Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Baroness Chapman of Darlington
That the Bill be now read a second time.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)
My Lords, the Bill that we are to discuss today is vital for the security of our nation. It enables the ratification and entry into force of the treaty between the UK and Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, and thus protects the operation of an essential UK military base in the Indian Ocean. The consequences of not ratifying this treaty should not be underestimated. The inevitable effect would be to expose the UK to an unacceptable level of risk and legal uncertainty, which could deny us key military and security capabilities, dramatically reducing the effectiveness of our Armed Forces and security services. A binding judgment against the UK from an international court or tribunal would undermine our ability to operate globally to protect UK influence and counter the threats we face in an increasingly dangerous world, and it would put at risk security at home.
I understand that the treaty has divided opinion. We have had good debates in both this House and the other place on its substance, and I, of course, welcome this scrutiny. Since the Government signed the treaty, there have been Statements and debates across both Houses, hundreds of Questions raised and answered, and the completion of several committee inquiries by learned colleagues.
The necessity of the Diego Garcia treaty and of this Bill has been amply demonstrated. It has been tested in detail by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Both agreed that protection of the strategic value of Diego Garcia—a vital national asset—was necessary. The IAC clearly set out the path to significant risks to the base if the treaty were not ratified.
The Diego Garcia treaty has the support of our international allies. The United States has been engaged throughout the negotiations and supports it, as do the rest of our Five Eyes partners; Japan, South Korea and India support it as well. The UN, the Commonwealth and the African Union all welcomed it. Our overseas territories family supports it. The list goes on.
I welcome the opportunity to test this further today. The treaty is an important matter that the Government considered with great care. We bore the full weight of responsibility for not only the security of the British people but the integrity of the UK’s position on the global stage, and for respect for the experiences of those who had lived on the islands.
This treaty is critical to our national security. The base holds a range of vital capabilities, some of which are highly secret. I know that those with experience in this House will understand the military advantage of being able to deploy forces rapidly across the Middle East, east Africa and south Asia, and will appreciate the political and security importance of operating such a prized asset jointly with our closest partner, the United States.
The deal preserves this vital security footprint. With it, we will retain full operational control over Diego Garcia, with robust provisions to keep adversaries out. These include: unrestricted access to and use of the base for the UK and the US; a buffer zone around Diego Garcia; a UK veto to ensure that no development or construction on the outer islands threatens base operations; and a ban on the presence of any foreign security forces. The protections were designed, tested and endorsed at the highest level of the US political and security establishment.
The Government acted to protect this vital asset because it faced an existential threat. This was well understood by the previous Government, which is why they started negotiations more than three years ago—negotiations that they entered in good faith, despite what we heard in the other place, and continued for 11 rounds, including detailed text-based negotiations in the weeks and months before the general election.
It was under the previous Government that Mauritius secured its string of legal and political victories against the UK. Noble Lords will be aware of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion in 2019 and the loss of votes at the UN General Assembly. This was followed in 2021 by a ruling by a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on a maritime delimitation dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. The special chamber, in a decision that was binding on the parties to the dispute, ruled that Mauritius’s sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s determinations. This gave a clear indication of how this tribunal—and, quite possibly, other international courts and tribunals—would approach the ICJ’s advisory opinion and the sovereignty dispute between the UK and Mauritius.
I urge noble Lords to reflect on the sound conclusions of the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. The learned members of both committees took evidence from eminent legal scholars, including a former member of the ICJ. The IAC concluded that, if the treaty is not ratified,
“Mauritius is likely to resume its campaign against the UK through international courts”
and stated that it heard evidence that
“any international court looking at this issue would be unlikely to find in favour of the UK”,
putting the base at risk.
The Government have been clear about the legal position. Had a long-term deal not been reached, it was highly likely that wide-ranging litigation would have been brought quickly against the UK. There were several potential routes for this, which included further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. The United Kingdom’s long-standing legal view has been that we would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending our legal position on sovereignty in such litigation. Even if we had chosen to ignore legally binding judgments against the UK, their legal effect on third countries and international organisations would have given rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions. We have all heard the counter- positions—that the Government are bowing to an opinion that is merely advisory and that there was no viable route to a binding judgment—but I am afraid those simply do not reflect the reality of this situation.
It is clear that securing a deal was essential. The agreement that the Government have signed protects the base for generations and is firmly in the national interest. The Government did not secure the base at any cost; we negotiated a deal that is good value for money for the British people. The full financial details were published alongside the treaty on the day of signature. The average cost per year in today’s money is £101 million, and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion. These figures have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. These figures draw on long-established methodology, used under this Government and previous Governments, to account for long-term projects. We have all heard, and I suspect we will hear again today, the Opposition claim that the cost is higher. This is grossly misleading. Accounting norms and processes set out in the Green Book are there for a reason: so we can understand the true value of things. Let us debate those values with transparency, not exaggeration or manipulation for political point-scoring.
I suspect that some in this House will have heard concerns regarding undue influence on Mauritius from hostile forces. The Opposition were quite vocal on the subject in the other place—although, interestingly, we heard barely a peep before 4 July last year, when they were in negotiations. The treaty is the only way to ensure the base continues to operate as it has done, with all the protections that I listed earlier, including threats from our adversaries; whereas, had Mauritius secured a binding judgment against the UK, there would have been nothing to stop it leasing different islands to different countries, dramatically undermining the utility of this prized military asset.
As with any government policy, it is crucial that we discuss the people who are at the heart of it. I know there is a deep strength of feeling, genuinely held, in this House and the other place about Chagossians. Let me be clear: this Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily state-to-state between Mauritius and the UK, and it is true that our priority was to secure the base, but that does not mean that the interests of the Chagossian community were set aside. Indeed, the treaty has the support of many in the Chagossian community. Olivier Bancoult, chair of the Chagos Refugee Group, which is the largest Chagossian group, has said
“we remain convinced that this agreement provides the only way forward”,
and in a recent communiqué urged all Members of the UK Parliament to support the Bill.
The treaty provides that Mauritius may develop a programme of resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago, other than Diego Garcia, and noble Lords will also be aware of the £40 million trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of Chagossians. I know many in this House are interested in the operation of these commitments. My noble friend Lord Collins noted in this place that, ahead of ratification, the Government would make a ministerial Statement in both Houses providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement and the modalities of the trust fund.
I know that many noble Lords are also interested in the environmental consequences of the treaty. It is crucial that one of the world’s most pristine marine environments is protected, and this Government and Mauritius are committed to that. Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam has publicly stated his commitment to the marine protected area and confirmed it directly to the former Environment Secretary at the UN Ocean Conference in June.
Just yesterday, the Mauritian Government announced plans for the establishment of the Chagos Archipelago marine protected area. This will be based on the robust International Union for the Conservation of Nature categories for marine protected areas. Critically, it makes it clear that there will be no commercial fishing across the entire 640,000 square kilometre area. The Great Chagos Bank will be given one of the highest levels of protection, with the rest of the MPA categorised as a highly protected conservation zone. There will be limited provision for controlled levels of artisanal fishing in confined zones intended for resettlement to allow for sustenance of the Chagossian community, while maintaining the commitment to nature conservation. This development should assuage the concerns we have heard in this House and the other place about Mauritian commitments to environmental protections.
Despite this progress, and the passage of the Bill in the other place, there are still those here who want to relitigate the debate that we had in July. There are Motions intended to probe and amend at Committee and Report. They are welcome, but Motions that are designed to wreck are not about the welfare of a community; they are a cynical tactic of delay and disruption. The Opposition Front Bench has tried blocking ratification, yet seems unable to accept the will of this House. I am disappointed, but unsurprised, that we all now look likely to have to witness an unedifying spectacle of it having another go.
Noble Lords will notice that we are not considering a committal Motion to commit the Bill to Committee today. As noble Lords know, it is extremely unusual to table a Motion to seek to divide the House to delay the passage of government legislation passed by the House of Commons. It is even more unusual for the Opposition to press such a Motion to a vote on the Floor of the House, as they have indicated they would. We know that His Majesty’s Opposition take their responsibilities seriously. They have said on multiple occasions to my noble friend the Leader of the House of Lords that their motivation is to properly challenge and scrutinise government legislation. That is their job; it is not to block legislation or stop the Government getting their programme through.
Let me share the truth of this matter. The amendment to the committal Motion favoured by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is, in effect, a fatal Motion. I will explain why: it makes committal conditional on consultation. It is not credible to undertake meaningful consultation in the 30-day period set out in the Motion. It would therefore risk progress towards ratification becoming bogged down in litigation. The Front Bench opposite should know that; I would be surprised if they do not.
The Motion would wreck the Bill and mean a delay not of 30 days but of months, maybe years. In these circumstances, the Bill and the treaty that it is intended to implement could not move ahead. This is both reckless and deeply cynical. It is reckless because it threatens the continued operation of the base on Diego Garcia and, with that, the national security of the British people. It is cynical because the Opposition now seek to use, for their own ends, a community they systematically disregarded when in government. We all know their record: the decision not to consult Chagossians when meaningful consultation was possible at the start of negotiations; the decision in 2016 not to permit any resettlement by Chagossians across the archipelago; and the dramatic failure to spend 96% of the £40 million commitment to support Chagossians.
It is worth contrasting that record with the record of this Government. We are financing a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of the Chagossian community. We are working with Mauritius to start a new programme of visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The treaty we have entered allows Mauritius to develop a programme of resettlement on the islands other than Diego Garcia. This Government are also increasing our support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These are initiatives that actually deliver for Chagossians; they are not empty promises or hollow words.
The Bill is relatively short. It preserves the current laws of the British Indian Ocean Territory as laws that will continue to apply to Diego Garcia once the treaty is in force, allowing for the base’s continued, effective operation with minimal disruption. The Bill also grants a new power to make the domestic legal changes needed to implement the treaty and to manage responsibly the base’s future operation.
There will be no change to the British nationality status that any Chagossian currently holds, whether it is a British citizenship or a British Overseas Territory citizenship, and current pathways for Chagossians to acquire British citizenship are also maintained. Most of the provisions in the Bill will commence only when the treaty enters into force. I trust that we will have a lively and thorough debate on this subject matter, and I look forward to debating the Bill’s contents. I beg to move.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the Bill, and I will come to some of her points shortly. This is now the second opportunity that we have had to debate the UK-Mauritius agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, but it is of course the first time that your Lordships’ House has been asked to approve the agreement in law.
When we debated the Motion to approve the treaty under the CRaG process, I lamented the fact that the other place was denied the opportunity to have a substantive debate on the treaty at that point. If the Government are so confident in their arguments, why did they deny the other House the opportunity to debate this properly? As I said then, the Government played fast and loose with the conventions on treaty approval, despite promises that had been given by their own Ministers when the CRaG process was first introduced. The Government were elected on the back of pledges to put public service and integrity first; refusing to adhere to the conventions in this case hardly lived up to those promises.
That said, as a responsible Official Opposition—and recognising the primacy of the other place, which approved the Bill at Third Reading—we will not seek to deny the Bill a Second Reading today. We already know that the other place did not have the opportunity to debate the treaty when it was laid before the House, and the Bill subsequently received minimal scrutiny. In fact, Committee and Third Reading were both taken on the same day, and a total of just 17 hours of debate were allocated to a Bill that fundamentally changes our strategic security role in the Indian Ocean and puts £35 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money in the hands of politicians thousands of miles away from the UK.
Not only was there no mention of the Bill in the Labour manifesto; there was a specific promise to protect our overseas territories. For the election, the Minister’s party’s manifesto said:
“Defending our security also means protecting the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies … Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination”.
It seems that tax is not the only manifesto commitment being binned today.
Crucially, the views of the Chagossian people have not been heard. We feel it is only right that the Government should be required to consult the Chagossian community on the implementation of this treaty, including on the establishment of the Chagossian trust fund, which the Minister discussed. The UK taxpayer will fund it, but the Mauritian Government will have sole responsibility to distribute it however they see fit.
That is why I tabled the amendment to the original committal Motion that would have required the Government to consult the Chagossian community over a period of 30 days. If the Minister is concerned that 30 days is not long enough, I note that we talked about making it longer, but we did not do so because we wanted the Government to have the opportunity to get their Bill through this Session. If I had set the Motion at three months, the Minister would have told us that there is no time to have a Committee debate before the end of this Session because the Opposition are trying to deny them the Bill. We deliberately selected a short period so that the Minister could not argue that we were trying to wreck the Bill—that was not our intention. It was a measured, reasonable approach which we felt would have made up completely for the Government’s failure to consult the Chagossians to date and would help us in our work to give the Bill the proper scrutiny it deserves, informed by the outcome of that consultation. It was not a wrecking amendment, and the Minister knows that in her heart of hearts. Without that additional consultation—
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
If the noble Lord was so concerned to do this, first, why did he not consult earlier? Secondly, he can achieve his aims—which would not be wrecking but would be perfectly legitimate —by amendment to the Bill, delaying implementation, perhaps. Those things are standard. He could make his case, or perhaps even win his vote, and achieve his aims, should they be genuine and not a wrecking amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
This treaty is due to last 100 years. How is it a wrecking amendment to take 30 days to consult the people who will be affected by it? The Minister is talking nonsense, and she knows it.
Without that additional consultation of the Chagossian people, we fear that the Bill, which received so little scrutiny in the other place, will go on to become law without the affected Chagossians having their views heard, as they rightly should. I know that a number of them have turned up to the Public Gallery to hear this debate today.
I hope that the Government’s decision to withdraw the committal Motion at the last moment is an indication that they are listening to us and want to think about this more deeply. It is clear to us that we need that consultation, so I call upon the Minister to bring it forward as part of the committal Motion when the Government eventually bring it back to the House. As I said, the Government intend this treaty to last 100 years; surely, we can take one month to consult the people most affected by it.
To call the Bill a surrender Bill is an understatement. This is a strategic capitulation that will see us give away sovereign territory that has been British for two centuries. To add insult to injury, taxpayers are paying tens of billions to Mauritius for the privilege of doing so. We know the important, strategic role that the British Indian Ocean Territory has played internationally as a staging post for forward operations in both the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Handing over sovereignty, even with a lease agreement in respect of Diego Garcia military base, puts, in our view, that strategic role in jeopardy.
In particular, the requirement in the agreement that Mauritius must be informed of armed attacks on third states directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia is an astounding failure of diplomacy. Could the Government tell us how this would actually work in practice, in a rapidly changing armed conflict? Has the US, which actually runs this base, agreed to do that? How would it work in practice? How would we inform them in an emergency situation, with proper notice to enable us to take strategic action, as required?
My noble friend Lady Goldie will expand on some of the security implications of this agreement, but we are clear that it is a capitulation that weakens our influence on the international stage. It is a surrender orchestrated by international lawyers and implemented by a Prime Minister who is either unwilling or unable to stand up for the UK national interest.
The Bill does not just relate to the UK’s affairs in the Indian Ocean; the sheer cost of the treaty with Mauritius makes the Bill a domestic issue, too. By pressing ahead with this legislation, the Government are facilitating an agreement that will see the UK pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius. I notice that the Minister spent quite a bit of her time disagreeing with those figures, yet only one hour ago, when I asked her how much of the ODA budget is being dedicated to this agreement, she got a cheap laugh, and avoided the question once again, as she has now done four times. However, she knows, as I know, that some of that ODA budget is being used to fund this agreement. If she wishes to be so transparent and disagree with our figures, why does she not tell us how much of it is going to be spent from the ODA budget? She can stand up and do it now, if she wishes.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
All of our ODA spending is published. It is probably one of the most transparent bits of government funding. I will send the noble Lord the website address so he can have a look and satisfy himself on this point.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am grateful for that; that is a concession, of sorts. I have only asked her the question four times during Questions so far. Now that she is willing to be more transparent, that is progress, at least.
Against that backdrop, hard-working Britons will be furious that Ministers have somehow found £35 billion to send 6,000 miles away when we face such financial challenges here at home. The fact is that the treaty facilitated by the Bill will fund tax cuts for Mauritius while taxes are being hiked here at home. We put this deal on hold when we were in Government, when it was in its infancy. We saw its flaws, and we paused it. Alas, Ministers no longer have the clarity of mind needed to deliver for the British people and are—
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am sorry, but that is factually incorrect and I would like to give the noble Lord the opportunity to correct it. It was paused, but when the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, was appointed Foreign Secretary, he restarted those negotiations.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am happy to tell the Minister that I have spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, about that. He agreed that it was paused, which I think she has just confirmed.
Alas, Ministers no longer have the clarity of mind needed to deliver for the British people and, as so often with this Government, they have allowed themselves to be taken in by their international lawyer friends and donors. This all begs the question: why? Why did Ministers feel the need to pursue this agreement that puts Britain’s interests last? Why have the Government seen fit to saddle taxpayers with an additional financial burden, at a time when we are all being softened up for massive tax rises from the Chancellor of the Exchequer?
Ministers have told us, as the noble Baroness did again today, that this agreement is a legal necessity, but, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar when we debated the Motion to approve the treaty—I commend his speech to noble Lords who have not had the chance to see it yet—there is a range of views among very senior lawyers on this matter. The Government cannot hide behind legal advice, unless they want to publish it for us all to see. This was a political decision for which Ministers must take the political responsibility.
The almost single-minded obsession with international law has blinded the Government to the real threat from a country that itself pays absolutely no heed whatever to that same international law. We know that China has said that it wants to deepen its strategic partnership with Mauritius. As recently as 15 May this year, China’s ambassador to Mauritius said that the People’s Republic of China wanted to strengthen ties with Mauritius, noting the country’s “strategic advantages”, and expressed a commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. The Chinese ambassador to Mauritius is on the record as offering, unsurprisingly, massive congratulations on the deal and stating that China fully supports Mauritius’s attempt to “safeguard national sovereignty”. It is a shame that China does not show that same regard to the national sovereignty of other nations.
That is who the Government have appeased with this agreement. When the Government took office, they claimed that they would protect our national security. Can the Minister please explain how ceding national sovereignty to a country that is known to be deepening its ties with a nation that we know to be a threat to the UK will help them achieve that manifesto commitment?
As the Official Opposition, we will seek to amend the Bill in your Lordships’ House to ensure that the Chagossian community is properly consulted and that the agreement facilitated by the Bill does not put the desires of international lawyers before the interests of the British people, who have paid the taxes which are now to be transferred with careless abandon to Mauritius.
Speaking of the rights of the Chagossians, I find myself on this occasion in the unusual position of agreeing with noble Lords to my left when I say that the Government have not handled this well. In the other place, the Liberal Democrat spokesman, Dr Al Pinkerton, said that,
“this Bill fails the Chagossian people”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 756.].”
On this, we agree. Ministers have failed to properly consult the Chagossians to the point that the community is now furious with this Government, as we have all seen from our email inboxes.
However, there was another way. In the other place, the shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, tabled a presentation Bill which included specific requirements
“to consult and engage with British Chagossians in relation to any proposed changes to the sovereignty and constitutional arrangements of the British Indian Ocean Territory”.
That is what should happen. The Chagossian community should be heard and not ignored.
In conclusion, the questions at the core of all our debates will remain these. Is this treaty a good deal for Britain? Does the Bill put us in the service of the British people? I do not think that it does—
Lord Callanan (Con)
We will set out our reasons in detail, if the Bill ever returns to your Lordships’ House. I give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I have listened carefully to all the noble Lord’s contributions. I fear that he has missed something out, and I want to help him. First, can he explain briefly whether international law advice which was given to the previous Administration over the status of British sovereignty, and which has not changed for this Administration, has changed? Secondly, why did James Cleverly, on 3 November 2022, make a Statement to Parliament that that Government had decided to begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the BIOT Chagos Archipelago? If everything that he said was a point of principle, why did the previous Government accept that negotiations had to start on ceding sovereignty?
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am always suspicious when the Liberal Democrats say that they want to be helpful. We have debated all these points at length.
Lord Callanan (Con)
Noble Lords should listen to the answer.
It is a matter of public record that discussions took place. I have spoken to both James Cleverly and to my noble friend Lord Cameron about this, and we are very clear that no agreement was possible along the terms that had been outlined. That is why the negotiations were paused and why we did not reach any agreement at the time. That is why we believe the process is flawed and why we will oppose the Bill.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
My Lords, I have been advised that it is not obligatory for me to declare an interest in this matter but, on the basis that it is better to be safe than sorry, I will do so. During a period in 1979, I was the head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office department responsible for the British Indian Ocean Territory.
The Bill to which we are giving a Second Reading—and I hope that is what we are doing—is by no means the first time the House has debated the UK-Mauritius treaty on the Chagos Islands. Ratification under the CRaG procedure took place on 30 June on the basis of a report from your Lordships’ International Agreements Committee, on which I have the honour to serve but not to represent. The House was divided by the Opposition on that occasion but the report was endorsed by a majority, and the CRaG process was thus completed in the sense recommended by the committee. Today’s Bill is simply needed to bring our domestic legislation into line with that decision. I hope that that can now be done speedily and without further controversy. It is with some regret that I hear signs that that may not happen.
