaty and the money that we are going to be sending to the Mauritian Government?
Despite what previous Mauritian Administrations have said, the Chagos people are a distinct people on the basis of ethnicity, culture and religion and should be afforded respect by being asked how they view the transfer of sovereignty of their homeland. If this Government turn their face, as it appears they will, against a referendum, they should pay heed to the referendum carried out by the BIOT citizens, which many friends and colleagues in the House have referred to, because that shows a staggering 99.2% of Chagossians who were polled supporting UK sovereignty over the Chagos Islands.
Chagossians have had to resort to press releases and court challenges to be heard, and it is now long past the time for the Government to step back and put in place a referendum to listen to their voices.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
The noble Baroness said 99.2%—I got it wrong; I said only 99%. Does she think that one of the reasons, or perhaps the reason, that the Government will not even contemplate a referendum of the Chagossian people is that they know that they would get the wrong answer and therefore they would be even more morally bound to tear up this Bill and the treaty?
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I pay tribute to my friends in the Chagossian community for raising their voices, which have been very loud. As I said, they have had to find other means by which to raise their voices, whether that be through court challenges or press releases.
I think the Government are well aware of how a number of Chagossians here feel about this. As my noble friend has already alluded to, we have heard that there are Mauritians who are in favour of this deal. I have no doubt that there are those from a Chagos background living in Mauritius now who are in favour of the deal—that is accepted—but I believe that the greater number of those Chagossians want to remain British citizens.
I also support Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown, which, as an alternative to a referendum, asks for a Chagossian representative to liaise with Parliament. I know that other later amendments coming up, including from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, look at ways to be creative about hearing the voice of Chagossians. I commend the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, on mentioning individual names. We are talking about communities but, actually, these are individuals who feel very passionately about their homeland; it is important that we remember that.
Finally, Amendment 49 seeks an assessment of Chagossian civic identity and self-determination, again seeking to underline the distinct nature of the Chagossian people. I support that amendment as well. This has been a good debate but, for me, it is really important to listen to the voices of the Chagossian people.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. She speaks with great sincerity and consistency in making her arguments, and I share many of her thoughts. I said on the earlier group that I am also awaiting the conclusions of the work of the International Relations and Defence Committee. I hope that it will be able to guide us with some of our thinking on this on Report, after its consultations with the community.
Reference has been made to my honourable friends in the House of Commons, who have also for many years been consistent that we should not repeat the history of making decisions on behalf of the community without involving them. It is our long-held view that that is the basis on which we should go forward.
One of the reasons why I intervened on the noble Baroness, and had the interaction with her noble friend, was that there have been some parts of the debate, especially in the House of Commons, where seeking consideration of the right to self-determination has perhaps been used as a bit of a proxy for other considerations, to try either to prevent a treaty or to prevent the restoration of rights. As the noble Lord said on behalf of his noble friend, we seem to be talking about some form of limited sovereignty, some form of limited and partial right to self-determination.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
The proposal has come from the Chagossian population. That is what we mean by self-determination. It is not for us to lay down whether they should have full sovereignty or partial sovereignty; it is for us to listen to what they want.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I agree with that. It is a clearer proposition than we have heard—a better proposition, in my view. Actually, “better” is the wrong word; it is a more convincing proposition because of its origination. The reality of how we define self-determination and the rights of the community—and where I think the debate has bled into previously—is that it has been used without that clarification, as a different political impetus with regard to the overall desirability or otherwise of having a treaty with Mauritius.
That is where I come to it. The most vociferous of speeches that we have heard deny the reality of what happened just last year. We can talk about the denial of rights. If we are talking about referendum statistics, I agree with about 90% of what the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, said about rights in her speech. But we do not have to go back to the 1960s to look at the denial of rights. It was in January 2024 that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, as Foreign Secretary, restated government policy that there would be no right of resettlement, and that was while negotiations on the basis of a treaty were carrying on. If it is an argument to suggest that we wish to restore rights of resettlement and rights to self-determination, I accede to that argument. I think it should be in the acknowledgement that the previous Government and this Government refused to do so in the absence of a treaty with Mauritius.
The context that we are in now is that the first opportunity that we may have for limited right of resettlement and acknowledgement of some form of self-determination is by virtue of a treaty. The Minister knows that these Benches do not consider them to go far enough, and we want to use these stages to see how we can go further. But it is worth recognising that the only opportunity that we have for some form of resettlement is by virtue of there being a treaty.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I am very interested to hear all the contributions from noble Lords on this important debate on the consultation of the Chagossians, or rather the lack of consultation. There have been some powerful speeches, particularly that from the noble Lord, Lord McCrea. Establishing a permanent representative of the Chagossians, as he proposes in his Amendment 37, would indeed be a very powerful thing. I think everybody has agreed that we need to give them a voice. They have not been properly consulted by the Foreign Office, and I am happy to concede to the noble Lord that they were not properly consulted by previous Governments either. No legislative scrutiny will change that.
The noble Lord postulated that it was a bit like him being offered the Dauphin of France, but, given the distance from Northern Ireland to Paris and that from Mauritius to the Chagos, it would be more appropriate for him to be offered the monarchy of Azerbaijan rather than Paris. But the Foreign Office needs to consult the community properly, and that process might be helped if they had a champion of their own.
Amendment 49 speaks to an interesting question about a shared civic identity between the Chagossians and the Mauritians. I think everybody has agreed that there really is not one. This reminded me of the contribution of my noble friend Lord Biggar at Second Reading. In pure terms of identity and self-determination, it makes absolutely no sense that Mauritius and the Chagos Islands should be lumped together in this way. It all stems from some bizarre decision by British imperial administrators many years ago and has absolutely nothing to do with the interests of the Chagossians.
We all know that the Chagossians have not been properly consulted, and that when I tabled an amendment to the committal Motion that would have required a consultation before the Bill could proceed, the Government, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, from the Dispatch Box, raised concerns about the practicality of any such consultation. In fact, the noble Baroness said in a meeting we held with others afterwards that 30 days was not long enough. Fair enough; it is a reasonable point. But when I asked how long was long enough, answer came there none. The Foreign Office has no interest whatever in consulting because, I suspect, despite what the Minister says about there being different opinions among the community, she knows what answer she would get. As it would find it far too difficult a question, the Foreign Office has sidestepped it completely and said that there is no self-determination right for the Chagossians in this case.
This, in my view, is not an acceptable state of affairs and we firmly believe the Government must consult the Chagossian community. It is great that the International Relations Committee is now doing so, but given the time available because the Government would not agree to extend the time for this Bill any further, there is no substitute for a proper consultation. The committee will do its best in the limited time it has.
I will return to the issue of a referendum later, but in the absence of a proper consultation with the Chagossian community in the lead-up to the UK Government’s decision to reach agreement with Mauritius, we see this as a very reasonable step to ensure that they are not left out in the cold as the future of the islands they once called home is determined as they are handed over lock, stock and barrel to a nation they know very little about.
The Government’s treatment of the Chagossians is nothing less than shameful, and I believe we have an opportunity to remedy that in some small way with these amendments. There are many other things that I could say about these amendments, but I think I will leave it at that.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, it is worth restating—and many of the contributions this afternoon have stated this too—that this Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the Chagos archipelago. If I can commend just one speech that we have heard in consideration of this group, it would be that from the noble Lord, Lord McCrea. I found that an impactful, passionate speech that was sincerely given and heartfelt. I do not think I am going to make him happy this afternoon, but what he said was sincerely felt and I respect the way he put his argument and many of the things he said.
We remain committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and an acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. I know—and I agree with much of what has been said—that this House clearly feels very strongly about Chagossians and ensuring that their views are properly heard. We have agreed that the International Relations and Defence Committee will undertake an important piece of work looking at Chagossian views on the treaty. We are looking forward to its report and I am sure we will all read it with great interest.
Turning to the arguments we have just debated, Amendments 13 and 28—I think the noble Lord said he was degrouping Amendments 14, 25, 64 and 84—all relate in some way to holding a referendum or some sort of consultation with Chagossians on the transfer of the Chagos archipelago to Mauritius. I know we have said before—there will be some repetition of argument on these issues—that in the negotiations on the treaty between the United Kingdom and the Government of Mauritius, our priority was to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. I accept that there will be those who disagree with that priority.
The Chagos archipelago has no permanent population and has never been self-governing. Therefore, on the question of self-determination for its population, the English courts have, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritius rather than of Chagossians. That feels incredibly cold and hard to read from this Dispatch Box, but that is the situation legally as determined by English courts. I do not think it helps anybody, not least the Chagossians, to somehow pretend that that is not the case. That is the situation we are in. We can regret that, we can argue about it, we can say that should not be the case; but that is the legal reality.
In a series of judgments since the 1970s, both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have also considered the related but distinct question of an alleged right of abode or other rights that are said to flow from that. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed the claims. The transfer of sovereignty therefore does not deprive Chagossians of any existing right. This is a long-standing legal position that previous UK Governments have also adopted.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
The Minister is repeating what she said at Second Reading, and I acknowledge that that is the case. I said to her then that while the courts have taken a particular view in relation to this matter, it does not rule out Parliament taking a different view, given that we believe in parliamentary democracy and parliamentary sovereignty. Given the way in which this community has been treated for 60 years now, it is fair to say, do we not have a moral obligation to accord them the right to have a say? Regardless of the fact that there have been court judgments on this, can we as not parliamentarians indicate that we believe that the best way forward is to listen to their voices?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I think we can. I do not think we can call it self-determination in the legally applicable sense, but I agree, and I think Parliament agrees too, that the Chagossians deserve the respect of a different kind of relationship with the UK Government, and we need to make sure that we engage with them in a respectful and meaningful way. I will get on to whether that means a referendum, but the noble Baroness makes a very strong point about the importance of listening to the voices of Chagossians themselves, however we might choose to do that. I have mentioned this being a long-standing legal position, but as I am trying to explain, we recognise the importance of these islands to the Chagossians, and we are working hard to reflect this in our wider policies, not all of which are reflected in the Bill because they do not require legislation.
Given that the treaty has been signed, however, and the Bill is reasonably well advanced, having been through the other place, I say with great sincerity that any formal consultation at this stage would not be honest or sufficiently meaningful. I think that was what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, was gently trying to point out to us, because that window was open at one point. It was open when the now Opposition were in government, and they never decided to consult the Chagossians. We agree with that Government, as they were—now the Opposition—that there is no actual legal duty in this situation to do that, but it is vital to respect the many different views within the Chagossian community, including that of several groups that welcome the deal.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I do not want to get ahead of myself, because Amendment 80 is a long way away. My appeal to the Minister—I would say exactly the same to the Mauritian Government if they were here—is that, while discussions on the treaty have concluded, it is obvious that there are ongoing discussions with the Mauritian Government. It is not closed yet for there to be consideration of structures of representation that are currently not in the treaty nor the Bill. My appeal at this early stage of Committee would be for the Minister to retain an open mind on potential structures for further discussions when it comes to representation including, perhaps, a firmer position on how the Chagossian community will be able to be represented going forward.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
That is a constructive proposition. The Government are very willing to engage in that kind of conversation and I note the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, which we will come to later in our considerations—perhaps not this evening, given our current rate of progress.
I point noble Lords to the statement by Olivier Bancoult, the leader of the largest Chagossian group, the CRG. I think it demonstrates that, while there are different views among Chagossians, there is strong support for the agreement from a significant number in the community.
I thought that Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, was really interesting. I am pretty sure this is not exactly what he intended, but in some respects it seems to be trying to replicate that which our elected Members of Parliament are there to do: to represent the views of their constituents, including, in a number of cases, Chagossians. I draw attention to the All-Party Parliamentary Group, which does an excellent job of liaising between Chagossians and Parliament.
In addition, the Government have established a Chagossian contact group, which has wide representation from Chagossian communities in the UK, but also in Mauritius, Seychelles and elsewhere, to give Chagossians the formal role—this is what I think noble Lords seek —that can shape decision-making on the UK Government’s support for their community. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, again reminded us, he will seek to make sure that that group can be as effective as I know noble Lords want it to be. The group met for the first time on 2 September and will convene quarterly thereafter. As my noble friend Lord Coaker and I said in our letter to all Peers, we are exploring opportunities for enhancing that group, including increasing its transparency and frequency. But we are clear that any decisions about the contact group have to be made in agreement with its existing members, and the Government will engage with the group on these questions.
I forget whether we are considering Amendments 29 and 32 or whether they have been degrouped. I think we are doing those. They were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and relate to the UNGA resolutions. I do not think that would be an especially constructive exercise. The treaty expressly states that it constitutes the full and final settlement of all claims by Mauritius in relation to the Chagos Archipelago; it is hard to see how the proposed report would add to that.
In relation to Amendment 49, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, there has never been a claim that all Chagossians share civic identity with Mauritius. As I have said, and as has been said numerous times in this Chamber and in the other place, it is a diverse community with a wide range of views. I said at the beginning of this contribution that the Government have prioritised the needs of security and securing the base on Diego Garcia. I know there are those who disagree with that and I have heard them. That being said, it does not mean that the Government should not do the very best job that we can of engaging with the Chagossian community, and making sure that its diverse range of views are reflected as best we can, as we move forward on the functioning of the contact group, the trust fund and other issues. I commit from the Dispatch Box that this Government will do everything they can to make sure that that happens, and I hope that the noble Lord will therefore seek to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lilley (Con)
With the leave of the Committee, I withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere
“(2) Sections 2 to 4 may not come into force until the Secretary of State sought to re-negotiate the Treaty so that it confers a right on Chagossian people to give birth within the Chagos Archipelago.”
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
In the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, I should like to move the amendment standing in his name. Amendments 3 and 4 are about the rights of Chagossians to bear children in the archipelago and the rights of people born in the archipelago to continued British Overseas Territories citizenship. So as not to detain your Lordships any longer than necessary, I will also speak to my own Amendment 50 in this group, which is about registering married Chagossians as British Indian Ocean Territory citizens.
The Minister has just repeated that she deeply regrets the treatment of Chagossians over the decades, and I believe her. She is obviously sincere and has said that on many previous occasions. In our debate last month, she described it as appalling and morally shameful; she said that they had been badly treated over many decades. So I pose the question: what is adequate restitution for this appalling treatment, which all sides seem to agree is deeply shameful? What would constitute a way of making good a wrong in a way that is understood morally and legally? What we mean by restitution, of course, is restoring something. If you have taken something from someone, restitution means giving it back or compensating them to an equivalent value.
I am afraid that all arguments end up in the same place: the restitution sought by Chagossians for those 60 years was the right to return to the homeland from which they had been plucked and then dumped hundreds, or in some cases thousands, of miles away in strange new lands. I want the Committee to think for a moment about what a return would be like: to imagine the resettlement of the atolls around Diego Garcia, if not of the base itself, with the coconut groves coaxed back into order, their fronds trimmed; children born in the islands being taught by their elders how to husk and split the coconuts; villages on the shore, with their bright roofs rising above the takamaka and banyan trees. Imagine the old churches being reconstituted and the coral stone being used. All of that is what is being sought by our fellow subjects of Chagossian origin, as British Indian Ocean Territory citizens, and it is not available under any alternative plan.
Mauritius recognises a right to settle in the island for Mauritians, under whom it includes Chagossians. But what is being proposed by Mauritius is the dissolution of BIOT citizenship into Mauritian citizenship, equivalent in the Seychelles, and now the equivalent for us. This is something that is unprecedented. I do not think that we have ever done this before. Yes, of course, when we have transferred jurisdiction as a withdrawing colonial power, we have transferred citizenship: you become a Kenyan or whatever it is. But I cannot think of any precedent where you remove somebody’s citizenship and instead give them citizenship of a country to which they feel no loyalty at all. As long as this wrong endures—as long as people feel that they do not have the nationality on their passport that they feel in their hearts—there will not be any stability.
The Minister spoke in the last round about why we should not reopen what was defined by the courts as a final, full and binding settlement. Well, it will not be final. By the way, that is what Mauritius agreed to in 1965, when it was paid to renounce all of its claims; reparations are never fully final. The deprivation of Chagossians of the citizenship that they want, that they want for their children and that past Governments legislated for—we amended the Nationality Act 1981 in 2022 in order precisely to create this status—is not going to result in a full and final settlement. On the contrary, there will be as much rejection of that new dispensation from the people most directly involved as there was recently from the Mauritians of the existing status quo. In fact, I would not be at all surprised if the part of the Chagossian population that rejects the deal constitutes itself as a Government-in-exile and begins to seek recognition. The idea that we are doing all of this in order to settle something quietly so that it all goes away is going to be tested by events—I hope I am wrong about this, but I suspect not. We are going to look back and think, “Why did we not see this coming?”
There is a way of going back to what was our plan as recently as 2015: looking at the places in the archipelago that can be resettled without prejudice to the base, allowing those people then to work in the civilian jobs, which are currently done mainly by Filipinos and Sri Lankans and so on, on Diego Garcia itself. It could be that this whole rap becomes what the Falklands war was to that archipelago: the beginning of an economic renaissance as Britain begins to take an interest in its overseas possession and begins to create active economic opportunities for the people there, whether servicing the military facilities or in fishing or whatever it is. But none of that is going to happen if we simply declare that our Chagossian fellow citizens are really just misguided Mauritians and that they have no more particular right to their ancestral homelands and to the graves of their ancestors than any other Mauritian citizen. It is in your Lordships’ power to put a stop to this and not to ratify this treaty. As our national poet said:
“Prevent it, resist it, let it not be so,
Lest child, child’s children, cry against you woe!”
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 45, 46, and 48. Following on from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, these are measures that would in some way perhaps help to make the Chagossian people feel that we had listened to their genuine concerns. Now, all of us who have been involved with the Chagossians have been seeing a lot of very written and spoken letters and speeches about what they went through, and why these amendments in particular would be something that could move things forward for them. In particular, 95 Chagossians have written who were born on the islands and are here. These are men and women who lived very peaceful, self-sufficient lives on the islands, including Diego Garcia, until the day they were forced on to the ships and told they would never see their homeland again.
It is important that we—for the public out there who perhaps have not grasped the detail of this—just repeat some of the things that they have said and why these amendments might make a slight difference. They all tell the same story. They describe being ordered to leave their homes with only what they could carry. Some recall arriving at the jetty to see their dogs and livestock taken from them and killed before they were pushed on to the ship. Others remember family members separated, possessions thrown into the sea and the moment the islands disappeared over the horizon: as one said, “The day the world went dark”. One native islander, now in her 70s, said, “We left our islands with nothing but our clothes. They took our dogs from us, howling. We were pushed onto the boat and told we would never return. Our children and grandchildren still do not have the documents that say who we really are”. Another said, “They took my home and now they take my identity. My passport says nothing of where I come from. We want to remain British with the right to return to our islands. We do not want to become Mauritian”.
I should add that Chagossians living in Mauritius report that, more recently, Mauritian authorities have already begun to replace their recorded place of birth—changing it to simply “Mauritius”—and in some cases their birth dates. So their birthplace, their identity and their history are being administratively erased.
Amendment 45 is on passports and official documentation. Chagossians have lived for a long time without anything that really recognises their origins, because their birthplace was depopulated, renamed and reclassified: in administrative terms, their existence as a people was largely erased. This amendment ensures that Chagossians can hold passports and documents affirming their historic identity and their connection to the Chagos Archipelago and the British Indian Ocean Territory. That identity, let us not forget, was never surrendered voluntarily. It was severed by force. As another Chagossian said, “We want the papers that say who we are. We are Chagossians from the Chagos. That must not be erased”. Yet under Clauses 2 to 4, if they are passed unamended, the United Kingdom would relinquish sovereignty over every island except Diego Garcia, and the legal foundation for recognising Chagossian identity through official documentation would disappear. This amendment helps with that.
Amendment 46 is about citizenship rights for children. Exile produced a citizenship gap that now affects three generations. Had the Chagossians remained on their islands, their children would automatically hold British Overseas Territory citizenship today. But exile broke that line, leaving many Chagossian families undocumented or semi-stateless for decades. This amendment would restore what displacement interrupted: automatic BOTC and BIOT citizenship for children born in the United Kingdom to Chagossian parents. As another native Chagossian wrote, “My children were born here but they do not have the citizenship I would have given them if I had been allowed to live in my home. This is injustice continuing to the next generation”.
Amendment 48 is on the retention of BOTC passports. Many Chagossians still hold a BOTC passport showing that they have a connection to the British Indian Ocean Territory. These are probably among their most treasured possessions because, for many, they are the only official recognition that they belong to those islands. If BIOT is dissolved for all islands except Diego Garcia, these passports will not be renewable and Chagossian identity will disappear again on paper. Ms Colin, one of the Chagossians, wrote, “Do not take our passports from us again. We lost our homes. Must we also lose our true identity?” This amendment would prevent that second erasure.
The legal position is even more troubling, although I have gone on a great deal about the moral one, which I think is hugely important. Nothing in the treaty with Mauritius, international law or the British Nationality Act requires these nationality rights to be removed. The Government are removing them by choice, not necessity. In Section 17H of the British Nationality Act 1981, inserted in 2022, a person with a Chagossian ancestor has the right to be registered as a BOTC and therefore as a British citizen. The connection that matters in law is historic, whether the ancestor was born in the British Indian Ocean Territory or the islands designated as BIOT in 1965. Whether BIOT exists today is irrelevant. Its abolition does not legally require the abolition of Chagossian nationality rights. Only repealing Section 17H does that, and this Bill repeals it.
This has never happened before. There is no precedent in British nationality law for stripping a people of British nationality status when their territory is transferred. In every previous case, from Kenya in 1963 to Saint Kitts and Nevis in 1983, people lost British territorial citizenship only because they gained a new citizenship of their own independent territory. Chagossians have no such citizenship to inherit. Had the transfer of the islands occurred after the registration window opened in 2022, the handover would have had no impact on Chagossian nationality rights. Their status and their ability to transmit it to their children would have remained intact.
The Government’s justification that BOTC is tied to a continuing connection with a British territory is incompatible with the very reason Section 17H was created. The purpose of that section was historical restitution, recognising that exile unjustly prevented Chagossians passing citizenship to their children. That injustice has not been remedied simply because the territory is being transferred.
The International Court of Justice made it clear in 2019 that the people of a non-self-governing territory must be consulted and that their freely expressed and genuine will must determine their future. That did not happen in 1965, and it is not happening now. Mauritius speaks of completing decolonialisation, yet ignores the fundamental principle of decolonialisation, which is the right of the people of the territory concerned to self-determination. The people of the Chagos Archipelago, the only people ever to live there, have not been consulted. They have not been given a referendum. They have expressed overwhelmingly that they do not wish their identity, their citizenship rights or their homeland to be handed over without their consent. As one native islander, Mr Joseph Elyse, wrote:
“We want to be recognised as a people before it is too late. Every year more of us natives pass away. We want our rights returned while we are still alive”.
These amendments do not seek advantage; they seek restoration. They would not create extraordinary rights; they would correct extraordinary wrongs. They would ensure that a people removed from their territory in circumstances now acknowledged by everyone as unjust is not erased again through the disappearance of its legal status, documentation and citizenship.
Many of the 95 surviving native islanders were children when they were taken from their homes. Some have died without justice. Those who remain ask for something profoundly simple: “Let the world know who we are, let our children have what was taken from us and let us be Chagossians in law as well as memory”. This House should honour that request. I therefore commend Amendments 45, 46 and 48 to the Committee, and urge noble Lords to support them.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere for moving Amendment 3 on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. We all hope his family member gets well soon. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for her very powerful speech.
These amendments all touch on the impact that the Bill will have on the citizenship rights of Chagossians. Clause 4 will limit the rights of those descended from Chagos Islanders to gain British citizenship, in several ways. My amendments in this group also seek to challenge the Government’s approach. It should be noted that settlement in the UK is not what many Chagossians want. Many want to return to the archipelago, and this is something that Ministers have discussed previously. That said, British citizenship should be an option for the Chagossians given the responsibility that I think everybody here believes that we owe them thanks to our historic links and, I am afraid, our record of mistreating their community.
My Amendment 7 would prevent the citizenship provisions coming into effect with the treaty, allowing more time for the Government to consider their approach in domestic law alongside the treaty. It might also allow for greater consultation of the Chagossian community, who are ultimately the people who will be affected by Clause 4. In her reply can the Minister confirm whether the Government have had any conversations with Chagossians about the effect of Clause 4? Can she confirm whether substantive discussions on citizenship rights have been held with the Chagossian contact group, which she claims to have met on a couple of occasions? What was the outcome of those discussions? I would also like to know whether Ministers have made any changes to their plans on citizenship rights as a result of some of the concerns raised by the Chagossian community.
My Amendment 39 probes the limitation of citizenship rights by birth year. Will the Minister please explain why 2027 has been chosen as the cut-off date? What opportunity will there be for the Chagossian community to make a case for its extension, should circumstances require it? Another important issue with any cut-off date for applications is communication. Have Ministers given any consideration to the procedure that should be followed to ensure that eligible Chagossians are contacted about their rights?
I have tabled Amendment 40 to probe the requirement that a person must not have previously held British citizenship to be eligible under the changes made by Clause 4. We can understand why it would not be appropriate for a person who has had their citizenship revoked not to be eligible, but why should a person who has given up their citizenship voluntarily be barred by this clause? I hope the Minister will be able to address these questions.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their speeches. A host of amendments, as we have heard, have been tabled in relation to citizenship rights. Some of them come from a bit of a misunderstanding of what Clause 4 does. I hope that I can explain the detail of what the Bill will mean. If it is not enough, I am very happy to write a letter and put it in the Library, because it is detailed and a little bit complicated. If that would be helpful, that is something I am happy to do. Let me have a go at explaining it all properly this evening and that may suffice.
Clause 4 makes provisions related to British nationality as a consequence of the dissolution of the British Indian Ocean Territory. These provisions are essential to ensure that the existing entitlements the Chagossians have to British citizenship remain unchanged. This clause also amends the British Nationality Act 1981 to reflect that BIOT will no longer be a British Overseas Territory, and as a result no future claims to British Overseas Territory citizenship can be made on the basis of a connection to BIOT.
This will not result in any change to the existing British nationality status that any Chagossian currently holds; this remains protected. Any Chagossian who currently holds British Overseas Territory citizenship retains it. Current routes to British citizenship will also continue to exist with their original expiry dates for application. This clause is vital in order to protect Chagossians’ rights to continue to obtain British citizenship. Seeking to delete the clause would be to play politics with this right.
I turn to the amendments tabled. Amendment 4 is a good example of an amendment that I would gently say is somewhat misconceived in its intent. Chagossians born on the Chagos Archipelago already automatically hold British Overseas Territory citizenship and British citizenship. This amendment would therefore seek to require the Secretary of State to bring forward legislation that would apply to anyone of any nationality born on the Chagos Archipelago once it is no longer a British territory.
The Government are clear that, as BIOT will no longer be an overseas territory, it will no longer be possible to make a new claim for British Overseas Territory citizenship. Instead, the Bill preserves Chagossians’ ability to claim British citizenship. Whether a Chagossian has British Overseas Territory citizenship or not will have no bearing on their ability to claim British citizenship under their bespoke citizenship route.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
I beg leave to withdraw the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow.
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Tuesday 18th November 2025
(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 139-I(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (17 Nov 2025)
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere
“(2) Sections 2 and 4 of this Act do not come into force until the duties outlined in sections (Equality Impact Assessment) and (Implications of treaty on United Kingdom defence spending and United States of America) are discharged.”
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I beg leave to move the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow.
The financial aspects of this Bill are the easiest for people not involved to understand. It does seem bizarre that at a time when we are borrowing money and scratching around for savings, we are raising taxes here in order to fund tax cuts in Mauritius. I do not want to detain noble Lords, so I will not go over the figures again. We had an expert disquisition from my noble friend Lady Noakes at Second Reading.
Even if we were to accept the Government’s figures, we still face an immense imbalance in where the money is going. I come back to the point that we were making just before dinner, about the wrong that everyone accepts was done to the Chagossians and what restitution would look like. The Minister said they had been very badly treated. Well, badly treated or otherwise, their compensation, if we measure it purely in financial terms, comes to a one-off £40 million settlement for good—whereas, even on the figures offered by the Government, we are paying Mauritius £101 million every year for the next 99 years. Who is the wronged party here? How is it that having done this harm to population A by moving them, we then reward the population that is in fact making permanent their exile and deepening their sense of grievance?
Never mind whether it is £3.1 billion, £35 billion or somewhere in between, at Second Reading my noble friend Lord Altrincham made the point that this is money being sent out of the country. We can argue about whether there is merit in Governments spending cash here to stimulate growth. I personally am of the camp that says it does not work. It is better to leave that money directed by people who are attached to it; they spend it more wisely and the growth impact is much higher. But I will allow that there is some impact in stimulating the domestic economy, even when a Government spend money badly. There is none at all when you just take a sum of money and send it several thousand miles away, which is what is being proposed here.
The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, are about impact assessments, particularly on the financial consequences for the United States, as well as for us. I just want to tackle the view that this is a great deal for the US—that, however inconvenient it is for us, we are left with the bill and the US gets to keep the base. Every pound that we send to Mauritius to lease the property that we currently own is a pound that we are not spending on defence. It is a pound taken away from NATO and from the western alliance. That is just the immediate and direct cost of what happens when you take a freehold and then decide to pay for it as a leasehold.
There is then, it seems to me, an underexplored indirect cost: how have we now incentivised future Mauritian Governments to monetise this territory? If they can get this sum of money out of us, why not lease other parts of the archipelago to other powers? The Minister has said, of course, that in the treaty they are not allowed to for military purposes. The treaty says they cannot use these things for defence purposes, but I wonder: down the line, if Mauritius was indeed incentivised to make more money and leased an island for supposedly civilian purposes, then very gradually it was turned in a secret way by an unfriendly power into a more direct military installation, is that something realistically that is then going to trigger a military reaction from us?
It seems to me that the only way of ensuring that we do not have unfriendly neighbours in the Chagos Archipelago is not to have these islands being leased out in the first place, and the best way of preventing the islands being leased out is to hang on to them ourselves.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
The noble Lord referred to £40 million. I assume he is referring to the trust fund that is going to be set up.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
However, as he is fully aware, that is totally in the hands of the Mauritian Government. No Chagossian from here can access that money. Is that not something that should be considered?
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that important correction. This would not be the first time this has happened. The sums that were disbursed to Mauritius in the 1970s, supposedly to be spent on the welfare of the Îlois exile community, were hung on to. They were disbursed very late, and their value had been significantly eroded by inflation in the meantime. Indeed, given that record, there is little wonder that there should be bad feeling from a lot of Chagossians towards the Mauritian Government.
Unusually in this House, the noble Baroness and I were on the same side in the 2016 referendum, so we are familiar with the argument that here is a little bit of your money back; we are spending it for you, and you should be grateful. It was an unconvincing argument to the British people in 2016, and I think it will be an unconvincing argument to the British people and to the Chagossian portion of the British family in 2025. I beg to move.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, I will refer to Amendment 24 in my name. I thank the Minister for her gracious remarks earlier in the debate. I can assure the Committee that I will not detain it as long this time. The amendment asks a simple and poignant question. Should the British taxpayer be compelled to fund a treaty that actively undermines our position on the international stage and erodes British sovereignty? I believe the answer is as simple as the question: no.
Article 11 of the treaty places the United Kingdom under financial obligations to Mauritius, including annual payments linked directly to the transfer of sovereignty. We are being asked to underwrite, year after year, a settlement that has not been endorsed by the people most deeply affected. In 2008 the Foreign Affairs Committee noted the “profound poverty” experienced by many Chagossians resettled in Mauritius. The United Kingdom Government have recognised the “hardship and suffering” caused by their displacement in the preceding years.
At a time when families across the United Kingdom are struggling with the cost of living, when public services are stretched and defence spending is under pressure, the Government are willing, and obliged under this treaty, to transfer British funds overseas in exchange for the honour of relinquishing sovereignty over a territory that hosts one of the most strategically important military bases in the world. Why would we pay for an island that we already own?
Without the inclusion of this amendment, we will be in the extraordinary position of financing, on an annual basis, a settlement that ultimately advances arguments that have repeatedly undermined British sovereignty. That is why this amendment is undeniably crucial. It protects not only the taxpayer but the constitutional integrity of this country, as well as relegating the overindulgent aspirations of the Mauritian Government, depriving them of even more British taxpayers’ money.
Let us also consider the native islanders—the Chagos people. Have we ever paused to consider how they might feel as this Parliament considers whether we should pay a foreign Government to take control of a territory in which they have never had a stake, all while ignoring the cry of the Chagos community in the UK?
Beyond that, there is also the question of accountability. Once these payments begin, Parliament loses direct control over how they are to be spent. There is no binding mechanism in the treaty to ensure that the native community will be benefited by these payments in a meaningful way. This arrangement risks repeating the injustice of the past, where funds provided in earlier decades did not reach the displaced communities in Mauritius who were living in poverty. Surely, we must learn from that history and not repeat it. That is essential.
I therefore believe we should not rush into binding financial commitments when so many broader questions remain unresolved—about self-determination, defence co-operation, the protection of strategic assets, and long-term political stability in a region where global competition is increasing and where the UK needs to be assertive and confident. The British taxpayer should not foot the bill for decisions that diminish our sovereignty and overlook the rights of sovereign British citizens. For these reasons, I commend my amendment to the House.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, and I want to speak to my Amendment 23. Before I go into that, the noble Lords, Lord Hannan and Lord McCrea, have put very clearly just how ridiculous it is that we have a territory that is ours and now we are paying to give it away. The whole thing is just such nonsense. I understand, as we all do, the security implications of Diego Garcia, but it is just inexplicable how this could not have been handled differently. Some noble Lords listening to the debate might well be feeling that this is definitely going to end in tears.
It is also very disappointing, particularly for the Chagossians who have sat here all evening—while we had a break as well—to see so few people here. There is one Back-Bencher from the Labour side, one Cross-Bencher, no Lib Dems at all now apart from the Front Bench, and a number—there should have been a few more—from the Conservative side. I am disappointed by that, and a lot of people should feel a little ashamed that those Chagossians have sat here all evening, listening to their future being decided with so few people listening.
My amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a report assessing the financial implications of the treaty for the United States of America and the United Kingdom, including the effect on NATO spending and the risk of global instability from uncontrolled leasing of islands. One of the main arguments the Government have advanced for the Bill before us—and for the treaty, which will be ratified if this Bill gets Royal Assent—is that the Americans strongly support the treaty and believe it provides the legal certainty they desire. The purpose of Amendment 23 in my name is to probe the downsides, as well as any potential upsides, to ensure that His Majesty’s Government can fully advise the Trump Administration of both.
There are three critical respects in which I do not believe that the Bill and the treaty are in the interests of the United States. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that they are profoundly contrary to the interests of the United States. It is plain, as we saw from the debate earlier, that the treaty will not be able to provide legal certainty, because it is contrary to international law on self-determination and the Ellice Islands precedent. The legal issue is not going to go away, because we will be signing a treaty if this Bill goes through. However, the points that I want to focus on relate to the costs and international peace and stability.
First, we have to make the point about the cost. This represents a huge sum that, if given to the Republic of Mauritius, cannot be spent on UK defence. The key point is that we must assess the benefit arising from the United States not having to pay for the lease of the islands in light of the fact that, under the current arrangements, we do not charge them anything to lease the islands either, and we do not charge ourselves for the islands because, of course, they are held under UK sovereignty.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, not least because my Amendment 59 comes from a similar position to her Amendment 23, in that it is a probing amendment. Indeed, looking across the range of amendments in this group, there is a considerable similarity between them; they all come from a similar spirit.
The amendments in this group, including mine, reflect two particular anxieties and concerns with the Bill. First, there are the overall financial implications and the concerns that have been raised in relation to them. My amendment specifically looks at the financial implications for defence. Secondly, given that a number of the amendments seek for the Government to produce an assessment or report, there is a concern that we want to get clarity and full transparency from the Government on a range of financial matters. My amendment deals with both those concerns.
On the issue of finance, we have already debated the transfer of sovereignty to Mauritius, which is proposed by the treaty and the Bill. A number of us have expressed our deep opposition to that, but this is not simply a case of handing over sovereignty to Mauritius. We are not simply giving sovereignty to Mauritius; we are paying Mauritius to take the Chagos Islands off our hands. That, in and of itself, shows one of the problems with the Bill.
We have seen in black and white the figures for the various payments that there will be, and the range of different assessments of what this deal will cost the taxpayer overall over its lifetime. The Government put it at the lowest level, with a GDP deflator, at around £3.4 billion. I think the cash terms are around £13 billion. The Opposition have indicated their assessment, with inflation, at £35 billion. I know that, in another place, one of the other parties not represented in this House gave an assessment that it would end up being around £50 billion, so there is a very wide range of cost.
However, one thing we can say with a level of certainty, as indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, is that this is money flowing out of this country that cannot directly benefit this country. If we make a presumption, which I will come to in a moment, that this is, in effect, defence spending then it is not simply money that cannot be used for the overall benefit of the UK; in defence terms, it is an opportunity cost. It is not simply something that is additional to the Bill, but money that cannot be spent on other things.
