(1 year, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That the Bill be read a Second time.
On 22 May, the Prime Minister signed a landmark treaty with the Republic of Mauritius that guarantees the continued UK operational control of Diego Garcia for the next 99 years and beyond.
Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)
Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?
Mr Bailey
I congratulate my hon. Friend on his recent appointment. It is important, right at the outset, that we understand that there has been almost no change in position. I refer him to the comments of the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) in 2023, when he stated that his
“primary objective is to ensure the continued effective operation of our defence facility on Diego Garcia.”—[Official Report, 13 June 2023; Vol. 734, c. 151.]
Can my hon. Friend confirm that that has not changed?
Order. I know that the hon. Member also wants to make a speech. I would not like him to use up his whole speech in an intervention in the first 10 seconds of the debate.
It was a timely intervention. I am happy to confirm that this precise deal delivers on the objective as originally set out when the Conservatives were in government. It secures the continued operation of the UK-US military base.
Several hon. Members rose—
To be fair, I will give way to one Opposition Member, and then I will make some progress. I give way to the former Deputy Prime Minister.
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his appointment. I had not intended to intervene so early, but I will, given that the record of the previous Government has come up. Can he confirm whether it is the case, as was the position under the previous Government, that we will retain sovereignty after 99 years on a rolling basis? Can he confirm the basis on which he is compensating the Mauritians, because it certainly was not the case that the last Government would have agreed to a remotely similar sum being paid? On this, as on so many other measures, there is an enormous gap between the negotiating position set out under the last Government and the total capitulation by Labour when they came into office.
To borrow a phrase, if the right hon. Member shows me his, I will show him mine. The whole point is that our deal is published. If he would like to go into the files and dig out his deal and publish it, we would be able to see where this deal has enhanced those protections, secured the operation of the base and got a better deal for the British people. I would be very happy if he would like to go into his files and publish the deal.
Several hon. Members rose—
I will come back to the former Deputy Prime Minister and then I will make some progress.
The Minister invites me to respond to him. He needs to appreciate that there is an enormous difference between a tough negotiating position in the British national interest and the capitulation of the Government’s deal.
I do not think the right hon. Gentleman wants to show me his draft deal, and there is a very good reason for that: this deal, this treaty and this Bill improve on that deal.
I said I would take one intervention from each side of the House. I have done that, so I will make some progress, but I am certain that Members will get another chance in a moment.
This treaty is indispensable to keeping Britain secure at home and strong abroad. It is an expression of our unbreakable defence and intelligence bonds with the United States. It strengthens and extends our power to respond to terrorists and hostile states, wherever they may be. It protects some of the world’s busiest trade routes, on which British businesses and consumers rely. It is a long-term investment in our core national interests, and it will benefit British people for generations to come.
I am going to make some progress, but I will be happy to give way in a moment.
Before I start getting into the detail, I want to recognise up front the Chagossians affected by decisions taken by Britain many years ago. We recognise in the preamble to the universal deep regret over what happened. It is acknowledged on the face of the treaty, and I know there is cross-party support for the Chagossians, although there is a range of views on the deal within the Chagossian community. I want to place that on the record right at the start of the debate—[Interruption.] I will return to the Chagossians in a moment.
Both Houses have now had the opportunity to scrutinise the treaty under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who is sitting next to me, gave evidence to three parliamentary Committees during the scrutiny period, allowing Members of this House and the other place to fully interrogate the details of the treaty. The International Agreements Committee concluded that if the treaty were not ratified, the future of the base on Diego Garcia would be at greater risk. The purpose of this Bill is to make the necessary changes to domestic law to implement the treaty, so that it can be ratified and brought into force.
Let me remind the House why we needed to secure this treaty. The Diego Garcia base is central to our national security—I know that all Members of this House will recognise that very simple fact.
I am going to make a wee bit more progress, but I always like giving way to a Luke, and I will do so in a bit—do not worry—but not quite yet.
I pay tribute to all Members of the House who have taken the time to scrutinise the treaty in detail.
Allow me to set out why it is so vital. The importance of the base cannot be overstated. The joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has played a vital role in defending the UK and its allies for over 50 years. The base plays a key role in operations that support UK forces and our allies across the middle east, east Africa and south Asia. Its deepwater port, airfield, and advanced communications and surveillance capabilities, give the UK and our allies crucial strategic capabilities, which have played a key role in missions to disrupt high-value terrorists, including Islamic State threats to the United Kingdom.
But the base on Diego Garcia was under threat. Had we not signed the treaty, we could have faced further legal rulings against us within weeks, because the negotiations begun by the Conservatives had been stayed. Further legal rulings might have included arbitrary proceedings against the UK under annex 7 of the UN convention on the law of the sea, known as UNCLOS.
In a moment. I will come to the hon. Gentleman—he should not worry.
A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. It would impact on our ability to protect the electromagnetic spectrum from interference, and impair our ability to ensure access to the base by air and sea, to patrol the maritime area around the base and to support the base’s critical national security functions.
Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)
My hon. Friend has spoken about the important capabilities of this vital US-UK base. Does he agree that it would be dangerous and counterproductive to put those capabilities at any risk—certainly if that could have happened in a matter of weeks or months?
I agree, and it is precisely the reason why the Conservative Government started the negotiations in the first place. You do not accidentally rock up one day to the Foreign Office and decide to start international negotiations; you do so because there is a clear risk to the future of the military base. That is why the Conservatives started the negotiations, why they had 11 rounds of negotiations, and why we had to conclude the deal.
As I have taken one intervention from this side of the House, I am happy to take another from the Opposition Benches.
The International Court of Justice ruling is not binding. It is not in law. We did not have to abide by it. Why are we giving away British territory to Mauritius and then renting it back? There was no need for us to do so. Why are we doing it?
I have a lot of time for the right hon. Gentleman. The provisions of those judgments affect the operations of the base—that is what is important here. It is also about the extension of the judgments, because other powers could be used on the basis of those judgments. That is the reason that the Conservatives started the negotiations. [Interruption.] If they would like to explain that there was a better reason that they started the negotiations—if it was not to ensure the security of this vital base—they are welcome to do so.
If the hon. Gentleman would like to explain why the Conservatives started the negotiations, I am happy to give way.
I thank the Minister for giving way, and I welcome him to his new position. He keeps saying “could”, “if” and that things “might” have happened. Will he accept that the legal judgments that have been cast down, which he is using as evidence, are not binding? Does he accept that when he talks about our deal—in other words, the last Government’s deal—he is actually being a bit duplicitous? There was no deal, because we ended the negotiations.
I think the Opposition have got their attack line sorted, but not the reasons why they started the negotiations.
Order. I did not like the word “duplicitous”, and I definitely did not like the carrying on afterwards. I am sure that “duplicitous” will not be said again today.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will make some progress, but I will take Members’ interventions in just a wee moment. [Interruption.] The shadow Foreign Secretary will get a go in a moment, but if she wants to continue shouting at me, she is more than welcome to do so; I will make some progress in the meantime. I hope she understands that this debate is best approached in a good-natured way, and I am certain that she will be doing so, with less shouting.
As I just mentioned—the hon. Gentleman might have missed it—I will give way in a moment, but I will now make some progress.
Courts and international bodies were already making decisions that undermined our position. Others would have followed suit, taking us down a path towards making the base inoperable. This Government will not allow that to happen. There has been a wealth of misinformation on these legal points, and those who have suggested that the UK should simply ignore international law fail to recognise the true impacts of these cascading adverse rulings, which would have not only impeded our ability to control and operate the base, but would have swiftly undermined our ability to control the waters, the air and the electromagnetic spectrum on which the base relies. Such rulings would have fundamentally undermined the very capabilities that make the base so uniquely valuable to the UK and the US, our allies.
This treaty eliminates that legal threat. Under the treaty, the UK will retain all the rights and authorities necessary for full operational control of Diego Garcia. It provides for unrestricted use of the base.
In just one moment.
The treaty provides for control over the movement of all persons and goods on the base, and for control over the electromagnetic spectrum used for communications. It ensures that nothing can be built within a buffer zone of 24 nautical miles without our say so, and it delivers an effective veto on any development in the Chagos archipelago that threatens the base—something that the previous Government failed to secure in their negotiations. It prohibits foreign security forces from establishing a presence on the outer islands.
I congratulate the Minister on his new position
May I get one little moment of agreement here? The Government say they abide by the law. Given the opt-out that we had, the original judgment was specifically not found in law, because we did not allow the ICJ to rule on Commonwealth issues. The question is a matter of law, so if the Minister is suggesting to the House that other actions would have taken place, they would have been unlawful. In what world was it necessary to block off those by assuming that this was law? It was not lawful.
The Foreign Office and the Government published the Government’s legal position when the treaty was laid. That assessment says:
“The longstanding legal view of the United Kingdom is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty”
in any future sovereignty litigation. That important and long-standing view predates this Government. Again, it was one of the reasons why the Conservative Government began the negotiations and held 11 rounds.
Alex Ballinger
Does the Minister not think it is the height of hypocrisy for those in the last Government, who negotiated 85% of this treaty over 11 rounds, to wait until they were in opposition to make these claims, none of which they made during their negotiations?
I thank my hon. Friend for that. It must be quite a freeing experience, because we now know that nearly every single legacy Tory MP during the last Government—whose Ministers started the negotiations, negotiated a deal, and made statements and answered questions in this House—were not actually supporting their Front Benchers, which is what we saw, but were deeply upset with the Conservative Government. If that is their genuine position, not just their political position now, they should have raised those concerns with the Foreign Secretary at the time. They should have been clear about it, but I believe that not many of them did so, and that tells a story.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman to his promoted position. If he is asking the House to thank him for negotiating what we already have, I think our thanks will be a long time in coming, because the outcome of the negotiations is pretty poor as far as this country is concerned. Surely we have given away what is of most strategic importance in this space as we now have to notify the Mauritian Government any time we want to do anything there. We do not currently have to do that, and therefore the element of surprise has been lost.
I have a lot of time for the hon. Gentleman, but I am afraid he is incorrect about the notification criteria. There is a lot of fake news out there—which I and the Minister beside me, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, have corrected in this House before—about the suggestion that pre-notification of action is required; it is not. As is explicitly set out in the documents, we do not need to undertake pre-notification. It is established under the criteria that post-action notification for overseas bases is normal, and that would be normal for the UK and our overseas allies that have overseas bases. It is not unusual, and he will be familiar with the fact that there is further international reporting of any military action. It is important that we go on the facts. Some people are worried about the situation that the hon. Gentleman outlined, but I can reassure him that they do not need to worry about it, because what he said is not accurate.
I sincerely congratulate my hon. Friend on his new position. I have to say to him that I have never found it a satisfactory basis for arguments or positions in this Chamber to say that those on the other side are doing it. However, I do think it is important that we are consistent. When we were in opposition and the Conservatives were in government, they made the Foreign Secretary a Member of the House of Lords, and we created about it. We shouted about how someone in a senior Cabinet position should be directly accountable to this House. We now have a super-active Attorney General making many controversial decisions. Does my hon. Friend agree with me that we should be making the case that the Attorney General should be in this House, not the other place?
That is not a matter for me in relation to this Bill, but my hon. Friend has put his views on the record, and I am certain that others on the Front Bench will have heard what he has said.
Several hon. Members rose—
The Minister has made it absolutely apparent that this is about the long-term security of the base, so could he explain why, under article 13, if after 99 years the Mauritians decide not to negotiate, the base will just stop. We will get first refusal, but we can easily see that the Chinese would outbid us because we in this country decide that that is not affordable. We are a hostage to fortune, and that base will crumble. He has not secured the base, he has just deferred the issue by four generations, and this House will then have to decide what to do.
It is good that the hon. Member has read the detail of the treaty. As he will know that, at the end of the initial 99-year lease, a first refusal will be offered to the United Kingdom. That is the right place to be, and that offer will mean—as he describes it, in four generations’ time—there is a decision for this House to take about what it wants to do based on the circumstances at the time. This gives us first refusal, so we can conceivably see that full control of the UK-US base on Diego Garcia could extend well beyond the 99 years I have mentioned.
Richard Tice
Does the Minister accept that we owned the freehold of the Chagos islands, and does he agree with me that in the mid-1960s we paid Mauritius £3 million in old money—some 80 million quid in today’s money—to cede all future claims over sovereignty?
The legal analysis that this Government have received, and indeed that the last Government received, showed that the position of UK sovereignty over the Diego Garcia military base was putting the base’s operation at risk. The reason why the last Government began the negotiations was to secure the continuing operation of the base, and it is the reason why we are doing so. Securing the future operation of that base is the primary concern of this Government. Indeed, as we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey), it was the primary concern of the last Government as well. That is what this deal secures, and it is really important that that is understood clearly: the base is what matters in relation to its continuing operation, and that is what this deal secures.
I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman first and then come to the hon. Gentleman.
Could I ask the Minister to return to the human cost and the human story? In 1968, the Chagossians first began to be removed from Diego Garcia and the archipelago. Their treatment was abominable and disgusting by any stretch of the imagination. It needs a bit more than a statement of regret; it needs a full-hearted apology to all the Chagossian people for the way they were treated.
Since there is a legal judgment that the Chagos islands in their entirety, including the archipelago and Diego Garcia, should return to Mauritius, is this treaty not just completing work that was not properly done in the 1960s? Would the Minister confirm that the question of returning to live on the outer islands is agreed, but be clearer about the Chagos islanders who want to return to Diego Garcia, either to visit or to reside, in the future? History has treated them badly, and that needs to put it right.
Order. I always respect the right hon. Gentleman, and I could put him down to speak because of his knowledge—if he wants me to, I can certainly add him to the list—but it would be better if we had shorter interventions.
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about the way the Chagossians were treated. For those who have a copy of the treaty to hand, part of the preamble says that the parties are
“Conscious that past treatment of Chagossians has left a deeply regrettable legacy, and committed to supporting the welfare of all Chagossians”.
That is in the treaty because their treatment was unacceptable, as he has explained, and it has caused a legacy of pain and suffering for that community. It is the reason why the Foreign Office Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, has engaged so much with the different views of a range of Chagossian voices in this debate.
I will come on to answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question when the interventions slow down a wee bit but, to get ahead of that, people will be able to visit Diego Garcia. Chagossians will be able to visit Diego Garcia as part of this treaty, which they are not currently able to do, but they will not be able to reside on Diego Garcia. They will be able to do so on some of the outer islands, for which the provisions will be different, but the military base is a military base for a reason, and although people will be able to visit, they will not be able to reside there. I will come back to that in due course.
If the hon. Member does not mind, I will come back to him when I deal with the Chagossians later, but in the meantime I am happy to take the other intervention.
Lincoln Jopp
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way on the negotiations. He is making great play of the fact that the previous Government started the negotiations and that there were 11 rounds of them. Is he not aware that, in 1965, the United Nations passed a resolution saying that we should enter into conversations with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. Those negotiations went on for 17 years and ended in 1981. In 1982, we all know what happened. So it is not where we start; it is where we finish.
I say politely to the hon. Gentleman—for whom I have a lot of time, and I respect his military service—that that comparison we have seen of the British Indian Ocean Territory with the Falkland Islands is shameful. I have seen the tweets from the Conservative party asking, with a map of the Falkland Islands, “Are they next?”—a shameful comparison, which stokes the flames of division and threatens the sovereignty of such overseas territories. Let me be clear, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth from the Foreign Office has been clear at the Dispatch Box: there are no changes or implications for any other British overseas territories. Indeed, the British overseas territories support the deal. I hope that we will not need to revisit this again, but any implication that seeks to apply the experience of BIOT to other overseas territories is unhelpful to them. I am certain that the hon. Gentleman wishes to create no question marks over those overseas territories.
Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)
To go back to the point that the Minister was making earlier about control, can he confirm to the House that, contrary to the reasoned amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), we are not ceding control of the Diego Garcia military base, consistent with clause 3?
My hon. Friend is exactly right. On the reasoned amendments, my colleague who is to conclude the debate, the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, will respond to some of the details of the reasoned amendment selected by Mr Speaker. However, there is a lot of misinformation about this treaty, and I believe that in some cases it is deliberate misinformation to confuse the picture. Clearly, securing the operation of the base is the priority of this Government and of this treaty. Indeed, I believe in good faith that it was the priority of the previous Government as well, which is why they started the negotiations and held them for 11 rounds, and why we concluded them, because we agreed with the previous Government that securing the future operation of the base was the priority. That is why they started them; that is why we completed them.
Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)
The Minister has already outlined the support of the British overseas territories. Will he please remind us of who else supports the Bill? Who supports it and who else opposes it, in addition to the Conservative party?
I will come to the level of international support in a moment, but our allies back this Bill and support it strongly. When we look at which column people choose to be in—the column of those in support of the Bill, with our allies, with India, the United States and others, or the column of countries and people who oppose it—I know which side I am on. I am on the side of our allies. It is up to each of the opposition parties to choose whether they oppose the Bill and to decide which column they are in. That is a choice not for me, but for them. Only one column has our allies in, including our principal security partner, the United States. It is on the side of the treaty.
I have long been interested in Diego Garcia, not least because I am one of the few Members of Parliament who has visited it, 40 years ago with the Defence Committee. May we get some certainty? Every time we mention the £35 billion estimate of the Government Actuary’s Department, the Minister’s colleague, the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), brushes it aside and says that he does not recognise the number. Given that we are spending a lot of taxpayers’ money on this—something we already owned—will he tell the House in detail how much the agreement will cost us over its lifetime?
I am grateful to the Father of the House for helping me to get back on track with my speech, because that is the topic of my next section. I will answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question in my remarks, but if a bit is missing, he may ask to intervene on me again.
We have heard some outrageous claims artificially boosting the costs of this deal. It will cost an average of £101 million per year in today’s money. That is an investment in today’s money of £3.4 billion over 99 years. That has been rigorously calculated, based on net present value, the methodology endorsed by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Office for Budget Responsibility. All the associated costings have been laid previously before the House and were explained in full at the time of signature.
Crucially, the exaggerated numbers that have been cited ignore inflation, the OBR deflation mechanisms and the Green Book. The Government have secured a strong deal. I remind those who criticise it that the previous Government knew full well that the status quo was dangerous and unsustainable—that is why they entered into negotiations in the first place, why they held 11 rounds of negotiations under successive Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries and Attorneys General, and why the Conservatives have never been able to provide serious alternatives to this deal.
I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman and then to my hon. Friend.
Can the Minister point to any other country in the world that has used NPV to give away sovereignty? As far as I am aware, there is none, so why are we pioneering that way forward?
This deal secures the base. The calculated value of the deal uses the Green Book. Other countries look at overseas bases that they rent and make the calculation based on their national accounting standards. We base it on the Green Book. Indeed, the Green Book was updated by the previous Government and has been used for such decisions for the past 20 years.
Several hon. Members rose—
I will return to the Green Book in a moment, but will give way first to my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey). I am trying to be fair to everyone.
Mr Calvin Bailey
Will the Minister place that £101 million in context? Perhaps the US or other nations have entered into such agreements. Will he make reference to the value for money that we received for the deal?
The deal represents broadly 0.2% of the defence budget. The total deal represents less than the cost of the unusable personal protective equipment acquired by the previous Government and burnt during the first year of the pandemic. A helpful comparator useful for the House to know about is the French base in Djibouti. Recently, France agreed a deal with Djibouti worth €85 million per year to rent a base. Diego Garcia is a larger—15 times larger—more capable and more strategically located military asset and, importantly, it is not next to the Chinese naval base that sits next to the French one in Djibouti. As a comparison, that is useful for people to understand in terms of present value.
Will the Minister give way?
I congratulate the Minister on his promotion, but must say how sorry I am that his first outing has been to defend this load of nonsense. What does he say to the UK Statistics Authority and to the Government Actuary’s Department, which appear to have a very different view of the costing of this to the one that he has just outlined? Is it not the case that what he has said represents a load of accounting double-speak and is dubious, to put it politely and in parliamentary terms?
That is not quite correct. Indeed, unfortunately, this is not my first outing. My first outing was at Defence questions yesterday, supporting British jobs in the defence sector and celebrating the £10 billion frigate deal that this Government achieved. My second outing was yesterday afternoon with the statement on the defence industrial strategy, making the case for more investment in British businesses. My third outing, though, is here today, securing the most vital military base that the UK and the US operate together. It is absolutely right that, as part of it, we present the costings to Parliament. It is also precisely right that those are reviewed properly by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Office for Budget Responsibility. That has happened, and that is why we have been able to use the figures with certainty. The costings are also entirely consistent with the Green Book.
The Green Book point is a useful one to dwell on for one moment, because if the policy of the Conservative party is not to use Green Book calculations for long-term investments—the same Green Book used for costings of our nuclear deterrent or pensions—I want to understand how much spending the Opposition are now committing to. In how many other examples would the Green Book no longer apply? What are their new accounting principles and what would be the increased cost to the public purse? How many more people will pay increased taxes, because of their disapplication of the Green Book principles? Those are entirely fair questions. The shadow Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Central Devon (Sir Mel Stride), signed the reasoned amendment, so surely he would be able to say how many other areas the Green Book no longer applies to. Perhaps the Opposition Front Benchers will be able to specify any other areas that they no longer believe that the Green Book applies to. We calculated our figures based on the Green Book, and that is why we are confident in them.
Several hon. Members rose—
I will take two more interventions, and then I will make some progress. I am aware that the debate is one that people want to speak in.
Lincoln Jopp
If the Minister is such a big fan of the social time discounting method that has been applied, will he tell the House where the social time discounting method has been used in other parts of Government to generate net present value?
The hon. Gentleman will know that we have published the full methodology, and that the social time preference rate is only one part of the calculation that we have used; we have also used the OBR’s inflation deflator mechanisms as well. He will also know that we published the full costings at the point of the treaty being applied.
Several hon. Members rose—
I will make a little bit more progress and then I will come back to the hon. Gentleman. [Interruption.] I can hear the shadow Foreign Secretary has gone back to her shouting again, but it is still not the politest way of running the debate. Let me keep going.
It was left to this Government to finish what our predecessors were unable to deliver. In doing so, we have secured a much stronger deal that will protect our interests well into the next century. Let me remind the House of the international context. The ruling of the International Court of Justice against the UK was a low moment for our country globally. It left our allies fearful that we might lose control of the base, it left our adversaries with opportunities to exploit, and it tarnished our reputation in the global south. In contrast, as we have heard on countless occasions from a range of colleagues, this deal has been welcomed wholeheartedly by our allies and the wider international community.
Alex Ballinger
Does the Minister agree that it is completely wrong for the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) and Reform UK to claim that President Trump did not support this deal, when he said it was a “very strong” deal that was secured for a “very long” time?
In support of the deal, the US Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth, put it well when he said:
“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the US. The UK’s (very important) deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region. We are confident the base is protected for many years ahead.”
President Trump has described the deal as “very long term” and “very strong”.
That follows a rigorous US inter-agency process, involving the whole of the US security apparatus, both under the previous Biden Administration and the current Trump Administration. This involved the Department of Defence, the National Security Council and the intelligence agencies, including the CIA. Do Conservative Members say that they do not trust the assessment of the CIA, the US and all the security apparatus? The deal secures the use of the base—they are happy with it and we are happy with it. Our Five Eyes partners recognise the benefits of the treaty for our collective security. The deal is supported by Japan, South Korea and India. It is also a deal publicly welcomed by the African Union, the UN Secretary General and the Commonwealth.
I turn now to the issue of Chagossians, which needs to be raised as well. While the negotiations were necessarily conducted on a state-to-state basis, we are alive to the diverse views of Chagossians about their future, and we have the utmost respect for their past suffering.
I will come back to the hon. Gentleman in a moment.
Although the Chagossians could not be part of the negotiations as they were conducted on a state-to-state basis, both the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), and Foreign and Commonwealth Development officials have met and had regular meetings over the past year, and stayed engaged with their diverse views. There are diverse views within the Chagossian community that are strongly held, and we have listened and respected those.
Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)
As some Members laugh about the nature of the 99 years and other Members talk about the sums of money involved, I ask all of us to look at the Public Gallery to remind ourselves that there are Chagossians here today who feel deeply aggrieved by the deal. They feel that the Foreign Office and this Government have not gone above and beyond to consult all the groups involved. The Minister said that this deal does not refer to other overseas territories, but the principle of self-determination of our overseas territories’ citizens—
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s argument. It is the reason why, right up front, before I went into the military utility of the base at Diego Garcia, I wanted to speak about the Chagossians. It is important. I will come on to the engagement that the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, has had in this respect, but I understand the strength of feeling that the hon. Gentleman describes. I will come to the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin), and then I will make progress.
I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. I am afraid my question goes back to the cost of the deal, which will hang around the Government’s neck like an albatross for the rest of their time in office. We know that the Government Actuary says the gross cost is £35 billion. Please can the Minister enlighten the House and help hon. Members to understand his own calculations? What is the meaning of “social time discounting”?
The hon. Gentleman’s intervention is not about Chagossians, but I realise I could not take his intervention earlier. He asks about the meaning of the social time preference rate in relation to the deal. Discounting in appraisal of social value is based on the concept of time preference, and that the value of goods or services today is greater than in the future. This is the discount rate that has been used in the Green Book since 2003, including in every year that his party was in Government. It was the basis on which this was there.
Several hon. Members rose—
To return to the issue of Chagossians, on which I am trying to make progress, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth and FCDO officials have met with the Chagossian communities. Under the treaty, Mauritius will now be free to carry out a programme of resettlement of the outer islands, and we have agreed a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of Chagossians and the resumption of visits to the Chagos archipelago. Over the coming months and years, we will increase the UK Government’s support to and engagement with UK Chagossians, including through UK-funded projects designed through a new contact group, informed by the Chagossians’ own wishes, which met for the very first time last week and was attended by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth.
The Minister will be aware that the payment from the 1960s, referred to by the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Richard Tice), was also supposed to be spent on Chagossian welfare, but many Chagossian groups have raised the fact that that money did not go on Chagossian welfare. It went on many other things for the Mauritian Government, but not on Chagossians. What confidence does he have that this agreement is any more valid than the last one?
That is precisely why my FCDO colleagues are working very closely with Mauritius to ensure that the money that is included in the treaty, and the obligations that both the UK and Mauritius sign up to in the treaty, are fully delivered so that the Chagossians receive what this treaty says they should receive. That is a really important part of the treaty.
Have the meetings undertaken by the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), included all the Chagossian groups, including the Chagos Refugees Group, based in Mauritius?
The Minister of State has met a full range of groups, including the group mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman.
The Minister is being extremely generous with his time. He was pressed earlier, but I would like to press him again on the social time discounting method. He should be able to give examples of big projects to which his Government have applied this method. Could he now do that and say why, for example, the right hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner) did not use that method when she was calculating the cost of the 10-year affordable housing programme?
I understand the argument that the right hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but I hope that he appreciates my argument that the calculation is based on the OBR’s inflation and deflation figures and on the social time preference rate. It is a figure that has been calculated and supported by the OBR, and it stands up to scrutiny. If Conservative Members are saying that they no longer wish to use the Green Book for calculating long-term investments like this, which is their inferred argument, then it is worth looking at what they are suggesting that we no longer use the Green Book to calculate—they are making an awfully large spending commitment when they suggest that.
Several hon. Members rose—
I am going to finish my remarks on Chagossians, if I may.
I hope that all Members of the House will recognise that the treaty is not just about the importance of the military base on Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia and the wider Chagos archipelago have a unique environment. I hope that protecting the world’s oceans is a point of cross-party unity in this debate, advanced across our overseas territories by the blue belt programme. The UK supports Mauritius’s ambitions to establish a marine protected area to safeguard the globally significant ecosystems in the Chagos archipelago, and the UK will provide technical support and assistance to enable that to happen. The UK and Mauritius will work with international conservation organisations to ensure implementation of science-backed strategies for conservation.
I want to conclude, but I realise that I have not been able to allow all the hon. Members to intervene who wanted to do so, so I give way to the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson).
The Minister seems to be arguing about exactly how much it will cost. My constituents just see that he is giving away British territory and paying rent for it, which is completely unacceptable to them. He talks about how it is good for the global south, because they agree with it; good for other countries, because they agree with it; and good for Mauritius, because it is getting extra money. What about the British people that he, as a British Minister, is here to represent? What are they getting for this deal? They are losing territory and it is costing them money.
We are securing one of the most valuable military bases on the planet. We are securing our close intelligence relationship with the United States. We are securing a vital base for operations in the region. We are securing a vital base for allies. That is the key British objective. It was the objective stated by the previous Government, which I believe the hon. Lady was serving in at the time, when they started negotiations. If she would like to say that she vividly opposes it and wants to publish the letters she was writing to the then Government for starting negotiations, she is welcome to do so, but I do not believe that any Conservative Members really did that.
Let me say one final thing on cost. The average payment cost is 20% less than the cost of the festival of Brexit under the previous Government. We can cite statistics, but the key thing the previous Government said that their deal would secure was the future operation of the base. This deal secures the future operation of the base. It is a surprise that Conservative Members are not going to accept it.
I will now conclude, because I want everyone to have a chance to speak in this debate. Let me do so by explaining what the Bill will do in practice. The Bill, along with the secondary legislation that will follow, will allow the treaty to be ratified and to enter into force. The Bill preserves the current laws of the British Indian Ocean Territory, which will ensure the base’s continued effective operation without any disruption during the transition. The Bill also ensures that there are no changes to the rights of Chagossians to acquire British citizenship, and no changes to the status of Chagossians who currently hold British citizenship or British overseas territory citizenship. Protecting national security is one of the utmost priorities of this Government, and we are delivering on that with this deal and the Bill. The Bill is crucial to securing the critically important military base on Diego Garcia for the next century and beyond, and that is why I commend it to the House.
As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, given that various other Committees have been looking into this and that it has been extensively debated on the Floor of the House, and considering the other work that the Committee is undertaking, including an inquiry launched this week into the Afghan data breach, that is why we have not looked into this matter. However, I will give way to the Minister, who I hope will give me some sort of reassurance.
To reassure my hon. Friend, as I did the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) earlier, we are not required to give pre-notification of any military activities to Mauritius. That is important, because some people are erroneously suggesting that we are. That is not correct; we do not have to give pre-notification.
It had already been rolled back. The hon. Gentleman is right that the last Government began discussions because Mauritius expressed a view. However, that was on the basis that a mutually beneficial arrangement could be reached. It was concluded that such an agreement could not be reached, and on that basis the last Government ceased the negotiations. It is not a question of their being rolled back; it was this Government who chose to reopen negotiations that had been closed down by the previous Government.
I come back to the international judgments. The other one cited by Ministers on the Government Front Bench early on in the discussion, when this issue was first raised, was the risk to access to electromagnetic spectrum as a result of the ITU potentially reaching a judgment that might be based on the non-binding judgment expressed by the ICJ. There is no actual evidence that it was going to do that, but it was possible that it might, and for that reason the Government expressed the view that this was important.
I would point out that the ITU has no ability to determine the use of spectrum. The Minister, in answering a written parliamentary question in February this year, made it clear that the allocation of spectrum was a matter for sovereign states. The ITU is a sort of gentleman’s club where everyone gets together to discuss these matters, but it is not able to hand over the right to the use of spectrum from one country to another. It is also worth noting that the ITU has, over the years, been subject to considerable pressure from China, which had a secretary general of the ITU. I recall from my time dealing with issues around the ITU the real concern about how the Chinese were seeking to use the ITU, so in my view it is a good thing that the ITU does not have the power to allocate spectrum.
There are also serious strategic concerns that the Government have not yet properly addressed. As has already been mentioned, an element of the agreement involves a requirement for us to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base. When the Minister gave evidence to the Committee, I pressed him on whether that would require advance notification—
indicated assent.
He is nodding. He gave me a very firm assurance that that was not the case. That is of some reassurance, but it does not go far enough. The fact that we are no longer able to carry out actions from our own base without then having to notify Mauritius, and presumably take note of any objection it has, represents a limitation that could well affect decisions as to where to deploy assets.
My right hon. Friend makes a fair point. A requirement for us to tell the Mauritians what has been happening from the base is exactly what might influence decisions as to its use for operations of the kind he describes. The Minister gave evidence to the Committee on this point just a few days, I think, after the Americans had launched their attack on Iran, which did not involve Diego Garcia. That was something I raised with the Minister.
I know how seriously the right hon. Gentleman takes these issues, and it is important for the House to understand this. I can confirm what I said to him previously, but also I draw his attention to article 3(2)(b) in the treaty and to annex 1. Article 3(2)(b) sets out clearly that
“the Parties shall not undermine, prejudice or otherwise interfere with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base, and shall cooperate to that end; and…the United Kingdom shall have full responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia.”
It sets out clearly our unrestricted ability to conduct the operations, including with the United States. That is very clear; it is in the treaty, and it is important that the House understands that.
It is. It is true about the legally binding aspect within the area that the tribunal covers, but that does not cover sovereignty, as we learned in 2015 when the tribunal sided with the British Government. Here we have the farcical situation of a House of policy and law shining light on one side and another, but never on the truth. This is where my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam is exactly right. If the Government were to come forward and say exactly which court, where and why, they might get more sympathy from Opposition, but we have been through an entire five-hour debate and we still do not have answers to those questions.
Another court that is often cited is the International Telecommunication Union covering spectre, radio and radar. Article 48.1 states
“Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations,”
and the Government know that. Even the written answer from the Minister—it has been hinted at before—states:
“Individual countries have the sovereign right to manage and use the radio spectrum, within their borders, the way they wish, subject to not causing interference with other countries. This right is recognised in the Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations are the international framework for the use of spectrum by radiocommunication services, defined and managed by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum. The ITU cannot challenge the UK’s use of civilian or military spectrum.”
It is clear here—the Government know it in their own answers—that the ITU has no role in sovereignty. It all boils down to where one believes British overseas territories stand.
Now we must talk about the cost, which has been much debated. There have been three figures in the debate: £3.4 billion, £10 billion and £34 billion. The £3.4 billion is the net present value using social time preference rate. The £10 billion is inflation adjusted, and the £34 billion is the nominal value by the Government Actuary’s Department. The question is, why use net present value? I put it earlier in the debate that there is no other precedent in the world for NPV being used in sovereignty matters. The Minister at the time asked whether the Conservatives want to do away with using NPV—of course not.
Absolutely, the Minister says it is within the Green Book. Absolutely not, because it has a perfect place in domestic use for commercial practicalities, not for international sovereignty issues. No other country has looked, or would look, at this because it does not make sense.
The House of Commons Library said when asked that
“this methodology is regularly used in government accounting, but its main use is for cost-benefit analyses. It is unusual to see it used in this situation like this, where only the cost is being assessed and it is not being compared to any benefit”.
On that basis, and listening to the House of Commons Library, what cost-benefit analysis has actually been done in this case, and would it be put in front of the House so we might be able to see it?
At the end of the day, NPV is highly political because it assumes a discount rate, and what is the discount rate that one should choose? In the details, it talks about 3.5%, but the US will use 3.5% or 7%, which would vastly differentiate the figures. It goes on further, for the social time preference rate is 3.5%, but for 30 years. This deal is for 99 years, so how can the Government respond in a written parliamentary question that this
“represents good value for UK taxpayers”?
On what basis are they comparing that if there is no international comparison? We are talking only about domestic uses and for an accounting point.
As I come to my conclusions, possibly the scariest thing to me—I have tried to highlight it throughout the debate—which does seem to be falling on deaf ears, is article 13. I believe this treaty is legally bomb-proof. It looks sensible, and I am no legal expert as I have attested to, but it seems to stand the test of time. That means when article 13 says explicitly that in 99 years Mauritius can say no and just take control, that is a big worry. We have heard from many Government MPs how it secures the long-term aspirations of this country for a period of 99 years. When I mentioned that, several Government MPs scoffed. But is it not the duty of this House to provide not only for the next generation, but the rest of time for our country, in the best interests of our country? After listening to all the arguments that have been made about how essential the base is, the very fact that Mauritius could pull the base is a very scary prospect. There is, of course, a caveat: the right of first refusal. But if China decides to do a deal with Mauritius at exorbitant cost, we are over a barrel and the British taxpayer must fork out yet again to guarantee our security. Mauritius has been given a golden ticket, and it knows it.
Beyond the sovereignty and cost, my biggest concern is that we are outsourcing decision -making for our children and our children’s children. That is the modus operandi of this Government—we need only look at the borrowing in the Budget to see how they borrow on the backs of future children. Pushing this decision out for 99 years is not security for now; it will help, but it creates a far bigger problem in 100 years’ time. If the Government want to give away our islands, they should be open and transparent about how and why.
The biggest thing is that we have not even had our day in court. That is what most troubles the British public. I think that the British public would be reasonable if a court found against us—they would happily say, “We follow the rule of law”—but the Government will not even try that. They say that there is a risk. As has been said, this has been going on for years, and still we are looking at a treaty to sign it off.
That inevitably poses final questions about what happens with Gibraltar, the Falklands and Cyprus. The Minister is correct to point out that there are differences, but the biggest fundamental problem that the Government have in arguing to the British people and the people of the Falklands is about understanding. If this House cannot understand the legal concepts of the places where we are likely to fight these causes, how can we expect the public to do so? When it comes to delivering comms to the UK public, that is what they need to understand.
What a debate. I genuinely think there were some thoughtful contributions from all parts of the House, but some were simply rhetoric and, frankly, a lot of nonsense. I single out the Chair of the Defence Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi), and my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb). Although I disagree with him, I thought he made passionate points of conviction on behalf of his constituents. There were also thoughtful contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie), for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Lillian Jones), for Macclesfield (Tim Roca), for Bolton West (Phil Brickell), for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger), for Hyndburn (Sarah Smith) and for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey).
On the other side there were particularly thoughtful contributions—which I might not have agreed with—from the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who is a former Attorney General, and the right hon. Members for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) and for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). There was a thoughtful contribution from the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), until he got on to the overseas territories at the end. I was pleased to hear that commitment from my opposite number, the right hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton), although she may want to check the Conservative Twitter feed for what it was putting out about the overseas territories, which I thought was deeply shameful and damaging.
I want to be clear about the purpose of this Bill and the decisions we have taken, which are about defending this country and our national security. That is the first duty of this Government. It is the first priority of our Prime Minister, our Foreign Secretary, our Defence Secretary and the entire ministerial team. I am afraid that whatever exhortations to the contrary we hear from the Opposition Benches, we will not take risks with our national security or engage in gambles in courts or anywhere else. That is not the action of a responsible Government, and we are not prepared to take those risks.
That is why this Bill will ensure that we ratify the treaty with Mauritius, resolve the legal status of this vital base and, crucially, protect its operations, which is the most fundamental aspect of what we are discussing today. It will ensure that we retain the critical security capabilities that support key operations around the world. Those are capabilities not only for ourselves, but for our allies. Fundamentally, those capabilities keep the people of this country safe on our streets, they keep our armed forces safe, and they keep our allies safe. We will not scrimp on national security or take gambles with it, which is essentially the argument that we have heard from the Opposition today.
I will start with the reasoned amendment, because it is full of so many holes and so many wrongs, including claims about the costs. It says that the treaty
“does not secure the base on Diego Garcia”.
That is wrong. It says that we do not have the “right to extend” the lease. That is wrong. It says that
“the measures in the Treaty leave the base vulnerable”.
That is wrong. It says that the treaty does not
“protect the rights of the Chagossian people”.
That is wrong. And it say that the treaty does not protect
“the future of the Marine Protected Area”.
That is wrong. I urge the House to reject the reasoned amendment today.