The legal testimony the International Agreements Committee was given before it reached its conclusion that the agreement should be ratified was not unanimous, but the committee’s view was that the most compelling evidence was that of Sir Christopher Greenwood, a former British judge of the International Court of Justice. His view was that if the UK were not to ratify the agreement, Mauritius could be expected to pursue actively the matter through international courts and, in the light of the opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice, to win such cases with damaging consequences for our security interests in the base at Diego Garcia and for those of our closest security ally, the United States. In addition, Sir Christopher pointed out that it was not correct to assert that the UK agreement with Mauritius amounted to the seceding of sovereignty since the International Court of Justice opinion already established that that step had been taken when the UK granted independence to Mauritius. That view was accepted by the international community.
It is relevant too to recall that Governments of both main parties have frequently stood at the Dispatch Box and stated, without ambiguity, that the British Government upheld the rules-based international order. It cannot seriously be disputed that a finding of the International Court of Justice, whether advisory or mandatory, is an integral part of that rules-based order. To suggest now that the International Court of Justice opinion could be ignored or set aside would surely be incompatible with those statements of policy so frequently repeated. At a time when the rules-based order is under such widespread attack, that course could hardly be in our national interest. Nor can we afford to ignore the fact that the 99-year lease on the base at Diego Garcia, with the possibility of extension, is sufficient to meet the security requirements of our closest ally, the United States, which is backing the agreement. To put those interests at risk by frustrating their implementation would seem to be an act of singular folly.
All this is to ignore the fact—as has been made clear in the debate already—that the previous Government held 11 rounds of negotiations on a similar basis to what has now been concluded in a negotiated agreement. If last year’s election had had a different result, can it be seriously doubted that the present Opposition would have been defending an agreement similar to the one that this House cleared on 30 June? None of these considerations invalidates the judgment that successive British Governments behaved in a lamentable way towards the Chagossian inhabitants of the islands, many of whom are now British citizens. The provisions agreed to mitigate these past failings are part of the Bill before us today, and rightly so. They are not, however, a reason to reject the agreement, or to delay it. To do that would in reality bring no satisfaction or benefit to anyone—quite the contrary.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of Friends of the British Overseas Territories, and as an adviser. It is with great sadness that I rise to speak to the Bill. Earlier today I spent some time with my friends from the Chagos Islands, and they have often felt ignored by many Governments of different hues but never have they felt as badly treated as by this Government. They have taken court cases to deal with their lack of agency with this Government, as they were left with no other option; indeed, there is a case still before the courts today.
Even at this late stage, if the Government do deign to consult with the Chagos community living here in the UK, it will be a start, at least, to listening to their needs and aspirations, as opposed to them being told what is happening to their homeland through government statements. I was shocked when I was told today by Chagossians living here in the UK—who are British citizens—that, despite repeated requests to meet their Members of Parliament in person, they have been told there is no time. I think that is absolutely wrong, and I hope the Minister will agree that it is wrong. It is anti-democratic, and if we are going to support a government policy, the Government must at least have the wherewithal to meet those affected by that government policy and defend it to them.
Chagossians, I am very pleased to say, have come along today to hear the debate. They are accompanied by colleagues from other overseas territories, because they too are concerned about what is happening. No doubt, as we have already heard, the Bill is all to do with national security and therefore should not be challenged. I was told as much in this House when I had the temerity to ask about the details of the trust fund being set up in Mauritius with British taxpayers’ money.
I contend that treating people with dignity and addressing their needs does not mean you are challenging national security needs. The two issues can and should exist together, and it saddens me greatly that this Government have chosen a different course. In January 2015, a report commissioned on behalf of the British Indian Ocean Territory—BIOT—and carried out by KPMG undertook a feasibility study for the resettlement of BIOT. Unlike our present Government, that study took the views of a range of stakeholders, including the Chagossian communities in Mauritius, the Seychelles, Manchester, Crawley and London. The study looked in depth at the environmental issues as well. This public document concluded:
“There are no fundamental legal obstacles that would prevent a resettlement of BIOT to go ahead”.
That was in 2015.
The Government of the day decided not to proceed with resettlement because of costs, but, crucially, the costs identified in the report for resettlement at that time are nowhere near the costs associated with this deal. How have the Government arrived at a place where we are now handing BIOT to Mauritius and paying for the privilege? By the way, we have already paid Mauritius, because in 1965, when it agreed to BIOT being created, we paid it £3 million, so this is us paying again for the privilege.
The Government have also told us that they had no option but to conduct and conclude. We have heard a lot about these 11 rounds of negotiations, but none was ever concluded. As someone who has experienced many negotiations throughout the years, the deal is not done until the deal is done. That is the critical issue here. We have already heard from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that there is a lack of clarity on the basis for proceeding with this deal, so it is imperative that the legal opinion is shared to bring transparency to what is very murky water. We are also advised by the Government that investment by the US has paused after the advisory judgment due to the lack of certainty. Surely such certainty could have been provided in another way. We could have asserted sovereignty over our territory instead of colluding in handing it away. That surely would have brought certainty for our American allies as well.
The Government also claim that we have to do this deal to protect the joint US-UK exclusive access to the electromagnetic spectrum on Diego Garcia, but the International Telecommunication Union, which supervises global communications technology, has no enforcement mechanisms to either terminate or interrupt our satellite operations on the Chagos Islands. I thank Policy Exchange for its work in this area; in particular, its publication The Chagos Debacle, A Critique of the British Government’s Shifting Rationales. Former NATO commander and Royal Navy Rear Admiral Chris Parry said recently that handing away the Chagos Islands is
“the biggest strategic mistake I have seen in my lifetime”.
Moving to the specifics in the Bill, or rather the lack of specifics, there is very little detail. We are told that there will be secondary legislation and there will be ministerial Statements to deal with a lot of the issues. That means that there will be less scrutiny. It is a matter of record that the Chagossian people were forcibly removed from their homes in the late 1960s. The Government are now telling us that by doing so, they do not have the right to self-determination. I find this very skewed thinking. You remove the Chagos Islanders from their homes by force and now they do not have self-determination. I think it is morally wrong.
At the very least what should be happening is a referendum of those of Chagossian heritage here in the UK, because despite what previous Mauritian Administrations have had to say, the Chagos people are a distinct people on the basis of ethnicity and religion and should be afforded the respect they deserve, not forced into a country that they have no affinity with and which is 1,300 miles away. Let me be clear. Even if Mauritius was the closest country, geography is not political destiny, especially when you have a distinct people, and I want to make that clear for a whole variety of reasons. KPMG, on behalf of BIOT, consulted in a meaningful way with the citizens back in 2014-15, and the Government should do so again. This is an historic decision we are making here and we need to listen to what the Chagossians have to say.
The Bill has nothing to say about the welfare of British Chagossians. Not one clause is drafted to deal with their needs. There is nothing in the Bill about the £40 million which has been sent to set up a trust fund in Mauritius for Chagossians who live there, but we have been told that British Chagossians will not benefit from that trust fund. Many Chagossians have left Mauritius in the past few months as they choose to be British and not live under the authority of Mauritius. Of course, those Chagossians who choose to remain in Mauritius are content with what is happening and are supporters of the Mauritian regime. That is why we should not be surprised that there are statements coming out of Mauritius in support of this deal.
As regards visiting the atoll, that, we understand, will be at the discretion of the Mauritian Government, who denied the very existence of the Chagos people until very recently, telling them that they were Mauritian instead. Having listened to many Chagossians talk about their identity, I can tell the House that the last thing they are is Mauritian.
Finally, there is nothing in this Bill about the very fragile and internationally important ecostructure of the many little islands and their marine area. I recognise that the Minister referenced the environment in her opening speech, and I am pleased to hear that there has been some movement in relation to that. I know that very many are concerned about the stewardship of the environment in the future, given that we are giving away all this to the Mauritian Government without any sanctions if the ecosystem is damaged.
I hope that the Government will take the opportunity to consult the Chagossian people. They deserve to be listened to, even at this late stage.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the powerful speech by my noble friend Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee. I am tempted just to say “ditto” and sit down, but that is not the practice in this place, so I will focus on some aspects that differ from the focus that she gave. The importance she attached to the Chagossians enables me to be a bit briefer than I would otherwise have been.
I want to return to a powerful assertion that was made the first time this House considered a Statement on this subject, which was diluted a bit today in the defence put forward by the noble Minister. The original Statement by the Defence Secretary said
“without this deal—within weeks we could face losing legal rulings, and within just a few years the base would become inoperable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]
What is the likelihood of us facing a legally binding ruling? If so, I ask the Minister, from which court is it likely to come?
First, as even the Foreign Office recognises, the opinion of the International Court of Justice was purely advisory, not binding. Secondly, it was based on UN General Assembly resolutions. Such resolutions are not legally binding, especially as they have not been endorsed by the Security Council. Thirdly, when the UK signed up to the International Court of Justice, our declaration specifically said that the Government of the UK excluded the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on
“any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”,
as is Mauritius. Hence, the opinion of the ICJ was triply non-binding, and no future ruling of the ICJ on this dispute could be binding on us.
Ministers never mention these facts; either they are unaware of them, or they do not want us to know. Instead, they segue on to discussing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as the noble Baroness did today, since that also has a tribunal. However, Article 298 of that treaty provides that states may “at any time” exclude “disputes concerning military activities”. Therefore, it is hard to see how the UNCLOS tribunal could reach a binding ruling which would impede our use of the base, still less do so in ways that the Defence Minister originally spelled out when he said:
“Rulings against us would mean we could not prevent hostile nations from setting up installations … on the outer islands … we could not guarantee the safe berth of our subs, patrol the waters around the base, control the airspace directly above or protect the integrity of our communications systems”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]
All that seems impossible to come from a tribunal which excludes, or where we can exclude, military matters.
These are not the only issues which the Government refuse to address. They never mention—even the Explanatory Memorandum on the agreement ignores it—the Pelindaba treaty, to which Mauritius is a signatory. It is signed by all countries counted as in the African region—and Mauritius is one—making Africa a nuclear-free zone. The treaty allows no reservations, at the time or subsequently, so it will apply to Diego Garcia, and it cannot be overridden by our treaty unless Mauritius resiles from the Pelindaba treaty. Do the Americans accept that that will mean that no nuclear weapons-carrying vessels or planes can use the base?
The agreement with Mauritius purportedly relates to completing the decolonisation of Mauritius. There are two relevant principles that have a bearing on the process of decolonisation. The first is the right to self-determination, and the second is the principle of territorial integrity. This agreement elevates the principle of territorial integrity above that of the right to self-determination.
It is bizarre that boundaries laid, and former administrative arrangements imposed on an area, by the colonial power should be treated as so sacrosanct, whereas the rights of the people who were displaced—many of whom would like to return or have the right to return—are to be ignored. It is even more bizarre given, as my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out, the promise in the Labour Party manifesto that it would support the sovereignty, integrity and right to self-determination of peoples in the British Overseas Territories. I wait in the summing up to hear how the Government reconcile their promise made to the British people, and to the peoples of those territories, with what they are doing today.
Why are the Government ploughing ahead? Of course, they refer to the fact that negotiations began under the previous Government, although they were paused by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. At the time they were paused, I found myself discussing this with a Foreign Office official, who I heard mention the agreement. I said, “Isn’t it good that these negotiations have been paused?” He obviously did not approve of the negotiations. He said, “Oh, it’ll make no difference; they’ll continue. It is the settled policy of the Foreign Office, whichever Government are in power, that we shall continue with this process to give away the sovereignty of them”.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
All the legal considerations that the noble Lord has outlined to the House, including those in the latter part of his remarks, pre-date November 2022, when the previous Government started negotiations to cede sovereignty. They took all his remarks into consideration, so why did they start negotiations to cede sovereignty?
Lord Lilley (Con)
The noble Lord is making a party-political point, as the Lib Dems always do. I am accepting that both parties are allowing themselves to be driven by the settled policy of the Foreign Office. We have to recognise that.
Lord Lilley (Con)
Whenever it started, the settled policy of the Foreign Office will probably continue for another 22 years. Anyone who has been a Minister knows that every department has a settled policy that continues unless Ministers come along and determine to overthrow it.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Earlier in 2022, the then Government’s view was that there would be no change to the sovereignty of Chagos. That was a Statement given to Parliament in early 2022. The policy changed under Liz Truss as Prime Minister and James Cleverly as Foreign Secretary to start negotiations to cede sovereignty. If there had been a settled will, it had been the one before the Government changed policy. It was the noble Lord’s Government who changed the policy.
Lord Lilley (Con)
Of course it was, but they allowed it to be changed from pressure from the Foreign Office. We can go into the archaeology of when this surfaced in the form of government policy and when it was internal, but I have no doubt that it was. Whenever I have spoken to Foreign Office officials, they have acknowledged that we are not bound by rulings of the court, nor are we likely to be, and nor are we bound by the obligations of any treaty, but they argue that Britain must none the less abide by even non-binding advisory opinions, since if we do not, how can we tell other countries that they must abide by international law? That is precisely the argument that was forwarded just now by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay.
It is touching that our diplomats believe that countries that might otherwise flout international obligations and rulings will change their ways and become law-abiding if they see us obeying rulings that we do not have to abide by and being purer than pure. I believe that the policy of the Foreign Office, and, above all, the policy of elected officials in charge of the Foreign Office, should be to pursue British interests and not to set about setting examples to other countries and virtue signalling. That is what this is doing, and it is weak for that reason. I hope that the House will in the weeks to come persuade the Government to abandon it.
Lord Thurlow (CB)
My Lords, in my comments today I wish to give your Lordships a short break from the tangle of treaties and policies and who did what in diplomatic circles. In my contribution, I shall talk about the protection of the ocean surrounding the Chagos Archipelago. In doing so, I thank the Library and others for their assistance. I was encouraged by the Minister’s opening comments regarding the environment.
By way of background, a marine protection area was established around Chagos following a determined and successful campaign by the British charity Blue Marine and others, which persuaded the then Labour Administration to designate an MPA in the closing weeks of the Brown Administration. They created what was then the largest no-take fishing zone in the world—an extraordinary achievement. Blue Marine, together with other NGOs, seeks to protect and restore ocean health worldwide by securing MPAs like this. It has successfully established protection over some 4.3 million square kilometres of ocean—an outstanding achievement—and the Chagos MPA is a significant part of that success. It works.
For those unfamiliar with MPAs, they are precisely that: the designation protects the marine area from overfishing and destructive fishing techniques, and they work to restore marine habitats and support coastal communities with sustainable fishing practices. These large-scale marine reserves enjoy the critical mass to allow the restoration of vital marine ecosystems. They enjoy international acceptance and, critically, they need policing to enforce that protection.
The present arrangement enables the UK to police the Chagos MPA against illegal fishing activity, but what of future protection? The Chagos agreement that we are discussing today refers to a “separate written instrument” that will outline how the management of the MPA and its policing will be managed. Why the simple matter of managing the Chagos MPA cannot be dealt with in the Bill, I fail to understand. Reference to a separate written instrument sounds like a response from an instalment of “Yes, Minister”—a slow process of obfuscation and delay until following the next election, when it all falls apart. I hope not. Will the Minister please explain more of the detail relating to the separate written instrument in her closing remarks? For many, the lack of clarity about how policing and management will be paid for is a worry.
The agreement that we are discussing refers to an annual payment of £35 million, £40 million or £45 million per annum over 20 years, to be gifted as development capital to Mauritius. How much of that will be allocated to managing the marine protected area? Where is the detail? Are we really committing hundreds of millions of taxpayers’ money over 20 years to an agreement with little detail?
The Bill transfers sovereignty of the islands to Mauritius while retaining control over Diego Garcia for 99 years. This dual authority could complicate the enforcement of the environmental protections. While Mauritius has pledged to maintain the MPA—and yesterday’s news is welcome—economic pressures, such as fishing licences and development deals, could lead to relaxed regulations. Experts warn that even slight deregulation could unravel decades of ecological resilience.
We must protect our oceans, just as we seek to protect the rest of our planet from the climate crisis. We are more familiar with the land-based effects of the crisis: the destruction of the rainforest, the growing red list of endangered species and the melting ice. Above all, there is an interdependence between the health of oceans and survival on land. Protecting the health of these oceans seems to me to enjoy fewer column inches in the media, notwithstanding the remarkable television series narrated by Sir David Attenborough, which has been eye-opening and persuasive.
It is worth pointing out that the Chagos Islands are some 2,000 kilometres away from Mauritius. Its maritime enforcement assets include two small planes, which cannot reach Chagos, and two ocean-going vessels. Can we really expect it to invest the sums of money and resources that are required to administer protection and to maintain and enhance this vital MPA? There must be serious doubts about this and about the effectiveness of our agreement with Mauritius, which includes hands-on involvement in the management of this MPA.
With the current awareness of the climate crisis, I do not think that it is appropriate to leave the details of administering this ocean area to a separate written instrument. The agreement risks leaving Mauritius with an overwhelming conservation burden. It is worth noting that the International Agreements Committee of this House considers it vital that an appropriate portion of the annual grant funding be allocated specifically to supporting the marine protected area.
I look forward to the Minister’s responses to these concerns. I would specifically like an indication of how much of the proposed annual payments will be directed towards policing the Chagos MPA.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a friend of the British Overseas Territories. Can I say how delighted I am to hear the excellent speech from the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, because I, too, shall focus on MPAs at the end of my remarks?
We have to ask ourselves how we are now in the position of giving away a vital British Overseas Territory to a nation that has no legitimate claim to it—and paying it a fortune in the process. It simply comes down to the traditional role of our Foreign Office: always selling out British interests as we kowtow to hostile foreign states such as China while abandoning our friends and allies. Of course, the Foreign Office has a long history of this.
Last week, the Telegraph contained an obituary for Vice Admiral Sir Jonathan Tod, who flew more than 2,000 hours in 25 types of aircraft and commanded the aircraft carrier “Illustrious”. His talent was soon recognised and, in 1980, he was promoted early to captain and sent to the Cabinet Office. There, he headed the assessments team in analysing intelligence from central and South America.
In July 1981, Tod told the Joint Intelligence Committee that, if the Argentines were to conclude that there was no peaceful solution to the Malvinas question, they would be capable of mounting an invasion swiftly and with little warning. The Foreign Office absolutely rubbished that as scaremongering and the intelligence watch on the Argentines was scaled down, giving Argentina the signal that we did not care about the Falkland Islands. However, Tod stuck to his guns. In the October, he warned that the threats emanating from Argentina were not disinformation. Six months later, Argentina invaded; the rest is history.
Then we have Gibraltar. Again, the FCO tried to sell it out to Spain, with secret negotiations on shared sovereignty in 2001 and 2002. There was no reason for sharing sovereignty with Spain apart from the FCO wanting to kowtow to a foreign EU Government. Once the plan was in the open, of course, the Gibraltar Government organised a poll. Some 98.97% voted against the UK Government’s plan and wanted to stay with the UK—another FCO plan scuppered.
Now I come on to the Chagos Islands. These islands have been British since the end of the Napoleonic wars, long before Mauritius existed as an independent country. Nobody had ever lived in Mauritius until the Dutch brought in slaves, and then the French took over. No Mauritians ever landed on the Chagos Islands, some 2,000 kilometres away, to inhabit or claim them. Thus, Mauritius has never owned or controlled the islands; the Mauritian sovereignty claim is totally bogus and nothing more than a rewriting of history. France and the UK administered the Chagos Islands and Mauritius from Mauritius, but they were never owned by Mauritius.
Its false claim was strengthened by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the judicial arm of the thoroughly discredited United Nations in its usual anti-colonialism stance. I do not mean to offend noble Lords, but I say discredited because there has never been any UN condemnation of the genocide being perpetuated by Russia in Ukraine, nor in China with the Uyghurs, nor in Myanmar. When we come to the current genocide in new Sudan, which was debated about an hour ago in this Chamber, while US officials have explicitly declared that the RSF and associated militias have committed genocide, the UN as an organisation has generally used terms such as “risk of genocide” or “genocide could be occurring”. It is typical UN cop-out speech. The UN cannot denounce genocide, but it can denounce UK ownership of the Chagos Islands as colonialism. The ICJ’s so-called ruling was merely an advisory opinion from a political court, which in 2017 was involved in a grubby episode to remove the Security Council nominee judge who was British, the renowned Sir Christopher Greenwood, stack the court with more Asia-Pacific judges and reduce western influence.
