Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere
“(2) Sections 2 and 4 of this Act do not come into force until the duties outlined in sections (Equality Impact Assessment) and (Implications of treaty on United Kingdom defence spending and United States of America) are discharged.”
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I beg leave to move the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow.
The financial aspects of this Bill are the easiest for people not involved to understand. It does seem bizarre that at a time when we are borrowing money and scratching around for savings, we are raising taxes here in order to fund tax cuts in Mauritius. I do not want to detain noble Lords, so I will not go over the figures again. We had an expert disquisition from my noble friend Lady Noakes at Second Reading.
Even if we were to accept the Government’s figures, we still face an immense imbalance in where the money is going. I come back to the point that we were making just before dinner, about the wrong that everyone accepts was done to the Chagossians and what restitution would look like. The Minister said they had been very badly treated. Well, badly treated or otherwise, their compensation, if we measure it purely in financial terms, comes to a one-off £40 million settlement for good—whereas, even on the figures offered by the Government, we are paying Mauritius £101 million every year for the next 99 years. Who is the wronged party here? How is it that having done this harm to population A by moving them, we then reward the population that is in fact making permanent their exile and deepening their sense of grievance?
Never mind whether it is £3.1 billion, £35 billion or somewhere in between, at Second Reading my noble friend Lord Altrincham made the point that this is money being sent out of the country. We can argue about whether there is merit in Governments spending cash here to stimulate growth. I personally am of the camp that says it does not work. It is better to leave that money directed by people who are attached to it; they spend it more wisely and the growth impact is much higher. But I will allow that there is some impact in stimulating the domestic economy, even when a Government spend money badly. There is none at all when you just take a sum of money and send it several thousand miles away, which is what is being proposed here.
The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, are about impact assessments, particularly on the financial consequences for the United States, as well as for us. I just want to tackle the view that this is a great deal for the US—that, however inconvenient it is for us, we are left with the bill and the US gets to keep the base. Every pound that we send to Mauritius to lease the property that we currently own is a pound that we are not spending on defence. It is a pound taken away from NATO and from the western alliance. That is just the immediate and direct cost of what happens when you take a freehold and then decide to pay for it as a leasehold.
There is then, it seems to me, an underexplored indirect cost: how have we now incentivised future Mauritian Governments to monetise this territory? If they can get this sum of money out of us, why not lease other parts of the archipelago to other powers? The Minister has said, of course, that in the treaty they are not allowed to for military purposes. The treaty says they cannot use these things for defence purposes, but I wonder: down the line, if Mauritius was indeed incentivised to make more money and leased an island for supposedly civilian purposes, then very gradually it was turned in a secret way by an unfriendly power into a more direct military installation, is that something realistically that is then going to trigger a military reaction from us?
It seems to me that the only way of ensuring that we do not have unfriendly neighbours in the Chagos Archipelago is not to have these islands being leased out in the first place, and the best way of preventing the islands being leased out is to hang on to them ourselves.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
The noble Lord referred to £40 million. I assume he is referring to the trust fund that is going to be set up.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
However, as he is fully aware, that is totally in the hands of the Mauritian Government. No Chagossian from here can access that money. Is that not something that should be considered?
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that important correction. This would not be the first time this has happened. The sums that were disbursed to Mauritius in the 1970s, supposedly to be spent on the welfare of the Îlois exile community, were hung on to. They were disbursed very late, and their value had been significantly eroded by inflation in the meantime. Indeed, given that record, there is little wonder that there should be bad feeling from a lot of Chagossians towards the Mauritian Government.
Unusually in this House, the noble Baroness and I were on the same side in the 2016 referendum, so we are familiar with the argument that here is a little bit of your money back; we are spending it for you, and you should be grateful. It was an unconvincing argument to the British people in 2016, and I think it will be an unconvincing argument to the British people and to the Chagossian portion of the British family in 2025. I beg to move.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, I will refer to Amendment 24 in my name. I thank the Minister for her gracious remarks earlier in the debate. I can assure the Committee that I will not detain it as long this time. The amendment asks a simple and poignant question. Should the British taxpayer be compelled to fund a treaty that actively undermines our position on the international stage and erodes British sovereignty? I believe the answer is as simple as the question: no.
Article 11 of the treaty places the United Kingdom under financial obligations to Mauritius, including annual payments linked directly to the transfer of sovereignty. We are being asked to underwrite, year after year, a settlement that has not been endorsed by the people most deeply affected. In 2008 the Foreign Affairs Committee noted the “profound poverty” experienced by many Chagossians resettled in Mauritius. The United Kingdom Government have recognised the “hardship and suffering” caused by their displacement in the preceding years.
At a time when families across the United Kingdom are struggling with the cost of living, when public services are stretched and defence spending is under pressure, the Government are willing, and obliged under this treaty, to transfer British funds overseas in exchange for the honour of relinquishing sovereignty over a territory that hosts one of the most strategically important military bases in the world. Why would we pay for an island that we already own?
Without the inclusion of this amendment, we will be in the extraordinary position of financing, on an annual basis, a settlement that ultimately advances arguments that have repeatedly undermined British sovereignty. That is why this amendment is undeniably crucial. It protects not only the taxpayer but the constitutional integrity of this country, as well as relegating the overindulgent aspirations of the Mauritian Government, depriving them of even more British taxpayers’ money.
Let us also consider the native islanders—the Chagos people. Have we ever paused to consider how they might feel as this Parliament considers whether we should pay a foreign Government to take control of a territory in which they have never had a stake, all while ignoring the cry of the Chagos community in the UK?
Beyond that, there is also the question of accountability. Once these payments begin, Parliament loses direct control over how they are to be spent. There is no binding mechanism in the treaty to ensure that the native community will be benefited by these payments in a meaningful way. This arrangement risks repeating the injustice of the past, where funds provided in earlier decades did not reach the displaced communities in Mauritius who were living in poverty. Surely, we must learn from that history and not repeat it. That is essential.
I therefore believe we should not rush into binding financial commitments when so many broader questions remain unresolved—about self-determination, defence co-operation, the protection of strategic assets, and long-term political stability in a region where global competition is increasing and where the UK needs to be assertive and confident. The British taxpayer should not foot the bill for decisions that diminish our sovereignty and overlook the rights of sovereign British citizens. For these reasons, I commend my amendment to the House.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, and I want to speak to my Amendment 23. Before I go into that, the noble Lords, Lord Hannan and Lord McCrea, have put very clearly just how ridiculous it is that we have a territory that is ours and now we are paying to give it away. The whole thing is just such nonsense. I understand, as we all do, the security implications of Diego Garcia, but it is just inexplicable how this could not have been handled differently. Some noble Lords listening to the debate might well be feeling that this is definitely going to end in tears.
It is also very disappointing, particularly for the Chagossians who have sat here all evening—while we had a break as well—to see so few people here. There is one Back-Bencher from the Labour side, one Cross-Bencher, no Lib Dems at all now apart from the Front Bench, and a number—there should have been a few more—from the Conservative side. I am disappointed by that, and a lot of people should feel a little ashamed that those Chagossians have sat here all evening, listening to their future being decided with so few people listening.
My amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a report assessing the financial implications of the treaty for the United States of America and the United Kingdom, including the effect on NATO spending and the risk of global instability from uncontrolled leasing of islands. One of the main arguments the Government have advanced for the Bill before us—and for the treaty, which will be ratified if this Bill gets Royal Assent—is that the Americans strongly support the treaty and believe it provides the legal certainty they desire. The purpose of Amendment 23 in my name is to probe the downsides, as well as any potential upsides, to ensure that His Majesty’s Government can fully advise the Trump Administration of both.
There are three critical respects in which I do not believe that the Bill and the treaty are in the interests of the United States. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that they are profoundly contrary to the interests of the United States. It is plain, as we saw from the debate earlier, that the treaty will not be able to provide legal certainty, because it is contrary to international law on self-determination and the Ellice Islands precedent. The legal issue is not going to go away, because we will be signing a treaty if this Bill goes through. However, the points that I want to focus on relate to the costs and international peace and stability.
First, we have to make the point about the cost. This represents a huge sum that, if given to the Republic of Mauritius, cannot be spent on UK defence. The key point is that we must assess the benefit arising from the United States not having to pay for the lease of the islands in light of the fact that, under the current arrangements, we do not charge them anything to lease the islands either, and we do not charge ourselves for the islands because, of course, they are held under UK sovereignty.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, not least because my Amendment 59 comes from a similar position to her Amendment 23, in that it is a probing amendment. Indeed, looking across the range of amendments in this group, there is a considerable similarity between them; they all come from a similar spirit.
The amendments in this group, including mine, reflect two particular anxieties and concerns with the Bill. First, there are the overall financial implications and the concerns that have been raised in relation to them. My amendment specifically looks at the financial implications for defence. Secondly, given that a number of the amendments seek for the Government to produce an assessment or report, there is a concern that we want to get clarity and full transparency from the Government on a range of financial matters. My amendment deals with both those concerns.
On the issue of finance, we have already debated the transfer of sovereignty to Mauritius, which is proposed by the treaty and the Bill. A number of us have expressed our deep opposition to that, but this is not simply a case of handing over sovereignty to Mauritius. We are not simply giving sovereignty to Mauritius; we are paying Mauritius to take the Chagos Islands off our hands. That, in and of itself, shows one of the problems with the Bill.
We have seen in black and white the figures for the various payments that there will be, and the range of different assessments of what this deal will cost the taxpayer overall over its lifetime. The Government put it at the lowest level, with a GDP deflator, at around £3.4 billion. I think the cash terms are around £13 billion. The Opposition have indicated their assessment, with inflation, at £35 billion. I know that, in another place, one of the other parties not represented in this House gave an assessment that it would end up being around £50 billion, so there is a very wide range of cost.
However, one thing we can say with a level of certainty, as indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, is that this is money flowing out of this country that cannot directly benefit this country. If we make a presumption, which I will come to in a moment, that this is, in effect, defence spending then it is not simply money that cannot be used for the overall benefit of the UK; in defence terms, it is an opportunity cost. It is not simply something that is additional to the Bill, but money that cannot be spent on other things.
