Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Hannan of Kingsclere Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I first declare my interest as a Friend of the British Overseas Territories. I support the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in his efforts to bring clarity to the Bill, at the very beginning of the Bill.

I particularly endorse the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, in relation to his amendments. It was in the conversation about those amendments that the issue of self-determination came up. I know that we are going to talk about self-determination in relation to amendments later on in Committee. However, there is a fundamental point about self-determination. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, asked whether we would ever cede British territory. Well, of course we have, when we have had self-determination exercised. In this case—the Minister went through this in some detail in Second Reading, because I raised it—it is deemed not applicable to the British Indian Ocean Territory.

We all received a letter today from 650 members of the Chagossian community here in the United Kingdom. In that letter they say:

“To do so, however, in the context of re-denying the people concerned self-determination while simultaneously paying a country that played a key role in denying that people self-determination in relation to their territory on the previous occasion, more money than is required to resettle the people with the rightful claim to the territory, in order to lease one of their islands, demonstrates extreme moral disorientation”.


I completely agree with that.

I also completely agree with the second point that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, made on resettlement. We all heard at Second Reading that there had been an exercise looking at resettling Chagossians into the Chagos Islands. Back in 2015, the KPMG report gave the details of the costs and the then Government decided not to proceed, probably based mostly on cost. But now the costs we are paying to the Mauritian Government far exceed the costs of resettlement. There is an opportunity for some Chagossians, if they wish, to resettle on Diego Garcia. In other British Overseas Territories there are civilians on military bases: Ascension Island comes to mind. So it could be the case that it happens in Diego Garcia as well. We will touch on resettlement rights and the right to return in other amendments, but, given that it was raised in this context, I just wanted to make those couple of points. I support the amendments in this group.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I will start with the amendment from my noble friend Lord Callanan and the objection to it from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, which was that this wasincompatible with the decision taken by Parliament. I will just quote—because I think it is helpful—Article 18 of the treaty. It states:

“This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the first month following the date of receipt of the later note by which the Parties notify each other that they have completed their respective internal requirements and procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement”.


In other words, it cannot enter into force until both Chambers of this Parliament have given their assent.

We have not made any bones about the fact that we do not like the treaty at all. I think it is a bit much to complain about my noble friend making this point in principle.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The noble Lord will recall that I had said that it is not in force. I said Parliament had ratified it. I am not sure whether the noble Lord can intervene on an intervention, but I am sure he can intervene on his noble friend in just a moment as a proxy to intervene on me. Parliament has ratified the treaty. The treaty is not in force, but treaty-making is a prerogative power, not a parliamentary power. I am sure the noble Lord will agree with that.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I will, of course, invite an intervention. I do not know what the rules are on intervening on an intervention.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am happy that my noble friend gives way, because, since the noble Lord intervened on me earlier, I have had a chance to check the facts of the case and, unsurprisingly, he is completely wrong. Parliament has not ratified the treaty because Parliament cannot ratify the treaty. The ratification of treaties under the CRaG legislation is a matter for the Government, using the royal prerogative. Parliament can delay the ratification but cannot prevent it. Whatever this House voted, or whatever the House of Commons voted, the Government are entitled, under the royal prerogative, to ratify the treaty in any case. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.

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[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

That is extremely helpful. I very much welcome my noble friend’s intervention.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

I am very much going to regret getting involved in this, but I think it is helpful to understand what this House has and has not done. Both Houses of Parliament have voted that the Government should ratify this treaty. That is the situation as it is. This debate is about making sure we have the right legislation to enable us to enact the treaty.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I think lots of positions will be endlessly stated on that; I am not going to take it any further now. I do not see anyone changing their minds about that, but I would like to address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who suggested that this was really about a reluctance ever to cede sovereignty and to allow any colony to go its own way.

One of the peculiar features of British rule overseas was the nature of its dissolution. The British Empire, unlike most others, had a self-dissolving quality because it had the democratic self-determination principle that was adumbrated in this House and then exported. Very few imperial moments ended so peacefully. Yes, there were tragic exceptions in Kenya, Cyprus, India and Palestine, I suppose. Ireland was a slightly different story, because it was not treated as a colony but as part of the country itself. But those were exceptional; in most places, including most Caribbean countries and Malaya, independence happened without a shot being fired in anger because there was that belief in self-determination. Quite often the imperative to decolonise, as my noble friend Lord Lilley suggests, overrode self-determination.