If it is the Government’s case that we have to obey the ICJ in this case, will we have to obey it when it gives an advisory opinion on giving the Falklands to Argentina or on giving Gibraltar to Spain? The previous Government, of course, were negotiating and negotiating, but they had no intention to sell out. It is one thing starting negotiations but another to conclude them in a bare three months as Mr Lammy did.
We first need to look at why Labour did it. I think we need to look at the past behaviour of the Prime Minister. Before entering politics, Sir Keir Starmer was invited to a high-profile legal conference in 2013 hosted by the Mauritius Bar Association at the InterContinental hotel on the intriguingly named Balaclava beach. It was a gathering of international lawyers. While there, Sir Keir delivered a keynote speech. More notably, he used the visit as an opportunity to engage in discussions on the Chagos issue with Mauritian legal and political figures. He met the then Prime Minister, Navin Ramgoolam, who is now leading Mauritius’s negotiations over the islands and is back as Prime Minister. Ramgoolam later recalled their 2013 meeting as a moment of shared values and mutual understanding. Another prominent Mauritian lawyer and friend of Sir Keir Starmer, Satyajit Boolell, has stated that he “cleared things up” for him regarding the Chagos issue.
Thus, we have our new Prime Minister already keen to sell out to Mauritius, and then came along the new Foreign Secretary, David Lammy MP, not known to be the sharpest knife in the drawer and ripe for the FCO to con him into a sell-out. I can imagine what the FCO said to him at their first meeting: “Welcome, Minister. You have a unique opportunity to settle a long-running issue, which the last Government failed to do. We have an International Court of Justice ruling, and we must hand back the Chagos Islands to their rightful owner, Mauritius. You can get the credit where the last Government failed. They started negotiations, but they were unable to conclude them. Naturally, we will have to pay them a small amount to keep our lease on the military base at Diego Garcia, and that will keep the Americans happy. It is a win-win for you, Minister. We avoid condemnation from the UN, the Americans are content, and you will get the credit for a diplomatic success”. I challenge anyone to say that that description of what happened is not reasonably accurate in all probability.
The previous Government had started negotiations in November 2022 and were nowhere near an agreement after 11 rounds of negotiations by the general election in 2024. That is 18 months of negotiations, including six months led by my very able noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton. I have to hand it to Mr Lammy: he was a mere three months into the job and a new Foreign Secretary with no experience whatever, and yet he concluded the deal in a mere three months. No wonder the deal is so diabolically bad for the UK and the Chagossians.
We have surrendered a UK strategic asset to China, which is already talking to Mauritius about doing deals there. Which country will fund development in the Chagos Islands? It will be China, of course—possibly India too, but certainly China. If Mauritius wishes to exploit the archipelago economically, it will need to establish infrastructure on the islands, and the most likely investor for that is China. China will most likely build a huge military base on one of the other 70 islands, some of which have very shallow water around them. We have seen how China has illegally built massive military bases on sandbanks in the South China Sea. It would be a piece of cake to do likewise on one of the Chagos Islands.
I leave it to others to try to get to the bottom of the cost: £5 billion, £9 billion, £18 billion or £35 billion. Even £1 million is an outrageous sum to give to a foreign power with no rights whatever to the islands, along with our giving away our own territory.
I conclude on the environmental crime that we will soon see there when the marine protected area is destroyed, as it surely will be. Mauritius ranks very low globally in overall ecosystem vitality and biodiversity protection metrics, with fish stocks showing a decline. The Chagos Islands boast some of the world’s most pristine coral reefs and marine biodiversity, making their preservation critical not only for ecological reasons but for future scientific research on climate change adaptation and marine conservation.
In 2010, the UK Government established an MPA of approximately 640,000 square kilometres around the islands. This no-take zone is one of the world’s largest marine reserves and protects the Chagos Archipelago’s coral reefs, deep-sea habitats and wildlife. However, China’s distant ocean fishing fleet is ravaging and destroying our oceans, invading the Galápagos MPA. It is a constant battle to keep it out of our gigantic Pitcairn Islands MPA, the second largest in the world at 841,000 square kilometres. So when China does a deal with the Mauritius Government, now mired in corruption scandals, the MPA will be the first target for Chinese exploitation and destruction as China fishes it dry and destroys the coral reefs with bottom trawling. Four of the top 10 MPAs in the world are UK overseas territories, and we will have destroyed one of them.
I ask the Government: is there nothing you will not sell out in this grubby deal—the Chagossian people, our defence and security, the costs to our economy, the perception that we may sell out other overseas territories and now even our pristine marine environment? I pray that this appallingly bad Bill can be amended or stopped before it does more damage to our country.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I think we all agree that what a Labour Government did 60 years ago in displacing the Chagossians was disgraceful and that there has been a tangled web of deception ever since under Governments of all parties. The Chagossians have been treated with shameful contempt and disdain. This treaty, and hence this Bill, while not perfect, open the way to some sort of justice after 60 years; that is a good advance.
This is a remarkable week of anniversaries concerning Chagos. Yesterday marked no fewer than three of them: 3 November was the 25th anniversary of the High Court judgment in 2000 allowing the Chagossians to return to the outer islands. In Mauritius, 3 November is Chagossian National Day when the Prime Minister lays a wreath at the Chagos monument on the port side in Port Louis, accompanied by the chairman of the Chagos Refugees Group, Olivier Bancoult. As my noble friend Lord Purvis noted, 3 November was also the third anniversary of the UK announcement to Parliament in 2022 by the then Conservative Foreign Secretary that constructive negotiations on sovereignty, the protection of the base, the Chagossians and the marine protected area would begin with Mauritius, with a view to reaching agreement in early 2023.
We can now add a fourth notable 3 November event: the creation by Mauritius, announced yesterday, of the Chagos MPA, as the Minister noted. To cap it all, 8 November, Saturday, is the 60th anniversary—a sad one—of the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and the creation of BIOT by Order in Council in 1965 with, of course, the beginning of the disgraceful expulsion of Chagossians from their home.
I have supported the Chagossians for several decades and declare my long-standing membership of the Chagos All-Party Parliamentary Group, founded 20 years ago, which has shaped my desire for a resolution of this long-open wound.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has used a lot of extravagant terms at different times to deplore this treaty, calling it variously in the last few months a “strategic capitulation”, a “surrender”, “obscene” and “dangerous”. He did not disappoint today—he was very entertaining—but the Opposition are being utterly disingenuous, dishonest and hypocritical, as this treaty is pretty much what they would have concluded in the two years from the launch of negotiations in autumn 2022 to their loss of power in July 2024.
My noble friend Lord Purvis has said in his interventions today and when we debated the treaty in June:
“The treaty is a consequence of now completing the previous Conservative Government’s policy. Some who agreed with it then disagree with it now, but that does not change the fact that the Conservatives made a major policy choice to cede sovereignty and to do it under the context of the International Court of Justice decisions”.—[Official Report, 30/6/25; col. 475.]
After hearing Sir Christopher Greenwood, a former judge of the International Court of Justice, our International Agreements Committee concluded that the future of the base on Diego Garcia would be at greater risk in the likely event of a future binding legal judgment in favour of Mauritius. Sir Christopher recognised that the ICJ opinion was advisory and not binding, but that it is
“a very authoritative guide to the legal position. In reality, it would be very difficult for any state just to ignore an almost unanimous opinion of the international court”.
Liberal Democrats want to be assured that the UK would not permit the United States to breach international law at Diego Garcia, as the then UK Government did in colluding in the use of the base for extraordinary rendition after 9/11. As my colleague in the other place, James MacCleary, said in a debate in May:
“Having now confirmed this deal on a shared UK-US asset, how confident is the Secretary of State that Diego Garcia will not be used by this White House to advance foreign policy objectives that we deem contrary to our principles and interests?”—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1289.]
I would welcome an answer to that from the Minister today, if she is able to provide one.
The treaty does not bring Mauritius closer to China; rather, it strengthens Mauritius’s relationship with the West. Mauritius has not joined China’s belt and road initiative and has no intention of doing so. A long-term agreement between the UK and Mauritius reinforces not only UK but Commonwealth ties, especially with India, which is a close ally of Mauritius. Mauritius also has close ties with the EU, France and Australia. The treaty strengthens NATO’s position and potential operations in the Indian Ocean, and India recently participated in military exercises with the US out of Diego Garcia. The Bill and treaty will bring BIOT to an end, allow Chagossians to return to their native outer islands under Mauritian sovereignty and provide for visits to Diego Garcia. I realise that the treaty does not provide for a right to self-determination, but the House needs to recognise that the majority of Chagossians none the less support it.
The Chagos Refugees Group is the largest and longest-standing group of its kind. It is led by Olivier Bancoult, whom I have met several times, including earlier this year. The CRG, the members of which are all dual citizens of the UK and Mauritius, has campaigned for the rights of Chagossians to return, including through pursuing litigation in our Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and other international courts. The CRG believes that the UK-Mauritius treaty is the only way Chagossians will be able to return for visits and resettlement. In a statement made three weeks ago, Olivier Bancoult said on behalf of the group:
“For the last 55 years since our exile began we have implored the UK government to permit us to resettle in our homeland. After repeated rejection of our demands we remain convinced that this agreement provides the only way forward, in which our compatriots will be allowed to restore the ancestral connection to our islands … Unless, therefore, the Agreement is approved and implemented our exile will continue with no hope of restoring our fundamental human right to return”.
He added:
“This resolution has come about after comprehensive consultation of Chagossians worldwide”.
However, he warned that,
“if Mauritius will not fulfil its responsibilities to us of course we will raise our voices”.
In fact, not only has Olivier Bancoult been consulted over 30 times by the Mauritian Government but Stephen Doughty, the UK Minister responsible, has met Chagossians throughout the process and briefed them ahead of the agreement. There was also mention earlier, I think, of a government-commissioned study conducted by KPMG in 2015, which involved considerable consultation with the Chagossians.
Sir Christopher Greenwood, in his evidence to the International Agreements Committee, said:
“Britain’s standing to argue that Mauritius should be required to resettle Chagossians on the other islands, frankly, is somewhat undermined by the fact that the United Kingdom has consistently refused any suggestion of resettlement on the other islands. That is a position that the UK Government have reaffirmed relatively recently”.
He cited a reply by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, in 2022, to a Written Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, in which the noble Lord confirmed that, in November 2016, which was also under a Conservative Government,
“the UK Government announced that resettlement of Chagossians could not be supported on the grounds of feasibility, defence and security interests, and cost to the British taxpayer. There remains no right of abode in BIOT”.
That was the position under the Conservative Government—no resettlement in the Chagos Islands. It is an improvement on the situation under previous Governments that resettlement is now to be possible, even if not assured.
It is true that the provision in the treaty on resettlement is permissive, saying that Mauritius is free to arrange for resettlement on all the islands except Diego Garcia, rather than obligatory. As my noble friends here and friends in the other place have consistently argued, more clarity is needed about the implementation of the agreement and the impact on Chagossians, including on funding from the trust fund and on resettlement. It would be good to hear more detail from the Minister today.
Finally, other provisions of the treaty or Bill which merit a mention are citizenship and environmental matters. While the Bill removes the ability of people to acquire British Overseas Territories citizenship on the basis of connection to BIOT, it preserves a route to full British citizenship for Chagossian descendants. The treaty includes provisions for the UK to support Mauritius in establishing and managing marine protected areas. We have noted that, yesterday, Mauritius created one called CAMPA: the Chagos Archipelago MPA. The treaty commits the parties to co-operate on environmental protection, maritime security and illegal fishing. My friend in the other place, Dr Al Pinkerton, understandably put forward the need for accountability, with an annual report on progress on the MPAs so that environmental protection does not fade from view. My last request would be to hear from the Minister a commitment to such regular reporting on environmental protection.
Lord Morrow (DUP)
My Lords, the people of Northern Ireland have a particular interest in the Chagos islands, because the United Kingdom took on responsibility for the islands and, crucially, a duty of care for the Chagossian people in 1814, when the UK was represented by one of the most successful Foreign Secretaries, Viscount Castlereagh. He went on to play a pivotal role in laying the foundation for peace in Europe for nearly 100 years through the Congress of Vienna the following year, the success of which stands in sharp contrast to the shortcomings of Versailles, 160 years later. His family home, Mount Stewart, in Northern Ireland, is now owned by the National Trust and contains the state chairs from the Congress of Vienna, which were donated to Castlereagh after the conclusion of the congress, in recognition of the crucial contribution that he made to proceedings.
In my comments today, I want to reflect on the serious human rights failures attending the Bill before us and the treaty to which it relates. The argument for the Bill and treaty is that, on 8 November 1965, the UK Government, with the consent of the Mauritian Council of Ministers, removed the Chagos Islands and made them into a separate colony, the British Indian Overseas Territory, in order to meet the American request for a military base on the islands. This means that Mauritius gained independence in 1968 without the Chagos Islands
The argument is that this was contrary to UN Resolution 1514 on decolonisation, because it involved the colonial power, the UK, changing the territorial integrity of the colony before decolonisation. In this context it is said that, notwithstanding that the Mauritian Council of Ministers consented to the separation of the Chagos Islands in 1965, this decision was not valid because the United Kingdom acted contrary to international law in seeking this separation, and therefore since 1968, the decolonisation of Mauritius has been only partially secured and will not be fully secured until the islands are returned to Mauritius. This argument, however, depends on abstracting a concern for the territorial integrity of the 1965 colony, frozen in time, apart from all other considerations of international law.
The distance from the island of Mauritius to the Chagos Islands is a huge 1,339 miles—the distance from here to north Africa. Not surprisingly, the people are of a different ethnic group and religion. Thus, in international law regarding decolonisation, rather than self-determination being subject to territorial integrity, territorial integrity is very much subject to self-determination.
In the second instance, turning to the events of 1968 to 1973, the delivery of self-determination was undermined from 1968 because, after creating the British Indian Ocean Territory, the UK Government embarked on one of the most shameful episodes in our history, as has already been mentioned in your Lordships’ House today. We would like to think that the events of 1968 to 1973 took place in an earlier age—between 1768 and 1773, or perhaps between 1868 and 1873—but they did not. They happened within my lifetime and those of many noble Lords, and involved the forced removal of the Chagossian people not just from their homes but from their islands.
In this context, the Government’s argument is that we can somehow forget about the self-determination of the people of the islands and just revert to the pre-8 November 1965 territorial integrity, and so effectively reassert the validity of what happened between 1968 and 1973. Rather than alleviating our national shame and moral responsibility, the Government’s decision to use the fact that we forcibly removed the Chagossians from their homeland as an excuse for denying them self-determination makes our moral failure much worse. It involves our acting as if the Chagossians do not exist.
The Government might seek to argue that their position is not that the Chagossians do not exist but that they are properly conceived of as Mauritians for two reasons. First, because pre-8 November 1965 they lived in the colony of Mauritius, the boundaries of which the Government are seeking to restore; and secondly, because some Chagossians live in Mauritius.
This argument, however, is completely unsustainable. First, most Chagossians do not live in Mauritius and those who do have been leaving in large numbers. Secondly, those who remain in Mauritius are there only because they were forcibly removed to Mauritius, not because they wanted to go there. We need to give some thought to that. Thirdly, the relationship between the Chagossians and Mauritians is such that it is plainly very difficult, if not impossible, for Chagossians to place themselves in the identity of Mauritian, because the Mauritians played a crucial role in facilitating what amounted to an existential attack on the Chagossians: their forced removal from the Chagos Islands in agreeing they would be moved to the island of Mauritius, 1,339 miles away.
The 1965 decision of the Mauritian Council of Ministers was not valid because it took place while Mauritius was a UK colony. How much more valid is any attempt to pretend that the decision of the Republic of Mauritius in 2025 can be regarded as a valid decision on the part of the Chagossians, who, unlike the Mauritian Council of Ministers in 1965, were not consulted?
Going forward, two things are absolutely clear. First, having taken advice, it would be perfectly possible to facilitate a robust and secure referendum of the Chagossians, who live principally in the UK, the Seychelles and Mauritius, to find out whether they self-determine that their islands—which, from this Saturday, will have been functionally separate from what has become the Republic of Mauritius for 60 years—should rejoin Mauritius or not. This is critically important because the informal referendum, facilitated by a BIOT citizens group which has engaged around 40% of Chagossians, has demonstrated that over 99% of them do not wish their islands to be given to the Mauritians. Secondly, according to the crucial KPMG report already mentioned in your Lordships’ House today, the resettlement of the Chagos Islands would be significantly cheaper than leasing just one of the islands, Diego Garcia, from Mauritius.
It was unconscionable that we should have taken the people of the Chagos Islands from their own lands, but now the UK Government’s Mauritius treaty and Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill are about to make things much worse. First, the Bill—the concluded passage of which facilitates the coming into force of the Mauritius treaty—seeks to give the Chagossians’ lands to what many of them regard as a foreign country, without their consent and without even requiring the Mauritians to resettle the Chagos Islands with the Chagossians. Secondly, the Government propose paying the Republic of Mauritius—which many Chagossians regard not only as a foreign country but a foreign country that has a history of discriminating against Chagossians—an extravagant amount of money for the use of just one island when that would pay for the resettlement of the Chagossians in their islands right now. Thirdly, the Government then hoist themselves by their own petard by engaging directly with the Chagossians, as distinct from the Mauritians, through Article 11 of the treaty, but then make no attempt to facilitate their self-determination.
There is more we would all like to say, but if the Government decide to proceed they will unwittingly make provision for an even more disturbing TV drama than “Mr Bates vs The Post Office”. I urge them to think about that. The British public expect more from their Government in 2025. I strongly advise them to step back from the brink.
Lord De Mauley (Con)
My Lords, the International Relations and Defence Committee, which I have the honour to chair, decided, on the announcement of the deal with Mauritius, to have a look at the proposed handover of sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory. As a result, the committee raised a number of issues. In view of the fact that we are a cross-party committee, we did not get into an argument about the Government’s detailed reasons for doing the deal. We simply observed that the decision to proceed was ultimately political. That statement itself acknowledges the fact that several members of the committee, including me, were very doubtful about the Government’s stated legal and other reasons. My noble friend Lord Lilley eloquently set out the basis for some of those doubts.
Our witnesses were unanimous in their view that Diego Garcia holds a pivotal strategic role for the United Kingdom and the United States, and that it is critical for broader western security strategy in the Indo-Pacific—on that much at least, we can agree with the Government. The Government argue that the deal secures Diego Garcia as a UK base. As an article from RUSI issued since our inquiry points out, however, the base was already secure prior to the ceding of sovereignty. We heard arguments that I find persuasive that the deal could, in fact, make the base less secure in absolute terms. I will come to some of those in a moment.
The committee focused on four key areas: the future of defence and security arrangements on Diego Garcia; the rights of the Chagossian people; the environmental protection of the archipelago; and the costs arising from the agreement.
As regards defence and security, witnesses alerted us to a number of potential risks. Most of these revolved around increased vulnerability to Chinese political warfare tactics. Our attention was drawn to the fact that there remains a risk, particularly in the context of expanding Chinese influence on the African continent, that the base may need to be used in a way that is perceived as contentious in Africa—for example, arising from the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty—and could cause diplomatic difficulties, to say the least, for the UK in the future.
As regards the long term, we heard evidence that the Government’s confidence in the strength of the UK’s right of first refusal to an extension after 99 years was unconvincing. This was because, among other things, it lacks the mechanism for enforcement and would be difficult to assert in practice. This is a significant potential source of future vulnerability that the Government must address now as part of their long-term strategic planning.
Being in Hong Kong at the time of its handover to the Chinese in 1997—and look what a success that has been—brought home to me that 99 years today is little more than a single lifespan. We noted that the agreement has introduced a risk that Mauritius—as the sovereign power, if the treaty is ratified—could object to a specific military operation from Diego Garcia, due to differing views on whether it meets the requirements of international humanitarian law. While the Government were categorical that this would not limit UK-US freedom of action, we were warned that such objections could lead to lawfare and create diplomatic difficulties for the UK, bringing the risk that they affect military operations.
I turn to the rights of Chagossians. We met a cross- section of members of the community in UK and Mauritius. While we acknowledge that their views cannot be representative of the entire community, those we met expressed unanimous dissatisfaction with the consultation processes conducted by both the UK and Mauritian Governments. Concerns revolved principally around, first, the vague language relating to resettlement and, secondly, the inadequacy of arrangements to ensure that Chagossians benefit from the financial package being given to Mauritius by the UK. It is notable that under Article 10 of the agreement, the UK is required to give preference to suitably qualified Mauritian nationals, to the maximum extent practical when employing contractors, but no reference is made to prioritising employment for those of Chagossian heritage.
To date, the Government have not provided a clear or convincing rationale for excluding Chagossians from employment on Diego Garcia. The lack of attention to the interests of Chagossians is even more stark in the context of the financial package. Concerns were raised to us about the £40 million trust fund that the UK will set up under Article 11 of the agreement, dedicated to the Chagossian community, with Mauritius establishing the fund under its financial regulations, in consultation with the UK.