Across the lifetime of this deal, whether we assess it at £3.4 billion, £35 billion or whatever figure you place on it, there will be real terms consequences for defence. It may seem a relatively small amount compared with what we will spend on defence over that period, but I will give a few examples from a defence point of view. The Type 26 frigate programme comes to about £8 billion, the “Queen Elizabeth” class carriers cost about £6.2 billion in total, and a single F35 fighter costs about £80 million. All those things are being taken away. Whatever money is assessed as the current value of our contribution to Mauritius via this deal is money that cannot be spent in this country.
Finally, this again comes to the point about trying to seek a level of transparency. There is a level of dispute over how much we are spending and how we assess it, but there is also a lack of clarity about the budgets that money comes from. I think there are three possibilities. Is this money, in general, coming out of the Foreign Office budget? Is it more particularly, under that category, money that will be deducted from what would otherwise be overseas aid, or is it coming from the defence budget? The purpose of my amendment is to probe that and try to gain some clarity and transparency from the Government about not simply how much we are spending but where it is coming from.
Lord Altrincham (Con)
I thank the Minister for her patience in hosting this Committee. I will comment on my Amendment 52 and the other amendments in this group with specific reference to the financial agreement, where there seems to be ambiguity regarding the cost of this project. There clearly has been some ambiguity in the supervision of the contract, which may be because of the prerogative and lack of parliamentary participation, but this is a very large financial commitment to slip through under the prerogative and it is reasonable that we take a hard look at the contract itself in Parliament. That is why my amendment suggests that it goes back to the House of Commons.
The contract provides for two kinds of payments. It provides for 13 years of fixed payments of £2.3 billion. That is the easiest part of the contract to understand. If noble Lords wish to think of it in present value terms they might be a bit less than £2.3 billion, but those payments are nevertheless fixed and there is a schedule for when they are paid, albeit the Government appear to have offered the Republic of Mauritius the possibility of accelerating those payments.
Those payments take us to year 13. At year 14, the contract is linked to inflation. From here on, the payments are not just unknown but uncapped. That is a remarkable thing for the Government to offer. From year 14, the payments increase with inflation. No one knows what that will be; it could be very large. Therein lies the ambiguity in the approach to how much money is at stake: it is because the Government are offering the Republic of Mauritius the remarkably valuable asset of exposure to UK inflation from years 14 to 99. This is an almost unheard of contract. Incidentally, it is the same kind of financing error that His Majesty’s Treasury has made in linking so much of our gilt issuance to inflation. This itself has been the financial constraint on the Chancellor in recent months because of our exposure to the linkers, which have all moved up with inflation. It is an error that the Treasury has made before, so why is this contract linked to inflation?
I will take a look at what that actually means. The important numbers are the actual numbers that will be paid—nominal numbers—so let us not worry about the inflation adjusted and present value calculation. The actual numbers are those that will have to be funded by taxpayers in the future. If we go from year 14 and imagine a world of 2% inflation for the rest of the century, the Government will have to fund the Republic of Mauritius another £28 billion. At 3%, they will be funding £50 billion. At 4%, it will be £90 billion and at 5% it will be £174 billion.
Where do we go with these numbers? What do they really mean? How can we be comfortable with this kind of exposure? The first answer is that it is a very unusual kind of contract; it has no cap to it and provides enormous exposure to the UK over time. But in terms of just rough numbers, what does that mean? Trading in UK inflation through the gilt market indicates that, for the next 30 years, UK inflation will be around 3%, so it may be at the lower end. But if you look at other examples of where UK inflation has been over the last 100 years, there really are no suggestions that it is below 5%; it is more like 6% or 7%. Remember, it was over 10% only a couple of years ago and over 20% in the 1970s. Rolling forward at 100 years above 5% is probably a reasonable place to be.
Let us take it to be in the 3% zone, which would be very low and benign for the Government. If we then take one of the present-value calculations, we find that there are no scenarios in which this contract is worth less than £15 billion—and at £15 billion it is still uncapped: it is not as if it has been hedged, financed out or closed out in agreement with Mauritius. It still leaves the Government with all the exposure, so it is a remarkable contract in that form.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 53 in my name and that of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, who unfortunately cannot be here this evening. It is clearly a probing amendment to give the Committee an opportunity to consider the implications for the UK of another possibility affecting Article 11, the economic partnership of the treaty. That possibility is that, within the 100 years-plus of the treaty, the Diego Garcia military base might become unusable, due to natural causes or because of a sea level rise triggered by global warming. While the loss of use would have military consequences, due to the wording of the treaty the UK’s financial obligations to Mauritius would appear not to be affected.
As I mentioned at Second Reading, the treaty makes some valiant assumptions about the steadfastness of relationships between the countries concerned. That aside, it would be helpful to understand why, if only as a precautionary principle, no mention of this possibility —the functional failure of the base—or how it might be handled is covered in the treaty. I assume that the possibility was considered by His Majesty’s Government and the United States in their preparations for negotiation. Can the Minister confirm this? Was it decided, based on historical records, that the risk of an earthquake, tsunami or other natural cause was so remote that these need not be considered?
Indeed, in his response in the debate on 30 June, the Minister mentioned that, like all small atoll islands, it is naturally dynamic. While not wishing to speculate on future erosion, he said that scientific surveys had concluded that the overall natural land area of the island had decreased by less than one per cent over the last 50 years. But what about sea level rise? There is a widespread presumption that sea levels will rise in the future. The amount of rise, its timing and spread in the world’s oceans is still speculative, but, based on realistic IPCC global warming projections, estimates for the Chagos atoll indicate rises that would impact on the functioning of the Diego Garcia base. They suggest that, within 100 years of the treaty, the runway and hard standings will not be covered, but some of the domestic and fuel storage areas could become submerged, either intermittently by diurnal tides or on a permanent basis. There could also be difficulties with quayside berthing and the present availability of fresh water. This is but a résumé of findings that were sent to FCDO officials in January, before the treaty was signed in May this year.
Maybe the United States, having done its own assessment, believes that it will be possible gradually to strengthen the sea defences as necessary to maintain the base’s operational capabilities. It would be helpful if the Minister could indicate what assessments the United States has made of sea levels. Looking at the wording of the treaty, as I mentioned at Second Reading, there will be the opportunity to attempt to resolve any issue about payment by the arrangements for settling disputes contained in it. But, whatever arrangement might be accepted by both parties today, it does not follow that the same consensus might be possible later, due to changes in the individuals and their perceptions then. There seems therefore to be good reason to have an agreement with Mauritius now, before ratifying the treaty, on how the eventuality of the base becoming unusable would affect Article 11.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I rise very briefly to commend the noble and gallant Lord on his amendment. It is an incredibly sensible amendment that should not be contentious because, if there are difficulties arising out of natural causes or disaster, it would be unthinkable for His Majesty’s Government to have to continue to pay large sums of money to the Government of Mauritius. I hope that that will be taken on board.
Secondly, I will refer to the treaty, which, at Article 11, talks about the economic partnership between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. There are three parts to that. The first is the annual sum that has to be paid: there has been lots of conversations around what that is and what it might amount to. The second is the trust fund, which the Minister knows I take a particular interest in and which we will discuss in the eighth group of amendments. The third is the multiyear funding as part of a development framework for projects to be undertaken by the Mauritius Government across 25 years. We have heard very little about this multiyear funding. I wonder whether the Minister could elucidate that and give us some details in relation to what that is and what it is thought to be. In the treaty, it says that the amounts, payments and modality for all those three issues will be agreed separately. So it is important for the House to have some clarity in relation to that and I look forward to hearing from the Minister.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I was going to say that this has been an excellent debate, but it has not really been much of a debate seeing as nobody from the Labour side has bothered to get up and try to defend the Government’s actions on this matter. Not even the Foreign Office trade union crowd on the Cross Benches have come along to justify the Government’s actions on this. I note from the media reports that apparently the Mauritian AG is in London for discussions, no doubt to celebrate his brilliantly successful negotiation. He will probably find that the Foreign Office has given him another £100 million today for his trouble in coming over here in the first place.
It would not be right for me to begin my contributions without mentioning the excellent forensic speeches of my noble friends Lord Altrincham and Lady Noakes at Second Reading. It seemed to me very convincing that the Government have increasingly got their numbers wrong. I look forward to the noble Baroness attempting to explain her financial figures again.
I am sure that some noble Lords will argue—maybe the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will—that this agreement has been made and there is nothing we can do about it. They might say that it is an unfortunate oversight, but we cannot change the agreement. However, the treaty, as we have discussed previously, has not yet been ratified; it is not final. The Government could still change their approach. It is unlikely, and it would take political will, but everything is possible.
Now that we know that the treaty is not inevitable and that the overall cost expected when the agreement was reached was wrong, I hope Ministers will take the opportunity to reconsider. In any other walk of life, a decision-maker faced with a significantly higher cost than expected would reassess their position. Why are Ministers failing to take that responsible approach with taxpayers’ money? The Chancellor will get up next week and tell us that the country is bust, and that we need to raise taxes and cut spending, but the FCDO seems to take no account of the extra costs when negotiating this agreement.
My Amendment 22 would require a review of the overall financial cost of the agreement. With such uncertainty about the overall costs, I think this is an entirely reasonable amendment that would give greater transparency to taxpayers on how much of their money will be sent to Mauritius, over time, as we have said before, to fund tax cuts over there. We pay more tax over here, but the Mauritians will be able to cut their taxes with the money that we are very generously sending to them.
As I said, on value for money we are being told to expect spending cuts at the Budget on 26 November. Before the Government cut a single extra service for the British people, Ministers should first consider cutting their surrender deal with the Mauritian Government. In my view, most of the British public would be aghast when presented with the fact that the Government have surrendered territory to a foreign state and simultaneously somehow found themselves paying for the privilege. This is a clear failure to deliver value for money to taxpayers.
My Amendment 70 would require the Government to make a statement explaining why they believe that each payment to Mauritius represents value for money. My Amendment 75 would require the publication of a schedule of expected payments to Mauritius along with their dates. The Government should not resist measures which increase transparency on the financial elements of the agreement.
I gave a wry smile when the noble Lord, Lord Weir, asked the Minister for the breakdown of the costs of this agreement between the MoD budget and the FCDO budget. I hope he has more success than I have in asking this question, because I have asked it five times and she has refused to tell me how much is being paid out of the different budgets. One was beginning to suspect that she does not even know how much money we are handing over on behalf of this deal.
