(1 day, 2 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 20J in my name proposes that Clauses 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report setting out the reasons for rejecting the alternative legal remedies to those set out in the Mauritius treaty for resolving challenges to the United Kingdom’s sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago.
At the heart of the Government’s justification for proceeding with the Bill to bring the Mauritius treaty into force is the non-binding judgment of the International Court of Justice from 2019. The Government have, I think, acknowledged that it is not binding but have sought to ensure that, if it is ignored, binding judgments will quickly arise and other countries upon which we depend to run the base would then refuse to help. The Government have not clearly explained what these feared judgments are and why they would be binding. I invite the Minister to do so in detail and to tell the Committee which countries we depend on to run the islands, which we think would then refuse key services and what those services are.
However, in this amendment, I want to probe a different approach. The Government tell us that this is a critical Bill because its passage will facilitate the coming into force of the Mauritius treaty. The treaty is vital because the United States has told the UK Government that it is unhappy about having a major US base on Diego Garcia when the sovereignty of Garcia is contested. Furthermore, it has paused investment on Diego Garcia, which will not recommence until the legal standing of the Chagos Islands has been resolved.
It is crucial that this matter is resolved, because the security—not just of the United States but of the United Kingdom and the West—depends on full US investment in Diego Garcia. In this context, the reason why the Bill and the treaty, which will come into force if it becomes an Act of Parliament, are vital is because they set out the only route to legal certainty for the standing of the US military base. However, this solution does not provide the only way forward to secure legal certainty, and there are alternative ways forward that would better secure legal certainty than the Bill and the treaty. It is the purpose of my amendment to ask the Government to consider these alternatives.
The problem with the Government’s approach in claiming that the treaty constitutes the only legal way forward is that it is the product of a non-binding legal judgment that was a response to the disagreement between two parties—the Republic of Mauritius and the United Kingdom. The Chagossians were not a party to the case because at that time they did not have international personality. Had they been a party then, the judgment would have dealt with a wider range of issues and considered a wider range of ways forward.
My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I thank the Ministers for the patience and courtesy that they have displayed all evening. The two Ministers and the Whip know that they are among my favourite Peers, not just my favourite Government Front-Benchers, and they have been very patient and good-humoured.
I take issue with the idea that this is a done deal. That is an argument that has run through a lot of the debates and this seems to be the apt amendment on which to take it on. We have been told repeatedly—including by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, last week, and again just before dinner by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—that the treaty has been signed and been passed by the CRaG process and that therefore all this is, as it were, dancing after the music, and we would be exposing ourselves to a much more dangerous situation if we now try to hold it up.
I ask the Committee to ponder the possibility that the CRaG process has not in fact been a full democratic exercise. There has been no vote. Everything was rushed through from Second Reading in one day—there was no Report stage. I have never been a Member of the other place, unlike some of your Lordships present, but, as I understand it, you have a vote in the CRaG process by moving an amendment or a resolution and then voting for it. Looking online, I see that there is such an amendment, standing in the name of my right honourable friend the Leader of the Opposition and others, signed by 107 Members of the other place, from six political parties. I concede that that is not nearly as big a deal as it would have been a decade ago—there has been something of a splintering of parties. As yet, there has been no vote on it.
I mention this because the idea that therefore we have no option except to tweak statements at the margin and polish the edges of this, and cannot look for substantive changes, is fundamentally at odds with what was promised when the CRaG process was brought in. If the treaty was rushed through without debate in another place, surely the only proper scrutiny and the only proper chance of amendment is in this Chamber. Therefore, I hope that noble Lords on all sides will feel uninhibited when it comes to moving and, in due course, voting on substantive amendments. This is the one realistic opportunity that we have to make the points that would be made by the people from the Chagos Islands watching us now if they had a voice in our counsels.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, reminds us, this amendment gets to the core of the criticisms that have been levelled against the Government’s approach to this Bill so far. As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out numerous times during the debates on the first day in Committee, it is very difficult to see which court could have delivered a binding judgment against the UK on the question of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. Yet it is the repeated contention of the Government that this treaty is somehow essential to deliver legal certainty.
The question remains of which court could have delivered a binding judgment that would have threatened that legal certainty and the security of the military base. I hope that the Government can finally provide us with an answer. If they cannot answer that question then the argument that this treaty and this Bill were both necessary falls apart. Indeed, the argument that the treaty and the Bill are needed urgently also falls apart, and we should consider whether the Government should take a more circumspect approach. That is what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, suggests.
If this treaty is necessary, Ministers must surely have considered other options before coming to this agreement with Mauritius. Perhaps the Minister can tell the Committee what consideration was given to resettlement of the Chagos Archipelago by Chagossians, for example. What would the cost have been for that? What is the difference between that cost figure and the true cost associated with this treaty? I say “true cost” because the Government’s initial claims on costs have now been thoroughly discredited.
There were lots of options that should have been considered, so perhaps the noble Baroness can tell us what options were in fact considered. I understand that these are specific questions about the process followed by Ministers before agreeing to the treaty with Mauritius, so if the noble Baroness cannot say with certainty what potential approaches were considered, perhaps she could write to us to confirm the details.
In relation to Amendment 20J, the House has dedicated at least 15 hours to debating the Government’s rationale for entering this treaty. It has been subject to two reports, by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Three separate committees—the IAC, the IRDC and the Foreign Affairs Committee—have held evidence sessions and questioned the Minister for the Overseas Territories.
The Government have been consistently clear throughout. The legal case was compelling and there was no credible alternative. A policy of hanging tough, which I assume the noble Lord has in mind, would have been a real gift to our adversaries. As we have stated on numerous occasions, the continued operation of the base was under threat. Courts were already making decisions which undermined our position. If a long-term deal had not been reached, further wide-ranging litigation was likely, with no realistic prospect of the UK successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such cases.
Legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, affecting, for example, our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia. Both the IRDC and the IAC recognise that the treaty provides legal certainty for the base. I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate. I have noticed that no one has spoken against the amendment, other than the Minister who brought her explanation and reason. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, there has been lot of talk about the rules-based international order in recent years, largely in response to the concern that the reality to which it testifies looks considerably less certain in the context of the development of what some scholars are now calling Cold War II. The truth, however, is that international relations has never been a strictly rule-based order, in the sense that it has approximated life in the domestic context. On the other hand, informed by social conventions that testify to the common humanity of all the people of the earth, international relations has never approximated to international anarchy. There have always been rules, and yet they have been different from the domestic sense because of the absence of a world state with all the sanctions of domestic government.
In this context, those rules have to accommodate considerations of power in a way that we do not see domestically. Sound thinking about international relations has never been just about rules abstracted from considerations of power any more than it has been about power abstracted from rules.
We can get into real difficulty if we lose sight of questions of power. One critical way in which international relations has conventionally had regard for questions of power arises from the point at which a new sovereign state, whether arising from the break-up of an existing state, decolonisation, or some other kind of reconfiguration of territorial integrity, is recognised by other sovereign states. This act of recognition conveys on the state sovereignty as the international personality. It involves those states saying that they recognise the right of the other state to exist, with its territorial integrity, and the right of that state to make the laws to which it is subject in relation to that territorial integrity.
This process is mutual in the sense that if state A will not recognise state B, then state B usually will not recognise state A until state A recognises it. One of the critical questions facing a sovereign state in determining whether it recognises another state is whether it recognises its full territorial integrity and right to make the laws of that territorial integrity, together with an assessment of its physical capacity to govern that territorial integrity.
My Lords, I will say a few words in support of the noble Lord’s amendment, which seems really sensible: we should not have been paying to give away British territory without a full and proper assessment of who was going to take it over. This all boils down to whether we trust Mauritius. My feeling is that, while I have probably a great deal of respect for Mauritian people, I am not sure that the Government of Mauritius is one that we would genuinely want to trust in the way that this whole treaty is doing.
I also detect a feeling among the Government and perhaps Whips that, really, we are all wasting our time here: “What on earth are we doing spending all this time?” As the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, we have seen how little time was spent on this and how quickly it came through once the election was over and the new Government were in place. Suddenly, this all was happening. That is why it is important that, even if there are very few people here, we consider all these issues. In the long term, this will all be recorded. There will be a time in the future when many people look back and say, “Oh, perhaps we should have considered that more when it came”.
I do not believe that Mauritius has treated Chagossians who live in Mauritius very well. Yes, there are a few who have done obviously very well and are now out cajoling and saying how wonderful it is that Mauritius is going to take over the islands, but the reality is that they have not been treated well. You need to just talk to any of the Chagossians who are here to discover what has been going on. That was when there was some kind of input from our Government; what on earth is going to happen when the British Government no longer have any say in what is happening in Mauritius?
We need a proper, detailed assessment of the ability of the Government in Mauritius to not just look after the welfare of Chagossians who are there, and in the future, but to look after the whole archipelago and obey the terms of the treaty. The treaty may not be tough enough, but, at the very least, we want to make sure that, if there is one, they carry through their side of it. I just have a real feeling that, once this is all signed and sealed, so many people will forget about what has happened and the Mauritian Government will have an easy time doing anything they want, and mostly not doing things that they should be doing to preserve those wonderful islands and the people who should be allowed to go back there. So I support this amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for their contributions on the noble Lord’s Amendment 20K, which, much like his Amendment 20J in the previous group, asks a specific question of the Government, which I think gets to the heart of the process that was apparently followed by Ministers in reaching agreement on the terms of the treaty.
Clearly, Ministers will have had to consider other issues beyond the claim, which we have debated at length, that the sovereignty of the archipelago was somehow threatened by a binding legal judgment. The long-term security and effective management of the archipelago will, if the Government get their way, be delivered by the Government of Mauritius. We surely cannot have decided to pass that responsibility over to the Mauritian Government without first assessing their ability to manage the islands that we are, well, not giving t them but paying them to take. Would the Minister consider publishing the details of the Government’s assessment of Mauritius’s ability to manage and protect the islands effectively?
In an earlier group, we debated Mauritius’s responsibility for illegal migrants arriving on the islands, but this is just one of the relevant administrative questions that should have been considered by Ministers before an agreement was reached with the Mauritian Government. For example, was the fact that Mauritius does not even have a navy considered a relevant fact when the UK Government formed a view of the Mauritian Government’s ability to manage the islands?
The Mauritian National Coast Guard consists of one offshore patrol vessel, two midshore patrol vessels and 10 fast interceptor boats. As has been said repeatedly, the Chagos Archipelago is approximately 1,250 miles away from Mauritius. Do the UK Government feel that Mauritius’s coastguard is adequately equipped to deal with the challenges it will face as a result of this treaty? Can the Minister confirm whether her department have had any discussions whatever with the Mauritians about increasing their coastguard’s resources in light of their responsibility for the archipelago? If they even had a boat that could reach the distance, that would be a step forward. Will this be monitored by the UK Government on an ongoing basis and raised appropriately through the joint commission, or will we just say that we have handed the islands over and it is now the Mauritians’ responsibility, when we know from all available evidence that they have no capacity whatever to do any of that management?
The Mauritian coastguard’s role is not only important for the Mauritian Government’s access to and administration of the islands. The coastguard will, presumably, play a role in establishing and maintaining the marine protected area that the Minister has told us at great length that they are establishing. What discussions have Ministers had with their Mauritian counterparts to fully understand their plans to protect this important marine protected area? It does not have any boats that can even reach the islands, never mind protect the islands from any access by foreign vessels. Can the Minister confirm whether the UK Government are satisfied that the Mauritian Government have or are about to acquire the capabilities needed to maintain the protected area? When this was debated on the previous day of Committee, the Minister said:
“The MPA will be for the Mauritian Government to implement”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 801.]
I am sure it will, but have we not given any thought whatever to their ability to implement that?
We understand that this would be the responsibility of the Mauritian Government if the Bill goes through, but does the Minister think that there is any responsibility whatever for the UK Government to ensure that those nations with whom we make agreements are able to practically fulfil their obligations before we then sign a treaty? It is essential that we should have some clarity on this process that Ministers have followed in establishing that Mauritius has not just committed to the terms of the treaty but is in a position to be able to honour the terms of the treaty if and when it finally comes into force. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, Amendment 20K, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, seeks to oblige the Government to publish a report on the ability of Mauritius to govern the Chagos Archipelago and on the implications of the treaty for international peace and stability. The IRDC concluded that the treaty gave the UK legal clarity on which it could capitalise to enhance defence co-operation and that it was a platform for reinforcing operational links with key regional partners, allowing the UK to position itself as a credible contributor to regional stability grounded in the rule of law. Under the treaty, the UK retains full operational control over Diego Garcia. There are robust provisions in place to protect the security of the base. The treaty is the best way to ensure the continued operation of the joint UK-US base and therefore to protect international peace and security. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
The Minister has not even attempted to address any of the questions that we have asked.
I am very happy if the noble Lord would like to ask me a specific question that I have not already answered in previous groups. Would the noble Lord like to do that?
Will the Minister comment on the ability of the Mauritian coastguard actually to enforce the marine protected area, for instance?