A key theme during our discussion with the Chagossians was the lack of clarity on how the trust fund would be managed, with participants highlighting the Mauritian Government’s poor record in supporting their community. For example, in 2016 the UK provided £40 million to the Mauritian authorities to improve Chagossian lives, yet only £1.3 million was disbursed, and even those funds came with restrictive conditions. Given this, it is surprising that the Government have surrendered the right to manage this fund to Mauritius, when the UK is itself well equipped to manage funds on behalf of others.
The Government have committed to providing a factual update to Parliament on the modalities of the trust fund, and on eligibility for resettlement. I ask the Minister when that update will be forthcoming. Alongside the trust fund, a £45 million annual development grant will be provided by the UK for a period of 25 years, to support development projects aimed at improving the economic welfare of Mauritius and its citizens. Why has a proportion of the grant, at least, not been earmarked for the benefit of Chagossians? I find it extraordinary that it was a Labour Government, in the 1960s, who evicted the population of the Chagos Islands callously from their island homes, and it is a Labour Government, in 2025, who have so blatantly failed to give adequate attention to the rights of the Chagossians.
I turn to the environmental implications. The committee heard the archipelago described by a credible environmental expert as
“the most important reef wilderness on the planet”.
Concern arises partly because there is uncertainty about the future of the marine protected area established around the BIOT in 2010 by the UK, as the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, said, given that it has not been recognised by Mauritius. We were told in particular that the Mauritian Government’s track record in marine governance is poor. Furthermore, assuming that Mauritius acts in good faith in the matter of the environment, its enforcement capabilities are currently limited, as again the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, said, to just two ocean-going vessels and two aircraft that are incapable of reaching Chagos directly.
I turn finally to the cost of the agreement. For each of the first three years, the UK will pay Mauritius £165 million. It will then pay £120 million per year for the following 10 years. Thereafter, it will continue to pay the equivalent of £120 million annually, increasing in line with inflation. In addition, the UK will fund the £40 million trust fund and the £45 million annual development grant that I referred to earlier. The Government calculate the total cost of all this at approximately £3.4 billion. However, critics have questioned the methodology used and argued that the total cost of the agreement could be very considerably greater.
Attempting to justify the cost of the agreement, the Minister asserted to us that the payments to Mauritius compare favourably with payments made by others for overseas bases. For example, he indicated that France had recently arranged an €85 million per year deal with Djibouti on its basing arrangements for a military base 15 times smaller than Diego Garcia. We noted, however, that the Government’s emphasis on the size of the Djibouti base draws a false equivalence between size and cost; it therefore calls into doubt any such comparison. We called on the Government to provide the committee with further information on how the overall leasing costs for Diego Garcia were determined and how these may affect the allocations in the defence budget. No such data has yet been produced.
As I hope I have outlined, the Government still have some very serious questions to answer on the future defence and security arrangements, the rights of the Chagossians, the environmental protection of the archipelago, and the costs arising from the arrangement.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
My Lords, as a former Defence Minister and current chair of the ISC, I recognise the vital importance of the base on Diego Garcia. It is significant because of its strategic location. It has been vital in combating some of the most serious threats against us and our allies, including from terrorism and hostile states. It has a unique capability of collecting data, which has been used to counter terrorism both abroad and at home. It has made our security, not only ours but that of our allies, greater. It is also a strategically vital logistics hub and protects some strategic shipping lanes. On national security, we usually have consensus across the House, both here and in the other place. Therefore, I am saddened and disappointed that the Official Opposition are using this as a political football on such a vital interest, not just to us but to our allies.
There have been four main issues put forward against the Bill. One is the legal issue around sovereignty; the second is cost; the third is the threat from China; and the fourth is the way in which the Chagossian people have been treated. In opening, my noble friend Lady Chapman outlined the issues around the legal uncertainty surrounding the Diego Garcia base. The excellent report of the International Agreements Committee— I congratulate Members who were involved in it—covers those in good detail but, like all legal questions, there are different opinions. Clearly, the committee took evidence from different opinions in its work and Professor Richard Ekins KC was of the opinion that the ICJ opinion was not legally binding.
As has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, Sir Christopher Greenwood said that he could envisage at least two possible routes to make that agreement binding. Clearly, there is a division; there is uncertainty, and that is what the Bill is about, as was said by the Minister in opening the debate, and that is why the last Government entered into negotiations on this.
On the issue around sovereignty, what I find difficult is this. James Cleverly, the Foreign Secretary at the time, said on 3 November, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that negotiations would begin
“on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory”
and that it was the Government’s
“intention to secure an agreement on the basis of international law”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
The then Government were clear about discussing sovereignty, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said. The rhetoric from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is that this is the sovereignty surrender Bill; I challenge the Conservative party to say what has changed in that time, when it was quite clear that the last Government were going to discuss the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands.
The noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra, said that it was all those nasty people at the Foreign Office who have basically bamboozled Ministers of both Governments, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that the Conservatives would have come to a similar conclusion: if they had been returned to office, this Bill would have been put forward.
Secondly, on the issue around costs, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, did the usual trick of adding up all this money to get to £35 billion to give the impression that this money will be paid out tomorrow, when it will be over 100 years. This investment underpins the already huge investment that not only we have put into the Diego Garcia base but, more importantly, the Americans, and will continue to do for years to come. The committee report mentioned Djibouti, as did the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, and possible issues around size, but this is not an unusual arrangement. However, the joint agreement gives certainty to ourselves and our American allies to invest in the future of that vital capability.
Thirdly, on China, there is a lot of hyperbole spoken on this issue—and not just on this Bill. A lot of ill- informed comment is often portrayed as fact. I urge noble Lords to look at our ISC report of 2023 on China. Yes, China is a threat. Is it a threat to Diego Garcia now? Yes, it is. Will it be in the future? Yes, it will be. But the Bill does nothing to make that more likely. On the issue of China, who is Mauritius’s main interlocutor? It is India. Our Five Eyes partners have all agreed this and think it is a good way forward. It has been suggested that Mauritius will have a veto over military operations; no, it will not, if we look at the Bill—it will have the same rights as the Republic of Cyprus in terms of the sovereign base areas. If military action takes place, people will be informed afterwards. That is not giving it a veto. The idea that China will somehow get close to our very valuable assets there is not the case, because for the first time the outer islands, which are vulnerable, will be secured; that is something we should welcome. It also underpins the strategy of working with our Pacific partners to ensure that we face down China in that part of the world.
Fourthly, on the Chagossian people, I think everyone agrees that the way they have been treated over decades has been completely shameful. This agreement makes a movement forward—as my noble friend said, the funding coming forward allows some limited resettlement —but I urge those Chagossians listening not to be fooled by the Conservative Front Bench. I spent 23 years in the House of Commons, and the only person who consistently raised this issue was the Member for Islington North, Jeremy Corbyn. I never heard a single Member on the Conservative Benches, so it is clearly political opportunism to say now that, somehow, they care about the Chagossian people; they do not at all. I would be very wary about that being put forward.
This is an important Bill. The agreement has the support of our Five Eyes partners and of regional players. Please, if we are talking about national security, this is too vitally important to be kicked around, as it is being, as a political football. We need this Bill. It gives a secure future for our continued occupation of Diego Garcia and, more importantly, the facilities that it brings to keep us all safe.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. He deployed a lot of knowledge and insight, and I have great respect for him. He mentioned the former leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, who has been consistent in his interest in this subject; I would also add Andrew Rosindell, who, from the day I joined Parliament, has been consistent in his challenging of Governments of all colours and standing up for the Chagossians.
My noble friend Lord Callanan mentioned his amendment, and the Minister was pretty impolite about that amendment. If the Government were serious about challenging our amendment, why did they not put it to a vote? Incidentally, where are the Labour Peers this evening? If they did not like our amendment, they could have voted it down and allowed the Bill to be committed to a Committee of the whole House. Surely, that would have been the sensible thing to have done.
In 2010, I was appointed Minister for the Overseas Territories. Some 31 years on from when the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was the director of the overseas territories directorate, I was taking a great interest in this subject; whether that makes him very old or me very young, I do not know, but we both care passionately about this subject. I remember at the time looking at the whole issue of the Chagossian people, and we agreed at the time, in 2010, to set up a feasibility study, which then eventually reported in 2014. It is a great shame that the then Government, which, I think, was in transition from David Cameron to Theresa May, did not pick up the recommendations of that feasibility study, take action and look at different schemes to allow the Chagossians to return.
The Chagossians have been treated quite appallingly. There is no doubt about that. Under a Labour Government, decisions were made that were egregious, on a par probably with the Highland clearances and the appalling evictions during the famine in Ireland. These people were forcibly removed from their territory, from their land, and we should be ashamed—my Government as well, over successive decades, but all Governments.
There has been talk about consultation with the Chagossians, involvement with them and engaging with them, but I agree 100% with the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow: we should have a referendum of the Chagossian people. If it is possible to have a referendum for the position of chancellor of the University of Oxford and poll all the alumni around the world, surely it would be perfectly feasible and possible to have a referendum of Chagossians, who are living in this country, in Mauritius and in the Seychelles, with some in different parts of Europe. I believe very strongly that we should do that. One of the observations I have come away with, having had many conversations with Chagossians, is that they are a very proud group of people. What is extraordinary, beyond belief, is that they are still incredibly loyal to the Crown. We do not deserve that. We owe them a duty.
On the deal itself, we have heard many different legal opinions. We heard my noble friend Lord Lilley, who I thought made an excellent speech in which he dealt with this subject, so I will not go over that ground again. I do know Sir Christopher Greenwood extremely well—we were immediate contemporaries, reading law at Cambridge and then at the Inns of Court—and I respect his opinions enormously. During my time as the Minister for the UN, I used to go and visit him at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, where he was our resident judge. He has not once said that these decisions—there is more than one decision—and potential decisions could be totally binding. Other legal experts have said that they are always going to be advisory.
We are where we are. I personally think that the Truss Government, who did not last very long, were quite wrong to launch these negotiations, but the negotiations were launched. Eleven rounds of negotiations took place. A number of Labour Peers who are not here today have said that after 11 rounds we were bound to reach a decision, and it was only a matter of time when the new Government came in that they would decide this. Well, I have spoken to James Cleverly and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and they had red lines beyond which they were not prepared to go under any circumstances.
I will not go into them all, but there were two key red lines. The first was a properly managed MPA, preferably with joint sovereignty, and the other, more important red line was negotiating with Mauritius for a sovereign base area, and I think Mauritius would have agreed this. A sovereign base area is very different from a lease; it is a sovereign base in perpetuity. The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made the point about us being obliged to notify Cyprus that the two Cyprus sovereign bases are our sovereign territory. In this case we have no obligation to do that; this will be not our sovereign territory but Mauritius’s, and we will be in a very different position as a lessee.
If one looks back at the Cyprus negotiations under a Tory Government in 1960, Cyprus was a country fighting for its independence after a very bloody, unpleasant conflict between the British occupying forces and EOKA. After painful negotiations, we got to the stage at which Cyprus was going to reach its independence, but we stood firm and insisted on those two sovereign base areas. The Cypriot Government were not happy, but I suggest to your Lordships that they had a much stronger bargaining position than the Mauritian Government had over the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. In fact, if we had negotiated a 99-year lease on those sovereign base areas in 1960, we would now be looking at 34 years to go.
If one looks at Hong Kong, would it not have been better if the Government in 1897 had secured a sovereign grant of the New Territories? Obviously, we had outright sovereignty on Hong Kong and Kowloon, but it was decided after the war that it was not feasible to maintain sovereignty over Hong Kong and Kowloon without the New Territories. If the Government then had insisted on an outright grant of sovereignty, which may well have been quite possible—I have read all the debates at the time—we would have been in a very different position. If one looks at what happened with Hong Kong, there was enormous pressure on leases and discussion, debate and uncertainty running up to 1997, and that started about 30 years out. I suggest to the Minister that, probably in about 70 years, those discussions will start taking place about the future of Diego Garcia. We may well get a very warm reception from the Mauritian Government in terms of extending the lease by those 40 years, but we may not. A lot of things can change.
The bottom line is that we have lost control. If this treaty goes through, we will have completely lost control of the future of that base. Yes, it will be secure in the short term, subject to all sorts of caveats that have been mentioned. That is why I am very disappointed and sad that that red line was crossed. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, would have allowed that red line to be crossed. Furthermore, had he tried to cross it, he would never have got it through the House of Commons anyway.
On the marine protection area, one of the first things I dealt with when I became Overseas Territories Minister was to look at the biodiversity within the territories—92% of our total biodiversity is in the OTs, of which 20% is in the Chagos Archipelago. It may well be that the commitments of Navin Ramgoolam—whom I know well—will be honoured by future Governments. His Excellency is an honourable, decent man, but he could be replaced by someone completely different. As the noble Lords, Lord Thurlow and Lord Blencathra, have pointed out, the agreements that have been made around the MPA could easily be rescinded or changed, and that MPA, which is one of the jewels in the crown of the overseas territories, could be put at very severe risk indeed.
I will not go into details about the costs, except to say that I think the Minister was wrong in her figures. If one includes the 40 years at £101 million, that comes to £14 billion, not the £3 billion that she mentioned. This decision by the Government not to commit has given us a pause to reflect on what we do now. I urge the House to remember that we have a duty to consult the Chagossian people and improve the Bill, and we absolutely must do that.
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, and particularly his very thoughtful speech today. I say at the outset that I support the Bill as a necessary consequence of the Chagos Islands agreement, which I also support.
I will not deal with the future of the Chagossians or environmental issues today, important though they both are. I will focus on security, but I think that both the British and Mauritian Governments will need to work hard to meet the justified demands of the Chagossian people.
I will not go over all the ground covered by the Minister in her opening speech, but I want to emphasise the importance of the base on Diego Garcia for our security and, more generally, for western security. A simple look at the map shows why it matters so much for our security, and for western security, in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and why security of the base in the years ahead is so important.
For that reason, I continue to think—and, as I have said before in this House, I thought at the time—that it was absolutely right for the previous Government to start intensive negotiations with Mauritius, with the aim of ensuring
“the continued effective operation of the joint UK/US military base on Diego Garcia”;—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
that it was absolutely right for the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to decide, after examining the issue, to continue with the negotiations; and that it is absolutely right for the present Government to conclude them.
As I understand it—and I have listened carefully to the Minister—the agreement will provide us and the United States with the certainty we both need over the future of the military base on Diego Garcia for 99 years, plus another 40 years if we exercise our rights under the treaty. It does not surprise me that our Five Eyes partners—the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—have welcomed the deal, recognising its importance for their and our security, nor that India, South Korea and the African Union have welcomed it too.
It would, of course, have been nice to have secured the deal without the cost. Some £101 million a year in today’s money is not cheap, and it would build a lot of hospitals. But surely the question is whether paying 0.2% of the defence budget is a price worth paying for the security it brings. I believe that it is.
Finally, it is worth considering the implications of our not agreeing a deal, of continuing with a contested relationship with Mauritius, the UN and the ICJ, and of ditching an agreement that we have reached with, and that has the support of, our Five Eyes partners. I know it is always risky to peer into the future, particularly given today’s uncertain world, but we can be pretty certain that the ICJ and UN General Assembly resolutions condemning us would continue. It is likely that they will be legally binding on us in the future. Could we just ignore that? Yes, we could, but in doing so, in these circumstances, we would be flouting international law. I believe—and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, is listening—that the United Kingdom should be supporting and respecting international law, not flouting it. That has been, and should remain, our tradition, whether under a Conservative or a Labour Government.
May I also say to the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra—
Lord Lilley (Con)
The noble Lord said that we should pursue international law. Does he accept that we have, under the International Court of Justice, an opt-out for disputes between ourselves and Commonwealth countries—or was he going to mention that anyway?
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
I was not going to mention that; I was making the simple point that respect for international law has been, and should remain, an extremely important part of British foreign policy.
I say this to the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra. When I was in the Foreign Office, serving under the late Lord Carrington and Lord Hurd, I was not conscious that there was a Foreign Office policy and not a government foreign policy. I have to say, I did not have the privilege of serving under the noble Lord, Lord Cameron.
The agreement with Mauritius and the treaty we are now considering respect international law, protect British and western security, have the support of our Five Eyes partners, India and others, and, in my view, unquestionably deserve our support.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, there is pretty stiff competition for the accolade “worst Bill of this Session”, but this Bill is right up there in contention.
The Chagos Islands are linked to Mauritius only by virtue of the fact that they were both once administered as part of one colony. There is no historical, geographical or cultural basis for Mauritius claiming ownership. I have no idea why, in 1965, the Labour Government decided to pay Mauritius £3 million for agreeing to detach the Chagos Islands, but that is what they did. That £3 million is something like £70 million in today’s money. Labour has form on chucking taxpayers’ money at Mauritius. The cost of this Bill is what I want to focus on today.
The Bill itself contains no financial provisions, but it is important because, if it passes, it will pave the way for ratification of the treaty, which will trigger the payments described in the treaty. This is where the smoke and mirrors start to come in. As has already been mentioned today, the Explanatory Memorandum to the treaty says:
“The average annual cost to the UK … is £101 million in 2025/2026 prices”.
That is technically correct, but we will be spending taxpayers’ money in cash, not as expressed notionally in this year’s prices.
The biggest element of the package runs for the whole of the 99 years. It starts at £165 million for the first three years, then it is £120 million for the next 10 years. After that, it is indexed for the whole of the remaining period using the GDP deflator. This means that, by the end of the 99 years, we will be paying more than £650 million a year—assuming that the deflator comes in at 2%, which is a fairly heroic assumption given the Bank of England’s current performance on controlling inflation. That is what compounding does, even when using the very low rate of 2%. As say, if inflation goes above that, the figure could be very much more. In cash terms, the average is not £101 million; it is at least three times that.
That is not all. The payment structure is front-end loaded, which means that using an average of 99 years understates the short-term fiscal impact. If we look just at the first 10 years, the average payment in 2025-26 prices is not £110 million; it is about £150 million. In cash terms, it is around £170 million. The Secretary of State for Defence told the other place that the treaty would cost the UK less than 0.2% of the defence budget. That is about £120 million, using the 2025-26 budget numbers. In cash terms, we will never, never pay less than £120 million a year. At current prices, we do not pay less than £120 million until about year 30 of the deal. Did the Secretary of State for Defence not understand the deal—or had he concocted this description in a deliberate attempt to confuse?
The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to say that the total expected cost of the finance package, using a net present value methodology, is £3.4 billion, as we have already heard. The total cash cost to taxpayers via the Exchequer is nearer 10 times that. The figure of £3.4 billion not only knocks off future inflation to get to 2025-26 prices; it then knocks off very much more by using a social time preference rate in accordance with the Treasury’s Green Book, and that rate starts at 3.5% and drops down to 2.5%. I will spare noble Lords a discourse on the social time preference rate. It is a fact that the Government use a lower figure when it suits them. Indeed, when the noble Lord, Lord Stern, was asked to analyse the economics of climate change, he used a discount rate of 0.1%. The Government did not even challenge that. Far from it: they used the report to justify the completely crazy costs of net-zero policies.
It is clearly convenient for the Government to use a high discount rate when they are calculating what they claim to be the cost of this policy. I am not going to argue about the discount rate. Instead, I am going to argue that it is simply not relevant. The Treasury’s Green Book draws a clear distinction between what it calls the economic dimension, and the financial dimension. Discounting is relevant to the economic dimension but not to the financial dimension. The Green Book describes discounting in the following terms. The reason for social discounting is to allow proposals of different lengths and with different options, and with different profiles of net costs and benefits over time, to be compared on a common basis. That is not what we are doing here. There is no question of comparing differing proposals in the Bill we have before us. The Government are using discounting to try to pull the wool over our eyes, but we are not deceived. The financial cost of this Bill is not £3.4 billion. It is £35 billion at best.
This is a bad Bill, for the many reasons that have been given by my noble friends and other noble Lords today. For me, it is another example of the reason why the Labour Government cannot be trusted with taxpayers’ money. This morning, the Chancellor of the Exchequer as good as announced that she is going to raise taxes in this month’s Budget. In the first five years alone, hugely important to the Budget arithmetic, nearly £900 million will be given to the Mauritian Government. How can the Government look British taxpayers in the eye and say that they will make us pay more tax so they can give it away to a foreign Government?
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I first mentioned the Chagos Islands back in 2008 in the other place, when we had set up an all-party group on Chagos. I have to say that over the years, when I was at those meetings in the other place, I never once heard a Chagossian say that they were asking to be put under Mauritian rule; they were asking for the British Government to allow them back home. To me, a basic underlying problem with the Bill is that, despite how we behaved to the Chagos Islanders—in our lifetime, let us remember, not in some far-off time in colonial history—when we arbitrarily evicted them out of their homes, which was a gross abuse that we undertook and, let us be clear, would these days be called ethnic cleansing, this Labour Government are repeating the mistakes of the past, with no involvement of the Chagossians and no attempt to get their views by way of a referendum.