I additionally ask the Minister what powers Ministers have to ensure that the money we hand over to Mauritius is spent as agreed. The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, particularly highlighted the trust fund supposedly set up for the benefit of Chagossians, but how they spend it is entirely within the control of Mauritius. There have been well-documented corruption cases in Mauritius; how do we know how that money will be spent? I think we should be told or Ministers should at least seek to find out.
Finally, Amendment 74 relates to a slightly separate question on the part of the UK-Mauritius agreement relating to the employment of Mauritians on the Diego Garcia military base. I tabled it to ask the noble Baroness some specific questions on the practical effect of the article of this agreement. Can she confirm whether this article means Mauritians will be prioritised for employment on the Diego Garcia military base over, for example, British citizens or Chagossians? Who ultimately would their employer be? This also speaks to value for money. Can the Minister confirm whether her department has made any assessment of the impact of the provisions relating to the employment of Mauritians and how much that will contribute to the cost of running the base?
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
I am not sure that diplomacy is quite the thing for the noble Lord to aspire to. We will move to discussing the amendments that deal with the financial issues and the payments to be made under the treaty. Inevitably in Committee, other issues will be raised as part of the discussions, including those around the trust fund and the way it is managed, as well as security. These are important questions but, if it is okay with noble Lords, it is probably better to deal with them when we reach the appropriate group, so that we can get into sufficient depth when we deal with those specific amendments.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
I was stressing the point that the agreement is about the Chagos Archipelago, but we are interested in Diego Garcia. If Diego Garcia is not available, the treaty requires us to continue to pay Mauritius for the 100 years or whatever it is. We would then be paying for something we do not even have, let alone have the use of. It would seem sensible to have some arrangement in the treaty to cope with this. I am surprised there is not one. If not, how will it be handled?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
We do not expect to be confronted with this situation in the case of Diego Garcia. I am sure there will be adaptations to mitigate this, as there already have been. In the event that sea levels rise to the extent that they would need to in order to make the base unusable, the entire planet would be facing very real threat. That would confront us in very many locations, including Montserrat, St Helena and Ascension. This would probably be the least of our problems.
Out of respect for the noble and gallant Lord and his genuine concern—it is not an unreasonable question— I will reflect on this and try to come back to him with a more thorough response, because I can see that he cares about this and wants to know that the Government have given this the proper consideration that he would expect. I undertake to do that. Luckily, this is the first day of Committee and we have the opportunity to allow ourselves further conversations on these issues.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My concern is that we would have to continue to pay under the present agreement, even though there was not a base available.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I understand fully the nature of the noble and gallant Lord’s concern. He has explained it well and repeatedly, and I have committed to come back to him with a further response. I do not think I can do any more than that tonight.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
Before the noble Baroness leaves that point, I fully respect the noble and gallant Lord’s position on the base not being available due to natural disasters—or, as we called it when I was a solicitor, an act of God—but what happens if the base becomes simply unusable because of an act of aggression by a bad actor in 50 years’ time, which we have no sight of at this moment? The point is that if it becomes unusable for whatever reason, whether by act of God or an act of aggression, will we still continue to pay for a base that we cannot use?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I simply cannot answer that because it would depend so much on the circumstances and on who would be culpable. I do not know. I will think about that and come back to the noble Baroness. It is very difficult to respond to hypotheticals. I could create a few hypotheticals that answer those specific questions but I do not think that would necessarily get us anywhere. She is probably after something a little more concrete than that. I will give that some further thought and see whether I can come back to her with something more satisfactory. I guess, ultimately, that if there is some unavailability we have the option of breaching the terms of the agreement through non-payment, which would end the agreement. However, I will look into our legal position in that situation and make sure we have some clarity so that we can consider this further if we need to.
On the issue of the split and how the money will be found, the noble Lord opposite—in his usual charming way—suggests that we have not really thought about this. Some of the money will come from the FCDO and some from the MoD. It is all government money; it is all taxpayers’ money. I really do not understand the preoccupation with this. That split will be fair. We are very used to paying for things jointly. We do it all the time on various things. This is not an unusual situation.
Lord Callanan (Con)
Will the Minister tell us how much? There is a difference between the money that is spent from her aid budget in the FCDO and the money spent from the MoD. If it is such a simple, straightforward issue that she keeps brushing the question aside then why not just give us the figures? How much of it is coming from the MoD budget and how much of it is coming from the ODA budget, which is, of course, capped?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
It is not capped, actually. Not all ODA money is spent by the FCDO. The MoD spends ODA as well. Not all money spent by the FCDO is ODA. You can spend ODA only on certain activities in certain places. My reading of the OECD rules is that I do not think the DAC would allow us to spend ODA for the purpose of paying for a military base. That does not mean we could not spend ODA in Mauritius if we wanted to—we have a very small programme there at the moment. I hope that helps. The noble Lord may wish to go away and read up on the DAC rules, which might assist him in answering this question.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I was not asking for an explanation of how the different split works between Foreign Office money and ODA money; I was simply asking her how much of the Bill is spent from the Foreign Office budget and how much of it is spent from the MoD budget. I do not see what is so difficult about answering a simple question.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
But the noble Lord did ask me about ODA.
Lord Callanan (Con)
That was part of the question: how much is coming out of the ODA budget?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
It is not coming out of the ODA budget—that is my point—but that does not mean it is not coming out of the FCDO budget, which is different. Does that help the noble Lord?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I do not know how much will be from the FCDO and how much will be from the MoD. It is not ODA, which is the bit I am responsible for. I do not fully understand—perhaps the noble Lord could tell me—why it makes a difference to him how much comes from the FCDO and how much comes from the MoD. I might be better able to assist him if he wishes to explain why this is important. It is not ODA, if that is his concern.
Lord Callanan (Con)
That is an interesting clarification that I have not heard before. Is she telling us, then, that none of the money funding this agreement comes out of the ODA budget?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
You cannot pay for a military base out of your development budget.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I have not given way; I have had enough of this. The noble Lord should probably write to me and explain his question, because we are clearly not getting very far with this. If the noble Baroness on the Back Bench wants to have a go and puts it in a different way, I would be very happy to try to answer.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
The Minister wants this in writing, but unless I am particularly stupid, I thought it was a very simple question.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
The question was: how much is going to be from the ODA budget? I have answered that, and I do not know how to answer that any more clearly. As for how much comes from the FCDO and how much from the MoD, the Treasury will allocate us different amounts of money for different things. I do not quite understand why that makes a difference to the noble Lord—
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I know the Minister was not attracted by the charms of the Front Bench, so I will try slightly differently. I suppose what we are trying to establish first of all is the percentage breakdown between the FCDO and the MoD. It matters because if this is not additional money, there will be a level of opportunity cost. If, for example, we are eating into the MoD budget, that money could be spent on other things. I think, from what I have gathered from what the Minister has said, that the bulk of the money would come from the MoD because of restrictions, but it would be useful to have percentage terms.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Okay, I will see whether we can get that. I do not know that that will be consistent over time, and I do not know whether the Treasury will want to be making that clear from now on. The MoD is deciding to buy itself some capability with this money. It is a significant investment, but it is not beyond the realms of what the MoD would spend on a capability such as this. That is my understanding. Exactly how much comes from each department will be published as we go along, because these things are published in the ordinary run of things.
The confusion in my mind comes from the interchangeable use of “ODA” and “FCDO”, and they are clearly different things. I look after the ODA budget, but the FCDO spends an awful lot more than just ODA. The MoD spends the ODA, too, as does DESNZ, the Department of Health, Defra and many other departments. Does this help noble Lords? Are we getting somewhere?
On Amendments 70, 74 and 75, all tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, I repeat that Parliament has already agreed the principles of the treaty and has not decided to vote against ratification. Any requirement for further approval from Parliament for the payments ignores the thorough and correct process that the treaty and Bill have already gone through and risks undermining the treaty, since non-payment by the UK is a ground for termination.
Regarding Amendment 74, I reassure noble Lords that there are no impacts on the cost of running the base from Article 10. This article pertains to the normal contractual arrangements, with any preference being to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with existing policies, requirements, laws and regulations.
Finally, regarding Amendment 75, I remind noble Lords that an annual payment to Mauritius is a fundamental part of the agreement, and this principle, and the amounts of those payments, were published in full on the day of treaty signature. I hope that in the light of this, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
I asked the Minister a specific question about whether His Majesty’s Government knew about India and Mauritius. Did they know or not?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Of course we knew. My understanding is that this pre-dated negotiations and refers to something on the island of Mauritius itself. if I am wrong about that, I will correct the record and inform the noble Baroness.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
With the Committee’s permission, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago should the Agreement be terminated.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 6 is linked to Amendment 79 in this group. Amendment 6 would link the Bill’s effect to the treaty. If we were to make this amendment, the moment the treaty ceased to have effect, so would this legislation. Amendment 79 would require the Government to publish a statement of their understanding of the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago, should the underlying treaty be terminated.
The reason behind these amendments is that the wording of Clause 2, which would stand on the statute book even if the treaty itself were revoked, is clear only that:
“His Majesty is no longer sovereign over”
the Chagos Archipelago. However, it does not state that Mauritius would be sovereign over the archipelago. The Hong Kong Act was worded similarly and did not grant China sovereignty; it merely revoked Her Majesty’s sovereignty. This means that the only document establishing Mauritian sovereignty over the islands is the UK-Mauritius agreement. If that agreement were terminated, what would be the status of the islands? That is the question that we are putting to the Government.
Interestingly, it is not the case that we could not state in the Bill that Mauritius has sovereignty. There is precedent for that, and it would perhaps state the position more clearly. If noble Lords cast their minds back to the Heligoland–Zanzibar Treaty of 1890—which saw Britain cede sovereignty of Heligoland, a series of islands in the North Sea off Schleswig-Holstein—they will remember that that was in exchange for a free hand in respect of the independent Sultanate of Zanzibar. The Anglo-German Agreement Act 1890, which gave effect to that treaty, stated specifically, in the Schedule, that
“the sovereignty over the Island of Heligoland, together with its dependencies, is ceded by Her Britannic Majesty to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany”.
Can the Minister explain why the Bill follows the example of the 1985 Act and not the clearer precedent of the 1890 Act?