I suggest that the noble Lord looks at the ways in which marine protected areas are generally enforced. It is not, as he seems to imagine, by patrolling in vessels around the ocean, checking on things. That is not how these things work. But I will gladly send him some information about that.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for their contributions. Having listened to the Minister, I am wondering whether she will get time to reflect on this debate and on what has been asked and what has been said. Perhaps, if she does, she will write to us and put her reply in the Library, for the availability of every Peer in this House. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lord, I beg leave to propose my Amendments 20L, 20N and 20P. In the interests of brevity and immediacy, I will speak only on Amendment 20L, because I have covered the others in previous groups. This is the amendment that requires the Secretary of State to look at the impact of this treaty on other British Overseas Territories and the implications for their sovereignty.
Of course, we are always told in these situations by whoever is in government, “Oh, it’s a unique situation, you can’t compare”. On one level, that is a truism. Of course, all these situations are unique, yet I think it would be extremely naive not to consider the possibility that they will be fallen upon hungrily by people who want a change to the status quo. The idea that even now there are not politicians and lawyers in Buenos Aires or Madrid looking at the implications of this deal and saying, “How can we press this into the parallel arguments that we have for claims over British Overseas Territories?” is utterly fanciful.
They may already be putting out feelers to British lawyers, who seem very happy to work against the interests of the Crown on these questions. The representative of Mauritius in this case gave an interview in which he gloried in the fact that he lived in a country where you could humiliate the Government. If he is not available, perhaps by then the Attorney-General will no longer be in politics, or indeed perhaps the Prime Minister. They also both have long records of working on cases of this kind.
I suspect that the briefs that will be put in front of them will make the claim that Britain has now, in practice, for all that there was no jurisdiction, for all that it was an advisory ruling, for all that Commonwealth disputes were excluded, conceded this extraordinary and perilous precedent that, if a territory was at one time or another ruled from somewhere else, that establishes the basis of a sovereignty claim. I do not think it is completely fanciful for these elements in foreign countries to feel that they will be dealing with sympathetic elements within the United Kingdom.
Indeed, they have had experience of that. If we think of the experience of our relations with Argentina prior to the war in 1982, we can understand why the Argentines felt that Britain was going to move on the subject. We had the 1968 Anglo-Argentine memorandum, which expressly talked about sovereignty being on the agenda. We then had the persistent proposals throughout the 1970s for the leaseback arrangement, and then the withdrawal of HMS “Endurance”. Argentina is a country I know well, and indeed I have had the privilege of visiting the Falkland Islands as well. To this day, I am often told by Argentine politicians that Margaret Thatcher led them on to the punch—that Britain deliberately looked as though it was preparing to withdraw from the islands in order to provoke this conflict. I think that is nonsense. None the less, you can understand why they think that there are sympathetic elements here.
Similarly, if we look at relations between Britain and Madrid in the run-up to the Córdoba agreement over Gibraltar, the 1990s were a time of constant proposals from this side for some kind of joint sovereignty. It was only a referendum of the Gibraltarian people that put a stop to that process. By the way, it was a referendum that official Britain detested and for a long time did not reconcile itself to and ignored, until it became politically impossible and a new dispensation was reached. So, yes, this will be looked at in Buenos Aires and Madrid.
It will be looked at, I am sure, by those in Nicosia. They will think that there is an extremely close parallel there, in the sense that this is a military installation rather than an ethnically separate population. Again, they will say “This was ruled from somewhere else and we have a claim”. When I was a Member of the European Parliament, I would often get petitions and resolutions from Greek Cypriot MEPs raising the issue of the base.
What all these claims have in common is that final resolutions are never treated as final by the other party, any more than the final and binding resolution was with Mauritius in 1965. I do not want to bore noble Lords on this, but I feel it bears repetition. Mauritius trousered a large sum of money in exchange for perpetually renouncing any claim over the Chagos Islands.
In fact, there are very few British Overseas Territories that have not at some point been ruled from somewhere else. In addition to the ones I have mentioned, I was listing just now which ones have at some point had some other seat of government. Cayman, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos, St Helena and Montserrat were all, at some point or another, ruled by someone else. All of them will be looking at this as a precedent and a claim.
What all our overseas territories have in common is that they are all content with their present status. The British Empire was unusual in the peaceful and voluntary nature of the way it was relinquished: not completely, not universally—there were tragic exceptions in Cyprus, India and Kenya—but they were the exceptions. They were not the rule. Decolonisation in Malaysia was a perfectly peaceful process, for example. The only argument was about whether the British should stay longer to defeat the Communist insurgents. It was a generally peaceful process in the Caribbean and in most of Africa, so the places that have stayed are the places that wanted to stay, and they made that very clear, in the cases of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar in quite recent memory, with overwhelming referendums. It seems to me that they will now be looking to those referendums as their one shield: the only thing that potentially distinguishes them. But of course they will be vulnerable to the argument that, if we are treating Mauritius rather than the Chagos Islands as the unit, why should we not treat all of Cyprus as the unit, since that was once partitioned in a similar way at the time of independence? They will all be extremely alarmed by that precedent.
It seems to me there is only one way of reassuring these countries, which is to allow a referendum of the Chagossians, dispersed and scattered as they may be. Then, if the Chagossians vote in favour, it does not matter. We would not be setting any precedent. We would be following the principle of self-determination. If the Chagossians vote to be Mauritian, that is of no concern to Gibraltarians or Falkland Islanders or anyone else, because the principle of self-determination would be upheld. But at least let us give them the vote.
We are privileged in this country to be custodians, stewards, of a largely maritime sovereign area. If we put together the oceans around our overseas territories, they are about the same size as India. We are in charge of some of the richest and most important marine environments, and that is our real string of pearls. The pearls are there because in every case they want to be on the string. Let us not set the precedent of tearing one of those pearls off and hurling it away in defiance of the wishes of the people most involved. I beg to move.
My Lords, in his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has tried to pre-empt the comments that I was about to make. I remember well the Falklands War in 1982. I remember many negotiations with Spain about Gibraltar. I remember the struggles with China over Hong Kong. I remember discussions about the future of the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—both of which I have visited—as well as discussions about the future of St Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha, Anguilla and the sovereign territories in Cyprus. In each case, the discussions took place on the basis of the interests of each sovereign territory concerned and I believe that that will remain the case. I cannot see why this treaty over the British Indian Ocean islands and the Chagos Islands will affect the discussions that we will have with our other overseas territories about their futures. I think that the situation will remain as it has been in the past, so I do not feel that I can support this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan.
My Lords, I certainly do support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I will be very brief. The amendment on which I want to focus is not one regarding referenda and consulting the Chagossian people, even though that is very important. Amendment 20L simply states—and I would be surprised if the Government could not accept this—that the Secretary of State needs to come up with a report
“assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty”.
What is wrong with that amendment? Nothing. It would cost the Foreign Office a certain amount of time and effort to put together a report but, in the context of what has been said—at Second Reading, in the debate that we had on the treaty, on the first and second day in Committee—it is not asking a lot.
The noble Lord, Lord Jay, was looking specifically at the interests of the citizens in those different territories. He has a huge amount of knowledge, wisdom and experience, and what he said made a huge amount of sense. What he perhaps did not address is the signals that this Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the treaty, will send to other countries. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, made some specific points about Argentina—where we know that the dispute will not go anywhere; it will go on and on—as well as Gibraltar. I will also mention one other territory that could well—
I hesitate to interrupt, but I think we need to remind ourselves before it gets repeated again that we have just done a deal on Gibraltar with Spain. That has been welcomed by the Government in Gibraltar and that situation is no longer as is being implied by the noble Lord.
I understand that, but circumstances can change and this may well be seen as a precedent in the future.
I want to mention one other territory: Anguilla. As the Minister will know, Anguilla went through a period of huge unrest to resist becoming part of St Kitts and Nevis. The consequence was that a UK battalion of the Parachute Regiment had to deploy to Anguilla to control the unrest that took place. This is a small but incredibly proud territory that wanted to remain British. In the past few years, there have been a number of attempts by St Kitts and Nevis to reopen the whole issue of Anguilla.
There will be consequences of this treaty going through, which could be to some extent alleviated if the Government would accept this very simple amendment, Amendment 20L. This is the amendment in this group that concerns me most. I do not think that it is asking a great deal of the Government to put this in the Bill. This would be a very important signal in the Bill that those other territories would be properly considered.
My Lords, I want to say a few words. I have been rather sparing in the Committee debate today, but the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has prompted me to speak.
I have been a passionate supporter of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, I have served on this Parliament’s executive committee of the CPA UK and I have had the great privilege of visiting a great number of Commonwealth nations in all parts of the world, including early this year Malaysia. We have to be very careful, particularly perhaps in this House of Parliament, when we debate a process that has been very difficult on decolonisation. We have to be very cautious with how we approach it and very mindful of the language that we use.
We had 12 years of the Malayan Emergency and I have met the relatives of those who were affected by that. There is not a Commonwealth country that does not have difficult stories, on many occasions. We are still living with this today. I would counsel anybody that, yes, of course, we are free to make any contributions, but we have to be very mindful.
The noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, whom I greatly respect, indicated that perhaps the precedent was this deal. Now, there may be circumstances where a bad deal might be seen by other people as some form of precedent, but I do not think that that is the point that is being made in this group. The point that I hear being made in this group is that the very point of principle that we opened negotiations to cede sovereignty is the precedent. Well, that decision was made in 2022. If we are to see the consequences of decisions taken by a British Government to recognise that negotiations should take place to cede sovereignty, then we have had three years of knowing what the consequences of that will be. I have heard nothing from anybody on this group saying that they have seen the consequences of that decision taken by the previous Administration in November 2022.
My Lords, I want primarily—perhaps later—to talk about my Amendments 20Q and 20U, but I will say something about my noble friend Lord Hannan’s Amendment 20L to emphasise one particular precedent he mentioned in passing but seems the most compelling and dangerous. Indeed, in line with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I have been rather cautious about discussing this because I did not want to put ideas into people’s heads, but, for two reasons, I will go ahead and talk about it now. First, there is no better way to keep a secret than to pronounce it in the House of Lords; and secondly, as my noble friend Lord Hannan said, there are lawyers in every country looking to see whether this is a precedent that they could use to right some past wrong or to change some past circumstance which they would like changed.
The most compelling comparison is between what we are doing now and the reasons given for doing it and the independence of Cyprus, where we severed off the sovereign bases. They were part of a whole. The territorial integrity of Cyprus was divided between the sovereign bases and the rest. That is exactly what we are accused of doing in the case of the Chagos Islands. It is actually much more true in the case of Cyprus than in that of the Chagos Islands, because Cyprus was always governed as one unit by us whereas the Chagos Islands had separate laws, even if they were transmitted from somebody resident in Mauritius. Therefore, if we are saying that there is compelling reason for us to say we cannot separate the Chagos Islands from Mauritius, of which it has never been part, then surely there are compelling reasons why we should never have separated the sovereign base territories from the rest of Cyprus.
Those bases are hugely important. They played a role time and again in recent disputes and interventions, and in the prospect of interventions in the Middle East. We have been able to help fly from them and intercept missiles from Iran coming towards Israel. In previous conflicts, we used the bases there. They of value not only to us but to the whole of NATO. If we put them at risk by saying to the world that we have no right to have separated them then we would be doing something very foolish.
The only difference I can think of—I am offering a solution to this dilemma, because I do not want the issue of the sovereign bases to be opened up in a dangerous way—is that the decisions in Cyprus were taken before the United Nations General Assembly resolution on which the advisory opinion of the ICJ was based, and therefore it did not apply to them. Of course, advisory opinions are not actually binding—they are wrongly taken as being binding but they are not—but do they apply retrospectively? In many cases when courts rule, they say, “This has always been the case; we’ve only just now ruled it”.
I would like to hear how the Minister proposes to defend the sovereign bases in Cyprus from this precedent. She is obviously not doing this willingly; she is obviously unwilling and she is a wonderful Minister, but she has been given a tough job to do. I would like to hear some justification for this. I do not know whether the precedent in Committee allows me to sit down now and stand up later to deal with my amendments, but assuming I can do that, I will.
My Lords, I will briefly make two points. First, on behalf of my noble friend Lord McCrea, who has had to leave for a family wedding, I will speak to Amendment 57, which principally brings to the Committee’s attention the role of British legal firms in this issue.
We have been critical in this House of the current and, to some extent, the previous Government. Those criticisms are not entirely without merit on the issue of sovereignty. There has also been further British involvement in any number of aspects, the four most significant legal interventions being two cases in connection with UNCLOS; one relating to the advisory opinion of the ICJ; and one on the drafting of the UN security resolution. In each of these four cases, the Mauritius Government used British firms as their legal representation in order to further their aims. In effect, British firms acted on behalf of a foreign Government to challenge British sovereignty, British defence rights and the wishes of British citizens. We cannot do anything about what happened in the past, but I suppose the amendment queries whether there is an appropriate way forward in terms of that level of support for Mauritius. Raising my noble friend Lord McCrea’s amendment gives the Government an opportunity to respond to it.
