Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Jerome Mayhew Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

The treaty that the Bill will implement is shocking for so many reasons: the security implications, the staggering costs, and the voices that it has ignored—the voices of British Chagossians. Their views and concerns are many and varied. I had the privilege of meeting members of the community when they came to Parliament, while the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), met British Chagossians only once, and that was on the very day that the treaty was signed—far too late for their voices to have any influence. They are rightly frustrated that they have been excluded from negotiations and denied meaningful engagement. It is painfully clear that their voices were not considered; if they had been, the treaty might have placed their rights at its very centre.

Instead, article 6 gives Mauritius the freedom to resettle Chagossians, but not the duty to do so. After half a century of waiting for it, their right of return is left entirely at the discretion of a foreign Government. Under article 11, despite the billions of pounds that the Bill will transfer to Mauritius, only a fraction—in the form of a trust fund—is intended for Chagossians. Even then, it will be administered solely by Mauritius, with no guarantee that British Chagossians will have any say in how it is spent.

The treaty says that the UK and Mauritius want to

“recognise the wrongs of the past”,

but how can we recognise a wrong if we refuse to listen to those who suffered it? New clause 7, tabled by the shadow Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), is vital because it would require the Government to listen to and consult the Chagossian community here in the UK, and to report back on how their rights are being upheld. That would give British Chagossians the voice that they have been denied again and again.

Another vital issue is the risk that the Bill poses to one of the most precious marine environments on earth. The waters around the Chagos Islands form one of the world’s largest and most pristine marine protected areas. As we have heard, it is a haven of biodiversity, untouched by industrial fishing since 2010. Yet the treaty places that fragile ecosystem in jeopardy. Mauritius has promised to establish a new marine protected area, but it lacks the capacity to enforce it. It has no navy, and its coastguard of nine vessels is already stretched by patrolling waters thousands of miles away. By contrast, the UK has spent over £1.2 million since 2022 on monitoring and protecting those seas, developing world-leading expertise in remote enforcement through ships, sensors and satellite imagery.

Illegal fishing is already rife across the Indian ocean. China’s distant-water fleet is the largest in the world and the worst global offender for illegal fishing, according to the illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing index. What confidence can we have that Mauritius—a close ally of China—will be able or willing to resist such pressure and protect these fragile waters?

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)]

Is my hon. Friend aware that Mauritius does not have a navy?

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. It has no navy and only nine coastguard vessels; it is not able to protect those waters.

Even if illegal fishing were controlled, the Mauritian Fisheries Minister has already spoken of wanting to issue fishing licences around the Chagos Islands. The agreement provides no guarantees; the extent of future protections will be decided only after the Bill has passed. New clauses 3 and 4 are essential to ensure parliamentary oversight of any future agreement and regular reporting on coral health, fish stocks and biodiversity.

As it stands, the Bill would hand billions of pounds of UK taxpayers’ money to Mauritius, with no guarantees of protection of the marine environment, no provisions to safeguard the rights of British Chagossians, and no mechanism for Britain to monitor whether the safeguards around the strategic military base on Diego Garcia are effective. The Conservative amendments offer a chance for the Government to be transparent, publish the legal advice on which they surrendered the Chagos Islands, and give the House a vote on the payment of £35 billion to Mauritius. The treaty is damaging in so many ways, but let us not make the damage worse by waving it through unchecked.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

I will primarily focus on new clause 8, which is in my name and the names of colleagues. First and foremost, this Bill is about perfecting the decolonisation of the British Indian Ocean Territory—that is self-evident in clause 2—but it does that in a way that ignores a primary component of decolonisation. We subscribe to United Nations resolution 1514. That resolution talks about respecting not only the integrity of territory, but self-determination. The British Indian Ocean Territory has existed, de facto and de jure, for over 50 years, yet the Government’s approach in justifying this completion of decolonisation is to focus solely on territorial integrity by claiming that the Chagos islands are, in fact, part of Mauritius.

Resolution 1514 contains a number of components. Its first point is that

“The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights”.

Its second point is that

“All peoples have the right to self-determination”.

The question for this House is surely this: are the Chagossians a people? I certainly think that they are. They are distinct from the Mauritians by their ethnic background, by their religion and by geography. Mauritius and the Chagos islands are over 1,300 miles apart, approximately as far as it is from this House to north Africa, so after 50 years of the existence of the BIOT, it really is a stretch to say that the sole defining issue is that of territorial integrity. To say that is to ignore the right to self-determination.