My noble friend Lord Lilley’s Amendment 12 seeks to deliver clarity that the UK can regain sovereignty. That would be a better outcome than an explicit statement that Mauritius will have sovereignty in perpetuity. Whatever the Government’s position on the legal status of the archipelago under this legislation, I believe that, either way, we deserve some clarity.
My Amendment 77 also seeks to resolve a lack of legislative clarity that arises from the fact that the Bill is implementing the more detailed treaty. The treaty provides for the creation of a joint commission, but we have precious little detail on the commission. My amendment would require the UK Government to set out the process that they intend to follow, alongside the Government of Mauritius, to establish the commission. I am sure that the Government will resist the amendment, but I hope that there will be an opportunity for the Minister at least to set out the Government’s expectations of the process that will be followed. Can the Minister say where, when and how often the commission is expected to meet? Who is expected to be appointed to represent the UK Government on it? Will they be a political appointment or a civil servant, and how will they be appointed? I assume that we will have a senior representative, but if the Minister could tell us who or what it might be, that would aid the Committee in its consideration of the Bill.
These are all very important questions that should be answered before we proceed with the Bill. So far, the Government have sought to avoid debate, resisted consultation and prevented transparency, but I hope the Minister can do better in her response to the amendments in this group. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Beith) (LD)
My Lords, if this amendment is agreed to, I will be unable to call Amendment 7 by reason of pre-emption.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 89 in my name and in support of the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.
At Second Reading, I raised the broad issue of the royal prerogative, and the Minister is aware of my, perhaps inquisitive, interest in that. That broad power is in Clause 3, and the specific reference to His Majesty’s power to make Orders in Council comes in at Clause 5, particularly in Clause 5(1)(a). That is powerful. For the benefit of the Chamber, I repeat what that says:
“His Majesty may by Order in Council … make any provision that appears to His Majesty to be appropriate as a result of the Treaty”.
The following paragraph goes on to explain that that can be a
“consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision in relation to … this Act, or … an Order under paragraph (a)”.
I want to thank the Minister for her letter, which she very kindly sent to me yesterday. In it, she alludes to this particular issue and says that “Clause 5 of the Bill creates a new statutory power for His Majesty to make such provision by Orders in Council as he considers appropriate as a result of the treaty”. This led to my Amendment 89, because I am just trying to seek clarification of this power. In particular, I want to establish whether that power can be used by His Majesty, for example, to withdraw the United Kingdom as a party to the treaty and withhold any payment due to Mauritius if Mauritius violates any terms of the treaty.
This is not a lengthy matter for discussion. In responding, I would ask the Minister, if she opposes my amendment, and I anticipate that she may, to be specific about the ground of objection. It may be that she says, “I don’t want the Secretary of State being mixed up in anything like this, it’s just unnecessary and tiresome and he’s got enough on his plate without being burdened with all that”. On the other hand, she might consider that this is an incompetent use of the royal prerogative. I would be interested in understanding that better.
It would be more alarming if the Minister said that she does not consider that, if Mauritius violates any terms of the treaty, the UK will be able to withdraw and cease payment. It is rather along the lines of the point raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, who is not in his place. There is a basic issue about whether the thing is working or not. In his case, the thing is not working because the base has disappeared under the ocean. In the dim and distant past in contract law there was something called “frustration of the contract”: if the underlying purpose disappeared, the contract evaporated. The Minister has undertaken to investigate that further and we shall await that.
I really want to understand, if Mauritius violates the treaty, what practical solution is available to the UK: whether it is paying the money, coming out of the treaty or taking whatever other remedial action is necessary. I shall look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in relation to Amendment 77 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on the process for the establishment of the joint commission. This is critically important because, while the treaty does talk about the process of setting up the joint commission in Annex 3, there is no determination as to whether that person, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said, will be a Member of Parliament, will be accountable to Parliament or will be a civil servant. It would be very helpful if we had more detail in relation to that matter.
It brings me back to my days studying constitutional law at Queen’s University, Belfast, when Professor Brigid Hadfield used to lecture us about the mischief behind the law. She would say, “Read the debate in Parliament to find out what the mischief was”. I was just thinking of her there when I was listening to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. It would be really useful to find out what the Government’s position is in relation to this joint commission, because it could be a very critical part of the post-agreement scenario, where there is accountability to this place. I would really welcome clarity in relation to that matter.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, I would like to address Amendments 11 and 12 in my name, which both relate to the terms of the lease. Over the years, I have often heard leaseholders wish they had, or propose to acquire, the freehold. They feel that, as leaseholders, they are in a very inferior position and that the freeholder has the whip hand and, of course, at the end of the lease, the freeholder, like as not, gets everything back and leaseholders potentially lose everything. This is the first time I have ever heard of someone wanting to swap a freehold for a leasehold and, at the same time, claiming that they will be more secure as a result. Of course, they will not—and even less secure, given the terms of this agreement. Amendment 11 relates to whether or not the lease is renewable.
The lease is dealt with in Article 13 of the treaty, which says that it has a duration of 99 years. What happens at the end of 99 years? Is it automatically renewable? No. Under Article 13.5, the UK has a right to first refusal for a further 40 years on the same terms as offered to any third state. There we have it. Mauritius can offer the UK-US base to a third state in 99 years’ time and force the UK and USA to outbid some other bidder—it might be China, India, Iran or any other country with interests in the Indian Ocean around it, such as Saudi Arabia. There are lots of countries that can afford and might like to have this base. We would have to outbid them to retain what had been maintained and invested in for the previous 99 years. I have no reason to suppose that it would not be as valuable in the future then as it is now.
Lord Lilley (Con)
Probably to get some more money. Indeed, we should have dealt with that in the previous session on money. How much more money is he asking for? One understands there are debates in Mauritius saying they have done so well that they should now reopen discussions and get a little more.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, I am not sure if the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, wants a serious response to that last comment. I will respond to the noble Lord’s point that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Yes, this is true, but if the asset is legally contested to the extent that a close ally is no longer investing in it, and third-party friends and allies are possibly unwilling to support its operability, I would say that possession of that asset is worth a lot less than one that has legal certainty, the investment of the United States and the ability to operate it, because third parties will not be questioning the legal basis on which it is held. But we have been through this at some length already.
I turn to the amendments in the group concerning various mechanisms surrounding termination and the extension of the treaty. We will deal with the issue of sovereignty and termination in a subsequent group. On Amendments 6, 12, 79 and 89 about the implications of terminating the treaty, I should remind the House that there are extremely limited grounds for termination once the treaty is in force, both of which are within the UK’s control. The first would be if we did not pay the sums due under Article 11. Secondly, to answer the point made by the noble Lord, it would be in the case of an armed attack, or threat of one by the United Kingdom on Mauritius, or one directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia. This base is, of course, to be operated by the United Kingdom and the United States together.
It is in our interests that the grounds for termination are limited in this way. It means that Mauritius is unable unilaterally to terminate the agreement except in very specific circumstances. These amendments would therefore force us to reopen negotiations on an area in which we have already secured the strongest terms, and which have also been endorsed by our US allies. It is also highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination. It is important that we understand and are clear about that.
On Amendment 11, Article 13 already sets out the basis on which we can extend the duration of the treaty, including our right of first refusal. The treaty will last for an initial 99 years and may be extended for a further 40 years and beyond, by agreement between the UK and Mauritius. Even if no agreement were reached, the UK would have the right to first refusal on the use of Diego Garcia. If exercised, this would prevent the use of the base by any other party. I was asked—I think by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, but it may have been another noble Lord—how exactly this would work and on what terms. I will get a full answer on this specific point. For today, I am relying on the right of first refusal. I will come back to noble Lords and clarify exactly what is meant by this.
I welcome the interest shown by Amendment 77 in the establishment of the joint commission. Its precise structure is still being developed and will continue to be a point of negotiation between the UK, Mauritius and the US. This includes the development of terms of reference as to how the joint commission will function. However, the following principles have already been agreed, as set out in Annexe 3 to the treaty. I think these answer some of the points that were put, although, because we are still negotiating, it is useful to get the responses, understanding and views of noble Lords on some of these things. The joint commission shall consist of one senior representative from each party as co-chairs, and four additional representatives from each party. The US shall have the right to introduce items for discussion in the joint commission and to designate a representative to attend meetings and provide views and advice. The joint commission shall meet at least twice a year, or more frequently on the request of either party. All decisions of the joint commission shall be taken with the agreement of both parties.
While I welcome the opinions of noble Lords on the best means of keeping the House informed on the development of the joint commission, I do not think that a statutory obligation to publish a statement would be the most appropriate means of doing so, although I will think about this a little more.
On this issue of prerogative and the law on Diego Garcia, this applies only to the law on Diego Garcia. We did have quite a complex exchange about this in one of our briefing conversations and it does not apply to the operation of the treaty, so it would not concern non-payment or any of those other issues. It is only about the law as it applies to Diego Garcia. I hope that that is helpful and that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions. As usual, my noble friend Lord Lilley made an excellent contribution to the debate, and I thank the Minister for her reply. I do not think she has answered all the questions that we asked, or certainly that I asked—I know that she answered some, but not all. She set out the legal position on the commission, as it is in the treaty, but she has not provided any more details on who will be its members, how they will do the appointments et cetera. I would be grateful if she would write to us with the details of that.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I would never deliberately not answer a question from the noble Lord. I have set out what has been agreed so far, and I have explained that the commission is subject to negotiation and that I will commit to updating the House. I do not quite understand the niggle in the noble Lord’s voice.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am not being niggly; I am just repeating the questions that I asked. Who will be the members of the commission? How will they be appointed? Those are the questions that I asked. She set out the numbers, which we could see from the original agreement, but she has not provided the further details that we asked for. I did say that she had answered some of the questions but not all of them.
The long-term legal status of the archipelago is supposedly the driving motivation behind the Government’s decision to seek this agreement with Mauritius, so I think the questions that have been posed are entirely reasonable to seek clarity on the status of what would happen should the treaty be revoked.