Some noble Lords will, I am sure, remember that in 1956 Malta voted in a referendum, by 77%, to turn itself into three Westminster constituencies and become part of the United Kingdom. It was turned down and, soon after, Malta ended up not just independent but outside NATO and the Commonwealth, and pursuing an extremely unhelpful line. During the Maltese process of accession to the European Union, I discussed this with Dom Mintoff, who was still alive. He was an old and revered figure at that time, and he said, “My wife is British and I love Britain, but how do you expect anyone to respond to being treated in that way?”

I mentioned Malta because there was a similar debate, which I do not think has come up in any of your Lordships’ deliberations, in one of the parties in Mauritius in the 1960s about whether to adhere to the United Kingdom and seek representation at the other end of this building. The idea that this is really about some kind of grasping imperial power refusing to let go is wrong in the generality and especially wrong in this case, because we are refusing to recognise the wishes of the people concerned—the only people who ever formed a permanent population of the Chagos Archipelago between 1714 and the early 1970s.

Self-determination does not always mean independence. It means exactly that: you can self-determine to be part of a larger bloc. The referendum in Scotland in 2014 was an act of self-determination; it did not stop being self-determination because of the referendum result. That is what we mean by democracy. I fear that self-determination, which is a core principle of the United Nations and of the legal order that we have defended even since the Atlantic charter in 1941, is being overridden here for no good reason at all. This is what makes me so frustrated. Every time I sit down to draft what I want to say about these amendments, I start getting angry all over again about the utter needlessness of it all, for the reasons set out by my noble friend Lord Lilley. We are surrendering to a case where there is no jurisdiction over us. If Ministers think that that is wrong, I would love to hear the Minister explain why the Government will not accept my noble friend’s amendments.

It seems that what we are doing here is creating a hierarchy of norms, not by the intrinsic importance of their jurisdictional power, but on the basis of taste and fashion. The principle of self-determination is thus ranked below the principle of general decolonisation—getting out of the way—and that is fundamentally because of a transient public mood. It is considered unfashionable to have flags with little Union Jacks in the top corner, which sets a very dangerous precedent.

It may be—I do not know—that the Government will argue that the reason we are following this non-binding resolution, which is not a legal judgment, is not because there is some hidden reason that we really have to, as my noble friend suggests, but, they may say, because we have to give an example. It would be because the international order is in danger; countries are throwing their weight around; Machtpolitik is prevailing; the whole post-war order is looking shaky; even the United States, on which it rested, is now asserting its interests without recourse to treaties. Therefore, we need to set a lead.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I never said that we did; that was between Mauritius and the Maldives. My point is to make the case to noble Lords that the advisory opinions—advisory though they are—stand to inform subsequent opinions of international tribunals. That is what happened in that case, and that is why I bring that as a supporting argument for the Government’s case—to help noble Lords understand how we have got to where we are.

While an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS almost certainly would not address the question of sovereignty directly, it may reach decisions on related matters based on conclusions about sovereignty. Noble Lords may disagree, but the Government’s position is that we are concerned about this—and I suggest that the previous Government were also concerned about this; otherwise, what were they doing? We are concerned not just about the effects of a binding judgment on the UK but about the legal effect on third countries and international organisations, which could give rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions.

Although I do not expect there to be agreement on this, I believe that we cannot say that the Government have not fully considered all the potential legal jeopardy in which we would place ourselves. Further, we believe that the suck-it-and-see approach that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, advocates would leave us in a much weaker position when it comes to negotiating with Mauritius.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

May I press the Minister on that point? I am very grateful to her for giving way. She said that there was an existential threat to the base. So that I have understood that clearly, is she saying that there was something in addition to the possibility of an adverse UNCLOS judgment? As she conceded a moment ago, UNCLOS has no sovereignty; I just looked up what it says on its website, and it says, “We don’t do sovereignty issues”. That issue was tested with the case between the Philippines and China, when the latter was building reefs over some contested land, and UNCLOS said that it had nothing to do with it. Therefore, is there something else? Is an adverse judgment from a body that cannot decide sovereignty, in her view, an existential threat to the existence of the base? Would it make the existence of that base impossible?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

What do we mean by existential? We could still have a Diego Garcia—there could be something there. However, it would be existential because, if the operability is compromised, the base as it exists today—it is a unique place and it does things that we do not do anywhere else—would be compromised. To that extent, I suggest that that is an existential threat to the operability of the base.