Across the lifetime of this deal, whether we assess it at £3.4 billion, £35 billion or whatever figure you place on it, there will be real terms consequences for defence. It may seem a relatively small amount compared with what we will spend on defence over that period, but I will give a few examples from a defence point of view. The Type 26 frigate programme comes to about £8 billion, the “Queen Elizabeth” class carriers cost about £6.2 billion in total, and a single F35 fighter costs about £80 million. All those things are being taken away. Whatever money is assessed as the current value of our contribution to Mauritius via this deal is money that cannot be spent in this country.
Finally, this again comes to the point about trying to seek a level of transparency. There is a level of dispute over how much we are spending and how we assess it, but there is also a lack of clarity about the budgets that money comes from. I think there are three possibilities. Is this money, in general, coming out of the Foreign Office budget? Is it more particularly, under that category, money that will be deducted from what would otherwise be overseas aid, or is it coming from the defence budget? The purpose of my amendment is to probe that and try to gain some clarity and transparency from the Government about not simply how much we are spending but where it is coming from.
Lord Altrincham (Con)
I thank the Minister for her patience in hosting this Committee. I will comment on my Amendment 52 and the other amendments in this group with specific reference to the financial agreement, where there seems to be ambiguity regarding the cost of this project. There clearly has been some ambiguity in the supervision of the contract, which may be because of the prerogative and lack of parliamentary participation, but this is a very large financial commitment to slip through under the prerogative and it is reasonable that we take a hard look at the contract itself in Parliament. That is why my amendment suggests that it goes back to the House of Commons.
The contract provides for two kinds of payments. It provides for 13 years of fixed payments of £2.3 billion. That is the easiest part of the contract to understand. If noble Lords wish to think of it in present value terms they might be a bit less than £2.3 billion, but those payments are nevertheless fixed and there is a schedule for when they are paid, albeit the Government appear to have offered the Republic of Mauritius the possibility of accelerating those payments.
Those payments take us to year 13. At year 14, the contract is linked to inflation. From here on, the payments are not just unknown but uncapped. That is a remarkable thing for the Government to offer. From year 14, the payments increase with inflation. No one knows what that will be; it could be very large. Therein lies the ambiguity in the approach to how much money is at stake: it is because the Government are offering the Republic of Mauritius the remarkably valuable asset of exposure to UK inflation from years 14 to 99. This is an almost unheard of contract. Incidentally, it is the same kind of financing error that His Majesty’s Treasury has made in linking so much of our gilt issuance to inflation. This itself has been the financial constraint on the Chancellor in recent months because of our exposure to the linkers, which have all moved up with inflation. It is an error that the Treasury has made before, so why is this contract linked to inflation?
I will take a look at what that actually means. The important numbers are the actual numbers that will be paid—nominal numbers—so let us not worry about the inflation adjusted and present value calculation. The actual numbers are those that will have to be funded by taxpayers in the future. If we go from year 14 and imagine a world of 2% inflation for the rest of the century, the Government will have to fund the Republic of Mauritius another £28 billion. At 3%, they will be funding £50 billion. At 4%, it will be £90 billion and at 5% it will be £174 billion.
Where do we go with these numbers? What do they really mean? How can we be comfortable with this kind of exposure? The first answer is that it is a very unusual kind of contract; it has no cap to it and provides enormous exposure to the UK over time. But in terms of just rough numbers, what does that mean? Trading in UK inflation through the gilt market indicates that, for the next 30 years, UK inflation will be around 3%, so it may be at the lower end. But if you look at other examples of where UK inflation has been over the last 100 years, there really are no suggestions that it is below 5%; it is more like 6% or 7%. Remember, it was over 10% only a couple of years ago and over 20% in the 1970s. Rolling forward at 100 years above 5% is probably a reasonable place to be.
Let us take it to be in the 3% zone, which would be very low and benign for the Government. If we then take one of the present-value calculations, we find that there are no scenarios in which this contract is worth less than £15 billion—and at £15 billion it is still uncapped: it is not as if it has been hedged, financed out or closed out in agreement with Mauritius. It still leaves the Government with all the exposure, so it is a remarkable contract in that form.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 53 in my name and that of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, who unfortunately cannot be here this evening. It is clearly a probing amendment to give the Committee an opportunity to consider the implications for the UK of another possibility affecting Article 11, the economic partnership of the treaty. That possibility is that, within the 100 years-plus of the treaty, the Diego Garcia military base might become unusable, due to natural causes or because of a sea level rise triggered by global warming. While the loss of use would have military consequences, due to the wording of the treaty the UK’s financial obligations to Mauritius would appear not to be affected.
As I mentioned at Second Reading, the treaty makes some valiant assumptions about the steadfastness of relationships between the countries concerned. That aside, it would be helpful to understand why, if only as a precautionary principle, no mention of this possibility —the functional failure of the base—or how it might be handled is covered in the treaty. I assume that the possibility was considered by His Majesty’s Government and the United States in their preparations for negotiation. Can the Minister confirm this? Was it decided, based on historical records, that the risk of an earthquake, tsunami or other natural cause was so remote that these need not be considered?
Indeed, in his response in the debate on 30 June, the Minister mentioned that, like all small atoll islands, it is naturally dynamic. While not wishing to speculate on future erosion, he said that scientific surveys had concluded that the overall natural land area of the island had decreased by less than one per cent over the last 50 years. But what about sea level rise? There is a widespread presumption that sea levels will rise in the future. The amount of rise, its timing and spread in the world’s oceans is still speculative, but, based on realistic IPCC global warming projections, estimates for the Chagos atoll indicate rises that would impact on the functioning of the Diego Garcia base. They suggest that, within 100 years of the treaty, the runway and hard standings will not be covered, but some of the domestic and fuel storage areas could become submerged, either intermittently by diurnal tides or on a permanent basis. There could also be difficulties with quayside berthing and the present availability of fresh water. This is but a résumé of findings that were sent to FCDO officials in January, before the treaty was signed in May this year.
Maybe the United States, having done its own assessment, believes that it will be possible gradually to strengthen the sea defences as necessary to maintain the base’s operational capabilities. It would be helpful if the Minister could indicate what assessments the United States has made of sea levels. Looking at the wording of the treaty, as I mentioned at Second Reading, there will be the opportunity to attempt to resolve any issue about payment by the arrangements for settling disputes contained in it. But, whatever arrangement might be accepted by both parties today, it does not follow that the same consensus might be possible later, due to changes in the individuals and their perceptions then. There seems therefore to be good reason to have an agreement with Mauritius now, before ratifying the treaty, on how the eventuality of the base becoming unusable would affect Article 11.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I rise very briefly to commend the noble and gallant Lord on his amendment. It is an incredibly sensible amendment that should not be contentious because, if there are difficulties arising out of natural causes or disaster, it would be unthinkable for His Majesty’s Government to have to continue to pay large sums of money to the Government of Mauritius. I hope that that will be taken on board.
Secondly, I will refer to the treaty, which, at Article 11, talks about the economic partnership between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. There are three parts to that. The first is the annual sum that has to be paid: there has been lots of conversations around what that is and what it might amount to. The second is the trust fund, which the Minister knows I take a particular interest in and which we will discuss in the eighth group of amendments. The third is the multiyear funding as part of a development framework for projects to be undertaken by the Mauritius Government across 25 years. We have heard very little about this multiyear funding. I wonder whether the Minister could elucidate that and give us some details in relation to what that is and what it is thought to be. In the treaty, it says that the amounts, payments and modality for all those three issues will be agreed separately. So it is important for the House to have some clarity in relation to that and I look forward to hearing from the Minister.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I was going to say that this has been an excellent debate, but it has not really been much of a debate seeing as nobody from the Labour side has bothered to get up and try to defend the Government’s actions on this matter. Not even the Foreign Office trade union crowd on the Cross Benches have come along to justify the Government’s actions on this. I note from the media reports that apparently the Mauritian AG is in London for discussions, no doubt to celebrate his brilliantly successful negotiation. He will probably find that the Foreign Office has given him another £100 million today for his trouble in coming over here in the first place.
It would not be right for me to begin my contributions without mentioning the excellent forensic speeches of my noble friends Lord Altrincham and Lady Noakes at Second Reading. It seemed to me very convincing that the Government have increasingly got their numbers wrong. I look forward to the noble Baroness attempting to explain her financial figures again.
I am sure that some noble Lords will argue—maybe the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will—that this agreement has been made and there is nothing we can do about it. They might say that it is an unfortunate oversight, but we cannot change the agreement. However, the treaty, as we have discussed previously, has not yet been ratified; it is not final. The Government could still change their approach. It is unlikely, and it would take political will, but everything is possible.
Now that we know that the treaty is not inevitable and that the overall cost expected when the agreement was reached was wrong, I hope Ministers will take the opportunity to reconsider. In any other walk of life, a decision-maker faced with a significantly higher cost than expected would reassess their position. Why are Ministers failing to take that responsible approach with taxpayers’ money? The Chancellor will get up next week and tell us that the country is bust, and that we need to raise taxes and cut spending, but the FCDO seems to take no account of the extra costs when negotiating this agreement.
My Amendment 22 would require a review of the overall financial cost of the agreement. With such uncertainty about the overall costs, I think this is an entirely reasonable amendment that would give greater transparency to taxpayers on how much of their money will be sent to Mauritius, over time, as we have said before, to fund tax cuts over there. We pay more tax over here, but the Mauritians will be able to cut their taxes with the money that we are very generously sending to them.
As I said, on value for money we are being told to expect spending cuts at the Budget on 26 November. Before the Government cut a single extra service for the British people, Ministers should first consider cutting their surrender deal with the Mauritian Government. In my view, most of the British public would be aghast when presented with the fact that the Government have surrendered territory to a foreign state and simultaneously somehow found themselves paying for the privilege. This is a clear failure to deliver value for money to taxpayers.
My Amendment 70 would require the Government to make a statement explaining why they believe that each payment to Mauritius represents value for money. My Amendment 75 would require the publication of a schedule of expected payments to Mauritius along with their dates. The Government should not resist measures which increase transparency on the financial elements of the agreement.
I gave a wry smile when the noble Lord, Lord Weir, asked the Minister for the breakdown of the costs of this agreement between the MoD budget and the FCDO budget. I hope he has more success than I have in asking this question, because I have asked it five times and she has refused to tell me how much is being paid out of the different budgets. One was beginning to suspect that she does not even know how much money we are handing over on behalf of this deal.
I additionally ask the Minister what powers Ministers have to ensure that the money we hand over to Mauritius is spent as agreed. The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, particularly highlighted the trust fund supposedly set up for the benefit of Chagossians, but how they spend it is entirely within the control of Mauritius. There have been well-documented corruption cases in Mauritius; how do we know how that money will be spent? I think we should be told or Ministers should at least seek to find out.
Finally, Amendment 74 relates to a slightly separate question on the part of the UK-Mauritius agreement relating to the employment of Mauritians on the Diego Garcia military base. I tabled it to ask the noble Baroness some specific questions on the practical effect of the article of this agreement. Can she confirm whether this article means Mauritians will be prioritised for employment on the Diego Garcia military base over, for example, British citizens or Chagossians? Who ultimately would their employer be? This also speaks to value for money. Can the Minister confirm whether her department has made any assessment of the impact of the provisions relating to the employment of Mauritians and how much that will contribute to the cost of running the base?
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
I am not sure that diplomacy is quite the thing for the noble Lord to aspire to. We will move to discussing the amendments that deal with the financial issues and the payments to be made under the treaty. Inevitably in Committee, other issues will be raised as part of the discussions, including those around the trust fund and the way it is managed, as well as security. These are important questions but, if it is okay with noble Lords, it is probably better to deal with them when we reach the appropriate group, so that we can get into sufficient depth when we deal with those specific amendments.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
I was stressing the point that the agreement is about the Chagos Archipelago, but we are interested in Diego Garcia. If Diego Garcia is not available, the treaty requires us to continue to pay Mauritius for the 100 years or whatever it is. We would then be paying for something we do not even have, let alone have the use of. It would seem sensible to have some arrangement in the treaty to cope with this. I am surprised there is not one. If not, how will it be handled?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
We do not expect to be confronted with this situation in the case of Diego Garcia. I am sure there will be adaptations to mitigate this, as there already have been. In the event that sea levels rise to the extent that they would need to in order to make the base unusable, the entire planet would be facing very real threat. That would confront us in very many locations, including Montserrat, St Helena and Ascension. This would probably be the least of our problems.
Out of respect for the noble and gallant Lord and his genuine concern—it is not an unreasonable question— I will reflect on this and try to come back to him with a more thorough response, because I can see that he cares about this and wants to know that the Government have given this the proper consideration that he would expect. I undertake to do that. Luckily, this is the first day of Committee and we have the opportunity to allow ourselves further conversations on these issues.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My concern is that we would have to continue to pay under the present agreement, even though there was not a base available.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I understand fully the nature of the noble and gallant Lord’s concern. He has explained it well and repeatedly, and I have committed to come back to him with a further response. I do not think I can do any more than that tonight.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
Before the noble Baroness leaves that point, I fully respect the noble and gallant Lord’s position on the base not being available due to natural disasters—or, as we called it when I was a solicitor, an act of God—but what happens if the base becomes simply unusable because of an act of aggression by a bad actor in 50 years’ time, which we have no sight of at this moment? The point is that if it becomes unusable for whatever reason, whether by act of God or an act of aggression, will we still continue to pay for a base that we cannot use?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I simply cannot answer that because it would depend so much on the circumstances and on who would be culpable. I do not know. I will think about that and come back to the noble Baroness. It is very difficult to respond to hypotheticals. I could create a few hypotheticals that answer those specific questions but I do not think that would necessarily get us anywhere. She is probably after something a little more concrete than that. I will give that some further thought and see whether I can come back to her with something more satisfactory. I guess, ultimately, that if there is some unavailability we have the option of breaching the terms of the agreement through non-payment, which would end the agreement. However, I will look into our legal position in that situation and make sure we have some clarity so that we can consider this further if we need to.
On the issue of the split and how the money will be found, the noble Lord opposite—in his usual charming way—suggests that we have not really thought about this. Some of the money will come from the FCDO and some from the MoD. It is all government money; it is all taxpayers’ money. I really do not understand the preoccupation with this. That split will be fair. We are very used to paying for things jointly. We do it all the time on various things. This is not an unusual situation.
Lord Callanan (Con)
Will the Minister tell us how much? There is a difference between the money that is spent from her aid budget in the FCDO and the money spent from the MoD. If it is such a simple, straightforward issue that she keeps brushing the question aside then why not just give us the figures? How much of it is coming from the MoD budget and how much of it is coming from the ODA budget, which is, of course, capped?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
It is not capped, actually. Not all ODA money is spent by the FCDO. The MoD spends ODA as well. Not all money spent by the FCDO is ODA. You can spend ODA only on certain activities in certain places. My reading of the OECD rules is that I do not think the DAC would allow us to spend ODA for the purpose of paying for a military base. That does not mean we could not spend ODA in Mauritius if we wanted to—we have a very small programme there at the moment. I hope that helps. The noble Lord may wish to go away and read up on the DAC rules, which might assist him in answering this question.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I was not asking for an explanation of how the different split works between Foreign Office money and ODA money; I was simply asking her how much of the Bill is spent from the Foreign Office budget and how much of it is spent from the MoD budget. I do not see what is so difficult about answering a simple question.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
But the noble Lord did ask me about ODA.
Lord Callanan (Con)
That was part of the question: how much is coming out of the ODA budget?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
It is not coming out of the ODA budget—that is my point—but that does not mean it is not coming out of the FCDO budget, which is different. Does that help the noble Lord?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I do not know how much will be from the FCDO and how much will be from the MoD. It is not ODA, which is the bit I am responsible for. I do not fully understand—perhaps the noble Lord could tell me—why it makes a difference to him how much comes from the FCDO and how much comes from the MoD. I might be better able to assist him if he wishes to explain why this is important. It is not ODA, if that is his concern.
Lord Callanan (Con)
That is an interesting clarification that I have not heard before. Is she telling us, then, that none of the money funding this agreement comes out of the ODA budget?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
You cannot pay for a military base out of your development budget.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I have not given way; I have had enough of this. The noble Lord should probably write to me and explain his question, because we are clearly not getting very far with this. If the noble Baroness on the Back Bench wants to have a go and puts it in a different way, I would be very happy to try to answer.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
The Minister wants this in writing, but unless I am particularly stupid, I thought it was a very simple question.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
The question was: how much is going to be from the ODA budget? I have answered that, and I do not know how to answer that any more clearly. As for how much comes from the FCDO and how much from the MoD, the Treasury will allocate us different amounts of money for different things. I do not quite understand why that makes a difference to the noble Lord—
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I know the Minister was not attracted by the charms of the Front Bench, so I will try slightly differently. I suppose what we are trying to establish first of all is the percentage breakdown between the FCDO and the MoD. It matters because if this is not additional money, there will be a level of opportunity cost. If, for example, we are eating into the MoD budget, that money could be spent on other things. I think, from what I have gathered from what the Minister has said, that the bulk of the money would come from the MoD because of restrictions, but it would be useful to have percentage terms.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Okay, I will see whether we can get that. I do not know that that will be consistent over time, and I do not know whether the Treasury will want to be making that clear from now on. The MoD is deciding to buy itself some capability with this money. It is a significant investment, but it is not beyond the realms of what the MoD would spend on a capability such as this. That is my understanding. Exactly how much comes from each department will be published as we go along, because these things are published in the ordinary run of things.
The confusion in my mind comes from the interchangeable use of “ODA” and “FCDO”, and they are clearly different things. I look after the ODA budget, but the FCDO spends an awful lot more than just ODA. The MoD spends the ODA, too, as does DESNZ, the Department of Health, Defra and many other departments. Does this help noble Lords? Are we getting somewhere?
On Amendments 70, 74 and 75, all tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, I repeat that Parliament has already agreed the principles of the treaty and has not decided to vote against ratification. Any requirement for further approval from Parliament for the payments ignores the thorough and correct process that the treaty and Bill have already gone through and risks undermining the treaty, since non-payment by the UK is a ground for termination.
Regarding Amendment 74, I reassure noble Lords that there are no impacts on the cost of running the base from Article 10. This article pertains to the normal contractual arrangements, with any preference being to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with existing policies, requirements, laws and regulations.
Finally, regarding Amendment 75, I remind noble Lords that an annual payment to Mauritius is a fundamental part of the agreement, and this principle, and the amounts of those payments, were published in full on the day of treaty signature. I hope that in the light of this, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
I asked the Minister a specific question about whether His Majesty’s Government knew about India and Mauritius. Did they know or not?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Of course we knew. My understanding is that this pre-dated negotiations and refers to something on the island of Mauritius itself. if I am wrong about that, I will correct the record and inform the noble Baroness.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
With the Committee’s permission, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago should the Agreement be terminated.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 6 is linked to Amendment 79 in this group. Amendment 6 would link the Bill’s effect to the treaty. If we were to make this amendment, the moment the treaty ceased to have effect, so would this legislation. Amendment 79 would require the Government to publish a statement of their understanding of the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago, should the underlying treaty be terminated.
The reason behind these amendments is that the wording of Clause 2, which would stand on the statute book even if the treaty itself were revoked, is clear only that:
“His Majesty is no longer sovereign over”
the Chagos Archipelago. However, it does not state that Mauritius would be sovereign over the archipelago. The Hong Kong Act was worded similarly and did not grant China sovereignty; it merely revoked Her Majesty’s sovereignty. This means that the only document establishing Mauritian sovereignty over the islands is the UK-Mauritius agreement. If that agreement were terminated, what would be the status of the islands? That is the question that we are putting to the Government.
Interestingly, it is not the case that we could not state in the Bill that Mauritius has sovereignty. There is precedent for that, and it would perhaps state the position more clearly. If noble Lords cast their minds back to the Heligoland–Zanzibar Treaty of 1890—which saw Britain cede sovereignty of Heligoland, a series of islands in the North Sea off Schleswig-Holstein—they will remember that that was in exchange for a free hand in respect of the independent Sultanate of Zanzibar. The Anglo-German Agreement Act 1890, which gave effect to that treaty, stated specifically, in the Schedule, that
“the sovereignty over the Island of Heligoland, together with its dependencies, is ceded by Her Britannic Majesty to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany”.
Can the Minister explain why the Bill follows the example of the 1985 Act and not the clearer precedent of the 1890 Act?
My noble friend Lord Lilley’s Amendment 12 seeks to deliver clarity that the UK can regain sovereignty. That would be a better outcome than an explicit statement that Mauritius will have sovereignty in perpetuity. Whatever the Government’s position on the legal status of the archipelago under this legislation, I believe that, either way, we deserve some clarity.
My Amendment 77 also seeks to resolve a lack of legislative clarity that arises from the fact that the Bill is implementing the more detailed treaty. The treaty provides for the creation of a joint commission, but we have precious little detail on the commission. My amendment would require the UK Government to set out the process that they intend to follow, alongside the Government of Mauritius, to establish the commission. I am sure that the Government will resist the amendment, but I hope that there will be an opportunity for the Minister at least to set out the Government’s expectations of the process that will be followed. Can the Minister say where, when and how often the commission is expected to meet? Who is expected to be appointed to represent the UK Government on it? Will they be a political appointment or a civil servant, and how will they be appointed? I assume that we will have a senior representative, but if the Minister could tell us who or what it might be, that would aid the Committee in its consideration of the Bill.
These are all very important questions that should be answered before we proceed with the Bill. So far, the Government have sought to avoid debate, resisted consultation and prevented transparency, but I hope the Minister can do better in her response to the amendments in this group. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Beith) (LD)
My Lords, if this amendment is agreed to, I will be unable to call Amendment 7 by reason of pre-emption.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 89 in my name and in support of the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.
At Second Reading, I raised the broad issue of the royal prerogative, and the Minister is aware of my, perhaps inquisitive, interest in that. That broad power is in Clause 3, and the specific reference to His Majesty’s power to make Orders in Council comes in at Clause 5, particularly in Clause 5(1)(a). That is powerful. For the benefit of the Chamber, I repeat what that says:
“His Majesty may by Order in Council … make any provision that appears to His Majesty to be appropriate as a result of the Treaty”.
The following paragraph goes on to explain that that can be a
“consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision in relation to … this Act, or … an Order under paragraph (a)”.
I want to thank the Minister for her letter, which she very kindly sent to me yesterday. In it, she alludes to this particular issue and says that “Clause 5 of the Bill creates a new statutory power for His Majesty to make such provision by Orders in Council as he considers appropriate as a result of the treaty”. This led to my Amendment 89, because I am just trying to seek clarification of this power. In particular, I want to establish whether that power can be used by His Majesty, for example, to withdraw the United Kingdom as a party to the treaty and withhold any payment due to Mauritius if Mauritius violates any terms of the treaty.
This is not a lengthy matter for discussion. In responding, I would ask the Minister, if she opposes my amendment, and I anticipate that she may, to be specific about the ground of objection. It may be that she says, “I don’t want the Secretary of State being mixed up in anything like this, it’s just unnecessary and tiresome and he’s got enough on his plate without being burdened with all that”. On the other hand, she might consider that this is an incompetent use of the royal prerogative. I would be interested in understanding that better.
It would be more alarming if the Minister said that she does not consider that, if Mauritius violates any terms of the treaty, the UK will be able to withdraw and cease payment. It is rather along the lines of the point raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, who is not in his place. There is a basic issue about whether the thing is working or not. In his case, the thing is not working because the base has disappeared under the ocean. In the dim and distant past in contract law there was something called “frustration of the contract”: if the underlying purpose disappeared, the contract evaporated. The Minister has undertaken to investigate that further and we shall await that.
I really want to understand, if Mauritius violates the treaty, what practical solution is available to the UK: whether it is paying the money, coming out of the treaty or taking whatever other remedial action is necessary. I shall look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in relation to Amendment 77 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on the process for the establishment of the joint commission. This is critically important because, while the treaty does talk about the process of setting up the joint commission in Annex 3, there is no determination as to whether that person, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said, will be a Member of Parliament, will be accountable to Parliament or will be a civil servant. It would be very helpful if we had more detail in relation to that matter.
It brings me back to my days studying constitutional law at Queen’s University, Belfast, when Professor Brigid Hadfield used to lecture us about the mischief behind the law. She would say, “Read the debate in Parliament to find out what the mischief was”. I was just thinking of her there when I was listening to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. It would be really useful to find out what the Government’s position is in relation to this joint commission, because it could be a very critical part of the post-agreement scenario, where there is accountability to this place. I would really welcome clarity in relation to that matter.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, I would like to address Amendments 11 and 12 in my name, which both relate to the terms of the lease. Over the years, I have often heard leaseholders wish they had, or propose to acquire, the freehold. They feel that, as leaseholders, they are in a very inferior position and that the freeholder has the whip hand and, of course, at the end of the lease, the freeholder, like as not, gets everything back and leaseholders potentially lose everything. This is the first time I have ever heard of someone wanting to swap a freehold for a leasehold and, at the same time, claiming that they will be more secure as a result. Of course, they will not—and even less secure, given the terms of this agreement. Amendment 11 relates to whether or not the lease is renewable.
The lease is dealt with in Article 13 of the treaty, which says that it has a duration of 99 years. What happens at the end of 99 years? Is it automatically renewable? No. Under Article 13.5, the UK has a right to first refusal for a further 40 years on the same terms as offered to any third state. There we have it. Mauritius can offer the UK-US base to a third state in 99 years’ time and force the UK and USA to outbid some other bidder—it might be China, India, Iran or any other country with interests in the Indian Ocean around it, such as Saudi Arabia. There are lots of countries that can afford and might like to have this base. We would have to outbid them to retain what had been maintained and invested in for the previous 99 years. I have no reason to suppose that it would not be as valuable in the future then as it is now.
Lord Lilley (Con)
Probably to get some more money. Indeed, we should have dealt with that in the previous session on money. How much more money is he asking for? One understands there are debates in Mauritius saying they have done so well that they should now reopen discussions and get a little more.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, I am not sure if the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, wants a serious response to that last comment. I will respond to the noble Lord’s point that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Yes, this is true, but if the asset is legally contested to the extent that a close ally is no longer investing in it, and third-party friends and allies are possibly unwilling to support its operability, I would say that possession of that asset is worth a lot less than one that has legal certainty, the investment of the United States and the ability to operate it, because third parties will not be questioning the legal basis on which it is held. But we have been through this at some length already.
I turn to the amendments in the group concerning various mechanisms surrounding termination and the extension of the treaty. We will deal with the issue of sovereignty and termination in a subsequent group. On Amendments 6, 12, 79 and 89 about the implications of terminating the treaty, I should remind the House that there are extremely limited grounds for termination once the treaty is in force, both of which are within the UK’s control. The first would be if we did not pay the sums due under Article 11. Secondly, to answer the point made by the noble Lord, it would be in the case of an armed attack, or threat of one by the United Kingdom on Mauritius, or one directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia. This base is, of course, to be operated by the United Kingdom and the United States together.
It is in our interests that the grounds for termination are limited in this way. It means that Mauritius is unable unilaterally to terminate the agreement except in very specific circumstances. These amendments would therefore force us to reopen negotiations on an area in which we have already secured the strongest terms, and which have also been endorsed by our US allies. It is also highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination. It is important that we understand and are clear about that.
On Amendment 11, Article 13 already sets out the basis on which we can extend the duration of the treaty, including our right of first refusal. The treaty will last for an initial 99 years and may be extended for a further 40 years and beyond, by agreement between the UK and Mauritius. Even if no agreement were reached, the UK would have the right to first refusal on the use of Diego Garcia. If exercised, this would prevent the use of the base by any other party. I was asked—I think by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, but it may have been another noble Lord—how exactly this would work and on what terms. I will get a full answer on this specific point. For today, I am relying on the right of first refusal. I will come back to noble Lords and clarify exactly what is meant by this.
I welcome the interest shown by Amendment 77 in the establishment of the joint commission. Its precise structure is still being developed and will continue to be a point of negotiation between the UK, Mauritius and the US. This includes the development of terms of reference as to how the joint commission will function. However, the following principles have already been agreed, as set out in Annexe 3 to the treaty. I think these answer some of the points that were put, although, because we are still negotiating, it is useful to get the responses, understanding and views of noble Lords on some of these things. The joint commission shall consist of one senior representative from each party as co-chairs, and four additional representatives from each party. The US shall have the right to introduce items for discussion in the joint commission and to designate a representative to attend meetings and provide views and advice. The joint commission shall meet at least twice a year, or more frequently on the request of either party. All decisions of the joint commission shall be taken with the agreement of both parties.
While I welcome the opinions of noble Lords on the best means of keeping the House informed on the development of the joint commission, I do not think that a statutory obligation to publish a statement would be the most appropriate means of doing so, although I will think about this a little more.
On this issue of prerogative and the law on Diego Garcia, this applies only to the law on Diego Garcia. We did have quite a complex exchange about this in one of our briefing conversations and it does not apply to the operation of the treaty, so it would not concern non-payment or any of those other issues. It is only about the law as it applies to Diego Garcia. I hope that that is helpful and that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions. As usual, my noble friend Lord Lilley made an excellent contribution to the debate, and I thank the Minister for her reply. I do not think she has answered all the questions that we asked, or certainly that I asked—I know that she answered some, but not all. She set out the legal position on the commission, as it is in the treaty, but she has not provided any more details on who will be its members, how they will do the appointments et cetera. I would be grateful if she would write to us with the details of that.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I would never deliberately not answer a question from the noble Lord. I have set out what has been agreed so far, and I have explained that the commission is subject to negotiation and that I will commit to updating the House. I do not quite understand the niggle in the noble Lord’s voice.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am not being niggly; I am just repeating the questions that I asked. Who will be the members of the commission? How will they be appointed? Those are the questions that I asked. She set out the numbers, which we could see from the original agreement, but she has not provided the further details that we asked for. I did say that she had answered some of the questions but not all of them.
The long-term legal status of the archipelago is supposedly the driving motivation behind the Government’s decision to seek this agreement with Mauritius, so I think the questions that have been posed are entirely reasonable to seek clarity on the status of what would happen should the treaty be revoked.
I also think we need clarity on the UK’s right to withdraw from the treaty and withhold payments in line with the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Goldie. I think that that is all the information we are going to get out of the Minister tonight so, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Lilley
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has—(a) sought to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius on whether Mauritius will establish a right for Chagossians to return and reside in the Chagos Islands, and(b) laid before both Houses of Parliament a report on progress on establishing such negotiations with the Government of Mauritius and the outcome of any that have taken place.(2B) Within two months of the report being laid under paragraph (2A(b), the Secretary of State must table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the contents of the report.(2C) In this section “Chagossians” are defined as those eligible for British citizenship under section 4 of the Act, and their descendants.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires that the Government must undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return, with a report laid before Parliament on the outcome of the negotiations. The Government must subsequently table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the content of that report.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Amendment 10 deals with the issue of resettlement. This is a very sensitive issue, one that Chagossians feel very deeply about. But Article 6 of the agreement, which is entitled “Resettlement of Chagossians”, fails to give any right to Chagossians to resettle. The wording of Article 6 is:
“In the exercise of its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, Mauritius is free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago other than Diego Garcia. Such resettlement shall be implemented in conformity with the terms of this Agreement and the laws of Mauritius”.
Let us be clear: there is no right for Chagossians to resettle; there is no obligation on Mauritius to resettle the Chagossians. Mauritius is simply free to do resettlement but it does not specify that that resettlement has to be by Chagossians. It could resettle it with Mauritians—just as, when I used to work in Indonesia, it resettled Javans on the various islands such as Borneo and Sumatra. All we are doing is saying that Mauritius can do what it likes—it can do or not do anything that is to the benefit of the Chagossians, or it can give away their former lands and islands to other people—and we will effectively sanctify that through our agreement to Article 6.
Back in 2015, the British Government looked at the possibility of resettlement and asked KPMG to do a study of how much it would cost and how feasible it was. A year later, KPMG came out with a report which stated that resettlement was possible. It would cost certain sums depending how much resettlement was done. If there was a pilot community of 150 people, that would cost in those days £63 million—in current money, that would be about £80 million to £90 million. If there was a medium-sized settlement of 500 people, that would cost about £200 million in today’s money, and if there was a large community of 1,500 people, which is more than the population of Chagos in 1965, that would cost in today’s money £570 million. That is a large sum, but it is much smaller than the sums we have committed to pay Mauritius over the life of this deal. They are largely one-off sums, whereas we are talking of paying Mauritius initially an average of £110 million, inflation adjusted, plus some lump sums and some bringing forward of money in the early period.
We could certainly start a pilot community of Chagossians back in the Chagos Islands for a fraction of what we are otherwise committed to spend on this agreement, so I understand why Chagossians feel really let down and sold out that we are prepared to pay so much money to Mauritius and to designate none of that to their potential resettlement. We pretend to by having this Article entitled “Resettlement of Chagossians”, but it gives no guarantee that the money will be spent in this way.
The study by KPMG looked into the practicalities. The reason it costs money is that we will have to rebuild facilities. On some of the islands there was a church, a hospital, buildings and so on that have fallen into rack and ruin. They would have to be re-established, and there would have to be transport facilities for the envisaged resettled communities to link up with each other and the outside world, but I again point out that these are not huge sums. This is not impossible. It is something that many in the Chagossian community, in the UK, in Mauritius even more, in the Seychelles and elsewhere would like to undertake, but they are not going to be able to undertake it unless Mauritius says so, and one gets the feeling that Mauritius is not terribly well disposed to the idea, otherwise it would not have negotiated such harsh terms in Article 6, which imposes no obligation on it to do so.
I ask Ministers to think again about this and to go back to the Mauritians and say, “I’m sorry, we have”—as they will have done by then—“consulted the Chagossians. We found how eager many of them are to resettle. Many more are eager to have the right of return to visit the graves of their ancestors, the places where they were born and the churches where they worshipped, and we feel they should be given that right, and if we’re going to settle a trust fund on you, we want to be sure it’s going to be used for those purposes as well as perhaps a chunk of the money we’re paying you in rent”. I hope the Minister will look at that in a positive way, given her evident sympathy for the Chagossians, and tell us that there is going to be a little hint of some more positive news that we can give the Chagossian community. I beg to move.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I will speak briefly in support of the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan, in this group. On resettlement, what we have in the treaty may be described as less than useless. I say that because, to a certain extent, it confers a right that is already there, but it underlines it in such a way and denies others that right. The treaty explicitly says that there is a right for Mauritius to resettle people.
If we have handed over sovereignty to Mauritius, people implicitly have a right to resettle on the other islands anyway but, actually, it very much underlines that Mauritius is completely in control; it is completely in the driving seat. There is a lack of reference to the Chagossians: yes, Mauritius may choose to allow some Chagossians back, but it may choose also to deny them. There is no specific right for the Chagossians.
If, as has been mentioned across the Chamber, we are to try to rectify some of the many ills that we have done to the Chagossian people over the years, having at least some level of right of return is the bare minimum that we should be looking for here. The concern is that, from the point of view of Mauritius, the implication will be that, if it is to allow back some Chagossians, they will be the hand-picked Chagossians who have played ball with the Mauritian Government. If you are a good boy or a good girl, yes, you may be allowed back. If, however, you have been part of the awkward squad, you may have a much lesser chance of being resettled on the Chagos Islands than, for example, Chinese contractors. That is the problem.
These amendments would at least take a step towards trying to ameliorate and rectify that situation. If we cannot give the Chagossians an opportunity or a right, which is completely missing in the treaty and missing in the Bill, we are not giving them anything.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I just want to add my voice to those of my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord Weir. If the Chagos Islands had remained inhabited, this issue of sovereignty would not have arisen. They would have been in the same category as Gibraltar, the Falklands or any other territory with a permanent population that had expressed its right to self-determination.
Now, you could argue that that would solve our problem in terms of the base. Equally, you could argue that it is the obvious way of making restitution; it is the way of giving back what was taken. But if you flip that around and look at it from the point of view of Mauritius, is that not precisely why you would not want to have a Chagossian population—or an exclusively Chagossian population—in a doughnut in the outer atolls around Diego Garcia?
The last thing you would want is to risk a Chagossian secessionist movement, where the people who had returned to their ancestral homes had made it very clear that they felt no loyalty to the state of Mauritius and that—in most cases, with a few exceptions, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, said—they did not want to be part of it. Therefore, you would have every incentive to settle the place with your own citizens, or with others, so that they were at least a majority.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, for his remarks. Picking up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley—I have a subsequent amendment on the supplementary list, so we may get to it at some point but it is not on today’s list—does the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, agree with me that what makes this lack of provision for resettlement of the Chagossians worse is that we actually have a blueprint, albeit not necessarily perfect, of how this can be achieved, through the KPMG report in 2015? It is not as though we are doing this against a vacuum. We are not only ignoring the right of Chagossians to return but completely ignoring the pathway through which this can happen.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
The noble Lord makes an extremely good point. If you see this purely in fiscal terms, depending on whether we take the Government’s or my noble friend Lady Noakes’s figures, it is an obviously disastrous thing to spend either six times or 60 times as much as in the KPMG report, simply to give to another country.
We keep hearing from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that growth is her priority and so on. Here is a very good way of making a saving: by not giving money away for territory that we already have but, instead, using a much smaller fraction of that sum to make restitution to the people who were removed. It ticks every box.
I mentioned earlier that the Falkland Islands were saved, paradoxically, by the experience of war because it led to investment, it led to fishing and hydrocarbons being exploited around the coasts, and it led to employment opportunities and better transport links. If we had a settled Chagossian population around the base, they would be the obvious people to work as the contractors on the base. Instead of having to import all these Filipinos from Singapore by air, we would have a population there doing the non-military, non-sensitive jobs.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I think Article 6, “Resettlement of Chagossians”, is the most misnamed article in this treaty. It tells us that,
“Mauritius is free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago other than Diego Garcia”.