I know it would be difficult to organise a referendum right across the world for Chagossians, but it could be done if there was the will to do it. Instead of rushing to announce this deal with Mauritius, the Government could have started a process of real engagement with Chagossians all over the world. That would have shown all the various bodies passing judgment on us that we were serious about looking after the interests of those whose islands were being discussed. The entire basis for this surrender of sovereignty seems to be the principle in international law that territories generally ought not to be divided at independence, but there are countless examples of that having occurred and having been right at the time—India, for example.
The Government say it is important that we ensure the future of the Diego Garcia base, and that without this treaty its future would be uncertain. Why should it be uncertain? There is no one in this House who disagrees about the importance of the base for our security. The uncertainty they mean is based on three international judgments. The International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 2019 was just that—advisory. The UN General Assembly resolution of 2019 is only a recommendation. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea judgment of 2021 followed a process that did not even involve the UK and is therefore not binding.
I am afraid this is just another example of our Government refusing to stand up for our own country and our own national interest. Can anyone imagine China or the United States giving up territory because of some international legal opinion? Of course they would not, because they put their own country first, and it is about time that we did that too. What if this advisory council suddenly said, “We think the Falklands should be given back to Argentina”? Would the Government then say that perhaps that might be something we should do?
We are now going to pay out millions of pounds to give away our own territory, and no amount of fine words from lawyers, liberal ideas and international law will convince the public that this deal is anything other than a shameful act of betrayal of Chagossians. As it stands, not a single Chagossian has the right to return to the islands. It is all down to the Mauritian Government —a Government who are getting closer and closer to China and will face any direction if the money is there. They will decide how the money that we give will get to the Chagossians, if it ever does. Whatever assurances there are on paper are likely, in a short time, to become of little value. Guarantees will be worthless, and where then will be all these pillars of international law? I doubt they will be anywhere to be seen.
This Bill was not in the Labour Party’s manifesto. It was announced very soon after the election and I think that it came out of the blue to all of us. Yes, the Conservatives had started to negotiate, but I am not really interested in blaming who started what. The reality is that the Conservatives did not actually sign up to anything; it is the Labour Government who are signing up to it now. That is their decision that they took quickly just after they were elected.
Why are the Government surrendering a vital geopolitical asset, a matchless environmental protection order, vast reserves of increasingly precious seabed resources and the right of self-determination of the Chagossian people, to say nothing of the massive price tag that the people of the UK will pay for generations to come to rent something that we presently own? Why the rush?
This whole deal and the Bill make no sense to me morally for the British Chagossians, legally, economically or from a security perspective. I genuinely do not understand where it has come from, and that makes me wonder if the only way to understand it—I know noble Lords will not like me saying this—is to look at the role of the Attorney-General, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer. For it is the Attorney-General who, as a barrister, moved from Doughty Street Chambers, which he had shared with his friend, the current Prime Minister, to join the chambers jointly founded by their mutual friend, a certain Philippe Sands, the lawyer who has represented Mauritius’s interests over those of the British Chagossians throughout this sorry saga. The noble and learned Lord became a member of Matrix Chambers and I can only assume that he assumed his friendship with Sands presented no conflict of interest when he became Attorney-General. Nor, indeed, did he suggest a conflict of interest when, in 2023, before he was Attorney-General, he represented a group of Sri Lankan asylum seekers in Chagos and then decided a few years later, as Attorney-General, to allow their case and let them resettle in the UK. Surely this was a conflict of interest.
I am raising this because this is what people out there are asking. If I cannot raise it here in this Chamber, where can we get these answers? Some people may say that this is all above board and it is not for me to say it is not, but it is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, observed in an interview with the New Statesman recently on the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer—he actually said, “He’s got to go”; I will not quote what he said about the noble and learned Lord, because it was pretty harsh—that
“They talk about the rule of law but what they want is a rule of lawyers”.
The Attorney-General said in his 2024 Bingham lecture on the rule of law:
“Since taking office, this Government has already taken steps to uphold those obligations and demonstrate our deep commitment to international law. We have reached agreement with Mauritius to settle the historic sovereignty claims over BIOT/Chagos Archipelago in a manner that successfully marries our international law obligations with vital national security requirements”.
There was not a single mention in that speech of the Chagossian people—shameful. Surely he should recuse himself from anything to do with the Chagos Islands. We should get a statement from him on his position and we should get the legal opinion.
I am deeply ashamed of the Government’s position on this. It is probably the most shameful act of their one-year tenure. I am pleased—people will not like this either—that Reform has said quite clearly and unequivocally that if it gets into power it will tear this treaty up. I will back that, whatever lawyers and international bodies say, because this deal is wrong for our country. It is outrageous that a Government are getting away with giving away our sovereignty in this very short time.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I would prefer the noble Baroness to be consistent. If she is criticising the Attorney-General under this Government for giving advice on continuing negotiations to cede sovereignty, why is she not as critical of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, who was Attorney-General in November 2022, when, presumably, she gave advice to the previous Government to commence negotiations to seek sovereignty?
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
The noble Lord has obviously seen some of these legal agreements. I have not. I would like to see all this legal advice. I see no reason why this House should not see the legal advice.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, we have an opportunity to right an old wrong and prevent a new injustice. We have an opportunity to stop the handover of tens of millions of pounds a year—billions in total—to fund tax cuts somewhere else while taxes are rising here. We have an opportunity to prevent the handover of strategic territory to a state that may come under the influence of unfriendly powers. Above all, we have the ability to stand up belatedly for the injured party here: the Chagossian people.
Sitting silently in the Gallery throughout your Lordships’ debate has been a contingent of our friends from the British Indian Ocean Territory. Their role as silent spectators has been eerily symbolic of the role they have played these past 50 years, and especially these past five years, as decisions about them have been made without them. But we have an opportunity to go in a different direction. Article 18 of the treaty makes it clear that it cannot enter into force until both parties have informed each other that they have concluded all the national ratificatory procedures.
I remind noble Lords one more time of what the Labour manifesto said about this. As my noble friend Lord Callanan quoted, it said:
“Defending our security also means protecting the British Overseas Territories … Labour will always defend their sovereignty and right to self-determination”.
I would argue that, under the Salisbury convention, it works both ways. You could at least make the claim that this Chamber has not just the opportunity but the duty to enforce the manifesto on which Labour was elected, and that means recognising the self-determination of the Chagossian people.
Why are we doing this? I will not repeat my noble friend Lord Lilley’s speech. There is no legal obligation. For one thing, military facilities are excluded from the purview of these courts, but even if you set that aside, it was expressly drawn up in the clearest language that our lawyers could devise that there was no purview for a court such as this in a dispute between two present or former members of the Commonwealth. That was expressly put in to prevent challenges of this kind.
I think we all know the answer—we heard it from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, a second ago. I cannot help noticing from the sparse Benches opposite that there is no great enthusiasm from the governing party for this measure, but there is a clique of people for whom “Decolonise” is everything. It is painful for them to see little union jacks in the upper corners of flags. They approach these questions impressionistically, based on vibes and emotions, almost regardless of the legal rights and wrongs or the interests of the people concerned.
It is very clear from Philippe Sands’ book, in which he wrote about the whole process, how he, the Attorney-General and, I suspect, the Prime Minister, have come at this. You must always back the ex-colony against the ex-coloniser, always back the poorer state against the western one, always back the non-white population against the white one, regardless of the rights and wrongs. This is even though the people being injured here are, of course, the dispossessed Chagossians. Even as a decolonising exercise, it totally fails on its own terms, because here is a territory now being handed to a genuinely colonial power that has no interest in it and no connection except a pecuniary one.
I will not get into the ecological arguments, which were so well stated by the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, or indeed the strategic ones that we have heard from other people. To emphasise the wrong done to the Chagossian population, I just want to canter very briefly through some of the history.
The archipelago was uninhabited until 1783. The French then populated it with enslaved people taken from the African mainland. It was seized during the Napoleonic Wars—or rather, it was not seized, but the Indian Ocean French-speaking territories were seized—by the Royal Navy, as dramatically rendered in one of the Patrick O’Brian novels.
At the end of that war, in 1814, Mauritius and the Chagos Islands were ceded—separately—to the British Crown. The Chagos Islands were never part of Mauritius. They were administered from Mauritius because there was no suitable administrative seat in the archipelago.
I invite noble Lords to entertain seriously for a moment the argument that, because somewhere was once administered from somewhere else, that creates a sovereignty claim. By that logic, Anguilla would be part of St Kitts; the Turks and Caicos Islands would be part of Jamaica; indeed, come to that, Burma would be part of India. It is a ludicrous argument, an incredibly dangerous precedent that we are setting, not only for our fellow subjects in other overseas territories such as Gibraltar and the Falklands, but for any other country that was ever administered from somewhere else, which is a great many places on the planet.
Let us fast-forward to 1965. As we have heard, the Mauritian Government accepted and gladly pocketed the then huge sum of £3 million in return for renouncing in perpetuity any claim to the Chagos Archipelago. They were far from unhappy about that; this was a territory to which they were unconnected, and they saw this as an extremely good deal. I will quote what the then Prime Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, said shortly afterwards. He said this was a territory
“of which very few people knew, which is very far from here, and which we had never visited”.
As far as he was concerned, that was that. The deal was done.
Mauritius then pocketed some further funds that were handed over by this country, supposedly for the betterment of the Chagossian diaspora, although a lot of that money somehow never quite trickled through to the people that it was supposed to help. Indeed, a lot of the bad feeling of the diaspora population towards Mauritius stems from the way in which those funds have been disbursed down the decades.
It was really only 15 or so years ago, as China began to become interested in Mauritius, that the claim was pressed again in earnest. There was a state visit from the Chinese Head of State, an unusual thing for a country the size of Mauritius. The first free trade agreement, I think, between China and an African state was with Mauritius. At that point, suddenly, Mauritius became very interested in exercising sovereignty over this territory, and can you blame it? It has been referred to aptly as the Malta of the Indian Ocean. Of the seven great naval choke points in the world, it is within reach of four of them: the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait and the Cape of Good Hope. It was from the Diego Garcia base in 1991 that the waves of B52 bombers took off to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. It was from there that a brave part of the campaign against the Taliban was waged.
It is worth noting, if we are playing the game of decolonise, that for a diaspora Chagossian to dispute Mauritian sovereignty is an imprisonable offence under a law passed in 2021. Simply to say what I am saying would get me a spell in chokey if I were in Mauritius. However, there is an alternative solution, and it was touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. I want to put this forward because it is not just that we are stopping this; we have to have an alternative. It was one that was initially looked at when Tony Blair was Prime Minister. He commissioned a feasibility study by KPMG into resettling the Chagossian population on the outer atolls. The feasibility study came back much later and said that it could be done for the cost of £3 billion over a century, which, in a rather short-sighted move, the subsequent Conservative Government decided was too big an outlay during the time of austerity. But even if we accept the Minister’s figures on the liability to British taxpayers—and I suspect that my noble friend Lady Noakes is much closer to the actual sum—that is still a lot more expensive than putting in the infrastructure and resettling the Chagossian population as British subjects in a British overseas territory. Then, because it would be an inhabited territory, that would put the sovereignty claim for ever beyond doubt. It would then be up to the people there, and them alone, if they wanted to change their sovereignty.
When this Government took office, they promised growth. What we are seeing is that they are delivering shrinkage in every sense: economically, morally and geographically. If this Bill goes through and we compound the injustice to our fellow subjects of Chagossian descent, we will be in every sense diminished as a country.
Lord Horam (Con)
My Lords, I shallow narrow down the grand anti-colonial views of my noble friend Lord Hannan—it was a splendid piece of radical demography, if I may say so, and really well done—to the point made very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and my good and noble friend Lord Bellingham, which is the position of the Chagossians.
I should declare an interest straight away in that I am vice-chairman of the All-Party Group on the Chagos Islands; this is because I took part in a parliamentary delegation to Mauritius many years ago and have maintained contact with the island since. I have been there once. It is a splendid place to go, by the way—thoroughly enjoyable, rather different from a November day in the House of Lords. There is no doubt that Mauritius is a very pro-British colony, so pro-British that it follows our Premier League football avidly. There is even, I found to my surprise, in the middle of Mauritius, a village called Arsenal, with a football team called Arsenal Wanderers. I tried to find out whether there was a Manchester United, reflecting my own interest, but no luck, I am afraid.
None the less, I reiterate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, made: Mauritius is a significant player and is in a vital part of the world. It is currently very pro-British and successful, and we should be careful in how we handle this diplomatically. It could easily go very wrong if we do not take their point of view into account.
More importantly, there is the position of the Chagossians. There is no doubt that we did a terrible thing to them in 1965. My noble friend Lord Bellingham compared it to the clearances in northern Scotland; what happened in 1965 is similar in that we took their hereditary land and banished them from it. Forget the law—we have a moral debt to these people, which we must fulfil. I am glad some of them are in the Public Gallery. There is no doubt that opinions are mixed: I know that many of the UK Chagossians are against the Bill, but, equally, many of the Chagossians in Mauritius and the Seychelles are in favour of it. Indeed, the chairman of the Chagos Refugees Group, Olivier Bancoult—parts of whose statement was read out by my good friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford; I will not repeat it—makes it clear that there has been good consultation, with which he is satisfied, and that he supports the Bill.
What really worries me is a point that has not yet been made in today’s debate; it was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, the chair of the International Agreements Committee, in earlier debates on this subject. The Bill and the treaty are notably deficient in dealing with the Chagossians’ rights. Only one sentence in the whole treaty deals with the position of the Chagossians, saying that the Mauritian Government are now in a position to do something for the Chagossian people. That is all it says: in effect, that the Mauritian Government are able to do something.
I have a suggestion for the Minister, whom I am glad to see back in her place. My noble friend Lord Callanan homed in on an important point: there is a big gap on the treatment of the Chagossians in the treaty and in the Bill; they are incredibly insufficient in that regard. I am sorry that we are not discussing the amendment he proposed, because the idea of having four or five weeks in which we could discuss all this properly—in a measured way, without relying on what people outside the Chamber are saying, and perhaps through a Select Committee—is entirely sensible. If we cannot have that, could we none the less do something else to meet the problem by a different method?
I understand that, normally, in treaties of this kind, we do not want to get into how a partner to the treaty should handle people who are, after all, its own citizens—namely, in this case, the many Chagossians in Mauritius. We would not normally do that in diplomatic circles; that is not the way it is handled. However, the Government could have attached to the treaty an exchange of letters that drew on any views that may have been expressed by the Chagossian people. There could have been a referendum or some other means to find out opinions on exactly how this should be handled and what they want.
To go forward on this, frankly, sketchy basis is not sufficient. It is a shame that we appear to be so far advanced down the line, but have not fully addressed this in the way we should. I seriously suggest to the Minister, who has admirably put forward her position, that we should attach to this treaty an exchange of diplomatic letters which, at the very least, take into account any views expressed, while we have the further discussions my noble friend Lord Callanan wishes us to have.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP) [V]
My Lords, I first declare an interest as a friend of British Overseas Territories.
The Bill is labelled the Diego Garcia Bill, but we all know it goes much further than that and deals with the full implementation of the Chagos Islands deal. The Government have told us that the previous Government started negotiations on sovereignty. The Opposition have told us that they would not have signed that Bill. I suspect that both those assertions are true.
Our task is to dissect whether the Bill is an appropriate one. In my view, this is a poor deal for the United Kingdom as a whole, but above all, a shameful deal for the Chagossian people. The Chagos Islands have been British since 1814. That was before the final defeat of Napoleon, and indeed before the Falkland Islands, for example, were British. It is before the vast bulk of countries across the world were in their current form—certainly before their current boundaries. It is before even the UK’s current boundaries themselves existed. Yet, we are handing over sovereignty to a country which is over 1,000 miles away from the Chagos Islands and has never ruled over or had control of them. It is akin to us handing over the Isle of Wight to Belarus, so limited are the geographical connections between the two. As the Government have indicated, we are doing so in part because of the advisory ruling of the ICJ and the threat legally of what is to come. I will not reiterate the very wise points, from a legal perspective, made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley; suffice it to say that I am not convinced by the Government’s legal case.
Let me go further—and I appreciate this will appear as heresy to some in the House. When it comes to British sovereignty and the self-determination of those under British sovereignty, while international opinion is always something to which we should have regard, we cannot simply give carte blanche to international opinion. Those who would treat international opinion as sacrosanct in these matters will have to answer at some future stage, when the ICJ, no doubt prompted by some feeling of anti-colonialism, declares that the Falkland Islands should be part of Argentina, or that Gibraltar should be part of Spain. That is the logical conclusion of saying that we cannot at any stage challenge what is ruled by an international court, and it is why I believe that British sovereignty and regard to the self-determination of the people within that must be paramount.
It is not simply a question, as others have said, of giving away sovereignty. We are not simply giving it to Mauritius; we are actually paying them a substantial fee to take it off our hands. Whether we regard that as the £3.4 billion the Government are talking about, the £35 billion the main opposition party is talking about, or somewhere in between, we are paying a vast sum—a cash cow—to Mauritius to ensure that the Chagos Islands become theirs. Not only are we giving a feather in the cap—a big financial gain—to Mauritius, but we are also giving them an asset.
We know already of the deep involvement of China, which sees Mauritius as part of its sphere of influence. There is no doubt that in the days to come, we will see parts of the Chagos Islands being built on by the Chinese, who will encroach more and more in that area. Then, the Government will ultimately be left with no real response, because they have already surrendered the sovereignty of the islands to Mauritius.
The other motivation is, perhaps, a feeling of colonial debt or guilt. But if we take at face value the premise that there is colonial debt, to whom do we owe that debt? Surely it is to those who we colonised in the first place—namely, the Chagossians. They have been treated shamefully. That is no different from what I suspect has happened over the last 60 years—we have a very poor record in the Chagos Islands.
The Chagossians, throughout these negotiations, have not had a veto, have not been directly involved in negotiations, and when it comes to consultation have effectively been consulted after deals have been done. That is not the way to reflect self-determination. In the deal itself, as well as giving over sovereignty to Mauritius we have a trust fund supposedly for Chagossians which will be entirely controlled by the Mauritius Government—not a penny will go directly to the Chagossians themselves. We did not even, within this deal, get a right of return; we have ceded that entirely to Mauritius. I have no doubt that, if there is any form of right of return, it will be for those Chagossians who have shown subservience to the Mauritian Government. Anybody deemed to take a different view from the Mauritius Government will not be able to return to their homeland.
This is a shameful deal. I welcome, at least, that the committal Motion has not gone ahead. I urge the Government, even at this belated hour, to take advantage of that time and genuinely consult and reach a view on the self-determination of the Chagossian people. We have been told by the Minister and others that Chagossians are content to be with Mauritius. Let the Government put that to the test and show proper self-determination to the people of the Chagos Islands. Let us use this pause to abandon this appalling deal and this rotten Bill.
Lord Altrincham (Con)
I thank the Minister for her patience in hosting this debate and welcome the Chagossians who have joined us this evening—they are very welcome in our House.
I start by noting that some matters are not obvious because they are not obvious, and this one is really quite a complicated story to explain. It was interesting to hear how the Minister was able to explain it, in a sense tactfully, because it involves at least three countries, the rights of individuals, a wide-ranging view on legal matters and interpretations, and environmental issues. And only then do we get to the defence issues and, finally, to a very large amount of money.
To understand why we are paying out so much money, we need to understand why the agreement is in the form it is. That always goes back to the claim on sovereignty and the Government’s anxiety over the legal risks. The Minister in the Commons, just like the Minister this evening, referenced once again the International Agreements Committee report from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the statement in that report—the report is very carefully written—that if agreement was not reached then there would be some risk to the base. We always hear this. The Government do not like to quote the other statements made in the conclusion of that report, where it says that the findings in 2019 were non-binding. It also notes that the treaty does not make appropriate provisions for the Chagossians and concludes with an observation that the treaty is a compromise. That is a good word to describe the situation the Government are in: it is some kind of compromise.
Indeed, our colleagues on the International Relations and Defence Committee, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, struggled with the legal position here. They heard lots of legal opinions and they were not able to reach any conclusion. They said there is a wide range of opinions, and came up with the language that it was a political decision. Again, that is a fair way of describing it: we have a compromise for political reasons in the judgment of the Government.
We would expect the financial part to reflect the spirit of that—a spirit of compromise and of a rather complicated story. However, when you get to the financial part of this agreement, you find that, in fact, it is a great deal of money. My noble friend explained the initial payments, but the Government like to talk about an amount of £101 million, in this discounted, not-real-money way. The initial payments, incidentally, are over £200 million a year. The Government always go back to try to justify why we are paying this rental fee. They say, with great triumph, that there is precedent —we heard this in the House of Commons—in the example of France paying €85 million a year for a military base in Djibouti.