With that, I hope that noble Lords who have presented their amendments are satisfied. If not, we can of course return to these issues on Report.

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[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I will speak in favour of Amendments 2, 13, 25 and 28. Amendment 2 is an all-purpose amendment saying that the treaty should not come into force until other conditions in amendments are incorporated. Amendments 13 and 28 call for consultation, and Amendment 25 for a referendum.

As I have mentioned previously, the advisory ruling of the International Court of Justice was based on a non-binding UN resolution about the process of decolonisation. That ruling explicitly says that a colonial state can sever part of a territory if it is the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned that they be separated.

The Chagossians cite the example of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The parallel between the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and the situation of Chagos versus Mauritius is striking. When the Government consulted the people of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands before ceasing to be the colonial power, they found that there was considerable opposition in the Ellice Islands to being lumped in with the Gilbert Islands. The parallels between that and the Chagos Islands and Mauritius are very striking. The Chagos Islands are 1,339 miles away from Mauritius, and the Ellice Islands are just 800 miles away from the Gilbert Islands. The Chagos Islands have a different ethnic mix. They are basically populated by people from the African continent, whereas that is not the case in Mauritius. Likewise, with the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, one was Polynesian and one was Micronesian. The disparity of numbers is, if anything, even greater in the case of the Chagos Islands versus Mauritius than it was in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands.

After consulting, the British Government rightly decided that they should test the views of the people concerned. They had a referendum, and the vote was very striking. The people of the Ellice Islands voted to separate from the Gilbert Islands by 3,799 votes to 293. This is a comparatively small number of people—fewer, in fact, than the diaspora of Chagossian peoples in the UK, the Seychelles and Mauritius itself. It surely is possible for us to consult with them and seek their views, ideally through a referendum. The Government may say, “Why have a referendum? It’s so difficult. We can’t do it”. But the Chagossians themselves have today given the results of an opinion poll they have carried out, which 3,500 people responded to out of roughly 10,000 potential respondents. That is a very high proportion. Of those 3,500, an overwhelming proportion were against being lumped in with Mauritius.

The Government may well say that it is still only a minority of the total population. That is fair enough. Again, suck it and see—have a referendum of the total. Who would be the potential electors? The Chagossian nationals would be, as defined in this Bill. We have done that bit for the Government, so that is already there. It is clearly possible over a period to consult them if the Chagossians can organise a poll like this fairly rapidly and with such a high response rate.

The Government often argue that the Chagossians are “not really a people and in any case they’re no longer there”. However, there are precedents in history for people being removed from a place and allowed back. The Acadians were shipped out of Canada because they were thought to be unreliable French-speaking Catholics but subsequently were allowed back and are still a distinctive community in that part of Canada. Similar things have happened with the Chechens and the Crimeans more recently, after the Second World War. In history, we all know the displacement that was suffered by the ancient Israelites. It is possible to say that people who have been removed from a territory still have a right to that territory and should be consulted about its sovereignty.

These amendments seek to ensure that we do have a referendum. Failing that, if the Government can convince us that it is impossible in some way to organise a referendum, let us have a thorough and prolonged period of consultation. I would like to hear more from the Government on what they are doing now, having been provoked into it by the amendment to the committal Motion to ask the relevant Select Committee of this House to carry out a consultation. How are they envisaging that being carried out, and how will they define the Chagos consultation groups and so on? I think your Lordships’ House would almost certainly welcome greater information about that process and how the Government see it happening. If they do not satisfy us on this, I think we need to press ahead with Amendments 13 and 28 on the consultation, but ideally let us go ahead and have a referendum under Amendment 25.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I introduce Amendment 29 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who is prevented by a family illness from being here. His amendment draws attention to the contradiction between the principles in this Bill and some of the UN resolutions dealing with when it is valid to partition a territory. The legal case on which the Government rest, as we established in the last round of amendments, is fundamentally UN Resolution 1514, which was the basis of the Mauritian claim that it was wrong to have divided the territory at independence.