I want to deal briefly with the wider point. We do not always see eye to eye, but I agree with at least one phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, used: he said that we have to be careful about words, and words matter. One of the major concerns, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, and others, might be described as the precedent and the ripple effect. It is undoubtedly the case that in the past we as a nation have made mistakes in dealing with overseas territories. In particular, we have sent out the wrong signals on both the Falklands and Gibraltar. It is probably the case that some, at different points within Governments in the past, would have been quite happy to see those territories dispatched to another sovereign territory on that basis. They can best speak for themselves but, fortunately enough, in each case we have drawn back from what might be described as a fatal mistake. The danger with this is that it crosses the line in handing over that level of sovereignty.
Mention has been made of a range of overseas territories. The one thing that largely unites them is that whatever discussions we have had with different Governments, about whatever level of co-operation, they have ultimately respected the self-determination and the inhabitants’ will for sovereignty. That is what at times has drawn us back. I think this goes beyond that and moves towards a situation regarding the wishes of the Chagossian people and their right to self-determination—and that self-determination may, because we do not know definitively, express itself in them saying, “We want to be part of Mauritius”. If that is their self-determination, so be it. I think it is unlikely to be the case; nevertheless, so be it. The concern is the signal that this sends out to the outside world.
The Minister mentioned the arrangements as regards Gibraltar. I think there has been work ongoing with both this Government and the previous Government to try to find arrangements that are in the best interests of Gibraltar. I entirely acknowledge that, while it is sometimes easy to criticise when looking from outside, the Gibraltar Government themselves have been supportive of those actions and have backed the moves made so far.
It is really important that there is not a dispute with regards to Gibraltar. There is an arrangement that is agreed with Spain and it is not in question at all, in any sense.
Absolutely. I have taken the Minister and the Government to task on a range of things, but this may be one issue on which we are in vigorous agreement. I do not question the Government’s bona fides as regards Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands. I know there is a strong commitment to both. I fully acknowledge that and believe it would be the case under a future Government, but this is not a concern over the attitude of this Government or other UK Governments over the ripple effect. It is the danger of what message will be sent out; as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, there is a ripple effect towards Madrid and Buenos Aires, which might take a very different approach in future.
I am really sorry, but we have an agreement with Spain. The matter is settled. Madrid takes the same view that London takes; it is the same view that the Government of Gibraltar take. It is settled, and it is beyond unhelpful for noble Lords—unintentionally, I realise, as this is a relatively recent development—to suggest in any way that that is not the case.
I am not querying that. What I am saying is from experience and from having spoken directly to Gibraltarians in relation to this. They know that a very good agreement may have been done with this Government, but Spanish Governments down the years have sometimes tended to blow hot and cold as regards Gibraltar.
Yes, but part of the problem is that sometimes in this country we fall into a trap where we see agreements as final settlements. There are sometimes other Governments who either see them as a process or, while they may be fully committed to them, cannot say whether a future Government would feel bound in their attitude towards them.
I appreciate that we have it in black and white as regards Gibraltar and I do not doubt the actions taken by the Government. I fully support them, beyond any question mark of doubt, but we have been told by Gibraltarians that sometimes what happens in Madrid can run contrary to what happens in the border provinces with Gibraltar, which want to have a much stronger relationship. Depending on what attitude they want to take, they can turn hot and cold on the relationship. I have no doubt that the Government have done a very good job in nailing down that agreement but, again, I just express the concern for a future situation—perhaps it is more pertinent for Buenos Aires, which down the years has had a much more volatile approach to some of these issues—over the signals that we inadvertently send by way of this to other Governments. I have no question over the bona fides of either this Government or future UK Governments in relation to that.
Does the noble Lord accept that perhaps a closer analogy is where a party has one position when it is in government but a completely different one when it is in opposition, which is true of His Majesty’s Opposition towards this treaty with Mauritius?
That is true of a party that votes against it at Third Reading in the House of Commons and then seems largely supportive of the deal here. So, yes, that could be a perfectly good opportunity, but that can be applied in several parts of the body politic.
I am getting rather tired of this Front-Bench thing about what the last Government did. The reality is that the last Government did not sign any treaty. They may have been talking. They could have talked and talked, but they did not sign a treaty. This Government came in and signed a treaty.
I do not hold a brief for either the Government or the main Opposition. I am happy for them to spell it out. Undoubtedly, what the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, has said is correct, but rather than essentially being in a position where we look to see where the lines of accountability and blame should lie, we should ultimately be focusing on ensuring that we support the self-determination of the Chagossian people. That is the fatal flaw with this agreement.
My Lords, I just want us to remind ourselves of the history of the British Empire and how Macmillan suddenly said: there are now winds of change and, if we resist, we may lose something very good. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II created this wonderful thing called the Commonwealth. She put in a lot of effort and energy, and those countries that were once ruled are now part of the Commonwealth, and what is interesting is that in most of those countries the national language is English. So there can be a transition that does not destroy a lot of goodness nor give the impression that those territories where the sovereign is still His Majesty the King will simply look at this and say, “They did it, so we can”. You will find that politically, in Jamaica and other places, the Crown has made it very clear that this is a decision of those nations. If they wanted to become independent, that is their decision. They are not going to force themselves on anybody.
I thought the treaty that was entered into with Mauritius was to create a long-term use of Diego Garcia and the archipelago. If we did not, the challenge was soon going to come because of what happened at the United Nations. We would have found ourselves with a big challenge. Even China was interested in challenging British sovereignty, but now a treaty has been signed and has secured this.
Another good thing on which I want to congratulate the Government is that they did not simply sign a treaty so that this base can be used for 99 years. Because sovereignty is now being transferred, they also provided a trust fund for the Chagossians to be better looked after than when the British had sovereignty over the place. This is a win-win situation for the Chagossians and for Britain. We now have security of the base for a 99-year lease. That is quite a long time. I do not think you and I will be here in 99 years, but those who are here may say we did a good thing at the time. As for the fear of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, of what other places may do, it is their right to do whatever they want to do.
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity also to speak to my Amendments 20U and 20Q. Amendment 20U would provide that the Bill shall not come into force until the Secretary of State has published
“a report on how the Treaty may increase any political or legal risks”—
that is what we have been told underlie it—
“related to … reliance on third countries required to service the base … risks of litigation from Mauritius regarding the base in Diego Garcia in the International Court of Justice”—
and I hope this will include some explanation of the Government’s reactions to the Mauritian declarations of 23 September 1968 which, as I understand it, mirrored our determination that the ICJ should not have jurisdiction on disputes between previous and current Commonwealth states and ourselves; Mauritius likewise said that any such disputes should be settled reciprocally. Finally, the report should include the
“risks of litigation in an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.
The Minister said a little while ago that we spent many hours discussing the reasons or rationale behind the decision to cede sovereignty. In fact, we have spent many hours dragging out from the Government an explanation of their decision to do so. It is pretty clear that the decision came first, and their justification has been cobbled together in response to each successive challenge that has been put forward to it. The more it has been challenged, the more tenuous the rationale has become. It has been spread out like an elastic band and has become thinner and more transparent. It is very clear that, if we keep on this process, it will eventually break and then the Government will be without any rationale at all.
The Government first suggested that the ICJ decision was purely advisory but Mauritius might come back and somehow get a definitive ruling out of the ICJ. However, that was then abandoned because, of course, we had the specific opt-out when we signed up to the ICJ that it would not be able to consider disputes between ourselves and present or previous Commonwealth countries. One thing has puzzled me. Looking back through the record, I have never seen Ministers refer in words to that opt-out. They have tacitly acknowledged it, because they move on to talking about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Likewise, when we have heard from the great mandarins of the Foreign Office, none of them has ever explicitly let past their lips—if I have read the transcript correctly—the existence of this opt-out. That is a great mystery. When people do not say something, one wants to know why, particularly when they tacitly admit it.
Oh dear, I hope I have not caused the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to leave in disgust. We were hoping he would be able to break this omertà that has forbidden him and his colleagues ever to mention this.
My suspicion—of course it is no more than a suspicion, and the person who could have set that right has left the Chamber—is that the Permanent Secretaries in the Foreign Office and the other mandarins who have spoken in defence of the Government on this never actually told Ministers about this opt-out and they do not like to admit that. Ministers do not like to admit that they did not know about it, because that looks pretty difficult. Maybe in the course of debate we will find that that is an unworthy consideration and they were told explicitly at the beginning there was no possibility of the ICJ reaching a binding judgment on the sovereignty of the Chagos. They tacitly accept that is the case and move on to the possibility of a judgment coming from the tribunal set up under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
My amendment would force the Government to be more explicit about that. What precedents are there for this tribunal ruling on sovereignty? The noble Baroness said that she thought it was very unlikely—I think that was her phrase—that the tribunal would directly rule on sovereignty. I think she is more than right on that, because there are no precedents I can find for it ruling on sovereignty. But then she said that it might rule on other things and sort of assume sovereignty. I would like some examples of that sort of thing happening, if it is a sufficiently big risk for us to be doing this nefarious deed of ceding sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. We have not had that up to now.
The tenuous justification moves on to say that there may be a ruling that would somehow assume sovereignty, but what negative effects would that have? It would apparently put the base at risk, because of its reliance on being supplied from other countries. From which other countries is the Diego Garcia base supplied, and in what way, and how would that be put at risk? Is it supplied from Aden? Would the Suez Canal be closed to British shipping if it was thought to be supplying the base? Would we get labour from mainland Africa to help run the base? Would the Philippines refuse to send Filipino workers to help run the base? When we are given such a tenuous reason, at the end of a long chain of tenuous arguments, we need some substance to it. This amendment would require the Government to give that.
Amendment 20Q would provide that the Bill would come into force only
“when the Secretary of State has published a report into the governance of the Chagos Archipelago under the Treaty, including local administration and democracy”.
The Minister has said that there was never any settled population in the Chagos Islands, nor any system of local administration. I am sure that was said in good faith, and I can well understand that the detailed history of the Chagos Archipelago is not something most of us have studied, but a letter has now been sent to the Minister, and to the committee that has been asked to consult with the Chagossians, pointing out that, in the absence of the British, who sort of came and went, the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands elected a chief to help with the governance and local administration of the islands. Therefore, the settled inhabitants did have a local administration in the past, and we want to know what is going to replace it in future.
We know that Mauritius, while it has no obligation to, will be able to resettle the islands. It may, of course, settle them with Mauritians, not Chagossians. Either way, what system of administration will there be, and will it be democratic or autocratic? I think we should know. My Amendment 20Q would require the Government to spell that out, and to acknowledge and accept that it was a mistake to say that there has never been any system of local administration, when clearly there has.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere for leading this debate. He set out a very strong argument for his amendments in this group, as did my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown.
Amendment 20L, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hannan, is a very helpful amendment in Committee, as it affords the Committee the opportunity to debate the impact of the Government’s decision on the Chagos Archipelago on other overseas territories. While I accept that there are, of course, legal arguments here, we believe that they should be explored fully. I want to focus on the impact of the UK Government’s treatment of the Chagossians, and on our reputation among other overseas territories, which look to the UK for steadfast support and security. How do residents, and descendants of the residents, of other overseas territories feel now that the Government have caved in to pressure from their international lawyer friends on the question of the Chagos Islands?
As my noble friend Lord Hannan observed, the British Indian Ocean Territory is not the only overseas territory subject to legal claims by foreign states. Does the Minister accept that the behaviour of our Government on this issue will have ramifications for the level of trust in the UK held by residents of other overseas territories? We should be standing up for our overseas territories and protecting those who live on them, not caving in to activist international lawyers. In my view, it really is that simple. Can the Minister confirm that the UK Government are not considering ceding sovereignty over any other British Overseas Territories? Will she rule out such a move in future? We want residents of the overseas territories to feel secure, and I hope that the Minister’s words in response to this group will help to give them that security.
My Lords, a large number of the amendments that have been tabled seek to mandate the Government to renegotiate the treaty with Mauritius on various points. The noble Lord told me this on many occasions in the last Parliament, so I am sure that he understands the point that I am about to make: treaty-making and international negotiations are a matter for the Government, in exercise of the royal prerogative. It is simply not practical for that to become a matter where Parliament seeks to direct this or that isolated element of what can be intense, dynamic and sometimes difficult negotiations. In this case, I can assure the Committee that the Government have thoroughly considered all aspects of the treaty that the UK has entered into and used all their efforts throughout to achieve the best possible deal for the UK. These requests to reopen negotiations on different points are not realistic and would make the UK appear an unreliable counterparty on the international stage. This treaty has gone through a rigorous assessment and been agreed at the highest levels of the US security establishment.
Our reasons for rejecting Amendment 20U are, essentially, those that I set out earlier in relation to Amendment 20J, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I do not intend to repeat them.
Amendment 20L was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I enjoy the noble Lord’s contributions. His speeches are as entertaining as they are, unfortunately, inaccurate and misleading sometimes. My grandfather fought in Malaya, in the Green Howards, and so it was an unfortunate example that the noble Lord chose to resort to—but I forgive him for this, because he puts so much into his speeches. I assure him and other noble Lords that this deal has been welcomed by both Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, their Governments have both stated that there is no read-across to them, and we should respect what they have to say.