This all comes back to a fundamental question: if there was not a problem, why did the previous Government start negotiating? Why did they continue negotiating until just weeks before the general election? It is simply not correct to claim that the negotiations were stopped. We have heard what the official readout of the meeting with the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), said and it was very, very clear: he instructed the teams to act at pace in order to make the agreement. The evidence is there, and claims to the contrary are simply wrong.
A number of important points have been made today, but I will start with those about operations, because some very sensible questions have been raised. It is the operations of the base that are currently under threat from the legal uncertainty. That is why we have taken steps to secure it, and why our allies and Five Eyes partners—the United States and others—back this deal. In the future, those operations will now be secure. The Bill ensures that we can exercise all rights and authorities granted through the treaty. We will retain full operational control over Diego Garcia, which we have continued to have for the last 50 years—the Bill secures that.
I want to reiterate our commitment to expeditiously inform Mauritius of military action. Let me repeat for the record: we are not obliged to give Mauritius advance notice of any action under the treaty. No sensitive intelligence will be shared, nor operations put at risk—it is there on the face of the treaty. Our allies, especially the United States under two Administrations, have gone through it with a fine-toothed comb. They would not be supporting this deal and signing off on it if that operational autonomy was not protected.
I turn to Members’ points about the law. Many reasonable questions have been raised, and we have heard some historical revisionism at different points. The right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) expressed worries about lawfare, but we have acted precisely because of the threats of action that could impede the operations in the short, medium and, indeed, long term. It is totally wrong to say that Mauritius had no claim; decades ago, we agreed that sovereignty would ultimately revert to Mauritius. The Government’s legal case has been published—it was there for all to see on the day of treaty signature. In summary, Mauritius would have secured a binding judgment that would have harmed the operation of the base. That has been the consistent position of the Government. We have set it out on a number of occasions, and our position is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.
The right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who is a former Attorney General, and others have reflected on a number of issues. I will not go into all of them but, for the record, let me refer to the comprehensive rejection of our arguments by 13 judges to one at the ICJ in 2019; the loss in the UN General Assembly vote by a margin of 116 to six; the maritime delimitation judgment that is binding on Mauritius and the Maldives, which was handed down in 2021 by the special chamber of ITLOS; the obligations placed on the BIOT Administration by UN bodies to cease specific activities; and a series of complications and blockages at international organisations, including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation. We have also set out where future risks are likely to take place, and we are not willing to gamble with that. Those are the fundamental facts here, and that is why it is necessary to do this deal.
Questions were raised about the extension. It is very clear that we have the right of first refusal, and that we might extend the lease for a further 40 years.
The point I made in my contribution was that I relied entirely on what Ministers had said to this place about the Government’s legal justification for their actions. That chain starts with the former Foreign Secretary saying that, in the Government’s view, a binding legal judgment was inevitable. The Minister has just given us a list of a variety of opinions and clear opposition —it is true—to the UK’s position from a variety of different organisations. As far as I can tell, he has not told us from which court a binding judgment might come. We have said that it cannot be the ICJ. Which court could give a binding judgment against the UK in this matter?
First, the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows that I am not going to disclose the full privileged legal advice to the Government, which the previous Government received, for very good reasons. We have set out very clearly that provisional measures could be brought forward that would immediately affect operations—within six to eight weeks—and the conditions in chapter 7 of ITLOS. In a number of areas, there were very significant risks. I will not, and he understands why I will not, go into the details of that, but it is simply not a risk that this Government are willing to take or, as he knows, that the previous Government were willing to take, which is ultimately why they started the negotiations.
I am conscious of the time, and I have explained the extension, but I want to talk a little about our allies and opponents. The shadow Foreign Secretary said that people have not said publicly what they feel about the deal, but that is not the case. We have heard from President Trump and US Defence Secretary Hegseth. US Secretary of State Rubio said:
“The U.S. welcomes the historic agreement between the UK and Mauritius on the future of the Chagos Archipelago. This agreement secures the long-term, stable, and effective operation of the joint U.S.-UK military facility at Diego Garcia, which is critical to regional and global security.”
Our Five Eyes allies support it, with Canada’s Foreign Ministry saying that it welcomes the signing, and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong saying that Australia welcomes the signing, while Australia’s ambassador to the US said that it was great to see a resolution to this important issue. New Zealand’s Foreign Minister and India’s Ministry of External Affairs have said the same. Japan has commended the efforts of the Governments to reach agreement, and the Republic of Korea similarly welcomed its signing. In addition, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar and others have welcomed the deal.
It is, therefore, clear that the Government are on the side of the United States, our Five Eyes partners and other allies around the world, and we are protecting our operations and national security. Given the US bipartisan support, what is not good enough for the Opposition? Our key security partners back the deal, and that is why they have agreed to it.
Quite frankly, we have heard some outrageous claims about the costs. We have been very clear about them, and the £34 billion figure is absurdly misleading and inaccurate. It ignores inflation and the changing value of money over 99 years—£1 today will not be worth the same in 99 years’ time—and the £101 million annual average cost compares favourably with other countries’ bases. Our accurate figures reflect how the Government account for long-term project spend. Funnily enough, when we add a sum each year, which is entirely reasonable, over a 99-year period, it adds up to a larger sum. This is equivalent to the spending on the NHS for a few hours, and a tiny proportion of our defence budget. It compares very favourably with what France has paid for its base in Djibouti. This base is 15 times larger, while France’s base is next to a Chinese facility, and ours has unique security provisions in place.
Quite frankly, it shows some brass neck for the Opposition to be making claims about defence and security when they presided over the hollowing out of our armed forces, appalling accommodation and decline. That is changing under this Government. We are spending on our national defence, our NATO commitments and our security relationships with the United States, and we will absolutely not apologise for that or scrimp on our national security. One final point is that a financial element was always key to the deal, as the Conservatives conceded in their engagements under multiple Prime Ministers.
Important points were made about the environment and the marine protected area. Fundamentally, Mauritius will determine the area’s future, but Prime Minister Ramgoolam recently reaffirmed to the former Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham and Croydon North (Steve Reed), his country’s commitment to protecting that unique ecosystem. We are engaged in active discussions with the Mauritians about that, and I will keep right hon. and hon. Members updated.
I conclude as the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) started, by paying tribute to the Chagossians who have joined us here today. Both in opposition and in government, I have repeatedly met a range of Chagossian communities with a range of views, and I have a deep respect for their dignity and their different views. There will be people who fundamentally disagree with this treaty, but there are many who fundamentally agree with it, as we have heard in this debate.
The Government deeply regret how Chagossians were removed from the islands. We have heard concerns about the impact on them and their ability to access British nationality. The Bill will ensure that Chagossians have no adverse effects on their nationality rights—no Chagossians will lose their existing rights to hold or claim British citizenship. It will be for Mauritius to set the terms of and manage any future resettlement. Reasonable questions have been asked about why people cannot resettle on Diego Garcia, but it is an active military base with security restrictions so that is not realistic, but we will restart the heritage visits.
To anticipate what the Liberal Democrat spokesperson might be about to ask me, I confirm to him that before ratification, there will be a ministerial statement. I will not give him the exact date, because I do not set the dates of business, but it will provide a factual update on resettlement eligibility and how the trust fund will work. I am engaged actively in those discussions, and that will enable further discussion in a proper manner.
Calum Miller
Will the Minister please confirm, as Lord Collins did in the other place, that time will be set aside in both Houses for a debate on the statement?
Absolutely. I confirm that we are happy to discuss that further. Such decisions are not for me, but for the usual channels and the leaders in both Houses. However, I want to confirm the commitment that was made previously.
This comes down to one fundamental question: why did the Opposition start the negotiations if there was not a problem? Why did they continue the negotiations until just weeks before the general election? It was because fundamental national security interests and the protection of the British people were at risk. This Government recognise that, our allies recognise that and we have acted to secure a deal to protect Diego Garcia and its operations well into the next century. While Reform and the Conservatives speak of national security but fail to do anything to secure it, this Labour Government negotiate and deliver. We deliver deals—with the United States, with India, with the European Union and on new frigates—and, fundamentally, we deliver national security by securing this base on Diego Garcia. I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(1 year ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My hon. Friend is 100% right, and that is one of the reasons why we oppose this Bill and have done so from the very start.
The promises given by Ministers that nothing can happen in the Chagos archipelago that threatens our interests are already being undermined. Mauritius is in discussions with India about a security role that it can play in the archipelago, and the UK is not even in the room. If these discussions with a friendly country are taking place without the UK, one can only wonder what discussions are taking place in secret with China and Russia. There has been a report that China is already negotiating with Mauritius for Peros Banhos. When he speaks, perhaps the Minister can tell us what he knows about that.
I want to say on that point that this is absolute nonsense. Is the shadow Minister willing to provide any evidence that that is going to take place? This treaty protects the security of the outer islands and expressly prohibits foreign forces building bases on them—something on which her Government did not succeed in their negotiations.
I am grateful to the Minister, but can he actually give me the reassurance that no discussions are taking place? Perhaps he can answer that question when he responds to the debate later.
The promises given by Ministers that nothing can happen in the Chagos archipelago that threatens our interests are already being undermined. If these discussions with a friendly country are taking place without the UK, I can only wonder what discussions are taking place in secret. If such discussions are taking place, that would undermine the assurances Ministers have given to this House and be an act of bad faith on the part of Mauritius. The House knows that this Government kowtow to the Chinese Communist party, leading it to threaten our interests here. Now, they are failing to take seriously the warnings about China, and the threats it poses to Diego Garcia, our military assets and our interests in the Indo-Pacific.
I think my right hon. Friend makes some very interesting points, and perhaps not surprisingly, one might ask the question: are the Government sleeping with the enemy here?
If the Minister will allow me, I will just finish this point. The key thing we are asking for is a reassurance from the Minister, and he will have more than ample opportunity later to respond to the points I am making.
I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, but she and the right hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart) have raised China, Russia and Iran. Why does she think that the United States, our closest security ally, backs this deal if there is any possibility of any of the fantasy things she is suggesting taking place. They cannot take place, because the treaty prevents them. She clearly has not read it.
I am not sure where the hon. Gentleman has been for the past year and several months, but we have gone over this time and again in this Chamber. There was no legal basis. We stopped—[Interruption.] Maybe I will repeat this very slowly for his benefit: we stopped the negotiations.
I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, but I must, Ms Nokes, correct the record here. This has been a repeated argument, by the shadow Minister and others, claiming that the then Government stopped the negotiations. They did not. In fact, they carried them on. There was a gov.uk statement on 24 February reflecting the continuing of the negotiations by the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak). Indeed, they carried on into May, just before the election. It is there in writing on the previous Government’s own website.
I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman has the gall to come here and talk about national security today, when the former leader of his party in Wales admitted to taking bribes from Russia, and when again he has been using talking points that come right from the Kremlin in blaming NATO for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—absolutely shameful. The Mauritian Attorney General was interviewed on Mauritian TV today, and he said regarding the hon. Gentleman’s tweets claiming that Mauritius was negotiating a lease on Peros Banhos that that was a gross falsehood and a political gimmick. The hon. Gentleman talks about the United States. The Secretary of War, Secretary Hegseth, said:
“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the United States.
The UK’s…deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region.
We are confident the base is protected for many years ahead.”
Why is the United States backing this deal, if anything that the hon. Gentleman says is true?
Nigel Farage
I can assure you that America is not backing this deal. What it is saying is, “What we have is what we hold.” That is the American attitude at the moment, but as I said, when it wakes up to the satellite observation deal done with India already, as reported in The Economic Times of India on 12 September this year, and once you realise—
My right hon. Friend makes an extremely powerful point. The Henry VIII powers in the Bill are not limited at all. I heard so many complaints when I was a Minister from the Labour party about Henry VIII powers. The Bill literally gives Ministers the ability to change any existing piece of legislation in any sphere whatsoever if it is necessary to implement this deal. There can never have been a Henry VIII power as powerful as that given to Ministers by this legislation, which is all to do with the surrender of Chagos and the transfer of tens of billions of pounds to a foreign power—a foreign power that is in a strategic partnership with China and in close workings with other countries that are not on our side. What on earth was the Prime Minister thinking? As the Minister lay in bed last night tossing and turning in anticipation of the debate, I am sure that that was the question that went round and round in his head.
So many questions remain to be answered. Why did the Prime Minister say that the payment would be £3.4 billion when the Government’s own offices now show that it will be at least £35 billion? Is this the most important strategic base in the Indian ocean? Can the Minister confirm that Diego Garcia is effectively a US base, manned by thousands of Americans, with at most a few dozen Brits there in liaison? If this is in fact a United States base and not operationally—
It is a joint base.
It might be a joint base technically, but what is it in reality? I would love an intervention from the Defence Minister; he could tell us. How much do we use it operationally, because there are thousands of Americans there and, as I understand it—unless he corrects me—at most dozens of Brits. In other words, it is a United States base on sovereign UK territory that we will pay tens of billions of pounds for over the next 100 years to provide it to the Americans for free. It makes no sense, and I do not see why we have had no answer from Ministers as to why that is a sensible use of public money.
I will give way to the Minister and then to my right hon. Friend.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his generous comments. He and I have always had robust but friendly discussions on many issues. However, I do have to correct him on this point. The US pays for the operations, and the value to the British taxpayer, the US taxpayer and, indeed, all our allies is priceless in that it protects the people of this country from multiple threats, so what he says simply does not make sense.
The United States plays a critical role as a member of NATO and as a key ally—if not the key ally—of ours, but despite the priceless nature of the service it provides, we do not typically pay for it. We do not normally pay for its bases; we pay for our own.
I understand, Madam Chairman, and of course you are quite right. The point I was making is that there has never been a Government who are so reluctant to govern as the one we have today. We have heard from hon. Members how baffling the decision is to surrender the Chagos islands. The only rational reason that could account for it is some kind of secret deal with China. I do not know if that is the case. The Government’s obeisance to international law might well trump national sovereignty, and in fact there is no rational calculation behind this decision except that of submission to their ideas of international law.
Again, I have to take serious issue with what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting. If what he is suggesting is true, why do the United States, our Five Eyes partners, and other key allies support this deal? It protects our national security, and it secures the base on Diego Garcia. Why would they support it? There is no secret deal—this is absolute nonsense.
I am grateful to the Minister. I suspect there has been a private conversation with the American Government as well, and that in recognition of the fait accompli that this Government have yielded to Mauritius, the Americans have extended this somewhat limited statement of support for the deal as some kind of favour to the Prime Minister, in exchange for support he has given them on other matters. The fact is that this deal is bad for Britain and bad for Britain’s sovereignty, and behind the scenes we know that the Americans do not support it.
I want to talk about secret deals, because my only addition to the debate—very powerful points have been made already—is to say that secret deals have been done with respect to the Chagos islands in the past. Under the 30-year rule, archival evidence has come out recently of a secret deal with respect to the base at Diego Garcia between the British Government of the day—the Thatcher Government—and the American Administration. That deal was done in the national interest. The renewal of the nuclear deterrent—the Trident programme—was being set up, and there was an agreement with the Americans whereby they could expand their access and the use of Diego Garcia in exchange for a reduction in the fee, essentially, that the British Government were charged for collaboration on the Trident programme. We had to pay significantly less than we would have paid otherwise because of the expanded access that we were giving to the Americans in those years. It was called the Diego-Trident package in the negotiations and the correspondence between the British and the Americans at that time. It was kept quiet for understandable reasons, and we only know about it now. I worry that there is a similar lack of transparency around this deal because, as I say, it cannot possibly be a deal that is in the national interest.
As ever, my learned right hon. Friend has pipped me to the punch. That is exactly a good example of the kind of sites we are worried about. What has that meant? We have taken on British nationals overseas and invited them in to give them security, because they feared for political interference and, worse still, for the safety of themselves and their families.
We are not doing our duties if we are not thinking about these things, because, as we have already seen, it is hard enough to predict things in two or three years’ time, let alone 100 years. At that point, as it is written, we will get the best offer, but it will be only offered to us. We could be outstripped by China, Russia or a BRIC country in the future—we do not know; it is 100 years away—and there is no mechanism to solve that. Worse still, Mauritius could simply say, “We do not want a base here at all,” and there is nothing in this Bill that would stop that. The Government repeatedly have been asked those questions, and they cannot set that out. That is why new clause 2 asks for those impacts to be considered and looked at.
New clause 3 would move the marine protected area. I will return to a point I made earlier. The fact is that when Britain and the United Kingdom were taken under UNCLOS in 2010 by Mauritius under annex VII, we wanted to implement protections in the area. Mauritius felt that that impeded on its ability to make its own decisions, which the court found in favour of, and it also wanted to fish in the area. Hang on a second! We are putting weaknesses into this Bill when we know that Mauritius has set its intent. I hope it has moved on, as the debate on climate has, but this new clause would be a guarantee to ensure that that has been thought about.
Let me turn to new clause 5. I appreciate the Minister stepping up, because there has already been debate about the Peros Banhos islands, and he has said there are no concerns that they will be leased to China. Let us be real: this Bill has only just come out—the ink is barely dry—and we already hear stories. Many journalists have already talked about this issue. Maybe I am wrong, but that shows the examples of what could and will come without paying attention to the security and the geopolitical and strategic advantage that these islands have, which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson) talked about. All new clause 5 asks us to do is ensure that that is reported on and looked at. Again, there is a dereliction of duty by not having that reported.
I could go on, because there are many more amendments, but the salient points in this debate have been made. All the amendments tabled in the names of Conservatives— and, to be fair, in the names of Members of many other Opposition parties—ask for one simple thing: transparency and explanation. They ask for a simple way of seeing what the legal advice does and where the financial outcome comes.
The Minister is nodding along, but there must be something wrong if the public and Opposition Members cannot simply understand the arguments for what is being put in place. We cannot see the wood for the trees. It is a Government’s duty to show those arguments, and I look forward to the Minister doing that in his response and putting these arguments to bed once and for all. Otherwise, the British public will not forgive him.
A deal of such implication, one would have thought, would have been hotly debated in this House, yet as has been pointed out, there has been no attempt to defend it by the Government. In fact, one could hardly call this a debate—it has all been one-sided. In a debate, people usually argue in favour of whatever the proposal happens to be and listen to and rebut the arguments from the other side. We have had no rebuttal from the other side—the Government—today, despite the fact that this is such an important deal.
For some people outside the House, this deal might seem to be an unimportant issue—where are the Chagos islands, and why do they matter? However, even if the attitude taken by Government Members is to say, “Our constituents are not all that interested in the issues around the Chagos islands,” there are issues with this deal that have been raised this evening that should concern them all.
Let us look at the issues, because they are addressed by the amendments. The first is human rights—the human rights of the people who were displaced in the 1960s and who are ignored in this deal. Their rights to self-determination and to decide where they live are being ignored, yet we are not getting any response from the Government—the party that talks about human rights all the time. They say that we cannot leave the European convention on human rights because human rights are so important, but they are ignoring the human rights of the people who are affected by this deal.
Since we are going to have a debate, I will listen to the Minister.
I thank the right hon. Member for giving way. He says that he wants a debate, and I have given a number of rebuttals. He mentions the Chagossians, whom I will come to in my concluding remarks. I respect what he has to say, but I point him to remarks from the Chagos Refugees Group, which said in its communiqué to all of us: “We urge all Members of Parliament to support the Bill at its final stages and deliver long overdue justice to all our people. Passing this Bill will mark a turning point and the moment when Parliament stands on the right side of history and begins to restore what was unjustly taken from us.” There are a range of views within the Chagossian community, and I think it is important that those are put on the record.
Of course there are many who take a totally different point of view and whose wishes are not reflected in this Bill. The amendments that have been tabled to seek to remedy that situation are being ignored and opposed by the Government.
The second issue is the economy. On a regular basis, we hear how difficult the fiscal position is for this country—black holes we have to fill by taking money off pensioners, reducing benefits, cutting here and cutting there, and taxing people to the hilt. Yet when amendments are tabled that simply request transparency and the opportunity to look at the expenditure involved in this treaty, we hear no support from the Government. Either we are concerned about the fiscal position of this country or we are not. I would suggest that £35 billion—and rising—is a significant figure that we should be looking at.
Thank you for allowing me to speak on this issue once again, Ms Ghani. I will prefix my comments with this. It is always good to see the Ministers—the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) and the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard)—in their place. They are both honourable men whose friendship I value. Being ever respectful, and with great respect to both hon. Gentlemen, I wish to make some comments that will be very contrary to what they have put forward today.
It will be no surprise that I rise at the last hour and as the last Back-Bench speaker—that is often the case, but none the less it is always a pleasure to make a contribution —to ask the Government again to reconsider their decision and ask the Committee to oppose the Bill, even though I know that the numbers game does not stack up.
As we all know, the treaty provides for Mauritius to exercise full sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, with the UK exercising rights on Diego Garcia during an initial 99-year period. Over those 99 years, the UK will pay Mauritius a total of around £3.4 billion in 2025-26 prices, and that will probably rise. At a time when the Government are taxing farmers, taxing widows’ pensions and taxing the middle class into oblivion, handing over £3.4 billion with a benefit that is not tangible is unacceptable. Our constituents will be worse off in the next financial year. Indeed, a typical British family are as much as £15,000 a year poorer than they were five years ago, according to recent Telegraph Money analysis. Why, then, have we entered into this agreement, which may fluctuate and cost substantially more than the figure that has been predicted?
I want to make it clear that I believe this treaty should be renegotiated from beginning to end, but if the Bill is to go ahead, it is essential that any increases in payments should come through this House, and that whatever Government are in place at that time should present that. I therefore support new clause 1, which would give certainty and security that increases would not take place without the approval of this House.
Turning to new clauses 2, 5 and 7, I have long stated that there are now substantial risks to our military bases, and that has been reiterated by every person bar one in the Committee today. I am anxious to understand our legal standing on this. I believe it is right and proper for the Committee to understand the nature of how renting from Mauritius will give us the safety and security needed to ensure that those stationed on the base, or relying on support from the base in that area, will not feel vulnerable or exposed. I believe that this deal does expose us, and that we need to be very much aware of our standing and take the necessary steps. That begins with having full knowledge and not simply empty assurances. The recent debacle with the Chinese spies decisions has shown that openness, transparency and accountability are needed even more tonight than they have been in the other statements and urgent questions today. New clause 2 would enforce that as a minimum.
New clause 9 is similar to new clause 8, tabled by the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) and my right hon. Friend the Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson). I support new clause 9, given its similarity to the new clause brought forward by my Northern Ireland colleagues, who are intimately aware of how issues on the ground can be vastly different from those that are reported. This addition to ensure that a report is made on the compliance of the treaty and the Act with the UN General Assembly resolutions on decolonisation is vital and, I believe, underlines the words of support that have been given to those in the area who are fearful of the removal of British influence and support and fearful of the Mauritian ideals, which were flagged by our American allies in their human rights report in 2023.
As the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on international freedom of religion or belief, I know that the two issues of human rights and persecution are married together as one, because when we highlight the issue of human rights, we also highlight the issue of persecution of religious beliefs, and vice versa. I really have to express some concerns over human rights in this context. I understand that the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth will reply to the debate. Although I believe he understands and believes in these issues as strongly as I do, I still have great concerns about human rights. It is essential that we do not simply hand over control and abandon not just the military base but all in the region who have relied on our support and friendship over the years.
Unfortunately, this has been a bad treaty from beginning to end. Our Chagossian citizens remain unhappy, our armed forces remain unhappy and the families who are footing the bill are unhappy. I believe that the Government have made the wrong decision on this. The recent Chinese debacle has heightened the need to continue to have boots on the ground and eyes wide open against those who would seek to thwart British interests and the interests of freedom and democracy worldwide. We have recently seen the result of appeasement when the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister highlighted the difficulties brought about by this Government’s decision to recognise terrorism and a Palestinian state with no borders, no working non-terrorist Government and no social care system. The handing over of Chagos and renting it back will prove to be a costly and dangerous exercise in capitulation, and even at this very late stage I urge the Government to think again and, at the very least, accept additional protection for the sake of all our collective security.
I thank all hon. and right hon. Members for their contributions. I will attempt to respond to the specifics of the amendments and new clauses in due course, but I want to come back to some of the fundamental points that have been raised during the debate first, and I also want to respond to some of the specific questions that were raised.
With the exception of some genuine questions in relation to the Chagossians, the MPA and the environmental protections, and the implementation of this treaty, it was a shame to see the rehash of the same arguments that were made on Second Reading. There were some outrageous and nonsensical arguments and claims, particularly relating to the costs and to other matters, which I will come to.
I was shocked by some of the anti-American, conspiracy-fuelled nonsense that we heard at various points during the debate. The base is critical to the United Kingdom, the United States, our allies and our national security, and the Bill and the treaty protect the functioning of that base. It does not surrender it; it secures it into the future. This is a Government who inherited a mess from the former Ministers on the Opposition Benches. We are getting stuff done. We are a patriotic Government; our first duty is to protect the national security of this country, and that is why we have got this deal done. It is why it is backed by the United States. It is why it is backed by our Five Eyes partners. It is absolutely crucial to protect the British people and our allies.
We have been very transparent about the reasons for it, and they are the exact opposite of what has been suggested. I come back, as I always have done, to the fundamental question: if there were not a problem and a risk to the operations of this crucial base, why did the previous Government start the negotiations, why did they continue them through 11 rounds of negotiations, and why did they continue them right up until the general election? Those are the facts.
I will happily take interventions, but first I want to respond to the points that have been made. This agreement has been backed by our key allies and international partners, including the US and our Five Eyes allies. India, Japan and South Korea have also made clear their strong support.
Many questions were asked about the robust security provisions that we have in place to protect the UK and the base for decades to come. The treaty and the Bill secure full operational control of Diego Garcia, a strict ban on foreign security forces across the archipelago and an effective veto on any activity that threatens the base on Diego Garcia. It has been welcomed by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Development Committee in the other place, which said that they
“were assured that the Agreement preserves the UK’s and the US’s freedom of action.”
The legal rationale has been referred to many times, but legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, for example, affecting our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia, and even if we did not comply, international organisations and other countries would. We have set out the legal rationale on a number of occasions. We have been very clear. We also published documents around it.
I will respond to some points first. Hon. Members have had plenty of time to make their case. I have also responded to many of their points during the course of the debate, and I am going to respond to the questions.
China has been raised erroneously on many occasions, but we have negotiated robust security provisions to protect the UK and the base for decades to come, and that includes a strict ban on any foreign security forces, including the Chinese, across the archipelago.
The question of finances was raised by a number of Members, and indeed a number of the amendments refer to it. I have to be absolutely clear, as I was on Second Reading: the £30 billion to £35 billion figure quoted by some from the Opposition is totally inaccurate and wildly misleading. It is utterly wrong to ignore the effects of inflation and the changing value of money on the real costs of a deal that lasts 99 years. We published the full costs alongside the treaty. [Hon. Members: “How much?] They ask how much. I have been very clear about that throughout the debate and at the earlier stages. The average cost per year in today’s money is £101 million, and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion. Just for comparison, the costs compare favourably to other international basing agreements. France, for example, as I said, recently announced an €85 million a year deal with Djibouti. This base is much larger and has much more capabilities, so it compares very favourably.
Conservative Members ask about costs. The total expected cost of the treaty using that NPV methodology, which is the same that has been agreed by the Government Actuary’s Department and others, is just over one third of the value lost by the Department for Health and Social Care under their Governments on PPE that was wasted in the first year of the pandemic, if they want to talk about costs and wasting money. This is a clear investment in our national security. We will not scrimp on our national security, and we will not apologise for keeping our base safe.
I have been clear throughout. We have set and published the methodology. It has been backed by the Office for Budget Responsibility, the statistics regulator and others, and I am happy to set that all out again in writing for the hon. Member if that would be helpful.
I was quite surprised to hear some of the unfortunate remarks made by some Members about the United States and its commitment to this base. The United States pays for the operating costs. We have a crucial national security relationship, which keeps us, the United States and our allies safe. This is a joint base on Diego Garcia. It is absolutely right that those arrangements are in place. As I said, the value from the capability of the base is priceless. This is absolutely the right investment to make.
I was appalled by some of the comments being made. I remind the Committee that President Trump, Secretary of War Hegseth and Secretary Rubio have publicly supported the treaty, as have Five Eyes partners and others.
No, I will not give way to the hon. Member. He was not even here throughout the debate. His leader, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), is missing in action—oh, he’s turned up now. He came up with so many figures throughout this process, but he has finally turned up; it is good to see him here.
Questions were raised about the Chagossians, and I want to respond to them seriously because I recognise, as I have done, the very sincere feelings that are felt among different parts of the Chagossian community. We have heard a range of views expressed today by different Members, and I acknowledge the Chagossians who are here in the Gallery. I understand many of them will not support this treaty, but other Chagossians and Chagossian groups do support it, as we have heard during the debate. But I repeat again for the record that the Government deeply regret the way Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship that is built on respect and acknowledgment of the wrongs of the past. The negotiations were between the UK and Mauritius, with our priority being to secure full operation of the base on Diego Garcia, but we will finance a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of the Chagossian communities. We will work to start a new programme of visits, including to Diego Garcia. Of course, Mauritius will be able to develop a programme of resettlement on the islands other than Diego Garcia. We will continue our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects.
I hope the whole Committee can unite around this point. I pay tribute to the Chagossians in the United Kingdom for the contribution they make to the schools in their communities and to the Catholic churches where they live and, in my constituency, for their work at Wythenshawe hospital and Manchester airport—it is second to none. They are welcome here, and we value them very much, despite our political differences in this Chamber.
I completely and wholeheartedly associate myself with those comments from my hon. Friend. I know he has been a passionate advocate for Chagossians in the UK, and particularly in his constituency, over many years. We have spoken about this matter many times, and I know he and other Members speak passionately on the matter.
Will the Minister reply to the point made by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), myself and others that not in the last 100 years since the exchange of colonies after the first world war has a people been transferred from the sovereignty of one empire to another without being properly consulted?
The right hon. Member knows that we regret what happened historically in relation to the Chagos Islands. He will also know that the islands are not permanently inhabited. That was necessarily a negotiation between the United Kingdom and Mauritius.
Let me respond to the many points about the environment, on which many amendments were tabled. We are absolutely clear that the United Kingdom and Mauritius are committed to protecting one of the world’s most important marine environments. Indeed, the Mauritian Prime Minister met the former Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham and Croydon North (Steve Reed), in the margins of the third United Nations ocean conference in Nice on 9 June, where he reaffirmed his commitment to the creation of that marine protected area around the Chagos archipelago. That will be supported by an enhanced partnership with us. The treaty has been welcomed by leading conservation NGOs, including the Zoological Society of London. We continue to work with Mauritius on the implementation of that measure. We are considering seriously the many genuine concerns that right hon. and hon. Members, including the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and members of the Environmental Audit Committee, have raised. They are serious and important questions, and I assure the Committee that we are taking them seriously, and I will try to update the House on them in due course.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way—he is being very generous. In 2017, the clear position was that the International Court of Justice was not in a position to adjudicate on the relationship between us and a member of the Commonwealth. Has that changed, and, if so, when?
We have been very clear about the legal position and the legal risk. The right hon. Gentleman’s Government knew this; it is why they started the process. I do not want to detain the Committee by going through all the arguments that I made on Second Reading—[Interruption.] But he knows that we faced the comprehensive rejection of our arguments at the ICJ in 2019, we lost votes at the UN General Assembly, we had the maritime delineation judgment binding on Mauritius and the Maldives—[Interruption.]
Thank you, Madam Chairman. The Opposition ask questions and then make so much noise—they do not even want to hear the answers.
I have mentioned the obligations placed on the BIOT Administration by UN bodies to cease specific activities. I have mentioned the series of procedural complications and blockages at international organisations, including the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. There are many examples of clear risks. I have explained before the potential under annex VII of UNCLOS—
The hon. Gentleman chunters “potential”, but is he willing to gamble with our national security? Is he willing to gamble on the operational effect? [Interruption.] Oh, he is willing to gamble! I find it absolutely extraordinary that he is willing to gamble with our national security and that of our allies. That is exactly why the United States and our Five Eyes partners back this deal: it settles that debate.
I will turn to the amendments. The right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel) tabled amendments 1, 2 and 7 and new clause 2 on the publication of legal advice. She will know from her time in government that it is highly unusual for the Government to publish legal advice that they have obtained. That advice is privileged, and it is important that the Government are able to take frank and confidential advice, as she well knows. In some circumstances, the Government may publish a statement of their legal position, as we did in the case of the Diego Garcia treaty, on the day it was signed. As I have repeatedly explained—Members keep chuntering about it—if a long-term deal is not reached between the UK and Mauritius, it is highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would be brought quickly by Mauritius against the UK. It might include, for example, further arbitral proceedings against the UK under annex VII of the UN convention on the law of the sea. A judgment would be binding on the UK.
Let me turn to amendments 11 and 14. The hon. Member for Clacton, who has finally turned up but is not even listening, tabled several amendments that appear to serve no function other than wasting Government and parliamentary time. The public consultation proposed in amendment 11, and the impact assessment, would be needlessly costly and time-consuming. They would only confirm the conclusion—on which he had no answers—already reached by our closest ally, the United States, by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee, and by our Five Eyes partners. The public already know that the treaty secures the future of the critical base on Diego Garcia. The strategic value has been debated at length and is well understood. We are not willing to gamble with our national security, even if the Member for Clacton is willing to. Quite frankly, he has some gall to turn up after his comments on NATO and Russia—I find it quite extraordinary.
In amendment 13, the hon. Member for Clacton offers an ill-conceived proposal that would keep Diego Garcia listed as an overseas territory while accepting that His Majesty the King would no longer be sovereign. Not only is that constitutionally inaccurate, but in the context of the British Nationality Act 1981 it would have serious consequences for the nationality rights of Chagossians born on different islands in the archipelago. Surely his intention cannot be for individuals born on Diego Garcia to be treated differently from those born on Peros Banhos or the Salomon Islands.
Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6, tabled by the right hon. Member for Witham and amendment 8 tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), seek to change or remove the statutory powers to make an Order in Council. It is, of course, absolutely right that Parliament should be able to scrutinise the use of power, which is why the Bill provides for the negative procedure to be used. The vast majority of changes that the Government will make using that power will be technical and operational amendments on matters to ensure that our domestic law is consistent with the new status of Diego Garcia—those are matters as varied as police pensions, copyright law, and changes to student finance. The proposed amendments would mean that the House would be obliged to spend valuable parliamentary time on each change to legislation for 99 years. Members surely cannot wish us to spend that amount of time on all those things, and that approach is consistent with powers taken to amend existing legislation in previously comparable situations.
New clauses 1, 11, and 10 regard the prior approval of payments. I have set out clearly the costs, and the absolutely nonsensical figures that have been put forward by the Opposition and the hon. Member for Clacton, and we wholly reject the new clauses. It is entirely usual and proper for payments under international treaties to be made under the royal prerogative, and requiring a separate distinct vote before payments can be made would create unacceptable risk for the long-term sustainability of the treaty. Without the certainty that the Bill and the treaty provide, the UK and US military would not be able to invest in vital capabilities. That would have major operational implications for the base. On new clause 11 tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, the House of Commons will scrutinise our annual estimates in the usual way, and spending under the treaty will be included in that process. New clause 10 is not necessary either.
New clauses 3, 4 and 9 are on the marine protected area. There is no requirement for the UK to consent to Mauritius establishing such an area or to its management, and that would be inconsistent with the treaty. Although the UK will be playing a different role in respect of the future MPA, both the UK and Mauritius remain committed to protecting that vital marine environment. That is why, under the terms of the treaty, we will provide technical support and assistance to Mauritius, in accordance with a separate written instrument. We will not make any additional direct payments to Mauritius as part of that activity.
On Chagossians and the right of self-determination, amendments 9 and 10, and new clauses 7, 8, 12, 13, and 14 concern the Chagossian community, and I understand and share the strength of feeling on the wider subject, and the historical treatment of the Chagossian communities. That is why the Government have put the preservation of nationality rights at the heart of the Bill. I am sympathetic to the concerns put forward about resettlement. I understand the intention of amendment 9, but it is not necessary. Under the agreement we have already agreed that Mauritius will be able to develop a programme of resettlement on islands other than Diego Garcia—I refer the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to comments from Olivier Bancoult and the Chagos Refugees Group. They have been clear that that is why they support this measure, and are urging us all to support the treaty. I also understand the questions on consultation, but as I have said, those negotiations were between the UK and Mauritius. The islands that make up BIOT do not have, and never have had, a settled population and have never been self-governing. No question of self-determination for a population therefore arises now.
New clauses 5, 6, 15 and 17 relate to national security issues, but they are simply not needed because the treaty protects our national security and secures the base. We have maintained full operational control of Diego Garcia with all the necessary rights and authorities, as well as a series of additional protections. In closing, the Bill and the treaty have been thoroughly scrutinised—
Several hon. Members rose—
No, I am not going to give way now. There have been plenty of debates and questions, and plenty of discussion. The Government have provided all the information necessary for Parliament to hold us to account, including publishing the full costs of the treaty and the legal rationale for the deal. The International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee have confirmed their agreement that the Bill does what we have set out, and the Government do not take risks with our national security, as the Opposition or Reform would do. That has been our priority throughout. I reject the amendments and urge the passage of the Bill.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 7, in clause 1, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State lays before Parliament a memorandum on the obligations under international law which require the UK to cede sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory to the Government of Mauritius.
(1B) The memorandum specified in subsection (1) must include—
(a) a summary of the legal advice received by the UK Government on this issue;
(b) an analysis of the status of UK's sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory under international law;
(c) the legal argument for the cessation of British sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory; and
(d) the risks which the UK Government may have faced had it not reached an agreement with the Government of Mauritius.
(1C) The report specified in subsections (1A) and (1B) must be laid before Parliament no later than two months after this Act receives Royal Assent.”—(Priti Patel.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
In a world that is growing more dangerous, this Labour Government will always put Britain’s security first, and if there is one thing that Members should take away from today’s debate, it is the absolute necessity of this Bill to secure the military base on Diego Garcia, which has played a critical role in defending the UK and our allies for over 50 years. Both the treaty and the Bill guarantee the long-term, secure operation of our military base and ensure that it will continue protecting our national security for generations to come.
Let me take this opportunity to thank Members on both sides of the House for their scrutiny of the Bill throughout its passage. I am grateful to those who contributed to the vigorous debate on Second Reading in September and to those who participated in today’s Committee proceedings. I thank the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee for their thorough inquiries into the substance of the treaty. In particular, I want to thank the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), for his tireless efforts in guiding the Bill through the House.
I would also like to thank the officials who worked on the Bill and the treaty, both under this Government and under the previous Government. Lastly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our international allies, especially the United States, for their support throughout the treaty negotiation process. Their backing was crucial in ensuring that this treaty, in the words of the US Defence Secretary Hegseth,
“secures the operational capabilities of the base…for many years ahead.”
This treaty also recognises the importance of the islands to the Chagossians. This Government respect the diversity of views within the community, so we will continue to engage with the Chagossian groups over the coming months and years. We have also committed to increase our support through new and existing projects. The US, our Five Eyes partners, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea have all supported this deal. Our adversaries would have loved to see this deal fail and the military base placed under threat, but this Government are not risking our national security, as the Opposition parties would claim we are.
Let me make it clear why we are here today. We inherited a set of negotiations started by the Conservatives. They chose to start negotiations to deliver what Lord Cameron said in January 2024 would be the
“safety, security and long-term viability of this base”.
The right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) explained the objectives at this very Dispatch Box. He also said they were to
“secure an agreement on the basis of international law…to strengthen…cooperation”
with Mauritius on
“maritime security…the environment…and to tackle illegal migration”.—[Official Report, 3 November 2022; Vol. 721, c. 27WS.]
