Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

John Whittingdale Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point, which I know he has made before. I repeat the point I made earlier: we are simply not getting from the Government an adequate rebuttal of these points, and we need to have that. If the Government have a good answer to what he and my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) have said, Second Reading of the Bill is the moment for the Government to deliver that explanation. We are all still waiting.

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) is right, but the existing position goes even further. Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of the written answer from the Government on 7 February this year:

“Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum.”?

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend, and perhaps I should refine my argument. It is not just that the Government are not answering the questions; it is that when they do answer the questions, they undermine their own argument. It is worse than we thought. We are not getting clarity from the Government about what would be the legal judgment that they themselves have relied on as almost the entire basis for their actions, and this really matters. The Government owe us a proper explanation.

I am prepared to concede—I hope the Minister will accept that I am a fair-minded person—that there may be a persuasive argument that the Government could make about which court and which circumstances would deliver the kind of judgment that makes this action inevitable and necessary, but I have waited a long time to hear it, and I am still waiting. I hope that when the Minister stands to sum up the debate he will give us that answer, because the House of Commons deserves to hear it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to take part in the debate. The Foreign Affairs Committee, on which I sit—I welcome two of my Labour colleagues from the Committee and my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth) to the debate—has had the opportunity to question the Minister, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), although I was not entirely persuaded by some of his answers. That is not to say that the Intelligence and Security Committee, which has other powers, is not an appropriate body for looking at some aspects—indeed, the Defence Committee should also do so.

The one thing that I think everybody agrees on is the importance of Diego Garcia and the Chagos islands to the United Kingdom. My right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) quoted Admiral Lord West, his former boss—he was, of course, a Minister in the last Labour Government and the security adviser to the Prime Minister—who said:

“It is no exaggeration to say that Diego Garcia—the largest of the Chagos Islands—hosts the most strategically important US air and logistics base in the Indian Ocean and is vital to the defence of the UK and our allies.”

I have no doubt that Labour Members share that sentiment, but perhaps not his later comment, which was:

“An agreement with Mauritius to surrender sovereignty over the Chagos Islands threatens to undermine core British security interests, and those of key allies, most notably the United States.”

We do need to listen to the warning he gave.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

Admiral Lord West has been referred to twice so far in the debate. My right hon. Friend may be unaware that Admiral Lord West had a letter published in the national press on 28 May in which he talked about the

“disgraceful decision to hand over ownership of the Chagos archipelago”.

He added:

“I do not accept that the move is ‘absolutely vital for our defence and intelligence’, as the Prime Minister claims.”

I wonder what Government Back Benchers who have been slavishly reading their scripts make of that from someone of that calibre—a former director of Defence Intelligence.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right—

[Mr Calvin Bailey]

Will the right hon. Member give way?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

If I might just answer my hon. Friend before doing so. Admiral Lord West has immense experience and knowledge. If the Defence Committee should decide to look at this, it might well ask him to give evidence on the basis of his considerable experience in the area.

[Mr Bailey]

Will the right hon. Member explain how UNCLOS enables intelligence activity, and then perhaps why we have represented the views that we have on the basis of our experience and understanding?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I will come on to UNCLOS. As the hon. Member knows, it is an organisation that has expressed a view, but not one that is binding on the United Kingdom. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), the former Attorney General, set out very clearly the various international opinions that have been expressed but which are not binding or mandatory for the United Kingdom to follow. That is critical to this debate.

[Mr Bailey]

Will the right hon. Member please explain, then, what the limits of UNCLOS are on the sovereign space—sea, land and air—around Diego Garcia, as they stand and as they are extended in the agreement?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman specifically on that issue, but I can tell him that it has been absolutely clear that whatever the UNCLOS opinion is, it is not binding on this country. We will read with interest its view, but it is not one that we are necessarily required to follow.

The existing position has safeguarded the interests of this country for a very long period, so the first question one is required to ask is: why are we changing a guaranteed security status for this country by handing over the sovereignty of Diego Garcia? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam has said, it is based on opinions that have been expressed but not ones that we are required to follow.