This is an extraordinary precedent to set. The idea that if a territory, for reasons of administrative convenience, was at one time governed from somewhere else, that creates a lasting claim, would upend borders on every continent and in every archipelago. It would mean that Aden and Somaliland are again governed from India, and that the Cayman Islands are again governed from Jamaica. If we extend beyond British territories, it would mean that the Philippines were governed from Mexico, and that Bolivia was again governed from my native Peru, which was the seat of the viceroyalty. It would be an extraordinary principle.

Indeed, when read in context, the UN is not arguing that. If it did, it would have opposed the split of Czechoslovakia, the independence of Montenegro from Serbia, and so on. Of course it does not argue that. The three resolutions referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, essentially establish criteria where it is proper to divide a territory for reasons of geography, history, ethnic distinction or nationality—a sense of being a people and wanting to live in your own polity. As we just heard from my noble friend Lord Lilley, all those criteria are plainly met in this case. When the Chagos Islands were ceded by the French in 1814, they were ceded as a separate territory from Mauritius. They are populated by a different population, one that came from the west rather than from the east. The only reason that they were governed from Mauritius was not because they were part of Mauritius but because there is nowhere among those sparse and beautiful atolls suitable for a seat of government. It is similar to some of our continuing overseas territories in the Atlantic today, visited occasionally by a governor because there is no permanent seat there.

This is the key group of amendments—and the crux of the entire debate is the question of consulting the people who have the most at stake. They are the only people who have ever constituted a permanent population of that archipelago and their descendants, the people defined in this Bill as the citizens of the BIOT. My noble friend Lord Lilley gave a very good example: the consultation between the Ellice Islands and the Gilbert Islands at the moment of independence. They felt that they had not enough in common to accept government from each other’s hands, so the Ellice Islands became the monarchy of Tuvalu and the Gilbert Islands became the Republic of Kiribati. The distances here, ethnically and geographically, are much wider. There is not much doubt that if we had carried out a consultation in 1965, we would have had the same outcome as in the case cited by my noble friend.

Why does that suddenly stop being true now? Why does the passage of time invalidate that claim? This is a proposal to hand the Chagossian people to a nation that has never governed them, never seen them as part of their demos, that was very happy to renounce all claims in perpetuity and trouser a cash sum in exchange for doing so, and which has continued to treat the archipelago in essentially pecuniary terms. Why not test the proposition today?

I repeat a point made by my noble friend Lord Bellingham at Second Reading. It is perfectly logistically feasible to conduct a referendum across scattered territories. Last year I voted for our absent colleague—my noble friend Lord Hague of Richmond—to be Chancellor of the University of Oxford. There was a poll that was conducted electronically across five continents, the alumni being dispersed in their tens of thousands. There was a simple enough process. You establish the right of somebody to vote, you establish their identity, you show that they genuinely are an alumnus, then you have the vote. We have established who would be eligible here, and the right of descent that conveys BIOT citizenship.

I refuse to believe that it is logistically beyond us to consult the Chagossian people. I cannot speak for everyone on this side, but I am pretty sure that if the Chagossian people voted overwhelmingly for Mauritian citizenship, opposition to this proposal would dissipate and people would accept it as a valid exercise of self-determination. There is something more than perverse about acting in the name of decolonisation when taking a people against their will and transferring them to the sovereignty of a foreign state, a country whose Prime Minister at the time of the partition said that it is a territory which they never visit and of which they know little.