I am thankful to live in a democracy where I am free to do all manner of things; sometimes I choose not to do all manner of things for various reasons. I am quite sure Mauritius will take the same view in relation to resettlement of Chagossians on the outer islands.
There is no right of resettlement or return in the treaty. I have a later amendment, on the Second Marshalled List, which deals with this. According to the treaty, there is no right of return or no right of resettlement—we need to be very clear on that. I think that is morally wrong. The language in this Bill deals with what I think is a failure of negotiation, to be honest, because I do not think it would have been beyond the wit of man to have had at the very least a right of return, if not a right of resettlement, in the treaty. With the Mauritian AG here in London, what better time to have a discussion about the right of return and the right of resettlement for the Chagossian people?
Amendment 72, in the alternative, seeks to have some accountability for the current aspiration in the treaty—in other words, after it is implemented—to look back and see what is happening in relation to the right of resettlement. That will give some transparency to why the wording in the treaty has been chosen and, again, get to the purpose of the article.
In conclusion, I strongly support both these amendments. It is wrong not to have a right of return and a right of resettlement in the treaty and the way in which it is presented in the treaty is wrong also.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Lilley for leading on this group. The Chagossian community overwhelmingly wants to see a scheme for the resettlement of the archipelago, reversing the forced removal of the islanders in the late 1960s. As we know, many Chagossians living in Mauritius feel that they are treated, even now, as second-class citizens, and this should not be an acceptable situation. We will probe the treatment of the Chagossians in Mauritius more fully when we debate amendments relating to the trust fund.
Many Chagossians still want, understandably, to return to their homeland. The treaty is clear, sadly, that Mauritius shall be free to arrange for resettlement of Chagossians on all the islands of the archipelago except Diego Garcia, but it is not clear in the treaty what this might look like; nor is it clear how likely resettlement actually is in practice. My Amendment 72 is very simple. It merely requires the Government to publish the findings of a review of all discussions between the UK and Mauritius in respect of the resettlement of the islands. The resettlement under the treaty would be for the islands other than Diego Garcia, so this is not something that should undermine the operations of the base. Given that, we cannot see why the Government would be unwilling to share details of their discussions with the Mauritians on resettlement.
Can the Minister please set out clearly how often resettlement was discussed with the Mauritian Government during the negotiations ahead of the treaty, and what her department’s assessment is of the likelihood that Mauritius will establish a scheme for the resettlement of the islands? Would the UK support a resettlement effort financially? Could some of the existing funds that we are giving to Mauritius be used for resettlement? If not, what is the estimated risk that the Mauritian Government would refuse to undertake a resettlement on cost grounds?
In essence, our question to the Government is: what does this treaty mean for the Chagossian community’s hope of resettlement? If, in the Foreign Office’s view, this treaty effectively kills any hope of resettlement, does the Minister not accept that the Government should manage the expectations of the Chagossians and be very clear and transparent with them that that is what they have agreed? We want to end the lack of transparency around the Bill and I hope that the Minister will be able to do that today.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I agree with the noble Lord that transparency and frankness with the Chagossian community is vital, which is why I have resisted some of the discussions around consultations and referendums. To give the impression that a consultation or referendum can elicit change to a treaty that has already been negotiated in a state-to-state negotiation is wrong. On the noble Lord’s question about how often we have discussed resettlement, it has been discussed throughout and repeatedly—of course it has. It is a very important part of the negotiation that we have had with the Government of Mauritius.
We are coming to some amendments on the operation of the trust fund in the next group, but some news will come from Mauritius shortly on exactly how that will operate. I think that will be reassuring for noble Lords and I hope that we get it very soon so that we can include it in our considerations.
I would point out that resettlement now is non-existent. It has not been possible. They have not even been having heritage visits since Covid; the previous Government did not get round to sorting them out. Having said that, it is good that the Conservative Party is now turning some attention to this.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, “But consider if the islands had not been depopulated”. In response, I point out that if the islands had not been depopulated then there would not be a base and we would not have a treaty. They probably would have been returned to Mauritius, as part of decolonisation, and be Mauritian now anyway. I am at a bit of a loss—but the noble Lord is going to tell me now what he was getting at.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
Forgive me, but I am not sure that is quite true. I do not think the Americans wanted the entire archipelago voided of population; they were satisfied with having Diego Garcia. The Minister and I were not born then, but our predecessors went ahead and volunteered the complete evacuation, which was the beginning of all our problems.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
But that is what happened, and it cannot be undone. We are in a situation where there is clearly no prospect of resettlement now on Diego Garcia—I am glad that that has not explicitly come up in debate—but there is the possibility of resettlement on the other islands and the prospect of visits to Diego Garcia in a way that has not happened for some years.
Specifically on the amendments in this group, I do not think that Amendments 10 and 72 are necessary, but I should explain why. Under the terms of the agreement, Mauritius is already free to develop a programme of resettlement on islands other than Diego Garcia. It will be for Mauritius to decide whether it takes that forward. We have already committed to making a ministerial Statement in both Houses, providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement. The agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms, without requiring the UK taxpayer to pick up the bill. We know that would be considerable, because of the KPMG report.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
Our Governments over the past 30 or 40 years refused to allow the Chagossians to go back. Why does the Minister think the Mauritian Government will ever allow them? What if they say, “Absolutely no”. Have we any say? Can we do anything?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
It is for the Mauritian Government to make that decision. I understand the noble Baroness’s scepticism, especially given our reluctance to undertake this. To serve citizens living in such a remote place with so few services is a considerable thing to do, which is why we are very careful and mindful of the warnings that we have heard about not wanting to give false hope or a false impression, or to make this sound straightforward. That guides us all in our discussions. It is, of course, an incredibly difficult prospect and very expensive. There is the trust fund. I do not know how that would operate and whether it would enable some of this to happen. This is for the Government of Mauritius to determine; we are completely clear about that. The noble Baroness might not wish that to be so, but I point out that the UK Government, for over 50 years, have made it absolutely clear that we would not facilitate return to the islands, for security and financial reasons.
On Amendment 72, it is important that negotiations between the UK and Mauritius on this matter—which I completely accept is sensitive—can take place in confidence. Publishing the records of confidential negotiations such as this would be damaging to trust in the UK keeping matters confidential in the future. That relates not just to our negotiations with Mauritius; it would obviously relate to the prospect of our negotiations with other states on other equally or more sensitive matters. With that, I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)
Before the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, stands up, I want to make a statement. Noble Lords will be aware that grouping processes are well established. The deadline of 5 pm is always communicated to all Peers when the groupings are sent out. Late degrouping is discouraged, I am afraid. For this group, the groupings were sent out at 11 am with a deadline of 5 pm and no changes were made. The changes sought by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, were requested shortly before 6 pm. There is nothing procedural to stop the noble Lord degrouping the amendments for separate debate during proceedings today—I am sure he is doing so—but it is inconvenient for the Minister, who might not be able to respond to some of his degrouping.
Amendment 14
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the provisions from coming into force until the Government has ensured that there has been a referendum of the Chagossian people on the question of sovereignty.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for his statement, but the Chief Whip’s Office was informed last night of my intention to degroup these amendments. In fact, it wrote to me and to my noble friend Lord Lilley to ask if I agreed with grouping his amendment with this degrouped amendment. Clearly, there was an expectation from the office that it would do that and then, sometime during the day, that expectation was changed. The noble Lord would have a case if the Chief Whip’s Office had been given no notice whatever and did not know anything about it, but clearly it does. As the Deputy Chairman of Committees indicated, notice has been given and there was an expectation that this would take place.
To go on to the issues in consequence—
Lord Leong (Lab)
I just want to clarify that I have a note here saying that the Chief Whip decided this afternoon. Given how late the change was made, it could not be reflected in Today’s List, which had already been published. I informed the Deputy Chairman of Committees of the degrouping just 10 minutes ago.
Lord Callanan (Con)
Thank you. I think the noble Lord has just confirmed that the Chief Whip decided this afternoon, but the Chief Whip’s office was informed last night. If that was the case, why did the Chief Whip’s office email my noble friend Lord Lilley and me this morning asking whether we were in agreement with his amendment being incorporated in my degrouping? Clearly, there was an expectation that that would happen. The Chief Whip decided this afternoon that he did not want to do that, and it is his right to do that. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Leong, has also acknowledged, it is my right on the Floor of the House to degroup the amendment, which is what I am doing. It seems to me to be a bit of a silly and pointless debate.
I am tempted to quote the late Lady Thatcher in a discussion on referendums, when she argued that they are a practice to be referred to only on constitutional issues. I think that still holds as a good rule of thumb. Where there is a chance that a model of governance is fundamentally altered, politicians may take a direct democratic approach. Despite our reservations, the Chagos Archipelago is about to undergo the most foundational change in its terms of governance. We are giving away sovereignty over the islands in what is another step in a long story of Britain, sadly, failing the Chagossians, the vast majority of whom in a survey released today do not want Mauritius to be in control of their sovereignty. We would not cede sovereignty over a part of these islands to another state without consultation, and it is unlikely that it would happen without a referendum. So why does this principle not hold for the Chagossians? That is the question we are putting to the Government with these amendments.
I am sure that the Government have not applied different principles to different peoples out of pure negligence. The reason the Government will not agree to a referendum on this trajectory-altering decision is because, at heart, they know that this is a dud deal. The Government know they are selling the Chagossian people down the river, all to continue their policy of blind adherence to the opinions of the Attorney-General and international lawyers. They know that they have not taken the necessary steps to ensure that this is what is best for both the British and Chagossian populations. They know that, if given the choice, the Chagossian people would almost certainly choose for the archipelago to remain British.
A poll conducted by the Friends of the British Overseas Territories and endorsed by Whitestone Insight found that 99% of the 3,389 Chagossians who responded to the poll were in favour of the archipelago remaining British. It is simple: the Chagossian community overwhelmingly opposes this Bill, and that is why the Government have not consulted it properly—because they do not want to receive an answer that they do not like. That is why the Government will also, I suspect, resist a referendum on the Chagossians.
It is also puzzling that other noble Lords—sadly, not many of them are in the Chamber at this late hour—have not tabled their own amendments on a referendum. Certain members of the Foreign Office contingent that normally sits over there were in favour of two referendums on our EU membership, but it seems that they are not in favour of even a single one for the Chagossians.
The Liberal Democrats’ foreign affairs spokesman, Al Pinkerton, was very clear on his party’s support for a referendum. He said that the Liberal Democrats stood for Chagossian sovereignty over their own citizenship and protection of their rights. He said that
“this Bill fails the Chagossian people”
because it continues the injustice of taking decisions about the Chagos Islands
“without the consent of those most affected”.
The referendums that we are proposing would actually ask for the consent of those most affected. This was, he said, to be remedied through
“a referendum of the Chagossian people themselves”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 756.]
I was sad to see that there was no Liberal Democrat amendment on a referendum. That prompted me to put my amendments down for debate, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lilley for also tabling his own amendments.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. He absolutely put his amendment down. At first, I thought I would do him the courtesy of listening to how effective he was going to be in making his argument. So far, I am finding out that, the more briefly he speaks, the more persuasive he is.
Lord Callanan (Con)
It is not my fault if the Liberal Democrats do not want to be consistent on this.
The point is that colleagues of the noble Lords to my left have argued in the other place for a referendum, but the Liberal Democrats in your Lordships’ House have done nothing. The noble Lord has tabled just two amendments, only one of which is consequential. When we debated ratification, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, withdrew his amendments to the Motion without a Division. I think that speaks a thousand volumes. It seems that it falls to my noble friends on these Benches to stand up for the Chagossians and ask for the referendum that they rightly deserve. I beg to move.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I support my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment. My own amendment also calls for a referendum. The Government have given priority to the Mauritians—and, indeed, to some extent, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice—maintaining what they think of as territorial integrity over the right to self-determination. That should not be the case. Under international law, the right of a group within a decolonised area to self-determination has priority over so-called territorial integrity. It is very regrettable that that has not yet been conceded.
When we come to vote on this subject on Report, as no doubt we will, I very much hope that this will be an area where there is widespread support across the House. I very much hope that the Liberal Democrats will support a vote requiring a referendum among the Chagossian people over the right to self-determination. We are told that they did so in the Commons. In fact, they were so moved by it and thought it such an important issue that they voted against the whole Bill at Third Reading.
So far, the amendments the Liberal Democrats have tabled cannot be said to be amendments that would require a referendum. Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, would require that
“a Minister of the Crown must engage with the Government of the Republic of Mauritius with a view to establishing a Joint Parliamentary Commission”.
We are getting “could”, “may” and “might” added together.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I will speak to the noble Lord’s amendment first, because I am informing the House about it, and then he can tell me where I am wrong.
Amendment 80 would require that, having engaged with the Mauritian authorities to set up this joint commission, and having perhaps persuaded them to do so:
“The Minister of the Crown must further propose that the Commission’s responsibilities include … evaluating the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including … the right of return”
and
“the right to self-determination”.
We would therefore have to seek the Mauritians’ agreement on setting up a commission and then propose to that commission that it does something to evaluate the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, which would include the right of return and to self-determination. However, this amendment, if we were to accept it, contains absolutely no requirement for the House to support a referendum. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that this convoluted chain of events would lead to such a recommendation.
The final sentence of the amendment reads:
“If the Commission described in subsection (1) is established, within five years of the commencement of the Treaty”,
et cetera. The commission is not envisioned to even get going for several years, and the amendment is probably realistic to recognise this. I am looking forward to a serious Liberal amendment, or their support for serious amendments from me and my noble friend that would require a referendum. I give way to the noble Lord, now that he knows more about what his amendment says.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for intervening when he was moving his amendment. I am flattered by being so courted by the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley. Historians will be aware that the Rough Wooing was not entirely successful in my Border area. I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that I am sure he will be able to clarify. He is aware that the House of Commons voted on Amendment 9 for a referendum. Tabled by my colleagues, it would have required the Government to seek to
“undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return and on a referendum”
for Chagossians on self-determination. Parliament has voted on this already. The Division was 319 votes against and 83 in favour. The Conservatives did not support it. Why?
Lord Lilley (Con)
I am afraid I cannot tell the noble Lord that. I read the debate and it was not clear that there was much focus on the Liberal amendment. He has read out part of it; it covered lots of other things and they probably thought it was a bit wishy-washy.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I do not think that is quite acceptable. Amendment 9 was voted on, and it included everything that the noble Lord asked of me. Why did the Conservatives not support it?
Lord Lilley (Con)
I do not know. I am not an official representative of the Conservative Party. I am flattered that the noble Lord thinks I control the Conservative Party in the Commons and in this place. I do not do either. I have not had any ministerial role since about 2000. I may give the impression of having power and influence beyond that which I really do, and I am flattered that he should think so.
I would like to see the Liberal Democrats support us. We know that, if they do, we will win, but they seem unlikely to do so. It is clear that they have done a deal with the Government. They will never defeat the Government on issues of substance because, if they do, they will not get as many peerages as they want next time. Let us be quite clear about this. It is as shoddy as that underneath this, I suspect. I hope I am wrong—I may well be. I often am.
It would be a wonderful thing, and we may be able to achieve something for the Chagossians in the shape of getting an amendment on Report—not now, because we are in Committee—which has the support of a majority in this House. If we carry it out, the odds are that the Chagossian people will declare that they do not want to be incorporated in Mauritius and would prefer to remain citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory and British subjects. In that case, we should honour and support their decision when it is taken. I look forward to a Damascene conversion by the Liberal party to this amendment.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, we are almost having another debate on the referendum, which I spoke to on the original amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, earlier. The referendum is probably one of the most important aspects of the Bill, because it is fair and needed and the Chagossians really want it. I am not really interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said about what happened on the amendment on a referendum in the other place, because it was not in the manifesto. As far as I am concerned, we in this Committee should be able to make up our own minds and should certainly not be stopped from moving amendments to the Bill just because the other place has decided something.
It is so just so antidemocratic. I am amazed that the Labour Back-Benchers are going along with this. They are not here—does that mean that they do not actually support the Bill but are having to be loyal? It is a shocking Bill. As the noble Lord said at the beginning, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said at Second Reading, this must rate as the worst Bill that Labour have brought forward—which is quite difficult, as there have been so many awful Bills. They just cannot justify it.
These amendments tonight are very important, and I hope that, when we come back on Report, many more Members will have actually read what has gone on in this debate and recognised that to support a referendum is the right thing to do.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their comments on this. I feel that we have discussed the issue of a referendum fairly comprehensively, as the noble Baroness suggested.
The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, pointed the finger at the Lib Dems and accused them of inconsistency. I do not always see eye to eye with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, nor with the Liberal Democrats, but if you want consistency on this issue, I do not think you could do much better than the noble Lord or his colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who has championed the rights of the Chagossians for very many years. I have frankly never heard a peep out of the noble Lord opposite or from many of his colleagues on this topic, the rights of Chagossians, resettlement or anything else to do with the Chagos Islands. If we are after consistency, then the Liberal Democrats have, to be fair, been pretty consistent on this issue for very many years now.
On the issue of a referendum, I remind the Committee that negotiations on the treaty were between the UK and Mauritius, with our priority being to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. The Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population nor has ever been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population can therefore arise. This has been tested in the English courts, as we said in our earlier debate, in a series of judgments since the 1970s. The transfer of sovereignty does not deprive the Chagossians of any existing right.
A time for a referendum or some formal legal basis of a consultation would have been prior to this point, maybe even prior to or during some of the 11 rounds of negotiation undertaken by the previous Government. This is despite the fact that they clearly now think that there is absolutely no legal risk to the security of the islands. It is really important that we do not allow the Chagossian community to have the impression that a consultation or a referendum held now would in any way be able to affect a treaty that has already been agreed by two Governments and that we have been instructed to ratify by votes in both Houses. The Bill has also been through all its processes in the other place.
With that, I hope the noble Lord decides to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
The Minister will not be surprised that I am not convinced by her arguments. I am sure this is something that we will return to at later stages of the Bill but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, it is now 10.48 pm. There are not many Members remaining in the Chamber. The next group of amendments is very long and relates to a very important issue, so I invite the Government to resume the House at this stage.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, we are very happy to continue. As I said earlier, the degrouping was done very late. I have been instructed that we have to carry on until the next group.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I note that, in the supplementary Marshalled List of amendments, the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, has two amendments which pertain to the environment. It would be much better if those were attached to the next grouping. Therefore, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that this is a good point to adjourn.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, following on from that, these amendments coming up are on really important environmental issues that the government party says it cares about very much. I know that there may well have been some agreement, but we Back-Benchers who are not in any political party do not get asked about our agreements on anything, so I would formally like to propose that this House do now resume.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, degrouping after groups have been published goes against what is clearly in the Companion. It is to be discouraged, as a consequence of the Procedure Committee clearly outlining in 2022 why it is, in effect, a discourtesy to the House. This has happened. Sometimes there are consequences to these discourtesies, which is why the Companion indicates that they should be discouraged, and that is when colleagues are under the understanding that reaching certain target groups will be adhered to. It is up to all colleagues to offer due respect to other colleagues who take part in these groupings, but I have been watching the clock on a number of occasions when colleagues have gone far beyond what is considered a courtesy to the Committee in the Companion. There are consequences to how we conduct our debates; one is that we should adhere to our understanding and consider the next group.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I actually move that this House do now resume.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
The noble Baroness has moved that the House do now resume. I will take advice as to whether it is debateable. It is debateable, in which case the Motion now stands before the Committee.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I wish to oppose the noble Baroness in the suggestion, because I think we have made some good progress this evening and had some good debates. We are about to discuss some very important issues around the marine protected area. I am here and ready to do that, despite the bizarre late degrouping for no apparent reason, when we had a repeat of an earlier debate. I think it would be good to make some progress this evening.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I imagine that the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, would want his two amendments grouped with the other marine protected area amendments. Unfortunately, he is not here. It would be good to have all those amendments grouped together, so that we could have a thorough exposition of the environment, instead of part of it tonight and part of it next Tuesday. I would have preferred it if my Amendment 20A was grouped with the right of Chagossians to return, which was already debated but, because it was not, it now has to wait until next week. So I think there is an argument to have the next group next week, so that all the marine environment amendments can be heard together.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
My Lords, the Question has been put that the House do now resume. I must now put that Question. I think on a show of voices the Not-Contents have it.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, would it be helpful if I move that the House do now adjourn?
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
Obviously, we are not going to have a vote now, but it would be helpful for those of us who are non-aligned in this House to have more communication than we have had to date in relation to these matters. There seem to be quite a few of us.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Perhaps I might say to the noble Baroness that communication with regard to the degrouping was not equally applied to all, so I have sympathy with her. Perhaps if we continue with this group now, we might conclude this evening in an amicable way.
Amendment 15
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the provisions from coming into force until the Government has published its plan to ensure the long term protection of the Chagos Marine Protected Area.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, in moving my Amendment 15 I will speak also to Amendments 16, 66 and 73, which are also in my name in this group.
The treaty is clear that Mauritius shall have the duty to conserve and protect the environment, in particular in respect of the marine protected area. It also commits the UK to provide support and assistance to Mauritius in the establishment and management of its marine protected area in the Chagos Archipelago.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 60, 65 and 68 on the protection and preservation of native and migratory bird species, protection against illegal fishing and, generally, marine conservation. Chagossians support these amendments and want to see His Majesty’s Government implementing them.
First, I will deal with the protection and preservation of native and migratory bird species. Amendment 60 not only represents an environmental concern but a kind of power that, as the indigenous people of the Chagos Islands, they wish to be able to exercise themselves. It sets out the kind of responsible stewardship they want to provide to their own homeland, but the Bill, in Clauses 2 to 4, extinguishes their right to self-government in the islands from which they were forcibly removed by a Labour Government.
The Chagos Archipelago is one of the most important sea bird sanctuaries on earth. It supports some of the largest and least disturbed tropical sea bird colonies remaining anywhere in the world. Scientific surveys by the British Indian Ocean Territory, the Zoological Society and the Chagos Conservation Trust confirm that it holds globally significant populations of species that are in decline elsewhere.
I could go through and name a number of the breeds that are very rare: red-footed boobies breed in very large numbers and tens of thousands of brown noddies, white terns, sooty terns and wedge-tailed shearwaters are nesting successfully nesting on the uninhabited islands that remain free of invasive predators.
Sea birds are not simply wildlife; they are the ecological engine of the entire archipelago. Guano from the large sea bird colonies enriches coastal waters, increasing nitrogen and phosphorus levels that in turn fuel reef productivity. Peer-reviewed research published in Nature shows that reef fish biomass adjacent to healthy seabird colonies can be up to five times higher than the reefs where seabirds have been lost. Protecting seabirds is therefore central to protecting the coral reefs, the lagoon ecosystems and the wider marine food web.
These are not hypothetical risks; they are documented threats to the species of global conservation concern, coming from rats, which can wipe out entire colonies. Light pollution disorientates fledglings. Human disturbance can cause nesting failure. There is a whole range of things. The amendment seeks to create a clear duty to safeguard this irreplaceable natural heritage. It is the kind of environmental care and responsible stewardship that the Chagossians themselves wish to bring to their homeland if they are allowed back and to have self-determination. If this Bill passes in its current form, we will transfer the Chagos Islands to the Republic of Mauritius, a country that is 1,337 miles away and does not even have the capacity, as I said earlier, to reach the islands without assistance from India. We will deny the Chagossian people the opportunity to govern these vital ecological assets. That shows what is at stake. The Chagossian people are asking what needs to be done and what they will lose if we proceed with Clauses 2 to 4. We should not be denying them this as far as the amendment on birds is concerned.
Amendment 65 seeks to introduce a waste management and coastal protection system for the Chagos archipelago. Again, I am sure that noble Lords will agree with this because the ecological consequences are serious and well documented—the risk of ghost nets ensnaring endangered green and hawksbill turtles as well as red-footed boobies, which I have already mentioned, brown noddies and reef sharks. When these nets become caught on the reef crest, they break the coral colonies and accelerate degradation.
It is a most significant protected marine area, covering more than 640,000 square kilometres, including a very large share of the remaining high-quality coral reefs in the Indian Ocean. Seabird-driven nutrient cycles, which sustain high fish biomass on adjacent reefs, are disrupted when plastics and fishing gear interfere with nesting colonies. The Chagossian people know this better than anyone. They have told us that keeping their coastline clean is a matter of identity, stewardship and duty. They want to remove the waste that arrives from other nations and prevent further debris entering their waters. That is an essential part, to them, of caring for their homeland. This amendment is not merely about waste but about justice. It is about whether this House, currently denying the Chagossian people any act of self-determination, will also deny them the ability to protect the beaches, reefs and nesting grounds of their homeland. I hope that this amendment will be supported by noble Lords.
Amendment 68 concerns protection against illegal fishing. It would require the Secretary of State to establish a system of patrols and monitoring to prevent illegal fishing within Chagos territorial waters and the surrounding marine protected areas. It would require the Secretary of State to establish a clear system of patrols and monitoring within the Chagos territorial waters and the surrounding marine protected areas. It is exactly what the Chagossian community have said they would want to do for themselves if Clauses 2 to 4 of this Bill were not going through and the United Kingdom was relinquishing sovereignty. The evidence of illegal fishing in these waters is real and well documented. The Chagos marine protected area spans more than 640,000 square kilometres, an area the size of France. It is formally designated as a fully no-take zone, yet its remoteness has made it a target for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Satellite monitoring, vessel tracking systems and analysis by global monitoring groups such as Global Fishing Watch have on multiple occasions detected foreign longliners operating close to, and in some instances within, the BIOT waters.
Enforcement records maintained by the British Indian Ocean Territory Administration confirm that vessels have been intercepted while illegally targeting tuna, sharks and other species. Past patrols have confiscated shark fins, prohibited gear and long lines, providing clear physical evidence of illegal extraction.
The ecological consequences are profound. Illegal fishing undermines the conservation objectives of one of the world’s most important marine protected areas. Every scientific assessment of Chagos ecosystems concludes that maintaining strong enforcement is essential to preserve its uniquely intact reefs, fish biomass and biodiversity.
There are still many people in the Chagossian community who, from their history and heritage, understand this intimately. They have said that protecting the fish stocks is as important to them as protecting their beaches and nesting sites. They want to be able to participate in patrols to support monitoring and to take responsibility for safeguarding the marine life that their parents and grandparents depended on. They see illegal fishing as a threat not only to biodiversity but to their future ability to sustain themselves when they go back to their islands.
Also, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—we have been discussing the advice that it gave—Article 61 requires coastal states to conserve living resources. Article 62 obliges them to ensure proper management and enforcement. Article 73 grants the authority and responsibility to board, inspect, arrest and detain vessels engaged in illegal fishing. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has confirmed that these articles require states to maintain monitoring, to regulate and, crucially, to enforce. At present, there is no statutory duty in domestic law requiring the UK to maintain patrols or monitoring in the BIOT. This amendment would fill that gap and bring legislation into proper alignment with other international obligations, which noble Lords are very keen always to comply with.
The Government may argue that Mauritius can meet these responsibilities after transfer, but the United Kingdom remains the coastal and administrating power today and its treaty obligations exist today. They cannot be satisfied by assuming that another state will meet them.
These are very sensible amendments which, if passed, would at least give the Chagossians the feeling that the United Kingdom cared about the islands overall, about the fishing, the bird life and about the marine life generally. I hope that noble Lords, when they look carefully at this, will actually agree to these amendments. If not, we will bring them back on Report.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I had not intended to speak on these amendments because there are other far more qualified people who I thought would do so. I served on your Lordships’ Environment and Climate Change Committee when it produced the report in July 2023 on the biodiversity agreement in Montreal. As I recall, that commitment, the Montreal treaty, requires Britain to protect 30% of its marine areas by 2030; it was called the 30 by 30 agreement. We were very proud, and I think it was mentioned in that report, that the largest single area of sea that was being protected was the British Indian Ocean Territory’s sea. We accepted tacitly that it was Britain’s responsibility to protect that, that it was a very important area of biodiversity for the world as a whole, and that it was our responsibility.
It now seems that we have handed that over to Mauritius, but Mauritius has no means of policing that area. It has no boats or aeroplanes that could cover that distance and that area. I doubt whether we had permanent boats stationed there, but if there were problems we could. We have the capacity to send both sea- and airborne reconnaissance aircraft to make sure that things are being properly respected.
I wonder, therefore, whether this treaty which we are now legislating to implement is not in contravention of our commitments under the Montreal biodiversity treaty. Are we abandoning commitments we made there and leaving them, in effect, unpoliced?
Another treaty was passed which we did not investigate and which was investigated by another committee of this House. I cannot even remember the name of the treaty but it was about areas of the sea which are outside national jurisdiction. It would seem that this now covers the BIOT—or does it? I hope the Minister will tell us which of these two treaties it is covered by. Is it covered by the old one, which we had responsibility for but have now given up, despite our international obligations under international law, which are normally sacrosanct, or is it under another treaty, which means that it is now dealt with as if it is beyond national jurisdiction?
These are clearly very important matters. It is a shame that we are discussing them at this time of night when people far better informed than I, who could bring their expertise and knowledge to bear, are not here. Since they are not here, I am raising these questions and hope that the Minister will be able to respond to them.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, I am happy to respond. As I understand it, details about the Mauritian marine protected area were published only last week, or it may have been the week before. There will be a new treaty which will be lodged at the UN in a similar way to ours. It will not be a BBNJ issue. I think we will be considering it in this House next week, when we can get into it in a little more detail now that the noble Lord is back into these issues after a bit of a break. Because this would not be biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, it would be the responsibility of the Mauritians and covered by the new treaty. I can talk about that a bit more now.
Amendments 15 and 66 would prevent Clauses 2 to 4 coming into force until the UK Government had published a report on how it intended to preserve the Chagos Marine Protected Area. The MPA will be for the Mauritian Government to implement. They have already announced the creation of the MPA, which they will create once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the marine protected area. Low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians will be allowed in certain limited areas and will be compatible with nature conservation. The UK will continue to support Mauritius in the establishment of this marine protected area and in protecting the globally significant ecosystems of the Chagos Archipelago.
On Amendments 38 and 65, while I appreciate and understand the noble Baroness’s commitment to sustaining the unique and pristine environment around the archipelago, recycling and waste management systems on the outer islands would be for Mauritius to deliver. On Diego Garcia itself, waste management is currently undertaken by the US and monitored by the UK to ensure compliance with environmental standards. This will continue following the entry into force of the agreement, with no identified need to change current processes.
On Amendment 60, while Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, the UK will continue to provide support to protect migratory bird species. Within the agreement, under the international organisations’ exchange of letters, the UK and Mauritius will, for instance, agree separate arrangements to maintain the listed Ramsar wetlands site on Diego Garcia, which provides a unique protected habitat for migratory birds. Further protections will be a matter for Mauritius.
On Amendments 16 and 68, Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, including enforcement. On 3 November, the Mauritian Government announced the creation of the Chagos Archipelago Marine Protected Area. They have confirmed already that no commercial fishing will be allowed in any part of the MPA. They will, however, allow low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians in certain limited areas, which will be compatible with nature conservation.
The UK has agreed to co-operate with Mauritius on maritime security and provide assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty. The terms of this co-operation and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.
Amendment 73 is completely unnecessary. We have been clear on this. The UK has not and will not make any financial payment to the Mauritian Government to establish a new MPA in the waters surrounding the Chagos Archipelago. The UK has agreed to provide support and assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty, protecting the vital military base on Diego Garcia, and the terms of this support and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.
Amendment 76 is no longer required. On 3 November, Mauritius, as I have said, announced the creation of its MPA once the treaty enters into force. Similarly, the points about artisanal fishing apply to that amendment as well. With that, I hope that the amendment can be withdrawn.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her answers, but I think the debate reflects the complexity of the environmental provisions. As my noble friend said, it is a shame that we could not have had it at a more reasonable time, when there could have been more participants in the debate, but the Government clearly do not wish to do that.
This is not a niche issue: protecting the unique and biodiverse environment on and around the islands is of international significance. The Chagossians, the scientific community and many others want to see the Chagos Islands’ unique ecosystem protected, and it would be an abrogation of the Government’s responsibilities if they were to press ahead with this deal without first securing the appropriate assurances from Mauritius.
I am obviously delighted that Mauritius has announced the marine protected area—I am sure we are all really pleased to see that—but I think the key point was the one raised by my noble friend, which is the matter of enforcement. Mauritius is a small island, it has very few resources and it is thousands of miles away from the Chagos Islands. The waters surrounding the Chagos are rich in fishing and biodiversity and I am sure that, in a few years’ time, we will probably see them being exploited, not for any lack of willingness on the part of the Mauritians but simply because they are completely unable to enforce the provisions. That would be a shame for one of the most unique environments in the world. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Tuesday 25th November 2025
(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 139-II(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (24 Nov 2025)
Lord Callanan
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has—(a) sought to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius on whether Mauritius would agree an amendment to Article 10 of the Treaty to allow Chagossians as well as Mauritian nationals the right to be employed on the Base to the maximum extent practicable;(b) laid before both Houses of Parliament a report on progress on establishing such negotiations with the Government of Mauritius and the outcome of any that have taken place.(2B) Within two months of the report being laid under paragraph (2A)(b), a Minister must table substantive motions in the House of Commons and the House of Lords on the contents of the report.(2C) In this section “Chagossians” are defined as those eligible for British citizenship under section 4 of the Act and their descendants.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to prevent the provisions from coming into force until the Government has sought to negotiate Chagossian employees the same right to work in support of the operation of the Base as Mauritians under Article 10 of the Treaty, with a report laid before Parliament on the outcome of the negotiations and subsequent motions in the Commons and Lords on the contents of the report.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, the trust fund set up for the Chagossians is absolutely central to this treaty. Under Article 11, the Mauritians have been given the responsibility for administering the fund, which will be paid for, of course, by the UK. However, we still do not have any clarity on how Mauritius will manage the fund. We seem to have no say in it whatever.
The reality of Mauritius’s past record is also a cause for concern. Since the forced removal of the Chagossians from the archipelago, many Chagossians have lived on Mauritius. As has been pointed out a number of times in the debates so far, in the 1970s the UK Government paid £4 million into a trust fund for the benefit of registered Chagossians. I would be very interested to know the Government’s assessment of whether that trust fund has indeed been a success. Do the Government have any concerns about the way Mauritius has managed that fund before we offer to donate cash for another one? If the Government are concerned about Mauritius’s past actions in this area, what additional assurances have Ministers sought from the Mauritian Government to prevent mismanagement, corruption or failure to properly distribute funds in future?
The domestic reality of this arrangement is also worrying. Many Britons will struggle to understand why we are transferring funds to a foreign Government so that they can manage a trust fund on our behalf. Does this mean that we are transferring funds without proper control over how those moneys are spent? What powers will the UK have under the treaty to ensure that Mauritius is fulfilling its responsibilities? These are all important questions—many Members have raised them in the debates so far—which Ministers should seek to answer, either at the Dispatch Box or in the Bill.
Amendment 17 in my name and Amendments 26 and 78 in the names of my noble friends Lord Lilley and Lord Hannan of Kingsclere relate to the employment of Chagossian citizens on the military base. The treaty makes provision for the employment of Mauritians on the base. We debated issues related to that provision in an earlier group. The treaty, sadly, does not make any provision for the employment of Chagossians on the base. We already know how many Chagossians living on Mauritius feel that they are treated as second-class citizens. Does the Minister agree that Chagossians should have similar protections for their employment on the military base as Mauritians?
Amendment 81, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, is a very simple amendment that would provide for a report on the impact of the treaty on British Indian Ocean Territory citizens. I see no reason why a Minister would refuse to produce that report. The rights of BIOT citizens are, or should be, central to the future of the islands. We need some clarity on this matter. If the Government cannot commit to a report on the impact of the treaty, will the Minister at least give the Committee an assurance that her department will do everything in its power under the terms of the treaty to ensure that BIOT citizens are properly supported by Mauritius?
I look forward to hearing the rest of the debate and the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, in this group I will speak to my Amendments 20A, 50A and 81A. I also strongly support Amendment 55 in the name of my noble friend Lord Weir of Ballyholme. As the Minister knows, I have asked several questions about the trust fund, which, as I understand it, will be totally in the control of the Mauritian Government. This brings inherent problems, particularly as those Chagossians living here in the UK are often near or below the poverty line and could well do with access to help and assistance. Amendment 55 seeks to probe the fairness of the payments to Mauritians and Chagossians.
I will go further in saying that the Secretary of State should establish a Chagossian advisory council comprised primarily of individuals of Chagossian descent, including members based here in the UK, Mauritius and Seychelles. This council could then be consulted on all strategic programme and spending decisions relating to the trust fund, ensuring that Chagossian communities are directly involved in shaping priorities and oversight. That would promote transparency. The minutes of the council meetings and any recommendations or advice could also be published annually. That goes further than the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Weir, but I would be obliged to hear from the Minister on this as it would deal with some of the issues around transparency and accountability as well.
On Amendment 20A, I am not going to labour the points raised as we discussed some of this last week in Committee, but I remind the Committee that the current provisions of the treaty do not grant a right for Chagossians to access their homeland. They leave it up to the Mauritian Government as to whether this happens. Article 6 states that the Mauritian Government are
“free to implement a programme of resettlement”.