As the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) said, I understand that the original linkage of the Chagos islands to Mauritius that took place was regarded as a matter of administrative convenience. However, they are actually 1,250 miles apart. On that basis, when the United Kingdom agreed to the independence of Mauritius, it was separated from the Chagos islands. There was no suggestion at that time that the two should be linked and that the islands be given over to Mauritius, which, despite the linkage, had no claim and no involvement in their running.

[Alex Ballinger]

Does the right hon. Gentleman, who is my colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee, acknowledge that by opening negotiations with Mauritius, the last Government conceded that there was a point around sovereignty to be discussed and that, certainly from then onwards, it was difficult for this Government to roll back that point?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

It had already been rolled back. The hon. Gentleman is right that the last Government began discussions because Mauritius expressed a view. However, that was on the basis that a mutually beneficial arrangement could be reached. It was concluded that such an agreement could not be reached, and on that basis the last Government ceased the negotiations. It is not a question of their being rolled back; it was this Government who chose to reopen negotiations that had been closed down by the previous Government.

I come back to the international judgments. The other one cited by Ministers on the Government Front Bench early on in the discussion, when this issue was first raised, was the risk to access to electromagnetic spectrum as a result of the ITU potentially reaching a judgment that might be based on the non-binding judgment expressed by the ICJ. There is no actual evidence that it was going to do that, but it was possible that it might, and for that reason the Government expressed the view that this was important.

I would point out that the ITU has no ability to determine the use of spectrum. The Minister, in answering a written parliamentary question in February this year, made it clear that the allocation of spectrum was a matter for sovereign states. The ITU is a sort of gentleman’s club where everyone gets together to discuss these matters, but it is not able to hand over the right to the use of spectrum from one country to another. It is also worth noting that the ITU has, over the years, been subject to considerable pressure from China, which had a secretary general of the ITU. I recall from my time dealing with issues around the ITU the real concern about how the Chinese were seeking to use the ITU, so in my view it is a good thing that the ITU does not have the power to allocate spectrum.

There are also serious strategic concerns that the Government have not yet properly addressed. As has already been mentioned, an element of the agreement involves a requirement for us to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base. When the Minister gave evidence to the Committee, I pressed him on whether that would require advance notification—

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)]

indicated assent.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

He is nodding. He gave me a very firm assurance that that was not the case. That is of some reassurance, but it does not go far enough. The fact that we are no longer able to carry out actions from our own base without then having to notify Mauritius, and presumably take note of any objection it has, represents a limitation that could well affect decisions as to where to deploy assets.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

rose—

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I shall give way to my right hon. Friend, who is an expert on these matters.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

If this means that we do not have to inform Mauritius in advance of a direct armed attack from the base, presumably it means that we have to inform it as soon as possible after such an attack. If such an attack were an overt attack, Mauritius would presumably know about it already because everyone would have seen it, so this rather suggests that we might have to inform it if there had been some sort of covert attack that other people had not seen and that it would otherwise not know about. Is that a satisfactory situation?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

My right hon. Friend makes a fair point. A requirement for us to tell the Mauritians what has been happening from the base is exactly what might influence decisions as to its use for operations of the kind he describes. The Minister gave evidence to the Committee on this point just a few days, I think, after the Americans had launched their attack on Iran, which did not involve Diego Garcia. That was something I raised with the Minister.

[Stephen Doughty]

I know how seriously the right hon. Gentleman takes these issues, and it is important for the House to understand this. I can confirm what I said to him previously, but also I draw his attention to article 3(2)(b) in the treaty and to annex 1. Article 3(2)(b) sets out clearly that

“the Parties shall not undermine, prejudice or otherwise interfere with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base, and shall cooperate to that end; and…the United Kingdom shall have full responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia.”