That is what this deal secures, and that is why I wish it a speedy and successful passage through the rest of its parliamentary proceedings.
Let us be absolutely clear: the Conservatives started the negotiations. They held 11 rounds, but they failed to secure a deal. It is a question that not a single Tory MP wanted to answer today: why did they start these negotiations if it was so bad? If it was such a threat to national security, why was it a Conservative Government who started the negotiations? Why did they hold 11 rounds? It was a Labour Government who secured the deal; it is a Labour Government who are going to secure the future of our military base, and that is why I commend the Bill to the House.
Let me begin my remarks by once again paying tribute to the heroic Chagossian community who have joined us once again for this debate and have been here for a good four hours. In response to the Minister’s last point—he may have heard us say this previously on Second Reading and during Opposition day debates—no deal is better than a terrible deal, and the Conservative party would never have put this deal forward.
Throughout the process, the Government—[Interruption.] They can all make as much noise as they want on the Government benches. None of them were here—[Interruption.] They can point their fingers as much as they want; none of them were sitting here earlier to defend their Government on this terrible deal.
Let me come back to the Chagossian community, because throughout this process, they have been silenced and ignored by this Government, and they have faced decades of pain and hurt. [Laughter.] This is not a laughing matter at all. Hon. Members may want to sneer about this, but they should pay some respect to the Chagossian people, because we praise them and are grateful to them for their dignified campaign. There are some Members in this House, even on the Government Benches, who have Chagossians as their own constituents, who they have made representations on behalf of as well. I think we should thank them for the work that they have done.
I also want to thank hon. Members from across the House for their interest in this Bill and their diligent scrutiny. I say that because the Labour Government have sought to keep debates on their surrender treaty as short and restricted as possible, and we have seen that again. [Interruption.] They have not been here to contribute to those debates—what would they know? I am particularly grateful for the efforts of hon. Members who have challenged and debated the Bill, including the interest in the Foreign Affairs Committee evidence session. Opposition Members on the Environmental Audit Committee and the Science and Technology Committee spent valuable time in Select Committees—let me emphasise that: in Select Committees—scrutinising this treaty. Opposition Members have been relentless and I thank them for their forensic questioning and for exposing the scandalous way in which this Government have acted. These debates have benefited from the legal expertise and knowledge of former Ministers and Law Officers, and I am thankful to them for their contribution and support.
I also want to pay tribute to the Minister for the Overseas Territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty). He has been diligent in responding to questioning, and he has probably spent more time in the House debating this issue, as well as responding to written communications, than he originally expected. He has become the Minister for defending the indefensible. Although we do disagree robustly on this treaty, we thank him and respect him for his contributions.
Let us be clear: this is a bad Bill for Britain; the Opposition will continue to oppose it, and our colleagues in the other place will give it further scrutiny. It leaves Britain weaker and poorer, it gives succour to our enemies, and it has shown the world that, under Labour, Britain is being governed by weak Ministers who appease the whims of left-wing lawyers and activists, rather than standing up for our national interest. Friend and foe alike will now see Britain as a soft touch that can be bullied by lawfare into waving the white flag of surrender, rather than proudly flying the Union flag.
For Britain’s standing in the world, for our defence and national security, and for our suffering British taxpayers, I bitterly regret the passage of this Bill. For months we have been calling on Labour to step back from the brink and ditch this mind-boggling surrender deal, but this Government have arrogantly blundered on. Britain comprehensively lost in these negotiations, the treaty and the Bill that we have considered today as a result. Ministers have squirmed and rolled over at every turn and have been eaten for breakfast by the Mauritian Government.
Let me be clear: we will oppose this Bill every step of the way in this House and in the other place. It is worth noting that within weeks of coming to power, this soft-touch Government decided that they would end more than 200 years of British sovereignty over this vital territory for our country’s security and national interest, and for no justifiable reason. We are not just giving up the islands of the archipelago; more than that, the national interest is being squandered, and so is peace and stability in that area.
The Government are asking British taxpayers, whom they have already thrashed with vindictive taxes, now to shoulder the burden of this scandalous deal, and it is simply not on. Labour Governments often bang on about the redistribution of wealth, but today they take it to a new level with the redistribution of wealth from Britain to Mauritius. How much of the money will be plundered from the Defence budget, hindering our armed forces’ ability to procure new capabilities at the worst possible time? It comes as the Minister for Defence Procurement has overseen a freeze on procurement as the world gets more dangerous, and we do know that the world is getting more dangerous. The much-vaunted strategic defence review, which Labour pledged would see off all the major threats, was overdue and underfunded—but guess what? Labour has no plan to pay for it now.
Here we are now: the Government have found it within themselves to spend £35 billion on this deal. This is not just money from down the line in the future; it is hundreds of millions of pounds each year within this Parliament. Today the Government have sunk to a new low: Labour MPs have voted against giving Parliament, this House, a say over sending £35 billion of our constituents’ money to Mauritius with no strings attached. Mauritius will now use our money to reduce its debt and cut taxes because of this Government. Labour MPs have voted to block the publication of a summary of legal advice on which the Government relied to make this dodgy deal. We might have thought that they had learnt from the current China debacle that this is not the right way, but no, they still cannot offer a sound legal explanation for why they have rushed through this deal.
The Government have refused to adopt our amendments to ensure the monitoring of how the rights of Chagossians will be safeguarded. The Chagossians, to whom we have a special responsibility, have been neglected and ignored by Labour since the election, so it comes as no surprise—and it is now a bitter blow for them—that there is no cost implication or, indeed, any good reason as to why we are going down this route.
The Government have also declined to adopt our amendment to keep the Intelligence and Security Committee apprised of the security protections in this treaty, again denying hon. Members the scrutiny to which we are entitled. It is astonishing, in the light of the national security concerns that this terrible deal now brings, and it leaves our country weaker and poorer. This is a deal that this Government and our country will come to regret.
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
That the Bill be now read a second time.
My Lords, the Bill that we are to discuss today is vital for the security of our nation. It enables the ratification and entry into force of the treaty between the UK and Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, and thus protects the operation of an essential UK military base in the Indian Ocean. The consequences of not ratifying this treaty should not be underestimated. The inevitable effect would be to expose the UK to an unacceptable level of risk and legal uncertainty, which could deny us key military and security capabilities, dramatically reducing the effectiveness of our Armed Forces and security services. A binding judgment against the UK from an international court or tribunal would undermine our ability to operate globally to protect UK influence and counter the threats we face in an increasingly dangerous world, and it would put at risk security at home.
I understand that the treaty has divided opinion. We have had good debates in both this House and the other place on its substance, and I, of course, welcome this scrutiny. Since the Government signed the treaty, there have been Statements and debates across both Houses, hundreds of Questions raised and answered, and the completion of several committee inquiries by learned colleagues.
The necessity of the Diego Garcia treaty and of this Bill has been amply demonstrated. It has been tested in detail by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Both agreed that protection of the strategic value of Diego Garcia—a vital national asset—was necessary. The IAC clearly set out the path to significant risks to the base if the treaty were not ratified.
The Diego Garcia treaty has the support of our international allies. The United States has been engaged throughout the negotiations and supports it, as do the rest of our Five Eyes partners; Japan, South Korea and India support it as well. The UN, the Commonwealth and the African Union all welcomed it. Our overseas territories family supports it. The list goes on.
I welcome the opportunity to test this further today. The treaty is an important matter that the Government considered with great care. We bore the full weight of responsibility for not only the security of the British people but the integrity of the UK’s position on the global stage, and for respect for the experiences of those who had lived on the islands.
This treaty is critical to our national security. The base holds a range of vital capabilities, some of which are highly secret. I know that those with experience in this House will understand the military advantage of being able to deploy forces rapidly across the Middle East, east Africa and south Asia, and will appreciate the political and security importance of operating such a prized asset jointly with our closest partner, the United States.
The deal preserves this vital security footprint. With it, we will retain full operational control over Diego Garcia, with robust provisions to keep adversaries out. These include: unrestricted access to and use of the base for the UK and the US; a buffer zone around Diego Garcia; a UK veto to ensure that no development or construction on the outer islands threatens base operations; and a ban on the presence of any foreign security forces. The protections were designed, tested and endorsed at the highest level of the US political and security establishment.
The Government acted to protect this vital asset because it faced an existential threat. This was well understood by the previous Government, which is why they started negotiations more than three years ago—negotiations that they entered in good faith, despite what we heard in the other place, and continued for 11 rounds, including detailed text-based negotiations in the weeks and months before the general election.
It was under the previous Government that Mauritius secured its string of legal and political victories against the UK. Noble Lords will be aware of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion in 2019 and the loss of votes at the UN General Assembly. This was followed in 2021 by a ruling by a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on a maritime delimitation dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. The special chamber, in a decision that was binding on the parties to the dispute, ruled that Mauritius’s sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s determinations. This gave a clear indication of how this tribunal—and, quite possibly, other international courts and tribunals—would approach the ICJ’s advisory opinion and the sovereignty dispute between the UK and Mauritius.
I urge noble Lords to reflect on the sound conclusions of the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. The learned members of both committees took evidence from eminent legal scholars, including a former member of the ICJ. The IAC concluded that, if the treaty is not ratified,
“Mauritius is likely to resume its campaign against the UK through international courts”
and stated that it heard evidence that
“any international court looking at this issue would be unlikely to find in favour of the UK”,
putting the base at risk.
The Government have been clear about the legal position. Had a long-term deal not been reached, it was highly likely that wide-ranging litigation would have been brought quickly against the UK. There were several potential routes for this, which included further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. The United Kingdom’s long-standing legal view has been that we would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending our legal position on sovereignty in such litigation. Even if we had chosen to ignore legally binding judgments against the UK, their legal effect on third countries and international organisations would have given rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions. We have all heard the counter- positions—that the Government are bowing to an opinion that is merely advisory and that there was no viable route to a binding judgment—but I am afraid those simply do not reflect the reality of this situation.
It is clear that securing a deal was essential. The agreement that the Government have signed protects the base for generations and is firmly in the national interest. The Government did not secure the base at any cost; we negotiated a deal that is good value for money for the British people. The full financial details were published alongside the treaty on the day of signature. The average cost per year in today’s money is £101 million, and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion. These figures have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. These figures draw on long-established methodology, used under this Government and previous Governments, to account for long-term projects. We have all heard, and I suspect we will hear again today, the Opposition claim that the cost is higher. This is grossly misleading. Accounting norms and processes set out in the Green Book are there for a reason: so we can understand the true value of things. Let us debate those values with transparency, not exaggeration or manipulation for political point-scoring.
I suspect that some in this House will have heard concerns regarding undue influence on Mauritius from hostile forces. The Opposition were quite vocal on the subject in the other place—although, interestingly, we heard barely a peep before 4 July last year, when they were in negotiations. The treaty is the only way to ensure the base continues to operate as it has done, with all the protections that I listed earlier, including threats from our adversaries; whereas, had Mauritius secured a binding judgment against the UK, there would have been nothing to stop it leasing different islands to different countries, dramatically undermining the utility of this prized military asset.
As with any government policy, it is crucial that we discuss the people who are at the heart of it. I know there is a deep strength of feeling, genuinely held, in this House and the other place about Chagossians. Let me be clear: this Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily state-to-state between Mauritius and the UK, and it is true that our priority was to secure the base, but that does not mean that the interests of the Chagossian community were set aside. Indeed, the treaty has the support of many in the Chagossian community. Olivier Bancoult, chair of the Chagos Refugee Group, which is the largest Chagossian group, has said
“we remain convinced that this agreement provides the only way forward”,
and in a recent communiqué urged all Members of the UK Parliament to support the Bill.
The treaty provides that Mauritius may develop a programme of resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago, other than Diego Garcia, and noble Lords will also be aware of the £40 million trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of Chagossians. I know many in this House are interested in the operation of these commitments. My noble friend Lord Collins noted in this place that, ahead of ratification, the Government would make a ministerial Statement in both Houses providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement and the modalities of the trust fund.
I know that many noble Lords are also interested in the environmental consequences of the treaty. It is crucial that one of the world’s most pristine marine environments is protected, and this Government and Mauritius are committed to that. Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam has publicly stated his commitment to the marine protected area and confirmed it directly to the former Environment Secretary at the UN Ocean Conference in June.
Just yesterday, the Mauritian Government announced plans for the establishment of the Chagos Archipelago marine protected area. This will be based on the robust International Union for the Conservation of Nature categories for marine protected areas. Critically, it makes it clear that there will be no commercial fishing across the entire 640,000 square kilometre area. The Great Chagos Bank will be given one of the highest levels of protection, with the rest of the MPA categorised as a highly protected conservation zone. There will be limited provision for controlled levels of artisanal fishing in confined zones intended for resettlement to allow for sustenance of the Chagossian community, while maintaining the commitment to nature conservation. This development should assuage the concerns we have heard in this House and the other place about Mauritian commitments to environmental protections.
Despite this progress, and the passage of the Bill in the other place, there are still those here who want to relitigate the debate that we had in July. There are Motions intended to probe and amend at Committee and Report. They are welcome, but Motions that are designed to wreck are not about the welfare of a community; they are a cynical tactic of delay and disruption. The Opposition Front Bench has tried blocking ratification, yet seems unable to accept the will of this House. I am disappointed, but unsurprised, that we all now look likely to have to witness an unedifying spectacle of it having another go.
Noble Lords will notice that we are not considering a committal Motion to commit the Bill to Committee today. As noble Lords know, it is extremely unusual to table a Motion to seek to divide the House to delay the passage of government legislation passed by the House of Commons. It is even more unusual for the Opposition to press such a Motion to a vote on the Floor of the House, as they have indicated they would. We know that His Majesty’s Opposition take their responsibilities seriously. They have said on multiple occasions to my noble friend the Leader of the House of Lords that their motivation is to properly challenge and scrutinise government legislation. That is their job; it is not to block legislation or stop the Government getting their programme through.
Let me share the truth of this matter. The amendment to the committal Motion favoured by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is, in effect, a fatal Motion. I will explain why: it makes committal conditional on consultation. It is not credible to undertake meaningful consultation in the 30-day period set out in the Motion. It would therefore risk progress towards ratification becoming bogged down in litigation. The Front Bench opposite should know that; I would be surprised if they do not.
The Motion would wreck the Bill and mean a delay not of 30 days but of months, maybe years. In these circumstances, the Bill and the treaty that it is intended to implement could not move ahead. This is both reckless and deeply cynical. It is reckless because it threatens the continued operation of the base on Diego Garcia and, with that, the national security of the British people. It is cynical because the Opposition now seek to use, for their own ends, a community they systematically disregarded when in government. We all know their record: the decision not to consult Chagossians when meaningful consultation was possible at the start of negotiations; the decision in 2016 not to permit any resettlement by Chagossians across the archipelago; and the dramatic failure to spend 96% of the £40 million commitment to support Chagossians.
It is worth contrasting that record with the record of this Government. We are financing a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of the Chagossian community. We are working with Mauritius to start a new programme of visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The treaty we have entered allows Mauritius to develop a programme of resettlement on the islands other than Diego Garcia. This Government are also increasing our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These are initiatives that actually deliver for Chagossians; they are not empty promises or hollow words.
The Bill is relatively short. It preserves the current laws of the British Indian Ocean Territory as laws that will continue to apply to Diego Garcia once the treaty is in force, allowing for the base’s continued, effective operation with minimal disruption. The Bill also grants a new power to make the domestic legal changes needed to implement the treaty and to manage responsibly the base’s future operation.
There will be no change to the British nationality status that any Chagossian currently holds, whether it is a British citizenship or a British Overseas Territory citizenship, and current pathways for Chagossians to acquire British citizenship are also maintained. Most of the provisions in the Bill will commence only when the treaty enters into force. I trust that we will have a lively and thorough debate on this subject matter, and I look forward to debating the Bill’s contents. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the Bill, and I will come to some of her points shortly. This is now the second opportunity that we have had to debate the UK-Mauritius agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, but it is of course the first time that your Lordships’ House has been asked to approve the agreement in law.
When we debated the Motion to approve the treaty under the CRaG process, I lamented the fact that the other place was denied the opportunity to have a substantive debate on the treaty at that point. If the Government are so confident in their arguments, why did they deny the other House the opportunity to debate this properly? As I said then, the Government played fast and loose with the conventions on treaty approval, despite promises that had been given by their own Ministers when the CRaG process was first introduced. The Government were elected on the back of pledges to put public service and integrity first; refusing to adhere to the conventions in this case hardly lived up to those promises.
That said, as a responsible Official Opposition—and recognising the primacy of the other place, which approved the Bill at Third Reading—we will not seek to deny the Bill a Second Reading today. We already know that the other place did not have the opportunity to debate the treaty when it was laid before the House, and the Bill subsequently received minimal scrutiny. In fact, Committee and Third Reading were both taken on the same day, and a total of just 17 hours of debate were allocated to a Bill that fundamentally changes our strategic security role in the Indian Ocean and puts £35 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money in the hands of politicians thousands of miles away from the UK.
Not only was there no mention of the Bill in the Labour manifesto; there was a specific promise to protect our overseas territories. For the election, the Minister’s party’s manifesto said:
“Defending our security also means protecting the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies … Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination”.
It seems that tax is not the only manifesto commitment being binned today.
Crucially, the views of the Chagossian people have not been heard. We feel it is only right that the Government should be required to consult the Chagossian community on the implementation of this treaty, including on the establishment of the Chagossian trust fund, which the Minister discussed. The UK taxpayer will fund it, but the Mauritian Government will have sole responsibility to distribute it however they see fit.
That is why I tabled the amendment to the original committal Motion that would have required the Government to consult the Chagossian community over a period of 30 days. If the Minister is concerned that 30 days is not long enough, I note that we talked about making it longer, but we did not do so because we wanted the Government to have the opportunity to get their Bill through this Session. If I had set the Motion at three months, the Minister would have told us that there is no time to have a Committee debate before the end of this Session because the Opposition are trying to deny them the Bill. We deliberately selected a short period so that the Minister could not argue that we were trying to wreck the Bill—that was not our intention. It was a measured, reasonable approach which we felt would have made up completely for the Government’s failure to consult the Chagossians to date and would help us in our work to give the Bill the proper scrutiny it deserves, informed by the outcome of that consultation. It was not a wrecking amendment, and the Minister knows that in her heart of hearts. Without that additional consultation—
If the noble Lord was so concerned to do this, first, why did he not consult earlier? Secondly, he can achieve his aims—which would not be wrecking but would be perfectly legitimate —by amendment to the Bill, delaying implementation, perhaps. Those things are standard. He could make his case, or perhaps even win his vote, and achieve his aims, should they be genuine and not a wrecking amendment.
This treaty is due to last 100 years. How is it a wrecking amendment to take 30 days to consult the people who will be affected by it? The Minister is talking nonsense, and she knows it.
Without that additional consultation of the Chagossian people, we fear that the Bill, which received so little scrutiny in the other place, will go on to become law without the affected Chagossians having their views heard, as they rightly should. I know that a number of them have turned up to the Public Gallery to hear this debate today.
I hope that the Government’s decision to withdraw the committal Motion at the last moment is an indication that they are listening to us and want to think about this more deeply. It is clear to us that we need that consultation, so I call upon the Minister to bring it forward as part of the committal Motion when the Government eventually bring it back to the House. As I said, the Government intend this treaty to last 100 years; surely, we can take one month to consult the people most affected by it.
To call the Bill a surrender Bill is an understatement. This is a strategic capitulation that will see us give away sovereign territory that has been British for two centuries. To add insult to injury, taxpayers are paying tens of billions to Mauritius for the privilege of doing so. We know the important, strategic role that the British Indian Ocean Territory has played internationally as a staging post for forward operations in both the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Handing over sovereignty, even with a lease agreement in respect of Diego Garcia military base, puts, in our view, that strategic role in jeopardy.
In particular, the requirement in the agreement that Mauritius must be informed of armed attacks on third states directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia is an astounding failure of diplomacy. Could the Government tell us how this would actually work in practice, in a rapidly changing armed conflict? Has the US, which actually runs this base, agreed to do that? How would it work in practice? How would we inform them in an emergency situation, with proper notice to enable us to take strategic action, as required?
My noble friend Lady Goldie will expand on some of the security implications of this agreement, but we are clear that it is a capitulation that weakens our influence on the international stage. It is a surrender orchestrated by international lawyers and implemented by a Prime Minister who is either unwilling or unable to stand up for the UK national interest.
The Bill does not just relate to the UK’s affairs in the Indian Ocean; the sheer cost of the treaty with Mauritius makes the Bill a domestic issue, too. By pressing ahead with this legislation, the Government are facilitating an agreement that will see the UK pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius. I notice that the Minister spent quite a bit of her time disagreeing with those figures, yet only one hour ago, when I asked her how much of the ODA budget is being dedicated to this agreement, she got a cheap laugh, and avoided the question once again, as she has now done four times. However, she knows, as I know, that some of that ODA budget is being used to fund this agreement. If she wishes to be so transparent and disagree with our figures, why does she not tell us how much of it is going to be spent from the ODA budget? She can stand up and do it now, if she wishes.
All of our ODA spending is published. It is probably one of the most transparent bits of government funding. I will send the noble Lord the website address so he can have a look and satisfy himself on this point.
I am grateful for that; that is a concession, of sorts. I have only asked her the question four times during Questions so far. Now that she is willing to be more transparent, that is progress, at least.
Against that backdrop, hard-working Britons will be furious that Ministers have somehow found £35 billion to send 6,000 miles away when we face such financial challenges here at home. The fact is that the treaty facilitated by the Bill will fund tax cuts for Mauritius while taxes are being hiked here at home. We put this deal on hold when we were in Government, when it was in its infancy. We saw its flaws, and we paused it. Alas, Ministers no longer have the clarity of mind needed to deliver for the British people and are—
I am sorry, but that is factually incorrect and I would like to give the noble Lord the opportunity to correct it. It was paused, but when the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, was appointed Foreign Secretary, he restarted those negotiations.
I am happy to tell the Minister that I have spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, about that. He agreed that it was paused, which I think she has just confirmed.
Alas, Ministers no longer have the clarity of mind needed to deliver for the British people and, as so often with this Government, they have allowed themselves to be taken in by their international lawyer friends and donors. This all begs the question: why? Why did Ministers feel the need to pursue this agreement that puts Britain’s interests last? Why have the Government seen fit to saddle taxpayers with an additional financial burden, at a time when we are all being softened up for massive tax rises from the Chancellor of the Exchequer?
Ministers have told us, as the noble Baroness did again today, that this agreement is a legal necessity, but, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar when we debated the Motion to approve the treaty—I commend his speech to noble Lords who have not had the chance to see it yet—there is a range of views among very senior lawyers on this matter. The Government cannot hide behind legal advice, unless they want to publish it for us all to see. This was a political decision for which Ministers must take the political responsibility.
The almost single-minded obsession with international law has blinded the Government to the real threat from a country that itself pays absolutely no heed whatever to that same international law. We know that China has said that it wants to deepen its strategic partnership with Mauritius. As recently as 15 May this year, China’s ambassador to Mauritius said that the People’s Republic of China wanted to strengthen ties with Mauritius, noting the country’s “strategic advantages”, and expressed a commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. The Chinese ambassador to Mauritius is on the record as offering, unsurprisingly, massive congratulations on the deal and stating that China fully supports Mauritius’s attempt to “safeguard national sovereignty”. It is a shame that China does not show that same regard to the national sovereignty of other nations.
That is who the Government have appeased with this agreement. When the Government took office, they claimed that they would protect our national security. Can the Minister please explain how ceding national sovereignty to a country that is known to be deepening its ties with a nation that we know to be a threat to the UK will help them achieve that manifesto commitment?
As the Official Opposition, we will seek to amend the Bill in your Lordships’ House to ensure that the Chagossian community is properly consulted and that the agreement facilitated by the Bill does not put the desires of international lawyers before the interests of the British people, who have paid the taxes which are now to be transferred with careless abandon to Mauritius.
Speaking of the rights of the Chagossians, I find myself on this occasion in the unusual position of agreeing with noble Lords to my left when I say that the Government have not handled this well. In the other place, the Liberal Democrat spokesman, Dr Al Pinkerton, said that,
“this Bill fails the Chagossian people”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 756.].”
On this, we agree. Ministers have failed to properly consult the Chagossians to the point that the community is now furious with this Government, as we have all seen from our email inboxes.
However, there was another way. In the other place, the shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, tabled a presentation Bill which included specific requirements
“to consult and engage with British Chagossians in relation to any proposed changes to the sovereignty and constitutional arrangements of the British Indian Ocean Territory”.
That is what should happen. The Chagossian community should be heard and not ignored.
In conclusion, the questions at the core of all our debates will remain these. Is this treaty a good deal for Britain? Does the Bill put us in the service of the British people? I do not think that it does—
I start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for her closing speech. It was exactly the kind of speech I would have expected from her. It was forensic and detailed, asking absolutely legitimate questions that any respectable Opposition should put to a Government proposing this kind of Bill. I will try to answer all her questions— I was writing as quickly as I could—but I may not get through them all. The idea of a letter in the Library, explaining the detail so that everybody can see what we have to say, is a very good one. I would be happy to do that.
I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. It has been lively, as I suspected it might be. I might say that I agreed with some contributions more than others, and some were probably better informed than others, but that is the nature of these things. I will endeavour to respond to all the points raised by noble Lords, and we will, I hope, have further discussions in Committee on many of those.
I would like to remind the House why we are scrutinising and reviewing a Bill sent to us from the other place. The Bill is essential to ensure that the treaty with Mauritius can be ratified, a treaty that is fundamental to safeguarding the operations of a critical UK-US base on Diego Garcia and to the security of British people. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, the Bill is also vital to protecting the British citizenship rights of Chagossians.
Noble Lords have questioned the legal rationale for this deal and asked what court could give a binding judgment. Let me set this out again: as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, explained well in his speech, if a long-term deal had not been reached, it is highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would have been brought quickly against the UK. Both the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee, in scrutinising the treaty, heard evidence of where these binding judgments could come from.
One possibility is that Mauritius would find a dispute under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that it could bring before an arbitral tribunal under Annexe VII of the convention. That also raises the prospect that Mauritius would seek provisional measures from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Provisional measures of this type and the decision of an arbitral tribunal would each be legally binding on the UK. A further possibility is that a dispute under a multilateral treaty could be brought before the International Court of Justice. A judgment delivered in the manner by the ICJ in disputes between states may also be legally binding.
There are those—we have had this ever since we started debating this issue—who question where this binding judgment might arise, but they are fundamentally missing the point here. The risk was real. International courts were already reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty, and this in turn, as my noble friend Lord Browne explained, put the base at real risk. The point is that the treaty with Mauritius prevents that happening in the future.
Noble Lords are perfectly entitled to take a different view on the extent of that risk; that is absolutely their right. The Government’s view is that that risk is real. Having that view, any responsible Government making that assessment has to seek to resolve it and to come to some lasting, legally enforceable arrangement with Mauritius. That is why we did the deal. Noble Lords are entitled to disagree with the Government, and I have absolutely no issue with that, but please do not impute some sort of bad intent or motive around political correctness, colonialism or any of those things. Our intention is to secure that base for the benefit of the security of our country. We did it so an agreement could be concluded on our terms, rather than it being forced upon us so that we would have to accept the imposition of an arrangement that would not have been in our favour.
I am interpreting the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, on the overseas territories as an invitation to the Government to restate their longstanding and clear commitment to all our overseas territories. The Conservatives, at some points in these debates, although not recently—the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, never did this, but others did—would raise the issue of the Falkland Islands. I thought that that was the height of irresponsibility, and I am very glad that they no longer attempt to bring that question into these discussions, because it was wrong that they did that.
This treaty has a complex resolution process attached to it because it needs to be long-lasting, and we are trying to cover every eventuality that might arise. That is a really good subject for us to get into in Committee, and we must test that to make sure that we have got that right. I have every confidence that the noble Baroness and her colleagues will bring to us situations that we need to hold up against that process, to make sure that we have got that right.
On the notification of activities of third countries with our consent, there is a notification there. I think that is right, but it is not in any way conditional. We do not need consent. It is not about permission or any of those things. I hope that that is helpful.
On the ability to make law, we had an interesting discussion at the briefing about royal prerogative and the ability of the King to make law in Diego Garcia. We need to get into that in Committee. There will be things in the Bill that, when I was sitting in the noble Baroness’s place, I would have been asking questions about, such as powers and flexibilities, the ability of Ministers to make decisions, and the various methodologies. I expect we will be having long discussions about negative and affirmative procedures, for example, and law-making power is one such issue.
I want to address some of the points that were made regarding the Chagossian community. As I stated in my opening speech, this Government deeply regret how the Chagossians were removed from the islands. This is a community that the Government are committed to working with and supporting in the months and years ahead. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. She made a compelling and genuine contribution on this important issue, as did the noble Lord, Lord Horam, and I commend those who have been working on this for very many years. She did her party proud, and I respect the longstanding commitment that she and others have had.
The Bill ensures that there will be no adverse impact on Chagossians’ nationality rights as a result of the treaty. Chagossians will not lose their current rights to hold or claim British citizenship, and no one will lose existing British Overseas Territory citizenship status. The Bill does, however, remove Chagossians’ ability to acquire British Overseas Territory citizenship in the future, because once the treaty comes into force, BIOT will not be an overseas territory.
On the trust fund, the noble Lord, Lord Horam, raised the possibility of an exchange of letters on the future treatment of Chagossians under this fund. This is, again, a genuine issue that we ought to explore. I appreciate that noble Lords will want more detail on how the trust fund will operate. I look forward to discussing this in Committee. Who knows? We might be able to reach some sort of agreement on that issue.
On the citizenship law, which was raised by one or two noble Lords opposite—it may have been the noble Lord, Lord Hannan—there have been mentions of section 76B of the Mauritian criminal code and concerns that Chagossians are leaving Mauritius for fear of being prosecuted for their affiliation with the UK. This is really important: no one has ever been prosecuted under this law; but just because no one has ever been subject to it, that does not make it right. Last week, the Mauritian Government repealed this section, and, as of April 2025, 94% of Chagossians with British nationality also had Mauritian citizenship.
On the right to self-determination, there have been questions during the debate, and leading up to it, about consultation with Chagossians. The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily between states—the UK and Mauritius—and it is true that we have prioritised the operation of the base on Diego Garcia. That has been our priority. There may be people here who disagree with that and who would have preferred us to prioritise other issues, and I respect their right to hold that view, but that is not the view of the Government. We wanted to protect the base.
There were some, including the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who raised the right to self-determination for the Chagossians. I have followed the noble Baroness’s career for many years; I do not know why, but I have always been rather attached to following what she does and says, and I have a real long-standing respect for her. I completely understand why she wants to raise this issue, and why it matters so much to her. The fact is that the Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population and has never been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population, therefore, legally arises.
The English courts, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, have proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritians rather than Chagossians. Both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have considered, in a series of judgments since the 1970s, the related but distinct question of an alleged right of abode or other rights said to flow from that. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed these claims. The transfer of sovereignty, therefore, does not deprive Chagossians of any existing rights. This is a long-standing legal position that previous UK Governments have also adopted, including in claims brought as recently as 2020. That all sounds very legalistic and cold; nevertheless, that is the legal position as it stands.
I thank the Minister for addressing this issue, because it has become a real touchpoint in the general populace. Does she agree that, while we might differ on the legality issue, there is a moral duty on the Government to engage with the Chagossians, who feel so let down, not just by this Government—I made that very clear—but by the whole political establishment in this country?
I agree, and I will say a little about engagement. It is an important point, and it deserves a proper response. If there is more that we can do, we would be very open to discussions about how it could be done in the right way that does not derail the process that we are trying to undertake about bringing the treaty into law.
Having said that, we recognise the importance of the islands to Chagossians, and have worked hard to reflect this in our wider policies. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has, as he said, a long-standing position on this which I understand and respect. His impressive command of the history of this subject was put to good use in his previous interventions. I completely agree with his point about the shameful treatment of the Chagossian population.
On engagement, in the past three years officials have met Chagossians and groups over 30 times to discuss the agreement and FCDO’s wider support to the community. The Minister for Overseas Territories, Stephen Doughty, has met with Chagossians four times since he has been in post since July last year and, on 2 September, the new Chagossian contact group met. It has wide representation from Chagossian communities in the UK, Mauritius, the Seychelles and elsewhere to give Chagossians a formal role that shapes decision-making in the UK Government’s support for their community. The group met for the first time on 2 September and will convene quarterly hereafter.
Claims that all Chagossians are opposed to the agreement fail to respect the differing views of this diverse and vibrant community. We have seen some of that reflected in our discussions this afternoon. Many voices support the outcome reached, and these include the Chagos Refugees Group, the Chagos Islanders Movement, the UK Natives Chagossian Council and the Seychelles Chagossian committee. However, I accept that there are many Chagossians who take a different view, which is their right.
On resettlement, points have been made that the treaty does not guarantee Chagossians the right of return to the archipelago and that it should have done. This has come up several times. In 2016, when in government, the Conservatives ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands. The KPMG report, which has been mentioned several times and was commissioned by that Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. This agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms without requiring the UK taxpayer to foot the bill.
There has been a range of views about Mauritius and its reliability. Some noble Lords have implied that Mauritius is somehow an unreliable partner that cannot be trusted. These claims are insulting to Mauritius, which is a member of the Commonwealth and a westward-facing country with shared democratic values. Mauritius ranks among the top African nations in governance, human development and innovation. It is a full democracy, a regional leader in human rights and a trusted partner in upholding the rules-based international order. It ranks second out of 54 African countries in the Mo Ibrahim index of African governance. It is also one of only two African countries not to have signed up to China’s belt and road initiative. As an act of good faith, Mauritius stopped its legal campaign against us while we negotiated.
Much has also been said about China. There has been a substantial amount of complete misinformation about China’s influence in the region and reported plans to develop a military base in the Chagos Archipelago. The Mauritian Attorney-General has stated publicly that these claims are a gross falsehood and calls them a political gimmick. I can confirm, unequivocally, that the treaty prevents any foreign security forces, civilian or military, from establishing themselves in the archipelago. Furthermore, if the UK believes, for whatever reason, that any activity taking place in the archipelago would jeopardise the security of the base, Mauritius is obliged under the treaty to co-operate with us to prevent that risk, and the UK can veto any construction or development across the archipelago which we consider to be a security threat to the base. As for claims that China supports the treaty because it grants it greater influence in the Indian Ocean, that is, frankly, nonsense.
This is why our closest allies and partners have welcomed the deal, especially the US and other Five Eyes partners. They are satisfied that the treaty protects the base against foreign influence and think that it is essential for our capabilities for generations to come.
Many of the points on the issue of the environment are really quite important, including on marine protected areas. The noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, made a thoughtful speech about this. There have been claims made, both during the debate today and in the other place, that the Mauritian Fisheries Minister wished to issue fishing licences in the area, which would risk, the argument goes, the protection of the unique marine environment of the archipelago. It must be noted that the point the Minister was making was more to do with sovereignty than with fisheries policy, but, as I said in my opening speech, the Mauritian Government confirmed only yesterday that they will establish a marine protected area that follows current bounds of the BIOT MPA and that they will not allow any commercial fishing in any section of the marine protected area.
Noble Lords have quite reasonably sought assurances on enforcement of the MPA, and I expect this is something we will get into detailed discussion about in Committee. For today, I point out that, if the UK at any point believes that Mauritius is in breach of its environmental obligations, we can seek to resolve that using the agreed dispute resolution mechanism in Article 14. In any case, the UK and Mauritius are working to finalise the arrangements on maritime security to ensure that there are patrolling capabilities and that these are maintained.
On the point about the marine protected area, I think the Minister said that Mauritius had duplicated the zone absolutely. Is it not the case that it is not a no-catch zone? Point B in the communiqué issued confirmed that fishing will still be permitted in over 600,000 square kilometres of the zone.
That is right, and I said that in my opening speech. This is about artisanal fishing. In the event of some sort of resettlement on the outer islands, those communities would need to sustain themselves. They would fish using traditional artisanal methods, and that is what the permission relates to. It would not permit any other form of fishing, because that would clearly be detrimental to marine life.
The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, chair of the ISC, said—and this is about money—it is disappointing that there continues to be reference to artificially inflated figures of the cost of the treaty. It is misleading to ignore inflation and the changing value of money over time. The net present value of the treaty is what we have always said it will be: £3.4 billion over its lifetime. This is in line with long-standing practice in how the Government account for all long-term spend. The Office for Statistics Regulation and the OBR have verified these figures and confirmed that we have applied this methodology correctly.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the point is that, in accounting for money, cash accounting is used in government. What she is talking about is economic analysis, which is not the same as financial analysis. If she had been in the Chamber she would have heard my speech on this subject. It is clear that, when we come to draw up accounts for the Government, cash goes into this in pounds expressed in the time expended.
I apologise to the noble Baroness for missing her speech, and I will read it in Hansard; the bladder is only so strong. What matters here is that there is consistency across government and over time in the way that we do these things. These things are done the same as they would be done for any other agreement.
I know that some people take a different view of the OBR from the one that this Government take. We take it seriously, and it has looked at our figures and verified them. The noble Baroness could by all means come back to this in Committee—I am sure that she will—but, for tonight, I will stick with what the OBR had to say on this issue. The way that we have done this ensures that the figures are realistic and comparable, not inflated by simply adding up future payments while ignoring the depreciation of value over time.
The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, made quite a thoughtful speech. He is worried about the money. I should point out that we do not see this as an open market situation by any means. He seeks clarity about total cost. I can confirm that £3.4 billion is just that—it is the total cost.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, suggested that the US should be contributing to the cost of the treaty, given its joint use of the military base. We have to recognise that the US pays for the operating costs of the base, and these are several multiples greater than any payments by the UK. We benefit greatly from this arrangement. This allows us to access a valuable capability that keeps our country safe and the US is paying far more for it than we do.
Does my noble friend agree that this agreement also allows the Americans to forward plan for their investment, which, as she quite rightly says, is substantial?
Absolutely. I thought the point made by the former Secretary of State for Defence, my noble friend Lord Browne of Ladyton, added to this very well when he talked about how future investment is jeopardised by the legal uncertainty that we are seeking to resolve.
Some have questioned the use of defence money in particular for this treaty. To be absolutely clear, the cost will be split between the FCDO and the MoD, as is appropriate given the shared interests of both departments in maintaining the future of the base. As set out by the Defence Secretary in his Oral Statement on the treaty in the other place, the costs represent a fraction of a percentage of the total defence budget—less than 0.2%. It is a bit far-fetched to suggest that the annual payments are in any way comparable to the biggest uplift in defence spending that we have seen since the end of the Cold War.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, raised sea level change. I do not know why I am dealing with this in the money section, but this is where I have written it down so we might as well get it on the record. As he said, it is true that sea level change has been less than 1% over the past 50 years, but it would be helpful for us to explore in Committee how a future sea level change, which he quite rightly alerts us to, would be treated by the dispute resolution process. I do not have a clear answer to that tonight but that is what Committee is for: getting to the bottom of exactly those sorts of questions.
I will give the last word to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. He made the very strong argument—it is not one that I had thought of, but I will definitely use it again—that this House voted in July to ratify the treaty. The Bill facilitates the enactment of this House’s wishes, because we voted in favour of the treaty. The Bill is necessary so that we can complete the ratification with Mauritius and therefore secure the critical military base on Diego Garcia. I thank noble Lords for their contributions and look forward to debating this in Committee.