That falls far short of right to access the islands. That is what this amendment seeks to do.
Amendment 50A concerns the protection of Chagossian identity and birthplace. I tabled this amendment at the request of the Chagossian community here in the UK, including many native islanders who were born on Diego Garcia, Peros Banhos and Salomon before their forced removal between 1968 and 1973.
This amendment is not theoretical and it is not precautionary. It responds to a real, current and deeply troubling practice that is already happening, and the Committee needs to be aware of the seriousness of this. We have now seen documentary evidence that Mauritian authorities have begun issuing birth certificates to Chagossians in which the true place of birth has been removed and replaced with Mauritius. In each case, the names of islands such as Diego Garcia, Peros Banhos or Salomon have been deleted from the official record. It is not an allegation; it is a matter of record. Chagossian families have shown us the documents and they have been verified by lawyers. Native islanders born on Peros Banhos and Diego Garcia are now being told by a Government claiming future sovereignty over their homeland that they were not born there at all.
This pattern of altering official records is consistent with long-standing concerns expressed by Chagossians who lived in Mauritius, many of whom describe decades of discrimination, marginalisation and a complete lack of constitutional recognition as a distinct people. United Nations human rights experts have previously documented that Chagossians in Mauritius faced entrenched barriers to housing, healthcare, employment and political participation, and continue to experience de facto discrimination as an Afro-descendant minority. Would the Minister care to look at the page on the website of the Mauritian Government which is dedicated to the Chagos Archipelago? There they refer to those who were “forcibly removed” from the islands in the 1960s as
“Mauritians born and residing at the time in the Chagos Archipelago”.
I have seen the passport of a Chagossian who was deported from Diego Garcia to the Seychelles. In that case, the birthplace that was originally recorded as Diego Garcia has been replaced with Mauritius. I am informed by those directly affected that this practice followed political agreements involving the former Mauritian Prime Minister and the former Seychelles President, under which Chagossians living in Seychelles were required to have Mauritius entered on their documents rather than the true place of their birth on the island. Whether these arrangements were informal or formal, the effect is the same: the birthplace of Chagossian natives has been erased, replaced or falsified. That is an act of identity deletion; it is happening now, and the evidence is in front of us.
The way to deal with this is through this amendment, which I believe is essential. The Chagossians were removed once, their homes were demolished, their pets were killed, their possessions were thrown into the sea, and they were shipped to Mauritius and the Seychelles with no warning and no rights. They lost their land, their livelihood and their future. What they ask for today is, I believe, modest in comparison. They ask for the one thing they still possess: the truth of who they are and where they were born. The Committee needs to be cognisant of that. Identity is not a technicality; for a displaced person, it is absolutely everything. It is the final surviving link to their home, lineage, history and dignity. Yet we now know—not just fear or speculate—that the birthplace of Chagossian natives has been altered by an external authority. There can be no more powerful demonstration of why this House must intervene.
The Government have repeatedly argued that decisions about the Chagos should respect international norms—we have heard it many times in this House. International law is absolutely clear on this point. Altering a displaced person’s civil status records without their consent violates the principles laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN guiding principles on internal displacement and the fundamental norms to identity as recognised in human rights jurisprudence.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I speak briefly in support of my noble friend Lady Foster, based on insight and experience. The Chagossian package that we, the previous Government, negotiated was for £40 million over 10 years. Part of the challenge faced by the previous Government was around administration and governance and who would have a say on how that money was spent. For example, the delivery partners included the British Council for packages on English language training. We worked with universities, including Middlesex University, on delivering skill sets for Chagossian communities, and there was some insight provided on governance by local communities right here in the United Kingdom. I share that insight and experience because it remained a big challenge as to how the money would be administered.
Perhaps I can ask the Minister about some specifics. The £40 million Chagossian support package was, as she will know, administered by the FCDO—in other words, the UK Government. In the £40 million now being proposed, that will shift, so the issue of accountability, particularly for the Chagossian people, will be a vital component. I have some probing questions on the existing schemes that are already operational. Going purely from memory, about £30-odd million had been allocated. Will those schemes run to the end of their project period? What has happened to that extra £10 million? Has it been reallocated to the £40 million now being proposed in the trust fund by the Government?
Lord Hay of Ballyore (DUP)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 38A and 38B in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Weir. The amendment before the Committee in my name would require that this Government
“shall seek to permit limited commercial and chartered flights for British Chagossians to and from Diego Garcia, using the existing runway facilities”,
and is of great importance. Like many colleagues have already mentioned, the islanders themselves ought to be at the very heart of this conversation. I was privileged to receive correspondence from many members of the Chagossian community living in the United Kingdom, asking that I reflect their concerns on this issue. I believe this would be a modest but vital step towards addressing the historic injustice inflicted on the Chagossian community.
I shall explain why the Government should accept this amendment and why the Bill in its present form is inadequate without it. Noble Lords will be aware of the history of the British Indian Ocean Territory, and I do not intend to repeat it today. However, we must be continually mindful of what happened to the inhabitants of these islands from 1968 to 1973, then numbering around 2,000: they were removed from their homes so that Diego Garcia could become the site of a UK-US military base.
Since then, the Government have repeatedly recognised that these are British Overseas Territories citizens, some native, but many descendants of deceased islanders who never returned, and the Government have provided certain support measures throughout the years, or so they might contend. Yet, in spite of this, they have failed to take into account the undeniably important right of the Chagossians to have any meaningful access to their former homeland. They have been denied what we consider an expectation to return home at the end of the day.
This amendment is about more than symbolic flights; it addresses infrastructure, reconnection and justice. It taps into the Chagossian people and their campaign for representation throughout this long process, during which His Majesty’s Government have continually left them very much outside in the cold. This amendment would allow limited commercial or charter traffic, especially for the Chagossian community in the United Kingdom. This would not be a wholesale opening of the island, nor would it challenge the base operations; it would simply permit members of the community, many of whom live in the United Kingdom, to visit, reconnect and maintain their culture and family ties to the Chagossian community.
Those opposed to this amendment may argue that additional flights raise security and other major issues. I respectfully suggest that this argument cannot be used to stonewall all access. Instead, this amendment demands a managed, limited and regular scheme—for example, scheduled charters once or twice a year. Under vetting, with government oversight, this is entirely compatible with defence interests. Indeed, recognising the ties of displaced people is part of Britain’s international human rights obligations. The amendment would permit family members to see where their parents were born and to grieve, remember and connect with their roots. That matters more than any of us could ever know. It gives the Chagossian community a tangible and practical link to their homeland. Practically speaking, the Government should include reporting requirements on how many flights, who operates them, capacity and cost. We should ensure a transparent and accountable process. I therefore urge noble Lords to consider this amendment carefully. Without it, the Bill will proceed without a tangible measure of access and leave the Chagossian community with yet another broken promise.
I turn to Amendment 38B in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Weir. In its current form, the Bill fails to provide even the most basic protections for a community whose treatment by successive Governments has been one of the most regrettable chapters in our modern history. The proposal in this amendment is simple. All employment on the Diego Garcia military base must include fair and equal opportunities for the Chagossians as British Indian Ocean Territory citizens, and conditions must be in line with UK labour standards. Those conditions are the bare minimum we should expect for individuals working under the authority of the United Kingdom, particularly in the case of British Chagossians, who have just as much claim to Britishness as we do. Although the Government like to point out that Chagossians can apply for jobs on Diego Garcia, in reality very few have ever had meaningful access to stable, fair and properly regulated employment on the island. Much of the labour force is made up of contracted or sub-contracted workers from elsewhere. Where Chagossians have been employed, concerns have been raised in relation to pay disparity and unclear contractual safeguards. Without explicit protection in legislation, these inequalities will simply continue unchecked. We cannot allow that to happen.
The British Overseas Territories should reflect British values, and those include adherence to UK recognised labour standards. These standards cover fair pay, safe conditions, rest periods, paid leave and protection from discrimination. I completely disagree with the claim that a military base “complicates” and creates a problem for workforce regulations. Civilians work on UK and allied military installations right across the world.
This amendment is about treating the Chagossian community with fairness and basic justice. It is a chance for Parliament to ensure that the community that paid the highest price for Britain’s historical decisions in the British Indian Ocean Territory is no longer marginalised from its own homeland.
This amendment may not ensure self-determination or the maintenance of sovereignty, and nor is it likely to affect the security of the region. But what it does seek to do is to put the Chagossian people first. If the Government are serious about righting the past wrongs, surely, they must begin by guaranteeing equal treatment in employment.
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
My Lords, I will say at the outset that I do not see the need for the amendments we are discussing. However, I do think that responding to and respecting the wishes and interests of the Chagossians is one of the most important and difficult issues facing the Governments of both the United Kingdom and Mauritius.
There is a lot of history to make good here. It is all the more difficult, in that there is no single Chagossian view. There are Chagossian people in Britain, in Mauritius, in the Seychelles and elsewhere, and there are different views among and indeed within the different communities. It would be unwise to think that there is an immediate or straightforward answer to meeting the wishes and interests of these different communities. My guess is that current and future British and Mauritian Governments will be dealing with these questions for quite some time to come.
It is sensible of the Government to ask the International Relations and Defence Committee to look into the issue, and sensible of them to conduct a survey of Chagossian interests and wishes. This is not an easy task. There will be, and indeed already are, doubts expressed about the time and scope of the IRDC’s work. That, I fear, is inevitable, but I hope that the results of the IRDC’s survey and its report will give the Minister some firm ground on which to make her promised statement in due course.
I know that discussions have been going on between the Mauritian and British Governments about the way forward. I hope that one conclusion of these talks will be that the £40 million trust fund to be administered by Mauritius will be administered in the interests of all Chagossians, and in a way that reassures Chagossians, wherever they are now, that their views are properly heard and represented. There is understandable scepticism about this, and it needs to be addressed.
I hope too that the Government will recognise and indeed facilitate the right of return to and resettlement on the Chagos outer islands, and that here too, there will be close and constructive co-operation between the British and Mauritian Governments.
There is a lot of history to put right as far as the Chagossian community is concerned, in Britain and elsewhere. The Government are, I know, fully conscious of that, and I am sure that future Governments will be too. Meanwhile, I hope that this Bill will soon be approved, passed and implemented.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
My Lords, I would certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jay, when he says that the Chagossian people, in the disparate parts of the world in which they live, are not united on many issues. However, one thing on which they are united is their desire for employment opportunities on Diego Garcia, so I very much support the words of my noble friend Lord Callanan.
When I looked at this as a Foreign Office Minister, one of the things that staggered me was the number of people employed on that base from Sri Lanka, India and many other countries. There were occasionally some Chagossians, but there was no comprehensive, well-thought-out framework for Chagossians, be they in Crawley, Mauritius or the Seychelles, to find opportunities for employment in Diego Garcia. It was almost as though there was an underlying desire on the part of both the MoD and the Americans not to employ them on the basis, probably, that they might well go on to claim other rights. There was a lot of concern about whether there would be an issue of self-determination if they went there and settled there. I think my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment makes a great deal of sense. This is one issue that the Chagossian people are fully agreed on, and we should absolutely support it.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, I rise in relation to this group. Picking up the remarks, first of all, of the noble Lord, Lord Jay, I will say that, yes, there is not, perhaps, a single unified position of every single Chagossian. Perhaps we should not be surprised at that. Can we identify an issue in the United Kingdom on which there is a single view which every citizen of the United Kingdom holds? We may indeed have great difficulty in finding many issues within this House on which every single one of us is on exactly the same page. Of course, there would be a way to test that, which is the case of democratic self-determination. That would have been the way to see where the majority of opinion lay within the Chagossian community. It would not be beyond the wit of any Government to do that.
Turning to the amendments in this group, I want to particularly address my Amendments 38C and 55. I have also co-signed a number of my noble friend Lord Hay’s amendments. The thread that very much runs through the amendments in this group, both in content and spirit, is an attempt to actually do something practical, even at this late hour, to support the Chagossian people.
For example, the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, look at employment rights; my noble friend Lord Hay’s amendments look to both employment rights and making some level of provision in terms of flights to the Chagos Islands, and Amendment 50A, from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, looks at birthright and identification, so that the Chagossians do not become some sort of 21st-century Trotsky, who will suddenly be erased, with their identity being erased from all photographs. They will simply become some sort of non-people. All the amendments are very much in the spirit of trying to provide support to the Chagossian people.
It seems that there are objectively three ways in which the United Kingdom can support the Chagossian people. It is undoubtedly the case. I think it has been acknowledged in earlier parts of this debate, from all sides of the House, that, whatever our views on the present treaty, and whatever our views on a wide range of issues, there does seem to be a common agreement and an acknowledgement that we have had over half a century of poor and shameful treatment of the Chagossian people. Successive Governments of whatever political persuasion have let down the Chagossian people. We cannot turn back the clock to prevent what happened in the late 1960s or the 1970s, or what happened subsequent to then. But what we can try to do is ameliorate the situation.
Again, I would highlight three areas which we could look at. The first is the issue of democracy and self-determination, which was the subject of an earlier debate. The second area, which I think is the principal focus of this group of amendments, is how we can provide financial and practical support for the Chagossians. The third issue is the rights of resettlement of Chagossians. My two amendments deal specifically with the latter two.
Turning first to Amendment 38C, this highlights to the Government that there was an alternative way forward. The KPMG report that was produced in 2015, commissioned by a former Labour Prime Minister, put forward a potential pathway of progress as regards the Chagos Islands. My amendment, in the spirit of trying to be practical in terms of help, does not seek to go fully down that pathway or to reinstate the KPMG report. That is clearly something that the Government would reject, but there were a range of proposals within that report dealing with resettlement.
The cost highlighted in 2015 for implementing that report would, I think, have been about £400 million. Sadly, at that stage, the Government rejected that as being far too expensive. Whatever arguments we may have had at an earlier stage over the broader financial cost of this settlement, it seems to me that a solution which cost £400 million would have been very cheap compared with what we face in practice, no matter what figures we belie.
So it strikes me that, while we still have that sovereignty and control of the Chagos Islands, we should be facilitating that resettlement, because it is clear that the treaty agreement that we have reached does not give a right of resettlement to the Chagossians; it hands that lock, stock and barrel to the Mauritius Government. As I said at an earlier stage, I suspect that those who make the right noises towards the Mauritian Government may be able to resettle, while those who are deemed the “awkward squad” will not be able to go back to their homeland. It seems that the very least we can do is to make that provision while we still can for the resettlement of the Chagossian people.
Finally, Amendment 55 is, again, a probing amendment. We have rehearsed the broader financial position. It is clear that, in stark figures, £101 million will be paid per year to the Mauritius Government. We know that the disparity in terms of what that equates to as a total will vary between the Government’s assessment, using one particular calculation of £3.4 billion, and the main Opposition’s figure of £35 billion, but we know that vast sums will go directly to the Mauritian Government. Where we owe a duty of care in particular is to the Chagos Islanders: they should be our top priority when it comes to finance, but this amendment does not even go quite as far as that. We are simply saying that, financially, we want to ensure that there is at least a determination that what is provided is fair and equal towards the Chagos Islanders compared with Mauritius.
I have to say that there is deep concern over the £40 million trust fund. No doubt the Government will say that it is very well intended to provide direct support to the Chagossian people. However, by providing it in such a way that it is entirely within the Mauritian Government’s control, while Chagossians appear to have no particular leverage as to how it is spent, we do not know on what projects or on whom it will be spent. This is one opportunity, at least, to probe the Government on what actions are going to be taken to at least try to ensure equality of provision on that basis.
I look forward to the Minister’s summing up to see what practical measures the Government can take. For instance, will they accept that we monitor the situation closely through an equality assessment, or ensure that there are Chagossians put on any board that deals with the distribution of the money? The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has suggested that there should be a reference group of Chagossians who could at least monitor this. If it simply becomes, effectively, a slush fund for the Mauritian Government to indulge whatever pet projects they want, under the guise of providing for the Chagossian people, without any direct input or control from them, we will simply have repeated the mistakes of history and let down the Chagossian people again.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 78 and in support of the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Hay and Lord Weir, the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and my noble friend Lord Callanan. The crux of this debate is about ending the dream of return for most British Chagossians. As long as they were British citizens, there was always the possibility of resettlement, but we know that Mauritius denies their nationality, treats them as so many Mauritian citizens and is certain not to allow a general right of return to the Chagossian population.
One or two Chagossians who have said all the right things, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, says, may be allowed back as part of that general migration, but we can be pretty certain that they will not be our fellow subjects watching now from the Gallery, stoical and silent, ignored and overlooked in a grisly symbol of these past five decades.
My amendment deals specifically with the rights of employment at the base, but I want to widen it a little to what would make an economically viable community in the Chagos Islands. The Minister has said several times at the Dispatch Box that our priority is maintaining the base and that by implication, therefore, we cannot do the right thing by the Chagossian population. I do not believe there is a contradiction. Maintaining sovereignty would meet both our strategic and our moral obligations of stewardship as the sovereign power and the focus of loyalty of the Chagossian population, and it is economically viable. We heard in our last debate that it could not happen because it was too far away, too distant and too expensive, but as we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Weir, it is a fraction of what we are paying in direct transfers to Mauritius, let alone any associated costs. We can take the Minister’s figures and say that it is six times more expensive to hand the archipelago away, or we can take my noble friend Lady Noakes’s figures and say that it is more like 60 times as expensive. Either way, it is extraordinary that we are not considering the option of resettlement.
I want to explore how that would work. I mentioned last week that the Falklands War was, paradoxically, the beginning of the economic revival of that archipelago because the regular link to the UK and the impact on the economy, as well as our readiness to start exploiting some of the resources, made an island that until then had been suffering from emigration viable and hugely attractive. It has nearly doubled its population since. At the moment we are flying in civilian contractors for all the non-military jobs on an occasional flight from Singapore. These contractors come from the Philippines, Sri Lanka or India, and they do the many non-military jobs on a base of that size—the construction, cooking, cleaning and so on. There is no reason why those jobs could not be done by local people. It would make sense both economically and in security terms, as well as giving a viable economic option to the British Chagossians who return.
But I would not want to leave your Lordships with the thought that this would be a population wholly dependent on the existence of the military base. That is not a position that anyone wants in the long term. It is not a position that the Falkland Islands would want to be in. We will come on to our other overseas territories in a later group, but the economy of Gibraltar has been transformed since the 1980s. Having been almost completely dependent for GDP on our naval base there, it has now become a hugely successful territory through private enterprise. There are lots of other things. What would those other things be? I have said before in this House that it is not for politicians to second-guess the private sector and I am conscious of sitting next to my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who has written a wonderful book making this point at greater length, but here are some ideas off the top of my head after conversations with British Chagossians who had been kicking around a couple of these ideas. Here are seven or eight ideas. Maybe one or two of them might be viable. That is all you would need.
First is the extraordinary marine resource. What about establishing a marine and oceanographic university on Peros Banhos? There has been a lot of interest from academic institutions here and elsewhere. Lancaster University, the University of Exeter, the University of Western Australia in Perth and Dalhousie in Canada have all been involved in ecological and maritime projects around the archipelago. Is it so unthinkable to have a permanent base there that in time could take visiting students and have accommodation for them?
Secondly, the obvious one is tourism. People put a great premium on both novelty and isolation. Here is the last undiscovered tourist archipelago. It can be reached by seaplane from the Maldives which, it is worth reminding ourselves, is closer to the Chagos Archipelago than either the Seychelles or Mauritius. It is perfectly feasible to see snorkelling, birdwatching, scuba-diving and exploration of the marine fauna becoming viable. There are wealthy people who would spend a great deal of money for the additional seclusion and the new frontier.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
This is all very fascinating. I hope we get back to Heligoland soon, and maybe the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, but I have to ask the noble Lord: where was he when his Government decided that the straightforward thing to do was to go for the cession of sovereignty?
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
I was a Member of the European Parliament, and I spoke out quite strongly against that Government. I hope the noble Lord knows me well enough to know that I was never a party line man. I thought it was an appalling thing to do then, and I still think it is an appalling thing to do.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
Yes, the previous Government set out to give sovereignty to Mauritius across the archipelago, but not necessarily on the sovereign base. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has made it very clear that one of his red lines was protecting the sovereign base in perpetuity, as in Cyprus. That would have been a very plausible and popular decision.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
That was my understanding, but even that was too much for me. Even if we had been able to get continued sovereignty on the base and some kind of shared sovereignty on the outer atolls, that would still have been exchanging a freehold for a leasehold. It is a preposterous thing to do when we are being told to do it by a court that has expressly been denied jurisdiction in cases between Commonwealth states. We would be doing it, setting a terrible precedent, to satisfy a tribunal that has no authority.
I was very critical of the previous Government for countenancing these changes. I have told the people involved what I think of it. I am equally critical of this Government, as I suspect are quite a lot of the people on the Labour Benches. I look at the expressions of some noble Lords opposite. I know they are decent patriots and democrats, and I know they feel a sense of obligation to our dispossessed Chagossian colleagues. Of course, they have to do their duty, such is the essence of politics.
I finish by holding out the prospect—just the vision—of people coming back: of civilian and military life coming back; of stories told again by grandmothers under newly thatched roofs, their voices stitched with salt and memory; of footsteps remembering the pale coral paths; and of the islands themselves remembering their old inhabitants, as the tides remember the moon.
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 31 standing in my name. I want to place on record my appreciation for the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, stepping in last week during the difficult situation I had back home. It again demonstrates clearly that, when you throw an awkward ball to a good player, he will pick it up, make you look good and carry on as if nothing has happened, but I appreciate his assistance in that instance.
I was about to say three lines on this amendment, but then I thought I was perhaps being too presumptuous, because I hoped that the Government, just by reading the amendment, would simply have said that there was no reason why they could not support it. I hope that that is exactly what they will say at the end of the debate, but I think I had better say more than just one or two lines in relation to it before sitting down.
Even if one accepted that it was just £101 million every year for 99 years and considered the proposition in its own terms, without regard for the preceding history, the contrast between this and a one-off payment of £40 million to the Chagossians conveys the message that, while the Mauritians are important and worthy of respect, the Chagossians are, by contrast, worthy only of a few crumbs from the table, relatively speaking, which is deeply hurtful and insulting.
Secondly, to really understand the injustice presented by the arrangement, it obviously needs to be seen in the context of history. The Chagossians do not, for the most part, regard themselves as Mauritian.
I have heard what the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Jay, have said. As the noble Lord, Lord Weir, rightly said, across the United Kingdom there is a multiplicity of views on many issues, so it is difficult to get a concise, exact and single supporting view on this, but I will say these things anyway. In this context, the decision to also pay Mauritius a fantastically large sum of money for the use of just one of the Chagos Islands, while the Chagossians are afforded just £40 million, compounds the present injustice.
To appreciate the menacing nature of the way this monetary injustice greatly compounds the underlying injustice, one must point out that the monies for resettlement set out in the KPMG report are significantly less than the monies it is now proposed the Republic of Mauritius be paid for the UK to lease just one of the Chagos Islands.
Finally, the funding for the Chagossians is also important. Article 11 of the treaty undermines the UK Government’s argument for it by addressing the Chagossians apart from the Mauritians. They are, in effect, saying that it is right to return the islands to the Republic of Mauritius because the pre-8 November 1965 boundaries of the colony express the self-determination of the people of the territory, which implies that everyone, at least from a civic perspective, can be happily Mauritian. However, in that context, there would be no need to address the Chagossians separately and allocate payment to them. In addressing the Chagossians separately, the treaty, in effect, hoists itself with its own petard.
Lord Kempsell (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name in this group, and I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Hannan, who masterfully adumbrated his litany of development ideas, as well as those in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Callanan, and others.
The theme before the Committee in this group has surely been, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, put it, an attempt to understand the views, wishes, legitimate desires and concerns of Chagossians. How is it possible to do so without a proper process for consultation with the Chagossian community? Much has already been said in the Committee about the inadequacy of the consultation process followed by the Government that has brought us to this point in the design of the Bill and their policy. My Amendment 81C would make the Chagossian contact group, the Government’s official consultation forum, more robust. Indeed, it would ensure that the Chagossian contact group remained in existence throughout the lifetime of the treaty.
In all the impenetrable fora, groups and organisations within Whitehall, the Chagossian contact group has been shrouded, I think it is fair to say, in a little secrecy. I have repeatedly asked Written Questions of Ministers about the operation of this consultation mechanism. We know that it met earlier this year and was attended by a Minister and that it is chaired by a deputy director in the FCDO and has a small secretariat. My amendment would ensure that it remained active and that Chagossians continued to be enfranchised to a greater extent than they have been thus far by the Government.
My Amendment 81G pertains to the theme of resettlement, which has already been mentioned extensively in the debate. The Government prayed in aid the notion of resettlement as one of their key motives for pursuing this policy, and they have taken the word of the Mauritian Government, I think it is fair to say, on trust when it comes to resettlement. To a certain extent, that is to be expected at international negotiations and in bilateral fora, but there is no reason why the Government should not take steps to ensure that the important issue of resettlement is continually checked on by Ministers in future. That is why, in Amendment 81G, I suggest that within 12 months of Royal Assent the Secretary of State should publish a report made in connection with Article 6 of the treaty as to progress on resettlement.
For the sake of timing, I shall speak also to my Amendment 20C, which is grouped here, on the marine protected area. With this amendment, I seek to ensure that the Government take external expertise and consultation of the kind that the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, mentioned, from universities and scientific experts, who have deep concerns about the potential administration of the marine protected area by the Mauritian authorities and the standards to which those authorities will hold the administration of the MPA and its future designations—whether they will truly be in accordance with the standards that have thus far been set by the UK Government, in terms of both environmental protection and the quality of expertise, scientific and otherwise, used in governing those important regions for marine and broader conservation. My Amendment 20C seeks to ensure that an independent panel is commissioned before those elements of the treaty come into force to provide a serious and well-thought-out independent view, away from the scientific advice that the UK Government will take from their own resources, and to publish that advice so that the international community can see that the Mauritian Government will be held to those international standards.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I rise to particularly support Amendment 20 in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan, and, more generally, Amendment 26 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, who is not in his place, and Amendments 38B and 78. This is an important group because it seeks to remedy the way in which the Bill will not only make the Chagossians stateless, but prejudice their ability to financially provide for themselves and their families for today and tomorrow.
Last month, I travelled to Hamburg on business. At dinner, I was sat next door but one to a gentleman who was involved in business in quite a substantial way in Mauritius. It did not take long for my German colleagues to explain to him that I sat in your Lordships’ House, upon which he leant over and implored me—no, begged me—to do that deal with Diego Garcia, so that, in his words, “our streets can be paved with gold”. Those were his exact words.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
My Lords, I was not sure whether anybody else wanted to follow that last speech. I do not think I have ever seen the Prime Minister drink prosecco—he would prefer a pint, I think.
Anyway, I thank noble Lords for their speeches on this quite important set of amendments, and I would be very surprised if we did not come back to some of these issues on Report, because, for all the nonsense we have just heard, there are actually some very thoughtful and quite important considerations here. Someone put it very well when they said that, while they might not agree with everything we are doing, there is a shared view across the House that we need to do as best we can through this process for the Chagossian communities.
Regarding Amendments 17, 26 and 78, the Chagossians are already entitled to work on the base and have done so. There are a range of job opportunities on Diego Garcia, open to Chagossians with British, Mauritian and Seychelles citizenship. A link to vacancies advertised by KBR, the main contractor responsible for recruiting and managing support staff at the base, is already available on the GOV.UK pages, setting out UK government support for Chagossians. On Amendment 78 from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan—
Lord Bellingham (Con)
How many Chagossians are actually working on the base today?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I do not think that data is published anywhere, I am afraid. If it is, I shall provide it to the noble Lord.
I very much enjoyed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, as I always do, but it is unjustifiable to define Chagossians as only those holding British Overseas Territories citizenship. I think that is what he was getting at. There are many Chagossians living in Mauritius, the Seychelles and beyond, and this would also exclude anyone who holds British citizenship, but not British Overseas Territories citizenship.
Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which is one of many that would require the Government to seek something from Mauritius, is not needed. We have already committed to making a Statement to Parliament—and I think it is right that we do this—on the modalities of the Chagossian trust fund and eligibility for resettlement. That is in large part a response to the considerable interest that there has been from noble Lords across the House in making sure that the trust fund is run properly and fairly.
Taking this together with Amendment 38A from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, on air travel to Diego Garcia, I say that, as we have said numerous times, the UK is taking forward planning for a programme of heritage visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. These were paused in 2019 because of Covid, but we are working hard to reinstate them as soon as possible. Now, as then, these visits would include visits to key heritage sites. Specifically on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, there are no commercial flights to Diego Garcia, and nor would they be practical, as it is a working military base that is highly sensitive. Allowing commercial flights would interfere with the operational use of the base. Heritage visits in the past have often involved the use of charter aircraft and this may be the case for future visits also, but there is nothing in the treaty that would prevent this.
On Amendment 20C, noble Lords will recall that we debated the environmental impacts of the treaty and the marine protected area around the Chagos Archipelago last week. Both the UK and Mauritius are committed to protecting the unique environment around the islands. Noble Lords will be aware that on 2 November Mauritius issued a statement announcing the creation of a marine protected area once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the MPA. Low levels of artisanal fishing, compatible with nature conservation or for subsistence of the Chagossian community, would be allowed in certain limited areas.
The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to delay the implementation of the Bill and the entry into force of the treaty. The treaty has already been reviewed by two Select Committees of this House. They have reported their findings and agreed that the treaty allows for positive environmental work, with the IAC welcoming
“the Government’s assurance that it will work closely with the Mauritian Government to establish a well-resourced and patrolled Marine Protected Area”.
Amendment 38C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would require the Government to implement the resettlement recommendations of the 2015 KPMG study. The KPMG report, commissioned by the Conservative Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. The then Government ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
Will the Minister confirm that there were three different options for how many people you would resettle, and the costs of all of them were substantially lower than the transfer payments that we are making to Mauritius alone under the current deal?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
That is correct, but those payments would not have paid for a legally secure operation of the base alongside our United States allies. Whatever legal geniuses we have opposite us today, those in the White House differed on the analysis now being put forward by the Conservative Party, which is clearly different from what they put forward in the not-so-distant past.
The agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms, without requiring the UK taxpayer to pick up the bill.
On Amendment 81G from the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, as I and other Ministers have said on numerous occasions, it will be for Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement once the treaty comes into force. I am very sympathetic to the way he put his case on this, but it would not be a good use of taxpayers’ money to keep reporting on something that is not in our gift to achieve. The Government are increasing their support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These include Chagossian-led community projects in Crawley and beyond, as well as education and English language support, and have involved the creation of a number of FCDO-funded full-time jobs for Chagossians. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, asked me about commitments on this going forward. We are committed to these at least until the end of this Parliament. He will understand that what happens beyond that may depend on decisions of Ministers in the future.
Amendment 31 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and Amendment 55 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, ask for an equality impact assessment on the payments to be made by Mauritius to Chagossians. The Government have already released the public sector equality duty report relating to the treaty, which addresses all the issues around equalities and the impact assessment.
Amendment 50A tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, raises a really important issue. We do not think it is necessary to make provision for this in the Bill, but we understand her concern. As I said in my letter in relation to the first day of Committee, we will work with relevant authorities to ensure that official documentation reflects historic connections to the Chagos Archipelago wherever possible. British passports issued to Chagossians will continue to display their place of birth and, if they wish, those who already have British Overseas Territories citizenship status can hold a British passport reflecting their status as British Overseas Territories citizens. I am very sympathetic to the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness and commit to making diplomatic representations to the Government of Mauritius to ensure that place of birth is recorded accurately on documentation.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I very much appreciate the Minister’s commitment to do that, because this is such a hurtful thing. Sometimes, those of an Irish republican disposition will say that I am not British but just Irish, so it is something I feel very strongly about. The Chagossians are entitled to have their identity confirmed, and I would be very pleased if she could write to me after she raises those issues through the diplomatic channels.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Of course, I would be very happy to do that.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
On the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I put forward, as was alluded to in a number of speeches, including by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, the reason why we raised equality issues as regards financial payments is the potential role of Chagossians within the trust fund. There is a widespread concern at present that we are simply hoping that Mauritius does the right thing with that. I appreciate that the Minister is perhaps not in the position today to give any level of direct assurances. However, can she at least go away and come back before Report with the Government’s thoughts or information—perhaps after discussions with the Mauritian Government—as to how we can inject a level of Chagossian direct involvement and control over that trust fund? That would be very helpful for whenever we reach Report.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
That is not too much to ask. We are talking to the Mauritian Government about this, because we want the same thing as the noble Lord. I had hoped that we would be able to say something a little bit more detailed about that by now. We have not quite got there, but we will use best endeavours to get there before Report. I understand the motivation behind this, and it is right that we do what we can to make sure that noble Lords have the assurances they need by Report.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
In light of the reaffirmation that there will be both ongoing citizenship as well as dual nationality, and, perhaps uniquely, that community will be impacted directly by the terms of this treaty, does the Minister accept the principle that formal mechanisms of representation for the duration of this agreement, rather than just between now and the treaty coming into force, in principle warrant very serious consideration?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
It depends on what we mean by formal and what that looks like. We have an arrangement at the moment via the contact group and a commitment to strengthen and expand that, to make sure that does the job it is intended to do and the Government can support it in doing that. However, we are clear that we do not do anything to it without its consent. It is an area on which we are interested in having further conversations—I think the noble Lord knows what I am getting at. Whether that completely satisfies his desire for formality, we will probably continue to explore together.
With that, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the Minister that this has been a fascinating debate. It was a real pleasure to hear so many noble Lords focusing, as we rightly should, on the rights and futures of the Chagossian people.
The trust fund is an essential part of the treaty. Essentially, it is the only part of the treaty that is positive for the community. Therefore, we must not allow it to be maladministered, or worse, by the Mauritian Government. My noble friend Lord Ahmad made some very good points about the management of the existing fund, to which he got some answer from the Minister. We are certainly clear that the UK Government should take all necessary steps to hold the Mauritian Government to account for their management of the fund to ensure that the Chagossians are properly looked after and no longer treated as second-class citizens. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Fuller for trying to apply a little imaginary lipstick to his proverbial pig in this matter.
The points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, were particularly important and extremely serious. I was pleased to hear the assurances given to her by the Minister. We should not allow the Chagossian people to be treated in this manner by Mauritius.
This speaks to our concerns on value for money. Whichever figures you take, this agreement is a major financial undertaking, costing the British taxpayer billions of pounds over the lifetime of the deal. Any situation where the fund is capitalised but not managed properly would surely be unacceptable, and we should make sure that there are powers to hold Mauritius to account should that happen.
My noble friend Lord Hannan, in his excellent contribution, made some great points on how the Chagossians could be resettled in future and many of the alternative occupations that they could take in such circumstances.
If the Minister is not satisfied that the Government have the powers that they need to do that, I hope Ministers will go back to the Mauritian Government to ensure that we have those stronger powers before the treaty takes effect. The Minister is right that many of these matters will be returned to on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Callanan
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has—(a) sought to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius regarding a guarantee that paragraph 3(d) of Annex 1 will cover all non-UK and non-US civilian personnel stationed in the Chagos Archipelago, in addition to military and civilian security forces;(b) laid before both Houses of Parliament a report on progress on establishing such negotiations with the Government of Mauritius and the outcome of any that have taken place.(2B) Within two months of the report being laid under paragraph (2A)(b), a Minister must table substantive motions in the House of Commons and the House of Lords on the contents of the report.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to prevent the provisions from coming into force until the Government has sought guarantees regarding the presence of non-UK and non-US civilian personnel in the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group speak to perhaps one of the most concerning parts of the treaty—although the previous bit was also concerning: namely, the risk that this agreement will undermine our security. Given the large number of amendments in this group, I will speak only to those in my name. I know that my noble friend Lady Goldie will speak to her amendments as well, and I will certainly not seek to pre-empt her arguments in my remarks, as my noble friend is much more of an expert on defence matters than I will ever be.
My Amendment 18 is a commencement block that would prevent the main clauses of the Bill coming into effect until the Government have laid a report on securing a guarantee that all non-UK and non-US civilian personnel stationed on the archipelago will benefit from the provisions of Annex 1. Annex 1 protects the UK’s unrestricted access to Diego Garcia’s sea and airspace. The treaty makes reference to some civilian activity, but we are seeking an assurance from the Government that that part of the treaty in its entirety applies to civilians stationed on Diego Garcia. I hope the Minister will be able to give us that assurance.
Amendment 67 speaks to one of the most fundamental questions, which has already been the subject of much debate. The treaty is clear that the UK must inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia, using the magnificent word, “expeditiously”. The dictionary definition of expeditiously is “quickly and efficiently” and “with speed”. Many have rightly asked what expeditiously means in practice. My Amendment 67 clarifies that the UK Government must not inform Mauritius of any relevant armed attacks until the attack has ended. Providing prior notification to Mauritius, or indeed any third state not directly involved in the attack, could risk the safety of British and American servicemen who are engaged in the relevant operation. Could the Minister confirm that nothing in the treaty requires the UK Government to give forewarning of any attack emanating from the military base? If that is the case then I am sure they can accept the amendment.
Additionally, my amendment seeks a requirement not to notify Mauritius if notification would endanger the security of the base. Can the Minister confirm that nothing in the treaty would prevent the Government withholding notification if notifying Mauritius would endanger the base? My noble friend Lady Goldie will be going into additional details on these important issues.