This nation has dealt with decolonisation before, and we did not approach it on the basis that it is only about territorial integrity. Take the example of India. We decolonised in India, but we allowed it to be subject to self-determination—that is why we have India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is quite clear that this is not a situation in which territorial integrity trumps everything else. It does not trump self-determination. An experience of decolonisation such as India’s shows that territorial integrity is secondary to self-determination, yet the right of the people who claim the Chagos islands as their homeland to any measure of self-determination is the one thing that has been utterly ignored in this process. We have in our history the shameful episode of their forceful removal from the Chagos islands, and now under this treaty, we are going to compound that shame by legitimising that removal. Saying that this is only about territorial integrity is to legitimise their forceful removal from the Chagos islands—that is how we get around the question of self-determination. That is wrong. The people of the Chagos islands are a people. They are a people with a homeland; therefore, under international law, they are a people with a right to self-determination, so why do this treaty and this Bill trash that right? That is the fundamental haunting question when it comes to the humanity and international legal requirements of the situation that prevails.

The Government are obviously holding to the line, “It is only about territorial integrity,” but they are hoisted by their own petard, because they have recognised the Chagossians as a people by setting aside some millions of pounds for them. They cannot say it is only about territorial integrity, and there is no people to whom to give the right to self-determination, and then say, “For those people to whom we deny the right to self-determination, here is some conscience money.” They cannot do that, yet that is what the treaty does.

The BIOT recognised the separateness of the people of the Chagos islands, and even the much-vaunted advisory judgment of the International Court of Justice gives respect and acknowledgment—to an extent—to the question of self-determination. At one point, the judgment states:

“It follows that any detachment by the administering Power of part of a non-self-governing territory, unless based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned, is contrary to the right to self-determination.”

Even that advisory judgment recognised the exception of the freely expressed and genuine will of the people, but that is what we have not had on this issue. This Government have gone out of their way to deny the free and genuine expression of opinion by the people whose homeland is the Chagos islands. That shameful indictment compounds what we did to those people at the end of the 1960s. The Government now totally dehumanise their human rights by saying, “You have no rights whatever when it comes to self-determination.” That is fundamentally wrong.

If the splitting of that wider colony in 1965 was illegitimate because there was no self-determination, according to the advisory judgment of the Court, then equally the Chagos islands rejoining Mauritius without self-determination is illegitimate. The Government cannot have it both ways, but that is what this Bill is seeking to do. The Government say that because it was illegitimate to split the Chagos islands off from Mauritius in 1965 because there was no self-determination, the Bill is about territorial integrity only, but if the basis of rejoining the Chagos islands to Mauritius is without self-determination, then that equally is illegitimate. Those are some of the points that this Government have not faced, and if they have faced them, they have not answered them. This House is legitimately asking those questions tonight, and waiting for answers. If those answers do not come, it will illustrate how this is the tawdry, unacceptable and unenforceable Bill that it will ultimately be seen to be.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The Minister will try his best in a few minutes to defend this wholly indefensible Bill, but the public know what it is: they see it as an absolute sell-out. I suspect that the Government Members who are not filling the green Benches see it as a sell-out, too. That is why every single one of them failed to support the Bill in Committee, save for one brave or perhaps misguided Member.

The public can see that they are a weak Government without the backbone necessary to stand up for the British public’s interests. They see this Bill as the sell-out that it is geopolitically, with the Government blind to the associated security risks, the sell-out that it is financially, with £35 billion going to a foreign Government, and the sell-out that it is of the Chagossian people, with their exclusion from negotiations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Graham Stuart]

We are all wrestling with the question “Why?” As my hon. Friend has said, the Government’s position was clear in 2017: namely, that the ICJ had no power over a deal we made with a Commonwealth member. Perhaps this Prime Minister has, without telling us, reversed that in some way, and the Government have decided that this should be subject to the ICJ, in which case the Minister would have a point, but should we not know that we made ourselves subject to the ICJ when previously we were not? What other answers are there?

[Jerome Mayhew]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to ask those questions—questions that have been asked of the Government time and again throughout this legislative process, but to which we simply have not had an answer.

The Government seem to be blind to the risk of the craven withdrawal of influence from the Indo-Pacific region. This is more Jonathan Powell. He was, of course, the Prime Minister’s envoy, and the architect of the negotiation and the deal. The more I learn of Jonathan Powell, the more I realise that he seems to have a long-term instinct to downplay the threat from China—a threat in the Indian Ocean through this negotiated deal. Let us not forget that this is the same Jonathan Powell who now wears a different hat. He is now the National Security Adviser, and that, very unusually, was a political appointment. There is the question of his involvement—or perhaps it is not his involvement— in the collapse of the Chinese spying case. We are asked to believe that he was not involved in it, and that seems baffling as well.