Of course, it is extremely unlucky to justify British public spending with reference to French public spending, but, putting that aside, the Minister in the House of Commons was probably not aware that the whole idea of introducing Djibouti came from the Mauritians. They introduced it because they wanted to introduce the concept of an open market rent—this had to be on an open market basis. But this situation is not even beginning to be on an open market basis. As we have just discussed, it is a very complex compromise. We should never have accepted the comparison to the Djibouti example at all and should never have started from that position. With a moment’s reflection—just a moment’s reflection—we find that the UK is in no position to seek an open market rent for an American military base. It is preposterous. It is not even beginning to be an open market situation.
Then we get to the overall economics of the situation. The Government love talking about this number of £3.4 billion. It is a great deal of money for those who do not really wish to pay any money for this. Unluckily for the Government, they do not seem to understand the financial risk of the contract, which could be for a great deal more. The reason for that, as we have heard, is that in the contract there is an inflation ratchet from year 14 to 99. It is not a question of how we account for it today; it will be real money that flows out. The ratchet starts in year 14, so quite soon.
The reason that matters is that a future Government will almost certainly need to retrade this situation, for reasons that we do not know today. What they will find is that the Mauritians do not see the contract the same way—they do not account for it the same way. They will see an extremely valuable exposure to UK inflation. The Government do not seem to understand the risk in their own contract. Could the Minister report to the House whether the value of this contract is actually £3.4 billion—that is, the capped value—with no further exposure above £3.4 billion? It is extremely important that the Government find a way to cap this exposure, because if it rolls any longer then it will be locked in as being uncapped. That will create a frightful row in the future between the UK and the Republic of Mauritius, but we are trying to settle rows between the two countries. We do not want a misunderstanding of the value of the contract.
Finally, I add one other important thought, because we are deficit financing the Government at the moment. It is very burdensome for the Government to pay money out of the country to another country. The Government like to point out that some public expenditure creates domestic stimulus. That itself will always be argued over, because some people will say there is too much waste and that the spending is inefficient. When the Government waste money domestically, there probably is some level of domestic stimulus, but when the money is sent to the Republic of Mauritius, there is not any. It is worse than that because, in addition, the money is not being spent on the military base and the treaty provides for priority to Mauritian contractors and Mauritian workers—there are no jobs for people from the UK in this. It is a straight loss out of the UK. It is particularly burdensome.
The treaty amounts to a shakedown of UK taxpayers by the Republic of Mauritius. In addition, it points to weakness in financial controls at His Majesty’s Treasury and by the Government. It may in due course create great misunderstanding if the Government have not properly appreciated the inflation exposure that they have in the contract. A future Government will meet that exposure with dismay, and future taxpayers will be taking the cost of it.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, there is general agreement about the importance to the UK’s defence security, and to the USA’s, that a stable and legal arrangement should be agreed. The 100-year and more period of this treaty makes some valiant assumptions about the longevity of the relationships between the countries involved. Governments rise and fall, and relationships shift—sometimes dramatically, sometimes on a generational rather than a centenary timeframe. Although this is far from being a well-received arrangement and treaty, it may now be increasingly difficult to change course completely. However, in following from what the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, was saying, I have one question about the arrangements covering the payments to the Government of Mauritius.
Article 11 of the treaty says that in consideration of the agreement, which applies to the whole of the Chagos Archipelago, certain sums will be paid to Mauritius. The exchange of letters dealing with the details of these arrangements also forms part of the agreement, but the British and American interest is confined to the island and surrounding seas of Diego Garcia. In 100 years and more, there must surely be a possibility of some natural catastrophe—an earthquake or tsunami, or even a rise in ocean levels due to global warming. The runway at Diego Garcia is only a metre above today’s sea level. Any of these might make the base and/or the airfield no longer functional. Has the UK any automatic right to cease payments to Mauritius if the base is no longer usable nor capable of recovery at any reasonable cost?
Maybe the Minister will point to some section of the agreement that covers this eventuality. If it is not explicitly covered, will Mauritius still be lawfully entitled to the annual payments even if Diego Garcia is unusable? Were the UK to stop payments, would it have to be settled along the lines outlined in this agreement by arbitration and, ultimately, agreement between the respective Prime Ministers? It would not be in the UK’s national interest to be devoting scarce defence funds to a useless white elephant, but a clash over interpretation could also be damaging to our national interest.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, raised this point on my behalf in the debate on 30 June. In reply, the Minister suggested:
“Like all small atoll islands, it is naturally dynamic”.
He would not speculate about future erosion but was confident that surveys overall concluded that the natural land area
“has decreased by less than a single percent over the last 50 years”.—[Official Report, 30/6/25; col. 535.]
Is that a sufficient reassurance about a natural disaster or sea levels not rising by less than a metre for the next 100 years-plus? Considerable sums might be at stake. If this eventuality is not satisfactorily covered, should it be corrected before the treaty is finally approved?
Baroness Meyer (Con)
My Lords, as I look at the empty Benches opposite, I wonder whether some Labour Peers are just realising how unnecessary and reckless the Bill is.
First, the people of the Chagos Islands were not even consulted about the future of their homeland. Having already suffered the injustices of forced removal half a century ago, they have now been denied a voice in deciding its fate. For a Government who claim to uphold human rights, this is an extraordinary moral failure. The treaty claims to allow a programme of resettlement on some of the outer islands but not on Diego Garcia itself, the very heart of their former homeland. It provides no detail on where, when or how such a return might occur. The Government concede that settlement remains “necessarily uncertain”. In reality, the Chagossians’ right of return depends entirely on the discretion of the Government of Mauritius, who have shown little interest in their welfare. So those who were exiled more than 50 years ago will once again be denied any guarantee of justice or a true homecoming.
Secondly, this Government have chosen to give away British territory to Mauritius, even though there was no legally binding obligation on the United Kingdom to do so. In February 2019, the International Court of Justice issued only an advisory opinion—a political statement that carries no legal force, not a judgment. I will not go on about all the legal bases for why there was no need for us to sign any legal agreement, which the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, pointed out earlier.
In short, the Government are acting not out of legal necessity but by choice, while jeopardising one of the most important axes in the defence of the free world. The Government insist that this is about the long-term security of the base, but under Article 13 the lease expires in 99 years. What happens if Mauritius decides not to renew the lease? Only last month, its Prime Minister publicly questioned the duration and terms of the lease, suggesting that it may not guarantee long-term British or American access. A poor country will always be tempted by Chinese money. What if Beijing simply outbids us? Without a right to extend, this deal does not secure Diego Garcia, safeguard the marine protected area or protect the rights of the Chagossian people.
This is not an investment; it is an expensive and humiliating surrender made at a time when British taxpayers are already struggling. The Prime Minister has admitted that it will cost around £3.4 billion but, as my noble friend Lady Noakes so clearly set out, it will be at least £35 billion. Why are we giving away billions of pounds for territory that we already administer while the Americans keep the base? In other words, Britain pays, America stays and China watches.
Thirdly, the freehold now rests with a non-nuclear power. What if Mauritius objects to nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels using the port or airstrips, or imposes restrictions on operations vital to our defence? What if Chinese trawlers, granted fishing rights close to Diego Garcia, begin gathering intelligence under the cover of commerce? China, Russia and North Korea all have an interest in this vital region. This is not only a very expensive concession but a very dangerous one.
We have weakened our position, undermined our allies, burdened our taxpayers and silenced the Chagossians. This is quite simply the worst deal for Britain in living memory—a moral outrage, a legal folly and a strategic danger.
Does the Minister not agree that it is time to pause, admit that the Government have got it wrong and stand up for what is truly in our national interest? Will the Minister not agree that, before relinquishing sovereignty over any British territory, the Government have a duty to ensure the consent of its people? Can the Minister explain why the Government are proceeding with this Bill without first consulting the Chagossian people—those most directly affected by it? Will the Government commit to rectifying this omission—maybe, as suggested earlier, by a referendum? Will the Minister also confirm whether the Government recognise the Chagossian right to self-determination under international law, and if so, why their right of return has been made dependent on the discretion of Mauritius rather than on a clear guarantee within the treaty itself? Lastly, I remind the Minister that the trust fund is controlled by Mauritius and will not necessarily go to the British Chagossians.
Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer—despite not agreeing with a word she said. I am pleased because I have waited a long time to make this relatively short speech in this debate.
I concluded my contribution to the debate on 30 June on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, with the following sentence:
“I will offer this agreement my full support in these and any other proceedings in your Lordships’ House”.—[Official Report, 30/6/25; col. 524.]
That is still my position in relation to both the agreement and the Bill, the more so because, as my noble friend Lady Liddell remarked in the earlier debate in June, and as the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, reminded us today:
“Our allies, not just the Five Eyes communities of the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand—along with ourselves—but India, Japan and South Korea—
and the African Union
“—strongly support the deal”.—[Official Report, 30/6/25; col. 501.]
I congratulate my noble friend Lady Chapman of Darlington on her comprehensive opening remarks. I thank her and my noble friend Lord Coaker for their openness and engagement with noble Lords on the many issues and complications that are raised by this treaty. I thank my noble friends in particular for arranging an all-Peers drop-in session on the Bill on 29 October, and even more for ensuring that the key FCDO officials, including the UK chief negotiator, Harriet Matthews, were present to share their knowledge and respond to noble Lords’ remarks or questions, which they did candidly and, in my view, credibly. I am only sorry that the representatives of the Official Opposition who were in the room at the beginning of that conversation mostly left without taking advantage of the opportunity to question those who negotiated this and to ask the questions that they clearly have.
In as few minutes as I can possibly do, I will focus my speech on what was the main purpose of my speech on 30 June: to examine, in so far as I am able to, the principles that appear to underlie opposition to this treaty and, consequently, to the Bill.
The strategic importance of Diego Garcia and its base to the United Kingdom and the United States, and to all our allies globally, is well known. Interestingly, I found in my research, despite the fact that much of the commentary about this base refers to it as a secret base, that it is very easy to find out the detail of quite a substantial amount of its capability in open source. It is available in some detail. I proceed on the basis that no one engaged in this debate needs to be reminded of the specific or strategical operational support that it offers. My own experience of its importance to UK security and to that of our allies was the support that it gave our operations both in Iraq and in Afghanistan when I was the Secretary of State for Defence. I have no intention of going into the detail of that, but it is well known and, for those who do not know, a lot of this can be found in open source.
As a consequence of our agreement with Mauritius, we will have access to this capability, enhanced by more investment by the United States. It is not a case of saying that if we pay, the United States stays. The United States invests many multiples of its cash in this base in order to give it the extraordinary capability that it has. Nobody can do anything to change its position on the global map, but the Americans can continue to invest for a period and they have plans to invest further in the long term. We will get value for our money from what the Americans do to help support us and the way in which we work with them to make sure that capability improves all the time.
However, the fact of the matter is that in 2019, when the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion concluding that the UK’s administration of the Chagos Archipelago was unlawful and that Mauritius has sovereignty over the territory, it immediately imperilled continuing new and planned investment in Diego Garcia. I worry if this is not known to those on the opposite Benches. I understand, from an open source comment, that the US suspended that investment until the issue of sovereignty had been resolved. One of the advantages of having the negotiators in the meeting of 29 October was that I was able to ask them openly if the information, which is available for people to see and read, was known to the FCDO: was the fact this link existed known to the Government at the time when the negotiations started?
The uncertainty that justified the United States position is to be found in the evidence given by Sir Christopher Greenwood to the International Agreements Committee, which has also been referred to earlier by other speakers. Sir Christopher Greenwood is one of the UK’s pre-eminent practitioners of international law and a former judge in the International Court of Justice. In his opinion, any international court examining the sovereignty dispute would likely find in favour of Mauritius. Such an outcome would clearly represent a risk to the future of the military base, and thus to the UK’s national interests and security. That is not something we can just dismiss. Had the issue of sovereignty not being resolved by a negotiation, the suspension of US investment would also have represented a risk to the future of the military base, and thus to the UK’s national interests and security. That is the environment in which these decisions to enter negotiations were made back in November 2022.
I practised law for the best part of 20 years before I was elected. A substantial proportion of my practice was in negotiation. There are many lawyers in this House and I am sure that they realise that lawyers spend more time in negotiation than in almost anything else. On some occasions, my clients wanted me to enter negotiations in order to protect a status quo— I think we have called that a red line in this debate. It appears to me, from the many speeches that I have listened to, that this was the latter objective of the negotiations that the Conservative Government started: to get back to the status quo.
I always told my clients that I would argue for the status quo in negotiation but, if there was a judicial assessment that made the status quo unattainable, it would be a failure in the negotiations to try to achieve that. That is the situation that the Government were in in 2022.
The whole process, of course, started with the Written Statement made on 3 November. There has been toing and froing about what was said in the Statement in order to try to water it down, but let me read the first paragraph of that Statement, because it is extraordinarily revealing as to what the then Government were seeking to do. It reads:
“Following the meeting between the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Norfolk … and Prime Minister Jugnauth at the UN General Assembly, the UK and Mauritius have decided to begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)/Chagos archipelago”.
Next comes the important sentence:
“Through negotiations, taking into account relevant legal proceedings, it is our intention to secure an agreement on the basis of international law to resolve all outstanding issues”?—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
In other words, we were beginning to negotiate with the only people we could negotiate with—Mauritius, which was holding this particular card—to transfer the sovereignty to them in a way that would give stability, allow our major ally to get back into the relationship that we had, and continue to build this mother of all bases in the world. It is as simple as that.
I do not understand why everyone is looking for explanations for this by suggesting that, in these 11 exercises of negotiation, we were seeking to do something else. It is perfectly clear what the Conservative Government was setting out to do. They were pushed into this position by the fact that the United States was unwilling to continue to invest in this until that uncertainty was resolved.
On 29 October, I took the opportunity to ask the negotiators if that was what they understood to be happening; that is exactly what they understood to be happening. I understand why now, for political reasons, the Opposition wish to rewrite this, but that is what they were doing and what we continued.
Secondly—
Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)
I am happy to stop there because I have made my point. The nonsense about the Chinese has already been dealt with.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, to pick up on a theme identified by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and as identified by my honourable friend Tom Tugendhat on 9 September, when he noted in his speech at Second Reading of this Bill in the other place, yes, negotiations were commenced under the last Government. As Ministers, both he and I wrote to the Prime Minister—both Prime Ministers—to complain about the decision to institute those negotiations. We were right: the treaty was not one that should have been considered then, and it is not one that should be considered now; the whole principle was wrong then, and it is wrong now.
Why do I say that? The main rationale for handing over the islands is that an international tribunal—the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea—may abuse its jurisdiction in treating the ICJ’s advisory opinion as if it had established, as a matter of binding international law, that Mauritius was sovereign over the British Indian Ocean Territory. As I said when the House debated the treaty on 30 June, the risk of an adverse judgment and the real risk to the operation of the UK-US airfield at Diego Garcia are very significantly overplayed by those who favour this treaty. The ICJ had no such power and did not, in fact, reach the conclusion that Chagos should be transferred to Mauritius. Its advisory opinion left open other courses of action on the UK’s part other than surrender of the islands to Mauritius.
Mauritius cannot, as a matter of international law, secure a binding judgment before an international tribunal establishing that it is sovereign over the Chagos Islands, because the United Kingdom is not required to consent to a dispute of this nature being adjudicated by the International Court of Justice. Accordingly, if I might expand on the point made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, the Government explained their position by saying that they anticipated that another tribunal—as I said, specifically the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which, I may add, has no jurisdiction over questions of sovereignty over territory—will presuppose that the ICJ’s 2019 advisory opinion has settled that Mauritius is sovereign, and will thus proceed to exercise its jurisdiction in relation to disputes about the law of the sea on the premise that Mauritius, rather than the United Kingdom, is sovereign. Yet how can this be, since there is not a word about sovereignty over the Chagos Islands in that advisory opinion of the ICJ?
We must be in no doubt that the Government, on their own account, are handing over a priceless strategic asset and trampling over the Chagossian people as they do so, because they want to avoid being on the wrong end of a potential future abuse of adjudication. However, this is a premature and wholly unnecessary surrender that blazes a trail for other abuses of the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction to be leveraged into future United Kingdom defeats and compromise of our vital interests. We need to resist now, not only for our national security and that of our global allies but also to refute this abuse of law.
Furthermore, the deal is a terrible one, for the reasons ably outlined by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. Some of the examples are that the terms of the treaty provide very little in the way of leverage or protection for the UK. We cannot, for example, withhold payments for a breach of the terms that nominally protect our interests, and there is no machinery to enforce Mauritius’s commitments. Instead, Mauritius will be well placed to take our money and to reach accommodations with other states in relation to the archipelago that are injurious to our interests.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
I am following the noble Lord very closely, and I do not disagree with some of the points is making. Could he, however, clarify why it was that James Cleverly on 3 November said that the Government were to
“begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory”?—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
Clearly, the Government then were talking about the sovereignty of the actual islands.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
As I said earlier in my remarks, that was a decision with which I strongly disagreed then, and I strongly disagree now. He was plainly wrong in so saying.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Forgive me: I have given way once, and time is limited.
Professor Ekins, professor of law and constitutional government at Oxford, set out in detail, when he gave evidence to the House of Lords International Agreements Committee, the failings in the treaty. In particular, he set it out in even more detail in his Policy Exchange paper published at that time. I strongly urge the Minister to consider those two items in detail during the pause in proceedings brought about by the decision not to proceed with the committal Motion tonight.
There can be little doubt, contrary to the Government’s expostulations about saving the base, so ably outlined by my noble friend Lord Altringham, that this in fact weakens the strategic interests of our country. It does so without any sound legal or geopolitical basis, and, as many noble Lords have noted, without any reference to the wishes of those who lived in the archipelago, shamefully removed on the orders of a Labour Government —a shame that, as the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, noted, is about to be repeated and amplified by this present Labour Government.
Finally, the Minister said that the previous Government had entirely overlooked the Chagossian people, a calumny that was repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. Not so. Section 3 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 —a Conservative piece of legislation—was the first legislation to make provision for Chagos Islanders and their direct descendants to obtain British nationality, something successive Labour Governments had failed to provide.
Lord Biggar (Con)
My Lords, the treaty that the Bill before us would ratify vaunts its righting of the historic wrong done to the Chagossians, while doing little for them. It signals its virtue, without much exercising it. That has been made plain several times over the past few hours, so I will not labour it.
As my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere has rightly urged, the treaty’s real concern is not the Chagossians but completing the decolonisation of Mauritius. The Government accept the ICJ’s 2019 advisory opinion that, in effect, the detachment of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius in 1965 was unlawful because it defied UN General Assembly resolutions in 1960 and 1966. These declared that:
“Any attempt aimed at … disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with … the Charter of the United Nations”.
The 1966 one urged that the UK take no action that would dismember the territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity.
However, this principle of non-partition is nonsense. Supporting the 1960 resolution, the president of the General Assembly, Irish diplomat Frederick Boland, invoked Ireland’s loss of its historic integrity to illustrate the injustice of partition. He thereby expressed the Irish nationalist’s typical historical blindness. The island of Ireland had never been a political unit, apart from its union with Great Britain; and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, has already well said, there is no natural law prescribing that a geographical integrity has to be a political one. On the contrary, there can be good reasons for dividing it. Ireland was divided in 1922 because Irish republicans wanted home rule so much that they were prepared to use violence to attain it, while Irish unionists disliked it so much that they were prepared to take up arms to oppose it. Ireland was petitioned to prevent civil war—a justified act of political prudence. What is more, if the principle of non-partition were applied impartially, applicants to the ICJ would be clamouring for the restoration of the territorial integrity of British India and the return of the Gulf states and Burma to rule by Delhi. Oddly, we hear no such clamour.
The 1966 resolution is no less absurd than the 1960 one. It appeals to the national unity of Mauritius—as if the Chagos Islands were not separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian Ocean, and as if the islanders were an integral part of the Mauritian people; but many Chagossians feel as Mauritian as Irish republicans feel British. The only connection between Mauritius and the Chagos Islands is an accident of colonial administrative convenience. Talk of some national unity that was ruptured in 1965 is an opportunistic fiction.
Notwithstanding its opportunistic absurdity, the principle of non-partition was invoked and confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion. What is more, the court used that principle to adjudicate a crucial point of contention between Mauritius and the UK, notwithstanding the fact that, when originally submitting itself to the court, the UK explicitly excluded its jurisdiction over such a dispute.