(11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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That is extremely helpful. I very much welcome my noble friend’s intervention.
I am very much going to regret getting involved in this, but I think it is helpful to understand what this House has and has not done. Both Houses of Parliament have voted that the Government should ratify this treaty. That is the situation as it is. This debate is about making sure we have the right legislation to enable us to enact the treaty.
I think lots of positions will be endlessly stated on that; I am not going to take it any further now. I do not see anyone changing their minds about that, but I would like to address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who suggested that this was really about a reluctance ever to cede sovereignty and to allow any colony to go its own way.
One of the peculiar features of British rule overseas was the nature of its dissolution. The British Empire, unlike most others, had a self-dissolving quality because it had the democratic self-determination principle that was adumbrated in this House and then exported. Very few imperial moments ended so peacefully. Yes, there were tragic exceptions in Kenya, Cyprus, India and Palestine, I suppose. Ireland was a slightly different story, because it was not treated as a colony but as part of the country itself. But those were exceptional; in most places, including most Caribbean countries and Malaya, independence happened without a shot being fired in anger because there was that belief in self-determination. Quite often the imperative to decolonise, as my noble friend Lord Lilley suggests, overrode self-determination.
Some noble Lords will, I am sure, remember that in 1956 Malta voted in a referendum, by 77%, to turn itself into three Westminster constituencies and become part of the United Kingdom. It was turned down and, soon after, Malta ended up not just independent but outside NATO and the Commonwealth, and pursuing an extremely unhelpful line. During the Maltese process of accession to the European Union, I discussed this with Dom Mintoff, who was still alive. He was an old and revered figure at that time, and he said, “My wife is British and I love Britain, but how do you expect anyone to respond to being treated in that way?”
I mentioned Malta because there was a similar debate, which I do not think has come up in any of your Lordships’ deliberations, in one of the parties in Mauritius in the 1960s about whether to adhere to the United Kingdom and seek representation at the other end of this building. The idea that this is really about some kind of grasping imperial power refusing to let go is wrong in the generality and especially wrong in this case, because we are refusing to recognise the wishes of the people concerned—the only people who ever formed a permanent population of the Chagos Archipelago between 1714 and the early 1970s.
Self-determination does not always mean independence. It means exactly that: you can self-determine to be part of a larger bloc. The referendum in Scotland in 2014 was an act of self-determination; it did not stop being self-determination because of the referendum result. That is what we mean by democracy. I fear that self-determination, which is a core principle of the United Nations and of the legal order that we have defended even since the Atlantic charter in 1941, is being overridden here for no good reason at all. This is what makes me so frustrated. Every time I sit down to draft what I want to say about these amendments, I start getting angry all over again about the utter needlessness of it all, for the reasons set out by my noble friend Lord Lilley. We are surrendering to a case where there is no jurisdiction over us. If Ministers think that that is wrong, I would love to hear the Minister explain why the Government will not accept my noble friend’s amendments.
It seems that what we are doing here is creating a hierarchy of norms, not by the intrinsic importance of their jurisdictional power, but on the basis of taste and fashion. The principle of self-determination is thus ranked below the principle of general decolonisation—getting out of the way—and that is fundamentally because of a transient public mood. It is considered unfashionable to have flags with little Union Jacks in the top corner, which sets a very dangerous precedent.
It may be—I do not know—that the Government will argue that the reason we are following this non-binding resolution, which is not a legal judgment, is not because there is some hidden reason that we really have to, as my noble friend suggests, but, they may say, because we have to give an example. It would be because the international order is in danger; countries are throwing their weight around; Machtpolitik is prevailing; the whole post-war order is looking shaky; even the United States, on which it rested, is now asserting its interests without recourse to treaties. Therefore, we need to set a lead.
Part of the noble Lord’s lack of involvement was in not raising his objections in Parliament at the time. If those negotiations were entered into to resolve the legal considerations then the Statement in 2022 undermines his quite novel argument now.
It is the case that the previous Government entered into those negotiations. I believe that they entered into them in good faith and they knew what the conclusions would be. The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, is of course correct with regard to the 2017 declaration by the United Kingdom Government that they would be able to choose not to adhere to any rulings by the ICJ on the basis of a Commonwealth country, if that dispute started after 1987. It is a moot point whether this dispute started before then; there remain many arguments that it had. However, even if he is right, I am certain that the former Attorney-General—one of potentially three in 2022—would have advised the previous Administration that, regardless of that 2017 UK declaration, the ICJ would, as under its statute, refer to the General Assembly, because that is its purpose, and that there would be a resolution at the General Assembly. That was the entire point of the ICJ considering it, because it was referred to the ICJ by the General Assembly. I understand the noble Lord’s argument, but we would not be in a different place now even if his argument was very robust.
On the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and our little to and fro on the treaty, we have been told on many occasions by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and his colleagues in the previous Administration that treaty-making is a prerogative power. We do not have that short a memory in this House; we recall the Rwanda Bill and the Rwanda treaty. I recall the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, telling us that it was not our role to interfere in the prerogative power of Governments making, implementing or changing treaties. I quote:
“My Lords, we are not aware of any precedent for Parliament mandating the Government in international negotiations conducted under the royal prerogative. The Government were not prepared to accept such a significant … shift”.—[Official Report, 24/7/18; col. 1598.]
That is ultimately what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, puts forward. That quote from Hansard is from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. He was insistent that it was not Parliament’s role to interfere or mandate a Government in the negotiation of treaties under the royal prerogative. He was either wrong then and right now, or he was right then and wrong now. I am sure he will be able to say which when he sums up the debate.
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate—slightly wide ranging, but that often happens with the first group in Committee. I am sure we will return to some of the issues raised in proper depth when we get to the relevant amendments, and I look forward to that. We have heard some interesting claims from the Opposition, but it is the Government’s contention that none of the amendments in the first group is necessary, and I will explain why that is.
Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is unnecessary because it is clear what the purpose of the Bill is. It has been debated many times over. The Bill implements in domestic law, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, explained very clearly, those elements of the treaty between the United Kingdom and Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago that require such implementation. There are also elements of this amendment that are just false. We will have a further debate shortly, I am sure, but it is incorrect to state that the Bill seeks to limit Chagossian citizenship rights. The Bill makes changes necessary so that no new claims for British Overseas Territory citizenship can be made, but it also preserves the existing British Overseas Territory citizenship for those who hold it. The Bill preserves Chagossians’ rights to obtain British citizenship and the British citizenship of those who already hold it. We have been clear about this, and anything that suggests otherwise is helping, I think, to circulate misinformation, which does no good for anyone, least of all the Chagossians.
Amendment 8 would jeopardise our national security if accepted and fundamentally goes against what this treaty and Bill do, which is to safeguard our national security. This amendment would prevent the UK ratifying the treaty until an international court delivers a binding ruling. In that scenario there is a very real risk of the deal collapsing, and the Government’s view is that this would put the UK in a very weak negotiating position—far weaker than that in which we started negotiating. Actually, we did not start negotiating; as many noble Lords have observed, there were 11 rounds of negotiation under the previous Government. We have set out our legal rationale on multiple occasions, but for the avoidance of doubt I will restate it here: the Government acted to protect the Diego Garcia base because it faced an existential threat. The previous Government knew this, and that is why they started negotiations over three years ago and continued them for 11 rounds. Under the previous Government, Mauritius secured a string of legal and political victories against the UK.
On Amendment 9, the Government have already published their legal reasoning for signing the deal and have set this out clearly to Parliament on several occasions. Committees have heard expert testimony on these points, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, reminded us.
On Amendment 21, a notice will be published in the London Gazette on the day the treaty enters into force, as is the usual practice, and we will consider the utility of whether a Statement in Parliament at that point would be beneficial. It may well be.
On the clause stand part notice, Clause 1 sets out when the different clauses of the Bill come into force. Clauses 2 and 4 commence at the same time that the treaty enters into force. Article 18 of the treaty states that the treaty enters into force on the first day of the first month following the confirmation by both the UK Government and the Government of Mauritius that they have ratified the treaty.
Before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass both primary and secondary legislation, update the UK-US exchange of notes, and put in place agreements on the environment, maritime security and migration. Therefore, this clause provides that legal certainty and ensures that there is no ambiguity as to when the British Indian Ocean Territory is no longer an overseas territory or as to which laws will be saved. As I mentioned earlier, the Secretary of State will publish a notice in the London Gazette when the treaty enters into force.
I will give a little more detail about something that has come up several times. Noble Lords suggested that there is no legal risk here and, further, that there could never be any legal question around this. That really makes me wonder what on earth the previous Government were doing with officials’ time, ministerial time and the time of officials from other Governments, when they set about negotiating for 11 rounds. They paused the negotiations when the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, was appointed Foreign Secretary and then restarted them. If there was no legal jeopardy whatever, what on earth were the previous Government thinking when they set about that process? On the question of what court—
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. I asked a very clear, core question: from which international court does she fear a damaging, binding judgment? She will not tell us. She says that she does not know but that the previous Government must have known.
Forgive me, but I did not say that I did not know; I was just about to answer that specific question. I was making a point about the inconsistency and—frankly—ludicrousness of the Opposition doing something that, when they were in government, took up a great deal of time and resource, but which they now contend they never, ever needed to do.
Will the Minister give way? We keep hearing that the previous Government negotiated over 11 rounds and went on negotiating, but surely that reveals something about the previous Government’s steadfast determination to secure a good deal. If the Government had not been able to get a deal, would they have eventually signed up to an agreement? I do think they would have done.
At the risk of jumping further down the rabbit hole with the noble Lord, my point was simply that to contend now that there was never any possibility of any legal jeopardy, as many noble Lords have sought to do today, does not correspond with the fact that the previous Government did enter into negotiations. If there was never a legal risk, why did they do that? That is the point that I am seeking to make, a pretty straightforward point.
The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, asked me about binding judgments and courts; they are fair questions. I believe that I have responded to them previously, but I am happy to go into more detail today, as that is what Committee debates are all about. There are numerous avenues through which Mauritius could pursue a legally binding judgment, including under the dispute provisions of the treaties to which both states are parties or further arbitral—
I am getting on to that. Noble Lords are very impatient this afternoon. We are in Committee—we have time, and I am in no hurry. I am prepared to stay here as long as we need to get these things done.
I am speaking for myself; other noble Lords may take different views on that point.
Mauritius could also pursue a legally binding judgment through further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK—and I will come on to the points about the extent of those judgments and sovereignty, too. Such cases could be brought rapidly and include provisional measures, themselves legally binding, which could be introduced within weeks. The long-standing legal view of the United Kingdom is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.
The other important element to note here is that, even if the UK chose to disregard any legal rulings—that is not something that this Government would want to do, but we could—we rely on third countries to service the base. Therefore, the operability of the base depends on other states taking a view on such rulings. We of course control what we do, but we cannot control what other states do. If we need those states to agree with us and to ignore a legal ruling too, we may not be successful. It may be that we then compromise the operability of the base. That is a very real threat; we were concerned about that, as were our allies and partners, including the United States.
The risk of a binding ruling relating to sovereignty from this type of tribunal is simply too great, given the importance of the base for national security. Some have pointed to the 2015 arbitration between the UK and Mauritius, in which the tribunal was clear that it did not have jurisdiction over the question of sovereignty. That is right. However, that was before the advisory opinion in 2019 and before the 2021 judgment of a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in a case about delimitating the boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives. In that case, it was ruled that Mauritius’s sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s advisory determinations. These have changed the legal landscape.
Will the Minister confirm that, in those proceedings to which she just referred, the United Kingdom was not a party and made no submissions?
I never said that we did; that was between Mauritius and the Maldives. My point is to make the case to noble Lords that the advisory opinions—advisory though they are—stand to inform subsequent opinions of international tribunals. That is what happened in that case, and that is why I bring that as a supporting argument for the Government’s case—to help noble Lords understand how we have got to where we are.
While an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS almost certainly would not address the question of sovereignty directly, it may reach decisions on related matters based on conclusions about sovereignty. Noble Lords may disagree, but the Government’s position is that we are concerned about this—and I suggest that the previous Government were also concerned about this; otherwise, what were they doing? We are concerned not just about the effects of a binding judgment on the UK but about the legal effect on third countries and international organisations, which could give rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions.
Although I do not expect there to be agreement on this, I believe that we cannot say that the Government have not fully considered all the potential legal jeopardy in which we would place ourselves. Further, we believe that the suck-it-and-see approach that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, advocates would leave us in a much weaker position when it comes to negotiating with Mauritius.
May I press the Minister on that point? I am very grateful to her for giving way. She said that there was an existential threat to the base. So that I have understood that clearly, is she saying that there was something in addition to the possibility of an adverse UNCLOS judgment? As she conceded a moment ago, UNCLOS has no sovereignty; I just looked up what it says on its website, and it says, “We don’t do sovereignty issues”. That issue was tested with the case between the Philippines and China, when the latter was building reefs over some contested land, and UNCLOS said that it had nothing to do with it. Therefore, is there something else? Is an adverse judgment from a body that cannot decide sovereignty, in her view, an existential threat to the existence of the base? Would it make the existence of that base impossible?
What do we mean by existential? We could still have a Diego Garcia—there could be something there. However, it would be existential because, if the operability is compromised, the base as it exists today—it is a unique place and it does things that we do not do anywhere else—would be compromised. To that extent, I suggest that that is an existential threat to the operability of the base.
With that, I hope that noble Lords who have presented their amendments are satisfied. If not, we can of course return to these issues on Report.
Can the Minister answer my point about the UN Security Council and the UK’s ability and right to veto?
We are not saying that this goes to the Security Council. We are saying that there could be further rulings. With respect, that is a bit of a red herring. There could be rulings that affect how we are able to operate on the base. There could be votes at the General Assembly, which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, explained quite well. He is right; we could veto something at the Security Council, but we do not anticipate that, and that is not the legal threat that we are concerned about. It is a different legal threat.
If there are no further interventions, I respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for her replies. This has been an interesting debate. As she says, this is how the first debate in Committee normally goes. It is fairly wide ranging, and I am sure we will return to many of these issues.
Just before I address some of the other issues, I return briefly to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. We have already made the point that it is not Parliament’s role to ratify treaties under CRaG. Parliament has the right to delay them only, but the Government still have the right to agree them. I am not questioning the Government’s right to agree treaties under the royal prerogative. I might not like it—in fact, I really dislike it—but of course they have the right to do that. The reality is that they have now presented us with a Bill to implement the treaty that they have agreed. We fundamentally disagree with that treaty, so we have the perfect right to put forward amendments to the Bill that they have presented us with—the Table Office has ruled our amendments in order—and to debate them and vote on them if we wish.
I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Lilley for his excellent amendments in this group. I look forward to working with him throughout Committee and Report. We should certainly return to the question of international law on Report. My noble friend Lord Hannan made some excellent arguments as well.
I listened carefully to the Minister’s reply to my amendments, and I will look carefully at her remarks before we return to the Bill next year on Report. However, there is one point that she has not addressed. I return to and reiterate the point around the 1967 agreement with the United States. There was not a CRaG process in 1967, but that treaty, which has presumably been ratified, was agreed under whatever process we had then. Does the Minister not think it is still valid? Would she like to reply to that?
I am very happy to respond to that, and I am very sorry for not including that in my closing remarks. Obviously, the UK and the US are party to that treaty, and parties to treaties can agree to do things with those treaties. I remind the noble Lord and everybody else that the US very much supports what we are doing with our treaty with Mauritius.
Is she saying that the United States has agreed to abrogate that treaty?
I am saying that the United States publicly and in terms supports the treaty that we have agreed as a Parliament to ratify with Mauritius.
I heard that, but that was not in fact the question that I asked. If the original agreement is still in force—it is still an international treaty and is presumably still lodged—I assume that the Minister is telling me that the US has not yet agreed to abrogate that treaty. Therefore, if we concede the sovereignty of the BIOT, we are in breach of that treaty. She wants to talk to her noble and learned friend the Attorney- General, who is so keen to refer to international law all the time.
My point is that we will be doing so with the consent of the other party to the treaty.
I will look at Hansard, but I do not think that she has answered the question here.
The other point I want to make, going back to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is that I think he said at one stage that he has proposed amendments—plural. I can see only one amendment, unless another one has gone in recently that I have not yet seen.
Order. Will the noble Lord come to a conclusion?
My Lords, I am very interested to hear all the contributions from noble Lords on this important debate on the consultation of the Chagossians, or rather the lack of consultation. There have been some powerful speeches, particularly that from the noble Lord, Lord McCrea. Establishing a permanent representative of the Chagossians, as he proposes in his Amendment 37, would indeed be a very powerful thing. I think everybody has agreed that we need to give them a voice. They have not been properly consulted by the Foreign Office, and I am happy to concede to the noble Lord that they were not properly consulted by previous Governments either. No legislative scrutiny will change that.
The noble Lord postulated that it was a bit like him being offered the Dauphin of France, but, given the distance from Northern Ireland to Paris and that from Mauritius to the Chagos, it would be more appropriate for him to be offered the monarchy of Azerbaijan rather than Paris. But the Foreign Office needs to consult the community properly, and that process might be helped if they had a champion of their own.
Amendment 49 speaks to an interesting question about a shared civic identity between the Chagossians and the Mauritians. I think everybody has agreed that there really is not one. This reminded me of the contribution of my noble friend Lord Biggar at Second Reading. In pure terms of identity and self-determination, it makes absolutely no sense that Mauritius and the Chagos Islands should be lumped together in this way. It all stems from some bizarre decision by British imperial administrators many years ago and has absolutely nothing to do with the interests of the Chagossians.
We all know that the Chagossians have not been properly consulted, and that when I tabled an amendment to the committal Motion that would have required a consultation before the Bill could proceed, the Government, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, from the Dispatch Box, raised concerns about the practicality of any such consultation. In fact, the noble Baroness said in a meeting we held with others afterwards that 30 days was not long enough. Fair enough; it is a reasonable point. But when I asked how long was long enough, answer came there none. The Foreign Office has no interest whatever in consulting because, I suspect, despite what the Minister says about there being different opinions among the community, she knows what answer she would get. As it would find it far too difficult a question, the Foreign Office has sidestepped it completely and said that there is no self-determination right for the Chagossians in this case.
This, in my view, is not an acceptable state of affairs and we firmly believe the Government must consult the Chagossian community. It is great that the International Relations Committee is now doing so, but given the time available because the Government would not agree to extend the time for this Bill any further, there is no substitute for a proper consultation. The committee will do its best in the limited time it has.
I will return to the issue of a referendum later, but in the absence of a proper consultation with the Chagossian community in the lead-up to the UK Government’s decision to reach agreement with Mauritius, we see this as a very reasonable step to ensure that they are not left out in the cold as the future of the islands they once called home is determined as they are handed over lock, stock and barrel to a nation they know very little about.
The Government’s treatment of the Chagossians is nothing less than shameful, and I believe we have an opportunity to remedy that in some small way with these amendments. There are many other things that I could say about these amendments, but I think I will leave it at that.
My Lords, it is worth restating—and many of the contributions this afternoon have stated this too—that this Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the Chagos archipelago. If I can commend just one speech that we have heard in consideration of this group, it would be that from the noble Lord, Lord McCrea. I found that an impactful, passionate speech that was sincerely given and heartfelt. I do not think I am going to make him happy this afternoon, but what he said was sincerely felt and I respect the way he put his argument and many of the things he said.
We remain committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and an acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. I know—and I agree with much of what has been said—that this House clearly feels very strongly about Chagossians and ensuring that their views are properly heard. We have agreed that the International Relations and Defence Committee will undertake an important piece of work looking at Chagossian views on the treaty. We are looking forward to its report and I am sure we will all read it with great interest.
Turning to the arguments we have just debated, Amendments 13 and 28—I think the noble Lord said he was degrouping Amendments 14, 25, 64 and 84—all relate in some way to holding a referendum or some sort of consultation with Chagossians on the transfer of the Chagos archipelago to Mauritius. I know we have said before—there will be some repetition of argument on these issues—that in the negotiations on the treaty between the United Kingdom and the Government of Mauritius, our priority was to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. I accept that there will be those who disagree with that priority.
The Chagos archipelago has no permanent population and has never been self-governing. Therefore, on the question of self-determination for its population, the English courts have, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritius rather than of Chagossians. That feels incredibly cold and hard to read from this Dispatch Box, but that is the situation legally as determined by English courts. I do not think it helps anybody, not least the Chagossians, to somehow pretend that that is not the case. That is the situation we are in. We can regret that, we can argue about it, we can say that should not be the case; but that is the legal reality.
In a series of judgments since the 1970s, both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have also considered the related but distinct question of an alleged right of abode or other rights that are said to flow from that. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed the claims. The transfer of sovereignty therefore does not deprive Chagossians of any existing right. This is a long-standing legal position that previous UK Governments have also adopted.
The Minister is repeating what she said at Second Reading, and I acknowledge that that is the case. I said to her then that while the courts have taken a particular view in relation to this matter, it does not rule out Parliament taking a different view, given that we believe in parliamentary democracy and parliamentary sovereignty. Given the way in which this community has been treated for 60 years now, it is fair to say, do we not have a moral obligation to accord them the right to have a say? Regardless of the fact that there have been court judgments on this, can we as not parliamentarians indicate that we believe that the best way forward is to listen to their voices?
I think we can. I do not think we can call it self-determination in the legally applicable sense, but I agree, and I think Parliament agrees too, that the Chagossians deserve the respect of a different kind of relationship with the UK Government, and we need to make sure that we engage with them in a respectful and meaningful way. I will get on to whether that means a referendum, but the noble Baroness makes a very strong point about the importance of listening to the voices of Chagossians themselves, however we might choose to do that. I have mentioned this being a long-standing legal position, but as I am trying to explain, we recognise the importance of these islands to the Chagossians, and we are working hard to reflect this in our wider policies, not all of which are reflected in the Bill because they do not require legislation.
Given that the treaty has been signed, however, and the Bill is reasonably well advanced, having been through the other place, I say with great sincerity that any formal consultation at this stage would not be honest or sufficiently meaningful. I think that was what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, was gently trying to point out to us, because that window was open at one point. It was open when the now Opposition were in government, and they never decided to consult the Chagossians. We agree with that Government, as they were—now the Opposition—that there is no actual legal duty in this situation to do that, but it is vital to respect the many different views within the Chagossian community, including that of several groups that welcome the deal.
I do not want to get ahead of myself, because Amendment 80 is a long way away. My appeal to the Minister—I would say exactly the same to the Mauritian Government if they were here—is that, while discussions on the treaty have concluded, it is obvious that there are ongoing discussions with the Mauritian Government. It is not closed yet for there to be consideration of structures of representation that are currently not in the treaty nor the Bill. My appeal at this early stage of Committee would be for the Minister to retain an open mind on potential structures for further discussions when it comes to representation including, perhaps, a firmer position on how the Chagossian community will be able to be represented going forward.
That is a constructive proposition. The Government are very willing to engage in that kind of conversation and I note the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, which we will come to later in our considerations—perhaps not this evening, given our current rate of progress.
I point noble Lords to the statement by Olivier Bancoult, the leader of the largest Chagossian group, the CRG. I think it demonstrates that, while there are different views among Chagossians, there is strong support for the agreement from a significant number in the community.
I thought that Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, was really interesting. I am pretty sure this is not exactly what he intended, but in some respects it seems to be trying to replicate that which our elected Members of Parliament are there to do: to represent the views of their constituents, including, in a number of cases, Chagossians. I draw attention to the All-Party Parliamentary Group, which does an excellent job of liaising between Chagossians and Parliament.
In addition, the Government have established a Chagossian contact group, which has wide representation from Chagossian communities in the UK, but also in Mauritius, Seychelles and elsewhere, to give Chagossians the formal role—this is what I think noble Lords seek —that can shape decision-making on the UK Government’s support for their community. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, again reminded us, he will seek to make sure that that group can be as effective as I know noble Lords want it to be. The group met for the first time on 2 September and will convene quarterly thereafter. As my noble friend Lord Coaker and I said in our letter to all Peers, we are exploring opportunities for enhancing that group, including increasing its transparency and frequency. But we are clear that any decisions about the contact group have to be made in agreement with its existing members, and the Government will engage with the group on these questions.
I forget whether we are considering Amendments 29 and 32 or whether they have been degrouped. I think we are doing those. They were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and relate to the UNGA resolutions. I do not think that would be an especially constructive exercise. The treaty expressly states that it constitutes the full and final settlement of all claims by Mauritius in relation to the Chagos Archipelago; it is hard to see how the proposed report would add to that.
In relation to Amendment 49, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, there has never been a claim that all Chagossians share civic identity with Mauritius. As I have said, and as has been said numerous times in this Chamber and in the other place, it is a diverse community with a wide range of views. I said at the beginning of this contribution that the Government have prioritised the needs of security and securing the base on Diego Garcia. I know there are those who disagree with that and I have heard them. That being said, it does not mean that the Government should not do the very best job that we can of engaging with the Chagossian community, and making sure that its diverse range of views are reflected as best we can, as we move forward on the functioning of the contact group, the trust fund and other issues. I commit from the Dispatch Box that this Government will do everything they can to make sure that that happens, and I hope that the noble Lord will therefore seek to withdraw his amendment.
With the leave of the Committee, I withdraw my amendment.
I thank my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere for moving Amendment 3 on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. We all hope his family member gets well soon. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for her very powerful speech.
These amendments all touch on the impact that the Bill will have on the citizenship rights of Chagossians. Clause 4 will limit the rights of those descended from Chagos Islanders to gain British citizenship, in several ways. My amendments in this group also seek to challenge the Government’s approach. It should be noted that settlement in the UK is not what many Chagossians want. Many want to return to the archipelago, and this is something that Ministers have discussed previously. That said, British citizenship should be an option for the Chagossians given the responsibility that I think everybody here believes that we owe them thanks to our historic links and, I am afraid, our record of mistreating their community.
My Amendment 7 would prevent the citizenship provisions coming into effect with the treaty, allowing more time for the Government to consider their approach in domestic law alongside the treaty. It might also allow for greater consultation of the Chagossian community, who are ultimately the people who will be affected by Clause 4. In her reply can the Minister confirm whether the Government have had any conversations with Chagossians about the effect of Clause 4? Can she confirm whether substantive discussions on citizenship rights have been held with the Chagossian contact group, which she claims to have met on a couple of occasions? What was the outcome of those discussions? I would also like to know whether Ministers have made any changes to their plans on citizenship rights as a result of some of the concerns raised by the Chagossian community.
My Amendment 39 probes the limitation of citizenship rights by birth year. Will the Minister please explain why 2027 has been chosen as the cut-off date? What opportunity will there be for the Chagossian community to make a case for its extension, should circumstances require it? Another important issue with any cut-off date for applications is communication. Have Ministers given any consideration to the procedure that should be followed to ensure that eligible Chagossians are contacted about their rights?
I have tabled Amendment 40 to probe the requirement that a person must not have previously held British citizenship to be eligible under the changes made by Clause 4. We can understand why it would not be appropriate for a person who has had their citizenship revoked not to be eligible, but why should a person who has given up their citizenship voluntarily be barred by this clause? I hope the Minister will be able to address these questions.
I thank noble Lords for their speeches. A host of amendments, as we have heard, have been tabled in relation to citizenship rights. Some of them come from a bit of a misunderstanding of what Clause 4 does. I hope that I can explain the detail of what the Bill will mean. If it is not enough, I am very happy to write a letter and put it in the Library, because it is detailed and a little bit complicated. If that would be helpful, that is something I am happy to do. Let me have a go at explaining it all properly this evening and that may suffice.
Clause 4 makes provisions related to British nationality as a consequence of the dissolution of the British Indian Ocean Territory. These provisions are essential to ensure that the existing entitlements the Chagossians have to British citizenship remain unchanged. This clause also amends the British Nationality Act 1981 to reflect that BIOT will no longer be a British Overseas Territory, and as a result no future claims to British Overseas Territory citizenship can be made on the basis of a connection to BIOT.
This will not result in any change to the existing British nationality status that any Chagossian currently holds; this remains protected. Any Chagossian who currently holds British Overseas Territory citizenship retains it. Current routes to British citizenship will also continue to exist with their original expiry dates for application. This clause is vital in order to protect Chagossians’ rights to continue to obtain British citizenship. Seeking to delete the clause would be to play politics with this right.
I turn to the amendments tabled. Amendment 4 is a good example of an amendment that I would gently say is somewhat misconceived in its intent. Chagossians born on the Chagos Archipelago already automatically hold British Overseas Territory citizenship and British citizenship. This amendment would therefore seek to require the Secretary of State to bring forward legislation that would apply to anyone of any nationality born on the Chagos Archipelago once it is no longer a British territory.
The Government are clear that, as BIOT will no longer be an overseas territory, it will no longer be possible to make a new claim for British Overseas Territory citizenship. Instead, the Bill preserves Chagossians’ ability to claim British citizenship. Whether a Chagossian has British Overseas Territory citizenship or not will have no bearing on their ability to claim British citizenship under their bespoke citizenship route.
(11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I was going to say that this has been an excellent debate, but it has not really been much of a debate seeing as nobody from the Labour side has bothered to get up and try to defend the Government’s actions on this matter. Not even the Foreign Office trade union crowd on the Cross Benches have come along to justify the Government’s actions on this. I note from the media reports that apparently the Mauritian AG is in London for discussions, no doubt to celebrate his brilliantly successful negotiation. He will probably find that the Foreign Office has given him another £100 million today for his trouble in coming over here in the first place.
It would not be right for me to begin my contributions without mentioning the excellent forensic speeches of my noble friends Lord Altrincham and Lady Noakes at Second Reading. It seemed to me very convincing that the Government have increasingly got their numbers wrong. I look forward to the noble Baroness attempting to explain her financial figures again.
I am sure that some noble Lords will argue—maybe the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will—that this agreement has been made and there is nothing we can do about it. They might say that it is an unfortunate oversight, but we cannot change the agreement. However, the treaty, as we have discussed previously, has not yet been ratified; it is not final. The Government could still change their approach. It is unlikely, and it would take political will, but everything is possible.
Now that we know that the treaty is not inevitable and that the overall cost expected when the agreement was reached was wrong, I hope Ministers will take the opportunity to reconsider. In any other walk of life, a decision-maker faced with a significantly higher cost than expected would reassess their position. Why are Ministers failing to take that responsible approach with taxpayers’ money? The Chancellor will get up next week and tell us that the country is bust, and that we need to raise taxes and cut spending, but the FCDO seems to take no account of the extra costs when negotiating this agreement.
My Amendment 22 would require a review of the overall financial cost of the agreement. With such uncertainty about the overall costs, I think this is an entirely reasonable amendment that would give greater transparency to taxpayers on how much of their money will be sent to Mauritius, over time, as we have said before, to fund tax cuts over there. We pay more tax over here, but the Mauritians will be able to cut their taxes with the money that we are very generously sending to them.
As I said, on value for money we are being told to expect spending cuts at the Budget on 26 November. Before the Government cut a single extra service for the British people, Ministers should first consider cutting their surrender deal with the Mauritian Government. In my view, most of the British public would be aghast when presented with the fact that the Government have surrendered territory to a foreign state and simultaneously somehow found themselves paying for the privilege. This is a clear failure to deliver value for money to taxpayers.
My Amendment 70 would require the Government to make a statement explaining why they believe that each payment to Mauritius represents value for money. My Amendment 75 would require the publication of a schedule of expected payments to Mauritius along with their dates. The Government should not resist measures which increase transparency on the financial elements of the agreement.
I gave a wry smile when the noble Lord, Lord Weir, asked the Minister for the breakdown of the costs of this agreement between the MoD budget and the FCDO budget. I hope he has more success than I have in asking this question, because I have asked it five times and she has refused to tell me how much is being paid out of the different budgets. One was beginning to suspect that she does not even know how much money we are handing over on behalf of this deal.
I additionally ask the Minister what powers Ministers have to ensure that the money we hand over to Mauritius is spent as agreed. The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, particularly highlighted the trust fund supposedly set up for the benefit of Chagossians, but how they spend it is entirely within the control of Mauritius. There have been well-documented corruption cases in Mauritius; how do we know how that money will be spent? I think we should be told or Ministers should at least seek to find out.
Finally, Amendment 74 relates to a slightly separate question on the part of the UK-Mauritius agreement relating to the employment of Mauritians on the Diego Garcia military base. I tabled it to ask the noble Baroness some specific questions on the practical effect of the article of this agreement. Can she confirm whether this article means Mauritians will be prioritised for employment on the Diego Garcia military base over, for example, British citizens or Chagossians? Who ultimately would their employer be? This also speaks to value for money. Can the Minister confirm whether her department has made any assessment of the impact of the provisions relating to the employment of Mauritians and how much that will contribute to the cost of running the base?
I am not sure that diplomacy is quite the thing for the noble Lord to aspire to. We will move to discussing the amendments that deal with the financial issues and the payments to be made under the treaty. Inevitably in Committee, other issues will be raised as part of the discussions, including those around the trust fund and the way it is managed, as well as security. These are important questions but, if it is okay with noble Lords, it is probably better to deal with them when we reach the appropriate group, so that we can get into sufficient depth when we deal with those specific amendments.
I was stressing the point that the agreement is about the Chagos Archipelago, but we are interested in Diego Garcia. If Diego Garcia is not available, the treaty requires us to continue to pay Mauritius for the 100 years or whatever it is. We would then be paying for something we do not even have, let alone have the use of. It would seem sensible to have some arrangement in the treaty to cope with this. I am surprised there is not one. If not, how will it be handled?
We do not expect to be confronted with this situation in the case of Diego Garcia. I am sure there will be adaptations to mitigate this, as there already have been. In the event that sea levels rise to the extent that they would need to in order to make the base unusable, the entire planet would be facing very real threat. That would confront us in very many locations, including Montserrat, St Helena and Ascension. This would probably be the least of our problems.
Out of respect for the noble and gallant Lord and his genuine concern—it is not an unreasonable question— I will reflect on this and try to come back to him with a more thorough response, because I can see that he cares about this and wants to know that the Government have given this the proper consideration that he would expect. I undertake to do that. Luckily, this is the first day of Committee and we have the opportunity to allow ourselves further conversations on these issues.
My concern is that we would have to continue to pay under the present agreement, even though there was not a base available.
I understand fully the nature of the noble and gallant Lord’s concern. He has explained it well and repeatedly, and I have committed to come back to him with a further response. I do not think I can do any more than that tonight.
Before the noble Baroness leaves that point, I fully respect the noble and gallant Lord’s position on the base not being available due to natural disasters—or, as we called it when I was a solicitor, an act of God—but what happens if the base becomes simply unusable because of an act of aggression by a bad actor in 50 years’ time, which we have no sight of at this moment? The point is that if it becomes unusable for whatever reason, whether by act of God or an act of aggression, will we still continue to pay for a base that we cannot use?
I simply cannot answer that because it would depend so much on the circumstances and on who would be culpable. I do not know. I will think about that and come back to the noble Baroness. It is very difficult to respond to hypotheticals. I could create a few hypotheticals that answer those specific questions but I do not think that would necessarily get us anywhere. She is probably after something a little more concrete than that. I will give that some further thought and see whether I can come back to her with something more satisfactory. I guess, ultimately, that if there is some unavailability we have the option of breaching the terms of the agreement through non-payment, which would end the agreement. However, I will look into our legal position in that situation and make sure we have some clarity so that we can consider this further if we need to.
On the issue of the split and how the money will be found, the noble Lord opposite—in his usual charming way—suggests that we have not really thought about this. Some of the money will come from the FCDO and some from the MoD. It is all government money; it is all taxpayers’ money. I really do not understand the preoccupation with this. That split will be fair. We are very used to paying for things jointly. We do it all the time on various things. This is not an unusual situation.
Will the Minister tell us how much? There is a difference between the money that is spent from her aid budget in the FCDO and the money spent from the MoD. If it is such a simple, straightforward issue that she keeps brushing the question aside then why not just give us the figures? How much of it is coming from the MoD budget and how much of it is coming from the ODA budget, which is, of course, capped?
It is not capped, actually. Not all ODA money is spent by the FCDO. The MoD spends ODA as well. Not all money spent by the FCDO is ODA. You can spend ODA only on certain activities in certain places. My reading of the OECD rules is that I do not think the DAC would allow us to spend ODA for the purpose of paying for a military base. That does not mean we could not spend ODA in Mauritius if we wanted to—we have a very small programme there at the moment. I hope that helps. The noble Lord may wish to go away and read up on the DAC rules, which might assist him in answering this question.
I was not asking for an explanation of how the different split works between Foreign Office money and ODA money; I was simply asking her how much of the Bill is spent from the Foreign Office budget and how much of it is spent from the MoD budget. I do not see what is so difficult about answering a simple question.
But the noble Lord did ask me about ODA.
That was part of the question: how much is coming out of the ODA budget?
It is not coming out of the ODA budget—that is my point—but that does not mean it is not coming out of the FCDO budget, which is different. Does that help the noble Lord?
I do not know how much will be from the FCDO and how much will be from the MoD. It is not ODA, which is the bit I am responsible for. I do not fully understand—perhaps the noble Lord could tell me—why it makes a difference to him how much comes from the FCDO and how much comes from the MoD. I might be better able to assist him if he wishes to explain why this is important. It is not ODA, if that is his concern.
That is an interesting clarification that I have not heard before. Is she telling us, then, that none of the money funding this agreement comes out of the ODA budget?
You cannot pay for a military base out of your development budget.
I have not given way; I have had enough of this. The noble Lord should probably write to me and explain his question, because we are clearly not getting very far with this. If the noble Baroness on the Back Bench wants to have a go and puts it in a different way, I would be very happy to try to answer.
The Minister wants this in writing, but unless I am particularly stupid, I thought it was a very simple question.
The question was: how much is going to be from the ODA budget? I have answered that, and I do not know how to answer that any more clearly. As for how much comes from the FCDO and how much from the MoD, the Treasury will allocate us different amounts of money for different things. I do not quite understand why that makes a difference to the noble Lord—
I know the Minister was not attracted by the charms of the Front Bench, so I will try slightly differently. I suppose what we are trying to establish first of all is the percentage breakdown between the FCDO and the MoD. It matters because if this is not additional money, there will be a level of opportunity cost. If, for example, we are eating into the MoD budget, that money could be spent on other things. I think, from what I have gathered from what the Minister has said, that the bulk of the money would come from the MoD because of restrictions, but it would be useful to have percentage terms.
Okay, I will see whether we can get that. I do not know that that will be consistent over time, and I do not know whether the Treasury will want to be making that clear from now on. The MoD is deciding to buy itself some capability with this money. It is a significant investment, but it is not beyond the realms of what the MoD would spend on a capability such as this. That is my understanding. Exactly how much comes from each department will be published as we go along, because these things are published in the ordinary run of things.
The confusion in my mind comes from the interchangeable use of “ODA” and “FCDO”, and they are clearly different things. I look after the ODA budget, but the FCDO spends an awful lot more than just ODA. The MoD spends the ODA, too, as does DESNZ, the Department of Health, Defra and many other departments. Does this help noble Lords? Are we getting somewhere?
On Amendments 70, 74 and 75, all tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, I repeat that Parliament has already agreed the principles of the treaty and has not decided to vote against ratification. Any requirement for further approval from Parliament for the payments ignores the thorough and correct process that the treaty and Bill have already gone through and risks undermining the treaty, since non-payment by the UK is a ground for termination.
Regarding Amendment 74, I reassure noble Lords that there are no impacts on the cost of running the base from Article 10. This article pertains to the normal contractual arrangements, with any preference being to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with existing policies, requirements, laws and regulations.