I also think we need clarity on the UK’s right to withdraw from the treaty and withhold payments in line with the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Goldie. I think that that is all the information we are going to get out of the Minister tonight so, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Lilley
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has—(a) sought to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius on whether Mauritius will establish a right for Chagossians to return and reside in the Chagos Islands, and(b) laid before both Houses of Parliament a report on progress on establishing such negotiations with the Government of Mauritius and the outcome of any that have taken place.(2B) Within two months of the report being laid under paragraph (2A(b), the Secretary of State must table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the contents of the report.(2C) In this section “Chagossians” are defined as those eligible for British citizenship under section 4 of the Act, and their descendants.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires that the Government must undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return, with a report laid before Parliament on the outcome of the negotiations. The Government must subsequently table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the content of that report.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Amendment 10 deals with the issue of resettlement. This is a very sensitive issue, one that Chagossians feel very deeply about. But Article 6 of the agreement, which is entitled “Resettlement of Chagossians”, fails to give any right to Chagossians to resettle. The wording of Article 6 is:
“In the exercise of its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, Mauritius is free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago other than Diego Garcia. Such resettlement shall be implemented in conformity with the terms of this Agreement and the laws of Mauritius”.
Let us be clear: there is no right for Chagossians to resettle; there is no obligation on Mauritius to resettle the Chagossians. Mauritius is simply free to do resettlement but it does not specify that that resettlement has to be by Chagossians. It could resettle it with Mauritians—just as, when I used to work in Indonesia, it resettled Javans on the various islands such as Borneo and Sumatra. All we are doing is saying that Mauritius can do what it likes—it can do or not do anything that is to the benefit of the Chagossians, or it can give away their former lands and islands to other people—and we will effectively sanctify that through our agreement to Article 6.
Back in 2015, the British Government looked at the possibility of resettlement and asked KPMG to do a study of how much it would cost and how feasible it was. A year later, KPMG came out with a report which stated that resettlement was possible. It would cost certain sums depending how much resettlement was done. If there was a pilot community of 150 people, that would cost in those days £63 million—in current money, that would be about £80 million to £90 million. If there was a medium-sized settlement of 500 people, that would cost about £200 million in today’s money, and if there was a large community of 1,500 people, which is more than the population of Chagos in 1965, that would cost in today’s money £570 million. That is a large sum, but it is much smaller than the sums we have committed to pay Mauritius over the life of this deal. They are largely one-off sums, whereas we are talking of paying Mauritius initially an average of £110 million, inflation adjusted, plus some lump sums and some bringing forward of money in the early period.
We could certainly start a pilot community of Chagossians back in the Chagos Islands for a fraction of what we are otherwise committed to spend on this agreement, so I understand why Chagossians feel really let down and sold out that we are prepared to pay so much money to Mauritius and to designate none of that to their potential resettlement. We pretend to by having this Article entitled “Resettlement of Chagossians”, but it gives no guarantee that the money will be spent in this way.
The study by KPMG looked into the practicalities. The reason it costs money is that we will have to rebuild facilities. On some of the islands there was a church, a hospital, buildings and so on that have fallen into rack and ruin. They would have to be re-established, and there would have to be transport facilities for the envisaged resettled communities to link up with each other and the outside world, but I again point out that these are not huge sums. This is not impossible. It is something that many in the Chagossian community, in the UK, in Mauritius even more, in the Seychelles and elsewhere would like to undertake, but they are not going to be able to undertake it unless Mauritius says so, and one gets the feeling that Mauritius is not terribly well disposed to the idea, otherwise it would not have negotiated such harsh terms in Article 6, which imposes no obligation on it to do so.
I ask Ministers to think again about this and to go back to the Mauritians and say, “I’m sorry, we have”—as they will have done by then—“consulted the Chagossians. We found how eager many of them are to resettle. Many more are eager to have the right of return to visit the graves of their ancestors, the places where they were born and the churches where they worshipped, and we feel they should be given that right, and if we’re going to settle a trust fund on you, we want to be sure it’s going to be used for those purposes as well as perhaps a chunk of the money we’re paying you in rent”. I hope the Minister will look at that in a positive way, given her evident sympathy for the Chagossians, and tell us that there is going to be a little hint of some more positive news that we can give the Chagossian community. I beg to move.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I will speak briefly in support of the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan, in this group. On resettlement, what we have in the treaty may be described as less than useless. I say that because, to a certain extent, it confers a right that is already there, but it underlines it in such a way and denies others that right. The treaty explicitly says that there is a right for Mauritius to resettle people.
If we have handed over sovereignty to Mauritius, people implicitly have a right to resettle on the other islands anyway but, actually, it very much underlines that Mauritius is completely in control; it is completely in the driving seat. There is a lack of reference to the Chagossians: yes, Mauritius may choose to allow some Chagossians back, but it may choose also to deny them. There is no specific right for the Chagossians.
If, as has been mentioned across the Chamber, we are to try to rectify some of the many ills that we have done to the Chagossian people over the years, having at least some level of right of return is the bare minimum that we should be looking for here. The concern is that, from the point of view of Mauritius, the implication will be that, if it is to allow back some Chagossians, they will be the hand-picked Chagossians who have played ball with the Mauritian Government. If you are a good boy or a good girl, yes, you may be allowed back. If, however, you have been part of the awkward squad, you may have a much lesser chance of being resettled on the Chagos Islands than, for example, Chinese contractors. That is the problem.
These amendments would at least take a step towards trying to ameliorate and rectify that situation. If we cannot give the Chagossians an opportunity or a right, which is completely missing in the treaty and missing in the Bill, we are not giving them anything.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I just want to add my voice to those of my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord Weir. If the Chagos Islands had remained inhabited, this issue of sovereignty would not have arisen. They would have been in the same category as Gibraltar, the Falklands or any other territory with a permanent population that had expressed its right to self-determination.
Now, you could argue that that would solve our problem in terms of the base. Equally, you could argue that it is the obvious way of making restitution; it is the way of giving back what was taken. But if you flip that around and look at it from the point of view of Mauritius, is that not precisely why you would not want to have a Chagossian population—or an exclusively Chagossian population—in a doughnut in the outer atolls around Diego Garcia?
The last thing you would want is to risk a Chagossian secessionist movement, where the people who had returned to their ancestral homes had made it very clear that they felt no loyalty to the state of Mauritius and that—in most cases, with a few exceptions, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, said—they did not want to be part of it. Therefore, you would have every incentive to settle the place with your own citizens, or with others, so that they were at least a majority.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, for his remarks. Picking up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley—I have a subsequent amendment on the supplementary list, so we may get to it at some point but it is not on today’s list—does the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, agree with me that what makes this lack of provision for resettlement of the Chagossians worse is that we actually have a blueprint, albeit not necessarily perfect, of how this can be achieved, through the KPMG report in 2015? It is not as though we are doing this against a vacuum. We are not only ignoring the right of Chagossians to return but completely ignoring the pathway through which this can happen.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
The noble Lord makes an extremely good point. If you see this purely in fiscal terms, depending on whether we take the Government’s or my noble friend Lady Noakes’s figures, it is an obviously disastrous thing to spend either six times or 60 times as much as in the KPMG report, simply to give to another country.
We keep hearing from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that growth is her priority and so on. Here is a very good way of making a saving: by not giving money away for territory that we already have but, instead, using a much smaller fraction of that sum to make restitution to the people who were removed. It ticks every box.
I mentioned earlier that the Falkland Islands were saved, paradoxically, by the experience of war because it led to investment, it led to fishing and hydrocarbons being exploited around the coasts, and it led to employment opportunities and better transport links. If we had a settled Chagossian population around the base, they would be the obvious people to work as the contractors on the base. Instead of having to import all these Filipinos from Singapore by air, we would have a population there doing the non-military, non-sensitive jobs.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I think Article 6, “Resettlement of Chagossians”, is the most misnamed article in this treaty. It tells us that,
“Mauritius is free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago other than Diego Garcia”.
I am thankful to live in a democracy where I am free to do all manner of things; sometimes I choose not to do all manner of things for various reasons. I am quite sure Mauritius will take the same view in relation to resettlement of Chagossians on the outer islands.
There is no right of resettlement or return in the treaty. I have a later amendment, on the Second Marshalled List, which deals with this. According to the treaty, there is no right of return or no right of resettlement—we need to be very clear on that. I think that is morally wrong. The language in this Bill deals with what I think is a failure of negotiation, to be honest, because I do not think it would have been beyond the wit of man to have had at the very least a right of return, if not a right of resettlement, in the treaty. With the Mauritian AG here in London, what better time to have a discussion about the right of return and the right of resettlement for the Chagossian people?
Amendment 72, in the alternative, seeks to have some accountability for the current aspiration in the treaty—in other words, after it is implemented—to look back and see what is happening in relation to the right of resettlement. That will give some transparency to why the wording in the treaty has been chosen and, again, get to the purpose of the article.
In conclusion, I strongly support both these amendments. It is wrong not to have a right of return and a right of resettlement in the treaty and the way in which it is presented in the treaty is wrong also.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Lilley for leading on this group. The Chagossian community overwhelmingly wants to see a scheme for the resettlement of the archipelago, reversing the forced removal of the islanders in the late 1960s. As we know, many Chagossians living in Mauritius feel that they are treated, even now, as second-class citizens, and this should not be an acceptable situation. We will probe the treatment of the Chagossians in Mauritius more fully when we debate amendments relating to the trust fund.
Many Chagossians still want, understandably, to return to their homeland. The treaty is clear, sadly, that Mauritius shall be free to arrange for resettlement of Chagossians on all the islands of the archipelago except Diego Garcia, but it is not clear in the treaty what this might look like; nor is it clear how likely resettlement actually is in practice. My Amendment 72 is very simple. It merely requires the Government to publish the findings of a review of all discussions between the UK and Mauritius in respect of the resettlement of the islands. The resettlement under the treaty would be for the islands other than Diego Garcia, so this is not something that should undermine the operations of the base. Given that, we cannot see why the Government would be unwilling to share details of their discussions with the Mauritians on resettlement.
Can the Minister please set out clearly how often resettlement was discussed with the Mauritian Government during the negotiations ahead of the treaty, and what her department’s assessment is of the likelihood that Mauritius will establish a scheme for the resettlement of the islands? Would the UK support a resettlement effort financially? Could some of the existing funds that we are giving to Mauritius be used for resettlement? If not, what is the estimated risk that the Mauritian Government would refuse to undertake a resettlement on cost grounds?