Through Amendment 20M, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, seems to be suggesting that the Government have not complied with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in respect of the treaty. I respectfully disagree with him on this. The treaty was laid in Parliament on the day that it was signed, under the process set out in the Act. CRaG requires that a treaty is laid in both Houses for 21 joint sitting days before it may be ratified. The period expired on 3 July 2025, with neither House resolving against ratification. During that 21-day period, two committees in this House held evidence sessions, including with the Minister for Overseas Territories, and produced reports, which we have responded to. There was a debate and a vote on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, against ratification, which this Government defeated. As a matter of practice, the UK Government do not ratify treaties until the necessary implementing legislation is in place, and that is what the Government are currently doing with the Bill.
Amendments 20P and 20Q appear to misunderstand the archipelago. I feel uncomfortable making this point, as it feels very cold, harsh and legalistic, particularly given the testimonies, many of which we have heard directly from Chagossians in their accounts of what happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not feel comfortable repeating it but this is the legal situation as it is, and it is important to be clear. The archipelago has never had a permanent population. The islands have not been inhabited since the population was removed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, there is no “economy” of the Chagos Archipelago. Once the treaty enters into force, Mauritius will be sovereign and will have jurisdiction over the regulation of commercial activities unrelated to the operation of the base throughout the archipelago, subject to the constraints of the treaty. On the exclusive economic zone around the archipelago, Mauritius has announced its intention to establish a marine protected area and, importantly, there will be no commercial fishing allowed. It will be for Mauritius to decide how any resettlement will work, including in respect of governance of the islands.
Amendment 57, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and spoken to on his behalf, cannot be accepted. The UK’s legal services industry and the English Bar are internationally recognised for their expertise. That includes expertise in public international law, and UK-qualified lawyers act for states all around the world on various matters, facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes. The standing of UK legal expertise should be a matter of pride for this House, not a tool for manipulation by politicians to achieve narrow and short-term advantage. An attempt to place a prohibition on who can utilise our world-leading legal services would undermine access to legal representation—an important element of the rule of law. It is wholly inappropriate for the Government to dictate who can be represented by whom. It risks undermining our standing on the world stage.
I hesitate to repeat the debate we had last week, but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that, had there been no legal risk to our position, why did the United States stop investment in the base at that point? It was because it was sufficiently concerned about the legal risk. Had there been no basis whatever for our concerns on legality, why on earth did the previous Government even begin to negotiate, accepting that they did not manage to conclude a deal? Our view is that there was sufficient legal risk. The noble Lord disagrees, as is his right, but the fact is that the principle of this treaty, and the necessity for it, has been through the appropriate process. It has been voted on in this place and we have voted that this treaty should be ratified. We have already taken that decision in this Chamber. This legislation is about making the necessary changes to UK domestic law to enable us to sign, fully ratify and implement.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way, but I ask her to respond to the point I made: why, even now, does she refuse to let pass her lips any recognition that there was never any possibility of the ICJ reaching a legally binding decision that would affect us, because of our opt-out from the power of the ICJ to decide on disputes between ourselves and Mauritius? UNCLOS is a different matter, but would she let those words pass her lips?
My Lords, I accept that about the ICJ, but the point is that other countries will act on an advisory opinion even if we choose to ignore it. We have not chosen to ignore it. That is a judgment call. Partly, that is because we think that, by negotiating now, we negotiate from a stronger position than we would have had we waited for other, binding judgments. Those judgments can come from any treaty to which both parties are signed up. That is why we feel—and not everyone has to agree with the Government on this—that there is sufficient legal question that we needed to act and to negotiate. If they are honest with themselves—there is a lack of former Ministers who were responsible for this arguing the point that the noble Lord makes; they argue other points but not this one—there was sufficient legal jeopardy for the previous Government to enter into this process. I hope noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.
I am grateful to the Minister for dealing so comprehensively with all those points, and to all noble Lords who contributed: the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Ludford, my noble friends Lord Bellingham and Lord Lilley, the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Purvis, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu.
On finality, almost all treaties are said to be final at the time but they are not always treated as final by one or both parties. The treaty of Utrecht was pretty final. It said that Spain would have first refusal if Britain ever left, but it was pretty final about granting sovereignty. I absolutely agree, as the Minister says, that Spain has now agreed to a permanent settlement, but it is one of many, and experience tells us that incoming Governments do not always regard treaties signed by their predecessors as final. Indeed, the treaty we signed when Mauritius became independent and renounced all claim to the Chagos Islands was said to be permanent at the time, so I am less reassured than I think she hoped I might have been.
Let me put it the other way around: the way to make these treaties final is to stop inviting people, through our behaviour, to reopen them—to refuse to countenance it. The French had a very similar issue in the Comoros; they just refused to countenance it. I cannot see any other country doing what we are doing now. Indeed, I am afraid to say I cannot see any British Government other than this one having done it.
I do not want to get into the whole history of the Malayan emergency, but there is a wonderful record that, when Malaysia became independent, one of the first acts of the new Government was to give some very valuable land containing the house called Carcosa Seri Negara—a very fine house—to Britain in perpetuity as sovereign British territory. It became the seat of the high commission in Kuala Lumpur in recognition of all the things that we had done together. A young anti-colonialist Minister said, “But if we give them the best land in KL, no one will believe that we fought for our independence”, and there was a rather awkward moment around the Cabinet table because, of course, they did not: we were in Malaya supporting a democratic Government against a communist insurgency. We would have left much earlier had we not had the requests of that Government to remain and support them. That is getting slightly off topic so, with your Lordships’ permission, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, nationality has two distinct meanings: it is what it says on our passports, but it is also what we feel. The second of those, the sense of identity and belonging, of being a link in a chain between past and future generations, can be unconnected to territory.
Perhaps the supreme example of nationality that exists in the heart is the State of Israel. History affords few stories like it: a people who for 2,000 years were stateless and scattered but never lost the aspiration of statehood—“Next year in Jerusalem”. Then, one day, quite extraordinarily and almost providentially, they fulfilled it. The British Government recognised a claim of nationality based on cultural, ethnic and religious homogeneity, even though it had been unrelated to territory since time immemorial.
My Lords, my Amendment 50B is very clear and simple, and nothing to do with security on Diego Garcia or the details of the treaty between Mauritius and the United Kingdom. It is simple: it is for our Government to recognise the Chagossian people in the law of the United Kingdom as an indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago.
I raise this because so many of the Chagossians we have met and know are men and women who have lived on these islands, who were baptised in the island chapels, who fished, who tended their gardens, who raised children and buried their dead there. They are the indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago. It is important that what they have asked for, that they are recognised by our country, is agreed to.
The need for this amendment arises because even now, more than half a century after their removal, the Chagossian people are still being told by Ministers that they never existed as a permanent population, that their islands were never self-governing in any meaningful sense and that there is therefore no question of self-determination. Only last week, on the first day in Committee, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, repeated that claim, saying:
“The Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population nor has ever been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population can therefore arise”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 795.]
That statement is not true. It is contradicted by every serious historical study, by the records in the National Archives, by the findings of the International Court of Justice, by the judgment of our own courts and most importantly by the lived memory of the men and women who have written to and met us and live all over in the diaspora.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said that he would not go into the history, but it is important when we are discussing a people that we understand the history. Archival records from the 19th and 20th centuries list births, marriages and burials across multiple generations on Peros Banhos, Salomon and Diego Garcia. Parish registers from Notre Dame de L’Assomption on Diego Garcia record entire family lines. Children were born there, married there and died there. The High Court in the Bancoult judgments accepted that the Chagossians were a settled people. The International Court of Justice—one of the reasons we have this treaty—in its 2019 advisory opinion recognised the Chagossians as the people of the territory with a right to self-determination. Research and documents from various academics have shown that there is at least 150 to 170 years of continuous multigenerational residence.
That is what an indigenous people is; that is what a permanent population is. Yet the Government continue to repeat a narrative first invented back in 1968, when the Foreign Office issued internal instructions to describe the Chagossians in public as temporary contract workers to avoid United Nations scrutiny. Those instructions are still in the archives and still legible. They show unequivocally that the United Kingdom knew the truth then, and it should know the truth now. It is time for this Parliament in discussing this treaty to put the truth into law.
The Minister also claimed that the islands were never self-governing but, as every historian of the archipelago now agrees, the islands were in practice run not by resident British administrators, who were almost never present, but by the Chagossians themselves. Families organised communal work, maintained chapels and community buildings and settled disputes. Testimony from multiple surviving islanders shows that respected elders served as local leaders.
One of the older Chagossian families that has been mentioned before in Committee, the Mandarin family of Peros Banhos, has given oral testimony that their ancestor, Jean Charles Mandarin, a blacksmith serving the whole island, was nominated by the community to act as a local headman in the long absence of any resident British authority. His leadership was even recorded in a scholarly Brill volume on the dispossession of the Chagos Islands, describing him as “a thorn in the flesh of the administration”. His grandson, Fernand Mandarin, born on Peros Banhos, later led the Chagossian Social Committee, represented his people at the United Nations and wrote one of the most detailed oral histories of island life. Today, his descendants continue that leadership in ongoing legal actions before the High Court. How can the Minister stand in this Chamber and say there was no permanent population and no self-organisation when the evidence is so overwhelmingly clear?
The amendment puts this right. It recognises in law what the world’s historians, courts and international institutions have already recognised: that the Chagossians are the indigenous people of the Chagos Islands. The amendment clearly defines them as those born on the islands
“prior to their depopulation between 1968 and 1973”
and their direct descendants. It requires the Secretary of State, when exercising any function under the Bill, to have regard to their identity, cultural integrity and rights.
The amendment is necessary, because the Bill does exactly the opposite with Clauses 2 to 4, which would abolish the British Indian Ocean Territory for every island except Diego Garcia, stripping away the only remaining statutory recognition of the Chagossian people’s historic and legal connection to their homeland. It would remove the very provisions in the British Nationality Act through which they are currently recognised in law. It would hand their homeland to another state without any act of self-determination, despite the clear findings of the International Court of Justice that the Chagossian people are entitled to that right.
We now know what that means in practice. Mauritian authorities have already begun issuing new birth certificates to Chagossians, in which the place of birth is rewritten as Mauritius, erasing all mention of the islands. That is actually happening. I have seen some of that documentary proof.
The recognition in the amendment would prevent that erasure. It does not settle the question of sovereignty, prejudge the right of return or determine citizenship policy, but it ensures that the people who lived on these islands for generations, who were removed without consent and who have been fighting to preserve their identity ever since cannot be written out of their own history or out of our legislation.
One native islander wrote:
“We want our name to exist before we die. We want to be seen as the people of our islands, not as shadows erased from paper.”
Another wrote:
“They took our homes. They took our animals. They took our graves. Please, do not let them take our identity in law.”
Another important one says:
“The Minister says we were never a people. I lived my whole childhood on Peros Banhos. My father and mother were born there. How can she say we were not there?”
The world knows that there was a people in the Chagos Islands. The archives know, the courts know, the UN knows, the historians know and the survivors who still bear witness know. Only this Bill seems to pretend otherwise. I believe that recognition is the minimum moral duty owed to a people who were removed from their homeland, denied their rights and then told that their existence did not matter.
The amendment affirms that they did exist, they do exist and they will continue to exist in the law of this country. I know that a group of Chagossians have written to the Minister in the last few days questioning why she made such a statement. I hope that she will be able to give them some support tonight and say that she recognises their existence and that they should be recognised in the law of the United Kingdom. The amendment does not affect anything to do with security, which seems to be and rightly, perhaps, is the real reason for what the Government are doing. This does not affect one single bit of anything to do with the security of the Chagos Islands, so I hope that the Minister will go back and accept the amendment on Report.
My Lords, Amendment 81 in my name is in some key senses the most important of all the amendments that I have tabled in Committee. The purpose of Amendment 81 is to probe the question of what will happen to the Chagossian people if the Bill receives Royal Assent and the Mauritius treaty comes into force. The logic that underpins the Government’s position is that Chagossians are, from the civic perspective—the perspective of their citizenship—Mauritian.
Of course, this will not change their ethnicity, but it will extinguish a critical dimension of their identity, which, while in a very real sense it was suspended as a result of the gross injustices that were committed against them in 1968 and 1973, has not been extinguished. Although the splitting of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius in 1965 was imposed on the Chagossians, it bestowed on them a civic identity apart from Mauritius that they were pleased to receive and enjoyed while living on their islands from 1965 until their forced expulsion.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his Amendment 81 that he has just talked about, which rightly puts the focus of our debate on the citizens of the Chagos Islands, the Chagossian community themselves. It has so far been a disappointing aspect of this Committee to hear the Government dismiss the rights of the Chagossian community. Throughout the process of agreeing the treaty, it is clear that the Chagossians have not been properly consulted. In fact, the Government’s official view—I think the noble Baroness has repeated it again this evening—is that there is no relevant claim of self-determination in respect of the Chagos Archipelago.
I also welcome Amendment 50B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. The resettlement of the Chagos Islands under the treaty is an option, not a requirement, and it is increasingly clear that it is possible that the Mauritians will simply ignore it and not take any steps whatever to achieve resettlement of the Chagossians.
The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, would certainly help put pressure on the UK Government and, in turn, the Mauritian Government to use the provisions of the treaty in respect of resettlement and allow those Chagossians who wish to to return to the outer islands.