Finally, regarding Amendment 75, I remind noble Lords that an annual payment to Mauritius is a fundamental part of the agreement, and this principle, and the amounts of those payments, were published in full on the day of treaty signature. I hope that in the light of this, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I asked the Minister a specific question about whether His Majesty’s Government knew about India and Mauritius. Did they know or not?
Of course we knew. My understanding is that this pre-dated negotiations and refers to something on the island of Mauritius itself. if I am wrong about that, I will correct the record and inform the noble Baroness.
With the Committee’s permission, I beg leave to withdraw.
Probably to get some more money. Indeed, we should have dealt with that in the previous session on money. How much more money is he asking for? One understands there are debates in Mauritius saying they have done so well that they should now reopen discussions and get a little more.
My Lords, I am not sure if the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, wants a serious response to that last comment. I will respond to the noble Lord’s point that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Yes, this is true, but if the asset is legally contested to the extent that a close ally is no longer investing in it, and third-party friends and allies are possibly unwilling to support its operability, I would say that possession of that asset is worth a lot less than one that has legal certainty, the investment of the United States and the ability to operate it, because third parties will not be questioning the legal basis on which it is held. But we have been through this at some length already.
I turn to the amendments in the group concerning various mechanisms surrounding termination and the extension of the treaty. We will deal with the issue of sovereignty and termination in a subsequent group. On Amendments 6, 12, 79 and 89 about the implications of terminating the treaty, I should remind the House that there are extremely limited grounds for termination once the treaty is in force, both of which are within the UK’s control. The first would be if we did not pay the sums due under Article 11. Secondly, to answer the point made by the noble Lord, it would be in the case of an armed attack, or threat of one by the United Kingdom on Mauritius, or one directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia. This base is, of course, to be operated by the United Kingdom and the United States together.
It is in our interests that the grounds for termination are limited in this way. It means that Mauritius is unable unilaterally to terminate the agreement except in very specific circumstances. These amendments would therefore force us to reopen negotiations on an area in which we have already secured the strongest terms, and which have also been endorsed by our US allies. It is also highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination. It is important that we understand and are clear about that.
On Amendment 11, Article 13 already sets out the basis on which we can extend the duration of the treaty, including our right of first refusal. The treaty will last for an initial 99 years and may be extended for a further 40 years and beyond, by agreement between the UK and Mauritius. Even if no agreement were reached, the UK would have the right to first refusal on the use of Diego Garcia. If exercised, this would prevent the use of the base by any other party. I was asked—I think by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, but it may have been another noble Lord—how exactly this would work and on what terms. I will get a full answer on this specific point. For today, I am relying on the right of first refusal. I will come back to noble Lords and clarify exactly what is meant by this.
I welcome the interest shown by Amendment 77 in the establishment of the joint commission. Its precise structure is still being developed and will continue to be a point of negotiation between the UK, Mauritius and the US. This includes the development of terms of reference as to how the joint commission will function. However, the following principles have already been agreed, as set out in Annexe 3 to the treaty. I think these answer some of the points that were put, although, because we are still negotiating, it is useful to get the responses, understanding and views of noble Lords on some of these things. The joint commission shall consist of one senior representative from each party as co-chairs, and four additional representatives from each party. The US shall have the right to introduce items for discussion in the joint commission and to designate a representative to attend meetings and provide views and advice. The joint commission shall meet at least twice a year, or more frequently on the request of either party. All decisions of the joint commission shall be taken with the agreement of both parties.
While I welcome the opinions of noble Lords on the best means of keeping the House informed on the development of the joint commission, I do not think that a statutory obligation to publish a statement would be the most appropriate means of doing so, although I will think about this a little more.
On this issue of prerogative and the law on Diego Garcia, this applies only to the law on Diego Garcia. We did have quite a complex exchange about this in one of our briefing conversations and it does not apply to the operation of the treaty, so it would not concern non-payment or any of those other issues. It is only about the law as it applies to Diego Garcia. I hope that that is helpful and that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions. As usual, my noble friend Lord Lilley made an excellent contribution to the debate, and I thank the Minister for her reply. I do not think she has answered all the questions that we asked, or certainly that I asked—I know that she answered some, but not all. She set out the legal position on the commission, as it is in the treaty, but she has not provided any more details on who will be its members, how they will do the appointments et cetera. I would be grateful if she would write to us with the details of that.
I would never deliberately not answer a question from the noble Lord. I have set out what has been agreed so far, and I have explained that the commission is subject to negotiation and that I will commit to updating the House. I do not quite understand the niggle in the noble Lord’s voice.
I am not being niggly; I am just repeating the questions that I asked. Who will be the members of the commission? How will they be appointed? Those are the questions that I asked. She set out the numbers, which we could see from the original agreement, but she has not provided the further details that we asked for. I did say that she had answered some of the questions but not all of them.
The long-term legal status of the archipelago is supposedly the driving motivation behind the Government’s decision to seek this agreement with Mauritius, so I think the questions that have been posed are entirely reasonable to seek clarity on the status of what would happen should the treaty be revoked.
I also think we need clarity on the UK’s right to withdraw from the treaty and withhold payments in line with the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Goldie. I think that that is all the information we are going to get out of the Minister tonight so, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
I agree with the noble Lord that transparency and frankness with the Chagossian community is vital, which is why I have resisted some of the discussions around consultations and referendums. To give the impression that a consultation or referendum can elicit change to a treaty that has already been negotiated in a state-to-state negotiation is wrong. On the noble Lord’s question about how often we have discussed resettlement, it has been discussed throughout and repeatedly—of course it has. It is a very important part of the negotiation that we have had with the Government of Mauritius.
We are coming to some amendments on the operation of the trust fund in the next group, but some news will come from Mauritius shortly on exactly how that will operate. I think that will be reassuring for noble Lords and I hope that we get it very soon so that we can include it in our considerations.
I would point out that resettlement now is non-existent. It has not been possible. They have not even been having heritage visits since Covid; the previous Government did not get round to sorting them out. Having said that, it is good that the Conservative Party is now turning some attention to this.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, “But consider if the islands had not been depopulated”. In response, I point out that if the islands had not been depopulated then there would not be a base and we would not have a treaty. They probably would have been returned to Mauritius, as part of decolonisation, and be Mauritian now anyway. I am at a bit of a loss—but the noble Lord is going to tell me now what he was getting at.
Forgive me, but I am not sure that is quite true. I do not think the Americans wanted the entire archipelago voided of population; they were satisfied with having Diego Garcia. The Minister and I were not born then, but our predecessors went ahead and volunteered the complete evacuation, which was the beginning of all our problems.
But that is what happened, and it cannot be undone. We are in a situation where there is clearly no prospect of resettlement now on Diego Garcia—I am glad that that has not explicitly come up in debate—but there is the possibility of resettlement on the other islands and the prospect of visits to Diego Garcia in a way that has not happened for some years.
Specifically on the amendments in this group, I do not think that Amendments 10 and 72 are necessary, but I should explain why. Under the terms of the agreement, Mauritius is already free to develop a programme of resettlement on islands other than Diego Garcia. It will be for Mauritius to decide whether it takes that forward. We have already committed to making a ministerial Statement in both Houses, providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement. The agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms, without requiring the UK taxpayer to pick up the bill. We know that would be considerable, because of the KPMG report.
Our Governments over the past 30 or 40 years refused to allow the Chagossians to go back. Why does the Minister think the Mauritian Government will ever allow them? What if they say, “Absolutely no”. Have we any say? Can we do anything?
It is for the Mauritian Government to make that decision. I understand the noble Baroness’s scepticism, especially given our reluctance to undertake this. To serve citizens living in such a remote place with so few services is a considerable thing to do, which is why we are very careful and mindful of the warnings that we have heard about not wanting to give false hope or a false impression, or to make this sound straightforward. That guides us all in our discussions. It is, of course, an incredibly difficult prospect and very expensive. There is the trust fund. I do not know how that would operate and whether it would enable some of this to happen. This is for the Government of Mauritius to determine; we are completely clear about that. The noble Baroness might not wish that to be so, but I point out that the UK Government, for over 50 years, have made it absolutely clear that we would not facilitate return to the islands, for security and financial reasons.
On Amendment 72, it is important that negotiations between the UK and Mauritius on this matter—which I completely accept is sensitive—can take place in confidence. Publishing the records of confidential negotiations such as this would be damaging to trust in the UK keeping matters confidential in the future. That relates not just to our negotiations with Mauritius; it would obviously relate to the prospect of our negotiations with other states on other equally or more sensitive matters. With that, I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Before the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, stands up, I want to make a statement. Noble Lords will be aware that grouping processes are well established. The deadline of 5 pm is always communicated to all Peers when the groupings are sent out. Late degrouping is discouraged, I am afraid. For this group, the groupings were sent out at 11 am with a deadline of 5 pm and no changes were made. The changes sought by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, were requested shortly before 6 pm. There is nothing procedural to stop the noble Lord degrouping the amendments for separate debate during proceedings today—I am sure he is doing so—but it is inconvenient for the Minister, who might not be able to respond to some of his degrouping.
Amendment 14
I thank the noble Lord for his statement, but the Chief Whip’s Office was informed last night of my intention to degroup these amendments. In fact, it wrote to me and to my noble friend Lord Lilley to ask if I agreed with grouping his amendment with this degrouped amendment. Clearly, there was an expectation from the office that it would do that and then, sometime during the day, that expectation was changed. The noble Lord would have a case if the Chief Whip’s Office had been given no notice whatever and did not know anything about it, but clearly it does. As the Deputy Chairman of Committees indicated, notice has been given and there was an expectation that this would take place.
To go on to the issues in consequence—
I just want to clarify that I have a note here saying that the Chief Whip decided this afternoon. Given how late the change was made, it could not be reflected in Today’s List, which had already been published. I informed the Deputy Chairman of Committees of the degrouping just 10 minutes ago.
I thank noble Lords for their comments on this. I feel that we have discussed the issue of a referendum fairly comprehensively, as the noble Baroness suggested.
The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, pointed the finger at the Lib Dems and accused them of inconsistency. I do not always see eye to eye with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, nor with the Liberal Democrats, but if you want consistency on this issue, I do not think you could do much better than the noble Lord or his colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who has championed the rights of the Chagossians for very many years. I have frankly never heard a peep out of the noble Lord opposite or from many of his colleagues on this topic, the rights of Chagossians, resettlement or anything else to do with the Chagos Islands. If we are after consistency, then the Liberal Democrats have, to be fair, been pretty consistent on this issue for very many years now.
On the issue of a referendum, I remind the Committee that negotiations on the treaty were between the UK and Mauritius, with our priority being to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. The Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population nor has ever been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population can therefore arise. This has been tested in the English courts, as we said in our earlier debate, in a series of judgments since the 1970s. The transfer of sovereignty does not deprive the Chagossians of any existing right.
A time for a referendum or some formal legal basis of a consultation would have been prior to this point, maybe even prior to or during some of the 11 rounds of negotiation undertaken by the previous Government. This is despite the fact that they clearly now think that there is absolutely no legal risk to the security of the islands. It is really important that we do not allow the Chagossian community to have the impression that a consultation or a referendum held now would in any way be able to affect a treaty that has already been agreed by two Governments and that we have been instructed to ratify by votes in both Houses. The Bill has also been through all its processes in the other place.
With that, I hope the noble Lord decides to withdraw his amendment.
The Minister will not be surprised that I am not convinced by her arguments. I am sure this is something that we will return to at later stages of the Bill but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, it is now 10.48 pm. There are not many Members remaining in the Chamber. The next group of amendments is very long and relates to a very important issue, so I invite the Government to resume the House at this stage.
My Lords, we are very happy to continue. As I said earlier, the degrouping was done very late. I have been instructed that we have to carry on until the next group.
I note that, in the supplementary Marshalled List of amendments, the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, has two amendments which pertain to the environment. It would be much better if those were attached to the next grouping. Therefore, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that this is a good point to adjourn.
The noble Baroness has moved that the House do now resume. I will take advice as to whether it is debateable. It is debateable, in which case the Motion now stands before the Committee.
I wish to oppose the noble Baroness in the suggestion, because I think we have made some good progress this evening and had some good debates. We are about to discuss some very important issues around the marine protected area. I am here and ready to do that, despite the bizarre late degrouping for no apparent reason, when we had a repeat of an earlier debate. I think it would be good to make some progress this evening.
I imagine that the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, would want his two amendments grouped with the other marine protected area amendments. Unfortunately, he is not here. It would be good to have all those amendments grouped together, so that we could have a thorough exposition of the environment, instead of part of it tonight and part of it next Tuesday. I would have preferred it if my Amendment 20A was grouped with the right of Chagossians to return, which was already debated but, because it was not, it now has to wait until next week. So I think there is an argument to have the next group next week, so that all the marine environment amendments can be heard together.
I had not intended to speak on these amendments because there are other far more qualified people who I thought would do so. I served on your Lordships’ Environment and Climate Change Committee when it produced the report in July 2023 on the biodiversity agreement in Montreal. As I recall, that commitment, the Montreal treaty, requires Britain to protect 30% of its marine areas by 2030; it was called the 30 by 30 agreement. We were very proud, and I think it was mentioned in that report, that the largest single area of sea that was being protected was the British Indian Ocean Territory’s sea. We accepted tacitly that it was Britain’s responsibility to protect that, that it was a very important area of biodiversity for the world as a whole, and that it was our responsibility.
It now seems that we have handed that over to Mauritius, but Mauritius has no means of policing that area. It has no boats or aeroplanes that could cover that distance and that area. I doubt whether we had permanent boats stationed there, but if there were problems we could. We have the capacity to send both sea- and airborne reconnaissance aircraft to make sure that things are being properly respected.
I wonder, therefore, whether this treaty which we are now legislating to implement is not in contravention of our commitments under the Montreal biodiversity treaty. Are we abandoning commitments we made there and leaving them, in effect, unpoliced?
Another treaty was passed which we did not investigate and which was investigated by another committee of this House. I cannot even remember the name of the treaty but it was about areas of the sea which are outside national jurisdiction. It would seem that this now covers the BIOT—or does it? I hope the Minister will tell us which of these two treaties it is covered by. Is it covered by the old one, which we had responsibility for but have now given up, despite our international obligations under international law, which are normally sacrosanct, or is it under another treaty, which means that it is now dealt with as if it is beyond national jurisdiction?
These are clearly very important matters. It is a shame that we are discussing them at this time of night when people far better informed than I, who could bring their expertise and knowledge to bear, are not here. Since they are not here, I am raising these questions and hope that the Minister will be able to respond to them.
My Lords, I am happy to respond. As I understand it, details about the Mauritian marine protected area were published only last week, or it may have been the week before. There will be a new treaty which will be lodged at the UN in a similar way to ours. It will not be a BBNJ issue. I think we will be considering it in this House next week, when we can get into it in a little more detail now that the noble Lord is back into these issues after a bit of a break. Because this would not be biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, it would be the responsibility of the Mauritians and covered by the new treaty. I can talk about that a bit more now.
Amendments 15 and 66 would prevent Clauses 2 to 4 coming into force until the UK Government had published a report on how it intended to preserve the Chagos Marine Protected Area. The MPA will be for the Mauritian Government to implement. They have already announced the creation of the MPA, which they will create once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the marine protected area. Low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians will be allowed in certain limited areas and will be compatible with nature conservation. The UK will continue to support Mauritius in the establishment of this marine protected area and in protecting the globally significant ecosystems of the Chagos Archipelago.
On Amendments 38 and 65, while I appreciate and understand the noble Baroness’s commitment to sustaining the unique and pristine environment around the archipelago, recycling and waste management systems on the outer islands would be for Mauritius to deliver. On Diego Garcia itself, waste management is currently undertaken by the US and monitored by the UK to ensure compliance with environmental standards. This will continue following the entry into force of the agreement, with no identified need to change current processes.
On Amendment 60, while Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, the UK will continue to provide support to protect migratory bird species. Within the agreement, under the international organisations’ exchange of letters, the UK and Mauritius will, for instance, agree separate arrangements to maintain the listed Ramsar wetlands site on Diego Garcia, which provides a unique protected habitat for migratory birds. Further protections will be a matter for Mauritius.
On Amendments 16 and 68, Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, including enforcement. On 3 November, the Mauritian Government announced the creation of the Chagos Archipelago Marine Protected Area. They have confirmed already that no commercial fishing will be allowed in any part of the MPA. They will, however, allow low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians in certain limited areas, which will be compatible with nature conservation.
The UK has agreed to co-operate with Mauritius on maritime security and provide assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty. The terms of this co-operation and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.
Amendment 73 is completely unnecessary. We have been clear on this. The UK has not and will not make any financial payment to the Mauritian Government to establish a new MPA in the waters surrounding the Chagos Archipelago. The UK has agreed to provide support and assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty, protecting the vital military base on Diego Garcia, and the terms of this support and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.
Amendment 76 is no longer required. On 3 November, Mauritius, as I have said, announced the creation of its MPA once the treaty enters into force. Similarly, the points about artisanal fishing apply to that amendment as well. With that, I hope that the amendment can be withdrawn.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her answers, but I think the debate reflects the complexity of the environmental provisions. As my noble friend said, it is a shame that we could not have had it at a more reasonable time, when there could have been more participants in the debate, but the Government clearly do not wish to do that.
This is not a niche issue: protecting the unique and biodiverse environment on and around the islands is of international significance. The Chagossians, the scientific community and many others want to see the Chagos Islands’ unique ecosystem protected, and it would be an abrogation of the Government’s responsibilities if they were to press ahead with this deal without first securing the appropriate assurances from Mauritius.
I am obviously delighted that Mauritius has announced the marine protected area—I am sure we are all really pleased to see that—but I think the key point was the one raised by my noble friend, which is the matter of enforcement. Mauritius is a small island, it has very few resources and it is thousands of miles away from the Chagos Islands. The waters surrounding the Chagos are rich in fishing and biodiversity and I am sure that, in a few years’ time, we will probably see them being exploited, not for any lack of willingness on the part of the Mauritians but simply because they are completely unable to enforce the provisions. That would be a shame for one of the most unique environments in the world. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(10 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I was not sure whether anybody else wanted to follow that last speech. I do not think I have ever seen the Prime Minister drink prosecco—he would prefer a pint, I think.
Anyway, I thank noble Lords for their speeches on this quite important set of amendments, and I would be very surprised if we did not come back to some of these issues on Report, because, for all the nonsense we have just heard, there are actually some very thoughtful and quite important considerations here. Someone put it very well when they said that, while they might not agree with everything we are doing, there is a shared view across the House that we need to do as best we can through this process for the Chagossian communities.
Regarding Amendments 17, 26 and 78, the Chagossians are already entitled to work on the base and have done so. There are a range of job opportunities on Diego Garcia, open to Chagossians with British, Mauritian and Seychelles citizenship. A link to vacancies advertised by KBR, the main contractor responsible for recruiting and managing support staff at the base, is already available on the GOV.UK pages, setting out UK government support for Chagossians. On Amendment 78 from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan—
How many Chagossians are actually working on the base today?
I do not think that data is published anywhere, I am afraid. If it is, I shall provide it to the noble Lord.
I very much enjoyed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, as I always do, but it is unjustifiable to define Chagossians as only those holding British Overseas Territories citizenship. I think that is what he was getting at. There are many Chagossians living in Mauritius, the Seychelles and beyond, and this would also exclude anyone who holds British citizenship, but not British Overseas Territories citizenship.
Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which is one of many that would require the Government to seek something from Mauritius, is not needed. We have already committed to making a Statement to Parliament—and I think it is right that we do this—on the modalities of the Chagossian trust fund and eligibility for resettlement. That is in large part a response to the considerable interest that there has been from noble Lords across the House in making sure that the trust fund is run properly and fairly.
Taking this together with Amendment 38A from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, on air travel to Diego Garcia, I say that, as we have said numerous times, the UK is taking forward planning for a programme of heritage visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. These were paused in 2019 because of Covid, but we are working hard to reinstate them as soon as possible. Now, as then, these visits would include visits to key heritage sites. Specifically on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, there are no commercial flights to Diego Garcia, and nor would they be practical, as it is a working military base that is highly sensitive. Allowing commercial flights would interfere with the operational use of the base. Heritage visits in the past have often involved the use of charter aircraft and this may be the case for future visits also, but there is nothing in the treaty that would prevent this.
On Amendment 20C, noble Lords will recall that we debated the environmental impacts of the treaty and the marine protected area around the Chagos Archipelago last week. Both the UK and Mauritius are committed to protecting the unique environment around the islands. Noble Lords will be aware that on 2 November Mauritius issued a statement announcing the creation of a marine protected area once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the MPA. Low levels of artisanal fishing, compatible with nature conservation or for subsistence of the Chagossian community, would be allowed in certain limited areas.
The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to delay the implementation of the Bill and the entry into force of the treaty. The treaty has already been reviewed by two Select Committees of this House. They have reported their findings and agreed that the treaty allows for positive environmental work, with the IAC welcoming
“the Government’s assurance that it will work closely with the Mauritian Government to establish a well-resourced and patrolled Marine Protected Area”.
Amendment 38C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would require the Government to implement the resettlement recommendations of the 2015 KPMG study. The KPMG report, commissioned by the Conservative Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. The then Government ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands.
Will the Minister confirm that there were three different options for how many people you would resettle, and the costs of all of them were substantially lower than the transfer payments that we are making to Mauritius alone under the current deal?
That is correct, but those payments would not have paid for a legally secure operation of the base alongside our United States allies. Whatever legal geniuses we have opposite us today, those in the White House differed on the analysis now being put forward by the Conservative Party, which is clearly different from what they put forward in the not-so-distant past.
The agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms, without requiring the UK taxpayer to pick up the bill.
On Amendment 81G from the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, as I and other Ministers have said on numerous occasions, it will be for Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement once the treaty comes into force. I am very sympathetic to the way he put his case on this, but it would not be a good use of taxpayers’ money to keep reporting on something that is not in our gift to achieve. The Government are increasing their support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These include Chagossian-led community projects in Crawley and beyond, as well as education and English language support, and have involved the creation of a number of FCDO-funded full-time jobs for Chagossians. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, asked me about commitments on this going forward. We are committed to these at least until the end of this Parliament. He will understand that what happens beyond that may depend on decisions of Ministers in the future.
Amendment 31 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and Amendment 55 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, ask for an equality impact assessment on the payments to be made by Mauritius to Chagossians. The Government have already released the public sector equality duty report relating to the treaty, which addresses all the issues around equalities and the impact assessment.
Amendment 50A tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, raises a really important issue. We do not think it is necessary to make provision for this in the Bill, but we understand her concern. As I said in my letter in relation to the first day of Committee, we will work with relevant authorities to ensure that official documentation reflects historic connections to the Chagos Archipelago wherever possible. British passports issued to Chagossians will continue to display their place of birth and, if they wish, those who already have British Overseas Territories citizenship status can hold a British passport reflecting their status as British Overseas Territories citizens. I am very sympathetic to the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness and commit to making diplomatic representations to the Government of Mauritius to ensure that place of birth is recorded accurately on documentation.
I very much appreciate the Minister’s commitment to do that, because this is such a hurtful thing. Sometimes, those of an Irish republican disposition will say that I am not British but just Irish, so it is something I feel very strongly about. The Chagossians are entitled to have their identity confirmed, and I would be very pleased if she could write to me after she raises those issues through the diplomatic channels.
Of course, I would be very happy to do that.
On the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I put forward, as was alluded to in a number of speeches, including by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, the reason why we raised equality issues as regards financial payments is the potential role of Chagossians within the trust fund. There is a widespread concern at present that we are simply hoping that Mauritius does the right thing with that. I appreciate that the Minister is perhaps not in the position today to give any level of direct assurances. However, can she at least go away and come back before Report with the Government’s thoughts or information—perhaps after discussions with the Mauritian Government —as to how we can inject a level of Chagossian direct involvement and control over that trust fund? That would be very helpful for whenever we reach Report.
That is not too much to ask. We are talking to the Mauritian Government about this, because we want the same thing as the noble Lord. I had hoped that we would be able to say something a little bit more detailed about that by now. We have not quite got there, but we will use best endeavours to get there before Report. I understand the motivation behind this, and it is right that we do what we can to make sure that noble Lords have the assurances they need by Report.
In light of the reaffirmation that there will be both ongoing citizenship as well as dual nationality, and, perhaps uniquely, that community will be impacted directly by the terms of this treaty, does the Minister accept the principle that formal mechanisms of representation for the duration of this agreement, rather than just between now and the treaty coming into force, in principle warrant very serious consideration?
It depends on what we mean by formal and what that looks like. We have an arrangement at the moment via the contact group and a commitment to strengthen and expand that, to make sure that does the job it is intended to do and the Government can support it in doing that. However, we are clear that we do not do anything to it without its consent. It is an area on which we are interested in having further conversations—I think the noble Lord knows what I am getting at. Whether that completely satisfies his desire for formality, we will probably continue to explore together.
With that, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, feels able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I agree with the Minister that this has been a fascinating debate. It was a real pleasure to hear so many noble Lords focusing, as we rightly should, on the rights and futures of the Chagossian people.
The trust fund is an essential part of the treaty. Essentially, it is the only part of the treaty that is positive for the community. Therefore, we must not allow it to be maladministered, or worse, by the Mauritian Government. My noble friend Lord Ahmad made some very good points about the management of the existing fund, to which he got some answer from the Minister. We are certainly clear that the UK Government should take all necessary steps to hold the Mauritian Government to account for their management of the fund to ensure that the Chagossians are properly looked after and no longer treated as second-class citizens. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Fuller for trying to apply a little imaginary lipstick to his proverbial pig in this matter.
The points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, were particularly important and extremely serious. I was pleased to hear the assurances given to her by the Minister. We should not allow the Chagossian people to be treated in this manner by Mauritius.
This speaks to our concerns on value for money. Whichever figures you take, this agreement is a major financial undertaking, costing the British taxpayer billions of pounds over the lifetime of the deal. Any situation where the fund is capitalised but not managed properly would surely be unacceptable, and we should make sure that there are powers to hold Mauritius to account should that happen.
My noble friend Lord Hannan, in his excellent contribution, made some great points on how the Chagossians could be resettled in future and many of the alternative occupations that they could take in such circumstances.
If the Minister is not satisfied that the Government have the powers that they need to do that, I hope Ministers will go back to the Mauritian Government to ensure that we have those stronger powers before the treaty takes effect. The Minister is right that many of these matters will be returned to on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
It is a very good point. I think there is a divergence, exactly as in this country, between the permanent apparat and the rest of the country, which would explain why my noble friend Lord Kempsell and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, are speaking to very different sets of people. As the German ambassador to London in 1914 said to his French counterpart, “You have your information, we have ours”. It seems that there is at least a debate in the United States about this, and you can see why. As my noble friend Lord Bellingham said, there is a real prospect down the line that a future Mauritian Government may take a very different attitude towards the presence in the outer atolls of powers that are unfriendly to us. We have no assurance that we will always be on friendly terms with that republic.
The world is imperfect, I understand that. The world is sublunary. We are dealing with lesser evils, as is usually the case in politics. But when the Minister has justified this treaty and the treatment of the Chagossians, she has always done so by saying, “Our priority was the security of the base”. I just ask noble Lords on all sides to consider how this makes us more secure in an imperfect world than we are at present. We have obvious sovereignty over the entire region at the moment. We have the great advantage of its isolation. There is no prospect of anybody taking a leased island and putting any kind of listening infrastructure or anything else nearby. How does moving from where we are now to what is proposed in this treaty make us more secure, even if we set aside all the wrongs being done to the Brits of Chagossian origin?
I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was on to something when he asked, “What if the Americans were to change sides?” But I am not sure that quite makes the point he intended. I just invite noble Lords to consider the wholly pecuniary terms in which Mauritius has considered this territory: not as part of its own demos, not as part of its own nation, but as an investment and a way of raising money—of paving its streets with gold, as my noble friend said earlier. Would it not be the ultimate humiliation if Mauritius were to trouser the sum of money that we are now paying it and then to turn around and sell the base to the United States? Where would that leave this Government? I would love to hear the Minister’s reply.
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to an important set of amendments, and I thank them too for the way in which they have put those amendments. There is clearly some disagreement between us, but there is no disagreement over the fact that every single person in the Chamber is seeking to ensure that we protect the security of the nation and the security of Diego Garcia, and on the importance of that base to us. I start from that point. There were a couple of times when noble Lords almost seemed to question that. I do not question it at all. I do not agree with everything that has been said, but I do agree with the right to challenge how we take this forward, because out of that come better legislation and more clarity. While I do not agree with the need for some of the amendments, some of the comments that those amendments require to be made from the Dispatch Box are important. I wanted to set that context out for noble Lords.
I also just want to say this, because I think it is important. I do not want to have a Second Reading debate again but the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Beamish, and others have made this point: the Government, whatever the rights and wrongs, are trying to bring stability. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, disagrees with the treaty, and it is fair for him to make that point, but the Government’s point of view is that we are trying to bring stability and certainty to an uncertain situation. The noble Lord disagrees with that, as do a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. But that is the Government’s view. The Government’s view, in answer to the challenge the noble Lord raised, is that we are changing it because we are trying to bring certainty to an uncertain situation. We believe we have done that, and we have made certain that we have secured one of the most important military bases—if not the most important military base—for ourselves and the United States. The noble Lord does not accept that or agree with that, but that is the alternative proposition the Government are making.
It is really important, therefore, to say, in answer to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir, and others, that we would not have gone forward with this were it not for the fact that the Americans support it. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is right. We can say, “Well, the Americans said this” or “The Americans said that”. I am going to quote this, because I think it is really important. The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that
“the United States welcomed the historic agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius on the future of … the Chagos Archipelago … this agreement secures the long-term, stable and effective operation of the joint US-UK military facility at Diego Garcia. This is a critical asset for regional and global security … We value both parties’ dedication. The US looks forward to our continued joint work to ensure the success of our shared operations”.
That does not mean, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Ahmad, and many others, said, there are not challenges to that and what it actually means in practice. But it is a pretty fundamental starting point for the UK Government to be able to directly quote US Secretary of State Rubio saying that the US supports what this Government are doing and taking forward. I lay that on the table as the context for trying to answer some of the points and considerations that have been made.
Some of the points and comments—I say to the noble Lords, Lord Morrow, Lord Weir and others, and even to an extent to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey —are perhaps better dealt with in some of the other groups, particularly on the rights of the Chagossians. My noble friend Lady Chapman has answered on this at great length and will continue to do so as we move forward. That context is really important for the debate and the discussion we are having.
I will try to deal with some of the amendments. It will take a little while and I hope that noble Lords will bear with me. Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seeks to prevent the presence of non-UK and non-US civilian personnel in the Chagos Archipelago. The treaty gives the UK control over these matters. The security provisions were, as I have said, designed and tested at the highest level of the US security establishment, which supported us in proceeding with the deal.
On Amendment 34 from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, let me be clear: the entire treaty is designed to preserve the UK’s ability to take the necessary steps to preserve the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base. Article 3(2)(c) states clearly that the UK has
“the full responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia”.
Mauritius and other states should have no doubt—this is the importance of comments made here—about our willingness to exercise our responsibilities in a manner that ensures the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base.
If I am wrong on this, I will write to the noble Baroness and put a copy in the Library so that all Members can access it. My understanding is that the crucial bit of Annex 1(11)(c) is
“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification”.
The phrase,
“the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties”,
refers to things contained within the treaty. I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that. I am grateful to her for pointing it out.
The fundamental point I am trying to make—which I think the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, made—is that we have an obligation under the treaty to notify Mauritius of activities emanating from the base but we do not have to seek its permission. “Expeditiously” notifying does not mean notifying before we take any agreed action. Those were the points that I thought the noble Baroness was making, but I will certainly seek to clarify exactly where that takes us with Annex 1(11)(c). I will write to the noble Baroness and provide a copy to others. I thank her for raising that.
The treaty specifically confers on the UK the unrestricted ability to
“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”
in respect of Diego Garcia. Given that there is no question over operational freedom on Diego Garcia, it is unclear what necessary derogations the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, is seeking. The annex gives the UK the extensive rights that we would need in such a situation.
The noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, raised reporting restrictions. His Majesty’s Armed Forces and the intelligence services routinely produce reports for the Prime Minister on all types of security matters. I reassure the noble Lord, and other noble Lords, that this will include operational issues arising on the Diego Garcia base. There is no requirement for this to be made a statutory obligation, as Amendment 81E seeks to do. Additionally, Amendment 81F would represent an unusual interference with the prerogative to conduct international affairs and to make or unmake treaties. Noble Lords will understand that there is often a need for confidentiality in international discussions.
The clock is flashing away and the Whip is getting jumpy next to me. I shall have a look at Hansard and I shall write to noble Lords in the debate with anything that I have not covered and any questions that have not been answered and make sure that the amendments that I have not responded to are responded to. I shall send the letter to noble Lords in the debate. Let me be clear: I shall write to noble Lords about two or three of the amendments that I have not covered, copy the letter to noble Lords and put a copy in the Library. I hope that that is acceptable to everyone.
I thank noble Lords for a really interesting and important debate on the security provisions of the treaty and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 36, which, as the noble Lord mentioned, relates to asylum seekers who arrive on Diego Garcia, or anywhere on the Chagos Islands. Its purpose is very simple: it ensures that, if any person fleeing danger or persecution lands on those shores, they will not be subjected to unlawful detention, denial of due process, or the kinds of conditions that a British judge has already found to be in breach of international law.
I got a very nice personal letter from a native Chagossian, saying:
“We were exiled from our islands once, but we must not watch new injustice happen on our shores again. Anyone who arrives in our homeland must be treated with dignity. No one should suffer in the Chagos as we once did … As a native islander, I insist that any asylum seeker reaching the Chagos must have their rights respected. We were once denied justice. We cannot allow injustice to happen again in our name”.
Of course, the background has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—that in late 2021 more than 60 Sri Lankan Tamils were intercepted at sea and brought to Diego Garcia after their vessel was found in distress. Those individuals, many of whom intended to seek asylum in Canada, were accommodated for almost three years in a fenced compound on the island. This was not a temporary holding area; it became a long-term camp. The conditions are a matter of judicial record. The British Indian Ocean Territory Supreme Court found that the asylum seekers were effectively held in unlawful detention. The acting judge described the camp as
“a prison in all but name”
and said it was unsurprising that the individuals felt they were being punished. Evidence presented to the court documented leaking tents, rodent infestation, extreme heat, restricted movement, repeated incidents of self-harm and at least one mass suicide attempt. Some were warned that leaving the compound would expose them to the risk of being shot on security grounds. Those words are not mine—they were the court’s findings.
We also now know, again from the court’s judgment, that progress on their protection claims was impeded because of political factors, including concerns within the Home Office about the Government’s Rwanda policy. Rwanda seems to get mentioned everywhere. The effect of that delay was that these individuals were kept in a camp, in extreme conditions, for far longer than should ever have been contemplated. Most have now been brought to the United Kingdom, as has been said. I think that my noble and learned friend Lord Hermer was involved in that before he became Attorney-General. The Government described this as a one-off transfer and said that Diego Garcia would not be used again for long-term processing, but it remains the case that nothing in statute today prevents a future commissioner, Minister or Government using the islands in exactly the same way, should another vessel arrive. That is why this amendment is necessary; it gives effect to what the United Kingdom is already legally bound to do and ensures that any transfer to Mauritius or any other state happens only under an agreement that guarantees humane treatment, full rights of appeal and compliance with international law. These are not new standards; they are the minimum standards that the United Kingdom already owes to any asylum seeker, regardless of geography.
This amendment also speaks to something deeply felt by the Chagossians. The Chagossian people know what it is to be held without rights; they know what it is to have decisions made about their lives thousands of miles away; and they know what it is to be told they have no voice in decisions taken on their own islands. They have told us repeatedly that they do not want Diego Garcia, or any part of the Chagos Archipelago, to become a place where other vulnerable people suffer in silence.
There is also a simple and moral point. The only civilians permitted to remain long-term on the islands in the past decade were not the native Chagossians but asylum seekers confined in a manner that a British judge found to be unlawful. That fact alone should give the Committee pause for reflection. It was perfectly okay for asylum seekers to be on Diego Garcia but not the original Chagos people.
This amendment seeks to ensure that asylum seekers under Mauritian jurisdiction must have binding guarantees for monitoring, appeal rights, independent oversight and humanitarian standards. The Chagossian community has raised serious concerns about the treatment of vulnerable people already in Mauritius. These concerns cannot be dismissed and certainly cannot be ignored. The Government now intend that asylum seekers arriving in Chagos should be sent there.
This amendment does not oppose the transfer of asylum seekers. It does not dictate the policy of future Governments; it simply ensures that the mistakes made between 2021 and 2024 can never be repeated on British responsibility. It ensures that any person arriving on those islands is processed humanely, lawfully and with respect for their basic rights. For the Chagossians, who were themselves displaced without rights, this is not an abstract principle. It is an affirmation that the islands they still regard as home will not again be a theatre for human suffering. It is a modest and necessary amendment, which is fully consistent with our international obligations and our national values. I therefore commend it to the Committee and urge noble Lords to support it.
My Lords, Amendments 19 and 27 from the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley, now in his place, seek to ensure that Mauritius will be responsible for any illegal migrants who may arrive at Diego Garcia. These are important amendments, and it is helpful that they have been tabled to allow us to clarify this point. I can reassure both noble Lords that the treaty already ensures Mauritian responsibility and closes a potential—as they correctly identify—illegal migration route to the UK. Mauritius, as the sovereign state and as specifically referenced under Annex 2 of the treaty, has jurisdiction over irregular migration to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia.
To the extent that the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley, through their amendments are seeking clarity on the arrangements with Mauritius to put that responsibility into practice, I can assure them that the UK Government are already in the process of agreeing with Mauritius the separate arrangements referenced in Annex 2 paragraph 10 of the treaty, to assist and facilitate in that exercise of Mauritian jurisdiction. These are ongoing negotiations on which I will not provide a running commentary; suffice to say that there will be no need to force the Government to provide a report on the negotiations.
Amendment 36 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, is another helpful amendment. It seeks to ensure that any arrangement entered into with Mauritius regarding migrants ensures the humane treatment, full rights of appeal and compliance with international law of any asylum seeker or refugee. It is an important amendment, and I can confirm that the Government will, of course, ensure that any arrangement we enter into will comply with applicable international law and our domestic obligations. For that reason, I think that the amendment is unnecessary, but I thank her for tabling it and allowing us to make that clear. I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her clarification, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for her contribution to this important debate. We know how strongly the British public feel on illegal immigration. It would have been outrageous if we handed over the territory yet retained responsibility for dealing with any illegal immigration.
I will look carefully at the words that the Minister used in her response in Hansard, but it seems as though she has provided the reassurances we are seeking that no illegal arrivals in the Chagos Archipelago will be able to make a claim in the UK for asylum now that sovereignty has been handed over. She used the famous government expression “I am not going to provide a running commentary”, which often means “I am not going to say”. Nobody is asking her to provide a running commentary; we just wanted a clarification on the issues or any outcome of the discussions. If there is a resolution to the discussions before we get to Report, I hope she will update us in writing. Apart from that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(10 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, reminds us, this amendment gets to the core of the criticisms that have been levelled against the Government’s approach to this Bill so far. As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out numerous times during the debates on the first day in Committee, it is very difficult to see which court could have delivered a binding judgment against the UK on the question of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. Yet it is the repeated contention of the Government that this treaty is somehow essential to deliver legal certainty.