Among the Government’s several, shifting justifications for signing the treaty is said to be the fear that a subsequent international tribunal—such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea—would use the ICJ’s opinion to make a binding judgment against the UK. Therefore, to avoid that embarrassment, the Government prefer to give up the fight now, conceding sovereignty and negotiating an expensive lease.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, that international law deserves respect. However, I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, that respect requires much more than blind, slavish compliance. When international law embodies an absurd principle that is opportunistically and partially applied outside of its agreed jurisdiction, it brings the international order into disrepute and corrodes the law’s authority.
For the sake of upholding confidence in international law, the UK should stand its ground, argue the strong, rational case for its sovereignty over the Chagos Islands, expose the imprudence and partiality of the General Assembly’s resolutions, and remind the international community that the ICJ has no jurisdiction. If some international tribunal were irresponsible enough to issue a binding judgment against the UK on the basis of the ICJ’s opinion, the UK should, with respect, not comply with it.
I have no doubt that that would cost us diplomatic good will in progressive circles that are entranced by an idealised view of international law, but we have no good will to lose with ideologically hostile states such as China, Russia and Iran. The rest of the so-called global South is not a politically uniform bloc; it embraces nations ranging from India to Nigeria and Peru, which have divergent—sometimes opposing—interests and views. They would not all react with equal disapproval to our principled non-compliance. Some might even be impressed by a self-confident Britain’s refusal to yield to opportunistic lawfare, in bold defence of the law’s integrity.
This treaty is disingenuous in championing the Chagossians and slavish in its blind compliance with absurd and partial law. For those reasons, we should not ratify it.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
My Lords, over breakfast I read the views of the noble Lord, Lord Biggar, and can confirm that they have not changed over the course of the day.
I begin with an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. He, the noble Lord, Lord Jay, and I spent 10 years in the Permanent Secretary’s office in the Foreign Office, and I certainly never discovered the secret plan to cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago that officials were apparently sitting on. I saw a number of changes of Foreign Secretary, and I cannot remember ever seeing the huddle of officials saying, “Is this the soft one we can manage to persuade that it’s time to cede the Chagos Archipelago?” I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, may have been watching too much “Yes, Minister”. It is sad that he has never been Foreign Secretary, because he has far too high an opinion of officials in the Foreign Office.
I have only three small points to make; I will be very brief, because I spoke at enormous length when we debated the treaty in July. At that time, the Opposition suggested that the treaty should not be ratified, but the House voted that it should be ratified. It cannot be ratified without this Bill; therefore, we should now pass it. That is my first point.
My second point is about the China syndrome. We heard then, and we are hearing again today, even from the Opposition Front Bench, the theory that recognising Mauritian sovereignty somehow opens the door to Chinese influence in the Chagos Archipelago and to a Chinese threat to the base. I have never understood this theory. If the risk were real, why did the Indians warmly welcome the treaty? Why did Secretary of State Rubio in Washington call the treaty a “monumental achievement”? Mr Rubio, like President Trump, is hardly soft on China. Mauritius is one of the only two African countries that have not signed up to the belt and road initiative. Why would the Mauritians enrage the Indians, to whom they are close, by helping the Chinese, whom they seriously distrust? Why would they forgo the payments we would be making? The theory makes no sense, and I strongly suspect that some of those who advance it know that perfectly well.
That brings me to my third point, which is, of course, the emollient one. The pernicious doctrine that the duty of opposition is to oppose, regardless of principle, merit or consistency, is perhaps particularly irresponsible in the sphere of foreign affairs. Mr Cleverly announced in 2022 that we would open negotiations to
“ensure the continued effective operation of the joint UK/US military base on Diego Garcia, which plays a vital role in regional and global security”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
We agreed; I heard no dissent. I did not know about the approaches of the noble Lord, Lord Murray. There was no public dissent from what the Government were going to do.
Under Foreign Secretary Cameron, negotiations continued—11 rounds, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, reminded us. I am rather sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, is not here tonight. It would have been very good to have his verdict on the Bill which results from the work he supervised. The legal issues and the China risk explored by Conservative Back-Benchers today will have been thoroughly explained to him at the time. Indeed, we now know that the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, no less, advised against the course that he was pursuing. There is nothing new in these arguments. They were known to the Conservative Ministers who proceeded with the negotiations.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said that it is one thing to start a negotiation about transferring sovereignty and quite another to conclude one. That is very true, but if I were absolutely determined not to cede sovereignty, I do not think I would start a negotiation about ceding sovereignty. I do not think, if I was strongly convinced that it was a bad idea, that I would have let it run on for 11 negotiating rounds.
We are shortly to hear from the Front Benches. I look forward to hearing from the Liberal Democrats; their concerns about the Chagossians do them credit. Their reservations about the treaty are ones I understand —they are honourable, although I believe they are unjustified.
We will also be hearing from the Conservative Front Bench—the heirs of Cameron and Cleverly. I have the greatest respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, not least because she hails from my part of the world. So my hopes are high that, unlike some of her colleagues, including those on the Front Bench, she will contrive to steer clear of the twin rocks of hypocrisy and irresponsibility.
Lord Northbrook (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Chagos Islands APPG. I give its secretary, David Snoxell, credit for persevering with the cause over the years. Unfortunately, having reflected carefully on the issue and the treaty, I have come to disagree on the conclusions formed by many of the group. I now feel that Mauritius will unfairly benefit more from the treaty than the Chagossians will. Indeed, I now feel that this agreement is bad for our national security and financially a disaster.
Until recently, I was under several misapprehensions. First, I was led to believe that the International Court of Justice—ICJ—verdict that the island should be handed back to Mauritius was legally binding on the UK. Secondly, I had not realised that the UK had already paid Mauritius £3 million in 1965 to retain ownership of the Chagos Islands after Mauritian independence. Thirdly, I believed that the UK was bound by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—UNCLOS. Fourthly, I believed that we had to obey the diktat of the International Telecommunication Union—ITU—concerning the threat to the electromagnetic spectrum. Fifthly, I had underestimated the threat to the islands on the defence front from future restrictions on nuclear weapons and from encroachment by China, Russia and Iran. Sixthly, I am not sure that the guarantees and financial promises to the Chagossians will be honoured.
I will now deal with each of the above issues in turn. First, on the ICJ verdict, I have since discovered that, while from February 2017 the UK has accepted in declarations all judgments of the ICJ, it does not accept that they apply to any dispute with the Government of any country which is or has been a member of the Commonwealth.
Secondly, the payment of £3 million in 1965—over £80 million in today’s money—means that we should not be paying Mauritius again.
Thirdly, the UK is not legally bound by the decisions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. According to Dr Luke Evans, at Second Reading in the other place on 9 September,
“back in 2015, under annex VII, the tribunal agreed with the UK that sovereignty could not be determined by UNCLOS. This was a marine protection issue”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/9/25; col. 818.]
Fourthly, as forensically examined by colleagues in the other place—Sir Jeremy Wright, Sir John Whittingdale and Mark Francois—it is clear that the ITU has no jurisdiction over the UK’s electromagnetic spectrum. The ITU treaty, to which we and others are a party, states specifically that the ITU has no authority over the allocation of military spectrum. Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the radio regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum. Will the Minister please confirm this, in light of the fact that any judgment by the ICJ against us is not legally binding?
Fifthly, I want to focus on the defence threat to the West from this deal. The Pelindaba treaty, as already mentioned, to which Mauritius is a signatory, prohibits the stationing and storage of nuclear weapons, yet Ministers have failed to explain what that will mean in practice once sovereignty is transferred. Also, an element of the agreement involves a requirement for us to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base. Can the Minister tell us whether this means that it must be done before the armed attack?
The defence threat also comes from hostile powers in the region. The risk to Britain’s security is great. Diego Garcia is our most strategic and important base in the Indian Ocean, critical to our partnership with the United States, and vital to project influence in the Indo-Pacific. Yet the Bill leaves huge questions unanswered. What safeguards will prevent hostile powers such as China, Russia and Iran seeking a foothold in the archipelago once Britain steps back? Beijing already describes Mauritius as a partner with strategic advantages, and Mauritius could well join its belt and road initiative. Port Louis boasts of advancing co-operation with Russia. Iran, since the first Iran-Mauritius Economic Forum in 2022, has explored export and import opportunities and joint ventures in agriculture, fisheries, pharmaceutical industries and nanotechnology.
Sixthly, I want to focus on the situation for the Chagossians themselves after this treaty. The speeches at Second Reading by the Labour MP Peter Lamb and the Conservative MP Aphra Brandreth are very relevant on the subject. Peter Lamb, MP for Crawley, where many Chagossian exiles live, makes very relevant points, from which I shall quote directly:
“Although mention of the Chagossians is made in the wording of the deal, I remain concerned … that there are gaps that leave the Chagossian people at risk. While there is the option for Chagossians to be allowed by the Mauritian Government to return to the islands, there is no requirement in the deal that that happens. There is no guarantee that any Chagossian who does return to the archipelago will not face restrictions that prevent permanent habitation, even at a subsistence level of economic activity. There is no guarantee at this time that the trust fund that is being created will be in the control of the Chagossians and used exclusively to address the consequences of their forcible removal from the islands. There is no guarantee that returning Chagossians will not face a 10-year prison sentence for questioning Mauritian territorial integrity through taking on British citizenship”.
Aphra Brandreth adds another key point on the issue, saying:
“The Government must … take the opportunity to implement a recommendation put forward by the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee and International Agreements Committee … that looked at the treaty. They urged the Government to ‘Enhance Chagossian engagement by establishing a formal consultation mechanism with the Chagossian community to monitor the Agreement’s implementation and ensure their meaningful inclusion in decision-making.’ Will the Minister confirm whether that recommendation will be implemented?”
Further, she states that
“the … trust fund, established as part of the UK-Mauritius treaty and financed by the UK, is to be distributed solely under the control of Mauritius, yet the Bill contains no provisions to monitor whether the rights of British Chagossians are upheld or to create any statutory oversight of the trust fund. Have Ministers secured from the Government of Mauritius any firm commitment that British Chagossians will have a formal role in the oversight and decision making regarding the fund? Indeed, why was a model of joint governance not agreed, ensuring that British Chagossians themselves have a voice in how the fund is governed and can benefit directly from it?”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/9/25; cols. 773, 812.]
In conclusion, this is a terrible deal for the UK, giving away full ownership of a vital defence asset and paying the Mauritian Government an extraordinary sum of £34 billion in cash terms to lease it back. I have shown how the key pillars of the Government’s argument for the necessity of doing this do not stand up. These are, namely, the ICJ judgment, the ITLOS argument and the electromagnetic spectrum. I reiterate that the Chagossians have certainly not been looked after in this deal, hence I would have strongly supported the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in his amendment.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I wish to acknowledge those of the Chagossian community who are here observing this debate, those following it at home and those who will read it. My noble friend Lady Ludford, in her powerful contribution to the debate, informed by decades of work on behalf of the Chagossians, told us of the remarkable sequence of November anniversaries, including some which are a dark stain on this country with regards to how we have treated the Chagossian community. We should all share blame for this generational mistreatment.
I start by stressing in clear terms that we still need more clarity on the rights given, potentially, to the Chagossians of a permissive nature, but by virtue of us providing those rights to the Mauritian Government, not directly to the Chagossians themselves. I hope the House will recognise that this has been a consistent and constant concern of these Benches, and it continues. We pursued it in the debate on the treaty and I am glad that the Minister acknowledged it in her opening remarks. My colleagues in the House of Commons pursued it when the Bill was in Committee there and I reiterate it today.
A test for us now is how, finally, we give rights back to Chagossians, including the right of self-determination for their future, which should be in their hands. If we negotiate an agreement on Gibraltar with the statement, “Nothing for Gibraltar without the Gibraltarians”, that should apply in this context too. Indeed, we divided the House of Commons in Committee on the right to self-determination. It is worth placing on the record in this debate, which I point out to the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster and Lady Meyer, that the Conservative Official Opposition did not support us in that. It is fine to call for self-determination and a referendum in this debate, but it is worth recalling that, just a couple of weeks ago, that party opposed it in the House of Commons.
We touched a little on history today. I went through a lot of the history in the debate on the treaty, so I do not need to rehearse it. Today, there was a slight new edge to this. It was interesting that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, criticised the Labour Government for concluding an agreement in 1965. That may well have had cross-party support, but the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, called it a shame on our country. With interesting parallels, it should be recognised that negotiations to detach the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius commenced on 29 June 1964, under the Conservative Government. The Conservative Party has form, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, might say.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Forgive me, but the shame, as I am sure the noble Lord will agree, comes from the removal of the Chagossian people from the Chagos Islands, not from the agreement itself.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Yes, and as the noble Lord will recall from the debate that we had on the treaty, that was accelerated under the Heath Administration in 1970 and concluded under the Conservative Government. The denial of repatriation was then subsequently under another Conservative Government. My point is that all of us in this country have a dark record when it comes to Chagossian rights. Our task now should be how we at least restore some of those.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, started his remarks by saying that the House of Commons was denied the opportunity of debating the treaty during the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act period of scrutiny. He knows, because he will remember the debate we had on the treaty, that, as Erskine May makes perfectly clear, one of the mechanisms for the House of Commons to deny ratification of a treaty would be through an Opposition day debate. During the scrutiny period of this treaty in the House of Commons, the Conservative Party chose a different subject for its Opposition day debate. It had the chance, if it chose to take it, of debating and moving an amendment in the House of Commons during the scrutiny period.
We are here today debating this Bill for one reason and one reason alone: the previous Administration made a political decision to cede sovereignty and to enter into negotiations to conclude this. I hear noble Lords saying no, and I will come on to that, when they may wish to change their minds. Not one Conservative colleague today said why the previous Government opened negotiations to cede sovereignty in 2022. The then Government did not open negotiations to improve relations or co-operation with Mauritius. They made the principal decision to cede sovereignty, but they still have not said why. I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, will outline clearly today why that was the case.
All legal considerations on this issue, which have been debated quite a lot during this debate, predate 2022. The complaints received in this debate predate James Cleverly and that Government’s decision. We have had complaints in this debate from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, of the current Attorney-General and the advice given to this Administration. As my intervention on the noble Baroness suggested, the same would have been the case under the previous Government. I assume that when the previous Government made the policy decision in November 2022 to open negotiations which would conclude with the ceding of sovereignty, they were also advised by Attorneys-General. I have a hunch that it might have been the Attorney-General at the time of November 2022, but it could have been any of the three Attorneys-General that the Government had in 2022. No doubt, history will tell us which one of those it was.
A new argument has been presented today by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra, that the Conservative Government were powerless and feeble and that their Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries were forced against their will by officialdom to make that statement in 2022. This is the argument of being in office but not in power. It was our suspicion at the time that the Conservatives were in office but not in power, and I am glad noble Lords have confirmed that.
I understand the argument that might say that this is a bad deal or that it has been handled badly. I think that many parts of it remain problematic, and I would have liked the Government to have handled it differently. But that is different from the Conservative Opposition in the Commons, who said in their amendment that they were “implacably” opposed to “ceding sovereignty”. They were not implacably opposed to ceding sovereignty in November 2022, so what changed?
Lord Bellingham (Con)
The noble Lord is actually putting a very strong case. What I said in my speech was that there was a red line about a sovereign base area—the concession of sovereignty across all the rest of the territory, but keeping the sovereignty of the base.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Lord; I listened carefully to his speech, which he made in his characteristically sincere way. I will try to address that point in a moment.
I asked: what changed? In the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, explaining when she winds up on behalf of her party what policy changes were being made, I might assume that the only relevant change is the fact that the Conservatives were in government and are now in opposition. Without there being a clear policy change, we can only make that assumption.
This is quite important because the Statement in 2022 said,
“on the exercise of sovereignty”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]
I have wondered why the same party that was implacably opposed then can be in favour of it now, especially because that Statement by the Government said that they were doing this to “resolve all outstanding issues” of international law. They knew that they had to resolve those outstanding issues of international law, but now they are denying the very virtue of the fact that they had any issues at all to address. That is quite hard to understand, and they have not made it any clearer today.
The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, was also made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. The 2022 Statement, which was the policy choice of the previous Government, was a mistake—as the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, indicated; I respect his honesty —or was, according to some of his colleagues, the result of deep state. Nevertheless, if that had raised serious defence concerns, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence at the time would presumably have raised concerns about it. That Minister was the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, so she has ample opportunity to address the noble Lords’ points in her speech today.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
We have heard a lot about what has gone on in the past and whether the Conservatives did this or that. What I want to know is: are the Liberal Democrats implacably opposed to this treaty? Do they want to see the Chagossians be given full democracy and have their rights listened to?
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am sure that the noble Baroness heard me—I am sure she was paying attention to the early part of my contribution—when I said that we moved that very Motion in the House of Commons just a few days ago but did not get support from the Official Opposition. So I appeal to the noble Baroness to wait until the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, makes her contribution and then to intervene on her with the same question.
The noble Lord, Lord Murray, made an interesting contribution. It was a post hoc breach of collective responsibility when he referred to his letter of opposition to that policy choice of his Government. I was going to intervene on him to ask politely whether he would place that letter in the Library for us all to see; I am very curious about it. I would be interested to know how many of his colleagues made the same complaints. I have mentioned the fact that one of those colleagues was the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie; of course, another of his ministerial colleagues at the time was the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. He did not intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Murray, so I assume that he did not write a letter of complaint at the time; I am sure that we will find out in due course.
Ultimately, we have to recognise, to be fair to the previous Government, that they entered into negotiations in good faith. I do not think a British Government would likely enter into negotiations on the ceding of sovereignty if they knew that the conclusion of that was not the ceding of sovereignty, so I give credit to the previous Government for acting in good faith about that. The question now is how we seek to raise our concerns on those very aspects of the Chagossians’ right to self-determination and on the scrutiny and operation of the trust fund. I hope we can continue to raise these concerns during the passage of the Bill in good faith.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I will try to get this debate back on track and deal with the issues that I think have been confronting us. The debate was ably introduced by the Minister and it has been predictably interesting, presenting some sharply contrasting views. It has also demonstrated a dichotomy between sincerely held views of former and venerable public servants and political views. There has been a further dichotomy within the political classes as to what constitutes responsible decision-making. As my noble friend Lord Murray indicated, even within the same party you can sometimes find a dichotomy of view—it happens, I say to the Minister. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that when it comes to a party having differences of view, I would think the Liberal Democrats could give master classes.
The position of these Benches was laid out clearly by my noble friend Lord Callanan. He also addressed the precipitate and surprising decision of the Government to delay their own Bill by, unusually, not proceeding with a committal Motion. The Minister, with admirable verbal gymnastics, sought heroically, if perhaps not completely convincingly, to explain that decision, but I think the reason is simple: the Government had concerns that the sensible amendment to the committal Motion that my noble friend had tabled was drawing support, and it may well have been that the Government were fearful that support for the amendment or a version of it would prevail and the Government would lose. But that was a judgment for the Government to make. I observe that the amendment was not prescriptive and would have left matters entirely under the control of the Government. What has now emerged is a welcome breathing space for the Government to consider and answer some serious questions about the agreement on which the Bill is predicated. Some of these questions have already been asked, but it will be my pleasure in a moment to add to them.
My noble friend Lord Callanan raised some of the most serious issues arising from the agreement, and it is interesting that the concerns he expressed were mirrored during the debate by a number of contributors. If we look at the agreement and at the trust fund, we find that there is an absence of knowing in detail what the views of the Chagossian people are on these issues. That was raised by a number of contributors, including my noble friend Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has concerns about that.
The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and my noble friends Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham spoke movingly about the treatment to which the Chagossian people have been subjected over decades. I found that moving— I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I am not being hypocritical in expressing that sentiment—and it was very much echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, who graphically described the lack of engagement in relation to current matters.
Then there is the issue of money—in today’s economic climate, a hot potato if ever there was one. The Chancellor is scratching around looking for every penny she can find, defence urgently needs upfront cash and taxes are almost certainly going up, yet the British taxpayer is going to be asked to pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius, a point that was raised by a number of contributors. My noble friend Lady Noakes gave a devastatingly forensic analysis of the costs and the Government’s disparate approach, and I will leave that to the Minister to respond to. Those concerns were echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, and the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme.
Then there was the position of China, and the not imagined but avowed objective of China to strengthen ties with Mauritius because of its strategic advantages, and China’s commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. These clearly cause concern to many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord De Mauley. Even the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, nobly supporting his Government, said, “China is a threat”. I agree. That was again referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I was a Defence Minister for nearly four and a half years, and one of my areas of responsibility was south-east Asia. China is a resolute prosecutor of its own interests, with an overt desire to exercise influence globally. At our peril do we waver in our vigilance.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I am so grateful to the noble Baroness. I just want to say that I am quite sure that the Mauritians would agree with that.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
That is an unexpected source of encouragement, for which I thank the noble Lord.