In essence, our question to the Government is: what does this treaty mean for the Chagossian community’s hope of resettlement? If, in the Foreign Office’s view, this treaty effectively kills any hope of resettlement, does the Minister not accept that the Government should manage the expectations of the Chagossians and be very clear and transparent with them that that is what they have agreed? We want to end the lack of transparency around the Bill and I hope that the Minister will be able to do that today.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I agree with the noble Lord that transparency and frankness with the Chagossian community is vital, which is why I have resisted some of the discussions around consultations and referendums. To give the impression that a consultation or referendum can elicit change to a treaty that has already been negotiated in a state-to-state negotiation is wrong. On the noble Lord’s question about how often we have discussed resettlement, it has been discussed throughout and repeatedly—of course it has. It is a very important part of the negotiation that we have had with the Government of Mauritius.
We are coming to some amendments on the operation of the trust fund in the next group, but some news will come from Mauritius shortly on exactly how that will operate. I think that will be reassuring for noble Lords and I hope that we get it very soon so that we can include it in our considerations.
I would point out that resettlement now is non-existent. It has not been possible. They have not even been having heritage visits since Covid; the previous Government did not get round to sorting them out. Having said that, it is good that the Conservative Party is now turning some attention to this.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, “But consider if the islands had not been depopulated”. In response, I point out that if the islands had not been depopulated then there would not be a base and we would not have a treaty. They probably would have been returned to Mauritius, as part of decolonisation, and be Mauritian now anyway. I am at a bit of a loss—but the noble Lord is going to tell me now what he was getting at.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
Forgive me, but I am not sure that is quite true. I do not think the Americans wanted the entire archipelago voided of population; they were satisfied with having Diego Garcia. The Minister and I were not born then, but our predecessors went ahead and volunteered the complete evacuation, which was the beginning of all our problems.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
But that is what happened, and it cannot be undone. We are in a situation where there is clearly no prospect of resettlement now on Diego Garcia—I am glad that that has not explicitly come up in debate—but there is the possibility of resettlement on the other islands and the prospect of visits to Diego Garcia in a way that has not happened for some years.
Specifically on the amendments in this group, I do not think that Amendments 10 and 72 are necessary, but I should explain why. Under the terms of the agreement, Mauritius is already free to develop a programme of resettlement on islands other than Diego Garcia. It will be for Mauritius to decide whether it takes that forward. We have already committed to making a ministerial Statement in both Houses, providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement. The agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms, without requiring the UK taxpayer to pick up the bill. We know that would be considerable, because of the KPMG report.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
Our Governments over the past 30 or 40 years refused to allow the Chagossians to go back. Why does the Minister think the Mauritian Government will ever allow them? What if they say, “Absolutely no”. Have we any say? Can we do anything?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
It is for the Mauritian Government to make that decision. I understand the noble Baroness’s scepticism, especially given our reluctance to undertake this. To serve citizens living in such a remote place with so few services is a considerable thing to do, which is why we are very careful and mindful of the warnings that we have heard about not wanting to give false hope or a false impression, or to make this sound straightforward. That guides us all in our discussions. It is, of course, an incredibly difficult prospect and very expensive. There is the trust fund. I do not know how that would operate and whether it would enable some of this to happen. This is for the Government of Mauritius to determine; we are completely clear about that. The noble Baroness might not wish that to be so, but I point out that the UK Government, for over 50 years, have made it absolutely clear that we would not facilitate return to the islands, for security and financial reasons.
On Amendment 72, it is important that negotiations between the UK and Mauritius on this matter—which I completely accept is sensitive—can take place in confidence. Publishing the records of confidential negotiations such as this would be damaging to trust in the UK keeping matters confidential in the future. That relates not just to our negotiations with Mauritius; it would obviously relate to the prospect of our negotiations with other states on other equally or more sensitive matters. With that, I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)
Before the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, stands up, I want to make a statement. Noble Lords will be aware that grouping processes are well established. The deadline of 5 pm is always communicated to all Peers when the groupings are sent out. Late degrouping is discouraged, I am afraid. For this group, the groupings were sent out at 11 am with a deadline of 5 pm and no changes were made. The changes sought by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, were requested shortly before 6 pm. There is nothing procedural to stop the noble Lord degrouping the amendments for separate debate during proceedings today—I am sure he is doing so—but it is inconvenient for the Minister, who might not be able to respond to some of his degrouping.
Amendment 14
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the provisions from coming into force until the Government has ensured that there has been a referendum of the Chagossian people on the question of sovereignty.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for his statement, but the Chief Whip’s Office was informed last night of my intention to degroup these amendments. In fact, it wrote to me and to my noble friend Lord Lilley to ask if I agreed with grouping his amendment with this degrouped amendment. Clearly, there was an expectation from the office that it would do that and then, sometime during the day, that expectation was changed. The noble Lord would have a case if the Chief Whip’s Office had been given no notice whatever and did not know anything about it, but clearly it does. As the Deputy Chairman of Committees indicated, notice has been given and there was an expectation that this would take place.
To go on to the issues in consequence—
Lord Leong (Lab)
I just want to clarify that I have a note here saying that the Chief Whip decided this afternoon. Given how late the change was made, it could not be reflected in Today’s List, which had already been published. I informed the Deputy Chairman of Committees of the degrouping just 10 minutes ago.
Lord Callanan (Con)
Thank you. I think the noble Lord has just confirmed that the Chief Whip decided this afternoon, but the Chief Whip’s office was informed last night. If that was the case, why did the Chief Whip’s office email my noble friend Lord Lilley and me this morning asking whether we were in agreement with his amendment being incorporated in my degrouping? Clearly, there was an expectation that that would happen. The Chief Whip decided this afternoon that he did not want to do that, and it is his right to do that. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Leong, has also acknowledged, it is my right on the Floor of the House to degroup the amendment, which is what I am doing. It seems to me to be a bit of a silly and pointless debate.
I am tempted to quote the late Lady Thatcher in a discussion on referendums, when she argued that they are a practice to be referred to only on constitutional issues. I think that still holds as a good rule of thumb. Where there is a chance that a model of governance is fundamentally altered, politicians may take a direct democratic approach. Despite our reservations, the Chagos Archipelago is about to undergo the most foundational change in its terms of governance. We are giving away sovereignty over the islands in what is another step in a long story of Britain, sadly, failing the Chagossians, the vast majority of whom in a survey released today do not want Mauritius to be in control of their sovereignty. We would not cede sovereignty over a part of these islands to another state without consultation, and it is unlikely that it would happen without a referendum. So why does this principle not hold for the Chagossians? That is the question we are putting to the Government with these amendments.
I am sure that the Government have not applied different principles to different peoples out of pure negligence. The reason the Government will not agree to a referendum on this trajectory-altering decision is because, at heart, they know that this is a dud deal. The Government know they are selling the Chagossian people down the river, all to continue their policy of blind adherence to the opinions of the Attorney-General and international lawyers. They know that they have not taken the necessary steps to ensure that this is what is best for both the British and Chagossian populations. They know that, if given the choice, the Chagossian people would almost certainly choose for the archipelago to remain British.
A poll conducted by the Friends of the British Overseas Territories and endorsed by Whitestone Insight found that 99% of the 3,389 Chagossians who responded to the poll were in favour of the archipelago remaining British. It is simple: the Chagossian community overwhelmingly opposes this Bill, and that is why the Government have not consulted it properly—because they do not want to receive an answer that they do not like. That is why the Government will also, I suspect, resist a referendum on the Chagossians.
It is also puzzling that other noble Lords—sadly, not many of them are in the Chamber at this late hour—have not tabled their own amendments on a referendum. Certain members of the Foreign Office contingent that normally sits over there were in favour of two referendums on our EU membership, but it seems that they are not in favour of even a single one for the Chagossians.
The Liberal Democrats’ foreign affairs spokesman, Al Pinkerton, was very clear on his party’s support for a referendum. He said that the Liberal Democrats stood for Chagossian sovereignty over their own citizenship and protection of their rights. He said that
“this Bill fails the Chagossian people”
because it continues the injustice of taking decisions about the Chagos Islands
“without the consent of those most affected”.
The referendums that we are proposing would actually ask for the consent of those most affected. This was, he said, to be remedied through
“a referendum of the Chagossian people themselves”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 756.]
I was sad to see that there was no Liberal Democrat amendment on a referendum. That prompted me to put my amendments down for debate, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lilley for also tabling his own amendments.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. He absolutely put his amendment down. At first, I thought I would do him the courtesy of listening to how effective he was going to be in making his argument. So far, I am finding out that, the more briefly he speaks, the more persuasive he is.
Lord Callanan (Con)
It is not my fault if the Liberal Democrats do not want to be consistent on this.
The point is that colleagues of the noble Lords to my left have argued in the other place for a referendum, but the Liberal Democrats in your Lordships’ House have done nothing. The noble Lord has tabled just two amendments, only one of which is consequential. When we debated ratification, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, withdrew his amendments to the Motion without a Division. I think that speaks a thousand volumes. It seems that it falls to my noble friends on these Benches to stand up for the Chagossians and ask for the referendum that they rightly deserve. I beg to move.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I support my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment. My own amendment also calls for a referendum. The Government have given priority to the Mauritians—and, indeed, to some extent, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice—maintaining what they think of as territorial integrity over the right to self-determination. That should not be the case. Under international law, the right of a group within a decolonised area to self-determination has priority over so-called territorial integrity. It is very regrettable that that has not yet been conceded.
When we come to vote on this subject on Report, as no doubt we will, I very much hope that this will be an area where there is widespread support across the House. I very much hope that the Liberal Democrats will support a vote requiring a referendum among the Chagossian people over the right to self-determination. We are told that they did so in the Commons. In fact, they were so moved by it and thought it such an important issue that they voted against the whole Bill at Third Reading.
So far, the amendments the Liberal Democrats have tabled cannot be said to be amendments that would require a referendum. Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, would require that
“a Minister of the Crown must engage with the Government of the Republic of Mauritius with a view to establishing a Joint Parliamentary Commission”.
We are getting “could”, “may” and “might” added together.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I will speak to the noble Lord’s amendment first, because I am informing the House about it, and then he can tell me where I am wrong.
Amendment 80 would require that, having engaged with the Mauritian authorities to set up this joint commission, and having perhaps persuaded them to do so:
“The Minister of the Crown must further propose that the Commission’s responsibilities include … evaluating the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including … the right of return”
and
“the right to self-determination”.