The question remains of which court could have delivered a binding judgment that would have threatened that legal certainty and the security of the military base. I hope that the Government can finally provide us with an answer. If they cannot answer that question then the argument that this treaty and this Bill were both necessary falls apart. Indeed, the argument that the treaty and the Bill are needed urgently also falls apart, and we should consider whether the Government should take a more circumspect approach. That is what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, suggests.
If this treaty is necessary, Ministers must surely have considered other options before coming to this agreement with Mauritius. Perhaps the Minister can tell the Committee what consideration was given to resettlement of the Chagos Archipelago by Chagossians, for example. What would the cost have been for that? What is the difference between that cost figure and the true cost associated with this treaty? I say “true cost” because the Government’s initial claims on costs have now been thoroughly discredited.
There were lots of options that should have been considered, so perhaps the noble Baroness can tell us what options were in fact considered. I understand that these are specific questions about the process followed by Ministers before agreeing to the treaty with Mauritius, so if the noble Baroness cannot say with certainty what potential approaches were considered, perhaps she could write to us to confirm the details.
In relation to Amendment 20J, the House has dedicated at least 15 hours to debating the Government’s rationale for entering this treaty. It has been subject to two reports, by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Three separate committees—the IAC, the IRDC and the Foreign Affairs Committee—have held evidence sessions and questioned the Minister for the Overseas Territories.
The Government have been consistently clear throughout. The legal case was compelling and there was no credible alternative. A policy of hanging tough, which I assume the noble Lord has in mind, would have been a real gift to our adversaries. As we have stated on numerous occasions, the continued operation of the base was under threat. Courts were already making decisions which undermined our position. If a long-term deal had not been reached, further wide-ranging litigation was likely, with no realistic prospect of the UK successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such cases.
Legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, affecting, for example, our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia. Both the IRDC and the IAC recognise that the treaty provides legal certainty for the base. I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate. I have noticed that no one has spoken against the amendment, other than the Minister who brought her explanation and reason. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 20K, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, seeks to oblige the Government to publish a report on the ability of Mauritius to govern the Chagos Archipelago and on the implications of the treaty for international peace and stability. The IRDC concluded that the treaty gave the UK legal clarity on which it could capitalise to enhance defence co-operation and that it was a platform for reinforcing operational links with key regional partners, allowing the UK to position itself as a credible contributor to regional stability grounded in the rule of law. Under the treaty, the UK retains full operational control over Diego Garcia. There are robust provisions in place to protect the security of the base. The treaty is the best way to ensure the continued operation of the joint UK-US base and therefore to protect international peace and security. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
The Minister has not even attempted to address any of the questions that we have asked.
I am very happy if the noble Lord would like to ask me a specific question that I have not already answered in previous groups. Would the noble Lord like to do that?
Will the Minister comment on the ability of the Mauritian coastguard actually to enforce the marine protected area, for instance?
I suggest that the noble Lord looks at the ways in which marine protected areas are generally enforced. It is not, as he seems to imagine, by patrolling in vessels around the ocean, checking on things. That is not how these things work. But I will gladly send him some information about that.
My Lords, I certainly do support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I will be very brief. The amendment on which I want to focus is not one regarding referenda and consulting the Chagossian people, even though that is very important. Amendment 20L simply states—and I would be surprised if the Government could not accept this—that the Secretary of State needs to come up with a report
“assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty”.
What is wrong with that amendment? Nothing. It would cost the Foreign Office a certain amount of time and effort to put together a report but, in the context of what has been said—at Second Reading, in the debate that we had on the treaty, on the first and second day in Committee—it is not asking a lot.
The noble Lord, Lord Jay, was looking specifically at the interests of the citizens in those different territories. He has a huge amount of knowledge, wisdom and experience, and what he said made a huge amount of sense. What he perhaps did not address is the signals that this Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the treaty, will send to other countries. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, made some specific points about Argentina—where we know that the dispute will not go anywhere; it will go on and on—as well as Gibraltar. I will also mention one other territory that could well—
I hesitate to interrupt, but I think we need to remind ourselves before it gets repeated again that we have just done a deal on Gibraltar with Spain. That has been welcomed by the Government in Gibraltar and that situation is no longer as is being implied by the noble Lord.
I understand that, but circumstances can change and this may well be seen as a precedent in the future.
I want to mention one other territory: Anguilla. As the Minister will know, Anguilla went through a period of huge unrest to resist becoming part of St Kitts and Nevis. The consequence was that a UK battalion of the Parachute Regiment had to deploy to Anguilla to control the unrest that took place. This is a small but incredibly proud territory that wanted to remain British. In the past few years, there have been a number of attempts by St Kitts and Nevis to reopen the whole issue of Anguilla.
There will be consequences of this treaty going through, which could be to some extent alleviated if the Government would accept this very simple amendment, Amendment 20L. This is the amendment in this group that concerns me most. I do not think that it is asking a great deal of the Government to put this in the Bill. This would be a very important signal in the Bill that those other territories would be properly considered.
My Lords, I will briefly make two points. First, on behalf of my noble friend Lord McCrea, who has had to leave for a family wedding, I will speak to Amendment 57, which principally brings to the Committee’s attention the role of British legal firms in this issue.
We have been critical in this House of the current and, to some extent, the previous Government. Those criticisms are not entirely without merit on the issue of sovereignty. There has also been further British involvement in any number of aspects, the four most significant legal interventions being two cases in connection with UNCLOS; one relating to the advisory opinion of the ICJ; and one on the drafting of the UN security resolution. In each of these four cases, the Mauritius Government used British firms as their legal representation in order to further their aims. In effect, British firms acted on behalf of a foreign Government to challenge British sovereignty, British defence rights and the wishes of British citizens. We cannot do anything about what happened in the past, but I suppose the amendment queries whether there is an appropriate way forward in terms of that level of support for Mauritius. Raising my noble friend Lord McCrea’s amendment gives the Government an opportunity to respond to it.
I want to deal briefly with the wider point. We do not always see eye to eye, but I agree with at least one phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, used: he said that we have to be careful about words, and words matter. One of the major concerns, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, and others, might be described as the precedent and the ripple effect. It is undoubtedly the case that in the past we as a nation have made mistakes in dealing with overseas territories. In particular, we have sent out the wrong signals on both the Falklands and Gibraltar. It is probably the case that some, at different points within Governments in the past, would have been quite happy to see those territories dispatched to another sovereign territory on that basis. They can best speak for themselves but, fortunately enough, in each case we have drawn back from what might be described as a fatal mistake. The danger with this is that it crosses the line in handing over that level of sovereignty.
Mention has been made of a range of overseas territories. The one thing that largely unites them is that whatever discussions we have had with different Governments, about whatever level of co-operation, they have ultimately respected the self-determination and the inhabitants’ will for sovereignty. That is what at times has drawn us back. I think this goes beyond that and moves towards a situation regarding the wishes of the Chagossian people and their right to self-determination—and that self-determination may, because we do not know definitively, express itself in them saying, “We want to be part of Mauritius”. If that is their self-determination, so be it. I think it is unlikely to be the case; nevertheless, so be it. The concern is the signal that this sends out to the outside world.
The Minister mentioned the arrangements as regards Gibraltar. I think there has been work ongoing with both this Government and the previous Government to try to find arrangements that are in the best interests of Gibraltar. I entirely acknowledge that, while it is sometimes easy to criticise when looking from outside, the Gibraltar Government themselves have been supportive of those actions and have backed the moves made so far.
It is really important that there is not a dispute with regards to Gibraltar. There is an arrangement that is agreed with Spain and it is not in question at all, in any sense.
Absolutely. I have taken the Minister and the Government to task on a range of things, but this may be one issue on which we are in vigorous agreement. I do not question the Government’s bona fides as regards Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands. I know there is a strong commitment to both. I fully acknowledge that and believe it would be the case under a future Government, but this is not a concern over the attitude of this Government or other UK Governments over the ripple effect. It is the danger of what message will be sent out; as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, there is a ripple effect towards Madrid and Buenos Aires, which might take a very different approach in future.
I am really sorry, but we have an agreement with Spain. The matter is settled. Madrid takes the same view that London takes; it is the same view that the Government of Gibraltar take. It is settled, and it is beyond unhelpful for noble Lords—unintentionally, I realise, as this is a relatively recent development—to suggest in any way that that is not the case.
I am not querying that. What I am saying is from experience and from having spoken directly to Gibraltarians in relation to this. They know that a very good agreement may have been done with this Government, but Spanish Governments down the years have sometimes tended to blow hot and cold as regards Gibraltar.
My Lords, a large number of the amendments that have been tabled seek to mandate the Government to renegotiate the treaty with Mauritius on various points. The noble Lord told me this on many occasions in the last Parliament, so I am sure that he understands the point that I am about to make: treaty-making and international negotiations are a matter for the Government, in exercise of the royal prerogative. It is simply not practical for that to become a matter where Parliament seeks to direct this or that isolated element of what can be intense, dynamic and sometimes difficult negotiations. In this case, I can assure the Committee that the Government have thoroughly considered all aspects of the treaty that the UK has entered into and used all their efforts throughout to achieve the best possible deal for the UK. These requests to reopen negotiations on different points are not realistic and would make the UK appear an unreliable counterparty on the international stage. This treaty has gone through a rigorous assessment and been agreed at the highest levels of the US security establishment.
Our reasons for rejecting Amendment 20U are, essentially, those that I set out earlier in relation to Amendment 20J, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I do not intend to repeat them.
Amendment 20L was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I enjoy the noble Lord’s contributions. His speeches are as entertaining as they are, unfortunately, inaccurate and misleading sometimes. My grandfather fought in Malaya, in the Green Howards, and so it was an unfortunate example that the noble Lord chose to resort to—but I forgive him for this, because he puts so much into his speeches. I assure him and other noble Lords that this deal has been welcomed by both Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, their Governments have both stated that there is no read-across to them, and we should respect what they have to say.
Through Amendment 20M, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, seems to be suggesting that the Government have not complied with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in respect of the treaty. I respectfully disagree with him on this. The treaty was laid in Parliament on the day that it was signed, under the process set out in the Act. CRaG requires that a treaty is laid in both Houses for 21 joint sitting days before it may be ratified. The period expired on 3 July 2025, with neither House resolving against ratification. During that 21-day period, two committees in this House held evidence sessions, including with the Minister for Overseas Territories, and produced reports, which we have responded to. There was a debate and a vote on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, against ratification, which this Government defeated. As a matter of practice, the UK Government do not ratify treaties until the necessary implementing legislation is in place, and that is what the Government are currently doing with the Bill.
Amendments 20P and 20Q appear to misunderstand the archipelago. I feel uncomfortable making this point, as it feels very cold, harsh and legalistic, particularly given the testimonies, many of which we have heard directly from Chagossians in their accounts of what happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not feel comfortable repeating it but this is the legal situation as it is, and it is important to be clear. The archipelago has never had a permanent population. The islands have not been inhabited since the population was removed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, there is no “economy” of the Chagos Archipelago. Once the treaty enters into force, Mauritius will be sovereign and will have jurisdiction over the regulation of commercial activities unrelated to the operation of the base throughout the archipelago, subject to the constraints of the treaty. On the exclusive economic zone around the archipelago, Mauritius has announced its intention to establish a marine protected area and, importantly, there will be no commercial fishing allowed. It will be for Mauritius to decide how any resettlement will work, including in respect of governance of the islands.
Amendment 57, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and spoken to on his behalf, cannot be accepted. The UK’s legal services industry and the English Bar are internationally recognised for their expertise. That includes expertise in public international law, and UK-qualified lawyers act for states all around the world on various matters, facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes. The standing of UK legal expertise should be a matter of pride for this House, not a tool for manipulation by politicians to achieve narrow and short-term advantage. An attempt to place a prohibition on who can utilise our world-leading legal services would undermine access to legal representation—an important element of the rule of law. It is wholly inappropriate for the Government to dictate who can be represented by whom. It risks undermining our standing on the world stage.
I hesitate to repeat the debate we had last week, but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that, had there been no legal risk to our position, why did the United States stop investment in the base at that point? It was because it was sufficiently concerned about the legal risk. Had there been no basis whatever for our concerns on legality, why on earth did the previous Government even begin to negotiate, accepting that they did not manage to conclude a deal? Our view is that there was sufficient legal risk. The noble Lord disagrees, as is his right, but the fact is that the principle of this treaty, and the necessity for it, has been through the appropriate process. It has been voted on in this place and we have voted that this treaty should be ratified. We have already taken that decision in this Chamber. This legislation is about making the necessary changes to UK domestic law to enable us to sign, fully ratify and implement.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way, but I ask her to respond to the point I made: why, even now, does she refuse to let pass her lips any recognition that there was never any possibility of the ICJ reaching a legally binding decision that would affect us, because of our opt-out from the power of the ICJ to decide on disputes between ourselves and Mauritius? UNCLOS is a different matter, but would she let those words pass her lips?
My Lords, I accept that about the ICJ, but the point is that other countries will act on an advisory opinion even if we choose to ignore it. We have not chosen to ignore it. That is a judgment call. Partly, that is because we think that, by negotiating now, we negotiate from a stronger position than we would have had we waited for other, binding judgments. Those judgments can come from any treaty to which both parties are signed up. That is why we feel—and not everyone has to agree with the Government on this—that there is sufficient legal question that we needed to act and to negotiate. If they are honest with themselves—there is a lack of former Ministers who were responsible for this arguing the point that the noble Lord makes; they argue other points but not this one—there was sufficient legal jeopardy for the previous Government to enter into this process. I hope noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.
I am grateful to the Minister for dealing so comprehensively with all those points, and to all noble Lords who contributed: the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Ludford, my noble friends Lord Bellingham and Lord Lilley, the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Purvis, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu.
On finality, almost all treaties are said to be final at the time but they are not always treated as final by one or both parties. The treaty of Utrecht was pretty final. It said that Spain would have first refusal if Britain ever left, but it was pretty final about granting sovereignty. I absolutely agree, as the Minister says, that Spain has now agreed to a permanent settlement, but it is one of many, and experience tells us that incoming Governments do not always regard treaties signed by their predecessors as final. Indeed, the treaty we signed when Mauritius became independent and renounced all claim to the Chagos Islands was said to be permanent at the time, so I am less reassured than I think she hoped I might have been.
Let me put it the other way around: the way to make these treaties final is to stop inviting people, through our behaviour, to reopen them—to refuse to countenance it. The French had a very similar issue in the Comoros; they just refused to countenance it. I cannot see any other country doing what we are doing now. Indeed, I am afraid to say I cannot see any British Government other than this one having done it.
I do not want to get into the whole history of the Malayan emergency, but there is a wonderful record that, when Malaysia became independent, one of the first acts of the new Government was to give some very valuable land containing the house called Carcosa Seri Negara—a very fine house—to Britain in perpetuity as sovereign British territory. It became the seat of the high commission in Kuala Lumpur in recognition of all the things that we had done together. A young anti-colonialist Minister said, “But if we give them the best land in KL, no one will believe that we fought for our independence”, and there was a rather awkward moment around the Cabinet table because, of course, they did not: we were in Malaya supporting a democratic Government against a communist insurgency. We would have left much earlier had we not had the requests of that Government to remain and support them. That is getting slightly off topic so, with your Lordships’ permission, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his Amendment 81 that he has just talked about, which rightly puts the focus of our debate on the citizens of the Chagos Islands, the Chagossian community themselves. It has so far been a disappointing aspect of this Committee to hear the Government dismiss the rights of the Chagossian community. Throughout the process of agreeing the treaty, it is clear that the Chagossians have not been properly consulted. In fact, the Government’s official view—I think the noble Baroness has repeated it again this evening—is that there is no relevant claim of self-determination in respect of the Chagos Archipelago.
I also welcome Amendment 50B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. The resettlement of the Chagos Islands under the treaty is an option, not a requirement, and it is increasingly clear that it is possible that the Mauritians will simply ignore it and not take any steps whatever to achieve resettlement of the Chagossians.
The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, would certainly help put pressure on the UK Government and, in turn, the Mauritian Government to use the provisions of the treaty in respect of resettlement and allow those Chagossians who wish to to return to the outer islands.
On a separate but related note, I am of course pleased that the International Relations and Defence Committee has launched its relatively short piece of work to finally hear the views of the Chagossian community, but I think there are some serious procedural flaws in its survey. There seems to be no control of who can submit views: I am sure the relevant Chinese bots are already on the subject of submitting the survey forms, and there are already concerning reports of Mauritian government officials actually filling in the forms on behalf of Chagossians in Mauritius. But, when the results are in and we have the report of the committee, I hope the Minister will commit to considering it carefully before we proceed to the next stage of the Bill.
We obviously understand that there may be limited time between the committee’s publication of its report and Report stage, so the Government may not have the time to consider and table their own amendments to reflect the views of the Chagossian community as expressed in the—valid, hopefully—responses to the committee. Should that be the case, we would ask the Government to engage constructively with others in this House on amendments before Report so that we can put the needs and welfare of the Chagossian community front and centre as we progress with the Bill. I hope that the Minister will be able to give that assurance today.
As the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, seeks to do, we need to step up and support the Chagossian community, who have been mistreated for far too long.
My Lords, Amendment 20M, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, requests that the treaty does not come into force until the publication of
“a report assessing the impact of Article 6 of the Treaty”.
As I and other Ministers have said on numerous occasions, it will be for Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement once the treaty enters into force. It is not sensible, or a good use of taxpayers’ money, to be reporting on something that will not be in our gift to achieve.
The Government are increasing our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These include Chagossian-led community projects in Crawley and elsewhere, education and English language support, and have involved the creation of a number of FCDO-funded full-time jobs for Chagossians.
Amendment 81, from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, requests a report of the forecast impact of the treaty on Chagossians. The Government have already released the public sector equality duty report relating to the treaty, which addresses all the issues around an equalities impact assessment. This, in addition to the IRDC’s current review, should support understanding of the impacts to the Chagossian community.
I understand, respect and appreciate the noble Lord’s support for the Chagossian community, but I must also speak to the many different views within the Chagossian community, including several groups that welcome the deal. I think that this will perhaps be surfaced as a result of the work that the IRDC is doing, and I obviously commit to reflecting on it as the Bill proceeds.
Amendment 50B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, seeks to recognise in the domestic law of the UK that the Chagossians are the indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago. I hear absolutely what she says about lived memory and the persuasive way that she puts that across. But the unfortunate fact—and I think it is unfortunate—is that both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have considered in a series of judgments since the 1970s the related questions of a claimed right of abode or other rights said to flow from the rights that she seeks to gain for the Chagossians through her amendment. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed the claims.
Had that not been the case—the noble Baroness clearly wishes that that had not been the case; it is her strongly held view and I can see why she feels so—the Government would perhaps have had to take a very different course, because the rights would have held a different weight in law. However, the situation is that history has taken us to a position where, much as we do not like it and it goes against some of the things that we feel and what we may even argue is the moral case, the legal situation is, I am afraid, as it is.
The legal situation is as I have described. The noble Baroness may wish that that were not the case, but the legal position is as it is, and the Government do not intend to amend the Bill in order to change that legal position.
That legal position is guidance; it is not law.
There have been legal judgments in English courts and elsewhere that have established that the right that the noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to grant to the Chagossian people does not currently exist in law. It is not guidance. Those are decisions of English courts. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who were diligent and eloquent in their defence of the dispossessed Chagossians. Sometimes people approach the story of Britain overseas as a kind of morality play where Britain plays the villain, the Alan Rickman of the global drama. We heard a hint of it, I think, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in the previous round. Every disengagement was somehow disagreeable. Here, the disagreeable thing is pulling out in a way that disregards the wishes of the people who have been most injured. I was grateful to the Minister for making the clarification on birth certificates. She is doing enormously well defending this position, I have to say. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Kempsell is not here to move his amendment, which I thought was a particularly good one.
We debated some of the financial aspects of the treaty on the first day in Committee. The Minister at that time asked to delay her remarks on those amendments to the appropriate group. I assume this is the group that she was referring to, so we all look forward to the fuller answer on the finances that she promised then.
The core contention of the Government is that the deal costs an average of £101 million a year and the present net value of payments under the treaty is therefore £3.4 billion. This has been challenged by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, but the Minister, rather than engaging in the substance of those challenges, has relied on the Government’s published figures and refused to explain why she believes those figures accurately reflect the cost of the deal.
The Minister has relied on the approval of the Government Actuary’s Department and simply argued that consistency was essential. These are typical deflections that, no doubt, many Ministers have used in previous cases, but they do not address the concerns of my noble friends. We know that the payments are front-loaded at £165 million for the first three years, and then £120 million for the next 10 years. After that point, it is index-linked. As my noble friend Lady Noakes set out at Second Reading, that will see the cash payments hitting more than £650 million a year by the end of the 99 years, depending, of course, on what indexation you use. With all those additional considerations, it is our contention that the true cost of the deal is not £3.4 billion, as claimed by Ministers, but something more like £35 billion.
So the question lands: why would the Government seek to play this down? If they are so delighted with the deal—if it is such a good deal for the British public that they keep claiming that they deliver for, as all government policies should surely be—then surely they would want to be open about the true cost of things. They brag about spending on every other area; they take every amount of money per year, cumulatively add it all up and then put it in a press release and brag to the British people about what a great amount they are spending in every area except for this one. Does the Minister think it is better that the country should know the full costings before the treaty comes into effect, or would she prefer that the UK tie itself into these vast annual payments first, before admitting what the true cost of the deal actually is?
We are clear that the British people deserve to know what their Government are signing up for. Ministers should engage with the detailed costings laid out by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, and the points made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, rather than hiding behind their pre-prepared lines. If they have nothing to hide, what is wrong with producing a report that we can all see and study and get checked by independent financial experts? Once Ministers have admitted the true cost of the deal, then they can start justifying the so-called benefits of the treaty against what the true cost actually is. I do not think that people would be impressed by arguments justifying that figure, but Ministers should do the decent thing and justify the real numbers openly and in public.
Noble Lords will recall that we debated the financial elements of the treaty in some detail last week, and I genuinely do not think that further debate is going to persuade anybody of anything this evening and probably is not a good use of time at this stage. However, I respect that the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Kempsell, who was not here to speak to his amendment, have tabled further amendments, so I am happy to put their minds at rest about the matter to the best of my ability this evening.
Noble Lords already know that the Government published full details of the financial payment on the day that the treaty was signed. These details are in the finance exchange of letters, which is included in the treaty in the version laid in the House and published on the government website. The details are also set out in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, which was also laid before the House and published on the government website. It is plain to see how much the treaty is costing. The breakdown on page 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum is particularly straightforward for anyone who might desire further information about what will be paid in each year of the treaty. Indeed, the clarity with which the information was presented by the Government was welcomed by the Office for Statistics Regulation, which confirmed that it was consistent with the principles of intelligent transparency.
Therefore, there is no requirement for any additional report on the financial costs, either before the Bill comes into force, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, proposes, or before each payment, as is suggested in the other amendment.
The quid pro quo I was asked about is that we get a unique military asset shared with our closest ally on a legally secure basis. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asks why I rely on government figures and the answer is because I am representing the Government. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Before the Minister sits down, the particular question I pose—and I am not being polemical; I think there is an issue—is: what actually stops Mauritius, contractually, from commercially transferring this revenue stream in a capitalised form to another purchaser?
I think the noble Baroness is asking me what a sovereign country would do with some money that it gets as part of payment from this treaty. I am not sure what the problem would be with Mauritius investing that money in something that then provided it with a return, which it could then use to support public services or anything else in Mauritius. I am not sure if I have properly understood exactly what the noble Baroness is concerned about. I would be happy to engage further—
Okay, that might be a good idea. I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment on that basis.
My Lords, Amendments 20T and 81K, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley, seek to achieve a similar objective to Amendments 80 and 82. Given the similarity of the two pairs of amendments, I was slightly surprised to see the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, degroup his amendments. We could have had a very satisfactory debate with the original grouping, but of course I fully respect the noble Lord’s right to degroup his amendments. I am slightly surprised, because he criticised me for doing something similar last week, but it is, of course, only right that noble Lords should be able to debate their amendments in the groupings that most suit them.
I am pleased that my noble friend Lord Lilley has the right to self-determination, as confirmed by a referendum of the Chagossians, in his amendment. This is an important point that I am sure many noble Lords will agree with.
Amendment 20T would also delay the implementation of the key parts of this Bill until some progress has been made on establishing the joint parliamentary commission. It seems to me that too many core parts of the treaty are not tied to deadlines or quantifiable outcomes. As a result, it would be hard to monitor whether Mauritius, and indeed the UK, are fulfilling their obligations under the treaty in a timely manner. My noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendment helpfully ties the joint parliamentary commission to the coming into effect of the Act, forcing Ministers and their Mauritian counterparts to get on with the job so that the commission can play an important role from the very beginning of the treaty’s effect. It is a very sensible proposal.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on whether the Government will agree that establishing a joint parliamentary commission would be a useful tool going forward.
My Lords, as the noble Lord opposite has indicated, it is slightly surprising that the four amendments on establishing a joint UK-Mauritius parliamentary commission or committee have been degrouped. Members are well within their rights to do this and I am glad at least that this time noble Lords have had sufficient notice of what is happening.
I am sensitive to the sentiment of these amendments. I take them to come from a genuine desire for greater parliamentary involvement in the scrutiny of the implementation of the treaty on specific areas that are of concern to the Committee. The Government have always said that they welcome scrutiny, and this remains the case. We are not opposed to the strengthening of links between the UK Parliament and that of Mauritius, although this would be a somewhat novel approach. I think it seems pretty likely that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, took inspiration from the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on this occasion.
There is a question of proportionality and the proper extent of the remit of such a parliamentary commission. Out of respect for the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I propose to discuss this in much more detail when we reach the debate on Amendment 80, which he has tabled. I hope that is acceptable to the noble Lord. I will be very happy to meet with him and other noble Lords to discuss this proposal, and specifically the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in more detail. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am persuaded by the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that his amendments are somewhat narrower but much more justified than my broader amendment. When the appropriate moment comes, I will not press my amendment and leave his standing.
In response to the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that we are clearer in the Bill about what it does, I have read it a couple of times and honestly do not think that it could not be any clearer. It is a Bill to enact an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago. I think that is sufficient, and if he does not, I am not sure what he is getting at.
The Government rejects Amendment 33 on the basis that the provision in question is not redundant. It is needed to ensure the secure and effective operation of the base. It ensures clarity on which law will apply through the jurisdiction that the UK will exercise under the treaty. Legal continuity and certainty for operations on the base once the British Indian Ocean Territory is dissolved is far from unnecessary.
Let me explain why we have Clause 3. This clause saves the law of BIOT, and law which relates to BIOT, as the law of Diego Garcia and law which relates to Diego Garcia. This has been done as the default, to ensure the continued effective running of the base on Diego Garcia and to make sure that there is no legal gap. Detailed work is being carried out to establish where technical amendments may be needed to this preserved law to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is defined in Clause 3 as the whole area that the UK can exercise jurisdiction over, as covered in the treaty. This includes the island of Diego Garcia and the 12 nautical miles surrounding it. Preserving the existing prerogative power to legislate for Diego Garcia means that we can continue to operate the base and its legal architecture in much the same way that we do today, and it gives the maximum flexibility for the future.
Amendment 51, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seems to be based on a misapprehension. As I mentioned in my response to the amendments related to Clause 3, His Majesty has a prerogative power to legislate for BIOT at present and Clause 3 preserves this power. It does not allow him to make laws for other parts of the realm about BIOT or Diego Garcia. If the noble Lord reads that clause of the Bill again, he will see that I am right about that.
The statutory power in Clause 5 is necessary to enable amendments to Acts and statutory instruments which form part of the law of Diego Garcia and amendments to legislation which forms part of the law of other jurisdictions—the UK Crown dependencies and the other OTs. These other jurisdictions have laws which refer to BIOT or treat it as one of the overseas territories. Amendments to those laws may be necessary to reflect the new status of Diego Garcia.
I see that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—as is becoming classic in his contributions on these occasions—has read the report from the DPRRC. His Amendments 51A, 51B and 51C appear to seek to implement its recommendations. Amendment 51BA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, appears to be less consistent with the recommendations—I think he has recognised that in his remarks—in that it would impose the affirmative procedure in respect not just of Orders in Council, which amend primary legislation, but of those which amend secondary legislation. Without showing too much leg so late at night, we are still considering these suggestions and we will return to them on Report. With that, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and others who contributed to this group. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her reply to my amendments. I appreciate that they are technical and relate to the prerogative, but they are important none the less.
In essence, we seek to understand whether the Government believe that Clauses 3 and 5 will limit the prerogative in any way because as we see from the drafting of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which we discussed earlier, this has effectively ended the Government’s adherence to the original Ponsonby rule. Statute is so often deficient when compared with convention. As in the case of the prerogative, statute should not limit the prerogative without very careful consideration.
I am grateful to the Minister for her reply. Given the complexity of these issues, I hope she will write to us to set out the impact of the Bill on the prerogative before we proceed to Report. In the meantime, I will, of course, study her reply in Hansard. Obviously, we reserve the right to return to any unresolved issues on Report.
My Lords, I have said repeatedly throughout these deliberations that the Government are very interested in thinking about different ways of working alongside the Chagossian community on these issues. That applies to Amendment 47 as well.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, asks the Government in her amendment to produce a report consisting of a demographic study of the Chagossian community. I am going to have to disappoint her this evening. It will not be possible to produce a useful report, at a cost to taxpayers, in time for it to do anything of consequence alongside this treaty. It is not a bad idea to have a report such as this, for many of the reasons that have been described. I would not be against it. What I am saying is that the responsibility for conducting the study does not belong in this Bill, but that does not mean it is a bad thing to do in principle. The noble Baroness will know, as we have heard most recently from the noble Earl, Lord Leicester, about the IDRC leading a report into the Chagossians, which I hope will be published soon. I hope that all these things will help to mitigate some of the noble Baroness’s concerns.
I saw that Jeremy Corbyn had also written to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, wo chairs the IRDC, which is responsible for the survey. It is not something that the Government are responsible for. We are looking forward to the results. We were asked what weight we put on the survey. It is for the committee to determine that. I am sure that it will take on board the comments that have been made by those who are concerned about how the survey has been conducted. I know that some Chagossians would be completely unable to access a survey such as this, for reasons of literacy or access to the means by which the survey is being conducted. I am sure that the committee will want to reflect on that. We certainly will when we receive its report. I look forward to it and hope that it is useful in assisting us to understand the complexity of opinion that exists within Chagossian communities.
On the substantive point that the noble Baroness raises, such a piece of work may well be useful, but I am not able this evening to commit the Government to commissioning it. With that, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that rather thoughtful answer. I note that she did not rule out what I said—that the Americans would still be seeing uncertainty in the future. I think that we will see that whatever happens in this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, my Amendment 88 in this group is very much in a similar vein to my earlier amendments, although I see I do not have the presence of my newly acquired fan—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—to encourage me. I seek reassurance that the
“unrestricted access, basing and overflight”
provisions in Annex 1(1)(a) of the agreement includes the right of the UK to allow nuclear-propelled vessels and nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft to enter the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia.
Although not in the amendment, the annexe of the treaty referred to also specifically covers the United States of America, and, for the avoidance of doubt, I include it in the confirmation I seek from the Secretary of State in this amendment. Again, I am asking that this be confirmed by the Secretary of State before the Bill can come into force. In this respect, I am perhaps baring my teeth more than my noble friend Lord Lilley, which is a rather unusual situation.
As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, Mauritius is a party to the Pelindaba treaty, which establishes the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear weapons in any signatory state. Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty states that both Mauritius and the United Kingdom confirm that no
“existing international obligations or arrangements … conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.
Annex 1 of the treaty states that the United Kingdom retains
“unrestricted ability to … control the … deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”.
Nuclear weapons are lethal capabilities. So Britain and the United States must, as per the terms of the treaty, have an unrestricted ability, surely, to house nuclear weapons or to dock nuclear submarines at the base on Diego Garcia should we choose to do so. Yet that would appear to require an express provision in this treaty, and I cannot find it.
Article 7(3) appears to seek to allay those concerns, but I would welcome an absolute clarification from the Minister. Will Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty prevent us basing Vanguard-class submarines or, in the future, nuclear-armed aircraft, or the United States stationing any nuclear weapons at the base on Diego Garcia? That is a question that I require answered. This cannot be left in doubt—hence my requirement that the Secretary of State publish a statement to confirm the matters I have raised before this Bill comes into force, so that everyone is clear about what the UK and the US can or, perhaps more alarmingly, cannot do. As my noble friend Lord Lilley commented, although they are not directly covered by the Pelindaba treaty, my amendment also makes reference to nuclear-propelled vessels and, for the avoidance of doubt, I seek reassurance that Mauritius would not take exception to that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for their amendments. I appreciate that they have questions about how the treaty protects the full operation of the base, and I want to reassure them that the treaty enables the continued operation of the base to its full capability. The treaty and the Bill we are debating today will have zero impact on the day-to-day business on Diego Garcia. Importantly, it will not reduce our ability to deploy the full range of advanced military capabilities to Diego Garcia. I am putting some of this on the record, and the noble Baroness, as a former Defence Minister, will know the careful calibration of the language that I am using: I am putting it on the record so that we are all clear.
As I say, noble Lords will understand that I pick my words with care in this particular context. I cannot and will not discuss operational matters on the Floor of this place, but I am confident that the Chamber would not necessarily want me to. The long-standing UK position of neither confirming nor denying the location or presence of nuclear weapons must stand. But let us talk about the hypothetical. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, concern the application of the Pelindaba treaty. Mauritius is a signatory, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness said, to the treaty. The UK is not a signatory to the treaty but is a signatory to Protocols 1 and 2. I can confirm to the Chamber that the Governments of the UK and Mauritius are both satisfied that the Diego Garcia treaty is compatible with these existing obligations.
I also remind colleagues, because this is important—again, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, if I remember rightly from his remarks, and, indeed, the noble Baroness raised this—that we are not alone in the matter. The Government of the United States have also tested all aspects of the Diego Garcia treaty in depth and at the highest levels of the security establishment. They, too, are satisfied that it protects the full operation of the base. Indeed, when I was talking about the earlier amendments in answer to that, I quoted the remarks of Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his comments about being satisfied with the treaty in every aspect.
Amendments 63 and 88 therefore are not necessary. We do not need a review of the impacts of nuclear treaties on the future operation of the base, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has proposed, because the future operation of the base has been protected. I say to the noble Baroness that we do not need to reopen paragraph 1.a of Annex 1 to the treaty, as has been suggested, because this already provides for unrestricted —that is the key word—access for UK and US vessels to enter the sea of Diego Garcia. Paragraph 1.b.i provides for unrestricted ability to control the conduct and deployment of lethal capabilities.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I do of course understand the sensitivity of not discussing operational activity in a public domain. However, if I revert to the Minister’s understandable reliance on what I described at Second Reading as that “huge protection” in Article 1, that is explicitly in contradiction with Article 7(1). Article 7(1) says expressly with reference to international obligations or arrangements that, if they are not to be obtempered or agreed to, that must be provided for in this agreement. That is the dilemma that is perplexing my noble friend Lord Lilley and myself. We seem to have on the face of this treaty a self-evident contradiction.
I understand the point that the noble Baroness is making. What I am saying to her is that the Government of Mauritius, the Government of the UK and the Government of the US see no contradiction in what the treaty says, and explicitly lays out, in respect of the ability of Diego Garcia to operate in the way that it has always done, with the lethal capabilities as outlined elsewhere in the Bill.
I hope that is helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness as reassurance that the situation will stay the same as it is now. As I have said, all those three parties to that treaty are confident that that remains the case.
I will say, however, that, although resisting the amendments, I am grateful that they were tabled. They are really important amendments to have made in order for the Government to have put on the record important elements of the treaty and the Bill. We have been able to clarify for the Chamber, and for those who read our proceedings, that the position that we would all want to see will continue with respect to Diego Garcia and that the full capabilities will be maintained.
Let me be absolutely clear: the full operational use of the base is protected to ensure that the base is able to continue in every way that it always has done. I hope that is helpful. On the basis of the reassurances that I have made and the comments that I have put on the record, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
That is very helpful and I entirely respect what the Minister says. He is a man of obvious integrity and commitment to the defence of this country. I am comforted that he is speaking for the Government, and therefore that the Government will maintain the freedom to use the Diego Garcia base to its full capabilities. I am not persuaded that that is necessarily in line with the Pelindaba treaty. That does not worry me so much. It may worry the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, or any future Lord Hermer in Mauritius, but let us hope that they will be ignored. So I will, of course, withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this is the last group of amendments in Committee. I am delighted to see so many noble Lords opposite taking a close interest in the Bill and what it will do to the Chagossian people. I am delighted that they are taking an interest in what their Government are finally doing to the Chagossians.
I have already spoken to my noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendments, which are similar in drafting to those of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. I must say that I prefer my noble friend’s amendments to his Amendments 80 and 82, principally because they include reference to a referendum of the Chagossians. My noble friend the Earl of Leicester has talked about how deficient the current survey being undertaken by the International Agreements Committee is. I think that we could greatly improve on that, but the best mechanism would be simply to hold a referendum of the Chagossians asking them whether they approve of this treaty.
I know that the Liberal Democrats were previously very supportive of a referendum, but, despite criticising the position of my party, this amendment implies that they may not now be so supportive. I hope to see information to the contrary from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. His amendment also differs from my noble friend Lord Lilley’s, in that it would apparently come into force after the treaty, whereas that of my noble friend would come into operation beforehand, which seems much more appropriate. I am of course happy to take up the offer of the noble Lord to discuss the wording of amendments because, as is so often the case in your Lordships’ House, we bring about improvements to a Bill only if we work together. I am certainly prepared, from my point of view, to work with him on the drafting of these amendments. I hope my noble friend Lord Lilley would be involved as well, so we can get them into a form where we can support them on Report and ask the Government to move on this.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for the considered and balanced contribution that he has made throughout the Bill but particularly on his Amendment 80. The amendment is interesting, and I understand the effect that he is seeking to achieve. It is a welcome addition to our debate today. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, earlier, I will also take Amendment 81K into consideration in the comments that I am about to make.
The proposal put forward by the noble Lord is a novel one. I could not recall any examples of where there have been joint committees set up between different legislatures in this way, but the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned some, and I will reflect on those to see whether there is anything we can glean from them that might be useful.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has made some changes to his amendment, but, unfortunately, we still cannot accept it in its current form today. The structure is not something that the treaty with Mauritius was drafted to contemplate. Of course, there is nothing to prevent parliamentarians in the UK engaging with their equivalents in Mauritius on these matters, but we do not see this as being a matter for domestic legislation in the way that we are considering it at the moment because, obviously, that does not have any effect on what the Mauritians themselves do.
Some elements in the noble Lord’s proposed scope for a joint parliamentary commission seem to be very much for the UK alone, so we could look at them. The Government are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is based on respect. As noble Lords will be aware, we have established a Chagossian contact group to give Chagossians a formal role that shapes decision-making on the UK Government’s support for their community. We are also providing additional support to build the capacity of community groups so that more are eligible for grants.
There are two elements in the amendment that are an issue for the Government and that we will disagree on at the moment, and those are the right to self-determination and compensation. On self-determination, we have been over this several times in this House and in the other place. To put it simply and plainly, in legal terms no question of self-determination applies. The English courts, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, have proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritius. On compensation, again it is legally the case that the UK paid compensation to the Chagossians in the 1980s and the English courts in a series of judgments and the European Court of Human Rights have ruled that this settled the claims definitively.