Amendment 69 in my name seeks to make a point about the location of specific equipment and installations on the base. It is essential that the security of the base is maintained. It would not be acceptable if the UK Government were to endanger the security of equipment at the military base by notifying Mauritius. In replying to the debate, can the Minister please address those concerns? It is essential that the UK Government have the right to refuse notification when doing so would endanger the base itself or our personnel.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Callanan on the amendments to which he spoke. I shall be dealing with the word “expeditiously” and I will try to ensure that that characterises my contribution, and perhaps influences this debate.
I wish to speak to my Amendments 83, 85, 86 and 87. At Second Reading, I raised the issue of the mismatch between the Bill and the treaty that it implements. My main concern in this whole affair is our defence and security and the implications of this Bill on that. I identified a range of areas where greater clarity is required. Before I continue, I should say that I have received a letter from the Ministers, for which I thank them. That sought to clarify some of the questions that I asked at Second Reading. The letter brings a degree of clarification, but in other respects it leaves me with questions. I shall address these as I explain my amendments.
Amendment 83 is simply a technical drafting amendment to accommodate my remaining amendments in this group. It specifies that the commencement of the treaty cannot occur until the conditions outlined in my amendments have been satisfied.
Amendment 85 relates to the specific notification requirements under Annex 1 1(b)(viii) of the treaty. My amendment would require that Clauses 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has published a statement establishing that the notification in Annex 1 1(b)(viii) of the treaty does not require the consent of Mauritius in response. The provision in Annex 1 to which this refers says that:
“In accordance with this Agreement and with reference to Article 2(5) and Annex 2, in respect of Diego Garcia, Mauritius agrees the United Kingdom shall have … unrestricted access, basing and overflight … for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels, upon notification to Mauritius”.
The amendment seeks to enable the Secretary of State to make explicit, before Clauses 2 to 4 of the Bill can come into force, that the consent of Mauritius is not required for us to host third-party forces on Diego Garcia.
As I mentioned, I have the letter from the Ministers in which they helpfully clarify that permission from Mauritius is not required. However, I require the Minister to confirm that such notification is after the event. If notification is required before the event, that implies consent is required, or that the intimation of an objection by Mauritius is possible. That is why I seek the clarification.
We cannot have a situation where Mauritius can in any way object to which forces are present at the base. The operation of the base, including the matter of the basing of our allies, must be solely at the discretion of the United Kingdom. I would appreciate the Minister giving a guarantee that Mauritius will have no control whatever over the basing and overflight of other countries’ forces. Unusually, the Minister and I are perhaps nearly at consensus in idem here. If that is the case, why would the Secretary of State be reluctant to publish a statement?
Amendment 86 is another defence and security amendment. It seeks that Clauses 2 to 4 would not come into force until the Secretary of State has published a statement establishing that the obligation under Annex 1(2) of the treaty
“does not extend to aircraft and vessels which have landed or docked at the Base for the purposes of maintenance or refuelling prior to the armed attack on a third state”.
Annex 1(2) of the treaty is the provision that requires the United Kingdom
“to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State”.
As we have discussed, much has been made of what is meant by “expeditiously”. The Ministers’ letter to me stated that they are satisfied that this does not require the UK to seek the permission of Mauritius, nor for notification to be given prior to the event. That is helpful. The International Agreements Committee of this House has also concluded that it interprets “expeditiously” to mean
“as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances”.
I believe that the Minister gives her interpretation in good faith, but what of Mauritius’s interpretation? Does the Minister know whether the Mauritian Government share this view? If she does not currently know, and I quite accept that she may not, I would be happy for her to write to me to confirm the point.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I totally support the amendments in the names of my noble friends Lord Callanan and Lady Goldie. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, both know that I, as someone who was involved with direct negotiations, albeit in 2019, remained unconvinced of one specific element above all else—I remain unconvinced of it today—and that was the security protections that have just been so eloquently narrated by my noble friend Lady Goldie.
In associating myself with those amendments, I will also press ahead on the archipelago and the lay of the land beyond Diego Garcia. I draw attention to paragraph 3(a) of Annex 1, which says that
“vessels and aircraft of the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall have unrestricted rights of overflight, navigation and undersea access”.
That is clear. It continues:
“States operating with the United Kingdom or the United States of America shall also have such unrestricted rights, save in respect of overflight or undersea access, which require notification”.
We need a degree more clarification to unwrap that provision, particularly on passage to and from Diego Garcia and the lay of the other parts of the archipelago. Like my noble friend, I press the Minister to give the specific assurance, which I certainly feel should be within the agreements signed with Mauritius, that notification does not mean before the event but after.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak on Amendment 67. This part of the agreement is being portrayed as though it has some type of special status. It is similar to the agreement we have with the sovereign base areas in Cyprus. The UK and our allies use Cyprus as a staging post for a number of operations outside the Republic of Cyprus. The way it operates there is that the Government of Cyprus are not informed prior to the use of that base but, like in this agreement, are informed afterwards. I accept the point about the use of “expeditiously”—what it means is worth debate—but the way I read this is that it is no different from other bases.
The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said she was nitpicking. To be fair to her, I do not think she is: she is trying to get clarity on this important point. We want to ensure that our forces and allies have free movement and use of the base under this treaty. I do not think that our United States allies would agree with the Bill and treaty if they in any way limited their use of the base, not only for actions against other parts of the world but in the siting of various pieces of equipment on those important islands. We look for some reassurance on that point, but it is important to have clarity. That would certainly allay some of the fears raised, quite legitimately by some people and by others as scaremongering against the Bill.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
My Lords, following on from the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, surely the fundamental difference with the two bases on Cyprus that he mentioned is that we kept them in perpetuity—they are sovereign bases. Yes, we have an arrangement with the Cypriot Government to inform them of activity after deployment takes place, but what concerns me about this particular lease arrangement is very simple.
At the moment, we have in place a Government in Mauritius headed by His Excellency Navin Ramgoolam, who is a democrat and a friend of his country. I had the privilege of meeting him a number of times when he was premier before. Indeed, he took over from a Government who were also democratic and had all the right intents. We had many arguments about this issue but, fundamentally, we were two democratic Governments discussing a matter.
The concern I have is this: what would happen if there were some sort of coup or a military Government in Mauritius? In these worst-case scenarios, we have to be prepared for the future. Let us hope for the best but prepare for the very worst. Could the Minister comment on what would happen to these arrangements in the treaty in that event? If, indeed, a military coup took place and an alliance was made with a hostile power, the operations of this base could be jeopardised.
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 20G and 20H in my name. I have tabled them because I want to probe more deeply whether the consequences of non-ratification are such that non-ratification is not an option.
Furthermore, it is important that we are clear about what we can and cannot do. The Minister has told the Committee that the treaty is a done deal; that it cannot be changed; and that the role of your Lordships’ House in relation to it and to the Bill before us today is really very limited. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has supported the Government in this view, suggesting that, going forward, there is only scope for possibly impacting the details of the implementation. It is clear that, although the CRaG process did not prevent the Government ratifying the treaty, the treaty was defined between the UK Government and the Republic of Mauritius in terms that place not only a clear distinction between the act of signing and ratification but unusual distance between the two, in that the treaty cannot come into focus unless and until the Bill before us today is passed and Clause 2 transfers sovereignty.
The comments of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, on day one in Committee were important. He said:
“Because of the way the treaty is drafted and the way Article 18 operates, the treaty can come into force only when this legislation is implemented. That is unusual”.
After an exchange, the Minister helpfully clarified the situation further and said:
“Before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass both primary and secondary legislation, update the UK-US exchange of notes, and put in place agreements on the environment, maritime security and migration”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 713.]
In this context, it is clear that, although the treaty has been negotiated and cannot be changed without reopening negotiations, it has been defined in terms to which both parties consented. This means that what could be drawn from the act of signature on 22 May was, by definition, inherently provisional and contingent. It was signed subject to recognition that the act of signing did not bring the treaty into force; and that the treaty would not come into force unless and until the respective political processes of both countries had been properly honoured. In this context, because the coming into force of the treaty depends on an Act of Parliament, this is plainly not a done deal, in my estimation.
Furthermore, as a legislature on its toes, we have to let the Executive know that we understand that, having negotiated the treaty, they will encourage us to pass this legislation so that it can move to ratification. We know that this does not mean that we have to pass this piece of legislation any more than we have to pass any other piece of legislation. If we reject this Bill, the islands could not be given to Mauritius. If the Government chose, they could then invoke the Parliament Act, which would delay things by some 13 months or thereabouts, in the context of which there is a good chance that common sense would prevail. The Republic of Mauritius could not object to this because it signed up to the treaty knowing that it depended on domestic processes that, in this case, require the passing of legislation through a legislature that cannot be dictated to by the Executive. It is really important that we are open, transparent and honest about the opportunity that we have both to stand up for the Chagossians and to say no to this treaty because, if we have the power to do so, we have the responsibility to do so. That is, I think, is of equal importance; it may even be more important.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, I rise to deal with Amendments 58, 61 and 62, which are, largely speaking, probing amendments.
My noble friend Lord Morrow raised the question of whether the Government have breached their manifesto; far be it from me to suggest that. There are even some scurrilous rumours that they will raise taxes, but that will clearly not be the case, and such rumours will obviously be disproved in the next few hours.
I and others have been very critical of the deal, the legislation and the approach that has been taken by the Government. We have been critical of the treatment of the Chagossian people on issues such as the right to self-determination and the ceding of sovereignty. It seems to me that the response that the Government will offer as a rationale is essentially that, whatever the position on those issues—and I appreciate the Government will dispute the position that I and others have put forward—the outweighing factor is the securing of our strategic defence within the area and, if that is got right, that will trump everything else.
That is why the amendments in this group are so important, as they try to put that to the test. My amendments and, indeed, a number of the others, try to seek assurances. I am using the word “assurances” as I am reminded of a phrase that a friend of mine would use when talking of “clarification”. He would say that the purpose of clarification is often not to make things clear but to put yourself in the clear. Instead, I will ask the Government for assurances on the issue of defence. Is what is being put forward—what is said on the tin—being met by what is delivered in respect of assurances?
As regards the amendments, I want to deal with three issues that are interrelated. First, I want to probe the position as regards the potential. We know what has been secured directly on Diego Garcia itself, but I want to probe on the potential for the Mauritius Government to enter into arrangements with third countries, to have a movement by those countries towards other islands by way of a leasing or some other arrangement, which may then descend into some form of military activity, with monitoring bases and things of that nature.
Earlier today, in answer to an Oral Question, the Minister rightly indicated that it would be wrong to speculate on potential future events. However, this is not an issue that simply appears in a vacuum. We know that the Mauritius Government have had relatively close relationships with Russia, for example, and have been in discussions with India, and that there are ongoing discussions with China. Indeed, it is reported in relation to one of the islands—Peros Banhos, if I am pronouncing that correctly—that there are discussions around a leasing arrangement. It is clear that Mauritius will look towards the Chagos Islands as an opportunity to work with a range of other Governments to lever in what they have been given.
Specifically, the concern is with regard to China. Where arrangements have been made between other jurisdictions and China, they have led, in a military sense, to a level of mission creep. We have seen that these things are beginning to happen. There are a number of examples, from Sri Lanka to Djibouti to the Solomon Islands. We need a belt and braces approach to how we are going to prevent any level of development around that side of things.
I know that the Minister will respond in part by saying that there is provision within the treaty that, should there be any sort of military arrangement, Mauritius would then have to notify the UK Government and that, effectively, the UK Government could say no to such an arrangement. However, there are a couple of concerns in relation to that. Amendment 58 therefore looks to see what practical measures can be taken. We need to flesh out in very clear-cut terms what we can do. The concern, of course, is that any notification by Mauritius might be post the event. We might see a situation in which something is, for example, leased to the Chinese, who then develop their own mission creep. Mauritius could then turn round and say that, “Actually, this has been leased out to them, and we do not know what they are doing, and they have gone beyond that”. We need to tease out from the Government what they intend to do in practice in a situation where, for example, a listening station was placed on one of the islands or there was a range of other realistic possibilities.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
What the noble Lord is saying is very interesting, but the treaty protects the outer islands from development. Mauritius is one of only two African countries that is not part of the belt and road initiative, so its main interlocuter is not China but India.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
We can pick which Government are looking to lever in additional influence in the area. I am simply saying that China has a particular record of reaching agreements with other countries to—
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
Will the noble Lord confirm that, although it is true that Mauritius is not part of the belt and road initiative—the road thing would not really work, if you think about the geography—it was the first African country with which China signed a free trade agreement, and it has received a state visit from the President of China, which, given the population of Mauritius, would suggest something a little more unspoken than just trade between those two territories.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
It is clear that the Chinese interests—and indeed those of other countries, which I think goes to the heart of why we are seeing this as a key strategic point of view—go beyond simply trying to create trading relationships. We know that Mauritius has around 1.3 million people, much smaller than even my own beloved Northern Ireland—but President Xi is not beating down the doors for a state visit to Belfast any time soon, as far as I am aware. Whether it is China, India or anyone else, whatever the assurances that are there, what are the practical implications and what can we do to assure ourselves that there will not be a level of mission creep?
I will continue very briefly, as I suppose time is moving on. Amendments 61 and 62 probe the position as regards airspace and maritime assurances. Again, this has been sold particularly on the basis of it being not simply the British position but the US position, so I think we need to see some level of joint assurance in relation to that. There has been a concern—and some level of suspicion, which I seek assurances that the Government can allay—that the position of the Americans has been effectively to go along with this treaty. There was, I think, a level of reluctance. It was reported initially that the Americans had given a level of lip service. I think we want to get a much greater level of reassurance that they have bought into this, rather than simply acquiescing with something that one of their allies has asked for. Specifically, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, there are some restrictions in terms of notification that seem to undermine the security implications.
For instance, if we look at the airspace side of things, there is a 12-mile zone around Diego Garcia, but airspace around the rest of the Chagos Islands is simply with Mauritius. On a maritime basis, we know that the treaty details that the archipelago waters, the territorial seas and the EEZ around the Chagos Islands are all within the control of Mauritius. Where there can be a level of restriction or interference on airspace or maritime boundaries, that can also create a concern. We seek assurances from government that what is being proposed—and this is a question of belt and braces—is actually going to provide the genuine level of defence. If so much else is potentially being sacrificed to bring about this deal, we need to make sure that we have something that is ironclad as regards our defences.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
It is probably best to let the Americans be the judge of their own best interests. They seem to be rather keen on this treaty and its ratification. The Secretary of State in Washington, who is also currently head of the National Security Council, called its conclusion a “monumental achievement”. He does not seem to be concerned that it might open the road to Chinese influence; nor do the Indians, who are, of course, close friends of the Mauritians and are as concerned as we and the Americans are about Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. The treaty is seen as a barrier to that, not an opening to it.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
Of course, the noble Lord knows better than anyone that Governments do each other favours in these situations, and Heads of Government will sometimes say, “I need you to say the following”, but I am pretty sure the Secretary of State said at the beginning that he was extremely worried by what he described as a serious threat to our national security when the deal was first put forward.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I am not sure what remarks the noble Lord is referring to. I am talking about the position taken by the current Administration of the United States.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I appreciate what the noble Lord has said in relation to the response in the public sphere by the American Government. Whatever one’s views—and there will be a range of views towards the current American Government across this Chamber—it is a fair accusation that they occasionally lapse into a certain level of hyperbole. It is either the greatest thing that has ever happened or the worst disaster. We should not necessarily take an enthusiastic apparent public endorsement as something being a great thing from the Secretary of State or the current President as a full reassurance of the American position.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I think it is probably best to take what they say at face value. They probably mean what they say.
I will now attempt to address the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and surprise her by saying that I think they are extremely sensible. I understand the thinking behind them. I understand her concerns that are encapsulated in Amendments 83 and 85 to 87, but I think the amendments are probably unnecessary. I suspect that the statements the noble Baroness is calling for could be made today. I suspect that we will hear them before the debates on this Bill are over, but it seems to me important that we should hear them, so I understand what the noble Baroness is saying.
I would like briefly to refer to the consistent and cogent arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, for a sovereign base area solution rather than the solution that is written into the treaty. I do not know why the last Government looked at it but decided not to pursue it. I do not know what the reasons were. They were probably, I would guess, topographical—we are talking about a very large area, rather than the two restricted areas on Cyprus—but I do not know, and I think it is a valid question to ask.
The big point, surely, is that we are where we are. We have a treaty, and we cannot ratify it until we pass this Bill. That is why I disagree strongly with the four amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell. He comes straight out and says that he wants renegotiation. He wants the treaty renegotiated in four separate respects, but we are where we are. The treaty exists. If we were to decide to reopen the negotiation, I think we could expect a rather hostile reaction in the United States. The principal concern of the United States is security of tenure and the continuing co-operation of third countries over supply chains. That is what they are concerned about—not our blue eyes but security of tenure of the base. Given that, some in Washington would argue that it is time for the United States to switch sides, to ditch us and do a direct deal with the Mauritians. That argument has been made in Washington and could be made again if we get ourselves into such a mess that, having secured a treaty that the Conservative Government sought and the Labour Government have concluded, we were to decide, after all, that it was not a treaty we wanted and that we wanted to go back to the start and negotiate something different. I can imagine the United States losing patience with us.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
I know that the noble Lord speaks with great insight but the whole point of the amendments, with which I agree—that is why I back my noble friend Lady Goldie in particular—is on the specific issue of security. Yes, as I have said on the Floor of the House before, there were 11 rounds of negotiation but, at the end of them, agreement could not be reached because—I speak from my own insight and experience—back in 2019, that element of security was not assured. When I returned to London, I asked Boris Johnson directly, in good faith—I was not the OTs Minister but I had a good rapport with the then Prime Minister—and he could not give me that assurance. That is what I have pressed for throughout the passage of the Bill.
It has come up repeatedly that there were 11 rounds of negotiations. I have spent a lot of time in business and, as the noble Lord knows, in government. When you are looking for a negotiation and seeking to agree something, the fact that there were 11 rounds would suggest—I know this for a fact—that that agreement could not be reached.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I respect what the noble Lord says and he knows what he is talking about. I also respect what the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, asked for in requesting four statements. We should be asking for statements rather than changes to the text of a treaty. We voted in July for the ratification of this treaty; we cannot ratify the treaty until we pass this Bill, and we should pass the Bill.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendment 54. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I think we are all pleased that we are where we are. It seems very strange to say that we cannot be discussing the Bill—that was almost the way it was put.
My amendment really follows on a little from what the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, talked about. During Committee in another place, concerns were expressed that other countries may seek to lease individual Chagos Islands and reference was made to reports that India and China were in consultation with the Republic of Mauritius. At that time, the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the honourable Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, responded robustly. He stated:
“I want to say on that point that this is absolute nonsense. Is the shadow Minister willing to provide any evidence that that is going to take place? This treaty protects the security of the outer islands and expressly prohibits foreign forces building bases on them—something on which her Government did not succeed in their negotiations”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 686.]
What is this great protection to which he referred?
Noble Lords will find that in paragraph 3 of the first annex to the Mauritius treaty. It states:
“In accordance with this Agreement, in respect of the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia, Mauritius agrees”—
this is point d—that,
“except in circumstances of necessity for a response to a humanitarian emergency or natural disaster in instances where the United Kingdom or the United States of America is unable or unwilling to provide such a response, Mauritius and the United Kingdom shall jointly decide on authorisations permitting the presence of non-United Kingdom, non-United States or non-Mauritian security forces, either civilian or military”.
I cannot see anything there to validate the Minister’s assertion that the treaty
“expressly prohibits”
foreign forces building bases on the islands. What it says is that they cannot do so without the agreement of the UK Government.
For me, this presents two real concerns. First, and most importantly, there is nothing in the treaty to provide any kind of safeguard in relation to the leasing of islands for purposes other than security and defence. This would leave the door wide open for other countries to seek to lease the islands, ostensibly for purposes other than security and defence. The argument made by the Minister in the other place was that the suggestion that there was a problem was nonsense. It seems to me to be very well founded. The extraordinary thing about these provisions is the fact that they relate to islands of immense geostrategic importance, yet the protections in relation to them are effectively non-existent. That seems very complacent to me.
There is nothing to prevent a hostile country leasing an island and either combining security and defence purposes with others, in the hope of hiding the former, or on beginning with non-security and defence purposes and then changing over to them. Can the Minister tell me how that could be prevented? What would happen if an island is leased for non-security and defence purposes, yet it subsequently becomes apparent that it is being used for those purposes and that the country has dug in well and has no intention of relinquishing the islands? How could they be dislodged? Would the Minister here like to respond on that? I found the suggestion from that Minister in the Commons that there are no presenting difficulties quite alarming. It suggested a certain otherworldliness with a high degree of disconnection from political reality.
Secondly, the other difficulty is the completely opaque nature of the protection that is provided and the lack of parliamentary scrutiny. At the moment, we would have no knowledge about when or if approaches were made by the Republic of Mauritius to seek UK agreement for other countries to use other islands, and we need to know that. My Amendment 54 would address this concern by requiring the Minister to develop regulations stating that before the UK can agree to a proposal from the Republic of Mauritius—made under Annex 1(3)(d) of the treaty—that any island other than Diego Garcia be used for security and defence purposes by another country, that proposal must be brought to Parliament and endorsed by a vote of both Houses. Will the Minister give me a reason why that should not happen?
In ending, I will ask at this stage about the point made in the debate on the fourth group about whether the Government were asked to give their consent before the deal between Mauritius and India was done. I am not sure that we got a response to that. It was going to give India a defence presence. I would really like to know how long the Government knew before that happened. Did they know and when did they agree to it?
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I will speak to my Amendment 81J on behalf of all those who have written to me, urging the House of Lords to look again at the security implications of the Bill. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult the Government of the United States before taking any action that may affect the security environment of Chagos or the operation of the facilities on Diego Garcia. It is simple, reasonable and, I think, essential. The Minister may well say that we will of course speak always and at length to our closest ally, but this amendment seeks to put that into the Bill and on a mandatory footing.
We are all aware that Diego Garcia is not an ordinary base; it is the backbone of US and UK operations in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and east Africa. It is critical for surveillance, early warnings, carrier support and global rapid deployment. Hundreds of thousands of British and American personnel have depended on it for missions authorised by this country, but the Bill does not have any statutory requirement even to consult with the ally whom we seek to stay closest to. Of course, the US is not a passive observer; it is a treaty partner that has kept those waters free from extremism, piracy and hostile influence for decades. Therefore, this is a straightforward amendment. I will not prolong the debate, because I can see the Whips getting nervous. Unfortunately, this is a rather large group of amendments, but I thought that it was very important to speak to my amendment. I hope that it will be considered by the Committee.
Lord Kempsell (Con)
My Lords, I am more than happy to associate myself with the amendments tabled in the name of my noble friend Baroness Goldie. We started the group by saying that your Lordships’ House would consider it expeditiously, so I will be brief.
My full sympathy is with the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, in these matters. All I can say is that he must be speaking to different people in Washington DC than I am when it comes to the provisions of this treaty. Occasionally in your Lordships’ House, we hear extreme criticisms of the Government of the United States, and that is entirely justifiable from noble Lords who take that position, but it is impossible on the one hand to criticise the position of the Government of the United States or the way they conduct themselves and simultaneously to suggest that the United Kingdom should resile from seeking to renegotiate provisions in the treaty that are, on further reflection and discussion in your Lordships’ House, found to be wanting. There is no reason why the Government of the United Kingdom should resile from seeking to renegotiate elements of this treaty which are deficient, as is being exposed in the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, gave an interesting constitutional deposition on the ins and outs of that process.
I will confine my comments to my controversial Amendments 81F and 20F, which seek that renegotiation. My full sympathy is with Ministers opposite who are trying to steer a difficult Bill on a difficult issue into a safer port. My amendments come from the fact that it is incumbent on your Lordships’ House to look beyond the current security situation. The treaty and its Annex 1 are necessarily drafted in the context of the current security picture, but that security picture is dynamic, and it does not take much imagination to envisage a time very soon when Ministers find themselves in a completely changed security scenario; for example, in the Indo-Pacific and the wider Pacific region. What if a military superpower were to invade a neighbouring country and the requirements of the UK’s Armed Forces in their use of the base area and the wider contested issue of sovereignty over the Chagos Islands changed dramatically from the position today? That is why I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, on issues such as the notification of the Government of Mauritius, the third-party armed forces being present, and the placement of devices and installations.
My Amendment 20F seeks to take that a step further by looking into the future and saying there may well come a point at which Ministers feel, at the outbreak of hostilities more widely in the world, a pressure to derogate from the restrictive provisions of Annex 1. That is why I package it with Amendment 81F, which would take the unusual step of placing a requirement on the Government to notify Parliament should there be communications from the Government of Mauritius about the application of that annex in future. It is an issue of such public concern. More broadly, outside of your Lordships’ House, the public feel the treaty has been so poorly handled and drafted that these extraordinary provisions are required.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I will not detain the Committee for long, but I want to speak briefly to Amendments 20D, 20E and 20F from my noble friend Lord Kempsell and to Amendment 87 from my noble friend Lady Goldie. We have witnessed in recent decades an extraordinary alchemy in the South China Sea. Whole islands are called from the vasty deep, summoned like Brigadoon into existence, not by prayer but by the imperatives of Chinese geopolitics. Reefs are dredged into runways; lagoons are refashioned into naval installations; artificial islands are planted thickly with radar, missile systems and airstrips, and it is all done in the name of installing civilian infrastructure. None of those installations or airstrips is openly avowed as a military unit, so, when we hear that in this treaty there is an effective British veto for any kind of defence installation, I ask noble Lords to consider that no one is going to call it a defence installation. It is going to be done subtly, little by little, and it is going to be a much tougher proposition suddenly to object when we feel that a line has been crossed than at present when we have the unquestioned sovereignty over the entirety of the archipelago.
I did not want to misquote the US Secretary of State, so just after my exchange with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, I looked up what he said on taking office. In November of last year, he said that the deal
“poses a serious threat to our national security”.
Obviously, he has changed his tune; people are entitled to change their minds. I just invite noble Lords to ask why he might have changed his mind. Is it that he saw a blinding figure on the road to Damascus and heard a voice saying, “Go into Damascus”—I think Marco Rubio has changed his religion at least twice, so I mean no disrespect to our most important ally. Or is it not more likely that he has been worked on by this Government’s officials?
Lord Beamish (Lab)
Could it not also be that when he came into office, he had not received the security briefings from his own intelligence services and possibly then he saw the importance of getting this deal and the permanency which it gives to both us and the United States?
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
It is a very good point. I think there is a divergence, exactly as in this country, between the permanent apparat and the rest of the country, which would explain why my noble friend Lord Kempsell and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, are speaking to very different sets of people. As the German ambassador to London in 1914 said to his French counterpart, “You have your information, we have ours”. It seems that there is at least a debate in the United States about this, and you can see why. As my noble friend Lord Bellingham said, there is a real prospect down the line that a future Mauritian Government may take a very different attitude towards the presence in the outer atolls of powers that are unfriendly to us. We have no assurance that we will always be on friendly terms with that republic.
The world is imperfect, I understand that. The world is sublunary. We are dealing with lesser evils, as is usually the case in politics. But when the Minister has justified this treaty and the treatment of the Chagossians, she has always done so by saying, “Our priority was the security of the base”. I just ask noble Lords on all sides to consider how this makes us more secure in an imperfect world than we are at present. We have obvious sovereignty over the entire region at the moment. We have the great advantage of its isolation. There is no prospect of anybody taking a leased island and putting any kind of listening infrastructure or anything else nearby. How does moving from where we are now to what is proposed in this treaty make us more secure, even if we set aside all the wrongs being done to the Brits of Chagossian origin?
I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was on to something when he asked, “What if the Americans were to change sides?” But I am not sure that quite makes the point he intended. I just invite noble Lords to consider the wholly pecuniary terms in which Mauritius has considered this territory: not as part of its own demos, not as part of its own nation, but as an investment and a way of raising money—of paving its streets with gold, as my noble friend said earlier. Would it not be the ultimate humiliation if Mauritius were to trouser the sum of money that we are now paying it and then to turn around and sell the base to the United States? Where would that leave this Government? I would love to hear the Minister’s reply.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to an important set of amendments, and I thank them too for the way in which they have put those amendments. There is clearly some disagreement between us, but there is no disagreement over the fact that every single person in the Chamber is seeking to ensure that we protect the security of the nation and the security of Diego Garcia, and on the importance of that base to us. I start from that point. There were a couple of times when noble Lords almost seemed to question that. I do not question it at all. I do not agree with everything that has been said, but I do agree with the right to challenge how we take this forward, because out of that come better legislation and more clarity. While I do not agree with the need for some of the amendments, some of the comments that those amendments require to be made from the Dispatch Box are important. I wanted to set that context out for noble Lords.
I also just want to say this, because I think it is important. I do not want to have a Second Reading debate again but the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Beamish, and others have made this point: the Government, whatever the rights and wrongs, are trying to bring stability. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, disagrees with the treaty, and it is fair for him to make that point, but the Government’s point of view is that we are trying to bring stability and certainty to an uncertain situation. The noble Lord disagrees with that, as do a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. But that is the Government’s view. The Government’s view, in answer to the challenge the noble Lord raised, is that we are changing it because we are trying to bring certainty to an uncertain situation. We believe we have done that, and we have made certain that we have secured one of the most important military bases—if not the most important military base—for ourselves and the United States. The noble Lord does not accept that or agree with that, but that is the alternative proposition the Government are making.
It is really important, therefore, to say, in answer to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir, and others, that we would not have gone forward with this were it not for the fact that the Americans support it. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is right. We can say, “Well, the Americans said this” or “The Americans said that”. I am going to quote this, because I think it is really important. The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that
“the United States welcomed the historic agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius on the future of … the Chagos Archipelago … this agreement secures the long-term, stable and effective operation of the joint US-UK military facility at Diego Garcia. This is a critical asset for regional and global security … We value both parties’ dedication. The US looks forward to our continued joint work to ensure the success of our shared operations”.
That does not mean, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Ahmad, and many others, said, there are not challenges to that and what it actually means in practice. But it is a pretty fundamental starting point for the UK Government to be able to directly quote US Secretary of State Rubio saying that the US supports what this Government are doing and taking forward. I lay that on the table as the context for trying to answer some of the points and considerations that have been made.
Some of the points and comments—I say to the noble Lords, Lord Morrow, Lord Weir and others, and even to an extent to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey—are perhaps better dealt with in some of the other groups, particularly on the rights of the Chagossians. My noble friend Lady Chapman has answered on this at great length and will continue to do so as we move forward. That context is really important for the debate and the discussion we are having.
I will try to deal with some of the amendments. It will take a little while and I hope that noble Lords will bear with me. Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seeks to prevent the presence of non-UK and non-US civilian personnel in the Chagos Archipelago. The treaty gives the UK control over these matters. The security provisions were, as I have said, designed and tested at the highest level of the US security establishment, which supported us in proceeding with the deal.
On Amendment 34 from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, let me be clear: the entire treaty is designed to preserve the UK’s ability to take the necessary steps to preserve the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base. Article 3(2)(c) states clearly that the UK has
“the full responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia”.
Mauritius and other states should have no doubt—this is the importance of comments made here—about our willingness to exercise our responsibilities in a manner that ensures the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
Forgive me for being slightly behind the curve; I was trying to follow the sections in the annex. The Minister referred to Annex 1(11), in particular the definition of “unrestricted”. That paragraph states that
“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification, subject to the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties to meet the requirements of international or domestic Mauritian law or current practice”.
For the sake of clarification, what are these “standing authorisations and notifications”?
Lord Coaker (Lab)
If I am wrong on this, I will write to the noble Baroness and put a copy in the Library so that all Members can access it. My understanding is that the crucial bit of Annex 1(11)(c) is
“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification”.
The phrase,
“the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties”,
refers to things contained within the treaty. I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that. I am grateful to her for pointing it out.
The fundamental point I am trying to make—which I think the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, made—is that we have an obligation under the treaty to notify Mauritius of activities emanating from the base but we do not have to seek its permission. “Expeditiously” notifying does not mean notifying before we take any agreed action. Those were the points that I thought the noble Baroness was making, but I will certainly seek to clarify exactly where that takes us with Annex 1(11)(c). I will write to the noble Baroness and provide a copy to others. I thank her for raising that.
The treaty specifically confers on the UK the unrestricted ability to
“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”
in respect of Diego Garcia. Given that there is no question over operational freedom on Diego Garcia, it is unclear what necessary derogations the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, is seeking. The annex gives the UK the extensive rights that we would need in such a situation.
The noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, raised reporting restrictions. His Majesty’s Armed Forces and the intelligence services routinely produce reports for the Prime Minister on all types of security matters. I reassure the noble Lord, and other noble Lords, that this will include operational issues arising on the Diego Garcia base. There is no requirement for this to be made a statutory obligation, as Amendment 81E seeks to do. Additionally, Amendment 81F would represent an unusual interference with the prerogative to conduct international affairs and to make or unmake treaties. Noble Lords will understand that there is often a need for confidentiality in international discussions.
The clock is flashing away and the Whip is getting jumpy next to me. I shall have a look at Hansard and I shall write to noble Lords in the debate with anything that I have not covered and any questions that have not been answered and make sure that the amendments that I have not responded to are responded to. I shall send the letter to noble Lords in the debate. Let me be clear: I shall write to noble Lords about two or three of the amendments that I have not covered, copy the letter to noble Lords and put a copy in the Library. I hope that that is acceptable to everyone.
I thank noble Lords for a really interesting and important debate on the security provisions of the treaty and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, the issue of national security is clearly one of the most important concerns that have been raised about this treaty. The continued and effective operation of the military base is paramount, and Ministers must ensure that they have the powers that they need to protect the security of the base. I listened very carefully to the reassurances provided by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, who I know has tremendous respect across the House for his commitment to defence and foreign affairs. I thank him for that.
I could raise a lot of points, but I shall not raise a number of them now because I will want to have a close look at Hansard for the reassurances that he was able to provide. I will make one point on the famous definition of the word “expeditiously”. I listened carefully, and the Minister quoted at length the opinion of the International Relations and Defence Committee, which of course was fascinating. I am not sure that he told us what the Government’s view was of the meaning of that word: as they will be applying it in practice, I think that would be more relevant. But, again, I shall look carefully at his remarks and we would welcome any further reassurances—although the Minister gave a very detailed exposition—that he can provide in writing. I am sure that my noble friend Lady Goldie, who made an excellent contribution, would also welcome any further reassurances that the Minister can provide in writing. The details of this issue are particularly important, beyond the political rhetoric that we are all involved in. This concerns one of the most fundamental aspects of our national security.
Having said all that, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Callanan
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has—(a) sought to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius to guarantee that the application of Annex 2 will oblige (where the UK Government so requests) the Mauritian Government to take responsibility for all asylum claimants and illegal entrants in the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia and accept the transfer of all claimants to Mauritian custody, and(b) laid before both Houses of Parliament a report on progress on establishing such negotiations with the Government of Mauritius and the outcome of any negotiations that have taken place.(2B) Within two months of the report being laid under paragraph (2A)(b), a Minister must table substantive motions in the House of Commons and the House of Lords on the contents of the report.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to prevent the UK being responsible for asylum claims resulting from illegal entrants into the Chagos Archipelago.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, this amendment seeks to prevent the United Kingdom being responsible for asylum seekers and refugees arriving in the Chagos Archipelago.
In moving this amendment, it is important that I remind the Committee of the background to this issue. In October 2021, a group of Tamil speakers who were apparently seeking to travel to Canada, bizarrely, by boat, foundered in the Indian Ocean and were escorted to Diego Garcia. These were the first people to claim asylum on Diego Garcia, they were kept on the island for several years and, in October 2024, the Government confirmed plans to relocate them to the UK for their legal claims to be processed. At the time, the Government said that this was to provide the asylum seekers with “greater safety and well-being”.
On 3 December 2024, it was reported in the Guardian—and of course I always believe everything that is reported in the Guardian—that lawyers and those campaigning for the asylum seekers to be relocated called their arrival in the UK a “big day for justice”. One of those interviewed by that newspaper—and we always believe what the Guardian says—was quoted as saying:
“We cannot believe we are finally in the UK … We feel we have reached paradise”.
My amendment seeks to probe the approach that would be taken to any future arrivals on the Chagos Archipelago. Will they be handed to Mauritius, to which the Government want to hand over sovereignty, or will they be handled by the British Government under this treaty? Has the Minister’s department made an assessment of the risk of the Tamils’ arrivals being transferred to the UK, opening another front in our fight to tackle illegal immigration? I do not expect the numbers to be great—I hope that they will not be great—but we need an answer on this important subject.
I also welcome Amendments 27 and 36 in this group, tabled in the names of my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, respectively. This is clearly something that noble Lords across the Committee are concerned about. I cannot imagine that this subject was not discussed with Mauritius during the negotiations, but I look forward to the Minister giving us some clarity on this issue and telling us whether these factors were in fact discussed with Mauritius. I beg to move.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 36, which, as the noble Lord mentioned, relates to asylum seekers who arrive on Diego Garcia, or anywhere on the Chagos Islands. Its purpose is very simple: it ensures that, if any person fleeing danger or persecution lands on those shores, they will not be subjected to unlawful detention, denial of due process, or the kinds of conditions that a British judge has already found to be in breach of international law.