We would therefore have to seek the Mauritians’ agreement on setting up a commission and then propose to that commission that it does something to evaluate the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, which would include the right of return and to self-determination. However, this amendment, if we were to accept it, contains absolutely no requirement for the House to support a referendum. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that this convoluted chain of events would lead to such a recommendation.
The final sentence of the amendment reads:
“If the Commission described in subsection (1) is established, within five years of the commencement of the Treaty”,
et cetera. The commission is not envisioned to even get going for several years, and the amendment is probably realistic to recognise this. I am looking forward to a serious Liberal amendment, or their support for serious amendments from me and my noble friend that would require a referendum. I give way to the noble Lord, now that he knows more about what his amendment says.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for intervening when he was moving his amendment. I am flattered by being so courted by the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley. Historians will be aware that the Rough Wooing was not entirely successful in my Border area. I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that I am sure he will be able to clarify. He is aware that the House of Commons voted on Amendment 9 for a referendum. Tabled by my colleagues, it would have required the Government to seek to
“undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return and on a referendum”
for Chagossians on self-determination. Parliament has voted on this already. The Division was 319 votes against and 83 in favour. The Conservatives did not support it. Why?
Lord Lilley (Con)
I am afraid I cannot tell the noble Lord that. I read the debate and it was not clear that there was much focus on the Liberal amendment. He has read out part of it; it covered lots of other things and they probably thought it was a bit wishy-washy.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I do not think that is quite acceptable. Amendment 9 was voted on, and it included everything that the noble Lord asked of me. Why did the Conservatives not support it?
Lord Lilley (Con)
I do not know. I am not an official representative of the Conservative Party. I am flattered that the noble Lord thinks I control the Conservative Party in the Commons and in this place. I do not do either. I have not had any ministerial role since about 2000. I may give the impression of having power and influence beyond that which I really do, and I am flattered that he should think so.
I would like to see the Liberal Democrats support us. We know that, if they do, we will win, but they seem unlikely to do so. It is clear that they have done a deal with the Government. They will never defeat the Government on issues of substance because, if they do, they will not get as many peerages as they want next time. Let us be quite clear about this. It is as shoddy as that underneath this, I suspect. I hope I am wrong—I may well be. I often am.
It would be a wonderful thing, and we may be able to achieve something for the Chagossians in the shape of getting an amendment on Report—not now, because we are in Committee—which has the support of a majority in this House. If we carry it out, the odds are that the Chagossian people will declare that they do not want to be incorporated in Mauritius and would prefer to remain citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory and British subjects. In that case, we should honour and support their decision when it is taken. I look forward to a Damascene conversion by the Liberal party to this amendment.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, we are almost having another debate on the referendum, which I spoke to on the original amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, earlier. The referendum is probably one of the most important aspects of the Bill, because it is fair and needed and the Chagossians really want it. I am not really interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said about what happened on the amendment on a referendum in the other place, because it was not in the manifesto. As far as I am concerned, we in this Committee should be able to make up our own minds and should certainly not be stopped from moving amendments to the Bill just because the other place has decided something.
It is so just so antidemocratic. I am amazed that the Labour Back-Benchers are going along with this. They are not here—does that mean that they do not actually support the Bill but are having to be loyal? It is a shocking Bill. As the noble Lord said at the beginning, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said at Second Reading, this must rate as the worst Bill that Labour have brought forward—which is quite difficult, as there have been so many awful Bills. They just cannot justify it.
These amendments tonight are very important, and I hope that, when we come back on Report, many more Members will have actually read what has gone on in this debate and recognised that to support a referendum is the right thing to do.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their comments on this. I feel that we have discussed the issue of a referendum fairly comprehensively, as the noble Baroness suggested.
The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, pointed the finger at the Lib Dems and accused them of inconsistency. I do not always see eye to eye with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, nor with the Liberal Democrats, but if you want consistency on this issue, I do not think you could do much better than the noble Lord or his colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who has championed the rights of the Chagossians for very many years. I have frankly never heard a peep out of the noble Lord opposite or from many of his colleagues on this topic, the rights of Chagossians, resettlement or anything else to do with the Chagos Islands. If we are after consistency, then the Liberal Democrats have, to be fair, been pretty consistent on this issue for very many years now.
On the issue of a referendum, I remind the Committee that negotiations on the treaty were between the UK and Mauritius, with our priority being to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. The Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population nor has ever been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population can therefore arise. This has been tested in the English courts, as we said in our earlier debate, in a series of judgments since the 1970s. The transfer of sovereignty does not deprive the Chagossians of any existing right.
A time for a referendum or some formal legal basis of a consultation would have been prior to this point, maybe even prior to or during some of the 11 rounds of negotiation undertaken by the previous Government. This is despite the fact that they clearly now think that there is absolutely no legal risk to the security of the islands. It is really important that we do not allow the Chagossian community to have the impression that a consultation or a referendum held now would in any way be able to affect a treaty that has already been agreed by two Governments and that we have been instructed to ratify by votes in both Houses. The Bill has also been through all its processes in the other place.
With that, I hope the noble Lord decides to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
The Minister will not be surprised that I am not convinced by her arguments. I am sure this is something that we will return to at later stages of the Bill but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, it is now 10.48 pm. There are not many Members remaining in the Chamber. The next group of amendments is very long and relates to a very important issue, so I invite the Government to resume the House at this stage.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, we are very happy to continue. As I said earlier, the degrouping was done very late. I have been instructed that we have to carry on until the next group.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I note that, in the supplementary Marshalled List of amendments, the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, has two amendments which pertain to the environment. It would be much better if those were attached to the next grouping. Therefore, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that this is a good point to adjourn.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, following on from that, these amendments coming up are on really important environmental issues that the government party says it cares about very much. I know that there may well have been some agreement, but we Back-Benchers who are not in any political party do not get asked about our agreements on anything, so I would formally like to propose that this House do now resume.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, degrouping after groups have been published goes against what is clearly in the Companion. It is to be discouraged, as a consequence of the Procedure Committee clearly outlining in 2022 why it is, in effect, a discourtesy to the House. This has happened. Sometimes there are consequences to these discourtesies, which is why the Companion indicates that they should be discouraged, and that is when colleagues are under the understanding that reaching certain target groups will be adhered to. It is up to all colleagues to offer due respect to other colleagues who take part in these groupings, but I have been watching the clock on a number of occasions when colleagues have gone far beyond what is considered a courtesy to the Committee in the Companion. There are consequences to how we conduct our debates; one is that we should adhere to our understanding and consider the next group.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I actually move that this House do now resume.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
The noble Baroness has moved that the House do now resume. I will take advice as to whether it is debateable. It is debateable, in which case the Motion now stands before the Committee.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I wish to oppose the noble Baroness in the suggestion, because I think we have made some good progress this evening and had some good debates. We are about to discuss some very important issues around the marine protected area. I am here and ready to do that, despite the bizarre late degrouping for no apparent reason, when we had a repeat of an earlier debate. I think it would be good to make some progress this evening.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I imagine that the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, would want his two amendments grouped with the other marine protected area amendments. Unfortunately, he is not here. It would be good to have all those amendments grouped together, so that we could have a thorough exposition of the environment, instead of part of it tonight and part of it next Tuesday. I would have preferred it if my Amendment 20A was grouped with the right of Chagossians to return, which was already debated but, because it was not, it now has to wait until next week. So I think there is an argument to have the next group next week, so that all the marine environment amendments can be heard together.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
My Lords, the Question has been put that the House do now resume. I must now put that Question. I think on a show of voices the Not-Contents have it.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, would it be helpful if I move that the House do now adjourn?
Noble Lords
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
Obviously, we are not going to have a vote now, but it would be helpful for those of us who are non-aligned in this House to have more communication than we have had to date in relation to these matters. There seem to be quite a few of us.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Perhaps I might say to the noble Baroness that communication with regard to the degrouping was not equally applied to all, so I have sympathy with her. Perhaps if we continue with this group now, we might conclude this evening in an amicable way.
Amendment 15
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the provisions from coming into force until the Government has published its plan to ensure the long term protection of the Chagos Marine Protected Area.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, in moving my Amendment 15 I will speak also to Amendments 16, 66 and 73, which are also in my name in this group.
The treaty is clear that Mauritius shall have the duty to conserve and protect the environment, in particular in respect of the marine protected area. It also commits the UK to provide support and assistance to Mauritius in the establishment and management of its marine protected area in the Chagos Archipelago.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 60, 65 and 68 on the protection and preservation of native and migratory bird species, protection against illegal fishing and, generally, marine conservation. Chagossians support these amendments and want to see His Majesty’s Government implementing them.
First, I will deal with the protection and preservation of native and migratory bird species. Amendment 60 not only represents an environmental concern but a kind of power that, as the indigenous people of the Chagos Islands, they wish to be able to exercise themselves. It sets out the kind of responsible stewardship they want to provide to their own homeland, but the Bill, in Clauses 2 to 4, extinguishes their right to self-government in the islands from which they were forcibly removed by a Labour Government.
The Chagos Archipelago is one of the most important sea bird sanctuaries on earth. It supports some of the largest and least disturbed tropical sea bird colonies remaining anywhere in the world. Scientific surveys by the British Indian Ocean Territory, the Zoological Society and the Chagos Conservation Trust confirm that it holds globally significant populations of species that are in decline elsewhere.
I could go through and name a number of the breeds that are very rare: red-footed boobies breed in very large numbers and tens of thousands of brown noddies, white terns, sooty terns and wedge-tailed shearwaters are nesting successfully nesting on the uninhabited islands that remain free of invasive predators.
Sea birds are not simply wildlife; they are the ecological engine of the entire archipelago. Guano from the large sea bird colonies enriches coastal waters, increasing nitrogen and phosphorus levels that in turn fuel reef productivity. Peer-reviewed research published in Nature shows that reef fish biomass adjacent to healthy seabird colonies can be up to five times higher than the reefs where seabirds have been lost. Protecting seabirds is therefore central to protecting the coral reefs, the lagoon ecosystems and the wider marine food web.