[Dr Evans]

Was my hon. Friend as surprised as I was to find out that the National Security Adviser does not speak to his deputy? [Interruption.]

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. I do not think we need this chuntering from the Front Bench. Can we ensure that the speech remains within the legislation that we are debating and voting on tonight?

[Jerome Mayhew]

I will endeavour to do so, Madam Chair. In fact, I will more than endeavour; I will do so.

The reason this is relevant is that it speaks to new clause 5. While the Government have their head in the sand in respect of Mauritius’s relations with China—this is why it is important, Madam Chair—their first argument is that Mauritius will not be influenced by China, and is it not awful of us to suggest that it might be. I raised this question with the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), back in October last year. I raised concerns that Mauritius was an ally of China and was open to influence from that country. With the disdain for which he is now famous, the right hon. Gentleman pooh-poohed that. He said that Mauritius was not a Chinese ally because it was not part of the belt and road agreement in Africa.

When we look at the relationship between China and Mauritius, however, we see that they have strong bilateral ties that go back to 1972, on economic co-operation and diplomatic support. China is the largest trading partner of Mauritius, which entered into a free trade agreement with China—the first such free trade agreement that China has entered into on the African continent. Perhaps it did not need to belong to the belt and road agreement in addition to its free trade agreement.

There is influence expressed through investments, loans and grants. China built the international airport terminal for Mauritius. It has invested in the Jinfei economic and trade co-operation zone—a flagship belt and road initiative—and between 2000 and 2012 China also funded 47 development projects in Mauritius through loans and grants. So forgive me, Madam Chair, if I do not swallow the argument that Mauritius is wholly beyond the influence of China.

The Government say, “If Mauritius is under the influence of China, don’t worry, because China don’t support this deal. China will be arguing against this deal.” We were told by the Prime Minister that China, Russia and Iran do not support the Chagos deal. Therefore, presumably my geopolitical security fears must be wrong. Well, Ministers have repeatedly been asked for the evidence that China does not support this deal, and none has been provided to date. If I am wrong on that, perhaps the Minister will say from the Dispatch Box where China has expressed its concerns about this deal.

If you were to listen to the Chinese ambassador to Mauritius, even you, Madam Chair, would be forgiven for thinking that China is thoroughly in favour of this deal, because he sent “massive congratulations” to Mauritius and said that China “fully supports” Mauritius’s attempt to “safeguard national security.” That is the definition of doublespeak if it does not mean that China is wholly in favour of this deal and is celebrating it with Mauritius. I am not convinced, and neither are the Government.

[Mike Kane]

I am fond of the hon. Gentleman, who speaks of “doublespeak”. It was not long ago in my political lifetime that the former Member for Witney, the then Prime Minister, invited His Excellency Xi Jinping for a pint in The Plough at Cadsden, in Oxfordshire. As he departed back to China from the airport in my constituency, I sat with the Prime Minister as he fawned over the Chinese Administration like it was some papal visit. What is going on with the Conservatives? Are you divided on what our approach to China should be?

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. Mr Kane, do not use the word “you”, because that refers to me.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am not often compared to the noble Lord Cameron, but it is absolutely right that as the geopolitical environment changes, so should our policies. We on this side of the House are realists.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

As I was in government at the time, I can answer the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Mike Kane): the golden decade proposed by the then Chancellor, with whom I did not get on very well, was a disaster. If anything should have been learned by that, his Government should have learned that when you sup with the Chinese, you better have a very long spoon, because they suck you in. We got nothing out of those 10 years, and now look at us.

[The Chairman]

Order. Mr Mayhew and colleagues who hope to intervene, let us remember the scope of the debate in front of us.

[Jerome Mayhew]

It is for exactly those reasons that we so desperately need new clause 5, which would require an annual security report to the Intelligence and Security Committee. That would mean that we are not caught with our heads in the sand again.

We are beginning to build a picture of a slippery Government who are not being honest with the British people, not being honest about the legal justifications for this deal and not being honest about the security risk associated with the deal, and who are now being slippery about the financial cost as well. Again, the Prime Minister himself said that this slippery deal was going to cost the taxpayer £101 million a year for 99 years. He rounded that down from £10 billion, which my maths would have come to, to £3.4 billion. Through a freedom of information request, the Government Actuary’s Department has confirmed that the actual cost is £34.7 billion. Did the Prime Minister just get the decimal point in the wrong place, or was it something more sinister?