Finally, and very importantly, the defence and security implications of this arrangement are clearly ringing alarm bells, as noted in the contributions from my noble friends Lord Lilley, Lord Blencathra, Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham. My noble friend Lord Bellingham helpfully distinguished between this agreement and the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, referred. The whole point is that we have sovereignty in Cyprus and can control these arrangements, but we cannot under this arrangement: we are in the hands of the agreement and Mauritius’s disposition to us.
The Minister described the base as a prized military asset. I was very glad to hear that and, of course, I agree. It was also emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Jay. But it is this aspect of defence and security to which I wish to devote my final remarks. The Minister already has a lot of questions to which a response is required, and the observations from my noble friend Lord Lilley certainly require comment, but here is my addendum.
With the help of the Bill, I have been endeavouring to knit together the components of the agreement with the text of the Bill. Seeking clarification from the Government on a number of vital points is part of a necessary scrutiny process, but His Majesty’s Opposition reserve their overall position on the Bill and will determine their approach at a subsequent stage in the procedure. In the meantime, let me set a general perspective.
We reach the ninth introductory paragraph to the agreement before there is any mention of
“protecting international peace and security”,
with specific reference to
“the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base on Diego Garcia”.
Although I might have hoped for earlier recognition of the primacy of defence and security, this is where we are. But the drafting confirms that this is a pivotal part of the agreement, which then promotes defence and security to Article 3 of the agreement and enhances that status by including Annex 1, so progress has been made. I mention this because it goes to the heart of what the agreement stands for, what it is about, and the need for absolute clarity.
There is the further question of the extent to which material text in the agreement should be replicated in the Bill. I propose to raise a number of factual questions, which I appreciate may require the Minister to go back to her officials. I am content that she does that and can respond by letter, a copy of which could perhaps be laid in the Library. At least the Government have now helpfully provided some time within which to do that.
Going back to the agreement, under Article 3,
“the Parties shall not undermine, prejudice or otherwise interfere with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base, and shall cooperate to that end”.
That is an undertaking of fundamental importance by Mauritius to the UK. It explicitly implies that Mauritius should not enter into any arrangements, either on its own account or with any third party, which could be in breach of that undertaking. That, by implication, logically confers upon the UK a right to respond to such arrangements by taking whatever action is necessary to safeguard the base, and our interests and those of our allies on the base. Can the Minister confirm that that is the Government’s understanding?
An important protection is granted to the UK by Annex 1, paragraph—
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
Forgive me for interrupting, but the noble Baroness said a few minutes ago that the sovereign base area in Cyprus was not the subject of a treaty. It was the subject of three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the treaty of establishment.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
I hesitate to correct the noble Lord. I think what I said in response to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, was that the sovereign base areas in Cyprus and this arrangement are not the same. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made was, in fact, about expeditiously communicating with Cyprus if we are going to do something. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I thank him for his intervention but I think we are slightly on different planes.
I had got to the UK’s position under Annex 1, paragraph 1A, which says that the UK shall have
“unrestricted access, basing and overflight for United Kingdom and United States of America aircraft and vessels to enter into the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia”.
That is good. Annex 1, paragraph 1B(i), says the UK shall have “unrestricted ability” to
“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”
on Diego Garcia. That is strong; it is a clear reassurance and there should be no ambiguity as to what it means. But less clear is Annex 1, paragraph 1B(viii), which says the UK shall have “unrestricted ability” to
“permit access, basing and overflight for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels, upon notification to Mauritius”.
If that is merely a courtesy intimation then it does not compromise the UK controlling the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities on Diego Garcia. If that notification requires the consent of Mauritius then it most assuredly does, so can the Minister confirm that such intimation is purely a courtesy and that consent to the proposed action is not required from Mauritius?
Under Annex 1, paragraph 2, the UK
“agrees to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State directly emanating from the Base on Diego Garcia”.
It is in the middle of the Indian Ocean, and a territorial armed attack on a third state could theoretically be mounted from the base, albeit that is perhaps unlikely. Can the Minister confirm whether that obligation to inform “expeditiously” extends to assets which, for example, merely called into the base to refuel and are once again at sea or airborne? Does that obligation also apply if UK forces disable hostile aircraft, drones, ships or other devices which present a threat to the base?
I ask these questions because in any live conflict, the environment is kinetic. The last thing on the minds of military commanders will be seeking consents. These questions which I have posed require clear, unambiguous answers.
I turn to how the agreement engages with the Bill. I would have thought that the issues I have already raised, plus the importance of the role of the joint commission under Article 12 and the mechanism for setting disputes under Article 14, all merit a specific mention in the Bill. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government are prepared to look at the drafting of the Bill with a view to incorporating some of these issues into it?
Specifically, there is in the Bill a reservation to His Majesty under his prerogative to make laws for Diego Garcia and to empower His Majesty to make Orders in Council. I raised this at the very helpful briefing meeting held by the Minister, for which I thank her, but I will add this point. His Majesty is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. What if a threat to the safety of our Armed Forces manifests in the base itself or in the assets operating from there? If there is a disagreement with Mauritius as to the character and gravity of that threat and how the UK proposes to respond, does the lawmaking power under Clause 3(3) prevail to do whatever is necessary to protect our military and civilian personnel and our assets?
This agreement raises two profound concerns. First, if the Government concede this area of British sovereignty, how safe are our other crown territories—the Falklands, Gibraltar and our sovereign bases in Cyprus? The moment that lawyers come sniffing around any of those, will this Government be resolute and stand up to that? Secondly, this agreement should not be seen as some tying up of loose legal ends with a box ticked. It has a significant impact on the British taxpayer, on the Chagossians themselves and on our defence and security interests.
Notwithstanding the acknowledged authority of the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lord Beamish, and the respect in which they are held in this House, the lack of support from the Government’s own Back Benches is troubling. I look forward to the Minister’s response, because this debate has raised a series of profoundly concerning substantive issues, and this Chamber needs reassurance.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for her closing speech. It was exactly the kind of speech I would have expected from her. It was forensic and detailed, asking absolutely legitimate questions that any respectable Opposition should put to a Government proposing this kind of Bill. I will try to answer all her questions— I was writing as quickly as I could—but I may not get through them all. The idea of a letter in the Library, explaining the detail so that everybody can see what we have to say, is a very good one. I would be happy to do that.
I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. It has been lively, as I suspected it might be. I might say that I agreed with some contributions more than others, and some were probably better informed than others, but that is the nature of these things. I will endeavour to respond to all the points raised by noble Lords, and we will, I hope, have further discussions in Committee on many of those.
I would like to remind the House why we are scrutinising and reviewing a Bill sent to us from the other place. The Bill is essential to ensure that the treaty with Mauritius can be ratified, a treaty that is fundamental to safeguarding the operations of a critical UK-US base on Diego Garcia and to the security of British people. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, the Bill is also vital to protecting the British citizenship rights of Chagossians.
Noble Lords have questioned the legal rationale for this deal and asked what court could give a binding judgment. Let me set this out again: as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, explained well in his speech, if a long-term deal had not been reached, it is highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would have been brought quickly against the UK. Both the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee, in scrutinising the treaty, heard evidence of where these binding judgments could come from.
One possibility is that Mauritius would find a dispute under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that it could bring before an arbitral tribunal under Annexe VII of the convention. That also raises the prospect that Mauritius would seek provisional measures from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Provisional measures of this type and the decision of an arbitral tribunal would each be legally binding on the UK. A further possibility is that a dispute under a multilateral treaty could be brought before the International Court of Justice. A judgment delivered in the manner by the ICJ in disputes between states may also be legally binding.
There are those—we have had this ever since we started debating this issue—who question where this binding judgment might arise, but they are fundamentally missing the point here. The risk was real. International courts were already reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty, and this in turn, as my noble friend Lord Browne explained, put the base at real risk. The point is that the treaty with Mauritius prevents that happening in the future.
Noble Lords are perfectly entitled to take a different view on the extent of that risk; that is absolutely their right. The Government’s view is that that risk is real. Having that view, any responsible Government making that assessment has to seek to resolve it and to come to some lasting, legally enforceable arrangement with Mauritius. That is why we did the deal. Noble Lords are entitled to disagree with the Government, and I have absolutely no issue with that, but please do not impute some sort of bad intent or motive around political correctness, colonialism or any of those things. Our intention is to secure that base for the benefit of the security of our country. We did it so an agreement could be concluded on our terms, rather than it being forced upon us so that we would have to accept the imposition of an arrangement that would not have been in our favour.
I am interpreting the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, on the overseas territories as an invitation to the Government to restate their longstanding and clear commitment to all our overseas territories. The Conservatives, at some points in these debates, although not recently—the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, never did this, but others did—would raise the issue of the Falkland Islands. I thought that that was the height of irresponsibility, and I am very glad that they no longer attempt to bring that question into these discussions, because it was wrong that they did that.
This treaty has a complex resolution process attached to it because it needs to be long-lasting, and we are trying to cover every eventuality that might arise. That is a really good subject for us to get into in Committee, and we must test that to make sure that we have got that right. I have every confidence that the noble Baroness and her colleagues will bring to us situations that we need to hold up against that process, to make sure that we have got that right.
On the notification of activities of third countries with our consent, there is a notification there. I think that is right, but it is not in any way conditional. We do not need consent. It is not about permission or any of those things. I hope that that is helpful.
On the ability to make law, we had an interesting discussion at the briefing about royal prerogative and the ability of the King to make law in Diego Garcia. We need to get into that in Committee. There will be things in the Bill that, when I was sitting in the noble Baroness’s place, I would have been asking questions about, such as powers and flexibilities, the ability of Ministers to make decisions, and the various methodologies. I expect we will be having long discussions about negative and affirmative procedures, for example, and law-making power is one such issue.
I want to address some of the points that were made regarding the Chagossian community. As I stated in my opening speech, this Government deeply regret how the Chagossians were removed from the islands. This is a community that the Government are committed to working with and supporting in the months and years ahead. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. She made a compelling and genuine contribution on this important issue, as did the noble Lord, Lord Horam, and I commend those who have been working on this for very many years. She did her party proud, and I respect the longstanding commitment that she and others have had.
The Bill ensures that there will be no adverse impact on Chagossians’ nationality rights as a result of the treaty. Chagossians will not lose their current rights to hold or claim British citizenship, and no one will lose existing British Overseas Territory citizenship status. The Bill does, however, remove Chagossians’ ability to acquire British Overseas Territory citizenship in the future, because once the treaty comes into force, BIOT will not be an overseas territory.
On the trust fund, the noble Lord, Lord Horam, raised the possibility of an exchange of letters on the future treatment of Chagossians under this fund. This is, again, a genuine issue that we ought to explore. I appreciate that noble Lords will want more detail on how the trust fund will operate. I look forward to discussing this in Committee. Who knows? We might be able to reach some sort of agreement on that issue.
On the citizenship law, which was raised by one or two noble Lords opposite—it may have been the noble Lord, Lord Hannan—there have been mentions of section 76B of the Mauritian criminal code and concerns that Chagossians are leaving Mauritius for fear of being prosecuted for their affiliation with the UK. This is really important: no one has ever been prosecuted under this law; but just because no one has ever been subject to it, that does not make it right. Last week, the Mauritian Government repealed this section, and, as of April 2025, 94% of Chagossians with British nationality also had Mauritian citizenship.
On the right to self-determination, there have been questions during the debate, and leading up to it, about consultation with Chagossians. The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily between states—the UK and Mauritius—and it is true that we have prioritised the operation of the base on Diego Garcia. That has been our priority. There may be people here who disagree with that and who would have preferred us to prioritise other issues, and I respect their right to hold that view, but that is not the view of the Government. We wanted to protect the base.
There were some, including the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who raised the right to self-determination for the Chagossians. I have followed the noble Baroness’s career for many years; I do not know why, but I have always been rather attached to following what she does and says, and I have a real long-standing respect for her. I completely understand why she wants to raise this issue, and why it matters so much to her. The fact is that the Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population and has never been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population, therefore, legally arises.
The English courts, noting the conclusion of the ICJ in the 2019 advisory opinion, have proceeded on the basis that the relevant right to self-determination in the context of BIOT was that of Mauritians rather than Chagossians. Both the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have considered, in a series of judgments since the 1970s, the related but distinct question of an alleged right of abode or other rights said to flow from that. On each occasion, the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights have ultimately dismissed these claims. The transfer of sovereignty, therefore, does not deprive Chagossians of any existing rights. This is a long-standing legal position that previous UK Governments have also adopted, including in claims brought as recently as 2020. That all sounds very legalistic and cold; nevertheless, that is the legal position as it stands.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister for addressing this issue, because it has become a real touchpoint in the general populace. Does she agree that, while we might differ on the legality issue, there is a moral duty on the Government to engage with the Chagossians, who feel so let down, not just by this Government—I made that very clear—but by the whole political establishment in this country?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I agree, and I will say a little about engagement. It is an important point, and it deserves a proper response. If there is more that we can do, we would be very open to discussions about how it could be done in the right way that does not derail the process that we are trying to undertake about bringing the treaty into law.
Having said that, we recognise the importance of the islands to Chagossians, and have worked hard to reflect this in our wider policies. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has, as he said, a long-standing position on this which I understand and respect. His impressive command of the history of this subject was put to good use in his previous interventions. I completely agree with his point about the shameful treatment of the Chagossian population.
On engagement, in the past three years officials have met Chagossians and groups over 30 times to discuss the agreement and FCDO’s wider support to the community. The Minister for Overseas Territories, Stephen Doughty, has met with Chagossians four times since he has been in post since July last year and, on 2 September, the new Chagossian contact group met. It has wide representation from Chagossian communities in the UK, Mauritius, the Seychelles and elsewhere to give Chagossians a formal role that shapes decision-making in the UK Government’s support for their community. The group met for the first time on 2 September and will convene quarterly hereafter.
Claims that all Chagossians are opposed to the agreement fail to respect the differing views of this diverse and vibrant community. We have seen some of that reflected in our discussions this afternoon. Many voices support the outcome reached, and these include the Chagos Refugees Group, the Chagos Islanders Movement, the UK Natives Chagossian Council and the Seychelles Chagossian committee. However, I accept that there are many Chagossians who take a different view, which is their right.
On resettlement, points have been made that the treaty does not guarantee Chagossians the right of return to the archipelago and that it should have done. This has come up several times. In 2016, when in government, the Conservatives ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands. The KPMG report, which has been mentioned several times and was commissioned by that Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. This agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms without requiring the UK taxpayer to foot the bill.
There has been a range of views about Mauritius and its reliability. Some noble Lords have implied that Mauritius is somehow an unreliable partner that cannot be trusted. These claims are insulting to Mauritius, which is a member of the Commonwealth and a westward-facing country with shared democratic values. Mauritius ranks among the top African nations in governance, human development and innovation. It is a full democracy, a regional leader in human rights and a trusted partner in upholding the rules-based international order. It ranks second out of 54 African countries in the Mo Ibrahim index of African governance. It is also one of only two African countries not to have signed up to China’s belt and road initiative. As an act of good faith, Mauritius stopped its legal campaign against us while we negotiated.
Much has also been said about China. There has been a substantial amount of complete misinformation about China’s influence in the region and reported plans to develop a military base in the Chagos Archipelago. The Mauritian Attorney-General has stated publicly that these claims are a gross falsehood and calls them a political gimmick. I can confirm, unequivocally, that the treaty prevents any foreign security forces, civilian or military, from establishing themselves in the archipelago. Furthermore, if the UK believes, for whatever reason, that any activity taking place in the archipelago would jeopardise the security of the base, Mauritius is obliged under the treaty to co-operate with us to prevent that risk, and the UK can veto any construction or development across the archipelago which we consider to be a security threat to the base. As for claims that China supports the treaty because it grants it greater influence in the Indian Ocean, that is, frankly, nonsense.
This is why our closest allies and partners have welcomed the deal, especially the US and other Five Eyes partners. They are satisfied that the treaty protects the base against foreign influence and think that it is essential for our capabilities for generations to come.
Many of the points on the issue of the environment are really quite important, including on marine protected areas. The noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, made a thoughtful speech about this. There have been claims made, both during the debate today and in the other place, that the Mauritian Fisheries Minister wished to issue fishing licences in the area, which would risk, the argument goes, the protection of the unique marine environment of the archipelago. It must be noted that the point the Minister was making was more to do with sovereignty than with fisheries policy, but, as I said in my opening speech, the Mauritian Government confirmed only yesterday that they will establish a marine protected area that follows current bounds of the BIOT MPA and that they will not allow any commercial fishing in any section of the marine protected area.
Noble Lords have quite reasonably sought assurances on enforcement of the MPA, and I expect this is something we will get into detailed discussion about in Committee. For today, I point out that, if the UK at any point believes that Mauritius is in breach of its environmental obligations, we can seek to resolve that using the agreed dispute resolution mechanism in Article 14. In any case, the UK and Mauritius are working to finalise the arrangements on maritime security to ensure that there are patrolling capabilities and that these are maintained.
Lord Callanan (Con)
On the point about the marine protected area, I think the Minister said that Mauritius had duplicated the zone absolutely. Is it not the case that it is not a no-catch zone? Point B in the communiqué issued confirmed that fishing will still be permitted in over 600,000 square kilometres of the zone.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
That is right, and I said that in my opening speech. This is about artisanal fishing. In the event of some sort of resettlement on the outer islands, those communities would need to sustain themselves. They would fish using traditional artisanal methods, and that is what the permission relates to. It would not permit any other form of fishing, because that would clearly be detrimental to marine life.
The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, chair of the ISC, said—and this is about money—it is disappointing that there continues to be reference to artificially inflated figures of the cost of the treaty. It is misleading to ignore inflation and the changing value of money over time. The net present value of the treaty is what we have always said it will be: £3.4 billion over its lifetime. This is in line with long-standing practice in how the Government account for all long-term spend. The Office for Statistics Regulation and the OBR have verified these figures and confirmed that we have applied this methodology correctly.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the point is that, in accounting for money, cash accounting is used in government. What she is talking about is economic analysis, which is not the same as financial analysis. If she had been in the Chamber she would have heard my speech on this subject. It is clear that, when we come to draw up accounts for the Government, cash goes into this in pounds expressed in the time expended.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I apologise to the noble Baroness for missing her speech, and I will read it in Hansard; the bladder is only so strong. What matters here is that there is consistency across government and over time in the way that we do these things. These things are done the same as they would be done for any other agreement.
I know that some people take a different view of the OBR from the one that this Government take. We take it seriously, and it has looked at our figures and verified them. The noble Baroness could by all means come back to this in Committee—I am sure that she will—but, for tonight, I will stick with what the OBR had to say on this issue. The way that we have done this ensures that the figures are realistic and comparable, not inflated by simply adding up future payments while ignoring the depreciation of value over time.
The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, made quite a thoughtful speech. He is worried about the money. I should point out that we do not see this as an open market situation by any means. He seeks clarity about total cost. I can confirm that £3.4 billion is just that—it is the total cost.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, suggested that the US should be contributing to the cost of the treaty, given its joint use of the military base. We have to recognise that the US pays for the operating costs of the base, and these are several multiples greater than any payments by the UK. We benefit greatly from this arrangement. This allows us to access a valuable capability that keeps our country safe and the US is paying far more for it than we do.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
Does my noble friend agree that this agreement also allows the Americans to forward plan for their investment, which, as she quite rightly says, is substantial?
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
Absolutely. I thought the point made by the former Secretary of State for Defence, my noble friend Lord Browne of Ladyton, added to this very well when he talked about how future investment is jeopardised by the legal uncertainty that we are seeking to resolve.
Some have questioned the use of defence money in particular for this treaty. To be absolutely clear, the cost will be split between the FCDO and the MoD, as is appropriate given the shared interests of both departments in maintaining the future of the base. As set out by the Defence Secretary in his Oral Statement on the treaty in the other place, the costs represent a fraction of a percentage of the total defence budget—less than 0.2%. It is a bit far-fetched to suggest that the annual payments are in any way comparable to the biggest uplift in defence spending that we have seen since the end of the Cold War.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, raised sea level change. I do not know why I am dealing with this in the money section, but this is where I have written it down so we might as well get it on the record. As he said, it is true that sea level change has been less than 1% over the past 50 years, but it would be helpful for us to explore in Committee how a future sea level change, which he quite rightly alerts us to, would be treated by the dispute resolution process. I do not have a clear answer to that tonight but that is what Committee is for: getting to the bottom of exactly those sorts of questions.
I will give the last word to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. He made the very strong argument—it is not one that I had thought of, but I will definitely use it again—that this House voted in July to ratify the treaty. The Bill facilitates the enactment of this House’s wishes, because we voted in favour of the treaty. The Bill is necessary so that we can complete the ratification with Mauritius and therefore secure the critical military base on Diego Garcia. I thank noble Lords for their contributions and look forward to debating this in Committee.