These are not hypothetical risks; they are documented threats to the species of global conservation concern, coming from rats, which can wipe out entire colonies. Light pollution disorientates fledglings. Human disturbance can cause nesting failure. There is a whole range of things. The amendment seeks to create a clear duty to safeguard this irreplaceable natural heritage. It is the kind of environmental care and responsible stewardship that the Chagossians themselves wish to bring to their homeland if they are allowed back and to have self-determination. If this Bill passes in its current form, we will transfer the Chagos Islands to the Republic of Mauritius, a country that is 1,337 miles away and does not even have the capacity, as I said earlier, to reach the islands without assistance from India. We will deny the Chagossian people the opportunity to govern these vital ecological assets. That shows what is at stake. The Chagossian people are asking what needs to be done and what they will lose if we proceed with Clauses 2 to 4. We should not be denying them this as far as the amendment on birds is concerned.
Amendment 65 seeks to introduce a waste management and coastal protection system for the Chagos archipelago. Again, I am sure that noble Lords will agree with this because the ecological consequences are serious and well documented—the risk of ghost nets ensnaring endangered green and hawksbill turtles as well as red-footed boobies, which I have already mentioned, brown noddies and reef sharks. When these nets become caught on the reef crest, they break the coral colonies and accelerate degradation.
It is a most significant protected marine area, covering more than 640,000 square kilometres, including a very large share of the remaining high-quality coral reefs in the Indian Ocean. Seabird-driven nutrient cycles, which sustain high fish biomass on adjacent reefs, are disrupted when plastics and fishing gear interfere with nesting colonies. The Chagossian people know this better than anyone. They have told us that keeping their coastline clean is a matter of identity, stewardship and duty. They want to remove the waste that arrives from other nations and prevent further debris entering their waters. That is an essential part, to them, of caring for their homeland. This amendment is not merely about waste but about justice. It is about whether this House, currently denying the Chagossian people any act of self-determination, will also deny them the ability to protect the beaches, reefs and nesting grounds of their homeland. I hope that this amendment will be supported by noble Lords.
Amendment 68 concerns protection against illegal fishing. It would require the Secretary of State to establish a system of patrols and monitoring to prevent illegal fishing within Chagos territorial waters and the surrounding marine protected areas. It would require the Secretary of State to establish a clear system of patrols and monitoring within the Chagos territorial waters and the surrounding marine protected areas. It is exactly what the Chagossian community have said they would want to do for themselves if Clauses 2 to 4 of this Bill were not going through and the United Kingdom was relinquishing sovereignty. The evidence of illegal fishing in these waters is real and well documented. The Chagos marine protected area spans more than 640,000 square kilometres, an area the size of France. It is formally designated as a fully no-take zone, yet its remoteness has made it a target for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Satellite monitoring, vessel tracking systems and analysis by global monitoring groups such as Global Fishing Watch have on multiple occasions detected foreign longliners operating close to, and in some instances within, the BIOT waters.
Enforcement records maintained by the British Indian Ocean Territory Administration confirm that vessels have been intercepted while illegally targeting tuna, sharks and other species. Past patrols have confiscated shark fins, prohibited gear and long lines, providing clear physical evidence of illegal extraction.
The ecological consequences are profound. Illegal fishing undermines the conservation objectives of one of the world’s most important marine protected areas. Every scientific assessment of Chagos ecosystems concludes that maintaining strong enforcement is essential to preserve its uniquely intact reefs, fish biomass and biodiversity.
There are still many people in the Chagossian community who, from their history and heritage, understand this intimately. They have said that protecting the fish stocks is as important to them as protecting their beaches and nesting sites. They want to be able to participate in patrols to support monitoring and to take responsibility for safeguarding the marine life that their parents and grandparents depended on. They see illegal fishing as a threat not only to biodiversity but to their future ability to sustain themselves when they go back to their islands.
Also, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—we have been discussing the advice that it gave—Article 61 requires coastal states to conserve living resources. Article 62 obliges them to ensure proper management and enforcement. Article 73 grants the authority and responsibility to board, inspect, arrest and detain vessels engaged in illegal fishing. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has confirmed that these articles require states to maintain monitoring, to regulate and, crucially, to enforce. At present, there is no statutory duty in domestic law requiring the UK to maintain patrols or monitoring in the BIOT. This amendment would fill that gap and bring legislation into proper alignment with other international obligations, which noble Lords are very keen always to comply with.
The Government may argue that Mauritius can meet these responsibilities after transfer, but the United Kingdom remains the coastal and administrating power today and its treaty obligations exist today. They cannot be satisfied by assuming that another state will meet them.
These are very sensible amendments which, if passed, would at least give the Chagossians the feeling that the United Kingdom cared about the islands overall, about the fishing, the bird life and about the marine life generally. I hope that noble Lords, when they look carefully at this, will actually agree to these amendments. If not, we will bring them back on Report.
Lord Lilley (Con)
I had not intended to speak on these amendments because there are other far more qualified people who I thought would do so. I served on your Lordships’ Environment and Climate Change Committee when it produced the report in July 2023 on the biodiversity agreement in Montreal. As I recall, that commitment, the Montreal treaty, requires Britain to protect 30% of its marine areas by 2030; it was called the 30 by 30 agreement. We were very proud, and I think it was mentioned in that report, that the largest single area of sea that was being protected was the British Indian Ocean Territory’s sea. We accepted tacitly that it was Britain’s responsibility to protect that, that it was a very important area of biodiversity for the world as a whole, and that it was our responsibility.
It now seems that we have handed that over to Mauritius, but Mauritius has no means of policing that area. It has no boats or aeroplanes that could cover that distance and that area. I doubt whether we had permanent boats stationed there, but if there were problems we could. We have the capacity to send both sea- and airborne reconnaissance aircraft to make sure that things are being properly respected.
I wonder, therefore, whether this treaty which we are now legislating to implement is not in contravention of our commitments under the Montreal biodiversity treaty. Are we abandoning commitments we made there and leaving them, in effect, unpoliced?
Another treaty was passed which we did not investigate and which was investigated by another committee of this House. I cannot even remember the name of the treaty but it was about areas of the sea which are outside national jurisdiction. It would seem that this now covers the BIOT—or does it? I hope the Minister will tell us which of these two treaties it is covered by. Is it covered by the old one, which we had responsibility for but have now given up, despite our international obligations under international law, which are normally sacrosanct, or is it under another treaty, which means that it is now dealt with as if it is beyond national jurisdiction?
These are clearly very important matters. It is a shame that we are discussing them at this time of night when people far better informed than I, who could bring their expertise and knowledge to bear, are not here. Since they are not here, I am raising these questions and hope that the Minister will be able to respond to them.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
My Lords, I am happy to respond. As I understand it, details about the Mauritian marine protected area were published only last week, or it may have been the week before. There will be a new treaty which will be lodged at the UN in a similar way to ours. It will not be a BBNJ issue. I think we will be considering it in this House next week, when we can get into it in a little more detail now that the noble Lord is back into these issues after a bit of a break. Because this would not be biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, it would be the responsibility of the Mauritians and covered by the new treaty. I can talk about that a bit more now.
Amendments 15 and 66 would prevent Clauses 2 to 4 coming into force until the UK Government had published a report on how it intended to preserve the Chagos Marine Protected Area. The MPA will be for the Mauritian Government to implement. They have already announced the creation of the MPA, which they will create once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the marine protected area. Low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians will be allowed in certain limited areas and will be compatible with nature conservation. The UK will continue to support Mauritius in the establishment of this marine protected area and in protecting the globally significant ecosystems of the Chagos Archipelago.
On Amendments 38 and 65, while I appreciate and understand the noble Baroness’s commitment to sustaining the unique and pristine environment around the archipelago, recycling and waste management systems on the outer islands would be for Mauritius to deliver. On Diego Garcia itself, waste management is currently undertaken by the US and monitored by the UK to ensure compliance with environmental standards. This will continue following the entry into force of the agreement, with no identified need to change current processes.
On Amendment 60, while Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, the UK will continue to provide support to protect migratory bird species. Within the agreement, under the international organisations’ exchange of letters, the UK and Mauritius will, for instance, agree separate arrangements to maintain the listed Ramsar wetlands site on Diego Garcia, which provides a unique protected habitat for migratory birds. Further protections will be a matter for Mauritius.
On Amendments 16 and 68, Mauritius will be responsible for the environment throughout the Chagos Archipelago, including enforcement. On 3 November, the Mauritian Government announced the creation of the Chagos Archipelago Marine Protected Area. They have confirmed already that no commercial fishing will be allowed in any part of the MPA. They will, however, allow low levels of artisanal subsistence fishing for resettled Chagossians in certain limited areas, which will be compatible with nature conservation.
The UK has agreed to co-operate with Mauritius on maritime security and provide assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty. The terms of this co-operation and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.
Amendment 73 is completely unnecessary. We have been clear on this. The UK has not and will not make any financial payment to the Mauritian Government to establish a new MPA in the waters surrounding the Chagos Archipelago. The UK has agreed to provide support and assistance in the establishment and management of the MPA as part of the Diego Garcia treaty, protecting the vital military base on Diego Garcia, and the terms of this support and assistance will be agreed in a separate process that is already under way.
Amendment 76 is no longer required. On 3 November, Mauritius, as I have said, announced the creation of its MPA once the treaty enters into force. Similarly, the points about artisanal fishing apply to that amendment as well. With that, I hope that the amendment can be withdrawn.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her answers, but I think the debate reflects the complexity of the environmental provisions. As my noble friend said, it is a shame that we could not have had it at a more reasonable time, when there could have been more participants in the debate, but the Government clearly do not wish to do that.
This is not a niche issue: protecting the unique and biodiverse environment on and around the islands is of international significance. The Chagossians, the scientific community and many others want to see the Chagos Islands’ unique ecosystem protected, and it would be an abrogation of the Government’s responsibilities if they were to press ahead with this deal without first securing the appropriate assurances from Mauritius.
I am obviously delighted that Mauritius has announced the marine protected area—I am sure we are all really pleased to see that—but I think the key point was the one raised by my noble friend, which is the matter of enforcement. Mauritius is a small island, it has very few resources and it is thousands of miles away from the Chagos Islands. The waters surrounding the Chagos are rich in fishing and biodiversity and I am sure that, in a few years’ time, we will probably see them being exploited, not for any lack of willingness on the part of the Mauritians but simply because they are completely unable to enforce the provisions. That would be a shame for one of the most unique environments in the world. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.