Madam Chair, you could be forgiven for thinking that the Government should no longer be trusted. They are changing their story in relation to this agreement, and they changed their story in relation to the China spy trial collapse. We need new clause 1 so that no payments can be made without direct approval from the House of Commons. At least then the Government would have to explain the real figures and be open to transparency and scrutiny.

The public see through Labour’s deal, and they know a sell-out when they see one. The Opposition amendments and new clauses bring transparency to expose this sell-out from a weak Prime Minister without the backbone to stand up for Britain. No wonder Labour Members are about to vote against them.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I will be brief, but I am very pleased to be able to speak in this debate as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on the Chagos islands, which last week had its 103rd meeting. It has been ably supported by David Snoxell, the former British high commissioner to Mauritius, who has done incredible work with his knowledge of and empathy for the Chagossian people. There are two former chairs of the group in the Committee at the moment—the hon. Members for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) and for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Mike Kane)—and the former Member for Crawley was also chair of the group at one time.

We founded that group a long time ago to listen to, and take action in support of, the Chagos islanders, who were angry that they had been forcibly removed from their homes, angry at the way they had been treated by successive British Governments, and very angry at the initial decision that was taken and the sheer brutality that went with it. To give Members a brief example, in 1973 a 20-year-old Chagossian woman, Liseby Elysé, while carrying her unborn child, was forcibly removed from the Chagos island of Peros Banhos. She lost her unborn child soon after her traumatic upheaval and the journey, and she and her husband survived with considerable uncertainty and in very precarious living conditions, like all other Chagossians. However, 45 years later, in 2018, she represented her community at The Hague when she spoke about her life and her losses. Her story was compelling and memorable, like those of so many other Chagos islanders, because of the personal horror, trauma and abuse that they suffered. They have always demanded and fought for their right of return, and that is the central core of what the all-party parliamentary group on the Chagos islands has done.

I realise there are now different opinions in the group about the sovereignty or otherwise of the islands, but there has always been a fundamental agreement on the right of return. That led to massive legal actions, which were bravely fought by the Chagos islanders with very little support. There were a few people such as Richard Gifford, their solicitor, who were fantastic in their support. Eventually, we gathered wider support, and we got favourable decisions at all levels of justice around the world, including at the United Nations General Assembly.

It is worth recalling, as many Members have done, the 1965 decision made by Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister. In offering Mauritius its independence, he came to this extraordinarily complicated deal, which essentially involved the United States getting a base on Diego Garcia and, in return, Mauritius getting its independence. Somewhere along the line, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire (Danny Kruger) pointed out, there would either be a discount on the next generation of nuclear weapons, or free delivery of weapons at some point in the future. A lot of this was shrouded in mystery, in the private conversations between Wilson and Prime Minister Ramgoolam at the time, so there is a lot of confusion surrounding that.

Somewhere at that time the idea was to set up the British Indian Ocean Territory, and somewhere at that time the decision was made that the archipelago—including Peros Banhos, which is a considerable distance from Diego Garcia—would be separated from Mauritius as well and that it would have to be depopulated, hence the utter brutality of the removal of the entire population from the islands. So the question that many Members have brought up is this: should the Chagos islands be separate from Mauritius or part of Mauritius? Interestingly, during the 1965 discussions Mauritius never accepted the separation. It never accepted that the Chagos islands should be separated either constitutionally or in any other way from Mauritius. As we know, the decision was basically forced on the Mauritians in return for their independence.

We now have a situation in which we have finally got a treaty. It has its imperfections—of that everyone is agreed. Personally, I am less than happy about the idea of a massive military base on Diego Garcia, and even less happy that it might be there in 100 years’ time. However, a treaty has been agreed that will ensure the right of Chagos islanders to return to the Chagos islands, but unfortunately only a limited right of return to Diego Garcia itself. I am looking forward to the Minister’s speech, and I would be grateful if was able to say a bit more about the rights of access to Diego Garcia for Chagos islanders, their right to visit the church and the graves of their ancestors, and whether there is some possibility of a degree of residence on Diego Garcia. There is no other place in the world where a military base is surrounded by an entirely depopulated area, in this case an island, and I would be grateful if the Minister was able to say something about that.