Having said all that, I recognise and understand the noble Lord’s intentions and his determination with this amendment. He has been consistent about arguing along these lines throughout our consideration of this Bill, and I suggest that we meet to discuss his amendment in more detail to see if we can find a way to move this forward ahead of Report. With that, I hope that for today he would be happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am glad there are so many witnesses who saw my ability to bring the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and the Minister together with some form of consensus at the end of this Committee. I am grateful for both the noble Lord’s and the Minister’s responses. She will know that I have been keen to see the areas where we can move towards formalisation and a degree of statutory underpinning for some structures of ongoing representation, because this is a special case. Even if it was novel—I am sure officials will now be studying all the examples I have given; by the time we get to Report I will try to find some more—I believe it is justified, given the circumstances are in. I am grateful for the willingness to discuss this. There are ongoing debates on the particular aspects the Minister said she had difficulty with. I will happily give way to the noble Lord.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I wish briefly to speak to Amendment 40 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I am struck by the fact that, in all his interventions so far in these debates—at Second Reading, in Committee and, now, on Report—he has never referred at all to the report of the International Agreements Committee on this treaty. He also seems not to have registered, let alone to respect, the vote that was taken at the end of the debate on 30 June.
The point I am making is that, were the noble Lord to go back to the documents and the evidence that was tabled at the time when the International Agreements Committee’s report was laid before this House, he would find there the testimony of Sir Christopher Greenwood. It is remarkably convincing and answers the question posed by the noble Lord in his Amendment 40; it describes what Sir Christopher thinks would happen in circumstances where Mauritius returned to a route that involved international litigation.
It is all set out there. He is an extremely distinguished British national judge of the International Court of Justice. It has nothing to do with the advisory opinion. It is to do with his views about the situation that would then exist. He believes that Mauritius would not have too much difficulty in convincing any international court to which it took litigation that the Chagos Islands were transferred at the time of Mauritian independence.
My Lords, I apologise to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, for not writing to him, but I hope that I can answer his concerns this afternoon.
Amendments 1 and 38, tabled by the noble and gallant Lord, relate to the termination of the treaty based on environmental degradation of Diego Garcia island. As I am sure that he will appreciate, given the importance of the base to both UK and US national security, we and the US are working hard to ensure that the base is protected from environmental damage. We have a programme to address coastal erosion and, while we cannot predict future erosion, specific studies have concluded that the overall land area of parts of the island that are not shaped by military construction decreased by less than a single percentage point over the last 50 years. However, I know that this is not really his point. He is using climate change and rising sea levels, but equally a significant pollution event, a meteor strike or something else could happen, so have the Government considered what they would do in an unpredicted and unpredictable situation that may arise and render the base unusable? That is the kernel of what he is getting at.
For obvious reasons, we do not want to get into a debate about other future hypothetical scenarios, whether they relate to the base becoming unusable or its no longer being needed. It is difficult to see that happening. The US, which has invested heavily in Diego Garcia, agrees that opening up the possibility of the agreement with Mauritius being terminated early is not helpful. However, I take the noble and gallant Lord’s point that, when dealing with a treaty over such a long period, we must at least be aware of the possibility that things can change. That is why we have included in the treaty the joint commission as a mechanism for agreeing between the UK, the US and Mauritius any developments relating to the base that we wish to raise. Should any of the hypothetical scenarios that I have referred to transpire, these are the sorts of issues that could be discussed in the joint commission, with decisions taken based on all the circumstances at the time. We have also included provision in the treaty for the matter to be raised up to prime ministerial level if necessary.
Using these mechanisms the UK and Mauritius would, in close consultation with the United States, agree a way forward. Ultimately, there is provision in the treaty for it to be terminated on two grounds, both of which depend on action by the UK. One is our failure to make payments. As noble Lords know, the UK abides by its international obligations, but in any particular case the Government of the day would need to consider their options in light of all the circumstances, looking at the terms of the treaty as well as wider international law. It is this wider international law, which we have not discussed previously, that I encourage the noble and gallant Lord to consider. He may wish to bear in mind that the international law of treaties permits the termination of a treaty when it becomes impossible for the treaty to be performed as a result of
“the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty”.
That is wider international law; that is not something that is held within this treaty itself. That is helpful and I hope it reassures him about his concerns.
I hope that the noble and gallant Lord can see that we are taking steps that are necessary to prevent the base becoming unusable and that, however hard hypothetical situations might be for us to imagine today, there are processes in place established by the treaty to resolve them. Using these processes, based on the circumstances of the time, no doubt any future UK Government would do what was in the best interests of the UK.
In the same vein, Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, discusses the ability to extend the agreement at the end of its initial 99 years. I assure him that there is already provision for the treaty to be extended by 40 years and beyond with the agreement of both parties. Even if agreement is not reached, the UK has the right of first refusal during that first 40 years after the initial period expires, meaning that no other country can use Diego Garcia without the UK being offered use first. I cannot accept his amendment as it seeks to change a carefully negotiated aspect of the treaty.
Similarly, I cannot accept Amendment 40, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which calls on the Secretary of State to publish a statement of the Government’s understanding of the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago should the agreement be terminated. The noble Lord is aware that the UK honours its international obligations and is committed to the treaty. The grounds for terminating the treaty are incredibly limited, as I have said, and entirely depend on the UK’s actions.
I thought it might be helpful to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, in particular, to outline a little more detail about from the law of treaties, which I am relying on in my attempts to persuade him this afternoon. Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the UK and Mauritius are both parties to, provides that:
“A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.
Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty”.
That covers the situation that he refers to—sea level rise—but would also cover many of the other situations that, at this stage, we are able to envisage occurring in the future.
I hope that noble Lords feel able to not press their amendments.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness very much for the way in which she has attempted to deal with my and our concerns. She has certainly pointed to an alternative way, but I still feel that this is something which should and could be sorted out before we get into formal ratification, and therefore I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Could I ask the noble Lord to wind up, please?
In the second instance, this difficulty was greatly compounded by the willingness of the Mauritian Cabinet of Ministers to accept £3 million in 1965 to become a party to the forced removal of the Chagossians, agreeing to receive them from the Chagos Islands. Had they been part of the same people civically, this would have been unthinkable, and they would have fought for the rights of their brothers and sisters—not allowing citizens to be subject to this indignity.
I gently remind all noble Lords that arguments deployed in Committee should not be repeated at length on Report.
My Lords, I support Amendment 32, to which I have added my name. Giving the Chagossian people a say before their homeland is transferred to Mauritius is not an unreasonable demand; it is basic justice. At its heart lies the principle of self-determination embedded in international law and central to the United Kingdom’s own foreign policy tradition. Article 1 of the United Nations charter affirms
“the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.
It is the very principle on which the United Kingdom has relied in relation to the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar, where referenda were rightly held and the will of the people to remain British was respected.
Self-determination is not a modern invention. It has underpinned the constitutional settlement of all Britain’s overseas territory. There is no principled reason why it should not apply here. The Chagossians are a people; they have their own language, culture and traditions, and a distinct identity that has endured despite expulsion. Above all, they have a profound and enduring connection to their islands. Despite their expulsion between 1968 and 1973, they have remained a cohesive people, the majority of whom oppose the transfer of their island to Mauritius, as the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, so clearly indicated earlier. It is therefore extraordinary that a Government who claim to champion human rights and the rule of law are asking this House to approve legislation that enables the most profound constitutional decision imaginable for the Chagossian people—the disposal of their homeland—without giving them any opportunity to vote on their future.
As mentioned earlier, even the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed serious concerns about the lack of consultation, calling for the ratification to be suspended and for the free, prior and informed consent of the Chagossian people to be secured. This Government speak readily of historic injustice and reparation. I therefore ask the Minister: why are those principles not applied to the Chagossian people—a people who were expelled from their homeland? This is an injustice. It is an old grievance, and a living one. It shapes how this Bill will be judged, not only by the Chagossians but by the wider world.
International law does not require the silencing of people; on the contrary, it protects their right to determine their own future. To hand over their islands and to extinguish their British-Chagossian identity, without first asking their opinion, would be a terrible injustice, and it would not go unnoticed. It would be remembered by other people, not least those in the British Overseas Territories who look to this Parliament to uphold the principle that their future is theirs to decide. This amendment offers the House a chance to uphold that principle, to break the cycle of exclusion and to begin to right a historical wrong. For the sake of the Chagossians and for the integrity of this House, I urge noble Lords to support the amendment.
Briefly, I also support Amendment 13, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, which states that the Act will come into force
“only once all outstanding legal actions, including appeals, by the Chagossian people have been determined”.
The failure of the Bill in that regard is bizarre. A judicial review challenging the exclusion of the Chagossians from meaningful consultation has been heard, and we are awaiting the judgment, as many noble Lords have mentioned. The arguments have concluded and the ruling is imminent—possibly as soon as 12 January, one week’s time—yet the Government are pressing ahead regardless. This is not a technicality; it is a vital democratic safeguard. Proceeding with legislation and a treaty ratification before the court has ruled raises serious constitutional concerns.
Can the Minister say why this debate has been tabled before the court ruling has been delivered? Why not wait one week? Why has the usual three-day rule between Report and Third Reading been ignored? Other noble Lords raised this point. Do the Government wish to conclude the treaty and lock in the transfer before the court has had its say, possibly in favour of the Chagossians’ right to self-determination? If this is not the Government’s intention, they must explain their actions to this House.
I accept the admonishment with regard to the spelling and drafting. I cannot blame the clerks for that; it is my fault. If, in proposed new subsection (5)(b), “participation in the operation in” and “opportunities of working in” Diego Garcia means jobs, I accept that also.
Recognising that the treaty is some distance from being ratified anyway, I strongly believe that other elements need to be in place, in agreement with the Government of Mauritius, before it is ratified. These measures are some of the elements that should be put in place before the treaty is ratified. We will discuss other elements in considering later groups, but between now and ratification, extra measures should be put in place to ensure that the consent of the Chagossian community is given and that their rights are underpinned by statute.
My Lords, as I have stated throughout the Bill’s progress through the House, I would like to acknowledge at the outset the importance of the islands to Chagossians as well as the different views within the Chagossian community on their future. This Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and an acknowledgment of the wrongs of the past.
I also acknowledge the strength of feeling in this House on addressing the range of issues raised by Chagossian communities here in the UK and in other parts of the world. In this context, I thank the IRDC for undertaking its recent review and publishing its report on the views of the Chagossian community regarding the UK-Mauritius agreement on the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia. As the report acknowledges, there is a wide range of diverse views among the Chagossian community, and I thank the noble Lord for introducing the report.
Such diversity of views is vital when considering Amendments 2, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 32, 33, 33A and 55, which pertain to engagement and consultation with the Chagossian communities. I agree with those in this House who say that transparency and frankness with the Chagossian community is vital. That is why I have resisted some of the discussions around consultations and referendums. To give the impression that a consultation or referendum can elicit a change to a treaty that has already been negotiated and signed in a state-to-state negotiation is wrong.
The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily state to state, with our priority being to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. That is what we have done. This deal will protect our national security for generations and ensure that the UK keeps unique and vital capabilities to deal with a range of threats.
Before the Minister sits down, could she tell us whether our very distinguished Attorney-General, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, had given any advice—admittedly, she cannot tell us what advice—to the Government on the report of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which has come out so strongly against what His Majesty’s Government are doing on the Chagos Islands?
Not that I am aware of. I point out that the committee to which the noble Baroness and others have referred is not a legal body of the UN; it does not speak for the UN or for any UN member states. It is important for noble Lords to be aware of that, so that they are not labouring under a misapprehension.
Before the Minister sits down, could I clarify one point? She is aware that the committee was set up under the UN charter to monitor the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. All UN members signed up to that and, although it is advisory, it carries a huge amount of influence, as do the other two tribunals, which are also advisory and which the Government have said they need to go along with.
They are very different things. I encourage the noble Lord to investigate this a little further and am happy to work with him on that. The fact is that this particular committee does not speak on behalf of the UN and there are many equivalent committees across the UN that also do not speak on behalf of member states. If noble Lords want to verify that, it is entirely up to them to do so, but that is the situation.
To continue, the Government’s priority remains the protection of the British people, including British Chagossians. As the location of a military base with sensitive capabilities and assets vital to the UK’s national security, it would not be appropriate for Diego Garcia to be included in Mauritius’s programme of resettlement. However, both the UK and the Republic of Mauritius remain committed to facilitating a programme of heritage visits to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. Chagossians will also retain the opportunity to work on Diego Garcia through contracted employment at the base.
In respect of Amendments 9, 16, 24 and 48 concerning the 2 December decision by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Government’s position is clear. The CERD is an independent body of experts that—I am repeating myself, but I want to make it absolutely clear for noble Lords—does not speak on behalf of the United Nations or of UN member states. The UK does not agree with the approach that the CERD has taken. The UN Secretary-General and the African Union chairperson have both welcomed the agreement. The treaty protects the base and our national security, which is why it has also been welcomed by the US, our Five Eyes partners and other important partners who appreciate the strategic importance of the base. Mauritius has also firmly and categorically rejected the CERD decision, and the Government therefore reject the tabled amendments.
Amendment 5 on migrants and asylum, from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not necessary and therefore we do not accept it. The treaty already ensures Mauritian responsibility for and jurisdiction over all migrants arriving to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The treaty closes a potential illegal migration route to the UK. The UK Government are already in the process of agreeing with Mauritius the separate arrangements referenced in paragraph 10 of annex 2 of the treaty to assess and facilitate that exercise of Mauritian jurisdiction. There are ongoing negotiations; I will not provide a running commentary, but both Mauritius and the UK agree that it would be for Mauritius to take responsibility for any migrants, including for any asylum or international protection claims. There is therefore no need for the Government to provide a report on the negotiations through an amendment to the Bill. I hope that answers noble Lords’ queries about that issue at this stage and that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. I thank the Minister for her response, but it seems to me that she still has not answered the fundamental question that many of my colleagues and others have posed to her: why are some UN advisory tribunals to be obeyed without question? They should not be questioned and we have to do exactly what they say, but others can apparently be safely ignored when it does not suit the Government’s case. She tells us that Mauritius was against the conclusion, and I bet it was, but apparently—this is what I have read and I hope it is correct—Mauritius is also actually a member of the tribunal that found against the treaty and recommended that it be disposed of.
We have heard some fantastic contributions, but of course we have not heard the opinion of the FCDO mandarinate on the Cross Benches, who are normally so keen to tell us that international tribunals have to be respected without question—but apparently not this one.
Nevertheless, I am proud to speak alongside every noble Lord who has spoken up for the Chagossian people and outlined how they have been so ill-treated and for so long ignored. The Minister has said a number of times that there is a diversity of opinion within the Chagossian community. I am sure she is right, which is why we need a referendum to determine the absolute view of what those opinions are. I pay particular tribute to my noble friend Lord De Mauley and his committee for the sterling job that it has done in attempting, in so brief a period, to provide at least some information on what the Chagossian community think. The fact that so many of them responded so quickly in the period before Christmas underlines the concerns that many of them have about this agreement.
We also share my noble friend Lord Lilley’s concerns about the reparations. It seems reasonable that, once Mauritius has sovereignty over the islands, it would bear the burden of any future claims for reparations. I am also grateful to the Minister for her clarification about the legal position on asylum seekers.
I will not detain the House any further. I reiterate our firm support for Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. It might be only half a loaf but we are grateful for that half. Still, we will also seek to be greedy and support the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, on the remainder of the loaf when those Divisions are finally called. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
We can address those concerns by passing at least one of these amendments.
My Lords, Amendments 3, 31A, 42 and 43 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, all relate to the marine protected area and the Mauritian intent to establish its own marine protected area. It will be for Mauritius to implement this MPA. However, we welcome the announcement on 3 November by the Mauritian Government of the establishment of the Chagos Archipelago marine protected area, to be known as CAMPA, and particularly their commitment that no commercial fishing will be allowed in any part of the area.
Amendment 31 from the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Godson, follows a similar vein, seeking to oblige the UK Government to report on the Mauritian MPA. But we have been clear that CAMPA will be for the Mauritian Government to enforce and fund, and the UK will not be providing direct funding to Mauritius to maintain or set up this MPA. Renegotiation of the treaty at this stage is not a practical proposition, as Mauritius has already made this public commitment to the MPA, which covers the protections requested in the noble Lords amendments. We therefore do not think they are necessary. Likewise—
What the Minister repeats is what the Mauritian Government have promised. I do not in any way attack what they have promised, but they cannot do it. They have not done it anywhere else, so why are we not insisting that we provide the resources for them to do it?
I will come on to that. It is a perfectly legitimate question, although I would urge people not to speak about the Mauritian Government, who have said everything we would all want them to say on these matters. We work with them in a positive light, and we want to work in partnership with them to make sure that the commitments they have made are followed through. The right way for us to do that is in a more positive way. I was about to come on to the question the noble Lord put, but I will gladly give way to the noble Baroness.
Baroness Cash (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way because the question is related. The Mauritian Government may be saying everything our Government want to hear, but at the moment we have no mechanism whatsoever to enforce it and to ensure that what happens in the future can also be enforced.
The noble Baroness has amplified the point made earlier by the noble Lord; it is an important point, and I will address it. However, at this stage we are going to reject Amendment 28, which seeks to oblige the UK to publish the proposed arrangements on MPA management and security before entry into force of the treaty. The UK and Mauritius are working together to finalise an arrangement on maritime security to ensure that patrolling, which provides enforcement regarding the future MPA, is maintained after entry into force. We will publish relevant MoUs, including on maritime security, once these are finalised, because we accept that it is vital. Everything that David Miliband said—I thank the noble Lord for reminding us of what he said—we stand by.
Amendments 29 and 30, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Godson, seek to ensure that money is set aside in the treaty for the establishment and maintenance of the MPA, and that the Government amend the treaty to allow for non-payment if Mauritius does not protect the marine environment. We agree that the continued protection of the environment is important. As previously set out, the UK is not going to be providing direct funding to Mauritius for this purpose. It is true, however, that the UK-Mauritius Strategic Partnership Framework does provide for technical support and expertise to enable the Mauritian Government to work alongside the environmental partners noble Lords have referred to, including the Zoological Society of London, to make sure that the ongoing protection of the marine environment is secure. This is separate to the treaty.
The noble Baroness asked what we would do if there was a breach. If the UK believes that Mauritius is in breach of its commitments in Article 5, on the environment, it can follow the process set out in Article 14, on settlement of disputes. There is therefore no need to include a further way to settle any disputes over protection of the environment, so we do not accept these amendments.
Baroness Cash (Con)
Before the Minister concludes, my understanding is that Article 14 does not provide for any recourse. There is no sanction, there is no provision, and it is not a mechanism referred to by anyone who has addressed this issue today.
Article 14 has been agreed as the way to settle disputes. A failure to deliver on environmental commitments could be something we would want to challenge, and the process by which we would do that is included in Article 14. In treaties, we do not need to have a sanction or punishment; the right thing to do is to try to resolve these things so that the impact can be changed. What we want is to make sure that the marine protected area is sustained and that what is environmentally special about this place is secured. That is something we all agree on, but where we differ is that I believe that the mechanisms in the treaty are sufficient to allow for that. What will make the real difference is the quality of the partnership we are able to develop with Mauritius on the work with ZSL and other partners, so that it is equipped to comply with the commitments it is making.
Baroness Cash (Con)
How are the Government addressing the fundamental fact—which has not been addressed by the Minister, I am afraid—that Mauritius does not have the capacity to police these waters in any way? We are simply in ignorance about all of this.
She said it, not me. That is why you can buy technical assistance; it is why technical assistance exists. We have a technical assistance partnership with many countries. It is a much better way, working alongside countries to make sure that environmental improvements happen. That is the approach the Government have taken, and it is in the treaty.
I hope that noble Lords will consider withdrawing and not pressing their amendments.
My Lords, the Minister’s remark to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, was a little uncalled for.
The Minister may say that she was joking, but it was not a very good joke.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. In Committee, noble Lords across the Chamber set out their profound concerns about the practical ability of the Mauritian Government to deliver on their commitments. As I said, nobody doubts what they have said and the statements they have made; however, I think we all doubt their ability to enforce this crucial MPA.
I do not need to repeat all the excellent points that have been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, my noble friend Lord Goldsmith and others in their contributions to this debate; they very closely reflect our concerns. Given the critical importance of the ocean around the archipelago for global diversity, we believe that it is necessary to press the Government on this, so that we can have a formal statement of the Government’s expectations of Mauritius under Article 5 of the treaty. We also believe that we need clarity on what steps Ministers will be willing to take to ensure the maintenance of the MPA in perpetuity by the Mauritian Government. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 50, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred; I am grateful for her support.
This treaty is both a diplomatic measure, when it comes to sovereignty, and a financial relationship; it also adds some obligations to a community whose rights have, as we have acknowledged, been diminished. So it is quite unusual. That is why, at Second Reading, I raised concerns around the financial elements of the treaty, the lack of clarity around how much will be allocated to addressing the rights of the Chagossian community, and the lack of transparency. I acknowledge Letter No. 1, which is appended to the treaty and outlines the figures, but I feel that further clarity is required.
I will not repeat the points I have made previously, but Amendment 50 seeks to address the major concerns around the lack of transparency in the planned implementation of the financial elements of the treaty—including through, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, indicated, a five-yearly update to Parliament on both progress and the contemporaneous situation with regard to the finances.
New subsection (4) in Amendment 50 also introduces what I would consider to be a break clause in the financial relationship outlined in the treaty and in letter one. Earlier in our proceedings, the Minister helpfully said that the treaty could be terminated on two grounds only. The second ground was in reference to the Vienna convention, if there are circumstances which mean the treaty is unimplementable, and the first element is the failure to make payments by the UK.
I say this without suggesting that Mauritius will act in bad faith or has entered into the treaty in bad faith, but there are no mechanisms which would allow us to consider whether Mauritius is also operating to fulfil its obligations, beyond those which have been elevated on diplomatic terms to Prime Minister level for dialogue. If that dispute mechanism has been exhausted, we believe that there should be some formal mechanism by which Parliament should then have the ability to say that the agreement on the finances reached under letter one should require supplementary approval. Indeed, the obligation on the Government of the day would be to come back to Parliament to say that the dispute mechanisms have been exhausted and no agreement has been reached, and therefore that this needs to be brought back. The sums of funds are extremely high; the obligations are serious. Therefore, I hope the Government will consider moving on this element.
Amendment 47, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not at all contradictory to this, and if he tests the opinion of the House, we will support him on that amendment. I am also grateful so far for the indications of support for my amendment.
My Lords, Amendments 7, 39, 47, and 50 all relate to financial transparency and parliamentary oversight of expenditure under the treaty.
Amendments 39 and 47, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seek to require the Government to publish a schedule of payments to Mauritius and a detailed statement of the total cost of the treaty, including the methodology used by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Treasury. These amendments are not necessary, as we published full details of the financial arrangements on the day the treaty was signed, including the finance exchange of letters and the Explanatory Memorandum laid before Parliament.
These documents set out the payment schedule and confirm that the net present value of the treaty is £3.4 billion in today’s money, calculated using the standard Green Book methodology that successive Governments have applied to long-term projects. The average annual payment is £101 million—less than a 0.25% of the defence budget and a fraction of the cost of comparable overseas facilities. This is a sound investment in our national security, and the figures have been confirmed by the Government Actuary’s Department. For these reasons, we reject these amendments.
Amendment 7, which ties commencement of Sections 2 to 4 of the Act to the discharge of duties under Amendment 47, would introduce unnecessary delay in ratification. The Government have already provided the transparency sought by the noble Lord through the published Explanatory Memorandum and accompanying documents, as well as a significant number of Parliamentary Questions and debates in this Chamber and the other place. We therefore do not accept this amendment.
Amendment 50, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, proposes an ongoing estimates and supply scrutiny process for expenditure under the treaty, including parliamentary approval of future payments and supplementary estimates. The agreement has already undergone scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, and neither House objected to ratification during the statutory period.
The treaty provides robust mechanisms for dispute resolution under Article 14. It is normal practice for payments under treaties to be made under the prerogative power. While the standard annual estimates process still applies, the introduction of additional parliamentary approval requirements is not necessary and would undermine the certainty and stability that this long-term agreement provides. As I have said on many occasions, the US covers the running costs of the base on Diego Garcia, which are significant, but any expenditure met by this Government will be published in our annual departmental accounts.
My Lords, I wish to make some comments on Amendment 22 in my name, and I will seek not to transgress my time in relation to this one.
In Committee, the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, pointed out the difficulty arising from the fact that while the Mauritius treaty makes provision for the leasing of Diego Garcia by the United Kingdom, this does not change the fact that in the event that the Mauritius treaty is ratified, Diego Garcia would come under the sovereignty of Mauritius.
This is problematic for two reasons at least. First, the Republic of Mauritius is a signatory to the Pelindaba treaty, which means that no nuclear weapons can be held in the territory over which it is sovereign. Secondly, Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty expressly states:
“Each Party confirms that none of its existing international obligations or arrangements now in force or effect between it and any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.
Can the Minister confirm—I know the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, has already made reference to this—that the Government have discussed this matter in its entirety with the Government of the United States and that they have confirmation from the US that they have secured their solemn pledge that no nuclear submarines or other nuclear weapons will be able to be taken to Diego Garcia if sovereignty is transferred?
I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on that point. But I very gently say that while of course he must not discuss operational matters, this cannot be pushed as an excuse for dodging questions about compliance with international law. Any attempt to deploy that stratagem, to the point of avoiding the demonstration of compliance with international law when non-compliance is feared, would form a deeply troubling precedent.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to get up for the first time on Report and address your Lordships on this important group dealing with security matters. I will try to come to some of the points that have been raised.
I will come to the point about the letter that the noble Baroness raised, but I will start with the challenge that she put at the end to explain how the Government are dealing with the position on the treaty from a security point of view. This answers some of the questions that have been asked, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I will not go into some of the operational points that have been made by him and others. However, on the security matters, I can say that if your Lordships look at the expressions of support for the security aspects of this treaty, all our major international allies and partners have supported the security arrangements. That is a fairly significant point for us to make and a fairly important point for the House to recognise.
To answer the noble Baroness, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and the noble Earl, Lord Leicester: President Trump expressed support for the Diego Garcia arrangements within the treaty. US Secretary Hegseth said:
“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the US. The UK’s (very important) deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region. We are confident the base is protected for many years ahead”.
That was not me but the US.
What is the US paying Britain for the lease? It is pretty clear why the Americans are supporting this: they are not having to shell out £34 billion.
The US pays for the operations at the base and has done for many years. I say to the noble Earl that it is a fairly important policy that the Government have secured this to ensure the security of the base over the coming decades. I will come to AUKUS in a minute, but the noble Earl, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and other noble Lords have asked in their amendments how the treaty arrangements protect the security of the base. All I am doing is reading out what our crucial allies are saying about it. I am saying what they are saying about it. They are paying for the operation of the base. We have secured the future of the base, and they are supporting it. Secretary Rubio came out and supported the base as well.
People ask me how we have secured it—this is the challenge the noble Baroness put to me—and how we have ensured that we have secured the future of the base. We have secured it by ensuring that our major allies support it. I can only imagine what the noble Earl would say if I could not read out quotes from the US supporting what we are doing. The Five Eyes have all supported it. Of the AUKUS partners, Australia supports it as well as the US. Canada, Japan, Korea and India have supported it. I think that is an important position for the Government to be in. That is the context within which all the amendments should be considered.
I do not question the desire of noble Lords in their amendments to challenge the Government and to understand how effectively we have done that. All I am arguing before your Lordships is that, in the context of the treaty, the future of the base is secured. That is a fairly important statement for the Government to be able to make. I will come to the Pelindaba treaty when I come to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and address the specifics that the noble Baroness raised.
Amendment 8 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, requests a statement from the Secretary of State on base security. The treaty has robust security provisions to protect the base, including full operational control of Diego Garcia, full UK control over the presence of foreign security forces across the archipelago and an effective veto over any construction or development that risks undermining, prejudicing or otherwise interfering with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base on Diego Garcia. Claims that Mauritius is an unreliable partner and one that cannot be trusted are unfounded. Mauritius is a member of the Commonwealth and a westward-facing country with shared democratic values. Mauritius ranks among the top African nations in governance, human development and innovation. It is a full democracy, a regional leader in human rights and a trusted partner in upholding the rules-based international order, ranking second out of 54 African countries in the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, for tabling Amendment 14 and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for supporting him. The noble Baroness asked me—I hope this helps the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, as well; I always try to be helpful, as noble Lords know—to ask my officials to draft a letter between now and Third Reading. Of course I will do that. I cannot guarantee that the content will necessarily be everything that the noble Baroness or the noble Lord want, but asking for a letter is a perfectly reasonable request. That will be done, and I will place a copy of it in the Library so that it is available to all noble Lords to consider as we move towards Third Reading.
Regarding the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, he knows—he has been a senior Minister and has a distinguished former Prime Minister sitting next to him—that it is very difficult to answer some of the specific questions that noble Lords have posed about certain capabilities. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, recognised that we cannot talk about it. I will say what I can. Amendment 14 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, would require guarantees
“that Mauritius will not enforce its duties under the Pelindaba Treaty on the Base”
and that sovereignty would revert to the UK if it did. As I said in Committee, the Governments of the UK and Mauritius are both satisfied that the Diego Garcia treaty is compatible with their existing obligations under applicable international law. The UK will ensure that all operations on Diego Garcia comply with its existing obligations. The UK is not a party to the Pelindaba treaty, although it is a party to Protocols I and II. The treaty and the Bill will allow the base to operate as it always has. It will not reduce our ability to deploy the full range of advanced military capabilities to and from Diego Garcia in any way.
My Lords, I will very briefly talk to my Amendments 10 and 15. When any Administration shift from the original arguments which justified their policy to a new set of arguments, you know that they are moving from evidence-based policy to policy-based evidence. That seems to be what is happening here.
When the original Statement was made about this treaty on 22 May, the Defence Minister in the other place said that if we did not have this treaty, within weeks we would face a binding legal judgment which would in due course render the base inoperable. That was implicitly based on the case before the International Court of Justice, but no mention was made that that ruling was purely advisory, not binding. No mention was made that it was based on General Assembly resolutions, which themselves are not binding and had never been ratified by the Security Council, where, in any case, we have a veto. There was no mention that when we signed up to the ICJ, we specifically precluded it from hearing or being bound by anything relating to disputes between the UK and Commonwealth members, and that subsequently, in 2012, the Cameron Government had tightened that by saying it should be not just present Commonwealth members but present or past Commonwealth members, just in case Mauritius should leave the Commonwealth to pursue its case.
When we mentioned these things, the Government did not say, “Oh yes, you’re quite right: we should have mentioned this earlier”. They simply shifted to talking about the possibility of tribunals in other fora, above all the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—but that convention cannot address sovereignty. In Committee, the Minister mentioned that in a dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives, in which Britain was not represented, the tribunal assumed on the basis of the ICJ treaty that the boundaries of Mauritius should include Chagos and ruled on that basis. But we have the right in any future dispute that involves us to be represented; above all, we have the right to invoke, I think, amendment 238, which precludes military matters. The Diego Garcia base is above all a military matter. So I do not see where any binding legal judgment could come from, which is why I say that this should not come into force until we see that there is a binding ruling from some international body. If it is going to happen within weeks, that is not going to delay the whole matter very much.
The second issue, which is dealt with in my second amendment, is the reference to any ruling—by whichever international body it is—effectively rendering the base inoperable. When we press on that, we are told that it would mean that countries that supply the base and provide facilities for the base would be able to withdraw those facilities, which in some way would render it inoperable. As to what these facilities are, I presume they get food from neighbouring countries in boats—but nothing much has changed. If countries wished effectively to impose an embargo on the Diego Garcia base, with or without an international resolution from the ICJ or any other tribunal, they could do so. If that would render the base inoperable, the base is much weaker than we thought; and, if they cannot do so, surely there is nothing much to worry about on whether there is a legal ruling.
I do not want to go on at length because I know that noble Lords want to get on to the important business of expressing their views in the Lobbies. But the fundamental basis of this whole treaty has shifted, like the Goodwin Sands—and, like sinking sands everywhere, when they shift, they swallow you up. The Government’s rationale for this whole Bill has been swallowed up by their refusal to just wait and see whether some tribunal would come up with some ruling which would, in some very strange way, render the base inoperable. I find that imaginary but, if it is possible, let us suck it and see.
We have been through this quite a few times, which I suppose is why other noble Lords are not jumping to their feet. Why not wait for a binding ruling? We have discussed previously that that would leave us in a disadvantaged position in terms of negotiation, were we to be negotiating with Mauritius following a binding ruling. The point that there can never be a binding ruling because no tribunal exists that could make one rather begs the question of why the previous Government committed themselves to 11 rounds of negotiations to protect themselves from something that could never happen.
Having said all that, the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, concern the legal rationale and the risks of the agreement, including, in Amendment 10, waiting for a binding ruling on sovereignty over the archipelago. I must again reject this argument and this amendment, given that waiting for such a thing, with the treaty with Mauritius not ratified, would put us in an incredibly weak position. It would risk the future of the base, the delay would be highly dangerous to UK national security, and we are just not going to do it.
We published our legal rationale for the deal on the day that the treaty was signed. The House has dedicated hours to debating that rationale. It has been the subject of two reports by respected committees in this place. The Government have been consistently clear throughout all this that the legal case was compelling and there was no credible alternative for managing the risk, which is why the previous Government undertook so many rounds of negotiation. We are confident that this agreement secures the base from legal threat, protecting UK national security for generations. I hope the noble Lord does not press his amendments to a vote.
I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for the amendments in this group. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have had some interesting debates on the future of the prerogative. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has made its recommendations on this point, and I understand why my noble friend has therefore tabled his amendment. The Constitution Committee has drawn Clause 5 to the attention of the House but fell short of matching the recommendations made by the DPRRC. We on the Opposition Front Bench have read carefully the Government’s response to the DPRRC’s report, which we believe has some merit. That said, we will not seek to oppose my noble friend should he choose to divide the House on this matter.
My Lords, Amendments 34 to 37 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seek to amend Clause 5 of the Bill. I appreciate that Amendments 34 to 36 would implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The Government have carefully considered the committee’s report on the Bill and responded to it but, on this occasion, we do not accept those recommendations.
I note what the noble Lord said about Third Reading. I am grateful to him for his detailed engagement with these provisions. I want to clarify one point about which noble Lords might not be entirely clear. The effect of the Bill is that there will be two powers. One is the prerogative power to legislate for Diego Garcia only, which is preserved under Clause 3. We seem to have some agreement on that point. The other power is a new statutory power conferred by Clause 5. Orders in Council made under Clause 5 will be statutory instruments. The Bill currently provides that those will be subject to the negative procedure where they amend primary legislation, and otherwise to no procedure. That is not because we argue that they are prerogative orders but because it is appropriate given their subject matter.
So far as the power to amend primary legislation is concerned, we have been clear that the negative procedure is appropriate, given that the changes to be made to legislation will in very large part be technical in nature. The purpose of the power is to ensure that the Government can bring the domestic statute book into conformity with both the purpose and effect of the treaty, making consequential changes as necessary. That works hand in hand with Clause 3, which provides a default position of continuity of the law. The Clause 5 powers will be necessary to make amendments to that law to adapt it to the treaty and the new status of Diego Garcia. This is not just about the law of Diego Garcia; UK legislation which refers to BIOT needs to be brought into line.
Applying the negative procedure here is consistent with the Cyprus Act 1960, which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, referred to. Section 3 of the Cyprus Act also provides for the law of the UK in relation to Cyprus or the sovereign base areas to continue and for statutory Orders in Council to be made under the negative procedure to make further adaptations as required.
The Hong Kong Act 1985 also provides for the negative procedure for statutory Orders in Council under Schedule 3, amending the law of the UK or of other British possessions.
The Government’s position is that it is appropriate that no procedure applies when the Clause 5 power is used other than to amend primary legislation. The operation of the base on Diego Garcia and the treaty as a whole are in the realm of international relations, defence and security, as the noble Lord said. Given the subject matter, it is appropriate for those instruments to be subject to no parliamentary procedure.
There will, of course, be statutory instruments, which will be registered and published in the usual way. It is not uncommon for Orders in Council which relate to the overseas territories to have no procedure attached to them. I am happy, and I think it would be a good idea, to continue to discuss this with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, ahead of Third Reading. I would be very happy to do that. I hope he withdraws his amendment.
I am grateful for that response, and in order not to delay the House, if I may, I will leave it at that point. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 34 and to return to this, if necessary, at Third Reading.
My Lords, Amendments 51 and 54, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, concern the establishment of a UK-Mauritius inter-parliamentary committee to oversee the implementation and operation of the treaty. I would love to please the noble Lord—I am happy to continue talking to him—but I am afraid that I will disappoint him this evening.
Amendment 51 seeks to require the Government to engage with Mauritius to create a committee, with equal representation from both parliaments and the purpose of promoting mutual understanding of the provisions of the treaty. The committee would have responsibilities, including monitoring the implementation of the treaty and its impact on Chagossians. Amendment 54 ties the commencement of the Act to the establishment of this committee.
I completely recognise that the intention behind the amendments is to promote dialogue and scrutiny. However, Mauritius’s agreement to it could not be guaranteed, and the treaty itself makes no provision for an inter-parliamentary committee. Indeed, there would seem to be some potential for overlap—perhaps even conflict—between the proposed role of the committee and that of the joint commission under the treaty. Furthermore, introducing this requirement would at least delay, if not prevent, the ratification and implementation of an agreement that is vital for our national security.
There are numerous committees across the two Houses that can—and, I am sure, will—undertake periodic inquiries into the operation of the treaty. This joint committee could overlap with the work of these Select Committees—and that would not be right. We have Select Committees for a purpose, and it is for them to scrutinise the work of departments, so I do not believe that we should try to replicate that.
I know that the noble Lord feels passionately about supporting Chagossians. He has told me that and I commend him on it, but I do not think a joint committee will increase trust among the Chagossian community. As mentioned on earlier groupings, this Government are committed to a relationship with Chagossians built on trust and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. There are also elected representatives in the other place who are there to advocate for their constituents, and there are many in this House who also do this.
The agreement has already been subject to extensive scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, and both Houses have had the opportunity to consider its terms. The treaty also establishes a joint commission under Article 12 to manage its operation, which is the appropriate forum for bilateral engagement. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for his indication of support, and to the Minister for her reply. I listened carefully to what she said. Of course, the joint commission on the treaty is executive-to-executive level, and I have consistently sought an opportunity for parliamentary dialogue to continue. It is absolutely right that elected Members of Parliament will represent their constituents and their constituents’ interests; indeed, MPs in the Mauritian parliament will do likewise. My ambition is to find a vehicle by which that can be done in a systematic way, not to contradict or to conflict with parliamentary committees but for there to be a parliamentary voice on behalf of the community where our commitment for their rights should be ongoing and not end once this treaty is ratified.
I am grateful for the Minister saying that she is willing to continue to talk. Equally, I understand that that is language not to give any commitment to anything at Third Reading, but I would like to continue the engagement with the noble Lord and the Minister on this, and indeed with other parliamentary vehicles. Because of the lateness of the hour—we have had a very busy Report stage—and notwithstanding the importance of this issue, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in my name.
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I have it in command from His Majesty the King to acquaint the House that His Majesty, having been informed of the Report of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill, has consented to place his interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
Clause 6: Commencement and short title
Amendment 1
My Lords, this government amendment will change the parliamentary procedure applicable to the delegated power in Clause 6. With this amendment, all instruments made using that power would be subject to the negative procedure. Previously, no parliamentary procedure applied unless the power was used to amend, repeal or revoke Acts of Parliament or statutory instruments made under them.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for his contribution to this. I am glad that we were able to agree on a sensible compromise which puts into effect one of the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I hope that this assures the noble Lord and the DPRRC that the Government have listened to the views of noble Lords and are willing to find compromises where they are sensible. I beg to move.