On a separate but related note, I am of course pleased that the International Relations and Defence Committee has launched its relatively short piece of work to finally hear the views of the Chagossian community, but I think there are some serious procedural flaws in its survey. There seems to be no control of who can submit views: I am sure the relevant Chinese bots are already on the subject of submitting the survey forms, and there are already concerning reports of Mauritian government officials actually filling in the forms on behalf of Chagossians in Mauritius. But, when the results are in and we have the report of the committee, I hope the Minister will commit to considering it carefully before we proceed to the next stage of the Bill.
We obviously understand that there may be limited time between the committee’s publication of its report and Report stage, so the Government may not have the time to consider and table their own amendments to reflect the views of the Chagossian community as expressed in the—valid, hopefully—responses to the committee. Should that be the case, we would ask the Government to engage constructively with others in this House on amendments before Report so that we can put the needs and welfare of the Chagossian community front and centre as we progress with the Bill. I hope that the Minister will be able to give that assurance today.
As the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, seeks to do, we need to step up and support the Chagossian community, who have been mistreated for far too long.
My Lords, Amendment 20M, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, requests that the treaty does not come into force until the publication of
“a report assessing the impact of Article 6 of the Treaty”.
As I and other Ministers have said on numerous occasions, it will be for Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement once the treaty enters into force. It is not sensible, or a good use of taxpayers’ money, to be reporting on something that will not be in our gift to achieve.
The Government are increasing our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These include Chagossian-led community projects in Crawley and elsewhere, education and English language support, and have involved the creation of a number of FCDO-funded full-time jobs for Chagossians.
Amendment 81, from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, requests a report of the forecast impact of the treaty on Chagossians. The Government have already released the public sector equality duty report relating to the treaty, which addresses all the issues around an equalities impact assessment. This, in addition to the IRDC’s current review, should support understanding of the impacts to the Chagossian community.
I understand, respect and appreciate the noble Lord’s support for the Chagossian community, but I must also speak to the many different views within the Chagossian community, including several groups that welcome the deal. I think that this will perhaps be surfaced as a result of the work that the IRDC is doing, and I obviously commit to reflecting on it as the Bill proceeds.
Amendment 50B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, seeks to recognise in the domestic law of the UK that the Chagossians are the indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago. I hear absolutely what she says about lived memory and the persuasive way that she puts that across. But the unfortunate fact—and I think it is unfortunate—is that both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have considered in a series of judgments since the 1970s the related questions of a claimed right of abode or other rights said to flow from the rights that she seeks to gain for the Chagossians through her amendment. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed the claims.
Had that not been the case—the noble Baroness clearly wishes that that had not been the case; it is her strongly held view and I can see why she feels so—the Government would perhaps have had to take a very different course, because the rights would have held a different weight in law. However, the situation is that history has taken us to a position where, much as we do not like it and it goes against some of the things that we feel and what we may even argue is the moral case, the legal situation is, I am afraid, as it is.
Will the Minister just give me a short, simple answer to why the United Kingdom Government will not recognise the Chagossian people as an indigenous people?
The legal situation is as I have described. The noble Baroness may wish that that were not the case, but the legal position is as it is, and the Government do not intend to amend the Bill in order to change that legal position.
That legal position is guidance; it is not law.
There have been legal judgments in English courts and elsewhere that have established that the right that the noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to grant to the Chagossian people does not currently exist in law. It is not guidance. Those are decisions of English courts. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who were diligent and eloquent in their defence of the dispossessed Chagossians. Sometimes people approach the story of Britain overseas as a kind of morality play where Britain plays the villain, the Alan Rickman of the global drama. We heard a hint of it, I think, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in the previous round. Every disengagement was somehow disagreeable. Here, the disagreeable thing is pulling out in a way that disregards the wishes of the people who have been most injured. I was grateful to the Minister for making the clarification on birth certificates. She is doing enormously well defending this position, I have to say. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Amendment 20S seeks to get the Secretary of State to produce a report on the so-called economic partnership between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, which is set up under Article 11 of the treaty. Parliament should have an opportunity to take note of that and debate it in both Houses.
The reason that is important, apart from the fact that the control of money is the supreme function of Parliament, is that the economic partnership article, Article 11, in the agreement, is very strange. It says:
“In consideration of this Agreement, the United Kingdom agrees … a. to pay Mauritius an annual sum; … b. to capitalise a Trust Fund for the benefit of Chagossians as established by Mauritius; and … c. to grant multi-year funding as part of a development framework for projects to be undertaken by Mauritius across twenty-five (25) years. … The arrangements for such payments, including amounts and modalities shall be agreed separately”.
It then says that this is a “full and final settlement” of the financial aspects of ceding sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.
Now, to call this a partnership is a very strange thing. We give them money annually. We give them more money for the benefit of the Chagossians. We give them yet more money for the benefit of the Mauritians. Where is the partnership in all this? If this partnership were ever to be introduced, I hope that Ministers would feel obliged or, out of their natural desire to be helpful, would seek to explain to us why this is a partnership rather than a kind of surrender where we give up the money, we give up the territory and we let them decide—even the trust fund that we set up for the benefit of the Chagossians is “as established by Mauritius”. So the Mauritians are going to determine how this trust fund is used and spent; the Chagossians will have no say in it and will probably get precious little benefit from it.
I hope the Minister will let us in on the secret. What is the quid pro quo in all this? Normally, any partnership means that there are two sides to it. I used to be a partner in a firm, and we were partners; we all benefited from each other. We did not have one side being partners and the other side getting all the benefits. I am genuinely mystified about this. Was it just that this was signed up for when the Government were suffering a fit of generosity? Perhaps the coffers were overflowing with funds. They could not think what to do but give some away to Mauritius for this, some away to a trust fund for that, then more away to Mauritius for 25 years. Where is it all coming from? Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us. I beg to move.
My Lords, I did not expect to participate in this, but I was having a conversation earlier with my noble friend Lord Minto, who is very knowledgeable about corporate finance. He posed the question: is there anything in this whole arrangement that would stop Mauritius capitalising on the revenue stream that they have coming to them and selling that off to someone else?
I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Kempsell is not here to move his amendment, which I thought was a particularly good one.
We debated some of the financial aspects of the treaty on the first day in Committee. The Minister at that time asked to delay her remarks on those amendments to the appropriate group. I assume this is the group that she was referring to, so we all look forward to the fuller answer on the finances that she promised then.
The core contention of the Government is that the deal costs an average of £101 million a year and the present net value of payments under the treaty is therefore £3.4 billion. This has been challenged by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, but the Minister, rather than engaging in the substance of those challenges, has relied on the Government’s published figures and refused to explain why she believes those figures accurately reflect the cost of the deal.
The Minister has relied on the approval of the Government Actuary’s Department and simply argued that consistency was essential. These are typical deflections that, no doubt, many Ministers have used in previous cases, but they do not address the concerns of my noble friends. We know that the payments are front-loaded at £165 million for the first three years, and then £120 million for the next 10 years. After that point, it is index-linked. As my noble friend Lady Noakes set out at Second Reading, that will see the cash payments hitting more than £650 million a year by the end of the 99 years, depending, of course, on what indexation you use. With all those additional considerations, it is our contention that the true cost of the deal is not £3.4 billion, as claimed by Ministers, but something more like £35 billion.
So the question lands: why would the Government seek to play this down? If they are so delighted with the deal—if it is such a good deal for the British public that they keep claiming that they deliver for, as all government policies should surely be—then surely they would want to be open about the true cost of things. They brag about spending on every other area; they take every amount of money per year, cumulatively add it all up and then put it in a press release and brag to the British people about what a great amount they are spending in every area except for this one. Does the Minister think it is better that the country should know the full costings before the treaty comes into effect, or would she prefer that the UK tie itself into these vast annual payments first, before admitting what the true cost of the deal actually is?
We are clear that the British people deserve to know what their Government are signing up for. Ministers should engage with the detailed costings laid out by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, and the points made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, rather than hiding behind their pre-prepared lines. If they have nothing to hide, what is wrong with producing a report that we can all see and study and get checked by independent financial experts? Once Ministers have admitted the true cost of the deal, then they can start justifying the so-called benefits of the treaty against what the true cost actually is. I do not think that people would be impressed by arguments justifying that figure, but Ministers should do the decent thing and justify the real numbers openly and in public.
Noble Lords will recall that we debated the financial elements of the treaty in some detail last week, and I genuinely do not think that further debate is going to persuade anybody of anything this evening and probably is not a good use of time at this stage. However, I respect that the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Kempsell, who was not here to speak to his amendment, have tabled further amendments, so I am happy to put their minds at rest about the matter to the best of my ability this evening.
Noble Lords already know that the Government published full details of the financial payment on the day that the treaty was signed. These details are in the finance exchange of letters, which is included in the treaty in the version laid in the House and published on the government website. The details are also set out in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, which was also laid before the House and published on the government website. It is plain to see how much the treaty is costing. The breakdown on page 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum is particularly straightforward for anyone who might desire further information about what will be paid in each year of the treaty. Indeed, the clarity with which the information was presented by the Government was welcomed by the Office for Statistics Regulation, which confirmed that it was consistent with the principles of intelligent transparency.
Therefore, there is no requirement for any additional report on the financial costs, either before the Bill comes into force, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, proposes, or before each payment, as is suggested in the other amendment.
The quid pro quo I was asked about is that we get a unique military asset shared with our closest ally on a legally secure basis. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asks why I rely on government figures and the answer is because I am representing the Government. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Before the Minister sits down, the particular question I pose—and I am not being polemical; I think there is an issue—is: what actually stops Mauritius, contractually, from commercially transferring this revenue stream in a capitalised form to another purchaser?
I think the noble Baroness is asking me what a sovereign country would do with some money that it gets as part of payment from this treaty. I am not sure what the problem would be with Mauritius investing that money in something that then provided it with a return, which it could then use to support public services or anything else in Mauritius. I am not sure if I have properly understood exactly what the noble Baroness is concerned about. I would be happy to engage further—
Okay, that might be a good idea. I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment on that basis.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 20T and 81K. Amendment 20T just requires that Amendment 81K would happen before the treaty, or parts of it, comes into force.
Amendment 81K proposes setting up a parliamentary commission between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. The proposal is that we seek to agree with Mauritius that this parliamentary commission should reflect equal representation from the Parliaments of the United Kingdom—this Parliament—and the Republic of Mauritius, which one hopes would be acceptable to the Mauritians as fairly rational in these circumstances. More important, what is the function of this commission? It should be to ensure,
“the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including but not limited to … ensuring a right of return … ensuring the right to self-determination via a referendum of all Chagossians on the question of sovereignty is held by the UK”,
and
“access to compensation, resettlement, or other forms of support”.
The Minister has repeated again today this extraordinary affirmation that there is no Chagossian people and never has been—that there has never been any permanent population of the Chagos Islands. I can see why the Minister can say that there no longer is, because we shamefully removed them. But to rely on the fact that we removed them and therefore they are not permanent, when all of us now think it was monstrous that this was done with no possibility of return at the time, and that we should be setting this right, now that we are trying to sort the aftermath of decolonisation, as it is seen, is to my mind extraordinary. How can there have been no permanent population in the past if there are churches, graveyards, signs of habitation, work, agriculture and fishing on several of the islands? Above all, how can we pretend that there never has been any Chagossian population and, at the same time, grant British citizenship to those who can demonstrate that they are descended from Chagossians?
The Minister cannot have it both ways. She cannot say that there has never been anyone there and that we are now recognising that those who have been there, or are descended from them, have the right to British citizenship. It is there in the treaty. I know that when she mentioned this she said it with obvious distaste and embarrassment, but that distaste and embarrassment should have been sorted out with her officials before she got round to saying it again in this Chamber. It is very insulting to the Chagossian people to say that they have never existed.
Given that the Chagossian people have existed, and that we recognise that it was wrong to remove them without in any way trying to provide them with some prospect of undoing that wrong, surely we should, through the parliamentary commission that I propose in this amendment, discuss with the Mauritians, if sovereignty is handed over to them, at least giving Chagossians the right of return and the right of self-determination via a referendum, along with access to compensation, resettlement or other forms of support. If we do that then at least we will go a small way to undoing the wrong that was done in the late 1960s—I think it extended into the 1970s—which all of us now recognise.
It is clearly important that we have some kind of parliamentary commission overseeing this, because the treaty does not do these things. It could allow the resettlement to be extended to Mauritians and not be given to Chagossians, and it could result in the fund that we set up not being paid out to Chagossians—certainly not to Chagossians who have been in the United Kingdom, but solely to Chagossians who now live in Mauritius. It is only right and proper that we have some parliamentary oversight from both sides—from Mauritius as well as from the UK—to ensure this is all properly done. I am sure this proposition is so reasonable that such a reasonable Minister as we have on the Front Bench cannot fail to agree with it. I beg to move.