When I was a Member of the European Parliament, Crawley was part of my constituency. I got to know some of the disparate groups that represent our Chagossian fellow subjects, and it is fair to say that they did not always agree on every issue—like many small communities, they had a broad diversity of opinions on a lot of subjects—but honestly, hand on heart, I do not think I ever recall meeting any Chagossian in this country who wanted to be a citizen of Mauritius. There are reasons for that. The experience of Chagossians in Mauritius was not a happy one: they were confined in slums, and they were subjected to, in their eyes, racism and discrimination. The idea that we are now placing this entire population, against their will, because of a non-binding opinion from a tribunal without jurisdiction is a truly extraordinary and shameful moment.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

To clarify: it is the position of the Opposition that the referendum would also be for there to able to be inhabitants on the military base?

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, if I may intervene—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am intervening on the noble Baroness. It is her speech.

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[Baroness Meyer (Con)]

But I allow my noble friend.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

The Chagossian people have made it very clear what they want. They had their own opinion poll on the subject, and that has been independently verified: 99.22% of people voted for it. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, asked what the proposition would be. It is for a resettlement on the outer atolls, under British jurisdiction and as British overseas citizens, in accordance with the plan set out in 2015, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, referred earlier.

[Baroness Meyer (Con)]

Yes, and they seem to approve what we are saying. Basically, these amendments are about asking the Chagossian people about the right to self-determination through a referendum. I have never met a Chagossian in my life, but I have received many letters from them over the past few days and feel that this is my moral duty, and I think that, in good conscience, the Government should allow them self-determination.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. She speaks with great sincerity and consistency in making her arguments, and I share many of her thoughts. I said on the earlier group that I am also awaiting the conclusions of the work of the International Relations and Defence Committee. I hope that it will be able to guide us with some of our thinking on this on Report, after its consultations with the community.

Reference has been made to my honourable friends in the House of Commons, who have also for many years been consistent that we should not repeat the history of making decisions on behalf of the community without involving them. It is our long-held view that that is the basis on which we should go forward.

One of the reasons why I intervened on the noble Baroness, and had the interaction with her noble friend, was that there have been some parts of the debate, especially in the House of Commons, where seeking consideration of the right to self-determination has perhaps been used as a bit of a proxy for other considerations, to try either to prevent a treaty or to prevent the restoration of rights. As the noble Lord said on behalf of his noble friend, we seem to be talking about some form of limited sovereignty, some form of limited and partial right to self-determination.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

The proposal has come from the Chagossian population. That is what we mean by self-determination. It is not for us to lay down whether they should have full sovereignty or partial sovereignty; it is for us to listen to what they want.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I agree with that. It is a clearer proposition than we have heard—a better proposition, in my view. Actually, “better” is the wrong word; it is a more convincing proposition because of its origination. The reality of how we define self-determination and the rights of the community—and where I think the debate has bled into previously—is that it has been used without that clarification, as a different political impetus with regard to the overall desirability or otherwise of having a treaty with Mauritius.

That is where I come to it. The most vociferous of speeches that we have heard deny the reality of what happened just last year. We can talk about the denial of rights. If we are talking about referendum statistics, I agree with about 90% of what the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, said about rights in her speech. But we do not have to go back to the 1960s to look at the denial of rights. It was in January 2024 that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, as Foreign Secretary, restated government policy that there would be no right of resettlement, and that was while negotiations on the basis of a treaty were carrying on. If it is an argument to suggest that we wish to restore rights of resettlement and rights to self-determination, I accede to that argument. I think it should be in the acknowledgement that the previous Government and this Government refused to do so in the absence of a treaty with Mauritius.

The context that we are in now is that the first opportunity that we may have for limited right of resettlement and acknowledgement of some form of self-determination is by virtue of a treaty. The Minister knows that these Benches do not consider them to go far enough, and we want to use these stages to see how we can go further. But it is worth recognising that the only opportunity that we have for some form of resettlement is by virtue of there being a treaty.

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Moved by

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) Sections 2 to 4 may not come into force until the Secretary of State sought to re-negotiate the Treaty so that it confers a right on Chagossian people to give birth within the Chagos Archipelago.”

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

In the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, I should like to move the amendment standing in his name. Amendments 3 and 4 are about the rights of Chagossians to bear children in the archipelago and the rights of people born in the archipelago to continued British Overseas Territories citizenship. So as not to detain your Lordships any longer than necessary, I will also speak to my own Amendment 50 in this group, which is about registering married Chagossians as British Indian Ocean Territory citizens.