My Lords, I want to say a big thank you to the Minister for her engagement following Report and for tabling this amendment by way of, as she says, what I hope is very much an agreeable compromise.
While the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee made the good point that Henry VIII powers should only exceptionally be subject to other than the affirmative procedure, in fact, when one looks at the detail of the Bill in the Government’s further response, it is quite clear that it would be excessive for the House to be detained on an affirmative debate on some of this legislation in relation to what are clearly not controversial matters. However, establishing the principle that all statutory orders should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny is, I think, important. I am very glad that the Government have accepted that.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their engagement on this crucial legislation, which secures a vital element of the UK’s national security and the UK’s transatlantic defence partnership. I thank noble Lords across the House for their expertise, which they have used to scrutinise the security of the base, the costs of the treaty, support mechanisms for the Chagossian community and environmental conservation provisions, to name a few.
The UK-Mauritius treaty protects the Diego Garcia military base and ensures that the UK retains full control over this vital asset. This in turn will protect our national security for generations, ensure that the UK keeps unique and vital capabilities to deal with a wide range of threats, and keep the British people safe. The Bill ensures that the treaty can be ratified. As the world grows more dangerous, so too does the importance of the base for our national security. Noble Lords will not need to be told how crucial it is that the treaty is ratified and the base protected in the ever-shifting geopolitical landscape of our age.
We have had extensive debate in this House, and it has been good debate. I thank noble Lords on this side of the Floor, including my noble friend Lord Beamish, for their thoughtful and insightful contributions. I thank noble Lords from across the House for their thoughtful contributions throughout the passage of the Bill, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, Lord Hannay, Lord Jay and Lord Purvis of Tweed. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hannan and Lord Lilley, for their exuberant speeches, even if I have not always agreed with them. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Hoey, and the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir, for their passionate speeches. I thank my noble friend Lord Coaker for his support on leading the Bill. I thank my honourable friends in the other place, the Minister for Overseas Territories and the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, who have spoken at length with Peers about the detail of the Bill.
Finally, I thank the officials who have supported the Bill. I thank those on the Bill team—notably Helena Brice, our indefatigable Bill manager—and the policy teams in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence. They have worked tirelessly behind the scenes, often working to challenging deadlines. I thank those in my private office, in particular Bola, who have of course been crucial in supporting me. My thanks must be offered to all the parliamentary staff who have ensured the smooth process of this Bill.
Amendment to the Motion
I thank the Minister for her courtesy and patience throughout this very unusual Bill and its passage through this House. I will make a few remarks on the financial costs.
The treaty makes provision for a financial agreement that requires the UK to make payments to the Republic of Mauritius for the next 99 years. The agreement is very unusual, and that is because the payments are not known. The payments are not known from year 14 for the next 85 years because the payments are linked not to events in the Indian Ocean but to UK domestic inflation. It is an extraordinarily long contract for the taxpayer to be exposed like this to UK domestic inflation.
Inflation in the future is unknown, unknowable and uncapped. That means the payments under this contract are unknown, unknowable and uncapped. Maybe the Foreign Office, in looking at the projections, imagined a very benign opportunity for UK inflation and maybe it hoped that the numbers would stay very low, but if we had inflation as high as it was in this country two years ago, at any point in the 85 years of this contract the payments would get completely out of hand and be completely unaffordable to the UK.
This is why Ministers and Parliament have been poorly briefed on the contents of the treaty and why there is this extraordinary difference between the £3.4 billion accounting valuation, which was done under the Treasury Green Book procedure for UK domestic infrastructure spending, and what this is actually going to cost. As my noble friend Lord Callanan mentioned, the Government’s own internal estimate of the cost is around £34 billion to £35 billion, which is a very substantial amount to be paying.
We might hope, at this stage of the Bill, to have some good advice from the OBR, but the OBR has been quite unhelpful to the Government—and, possibly, to Parliament—and said that it has nothing to do with this. We might hope for clarification from His Majesty’s Treasury. Of course, the treaty was not negotiated by the Treasury; it was negotiated by another department. But, in the middle of the holidays, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury slipped out an announcement on 16 December—it is on GOV.UK—to say that the Treasury would be changing its Green Book methodology. So, we can be sure that the Treasury does not even agree with the accounting valuation, let alone the actuarial true cost of this agreement.
When the Minister said to us during the passage of the Bill that the total cost was £3.4 billion—she said it to us in this Chamber—it was not correct, because the total cost is not known. That needs to be corrected in the treaty, because it is quite clear that that is the intention of the Government. The Government wish, for their own reasons, not well understood by the Opposition, to pay the Republic of Mauritius £3.4 billion. It is their intention and it appears to be their understanding—but it is not what is in the treaty.
My Lords, this is Third Reading. Arguments made at previous—
This is Third Reading and the noble Lord is repeating what has been debated before.
I will speak briefly to the rest of the amendment.
The amounts referenced in the Chamber and during the passage of the Bill have not been correct. We need to make sure that the treaty is amended to reflect what the Government’s intention is: that it should be a payment of £3.4 billion and not an open-ended economic exposure. Given the extremely unusual and long-dated nature of this contract, we need to make sure the treaty is amended to protect UK taxpayers and, indeed, to maintain confidence in the sovereign credit of the UK.
My Lords, this has been an important debate on an important Bill and a considerable treaty that impacts on people’s lives and on international law, and which has direct relevance to UK national security. But this regret amendment has a bit of a Cambodia year zero feel to it, as if it all started last summer.
A casual observer would not be aware from this debate—notwithstanding the point that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, just indicated—that the previous Government chose to open negotiations to cede sovereignty in November 2022, without a mandate or consulting the Chagossian people. That decision by the previous Government, which we now know was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Murray, and considered a mistake by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, was done without consultation and was not predicated on guaranteeing Chagossian rights. Furthermore, we now know that it was actively ongoing in April 2024. It was at that point that the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, wrote to the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee to confirm the continuation of the negotiations, but also, regrettably, the ongoing denial of the resettlement and consultation rights of the community. So if we are to have regrets, perhaps there is quite a lot that can be shared around the Chamber.
I have previously said, and I do not want to repeat it, that we have a deep regret with the current Government. They have chosen not to change the path of the previous Government in coming to office, and they chose not to conclude the process differently. That has been the essence of the votes on the amendments in this House. At each step of the way, I have sought to raise the concern about a lack of consultation, consent and rights. I am very pleased that the House backed my amendments to seek to address this, and I hope very much that the Commons will now back this too. Putting the permissive elements of Chagossian rights in the treaty on a Mauritian and UK statutory footing should now be the priority. I hope this will get cross-party support.
From the outset, I have raised concerns over the lack of transparency in the financial arrangements and value for money. I was also very pleased that the House backed my amendments to give Parliament, and through it the wider Chagossian community, a much greater say—indeed, a final say—on ceasing making payments if Mauritius does not honour its commitments as part of the treaty. As the House knows, there are mechanisms in place only if the UK renege on commitments, not Mauritius. I am not saying that it will and I am sure both parties have entered into the agreement in good faith, but if, for whatever reason, they fail to honour commitments, Parliament must have the ability to cease the financial elements of the agreement. I hope that the Government will move on these areas as they are the view expressed by this House.
I turn to some of the wider political arguments that we have heard—and we have heard quite a lot. Notwithstanding the “year zero” feel of this amendment, anyone listening to the debate or reading it in Hansard should understand the basic numbers of this House, because some external messaging about stopping the Bill, and the last-ditch efforts of people who have not stopped it, need to be put into context. There are—and I like many of them—281 Conservative Members of this House, while my Benches have 75. There is a separate argument as to the numbers, of course, but the number of Conservative Peers alone could sway the decision today if the Motion is voted on, and I understand that it will be. It is basically a regret Motion. The Conservatives have chosen, with the fire and fury that we have heard in opposition, not to oppose the Bill today but to complain about it. The whole public should be aware that that is the reality of what will be happening today, and we will see how many of those 281 will at least complain about it, even though they are not seeking to stop it.
As we reach the end of this Bill, I thank most particularly the Chagossian community, many members of which have watched our debates. I have regretted some of the language that they have had to listen to, but I hope many of them feel that there are many people in this House who believe sincerely in their rights.
I thank Ministers who have been willing to listen, engage and—on certain occasions, as we have heard today from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—agree. I want to chat with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about how persuasive he was, because I hope the Minister will now act on the other amendments that we have heard, but presumably that will have to be for ping-pong.
I support those who have helped me in the debate, including Adam Bull in our whips’ office, and many other people who have been in touch. I hope we can make progress and focus now on the priorities, which are Chagossian legal rights of resettlement, active consultation and participation, value for money and finance. We should return to these issues after the Commons has considered our sensible amendments.
My Lords, this Government are doing the tough and vital work necessary to protect our national security. We were in opposition for a long time, 14 years, so I understand the temptation to play political games whenever you get the chance—I completely get that. However, one thing that we never did was put our national security at risk.
I do not aim these remarks at all the noble Lords and Baronesses opposite; I know for a fact that the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Hoey, whose aim is true, have genuine, long-standing support for the Chagossian community, and they apply that to this debate. However, I have not seen that same integrity and care expressed by some others. Over the years, I often shadowed the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, but I do not think I have ever heard him mention the way that the Chagossian community has been treated or their rights or needs. I am the first to say that they have been badly treated, and have said so many times throughout the passage of the Bill.
I disagree with everything in the Motion. The deal secures the long-term future of the critically important military base on Diego Garcia. If we had not done a deal then that would have left the future of the base, as well as current operations, in jeopardy, with likely further wide-ranging litigation, which would have undermined base operations. Waiting for that risk to crystallise, as some noble Lords opposite encouraged us to do, would have placed us in a much weaker position from which to negotiate. Either there was legal jeopardy, which is presumably why the previous Government embarked upon round after round of negotiation, or, as they now ask us to believe, there was never any legal jeopardy, in which case what on earth were they doing with their time and that of officials undertaking negotiation in bad faith?
Unlike the previous Conservative Government’s strategy with the Rwanda deal, we have been upfront about the costs. We have set them out clearly in our Explanatory Memorandum and in the finance exchange of letters, which were published on the same day as the treaty and have been debated many times since.
I am sorry that the Minister has chosen to end this debate adopting a totally different tone from that which she pursued during Committee and Report. I asked a clear question: which goods, services and facilities will be withheld by which countries if we do not do this deal? She has not answered. She has said that there must be an answer to that question because the previous Government negotiated. She is the Minister and they are the Government; she must give us the answer and not say that there must be an answer from someone else.
I have clearly annoyed the noble Lord, given the finger-pointing this afternoon. My tone comes because this is the conclusion to these considerations. I would invite noble Lords to consider, when we talk about legal jeopardy and our reliance on third states, the remoteness of these islands and the complexity of sustaining a base of this nature. We rely on other states for supplies, for refuelling and for communications purposes. That is why we rest part of our argument on the need to resolve the legal jeopardy that the previous Government, as well as this Government and other states, could see existed here. We were determined to resolve this because, left unresolved, our position becomes weaker and weaker over time. This needed to be settled.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her replies. I do not think she said anything different from the points she made earlier. We had a lot of party-political insults but, yet again, no dealing with the actual issues that we raised. The one concession that I thought I heard from her—I will check Hansard—was an admission of what we have been saying all along: Mauritius does not in fact have the capabilities to resource the protection of the marine protected area. She has never said that in any previous assertions. Anyway, there are lots of points that I could take up more of the House’s time with, but I will not do that. I will just say that I would like to test the opinion of the House on my Motion.
The Opposition have put their amendment to the House and it has been carried. They are now going to vote against the Motion that they have just won on. I do not understand that at all. It seems to me that the normal thing is that, when a regret amendment is won, the Motion is amended and then the House approves the Motion as amended. We have tried to do that three times.
My Lords, I will try putting the Question once again. The Question is that the original Motion, as amended, be agreed to.
(9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
Lords amendment 5, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 6, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 4.
National security must always be the first priority of any Government, and that is all the more important during these uncertain times. This Government have always and will always act to ensure the safety and security of the British people. That is precisely why we have agreed the Diego Garcia military base deal and why we need to pass the Bill, so the treaty can come into effect. The deal secures the vital military asset for future generations. It allows the base to continue to operate as it has done for decades to come, protecting UK national security and regional stability, and that of our allies.
As part of this agreement, the Government have negotiated robust and extensive provisions to protect the base that will categorically prevent our adversaries from compromising the base or interfering with the vital protection the base gives to both the United Kingdom and the United States.
Several hon. Members rose—
I will make progress and then I will take some interventions—certainly from the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) and the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir Andrew Mitchell).
The UK will never compromise on our national security, and as we have repeatedly made clear, the agreement we struck is vital for protecting it; it guarantees the long-term future of a base that is vital for the United Kingdom and the United States and our allies, and which had been under threat. Crucially, the deal secures the operations of the joint US-UK base on Diego Garcia for generations. It has been publicly welcomed by key allies, including our Five Eyes partners, and key international partners including India, Japan and South Korea.
Throughout the passage of this Bill, the Minister has prayed in aid the support of the United States of America and the wider Five Eyes community. This morning the President of the United States dropped what could be described as a depth charge on that and made very clear what he thinks. What are the House and the Government to read of what the Minister says was the American position on the Bill and what it appears that its commander-in-chief is saying today?
We engage with the United States—our closest defence and security partner—on a range of issues, including this one, every single day, and we continue to do so. The hon. Member asks an important question. The United States and President Trump welcomed this deal in the spring, and when we discussed in detail why the agreement was needed, the strong protections that it includes and the vital security it provides for Diego Garcia, the Administration endorsed the agreement as a “monumental achievement” following a thorough inter-agency process in the United States. The hon. Member will know how serious that is.
In May the United States Secretary of State said,
“The Trump Administration determined that this agreement secures the long-term, stable, and effective operation of the joint US-UK military facility at Diego Garcia”.
We will of course have discussions with the Administration in the coming days to remind them of the strength of this deal and how it secures the base for the United Kingdom and the United States. We will continue those discussions on many levels.
Following the excellent point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), does the Minister realise that the President of the United States, following his perspicacious comments last night, has had a chance to examine the deal in full? Does he therefore understand why the last Conservative Government, of which I was a part—indeed, doing the job the Minister is doing now—would never ever have got this deal?
As I have said in this House many times, the last Government—the right hon. Gentleman knows this, as he was part of that Government—started this deal because they recognised that there was a serious challenge to the operation of the base, which is critical for our national security. [Interruption.] No, we have heard that claim made multiple times, but it is clear from the record of the Government of the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), that they continued those negotiations right into the run-up to the general election in 2024. They engaged in 11 rounds of negotiations because they recognised, as did we, the very serious risks to the operation of that base.
Several hon. Members rose—
I will happily give way to the former Cabinet Office Minister.
The Minister makes an important point. The key thing about the negotiations is that they were predicated on the United States’ concern about the continuing operation of the base in the context of concerns around international law. The position set out by the President of the United States last night is that he is not concerned about this—in fact, he is concerned about the deal the other way around. Moreover, I do not think that any of us would think that there is a concern around international law vis-à-vis the President of the United States. We are talking about two material changes. Surely in the face of these material changes, now is the time to pause and reconsider the implementation of the treaty. The circumstances have changed.
The circumstances have not changed. Again, we see this collective amnesia on behalf of former Cabinet Ministers on the other side, who, I remind the right hon. Member, engaged in 11 rounds of negotiations. They did that because they knew of the very serious security and operational reasons affecting the base. I refer him to the Secretary of War, who said at the time:
“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the US. The UK’s very important deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region. We are confident that the base is protected for many years ahead.”
Several hon. Members rose—
I have taken a number of interventions, so I will move on.
The deal had to be done because the base was under threat. Courts had already begun making decisions that weakened our position, and without the deal, as I have said many times, we faced the prospect of further wide-ranging litigation that could have rendered the base inoperable. Let me be clear, as I have been on many occasions: this is not just about the legal position; it is about the operation of the base.
Without a treaty and a secure footing, legally binding provisional measures could have been imposed within weeks that would have undermined base operations. Our ability to protect the electromagnetic spectrum from interference, to ensure access to the base by air and sea and to patrol the area around the base would have been eroded, and everything from overflight clearances to securing contractors could have been affected. That would have driven costs through the roof, deterred future investment and degraded the facility, and our adversaries would have jumped at the chance to disrupt the base—for example, by establishing outposts on the outer islands—with a guise of legality on their side. It is for all those reasons that the previous Government, many of whose former Cabinet Ministers are sitting on the Opposition Benches, undertook 11 rounds of detailed negotiations. It is also why they made critical concessions on the principles of sovereignty and direct payment.
Several hon. Members rose—
I have taken a number of interventions, so I would like to make some progress. I will happily take further interventions later.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I have heard him in this Chamber a number of times say that the United States supported this deal. The President of the United States clearly does not support it any more. I would have thought that that was the case for a pause, but I would also have thought that something else that has changed was the case for a pause: the resolution of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has also asked for the Bill not to go forward. Does the Minister not think that those two things together mean that we should pause?
We will not pause in defending our national security interests and those of our allies. We will do the right things to keep our national security and the operations of the base working as they have done for many decades. Despite the claims from the Opposition Benches, I reiterate that it is a matter of public record that, on February 2024, the former Prime Minister spoke with his Mauritian counterpart to confirm his commitment to negotiations, which continued until the general election. It was simply not credible to try to hang on, hope for the best and endanger an asset that is vital to our national security. The reality is that the previous Government failed to secure a deal. They failed to secure protections for the outer islands, for example. When it came to a matter of critical security, they did not deliver, so I am proud that we have secured a deal that is able to do those very things.
I thank the Minister for giving way; every time he comes to the House, he is most courteous. He mentioned the example of the former Prime Minister, but the former Prime Minister stated very clearly that the negotiations had to result in a “mutually beneficial” agreement. That did not happen, and therefore the Government ended those negotiations. Today, this Government are expecting us to vote on Third Reading for a deal that our greatest ally—an ally that the Minister has advocated for through this whole process—has turned its back on. How can he expect the House to do that when the circumstances have fundamentally changed?
I have explained the comments of the US Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the US Government, as well as the President’s previous comments. This is about our Five Eyes partners as well; it is about Canada, Australia, New Zealand and our other key partners. They all understand the critical national security capabilities that the base provides. It is also about Japan and the Republic of Korea. The deal has also been welcomed by a number of our other overseas territories. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would discount their views, but we are not willing to do that. We are willing to deliver national security and the capabilities that our Five Eyes partners need.
Let me turn to the issue referenced in the Lords amendments. I want to answer the many genuine questions that have been asked by a number of hon. and right hon. Members on behalf of the Chagossians. We have secured a deal that protects the interests of the Chagossians. I know that there are a number of Members of this House who rightly care deeply about this issue and have done so for many years, but I am afraid to say that there are others who have picked up the mantle for pure political game playing and who fail to recognise that there is a genuine range of opinions within Chagossian communities; there are some who oppose this deal and there are many who support it, and that simply has not been recognised by many. We deeply regret—I reiterate this—the way in which Chagossians have been treated by successive Governments in the past. That is why we are committed to a future relationship that is built on trust.
The treaty provides the only viable path to resettlement on the outer islands of the archipelago. We know that that is a matter of critical importance to many Chagossians. Following the Government’s efforts, Mauritius has confirmed that all Chagossians who were born on the archipelago and their children will be eligible for Mauritian citizenship and for participation in a future resettlement programme, regardless of where they live. The Bill also preserves current British and British overseas territory citizenship, and the pathway to British citizenship for Chagossians, meaning that they will be able to hold both British nationality and Mauritian citizenship. In fact, as of April 2025, 94% of Chagossians with British nationality also have Mauritian citizenship.
I give way on this issue to the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes).
On that point, the Minister will be aware that the matter was debated at length in the Lords. Indeed, one of the amendments that we are considering deals precisely with the entitlements of the Chagossians. They were not involved in the negotiations at any stage, and they have made that clear. Why on earth would the Minister reject the Lords amendment, which simply says that they should have a defining say in their own future?
With respect—Madam Deputy Speaker, you can correct me if I am wrong—it is a decision in relation to the engagement of financial privilege and the Standing Orders that means that those amendments are not for debate and will be disagreed with. That has been made clear by the Chair.
Working with Mauritius, we have also agreed the parameters for the operation of a Chagossian trust fund. On 12 December, the Mauritian Government approved legislation to establish the trust fund. That confirms, again, in response to many reasonable opinions expressed both in the other place and by those on the Opposition Benches—
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Chair made it clear at the outset that the amendments that deal with matters of finance were inappropriate to be considered here, for obvious reasons. I understood, however, that the amendments that we were debating, including those that reference the Chagossians, do not concern finance in particular. Can you clarify the matter?
The Deputy Speaker who was in the Chair before me read out the statement, and I will do so again for clarity. Having given careful consideration to Lords amendments 2 and 3, Mr Speaker is satisfied that they would impose a charge on the public revenue that has not yet been authorised by this House. In accordance with paragraph (3) of Standing Order No. 78, the amendments will therefore be deemed to be disagreed to and are not subject to debate.
We cannot keep having the same discussion again and again. This is a very substantial debate and many people hope to speak, so let us proceed as fast as we can.
Thank you for clarifying that, Madam Deputy Speaker.
In parallel with the other measures, we have established a contact group to give Chagossians a greater say in UK Government support to their communities and we are in the process of enhancing that group, as Baroness Chapman committed to do in the other place. Thanks to the work we have done and the reasonable concerns raised across the House, the Chagossian trust fund will be operated for Chagossians by Chagossians. There will be a Chagossian majority on the board, which will include a UK-based representative and a Chagossian chair. Those reasonable concerns have been raised in the course of the debates and we are trying to address them.
I need to make progress, as Madam Deputy Speaker has asked me to be conscious of time. I will come back for further interventions.
Before moving on to discuss the specific amendments, I express my thanks to the noble Lords for their tireless efforts and to the many noble peers who scrutinised and supported the Bill. Lords amendment 4 was tabled by the Government, and I thank Lord Lansley for his helpful conversation and collaboration on the topic. The amendment will change the parliamentary procedure applicable to the delegated power in clause 6. With that amendment, all instruments made using that power will be subject to the negative procedure. Previously, no parliamentary procedure applied unless the power was used to amend, repeal or revoke Acts of Parliament or statutory instruments made under them. The amendment makes it clear that the Government are prepared to work with those who engage in genuine, constructive dialogue, rather than those who rely on political point scoring, to achieve meaningful compromise.
Turning to the other amendments made in the other place, I make it clear that the Government are thankful for all the scrutiny and are willing to engage with challenge. However, the other amendments are either already provided for or not necessary, or they simply make political points and play games with our national security, so we cannot accept them.
Lords amendment 1 would amend clause 1 to prevent the Bill and the treaty from entering into force until the Government had sought to renegotiate the termination clauses to include the base becoming unusable due to environmental degradation. That is unnecessary and I shall set out why. First, limiting the circumstances in which the treaty can be terminated protects the UK’s interests and those of the United States, which has invested heavily in the base. In line with the United States’ wishes, the previous Conservative Government agreed to limit termination to two grounds, both of which are in UK control, and this Government have secured that—
The Minister mentions the United States’ wishes, and he appears to be presenting the case that the United States remains in the position that it was in previously, despite what President Trump said last night. The Deputy Prime Minister said in February:
“If President Trump doesn’t like the deal, the deal will not go forward”.
Last night, President Trump said that he did not like the deal. Is it still going forward, or is the Minister suggesting that President Trump did not mean what he said last night?
I have already answered that point. As I said, discussions will continue with the US Administration in the coming days, as they have done throughout the process. We will remind them of the strength of this deal, allay concerns and, of course, emphasise how it secures the base for both the United Kingdom and the United States. We work together on these matters. As the Speaker of the House of Representatives set out this morning, it is important that we work together on all matters of national security.
Let me make some progress on the issue of termination.
As I have said, limiting the circumstances in which the treaty can be terminated protects the UK’s interests and those of the US. The Government have secured that procedure.
Secondly, I reassure the House that, given the importance of the base, we are taking necessary steps to protect it from environmental damage. Working with the United States, again in partnership, we already have extensive measures in place, such as the coastal erosion programme, and scientific studies show that natural land loss over the past 50 years has been less than 1%. That said, we recognise the concerns of Lord Craig and Lord Houghton, and I would like to reassure them and Members of this House that the international law of treaties allows for the termination of a treaty when it becomes impossible for a treaty to be performed as a result of
“the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty”.
Baroness Chapman set out the legal position clearly in the other place.
For further reassurance, since that debate we have consulted Mauritius to verify that it shares our assessment. I am happy to update the House that this has been confirmed in writing to the Government. Mauritius is clear on the point, both as a matter of international law and in its domestic law. We welcome that confirmation by Mauritius and trust that it will assure Members in this House and in the other place who share this concern that such an amendment is unnecessary.
I give way to the former Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
The Minister seems to be putting an awful lot of faith in the good intent and reliability of the Mauritian Government. They are a close ally of China, which, he might remember, gave us cast-iron guarantees about the future of the Hongkongers once the lease on Hong Kong was given up. I gently remind him that the 2024 Labour manifesto, entitled “Change”, stated:
“Defending our security also means protecting the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, including the Falklands and Gibraltar. Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination.”
Can he look the Chagossians in the Gallery in the eye and tell them that that is what the Government are now doing?
I have great respect for the right hon. Gentleman and his role, and we have had many good conversations, but it is extremely unhelpful to, and unwanted by, residents in Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands that this false comparison keeps being made—
Absolutely, and we stand by that commitment to defend the Falklands and Gibraltar. That is exactly what we have been doing and will continue to do. I gently say that I fully recognise and respect the fact that there are many Chagossian groups who disagree with this deal as well as many who agree with it. Unfortunately, some of the comments in this place have represented only one side of that argument. It is our duty as a Government to listen to all those groups and to engage appropriately with them.
Lords Amendments 5 and 6 both relate to the costs of the treaty—
I am not going to take any more interventions at the moment. I need to make some progress.
Lords amendment 5 would require the Secretary of State to publish the total real-terms costs of payments made under the treaty, including the methodology used by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Treasury. I confess that it brings me some satisfaction to learn that the Opposition have eventually accepted the importance of quoting financial figures for a 99-year treaty in real terms. They have always known that it is misleading to ignore the impact of inflation—a pound today is not worth the same as a pound in 99 years’ time—and now at long last they seem to have seen the light. Let us see whether, in today’s debate, we can do away with the deliberately and misleadingly inflated figures that have been bandied about again by the shadow Foreign Secretary during questions today, and start discussing the financial elements of the treaty with accuracy and transparency.
Several hon. Members rose—
I will carry on, and then I will take the intervention from the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), who has raised these issues before.
For all the good intentions, I am afraid that Lords amendment 5 is unnecessary. We have been clear about the costs of the deal from the moment of signature. We published full details of the financial arrangements the very same day the treaty was signed, including in the financial exchange of letters and the explanatory memorandum laid before Parliament. If Opposition Members are having difficulty finding where that is, it is on pages 9 and 10 of the explanatory memorandum. The documents set out the payment schedule and the confirmed amounts at that time.
The methodology is clear: the average annual payment has been calculated using forecast inflation figures from the Office for Budget Responsibility. We used the forecast GDP deflator, which is published regularly. That generated the real value of the payments, which is the valueusb adjusted for inflation to create a fair comparison with other costs. Members will recall that this equates to less than a quarter of 1% of the Defence budget and compares favourably to the cost of comparable overseas facilities. I have mentioned the facility that France pays for in Djibouti. This is an immensely more valuable facility. It is priceless for our defence capabilities and those of our allies.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
Can the Minister confirm that the deal provides certainty and full operational use of the base for 99 years?
Absolutely, I can confirm that the deal secures the base for us and our allies. It secures the crucial capabilities that benefit ourselves, the United States and, indeed, all our allies.
I am happy to further canter through the calculations. The net present value was established by discounting the real value of the sums due to be paid over the duration of the treaty using the social time preference rate, as set out in the Green Book. That adjusts for social time preference, which is a reflection of the value society attaches to present, as opposed to future, consumption. That has been used in the UK by Governments of all flavours since 2003.
Members will be aware that my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury announced a review of the social time preference rate shortly before Christmas. That follows a review of the Green Book last year. I do not know how that review will conclude, but I know that the Government used the correct methodology when the figures were published, and were clear and transparent in doing so, and we will continue to do so whichever way the review comes out.
This evening, the Minister is trying to convince us to vote for this Chagos deal. The President of the United States says that the Government are handing over the island “FOR NO REASON WHATSOEVER”, so can he give us some reasons?
With the greatest of respect to the right hon. Lady, I do not think she has been present in many of the other debates on this issue—she popped up here today to make these points. I have been clear and answered the question already, so I will not do so again.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
I thank the Minister for giving way and for his detailed explanation of how the calculations have been made. The Government Actuary’s Department clearly stated that this deal would cost £34.7 billion. That figure was then confirmed by his colleague, the Minister for the Middle East, who said that all the figures had been ratified by the Government Actuary’s Department, but his colleague sitting next to him, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, told me that that figure was inaccurate. Will the Minister therefore clarify how much this deal costs?
We set out the costs clearly at the time, as I have done for the hon. Gentleman in the Chamber a number of times. What I will confirm is that they have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. The House of Commons Library has been through them and reached the same conclusion. The Office for Statistics Regulation has welcomed the Government’s approach and said that it is in line with intelligent transparency, and the Office for Budget Responsibility also confirmed separately to it that the discount rates were correct. I have given the hon. Gentleman four good reasons and the costs. However much Opposition Members bandy about the costs, it is simply unhelpful.
I will move on to the other amendments. Lords amendment 6 would introduce an ongoing estimates and supply scrutiny process for expenditure under the treaty, including parliamentary approval for future payments and supplementary estimates. The agreement has undergone intense scrutiny, and the treaty provides robust mechanisms for dispute resolution under article 14. It is normal practice for payments under treaties to be made under the prerogative power and charged on the Consolidated Fund under the authority of the Supply Acts. Furthermore, the amendment would infringe on the financial privilege of the Commons and affect the Commons’ arrangements for authorising expenditure. These are long-standing practices that members of the former Government will know. The same applied under them, and it applies under this Government, too.
Finally, subsection (4) would infringe on the prerogative power to make and unmake treaties. It is not wise to impose any immovable requirements about a hypothetical set of circumstances that might arise in the future. This provision risks requiring the Government to breach the UK’s obligations under a treaty. It is clearly preferable for all options to be open to a future Government, so that they can deal with whatever the future may bring and act in the UK’s best interests, taking into account all the circumstances.
I am conscious of your exhortations about time, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I know that a number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak. The previous Government recognised that there was a problem. They engaged in 11 rounds of negotiations, but failed to reach a deal that was in our interests and those of the United States. We secured this deal. It protects the base, and the interests of the United States and our Five Eyes partners.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. May I correct the record? The hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) says that there are not any veterans. I have served this country as an Army reservist, and I am very proud to have done so. We have many other Labour Members who have served and are veterans; they absolutely defend the national security of this country and have done so at many different stages. That comment is not accurate and needs to be corrected.
I thank—[Interruption.] Order. I can make a decision; I do not need any help. That was not exactly a point of order, Minister. It was much more of an intervention, which may have been taken by the Member who was about to rise to her feet. However, the Minister has got his point on the record. We need to move at a pace; otherwise, we will not get speakers in.
With the leave of the House, I will close the debate. Hon. and right hon. Members have raised important questions and points during the debate. Once again, I must reiterate that for those who engage in genuine and constructive debate, the Government are willing to find compromise where that is reasonable and proper, and that debate is welcome, as it has been in the other place.
The deal sits at the cornerstone of the defence and security of both the United Kingdom and the United States. It plays a crucial role in defending our interests, our countries and our people and ensures that we remain equipped to face an increasingly complex and dangerous world.
I have to challenge one of the points that has been made repeatedly and falsely throughout the debate. We have heard the same nonsense that this deal puts the base at threat from Chinese interference. [Interruption.]
Order. There appear to be many side conversations taking place. If Members wish to leave the Chamber, they can do so. Otherwise, we should focus on what the Minister is saying.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I was referring to the claims about Chinese interference. I doubt that those on the Opposition Benches have actually seen or read the op-ed by the Chinese ambassador to Mauritius on 14 January criticising the Chagos deal, which again very much underlines the point that I have been repeatedly making.
Just last week, the United States military signed a new contract worth $85 million for base operating support services. Before the treaty was signed, it had been rolling over previous contracts due to the uncertainty, but because of the certainty provided by this deal, it has now entered into a new long-term contract, which delivers strength and certainty for the United States, the United Kingdom and our allies, because national security is the priority for all of us.
While securing our national security, we have taken steps throughout the Bill to ensure that we have the measures in place, including the full control of Diego Garcia; the 24-mile nautical buffer zone where nothing can be built or placed without our consent, meaning that we can protect our interests; a rigorous process to prevent activities on the wider islands—some over 100 nautical miles away—from disrupting base operations; a strict ban on foreign security forces on the outer islands, whether civilian or military, without UK consent; and a binding obligation to ensure that the base is never undermined. These are robust provisions, and they defend the national security of ourselves and our allies, including the United States.
Many important points have been raised about the Chagossian community. I absolutely acknowledge and respect the Chagossians who are here today. I also acknowledge and respect that there are many views within the Chagossian community. I was disappointed by the tone of the remarks from the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), who I have good engagement with. I can tell her that I met Chagossians on 30 September 2024 and 3 October 2024. On 22 May 2025, she claimed that the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), had not met the Chagossians; in fact, he met them with me. On 2 September 2025, I was at the first meeting of the Chagossian contact group. Officials regularly engage with Chagossians. Indeed, I engaged with Chagossians long before I took this position as a Minister and did so in opposition, along with many hon. and right hon. Members, to listen to the range of views.
Several hon. Members rose—
No, I will not give way. I am conscious of time—I need to respond to the points made.
Of course, many groups support the deal, including the Chagos Refugees Group, the Chagos Islanders Movement and the Seychelles Chagossian committee.
The shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel), made many criticisms. We have heard and been through them a number of times. I remind her that, of course, it was her party that started the negotiations in the first place. She supported this when she was in government. The Conservatives have demonstrated absolute naked opportunism, ignoring the national security issues and jumping on the political bandwagon. They talk about defence and national security, but in 14 disastrous years in office their party hollowed out our armed forces. Our Government are investing at levels not seen since the cold war, and 85% of the negotiation rounds took place—
That is not a point of order. Can we prevent the debate from continuing in points of order? If colleagues wish to intervene, they can try to do so, and it is up to the Minister whether he wishes to respond to those interventions. We can keep going until 7.18 pm when the time will cut off.
I was referring to an article published on 14 January by the Chinese ambassador to Mauritius.
The former Government had access to the same legal advice, the same security briefings and the same threat assessments as we do now, including on threats to the operations of this crucial base, and senior figures raised no objections in Parliament, filed no critical questions and voiced no concerns on social media. It is only after leaving government that they have done so. That is not principled opposition; it is opportunistic.
Many questions were raised about the finances. I must be clear that the higher figure of £34.7 billion that was released by the Government Actuary’s Department was a nominal amount and was not adjusted for inflation or the social time preference rate, so it is deeply misleading to cite that figure, given the changing value of money over time. A pound today is not worth the same as a pound tomorrow. Quite frankly, I am baffled at hearing these complaints about the finances, given the billions that the Conservatives wasted on defective personal protective equipment, the festival of Brexit and who knows what else.
There were some very sensible and I think legitimate questions raised about the costs. The Government have always sought to be transparent on these matters. We set out the forecasts at the time of publication, and the documents that we published at the time of the treaty set out that the net present value of the treaty was £3.4 billion, calculated using the Green Book methodology —I have set that out on many occasions before. Of course, I would expect forecasts to change over time, given the changes in the OBR’s forecast inflation rate and other matters. We were transparent then, and of course we will continue that transparency in the usual ways before the House. Indeed, the TaxPayers’ Alliance, no less, has confirmed that the use of a discount rate to give NPV is a standard concept in finance, and that it is reasonable for the Government to use an inflation assumption and a discounting rate to give an NPV of the cost. If we use its suggestion of 2.9%, the annual payments would be £96 million on average, which is £5 million less in today’s money than the Government’s forecast at the time of the treaty’s publication.
I am not going to pursue the Minister down that line—I did that last time—but I do want to ask a simple question. This morning, we had a very clear statement from the President of the United States. The Deputy Prime Minister was also clear previously when he said that if America says no, then this does not go ahead. Are his counsels in any way discussing or thinking about waiting to find out whether that view from the President today is clear and for good? In other words, will they then stop this Bill?
That is a very reasonable question from the right hon. Gentleman. Of course, we engage with the United States as our closest defence and security partner every single day. Conversations are ongoing. We are always engaging with them on these matters, and I am sure we will continue to do so over the coming days. I have set out the clear position that the United States set out on many occasions—this went through a detailed inter-agency process—and of course we will continue conversations with the United States, as we have done before.
I was rather baffled by the complaint of the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner (David Simmonds), who is not now in his place—[Interruption.] Ah, he is at the Bar of the House. It was his Government who established the citizenship route for Chagossians, which rightly gives them the right to come here, and local authorities can engage in the usual way with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government about their needs.
My hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Middleton South (Graham Stringer) raised the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. This is very important, so let me be clear: it does speak on behalf of the United Nations or member states. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General and the African Union chairperson both welcomed the agreement, so it is simply not the case that those concerns were raised by the United Nations, and it is important that the record be corrected.
There were concerns about the reasons. I was clear about the operational impacts on the base of not securing this deal, which include overflight clearances, securing contractors, declining investment and degraded facility. We would also be unable to prevent—this is a crucial point that Members have reasonably raised—China or other nations from setting up installations on the outer islands or carrying out joint exercises. I have set out the legal reasons for that on many occasions, which include the litigation that could be brought quickly by Mauritius against the UK, including under annexe VII of the UN convention on the law of the sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding.
The shadow Foreign Secretary raised the Pelindaba treaty. The United Kingdom and Mauritius are satisfied that their existing international obligations are compatible with the agreement, and we are very clear that we comply with our obligations under international law.
I refer the Minister to article 298 of the UNCLOS treaty, which means we have a complete opt-out on military bases, but may I take him back to costs? The Government Actuary’s Department, whose whole raison d’être is to calculate long-term spending commitments, stood up the £35 billion figure—in fact, it said it might be more. Who should the House believe—people whose whole life’s work is to calculate long-term costs, or this Minister?
I regret the right hon. Gentleman’s tone. I have respect for him normally, but if he had been listening a moment ago, he would have heard me explain this exact point. It is a nominal amount. It is not adjusted for inflation or the social time preference rate. The value of money changes over time; £1 today is not worth the same as £1 tomorrow. This is very clear. I set out the multiple ways in which this has been verified, and it is even agreed by the TaxPayers’ Alliance.
We have discussed these issues at great length in this House on many occasions. Let me be clear: this deal secures this base for the national security of the United Kingdom and the United States, and it secures it for our allies. It is vital, and this is an important point to end on. My hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Middleton South asked why this matters to our constituents. It matters because the capabilities on this base matter for the national security of this country, our allies and our citizens in preventing terrorism and the activities of adversaries with hostile intent towards us, the United States and our allies. It secures this base into the future, and we urge the House to reject the Lords amendments and agree with Lords amendment 4.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.