I want to add to my noble friend’s words. I will not read the whole letter, but this is a copy of the letter to the Minister from the Chagossian people. They write that the Minister’s words
“cut deeply. They erase our history, our dignity, and the truth of who we are. They echo the very language used to justify our people’s deportation between 1968 and 1973. And they are demonstrably false … For more than a century before our exile, the Chagos Islands were home to a multigenerational, settled population. This is not our opinion. It is documented in church registers of births, marriages, and burials across Peros Banhos, Salomon and Diego Garcia; colonial-era records describing communities with homes, chapels, gardens and workplaces; judgments of the UK High Court in the Bancoult cases; the International Court of Justice; United Nations resolutions; academic research stretching across decades. We were not transient workers. We were a Creole-speaking people, rooted in our islands, with our own traditions, our own culture, and our own community life. To say that our homeland had ‘no permanent population’ is simply untrue … You also stated the islands had ‘never been self-governing’. Chagossians have never claimed to have operated a Westminster-style system. But for generations, in the long absence of resident British administrators, our islands were organised and cared for by local leaders from within our own community”.
This has been confirmed in academic work. Misley Mandarin, who lives here in London now with his family, finishes,
“We ask you not for sympathy, but for recognition. Not for pity, but for accuracy. Not for charity, but for truth. We deserve self-determination. We want to stay British and return to our islands as British citizens”.
My Lords, Amendments 20T and 81K, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley, seek to achieve a similar objective to Amendments 80 and 82. Given the similarity of the two pairs of amendments, I was slightly surprised to see the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, degroup his amendments. We could have had a very satisfactory debate with the original grouping, but of course I fully respect the noble Lord’s right to degroup his amendments. I am slightly surprised, because he criticised me for doing something similar last week, but it is, of course, only right that noble Lords should be able to debate their amendments in the groupings that most suit them.
I am pleased that my noble friend Lord Lilley has the right to self-determination, as confirmed by a referendum of the Chagossians, in his amendment. This is an important point that I am sure many noble Lords will agree with.
Amendment 20T would also delay the implementation of the key parts of this Bill until some progress has been made on establishing the joint parliamentary commission. It seems to me that too many core parts of the treaty are not tied to deadlines or quantifiable outcomes. As a result, it would be hard to monitor whether Mauritius, and indeed the UK, are fulfilling their obligations under the treaty in a timely manner. My noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendment helpfully ties the joint parliamentary commission to the coming into effect of the Act, forcing Ministers and their Mauritian counterparts to get on with the job so that the commission can play an important role from the very beginning of the treaty’s effect. It is a very sensible proposal.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on whether the Government will agree that establishing a joint parliamentary commission would be a useful tool going forward.
My Lords, as the noble Lord opposite has indicated, it is slightly surprising that the four amendments on establishing a joint UK-Mauritius parliamentary commission or committee have been degrouped. Members are well within their rights to do this and I am glad at least that this time noble Lords have had sufficient notice of what is happening.
I am sensitive to the sentiment of these amendments. I take them to come from a genuine desire for greater parliamentary involvement in the scrutiny of the implementation of the treaty on specific areas that are of concern to the Committee. The Government have always said that they welcome scrutiny, and this remains the case. We are not opposed to the strengthening of links between the UK Parliament and that of Mauritius, although this would be a somewhat novel approach. I think it seems pretty likely that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, took inspiration from the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on this occasion.
There is a question of proportionality and the proper extent of the remit of such a parliamentary commission. Out of respect for the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I propose to discuss this in much more detail when we reach the debate on Amendment 80, which he has tabled. I hope that is acceptable to the noble Lord. I will be very happy to meet with him and other noble Lords to discuss this proposal, and specifically the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in more detail. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to issues around the ceding of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius. I asked a question on the previous day of Committee about the drafting of this Bill and why it does not mention Mauritius. I wonder whether the Minister has had time to think about that and will be able to give your Lordships’ Committee an answer today. As I mentioned then, there are some previous examples of similar legislation that actually named the state that is gaining sovereignty, so I am keen to know why the precedent was not followed in this case.
My Amendment 33 simply seeks to remove two unnecessary subsections from the Bill. If we remove Clause 3(1) and (2), as my amendment would, we will be left with the simple statement that
“His Majesty has under his prerogative the like powers to make laws for Diego Garcia as His Majesty had before commencement for the British Indian Ocean Territory”.
With that simple statement, the Bill would assert His Majesty’s powers sufficiently and he could use those powers to ensure the continuity of law from the British Indian Ocean Territory to Diego Garcia. Given that these powers are under the prerogative, we cannot understand why a statutory provision is necessary to ensure the continuity of law following the ceding of sovereignty.
Furthermore, if the Bill passes in its current drafting and a future Parliament were to repeal this clause, what would the effect be on His Majesty’s prerogative powers? I understand that the Government’s intention is not to undermine the prerogative with the Bill—that is clear from Clause 5(4)—but why have they not included an identical provision in Clause 3? If the Government are merely confirming His Majesty’s prerogative powers, should the drafting not be simpler, so as not to risk limiting the prerogative?
My Lords, noble Lords have not had the opportunity to hear from me on the Bill previously. I apologise for not having intruded on previous debates, but I have listened to many of them.
I tabled Amendments 51A, 51B and 51C in pursuance of my continuing interest, over a number of years, in the exercise of prerogative powers and their relationship to parliamentary scrutiny. The combined effect of these three amendments would mean that any Order in Council that exercises a Henry VIII power—that is, to amend, repeal or revoke an Act—would be subject to affirmative procedure, instead of negative as proposed in the Bill, and that any other order, in other words not a Henry VIII power, would be subject to the negative procedure instead of no procedure.
These amendments reflect, and are in accordance with, the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which, in its 37th report on 13 November, said of the Henry VIII power in paragraph 17 that
“the Government has failed to provide a full explanation as to why the power … is subject to the negative procedure … We recommend that this power should be subject to the affirmative procedure”.
In relation to orders that are not of a Henry VIII power character, the committee went on to say:
“We recommend that the power in clause 5(1) when used to do anything other than amend, repeal or revoke an Act should be subject to the negative procedure”.
So my three amendments are intended precisely to deliver the recommendations of the DPRRC.
The Constitution Committee, in its 14th report, also drew attention to the provisions of Clause 5. It observed that Orders in Council that are made in relation to treaties are commonly made by way of the prerogative power—because treaties are made by the prerogative power—and with limited parliamentary scrutiny as a consequence. However, the committee did not dissent from the DPRRC’s recommendations in this case.
Orders in Council in relation to the British Indian Ocean Territories have historically been made by virtue of the prerogative. The terms of this agreement with Mauritius mean that that precedent no longer applies. Article 1 of the agreement recognises—or confers, depending on how you view it—sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, to Mauritius. Therefore, the basis for the exercise of the prerogative power—in other words, the exercise of sovereignty over the territory—is no longer applicable. I shall go on to explain why I therefore disagree with my noble friend on the Front Bench in his argument for Amendment 33.
These provisions provide for the continuation of the law in Diego Garcia. This is in accordance with the agreement in relation to Article 9 on jurisdiction. It follows in my view that the future exercise of the prerogative is sanctioned by this legislation in relation to Diego Garcia and that, as a result, any Orders in Council made should be regarded as statutory orders and, as such, subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have accepted that the orders that have Henry VIII powers should require a parliamentary procedure. They do not, however, provide for a parliamentary procedure for other Orders in Council.
Paragraph 48 of the Explanatory Notes says that this measure is in subsection (5) of Clause 5—in fact it is in subsection (6). The notes say that
“the intention is to maintain a clear distinction between prerogative and statutory orders”.
That is to be achieved, according to the Explanatory Notes, by stating that these powers are not exercised in pursuance of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. This is a very curious place that we have arrived at, since the Government are disapplying the Statutory Instruments Act while at the same time requiring that Orders in Council that are made that have a Henry VIII power attached to them require parliamentary scrutiny and are therefore statutory orders.
Let me be clear about the argument behind my three amendments. The prerogative stems from the exercise of a sovereign jurisdiction, which in relation to the United Kingdom is exercised by the sovereign in Parliament. In other dominions where His Majesty is sovereign, other forms of sovereign powers may subsist, but this treaty and agreement with Mauritius states baldly, in Article 1, that His Majesty is not sovereign in Diego Garcia. No prerogative power can exist without being dependent on this legislation.
Subsection (6)(b), in excluding this legislation from the interpretation under the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, is incorrect. On Report, and in response to this debate, I will be asking Ministers to think very carefully about two things. First, I hope positively, I ask them to change the procedures for the parliamentary scrutiny of Orders in Council so that Henry VIII powers are dealt with by an affirmative procedure, and, secondly, that Orders in Council for any other purpose are dealt with by a negative procedure. I ask them also to think very carefully about the terms of Clause 5(6), which incorrectly seeks to disapply the Statutory Instruments Act 1946.
It follows from my argument that I do not agree with my noble friend on Amendment 33, and I am afraid that I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Lilley in relation to his Amendment 51BA. He goes further than the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee would in applying an affirmative procedure to Orders in Council that are not for a Henry VIII purpose. Neither can I support other opposition to clauses standing part, but I expect that my noble friend was rightly seeking to probe the meaning of Clauses 2, 3 and 5. Of course, if one were to remove them, one would effectively repudiate the treaty. That may or may not be his intention, but I do not propose to speak to the opposition to those clauses standing part.
My Lords, I am persuaded by the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that his amendments are somewhat narrower but much more justified than my broader amendment. When the appropriate moment comes, I will not press my amendment and leave his standing.
In response to the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that we are clearer in the Bill about what it does, I have read it a couple of times and honestly do not think that it could not be any clearer. It is a Bill to enact an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago. I think that is sufficient, and if he does not, I am not sure what he is getting at.
The Government rejects Amendment 33 on the basis that the provision in question is not redundant. It is needed to ensure the secure and effective operation of the base. It ensures clarity on which law will apply through the jurisdiction that the UK will exercise under the treaty. Legal continuity and certainty for operations on the base once the British Indian Ocean Territory is dissolved is far from unnecessary.
Let me explain why we have Clause 3. This clause saves the law of BIOT, and law which relates to BIOT, as the law of Diego Garcia and law which relates to Diego Garcia. This has been done as the default, to ensure the continued effective running of the base on Diego Garcia and to make sure that there is no legal gap. Detailed work is being carried out to establish where technical amendments may be needed to this preserved law to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is defined in Clause 3 as the whole area that the UK can exercise jurisdiction over, as covered in the treaty. This includes the island of Diego Garcia and the 12 nautical miles surrounding it. Preserving the existing prerogative power to legislate for Diego Garcia means that we can continue to operate the base and its legal architecture in much the same way that we do today, and it gives the maximum flexibility for the future.
Amendment 51, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seems to be based on a misapprehension. As I mentioned in my response to the amendments related to Clause 3, His Majesty has a prerogative power to legislate for BIOT at present and Clause 3 preserves this power. It does not allow him to make laws for other parts of the realm about BIOT or Diego Garcia. If the noble Lord reads that clause of the Bill again, he will see that I am right about that.
The statutory power in Clause 5 is necessary to enable amendments to Acts and statutory instruments which form part of the law of Diego Garcia and amendments to legislation which forms part of the law of other jurisdictions—the UK Crown dependencies and the other OTs. These other jurisdictions have laws which refer to BIOT or treat it as one of the overseas territories. Amendments to those laws may be necessary to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia.
I see that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—as is becoming classic in his contributions on these occasions—has read the report from the DPRRC. His Amendments 51A, 51B and 51C appear to seek to implement its recommendations. Amendment 51BA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, appears to be less consistent with the recommendations—I think he has recognised that in his remarks—in that it would impose the affirmative procedure in respect not just of Orders in Council, which amend primary legislation, but of those which amend secondary legislation. Without showing too much leg so late at night, we are still considering these suggestions and we will return to them on Report. With that, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and others who contributed to this group. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her reply to my amendments. I appreciate that they are technical and relate to the prerogative, but they are important none the less.
In essence, we seek to understand whether the Government believe that Clauses 3 and 5 will limit the prerogative in any way because as we see from the drafting of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which we discussed earlier, this has effectively ended the Government’s adherence to the original Ponsonby rule. Statute is so often deficient when compared with convention. As in the case of the prerogative, statute should not limit the prerogative without very careful consideration.
I am grateful to the Minister for her reply. Given the complexity of these issues, I hope she will write to us to set out the impact of the Bill on the prerogative before we proceed to Report. In the meantime, I will, of course, study her reply in Hansard. Obviously, we reserve the right to return to any unresolved issues on Report.
My Lords, as some comments were made on the previous day in Committee about how few Members there were on the Government Benches, I thought it might be nice to say how pleased I am to see so many tonight. I am sorry that the Lib Dems still have not produced many people, but anyway: it is very nice to see so many people.
Amendment 47 is a stand-alone amendment, which again does not really affect the security aspects of Diego Garcia or the treaty in the sense of changing it hugely. It asks the Secretary of State to
“produce a report projecting the population growth of the Chagossian people over the next 30 years, including their global diaspora, and the impact of this Act upon that projected growth, and assess the implications for international recognition of their national identity”.