It sets out clearly our unrestricted ability to conduct the operations, including with the United States. That is very clear; it is in the treaty, and it is important that the House understands that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I understand that that is part of the treaty, but I hope that when the Minister winds up, he will address the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) that the requirement to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius, even after an operation, presumably means that we must do so as soon as possible, and that that will presumably apply to whatever kind of operation has taken place using the base. Perhaps he could tell us whether that might compromise decisions about the use of the base.

The other aspect I raised with the Minister when he was in front of the Committee was Mauritius being a signatory of the Pelindaba treaty. The Pelindaba treaty states that signatories will not have nuclear weapons on their soil. Britain, the UK, is not a signatory of it, but, as I say, Mauritius is. Again, the Minister told the Committee that there was no way in which anything in the agreement would affect the operational use of the base, but he would not go further and comment specifically on the aspects of potentially nuclear weapons on the Diego Garcia base. That is something of real concern, and I hope the Minister might say a little more about that conflict between his assurance and Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty, which specifically says that there should not be nuclear weapons held on the sovereign territory of signatories.

I turn to the cost of the treaty to the UK. We are told that there is some disagreement about the precise figure. I have to say that even £3.5 billion seems pretty large to me, let alone £35 billion, which is universally believed on the Opposition side to be a more accurate figure. It has been suggested, nevertheless, that this is a relatively small amount of money and it is a good deal. I recall that when this was first suggested, a different Mauritian Government were in power. The Prime Minister of Mauritius at that time had signed a deal, which the current Prime Minister of Mauritius described as a terrible deal and that as soon as he was elected, he would reopen the whole discussion. It certainly appears that he was successful in doing so: the sum that has now been agreed is, the Mauritian Prime Minister has told us, considerably bigger than his predecessor had originally agreed, and this was a great success of the new Prime Minister of Mauritius that he managed to squeeze even more money out of the British Government. That does beg the question: at what point does it stop being a good deal? The impression given is that the British Government were so keen to sign up to this deal, they basically have signed away to almost any sum advanced by Mauritius. As one or two of my hon. Friends have made clear, that will be a difficult message to sell on the doorstep at a time when the Government are having to make significant savings and to raise taxes.

In particular, I am concerned—the Minister will understand why—about the impact on the Foreign Office budget, because the Foreign Office suffered the biggest cuts of any Whitehall Department in the last spending round. It is already unclear about how those savings will be met, and there is speculation that the budgets of the British Council or the World Service, or our representation in embassies around the world, will be reduced. Despite those pressures and potentially very damaging cuts to Foreign Office expenditure, the Foreign Office appears to be expected to meet part of this bill. The Minister was unable to tell the Committee how the bill would be divided up between the Foreign Office budget and the Ministry of Defence budget. Perhaps that is something else that he might say a little more about when he winds up.

I will also touch on the other aspect of the consequences of this deal: the impact on the environment, which has been referred to by one or two Members. I pay tribute to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who is, I think it fair to say, engaged in other projects at the moment. She was assiduous in raising with the Minister her concern about the treaty’s impact on an incredibly important marine environment—that is recognised around the world. She wrote to the Minister, as he will be aware, and said:

“My principal concern is that there is now no funding mechanism in place to ensure Mauritius will properly resource marine protection in the Chagos Archipelago… Without any dedicated funding mechanism…there is nothing to ensure that this protection will continue other than the on-going willingness of the Mauritian Government to allocate resource”.

As has been observed, the archipelago is 1,250 miles away from Mauritius, and we are not entirely convinced that that willingness in Mauritius, on which the Government appear to be pinning their hopes, exists.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the presence of the Chagossians in the Public Gallery. They have been very badly treated over years, and it is of concern to me that they appear to have had virtually no input in this agreement, and that there has been no consultation with them. I know that a contact group is being established in the Foreign Office, but there is some scepticism about whether it has ever met, and about how many staff will be allocated to it. Perhaps the Minister might give details in his reply. [Interruption.] I am pleased to hear him say that it met last week.

I am grateful to the Government for answering questions so far, but an awful lot remain, and the answers that I have heard have failed to convince me that this treaty is in the economic, strategic and environmental interests of this country or the Chagos islands.