I got a very nice personal letter from a native Chagossian, saying:
“We were exiled from our islands once, but we must not watch new injustice happen on our shores again. Anyone who arrives in our homeland must be treated with dignity. No one should suffer in the Chagos as we once did … As a native islander, I insist that any asylum seeker reaching the Chagos must have their rights respected. We were once denied justice. We cannot allow injustice to happen again in our name”.
Of course, the background has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—that in late 2021 more than 60 Sri Lankan Tamils were intercepted at sea and brought to Diego Garcia after their vessel was found in distress. Those individuals, many of whom intended to seek asylum in Canada, were accommodated for almost three years in a fenced compound on the island. This was not a temporary holding area; it became a long-term camp. The conditions are a matter of judicial record. The British Indian Ocean Territory Supreme Court found that the asylum seekers were effectively held in unlawful detention. The acting judge described the camp as
“a prison in all but name”
and said it was unsurprising that the individuals felt they were being punished. Evidence presented to the court documented leaking tents, rodent infestation, extreme heat, restricted movement, repeated incidents of self-harm and at least one mass suicide attempt. Some were warned that leaving the compound would expose them to the risk of being shot on security grounds. Those words are not mine—they were the court’s findings.
We also now know, again from the court’s judgment, that progress on their protection claims was impeded because of political factors, including concerns within the Home Office about the Government’s Rwanda policy. Rwanda seems to get mentioned everywhere. The effect of that delay was that these individuals were kept in a camp, in extreme conditions, for far longer than should ever have been contemplated. Most have now been brought to the United Kingdom, as has been said. I think that my noble and learned friend Lord Hermer was involved in that before he became Attorney-General. The Government described this as a one-off transfer and said that Diego Garcia would not be used again for long-term processing, but it remains the case that nothing in statute today prevents a future commissioner, Minister or Government using the islands in exactly the same way, should another vessel arrive. That is why this amendment is necessary; it gives effect to what the United Kingdom is already legally bound to do and ensures that any transfer to Mauritius or any other state happens only under an agreement that guarantees humane treatment, full rights of appeal and compliance with international law. These are not new standards; they are the minimum standards that the United Kingdom already owes to any asylum seeker, regardless of geography.
This amendment also speaks to something deeply felt by the Chagossians. The Chagossian people know what it is to be held without rights; they know what it is to have decisions made about their lives thousands of miles away; and they know what it is to be told they have no voice in decisions taken on their own islands. They have told us repeatedly that they do not want Diego Garcia, or any part of the Chagos Archipelago, to become a place where other vulnerable people suffer in silence.
There is also a simple and moral point. The only civilians permitted to remain long-term on the islands in the past decade were not the native Chagossians but asylum seekers confined in a manner that a British judge found to be unlawful. That fact alone should give the Committee pause for reflection. It was perfectly okay for asylum seekers to be on Diego Garcia but not the original Chagos people.
This amendment seeks to ensure that asylum seekers under Mauritian jurisdiction must have binding guarantees for monitoring, appeal rights, independent oversight and humanitarian standards. The Chagossian community has raised serious concerns about the treatment of vulnerable people already in Mauritius. These concerns cannot be dismissed and certainly cannot be ignored. The Government now intend that asylum seekers arriving in Chagos should be sent there.
This amendment does not oppose the transfer of asylum seekers. It does not dictate the policy of future Governments; it simply ensures that the mistakes made between 2021 and 2024 can never be repeated on British responsibility. It ensures that any person arriving on those islands is processed humanely, lawfully and with respect for their basic rights. For the Chagossians, who were themselves displaced without rights, this is not an abstract principle. It is an affirmation that the islands they still regard as home will not again be a theatre for human suffering. It is a modest and necessary amendment, which is fully consistent with our international obligations and our national values. I therefore commend it to the Committee and urge noble Lords to support it.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 19 and 27 from the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley, now in his place, seek to ensure that Mauritius will be responsible for any illegal migrants who may arrive at Diego Garcia. These are important amendments, and it is helpful that they have been tabled to allow us to clarify this point. I can reassure both noble Lords that the treaty already ensures Mauritian responsibility and closes a potential—as they correctly identify—illegal migration route to the UK. Mauritius, as the sovereign state and as specifically referenced under Annex 2 of the treaty, has jurisdiction over irregular migration to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia.
To the extent that the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley, through their amendments are seeking clarity on the arrangements with Mauritius to put that responsibility into practice, I can assure them that the UK Government are already in the process of agreeing with Mauritius the separate arrangements referenced in Annex 2 paragraph 10 of the treaty, to assist and facilitate in that exercise of Mauritian jurisdiction. These are ongoing negotiations on which I will not provide a running commentary; suffice to say that there will be no need to force the Government to provide a report on the negotiations.
Amendment 36 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, is another helpful amendment. It seeks to ensure that any arrangement entered into with Mauritius regarding migrants ensures the humane treatment, full rights of appeal and compliance with international law of any asylum seeker or refugee. It is an important amendment, and I can confirm that the Government will, of course, ensure that any arrangement we enter into will comply with applicable international law and our domestic obligations. For that reason, I think that the amendment is unnecessary, but I thank her for tabling it and allowing us to make that clear. I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her clarification, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for her contribution to this important debate. We know how strongly the British public feel on illegal immigration. It would have been outrageous if we handed over the territory yet retained responsibility for dealing with any illegal immigration.
I will look carefully at the words that the Minister used in her response in Hansard, but it seems as though she has provided the reassurances we are seeking that no illegal arrivals in the Chagos Archipelago will be able to make a claim in the UK for asylum now that sovereignty has been handed over. She used the famous government expression “I am not going to provide a running commentary”, which often means “I am not going to say”. Nobody is asking her to provide a running commentary; we just wanted a clarification on the issues or any outcome of the discussions. If there is a resolution to the discussions before we get to Report, I hope she will update us in writing. Apart from that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Tuesday 25th November 2025
(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberDiego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 139-II(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (24 Nov 2025)
Lord Morrow
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report setting out any reasons for rejecting any remedies otherwise than this Treaty for resolving challenges to the United Kingdom’s sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago.”
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, Amendment 20J in my name proposes that Clauses 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report setting out the reasons for rejecting the alternative legal remedies to those set out in the Mauritius treaty for resolving challenges to the United Kingdom’s sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago.
At the heart of the Government’s justification for proceeding with the Bill to bring the Mauritius treaty into force is the non-binding judgment of the International Court of Justice from 2019. The Government have, I think, acknowledged that it is not binding but have sought to ensure that, if it is ignored, binding judgments will quickly arise and other countries upon which we depend to run the base would then refuse to help. The Government have not clearly explained what these feared judgments are and why they would be binding. I invite the Minister to do so in detail and to tell the Committee which countries we depend on to run the islands, which we think would then refuse key services and what those services are.
However, in this amendment, I want to probe a different approach. The Government tell us that this is a critical Bill because its passage will facilitate the coming into force of the Mauritius treaty. The treaty is vital because the United States has told the UK Government that it is unhappy about having a major US base on Diego Garcia when the sovereignty of Garcia is contested. Furthermore, it has paused investment on Diego Garcia, which will not recommence until the legal standing of the Chagos Islands has been resolved.
It is crucial that this matter is resolved, because the security—not just of the United States but of the United Kingdom and the West—depends on full US investment in Diego Garcia. In this context, the reason why the Bill and the treaty, which will come into force if it becomes an Act of Parliament, are vital is because they set out the only route to legal certainty for the standing of the US military base. However, this solution does not provide the only way forward to secure legal certainty, and there are alternative ways forward that would better secure legal certainty than the Bill and the treaty. It is the purpose of my amendment to ask the Government to consider these alternatives.
The problem with the Government’s approach in claiming that the treaty constitutes the only legal way forward is that it is the product of a non-binding legal judgment that was a response to the disagreement between two parties—the Republic of Mauritius and the United Kingdom. The Chagossians were not a party to the case because at that time they did not have international personality. Had they been a party then, the judgment would have dealt with a wider range of issues and considered a wider range of ways forward.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I thank the Ministers for the patience and courtesy that they have displayed all evening. The two Ministers and the Whip know that they are among my favourite Peers, not just my favourite Government Front-Benchers, and they have been very patient and good-humoured.
I take issue with the idea that this is a done deal. That is an argument that has run through a lot of the debates and this seems to be the apt amendment on which to take it on. We have been told repeatedly—including by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, last week, and again just before dinner by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—that the treaty has been signed and been passed by the CRaG process and that therefore all this is, as it were, dancing after the music, and we would be exposing ourselves to a much more dangerous situation if we now try to hold it up.
I ask the Committee to ponder the possibility that the CRaG process has not in fact been a full democratic exercise. There has been no vote. Everything was rushed through from Second Reading in one day—there was no Report stage. I have never been a Member of the other place, unlike some of your Lordships present, but, as I understand it, you have a vote in the CRaG process by moving an amendment or a resolution and then voting for it. Looking online, I see that there is such an amendment, standing in the name of my right honourable friend the Leader of the Opposition and others, signed by 107 Members of the other place, from six political parties. I concede that that is not nearly as big a deal as it would have been a decade ago—there has been something of a splintering of parties. As yet, there has been no vote on it.
I mention this because the idea that therefore we have no option except to tweak statements at the margin and polish the edges of this, and cannot look for substantive changes, is fundamentally at odds with what was promised when the CRaG process was brought in. If the treaty was rushed through without debate in another place, surely the only proper scrutiny and the only proper chance of amendment is in this Chamber. Therefore, I hope that noble Lords on all sides will feel uninhibited when it comes to moving and, in due course, voting on substantive amendments. This is the one realistic opportunity that we have to make the points that would be made by the people from the Chagos Islands watching us now if they had a voice in our counsels.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, reminds us, this amendment gets to the core of the criticisms that have been levelled against the Government’s approach to this Bill so far. As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out numerous times during the debates on the first day in Committee, it is very difficult to see which court could have delivered a binding judgment against the UK on the question of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. Yet it is the repeated contention of the Government that this treaty is somehow essential to deliver legal certainty.
The question remains of which court could have delivered a binding judgment that would have threatened that legal certainty and the security of the military base. I hope that the Government can finally provide us with an answer. If they cannot answer that question then the argument that this treaty and this Bill were both necessary falls apart. Indeed, the argument that the treaty and the Bill are needed urgently also falls apart, and we should consider whether the Government should take a more circumspect approach. That is what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, suggests.
If this treaty is necessary, Ministers must surely have considered other options before coming to this agreement with Mauritius. Perhaps the Minister can tell the Committee what consideration was given to resettlement of the Chagos Archipelago by Chagossians, for example. What would the cost have been for that? What is the difference between that cost figure and the true cost associated with this treaty? I say “true cost” because the Government’s initial claims on costs have now been thoroughly discredited.
There were lots of options that should have been considered, so perhaps the noble Baroness can tell us what options were in fact considered. I understand that these are specific questions about the process followed by Ministers before agreeing to the treaty with Mauritius, so if the noble Baroness cannot say with certainty what potential approaches were considered, perhaps she could write to us to confirm the details.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
In relation to Amendment 20J, the House has dedicated at least 15 hours to debating the Government’s rationale for entering this treaty. It has been subject to two reports, by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Three separate committees—the IAC, the IRDC and the Foreign Affairs Committee—have held evidence sessions and questioned the Minister for the Overseas Territories.
The Government have been consistently clear throughout. The legal case was compelling and there was no credible alternative. A policy of hanging tough, which I assume the noble Lord has in mind, would have been a real gift to our adversaries. As we have stated on numerous occasions, the continued operation of the base was under threat. Courts were already making decisions which undermined our position. If a long-term deal had not been reached, further wide-ranging litigation was likely, with no realistic prospect of the UK successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such cases.
Legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, affecting, for example, our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia. Both the IRDC and the IAC recognise that the treaty provides legal certainty for the base. I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate. I have noticed that no one has spoken against the amendment, other than the Minister who brought her explanation and reason. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Morrow
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report assessing the ability of the Government of Mauritius to govern the Chagos Archipelago under the terms of the Treaty and the implications for international peace and stability of transferring sovereignty.”
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, there has been lot of talk about the rules-based international order in recent years, largely in response to the concern that the reality to which it testifies looks considerably less certain in the context of the development of what some scholars are now calling Cold War II. The truth, however, is that international relations has never been a strictly rule-based order, in the sense that it has approximated life in the domestic context. On the other hand, informed by social conventions that testify to the common humanity of all the people of the earth, international relations has never approximated to international anarchy. There have always been rules, and yet they have been different from the domestic sense because of the absence of a world state with all the sanctions of domestic government.
In this context, those rules have to accommodate considerations of power in a way that we do not see domestically. Sound thinking about international relations has never been just about rules abstracted from considerations of power any more than it has been about power abstracted from rules.
We can get into real difficulty if we lose sight of questions of power. One critical way in which international relations has conventionally had regard for questions of power arises from the point at which a new sovereign state, whether arising from the break-up of an existing state, decolonisation, or some other kind of reconfiguration of territorial integrity, is recognised by other sovereign states. This act of recognition conveys on the state sovereignty as the international personality. It involves those states saying that they recognise the right of the other state to exist, with its territorial integrity, and the right of that state to make the laws to which it is subject in relation to that territorial integrity.
This process is mutual in the sense that if state A will not recognise state B, then state B usually will not recognise state A until state A recognises it. One of the critical questions facing a sovereign state in determining whether it recognises another state is whether it recognises its full territorial integrity and right to make the laws of that territorial integrity, together with an assessment of its physical capacity to govern that territorial integrity.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will say a few words in support of the noble Lord’s amendment, which seems really sensible: we should not have been paying to give away British territory without a full and proper assessment of who was going to take it over. This all boils down to whether we trust Mauritius. My feeling is that, while I have probably a great deal of respect for Mauritian people, I am not sure that the Government of Mauritius is one that we would genuinely want to trust in the way that this whole treaty is doing.
I also detect a feeling among the Government and perhaps Whips that, really, we are all wasting our time here: “What on earth are we doing spending all this time?” As the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, we have seen how little time was spent on this and how quickly it came through once the election was over and the new Government were in place. Suddenly, this all was happening. That is why it is important that, even if there are very few people here, we consider all these issues. In the long term, this will all be recorded. There will be a time in the future when many people look back and say, “Oh, perhaps we should have considered that more when it came”.
I do not believe that Mauritius has treated Chagossians who live in Mauritius very well. Yes, there are a few who have done obviously very well and are now out cajoling and saying how wonderful it is that Mauritius is going to take over the islands, but the reality is that they have not been treated well. You need to just talk to any of the Chagossians who are here to discover what has been going on. That was when there was some kind of input from our Government; what on earth is going to happen when the British Government no longer have any say in what is happening in Mauritius?
We need a proper, detailed assessment of the ability of the Government in Mauritius to not just look after the welfare of Chagossians who are there, and in the future, but to look after the whole archipelago and obey the terms of the treaty. The treaty may not be tough enough, but, at the very least, we want to make sure that, if there is one, they carry through their side of it. I just have a real feeling that, once this is all signed and sealed, so many people will forget about what has happened and the Mauritian Government will have an easy time doing anything they want, and mostly not doing things that they should be doing to preserve those wonderful islands and the people who should be allowed to go back there. So I support this amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for their contributions on the noble Lord’s Amendment 20K, which, much like his Amendment 20J in the previous group, asks a specific question of the Government, which I think gets to the heart of the process that was apparently followed by Ministers in reaching agreement on the terms of the treaty.
Clearly, Ministers will have had to consider other issues beyond the claim, which we have debated at length, that the sovereignty of the archipelago was somehow threatened by a binding legal judgment. The long-term security and effective management of the archipelago will, if the Government get their way, be delivered by the Government of Mauritius. We surely cannot have decided to pass that responsibility over to the Mauritian Government without first assessing their ability to manage the islands that we are, well, not giving t them but paying them to take. Would the Minister consider publishing the details of the Government’s assessment of Mauritius’s ability to manage and protect the islands effectively?
In an earlier group, we debated Mauritius’s responsibility for illegal migrants arriving on the islands, but this is just one of the relevant administrative questions that should have been considered by Ministers before an agreement was reached with the Mauritian Government. For example, was the fact that Mauritius does not even have a navy considered a relevant fact when the UK Government formed a view of the Mauritian Government’s ability to manage the islands?
The Mauritian National Coast Guard consists of one offshore patrol vessel, two midshore patrol vessels and 10 fast interceptor boats. As has been said repeatedly, the Chagos Archipelago is approximately 1,250 miles away from Mauritius. Do the UK Government feel that Mauritius’s coastguard is adequately equipped to deal with the challenges it will face as a result of this treaty? Can the Minister confirm whether her department have had any discussions whatever with the Mauritians about increasing their coastguard’s resources in light of their responsibility for the archipelago? If they even had a boat that could reach the distance, that would be a step forward. Will this be monitored by the UK Government on an ongoing basis and raised appropriately through the joint commission, or will we just say that we have handed the islands over and it is now the Mauritians’ responsibility, when we know from all available evidence that they have no capacity whatever to do any of that management?
The Mauritian coastguard’s role is not only important for the Mauritian Government’s access to and administration of the islands. The coastguard will, presumably, play a role in establishing and maintaining the marine protected area that the Minister has told us at great length that they are establishing. What discussions have Ministers had with their Mauritian counterparts to fully understand their plans to protect this important marine protected area? It does not have any boats that can even reach the islands, never mind protect the islands from any access by foreign vessels. Can the Minister confirm whether the UK Government are satisfied that the Mauritian Government have or are about to acquire the capabilities needed to maintain the protected area? When this was debated on the previous day of Committee, the Minister said:
“The MPA will be for the Mauritian Government to implement”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 801.]
I am sure it will, but have we not given any thought whatever to their ability to implement that?
We understand that this would be the responsibility of the Mauritian Government if the Bill goes through, but does the Minister think that there is any responsibility whatever for the UK Government to ensure that those nations with whom we make agreements are able to practically fulfil their obligations before we then sign a treaty? It is essential that we should have some clarity on this process that Ministers have followed in establishing that Mauritius has not just committed to the terms of the treaty but is in a position to be able to honour the terms of the treaty if and when it finally comes into force. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 20K, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, seeks to oblige the Government to publish a report on the ability of Mauritius to govern the Chagos Archipelago and on the implications of the treaty for international peace and stability. The IRDC concluded that the treaty gave the UK legal clarity on which it could capitalise to enhance defence co-operation and that it was a platform for reinforcing operational links with key regional partners, allowing the UK to position itself as a credible contributor to regional stability grounded in the rule of law. Under the treaty, the UK retains full operational control over Diego Garcia. There are robust provisions in place to protect the security of the base. The treaty is the best way to ensure the continued operation of the joint UK-US base and therefore to protect international peace and security. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
The Minister has not even attempted to address any of the questions that we have asked.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am very happy if the noble Lord would like to ask me a specific question that I have not already answered in previous groups. Would the noble Lord like to do that?
Lord Callanan (Con)
Will the Minister comment on the ability of the Mauritian coastguard actually to enforce the marine protected area, for instance?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I suggest that the noble Lord looks at the ways in which marine protected areas are generally enforced. It is not, as he seems to imagine, by patrolling in vessels around the ocean, checking on things. That is not how these things work. But I will gladly send him some information about that.
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for their contributions. Having listened to the Minister, I am wondering whether she will get time to reflect on this debate and on what has been asked and what has been said. Perhaps, if she does, she will write to us and put her reply in the Library, for the availability of every Peer in this House. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty.”
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lord, I beg leave to propose my Amendments 20L, 20N and 20P. In the interests of brevity and immediacy, I will speak only on Amendment 20L, because I have covered the others in previous groups. This is the amendment that requires the Secretary of State to look at the impact of this treaty on other British Overseas Territories and the implications for their sovereignty.
Of course, we are always told in these situations by whoever is in government, “Oh, it’s a unique situation, you can’t compare”. On one level, that is a truism. Of course, all these situations are unique, yet I think it would be extremely naive not to consider the possibility that they will be fallen upon hungrily by people who want a change to the status quo. The idea that even now there are not politicians and lawyers in Buenos Aires or Madrid looking at the implications of this deal and saying, “How can we press this into the parallel arguments that we have for claims over British Overseas Territories?” is utterly fanciful.
They may already be putting out feelers to British lawyers, who seem very happy to work against the interests of the Crown on these questions. The representative of Mauritius in this case gave an interview in which he gloried in the fact that he lived in a country where you could humiliate the Government. If he is not available, perhaps by then the Attorney-General will no longer be in politics, or indeed perhaps the Prime Minister. They also both have long records of working on cases of this kind.
I suspect that the briefs that will be put in front of them will make the claim that Britain has now, in practice, for all that there was no jurisdiction, for all that it was an advisory ruling, for all that Commonwealth disputes were excluded, conceded this extraordinary and perilous precedent that, if a territory was at one time or another ruled from somewhere else, that establishes the basis of a sovereignty claim. I do not think it is completely fanciful for these elements in foreign countries to feel that they will be dealing with sympathetic elements within the United Kingdom.
Indeed, they have had experience of that. If we think of the experience of our relations with Argentina prior to the war in 1982, we can understand why the Argentines felt that Britain was going to move on the subject. We had the 1968 Anglo-Argentine memorandum, which expressly talked about sovereignty being on the agenda. We then had the persistent proposals throughout the 1970s for the leaseback arrangement, and then the withdrawal of HMS “Endurance”. Argentina is a country I know well, and indeed I have had the privilege of visiting the Falkland Islands as well. To this day, I am often told by Argentine politicians that Margaret Thatcher led them on to the punch—that Britain deliberately looked as though it was preparing to withdraw from the islands in order to provoke this conflict. I think that is nonsense. None the less, you can understand why they think that there are sympathetic elements here.
Similarly, if we look at relations between Britain and Madrid in the run-up to the Córdoba agreement over Gibraltar, the 1990s were a time of constant proposals from this side for some kind of joint sovereignty. It was only a referendum of the Gibraltarian people that put a stop to that process. By the way, it was a referendum that official Britain detested and for a long time did not reconcile itself to and ignored, until it became politically impossible and a new dispensation was reached. So, yes, this will be looked at in Buenos Aires and Madrid.
It will be looked at, I am sure, by those in Nicosia. They will think that there is an extremely close parallel there, in the sense that this is a military installation rather than an ethnically separate population. Again, they will say “This was ruled from somewhere else and we have a claim”. When I was a Member of the European Parliament, I would often get petitions and resolutions from Greek Cypriot MEPs raising the issue of the base.
What all these claims have in common is that final resolutions are never treated as final by the other party, any more than the final and binding resolution was with Mauritius in 1965. I do not want to bore noble Lords on this, but I feel it bears repetition. Mauritius trousered a large sum of money in exchange for perpetually renouncing any claim over the Chagos Islands.
In fact, there are very few British Overseas Territories that have not at some point been ruled from somewhere else. In addition to the ones I have mentioned, I was listing just now which ones have at some point had some other seat of government. Cayman, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos, St Helena and Montserrat were all, at some point or another, ruled by someone else. All of them will be looking at this as a precedent and a claim.
What all our overseas territories have in common is that they are all content with their present status. The British Empire was unusual in the peaceful and voluntary nature of the way it was relinquished: not completely, not universally—there were tragic exceptions in Cyprus, India and Kenya—but they were the exceptions. They were not the rule. Decolonisation in Malaysia was a perfectly peaceful process, for example. The only argument was about whether the British should stay longer to defeat the Communist insurgents. It was a generally peaceful process in the Caribbean and in most of Africa, so the places that have stayed are the places that wanted to stay, and they made that very clear, in the cases of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar in quite recent memory, with overwhelming referendums. It seems to me that they will now be looking to those referendums as their one shield: the only thing that potentially distinguishes them. But of course they will be vulnerable to the argument that, if we are treating Mauritius rather than the Chagos Islands as the unit, why should we not treat all of Cyprus as the unit, since that was once partitioned in a similar way at the time of independence? They will all be extremely alarmed by that precedent.
It seems to me there is only one way of reassuring these countries, which is to allow a referendum of the Chagossians, dispersed and scattered as they may be. Then, if the Chagossians vote in favour, it does not matter. We would not be setting any precedent. We would be following the principle of self-determination. If the Chagossians vote to be Mauritian, that is of no concern to Gibraltarians or Falkland Islanders or anyone else, because the principle of self-determination would be upheld. But at least let us give them the vote.
We are privileged in this country to be custodians, stewards, of a largely maritime sovereign area. If we put together the oceans around our overseas territories, they are about the same size as India. We are in charge of some of the richest and most important marine environments, and that is our real string of pearls. The pearls are there because in every case they want to be on the string. Let us not set the precedent of tearing one of those pearls off and hurling it away in defiance of the wishes of the people most involved. I beg to move.
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
My Lords, in his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has tried to pre-empt the comments that I was about to make. I remember well the Falklands War in 1982. I remember many negotiations with Spain about Gibraltar. I remember the struggles with China over Hong Kong. I remember discussions about the future of the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—both of which I have visited—as well as discussions about the future of St Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha, Anguilla and the sovereign territories in Cyprus. In each case, the discussions took place on the basis of the interests of each sovereign territory concerned and I believe that that will remain the case. I cannot see why this treaty over the British Indian Ocean islands and the Chagos Islands will affect the discussions that we will have with our other overseas territories about their futures. I think that the situation will remain as it has been in the past, so I do not feel that I can support this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
My Lords, I certainly do support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I will be very brief. The amendment on which I want to focus is not one regarding referenda and consulting the Chagossian people, even though that is very important. Amendment 20L simply states—and I would be surprised if the Government could not accept this—that the Secretary of State needs to come up with a report
“assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty”.
What is wrong with that amendment? Nothing. It would cost the Foreign Office a certain amount of time and effort to put together a report but, in the context of what has been said—at Second Reading, in the debate that we had on the treaty, on the first and second day in Committee—it is not asking a lot.
The noble Lord, Lord Jay, was looking specifically at the interests of the citizens in those different territories. He has a huge amount of knowledge, wisdom and experience, and what he said made a huge amount of sense. What he perhaps did not address is the signals that this Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the treaty, will send to other countries. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, made some specific points about Argentina—where we know that the dispute will not go anywhere; it will go on and on—as well as Gibraltar. I will also mention one other territory that could well—
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I hesitate to interrupt, but I think we need to remind ourselves before it gets repeated again that we have just done a deal on Gibraltar with Spain. That has been welcomed by the Government in Gibraltar and that situation is no longer as is being implied by the noble Lord.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
I understand that, but circumstances can change and this may well be seen as a precedent in the future.
I want to mention one other territory: Anguilla. As the Minister will know, Anguilla went through a period of huge unrest to resist becoming part of St Kitts and Nevis. The consequence was that a UK battalion of the Parachute Regiment had to deploy to Anguilla to control the unrest that took place. This is a small but incredibly proud territory that wanted to remain British. In the past few years, there have been a number of attempts by St Kitts and Nevis to reopen the whole issue of Anguilla.
There will be consequences of this treaty going through, which could be to some extent alleviated if the Government would accept this very simple amendment, Amendment 20L. This is the amendment in this group that concerns me most. I do not think that it is asking a great deal of the Government to put this in the Bill. This would be a very important signal in the Bill that those other territories would be properly considered.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I want to say a few words. I have been rather sparing in the Committee debate today, but the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has prompted me to speak.
I have been a passionate supporter of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, I have served on this Parliament’s executive committee of the CPA UK and I have had the great privilege of visiting a great number of Commonwealth nations in all parts of the world, including early this year Malaysia. We have to be very careful, particularly perhaps in this House of Parliament, when we debate a process that has been very difficult on decolonisation. We have to be very cautious with how we approach it and very mindful of the language that we use.
We had 12 years of the Malayan Emergency and I have met the relatives of those who were affected by that. There is not a Commonwealth country that does not have difficult stories, on many occasions. We are still living with this today. I would counsel anybody that, yes, of course, we are free to make any contributions, but we have to be very mindful.
The noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, whom I greatly respect, indicated that perhaps the precedent was this deal. Now, there may be circumstances where a bad deal might be seen by other people as some form of precedent, but I do not think that that is the point that is being made in this group. The point that I hear being made in this group is that the very point of principle that we opened negotiations to cede sovereignty is the precedent. Well, that decision was made in 2022. If we are to see the consequences of decisions taken by a British Government to recognise that negotiations should take place to cede sovereignty, then we have had three years of knowing what the consequences of that will be. I have heard nothing from anybody on this group saying that they have seen the consequences of that decision taken by the previous Administration in November 2022.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, I want primarily—perhaps later—to talk about my Amendments 20Q and 20U, but I will say something about my noble friend Lord Hannan’s Amendment 20L to emphasise one particular precedent he mentioned in passing but seems the most compelling and dangerous. Indeed, in line with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I have been rather cautious about discussing this because I did not want to put ideas into people’s heads, but, for two reasons, I will go ahead and talk about it now. First, there is no better way to keep a secret than to pronounce it in the House of Lords; and secondly, as my noble friend Lord Hannan said, there are lawyers in every country looking to see whether this is a precedent that they could use to right some past wrong or to change some past circumstance which they would like changed.
The most compelling comparison is between what we are doing now and the reasons given for doing it and the independence of Cyprus, where we severed off the sovereign bases. They were part of a whole. The territorial integrity of Cyprus was divided between the sovereign bases and the rest. That is exactly what we are accused of doing in the case of the Chagos Islands. It is actually much more true in the case of Cyprus than in that of the Chagos Islands, because Cyprus was always governed as one unit by us whereas the Chagos Islands had separate laws, even if they were transmitted from somebody resident in Mauritius. Therefore, if we are saying that there is compelling reason for us to say we cannot separate the Chagos Islands from Mauritius, of which it has never been part, then surely there are compelling reasons why we should never have separated the sovereign base territories from the rest of Cyprus.
Those bases are hugely important. They played a role time and again in recent disputes and interventions, and in the prospect of interventions in the Middle East. We have been able to help fly from them and intercept missiles from Iran coming towards Israel. In previous conflicts, we used the bases there. They of value not only to us but to the whole of NATO. If we put them at risk by saying to the world that we have no right to have separated them then we would be doing something very foolish.
The only difference I can think of—I am offering a solution to this dilemma, because I do not want the issue of the sovereign bases to be opened up in a dangerous way—is that the decisions in Cyprus were taken before the United Nations General Assembly resolution on which the advisory opinion of the ICJ was based, and therefore it did not apply to them. Of course, advisory opinions are not actually binding—they are wrongly taken as being binding but they are not—but do they apply retrospectively? In many cases when courts rule, they say, “This has always been the case; we’ve only just now ruled it”.
I would like to hear how the Minister proposes to defend the sovereign bases in Cyprus from this precedent. She is obviously not doing this willingly; she is obviously unwilling and she is a wonderful Minister, but she has been given a tough job to do. I would like to hear some justification for this. I do not know whether the precedent in Committee allows me to sit down now and stand up later to deal with my amendments, but assuming I can do that, I will.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, I will briefly make two points. First, on behalf of my noble friend Lord McCrea, who has had to leave for a family wedding, I will speak to Amendment 57, which principally brings to the Committee’s attention the role of British legal firms in this issue.
We have been critical in this House of the current and, to some extent, the previous Government. Those criticisms are not entirely without merit on the issue of sovereignty. There has also been further British involvement in any number of aspects, the four most significant legal interventions being two cases in connection with UNCLOS; one relating to the advisory opinion of the ICJ; and one on the drafting of the UN security resolution. In each of these four cases, the Mauritius Government used British firms as their legal representation in order to further their aims. In effect, British firms acted on behalf of a foreign Government to challenge British sovereignty, British defence rights and the wishes of British citizens. We cannot do anything about what happened in the past, but I suppose the amendment queries whether there is an appropriate way forward in terms of that level of support for Mauritius. Raising my noble friend Lord McCrea’s amendment gives the Government an opportunity to respond to it.
I want to deal briefly with the wider point. We do not always see eye to eye, but I agree with at least one phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, used: he said that we have to be careful about words, and words matter. One of the major concerns, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, and others, might be described as the precedent and the ripple effect. It is undoubtedly the case that in the past we as a nation have made mistakes in dealing with overseas territories. In particular, we have sent out the wrong signals on both the Falklands and Gibraltar. It is probably the case that some, at different points within Governments in the past, would have been quite happy to see those territories dispatched to another sovereign territory on that basis. They can best speak for themselves but, fortunately enough, in each case we have drawn back from what might be described as a fatal mistake. The danger with this is that it crosses the line in handing over that level of sovereignty.
Mention has been made of a range of overseas territories. The one thing that largely unites them is that whatever discussions we have had with different Governments, about whatever level of co-operation, they have ultimately respected the self-determination and the inhabitants’ will for sovereignty. That is what at times has drawn us back. I think this goes beyond that and moves towards a situation regarding the wishes of the Chagossian people and their right to self-determination—and that self-determination may, because we do not know definitively, express itself in them saying, “We want to be part of Mauritius”. If that is their self-determination, so be it. I think it is unlikely to be the case; nevertheless, so be it. The concern is the signal that this sends out to the outside world.
The Minister mentioned the arrangements as regards Gibraltar. I think there has been work ongoing with both this Government and the previous Government to try to find arrangements that are in the best interests of Gibraltar. I entirely acknowledge that, while it is sometimes easy to criticise when looking from outside, the Gibraltar Government themselves have been supportive of those actions and have backed the moves made so far.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
It is really important that there is not a dispute with regards to Gibraltar. There is an arrangement that is agreed with Spain and it is not in question at all, in any sense.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
Absolutely. I have taken the Minister and the Government to task on a range of things, but this may be one issue on which we are in vigorous agreement. I do not question the Government’s bona fides as regards Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands. I know there is a strong commitment to both. I fully acknowledge that and believe it would be the case under a future Government, but this is not a concern over the attitude of this Government or other UK Governments over the ripple effect. It is the danger of what message will be sent out; as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, there is a ripple effect towards Madrid and Buenos Aires, which might take a very different approach in future.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am really sorry, but we have an agreement with Spain. The matter is settled. Madrid takes the same view that London takes; it is the same view that the Government of Gibraltar take. It is settled, and it is beyond unhelpful for noble Lords—unintentionally, I realise, as this is a relatively recent development—to suggest in any way that that is not the case.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I am not querying that. What I am saying is from experience and from having spoken directly to Gibraltarians in relation to this. They know that a very good agreement may have been done with this Government, but Spanish Governments down the years have sometimes tended to blow hot and cold as regards Gibraltar.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
Yes, but part of the problem is that sometimes in this country we fall into a trap where we see agreements as final settlements. There are sometimes other Governments who either see them as a process or, while they may be fully committed to them, cannot say whether a future Government would feel bound in their attitude towards them.
I appreciate that we have it in black and white as regards Gibraltar and I do not doubt the actions taken by the Government. I fully support them, beyond any question mark of doubt, but we have been told by Gibraltarians that sometimes what happens in Madrid can run contrary to what happens in the border provinces with Gibraltar, which want to have a much stronger relationship. Depending on what attitude they want to take, they can turn hot and cold on the relationship. I have no doubt that the Government have done a very good job in nailing down that agreement but, again, I just express the concern for a future situation—perhaps it is more pertinent for Buenos Aires, which down the years has had a much more volatile approach to some of these issues—over the signals that we inadvertently send by way of this to other Governments. I have no question over the bona fides of either this Government or future UK Governments in relation to that.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Does the noble Lord accept that perhaps a closer analogy is where a party has one position when it is in government but a completely different one when it is in opposition, which is true of His Majesty’s Opposition towards this treaty with Mauritius?
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
That is true of a party that votes against it at Third Reading in the House of Commons and then seems largely supportive of the deal here. So, yes, that could be a perfectly good opportunity, but that can be applied in several parts of the body politic.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
I am getting rather tired of this Front-Bench thing about what the last Government did. The reality is that the last Government did not sign any treaty. They may have been talking. They could have talked and talked, but they did not sign a treaty. This Government came in and signed a treaty.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I do not hold a brief for either the Government or the main Opposition. I am happy for them to spell it out. Undoubtedly, what the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, has said is correct, but rather than essentially being in a position where we look to see where the lines of accountability and blame should lie, we should ultimately be focusing on ensuring that we support the self-determination of the Chagossian people. That is the fatal flaw with this agreement.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
My Lords, I just want us to remind ourselves of the history of the British Empire and how Macmillan suddenly said: there are now winds of change and, if we resist, we may lose something very good. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II created this wonderful thing called the Commonwealth. She put in a lot of effort and energy, and those countries that were once ruled are now part of the Commonwealth, and what is interesting is that in most of those countries the national language is English. So there can be a transition that does not destroy a lot of goodness nor give the impression that those territories where the sovereign is still His Majesty the King will simply look at this and say, “They did it, so we can”. You will find that politically, in Jamaica and other places, the Crown has made it very clear that this is a decision of those nations. If they wanted to become independent, that is their decision. They are not going to force themselves on anybody.
I thought the treaty that was entered into with Mauritius was to create a long-term use of Diego Garcia and the archipelago. If we did not, the challenge was soon going to come because of what happened at the United Nations. We would have found ourselves with a big challenge. Even China was interested in challenging British sovereignty, but now a treaty has been signed and has secured this.