One of the Government’s recent arguments for the treaty and the Bill is that the Americans want it. They have explained that the United States is troubled about having a military base on an island with contested sovereignty, and that it has said that until matters are resolved and there is legal certainty, it will not invest in the base. That is probably précising the argument. The Government argue that the treaty and the Bill will deliver the requisite legal certainty. The argument is based on the assumption, if this Bill becomes an Act and the Mauritius treaty can then be ratified, that all the legal uncertainties will be put to bed.
It is my contention in moving Amendment 47 that if this Act passes and the Mauritius treaty is ratified—two things I very much hope will still not happen—all that will happen is that one legal uncertainty will be replaced by another, and the Americans will have made no progress towards getting that certainty. Instead of the uncertainty arising from the Republic of Mauritius contesting United Kingdom sovereignty over the islands, we will be presented with the uncertainty that arises from the Chagossian people contesting the Republic of Mauritius’s sovereignty. I get the sense that, in removing the basis for Chagossians living in the United Kingdom to continue to enjoy British Overseas Territory citizenship after the passage of this Act, there is a desire to try to collapse Chagossian civic identity into British civic identity, to the extent that Chagossians reside in the UK, so that distinctive Chagossian civic identity disappears.
The truth, however, is that the identity of the Chagossian community in exile will not go away, resting as it does principally across three states: the United Kingdom, Mauritius and the Seychelles. The number of Chagossians is increasing and they are becoming more animated in their commitment to securing self-determination as a people defined, even in exile, by their relationship to their islands.
There is a sense that, until this point, the impact of the Chagossian identity in international relations has been somewhat muted, in that their desire is not to be returned to their islands to become a sovereign, independent state. The Chagossians who issued the statement of self-determination, who have written to us and whom we have met, were very clear on this point. Since they see themselves as connected to the UK, there has never been a need hitherto for them to assert their identity and seek international personality to claim the islands. This will change completely if the islands are transferred to the Republic of Mauritius. Even while the United Kingdom has shamefully failed to resettle the islands, they have remained under British sovereignty, which over 99% of well over 3,000 Chagossians are recorded as saying that they want. Obviously, they do not want things as they are at present, but to be resettled.
In this context, the contention of my amendment is that the Government and the United States of America need to think carefully about what is likely to happen to the Chagossians as a people in exile. I believe that, rather than allowing themselves to be absorbed into other countries, they will continue increasing in number and adopting an ever-stronger and more resilient identity, and that in times to come we will look back on this Bill and this treaty, if it goes through, as something that has made even more uncertainty over Diego Garcia. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. It would be interesting not only to look at the future projections of the population of Chagossians but to have a proper, full-on demographic study of this unique people. We heard it asserted again by the Minister, in a very embarrassed and regretful tone, that there was no population and the people do not really exist, “This may not be my view but it is the view of the courts”, and so on. It is worth spending a moment reminding ourselves of who these people are, some of whom—to remind noble Lords opposite who have just turned up—are observing this debate.
There was a unique inheritance in the Chagos Archipelago. The population came from both directions: largely from Africa—from Madagascar, which has its own unique demographics, east Africa and Mozambique—as indentured labourers from the Indian subcontinent, from Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Bengal and Ceylon to some degree, and a little bit from France. This is reflected in a unique linguistic tradition. I have listened, over many years representing the part of Sussex where most British Chagossians live, to the Bourbonnais Creole. There is a kind of French spoken throughout the Indian Ocean, in the Seychelles and in Mauritius, but Chagossian French is clearly distinct. It is not simply a dialect of Mauritian French. There are very different words. For example, a boat is a “pirog” rather than a “bato”, and a net is a “lagoni” rather than a “rezou”. My apologies to any watching Chagossians for my pronunciation. There is a unique and distinctive oral tradition, rich in nautical metaphors and especially in longing, melancholy and a sense of exile.
In the grey and unpromising streets of Crawley—I mean no disrespect to Crawley, which is part of my old patch—people have worked to keep alive these old folkways and traditions. They are focused on the sense of longing and return. There are ritual incantations that mention the villages now lost. There are special celebrations and meals marking what was taken away. A sense of exile can become a central part of your identity as a people. We have seen it happen many times. I invite noble Lords to recall the words of Psalm 137:
“If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, Let my right hand forget her cunning …let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, If I remember thee not”.
With every passing year, it becomes a stronger part of your identity as a people.
All this is by way of saying that the idea that once this treaty is signed and a couple of signatures are exchanged, the people of Chagos will forget their identity, blend happily into the Mauritian population and become just one more exiled group with no more prospect of returning home is an utter fantasy. We will have replaced a legalistic dispute with a much more visceral one, which will carry on for as long as there are people who still remember the noise of the surf and swell of the archipelago. Those people will press every future Government for their right to return not as Mauritian citizens but as what they are asking for now, Chagossians under British sovereignty. Eventually, they will get a Government who honour their wish.
My Lords, in this amendment, we are talking about a democratic study of the Chagossian people. However, I want to speak about a matter that has been mentioned briefly by my noble friend Lord Callanan and that goes to the very heart of democratic integrity and the dignity of an entire people.
I wish to address a survey issued by the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee that aims to capture
“Chagossian views on the Agreement with Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago”.
This survey cannot be relied on. It is methodologically flawed, structurally careless, open to manipulation and in several aspects dangerously misleading. The Chagossian people, who have endured decades of dispossession, displacement and injustice, deserve far better than an instrument that falls short at every level.
First, on the technical design, the survey is hosted on Microsoft Forms, a rudimentary platform that any undergraduate research supervisor would reject for a project involving even minimal verification. There are no safeguards against duplicate submissions, no protection against cyber manipulation, no identity checks and no mechanism whatever to confirm whether a respondent is actually Chagossian. For a survey that concerns sovereignty, citizenship, resettlement and the legacy of one of the gravest forced removals in modern British history, this is astonishing. It leaves the process exposed to interference by anyone, anywhere, with any motive.
Unfortunately, that is not a theoretical risk. The survey still has a week to run, and we already have deeply troubling reports from Mauritius. There are claims, supported by video evidence which I have seen and direct testimonials, that Mauritian officials and intermediaries have been filling out the survey on behalf of Chagossians who cannot read English, cannot understand the political implications and cannot write their own responses.
Even more seriously, multiple Chagossians have told us that they oppose the agreement with Mauritius yet believe that they have been marked down as supporting it in this survey. If this is true, then a foreign Government are, in effect, interfering with a House of Lords committee’s evidence-gathering process. Not only does this compromise the validity of the survey but it threatens the independence and integrity of Parliament itself. Let us be absolutely clear: this is not a consultation but contamination.
Let me take your Lordships through some of the survey questions. It begins with text that states that:
“A new law implementing the Agreement is currently being debated … and members of the House of Lords want to hear … opinions … before voting on it”.
What it does not say—and very much ought to—is that this agreement is not yet in force, that ratification is required and that Parliament can still reject it. The omission is misleading and may lead many to believe the treaty is inevitable. When you are asking a displaced people about the fate of their homeland, clarity is not optional; it is essential.
The survey repeatedly instructs respondents not to provide any identifying information. At the same time, it allows anyone in the world to submit answers as many times as they like, with no checks. There is no way to confirm whether responses come from Chagossians, non-Chagossians, organised political activists or even automated submissions. I have personally seen a text message from a high-ranking Mauritius official stating:
“My guys in the Mauritian Government are”—
I will change the wording—very worried.
“They are planning for civil unrest when they cancel the tax cuts”.
It is clear what the Mauritians want. For a consultation that claims to express Chagossian views, this alone renders the entire exercise invalid.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for moving this amendment, my noble friend Lord Hannan for his excellent speech and my noble friend Lord Leicester, who also made some very good points.
Amendment 47, from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, gets to the core of a problem that the Government have so far avoided. When we originally considered passing a Motion requiring the Government to consult the Chagossians, which the Government were totally against, Ministers resisted it, not only because they felt that a consultation might be subject to judicial review but because the challenge of defining the Chagossian community presented challenges.
We have heard throughout our debates on the treaty that the UK Government have mistreated the Chagossians, not least through their forced removal from the Chagos Archipelago. The Government have gone some way to recognising this through the establishment of the trust fund. Does the Minister consider the creation of the trust fund for the Chagossians as the end of the matter, or will her department continue to look at further ways to support the displaced Chagossian community?
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to produce a report projecting the population growth of the Chagossian people over the next 30 years and to assess the implications of the outcome of the report for recognition of their identity. If we are to properly support the Chagossian community, as we believe we should, it is important that the UK Government make a proper effort to understand the community, its growth over time and where Chagossians have chosen to live. Will the Minister take this on board and look closely at ways in which the UK Government can improve their understanding of the Chagossian community? I look forward to hearing her response.
My Lords, I have said repeatedly throughout these deliberations that the Government are very interested in thinking about different ways of working alongside the Chagossian community on these issues. That applies to Amendment 47 as well.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, asks the Government in her amendment to produce a report consisting of a demographic study of the Chagossian community. I am going to have to disappoint her this evening. It will not be possible to produce a useful report, at a cost to taxpayers, in time for it to do anything of consequence alongside this treaty. It is not a bad idea to have a report such as this, for many of the reasons that have been described. I would not be against it. What I am saying is that the responsibility for conducting the study does not belong in this Bill, but that does not mean it is a bad thing to do in principle. The noble Baroness will know, as we have heard most recently from the noble Earl, Lord Leicester, about the IDRC leading a report into the Chagossians, which I hope will be published soon. I hope that all these things will help to mitigate some of the noble Baroness’s concerns.
I saw that Jeremy Corbyn had also written to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, wo chairs the IRDC, which is responsible for the survey. It is not something that the Government are responsible for. We are looking forward to the results. We were asked what weight we put on the survey. It is for the committee to determine that. I am sure that it will take on board the comments that have been made by those who are concerned about how the survey has been conducted. I know that some Chagossians would be completely unable to access a survey such as this, for reasons of literacy or access to the means by which the survey is being conducted. I am sure that the committee will want to reflect on that. We certainly will when we receive its report. I look forward to it and hope that it is useful in assisting us to understand the complexity of opinion that exists within Chagossian communities.
On the substantive point that the noble Baroness raises, such a piece of work may well be useful, but I am not able this evening to commit the Government to commissioning it. With that, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that rather thoughtful answer. I note that she did not rule out what I said—that the Americans would still be seeing uncertainty in the future. I think that we will see that whatever happens in this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, we are approaching the home straight now, which is good news. A lot of noble Lords have joined the debate at this stage. They will know that the Government attach great importance to adherence to international law. They will probably be aware that we have established that the International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over disagreements between Commonwealth states and therefore none on our dispute with Mauritius about sovereignty, and that we have established that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has no power to rule on sovereignty.
However, there is a treaty which does apply to Mauritius and which no one disputes the existence or authority of, and that is the Pelindaba treaty. It was never mentioned in the early stages of the Government’s declarations about their need to cede sovereignty to Mauritius or their claim that doing so would increase the security of the base. But the Pelindaba treaty is one which the countries of Africa—and that includes Mauritius—signed, creating a nuclear-free zone. I do not think anyone disputes that if the Chagos Archipelago is recognised as part of Mauritius then the Pelindaba treaty will apply to the Chagos Archipelago, and therefore to the Diego Garcia base. It is significant that the Pelindaba treaty says it should be a nuclear-free zone and that therefore Diego Garcia will be nuclear-free.
It is important that we establish what that means. Does it mean that no nuclear weapons can ever be stored, based or transited through Diego Garcia? If so, does the United States know about this? What is their reaction to it? It is less clear whether or not it means that nuclear-powered vessels can use the facilities of Diego Garcia. My noble friend Lady Goldie’s amendment would make that clear, and her amendment is at least as important as mine in seeking to establish the truth of this.
My Lords, my Amendment 88 in this group is very much in a similar vein to my earlier amendments, although I see I do not have the presence of my newly acquired fan—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—to encourage me. I seek reassurance that the
“unrestricted access, basing and overflight”
provisions in Annex 1(1)(a) of the agreement includes the right of the UK to allow nuclear-propelled vessels and nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft to enter the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia.
Although not in the amendment, the annexe of the treaty referred to also specifically covers the United States of America, and, for the avoidance of doubt, I include it in the confirmation I seek from the Secretary of State in this amendment. Again, I am asking that this be confirmed by the Secretary of State before the Bill can come into force. In this respect, I am perhaps baring my teeth more than my noble friend Lord Lilley, which is a rather unusual situation.
As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, Mauritius is a party to the Pelindaba treaty, which establishes the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear weapons in any signatory state. Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty states that both Mauritius and the United Kingdom confirm that no
“existing international obligations or arrangements … conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.
Annex 1 of the treaty states that the United Kingdom retains
“unrestricted ability to … control the … deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”.
Nuclear weapons are lethal capabilities. So Britain and the United States must, as per the terms of the treaty, have an unrestricted ability, surely, to house nuclear weapons or to dock nuclear submarines at the base on Diego Garcia should we choose to do so. Yet that would appear to require an express provision in this treaty, and I cannot find it.