The Minister has just repeated that she deeply regrets the treatment of Chagossians over the decades, and I believe her. She is obviously sincere and has said that on many previous occasions. In our debate last month, she described it as appalling and morally shameful; she said that they had been badly treated over many decades. So I pose the question: what is adequate restitution for this appalling treatment, which all sides seem to agree is deeply shameful? What would constitute a way of making good a wrong in a way that is understood morally and legally? What we mean by restitution, of course, is restoring something. If you have taken something from someone, restitution means giving it back or compensating them to an equivalent value.

I am afraid that all arguments end up in the same place: the restitution sought by Chagossians for those 60 years was the right to return to the homeland from which they had been plucked and then dumped hundreds, or in some cases thousands, of miles away in strange new lands. I want the Committee to think for a moment about what a return would be like: to imagine the resettlement of the atolls around Diego Garcia, if not of the base itself, with the coconut groves coaxed back into order, their fronds trimmed; children born in the islands being taught by their elders how to husk and split the coconuts; villages on the shore, with their bright roofs rising above the takamaka and banyan trees. Imagine the old churches being reconstituted and the coral stone being used. All of that is what is being sought by our fellow subjects of Chagossian origin, as British Indian Ocean Territory citizens, and it is not available under any alternative plan.

Mauritius recognises a right to settle in the island for Mauritians, under whom it includes Chagossians. But what is being proposed by Mauritius is the dissolution of BIOT citizenship into Mauritian citizenship, equivalent in the Seychelles, and now the equivalent for us. This is something that is unprecedented. I do not think that we have ever done this before. Yes, of course, when we have transferred jurisdiction as a withdrawing colonial power, we have transferred citizenship: you become a Kenyan or whatever it is. But I cannot think of any precedent where you remove somebody’s citizenship and instead give them citizenship of a country to which they feel no loyalty at all. As long as this wrong endures—as long as people feel that they do not have the nationality on their passport that they feel in their hearts—there will not be any stability.

The Minister spoke in the last round about why we should not reopen what was defined by the courts as a final, full and binding settlement. Well, it will not be final. By the way, that is what Mauritius agreed to in 1965, when it was paid to renounce all of its claims; reparations are never fully final. The deprivation of Chagossians of the citizenship that they want, that they want for their children and that past Governments legislated for—we amended the Nationality Act 1981 in 2022 in order precisely to create this status—is not going to result in a full and final settlement. On the contrary, there will be as much rejection of that new dispensation from the people most directly involved as there was recently from the Mauritians of the existing status quo. In fact, I would not be at all surprised if the part of the Chagossian population that rejects the deal constitutes itself as a Government-in-exile and begins to seek recognition. The idea that we are doing all of this in order to settle something quietly so that it all goes away is going to be tested by events—I hope I am wrong about this, but I suspect not. We are going to look back and think, “Why did we not see this coming?”

There is a way of going back to what was our plan as recently as 2015: looking at the places in the archipelago that can be resettled without prejudice to the base, allowing those people then to work in the civilian jobs, which are currently done mainly by Filipinos and Sri Lankans and so on, on Diego Garcia itself. It could be that this whole rap becomes what the Falklands war was to that archipelago: the beginning of an economic renaissance as Britain begins to take an interest in its overseas possession and begins to create active economic opportunities for the people there, whether servicing the military facilities or in fishing or whatever it is. But none of that is going to happen if we simply declare that our Chagossian fellow citizens are really just misguided Mauritians and that they have no more particular right to their ancestral homelands and to the graves of their ancestors than any other Mauritian citizen. It is in your Lordships’ power to put a stop to this and not to ratify this treaty. As our national poet said:

“Prevent it, resist it, let it not be so,


Lest child, child’s children, cry against you woe!”

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I appreciate that this is a bit involved and complex, and that noble Lords may wish to come back to some of these issues at later stages, but I think it is helpful to lay it out in a detailed and technical way at this stage. If a letter would be a more helpful format for noble Lords, I will put this into a letter and share it. In light of this, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.