Another good thing on which I want to congratulate the Government is that they did not simply sign a treaty so that this base can be used for 99 years. Because sovereignty is now being transferred, they also provided a trust fund for the Chagossians to be better looked after than when the British had sovereignty over the place. This is a win-win situation for the Chagossians and for Britain. We now have security of the base for a 99-year lease. That is quite a long time. I do not think you and I will be here in 99 years, but those who are here may say we did a good thing at the time. As for the fear of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, of what other places may do, it is their right to do whatever they want to do.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity also to speak to my Amendments 20U and 20Q. Amendment 20U would provide that the Bill shall not come into force until the Secretary of State has published
“a report on how the Treaty may increase any political or legal risks”—
that is what we have been told underlie it—
“related to … reliance on third countries required to service the base … risks of litigation from Mauritius regarding the base in Diego Garcia in the International Court of Justice”—
and I hope this will include some explanation of the Government’s reactions to the Mauritian declarations of 23 September 1968 which, as I understand it, mirrored our determination that the ICJ should not have jurisdiction on disputes between previous and current Commonwealth states and ourselves; Mauritius likewise said that any such disputes should be settled reciprocally. Finally, the report should include the
“risks of litigation in an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.
The Minister said a little while ago that we spent many hours discussing the reasons or rationale behind the decision to cede sovereignty. In fact, we have spent many hours dragging out from the Government an explanation of their decision to do so. It is pretty clear that the decision came first, and their justification has been cobbled together in response to each successive challenge that has been put forward to it. The more it has been challenged, the more tenuous the rationale has become. It has been spread out like an elastic band and has become thinner and more transparent. It is very clear that, if we keep on this process, it will eventually break and then the Government will be without any rationale at all.
The Government first suggested that the ICJ decision was purely advisory but Mauritius might come back and somehow get a definitive ruling out of the ICJ. However, that was then abandoned because, of course, we had the specific opt-out when we signed up to the ICJ that it would not be able to consider disputes between ourselves and present or previous Commonwealth countries. One thing has puzzled me. Looking back through the record, I have never seen Ministers refer in words to that opt-out. They have tacitly acknowledged it, because they move on to talking about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Likewise, when we have heard from the great mandarins of the Foreign Office, none of them has ever explicitly let past their lips—if I have read the transcript correctly—the existence of this opt-out. That is a great mystery. When people do not say something, one wants to know why, particularly when they tacitly admit it.
Oh dear, I hope I have not caused the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to leave in disgust. We were hoping he would be able to break this omertà that has forbidden him and his colleagues ever to mention this.
My suspicion—of course it is no more than a suspicion, and the person who could have set that right has left the Chamber—is that the Permanent Secretaries in the Foreign Office and the other mandarins who have spoken in defence of the Government on this never actually told Ministers about this opt-out and they do not like to admit that. Ministers do not like to admit that they did not know about it, because that looks pretty difficult. Maybe in the course of debate we will find that that is an unworthy consideration and they were told explicitly at the beginning there was no possibility of the ICJ reaching a binding judgment on the sovereignty of the Chagos. They tacitly accept that is the case and move on to the possibility of a judgment coming from the tribunal set up under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
My amendment would force the Government to be more explicit about that. What precedents are there for this tribunal ruling on sovereignty? The noble Baroness said that she thought it was very unlikely—I think that was her phrase—that the tribunal would directly rule on sovereignty. I think she is more than right on that, because there are no precedents I can find for it ruling on sovereignty. But then she said that it might rule on other things and sort of assume sovereignty. I would like some examples of that sort of thing happening, if it is a sufficiently big risk for us to be doing this nefarious deed of ceding sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. We have not had that up to now.
The tenuous justification moves on to say that there may be a ruling that would somehow assume sovereignty, but what negative effects would that have? It would apparently put the base at risk, because of its reliance on being supplied from other countries. From which other countries is the Diego Garcia base supplied, and in what way, and how would that be put at risk? Is it supplied from Aden? Would the Suez Canal be closed to British shipping if it was thought to be supplying the base? Would we get labour from mainland Africa to help run the base? Would the Philippines refuse to send Filipino workers to help run the base? When we are given such a tenuous reason, at the end of a long chain of tenuous arguments, we need some substance to it. This amendment would require the Government to give that.
Amendment 20Q would provide that the Bill would come into force only
“when the Secretary of State has published a report into the governance of the Chagos Archipelago under the Treaty, including local administration and democracy”.
The Minister has said that there was never any settled population in the Chagos Islands, nor any system of local administration. I am sure that was said in good faith, and I can well understand that the detailed history of the Chagos Archipelago is not something most of us have studied, but a letter has now been sent to the Minister, and to the committee that has been asked to consult with the Chagossians, pointing out that, in the absence of the British, who sort of came and went, the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands elected a chief to help with the governance and local administration of the islands. Therefore, the settled inhabitants did have a local administration in the past, and we want to know what is going to replace it in future.
We know that Mauritius, while it has no obligation to, will be able to resettle the islands. It may, of course, settle them with Mauritians, not Chagossians. Either way, what system of administration will there be, and will it be democratic or autocratic? I think we should know. My Amendment 20Q would require the Government to spell that out, and to acknowledge and accept that it was a mistake to say that there has never been any system of local administration, when clearly there has.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere for leading this debate. He set out a very strong argument for his amendments in this group, as did my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown.
Amendment 20L, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hannan, is a very helpful amendment in Committee, as it affords the Committee the opportunity to debate the impact of the Government’s decision on the Chagos Archipelago on other overseas territories. While I accept that there are, of course, legal arguments here, we believe that they should be explored fully. I want to focus on the impact of the UK Government’s treatment of the Chagossians, and on our reputation among other overseas territories, which look to the UK for steadfast support and security. How do residents, and descendants of the residents, of other overseas territories feel now that the Government have caved in to pressure from their international lawyer friends on the question of the Chagos Islands?
As my noble friend Lord Hannan observed, the British Indian Ocean Territory is not the only overseas territory subject to legal claims by foreign states. Does the Minister accept that the behaviour of our Government on this issue will have ramifications for the level of trust in the UK held by residents of other overseas territories? We should be standing up for our overseas territories and protecting those who live on them, not caving in to activist international lawyers. In my view, it really is that simple. Can the Minister confirm that the UK Government are not considering ceding sovereignty over any other British Overseas Territories? Will she rule out such a move in future? We want residents of the overseas territories to feel secure, and I hope that the Minister’s words in response to this group will help to give them that security.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, a large number of the amendments that have been tabled seek to mandate the Government to renegotiate the treaty with Mauritius on various points. The noble Lord told me this on many occasions in the last Parliament, so I am sure that he understands the point that I am about to make: treaty-making and international negotiations are a matter for the Government, in exercise of the royal prerogative. It is simply not practical for that to become a matter where Parliament seeks to direct this or that isolated element of what can be intense, dynamic and sometimes difficult negotiations. In this case, I can assure the Committee that the Government have thoroughly considered all aspects of the treaty that the UK has entered into and used all their efforts throughout to achieve the best possible deal for the UK. These requests to reopen negotiations on different points are not realistic and would make the UK appear an unreliable counterparty on the international stage. This treaty has gone through a rigorous assessment and been agreed at the highest levels of the US security establishment.
Our reasons for rejecting Amendment 20U are, essentially, those that I set out earlier in relation to Amendment 20J, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I do not intend to repeat them.
Amendment 20L was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I enjoy the noble Lord’s contributions. His speeches are as entertaining as they are, unfortunately, inaccurate and misleading sometimes. My grandfather fought in Malaya, in the Green Howards, and so it was an unfortunate example that the noble Lord chose to resort to—but I forgive him for this, because he puts so much into his speeches. I assure him and other noble Lords that this deal has been welcomed by both Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, their Governments have both stated that there is no read-across to them, and we should respect what they have to say.
Through Amendment 20M, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, seems to be suggesting that the Government have not complied with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in respect of the treaty. I respectfully disagree with him on this. The treaty was laid in Parliament on the day that it was signed, under the process set out in the Act. CRaG requires that a treaty is laid in both Houses for 21 joint sitting days before it may be ratified. The period expired on 3 July 2025, with neither House resolving against ratification. During that 21-day period, two committees in this House held evidence sessions, including with the Minister for Overseas Territories, and produced reports, which we have responded to. There was a debate and a vote on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, against ratification, which this Government defeated. As a matter of practice, the UK Government do not ratify treaties until the necessary implementing legislation is in place, and that is what the Government are currently doing with the Bill.
Amendments 20P and 20Q appear to misunderstand the archipelago. I feel uncomfortable making this point, as it feels very cold, harsh and legalistic, particularly given the testimonies, many of which we have heard directly from Chagossians in their accounts of what happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not feel comfortable repeating it but this is the legal situation as it is, and it is important to be clear. The archipelago has never had a permanent population. The islands have not been inhabited since the population was removed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, there is no “economy” of the Chagos Archipelago. Once the treaty enters into force, Mauritius will be sovereign and will have jurisdiction over the regulation of commercial activities unrelated to the operation of the base throughout the archipelago, subject to the constraints of the treaty. On the exclusive economic zone around the archipelago, Mauritius has announced its intention to establish a marine protected area and, importantly, there will be no commercial fishing allowed. It will be for Mauritius to decide how any resettlement will work, including in respect of governance of the islands.
Amendment 57, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and spoken to on his behalf, cannot be accepted. The UK’s legal services industry and the English Bar are internationally recognised for their expertise. That includes expertise in public international law, and UK-qualified lawyers act for states all around the world on various matters, facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes. The standing of UK legal expertise should be a matter of pride for this House, not a tool for manipulation by politicians to achieve narrow and short-term advantage. An attempt to place a prohibition on who can utilise our world-leading legal services would undermine access to legal representation—an important element of the rule of law. It is wholly inappropriate for the Government to dictate who can be represented by whom. It risks undermining our standing on the world stage.
I hesitate to repeat the debate we had last week, but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that, had there been no legal risk to our position, why did the United States stop investment in the base at that point? It was because it was sufficiently concerned about the legal risk. Had there been no basis whatever for our concerns on legality, why on earth did the previous Government even begin to negotiate, accepting that they did not manage to conclude a deal? Our view is that there was sufficient legal risk. The noble Lord disagrees, as is his right, but the fact is that the principle of this treaty, and the necessity for it, has been through the appropriate process. It has been voted on in this place and we have voted that this treaty should be ratified. We have already taken that decision in this Chamber. This legislation is about making the necessary changes to UK domestic law to enable us to sign, fully ratify and implement.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way, but I ask her to respond to the point I made: why, even now, does she refuse to let pass her lips any recognition that there was never any possibility of the ICJ reaching a legally binding decision that would affect us, because of our opt-out from the power of the ICJ to decide on disputes between ourselves and Mauritius? UNCLOS is a different matter, but would she let those words pass her lips?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, I accept that about the ICJ, but the point is that other countries will act on an advisory opinion even if we choose to ignore it. We have not chosen to ignore it. That is a judgment call. Partly, that is because we think that, by negotiating now, we negotiate from a stronger position than we would have had we waited for other, binding judgments. Those judgments can come from any treaty to which both parties are signed up. That is why we feel—and not everyone has to agree with the Government on this—that there is sufficient legal question that we needed to act and to negotiate. If they are honest with themselves—there is a lack of former Ministers who were responsible for this arguing the point that the noble Lord makes; they argue other points but not this one—there was sufficient legal jeopardy for the previous Government to enter into this process. I hope noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for dealing so comprehensively with all those points, and to all noble Lords who contributed: the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Ludford, my noble friends Lord Bellingham and Lord Lilley, the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Purvis, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu.
On finality, almost all treaties are said to be final at the time but they are not always treated as final by one or both parties. The treaty of Utrecht was pretty final. It said that Spain would have first refusal if Britain ever left, but it was pretty final about granting sovereignty. I absolutely agree, as the Minister says, that Spain has now agreed to a permanent settlement, but it is one of many, and experience tells us that incoming Governments do not always regard treaties signed by their predecessors as final. Indeed, the treaty we signed when Mauritius became independent and renounced all claim to the Chagos Islands was said to be permanent at the time, so I am less reassured than I think she hoped I might have been.
Let me put it the other way around: the way to make these treaties final is to stop inviting people, through our behaviour, to reopen them—to refuse to countenance it. The French had a very similar issue in the Comoros; they just refused to countenance it. I cannot see any other country doing what we are doing now. Indeed, I am afraid to say I cannot see any British Government other than this one having done it.
I do not want to get into the whole history of the Malayan emergency, but there is a wonderful record that, when Malaysia became independent, one of the first acts of the new Government was to give some very valuable land containing the house called Carcosa Seri Negara—a very fine house—to Britain in perpetuity as sovereign British territory. It became the seat of the high commission in Kuala Lumpur in recognition of all the things that we had done together. A young anti-colonialist Minister said, “But if we give them the best land in KL, no one will believe that we fought for our independence”, and there was a rather awkward moment around the Cabinet table because, of course, they did not: we were in Malaya supporting a democratic Government against a communist insurgency. We would have left much earlier had we not had the requests of that Government to remain and support them. That is getting slightly off topic so, with your Lordships’ permission, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report assessing the impact of Article 6 of the Treaty and the transfer of sovereignty under this Act on Chagossian civic identity.”
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, nationality has two distinct meanings: it is what it says on our passports, but it is also what we feel. The second of those, the sense of identity and belonging, of being a link in a chain between past and future generations, can be unconnected to territory.
Perhaps the supreme example of nationality that exists in the heart is the State of Israel. History affords few stories like it: a people who for 2,000 years were stateless and scattered but never lost the aspiration of statehood—“Next year in Jerusalem”. Then, one day, quite extraordinarily and almost providentially, they fulfilled it. The British Government recognised a claim of nationality based on cultural, ethnic and religious homogeneity, even though it had been unrelated to territory since time immemorial.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, my Amendment 50B is very clear and simple, and nothing to do with security on Diego Garcia or the details of the treaty between Mauritius and the United Kingdom. It is simple: it is for our Government to recognise the Chagossian people in the law of the United Kingdom as an indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago.
I raise this because so many of the Chagossians we have met and know are men and women who have lived on these islands, who were baptised in the island chapels, who fished, who tended their gardens, who raised children and buried their dead there. They are the indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago. It is important that what they have asked for, that they are recognised by our country, is agreed to.
The need for this amendment arises because even now, more than half a century after their removal, the Chagossian people are still being told by Ministers that they never existed as a permanent population, that their islands were never self-governing in any meaningful sense and that there is therefore no question of self-determination. Only last week, on the first day in Committee, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, repeated that claim, saying:
“The Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population nor has ever been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population can therefore arise”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 795.]
That statement is not true. It is contradicted by every serious historical study, by the records in the National Archives, by the findings of the International Court of Justice, by the judgment of our own courts and most importantly by the lived memory of the men and women who have written to and met us and live all over in the diaspora.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said that he would not go into the history, but it is important when we are discussing a people that we understand the history. Archival records from the 19th and 20th centuries list births, marriages and burials across multiple generations on Peros Banhos, Salomon and Diego Garcia. Parish registers from Notre Dame de L’Assomption on Diego Garcia record entire family lines. Children were born there, married there and died there. The High Court in the Bancoult judgments accepted that the Chagossians were a settled people. The International Court of Justice—one of the reasons we have this treaty—in its 2019 advisory opinion recognised the Chagossians as the people of the territory with a right to self-determination. Research and documents from various academics have shown that there is at least 150 to 170 years of continuous multigenerational residence.
That is what an indigenous people is; that is what a permanent population is. Yet the Government continue to repeat a narrative first invented back in 1968, when the Foreign Office issued internal instructions to describe the Chagossians in public as temporary contract workers to avoid United Nations scrutiny. Those instructions are still in the archives and still legible. They show unequivocally that the United Kingdom knew the truth then, and it should know the truth now. It is time for this Parliament in discussing this treaty to put the truth into law.
The Minister also claimed that the islands were never self-governing but, as every historian of the archipelago now agrees, the islands were in practice run not by resident British administrators, who were almost never present, but by the Chagossians themselves. Families organised communal work, maintained chapels and community buildings and settled disputes. Testimony from multiple surviving islanders shows that respected elders served as local leaders.
One of the older Chagossian families that has been mentioned before in Committee, the Mandarin family of Peros Banhos, has given oral testimony that their ancestor, Jean Charles Mandarin, a blacksmith serving the whole island, was nominated by the community to act as a local headman in the long absence of any resident British authority. His leadership was even recorded in a scholarly Brill volume on the dispossession of the Chagos Islands, describing him as “a thorn in the flesh of the administration”. His grandson, Fernand Mandarin, born on Peros Banhos, later led the Chagossian Social Committee, represented his people at the United Nations and wrote one of the most detailed oral histories of island life. Today, his descendants continue that leadership in ongoing legal actions before the High Court. How can the Minister stand in this Chamber and say there was no permanent population and no self-organisation when the evidence is so overwhelmingly clear?
The amendment puts this right. It recognises in law what the world’s historians, courts and international institutions have already recognised: that the Chagossians are the indigenous people of the Chagos Islands. The amendment clearly defines them as those born on the islands
“prior to their depopulation between 1968 and 1973”
and their direct descendants. It requires the Secretary of State, when exercising any function under the Bill, to have regard to their identity, cultural integrity and rights.
The amendment is necessary, because the Bill does exactly the opposite with Clauses 2 to 4, which would abolish the British Indian Ocean Territory for every island except Diego Garcia, stripping away the only remaining statutory recognition of the Chagossian people’s historic and legal connection to their homeland. It would remove the very provisions in the British Nationality Act through which they are currently recognised in law. It would hand their homeland to another state without any act of self-determination, despite the clear findings of the International Court of Justice that the Chagossian people are entitled to that right.
We now know what that means in practice. Mauritian authorities have already begun issuing new birth certificates to Chagossians, in which the place of birth is rewritten as Mauritius, erasing all mention of the islands. That is actually happening. I have seen some of that documentary proof.
The recognition in the amendment would prevent that erasure. It does not settle the question of sovereignty, prejudge the right of return or determine citizenship policy, but it ensures that the people who lived on these islands for generations, who were removed without consent and who have been fighting to preserve their identity ever since cannot be written out of their own history or out of our legislation.
One native islander wrote:
“We want our name to exist before we die. We want to be seen as the people of our islands, not as shadows erased from paper.”
Another wrote:
“They took our homes. They took our animals. They took our graves. Please, do not let them take our identity in law.”
Another important one says:
“The Minister says we were never a people. I lived my whole childhood on Peros Banhos. My father and mother were born there. How can she say we were not there?”
The world knows that there was a people in the Chagos Islands. The archives know, the courts know, the UN knows, the historians know and the survivors who still bear witness know. Only this Bill seems to pretend otherwise. I believe that recognition is the minimum moral duty owed to a people who were removed from their homeland, denied their rights and then told that their existence did not matter.
The amendment affirms that they did exist, they do exist and they will continue to exist in the law of this country. I know that a group of Chagossians have written to the Minister in the last few days questioning why she made such a statement. I hope that she will be able to give them some support tonight and say that she recognises their existence and that they should be recognised in the law of the United Kingdom. The amendment does not affect anything to do with security, which seems to be and rightly, perhaps, is the real reason for what the Government are doing. This does not affect one single bit of anything to do with the security of the Chagos Islands, so I hope that the Minister will go back and accept the amendment on Report.
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, Amendment 81 in my name is in some key senses the most important of all the amendments that I have tabled in Committee. The purpose of Amendment 81 is to probe the question of what will happen to the Chagossian people if the Bill receives Royal Assent and the Mauritius treaty comes into force. The logic that underpins the Government’s position is that Chagossians are, from the civic perspective—the perspective of their citizenship—Mauritian.
Of course, this will not change their ethnicity, but it will extinguish a critical dimension of their identity, which, while in a very real sense it was suspended as a result of the gross injustices that were committed against them in 1968 and 1973, has not been extinguished. Although the splitting of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius in 1965 was imposed on the Chagossians, it bestowed on them a civic identity apart from Mauritius that they were pleased to receive and enjoyed while living on their islands from 1965 until their forced expulsion.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his Amendment 81 that he has just talked about, which rightly puts the focus of our debate on the citizens of the Chagos Islands, the Chagossian community themselves. It has so far been a disappointing aspect of this Committee to hear the Government dismiss the rights of the Chagossian community. Throughout the process of agreeing the treaty, it is clear that the Chagossians have not been properly consulted. In fact, the Government’s official view—I think the noble Baroness has repeated it again this evening—is that there is no relevant claim of self-determination in respect of the Chagos Archipelago.
I also welcome Amendment 50B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. The resettlement of the Chagos Islands under the treaty is an option, not a requirement, and it is increasingly clear that it is possible that the Mauritians will simply ignore it and not take any steps whatever to achieve resettlement of the Chagossians.
The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, would certainly help put pressure on the UK Government and, in turn, the Mauritian Government to use the provisions of the treaty in respect of resettlement and allow those Chagossians who wish to to return to the outer islands.
On a separate but related note, I am of course pleased that the International Relations and Defence Committee has launched its relatively short piece of work to finally hear the views of the Chagossian community, but I think there are some serious procedural flaws in its survey. There seems to be no control of who can submit views: I am sure the relevant Chinese bots are already on the subject of submitting the survey forms, and there are already concerning reports of Mauritian government officials actually filling in the forms on behalf of Chagossians in Mauritius. But, when the results are in and we have the report of the committee, I hope the Minister will commit to considering it carefully before we proceed to the next stage of the Bill.
We obviously understand that there may be limited time between the committee’s publication of its report and Report stage, so the Government may not have the time to consider and table their own amendments to reflect the views of the Chagossian community as expressed in the—valid, hopefully—responses to the committee. Should that be the case, we would ask the Government to engage constructively with others in this House on amendments before Report so that we can put the needs and welfare of the Chagossian community front and centre as we progress with the Bill. I hope that the Minister will be able to give that assurance today.
As the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, seeks to do, we need to step up and support the Chagossian community, who have been mistreated for far too long.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 20M, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, requests that the treaty does not come into force until the publication of
“a report assessing the impact of Article 6 of the Treaty”.
As I and other Ministers have said on numerous occasions, it will be for Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement once the treaty enters into force. It is not sensible, or a good use of taxpayers’ money, to be reporting on something that will not be in our gift to achieve.
The Government are increasing our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These include Chagossian-led community projects in Crawley and elsewhere, education and English language support, and have involved the creation of a number of FCDO-funded full-time jobs for Chagossians.
Amendment 81, from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, requests a report of the forecast impact of the treaty on Chagossians. The Government have already released the public sector equality duty report relating to the treaty, which addresses all the issues around an equalities impact assessment. This, in addition to the IRDC’s current review, should support understanding of the impacts to the Chagossian community.
I understand, respect and appreciate the noble Lord’s support for the Chagossian community, but I must also speak to the many different views within the Chagossian community, including several groups that welcome the deal. I think that this will perhaps be surfaced as a result of the work that the IRDC is doing, and I obviously commit to reflecting on it as the Bill proceeds.
Amendment 50B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, seeks to recognise in the domestic law of the UK that the Chagossians are the indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago. I hear absolutely what she says about lived memory and the persuasive way that she puts that across. But the unfortunate fact—and I think it is unfortunate—is that both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have considered in a series of judgments since the 1970s the related questions of a claimed right of abode or other rights said to flow from the rights that she seeks to gain for the Chagossians through her amendment. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed the claims.
Had that not been the case—the noble Baroness clearly wishes that that had not been the case; it is her strongly held view and I can see why she feels so—the Government would perhaps have had to take a very different course, because the rights would have held a different weight in law. However, the situation is that history has taken us to a position where, much as we do not like it and it goes against some of the things that we feel and what we may even argue is the moral case, the legal situation is, I am afraid, as it is.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
Will the Minister just give me a short, simple answer to why the United Kingdom Government will not recognise the Chagossian people as an indigenous people?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
The legal situation is as I have described. The noble Baroness may wish that that were not the case, but the legal position is as it is, and the Government do not intend to amend the Bill in order to change that legal position.
The Earl of Leicester (Con)
That legal position is guidance; it is not law.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
There have been legal judgments in English courts and elsewhere that have established that the right that the noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to grant to the Chagossian people does not currently exist in law. It is not guidance. Those are decisions of English courts. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
I thank the Minister. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who were diligent and eloquent in their defence of the dispossessed Chagossians. Sometimes people approach the story of Britain overseas as a kind of morality play where Britain plays the villain, the Alan Rickman of the global drama. We heard a hint of it, I think, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in the previous round. Every disengagement was somehow disagreeable. Here, the disagreeable thing is pulling out in a way that disregards the wishes of the people who have been most injured. I was grateful to the Minister for making the clarification on birth certificates. She is doing enormously well defending this position, I have to say. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Lilley
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has produced a report on the economic partnership under Article 11 of the Treaty and a motion to take note of the report has been approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.”
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Amendment 20S seeks to get the Secretary of State to produce a report on the so-called economic partnership between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, which is set up under Article 11 of the treaty. Parliament should have an opportunity to take note of that and debate it in both Houses.
The reason that is important, apart from the fact that the control of money is the supreme function of Parliament, is that the economic partnership article, Article 11, in the agreement, is very strange. It says:
“In consideration of this Agreement, the United Kingdom agrees … a. to pay Mauritius an annual sum; … b. to capitalise a Trust Fund for the benefit of Chagossians as established by Mauritius; and … c. to grant multi-year funding as part of a development framework for projects to be undertaken by Mauritius across twenty-five (25) years. … The arrangements for such payments, including amounts and modalities shall be agreed separately”.
It then says that this is a “full and final settlement” of the financial aspects of ceding sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.
Now, to call this a partnership is a very strange thing. We give them money annually. We give them more money for the benefit of the Chagossians. We give them yet more money for the benefit of the Mauritians. Where is the partnership in all this? If this partnership were ever to be introduced, I hope that Ministers would feel obliged or, out of their natural desire to be helpful, would seek to explain to us why this is a partnership rather than a kind of surrender where we give up the money, we give up the territory and we let them decide—even the trust fund that we set up for the benefit of the Chagossians is “as established by Mauritius”. So the Mauritians are going to determine how this trust fund is used and spent; the Chagossians will have no say in it and will probably get precious little benefit from it.
I hope the Minister will let us in on the secret. What is the quid pro quo in all this? Normally, any partnership means that there are two sides to it. I used to be a partner in a firm, and we were partners; we all benefited from each other. We did not have one side being partners and the other side getting all the benefits. I am genuinely mystified about this. Was it just that this was signed up for when the Government were suffering a fit of generosity? Perhaps the coffers were overflowing with funds. They could not think what to do but give some away to Mauritius for this, some away to a trust fund for that, then more away to Mauritius for 25 years. Where is it all coming from? Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us. I beg to move.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I did not expect to participate in this, but I was having a conversation earlier with my noble friend Lord Minto, who is very knowledgeable about corporate finance. He posed the question: is there anything in this whole arrangement that would stop Mauritius capitalising on the revenue stream that they have coming to them and selling that off to someone else?
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Kempsell is not here to move his amendment, which I thought was a particularly good one.
We debated some of the financial aspects of the treaty on the first day in Committee. The Minister at that time asked to delay her remarks on those amendments to the appropriate group. I assume this is the group that she was referring to, so we all look forward to the fuller answer on the finances that she promised then.
The core contention of the Government is that the deal costs an average of £101 million a year and the present net value of payments under the treaty is therefore £3.4 billion. This has been challenged by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, but the Minister, rather than engaging in the substance of those challenges, has relied on the Government’s published figures and refused to explain why she believes those figures accurately reflect the cost of the deal.
The Minister has relied on the approval of the Government Actuary’s Department and simply argued that consistency was essential. These are typical deflections that, no doubt, many Ministers have used in previous cases, but they do not address the concerns of my noble friends. We know that the payments are front-loaded at £165 million for the first three years, and then £120 million for the next 10 years. After that point, it is index-linked. As my noble friend Lady Noakes set out at Second Reading, that will see the cash payments hitting more than £650 million a year by the end of the 99 years, depending, of course, on what indexation you use. With all those additional considerations, it is our contention that the true cost of the deal is not £3.4 billion, as claimed by Ministers, but something more like £35 billion.
So the question lands: why would the Government seek to play this down? If they are so delighted with the deal—if it is such a good deal for the British public that they keep claiming that they deliver for, as all government policies should surely be—then surely they would want to be open about the true cost of things. They brag about spending on every other area; they take every amount of money per year, cumulatively add it all up and then put it in a press release and brag to the British people about what a great amount they are spending in every area except for this one. Does the Minister think it is better that the country should know the full costings before the treaty comes into effect, or would she prefer that the UK tie itself into these vast annual payments first, before admitting what the true cost of the deal actually is?
We are clear that the British people deserve to know what their Government are signing up for. Ministers should engage with the detailed costings laid out by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, and the points made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, rather than hiding behind their pre-prepared lines. If they have nothing to hide, what is wrong with producing a report that we can all see and study and get checked by independent financial experts? Once Ministers have admitted the true cost of the deal, then they can start justifying the so-called benefits of the treaty against what the true cost actually is. I do not think that people would be impressed by arguments justifying that figure, but Ministers should do the decent thing and justify the real numbers openly and in public.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Noble Lords will recall that we debated the financial elements of the treaty in some detail last week, and I genuinely do not think that further debate is going to persuade anybody of anything this evening and probably is not a good use of time at this stage. However, I respect that the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Kempsell, who was not here to speak to his amendment, have tabled further amendments, so I am happy to put their minds at rest about the matter to the best of my ability this evening.
Noble Lords already know that the Government published full details of the financial payment on the day that the treaty was signed. These details are in the finance exchange of letters, which is included in the treaty in the version laid in the House and published on the government website. The details are also set out in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, which was also laid before the House and published on the government website. It is plain to see how much the treaty is costing. The breakdown on page 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum is particularly straightforward for anyone who might desire further information about what will be paid in each year of the treaty. Indeed, the clarity with which the information was presented by the Government was welcomed by the Office for Statistics Regulation, which confirmed that it was consistent with the principles of intelligent transparency.
Therefore, there is no requirement for any additional report on the financial costs, either before the Bill comes into force, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, proposes, or before each payment, as is suggested in the other amendment.
The quid pro quo I was asked about is that we get a unique military asset shared with our closest ally on a legally secure basis. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asks why I rely on government figures and the answer is because I am representing the Government. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
Before the Minister sits down, the particular question I pose—and I am not being polemical; I think there is an issue—is: what actually stops Mauritius, contractually, from commercially transferring this revenue stream in a capitalised form to another purchaser?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I think the noble Baroness is asking me what a sovereign country would do with some money that it gets as part of payment from this treaty. I am not sure what the problem would be with Mauritius investing that money in something that then provided it with a return, which it could then use to support public services or anything else in Mauritius. I am not sure if I have properly understood exactly what the noble Baroness is concerned about. I would be happy to engage further—
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Okay, that might be a good idea. I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment on that basis.
Lord Lilley
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the duties in section (Joint UK–Mauritius Parliamentary Commission) have been discharged.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected with another in the name of Lord Lilley, seeks to ensure that the sections 2 to 4 of the Act only come into force once the Secretary of State has sought to establish a Joint UK-Mauritius Parliamentary Commission.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 20T and 81K. Amendment 20T just requires that Amendment 81K would happen before the treaty, or parts of it, comes into force.
Amendment 81K proposes setting up a parliamentary commission between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. The proposal is that we seek to agree with Mauritius that this parliamentary commission should reflect equal representation from the Parliaments of the United Kingdom—this Parliament—and the Republic of Mauritius, which one hopes would be acceptable to the Mauritians as fairly rational in these circumstances. More important, what is the function of this commission? It should be to ensure,
“the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including but not limited to … ensuring a right of return … ensuring the right to self-determination via a referendum of all Chagossians on the question of sovereignty is held by the UK”,
and
“access to compensation, resettlement, or other forms of support”.
The Minister has repeated again today this extraordinary affirmation that there is no Chagossian people and never has been—that there has never been any permanent population of the Chagos Islands. I can see why the Minister can say that there no longer is, because we shamefully removed them. But to rely on the fact that we removed them and therefore they are not permanent, when all of us now think it was monstrous that this was done with no possibility of return at the time, and that we should be setting this right, now that we are trying to sort the aftermath of decolonisation, as it is seen, is to my mind extraordinary. How can there have been no permanent population in the past if there are churches, graveyards, signs of habitation, work, agriculture and fishing on several of the islands? Above all, how can we pretend that there never has been any Chagossian population and, at the same time, grant British citizenship to those who can demonstrate that they are descended from Chagossians?
The Minister cannot have it both ways. She cannot say that there has never been anyone there and that we are now recognising that those who have been there, or are descended from them, have the right to British citizenship. It is there in the treaty. I know that when she mentioned this she said it with obvious distaste and embarrassment, but that distaste and embarrassment should have been sorted out with her officials before she got round to saying it again in this Chamber. It is very insulting to the Chagossian people to say that they have never existed.
Given that the Chagossian people have existed, and that we recognise that it was wrong to remove them without in any way trying to provide them with some prospect of undoing that wrong, surely we should, through the parliamentary commission that I propose in this amendment, discuss with the Mauritians, if sovereignty is handed over to them, at least giving Chagossians the right of return and the right of self-determination via a referendum, along with access to compensation, resettlement or other forms of support. If we do that then at least we will go a small way to undoing the wrong that was done in the late 1960s—I think it extended into the 1970s—which all of us now recognise.
It is clearly important that we have some kind of parliamentary commission overseeing this, because the treaty does not do these things. It could allow the resettlement to be extended to Mauritians and not be given to Chagossians, and it could result in the fund that we set up not being paid out to Chagossians—certainly not to Chagossians who have been in the United Kingdom, but solely to Chagossians who now live in Mauritius. It is only right and proper that we have some parliamentary oversight from both sides—from Mauritius as well as from the UK—to ensure this is all properly done. I am sure this proposition is so reasonable that such a reasonable Minister as we have on the Front Bench cannot fail to agree with it. I beg to move.
The Earl of Leicester (Con)
I want to add to my noble friend’s words. I will not read the whole letter, but this is a copy of the letter to the Minister from the Chagossian people. They write that the Minister’s words
“cut deeply. They erase our history, our dignity, and the truth of who we are. They echo the very language used to justify our people’s deportation between 1968 and 1973. And they are demonstrably false … For more than a century before our exile, the Chagos Islands were home to a multigenerational, settled population. This is not our opinion. It is documented in church registers of births, marriages, and burials across Peros Banhos, Salomon and Diego Garcia; colonial-era records describing communities with homes, chapels, gardens and workplaces; judgments of the UK High Court in the Bancoult cases; the International Court of Justice; United Nations resolutions; academic research stretching across decades. We were not transient workers. We were a Creole-speaking people, rooted in our islands, with our own traditions, our own culture, and our own community life. To say that our homeland had ‘no permanent population’ is simply untrue … You also stated the islands had ‘never been self-governing’. Chagossians have never claimed to have operated a Westminster-style system. But for generations, in the long absence of resident British administrators, our islands were organised and cared for by local leaders from within our own community”.
This has been confirmed in academic work. Misley Mandarin, who lives here in London now with his family, finishes,
“We ask you not for sympathy, but for recognition. Not for pity, but for accuracy. Not for charity, but for truth. We deserve self-determination. We want to stay British and return to our islands as British citizens”.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 20T and 81K, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley, seek to achieve a similar objective to Amendments 80 and 82. Given the similarity of the two pairs of amendments, I was slightly surprised to see the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, degroup his amendments. We could have had a very satisfactory debate with the original grouping, but of course I fully respect the noble Lord’s right to degroup his amendments. I am slightly surprised, because he criticised me for doing something similar last week, but it is, of course, only right that noble Lords should be able to debate their amendments in the groupings that most suit them.
I am pleased that my noble friend Lord Lilley has the right to self-determination, as confirmed by a referendum of the Chagossians, in his amendment. This is an important point that I am sure many noble Lords will agree with.
Amendment 20T would also delay the implementation of the key parts of this Bill until some progress has been made on establishing the joint parliamentary commission. It seems to me that too many core parts of the treaty are not tied to deadlines or quantifiable outcomes. As a result, it would be hard to monitor whether Mauritius, and indeed the UK, are fulfilling their obligations under the treaty in a timely manner. My noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendment helpfully ties the joint parliamentary commission to the coming into effect of the Act, forcing Ministers and their Mauritian counterparts to get on with the job so that the commission can play an important role from the very beginning of the treaty’s effect. It is a very sensible proposal.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on whether the Government will agree that establishing a joint parliamentary commission would be a useful tool going forward.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Lord opposite has indicated, it is slightly surprising that the four amendments on establishing a joint UK-Mauritius parliamentary commission or committee have been degrouped. Members are well within their rights to do this and I am glad at least that this time noble Lords have had sufficient notice of what is happening.
I am sensitive to the sentiment of these amendments. I take them to come from a genuine desire for greater parliamentary involvement in the scrutiny of the implementation of the treaty on specific areas that are of concern to the Committee. The Government have always said that they welcome scrutiny, and this remains the case. We are not opposed to the strengthening of links between the UK Parliament and that of Mauritius, although this would be a somewhat novel approach. I think it seems pretty likely that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, took inspiration from the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on this occasion.