Article 7(3) appears to seek to allay those concerns, but I would welcome an absolute clarification from the Minister. Will Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty prevent us basing Vanguard-class submarines or, in the future, nuclear-armed aircraft, or the United States stationing any nuclear weapons at the base on Diego Garcia? That is a question that I require answered. This cannot be left in doubt—hence my requirement that the Secretary of State publish a statement to confirm the matters I have raised before this Bill comes into force, so that everyone is clear about what the UK and the US can or, perhaps more alarmingly, cannot do. As my noble friend Lord Lilley commented, although they are not directly covered by the Pelindaba treaty, my amendment also makes reference to nuclear-propelled vessels and, for the avoidance of doubt, I seek reassurance that Mauritius would not take exception to that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for their amendments. I appreciate that they have questions about how the treaty protects the full operation of the base, and I want to reassure them that the treaty enables the continued operation of the base to its full capability. The treaty and the Bill we are debating today will have zero impact on the day-to-day business on Diego Garcia. Importantly, it will not reduce our ability to deploy the full range of advanced military capabilities to Diego Garcia. I am putting some of this on the record, and the noble Baroness, as a former Defence Minister, will know the careful calibration of the language that I am using: I am putting it on the record so that we are all clear.
As I say, noble Lords will understand that I pick my words with care in this particular context. I cannot and will not discuss operational matters on the Floor of this place, but I am confident that the Chamber would not necessarily want me to. The long-standing UK position of neither confirming nor denying the location or presence of nuclear weapons must stand. But let us talk about the hypothetical. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, concern the application of the Pelindaba treaty. Mauritius is a signatory, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness said, to the treaty. The UK is not a signatory to the treaty but is a signatory to Protocols 1 and 2. I can confirm to the Chamber that the Governments of the UK and Mauritius are both satisfied that the Diego Garcia treaty is compatible with these existing obligations.
I also remind colleagues, because this is important—again, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, if I remember rightly from his remarks, and, indeed, the noble Baroness raised this—that we are not alone in the matter. The Government of the United States have also tested all aspects of the Diego Garcia treaty in depth and at the highest levels of the security establishment. They, too, are satisfied that it protects the full operation of the base. Indeed, when I was talking about the earlier amendments in answer to that, I quoted the remarks of Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his comments about being satisfied with the treaty in every aspect.
Amendments 63 and 88 therefore are not necessary. We do not need a review of the impacts of nuclear treaties on the future operation of the base, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has proposed, because the future operation of the base has been protected. I say to the noble Baroness that we do not need to reopen paragraph 1.a of Annex 1 to the treaty, as has been suggested, because this already provides for unrestricted—that is the key word—access for UK and US vessels to enter the sea of Diego Garcia. Paragraph 1.b.i provides for unrestricted ability to control the conduct and deployment of lethal capabilities.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I do of course understand the sensitivity of not discussing operational activity in a public domain. However, if I revert to the Minister’s understandable reliance on what I described at Second Reading as that “huge protection” in Article 1, that is explicitly in contradiction with Article 7(1). Article 7(1) says expressly with reference to international obligations or arrangements that, if they are not to be obtempered or agreed to, that must be provided for in this agreement. That is the dilemma that is perplexing my noble friend Lord Lilley and myself. We seem to have on the face of this treaty a self-evident contradiction.
I understand the point that the noble Baroness is making. What I am saying to her is that the Government of Mauritius, the Government of the UK and the Government of the US see no contradiction in what the treaty says, and explicitly lays out, in respect of the ability of Diego Garcia to operate in the way that it has always done, with the lethal capabilities as outlined elsewhere in the Bill.
I hope that is helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness as reassurance that the situation will stay the same as it is now. As I have said, all those three parties to that treaty are confident that that remains the case.
I will say, however, that, although resisting the amendments, I am grateful that they were tabled. They are really important amendments to have made in order for the Government to have put on the record important elements of the treaty and the Bill. We have been able to clarify for the Chamber, and for those who read our proceedings, that the position that we would all want to see will continue with respect to Diego Garcia and that the full capabilities will be maintained.
Let me be absolutely clear: the full operational use of the base is protected to ensure that the base is able to continue in every way that it always has done. I hope that is helpful. On the basis of the reassurances that I have made and the comments that I have put on the record, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
That is very helpful and I entirely respect what the Minister says. He is a man of obvious integrity and commitment to the defence of this country. I am comforted that he is speaking for the Government, and therefore that the Government will maintain the freedom to use the Diego Garcia base to its full capabilities. I am not persuaded that that is necessarily in line with the Pelindaba treaty. That does not worry me so much. It may worry the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, or any future Lord Hermer in Mauritius, but let us hope that they will be ignored. So I will, of course, withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 82, which is consequential upon Amendment 80. As the Minister referred to before, Amendment 80 had attracted some flattering imitation yesterday, but nevertheless I hope that we might be able to see progress on what I would consider to be a serious proposal to address some of the concerns that have been raised very sincerely. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said earlier, we have a lot of history to make good, and I agree.
This has been an unusual Committee stage of a Bill in many respects. Perhaps it is because this legislation and the treaty that it is connected to will have, unlike some other legislation that we often might consider to be indirect, a direct impact on people’s lives. They are a defined but diverse group of individuals who have been in touch with many noble Lords. Therefore, I believe that we have an obligation to treat this seriously. In Committee, there have been many passionate, but also proper and probing, questions on how the terms of the treaty will operate and how UK interests will also continue to be represented. We have just heard that from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and we heard it earlier from the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad.
Amendment 80 in my name is a proposition for an ongoing inter-parliamentary committee for the duration of the treaty. The Minister mentioned before that she felt it was perhaps a novel response. It is not entirely novel; there are precedents which I have based this on. There have been quite frequently free trade agreements that had parliamentary committees associated with them. There is the EFTA agreement, which the UK had been part of. There was the AWEPA for our African partners in parliaments, which we had been part of. There is doubt from many about how critical parts of the treaty negotiated by this Government will be handled, both by the UK and the Mauritian Governments, and operate through the commission.
We have heard many references today to the deeply flawed Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. It was fascinating for me to listen to this debate, because this House in 2021 passed a Motion—it happened to be in my name—about the ability for Parliament to have a straight up-and-down vote on treaties. The House passed an amendment to the then Trade Bill which stated that negotiating objectives or before-treaty negotiations would have to be presented to both Houses, and the House of Commons would have an opportunity to vote on those. I believe that those aspects would have been beneficial for this treaty. I think the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, forgot that he voted against that, so I am happy to remind him, just for the record, that on the latter part—on the first part, he was not in the House—in one of his very first votes in this House, he was against what he has been arguing so passionately for today.
My point is that there has not been a vote in the other place, so the only proper chance is here.
No, the case that the noble Lord was making passionately was about the faults in the CRaG process, and I agree with him about that. It is just that if he had not had his view, with his noble friends, in 2021, we would have had the enhanced processes for treaty scrutiny.
However, we are we are because the current Government were supportive of changing the CRaG process for up-down votes on treaties, and now they are against. The Opposition, who had been against then, are now in favour of it. It probably has to do with whoever is sitting on the government side of the House, rather than the opposition side, but we are where we are now. The issue is how we go forward, to some extent. That is not denying that there is still Report stage, and there will still be divisions potentially, but I wanted to flag at this stage, in Committee, the proposal to try to address some of the major concerns.
Before briefly addressing that specific part of the amendment, I want to put something on record, as there have been quite a few allusions today to the notion that the negotiations on this treaty were halted by the previous Administration. In a letter to the Foreign Affairs Committee from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, on 5 April 2024—just seven weeks before the Dissolution of Parliament—he reaffirmed that negotiations were ongoing and that questions on the future administration of the islands were subject to the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the UK and Mauritius. He also said in the letter:
“We will continue to update Chagossians as negotiations progress”.
The negotiations were ongoing at the time of the election. It is worth stating that on the record, because there has been quite a bit of misleading information today. It is interesting that the Foreign Affairs Committee had been making the case since 2008 for a strong moral case for resettlement. That was denied again in the letter from the Foreign Secretary in April 2024.
We have a moral duty to try to ensure that, whatever circumstances arise from the parliamentary proceedings, we have a mechanism by which we allow the Chagossian community to be represented. Through Amendment 80, my proposal is for an inter-parliamentary committee, with MPs from the Republic of Mauritius and MPs from the UK forming a committee for the duration of the treaty. We know, and I agree with much of what has been said today, that trust is low to non-existent among many in the Chagossian community and suspicion is very high. I acknowledge all of that. A means by which that can perhaps be addressed as the treaty is implemented, if it is brought into force, is one where UK and Mauritian parliamentarians, through dialogue, debate and mutual understanding, can observe and scrutinise their respective Executives. Back in their Parliaments, they can scrutinise how the treaty is operating, the implementation of the treaty, whether rights of return are being implemented, the right to self-determination as understood in customary international law, and access to compensation, resettlement and other forms of support.
The commission in the treaty is executive but this would add a parliamentary oversight function, which I believe would be of value. I hope that the amendment will receive cross-party support. I am open to discussing its particular wording, but I hope that the principle will receive support. We owe a moral duty to that community for ongoing representations to address their concerns and suspicions. I therefore beg to move Amendment 80.
My Lords, this is the last group of amendments in Committee. I am delighted to see so many noble Lords opposite taking a close interest in the Bill and what it will do to the Chagossian people. I am delighted that they are taking an interest in what their Government are finally doing to the Chagossians.
I have already spoken to my noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendments, which are similar in drafting to those of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. I must say that I prefer my noble friend’s amendments to his Amendments 80 and 82, principally because they include reference to a referendum of the Chagossians. My noble friend the Earl of Leicester has talked about how deficient the current survey being undertaken by the International Agreements Committee is. I think that we could greatly improve on that, but the best mechanism would be simply to hold a referendum of the Chagossians asking them whether they approve of this treaty.
I know that the Liberal Democrats were previously very supportive of a referendum, but, despite criticising the position of my party, this amendment implies that they may not now be so supportive. I hope to see information to the contrary from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. His amendment also differs from my noble friend Lord Lilley’s, in that it would apparently come into force after the treaty, whereas that of my noble friend would come into operation beforehand, which seems much more appropriate. I am of course happy to take up the offer of the noble Lord to discuss the wording of amendments because, as is so often the case in your Lordships’ House, we bring about improvements to a Bill only if we work together. I am certainly prepared, from my point of view, to work with him on the drafting of these amendments. I hope my noble friend Lord Lilley would be involved as well, so we can get them into a form where we can support them on Report and ask the Government to move on this.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for the considered and balanced contribution that he has made throughout the Bill but particularly on his Amendment 80. The amendment is interesting, and I understand the effect that he is seeking to achieve. It is a welcome addition to our debate today. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, earlier, I will also take Amendment 81K into consideration in the comments that I am about to make.
The proposal put forward by the noble Lord is a novel one. I could not recall any examples of where there have been joint committees set up between different legislatures in this way, but the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned some, and I will reflect on those to see whether there is anything we can glean from them that might be useful.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has made some changes to his amendment, but, unfortunately, we still cannot accept it in its current form today. The structure is not something that the treaty with Mauritius was drafted to contemplate. Of course, there is nothing to prevent parliamentarians in the UK engaging with their equivalents in Mauritius on these matters, but we do not see this as being a matter for domestic legislation in the way that we are considering it at the moment because, obviously, that does not have any effect on what the Mauritians themselves do.
Some elements in the noble Lord’s proposed scope for a joint parliamentary commission seem to be very much for the UK alone, so we could look at them. The Government are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is based on respect. As noble Lords will be aware, we have established a Chagossian contact group to give Chagossians a formal role that shapes decision-making on the UK Government’s support for their community. We are also providing additional support to build the capacity of community groups so that more are eligible for grants.
There are two elements in the amendment that are an issue for the Government and that we will disagree on at the moment, and those are the right to self-determination and compensation. On self-determination, we have been over this several times in this House and in the other place. To put it simply and plainly, in legal terms no question of self-determination applies. The English courts, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, have proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritius. On compensation, again it is legally the case that the UK paid compensation to the Chagossians in the 1980s and the English courts in a series of judgments and the European Court of Human Rights have ruled that this settled the claims definitively.
Having said all that, I recognise and understand the noble Lord’s intentions and his determination with this amendment. He has been consistent about arguing along these lines throughout our consideration of this Bill, and I suggest that we meet to discuss his amendment in more detail to see if we can find a way to move this forward ahead of Report. With that, I hope that for today he would be happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am glad there are so many witnesses who saw my ability to bring the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and the Minister together with some form of consensus at the end of this Committee. I am grateful for both the noble Lord’s and the Minister’s responses. She will know that I have been keen to see the areas where we can move towards formalisation and a degree of statutory underpinning for some structures of ongoing representation, because this is a special case. Even if it was novel—I am sure officials will now be studying all the examples I have given; by the time we get to Report I will try to find some more—I believe it is justified, given the circumstances are in. I am grateful for the willingness to discuss this. There are ongoing debates on the particular aspects the Minister said she had difficulty with. I will happily give way to the noble Lord.
I was just going to give him another example, not at British level but at the European level. There is of course the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which has Members of the European Parliament and all the representatives of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.
I am grateful. We have even got some good elements of Brexit incorporated in this debate as well, so we are on a roll. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw, on the basis that we will be returning to this to have what I hope will be constructive discussions with the Minister.