There is a question of proportionality and the proper extent of the remit of such a parliamentary commission. Out of respect for the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I propose to discuss this in much more detail when we reach the debate on Amendment 80, which he has tabled. I hope that is acceptable to the noble Lord. I will be very happy to meet with him and other noble Lords to discuss this proposal, and specifically the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in more detail. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to issues around the ceding of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius. I asked a question on the previous day of Committee about the drafting of this Bill and why it does not mention Mauritius. I wonder whether the Minister has had time to think about that and will be able to give your Lordships’ Committee an answer today. As I mentioned then, there are some previous examples of similar legislation that actually named the state that is gaining sovereignty, so I am keen to know why the precedent was not followed in this case.
My Amendment 33 simply seeks to remove two unnecessary subsections from the Bill. If we remove Clause 3(1) and (2), as my amendment would, we will be left with the simple statement that
“His Majesty has under his prerogative the like powers to make laws for Diego Garcia as His Majesty had before commencement for the British Indian Ocean Territory”.
With that simple statement, the Bill would assert His Majesty’s powers sufficiently and he could use those powers to ensure the continuity of law from the British Indian Ocean Territory to Diego Garcia. Given that these powers are under the prerogative, we cannot understand why a statutory provision is necessary to ensure the continuity of law following the ceding of sovereignty.
Furthermore, if the Bill passes in its current drafting and a future Parliament were to repeal this clause, what would the effect be on His Majesty’s prerogative powers? I understand that the Government’s intention is not to undermine the prerogative with the Bill—that is clear from Clause 5(4)—but why have they not included an identical provision in Clause 3? If the Government are merely confirming His Majesty’s prerogative powers, should the drafting not be simpler, so as not to risk limiting the prerogative?
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, noble Lords have not had the opportunity to hear from me on the Bill previously. I apologise for not having intruded on previous debates, but I have listened to many of them.
I tabled Amendments 51A, 51B and 51C in pursuance of my continuing interest, over a number of years, in the exercise of prerogative powers and their relationship to parliamentary scrutiny. The combined effect of these three amendments would mean that any Order in Council that exercises a Henry VIII power—that is, to amend, repeal or revoke an Act—would be subject to affirmative procedure, instead of negative as proposed in the Bill, and that any other order, in other words not a Henry VIII power, would be subject to the negative procedure instead of no procedure.
These amendments reflect, and are in accordance with, the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which, in its 37th report on 13 November, said of the Henry VIII power in paragraph 17 that
“the Government has failed to provide a full explanation as to why the power … is subject to the negative procedure … We recommend that this power should be subject to the affirmative procedure”.
In relation to orders that are not of a Henry VIII power character, the committee went on to say:
“We recommend that the power in clause 5(1) when used to do anything other than amend, repeal or revoke an Act should be subject to the negative procedure”.
So my three amendments are intended precisely to deliver the recommendations of the DPRRC.
The Constitution Committee, in its 14th report, also drew attention to the provisions of Clause 5. It observed that Orders in Council that are made in relation to treaties are commonly made by way of the prerogative power—because treaties are made by the prerogative power—and with limited parliamentary scrutiny as a consequence. However, the committee did not dissent from the DPRRC’s recommendations in this case.
Orders in Council in relation to the British Indian Ocean Territories have historically been made by virtue of the prerogative. The terms of this agreement with Mauritius mean that that precedent no longer applies. Article 1 of the agreement recognises—or confers, depending on how you view it—sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, to Mauritius. Therefore, the basis for the exercise of the prerogative power—in other words, the exercise of sovereignty over the territory—is no longer applicable. I shall go on to explain why I therefore disagree with my noble friend on the Front Bench in his argument for Amendment 33.
These provisions provide for the continuation of the law in Diego Garcia. This is in accordance with the agreement in relation to Article 9 on jurisdiction. It follows in my view that the future exercise of the prerogative is sanctioned by this legislation in relation to Diego Garcia and that, as a result, any Orders in Council made should be regarded as statutory orders and, as such, subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have accepted that the orders that have Henry VIII powers should require a parliamentary procedure. They do not, however, provide for a parliamentary procedure for other Orders in Council.
Paragraph 48 of the Explanatory Notes says that this measure is in subsection (5) of Clause 5—in fact it is in subsection (6). The notes say that
“the intention is to maintain a clear distinction between prerogative and statutory orders”.
That is to be achieved, according to the Explanatory Notes, by stating that these powers are not exercised in pursuance of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. This is a very curious place that we have arrived at, since the Government are disapplying the Statutory Instruments Act while at the same time requiring that Orders in Council that are made that have a Henry VIII power attached to them require parliamentary scrutiny and are therefore statutory orders.
Let me be clear about the argument behind my three amendments. The prerogative stems from the exercise of a sovereign jurisdiction, which in relation to the United Kingdom is exercised by the sovereign in Parliament. In other dominions where His Majesty is sovereign, other forms of sovereign powers may subsist, but this treaty and agreement with Mauritius states baldly, in Article 1, that His Majesty is not sovereign in Diego Garcia. No prerogative power can exist without being dependent on this legislation.
Subsection (6)(b), in excluding this legislation from the interpretation under the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, is incorrect. On Report, and in response to this debate, I will be asking Ministers to think very carefully about two things. First, I hope positively, I ask them to change the procedures for the parliamentary scrutiny of Orders in Council so that Henry VIII powers are dealt with by an affirmative procedure, and, secondly, that Orders in Council for any other purpose are dealt with by a negative procedure. I ask them also to think very carefully about the terms of Clause 5(6), which incorrectly seeks to disapply the Statutory Instruments Act 1946.
It follows from my argument that I do not agree with my noble friend on Amendment 33, and I am afraid that I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Lilley in relation to his Amendment 51BA. He goes further than the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee would in applying an affirmative procedure to Orders in Council that are not for a Henry VIII purpose. Neither can I support other opposition to clauses standing part, but I expect that my noble friend was rightly seeking to probe the meaning of Clauses 2, 3 and 5. Of course, if one were to remove them, one would effectively repudiate the treaty. That may or may not be his intention, but I do not propose to speak to the opposition to those clauses standing part.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, I am persuaded by the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that his amendments are somewhat narrower but much more justified than my broader amendment. When the appropriate moment comes, I will not press my amendment and leave his standing.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
In response to the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that we are clearer in the Bill about what it does, I have read it a couple of times and honestly do not think that it could not be any clearer. It is a Bill to enact an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago. I think that is sufficient, and if he does not, I am not sure what he is getting at.
The Government rejects Amendment 33 on the basis that the provision in question is not redundant. It is needed to ensure the secure and effective operation of the base. It ensures clarity on which law will apply through the jurisdiction that the UK will exercise under the treaty. Legal continuity and certainty for operations on the base once the British Indian Ocean Territory is dissolved is far from unnecessary.
Let me explain why we have Clause 3. This clause saves the law of BIOT, and law which relates to BIOT, as the law of Diego Garcia and law which relates to Diego Garcia. This has been done as the default, to ensure the continued effective running of the base on Diego Garcia and to make sure that there is no legal gap. Detailed work is being carried out to establish where technical amendments may be needed to this preserved law to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is defined in Clause 3 as the whole area that the UK can exercise jurisdiction over, as covered in the treaty. This includes the island of Diego Garcia and the 12 nautical miles surrounding it. Preserving the existing prerogative power to legislate for Diego Garcia means that we can continue to operate the base and its legal architecture in much the same way that we do today, and it gives the maximum flexibility for the future.
Amendment 51, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seems to be based on a misapprehension. As I mentioned in my response to the amendments related to Clause 3, His Majesty has a prerogative power to legislate for BIOT at present and Clause 3 preserves this power. It does not allow him to make laws for other parts of the realm about BIOT or Diego Garcia. If the noble Lord reads that clause of the Bill again, he will see that I am right about that.
The statutory power in Clause 5 is necessary to enable amendments to Acts and statutory instruments which form part of the law of Diego Garcia and amendments to legislation which forms part of the law of other jurisdictions—the UK Crown dependencies and the other OTs. These other jurisdictions have laws which refer to BIOT or treat it as one of the overseas territories. Amendments to those laws may be necessary to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia.
I see that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—as is becoming classic in his contributions on these occasions—has read the report from the DPRRC. His Amendments 51A, 51B and 51C appear to seek to implement its recommendations. Amendment 51BA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, appears to be less consistent with the recommendations—I think he has recognised that in his remarks—in that it would impose the affirmative procedure in respect not just of Orders in Council, which amend primary legislation, but of those which amend secondary legislation. Without showing too much leg so late at night, we are still considering these suggestions and we will return to them on Report. With that, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and others who contributed to this group. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her reply to my amendments. I appreciate that they are technical and relate to the prerogative, but they are important none the less.
In essence, we seek to understand whether the Government believe that Clauses 3 and 5 will limit the prerogative in any way because as we see from the drafting of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which we discussed earlier, this has effectively ended the Government’s adherence to the original Ponsonby rule. Statute is so often deficient when compared with convention. As in the case of the prerogative, statute should not limit the prerogative without very careful consideration.
I am grateful to the Minister for her reply. Given the complexity of these issues, I hope she will write to us to set out the impact of the Bill on the prerogative before we proceed to Report. In the meantime, I will, of course, study her reply in Hansard. Obviously, we reserve the right to return to any unresolved issues on Report.
Baroness Hoey
“Demographic study of the Chagossian peopleThe Secretary of State must produce a report projecting the population growth of the Chagossian people over the next 30 years, including their global diaspora, and the impact of this Act upon that projected growth, and assess the implications for international recognition of their national identity.”
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, as some comments were made on the previous day in Committee about how few Members there were on the Government Benches, I thought it might be nice to say how pleased I am to see so many tonight. I am sorry that the Lib Dems still have not produced many people, but anyway: it is very nice to see so many people.
Amendment 47 is a stand-alone amendment, which again does not really affect the security aspects of Diego Garcia or the treaty in the sense of changing it hugely. It asks the Secretary of State to
“produce a report projecting the population growth of the Chagossian people over the next 30 years, including their global diaspora, and the impact of this Act upon that projected growth, and assess the implications for international recognition of their national identity”.
One of the Government’s recent arguments for the treaty and the Bill is that the Americans want it. They have explained that the United States is troubled about having a military base on an island with contested sovereignty, and that it has said that until matters are resolved and there is legal certainty, it will not invest in the base. That is probably précising the argument. The Government argue that the treaty and the Bill will deliver the requisite legal certainty. The argument is based on the assumption, if this Bill becomes an Act and the Mauritius treaty can then be ratified, that all the legal uncertainties will be put to bed.
It is my contention in moving Amendment 47 that if this Act passes and the Mauritius treaty is ratified—two things I very much hope will still not happen—all that will happen is that one legal uncertainty will be replaced by another, and the Americans will have made no progress towards getting that certainty. Instead of the uncertainty arising from the Republic of Mauritius contesting United Kingdom sovereignty over the islands, we will be presented with the uncertainty that arises from the Chagossian people contesting the Republic of Mauritius’s sovereignty. I get the sense that, in removing the basis for Chagossians living in the United Kingdom to continue to enjoy British Overseas Territory citizenship after the passage of this Act, there is a desire to try to collapse Chagossian civic identity into British civic identity, to the extent that Chagossians reside in the UK, so that distinctive Chagossian civic identity disappears.
The truth, however, is that the identity of the Chagossian community in exile will not go away, resting as it does principally across three states: the United Kingdom, Mauritius and the Seychelles. The number of Chagossians is increasing and they are becoming more animated in their commitment to securing self-determination as a people defined, even in exile, by their relationship to their islands.
There is a sense that, until this point, the impact of the Chagossian identity in international relations has been somewhat muted, in that their desire is not to be returned to their islands to become a sovereign, independent state. The Chagossians who issued the statement of self-determination, who have written to us and whom we have met, were very clear on this point. Since they see themselves as connected to the UK, there has never been a need hitherto for them to assert their identity and seek international personality to claim the islands. This will change completely if the islands are transferred to the Republic of Mauritius. Even while the United Kingdom has shamefully failed to resettle the islands, they have remained under British sovereignty, which over 99% of well over 3,000 Chagossians are recorded as saying that they want. Obviously, they do not want things as they are at present, but to be resettled.
In this context, the contention of my amendment is that the Government and the United States of America need to think carefully about what is likely to happen to the Chagossians as a people in exile. I believe that, rather than allowing themselves to be absorbed into other countries, they will continue increasing in number and adopting an ever-stronger and more resilient identity, and that in times to come we will look back on this Bill and this treaty, if it goes through, as something that has made even more uncertainty over Diego Garcia. I beg to move.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. It would be interesting not only to look at the future projections of the population of Chagossians but to have a proper, full-on demographic study of this unique people. We heard it asserted again by the Minister, in a very embarrassed and regretful tone, that there was no population and the people do not really exist, “This may not be my view but it is the view of the courts”, and so on. It is worth spending a moment reminding ourselves of who these people are, some of whom—to remind noble Lords opposite who have just turned up—are observing this debate.
There was a unique inheritance in the Chagos Archipelago. The population came from both directions: largely from Africa—from Madagascar, which has its own unique demographics, east Africa and Mozambique—as indentured labourers from the Indian subcontinent, from Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Bengal and Ceylon to some degree, and a little bit from France. This is reflected in a unique linguistic tradition. I have listened, over many years representing the part of Sussex where most British Chagossians live, to the Bourbonnais Creole. There is a kind of French spoken throughout the Indian Ocean, in the Seychelles and in Mauritius, but Chagossian French is clearly distinct. It is not simply a dialect of Mauritian French. There are very different words. For example, a boat is a “pirog” rather than a “bato”, and a net is a “lagoni” rather than a “rezou”. My apologies to any watching Chagossians for my pronunciation. There is a unique and distinctive oral tradition, rich in nautical metaphors and especially in longing, melancholy and a sense of exile.
In the grey and unpromising streets of Crawley—I mean no disrespect to Crawley, which is part of my old patch—people have worked to keep alive these old folkways and traditions. They are focused on the sense of longing and return. There are ritual incantations that mention the villages now lost. There are special celebrations and meals marking what was taken away. A sense of exile can become a central part of your identity as a people. We have seen it happen many times. I invite noble Lords to recall the words of Psalm 137:
“If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, Let my right hand forget her cunning …let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, If I remember thee not”.
With every passing year, it becomes a stronger part of your identity as a people.
All this is by way of saying that the idea that once this treaty is signed and a couple of signatures are exchanged, the people of Chagos will forget their identity, blend happily into the Mauritian population and become just one more exiled group with no more prospect of returning home is an utter fantasy. We will have replaced a legalistic dispute with a much more visceral one, which will carry on for as long as there are people who still remember the noise of the surf and swell of the archipelago. Those people will press every future Government for their right to return not as Mauritian citizens but as what they are asking for now, Chagossians under British sovereignty. Eventually, they will get a Government who honour their wish.
The Earl of Leicester (Con)
My Lords, in this amendment, we are talking about a democratic study of the Chagossian people. However, I want to speak about a matter that has been mentioned briefly by my noble friend Lord Callanan and that goes to the very heart of democratic integrity and the dignity of an entire people.
I wish to address a survey issued by the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee that aims to capture
“Chagossian views on the Agreement with Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago”.
This survey cannot be relied on. It is methodologically flawed, structurally careless, open to manipulation and in several aspects dangerously misleading. The Chagossian people, who have endured decades of dispossession, displacement and injustice, deserve far better than an instrument that falls short at every level.
First, on the technical design, the survey is hosted on Microsoft Forms, a rudimentary platform that any undergraduate research supervisor would reject for a project involving even minimal verification. There are no safeguards against duplicate submissions, no protection against cyber manipulation, no identity checks and no mechanism whatever to confirm whether a respondent is actually Chagossian. For a survey that concerns sovereignty, citizenship, resettlement and the legacy of one of the gravest forced removals in modern British history, this is astonishing. It leaves the process exposed to interference by anyone, anywhere, with any motive.
Unfortunately, that is not a theoretical risk. The survey still has a week to run, and we already have deeply troubling reports from Mauritius. There are claims, supported by video evidence which I have seen and direct testimonials, that Mauritian officials and intermediaries have been filling out the survey on behalf of Chagossians who cannot read English, cannot understand the political implications and cannot write their own responses.
Even more seriously, multiple Chagossians have told us that they oppose the agreement with Mauritius yet believe that they have been marked down as supporting it in this survey. If this is true, then a foreign Government are, in effect, interfering with a House of Lords committee’s evidence-gathering process. Not only does this compromise the validity of the survey but it threatens the independence and integrity of Parliament itself. Let us be absolutely clear: this is not a consultation but contamination.
Let me take your Lordships through some of the survey questions. It begins with text that states that:
“A new law implementing the Agreement is currently being debated … and members of the House of Lords want to hear … opinions … before voting on it”.
What it does not say—and very much ought to—is that this agreement is not yet in force, that ratification is required and that Parliament can still reject it. The omission is misleading and may lead many to believe the treaty is inevitable. When you are asking a displaced people about the fate of their homeland, clarity is not optional; it is essential.
The survey repeatedly instructs respondents not to provide any identifying information. At the same time, it allows anyone in the world to submit answers as many times as they like, with no checks. There is no way to confirm whether responses come from Chagossians, non-Chagossians, organised political activists or even automated submissions. I have personally seen a text message from a high-ranking Mauritius official stating:
“My guys in the Mauritian Government are”—
I will change the wording—very worried.
“They are planning for civil unrest when they cancel the tax cuts”.
It is clear what the Mauritians want. For a consultation that claims to express Chagossian views, this alone renders the entire exercise invalid.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for moving this amendment, my noble friend Lord Hannan for his excellent speech and my noble friend Lord Leicester, who also made some very good points.
Amendment 47, from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, gets to the core of a problem that the Government have so far avoided. When we originally considered passing a Motion requiring the Government to consult the Chagossians, which the Government were totally against, Ministers resisted it, not only because they felt that a consultation might be subject to judicial review but because the challenge of defining the Chagossian community presented challenges.
We have heard throughout our debates on the treaty that the UK Government have mistreated the Chagossians, not least through their forced removal from the Chagos Archipelago. The Government have gone some way to recognising this through the establishment of the trust fund. Does the Minister consider the creation of the trust fund for the Chagossians as the end of the matter, or will her department continue to look at further ways to support the displaced Chagossian community?
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to produce a report projecting the population growth of the Chagossian people over the next 30 years and to assess the implications of the outcome of the report for recognition of their identity. If we are to properly support the Chagossian community, as we believe we should, it is important that the UK Government make a proper effort to understand the community, its growth over time and where Chagossians have chosen to live. Will the Minister take this on board and look closely at ways in which the UK Government can improve their understanding of the Chagossian community? I look forward to hearing her response.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, I have said repeatedly throughout these deliberations that the Government are very interested in thinking about different ways of working alongside the Chagossian community on these issues. That applies to Amendment 47 as well.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, asks the Government in her amendment to produce a report consisting of a demographic study of the Chagossian community. I am going to have to disappoint her this evening. It will not be possible to produce a useful report, at a cost to taxpayers, in time for it to do anything of consequence alongside this treaty. It is not a bad idea to have a report such as this, for many of the reasons that have been described. I would not be against it. What I am saying is that the responsibility for conducting the study does not belong in this Bill, but that does not mean it is a bad thing to do in principle. The noble Baroness will know, as we have heard most recently from the noble Earl, Lord Leicester, about the IDRC leading a report into the Chagossians, which I hope will be published soon. I hope that all these things will help to mitigate some of the noble Baroness’s concerns.
I saw that Jeremy Corbyn had also written to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, wo chairs the IRDC, which is responsible for the survey. It is not something that the Government are responsible for. We are looking forward to the results. We were asked what weight we put on the survey. It is for the committee to determine that. I am sure that it will take on board the comments that have been made by those who are concerned about how the survey has been conducted. I know that some Chagossians would be completely unable to access a survey such as this, for reasons of literacy or access to the means by which the survey is being conducted. I am sure that the committee will want to reflect on that. We certainly will when we receive its report. I look forward to it and hope that it is useful in assisting us to understand the complexity of opinion that exists within Chagossian communities.
On the substantive point that the noble Baroness raises, such a piece of work may well be useful, but I am not able this evening to commit the Government to commissioning it. With that, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that rather thoughtful answer. I note that she did not rule out what I said—that the Americans would still be seeing uncertainty in the future. I think that we will see that whatever happens in this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Lilley
“Review: impact on nuclear treatiesWithin three months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a review of the impact of this Act on the ability of the United Kingdom and Mauritius to comply with international treaties relating to nuclear weapons.”
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, we are approaching the home straight now, which is good news. A lot of noble Lords have joined the debate at this stage. They will know that the Government attach great importance to adherence to international law. They will probably be aware that we have established that the International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over disagreements between Commonwealth states and therefore none on our dispute with Mauritius about sovereignty, and that we have established that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has no power to rule on sovereignty.
However, there is a treaty which does apply to Mauritius and which no one disputes the existence or authority of, and that is the Pelindaba treaty. It was never mentioned in the early stages of the Government’s declarations about their need to cede sovereignty to Mauritius or their claim that doing so would increase the security of the base. But the Pelindaba treaty is one which the countries of Africa—and that includes Mauritius—signed, creating a nuclear-free zone. I do not think anyone disputes that if the Chagos Archipelago is recognised as part of Mauritius then the Pelindaba treaty will apply to the Chagos Archipelago, and therefore to the Diego Garcia base. It is significant that the Pelindaba treaty says it should be a nuclear-free zone and that therefore Diego Garcia will be nuclear-free.
It is important that we establish what that means. Does it mean that no nuclear weapons can ever be stored, based or transited through Diego Garcia? If so, does the United States know about this? What is their reaction to it? It is less clear whether or not it means that nuclear-powered vessels can use the facilities of Diego Garcia. My noble friend Lady Goldie’s amendment would make that clear, and her amendment is at least as important as mine in seeking to establish the truth of this.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 88 in this group is very much in a similar vein to my earlier amendments, although I see I do not have the presence of my newly acquired fan—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—to encourage me. I seek reassurance that the
“unrestricted access, basing and overflight”
provisions in Annex 1(1)(a) of the agreement includes the right of the UK to allow nuclear-propelled vessels and nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft to enter the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia.
Although not in the amendment, the annexe of the treaty referred to also specifically covers the United States of America, and, for the avoidance of doubt, I include it in the confirmation I seek from the Secretary of State in this amendment. Again, I am asking that this be confirmed by the Secretary of State before the Bill can come into force. In this respect, I am perhaps baring my teeth more than my noble friend Lord Lilley, which is a rather unusual situation.
As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, Mauritius is a party to the Pelindaba treaty, which establishes the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear weapons in any signatory state. Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty states that both Mauritius and the United Kingdom confirm that no
“existing international obligations or arrangements … conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.
Annex 1 of the treaty states that the United Kingdom retains
“unrestricted ability to … control the … deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”.
Nuclear weapons are lethal capabilities. So Britain and the United States must, as per the terms of the treaty, have an unrestricted ability, surely, to house nuclear weapons or to dock nuclear submarines at the base on Diego Garcia should we choose to do so. Yet that would appear to require an express provision in this treaty, and I cannot find it.
Article 7(3) appears to seek to allay those concerns, but I would welcome an absolute clarification from the Minister. Will Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty prevent us basing Vanguard-class submarines or, in the future, nuclear-armed aircraft, or the United States stationing any nuclear weapons at the base on Diego Garcia? That is a question that I require answered. This cannot be left in doubt—hence my requirement that the Secretary of State publish a statement to confirm the matters I have raised before this Bill comes into force, so that everyone is clear about what the UK and the US can or, perhaps more alarmingly, cannot do. As my noble friend Lord Lilley commented, although they are not directly covered by the Pelindaba treaty, my amendment also makes reference to nuclear-propelled vessels and, for the avoidance of doubt, I seek reassurance that Mauritius would not take exception to that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for their amendments. I appreciate that they have questions about how the treaty protects the full operation of the base, and I want to reassure them that the treaty enables the continued operation of the base to its full capability. The treaty and the Bill we are debating today will have zero impact on the day-to-day business on Diego Garcia. Importantly, it will not reduce our ability to deploy the full range of advanced military capabilities to Diego Garcia. I am putting some of this on the record, and the noble Baroness, as a former Defence Minister, will know the careful calibration of the language that I am using: I am putting it on the record so that we are all clear.
As I say, noble Lords will understand that I pick my words with care in this particular context. I cannot and will not discuss operational matters on the Floor of this place, but I am confident that the Chamber would not necessarily want me to. The long-standing UK position of neither confirming nor denying the location or presence of nuclear weapons must stand. But let us talk about the hypothetical. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, concern the application of the Pelindaba treaty. Mauritius is a signatory, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness said, to the treaty. The UK is not a signatory to the treaty but is a signatory to Protocols 1 and 2. I can confirm to the Chamber that the Governments of the UK and Mauritius are both satisfied that the Diego Garcia treaty is compatible with these existing obligations.
I also remind colleagues, because this is important—again, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, if I remember rightly from his remarks, and, indeed, the noble Baroness raised this—that we are not alone in the matter. The Government of the United States have also tested all aspects of the Diego Garcia treaty in depth and at the highest levels of the security establishment. They, too, are satisfied that it protects the full operation of the base. Indeed, when I was talking about the earlier amendments in answer to that, I quoted the remarks of Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his comments about being satisfied with the treaty in every aspect.
Amendments 63 and 88 therefore are not necessary. We do not need a review of the impacts of nuclear treaties on the future operation of the base, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has proposed, because the future operation of the base has been protected. I say to the noble Baroness that we do not need to reopen paragraph 1.a of Annex 1 to the treaty, as has been suggested, because this already provides for unrestricted—that is the key word—access for UK and US vessels to enter the sea of Diego Garcia. Paragraph 1.b.i provides for unrestricted ability to control the conduct and deployment of lethal capabilities.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I do of course understand the sensitivity of not discussing operational activity in a public domain. However, if I revert to the Minister’s understandable reliance on what I described at Second Reading as that “huge protection” in Article 1, that is explicitly in contradiction with Article 7(1). Article 7(1) says expressly with reference to international obligations or arrangements that, if they are not to be obtempered or agreed to, that must be provided for in this agreement. That is the dilemma that is perplexing my noble friend Lord Lilley and myself. We seem to have on the face of this treaty a self-evident contradiction.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I understand the point that the noble Baroness is making. What I am saying to her is that the Government of Mauritius, the Government of the UK and the Government of the US see no contradiction in what the treaty says, and explicitly lays out, in respect of the ability of Diego Garcia to operate in the way that it has always done, with the lethal capabilities as outlined elsewhere in the Bill.
I hope that is helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness as reassurance that the situation will stay the same as it is now. As I have said, all those three parties to that treaty are confident that that remains the case.
I will say, however, that, although resisting the amendments, I am grateful that they were tabled. They are really important amendments to have made in order for the Government to have put on the record important elements of the treaty and the Bill. We have been able to clarify for the Chamber, and for those who read our proceedings, that the position that we would all want to see will continue with respect to Diego Garcia and that the full capabilities will be maintained.
Let me be absolutely clear: the full operational use of the base is protected to ensure that the base is able to continue in every way that it always has done. I hope that is helpful. On the basis of the reassurances that I have made and the comments that I have put on the record, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lilley (Con)
That is very helpful and I entirely respect what the Minister says. He is a man of obvious integrity and commitment to the defence of this country. I am comforted that he is speaking for the Government, and therefore that the Government will maintain the freedom to use the Diego Garcia base to its full capabilities. I am not persuaded that that is necessarily in line with the Pelindaba treaty. That does not worry me so much. It may worry the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, or any future Lord Hermer in Mauritius, but let us hope that they will be ignored. So I will, of course, withdraw my amendment.
Lord Purvis of Tweed
“UK–Mauritius Inter-parliamentary Committee(1) Upon the passage of this Act, a Minister of the Crown must engage with the Government of the Republic of Mauritius with a view to establishing a UK-Mauritius Inter-parliamentary Committee to oversee the implementation and operation of the Treaty.(2) In undertaking the engagement required by subsection (1), the Minister of the Crown must make representations that the composition of the Inter-parliamentary Committee should reflect equal representation from the parliaments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius, and that its purpose should be to promote mutual understanding of the provisions of the Treaty through dialogue and debate, including consideration of the operation of the Joint Commission established under Article 12 of the Treaty.(3) The Minister of the Crown must further propose that the Inter-parliamentary Committee’s responsibilities include—(a) monitoring and assessing the implementation and operation of the Treaty;(b) evaluating the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including but not limited to—(i) the right of return,(ii) the right to self-determination, and(iii) access to compensation, resettlement, or other forms of support;(c) considering the welfare, integration, and general needs of Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom;(d) assessing progress made in negotiations between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Mauritius relating to the rights of Chagossians; and(e) reviewing any financial arrangements made under the Treaty, including those supporting resettlement, welfare, or the development of the Chagossian community.(4) If the Inter-parliamentary Committee described in subsection (1) is established, within five years of the commencement of the Treaty the Inter-parliamentary Committee must be invited to conduct a review of the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty arrangements.”
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 82, which is consequential upon Amendment 80. As the Minister referred to before, Amendment 80 had attracted some flattering imitation yesterday, but nevertheless I hope that we might be able to see progress on what I would consider to be a serious proposal to address some of the concerns that have been raised very sincerely. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said earlier, we have a lot of history to make good, and I agree.
This has been an unusual Committee stage of a Bill in many respects. Perhaps it is because this legislation and the treaty that it is connected to will have, unlike some other legislation that we often might consider to be indirect, a direct impact on people’s lives. They are a defined but diverse group of individuals who have been in touch with many noble Lords. Therefore, I believe that we have an obligation to treat this seriously. In Committee, there have been many passionate, but also proper and probing, questions on how the terms of the treaty will operate and how UK interests will also continue to be represented. We have just heard that from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and we heard it earlier from the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad.
Amendment 80 in my name is a proposition for an ongoing inter-parliamentary committee for the duration of the treaty. The Minister mentioned before that she felt it was perhaps a novel response. It is not entirely novel; there are precedents which I have based this on. There have been quite frequently free trade agreements that had parliamentary committees associated with them. There is the EFTA agreement, which the UK had been part of. There was the AWEPA for our African partners in parliaments, which we had been part of. There is doubt from many about how critical parts of the treaty negotiated by this Government will be handled, both by the UK and the Mauritian Governments, and operate through the commission.
We have heard many references today to the deeply flawed Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. It was fascinating for me to listen to this debate, because this House in 2021 passed a Motion—it happened to be in my name—about the ability for Parliament to have a straight up-and-down vote on treaties. The House passed an amendment to the then Trade Bill which stated that negotiating objectives or before-treaty negotiations would have to be presented to both Houses, and the House of Commons would have an opportunity to vote on those. I believe that those aspects would have been beneficial for this treaty. I think the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, forgot that he voted against that, so I am happy to remind him, just for the record, that on the latter part—on the first part, he was not in the House—in one of his very first votes in this House, he was against what he has been arguing so passionately for today.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My point is that there has not been a vote in the other place, so the only proper chance is here.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
No, the case that the noble Lord was making passionately was about the faults in the CRaG process, and I agree with him about that. It is just that if he had not had his view, with his noble friends, in 2021, we would have had the enhanced processes for treaty scrutiny.
However, we are we are because the current Government were supportive of changing the CRaG process for up-down votes on treaties, and now they are against. The Opposition, who had been against then, are now in favour of it. It probably has to do with whoever is sitting on the government side of the House, rather than the opposition side, but we are where we are now. The issue is how we go forward, to some extent. That is not denying that there is still Report stage, and there will still be divisions potentially, but I wanted to flag at this stage, in Committee, the proposal to try to address some of the major concerns.
Before briefly addressing that specific part of the amendment, I want to put something on record, as there have been quite a few allusions today to the notion that the negotiations on this treaty were halted by the previous Administration. In a letter to the Foreign Affairs Committee from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, on 5 April 2024—just seven weeks before the Dissolution of Parliament—he reaffirmed that negotiations were ongoing and that questions on the future administration of the islands were subject to the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the UK and Mauritius. He also said in the letter:
“We will continue to update Chagossians as negotiations progress”.
The negotiations were ongoing at the time of the election. It is worth stating that on the record, because there has been quite a bit of misleading information today. It is interesting that the Foreign Affairs Committee had been making the case since 2008 for a strong moral case for resettlement. That was denied again in the letter from the Foreign Secretary in April 2024.
We have a moral duty to try to ensure that, whatever circumstances arise from the parliamentary proceedings, we have a mechanism by which we allow the Chagossian community to be represented. Through Amendment 80, my proposal is for an inter-parliamentary committee, with MPs from the Republic of Mauritius and MPs from the UK forming a committee for the duration of the treaty. We know, and I agree with much of what has been said today, that trust is low to non-existent among many in the Chagossian community and suspicion is very high. I acknowledge all of that. A means by which that can perhaps be addressed as the treaty is implemented, if it is brought into force, is one where UK and Mauritian parliamentarians, through dialogue, debate and mutual understanding, can observe and scrutinise their respective Executives. Back in their Parliaments, they can scrutinise how the treaty is operating, the implementation of the treaty, whether rights of return are being implemented, the right to self-determination as understood in customary international law, and access to compensation, resettlement and other forms of support.
The commission in the treaty is executive but this would add a parliamentary oversight function, which I believe would be of value. I hope that the amendment will receive cross-party support. I am open to discussing its particular wording, but I hope that the principle will receive support. We owe a moral duty to that community for ongoing representations to address their concerns and suspicions. I therefore beg to move Amendment 80.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, this is the last group of amendments in Committee. I am delighted to see so many noble Lords opposite taking a close interest in the Bill and what it will do to the Chagossian people. I am delighted that they are taking an interest in what their Government are finally doing to the Chagossians.
I have already spoken to my noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendments, which are similar in drafting to those of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. I must say that I prefer my noble friend’s amendments to his Amendments 80 and 82, principally because they include reference to a referendum of the Chagossians. My noble friend the Earl of Leicester has talked about how deficient the current survey being undertaken by the International Agreements Committee is. I think that we could greatly improve on that, but the best mechanism would be simply to hold a referendum of the Chagossians asking them whether they approve of this treaty.
I know that the Liberal Democrats were previously very supportive of a referendum, but, despite criticising the position of my party, this amendment implies that they may not now be so supportive. I hope to see information to the contrary from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. His amendment also differs from my noble friend Lord Lilley’s, in that it would apparently come into force after the treaty, whereas that of my noble friend would come into operation beforehand, which seems much more appropriate. I am of course happy to take up the offer of the noble Lord to discuss the wording of amendments because, as is so often the case in your Lordships’ House, we bring about improvements to a Bill only if we work together. I am certainly prepared, from my point of view, to work with him on the drafting of these amendments. I hope my noble friend Lord Lilley would be involved as well, so we can get them into a form where we can support them on Report and ask the Government to move on this.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for the considered and balanced contribution that he has made throughout the Bill but particularly on his Amendment 80. The amendment is interesting, and I understand the effect that he is seeking to achieve. It is a welcome addition to our debate today. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, earlier, I will also take Amendment 81K into consideration in the comments that I am about to make.
The proposal put forward by the noble Lord is a novel one. I could not recall any examples of where there have been joint committees set up between different legislatures in this way, but the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned some, and I will reflect on those to see whether there is anything we can glean from them that might be useful.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has made some changes to his amendment, but, unfortunately, we still cannot accept it in its current form today. The structure is not something that the treaty with Mauritius was drafted to contemplate. Of course, there is nothing to prevent parliamentarians in the UK engaging with their equivalents in Mauritius on these matters, but we do not see this as being a matter for domestic legislation in the way that we are considering it at the moment because, obviously, that does not have any effect on what the Mauritians themselves do.
Some elements in the noble Lord’s proposed scope for a joint parliamentary commission seem to be very much for the UK alone, so we could look at them. The Government are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is based on respect. As noble Lords will be aware, we have established a Chagossian contact group to give Chagossians a formal role that shapes decision-making on the UK Government’s support for their community. We are also providing additional support to build the capacity of community groups so that more are eligible for grants.
There are two elements in the amendment that are an issue for the Government and that we will disagree on at the moment, and those are the right to self-determination and compensation. On self-determination, we have been over this several times in this House and in the other place. To put it simply and plainly, in legal terms no question of self-determination applies. The English courts, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, have proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritius. On compensation, again it is legally the case that the UK paid compensation to the Chagossians in the 1980s and the English courts in a series of judgments and the European Court of Human Rights have ruled that this settled the claims definitively.
Having said all that, I recognise and understand the noble Lord’s intentions and his determination with this amendment. He has been consistent about arguing along these lines throughout our consideration of this Bill, and I suggest that we meet to discuss his amendment in more detail to see if we can find a way to move this forward ahead of Report. With that, I hope that for today he would be happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I am glad there are so many witnesses who saw my ability to bring the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and the Minister together with some form of consensus at the end of this Committee. I am grateful for both the noble Lord’s and the Minister’s responses. She will know that I have been keen to see the areas where we can move towards formalisation and a degree of statutory underpinning for some structures of ongoing representation, because this is a special case. Even if it was novel—I am sure officials will now be studying all the examples I have given; by the time we get to Report I will try to find some more—I believe it is justified, given the circumstances are in. I am grateful for the willingness to discuss this. There are ongoing debates on the particular aspects the Minister said she had difficulty with. I will happily give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I was just going to give him another example, not at British level but at the European level. There is of course the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which has Members of the European Parliament and all the representatives of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful. We have even got some good elements of Brexit incorporated in this debate as well, so we are on a roll. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw, on the basis that we will be returning to this to have what I hope will be constructive discussions with the Minister.